FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, THE CONFERENCE OF BERLIN (THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE), 1945, VOLUME II Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Volume II The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945 United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945 (Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Volume II) Contents Preface List of Illustrations and Maps Introduction List of Abbreviations, Symbols, and Code Names List of Persons: Principal Members of Delegations List of Persons Mentioned List of Papers V. The president’s log Log of the president’s Trip to the Conference (Documents [Unnumbered document preceding Document 710 (#1)]-710) VI. Minutes and Other Records of Conference Proceedings Monday, July 16, 1945 Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)]) Truman–Churchill meeting, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)]) Tuesday, July 17, 1945 Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)]) Truman–Stalin meeting, noon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)]) Stimson–Churchill conversation, early afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)]) First plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)]) Wednesday, July 18, 1945 Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)]) First meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)]) Truman–Churchill luncheon meeting, about 1:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)]) Byrnes–Eden luncheon meeting, about 1:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)]) Truman–Stalin meeting, 3:04 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)]) Second plenary meeting, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)]) Thursday, July 19, 1945 Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)]) Second meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)]) First meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)]) Stimson–Cherwell conversation, noon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)]) Stimson–Alexander conversation, early afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)]) Third plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)]) Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)]) Mosely–Vyshinsky conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)]) Friday, July 20, 1945 Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)]) Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, 10:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)]) Byrnes–Gromyko conversation, morning (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)]) Third meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)]) Byrnes–Churchill luncheon meeting, early afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)]) Land–Leathers conversation, 3 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)]) Informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 3:45 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)]) Fourth plenary meeting, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)]) Truman–Churchill conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)]) Truman–Stalin conversation, about 6:45 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)]) Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)]) Saturday, July 21, 1945 Fourth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)]) Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12:15 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)]) Stimson–Churchill conversation, about 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)]) Fifth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)]) Tripartite dinner meeting, about 8:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)]) Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)]) Sunday, July 22, 1945 Stimson–Churchill conversation, 10:40 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)]) Fifth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)]) Truman–Churchill meeting, 12:15 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)]) Sixth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)]) First meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)]) Monday, July 23, 1945 Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)]) Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 10:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)]) Byrnes–Eden conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)]) Byrnes–Churchill conversation, morning (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)]) Sixth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)]) Morse–Weston conversation, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)]) Informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)]) Land–Leathers conversation, 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)]) Seventh plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)]) Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)]) Mosely-Gusev conversation, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)]) Tuesday, July 24, 1945 Seventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:15 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)]) Leahy-Churchill conversation, morning (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Truman and Churchill, 11:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)]) Tripartite military meeting, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)]) Byrnes–Eden–Molotov luncheon meeting; Byrnes–Molotov meeting immediately thereafter, 3:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)]) Truman–Bierut conversation, 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)]) Eighth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 5:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)]) Morse–Weston conversation, afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)]) Truman–Stalin conversation, 7:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)]) Byrnes conversation with members of the Polish Delegation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)]) Morse–Weston conversation, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)]) Second meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)]) Wednesday, July 25, 1945 Truman–Mountbatten conversation, 9:20 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)]) Truman–Stalin conversation, about 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)]) Ninth plenary meeting, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)]) Dunn–Harriman–Mikołajczyk conversation, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)]) Stimson–Stalin conversation, 12:25 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)]) Eighth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 12:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)]) Clayton–Mikolajczyk conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)]) Mosely–Strang and Mosely–Gusev conversations (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)]) Conversation concerning the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)]) Thursday, July 26, 1945 Meeting of the United States and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)]) Third meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)]) Harriman–Grabski conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)]) First meeting of the Protocol Subcommittee (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)]) Conversations among United States officials regarding war criminals, 9 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)]) Friday, July 27, 1945 Ninth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)]) Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 6 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)]) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)]) Saturday, July 28, 1945 Clayton–Mikolajczyk conversation, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)]) Truman–Attlee meeting, 9:15 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)]) Tenth plenary meeting, 10:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)]) Sunday, July 29, 1945 Truman–Molotov meeting, noon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)]) Truman–Attlee meeting, 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)]) Forrestal–Bevin conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)]) Despres–Minc conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)]) Monday, July 30, 1945 Conversation between members of the United States and Polish Delegations (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)]) Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)]) Tenth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)]) Lane–Modzelewski conversation, 6 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)]) Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)]) Byrnes–Attlee meeting [?] (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)]) Mosely–Ward and Mosely–Gusev conversations (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#145)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#145)]) Tuesday, July 31, 1945 Truman–Rowan conversation, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)]) Meeting of the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine, 10:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)]) Byrnes-Molotov conversation, morning or early afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)]) Eleventh plenary meeting, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)]) Harriman conversation with members of the Polish Delegation, afternoon or early evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)]) Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)]) Wednesday, August 1, 1945 Truman–Bierut conversation, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)]) Eleventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:25 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)]) Harriman–Mikołajczyk conversation, 12:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)]) Twelfth plenary meeting, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)]) Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)]) Thirteenth plenary meeting, 10:40 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)]) VII. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers General Questions Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers and dissolution of the European Advisory Commission (Documents 711-[Unnumbered document following Document 721 (#1)]) United Nations: Admission of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, and Spain (Documents 722-[Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)]) Possible trusteeship for Italian colonial territories and Korea (Documents 732-738) Officers of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Documents 739-743) Constitutional restraints on the President’s treaty-making powers (Documents 744-744) European Questions General European questions: Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; freedom of the press in eastern Europe (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 744 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)]) Inland waterways (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)]) Austria: Extension of the authority of the Renner government (Documents 761-[Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)]) Reparations (Documents 765-[Unnumbered document following Document 771 (#1)]) Agreements on zones of occupation and control machinery; occupation of the western zones and of Vienna; provisioning of Vienna (Documents 772-[Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)]) Alleged anti-Soviet activities (Documents 790-792) Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania Governments, control commissions, elections, conclusion of peace treaties, and diplomatic relations (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 792 (#1)]-833) Use of Allied property for reparations or war booty (Documents 834-[Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)]) Control of external assets (Documents 845-847) Germany: (Documents 879-892) Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period (Documents 848-878) Reparations, restitution, and war booty (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)]-980) External assets (Documents 981-[Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)]) Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)]) War criminals (Documents 1016-[Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)]) Soviet annexation of Königsberg and northern East Prussia (Documents 1020-[Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)]) The Rhineland and the Ruhr (Documents 1021-1027) The French zone of occupation and the French sector in Berlin (Documents 1028-1034) The “additional requirements” agreement (Documents 1035-1038) Coal and food (Documents 1039-[Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)]) Transfers of population (Documents 1053-[Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)]) Alleged anti-Soviet activities (Documents 1055-1055) German forces in Norway (Documents 1056-1058) Greece: Government and elections (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1058 (#1)]-1070) Relations with Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia (Documents 1071-1087) Italy: General policy, revision of surrender terms, and conclusion of a peace treaty (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1087 (#1)]-1093) Reparations (Documents 1094-1107) Retention of Allied forces and of a combined command in Italy (Documents 1108-1109) Admission to the United Maritime Authority (Documents 1110-1110) Proposed appointment of James H. Douglas, Jr., as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission (Documents 1111-1116) Poland: Government and elections; liquidation of the affairs of the Government-in-Exile (Documents 1117-1142) Frontiers and areas of administration (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)]-1154) Economic assistance from the United States (Documents 1155-1156) Soviet Union: General policy; sharing of information on atomic energy (Documents 1157-1157) Participation in European economic organizations (Documents 1158-1163) Repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals (Documents 1164-1168) Air traffic between the United States and the Soviet Union (Documents 1169-1174) Spain: General policy (Documents 1175-1179) United Kingdom: Lend-lease; need for Anglo-American financial discussions (Documents 1180-1186) Civil aviation policy (Documents 1187-1189) Allocation of shipping (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)]) Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery (Documents 1197-1200) Yugoslavia: Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia (Documents 1201-1205) Attitude on civil administration in Venezia Giulia (Documents 1206-1211) Far Eastern Questions China: Negotiations with the Soviet Union (Documents 1212-1222) Japan: Peace feelers through the Soviet Union (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)]) Issuance of a proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan (Documents 1236-1261) Basic military objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan (Documents 1262-[Unnumbered document following Document 1266 (#1)]) Control and command in the war against Japan (Documents 1267-1273) Relationship of the Soviet Union to the war against Japan (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)]-1282) British Commonwealth participation in the war against Japan (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)]) French and Netherland participation in the war against Japan (Documents 1288-[Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)]) Portuguese participation in the war against Japan (Documents 1295-1302) Use of atomic weapons in the war against Japan (Documents 1303-1315) Release of tankers for the war against Japan through altered distribution of European oil supplies (Documents 1316-1326) Near Eastern and African Questions Iran: Withdrawal of Allied forces (Documents 1327-[Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)]) Lebanon and Syria: The crisis in Franco-Levantine relations (Documents 1338-1343) Palestine: Jewish immigration; suggestion for Anglo-American discussions (Documents 1344-1347) Tangier: Future of the international zone; Soviet participation in the Paris conversations on Tangier (Documents 1348-[Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)]) Turkey: The Straits question; relations with the Soviet Union (Documents 1363-1378) Preparation of the Conference Communiqué (Documents 1379-1380) Final Documents Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States and the United Kingdom (Documents 1381-1381) Proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom (Documents 1382-1382) Protocol of Proceedings and Communiqué, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom: Protocol of Proceedings (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)]-1383) Communiqué (Documents 1384-1384) Appendices A. Mikołajczyk notes on a meeting of the Foreign Ministers and on Polish-American and Polish-Soviet conversations at the Berlin Conference (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)]-1394) B. French reaction to decisions of the Berlin Conference (Documents 1395-1415) C. Protocol of Proceedings and Communiqué of the Yalta Conference (Documents 1416-1417) D. Bohlen post-Conference memoranda on two Truman–Stalin meetings at the Berlin Conference (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)]-1419) E. Addenda (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)]-1433) Index List of Illustrations and Maps List of Illustrations and Maps PHOTOGRAPHS (Eight United States Army photographs taken at the Berlin Conference will be found in a group following page 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] .) Cecilienhof Palace [ Pg. [1] is part of V. The president’s log ] The three Heads of Government, July 17, 1945 [ Pg. [2] is part of V. The president’s log ] First plenary meeting, July 17, 1945 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document preceding Document 710 (#1)] ] Third plenary meeting, July 19, 1945 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, July 21, 1945 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] Meeting of the United States and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, July 26, 1945 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 710 ] Tenth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30, 1945 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] The three Heads of Government and their principal advisers, August 1, 1945 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] FACSIMILES OF DOCUMENTS Signed “top document” attached to the Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin Conference facing [ Pg. 1478 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] and Doc. 1383 ] A page from the United States original of the Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin Conference facing [ Pg. 1479 is part of Doc. 1383 ] MAPS The Japanese Armed Forces: Ground, 18 June 1945 (C. C. S. 643/3, annex to appendix B) ( in color ) facing [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] Ground Situation in China, 6 June 1945: Major U. S. Airfields Held by Japanese and Chinese (C. C. S. 893/1, appendix D) ( in color ) facing [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] Pacific Situation, 1 July 1945 (C. C. S. 893, appendix A) ( in color ) . facing [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] The Ruhr: Traffic Districts and Administrative Divisions facing [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] Consideration of the Western Frontier of Poland at the Berlin Conference facing [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] List of Abbreviations, Symbols, and Code Names List of Abbreviations, Symbols, and Code Names Editor’s Note .—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context. A, airgram AC, Allied Council; Allied Commission ACC, Allied Control Commission; Allied Control Council admin, administrative AFHQ, Allied Force Headquarters (Caserta, Italy) AFPac, United States Army Forces, Pacific AG, Aktien-Gesellschaft (stock company) AGWar, Adjutant General, War Department Amb, Ambassador Amco, name for the telephone switchboard servicing the United States Delegation at Babelsberg AmEmbassy, American Embassy AMET, Africa–Middle East Theater AMG, Allied Military Government AmLegation(s), American Legation(s) ammo, ammunition Argonaut, code name for the Yalta Conference, February 4–11, 1945 Ashcan, code name for a detention center maintained by SHAEF at Bad Mondorf, Luxembourg, for persons of the highest political and military importance ATC, Air Transport Command ATS, Auxiliary Territorial Service (United Kingdom) AUNOJ. See AVNOJ AUS, Army of the United States AusPolAd, United States Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs author, authorities AVNOJ, Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Yugoslavia BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation BD, barrels per day BG, military communications indicator BLU, British Liaison Unit BMW, Bavarian Motor Works BritEmb, British Embassy BritGovt, British Government C, military communications indicator CA, class identification for heavy cruiser CAC, Coast Artillery Corps CAD, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff Capcraft, code name for captured German vessels of small size CC, Control Council CCAC, Combined (American and British) Civil Affairs Committee CCS, Combined (American and British) Chiefs of Staff; document symbol used by the Combined Chiefs of Staff Cfb, military communications indicator CG, Commanding General Chanor, (English) Channel and Normandy CinCAFPac, Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific CNO, Chief of Naval Operations Comd, Commander Comea, communications indicator used on messages concerning the European Advisory Commission ComGenAir, Commanding General, Army Air Forces ComGenChina, Commanding General, United States Forces, China ComGenMed, Commanding General, Mediterranean ComGenMilMis, Commanding General, Military Mission CominCh, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet Comintern, (Third) Communist International ComNavEu, Commander, United States Naval Forces in Europe ComNavForGer, Commander, United States Naval Forces, Germany ComNavForGermany, Commander, United States Naval Forces, Germany ComNavGr, Commander, Naval Group ComNavGrp, Commander, Naval Group ComNavGroup, Commander, Naval Group Confmess, communications indicator used on messages to Babelsberg from the United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations, Moscow Confrep, communications indicator used on messages from Babelsberg to the United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations, Moscow Copre, communications indicator used on messages concerning the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Coronet, code name for the second phase of the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands CRAB, Combined (American and British) Resources Allocation Board C/S, Chief(s) of Staff CSAB, Combined (American and British) Shipping Adjustment Boards CWO, Chief Warrant Officer D–Day, term used to designate the unnamed day on which an operation commences or is to commence Depstel, Department’s telegram Dept, Department (usually the Department of State) Deptel(s), Department’s telegram(s) Depts, Department’s Deptstel, Department’s telegram DNI, Director of Naval Intelligence Dustbin, code name for Field Intelligence Agency, Technical (an interrogation group) EAC, European Advisory Commission EAM, National Liberation Front (Greece) ECITO, European Central Inland Transport Organization ECO, European Coal Organization EEC, Emergency Economic Committee, Europe EECE, Emergency Economic Committee, Europe EIT, European inland transport ELAS, National Popular Liberation Army (Greece) Embs, Embassy’s Embtel, Embassy’s telegram ES, Division of Economic Security Controls, Department of State ETO, European Theater of Operations ETOUSA, European Theater of Operations, United States Army EUR, Office of European Affairs, Department of State EW, European War EWT, Eastern War Time ExCom, Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations ExeCom, Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Eyes Only, communications indicator used on messages which were to receive extremely limited distribution F, document symbol used by the British Delegation to the Berlin Conference on papers relating to meetings of the Foreign Ministers Fan, military communications indicator Fat Man, an atomic bomb of the implosion type (the type dropped on Nagasaki; previously tested as an experimental device in New Mexico on July 16, 1945) FEA, Foreign Economic Administration FF, Fatherland Front (Bulgaria) FM, Field Marshal FO, Foreign Office FonMin, Foreign Minister FonOff(s), Foreign Office(s) ForMin, Foreign Minister ForOff, Foreign Office FX, military communications indicator G–2, Army general staff section dealing with intelligence at the divisional or higher level G–5, Army general or special staff section dealing with civil affairs at the divisional or higher level GmbH, Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (limited liability company) HQ, HQs, headquarters Hula, code name for the lend-lease transfer to the Soviet Union of 180 vessels to be assembled at Seattle, Washington, and Cold Bay, Alaska info, information; for information; for information to; for the information of IPCOG, Informal Policy Committee on Germany; document symbol used by that Committee I T and T, International Telephone and Telegraph Company JA, Judge Advocate JAGD, Judge Advocate General’s Department JCS, Joint (United States Army and Navy) Chiefs of Staff; document symbol used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Jcs, military communications indicator KKE, Communist Party of Greece Leg, Legation Little Boy, an atomic bomb of the gun-assembly type (not tested at the time of the Berlin Conference; the type dropped on Hiroshima) Lockup, code name for special handling of messages to the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union relating to the war against Japan L/T, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State M, military communications indicator MA, Military Attaché Mailfist, code name for the capture of Singapore Manhattan District, code name for the atomic-bomb-development project Masterwork, code name for the Berlin Conference (changed to Terminal ); name of the telephone switchboard servicing the United States Delegation at Babelsberg and of the United States area at Babelsberg Mel, communications indicator MG, military government Mik, Mikołajczyk mil, military Milepost, code name referring to stockpiling of supplies in eastern Siberia for the use of Soviet forces in the war against Japan MilID, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff MilMis, Military Mission MinForAff, Minister of (for) Foreign Affairs msg, message MWT, Ministry of War Transport (United Kingdom) mytel, my telegram Naf, military communications indicator nbr, number NDF, National Democratic Front (Rumania) NEI, Netherland East Indies Neter, communications indicator used on messages between the Department of State and the London Embassy with reference to relations with the Government of the Netherlands Niact, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night NKVD, People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Soviet Union) NL, national liberation nr, number NSDAP, National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazi Party) OANLC, Office of the Army–Navy Liquidation Commissioner OGPU, United State Political Administration (Soviet Union) Olympic, code name for the assault on Kyushu, scheduled for March 1, 1946 OPD, Operations Division, War Department General Staff OpDiv, Operations Division, War Department General Staff OpNav, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations OSS, Office of Strategic Services OWI, Office of War Information P, document symbol used by the British Delegation to the Berlin Conference on papers relating to plenary meetings para(s), paragraph(s) PAW, Petroleum Administration for War PC, Preparatory Commission of the United Nations PFC, Private First Class PGC, Persian Gulf Command pgh, paragraph PKWN, Polish Committee of National Liberation pls, please PM, Prime Minister PO, communications indicator POW(s), prisoner(s) of war PPR, Polish Labor Party PPS, Polish Socialist Party PreCo, Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Preco, communications indicator used on messages concerning the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations PriMin, Prime Minister PTT, post, telephone and telegraph PW, Pacific War PWD, Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force RCL, Reserved Commodity List R D & R, Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution Division rec’d, received reDeptel, regarding the Department of State’s telegram remytel, regarding my telegram reps, representatives reptd, repeated retels, regarding telegrams reurmemo, regarding your memorandum reurtel, regarding your telegram RM, Reichsmarks rpd, repeated rptd, repeated S–1, code name for the atomic bomb SA, National Socialist Storm Troops (Germany) SAC, Supreme Allied Commander SACMed, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean S/AE, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy Safehaven, code name for the United States program to forestall German attempts to hide assets outside Germany, particularly in European neutral countries Sam, class identification for “Samuel”-class troop carriers SC, document symbol used by the Secretary’s Staff Committee, Department of State SCAEF, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force Scaf, military communications indicator SD, communications indicator; Security Service of the National Socialist Elite Guard (Germany) SEA, Southeast Asia SEAC, Southeast Asia Command SecState, Secretary of State Sextant, code name for the Cairo Conferences, November–December 1943 Sgs, military communications indicator SHAEF, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force SM, Secretariat memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff SMR, South Manchurian Railway SovDeleg, Soviet Delegation SovGovt, Soviet Government SS, National Socialist Elite Guard (Germany) SSR, Soviet Socialist Republic Stat, United States Statutes at Large Sumoc, communications indicator SWNCC, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee; document symbol used by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee SWPA, Southwest Pacific Area TA. See Tube Alloys TASS, Telegraphic Agency of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics teles, telegrams Terminal, code name for the Berlin Conference, July 16–August 2, 1945 topsec, top secret Torch, code name for the Allied landings in North Africa TRC, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State Tube Alloys, code name for atomic energy research and development TUC, Trades Union Congress (United Kingdom) UK, United Kingdom; communications indicator UMA, United Maritime Authority UMEB, United Maritime Executive Board UNations, United Nations UnderSecNavs, Under Secretary of the Navy’s UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration urtel, your telegram USFA, United States Forces in Austria USFET, United States Forces, European Theater USGCC, United States Group, Control Council (Germany) USPolAd, United States Political Adviser V. See Victory V–1, Vergeltungswaffe –1 (a German weapon guided by an automatic pilot first used against England in June 1944) V–2, Vergeltungswaffe Zwei (a German weapon guided by an automatic pilot first used against England in September 1944) V–E Day, the day of Allied victory in Europe Victory, communications indicator used on outgoing messages from the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference (a Victory – in number was also assigned to incoming messages) V–J Day, the day of Japanese capitulation VLR, very long range W, communications indicator WAC, Women’s Army Corps War, military communications indicator WarCOS, Chief of Staff, United States Army WarOpDiv, Operations Division, War Department General Staff WSA, War Shipping Administration Wsa, communications indicator used on messages of the War Shipping Administration Y, code name for the atomic bomb Z, time indicator (the four digits immediately preceding the indicator give the hour at which the message in question was sent, expressed in “Zebra” time, i. e., Greenwich Civil Time—e.g.,231350Z represents 1350 hours, or 1:50 p.m., Greenwich Civil Time, on the 23d day of an unspecified month) Zecho, Czechoslovakia Zipper, code name for operations for the establishment of a bridgehead in the Port Swettenham–Port Dickson area preparatory to an advance southward on Singapore List of Persons: List of Persons: Principal Members of Delegations UNITED STATES 1 The President: Harry S. Truman The Secretary of State: James F. Byrnes Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy Joseph E. Davies, Special Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley, Special Ambassador Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet General of the Army Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State Ben Cohen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, Department of State Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary [of State] (together with political, military and technical advisers). [ Editor’s Note. —The advisers referred to who are known to have been present during international meetings and discussions at the Conference are: George V. Allen, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State. Abram Bergson, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Director, Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration, and Joint Executive Officer, Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards. Walter J. Brown, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Harvey H. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War. Cavendish W. Cannon, First Secretary, American Embassy, Lisbon. Lieutenant Joseph Chase, U. S. N. R., Assistant Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Moscow. Emilio G. Collado, Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State. Vice Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Major General John R. Deane, U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union. Emile Despres, Adviser on German Economic Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Rear Admiral Howard A. Flanigan, U. S. N., member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Wilder Foote, Assistant to the Secretary of State. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy. Rear Admiral Matthias B. Gardner, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Major General Charles P. Gross, U. S. A., member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Lieutenant General John E. Hull, U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff. Arthur Bliss Lane, Appointed Ambassador to Poland. Isador Lubin, Associate United States Representative, Allied Commission on Reparations. Rear Admiral Houston L. Maples, U. S. N., Senior Naval Officer, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union, and Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Moscow. J. Howard Marshall, General Counsel, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War. Captain Alexander S. McDill, U. S. N., Aide to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Brigadier General Andrew J. McFarland. U. S. A., Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and United States Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Captain Charles J. Moore, U. S. N., Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Huntington T. Morse, Assistant to the Administrator, War Shipping Administration. Philip E. Mosely, Political Adviser to the United States Representative, European Advisory Commission. Major General Lauris Norstad, U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, Headquarters, Army Air Forces. Captain Henry R. Oster, U. S. N., Deputy Director of Logistic Plans, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Edward Page, Jr., First Secretary, American Embassy, Moscow. J. R. Parten, Chief of Staff, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. R. Borden Reams, Information Officer, Office of the Secretary of State. James W. Riddleberger, Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State. Donald Russell, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Second Secretary (First Secretary from July 23), American Embassy, London. Charles W. Yost, Executive Secretary, Central Secretariat, Department of State; Secretary General of the United States Delegation. ] UNITED KINGDOM 2 The Prime Minister: Mr. Winston S. Churchill, M. P. Mr. C. R. Attlee, M. P. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Mr. Anthony Eden, M. P. Mr. Ernest Bevin, M. P. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow Sir Walter Monckton, Head of the U. K. Delegation to Moscow Reparations Commission Sir William Strang, Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, British Zone in Germany Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the Cabinet Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington and other advisers. [ Editor’s Note. —The advisers referred to who are known to have been present during international meetings and discussions at the Conference are: Denis Allen, First Secretary, Northern Department, Foreign Office. Major Arthur Birse, Second Secretary and Translator, British Embassy, Moscow. Hon. T. H. Brand, Chairman, Supplies for Liberated Areas Committee, Ministry of Production. Norman Brook, Additional Secretary to the Cabinet. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General. Brigadier Arthur Thomas Cornwall-Jones, British Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff. J. E. Coulson, Acting Head, Economic Relations Department, Foreign Office. Patrick Dean, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign Office. Brigadier C. G. B. Greaves, Director of Personnel Movement, War Office. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Haddon, Imperial General Staff. Geoffrey Wedgwood Harrison, First Secretary, German Department, Foreign Office. William Hayter, Acting Counsellor, Southern Department, Foreign Office; Secretary General of the British Delegation . Major-General Leslie Hollis, Senior Assistant Secretary, Office of the War Cabinet. Major-General Noel Galway Holmes, Deputy Quartermaster-General (Movements), War Office. Gladwyn Jebb, Head, Reconstruction Department, Foreign Office. Major-General Robert Edward Laycock, Chief of Combined Operations. Major Hugh Lunghi, British military interpreter. Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Macready, Head of the Army Delegation, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington. Lieutenant-Colonel G. Mallaby, Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Rear Admiral E. D. B. McCarthy, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff. Frederick Hoyer Millar, Head, Western Department, Foreign Office. Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Germany. Lord Moran, Personal Physician to the Prime Minister. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. Edward Max Nicholson, Head, Allocation of Tonnage Division, Ministry of War Transport. B. F. Picknett, Ministry of War Transport. Leslie Rowan, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister. Sir Robert Sinclair, Chief Executive, Ministry of Production. Major Louis Marguarde Theakstone, Interpreter to the Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Commander C. R. Thompson, Personal Assistant to the Minister of Defence. Mark Turner, Principal Assistant Secretary, Economic Advisory Branch, Foreign Office, detailed to the British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Sir David Waley, Under-Secretary, Treasury, detailed to the British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. J. G. Ward, Acting First Secretary, Reconstruction Department, Foreign Office. W. G. Weston, Ministry of War Transport.] SOVIET UNION 3 The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars: J. V. Stalin People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs: V. M. Molotov Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov, People’s Commissar, the Naval Fleet of the U. S. S. R. Army General A. I. Antonov, Chief of Staff of the Red Army A. Ya. Vyshinski, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs S. I. Kavtaradze, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs I. M. Maisky, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Admiral S. G. Kucherov, Chief of Staff of the Naval Fleet F. T. Gusev, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Great Britain A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in the United States of America K. V. Novikov, Member of the Collegium of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Director of the Second European Division S. K. Tsarapkin, Member of the Collegium of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Director of the United States Division S. P. Kozyrev, Director of the First European Division, Commissariat for Foreign Affairs A. A. Lavrishchev, Director of the Division of Balkan Countries, Commissariat for Foreign Affairs A. A. Sobolev, Chief of the Political Section of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany M. Z. Saburov, Assistant to the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany S. A. Golunsky, Expert Consultant of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and also political, military, and technical assistants. [ Editor’s Note. —The assistants referred to who are known to have been present during international meetings and discussions at the Conference are: Amazasp Avakimovich Arutyunyan, Assistant Director, Economics Division, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Lavrenty Pavlovich Beriya, Deputy Chairman, Council of People’s Commissars, and People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs. Major Nikolay Vasilyevich Evsekov, military interpreter. Marshal of Aviation Fedor Yakovlevich Falaleyev, Chief of the Air General Staff. Vladimir Sergeyevich Gerashchenko, Economic Specialist, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Mikhail Grigoryevich Gribanov, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Anatoly Iosifovich Lavrentyev, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. Vladimir Nikolayevich Pavlov, Personal Secretary and Interpreter to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars. Mikhail Mikhailovich Potrubach, First Secretary, Second Class, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Vladimir Semenovich Semenov, Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. Lieutenant General Nikolay Vasilyevich Slavin, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Soviet Army. Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Chief, Soviet Military Administration in Germany, and Commander in Chief, Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany.] POLAND 4 Bolesław Bierut, President of the National Council of the Homeland Stanisław Grabski, Vice President of the National Council of the Homeland Edward Boleslaw Osóbka-Morawski, Prime Minister Władysław Gomułka, Deputy Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Wincenty Rzymowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hilary Minc, Minister of Industry Marshal Michał Rola-Żymierski, Minister of National Defense Zygmunt Modzelewski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Tadeusz Żebrowski, Acting Director, Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ludwik Rajchman, Appointed Delegate to the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and Chairman, Supply and Reconstruction Mission to North America List of Persons Mentioned Editor’s Note .—The identification of the persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions under reference in the papers printed in this volume, and is for the year 1945 unless otherwise indicated. Unless there is indication to the contrary, titles and positions given are those held in or for the United States Government. Authors, journalists, and composers are not included in this list unless they are mentioned in the papers printed in some other capacity. Persons whose names are preceded by an asterisk were present at Berlin or Babelsberg at some time during the course of the Berlin Conference. In this list, names with diacritical marks (e. g., ö and š ) are alphabetized as if they were English names with no diacritical marks, rather than in the position which they would occupy if alphabetized in their original language. Likewise transliterations (e. g., Kh for the Russian X ) are alphabetized in English letter order. Abderhalden , Emil, Institute of Physics and Chemistry, Halle, Germany. * Abiba , Chief Steward Sotero, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. * Abramovitz , Moses, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Abyssinia , The Emperor of. See Haile Selassie. Acheson , Dean, Under Secretary of State (from August 16). * Adams , Francis W. H., United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Adcock , Brigadier General Clarence L., U. S. A., Chief, Civil Affairs Division, United States Forces, European Theater. Alba de Tormes , The Duke of, Spanish Ambassador to the United Kingdom. Alexander (Aleksandar) I, King of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 1921–1929; King of Yugoslavia, 1929–1934. * Alexander , Field Marshal Sir Harold, (British) Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. * Allen , Denis, First Secretary, Northern Department, British Foreign Office. * Allen , George V., Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State. Alling , Paul H., Consul General and Diplomatic Agent, Tangier. Anami , General Korehita, Japanese Minister of Army. Anders , Lieutenant General Władysław, Commander in Chief, Polish Second Corps, in Italy. Anderson , Sir John, British Chancellor of the Exchequer (to July 28). Angell , James W., United States Delegate, Paris Conference on Reparation. * Anheier , Harry D., Supervising Agent, Washington District, United States Secret Service. * Antonov , Army General Alexey Innokentyevich, Chief of Staff, Soviet Army. Arciszewski , Tomasz, Prime Minister in the Polish Government-in-Exile at London. Ardalan , Naser Qoli, Deputy in the Iranian Majlis. Ardenne , Baron Manfred of, German electronic physicist; director of a private experimental laboratory at Berlin. Armour , Norman, Ambassador to Spain. * Arnold , General of the Army Henry H., U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Air Forces. Arutiunian . See Arutyunyan. Arutunian . See Arutyunyan. * Arutyunyan , Amazasp Avakimovich, Assistant Director, Economics Division, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. * Attlee , Clement R., Chairman, British Parliamentary Labour Party; also (from July 26) Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury. Ayers , Eben A., Information Officer, The White House. Badoglio , Marshal Pietro, Italian Prime Minister, 1943–1944. Bainbridge , Kenneth T., Consultant, Manhattan District project. Balfour , Arthur James, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1916–1919. Balfour , John, British Minister, Washington. Balogh , Rev. István, Adviser to the Hungarian Prime Minister. Barbour , Walworth, Division of Southern European Affairs, Department of State. Barnard , Thurman L., Executive Director, Overseas Branch, Office of War Information. Barnes , Maynard B., United States Representative in Bulgaria. * Barry , Frank M., United States Secret Service. Baruch , Herman B., Ambassador to Portugal. Batt , William L., Vice Chairman (International Supply), War Production Board. * Bautista , Chief Steward Cayetano, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. * Beatty , Morgan, representative of the combined radio networks in the press, radio, and photographers’ pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference. * Behn , Gerald A., United States Secret Service. * Belknap , Chief Photographer’s Mate William, Jr., U. S. N., an official photographer for the Berlin Conference. Bell , John O., Divisional Assistant, Aviation Division, Department of State. Bellinger , Vice Admiral Patrick N. L., U. S. N., Commander, Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet. * Belot , Colonel Monti L., U. S. A., Commanding Officer, 178th General Hospital, Reims, France. Beneš , Edvard, President of Czechoslovakia. Berger , Edwin, Chief Engineer, Schott plant, Jena, Germany. * Bergson , Abram, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Beria . See Beriya. * Beriya , Lavrenty Pavlovich, Deputy Chairman, Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union; People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs. Bernadotte , Prince Carl (Junior), nephew of the King of Sweden. Bernadotte , Prince Carl (Senior), President, Swedish Red Cross; brother of the King of Sweden. * Betts , Brigadier General Edward C., U. S. A., Judge Advocate, European Theater. * Bevin , Ernest, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (from July 28). Bewilogua , Ludwig, Director, Low Temperature Physics Section, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics, Berlin. Bianchi , João Antonio de, Portuguese Ambassador to the United States. Bidault , Georges, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government of the French Republic. * Bierut , Boleslaw, President of the National Council of the Homeland in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. * Birse , Major Arthur, Second Secretary and Translator, British Embassy, Moscow. Biryusov . See Biryuzov. Biryuzov , Colonel General Sergey Semenovich, (Soviet) Deputy Chairman, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria. Bismarck , The Prince of, Chancellor of the German Empire, 1871–1890. * Bissell , Richard M., Jr., Director, Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration; Joint Executive Officer, Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards. * Blair , Lieutenant Colonel James A., U. S. A., a breakfast guest of the President at Babelsberg. Blaisdell , Thomas C., Jr., Chief, Mission for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, London. Bland , Sir Nevile, British Ambassador to the Netherlands. Blondin , Charles (Jean-Francois Gravelet ), French acrobat who crossed over Niagara Falls on a tight-rope on four occasions, 1859–1860. Bobrovi , Colonel, an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). * Bogomolov , Alexander Efremovich, Soviet Ambassador to France. * Bohlen , Charles E., Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1944–1946; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1946–1947, 1959– * Bolton , Captain Patrick, Private Secretary to the British Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Bonaparte , General Napoléon, Commander of the French expedition against Egypt, 1798–1799; (as Napoléon I) Emperor of the French, 1804–1814, 1815. Bonbright , James C. H., Assistant Chief, Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State. Bonnet , Henri, French Ambassador to the United States. Booth , Brigadier General Donald P., U. S. A., Commanding General, Persian Gulf Command. * Boring , Floyd M., United States Secret Service. Boris III, King of Bulgaria, 1918–1943. * Borrelli , Staff Sergeant Joe, U. S. A., band conductor at a dinner given by the President at Babelsberg. Boucher , Major-General Charles Hamilton, Commander, British Forces in Northern Greece. * Bowen , Colonel John W., U. S. A., Map Room Officer, White House Map Room. Bowker , Reginald James, British Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Spain. * Bradley , Corporal Alma, U. S. A., Telephone Operator, Amco switchboard. * Bradley , General Omar N., U. S. A., Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group. * Brand , Hon. T. H., Chairman, Supplies for Liberated Areas Committee, British Ministry of Production. Bratianu , Constantin (Dinu), President, Rumanian Liberal Party. * Bridges , Sir Edward, Secretary of the British Cabinet. Broad , Philip, Acting Counsellor, Office of the British Minister Resident, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta. * Brook , Norman, Additional Secretary to the British Cabinet. * Brooke , Field Marshal Sir Alan, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff. Brossin de Saint-Didier , Major General Auguste, Chief, French Military Mission, Washington. * Brown , John Nicholas, Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Brown , Walter J., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Broz Tito . See Tito. Brunk , P. A., Secretary, London Branch, United Maritime Executive Board. * Buhrman , Parker W., Political Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). Bulgaria , The King of. See Boris III. Bullard , Sir Reader, British Ambassador to Persia (Iran). * Bundy , Harvey H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of War. Burch , Harold A., Trade and Commerce Analyst, Office of Economics and Statistics, War Shipping Administration. Buriusoff . See Biryuzov. Bush , Vannevar, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development; Chairman, Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, Joint Chiefs of Staff. * Byrnes , James F., Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (to April 2); Secretary of State (from July 3). * Cabell , Brigadier General Charles P., U. S. A., member of the Joint Staff Planners, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Staff Planners, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Caccia , Harold, British Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Greece. * Cadogan , Hon. Sir Alexander, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office. * Caffery , Jefferson, Ambassador to France. * Caldwell , Chief Warrant Officer Horace K., U. S. A., White House Signal Corps Detachment. * Calinao , Chief Steward Federico, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. Campbell , Captain Sir Harold, Equerry in Waiting to King George VI. Campbell , Sir Ronald H., British Ambassador to Portugal. Campbell , Sir Ronald I., British Representative, European Advisory Commission. * Campion , John E., United States Secret Service. * Canfil , Fred E., United States Secret Service. * Canin , Private First Class Stuart, U. S. A., violinist at a dinner given by the President at Babelsberg. * Cannon , Cavendish W., First Secretary, American Embassy, Lisbon. Cárdenas , Juan Francisco de, Spanish Ambassador to the United States. Carnwath , Joseph W., United States Representative, London Branch, United Maritime Executive Board. Carra de Vaux de Saint-Cyr , Christian, French Delegate in Sweden. Carvalhaes , Colonel Augusto de, Chief of Protocol, Portuguese Ministry of War. * Cary , Colonel John B., U. S. A., Deputy Chief (Air), Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff. Castillo y Campos , Cristobal del, Under Secretary, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Catroux , General of the Army Georges, French Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Chamberlain , Neville, British Prime Minister, 1937–1940. Chaney , Major General James E., U. S. A., member of a military mission to Portugal, 1944. Chanler , Colonel William Charles, U. S. A., Acting Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff. Charles , Archduke of Austria, brother of the Archduke Otto. Charles , Sir Noel, Bart., British High Commissioner to Italy. * Chase , Lieutenant Joseph, U. S. N. R., Assistant Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Moscow. Cherrière , Brigadier General Paul-Raymond-Philippe, French Member, Allied Control Commission for Austria. * Cherwell , Lord, British Paymaster-General. Cheschmedjieff . See Cheshmedzhev. Cheshmeddieff . See Cheshmedzhev. Cheshmedjieff . See Cheshmedzhev. Cheshmedzhev , Grigor, Bulgarian Minister of Social Policy. Chesmedjiev . See Cheshmedzhev. Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the National Government of the Republic of China; Supreme Commander, China Theater. Childs , J. Rives, United States Representative, Paris Conversations Concerning Tangier. * Churchill , Junior Commander Mary, daughter of the British Prime Minister. * Churchill , Winston S., British Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury, and Minister of Defence (to July 26). Citrine , Sir Walter, General Secretary, British Trades Union Congress. Clark , General Mark W., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Forces in Austria. Clark Kerr . See Kerr. * Clay , Lieutenant General Lucius DuB., U. S. A., Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany. * Clayton , William L., Assistant Secretary of State (for Economic Affairs). * Cochrane , Admiral Edward L., U. S. N., Chief, Bureau of Ships, Navy Department. * Cohen , Benjamin V., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. * Coleman , Major Lawrence A., U. S. A., Office of the Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. * Collado , Emilio G., Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State. Conant , James B., Chairman, National Defense Research Committee. * Connor , Cassie, Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State. Conway , Captain Granville, United States Merchant Marine, Acting Administrator, War Shipping Administration. * Cooke , Vice Admiral Charles M., Jr., U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Cooper , Alfred Duff, British Ambassador to France. * Cornwall-Jones , Brigadier Arthur Thomas, British Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Costov . See Kostov. Coulondre , Robert, French Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1936–1938; Ambassador to Germany, 1938–1939. * Coulson , J. E., Acting Head, Economic Relations Department, British Foreign Office. Craig , Major General Howard A., U. S. A., Chief, Theater Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff. Crane , Major General John A., U. S. A., United States Representative, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria. Cripps , Sir Stafford, British President of the Board of Trade (from July 28). Cromie , Leonard J., Third Secretary, American Embassy, Athens. Crowley , Leo T., Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration. Ćuckov , Mane, Minister of State for Macedonia in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. Culbertson , Paul T., Chief, Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State. * Cunningham , Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew, Bart., (British) Naval Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean, 1942–October 1943; British First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, October 1943–1946. Curzon of Kedleston, Marquess, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1919–1924. * Custodio , Chief Steward Amando, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. * Cutler , Brigadier General Stuart, U. S. A., Commanding General, Berlin Headquarters District. * Cutter , Colonel R. Ammi, U. S. A., Assistant Executive Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Dalton , Hugh, British Chancellor of the Exchequer (from July 28). Dalton , Neil, Director, Domestic Branch, Office of War Information. Damaskinos , Archbishop of Greece; Regent of Greece. * Davies , Joseph E., Chairman, The President’s War Relief Control Board. Davies , Ralph K., Deputy Administrator, Petroleum Administration for War. Davis , Elmer, Director, Office of War Information. * Dean , Colonel Fred M., U. S. A., Executive Assistant to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. * Dean , Patrick, Assistant Legal Adviser, British Foreign Office. * Deane , Major General John R., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union. Debye , Peter Joseph William, Director, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics, Berlin, 1935–1939. De Gasperi , Alcide, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. de Gaulle , General Charles, President of the Council of Ministers in the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Dekanozov , Vladimir Georgyevich, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Dempster , Ernest J., United States Delegation, Paris Conversations Concerning Tangier. Denny , Brigadier, British officer in Italy (not otherwise identified). Derzhanski . See Durzhansky. * Despres , Emile, Adviser on German Economic Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Devlin , Captain Jones F., Jr., Director, Division of Vessels, Operations, War Shipping Administration. de Wilde , John C., Assistant Adviser on German Economic Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Dhimakis , Ilias, Slavo-Macedonian Communist guerrilla leader. Diamantopoulos , Cimon P., Greek Ambassador to the United States. * Dixon , Pierson, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, British Foreign Office. Doenitz . See Dönitz. Dönitz , Grand Admiral Karl, Commander in Chief, German Navy (to May 1); assumed the positions of Chief of State ( Staatsoberhaupt ) and Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces, May 1. * Donnelly , Colonel Charles H., U. S. A., Secretary, Joint Staff Planners and Joint Logistics Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff; United States Secretary, Combined Staff Planners and Combined Administrative Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. * Dooman , Eugene H., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs. * Douglas , Elsie L., Secretary to the Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Douglas , Colonel James H., Jr., U. S. A., Chief of Staff, Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces. Dragoicheva , Tsola, Secretary General, Bulgarian National Committee of the Fatherland Front. Draper , Brigadier General William H., Jr., U. S. A., Chief, Economic Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Drescher , George C., United States Secret Service. Drożniak , Edward, Director, Polish National Bank. * DuBois , Josiah E., Jr., United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Dunn , James Clement, Assistant Secretary of State (for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs); Chairman, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee. Durbrow , Elbridge, Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State. Durzhansky , Angel, Bulgarian Minister of Communications. Eareckson , Colonel William O., U. S. A., Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico. * Echols , Major General Oliver P., U. S. A., Deputy Commanding General, Office of Military Government for Germany, European Theater. * Edelstein , Lieutenant Julius C., U. S. N. R., Aide to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. * Eden , Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (to July 28); Chairman, Committee on German Dismemberment (established by the Yalta Conference). Edgcumbe , Major-General Oliver Pearce, British Commissioner, Allied Control Commission for Hungary. * Eisenhower , General of the Army Dwight D., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater; Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany; also (to July 14) Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. * Elbrick , C. Burke, First Secretary, American Embassy, Warsaw (en route to his post). * Elsey , Lieutenant George M., U. S. N. R., Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President. Erhardt , John G., Political Adviser on Austrian Affairs to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater. * Esposito , Brigadier General Vincent J., U. S. A., Chief, Logistics Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; member of the Joint Logistics Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Administrative Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. * Estrada , Chief Steward Pio, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. Ethiopia , The Emperor of. See Haile Selassie. Evatt , Herbert, Australian Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs. * Evsekov , Major Nikolay Vasilyevich, Soviet military interpreter. * Fahy , Charles, Legal Adviser, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Falaleyev , Marshal of Aviation Fedor Yakovlevich, Chief, Soviet Air Staff. Fallalev . See Falaleyev. Farrell , Brigadier General Thomas F., U. S. A., Deputy Commanding General, Manhattan District project. Felix , Archduke of Austria, brother of the Archduke Otto. Fetter , Frank W., Chief, Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property Affairs, Department of State. Fitch , Vice Admiral Aubrey W., U. S. N., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). * Fite , Katherine B., Assistant to the Legal Adviser, Department of State, detailed to the Office of the Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. * Flanigan , Rear Admiral Howard A., U. S. N., member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. * Fleener , Ensign Cecil M., U. S. N. R., Administrative Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President. Fletcher , Otto F., Economic Analyst, Special Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration, detailed to the Division of Economic Security Controls, Department of State. * Floresca , Chief Cook Mariano, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. * Fogelson , Colonel Elijah E., U. S. A., Adviser on Organization and Production, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Foote , Wilder, Assistant to the Secretary of State. * Forrestal , James, Secretary of the Navy. Foskett , Captain James H., U. S. N., Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Augusta . Fraleigh , William N., Second Secretary, American Embassy, Belgrade. Franco y Bahamonde , Generalissimo Francisco, Chief of State and President of the Spanish Government. Frank , Hans, (German) Governor General of Poland. Freeman , Commander Charles L., U. S. N., Executive Officer, U. S. S. Augusta. Frick , Wilhelm, (German) Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. Frith , Brigadier E. H. C., Commander, 26th British Liaison Unit, in Italy. Galounsky . See Golunsky. Galunski . See Golunsky. Ganev , Venelin Yordanov, Senior Regent in Bulgaria. * Gardner , Rear Admiral Matthias B., U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Garran , Isham Peter, Second Secretary, Western Department, British Foreign Office. Gates , Artemus L., Under Secretary of the Navy. * Gentle , Major James C., U. S. A., Economic Officer, Civil Affairs Division, United States Forces, European Theater. George II, King of the Hellenes. George VI, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. George , W. Perry, Assistant Chief, Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State (to April 9); Counselor, American Embassy, London (from April 9). George , Walter F., United States Senator from Georgia. Georgiev , Kimon, Bulgarian Prime Minister, 1934–1935, 1944–1946. Geraschenko . See Gerashchenko. * Gerashchenko , Vladimir Sergeyevich, Economic Specialist, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Gerbrandy , Pieter Sjoerd, Netherland Prime Minister (to June 23). Gereschenko . See Gerashchenko. * Gerhardt , Colonel Harrison A., U. S. A., Executive Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War; Acting Secretary, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee. Gerig , O. Benjamin, Alternate United States Delegate, Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. * Gill , Colonel Robert J., U. S. A., Executive Officer, Office of the Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. * Gilliam , Wilson A., United States Secret Service. Gilpatric , Donald S., Chief, War Areas Economic Division, Department of State. * Goberidge , maître d’hôtel at the Cecilienhof Palace (not otherwise identified). Goebbels , Joseph, German Minister for Public Enlightenment. Goering . See Göring. Golikov , Colonel General Filipp Ivanovich, Chief, Cadres Administration, People’s Commissariat for War of the Soviet Union; Commissioner for the Repatriation of Prisoners of War. Golunko . See Golunsky. Golunski . See Golunsky. * Golunsky , Sergey Alexandrovich, Expert Consultant, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. * Gomułka , Władysław, Deputy Prime Minister in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Gorduysus , Muzaffer Kamil, Turkish Consul, Komotiní, Greece. * Gorham , John T., United States Secret Service. Göring , Reich Marshal Hermann, German Minister for Aviation. Gorlinski . See Gorlinsky. * Gorlinsky , Major General Nikolay Dmitriyevich, Assistant to the First Assistant People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union. Goroshenko . See Gerashchenko. Gotsi , nom de guerre of Ilias Dhimakis, q. v. Gousev . See Gusev. Goussev . See Gusev. * Grabski , Stanisław, Vice President of the National Council of the Homeland in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. * Graham , Captain Frank H., U. S. A., White House Signal Corps Detachment. * Graham , Lieutenant Colonel Wallace H., U. S. A., 24th Evacuation Hospital, Bremen, Germany. Grässli , Max, Swiss Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in the United States. Great Britain and Northern Ireland , The King of the United Kingdom of. See George VI. * Greaves , Brigadier C. G. B., Director of Personnel Movement, British War Office. Greece , The King of. See George II. Greenwood , Arthur, British Lord Privy Seal (from July 28). * Greer , Major DeWitt, U. S. A., Officer in Charge, White House Signal Corps Detachment. Gregoriev . See Gregoryev. Gregoryev , Colonel B., (Soviet) Political Adviser, Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Grew , Joseph C., Acting Secretary of State. * Gribanov , Mikhail Grigoryevich, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Grol , Milan, Deputy Prime Minister in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. * Gromyko , Andrey Andreyevich, Soviet Ambassador to the United States; Soviet Delegate, United Nations Conference on International Organization. * Gross , Major General Charles P., U. S. A., member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Groves , Major General Leslie R., U. S. A., Commanding General, Manhattan District project. Groza , Petru, Rumanian Prime Minister. Gruenther , Major General Alfred M., U. S. A., Deputy Commander, United States Forces in Austria. Gryzlov , Lieutenant General Anatoly Alexeyevich, Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Soviet Army. * Gulick , Luther H., Adviser on Administration and Political Science, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Gusev , Fedor Tarasovich, Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Soviet Representative, European Advisory Commission; Soviet Representative, Committee on German Dismemberment (established by the Yalta Conference). Gustaf V, King of Sweden. * Haddon , Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas, British Imperial General Staff. Haile Selassie , Emperor of Ethiopia. Halifax , The Earl of, British Ambassador to the United States. Halsey , Admiral William F., U. S. N., Commander, United States Third Fleet. * Haman , Walter A., United States Secret Service. Handy , General Thomas T., U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army. Hankey , Hon. Robert M. A., British Chargé d’Affaires in Poland. * Harriman , W. Averell, Ambassador to the Soviet Union; United States Representative, Commission on the Polish Question (established by the Yalta Conference). Harris , David, Assistant Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State. * Harrison , Geoffrey Wedgwood, First Secretary, German Department, British Foreign Office. Harrison , George L., Special Consultant to the Secretary of War; Acting Chairman, Interim Committee (on atomic energy). Harrison , Leland, Minister to Switzerland. Harvey , Oliver, Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office. Hawkins , Harry, Counselor for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, London (with rank of Minister). * Hayes , Major Jesse, U. S. A., pilot of the Secretary of State’s plane. * Hayter , William, Acting Counsellor, Southern Department, British Foreign Office; Secretary General, British Delegation to the Berlin Conference. * Heath , Donald R., Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). Hebrang , Andrija, Minister of Industry in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. Heisenberg , Werner, Director, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics, Berlin. Hellenes , The King of the. See George II. Helmbold , Gerald H., Assistant Deputy Administrator for Ship Operations, War Shipping Administration. Henderson , Loy W., Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State. Hertz , Gustav, Chief, Research Laboratories, Siemens und Halske AG. Hess , Rudolf, German Minister Without Portfolio and Representative ( Stellvertreter ) of Hitler (to 1941). Hickerson , John D., Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State; also (July 7–August 7) Acting Director, Office of European Affairs, and Acting Chairman, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee. Hildred , Sir William, Director General of Civil Aviation, British Ministry of Civil Aviation. * Hilldring , Major General John H., U. S. A., Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff. Himmler , Heinrich, Chief of the German Police; Leader of the National Socialist Elite Guard. * Hipsley , Elmer R., United States Secret Service. Hirohito , Emperor of Japan. Hiss , Alger, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State (to March 18); Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State (from March 19). Hitler , Adolf, Führer , Chancellor of the German Reich, and Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces (to April 30). * Hoag , Brigadier General Earl S., U. S. A., Commanding General, European Division, Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces. Hodgson , Brigadier D. E. P., Head, British Military Mission to Albania. * Hollis , Major-General Leslie, Senior Assistant Secretary, Office of the British War Cabinet. Holman , Adrian, British Minister, Paris. * Holmes , Major-General Noel Galway, Deputy Quartermaster-General (Movements), British War Office. * Holmes , Robert E., United States Secret Service. Hood , Viscount, Reconstruction Department, British Foreign Office. Hopkins , Harry L., Adviser and Assistant to the President. Horn , Edhard, Chief Engineer, Horn plant, Plauen, Germany. Hornbeck , Stanley K., Ambassador to the Netherlands. Horne , Vice Admiral Frederick J., U. S. N., Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 1942–1946; also Chairman, Army–Navy Petroleum Board, 1943–1945. Houstoun-Boswall , W. E., British Political Representative in Bulgaria. Hoxha , Colonel General Enver, Prime Minister in the Provisional Government of Albania. Hoyer Millar . See Millar. * Hoying , Ship’s Clerk Edwin L., U. S. N. R., Administrative Officer, White House Map Room. Hubbard , Charles J., Consultant, Manhattan District project. Hull , Cordell, Secretary of State, 1933–1944. * Hull , Lieutenant General John E., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff. Hume , Major General Edgar E., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, Allied Military Government, Headquarters, Fifth Army. Hunt , Colonel Irvin L., U. S. A., Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918–1920. Hurley , Major General Patrick J., U. S. A., Ambassador to China. Ickes , Harold L., Administrator, Petroleum Administration for War. Iran , The Shah-in-shah of. See Pahlevi. * Ismay , General Sir Hastings, Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence. Ivanov , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). * Jackson , Robert H., Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality; United States Representative, International Conference on Military Trials. Jacobs , Joseph E., Chief of Mission in Albania. * Jamison , Brigadier General Glen C., U. S. A., Chief, Logistics Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, Army Air Forces. Japan , The Emperor of. See Hirohito. * Jebb , Gladwyn, Head, Reconstruction Department, British Foreign Office. Jerram , Cecil Bertram, British Minister to Sweden. * Johnson , George H., United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Johnson , Herschel V., Minister to Sweden. Jovanović , Lieutenant General Arso R., Chief of Staff, Yugoslav Army. Jowitt , Sir William, British Lord Chancellor (from July 28). Juin , General Alphonse-Pierre, Chief, French General Staff of National Defense. Kaltenbrunner , Ernst, Chief, German Security Police. Kardelj , Edvard, Second Vice President in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. * Kauffman , Richard G., United States Secret Service. Kausurev . See Kozyrev. * Kavtaradze , Sergey Ivanovich, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. * Kearney , William T., United States Secret Service. Keenlyside , F. H., Assistant Secretary, British Ministry of War Transport. Keitel , Field Marshal Wilhelm, Chief, German Armed Forces High Command. * Keith , Gerald, Counselor, American Embassy, Warsaw (en route to his post). * Kellerman , Roy H., United States Secret Service. Kennan , George F., Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in the Soviet Union. * Kerr , Sir Archibald Clark, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union; British Representative, Commission on the Polish Question (established by the Yalta Conference). Kessler , Brigadier General Alfred A., Jr., U. S. A., Military Attaché and Military Air Attaché, American Embassy, Stockholm. Key , Major General William S., U. S. A., Chief, United States Section, Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Keyser , Manager, Siemens–Halske plant, Gera, Germany (not otherwise identified). Khudyakov , Marshal of Aviation Sergey Vladimirovich, Deputy Chief, Soviet Air Staff. Khydyakov . See Khudyakov. Kilgore , Harley M., United States Senator from West Virginia. Kilpatrick , Brigadier General John R., U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Port of Embarkation, Newport News, Virginia. Kindleberger , Major Charles P., U. S. A., Washington Liaison Office, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. King , Alfred Hazell, British Acting Consul General, Salonika. * King , Fleet Admiral Ernest J., U. S. N., Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. Kirk , Alexander, Ambassador to Italy. Kiselev , Evgeny Dmitriyevich, Soviet Political Adviser, Vienna. Kissilev . See Kiselev. Kistiakowsky , George B., Consultant, Manhattan District project. Kleffens , Eelco N. van, Netherland Minister of Foreign Affairs. Klieforth , A. W., Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Czechoslovakia. * Koeltz , Lieutenant General Louis, Deputy Military Governor, French Zone of Occupation in Germany. Koenig , Brigadier General E. F., U. S. A., Commanding General, Chanor Base Section. * Koenig , General Joseph-Pierre, Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany. Kohler , Foy D., Assistant Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State. Kolchak , Vice Admiral Alexander Vasilyevich, leader of an anti-Bolshevik movement in Siberia, 1917–1920. Kołodziejski , Henryk, member of the Polish National Council of the Homeland. Kolshak . See Kolchak. Kondoianopoulos ( Kondoyannopoulos ), Andreas, Nomarch of the Greek Department of Rhodope. Konev , Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich, Commander in Chief, First Ukrainian Front. Koniev . See Konev. Konoe . See Konoye. Konoye , Prince Fumimaro, Japanese Prime Minister, 1937–1939, 1940–1941. * Koretsky , Colonel M. M., an officer in the Soviet Army connected with housing and security arrangements at the Berlin Conference (not otherwise identified). Kosanović , Sava, Minister of Information in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. Kostylev , Mikhail Alexeyevich, Soviet Ambassador to Italy. Kostov , Traicho, Secretary General, Bulgarian Communist Party. Kostyushchenko , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Germany (not otherwise identified). Kousnetsov . See Kuznetsov. * Kozyrev , Semen Pavlovich, Director, First European Division, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Kreiter , General, an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). * Kruglov , Colonel General Sergey Nikiforovich, First Assistant People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach , Gustav, Chairman, Managing Board, Fried. Krupp AG. (to 1943). * Kucherov , Admiral Stepan Grigoryevich, Chief of Staff, Soviet Navy. Kusnecov . See Kuznetsov. Kuter , Major General Laurence S., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Army Air Forces. * Kuznetsov , Admiral of the Fleet Nikolay Gerasimovich, People’s Commissar of the Soviet Navy. Kwapiński , Jan, Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Shipping and Acting Minister of Finance in the Polish Government-in-Exile at London; Representative of the Polish Government-in-Exile to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. * Kyle , Colonel William H., U. S. A., Aide to the Secretary of War. Labrishchev . See Lavrishchev. Lacoste , Francis, French Minister, Washington; Chargé d’Affaires ad interim (July 23–August 10). * Land , Vice Admiral Emory S., U. S. N. (retired), Administrator, War Shipping Administration; Chairman, United States Maritime Commission; United States Member, Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards. * Lane , Arthur Bliss, Appointed Ambassador to Poland. Lange , Oskar, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago. Larrabee , Lieutenant Colonel Sterling L., U. S. A., Military Attaché, American Embassy, Athens. Lascelles , Sir Alan, Private Secretary to King George VI. Laski , Harold J., Chairman, British Labour Party. * Laukhuff , Perry, Political Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Lavrentyev , Anatoly Iosifovich, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. * Lavrishchev , Alexander Andreyevich, Director, Division of Balkan Countries, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Lavrov , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). Lawrence , Ernest O., Consultant, Manhattan District project. * Laycock , Major-General Robert Edward, British Chief of Combined Operations. * Leahy , Fleet Admiral William D., U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. Leatham , Admiral Sir Ralph, British Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth. * Leathers , Lord, British Minister of War Transport. LeBreton , Rear Admiral David M., U. S. N., Commandant, Fifth Naval District; Commander, Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia. * Lee , Major Alfred K., U. S. A., a dinner guest of the President at Babelsberg. * Lee , Colonel Ernest R., U. S. A., Aide to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater. Lee , Lieutenant General John C. H., U. S. A., Commanding General, Communications Zone, European Theater. Lekarsky , Lieutenant General Krum, Bulgarian Assistant Minister of War. Leluk , General, chief Soviet supply officer at Vienna (not otherwise identified). Levels , Lieutenant Colonel, officer in Italy (not otherwise identified). Leverich , Henry P., Acting Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State. Ley , Robert, Head of the German Labor Front. * Licodo , Steward First Class Benjamin, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. Lightner , E. Allan, Jr., Secretary, United States Delegation, European Advisory Commission. * Lincoln , Brigadier General George A., U. S. A., Chief, Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; member of the Joint Staff Planners, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Staff Planners, Combined Chiefs of Staff. * List , Sergeant Eugene, U. S. A., pianist at several dinners given by the President at Babelsberg. Loftus , John A., Special Assistant to the Director, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State. Łomnicky , Captain, interpreter for the Commander in Chief, Polish Second Corps (not otherwise identified). Loudon , Alexander, Netherland Ambassador to the United States. * Lovell , Alfred H., Jr., Third Secretary, American Embassy, Warsaw (en route to his post). Lovett , Robert A., Assistant Secretary of War for Air. Lozovsky , Solomon Abramovich, Acting People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. * Lubin , Isador, Associate United States Representative, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Lunghi , Major Hugh, British military interpreter. Lupu , Nicolae, leader of the Rumanian National Peasant Party. MacArthur , General of the Army Douglas, U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Pacific; Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area. Maček , Vladimir, President, Croatian Peasant Party in Yugoslavia. Machold , Reinhold, Provincial Governor of Styria. Mack , William H. B., Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Austria. MacLeish , Archibald, Assistant Secretary of State (for Public and Cultural Relations). * Macready , Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon, Head of the Army Delegation, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington. MacVeagh , Lincoln, Ambassador to Greece. * Mahler , Ernst, Adviser on Industry, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Maiski . See Maisky. * Maisky , Ivan Mikhailovich, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Chairman, Allied Commission on Reparations. Makins , Roger, British Minister, Washington. * Mallaby , Lieutenant-Colonel G., (British Element,) Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Mallet , Sir Victor, British Appointed Ambassador to Spain. * Maloney , James J., United States Secret Service. Maniu , Iuliu, President, Rumanian National Peasant Party. * Maples , Rear Admiral Houston L., U. S. N., Senior Naval Officer, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union; Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Moscow. Marković , Lazar, a leader of the Yugoslav Radical Party. * Marshall , General of the Army George C., U. S. A., Chief of Staff, United States Army. * Marshall , J. Howard, General Counsel, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Martin , John Miller, Principal Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister, 1941–1945. Massigli , René, French Ambassador to the United Kingdom; French Representative, European Advisory Commission. * Matthews , H. Freeman, Director of European Affairs, Department of State. Matwin , Władysław, Polish Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in the Soviet Union. Maximov , Mikhail, Soviet Ambassador to Iran. Maxton , James, Member of the British Parliament. McCabe , Thomas B., Army–Navy Liquidation Commissioner. McCann , Rear Admiral Allan R., U. S. N., Commander, Task Force 68, United States Atlantic Fleet. * McCarthy , Lieutenant Charles E., U. S. N., White House courier. McCarthy , Colonel Charles W., U. S. A., Secretary, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee. * McCarthy , Rear Admiral E. D. B., Assistant Chief, British Naval Staff. * McCloy , John J., Assistant Secretary of War. McCreery , Lieutenant-General Sir Richard, Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Austria. * McDill , Captain Alexander S., U. S. N., Aide to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. * McDonald , First Lieutenant C. M., U. S. A., nephew of the Personal Physician to the President (Captain Alphonse McMahon). * McFarland , Brigadier General Andrew J., U. S. A., Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff; United States Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff. * McGrath , John J., Supervising Agent, New York District, United States Secret Service. * McIntire , Lieutenant Colonel A. M., U. S. A., Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces. * McMahon , Captain Alphonse, U. S. N. R., Personal Physician to the President. McNarney , General Joseph T., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater; Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater. McNeill , Captain William H., U. S. A., Assistant Military Attaché, American Embassy, Athens. Melbourne , Roy M., Acting United States Representative in Rumania. Meller , President, Berlin Physical and Technical Institute, Weida, Germany (not otherwise identified). Merenditis , Alexander, Governor General of Northern Greece. Metaxas , General John, Greek Prime Minister, 1936–1941. Meyrier , Jacques, Director General of Administrative Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Michael (Mihai) I, King of Rumania. Middleton , G. H., Second Secretary, British Embassy, Washington. Mihailović , General Draža, leader of the Yugoslav Nationalist Guerrilla Forces. * Mikołajczyk , Stanislaw, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Miles , Richard T. G., Third Secretary, British Embassy, Washington. * Millar , Frederick Hoyer, Head, Western Department, British Foreign Office. Millikan , M. F., Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration. * Minc , Hilary, Minister of Industry in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Mironenko , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Germany (not otherwise identified). Mishshenko , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). * Mitchell , Major Nicholas A., U. S. A., Assistant to the Military Aide to the President. * Modzelewski , Zygmunt, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco. * Molotov , Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Soviet Representative, Commission on the Polish Question (established by the Yalta Conference). * Monckton , Sir Walter, Head, British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Monroe , Thomas, Regional Director, Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration. * Montgomery , Field Marshal Sir Bernard, Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Germany. * Moore , Captain Charles J., U. S. N., Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moran , Commodore Edmond J., U. S. N. R., Assistant Deputy Administrator for Small Vessels, War Shipping Administration. * Moran , Lord, Personal Physician to the British Prime Minister. Morawski . See Osóbka-Morawski. Morgan , Stokeley W., Chief, Aviation Division, Department of State. Morgan , Lieutenant-General W. D., (British) Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. Morgenthau , Henry, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury (to July 22). Morocco , The Sultan of. See Mohammed V. Morrison , Herbert, British Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (from July 28). * Morse , Huntington T., Assistant to the Administrator, War Shipping Administration. * Mosely , Philip E., Political Adviser to the United States Representative, European Advisory Commission. * Mountbatten , Admiral Lord Louis, (British) Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. * Moynihan , Corporal Eleanor, U. S. A., Telephone Operator, Amco switchboard. * Murphy , Robert D., Political Adviser, Executive Office, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). Murray , Wallace, Ambassador to Iran. Mussolini , Benito, Italian Prime Minister, 1922–1943. * Myers , Lieutenant Colonel Henry T., U. S. A., pilot of the President’s plane. Napoléon I. See Bonaparte. * Navarra , Private First Class Jules, U. S. A., vocal soloist at a dinner given by the President at Babelsberg. Neikov , Petur, Bulgarian Communist leader. Nelson , Rear Admiral Horatio, Commander of the British Fleet at the Battle of Aboukir, 1798. * Nelson , Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence, U. S. A., Chaplain, Second Armored Division. * Nicholson , Edward Max, Head, Allocation of Tonnage Division, British Ministry of War Transport. Nimitz , Fleet Admiral Chester W., U. S. N., Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. * Nixon , Robert, representative of the International News Service in the press, radio, and photographers’ pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference. Nobel , Alfred, creator of the Nobel Foundation from which the Nobel prizes are awarded (died 1896). Noel-Baker , Philip John, British Minister of State. * Norstad , Major General Lauris, U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, Headquarters, Army Air Forces. * Northern , Captain Ernest M., Jr., U. S. A., Chaplain, 67th Armored Regiment. * Novikov , Kirill Vasilyevich, Director, Second European Division, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Soviet Delegate, United Nations Conference on International Organization; Secretary, Soviet Delegation to the Berlin Conference. Obbov , Alexander Christov, Secretary General, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (Fatherland Front wing). * O’Driscoll , Daniel J., United States Secret Service. Offie , Carmel, Deputy Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta. Okamoto , Suemasa, Japanese Minister to Sweden. * Olivares , Chief Steward Candido, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. Oliver , Covey T., Acting Chief, Division of Economic Security Controls, Department of State. Onodera , Major General Makoto, Military Attaché, Japanese Legation, Stockholm. Oppenheimer , J. Robert, Director, Manhattan District project laboratory, Santa Fe, New Mexico. * Ordona , Chief Cook Celedonio, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. * Orig , Chief Cook Alfredo, U. S. N., Head Boy, President’s messman detail. * Osóbka-Morawski , Edward Bolesław, Prime Minister in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. * Oster , Captain Henry R., U. S. N., Deputy Director of Logistic Plans, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Otto , Archduke of Austria; pretender to the Austrian throne. Oxley , Major-General W. H., Commissioner, British Military Mission in Bulgaria. Paetz , Chief Engineer, Siemens–Halske plant, Gera, Germany (not otherwise identified). * Page , Edward, Jr., First Secretary, American Embassy, Moscow. Pahlevi , Mohammad Reza Shah, Shah-in-shah of Iran. Palmer , Colonel Alan, British Military Mission to Albania. * Palomaria , Chief Cook Jose, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. Papandreou , George, Greek Prime Minister, April–December 1944. Papen , Franz von, German Ambassador to Turkey. * Parks , Major General Floyd L., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Sector, Berlin District. Parri , Ferruccio, Italian Prime Minister. * Parten , J. R., Chief of Staff, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Pasco , Lieutenant Colonel H. Merrill, U. S. A., Assistant Secretary, War Department General Staff. Pasvolsky , Leo, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Patterson , Gardner, Treasury Representative in Southeastern Europe. Patterson , Richard C., Jr., Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Patterson , Robert P., Under Secretary of War. * Patton , General George S., Jr., U. S. A., Commanding General, Third Army. Pauker , Ana, member of the Central Committee, Rumanian Communist Party. * Pauley , Edwin W., United States Representative, Allied Commission on Reparations. Pavlov , Assen, Bulgarian Minister of Agriculture. * Pavlov , Vladimir Nikolayevich, Personal Secretary and Interpreter to the Chairman, Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union. * Peck , Colonel Clarence R., U. S. A., Executive Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perkins , Lieutenant Commander Kenneth D., U. S. N., Chaplain, U. S. S. Augusta. Peterson , Sir Maurice Drummond, British Ambassador to Turkey. Pethick-Lawrence , Frederick W., Member of the British Parliament. Petkov , Nikola Dimitrov, Secretary General, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. Petrov , Appolon Alexandrovich, Soviet Ambassador to China. Petrov , Army General Ivan Efimovich, Chief of Staff to the Soviet Commander in Chief, First Ukrainian Front. Phelps , Dudley Maynard, Acting Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State. * Philler , Master Sergeant Henry, U. S. A., White House Signal Corps Detachment. * Picknett , B. F., British Ministry of War Transport. Piesch , Hans, Acting Governor of Carinthia. Pinkerton , Lowell Call, Consul General, Jerusalem. Pius XII, Pope. Podobed , Colonel, Soviet officer in Italy (not otherwise identified). * Podtserob , Boris Fedorovich, Secretary-Translator and Assistant to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Pogue , L. Welch, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board. Pope , The. See Pius XII. Popiel , Karol, head of the Polish Labor Party. * Portal , Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles, British Chief of Air Staff. * Potrubach , Mikhail Mikhailovich, First Secretary, Second Class, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Potter , Charles J., Deputy Administrator, Solid Fuels Administration for War; Chairman, Combined Coal Committee, Combined Production and Resources Board. * Prettyman , Chief Steward Arthur S., U. S. N., the President’s valet. Prodanović , Jaša, Minister for Serbia in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. Pushkin , Georgy Maximovich, Soviet Political Adviser, Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Pyron , Brigadier General Walter B., U. S. A., Director, Planning Division, Army-Navy Petroleum Board. Raczkiewicz , Wladyslaw, President of the Polish Government-in-Exile at London. Raczynski , Count Edward, Ambassador of the Polish Government-in-Exile at London to the United Kingdom. * Rajchman , Ludwik, Appointed Polish Delegate, Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; Chairman, Polish Supply and Reconstruction Mission to North America. Rákosi , Mátyas, First Secretary, Hungarian Workers Party Central Executive. Rankin , Lieutenant-Colonel J. T., Liaison Section, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta. * Reams , R. Borden, Information Officer, Office of the Secretary of State. Reber , Samuel, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State. * Redecker , Sydney B., Political Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Reed , Captain Arthur D., U. S. A., Civil Affairs Division, Headquarters, United States Sector, Berlin District. Reinstein , Jacques J., Acting Chief, Division of Financial Affairs, Department of State. Renner , Karl, Federal Chancellor in the Provisional Government of Austria. Rhee , Syngman, Chairman, Korean Commission, Washington. Ribbentrop , Joachim von, German Minister of Foreign Affairs. * Riddleberger , James W., Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State. Ridley , Major General Clarence S., U. S. A., Chief, United States Mission to the Iranian Army. * Rigdon , Lieutenant William M., U. S. N., Administrative Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President. * Riggs , Colonel Theodore S., U. S. A., member of the Joint Logistics Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Administrative Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Roberts , Frank, British Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in the Soviet Union. Rogozhin , Colonel Anatoly Ivanovich, leader of a corps of Russian troops which fought under German command in Yugoslavia in World War II. * Rokossovsky , Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin Konstantinovich, Commander, Second White Russian Army. * Rola-Zymierski , Marshal Michal, Minister of National Defense in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. * Romagna , Jack, Liaison Representative, The White House. Ronald , Nigel, Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office. Roosevelt , Franklin D., President of the United States, 1933–April 12, 1945. * Rosato , Chief Warrant Officer Frank J., U. S. A., Conductor, Berlin District Army Band. Rosenberg , Alfred, National Leader ( Reichsleiter ) and Head of the Office of Foreign Affairs, National Socialist German Workers Party, 1933–1940; German Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 1941–1944. * Rosenman , Samuel I., Special Counsel to the President. Rosenson , Alexander M., Economic Adviser, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Ross , Charles G., Secretary to the President. * Ross , Captain John B., U. S. A., son of the Secretary to the President. Ross , John C., Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State. * Rowan , Leslie, Principal Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister. * Rowley , James J., United States Secret Service. Royen , Jan Herman van, Netherland Minister Without Portfolio. * Rubin , Seymour J., Chief, Division of Economic Security Controls, Department of State, detailed to the United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Rueff , Jacques, French Inspector General of Finances; Chief, French Economic Commission for German Affairs. Rumania , The King of. See Michael I. * Rusk , Colonel Howard A., U. S. A., Chief, Convalescent Services Division, Office of the Air Surgeon, Army Air Forces. * Russell , Donald, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. * Rzymowski , Wincenty, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Sabourov . See Saburov. * Saburov , Maxim Zakharovich, Assistant to the Chief, Soviet Military Administration in Germany. Sadr , Mohsen, Iranian Prime Minister. Saed . See Sa’id. Sa’id-Maraghah’i , Mohammad, Iranian Prime Minister, March–November 1944. Saito . See Sato. Saka , Hasan, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Saksin , Georgy Filippovich, Acting Soviet Representative, European Advisory Commission. Salazar , António de Oliveira, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers; Minister of Foreign Affairs. Saracoğlu , Şükrü, Turkish Prime Minister. Sargent , Sir Orme, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office. Sarper , Selim, Turkish Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Sato , Naotake, Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Satterthwaite , Livingston, Civil Air Attaché, American Embassy, London. Saugstad , Jesse E., Chief, Shipping Division, Department of State. Saunders–Jacobs , Brigadier J. C., (British) Commander, Fifth Indian Infantry Brigade, in Greece. Sawyer , Charles, Ambassador to Belgium; Minister to Luxembourg. Sawyer , Mrs. Charles, wife of the Ambassador to Belgium. Schacht , Hjalmar, German Minister of Finance. * Schade , Commodore Henry A., U. S. N., Chief, United States Naval Technical Mission in Europe. Scheibe , Head of the Laboratory, Berlin Physical and Technical Institute, Weida, Germany (not otherwise identified). Schermerhorn , Willem, Netherland Prime Minister. Schoenfeld , H. F. Arthur, United States Representative in Hungary. Schuyler , Brigadier General Cortland T. Van R., U. S. A., Chief, United States Military Representation, Allied Control Commission for Rumania. Schwarzkopf , Lieutenant Colonel H. Norman, U. S. A., Commander, United States Military Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie . Scobie , Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald, British General Officer Commanding in Greece. Sébastiani , General of Division Horace-Frangois-Bastien, French Ambassador to Turkey, 1806–1807. * Semenov , Vladimir Semenovich, Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. Sepahbodi , Anoshiravan, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes , The King of the. See Alexander I. Seymour , Sir Horace, British Ambassador to China. Sforza , Count Carlo, Italian High Commissioner for Punishment of Illegal Acts Under Fascism and Minister Without Portfolio, 1944. Shantz , Harold, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Yugoslavia. * Sherman , Lieutenant C. D., U. S. A., Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces. Shinwell , Emanuel, Member of the British Parliament. Shmega , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Germany (not otherwise identified). Sikorski , General of the Armies Wladyslaw, Polish Prime Minister and Commander in Chief of the Polish Armies, 1939–1943. * Sinclair , Sir Robert, Chief Executive, British Ministry of Production. Skoropadski . See Skoropadsky. Skoropadsky , General Pavlo, self-styled Hetman of the Ukraine. * Slavin , Lieutenant General Nikolay Vasilyevich, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Soviet Army. Slipchenko , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). * Smith , Merriman, representative of the United Press in the press, radio, and photographers” pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference. Snyder , John W., Federal Loan Administrator (to July 22); Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion (from July 23). Sobelev . See Sobolev. * Sobolev , Arkady Alexandrovich, Chief, Political Section, Soviet Military Administration in Germany. Sobonev . See Sobolev. Sofianopolous . See Sophianopoulos. Sofianopoulos . See Sophianopoulos. Solborg , Colonel Robert A., U. S. A., Military Attaché, American Embassy, Lisbon. * Somervell , General Brehon B., U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Service Forces. Somerville , Admiral Sir James, Head of the Admiralty Delegation, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington. Sommers , Major Davidson, U. S. A., Assistant Executive, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Soong , T. V., Chinese Prime Minister; also (to July 30) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Sophianopoulos , Ioannis, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs. * Spicer , Vernon D., United States Secret Service. * Sproul , Robert G., Adviser on Human Relations, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Stainoff . See Stainov. Stainov , Petko, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cults. * Stalin , Generalissimo Iosif Vissarionovich, Chairman, Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union; People’s Commissar for Defense. Stamboliisky . See Stambolisky. Stamboliski . See Stambolisky. Stambolisky , Assen, member of the General Committee, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. * Stańczyk , Jan, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Stanojević , Aca, President, Yugoslav Radical Party. Stark , Admiral Harold R., U. S. N., Commander, United States Naval Forces, Europe; Commander, Twelfth Fleet. Stassen , Commander Harold E., U. S. N. R., United States Delegate, United Nations Conference on International Organization. Stein , Baron Heinrich vom und zum, Prussian Minister in charge of all civil affairs, 1807–1808. Stetson , Colonel John B., Jr., U. S. A., Commissioner, Office of the Joint Army–Navy Liquidation Board, Persian Gulf Command. Stettinius , Edward R., Jr., Secretary of State (to June 27); Personal Representative of the President (from June 28); Chairman, United States Delegation, United Nations Conference on International Organization (April 17–June 26). Stevenson , Air Vice Marshal Donald, British High Commissioner in Rumania. Stevenson , R. C. Skrine, British Ambassador to Yugoslavia. * Stimson , Henry L., Governor General of the Philippines, 1927–1929; Secretary of War, 1911–1913, 1940–September 1945. Stirbey , Prince Barbu, Rumanian Prime Minister, 1927–1930; head of the Rumanian Armistice Commission at Moscow, 1944. Stone , Rear Admiral Ellery W., U. S. N. R., Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (for Italy). * Stone , Colonel John N., U. S. A., Chief, Pacific Branch, Operational Plans Division, Headquarters, Army Air Forces. * Stoner , Chief Warrant Officer Frank G., U. S. A., White House Signal Corps Detachment. Stoyanov , Christo, member of the Executive Committee, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (Fatherland Front wing). * Strang , Sir William, Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Germany. Streicher , Julius, District Leader ( Gauleiter ) for Franconia, German National Socialist German Workers Party. * Stroop , Captain Paul D., U. S. N., Aviation Plans Officer on the Staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Šubašić , Ivan, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia, Sumer , Nurullah Esat, Turkish Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. Surtees , Major-General George, Commanding General, British Base and Lines of Communications, in Belgium. Susaicov . See Susaikov. Susaikov , Colonel General Ivan Zakharovich, (Soviet) Deputy Chairman, Allied Control Commission for Rumania. Šutej , Juraj, Minister Without Portfolio in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. Suzuki , Admiral Baron Kantaro, Japanese Prime Minister. Sweden , The King of. See Gustaf V. Swinton , Viscount, British Minister for Civil Aviation. Szakasits , Arpad, President, Hungarian Social Democratic Party. Szalai , Sándor, Chief, Foreign Department, Hungarian Social Democratic Party. Szent-Iványi , Sándor, Administrative Vice President, Hungarian Citizens Democratic Party. * Szostek , Corporal Charlotte, U. S. A., Telephone Operator, Amco switchboard. Taft , Charles P., Director, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State. Tappin , Lieutenant Colonel John L., U. S. A., Chief, Liaison Section, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta. Tarchiani , Alberto, Italian Ambassador to the United States. Tatarescu , Gheorghe, Rumanian Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Foreign Affairs. * Taylor , Captain Edmund B., U. S. N., Aide to the Secretary of the Navy. * Taylor , Chief Pharmacist’s Mate Preston C., U. S. N., detailed as Assistant to the Personal Physician to the President. Teleki , Count Géza, leader of the Hungarian Citizens Democratic Party. * Theakstone , Major Louis Marguarde, (British) Interpreter to the Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Thiessen , Peter, Director, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, Berlin. Thomas , Charles A., Consultant, Manhattan District project. Thomas , Edward J., Assistant Communications Officer, Office of Foreign Service Administration, Department of State. * Thomas , Private John R., Jr., U. S. A., nephew of the Personal Physician to the President (Captain Alphonse McMahon). * Thompson , Commander C. R., Personal Assistant to the British Minister of Defence. * Thompson , Llewellyn E., Jr., Second Secretary (First Secretary from July 23), American Embassy, London. Thorne , General Sir Andrew, (British) General Officer Commanding in Chief, Allied Land Forces in Norway. Thorp , Willard L., Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. * Tiernan , Colonel L. Curtis, U. S. A., Chief of Chaplains, European Theater. Tindall , Brigadier General Richard G., U. S. A., Military Attaché, American Embassy, London. Tischler , Josef, member of the Provincial Government of Carinthia. Tito , Marshal (Josip Broz ), Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia; Supreme Commander, Yugoslav Army. Tittmann , Harold H., Jr., Assistant to the Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII. Togo , Shigenori, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. Tomlinson , George, Member of the British Parliament. * Torina , Michael W., United States Secret Service. Toyoda , Admiral Soemu, Chief of Staff, Japanese Imperial Navy. * Trone , Solomon, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Truman , Sergeant Harry, U. S. A., nephew of the President. * Truman , Harry S., Vice President of the United States (January 20–April 12); President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy (from April 12). Truman , J. Vivian, brother of the President. Tsamados , Michael, Greek Under Minister for Foreign Affairs. * Tsarapkin , Semen Konstantinovich, Director, United States Division, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. * Turner , Mark, Principal Assistant Secretary, Economic Advisory Branch, British Foreign Office, detailed to the British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Tuthill , John Wills, Political Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Tyree , Commander John A., Jr., U. S. N., Assistant Naval Aide to the President. Umezu , General Yoshijiro, Chief of Staff, Japanese Imperial Army. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland , The King of. See George VI. * Vacarro , Ernest, representative of the Associated Press in the press, radio, and photographers’ pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference. Vandenberg , Arthur H., United States Senator from Michigan. * Vardaman , Captain James K., Jr., U. S. N. R., Naval Aide to the President. * Vardaman , First Lieutenant James M., U. S. A., nephew of the Naval Aide to the President. Varela Iglesias , Lieutenant General José Enrique, High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco. Vasilyevsky , Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich, Commander in Chief, Soviet Far Eastern Forces. Vassilievski . See Vasilyevsky. Vassilios , Metropolitan of Florina, Greece. * Vaughan , Brigadier General Harry H., U. S. A., Military Aide to the President. Velchev , Colonel Damian, Adviser to the Bulgarian Prime Minister, 1935. Venizelos , Eleftherios, Greek Prime Minister, 1910–1915, 1915, 1917–1920, 1924, 1928–1932, 1932, 1933. Villard , Henry S., Chief, Division of African Affairs, Department of State; United States Representative, Paris Conversations Concerning Tangier. * Vincent , John Carter, Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State. Vinogradov , Sergey Alexandrovich, Soviet Ambassador to Turkey. Vinogradov , Lieutenant General Vladislav Petrovich, (Soviet) Chief of Staff, Allied Control Commission for Rumania. Vishinski . See Vyshinsky. Vlasov , Lieutenant General Andrey Andreyevich, organizer of the “Russian Army of Liberation” (an anti-Soviet military force under German auspices). Voroshilov , Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich, Chairman, Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Voskresentev , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). Voulgaris , Admiral Petros, Greek Prime Minister. Vyshinski . See Vyshinsky. * Vyshinsky , Andrey Yanuaryevich, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Wadsworth , George, Minister to Lebanon and Syria. * Waley , Sir David, Under-Secretary, British Treasury, detailed to the British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Walker , John H., United States Secret Service. Wang Shih-chieh, Chinese Minister of Information (to July 30); Minister of Foreign Affairs (from July 30). Warburg , Otto, Director, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Cell Physiology, Berlin. * Ward , J. G., Acting First Secretary, Reconstruction Department, British Foreign Office. Warner , Edward, Vice Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board. * Waters , Edmund J., United States Secret Service. Wedemeyer , Lieutenant General Albert C., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater; Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, China Theater. * Weeks , Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald, Deputy Military Governor and Chief of Staff, British Zone of Occupation in Germany. * Weir , Albert R., United States Secret Service. * Weston , W. G., British Ministry of War Transport. * Whiteus , Corporal Mary, U. S. A., Telephone Operator, Amco switchboard. Wilhelm , Prince Imperial of Germany and Crown Prince of Prussia, 1888–1918. Willson , Vice Admiral Russell, U. S. N., member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Wilson , Edwin C., Ambassador to Turkey. * Wilson , Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland, Head, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington. Winant , John G., Ambassador to the United Kingdom; United States Representative, European Advisory Commission; United States Representative, Committee on German Dismemberment (established by the Yalta Conference). Winterbottom , John J., Director, Tanker Allocations, War Shipping Administration. Winterton , Major-General John, British Deputy Commissioner, Allied Control Commission for Austria. * Wise , Colonel John S., U. S. A., Staff Officer, Theater (Operations) Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff. Wolf , Justin R., Washington Liaison Representative, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Woodward , Lieutenant Colonel Harper L., U. S. A., Administrative Officer, Advisory Council to the Commanding General, Headquarters, Army Air Forces. Wu , K. C., Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yakovlev , Colonel Pavel G., Soviet repatriation agent in Italy. Yale , William, Area Specialist, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State. Yemashev . See Yumashev. Yonai , Admiral Mitsumasa, Japanese Minister of Navy. Yordanov , Georgy Ilchev, member of the General Committee, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. * Yost , Charles W., Executive Secretary, Central Secretariat, Department of State; Secretary General, United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference. Yugoslavia , The King of. See Alexander I. Yugov , Anton, Bulgarian Minister of the Interior. Yumashev , Admiral Ivan Stepanovich, Commander in Chief, Soviet Pacific Fleet. Yurdonov . See Yordanov. Zacharias , Captain Ellis M., U. S. N., Office of Public Information, Navy Department. Zakinthinos , Dionysios, Greek Under Secretary of the Press. Zakynthinos . See Zakinthinos. * Zebrowski , Tadeusz, Acting Director, Political Department, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. * Zhukov , Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich, Chief, Soviet Military Administration in Germany; Commander in Chief, Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany. * Zink , Major Harold, U. S. A., Political Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). 1 Reprinted, with minor corrections, from document No. 1384 , post . For official titles, see the List of Persons Mentioned, post , p. xlviii [ Pg. XLVIII includes portions of List of Persons: and List of Persons Mentioned ] . 2 Reprinted from document No. 1384 , post . 3 Reprinted, with minor corrections, from Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 161. 4 This list is confined to Polish officials who attended meetings or discussions in connection with the Berlin Conference which were attended also by officials of the United States Government. Principal Members of Delegations Principal Members of Delegations UNITED STATES 1 The President: Harry S. Truman The Secretary of State: James F. Byrnes Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy Joseph E. Davies, Special Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley, Special Ambassador Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet General of the Army Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State Ben Cohen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, Department of State Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary [of State] (together with political, military and technical advisers). [ Editor’s Note. —The advisers referred to who are known to have been present during international meetings and discussions at the Conference are: George V. Allen, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State. Abram Bergson, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Director, Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration, and Joint Executive Officer, Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards. Walter J. Brown, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Harvey H. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War. Cavendish W. Cannon, First Secretary, American Embassy, Lisbon. Lieutenant Joseph Chase, U. S. N. R., Assistant Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Moscow. Emilio G. Collado, Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State. Vice Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Major General John R. Deane, U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union. Emile Despres, Adviser on German Economic Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Rear Admiral Howard A. Flanigan, U. S. N., member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Wilder Foote, Assistant to the Secretary of State. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy. Rear Admiral Matthias B. Gardner, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Major General Charles P. Gross, U. S. A., member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Lieutenant General John E. Hull, U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff. Arthur Bliss Lane, Appointed Ambassador to Poland. Isador Lubin, Associate United States Representative, Allied Commission on Reparations. Rear Admiral Houston L. Maples, U. S. N., Senior Naval Officer, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union, and Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Moscow. J. Howard Marshall, General Counsel, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War. Captain Alexander S. McDill, U. S. N., Aide to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Brigadier General Andrew J. McFarland. U. S. A., Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and United States Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Captain Charles J. Moore, U. S. N., Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Huntington T. Morse, Assistant to the Administrator, War Shipping Administration. Philip E. Mosely, Political Adviser to the United States Representative, European Advisory Commission. Major General Lauris Norstad, U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, Headquarters, Army Air Forces. Captain Henry R. Oster, U. S. N., Deputy Director of Logistic Plans, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Edward Page, Jr., First Secretary, American Embassy, Moscow. J. R. Parten, Chief of Staff, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. R. Borden Reams, Information Officer, Office of the Secretary of State. James W. Riddleberger, Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State. Donald Russell, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Second Secretary (First Secretary from July 23), American Embassy, London. Charles W. Yost, Executive Secretary, Central Secretariat, Department of State; Secretary General of the United States Delegation. ] UNITED KINGDOM 2 The Prime Minister: Mr. Winston S. Churchill, M. P. Mr. C. R. Attlee, M. P. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Mr. Anthony Eden, M. P. Mr. Ernest Bevin, M. P. Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow Sir Walter Monckton, Head of the U. K. Delegation to Moscow Reparations Commission Sir William Strang, Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, British Zone in Germany Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the Cabinet Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington and other advisers. [ Editor’s Note. —The advisers referred to who are known to have been present during international meetings and discussions at the Conference are: Denis Allen, First Secretary, Northern Department, Foreign Office. Major Arthur Birse, Second Secretary and Translator, British Embassy, Moscow. Hon. T. H. Brand, Chairman, Supplies for Liberated Areas Committee, Ministry of Production. Norman Brook, Additional Secretary to the Cabinet. Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General. Brigadier Arthur Thomas Cornwall-Jones, British Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff. J. E. Coulson, Acting Head, Economic Relations Department, Foreign Office. Patrick Dean, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign Office. Brigadier C. G. B. Greaves, Director of Personnel Movement, War Office. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Haddon, Imperial General Staff. Geoffrey Wedgwood Harrison, First Secretary, German Department, Foreign Office. William Hayter, Acting Counsellor, Southern Department, Foreign Office; Secretary General of the British Delegation . Major-General Leslie Hollis, Senior Assistant Secretary, Office of the War Cabinet. Major-General Noel Galway Holmes, Deputy Quartermaster-General (Movements), War Office. Gladwyn Jebb, Head, Reconstruction Department, Foreign Office. Major-General Robert Edward Laycock, Chief of Combined Operations. Major Hugh Lunghi, British military interpreter. Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Macready, Head of the Army Delegation, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington. Lieutenant-Colonel G. Mallaby, Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Rear Admiral E. D. B. McCarthy, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff. Frederick Hoyer Millar, Head, Western Department, Foreign Office. Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Germany. Lord Moran, Personal Physician to the Prime Minister. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. Edward Max Nicholson, Head, Allocation of Tonnage Division, Ministry of War Transport. B. F. Picknett, Ministry of War Transport. Leslie Rowan, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister. Sir Robert Sinclair, Chief Executive, Ministry of Production. Major Louis Marguarde Theakstone, Interpreter to the Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Commander C. R. Thompson, Personal Assistant to the Minister of Defence. Mark Turner, Principal Assistant Secretary, Economic Advisory Branch, Foreign Office, detailed to the British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Sir David Waley, Under-Secretary, Treasury, detailed to the British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. J. G. Ward, Acting First Secretary, Reconstruction Department, Foreign Office. W. G. Weston, Ministry of War Transport.] SOVIET UNION 3 The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars: J. V. Stalin People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs: V. M. Molotov Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kuznetsov, People’s Commissar, the Naval Fleet of the U. S. S. R. Army General A. I. Antonov, Chief of Staff of the Red Army A. Ya. Vyshinski, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs S. I. Kavtaradze, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs I. M. Maisky, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Admiral S. G. Kucherov, Chief of Staff of the Naval Fleet F. T. Gusev, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Great Britain A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in the United States of America K. V. Novikov, Member of the Collegium of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Director of the Second European Division S. K. Tsarapkin, Member of the Collegium of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Director of the United States Division S. P. Kozyrev, Director of the First European Division, Commissariat for Foreign Affairs A. A. Lavrishchev, Director of the Division of Balkan Countries, Commissariat for Foreign Affairs A. A. Sobolev, Chief of the Political Section of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany M. Z. Saburov, Assistant to the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany S. A. Golunsky, Expert Consultant of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and also political, military, and technical assistants. [ Editor’s Note. —The assistants referred to who are known to have been present during international meetings and discussions at the Conference are: Amazasp Avakimovich Arutyunyan, Assistant Director, Economics Division, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Lavrenty Pavlovich Beriya, Deputy Chairman, Council of People’s Commissars, and People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs. Major Nikolay Vasilyevich Evsekov, military interpreter. Marshal of Aviation Fedor Yakovlevich Falaleyev, Chief of the Air General Staff. Vladimir Sergeyevich Gerashchenko, Economic Specialist, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Mikhail Grigoryevich Gribanov, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Anatoly Iosifovich Lavrentyev, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. Vladimir Nikolayevich Pavlov, Personal Secretary and Interpreter to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars. Mikhail Mikhailovich Potrubach, First Secretary, Second Class, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Vladimir Semenovich Semenov, Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. Lieutenant General Nikolay Vasilyevich Slavin, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Soviet Army. Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Chief, Soviet Military Administration in Germany, and Commander in Chief, Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany.] POLAND 4 Bolesław Bierut, President of the National Council of the Homeland Stanisław Grabski, Vice President of the National Council of the Homeland Edward Boleslaw Osóbka-Morawski, Prime Minister Władysław Gomułka, Deputy Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Wincenty Rzymowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hilary Minc, Minister of Industry Marshal Michał Rola-Żymierski, Minister of National Defense Zygmunt Modzelewski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Tadeusz Żebrowski, Acting Director, Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ludwik Rajchman, Appointed Delegate to the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and Chairman, Supply and Reconstruction Mission to North America 1 Reprinted, with minor corrections, from document No. 1384 , post . For official titles, see the List of Persons Mentioned, post , p. xlviii [ Pg. XLVIII includes portions of List of Persons: and List of Persons Mentioned ] . 2 Reprinted from document No. 1384 , post . 3 Reprinted, with minor corrections, from Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 161. 4 This list is confined to Polish officials who attended meetings or discussions in connection with the Berlin Conference which were attended also by officials of the United States Government. List of Persons Mentioned List of Persons Mentioned Editor’s Note .—The identification of the persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions under reference in the papers printed in this volume, and is for the year 1945 unless otherwise indicated. Unless there is indication to the contrary, titles and positions given are those held in or for the United States Government. Authors, journalists, and composers are not included in this list unless they are mentioned in the papers printed in some other capacity. Persons whose names are preceded by an asterisk were present at Berlin or Babelsberg at some time during the course of the Berlin Conference. In this list, names with diacritical marks (e. g., ö and š ) are alphabetized as if they were English names with no diacritical marks, rather than in the position which they would occupy if alphabetized in their original language. Likewise transliterations (e. g., Kh for the Russian X ) are alphabetized in English letter order. Abderhalden , Emil, Institute of Physics and Chemistry, Halle, Germany. * Abiba , Chief Steward Sotero, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. * Abramovitz , Moses, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Abyssinia , The Emperor of. See Haile Selassie. Acheson , Dean, Under Secretary of State (from August 16). * Adams , Francis W. H., United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Adcock , Brigadier General Clarence L., U. S. A., Chief, Civil Affairs Division, United States Forces, European Theater. Alba de Tormes , The Duke of, Spanish Ambassador to the United Kingdom. Alexander (Aleksandar) I, King of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 1921–1929; King of Yugoslavia, 1929–1934. * Alexander , Field Marshal Sir Harold, (British) Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. * Allen , Denis, First Secretary, Northern Department, British Foreign Office. * Allen , George V., Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State. Alling , Paul H., Consul General and Diplomatic Agent, Tangier. Anami , General Korehita, Japanese Minister of Army. Anders , Lieutenant General Władysław, Commander in Chief, Polish Second Corps, in Italy. Anderson , Sir John, British Chancellor of the Exchequer (to July 28). Angell , James W., United States Delegate, Paris Conference on Reparation. * Anheier , Harry D., Supervising Agent, Washington District, United States Secret Service. * Antonov , Army General Alexey Innokentyevich, Chief of Staff, Soviet Army. Arciszewski , Tomasz, Prime Minister in the Polish Government-in-Exile at London. Ardalan , Naser Qoli, Deputy in the Iranian Majlis. Ardenne , Baron Manfred of, German electronic physicist; director of a private experimental laboratory at Berlin. Armour , Norman, Ambassador to Spain. * Arnold , General of the Army Henry H., U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Air Forces. Arutiunian . See Arutyunyan. Arutunian . See Arutyunyan. * Arutyunyan , Amazasp Avakimovich, Assistant Director, Economics Division, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. * Attlee , Clement R., Chairman, British Parliamentary Labour Party; also (from July 26) Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury. Ayers , Eben A., Information Officer, The White House. Badoglio , Marshal Pietro, Italian Prime Minister, 1943–1944. Bainbridge , Kenneth T., Consultant, Manhattan District project. Balfour , Arthur James, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1916–1919. Balfour , John, British Minister, Washington. Balogh , Rev. István, Adviser to the Hungarian Prime Minister. Barbour , Walworth, Division of Southern European Affairs, Department of State. Barnard , Thurman L., Executive Director, Overseas Branch, Office of War Information. Barnes , Maynard B., United States Representative in Bulgaria. * Barry , Frank M., United States Secret Service. Baruch , Herman B., Ambassador to Portugal. Batt , William L., Vice Chairman (International Supply), War Production Board. * Bautista , Chief Steward Cayetano, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. * Beatty , Morgan, representative of the combined radio networks in the press, radio, and photographers’ pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference. * Behn , Gerald A., United States Secret Service. * Belknap , Chief Photographer’s Mate William, Jr., U. S. N., an official photographer for the Berlin Conference. Bell , John O., Divisional Assistant, Aviation Division, Department of State. Bellinger , Vice Admiral Patrick N. L., U. S. N., Commander, Air Force, United States Atlantic Fleet. * Belot , Colonel Monti L., U. S. A., Commanding Officer, 178th General Hospital, Reims, France. Beneš , Edvard, President of Czechoslovakia. Berger , Edwin, Chief Engineer, Schott plant, Jena, Germany. * Bergson , Abram, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Beria . See Beriya. * Beriya , Lavrenty Pavlovich, Deputy Chairman, Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union; People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs. Bernadotte , Prince Carl (Junior), nephew of the King of Sweden. Bernadotte , Prince Carl (Senior), President, Swedish Red Cross; brother of the King of Sweden. * Betts , Brigadier General Edward C., U. S. A., Judge Advocate, European Theater. * Bevin , Ernest, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (from July 28). Bewilogua , Ludwig, Director, Low Temperature Physics Section, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics, Berlin. Bianchi , João Antonio de, Portuguese Ambassador to the United States. Bidault , Georges, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government of the French Republic. * Bierut , Boleslaw, President of the National Council of the Homeland in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. * Birse , Major Arthur, Second Secretary and Translator, British Embassy, Moscow. Biryusov . See Biryuzov. Biryuzov , Colonel General Sergey Semenovich, (Soviet) Deputy Chairman, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria. Bismarck , The Prince of, Chancellor of the German Empire, 1871–1890. * Bissell , Richard M., Jr., Director, Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration; Joint Executive Officer, Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards. * Blair , Lieutenant Colonel James A., U. S. A., a breakfast guest of the President at Babelsberg. Blaisdell , Thomas C., Jr., Chief, Mission for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, London. Bland , Sir Nevile, British Ambassador to the Netherlands. Blondin , Charles (Jean-Francois Gravelet ), French acrobat who crossed over Niagara Falls on a tight-rope on four occasions, 1859–1860. Bobrovi , Colonel, an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). * Bogomolov , Alexander Efremovich, Soviet Ambassador to France. * Bohlen , Charles E., Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1944–1946; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1946–1947, 1959– * Bolton , Captain Patrick, Private Secretary to the British Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Bonaparte , General Napoléon, Commander of the French expedition against Egypt, 1798–1799; (as Napoléon I) Emperor of the French, 1804–1814, 1815. Bonbright , James C. H., Assistant Chief, Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State. Bonnet , Henri, French Ambassador to the United States. Booth , Brigadier General Donald P., U. S. A., Commanding General, Persian Gulf Command. * Boring , Floyd M., United States Secret Service. Boris III, King of Bulgaria, 1918–1943. * Borrelli , Staff Sergeant Joe, U. S. A., band conductor at a dinner given by the President at Babelsberg. Boucher , Major-General Charles Hamilton, Commander, British Forces in Northern Greece. * Bowen , Colonel John W., U. S. A., Map Room Officer, White House Map Room. Bowker , Reginald James, British Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Spain. * Bradley , Corporal Alma, U. S. A., Telephone Operator, Amco switchboard. * Bradley , General Omar N., U. S. A., Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group. * Brand , Hon. T. H., Chairman, Supplies for Liberated Areas Committee, British Ministry of Production. Bratianu , Constantin (Dinu), President, Rumanian Liberal Party. * Bridges , Sir Edward, Secretary of the British Cabinet. Broad , Philip, Acting Counsellor, Office of the British Minister Resident, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta. * Brook , Norman, Additional Secretary to the British Cabinet. * Brooke , Field Marshal Sir Alan, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff. Brossin de Saint-Didier , Major General Auguste, Chief, French Military Mission, Washington. * Brown , John Nicholas, Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Brown , Walter J., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Broz Tito . See Tito. Brunk , P. A., Secretary, London Branch, United Maritime Executive Board. * Buhrman , Parker W., Political Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). Bulgaria , The King of. See Boris III. Bullard , Sir Reader, British Ambassador to Persia (Iran). * Bundy , Harvey H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of War. Burch , Harold A., Trade and Commerce Analyst, Office of Economics and Statistics, War Shipping Administration. Buriusoff . See Biryuzov. Bush , Vannevar, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development; Chairman, Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment, Joint Chiefs of Staff. * Byrnes , James F., Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (to April 2); Secretary of State (from July 3). * Cabell , Brigadier General Charles P., U. S. A., member of the Joint Staff Planners, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Staff Planners, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Caccia , Harold, British Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Greece. * Cadogan , Hon. Sir Alexander, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office. * Caffery , Jefferson, Ambassador to France. * Caldwell , Chief Warrant Officer Horace K., U. S. A., White House Signal Corps Detachment. * Calinao , Chief Steward Federico, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. Campbell , Captain Sir Harold, Equerry in Waiting to King George VI. Campbell , Sir Ronald H., British Ambassador to Portugal. Campbell , Sir Ronald I., British Representative, European Advisory Commission. * Campion , John E., United States Secret Service. * Canfil , Fred E., United States Secret Service. * Canin , Private First Class Stuart, U. S. A., violinist at a dinner given by the President at Babelsberg. * Cannon , Cavendish W., First Secretary, American Embassy, Lisbon. Cárdenas , Juan Francisco de, Spanish Ambassador to the United States. Carnwath , Joseph W., United States Representative, London Branch, United Maritime Executive Board. Carra de Vaux de Saint-Cyr , Christian, French Delegate in Sweden. Carvalhaes , Colonel Augusto de, Chief of Protocol, Portuguese Ministry of War. * Cary , Colonel John B., U. S. A., Deputy Chief (Air), Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff. Castillo y Campos , Cristobal del, Under Secretary, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Catroux , General of the Army Georges, French Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Chamberlain , Neville, British Prime Minister, 1937–1940. Chaney , Major General James E., U. S. A., member of a military mission to Portugal, 1944. Chanler , Colonel William Charles, U. S. A., Acting Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff. Charles , Archduke of Austria, brother of the Archduke Otto. Charles , Sir Noel, Bart., British High Commissioner to Italy. * Chase , Lieutenant Joseph, U. S. N. R., Assistant Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Moscow. Cherrière , Brigadier General Paul-Raymond-Philippe, French Member, Allied Control Commission for Austria. * Cherwell , Lord, British Paymaster-General. Cheschmedjieff . See Cheshmedzhev. Cheshmeddieff . See Cheshmedzhev. Cheshmedjieff . See Cheshmedzhev. Cheshmedzhev , Grigor, Bulgarian Minister of Social Policy. Chesmedjiev . See Cheshmedzhev. Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the National Government of the Republic of China; Supreme Commander, China Theater. Childs , J. Rives, United States Representative, Paris Conversations Concerning Tangier. * Churchill , Junior Commander Mary, daughter of the British Prime Minister. * Churchill , Winston S., British Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury, and Minister of Defence (to July 26). Citrine , Sir Walter, General Secretary, British Trades Union Congress. Clark , General Mark W., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Forces in Austria. Clark Kerr . See Kerr. * Clay , Lieutenant General Lucius DuB., U. S. A., Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany. * Clayton , William L., Assistant Secretary of State (for Economic Affairs). * Cochrane , Admiral Edward L., U. S. N., Chief, Bureau of Ships, Navy Department. * Cohen , Benjamin V., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. * Coleman , Major Lawrence A., U. S. A., Office of the Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. * Collado , Emilio G., Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State. Conant , James B., Chairman, National Defense Research Committee. * Connor , Cassie, Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State. Conway , Captain Granville, United States Merchant Marine, Acting Administrator, War Shipping Administration. * Cooke , Vice Admiral Charles M., Jr., U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Cooper , Alfred Duff, British Ambassador to France. * Cornwall-Jones , Brigadier Arthur Thomas, British Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Costov . See Kostov. Coulondre , Robert, French Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1936–1938; Ambassador to Germany, 1938–1939. * Coulson , J. E., Acting Head, Economic Relations Department, British Foreign Office. Craig , Major General Howard A., U. S. A., Chief, Theater Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff. Crane , Major General John A., U. S. A., United States Representative, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria. Cripps , Sir Stafford, British President of the Board of Trade (from July 28). Cromie , Leonard J., Third Secretary, American Embassy, Athens. Crowley , Leo T., Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration. Ćuckov , Mane, Minister of State for Macedonia in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. Culbertson , Paul T., Chief, Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State. * Cunningham , Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew, Bart., (British) Naval Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean, 1942–October 1943; British First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, October 1943–1946. Curzon of Kedleston, Marquess, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1919–1924. * Custodio , Chief Steward Amando, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. * Cutler , Brigadier General Stuart, U. S. A., Commanding General, Berlin Headquarters District. * Cutter , Colonel R. Ammi, U. S. A., Assistant Executive Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Dalton , Hugh, British Chancellor of the Exchequer (from July 28). Dalton , Neil, Director, Domestic Branch, Office of War Information. Damaskinos , Archbishop of Greece; Regent of Greece. * Davies , Joseph E., Chairman, The President’s War Relief Control Board. Davies , Ralph K., Deputy Administrator, Petroleum Administration for War. Davis , Elmer, Director, Office of War Information. * Dean , Colonel Fred M., U. S. A., Executive Assistant to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. * Dean , Patrick, Assistant Legal Adviser, British Foreign Office. * Deane , Major General John R., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union. Debye , Peter Joseph William, Director, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics, Berlin, 1935–1939. De Gasperi , Alcide, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. de Gaulle , General Charles, President of the Council of Ministers in the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Dekanozov , Vladimir Georgyevich, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Dempster , Ernest J., United States Delegation, Paris Conversations Concerning Tangier. Denny , Brigadier, British officer in Italy (not otherwise identified). Derzhanski . See Durzhansky. * Despres , Emile, Adviser on German Economic Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Devlin , Captain Jones F., Jr., Director, Division of Vessels, Operations, War Shipping Administration. de Wilde , John C., Assistant Adviser on German Economic Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Dhimakis , Ilias, Slavo-Macedonian Communist guerrilla leader. Diamantopoulos , Cimon P., Greek Ambassador to the United States. * Dixon , Pierson, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, British Foreign Office. Doenitz . See Dönitz. Dönitz , Grand Admiral Karl, Commander in Chief, German Navy (to May 1); assumed the positions of Chief of State ( Staatsoberhaupt ) and Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces, May 1. * Donnelly , Colonel Charles H., U. S. A., Secretary, Joint Staff Planners and Joint Logistics Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff; United States Secretary, Combined Staff Planners and Combined Administrative Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. * Dooman , Eugene H., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs. * Douglas , Elsie L., Secretary to the Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Douglas , Colonel James H., Jr., U. S. A., Chief of Staff, Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces. Dragoicheva , Tsola, Secretary General, Bulgarian National Committee of the Fatherland Front. Draper , Brigadier General William H., Jr., U. S. A., Chief, Economic Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Drescher , George C., United States Secret Service. Drożniak , Edward, Director, Polish National Bank. * DuBois , Josiah E., Jr., United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Dunn , James Clement, Assistant Secretary of State (for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs); Chairman, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee. Durbrow , Elbridge, Chief, Division of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State. Durzhansky , Angel, Bulgarian Minister of Communications. Eareckson , Colonel William O., U. S. A., Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico. * Echols , Major General Oliver P., U. S. A., Deputy Commanding General, Office of Military Government for Germany, European Theater. * Edelstein , Lieutenant Julius C., U. S. N. R., Aide to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. * Eden , Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (to July 28); Chairman, Committee on German Dismemberment (established by the Yalta Conference). Edgcumbe , Major-General Oliver Pearce, British Commissioner, Allied Control Commission for Hungary. * Eisenhower , General of the Army Dwight D., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater; Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany; also (to July 14) Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. * Elbrick , C. Burke, First Secretary, American Embassy, Warsaw (en route to his post). * Elsey , Lieutenant George M., U. S. N. R., Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President. Erhardt , John G., Political Adviser on Austrian Affairs to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater. * Esposito , Brigadier General Vincent J., U. S. A., Chief, Logistics Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; member of the Joint Logistics Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Administrative Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. * Estrada , Chief Steward Pio, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. Ethiopia , The Emperor of. See Haile Selassie. Evatt , Herbert, Australian Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs. * Evsekov , Major Nikolay Vasilyevich, Soviet military interpreter. * Fahy , Charles, Legal Adviser, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Falaleyev , Marshal of Aviation Fedor Yakovlevich, Chief, Soviet Air Staff. Fallalev . See Falaleyev. Farrell , Brigadier General Thomas F., U. S. A., Deputy Commanding General, Manhattan District project. Felix , Archduke of Austria, brother of the Archduke Otto. Fetter , Frank W., Chief, Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property Affairs, Department of State. Fitch , Vice Admiral Aubrey W., U. S. N., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). * Fite , Katherine B., Assistant to the Legal Adviser, Department of State, detailed to the Office of the Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. * Flanigan , Rear Admiral Howard A., U. S. N., member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. * Fleener , Ensign Cecil M., U. S. N. R., Administrative Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President. Fletcher , Otto F., Economic Analyst, Special Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration, detailed to the Division of Economic Security Controls, Department of State. * Floresca , Chief Cook Mariano, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. * Fogelson , Colonel Elijah E., U. S. A., Adviser on Organization and Production, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Foote , Wilder, Assistant to the Secretary of State. * Forrestal , James, Secretary of the Navy. Foskett , Captain James H., U. S. N., Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Augusta . Fraleigh , William N., Second Secretary, American Embassy, Belgrade. Franco y Bahamonde , Generalissimo Francisco, Chief of State and President of the Spanish Government. Frank , Hans, (German) Governor General of Poland. Freeman , Commander Charles L., U. S. N., Executive Officer, U. S. S. Augusta. Frick , Wilhelm, (German) Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. Frith , Brigadier E. H. C., Commander, 26th British Liaison Unit, in Italy. Galounsky . See Golunsky. Galunski . See Golunsky. Ganev , Venelin Yordanov, Senior Regent in Bulgaria. * Gardner , Rear Admiral Matthias B., U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Garran , Isham Peter, Second Secretary, Western Department, British Foreign Office. Gates , Artemus L., Under Secretary of the Navy. * Gentle , Major James C., U. S. A., Economic Officer, Civil Affairs Division, United States Forces, European Theater. George II, King of the Hellenes. George VI, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. George , W. Perry, Assistant Chief, Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State (to April 9); Counselor, American Embassy, London (from April 9). George , Walter F., United States Senator from Georgia. Georgiev , Kimon, Bulgarian Prime Minister, 1934–1935, 1944–1946. Geraschenko . See Gerashchenko. * Gerashchenko , Vladimir Sergeyevich, Economic Specialist, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Gerbrandy , Pieter Sjoerd, Netherland Prime Minister (to June 23). Gereschenko . See Gerashchenko. * Gerhardt , Colonel Harrison A., U. S. A., Executive Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War; Acting Secretary, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee. Gerig , O. Benjamin, Alternate United States Delegate, Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. * Gill , Colonel Robert J., U. S. A., Executive Officer, Office of the Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. * Gilliam , Wilson A., United States Secret Service. Gilpatric , Donald S., Chief, War Areas Economic Division, Department of State. * Goberidge , maître d’hôtel at the Cecilienhof Palace (not otherwise identified). Goebbels , Joseph, German Minister for Public Enlightenment. Goering . See Göring. Golikov , Colonel General Filipp Ivanovich, Chief, Cadres Administration, People’s Commissariat for War of the Soviet Union; Commissioner for the Repatriation of Prisoners of War. Golunko . See Golunsky. Golunski . See Golunsky. * Golunsky , Sergey Alexandrovich, Expert Consultant, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. * Gomułka , Władysław, Deputy Prime Minister in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Gorduysus , Muzaffer Kamil, Turkish Consul, Komotiní, Greece. * Gorham , John T., United States Secret Service. Göring , Reich Marshal Hermann, German Minister for Aviation. Gorlinski . See Gorlinsky. * Gorlinsky , Major General Nikolay Dmitriyevich, Assistant to the First Assistant People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union. Goroshenko . See Gerashchenko. Gotsi , nom de guerre of Ilias Dhimakis, q. v. Gousev . See Gusev. Goussev . See Gusev. * Grabski , Stanisław, Vice President of the National Council of the Homeland in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. * Graham , Captain Frank H., U. S. A., White House Signal Corps Detachment. * Graham , Lieutenant Colonel Wallace H., U. S. A., 24th Evacuation Hospital, Bremen, Germany. Grässli , Max, Swiss Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in the United States. Great Britain and Northern Ireland , The King of the United Kingdom of. See George VI. * Greaves , Brigadier C. G. B., Director of Personnel Movement, British War Office. Greece , The King of. See George II. Greenwood , Arthur, British Lord Privy Seal (from July 28). * Greer , Major DeWitt, U. S. A., Officer in Charge, White House Signal Corps Detachment. Gregoriev . See Gregoryev. Gregoryev , Colonel B., (Soviet) Political Adviser, Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Grew , Joseph C., Acting Secretary of State. * Gribanov , Mikhail Grigoryevich, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Grol , Milan, Deputy Prime Minister in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. * Gromyko , Andrey Andreyevich, Soviet Ambassador to the United States; Soviet Delegate, United Nations Conference on International Organization. * Gross , Major General Charles P., U. S. A., member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Groves , Major General Leslie R., U. S. A., Commanding General, Manhattan District project. Groza , Petru, Rumanian Prime Minister. Gruenther , Major General Alfred M., U. S. A., Deputy Commander, United States Forces in Austria. Gryzlov , Lieutenant General Anatoly Alexeyevich, Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Soviet Army. * Gulick , Luther H., Adviser on Administration and Political Science, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Gusev , Fedor Tarasovich, Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Soviet Representative, European Advisory Commission; Soviet Representative, Committee on German Dismemberment (established by the Yalta Conference). Gustaf V, King of Sweden. * Haddon , Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas, British Imperial General Staff. Haile Selassie , Emperor of Ethiopia. Halifax , The Earl of, British Ambassador to the United States. Halsey , Admiral William F., U. S. N., Commander, United States Third Fleet. * Haman , Walter A., United States Secret Service. Handy , General Thomas T., U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army. Hankey , Hon. Robert M. A., British Chargé d’Affaires in Poland. * Harriman , W. Averell, Ambassador to the Soviet Union; United States Representative, Commission on the Polish Question (established by the Yalta Conference). Harris , David, Assistant Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State. * Harrison , Geoffrey Wedgwood, First Secretary, German Department, British Foreign Office. Harrison , George L., Special Consultant to the Secretary of War; Acting Chairman, Interim Committee (on atomic energy). Harrison , Leland, Minister to Switzerland. Harvey , Oliver, Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office. Hawkins , Harry, Counselor for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, London (with rank of Minister). * Hayes , Major Jesse, U. S. A., pilot of the Secretary of State’s plane. * Hayter , William, Acting Counsellor, Southern Department, British Foreign Office; Secretary General, British Delegation to the Berlin Conference. * Heath , Donald R., Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). Hebrang , Andrija, Minister of Industry in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. Heisenberg , Werner, Director, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics, Berlin. Hellenes , The King of the. See George II. Helmbold , Gerald H., Assistant Deputy Administrator for Ship Operations, War Shipping Administration. Henderson , Loy W., Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State. Hertz , Gustav, Chief, Research Laboratories, Siemens und Halske AG. Hess , Rudolf, German Minister Without Portfolio and Representative ( Stellvertreter ) of Hitler (to 1941). Hickerson , John D., Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State; also (July 7–August 7) Acting Director, Office of European Affairs, and Acting Chairman, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee. Hildred , Sir William, Director General of Civil Aviation, British Ministry of Civil Aviation. * Hilldring , Major General John H., U. S. A., Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff. Himmler , Heinrich, Chief of the German Police; Leader of the National Socialist Elite Guard. * Hipsley , Elmer R., United States Secret Service. Hirohito , Emperor of Japan. Hiss , Alger, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State (to March 18); Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State (from March 19). Hitler , Adolf, Führer , Chancellor of the German Reich, and Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces (to April 30). * Hoag , Brigadier General Earl S., U. S. A., Commanding General, European Division, Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces. Hodgson , Brigadier D. E. P., Head, British Military Mission to Albania. * Hollis , Major-General Leslie, Senior Assistant Secretary, Office of the British War Cabinet. Holman , Adrian, British Minister, Paris. * Holmes , Major-General Noel Galway, Deputy Quartermaster-General (Movements), British War Office. * Holmes , Robert E., United States Secret Service. Hood , Viscount, Reconstruction Department, British Foreign Office. Hopkins , Harry L., Adviser and Assistant to the President. Horn , Edhard, Chief Engineer, Horn plant, Plauen, Germany. Hornbeck , Stanley K., Ambassador to the Netherlands. Horne , Vice Admiral Frederick J., U. S. N., Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 1942–1946; also Chairman, Army–Navy Petroleum Board, 1943–1945. Houstoun-Boswall , W. E., British Political Representative in Bulgaria. Hoxha , Colonel General Enver, Prime Minister in the Provisional Government of Albania. Hoyer Millar . See Millar. * Hoying , Ship’s Clerk Edwin L., U. S. N. R., Administrative Officer, White House Map Room. Hubbard , Charles J., Consultant, Manhattan District project. Hull , Cordell, Secretary of State, 1933–1944. * Hull , Lieutenant General John E., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff. Hume , Major General Edgar E., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, Allied Military Government, Headquarters, Fifth Army. Hunt , Colonel Irvin L., U. S. A., Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, 1918–1920. Hurley , Major General Patrick J., U. S. A., Ambassador to China. Ickes , Harold L., Administrator, Petroleum Administration for War. Iran , The Shah-in-shah of. See Pahlevi. * Ismay , General Sir Hastings, Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence. Ivanov , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). * Jackson , Robert H., Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality; United States Representative, International Conference on Military Trials. Jacobs , Joseph E., Chief of Mission in Albania. * Jamison , Brigadier General Glen C., U. S. A., Chief, Logistics Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, Army Air Forces. Japan , The Emperor of. See Hirohito. * Jebb , Gladwyn, Head, Reconstruction Department, British Foreign Office. Jerram , Cecil Bertram, British Minister to Sweden. * Johnson , George H., United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Johnson , Herschel V., Minister to Sweden. Jovanović , Lieutenant General Arso R., Chief of Staff, Yugoslav Army. Jowitt , Sir William, British Lord Chancellor (from July 28). Juin , General Alphonse-Pierre, Chief, French General Staff of National Defense. Kaltenbrunner , Ernst, Chief, German Security Police. Kardelj , Edvard, Second Vice President in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. * Kauffman , Richard G., United States Secret Service. Kausurev . See Kozyrev. * Kavtaradze , Sergey Ivanovich, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. * Kearney , William T., United States Secret Service. Keenlyside , F. H., Assistant Secretary, British Ministry of War Transport. Keitel , Field Marshal Wilhelm, Chief, German Armed Forces High Command. * Keith , Gerald, Counselor, American Embassy, Warsaw (en route to his post). * Kellerman , Roy H., United States Secret Service. Kennan , George F., Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in the Soviet Union. * Kerr , Sir Archibald Clark, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union; British Representative, Commission on the Polish Question (established by the Yalta Conference). Kessler , Brigadier General Alfred A., Jr., U. S. A., Military Attaché and Military Air Attaché, American Embassy, Stockholm. Key , Major General William S., U. S. A., Chief, United States Section, Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Keyser , Manager, Siemens–Halske plant, Gera, Germany (not otherwise identified). Khudyakov , Marshal of Aviation Sergey Vladimirovich, Deputy Chief, Soviet Air Staff. Khydyakov . See Khudyakov. Kilgore , Harley M., United States Senator from West Virginia. Kilpatrick , Brigadier General John R., U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Port of Embarkation, Newport News, Virginia. Kindleberger , Major Charles P., U. S. A., Washington Liaison Office, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. King , Alfred Hazell, British Acting Consul General, Salonika. * King , Fleet Admiral Ernest J., U. S. N., Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations. Kirk , Alexander, Ambassador to Italy. Kiselev , Evgeny Dmitriyevich, Soviet Political Adviser, Vienna. Kissilev . See Kiselev. Kistiakowsky , George B., Consultant, Manhattan District project. Kleffens , Eelco N. van, Netherland Minister of Foreign Affairs. Klieforth , A. W., Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Czechoslovakia. * Koeltz , Lieutenant General Louis, Deputy Military Governor, French Zone of Occupation in Germany. Koenig , Brigadier General E. F., U. S. A., Commanding General, Chanor Base Section. * Koenig , General Joseph-Pierre, Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany. Kohler , Foy D., Assistant Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State. Kolchak , Vice Admiral Alexander Vasilyevich, leader of an anti-Bolshevik movement in Siberia, 1917–1920. Kołodziejski , Henryk, member of the Polish National Council of the Homeland. Kolshak . See Kolchak. Kondoianopoulos ( Kondoyannopoulos ), Andreas, Nomarch of the Greek Department of Rhodope. Konev , Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Stepanovich, Commander in Chief, First Ukrainian Front. Koniev . See Konev. Konoe . See Konoye. Konoye , Prince Fumimaro, Japanese Prime Minister, 1937–1939, 1940–1941. * Koretsky , Colonel M. M., an officer in the Soviet Army connected with housing and security arrangements at the Berlin Conference (not otherwise identified). Kosanović , Sava, Minister of Information in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. Kostylev , Mikhail Alexeyevich, Soviet Ambassador to Italy. Kostov , Traicho, Secretary General, Bulgarian Communist Party. Kostyushchenko , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Germany (not otherwise identified). Kousnetsov . See Kuznetsov. * Kozyrev , Semen Pavlovich, Director, First European Division, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Kreiter , General, an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). * Kruglov , Colonel General Sergey Nikiforovich, First Assistant People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach , Gustav, Chairman, Managing Board, Fried. Krupp AG. (to 1943). * Kucherov , Admiral Stepan Grigoryevich, Chief of Staff, Soviet Navy. Kusnecov . See Kuznetsov. Kuter , Major General Laurence S., U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Army Air Forces. * Kuznetsov , Admiral of the Fleet Nikolay Gerasimovich, People’s Commissar of the Soviet Navy. Kwapiński , Jan, Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Shipping and Acting Minister of Finance in the Polish Government-in-Exile at London; Representative of the Polish Government-in-Exile to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. * Kyle , Colonel William H., U. S. A., Aide to the Secretary of War. Labrishchev . See Lavrishchev. Lacoste , Francis, French Minister, Washington; Chargé d’Affaires ad interim (July 23–August 10). * Land , Vice Admiral Emory S., U. S. N. (retired), Administrator, War Shipping Administration; Chairman, United States Maritime Commission; United States Member, Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards. * Lane , Arthur Bliss, Appointed Ambassador to Poland. Lange , Oskar, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago. Larrabee , Lieutenant Colonel Sterling L., U. S. A., Military Attaché, American Embassy, Athens. Lascelles , Sir Alan, Private Secretary to King George VI. Laski , Harold J., Chairman, British Labour Party. * Laukhuff , Perry, Political Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Lavrentyev , Anatoly Iosifovich, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. * Lavrishchev , Alexander Andreyevich, Director, Division of Balkan Countries, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Lavrov , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). Lawrence , Ernest O., Consultant, Manhattan District project. * Laycock , Major-General Robert Edward, British Chief of Combined Operations. * Leahy , Fleet Admiral William D., U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. Leatham , Admiral Sir Ralph, British Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth. * Leathers , Lord, British Minister of War Transport. LeBreton , Rear Admiral David M., U. S. N., Commandant, Fifth Naval District; Commander, Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia. * Lee , Major Alfred K., U. S. A., a dinner guest of the President at Babelsberg. * Lee , Colonel Ernest R., U. S. A., Aide to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater. Lee , Lieutenant General John C. H., U. S. A., Commanding General, Communications Zone, European Theater. Lekarsky , Lieutenant General Krum, Bulgarian Assistant Minister of War. Leluk , General, chief Soviet supply officer at Vienna (not otherwise identified). Levels , Lieutenant Colonel, officer in Italy (not otherwise identified). Leverich , Henry P., Acting Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State. Ley , Robert, Head of the German Labor Front. * Licodo , Steward First Class Benjamin, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. Lightner , E. Allan, Jr., Secretary, United States Delegation, European Advisory Commission. * Lincoln , Brigadier General George A., U. S. A., Chief, Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; member of the Joint Staff Planners, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Staff Planners, Combined Chiefs of Staff. * List , Sergeant Eugene, U. S. A., pianist at several dinners given by the President at Babelsberg. Loftus , John A., Special Assistant to the Director, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State. Łomnicky , Captain, interpreter for the Commander in Chief, Polish Second Corps (not otherwise identified). Loudon , Alexander, Netherland Ambassador to the United States. * Lovell , Alfred H., Jr., Third Secretary, American Embassy, Warsaw (en route to his post). Lovett , Robert A., Assistant Secretary of War for Air. Lozovsky , Solomon Abramovich, Acting People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. * Lubin , Isador, Associate United States Representative, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Lunghi , Major Hugh, British military interpreter. Lupu , Nicolae, leader of the Rumanian National Peasant Party. MacArthur , General of the Army Douglas, U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Pacific; Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area. Maček , Vladimir, President, Croatian Peasant Party in Yugoslavia. Machold , Reinhold, Provincial Governor of Styria. Mack , William H. B., Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Austria. MacLeish , Archibald, Assistant Secretary of State (for Public and Cultural Relations). * Macready , Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon, Head of the Army Delegation, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington. MacVeagh , Lincoln, Ambassador to Greece. * Mahler , Ernst, Adviser on Industry, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Maiski . See Maisky. * Maisky , Ivan Mikhailovich, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Chairman, Allied Commission on Reparations. Makins , Roger, British Minister, Washington. * Mallaby , Lieutenant-Colonel G., (British Element,) Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Mallet , Sir Victor, British Appointed Ambassador to Spain. * Maloney , James J., United States Secret Service. Maniu , Iuliu, President, Rumanian National Peasant Party. * Maples , Rear Admiral Houston L., U. S. N., Senior Naval Officer, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union; Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Moscow. Marković , Lazar, a leader of the Yugoslav Radical Party. * Marshall , General of the Army George C., U. S. A., Chief of Staff, United States Army. * Marshall , J. Howard, General Counsel, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Martin , John Miller, Principal Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister, 1941–1945. Massigli , René, French Ambassador to the United Kingdom; French Representative, European Advisory Commission. * Matthews , H. Freeman, Director of European Affairs, Department of State. Matwin , Władysław, Polish Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in the Soviet Union. Maximov , Mikhail, Soviet Ambassador to Iran. Maxton , James, Member of the British Parliament. McCabe , Thomas B., Army–Navy Liquidation Commissioner. McCann , Rear Admiral Allan R., U. S. N., Commander, Task Force 68, United States Atlantic Fleet. * McCarthy , Lieutenant Charles E., U. S. N., White House courier. McCarthy , Colonel Charles W., U. S. A., Secretary, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee. * McCarthy , Rear Admiral E. D. B., Assistant Chief, British Naval Staff. * McCloy , John J., Assistant Secretary of War. McCreery , Lieutenant-General Sir Richard, Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Austria. * McDill , Captain Alexander S., U. S. N., Aide to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. * McDonald , First Lieutenant C. M., U. S. A., nephew of the Personal Physician to the President (Captain Alphonse McMahon). * McFarland , Brigadier General Andrew J., U. S. A., Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff; United States Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff. * McGrath , John J., Supervising Agent, New York District, United States Secret Service. * McIntire , Lieutenant Colonel A. M., U. S. A., Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces. * McMahon , Captain Alphonse, U. S. N. R., Personal Physician to the President. McNarney , General Joseph T., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater; Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater. McNeill , Captain William H., U. S. A., Assistant Military Attaché, American Embassy, Athens. Melbourne , Roy M., Acting United States Representative in Rumania. Meller , President, Berlin Physical and Technical Institute, Weida, Germany (not otherwise identified). Merenditis , Alexander, Governor General of Northern Greece. Metaxas , General John, Greek Prime Minister, 1936–1941. Meyrier , Jacques, Director General of Administrative Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Michael (Mihai) I, King of Rumania. Middleton , G. H., Second Secretary, British Embassy, Washington. Mihailović , General Draža, leader of the Yugoslav Nationalist Guerrilla Forces. * Mikołajczyk , Stanislaw, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Miles , Richard T. G., Third Secretary, British Embassy, Washington. * Millar , Frederick Hoyer, Head, Western Department, British Foreign Office. Millikan , M. F., Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration. * Minc , Hilary, Minister of Industry in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Mironenko , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Germany (not otherwise identified). Mishshenko , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). * Mitchell , Major Nicholas A., U. S. A., Assistant to the Military Aide to the President. * Modzelewski , Zygmunt, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco. * Molotov , Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Soviet Representative, Commission on the Polish Question (established by the Yalta Conference). * Monckton , Sir Walter, Head, British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Monroe , Thomas, Regional Director, Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration. * Montgomery , Field Marshal Sir Bernard, Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Germany. * Moore , Captain Charles J., U. S. N., Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moran , Commodore Edmond J., U. S. N. R., Assistant Deputy Administrator for Small Vessels, War Shipping Administration. * Moran , Lord, Personal Physician to the British Prime Minister. Morawski . See Osóbka-Morawski. Morgan , Stokeley W., Chief, Aviation Division, Department of State. Morgan , Lieutenant-General W. D., (British) Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. Morgenthau , Henry, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury (to July 22). Morocco , The Sultan of. See Mohammed V. Morrison , Herbert, British Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (from July 28). * Morse , Huntington T., Assistant to the Administrator, War Shipping Administration. * Mosely , Philip E., Political Adviser to the United States Representative, European Advisory Commission. * Mountbatten , Admiral Lord Louis, (British) Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. * Moynihan , Corporal Eleanor, U. S. A., Telephone Operator, Amco switchboard. * Murphy , Robert D., Political Adviser, Executive Office, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). Murray , Wallace, Ambassador to Iran. Mussolini , Benito, Italian Prime Minister, 1922–1943. * Myers , Lieutenant Colonel Henry T., U. S. A., pilot of the President’s plane. Napoléon I. See Bonaparte. * Navarra , Private First Class Jules, U. S. A., vocal soloist at a dinner given by the President at Babelsberg. Neikov , Petur, Bulgarian Communist leader. Nelson , Rear Admiral Horatio, Commander of the British Fleet at the Battle of Aboukir, 1798. * Nelson , Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence, U. S. A., Chaplain, Second Armored Division. * Nicholson , Edward Max, Head, Allocation of Tonnage Division, British Ministry of War Transport. Nimitz , Fleet Admiral Chester W., U. S. N., Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. * Nixon , Robert, representative of the International News Service in the press, radio, and photographers’ pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference. Nobel , Alfred, creator of the Nobel Foundation from which the Nobel prizes are awarded (died 1896). Noel-Baker , Philip John, British Minister of State. * Norstad , Major General Lauris, U. S. A., Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, Headquarters, Army Air Forces. * Northern , Captain Ernest M., Jr., U. S. A., Chaplain, 67th Armored Regiment. * Novikov , Kirill Vasilyevich, Director, Second European Division, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Soviet Delegate, United Nations Conference on International Organization; Secretary, Soviet Delegation to the Berlin Conference. Obbov , Alexander Christov, Secretary General, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (Fatherland Front wing). * O’Driscoll , Daniel J., United States Secret Service. Offie , Carmel, Deputy Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta. Okamoto , Suemasa, Japanese Minister to Sweden. * Olivares , Chief Steward Candido, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. Oliver , Covey T., Acting Chief, Division of Economic Security Controls, Department of State. Onodera , Major General Makoto, Military Attaché, Japanese Legation, Stockholm. Oppenheimer , J. Robert, Director, Manhattan District project laboratory, Santa Fe, New Mexico. * Ordona , Chief Cook Celedonio, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. * Orig , Chief Cook Alfredo, U. S. N., Head Boy, President’s messman detail. * Osóbka-Morawski , Edward Bolesław, Prime Minister in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. * Oster , Captain Henry R., U. S. N., Deputy Director of Logistic Plans, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Otto , Archduke of Austria; pretender to the Austrian throne. Oxley , Major-General W. H., Commissioner, British Military Mission in Bulgaria. Paetz , Chief Engineer, Siemens–Halske plant, Gera, Germany (not otherwise identified). * Page , Edward, Jr., First Secretary, American Embassy, Moscow. Pahlevi , Mohammad Reza Shah, Shah-in-shah of Iran. Palmer , Colonel Alan, British Military Mission to Albania. * Palomaria , Chief Cook Jose, U. S. N., member of the President’s messman detail. Papandreou , George, Greek Prime Minister, April–December 1944. Papen , Franz von, German Ambassador to Turkey. * Parks , Major General Floyd L., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Sector, Berlin District. Parri , Ferruccio, Italian Prime Minister. * Parten , J. R., Chief of Staff, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Pasco , Lieutenant Colonel H. Merrill, U. S. A., Assistant Secretary, War Department General Staff. Pasvolsky , Leo, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Patterson , Gardner, Treasury Representative in Southeastern Europe. Patterson , Richard C., Jr., Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Patterson , Robert P., Under Secretary of War. * Patton , General George S., Jr., U. S. A., Commanding General, Third Army. Pauker , Ana, member of the Central Committee, Rumanian Communist Party. * Pauley , Edwin W., United States Representative, Allied Commission on Reparations. Pavlov , Assen, Bulgarian Minister of Agriculture. * Pavlov , Vladimir Nikolayevich, Personal Secretary and Interpreter to the Chairman, Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union. * Peck , Colonel Clarence R., U. S. A., Executive Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perkins , Lieutenant Commander Kenneth D., U. S. N., Chaplain, U. S. S. Augusta. Peterson , Sir Maurice Drummond, British Ambassador to Turkey. Pethick-Lawrence , Frederick W., Member of the British Parliament. Petkov , Nikola Dimitrov, Secretary General, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. Petrov , Appolon Alexandrovich, Soviet Ambassador to China. Petrov , Army General Ivan Efimovich, Chief of Staff to the Soviet Commander in Chief, First Ukrainian Front. Phelps , Dudley Maynard, Acting Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State. * Philler , Master Sergeant Henry, U. S. A., White House Signal Corps Detachment. * Picknett , B. F., British Ministry of War Transport. Piesch , Hans, Acting Governor of Carinthia. Pinkerton , Lowell Call, Consul General, Jerusalem. Pius XII, Pope. Podobed , Colonel, Soviet officer in Italy (not otherwise identified). * Podtserob , Boris Fedorovich, Secretary-Translator and Assistant to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Pogue , L. Welch, Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board. Pope , The. See Pius XII. Popiel , Karol, head of the Polish Labor Party. * Portal , Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles, British Chief of Air Staff. * Potrubach , Mikhail Mikhailovich, First Secretary, Second Class, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Potter , Charles J., Deputy Administrator, Solid Fuels Administration for War; Chairman, Combined Coal Committee, Combined Production and Resources Board. * Prettyman , Chief Steward Arthur S., U. S. N., the President’s valet. Prodanović , Jaša, Minister for Serbia in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. Pushkin , Georgy Maximovich, Soviet Political Adviser, Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Pyron , Brigadier General Walter B., U. S. A., Director, Planning Division, Army-Navy Petroleum Board. Raczkiewicz , Wladyslaw, President of the Polish Government-in-Exile at London. Raczynski , Count Edward, Ambassador of the Polish Government-in-Exile at London to the United Kingdom. * Rajchman , Ludwik, Appointed Polish Delegate, Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; Chairman, Polish Supply and Reconstruction Mission to North America. Rákosi , Mátyas, First Secretary, Hungarian Workers Party Central Executive. Rankin , Lieutenant-Colonel J. T., Liaison Section, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta. * Reams , R. Borden, Information Officer, Office of the Secretary of State. Reber , Samuel, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State. * Redecker , Sydney B., Political Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Reed , Captain Arthur D., U. S. A., Civil Affairs Division, Headquarters, United States Sector, Berlin District. Reinstein , Jacques J., Acting Chief, Division of Financial Affairs, Department of State. Renner , Karl, Federal Chancellor in the Provisional Government of Austria. Rhee , Syngman, Chairman, Korean Commission, Washington. Ribbentrop , Joachim von, German Minister of Foreign Affairs. * Riddleberger , James W., Chief, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State. Ridley , Major General Clarence S., U. S. A., Chief, United States Mission to the Iranian Army. * Rigdon , Lieutenant William M., U. S. N., Administrative Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President. * Riggs , Colonel Theodore S., U. S. A., member of the Joint Logistics Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of the Combined Administrative Committee, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Roberts , Frank, British Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in the Soviet Union. Rogozhin , Colonel Anatoly Ivanovich, leader of a corps of Russian troops which fought under German command in Yugoslavia in World War II. * Rokossovsky , Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin Konstantinovich, Commander, Second White Russian Army. * Rola-Zymierski , Marshal Michal, Minister of National Defense in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. * Romagna , Jack, Liaison Representative, The White House. Ronald , Nigel, Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office. Roosevelt , Franklin D., President of the United States, 1933–April 12, 1945. * Rosato , Chief Warrant Officer Frank J., U. S. A., Conductor, Berlin District Army Band. Rosenberg , Alfred, National Leader ( Reichsleiter ) and Head of the Office of Foreign Affairs, National Socialist German Workers Party, 1933–1940; German Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 1941–1944. * Rosenman , Samuel I., Special Counsel to the President. Rosenson , Alexander M., Economic Adviser, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Ross , Charles G., Secretary to the President. * Ross , Captain John B., U. S. A., son of the Secretary to the President. Ross , John C., Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State. * Rowan , Leslie, Principal Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister. * Rowley , James J., United States Secret Service. Royen , Jan Herman van, Netherland Minister Without Portfolio. * Rubin , Seymour J., Chief, Division of Economic Security Controls, Department of State, detailed to the United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Rueff , Jacques, French Inspector General of Finances; Chief, French Economic Commission for German Affairs. Rumania , The King of. See Michael I. * Rusk , Colonel Howard A., U. S. A., Chief, Convalescent Services Division, Office of the Air Surgeon, Army Air Forces. * Russell , Donald, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. * Rzymowski , Wincenty, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Sabourov . See Saburov. * Saburov , Maxim Zakharovich, Assistant to the Chief, Soviet Military Administration in Germany. Sadr , Mohsen, Iranian Prime Minister. Saed . See Sa’id. Sa’id-Maraghah’i , Mohammad, Iranian Prime Minister, March–November 1944. Saito . See Sato. Saka , Hasan, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Saksin , Georgy Filippovich, Acting Soviet Representative, European Advisory Commission. Salazar , António de Oliveira, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers; Minister of Foreign Affairs. Saracoğlu , Şükrü, Turkish Prime Minister. Sargent , Sir Orme, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office. Sarper , Selim, Turkish Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Sato , Naotake, Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Satterthwaite , Livingston, Civil Air Attaché, American Embassy, London. Saugstad , Jesse E., Chief, Shipping Division, Department of State. Saunders–Jacobs , Brigadier J. C., (British) Commander, Fifth Indian Infantry Brigade, in Greece. Sawyer , Charles, Ambassador to Belgium; Minister to Luxembourg. Sawyer , Mrs. Charles, wife of the Ambassador to Belgium. Schacht , Hjalmar, German Minister of Finance. * Schade , Commodore Henry A., U. S. N., Chief, United States Naval Technical Mission in Europe. Scheibe , Head of the Laboratory, Berlin Physical and Technical Institute, Weida, Germany (not otherwise identified). Schermerhorn , Willem, Netherland Prime Minister. Schoenfeld , H. F. Arthur, United States Representative in Hungary. Schuyler , Brigadier General Cortland T. Van R., U. S. A., Chief, United States Military Representation, Allied Control Commission for Rumania. Schwarzkopf , Lieutenant Colonel H. Norman, U. S. A., Commander, United States Military Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie . Scobie , Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald, British General Officer Commanding in Greece. Sébastiani , General of Division Horace-Frangois-Bastien, French Ambassador to Turkey, 1806–1807. * Semenov , Vladimir Semenovich, Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Stockholm. Sepahbodi , Anoshiravan, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes , The King of the. See Alexander I. Seymour , Sir Horace, British Ambassador to China. Sforza , Count Carlo, Italian High Commissioner for Punishment of Illegal Acts Under Fascism and Minister Without Portfolio, 1944. Shantz , Harold, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Yugoslavia. * Sherman , Lieutenant C. D., U. S. A., Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces. Shinwell , Emanuel, Member of the British Parliament. Shmega , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Germany (not otherwise identified). Sikorski , General of the Armies Wladyslaw, Polish Prime Minister and Commander in Chief of the Polish Armies, 1939–1943. * Sinclair , Sir Robert, Chief Executive, British Ministry of Production. Skoropadski . See Skoropadsky. Skoropadsky , General Pavlo, self-styled Hetman of the Ukraine. * Slavin , Lieutenant General Nikolay Vasilyevich, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Soviet Army. Slipchenko , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). * Smith , Merriman, representative of the United Press in the press, radio, and photographers” pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference. Snyder , John W., Federal Loan Administrator (to July 22); Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion (from July 23). Sobelev . See Sobolev. * Sobolev , Arkady Alexandrovich, Chief, Political Section, Soviet Military Administration in Germany. Sobonev . See Sobolev. Sofianopolous . See Sophianopoulos. Sofianopoulos . See Sophianopoulos. Solborg , Colonel Robert A., U. S. A., Military Attaché, American Embassy, Lisbon. * Somervell , General Brehon B., U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Service Forces. Somerville , Admiral Sir James, Head of the Admiralty Delegation, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington. Sommers , Major Davidson, U. S. A., Assistant Executive, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Soong , T. V., Chinese Prime Minister; also (to July 30) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Sophianopoulos , Ioannis, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs. * Spicer , Vernon D., United States Secret Service. * Sproul , Robert G., Adviser on Human Relations, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. Stainoff . See Stainov. Stainov , Petko, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cults. * Stalin , Generalissimo Iosif Vissarionovich, Chairman, Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union; People’s Commissar for Defense. Stamboliisky . See Stambolisky. Stamboliski . See Stambolisky. Stambolisky , Assen, member of the General Committee, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. * Stańczyk , Jan, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Stanojević , Aca, President, Yugoslav Radical Party. Stark , Admiral Harold R., U. S. N., Commander, United States Naval Forces, Europe; Commander, Twelfth Fleet. Stassen , Commander Harold E., U. S. N. R., United States Delegate, United Nations Conference on International Organization. Stein , Baron Heinrich vom und zum, Prussian Minister in charge of all civil affairs, 1807–1808. Stetson , Colonel John B., Jr., U. S. A., Commissioner, Office of the Joint Army–Navy Liquidation Board, Persian Gulf Command. Stettinius , Edward R., Jr., Secretary of State (to June 27); Personal Representative of the President (from June 28); Chairman, United States Delegation, United Nations Conference on International Organization (April 17–June 26). Stevenson , Air Vice Marshal Donald, British High Commissioner in Rumania. Stevenson , R. C. Skrine, British Ambassador to Yugoslavia. * Stimson , Henry L., Governor General of the Philippines, 1927–1929; Secretary of War, 1911–1913, 1940–September 1945. Stirbey , Prince Barbu, Rumanian Prime Minister, 1927–1930; head of the Rumanian Armistice Commission at Moscow, 1944. Stone , Rear Admiral Ellery W., U. S. N. R., Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (for Italy). * Stone , Colonel John N., U. S. A., Chief, Pacific Branch, Operational Plans Division, Headquarters, Army Air Forces. * Stoner , Chief Warrant Officer Frank G., U. S. A., White House Signal Corps Detachment. Stoyanov , Christo, member of the Executive Committee, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (Fatherland Front wing). * Strang , Sir William, Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Germany. Streicher , Julius, District Leader ( Gauleiter ) for Franconia, German National Socialist German Workers Party. * Stroop , Captain Paul D., U. S. N., Aviation Plans Officer on the Staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Šubašić , Ivan, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia, Sumer , Nurullah Esat, Turkish Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. Surtees , Major-General George, Commanding General, British Base and Lines of Communications, in Belgium. Susaicov . See Susaikov. Susaikov , Colonel General Ivan Zakharovich, (Soviet) Deputy Chairman, Allied Control Commission for Rumania. Šutej , Juraj, Minister Without Portfolio in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia. Suzuki , Admiral Baron Kantaro, Japanese Prime Minister. Sweden , The King of. See Gustaf V. Swinton , Viscount, British Minister for Civil Aviation. Szakasits , Arpad, President, Hungarian Social Democratic Party. Szalai , Sándor, Chief, Foreign Department, Hungarian Social Democratic Party. Szent-Iványi , Sándor, Administrative Vice President, Hungarian Citizens Democratic Party. * Szostek , Corporal Charlotte, U. S. A., Telephone Operator, Amco switchboard. Taft , Charles P., Director, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State. Tappin , Lieutenant Colonel John L., U. S. A., Chief, Liaison Section, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta. Tarchiani , Alberto, Italian Ambassador to the United States. Tatarescu , Gheorghe, Rumanian Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Foreign Affairs. * Taylor , Captain Edmund B., U. S. N., Aide to the Secretary of the Navy. * Taylor , Chief Pharmacist’s Mate Preston C., U. S. N., detailed as Assistant to the Personal Physician to the President. Teleki , Count Géza, leader of the Hungarian Citizens Democratic Party. * Theakstone , Major Louis Marguarde, (British) Interpreter to the Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff. Thiessen , Peter, Director, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry, Berlin. Thomas , Charles A., Consultant, Manhattan District project. Thomas , Edward J., Assistant Communications Officer, Office of Foreign Service Administration, Department of State. * Thomas , Private John R., Jr., U. S. A., nephew of the Personal Physician to the President (Captain Alphonse McMahon). * Thompson , Commander C. R., Personal Assistant to the British Minister of Defence. * Thompson , Llewellyn E., Jr., Second Secretary (First Secretary from July 23), American Embassy, London. Thorne , General Sir Andrew, (British) General Officer Commanding in Chief, Allied Land Forces in Norway. Thorp , Willard L., Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. * Tiernan , Colonel L. Curtis, U. S. A., Chief of Chaplains, European Theater. Tindall , Brigadier General Richard G., U. S. A., Military Attaché, American Embassy, London. Tischler , Josef, member of the Provincial Government of Carinthia. Tito , Marshal (Josip Broz ), Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense in the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia; Supreme Commander, Yugoslav Army. Tittmann , Harold H., Jr., Assistant to the Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII. Togo , Shigenori, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. Tomlinson , George, Member of the British Parliament. * Torina , Michael W., United States Secret Service. Toyoda , Admiral Soemu, Chief of Staff, Japanese Imperial Navy. * Trone , Solomon, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Truman , Sergeant Harry, U. S. A., nephew of the President. * Truman , Harry S., Vice President of the United States (January 20–April 12); President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy (from April 12). Truman , J. Vivian, brother of the President. Tsamados , Michael, Greek Under Minister for Foreign Affairs. * Tsarapkin , Semen Konstantinovich, Director, United States Division, People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. * Turner , Mark, Principal Assistant Secretary, Economic Advisory Branch, British Foreign Office, detailed to the British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Tuthill , John Wills, Political Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). * Tyree , Commander John A., Jr., U. S. N., Assistant Naval Aide to the President. Umezu , General Yoshijiro, Chief of Staff, Japanese Imperial Army. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland , The King of. See George VI. * Vacarro , Ernest, representative of the Associated Press in the press, radio, and photographers’ pool assigned to cover the Berlin Conference. Vandenberg , Arthur H., United States Senator from Michigan. * Vardaman , Captain James K., Jr., U. S. N. R., Naval Aide to the President. * Vardaman , First Lieutenant James M., U. S. A., nephew of the Naval Aide to the President. Varela Iglesias , Lieutenant General José Enrique, High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco. Vasilyevsky , Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich, Commander in Chief, Soviet Far Eastern Forces. Vassilievski . See Vasilyevsky. Vassilios , Metropolitan of Florina, Greece. * Vaughan , Brigadier General Harry H., U. S. A., Military Aide to the President. Velchev , Colonel Damian, Adviser to the Bulgarian Prime Minister, 1935. Venizelos , Eleftherios, Greek Prime Minister, 1910–1915, 1915, 1917–1920, 1924, 1928–1932, 1932, 1933. Villard , Henry S., Chief, Division of African Affairs, Department of State; United States Representative, Paris Conversations Concerning Tangier. * Vincent , John Carter, Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State. Vinogradov , Sergey Alexandrovich, Soviet Ambassador to Turkey. Vinogradov , Lieutenant General Vladislav Petrovich, (Soviet) Chief of Staff, Allied Control Commission for Rumania. Vishinski . See Vyshinsky. Vlasov , Lieutenant General Andrey Andreyevich, organizer of the “Russian Army of Liberation” (an anti-Soviet military force under German auspices). Voroshilov , Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich, Chairman, Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Voskresentev , an alleged participant in anti-Soviet activities in Austria (not otherwise identified). Voulgaris , Admiral Petros, Greek Prime Minister. Vyshinski . See Vyshinsky. * Vyshinsky , Andrey Yanuaryevich, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Wadsworth , George, Minister to Lebanon and Syria. * Waley , Sir David, Under-Secretary, British Treasury, detailed to the British Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Walker , John H., United States Secret Service. Wang Shih-chieh, Chinese Minister of Information (to July 30); Minister of Foreign Affairs (from July 30). Warburg , Otto, Director, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Cell Physiology, Berlin. * Ward , J. G., Acting First Secretary, Reconstruction Department, British Foreign Office. Warner , Edward, Vice Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board. * Waters , Edmund J., United States Secret Service. Wedemeyer , Lieutenant General Albert C., U. S. A., Commanding General, United States Forces, China Theater; Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, China Theater. * Weeks , Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald, Deputy Military Governor and Chief of Staff, British Zone of Occupation in Germany. * Weir , Albert R., United States Secret Service. * Weston , W. G., British Ministry of War Transport. * Whiteus , Corporal Mary, U. S. A., Telephone Operator, Amco switchboard. Wilhelm , Prince Imperial of Germany and Crown Prince of Prussia, 1888–1918. Willson , Vice Admiral Russell, U. S. N., member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Wilson , Edwin C., Ambassador to Turkey. * Wilson , Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland, Head, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington. Winant , John G., Ambassador to the United Kingdom; United States Representative, European Advisory Commission; United States Representative, Committee on German Dismemberment (established by the Yalta Conference). Winterbottom , John J., Director, Tanker Allocations, War Shipping Administration. Winterton , Major-General John, British Deputy Commissioner, Allied Control Commission for Austria. * Wise , Colonel John S., U. S. A., Staff Officer, Theater (Operations) Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff. Wolf , Justin R., Washington Liaison Representative, United States Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations. * Woodward , Lieutenant Colonel Harper L., U. S. A., Administrative Officer, Advisory Council to the Commanding General, Headquarters, Army Air Forces. Wu , K. C., Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yakovlev , Colonel Pavel G., Soviet repatriation agent in Italy. Yale , William, Area Specialist, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State. Yemashev . See Yumashev. Yonai , Admiral Mitsumasa, Japanese Minister of Navy. Yordanov , Georgy Ilchev, member of the General Committee, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union. * Yost , Charles W., Executive Secretary, Central Secretariat, Department of State; Secretary General, United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference. Yugoslavia , The King of. See Alexander I. Yugov , Anton, Bulgarian Minister of the Interior. Yumashev , Admiral Ivan Stepanovich, Commander in Chief, Soviet Pacific Fleet. Yurdonov . See Yordanov. Zacharias , Captain Ellis M., U. S. N., Office of Public Information, Navy Department. Zakinthinos , Dionysios, Greek Under Secretary of the Press. Zakynthinos . See Zakinthinos. * Zebrowski , Tadeusz, Acting Director, Political Department, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. * Zhukov , Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich, Chief, Soviet Military Administration in Germany; Commander in Chief, Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany. * Zink , Major Harold, U. S. A., Political Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). List of Papers List of Papers Editor’s Note. —This list of papers has been printed in chronological order to give the reader ( a ) a convenient aid in locating individual papers by date and ( b ) a better sense of the temporal relationship of events described in this volume than he might obtain from the subject arrangement of the documents in part VII of the volume. In providing an aid in locating individual papers by date, it seemed desirable to include as separate items in this list papers which are quoted in substantial part within other documents, texts which appear in footnotes to other documents, and texts which are printed as enclosures, attachments, annexes, or appendices to documents bearing different dates. Information in this list concerning such papers is enclosed in brackets, and an indication is given as to the date and location of the principal documents to which these subordinate papers are related. A considerable number of the documents printed in this volume were not dated. Their placement in this list has been determined by their relationship to other documents of known date. The arrangement even of dated papers is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, since under a given date the time at which many of the documents originated is not known. In a few cases the order of related papers of the same date in this list differs from the order in which the same papers are printed in the body of the compilation, since time of origin was a prime factor in the preparation of this chronological list, whereas other factors, including time of receipt, were given weight in the arrangement of papers of even date in the body of the volume. When different extracts from the same document have been printed under separate subject headings, the document number and the page reference for each extract are shown in this list in connection with the description of the paper in question. In a few cases, the full text of a paper has been printed under one subject heading and an extract from the same paper has been printed under a different subject heading; in such cases this list gives the document number and page reference for the full text only. This list does not include very brief extracts from papers quoted in the footnotes or in the body of other documents, and it does not include papers merely referred to or summarized in the footnotes or in the body of other documents. Because it is not immediately apparent in many cases from the document heading printed in this list of papers that a given document was prepared at the Berlin Conference, all meetings of the Conference and all papers prepared at the Conference site (i.e., Potsdam, Babelsberg, or Berlin) during the period of the Conference (July 16–August 2, 1945) have been marked in this list with an asterisk (*). Date and Number Paper Document Number Page 1944 Sept. 18 [ 19 ] [ Aide-Mémoire by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill ] [Record of agreement regarding the possible use of an atomic bomb against Japan and regarding Anglo-American collaboration in developing atomic energy for military and commercial purposes; printed as an enclosure to a memorandum of July 18, 1945, from Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of War (document No. 1306, page 1370 [ Pg. 1370 includes portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] ), q. v.] 1945 Feb. 11 Protocol of Proceedings of the Yalta Conference Record of the conclusions of the Heads of Government at the Yalta Conference on the following subjects: world organization; territorial trusteeship; liberated Europe; dismemberment of Germany; a French zone of occupation in Germany; the Allied Control Council for Germany; reparations from Germany; war criminals; Poland; Yugoslavia; southeastern Europe; Iran; meetings of Foreign Secretaries; and the Montreux Convention and the Turkish Straits. 1416 1567 [ Pg. 1567 is part of Doc. 1416 ] Feb. 11 Communiqué Issued at the End of the Yalta Conference Public report on the conclusions of the Heads of Government at the Yalta Conference on the following subjects: the defeat of Germany; the occupation and control of Germany; reparation by Germany; the United Nations conference to be held at San Francisco; liberated Europe; Poland; Yugoslavia; meetings of Foreign Secretaries; and Allied unity in time of peace. 1417 1574 [ Pg. 1574 includes portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Mar. 10 [ President Roosevelt to the Ambassador to Spain ] [Views with regard to relations of the United States with Spain; quoted in footnote 4 to a telegram of July 16, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (document No. 1175, page 1171 [ Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 1175 ] ), q. v.] May 29 [ The Chief of the French Military Mission in the United States to the Chief of Staff, United States Army ] [Proposal to place a French corps of two infantry divisions under American command in the Pacific war; printed as enclosure A to a memorandum of July 16, 1945, by the United States Chiefs of Staff (document No. 1288, page 1341 [ Pg. 1341 includes portions of Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , and Doc. 1288 ] ), q. v.] June 11 [ The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs to Colonel John S. Wise, of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff ] [Suggestion as to the urgency of communicating with the Portuguese Government concerning plans for Portuguese participation in possible operations to expel Japanese forces from Timor; printed as an appendix to a memorandum of July 16, 1945, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (document No. 1295, page 1349 [ Pg. 1349 includes portions of Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , and Doc. 1295 ] ), q. v.] June 15 [ Declaration by Polish Authorities ] [Declaration by the so-called Polish Provisional Government suggesting Polish participation in international bodies concerned with Germany; summary printed in footnote 3 to a telegram of July 22, 1945, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union to the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference (document No. 1133, page 1125 [ Pg. 1125 is part of Doc. 1133 ] ), q. v.] 1945 June 20 [ The Soviet Ambassador to the Secretary of State ] [Review of Soviet-American discussions on the subject of trusteeship and request for discussion of this subject with Secretary Stettinius before the end of the United Nations Conference on International Organization; printed as enclosure 1 to a note of July 20, 1945, from the Soviet Ambassador to Secretary of State Byrnes (document No. 734, page 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 734 ] ), q. v.] June 23 [ The Secretary of State to the Soviet Ambassador ] [Statement of the United States position, in principle, with respect to the eligibility of the Soviet Union as an administering authority under the trusteeship system, and a suggestion that the subject of specific territories appropriate for the Soviet Union to administer be discussed later; printed as enclosure 2 to a note of July 20, 1945, from the Soviet Ambassador to Secretary of State Byrnes (document No. 734, page 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 734 ] ), q. v.] July 2 [ The Archduke Otto of Austria to President Truman ] [Views on the situation in Austria and suggestions for improving that situation; printed as an enclosure to a memorandum of July 17, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State (document No. 761, page 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 761 ] ), q. v.] July 3 (tel. Scaf 471) [ The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff ] [Report on problems concerning shipping on the Danube, recommendation for establishing an interim Danube Navigation Agency, and suggestion that internationalization of the Danube be added to the agenda for the Berlin Conference; printed as enclosure B to a memorandum of July 21, 1945, by the United States Chiefs of Staff (document No. 754, page 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] ), q. v.] July 6 (tel. 2384) The Minister in Sweden to the Secretary of State Report of a conversation between Prince Carl Bernadotte and the Japanese Military Attaché at Stockholm concerning a possible future Japanese approach to the King of Sweden with respect to ending the war. 1420 1589 [ Pg. 1589 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] and Doc. 1420 ] July 8 (C.C.S. 643/3) [ Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee ] [Analysis of the possibility of surrender by Japan; extract dealing with this subject printed in footnote 5 to the minutes of the 193d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 1945 (page 35), q. v.] July 9 [ Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg to the Acting Secretary of State ] [Questions concerning the implementation of the Yalta agreement on Poland; quoted in a letter of July 17, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State to Senator Vandenberg (document No. 1117, page 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 1117 ] ), q. v.] 1945 July 9 (tel.) [ The Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Pacific, to the War Department ] [Comments and suggestions with respect to British Commonwealth participation in the Coronet operations; extracts quoted in a memorandum of July 18, 1945, by the United States Chiefs of Staff (document No. 1284, page 1336 [ Pg. 1336 is part of Doc. 1284 ] ), q. v.] July 11 (tel.) [ The British Ambassador in Yugoslavia to the British Foreign Office ] [Report on the political situation in Yugoslavia; printed as an enclosure to a note of July 17, 1945, from the Secretary General of the British Delegation to the Berlin Conference to Mr. Cavendish W. Cannon, of the United States Delegation (document No. 1201, page 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1201 ] ), q. v.] July 12 [ The Soviet Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary to the United States and British Representatives on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary ] [Outline of revised procedures for conducting the work of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary; printed in the form of a proposal by the Soviet Delegation to the Berlin Conference circulated apparently on July 24, 1945 (document No. 796, page 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 796 ] ), q. v.] July 13 [ Memorandum ] [Statistics on oil production in eastern Europe; printed as annex I to a memorandum of July 21, 1945, from the Chief of Staff of the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (document No. 1321, page 1383 [ Pg. 1383 includes portions of Doc. 1320 and Doc. 1321 ] ), q. v.] July 13 [ Memorandum by the Commander, 26th British Liaison Unit ] [Minutes of a conversation between Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and Lieutenant General Wladyslaw Anders, Commander of the Polish Second Corps, concerning the effects of political developments in Poland on the Polish Second Corps; extracts printed as an enclosure to a despatch of July 20, 1945, from the Deputy Political Adviser at Allied Force Headquarters to the Secretary of State (document No. 1123, page 1113 [ Pg. 1113 includes portions of Doc. 1122 and Doc. 1123 ] ), q. v.] July 14 [ Memorandum by Mr. John Wills Tuthill, of the Political Division, United States Group, Control Council ( Germany )] [Review of German economic problems which should be discussed at the Berlin Conference; printed as sub-enclosure 1 to a memorandum of July 17, 1945, from the Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council (Germany) to the Political Adviser in Germany (document No. 850, page 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 850 ] ), q. v.] 1945 July 14 [ Memorandum ] [Memorandum by an unidentified German lawyer concerning the transfer of scientific and military research institutions from Germany to the Soviet Union; translation printed as an enclosure to a despatch of July 17, 1945, from the Political Adviser in Germany to the Secretary of State (document No. 896, page 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] ), q. v.] July 14 [ The Department of State to the British Embassy ] [Views on reconvening the European Inland Transport Conference; quoted in a telegram of July 19, 1945, from the Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (document No. 1160, page page 1159 [ Pg. 1159 includes portions of Doc. 1159 and Doc. 1160 ] ), q. v.] July 15 [ The Embassy in the United Kingdom to the British Foreign Office ] [Notification of the intention of the Department of State to announce on July 17, 1945, that the United States will support the admission of Italy in due course to the United Nations, and request for British support in this matter; quoted in an aide-mémoire of July 16, 1945, from the British Embassy to the Department of State (document No. 722, page 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 722 ] ), q. v.] July 15 [ Diary Entry by the Secretary of War ] [Account of a conversation with Ambassadors Harriman and Murphy concerning Soviet intentions in Manchuria; quoted in footnote 4 to a memorandum of July 16, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the President (document No. 1212, page 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 1212 ] ), q. v.] July 16 * Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: plan for the Terminal meetings; participation of two French colonial infantry divisions in Far Eastern operations; chairmanship of the military meetings at Terminal ; interpretation of the Presidential policy on lend-lease; and relations of the United States Chiefs of Staff with the Chiefs of Staff of other nations participating in the war against Japan. 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] July 16 * The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Procedural recommendations with respect to a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and the Soviet Union. 1275 1323 [ Pg. 1323 includes portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] July 16 (SM–2607) * The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Report that no information can be given regarding the details of a plan for Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor and the reasons for this situation. (Appendix: Memorandum of June 11, 1945, by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State, suggesting the urgency of communicating with the Portuguese Government concerning the plan referred to above.) 1295 1349 [ Pg. 1349 includes portions of Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , and Doc. 1295 ] 1945 July 16 (C.C.S. 462/25) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve an enclosed draft of a letter to the Department of State and the British Foreign Office concerning Portuguese participation in operations undertaken to expel the Japanese from Timor. 1296 1351 [ Pg. 1351 includes portions of Doc. 1295 and Doc. 1296 ] July 16 (C.C.S. 895) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Request for concurrence by the British Chiefs of Staff in a draft reply to a French proposal to place a corps of two infantry divisions under American command in the Pacific war. (Enclosures: Memorandum of May 29, 1945, from the Chief of the French Military Mission in the United States to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, containing the proposal referred to above; and a draft of a memorandum replying thereto.) 1288 1341 [ Pg. 1341 includes portions of Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , and Doc. 1288 ] July 16 * Truman–Churchill Meeting: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from published sources on this meeting. 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] July 16 (tel. Victory 23) * The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls Request for information on progress in controlling German external assets, particularly those in Spain. 981 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] July 16 * Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: the program and procedure for the Terminal Conference; an estimate of the enemy situation; progress reports on operations in the Pacific and the Southeast Asia Command; development of operations in the Pacific; and a report of Army air operations in the war against Japan. (Footnote: Extract relating to the possibility of surrender by Japan from a report by the Combined Intelligence Committee (C.C.S. 643/3) as of July 8, 1945.) 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Suggestion for the permanent detachment of the Ruhr and the Rhineland from the rest of Germany; proposal for an international protectorate for the area so detached. 1021 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 1021 ] July 16 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of a proposed agreement on the political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. 848 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 848 ] July 16 * The Secretary of War to the President Analysis and recommendations with respect to the condition of central Europe, the impracticability of destroying German industry, the economic and political treatment of Germany, and dismemberment of Germany. (The first three sections of this memorandum are printed as an enclosure to a letter of July 17, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, document No. 849 , q. v.) 849 , 1022 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 1022 ] 1945 (Footnote to document No. 849 : Extracts from Secretary Stimson’s diary, July 16–17, 1945, concerning discussions within the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on the treatment of Germany, with special reference to the Ruhr.) July 16 [* Memorandum by Mr. Perry Laukhuff, of the Political Division, United States Group, Control Council ( Germany )] [Review of political problems confronting the occupation authorities in Germany as a whole and in the United States zone of occupation; printed as enclosure 2 to a memorandum of July 17, 1945, from the Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council (Germany) to the Political Adviser in Germany (document No. 850, page 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 850 ] ), q. v.] July 16 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a memorandum on the relationship between reparations and the cession of German territory. 893 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 893 ] July 16 * Draft Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission Analysis of problems involved in the creation of a separate Rhineland-Ruhr state. 1023 992 [ Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 1023 ] July 16 (tel. 5814) The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Views on the advisability of bringing up the question of Tangier at the Berlin Conference. 1348 1408 [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 1348 and Doc. 1349 ] July 16 (tel. 1200) The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain Views on Spanish interests in Tangier; comments on the weakness of Spain’s international position. (Footnote to document No. 1175 : Letter of March 10, 1945, from President Roosevelt to Ambassador Armour, outlining the former’s views with regard to relations between the United States and Spain.) 1175 , 1349 1171 [ Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 1175 ] , 1408 [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 1348 and Doc. 1349 ] July 16 (tel. War 32887) The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee to the Secretary of War Interim report on the satisfactory testing of the atomic bomb. (Footnote: Extract from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 16, 1945, concerning the receipt of the above message and its communication to President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes.) 1303 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] July 16 [ Bulletin From “The Albuquerque Tribune” ] [Text of a statement issued by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Army Air Base, explaining an explosion which had taken place on the Base reservation; printed as enclosure 3 to a memorandum of July 18, 1945, from the Commanding General, Manhattan District Project, to the Secretary of War (document No. 1305, page 1361 [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] ), q. v.] 1945 July 16 [ Memorandum by Mr. Ernest O. Lawrence, of the Manhattan District Project Staff ] [Description of and comments on the test of the atomic bomb; printed as enclosure 4 to a memorandum of July 18, 1945, from the Commanding General, Manhattan District Project, to the Secretary of War (document No. 1305, page 1361 [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] ), q. v.] July 16 * The Secretary of War to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a memorandum from the Secretary of War to the President concerning the conduct of the war against Japan, a possible warning to Japan, the Yalta agreement concerning Soviet entry into the war against Japan, Manchuria, trusteeship for Korea, and Allied occupation of the main Japanese islands. (Footnote to document No. 1212 : Extracts from Secretary Stimson’s diary, July 14–18, 1945, concerning discussions within the United States Delegation on Soviet plans in the Far East and the Open Door policy.) (Footnotes to document No. 1236 : Extracts from Secretary Stimson’s diary, July 16–24, 1945, concerning Japanese peace maneuvers and the relationship between the warning to Japan and the successful test of the atomic bomb.) 1236 , 732 , 1212 , 1274 1265 [ Pg. 1265 is part of Doc. 1236 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 1212 ] , 1322 [ Pg. 1322 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)] and Doc. 1274 ] July 16 (tel. 31) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a message from Mr. Cordell Hull commenting upon the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan. 1237 1267 [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] July 16 The British Embassy to the Department of State British reaction to a United States proposal for the issuance of a statement, following the Italian declaration of war against Japan, supporting the admission of Italy to the United Nations in due course. 722 , 1088 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 722 ] , 1079 [ Pg. 1079 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1087 (#1)] and Doc. 1088 ] July 16 (tel. 32) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Request for approval for issuing a statement (text included in the message) supporting the admission of Italy to the United Nations. 723 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 722 and Doc. 723 ] July 16 (tel. 33) The Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy Review of correspondence with Ambassador Pauley concerning a suggestion that commodities received by the Soviet Union from German satellites on reparation account be made available to United States occupation forces through reverse lend-lease arrangements; suggestion in this connection that the United States indicate an interest in obtaining oil from Rumania and Hungary. (Footnote: Draft of a message to Ambassador Pauley on the above subject.) 1316 1378 [ Pg. 1378 includes portions of Doc. 1315 and Doc. 1316 ] July 16 (tel. 34) The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs to the Director of European Affairs Comments on Soviet proposals concerning the procedures of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary. 794 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] July 16 (tel. 291) The Representative in Hungary to the Acting Secretary of State Report that Major General Key will not commit himself with respect to Soviet proposals concerning the procedures of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary pending further clarification and possible instructions. 795 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] 1945 July 16 (tel. M 1240) The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania to the War Department Recommendation that agreement be reached at the Berlin Conference on the rights and privileges of the United States representatives on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania. 793 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 792 (#1)] and Doc. 793 ] July 16 (SH-1363) [ The Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania to the Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania ] [Outline of revised procedures for conducting the work of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania; printed as an enclosure to a despatch of July 17, 1945, from the Acting Representative in Rumania to the Secretary of State (document No. 797, page 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] ), q. v.] July 16 (tel. 1621) The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union Instructions to express to the Soviet Government the concern of the United States Government over Soviet economic measures affecting Rumania. 834 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] July 16 (tel. Victory 35) * The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Instruction to postpone action with respect to issuing a statement supporting admission of Italy to the United Nations pending consideration by Secretary Byrnes of a possible statement on Italy in which the Soviet Government might be invited to join. 724 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] July 17 (tel. 910) The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union Request for strict security measures in handling messages concerning Soviet-Japanese negotiations; information as to the individuals in Tokyo concerned in the present negotiations. 1223 1248 [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] and Doc. 1223 ] July 17 (tel. 913) The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union Comments concerning Soviet mediation to end the war; indication that Japan will fight to the bitter end if the enemy insists on unconditional surrender; instruction to obtain a reply as soon as possible from the Soviet Government to the Japanese proposal to send a special envoy to Moscow. 1224 1249 [ Pg. 1249 is part of Doc. 1224 ] July 17 * Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: military aspects of the unconditional surrender formula for Japan; the retention of United States forces in Italy; British participation in the war against Japan; command and control in the war against Japan; and United States policy concerning the Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal. 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] July 17 * The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Policy recommendations with respect to the disposition and distribution of captured German merchant shipping. 1005 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , and Doc. 1005 ] 1945 July 17 * The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Recommendations with respect to the retention of Allied forces and of a combined command in Italy. 1108 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 1107 and Doc. 1108 ] July 17 (SM-2610) * The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Recommendations as to United States policy concerning the Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal. 751 , 1363 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)] , and Doc. 751 ] , 1420 [ Pg. 1420 is part of Doc. 1363 ] July 17 (C.C.S. 706/14) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve amended drafts (texts printed) of messages to United States and British commanders and to the London Munitions Assignments Board with respect to the disposal of enemy war materiel in Germany and Austria. 895 835 [ Pg. 835 includes portions of Doc. 894 and Doc. 895 ] July 17 (C.C.S. 889/1) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Views concerning British Commonwealth participation in the war against Japan. 1283 1334 [ Pg. 1334 includes portions of Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , and Doc. 1283 ] July 17 (C.C.S. 890/1) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Comments on proposals to change the boundaries of command in the war against Japan. 1267 1313 [ Pg. 1313 is part of Doc. 1267 ] July 17 * The Secretary of War to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a memorandum of July 16, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the President containing an analysis and recommendations with respect to the condition of central Europe, the impracticability of destroying German industry, the economic and political treatment of Germany, and dismemberment of Germany. (Footnote to document No. 849 : Extracts from Secretary Stimson’s diary, July 16–17, 1945, concerning discussions within the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on the treatment of Germany, with special reference to the Ruhr.) 849 , 1022 754 [ Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 849 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 1022 ] July 17 (tel. 7182) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State Report on British civil aviation policy and on the impending visit of Sir William Hildred to the United States to discuss that policy. 1187 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 1187 ] July 17 * Truman–Stalin Meeting: Bohlen Notes Rough notes on a discussion concerning the agenda for the Berlin Conference; the general election in the United Kingdom; British attitudes toward the war against Japan; Soviet entry into the war against Japan; and the Stalin-Soong conversations which had recently taken place in Moscow. (Footnote: Cross reference to a memorandum of March 28, 1960, by Mr. Bohlen, with respect to the Truman-Stalin meeting of July 17, 1945, printed as document No. 1418, page 1582 [ Pg. 1582 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] and Doc. 1418 ] .) 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] 1945 July 17 * Truman–Stalin Meeting: The Assistant to the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Summary of additional subjects which the Soviet Government intends to place on the agenda for the Berlin Conference, as outlined by the Soviet Foreign Commissar to the President and the Secretary of State. 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] July 17 * The Assistant Secretary of War to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Notification of agreement between United States and British commanders as to the allocation of a French sector in Berlin. 1028 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 1027 and Doc. 1028 ] July 17 * Stimson–Churchill Conversation: Editor’s Note Quotation from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 17, 1945, concerning a discussion on German shipping, European problems, the coal situation, and the successful testing of the atomic bomb. 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] July 17 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of a memorandum for the Secretary of State recommending approval of agreements negotiated in the European Advisory Commission with respect to control machinery in Austria and zones of occupation in Austria and the administration of the city of Vienna. 772 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 772 ] July 17 * The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission to the Assistant Secretaries of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs, and for Economic Affairs Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of creating a separate Rhineland-Ruhr state. 1024 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 1023 and Doc. 1024 ] July 17 [* Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs ] [Background memorandum on the proposed agreements between China and the Soviet Union and recommendation that this subject be discussed with Generalissimo Stalin at the Berlin Conference, with the participation of Prime Minister Soong; printed as sub-attachment 1 to a memorandum of July 20, 1945, from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to Secretary Byrnes (document No. 1215, page 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] ), q. v.] July 17 [* Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs ] [Background memorandum on Outer Mongolia and United States policy toward that area; printed as subattachment 3 to a memorandum of July 20, 1945, from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to Secretary Byrnes (document No. 1215, page 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] ), q. v.] July 17 [* Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs ] [Background memorandum on Sinkiang; printed as subattachment 4 to a memorandum of July 20, 1945, from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to Secretary Byrnes (document No. 1215, page 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] ), q. v.] 1945 July 17 (tel. 2010) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Report that Rome newspapers have carried an item to the effect that Colonel James H. Douglas, Jr., will arrive soon to assume the post of Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission. 1111 1100 [ Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , and Doc. 1113 ] July 17 (tel. Victory 51) * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Acting Secretary of State Request for background information on the subject of reparations from Italy. 1094 1087 [ Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] July 17 (661) * The Political Adviser in Germany to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a memorandum of July 14, 1945, by an unidentified German lawyer concerning the transfer of scientific and military research institutions from Germany to the Soviet Union. 896 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] July 17 (410) The Acting Representative in Rumania to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a Soviet memorandum of July 16, 1945, containing an outline of revised procedures for conducting the work of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania. 797 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] July 17 (tel. 296) The Representative in Hungary to the Acting Secretary of State Observations with respect to the forthcoming elections in Hungary, including the possibility of tripartite supervision. 799 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 799 ] July 17 (tel. 367) The Representative in Bulgaria to the Acting Secretary of State Observations and recommendations with respect to the forthcoming elections in Bulgaria. 800 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] July 17 * Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: approval of the minutes of the 193d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and British Commonwealth participation in the war against Japan. 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] July 17 (tel. 2597) The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State Report that the British Ambassador has protested against continued Soviet requisitioning and removal of British equipment in Rumania and has rejected Soviet views on this subject. 835 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] Undated * The Secretary of State to the President Transmittal of a draft memorandum to Prime Minister Churchill on lend-lease questions. 1180 1177 [ Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 1180 ] July 17 * President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill Memorandum in reply to Mr. Churchill’s telegram of May 28, 1945, with respect to lend-lease to the United Kingdom during the war against Japan. 1181 1179 [ Pg. 1179 includes portions of Doc. 1180 and Doc. 1181 ] 1945 July 17 (F.O. 11(1)) * The Secretary General of the British Delegation to the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal Transmittal of the text of a message of July 11, 1945, from the British Ambassador in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Office reporting on the political situation in Yugoslavia. 1201 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1201 ] July 17 The Acting Secretary of State to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg Statement of United States policy toward the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. 1117 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 1117 ] July 17 * The British Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State Views on the Polish political situation; transmittal of a suggested statement with regard to Poland to be issued at the end of the Berlin Conference. 1118 1107 [ Pg. 1107 includes portions of Doc. 1117 and Doc. 1118 ] July 17 (1331) The Ambassador in Greece to the Secretary of State Transmittal of reports on political and economic conditions and on the military situation in northern Greece. 1071 1048 [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] July 17 (tel. 297) The Representative in Hungary to the Acting Secretary of State Report that the blackout on foreign newspaper reporting in Hungary may be raised somewhat. 746 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] July 17 (tel. 2598) The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State Report that the Soviet authorities are still studying the question of the creation of a Danube commission. 752 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] July 17 (1938) [ The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Yugoslavia ] [Protest that the conduct of Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia has not been in accord with the Belgrade agreement of June 9, 1945; printed as an enclosure to a note of July 25, 1945, from Prime Minister Tito and Foreign Minister Subasid to President Truman (document No. 1207, page 1214 [ Pg. 1214 includes portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] ), q. v.] July 17 * The Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council ( Germany ) to the Political Adviser in Germany Transmittal of memoranda reviewing the political and economic problems confronting the occupation authorities in Germany as a whole and in the United States zone of occupation for the solution of which high-level decisions or policy guidance is needed. 850 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 850 ] Undated * Memorandum by Major Harold Zink, of the Political Division, United States Group, Control Council ( Germany ) Background information and analysis concerning the problems of reestablishing a German governmental structure. 851 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] 1945 July 17 * First Plenary Meeting: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: choice of President Truman as presiding officer; the agenda; establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers; policy toward Germany; implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; policy toward Italy; dissolution of the European Advisory Commission; hour of meeting; and disposition of the German Fleet. 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] July 17 * First Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 59 [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] July 17 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposal for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers with the immediate task of drawing up treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary and of proposing settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe. 711 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 711 ] July 17 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposed agreement on the political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. (Annex, printed as document No. 894 : Proposal on principles, definitions, and an allocation formula in connection with reparations from Germany.) (Attachments to the annex: Principles agreed upon by the Allied Commission on Reparations; proposed definitions of restitution, war booty, and reparations; an agreed formula for the allocation of reparations as between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and an agreed procedure for settling the division of reparations between other countries.) 852 , 894 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 894 ] July 17 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposal for the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. 745 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 744 (#1)] and Doc. 745 ] July 17 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposal for terminating the short terms of surrender by Italy and the obsolete clauses of the long terms of surrender, and for replacing them by undertakings on the part of the Italian Government to meet the requirements of the existing situation. 1089 1080 [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] July 17 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State Memorandum of a telephone conversation with Mr. Cordell Hull concerning the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan. 1238 1268 [ Pg. 1268 includes portions of Doc. 1238 and Doc. 1239 ] July 17 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a letter of July 2, 1945, from the Archduke Otto of Austria to President Truman containing the Archduke’s views on the situation in Austria and his suggestions for improving that situation. 761 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 761 ] July 17 [* Diary Entry by the Secretary of War ] [Account of discussions with the Secretary of State concerning the proposed warning to Japan and the Open Door policy; quoted in footnotes to a memorandum of July 16, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the President (document No. 1212, page 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 1212 ] , and document No. 1236, page 1265 [ Pg. 1265 is part of Doc. 1236 ] ), q. v.] 1945 July 17 (tel. 38) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a suggested redraft of a proposal to the Soviet and French Governments to participate in the supervision of elections in Greece. 1059 1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1058 (#1)] and Doc. 1059 ] July 17 (tel. 39) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Summary of a report from the Ambassador in Iran on Soviet policy toward Iran; suggestion that the Iranian problem be discussed at the Berlin Conference. 1327 1389 [ Pg. 1389 is part of Doc. 1327 ] July 17 (tel. 40) The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Report of a difference of interpretation on the part of British and United States officials with respect to instructions issued by Ambassador Pauley on restitution questions; outline of a proposed reply to an aide-mémoire from the British Embassy on this subject. 897 840 [ Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 897 ] July 17 (tel. Victory 52) ( Conf-rep 2) * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Acting Head of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations Request for statistics on assets and output in eastern Germany before World War II. 898 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] July 17 (tel. War 33556) The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee to the Secretary of War Further interim report on the successful testing of the atomic bomb. (Footnote: Extract from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 18, 1945, concerning the communication of the above message to the President.) 1304 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] July 17 * Tripartite Communiqué Announcement that the Heads of Government have met and exchanged views, that the President of the United States will preside at the meetings of the Conference, and that the Foreign Ministers will hold regular meetings to prepare the work of the Conference. 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] July 17 (tel. 197) The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative in Hungary Views with respect to the procedures of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary. 798 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] July 17 (tel. 1629) The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union Instruction to inform the Soviet Government that the United States assumes Soviet concurrence in a line of action concerning German external assets. 982 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] July 17 (tel. 44) The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy Report on the status of negotiations with respect to the control of German external assets. 983 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] 1945 July 18 * Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: a memorandum for the President on the unconditional surrender formula for Japan; the relationship between the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and of the other nations participating in the war against Japan; French and Netherland participation in the war against Japan; staff conversations with Portugal; and disposition of captured German passenger ships. 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] July 18 * The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Recommendations for amending the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan. 1239 1268 [ Pg. 1268 includes portions of Doc. 1238 and Doc. 1239 ] July 18 (C.C.S. 679/6) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Recommendations for the allocation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of seven captured German vessels. 1190 1191 [ Pg. 1191 includes portions of Doc. 1189 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)] , and Doc. 1190 ] July 18 (C.C.S. 842/2) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve a draft memorandum (text printed) to the French and Netherland Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with respect to French and Netherland participation in the war against Japan. 1289 1344 [ Pg. 1344 includes portions of Doc. 1288 and Doc. 1289 ] July 18 (C.C.S. 889/2) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Transmittal of extracts from a message of July 9, 1945, from General of the Army MacArthur commenting upon and making suggestions with respect to British Commonwealth participation in the Coronet operations. 1284 1336 [ Pg. 1336 is part of Doc. 1284 ] July 18 (tel. Victory 56) * The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Adviser on German Economic Affairs to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Request for information as to whether the Soviet Union has been informed of a proposed directive on German coal production and exports. 1039 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] July 18 * First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers and dissolution of the European Advisory Commission; policy toward Germany; the agenda for the Second Plenary Meeting; disposition of the German Fleet; Poland; German economic problems; chairmanship of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers; and admission of Italy to the United Nations. 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] July 18 * First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Rapporteur’s Report Report by Secretary of State Byrnes to the Heads of Government on the discussions in the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] 1945 July 18 * Report by the Subcommittee on the Council of Foreign Ministers Report of approval of the United States proposal concerning the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers; transmittal of a redraft of paragraph 3 of that proposal. (Annex: Alternative texts considered by the Subcommittee.) 712 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 712 ] July 18 (tel. 2979) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Information concerning British newspaper reports of a speech by Lieutenant General Anders; report that General Anders is offering every facility for members of the Polish Corps in Italy who choose to do so to return to Poland. 1119 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 1118 and Doc. 1119 ] July 18 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the President Comments on Generalissimo Stalin’s statement with respect to exacting reparations from Italy. 1095 1087 [ Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] July 18 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a revised memorandum on the relationship between reparations and the cession of German territory. 900 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Background information with respect to restitution of identifiable gold recaptured from the Germans. 901 844 [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 901 ] July 18 * The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Comments on the Department of State’s redraft of a proposal to the Soviet and French Governments to participate in the supervision of elections in Greece. 1060 1042 [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , and Doc. 1061 ] July 18 [* Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union ] [Review of the Stalin–Soong negotiations in Moscow and recommendations as to United States policy with respect to implementation of the Yalta agreement concerning Soviet entry into the war against Japan; printed as attachment 2 to a memorandum of July 20, 1945, from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to Secretary Byrnes (document No. 1215, page 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] ), q. v.] July 18 (tel. 4310) The Representative in the Conversations Concerning Tangier to the Acting Secretary of State Report of an informal approach to Soviet representatives concerning Soviet participation in the Paris conversations on Tangier. 1350 1409 [ Pg. 1409 includes portions of Doc. 1349 and Doc. 1350 ] July 18 (tel. 7236) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State Report of a British suggestion that the question of reconvening the European Inland Transport Conference be taken up at the Berlin Conference. 1158 1158 [ Pg. 1158 includes portions of Doc. 1158 and Doc. 1159 ] 1945 July 18 (tel. 1548) The Ambassador in Spain to the Acting Secretary of State Report on the Spanish attitude toward Soviet participation in the Tangier regime. 1351 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 1350 and Doc. 1351 ] July 18 * Truman–Churchill Luncheon Meeting: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from published sources on this meeting. 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] July 18 * Byrnes–Eden Luncheon Meeting: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of documentation on this meeting. 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] July 18 (tel. 4307) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission Notification that the Soviet Embassy at London has not yet received permission to sign the pending agreements on additional requirements to be imposed on Germany and on zones of occupation in Germany. 1035 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 1034 and Doc. 1035 ] July 18 (C.C.S. 890/2) * Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff Comments on proposals to change the boundaries of command in the war against Japan and on the question of the higher strategic control of the war. 1268 1315 [ Pg. 1315 includes portions of Doc. 1267 and Doc. 1268 ] July 18 (C.C.S. 895/1) * Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff Views with respect to French participation in the war against Japan. 1290 1345 [ Pg. 1345 includes portions of Doc. 1289 , Doc. 1290 , and Doc. 1291 ] July 18 (C.C.S. 462/26) * Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff Comments on a proposed letter to the Department of State and the British Foreign Office with respect to Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor. 1297 1352 [ Pg. 1352 includes portions of Doc. 1296 and Doc. 1297 ] July 18 * The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Department of State and the British Foreign Office Conclusions with respect to Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor. 1298 1353 [ Pg. 1353 includes portions of Doc. 1297 and Doc. 1298 ] July 18 * The State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to Members of the Committee Panel at Babelsberg Circulation for approval of a memorandum on United States policy regarding the Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal. 1364 1423 [ Pg. 1423 includes portions of Doc. 1364 and Doc. 1365 ] July 18 * Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: approval of the minutes of the 194th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; French and Netherland participation in the war against Japan; staff conversations with Portugal; Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific Area; and command and control in the war against Japan. 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] July 18 * Truman-Stalin Meeting: Bohlen Notes Rough notes on a discussion concerning a message from the Emperor of Japan with respect to a mission of Prince Konoye and the reply to be made thereto. (Footnote: Cross reference to a memorandum of March 28, 1960, by Mr. Bohlen with respect to the Truman-Stalin meeting of July 18, 1945, printed as document No. 1419, page 1587 [ Pg. 1587 includes portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] .) 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] 1945 July 18 (tel. Victory 68) * The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Authorization to conclude the pending agreement on zones of occupation in Germany on the basis of a Soviet proposal for the final sentence of the accompanying report. 1029 1002 [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 1029 and Doc. 1030 ] July 18 * United States Delegation Working Paper Suggested revisions in the proposed agreement on the political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. 853 778 [ Pg. 778 includes portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] July 18 * The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Secretary of State Memorandum on the urgency of seeking an early decision as to War Department responsibility for interim financing of imports into Germany. 854 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] July 18 (SC–145 b ) Memorandum by the Central Secretariat Transmittal of a memorandum for the Secretary of State concerning the objective of the United States Government in the occupation of Germany. 855 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] July 18 * Second Plenary Meeting: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: relations with the press; the Rapporteur’s report on the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers; establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers; political principles for the treatment of Germany; and relations with Poland. 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] July 18 * Second Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] July 18 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Draft of a statement on the Polish question. 1120 1110 [ Pg. 1110 includes portions of Doc. 1119 and Doc. 1120 ] July 18 The Commanding General, Manhattan District Project, to the Secretary of War Report on the successful testing of the atomic bomb. (Enclosure 3: Bulletin from The Albuquerque Tribune , giving the text of a statement of July 16, 1945, by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Army Air Base, explaining an explosion which had taken place on the Base reservation.) (Enclosure 4: Memorandum of July 16, 1945, by Mr. Ernest O. Lawrence, describing and commenting upon the test of the atomic bomb.) (Footnote: Extract from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 21, 1945, concerning the receipt of this report and its communication to President Truman and the Secretary of State.) 1305 1361 [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] July 18 * Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of War Transmittal of a photocopy of an aide-mémoire initialed by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill on September 18 [ 199 ], 1944, concerning the use of an atomic bomb against Japan and Anglo-American collaboration in developing Tube Alloys for military and commercial purposes after the defeat of Japan. 1306 1370 [ Pg. 1370 includes portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] 1945 July 18 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs Memorandum of a conversation with the Second Secretary of the British Embassy concerning the admission of Italy to the United Nations. 725 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] July 18 (tel. 7241) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State Report of British views with respect to Spain. 1176 1172 [ Pg. 1172 includes portions of Doc. 1175 and Doc. 1176 ] July 18 (tel. 7242) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State Report of British views with respect to Tangier. 1352 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] July 18 (tel. Victory 77) * The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Acting Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs and the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls Tentative views with respect to exaction of reparations from Italy. 1096 1088 [ Pg. 1088 includes portions of Doc. 1095 and Doc. 1096 ] July 18 (tel. Victory 82) * The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs Notification that the Soviet Union has proposed the addition of Tangier and the Levant to the agenda for the Berlin Conference. 1338 1398 [ Pg. 1398 includes portions of Doc. 1338 and Doc. 1339 ] July 18 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Transmittal of two notes of July 18, 1945, from the Italian Ambassador with respect to a peace treaty for Italy. 1090 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 1089 and Doc. 1090 ] July 18 (tel. Naf 1042) (FX 24640) The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Report on military meetings with the Soviet authorities in Vienna held on July 16, 1945, with special reference to communications and the inability of the Soviet authorities in Austria to implement the pending European Advisory Commission agreements on Austria. 773 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] July 18 (tel. M 25043) ( Conf-mess 5) The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Statistics on assets and output in eastern Germany before World War II. 899 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] July 18 * Memorandum by the British Delegation Observations on the eastern frontier of Germany as it affects the principles governing the treatment of Germany and the authority of the Allied Control Council for Germany. 1144 1136 [ Pg. 1136 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)] , Doc. 1143 , and Doc. 1144 ] July 18 [* Diary Entry by the Secretary of War ] [Account of conversations with President Truman concerning the Open Door policy in China and the testing of the atomic bomb; quoted in footnote 4 to a memorandum of July 16, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the President (document No. 1212, page 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 1212 ] ) and in footnote 2 to a telegram of July 17, 1945, from the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee to the Secretary of War (document No. 1304, page 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] ), q. v.] 1945 July 18 (tel. 33) The Navy Department to the Commander, United States Naval Forces in Europe Request for United States representation on the Cap-craft commission to protect the United States interest in disposing of captured enemy small craft. 1006 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 1005 and Doc. 1006 ] July 18 (tel. 1416) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Observations on unconditional surrender as it would affect the fundamental character of the Japanese nation. 1225 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] July 18 [ The Soviet Acting Foreign Commissar to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ] [Notification of the inability of the Soviet Government to give a definite reply to a message from the Emperor of Japan and to the Japanese proposal to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as a special envoy; quoted in a telegram of July 19, 1945, from the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (document No. 1226, page 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] ), q. v.] July 18 (tel. 304) The Representative in Hungary to the Acting Secretary of State Report that new procedures for the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, more satisfactory to the United States than past procedures, have begun without formal agreement. 801 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] July 18 (tel. 51) The Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs and the Acting Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy Suggestions for emphasis in the negotiations at the Berlin Conference on the use of allied property as war booty or reparations. 836 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 835 and Doc. 836 ] July 18 (tel. 52) The Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Adviser on German Economic Affairs Report that the Soviet Union has not been informed of a proposed directive on German coal production and exports. 1040 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] July 18 (tel. 54) [ The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State ] [Draft of a message to Ambassador Pauley concerning the possibility that commodities received by the Soviet Union from the German satellites on reparation account be made available to United States forces through reverse lend-lease arrangements; quoted in footnote 3 to a telegram of July 16, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (document No. 1316, page 1378 [ Pg. 1378 includes portions of Doc. 1315 and Doc. 1316 ] ), q. v.] July 18 (tel. 56) The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Suggestion that steps be taken at the Berlin Conference to forestall Soviet seizure of German-held shares in Rumanian oil corporations as compensation for damages caused by Germany; discussion of arguments against such seizure. 984 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 984 ] 1945 July 18 (tel. 57) The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Background information on the question of inviting Italy to join the United Maritime Authority. 1110 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 1110 ] July 19 (tel.) The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State and the Ambassador to the Soviet Union Transmittal of a message from Prime Minister Soong to Ambassador Harriman with respect to the Chinese position in pending Sino-Soviet negotiations. 1213 1224 [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 1212 and Doc. 1213 ] July 19 * Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of a discussion concerning the supplying of information to the Soviet Union with respect to the war against Japan. 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] July 19 * Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: the agenda for the meeting; establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers; disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine; political principles for the treatment of Germany; policy toward Poland; economic principles for the treatment of Germany; and the agenda for the Third Plenary Meeting. 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] July 19 * Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the discussions in the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] ] July 19 * Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Rapporteur’s Report Report by Foreign Secretary Eden to the Heads of Government on the discussions in the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] July 19 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposal for the handing over to the Soviet Union of one-third of the German Navy and one-third of the German Merchant Marine. 1007 971 [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 1007 and Doc. 1008 ] July 19 * Report by the Subcommittee on German Political Questions Redraft of a proposed agreement on the political principles to govern the treatment of Germany during the initial control period. (Footnotes: Extracts from a letter of July 21, 1945, from the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs to the Acting and Assistant Chiefs of that Division, recounting some of the discussions in meetings of the Subcommittee in the preparation of this report.) 856 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] July 19 Proposal by the British Delegation Draft of a statement by the Heads of Government on the Polish question. 1121 1111 [ Pg. 1111 is part of Doc. 1121 ] 1945 July 19 * Proposal by the Soviet Government Proposal for the Conference to recommend to the United Nations the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Franco government in Spain and the rendering of support to democratic forces in Spain. 1177 1173 [ Pg. 1173 includes portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] July 19 * First Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee: Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Germany Summary of a discussion on the proposed agreement on economic principles for the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] ] July 19 * United States Delegation Working Paper Memorandum concerning probable Soviet amendments to the proposed agreement on political and economic principles for the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. 857 787 [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 857 and Doc. 858 ] July 19 * Texts Considered by the Economic Subcommittee Draft texts concerning the economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. 858 787 [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 857 and Doc. 858 ] Undated * Draft of Report by the Economic Subcommittee Draft of a report on the extent of agreement and disagreement in the Economic Subcommittee with respect to economic principles for the treatment of Germany. 859 , 1041 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1024 [ Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 1040 and Doc. 1041 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of a text concerning the financing of approved imports into Germany. 860 793 [ Pg. 793 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] July 19 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the President Recommendations for dealing with the Soviet proposal for disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine. 1008 971 [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 1007 and Doc. 1008 ] July 19 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the President Recommendation that Soviet agreement be sought to the supply of petroleum for western Europe from Austria, Hungary, and Rumania. 1318 1381 [ Pg. 1381 is part of Doc. 1318 ] July 19 * The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Working paper on implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and related problems. 747 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] July 19 [* The Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State and the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs ] [Summary of views with respect to the pending Sino-Soviet agreements arising out of the Yalta agreement concerning the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan; printed as attachment 1 to a memorandum of July 20, 1945, from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to Secretary Byrnes (document No. 1215, page 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] ), q. v.] 1945 July 19 [* Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs ] [Background information on Manchurian problems and recommendation as to United States policy toward the Yalta commitments relating to Manchuria; printed as subattachment 2 to a memorandum of July 20, 1945, from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to Secretary Byrnes (document No. 1215, page 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] ), q. v.] July 19 * Stimson-Cherwell Conversation: Editor’s Note Quotation from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 19, 1945, concerning a discussion on the atomic bomb. 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] July 19 * The Assistant Secretary of War to the Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Provisional approval of an attached memorandum (text printed) on United States policy regarding the Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal. 1365 1423 [ Pg. 1423 includes portions of Doc. 1364 and Doc. 1365 ] July 19 * The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Comments on the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to United States policy regarding the Dardanelles. 1366 1425 [ Pg. 1425 is part of Doc. 1366 ] July 19 (tel. 7259) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State Report of British views with respect to extending the membership of certain European economic organizations. 1159 1158 [ Pg. 1158 includes portions of Doc. 1158 and Doc. 1159 ] July 19 * Stimson-Alexander Conversation: Editor’s Note Quotation from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 19, 1945, concerning a discussion on the proposed appointment of Colonel James H. Douglas, Jr., as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission in Italy. 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] July 19 (tel. 1417) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Transmittal of the text of a note of July 18, 1945, from Acting Foreign Commissar Lozovsky expressing the inability of the Soviet Government to give a definite reply to a message from the Emperor of Japan and to the Japanese proposal to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as a special envoy. 1226 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] July 19 (C.C.S. 891/1) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Statement that the United States Chiefs of Staff are not in a position to discuss postwar relationships between the military staffs of the United States and the United Kingdom. 1197 1202 [ Pg. 1202 includes portions of Doc. 1196 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)] , and Doc. 1197 ] July 19 (C.C.S. 895/2) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve a redrafted memorandum (text printed) to the Chief of the French Military Mission in the United States concerning French participation in the war against Japan. 1291 1345 [ Pg. 1345 includes portions of Doc. 1289 , Doc. 1290 , and Doc. 1291 ] 1945 July 19 Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: approval of the minutes of the 195th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; participation of two French colonial infantry divisions in Far Eastern operations; Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery after the war with Japan; information for the Soviet Union concerning the war against Japan; a planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan; and the proposed appointment of Colonel James H. Douglas, Jr., as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission in Italy. 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] July 19 (tel. 118) The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State Report on military meetings with the Soviet authorities in Vienna. 774 670 [ Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] July 19 (tel. Victory 98) * The Assistant Secretary of War to the War Department Report of British concurrence in the proposed appointment of Colonel James H. Douglas, Jr., as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission in Italy; transmittal of the text of a proposed Anglo-American press release on this subject. 1113 1100 [ Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , and Doc. 1113 ] Undated * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposal for amending a British draft of a statement by the Heads of Government on the Polish question. 1421 1590 [ Pg. 1590 includes portions of Doc. 1420 and Doc. 1421 ] Undated * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Text submitted to the Conference on protection of assets of the Polish State. 1422 1591 [ Pg. 1591 includes portions of Doc. 1421 and Doc. 1422 ] July 19 (tel. 1418) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Comments on the Soviet rejection of a Japanese proposal to send a special envoy to Moscow. 1227 1251 [ Pg. 1251 includes portions of Doc. 1226 and Doc. 1227 ] July 19 (C.C.S. 679/7) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Recommendations concerning trooplift programs in the North Atlantic during the first half of 1946. 1191 1192 [ Pg. 1192 includes portions of Doc. 1190 and Doc. 1191 ] July 19 (P 10) * Proposal by the British Delegation Memorandum concerning the removal as war booty of British-owned oil equipment in Rumania. 837 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 837 ] July 19 * Third Plenary Meeting: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: a Bulgarian-Greek frontier incident; the Rapporteur’s report on the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers; political principles for the treatment of Germany; disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine; policy toward Spain; implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia; and removal of oil equipment from Rumania. 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] July 19 * Third Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] 1945 July 19 * Proposal by the British Delegation Suggestion that the Heads of Government issue a statement recalling that they have given recognition to the Yugoslav Government on the basis of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Tito-Šubašić agreement, which they expect to be carried out in the near future. 1202 1209 [ Pg. 1209 includes portions of Doc. 1202 and Doc. 1203 ] July 19 (tel. 481) The Acting Representative in Rumania to the Acting Secretary of State Report on the tactics of the Tatarescu faction in Rumania. 802 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] July 19 (tel. 7269) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State Report on the first impressions of the British Chargé d’Affaires in Poland following his arrival. 1122 1112 [ Pg. 1112 includes portions of Doc. 1121 and Doc. 1122 ] July 19 * Memorandum by the Secretary of War Reflections on the basic problems confronting the United States in its relations with the Soviet Union. (Footnote: Extracts from Secretary Stimson’s diary, July 19–22, 1945, on the genesis of this memorandum and the circumstances of its presentation to President Truman.) 1157 1155 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] July 19 (6275–3) [ The Bulgarian Foreign Minister to the Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria ] [Review of the situation in Bulgaria for the information of the participants in the Berlin Conference and a request for the establishment of regular diplomatic intercourse between Bulgaria and the Allied Powers; quoted in a message of July 24, 1945, from the Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (document No. 813, page 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] ), q. v.] July 19 [ The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Soviet Acting Foreign Commissar ] [Statement of the assumption that the Soviet Government, in view of its actions, has no objection to a démarche to the Spanish Government with respect to control of German assets in Spain, and notification that such a démarche will be made; quoted in an airgram of July 27, 1945, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State (document No. 997, page 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] ), q. v.] July 19 (tel. 2628) The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State Notification that instructions for an approach to the Soviet Government concerning the control of German external assets have been executed. 985 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] July 19 (tel. 990) The Ambassador in Turkey to the Acting Secretary of State Report of Turkish reactions to recent Anglo-Turkish conversations. 1367 1426 [ Pg. 1426 includes portions of Doc. 1366 and Doc. 1367 ] 1945 July 19 (tel. 730) The Ambassador in Greece to the Acting Secretary of State Observations on Soviet distortions in portraying Greece as a country in the throes of anarchy and as a menace to its peaceful neighbors. 1072 1060 [ Pg. 1060 includes portions of Doc. 1071 and Doc. 1072 ] July 19 * Tripartite Dinner Meeting: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of documentation on this meeting. 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] July 19 (tel. Victory 115 of July 20) * Mosely–Vyshinsky Conversation: The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Report, dated July 20, 1945, that Mr. Vyshinsky informed Mr. Mosely that the Soviet Government has approved the “additional requirements” agreement for Germany except the title and first paragraph. 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)] ] July 19 (tel. 60) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Report that the European Advisory Commission agreements on Austria have been approved by the State, War, and Navy Departments and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 775 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] July 19 (tel. 61) The Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Views on the reconvening of the European Inland Transport Conference; transmittal of the text of a communication of July 14, 1945, from the Department of State to the British Embassy on this subject. 1160 1159 [ Pg. 1159 includes portions of Doc. 1159 and Doc. 1160 ] July 19 (tel. 63) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Comments on the situation in the Levant. 1339 1398 [ Pg. 1398 includes portions of Doc. 1338 and Doc. 1339 ] July 19 (tel. 64) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Summary of the status of the Tangier negotiations with the British Government. 1353 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] July 19 * The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar Proposal for quadripartite supervision of elections in Greece. 1061 1042 [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , and Doc. 1061 ] July 19 (tel. 1205) The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy Notification that the Department of State has not yet received British concurrence in the proposed appointment of Colonel James H. Douglas, Jr., as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission in Italy. 1112 1100 [ Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , and Doc. 1113 ] July 19 (tel. 69) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Transmittal of the texts of proposed replies to inquiries from the press with respect to the unconditional surrender of Japan. 1240 1270 [ Pg. 1270 is part of Doc. 1240 ] July 19 (tel. 2634) The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State Report that representations have been made to the Soviet authorities concerning Soviet economic policy in Rumania. 838 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 838 and Doc. 839 ] 1945 July 19 (tel. 1641) The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union Suggestion that the question of controlling the external assets of the former German satellite states be discussed with the Soviet authorities at the Berlin Conference; expression of the view that the total freezing of such assets is desirable. 845 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] July 20 (tel.) The Ambassador in China to the President and the Secretary of State Transmittal of a message from President Chiang to President Truman informing the latter of the substance of a message from President Chiang to Generalissimo Stalin with respect to the Stalin-Soong negotiations, and asking Mr. Truman to impress upon Generalissimo Stalin the reasonableness of the Chinese position in those negotiations. 1214 1225 [ Pg. 1225 includes portions of Doc. 1213 and Doc. 1214 ] July 20 (tel. Victory 115) * The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Report that Mr. Vyshinsky informed Mr. Mosely [on July 19] that the Soviet Government has approved the “additional requirements” agreement for Germany except the title and first paragraph; summary of explanations concerning this agreement given to War Department officials by Ambassador Murphy and Mr. Mosely. 1036 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] July 20 Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on basic objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan and on an air transport route between the United States and Moscow. 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] July 20 * The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Recommendation that the President send a letter to Generalissimo Stalin on the subject of air traffic from the United States to Moscow via Berlin or discuss the subject with the Generalissimo. 1170 1167 [ Pg. 1167 includes portions of Doc. 1170 and Doc. 1171 ] July 20 Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee: Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Germany Notes on a discussion of economic principles for the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] July 20 * United States Delegation Working Paper Proposed text on the financing of imports into Germany. 861 793 [ Pg. 793 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] July 20 * United States Delegation Working Paper Proposed text on the financing of imports into Germany. 862 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] July 20 (tel. Victory 116) * The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France Instructions to propose quadripartite supervision of elections in Greece to the French Provisional Government. 1062 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , and Doc. 1063 ] July 20 * The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union Notification that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved a memorandum to the President with respect to air traffic from the United States to Moscow via Berlin. 1169 1166 [ Pg. 1166 includes portions of Doc. 1168 and Doc. 1169 ] 1945 July 20 President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin Request for Soviet approval of the diversion of air traffic between the United States and the Soviet Union to a route via Berlin. 1171 1167 [ Pg. 1167 includes portions of Doc. 1170 and Doc. 1171 ] July 20 * The Secretary of War to the President Recommendations for amending the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan. (Footnote: Extract from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 24, 1945, concerning a conversation with President Truman about the possibility of reassuring the Japanese as to the continuance of their dynasty.) 1241 1271 [ Pg. 1271 includes portions of Doc. 1240 and Doc. 1241 ] July 20 (tel. Victory 143) * The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Notification of Presidential approval of the European Advisory Commission agreements relating to Austria. 776 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] July 20 (tel. 2999) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Report on military meetings with the Soviet authorities in Vienna. 777 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] July 20 * The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Transmittal of memoranda by Messrs. Dooman, Vincent, and Harriman relating to the Sino-Soviet negotiations which had taken place in Moscow, and giving background information and recommendations with respect to those negotiations and with respect to Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang. 1215 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] July 20 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State Recommendation that the question of obtaining petroleum for western Europe from southern and eastern Europe be submitted to the Heads of Government. 1319 1382 [ Pg. 1382 includes portions of Doc. 1319 and Doc. 1320 ] July 20 * Byrnes-Gromyko Conversation: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of documentation on this conversation, at which the question of trusteeship was discussed. 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] July 20 * The Soviet Foreign Commissar to the Secretary of State Expression of the negative attitude of the Soviet Government toward foreign control of national elections; intimation that a Soviet proposal relating to Greece will be placed before the Berlin Conference. 1063 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , and Doc. 1063 ] July 20 * Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Department of State Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: economic principles for the treatment of Germany; policy toward Poland; establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers; the agenda for the Fourth Plenary Meeting; the admission of Italy and Spain to international organizations; reparations from Italy; revision of the Italian surrender terms; implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; and freedom of movement for press representatives in eastern Europe. 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] 1945 July 20 * Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the discussions in the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] ] July 20 * Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Rapporteur’s Report Report by Foreign Commissar Molotov to the Heads of Government on the discussions in the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] July 20 * Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal Suggestion that Secretary of State Byrnes might wish, in presenting a paper on policy toward Italy, to state orally the interest of the United States in the admission of Italy to the United Nations. 726 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] July 20 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposed declaration on the admission of Italy and the non-admission of Spain to the United Nations. 727 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] July 20 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposal to authorize the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider in detail the question of trusteeships and to work out practical proposals on this subject, including proposals concerning territories held under mandate of the League of Nations. 733 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 733 ] July 20 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Comments on the situation in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Greece; recommendation for resumption of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania; proposal for recommending to the Regent of Greece action toward establishing democratic government in that country. 804 , 1064 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 804 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 1063 and Doc. 1064 ] July 20 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposed statement by the Heads of Government with respect to fixing the western frontier of Poland along the line of the Oder and western Neisse Rivers. 1145 1138 [ Pg. 1138 includes portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , and Doc. 1146 ] July 20 * United States Delegation?Working Paper Draft of a statement for issuance by the Heads of Government with respect to policy toward Italy. 1091 1084 [ Pg. 1084 is part of Doc. 1091 ] July 20 * The Commanding General, Army Service Forces, to the British Minister of War Transport Informal transmittal of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on a British proposal to amend the proposed statement of basic objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan. 1262 1299 [ Pg. 1299 includes portions of Doc. 1262 and Doc. 1263 ] July 20 (tel. 511) The Ambassador in Iran to the Acting Secretary of State Report that a deputy in the Iranian Majlis has urged the withdrawal of Allied forces from Iran. 1328 1390 [ Pg. 1390 includes portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , and Doc. 1329 ] 1945 July 20 (tel. 3000) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Report on the discussion of supply problems during military meetings with the Soviet authorities in Vienna. 778 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] July 20 (tel. 7304) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State Report on British views with respect to Tangier. 1354 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 1353 and Doc. 1354 ] July 20 * Byrnes-Churchill Luncheon Meeting: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of documentation on this meeting. 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)] ] July 20 * The Soviet Ambassador to the Secretary of State Transmittal or copies of an exchange of correspondence in June 1945 between Ambassador Gromyko and Secretary of State Stettinius relating to trust territories. 734 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 734 ] July 20 (tel. 3002) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Report of a conversation held on July 19, 1945, between Major-General W. H. Oxley and Colonel General Sergey Semenovich Biryuzov with respect to Soviet troops in Bulgaria and British troops in Greece. 1074 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 1074 ] July 20 (1247) The Deputy Political Adviser at Allied Force Headquarters to the Secretary of State Transmittal of the minutes of a conversation of July 13, 1945, between Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and Lieutenant General Wladyslaw Anders, Commander of the Polish Second Corps, concerning the effects of political developments in Poland on the Polish Second Corps. 1123 1113 [ Pg. 1113 includes portions of Doc. 1122 and Doc. 1123 ] July 20 (C.C.S. 892/1) Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve an enclosed draft (text printed) of a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, concerning his primary mission, the boundaries of his command, British participation in the main operations against Japan, operations in the Outer Zone, and the development of bases. 1269 , 1285 1317 [ Pg. 1317 is part of Doc. 1269 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 1285 ] July 20 * Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: approval of the minutes of the 196th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia; and disposal of enemy war materiel in Germany and Austria. 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] July 20 (C.C.S. 877/4) * Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve an amended draft (text printed) on basic objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan. 1263 1299 [ Pg. 1299 includes portions of Doc. 1262 and Doc. 1263 ] July 20 * Land-Leathers Conversation: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from unofficial sources on this conversation relating to shipping matters. 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] July 20 * Informal Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of documentation on this meeting. 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] 1945 July 20 * United States Delegation Working Paper Notes on the agenda for the Fourth Plenary Meeting. 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] July 20 * Fourth Plenary Meeting: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: the Rapporteur’s report on the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers; time of plenary meetings; establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers; revision of the Italian surrender terms; policy toward the former German satellites; reparations from Italy; zones of occupation in Austria; admission of British and United States forces to Vienna; the western frontier of Poland; and trusteeships. 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] July 20 * Fourth Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] July 20 * Text Approved by the Heads of Government Agreement on the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers. 713 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 712 and Doc. 713 ] July 20 President Bierut and Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski to President Truman Proposals concerning the western frontier of Poland. 1146 1138 [ Pg. 1138 includes portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , and Doc. 1146 ] July 20 [ The Polish Chargé in the Soviet Union to the American Chargé in the Soviet Union ] [Note concerning establishment of a Polish military mission to the Allied Control Council for Germany and Polish representation on the Allied Commission on Reparations; quoted in a message of July 22, 1945, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union to the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference (document No. 1133, page 1125 [ Pg. 1125 is part of Doc. 1133 ] ), q. v.] July 20 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Recommendation for the shipment of crude oil or refined oil products into western Europe from southern and eastern Europe. 1320 1382 [ Pg. 1382 includes portions of Doc. 1319 and Doc. 1320 ] July 20 (tel. 1427) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Analysis of the Japanese position in the war and of the possibilities for ending the war. 1228 1252 [ Pg. 1252 is part of Doc. 1228 ] July 20 (tel. 516) The Ambassador in Iran to the Acting Secretary of State Report of an appeal from the Iranian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister for American action at the Berlin Conference to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet and British troops from Iran. 1329 1390 [ Pg. 1390 includes portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , and Doc. 1329 ] July 20 * Truman-Churchill Conversation: Memorandum by the President Note on a discussion of an adjustment of the exchange value of the franc and of proclamations by the Allied Control Council for Germany. 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] July 20 * Truman-Stalin Conversation: Memorandum by the President Note on a discussion regarding a meeting of the United States and Soviet Chiefs of Staff. 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] 1945 July 20 * Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee: United States Delegation Memorandum Notes on a discussion of possible internationalization of the Ruhr and the Rhineland. 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] July 20 Report by the Economic Subcommittee Report on the extent of agreement and disagreement within the Subcommittee with respect to economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany and reparations questions; transmittal of a revised text of the proposed agreement on economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany. 863 , 902 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 902 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Recommendations for amending further the proposed agreement on economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany. 864 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] July 20 * The Assistant Secretary of War to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Comments on a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President concerning the interim financing of imports into Germany. 865 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 864 and Doc. 865 ] July 20 [* Diary Entry by the Secretary of War ] [Notes on a discussion with Ambassador Harriman concerning the political situation in the Soviet Union; quoted in footnote 1 to a memorandum of July 19, 1945, by the Secretary of War (document No. 1157, page 1155 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] ), q. v.] July 20 (tel. 73) The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Views on action which might be taken with regard to a strike of Polish seamen in the United Kingdom and possible repercussions of such action on the United Maritime Authority. 1124 1114 [ Pg. 1114 includes portions of Doc. 1123 and Doc. 1124 ] July 20 (tel. 74) (SD 4486) The Acting War Shipping Administrator to the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator Information with respect to a strike of Polish seamen in the United Kingdom; transmittal of the texts of three communications on this subject sent or received by the War Shipping Administration. 1125 1116 [ Pg. 1116 includes portions of Doc. 1124 and Doc. 1125 ] July 20 (tel. 76) The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs to the Director of European Affairs Comments on the decision of Colonel James H. Douglas, Jr., to decline appointment to the Allied Commission in Italy and on the desirability of reaching agreement at the Berlin Conference as to the future of the Allied Commission. 1114 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 1114 and Doc. 1115 ] July 20 (tel. 79) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Comparison of certain aspects of the Soviet proposals concerning revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; recommendation that an effort be made to reach agreement on this matter at the Berlin Conference. 803 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 802 and Doc. 803 ] 01 July 21 (tel. Victory 149) * The Assistant Secretary of Stale for Economic Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State Ambassador Pauley’s comments concerning the interpretation of his instructions with respect to restitution questions. 903 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] July 21 * The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Comments on a Soviet proposal for internationalizing the Ruhr. 1025 997 [ Pg. 997 includes portions of Doc. 1024 and Doc. 1025 ] July 21 * Memorandum by the Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council ( Germany ) Comments on proposals for the creation of a separate Ruhr-Rhineland state. 1026 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 1026 ] July 21 * The Chief of Staff of the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Transmittal of statistics on oil production in eastern Europe. 1321 1383 [ Pg. 1383 includes portions of Doc. 1320 and Doc. 1321 ] July 21 * United States Delegation Memorandum Agenda for the Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] July 21 * Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: date and place of meeting and composition of the Council of Foreign Ministers; economic principles for the treatment of Germany; a declaration on Poland; implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; policy toward Italy and the former German satellites; and the agenda for the Fifth Plenary Meeting. 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] July 21 * Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Rapporteur’s Report Report by Secretary of State Byrnes to the Heads of Government on the discussions in the Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] July 21 (P. 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) * Report by the Subcommittee on Poland Draft of a declaration on Poland to be issued by the Heads of Government, with notations to indicate areas of disagreement in the Subcommittee on Poland. 1129 1120 [ Pg. 1120 is part of Doc. 1129 ] July 21 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Draft of a statement to be issued by the Heads of Government with respect to implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. 748 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 747 and Doc. 748 ] July 21 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to policy toward Italy. 1092 1085 [ Pg. 1085 includes portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1092 (#1)] ] July 21 Proposal by the United States Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to policy toward Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. 805 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] 1945 July 21 (tel. C 27265) The Commanding General, Army Forces, Pacific, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Suggestion that the boundary between the Southeast Asia Command and the Southwest Pacific Area be delineated to conform to the Philippine international boundary. 1270 1318 [ Pg. 1318 includes portions of Doc. 1269 and Doc. 1270 ] July 21 * Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: basic objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan; review of combined Anglo-American procedures for munitions assignments; internationalization of the Danube; trooplift programs in the North Atlantic during the first half of 1946; disposition of captured German passenger ships; and collection of weather information in eastern Siberia. 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] July 21 (C.C.S. 877/5) Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Reply to British comments on a proposed statement of basic objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan; transmittal of an amended draft of the proposed text. 1264 1304 [ Pg. 1304 includes portions of Doc. 1263 and Doc. 1264 ] July 21 * The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Recommendation for the abolition of the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington. 1198 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 1198 ] July 21 (C.C.S. 896) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff send a letter (draft text printed as enclosure A) to the Department of State and to the British Foreign Office suggesting that the agreement of the Soviet Government be sought to the creation of an interim Danube Navigation Agency. (Enclosure B: Message of July 3, 1945, from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, reporting on problems concerning shipping on the Danube, recommending the establishment of an interim Danube Navigation Agency, and suggesting that internationalization of the Danube be added to the agenda for the Berlin Conference.) 754 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] July 21 * The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Request that the President present to Generalissimo Stalin a memorandum requesting Soviet approval of a proposal to augment facilities for the collection and dissemination of weather information in Siberia. 1277 1325 [ Pg. 1325 includes portions of Doc. 1276 and Doc. 1277 ] July 21 * President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin Request for Soviet approval of a proposal to augment facilities for the collection and dissemination of weather information in Siberia. 1278 1326 [ Pg. 1326 includes portions of Doc. 1277 and Doc. 1278 ] July 21 (tel. 931) The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union Definition of the proposed mission of Prince Konoye to the Soviet Union. 1229 1257 [ Pg. 1257 includes portions of Doc. 1228 and Doc. 1229 ] 1945 July 21 (tel. 932) The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union Comments on Japanese policy with respect to possible surrender. 1230 1258 [ Pg. 1258 is part of Doc. 1230 ] July 21 (tel. 1568) The Ambassador in Portugal to the Acting Secretary of State Report of Portuguese reaction to the delay in arranging for Portuguese participation in the war against Japan; recommendation for action. 1299 1354 [ Pg. 1354 includes portions of Doc. 1298 and Doc. 1299 ] July 21 * Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: approval of the minutes of the 197th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; basic objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan; trooplift programs in the North Atlantic in the first half of 1946; and disposition of captured German passenger ships. 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] July 21 (C.C.S. 889/3) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Comments with respect to a proposed visit by British officers to General of the Army MacArthur and Fleet Admiral Nimitz. 1286 1339 [ Pg. 1339 includes portions of Doc. 1285 and Doc. 1286 ] July 21 (tel. 1433) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Comments on the possibility that the Japanese request to send a special envoy to Moscow has been discussed at the Berlin Conference; warning that Japanese-Soviet relations may take an unforeseeable turn. 1231 1259 [ Pg. 1259 includes portions of Doc. 1230 and Doc. 1231 ] July 21 (tel. 91) The Chief of Mission in Albania to the Acting Secretary of State Report on Greek-Albanian frontier incidents. 1075 1063 [ Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 1075 ] July 21 (tel. Victory 167) * The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Instructions to acknowledge a telegram from Mr. Syngman Rhee requesting the Heads of Government at the Berlin Conference to issue a statement with respect to Korea. 735 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] July 21 (tel. 46) The Ambassador in France to the United States Delegation Report of French acceptance of the proposal for quadripartite supervision of elections in Greece. 1065 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] July 21 (tel. 4396) The Ambassador in France to the Acting Secretary of State Report of a conversation with Foreign Minister Bidault concerning the Levant situation. 1340 1399 [ Pg. 1399 includes portions of Doc. 1339 , Doc. 1340 , and Doc. 1341 ] July 21 (tel Victory 170) * The War Shipping Administrator and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator to the Acting War Shipping Administrator Instructions for action with respect to a strike of Polish seamen in the United Kingdom; transmission of the text of a message from Vice Admiral Land to a United States shipping official in London on this subject. 1126 1118 [ Pg. 1118 is part of Doc. 1126 ] 1945 July 21 * Stimson–Churchill Conversation: Editor’s Note Quotation from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 21, 1945, concerning the communication to Prime Minister Churchill of Major General Groves’ report on the successful testing of the atomic bomb. 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] July 21 * Fifth Plenary Meeting: Department of State Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: the Rapporteur’s report on the Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers; a declaration on Poland; policy toward Italy and the former German satellites; the Polish frontiers and areas of Polish administration; and the coal and food supply for Germany. 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] July 21 * Fifth Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] July 21 * Text Considered by the Heads of Government Draft of a statement on the Polish question, with an indication of passages on which agreement has not yet been reached. 1130 1121 [ Pg. 1121 includes portions of Doc. 1129 and Doc. 1130 ] July 21 * Text Approved by the Heads of Government Agreed text of a statement on the Polish question to be issued by the Heads of Government. 1131 1123 [ Pg. 1123 includes portions of Doc. 1130 and Doc. 1131 ] July 21 (tel. Neter 187) The Ambassador to the Netherlands to the Acting Secretary of State Report on the urgent desire of the Netherland Government to make arrangements for Netherland participation in the war against Japan. 1292 1346 [ Pg. 1346 includes portions of Doc. 1291 and Doc. 1292 ] Julv 21 (2536) The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a memorandum by Mr. Ernest J. Dempster commenting upon the Spanish threat to withdraw from the Tangier Statute in the event of Soviet participation in the Tangier regime. 1355 1413 [ Pg. 1413 is part of Doc. 1355 ] July 21 (C.C.S. 897) * Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Background information and recommendations for action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerning the provision of personnel shipping for the requirements of Allied governments other than the United States and the United Kingdom. (Enclosure A: Draft of a memorandum from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board on the above subject.) 1192 1194 [ Pg. 1194 includes portions of Doc. 1191 and Doc. 1192 ] July 21 (tel. UK 46111) ( Wsa 3843) (PO 1) The Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board and the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration, to the War Shipping Administrator and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator Notification of agreement that the Milwaukee should be temporarily repaired in Germany and proceed to the United States for fitting; suggestion that agreement be reached at Babelsberg as to whether the United States or the United Kingdom should man and operate this vessel. 1193 1198 [ Pg. 1198 includes portions of Doc. 1192 and Doc. 1193 ] 1945 July 21 (tel. UK 46112) ( Wsa 3844) (PO 2) The Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board and the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration, to the War Shipping Administrator and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator Inquiry as to the appropriateness of dealing with the Polish Government-in-Exile on matters relating to the United Maritime Authority. 1132 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 1131 and Doc. 1132 ] July 21 [ The Polish Chargé in the Soviet Union to the American Chargé in the Soviet Union ] [Transmittal of a note concerning establishment of a Polish military mission to the Allied Control Council for Germany and Polish representation on the Allied Commission on Reparations; quoted in a message of July 22, 1945, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union to the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference (document No. 1133, page 1125 [ Pg. 1125 is part of Doc. 1133 ] ), q. v.] July 21 (tel. War 35987) The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee to the Secretary of War Notification that Secretary Stimson’s military advisers in Washington favor his “pet city’ “as a target for atomic attack. 1307 1372 [ Pg. 1372 includes portions of Doc. 1307 , Doc. 1308 , and Doc. 1309 ] July 21 (tel. War 35988) The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee to the Secretary of War Report on preparations for the first atomic attack against Japan. 1309 1372 [ Pg. 1372 includes portions of Doc. 1307 , Doc. 1308 , and Doc. 1309 ] July 21 (tel. 6019) The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Request for information concerning an agreement between the British Government and the Polish Government-in-Exile concerning the latter’s assets; information as to United States practice in granting Treasury licenses to Polish official agencies. 1128 1119 [ Pg. 1119 includes portions of Doc. 1127 and Doc. 1128 ] July 21 (tel. 36) The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs Comparison of United States and British approaches to the question of recognizing the Renner government in Austria. 762 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] July 21 (P 16) * Proposal by the British Delegation Proposal for the complete joint withdrawal of Allied forces from Iran in three stages. 1330 1391 [ Pg. 1391 includes portions of Doc. 1329 and Doc. 1330 ] July 21 [* Memorandum by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean ] [Report on the situation in Greece and on the relative size of the forces now under arms in Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia; printed as annex I to a memorandum of July 22, 1945, by Prime Minister Churchill (document No. 1076, page 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 1076 ] ), q. v.] 1945 July 21 [* Diary Entry by the Secretary of War ] [Notes on the receipt of a report from Major General Groves concerning the successful testing of the atomic bomb and its communication to President Truman and the Secretary of State; quoted in footnote 1 to a memorandum of July 18, 1945, from Major General Groves to Secretary Stimson (document No. 1305, page 1361 [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] ), q. v.] July 21 * United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the status of problems before the Berlin Conference as of July 21, 1945. 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] July 21 * Tripartite Dinner Meeting: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of documentation on this meeting. 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] July 21 (tel. Victory 182) * The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Department of State Report on discussions at the technical level concerning financing of imports into Germany. 866 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] July 21 (670) * The Political Adviser in Germany to the Secretary of State Report on the attitude of the German people with respect to Nazis and Nazism. 867 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 867 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of a directive to commanders of the forces of occupation in Germany concerning the formulation and execution of a uniform program with respect to economic matters. 868 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] July 21 * The Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany, to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a draft directive to commanders of the occupation forces in Germany. 869 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] July 21 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Draft of a directive for issuance by the Heads of Government to the commanders of the occupation forces in Germany with respect to action in the Allied Control Council for effectuating specified political and economic policies throughout Germany. 870 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 870 ] July 21 (tel. Victory 184) * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State Instructions for the repetition of certain messages to the American missions at Moscow and Bucharest; report on action at the Berlin Conference with respect to a declaration on German external assets. 986 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Recommendation for the issuance of a declaration on German external assets by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and (if possible) France. 987 954 [ Pg. 954 includes portions of Doc. 987 and Doc. 988 ] July 21 (tel. Victory 185) * The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State Transmittal of a decision as to United States action with respect to a strike of Polish seamen. 1127 1119 [ Pg. 1119 includes portions of Doc. 1127 and Doc. 1128 ] 1945 July 21 * Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee: Editor’s Note Cross reference to a post-Conference summary of the discussion at this meeting. 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] July 21 * British Text of a Draft Report by the Economic Subcommittee Draft of a report on the liability of Italy and Austria to pay reparations. 765 , 1097 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , and Doc. 765 ] , 1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 1096 and Doc. 1097 ] July 21 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Draft definition of war trophies. 904 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] July 21 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposal for dealing with questions involving the restitution of property seized by the enemy. 905 847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] July 21 * Proposal by the British Delegation Proposal for dealing with questions involving the restitution or replacement of property seized by the enemy. 906 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] July 21 [* The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs to the Acting Chief and the Assistant Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs ] [Account of some of the discussions in the Subcommittee on German Political Questions during the preparation of a report on the political principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period; quoted in footnotes 4–6 to the Report of the Subcommittee (document No. 856, page 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] ), q. v.] July 21 (tel. Victory 188) * The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Transmittal of the text of an approved reply to inquiries from the press with respect to the surrender of Japan. 1242 1272 [ Pg. 1272 includes portions of Doc. 1241 and Doc. 1242 ] July 21 (tel. 87) The Washington Liaison Officer for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Tentative recommendations with respect to reparations from Italy. 1098 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 1097 and Doc. 1098 ] July 21 (tel. Victory 189) * The Secretary of War to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee Confirmation of an earlier decision with respect to targets for atomic attack. 1308 1372 [ Pg. 1372 includes portions of Doc. 1307 , Doc. 1308 , and Doc. 1309 ] July 21 (tel.) The Under Secretary of the Navy to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet Views of the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Navy with respect to discussing the question of the Turkish Straits and the Kiel Canal at the Berlin Conference. 753 , 1368 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] , 1427 [ Pg. 1427 includes portions of Doc. 1368 and Doc. 1369 ] July 21 (tel. 7382) The Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom to the Deputy Solid Fuels Administrator for War Report on recommendations being considered by the British War Cabinet with respect to the British coal position. 1042 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 1041 and Doc. 1042 ] 1945 July 22 [ 21? ] (tel. Victory 190) * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations Request for statistics on production in eastern Germany before World War II. 912 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 911 and Doc. 912 ] July 22 (tel. 272) The Military Attaché in Portugal to the War Department Report of a conversation with Prime Minister Salazar concerning Soviet policy and the Portuguese desire to participate in the war against Japan. 1300 1356 [ Pg. 1356 is part of Doc. 1300 ] July 22 * Stimson-Churchill Conversation: Editor’s Note Quotation from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 22, 1945, concerning Prime Minister Churchill’s reactions to Major General Groves’ report on the successful testing of the atomic bomb; quotation from Mr. Harvey Bundy’s later account of Mr. Churchill’s reactions. 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] July 22 * Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: review of questions on the agenda; implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; operation of control procedures in Italy and the Balkans; economic principles for the treatment of Germany; seizure of industrial equipment in Rumania; and the agenda for the Sixth Plenary Meeting. 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] July 22 * Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs Summary, dated July 24, of the discussion regarding the Italian colonies in the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] July 22 * Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the discussions in the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] ] July 22 * Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Rapporteur’s Report Report by Foreign Secretary Eden to the Heads of Government on the discussions in the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] July 22 (tel. 491) The Acting Representative in Rumania to the Acting Secretary of State Report on political developments in Rumania. 806 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] July 22 * The Secretary of War to the President Recommendations concerning the rehabilitation of Europe, including principles for the treatment of Germany. 871 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 871 ] July 22 * Truman-Churchill Meeting: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from published sources on this meeting. 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] 1945 July 22 (tel. Victory 204) * The Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration, to Mr. M. F. Millikan, of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration Report of conversations with the British Minister of War Transport concerning coal problems. 1043 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 1043 and Doc. 1044 ] July 22 (tel. Victory 205) * The Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration, to the War Shipping A d ministration Report on an agreement reached with the British Minister of War Transport concerning the use of T-2 tankers for grain in the United Kingdom import program. 1194 1199 [ Pg. 1199 includes portions of Doc. 1194 and Doc. 1195 ] July 22 (C.C.S. 679/8) * Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff Counterproposals with respect to trooplift programs in the North Atlantic during the first half of 1946. 1195 1199 [ Pg. 1199 includes portions of Doc. 1194 and Doc. 1195 ] July 22 (C.C.S. 890/3) * Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff Recommendations concerning command arrangements in Indochina. 1271 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 1271 ] July 22 (tel.) The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the United States Delegation Transmittal of the text of a note of July 21, 1945, from the Polish Chargé at Moscow, enclosing a note of July 20, 1945, concerning establishment of a Polish military mission to the Allied Control Council for Germany and Polish representation on the Allied Commission on Reparations. (Footnote: Summary of a declaration of June 15, 1945, by the so-called Polish Provisional Government suggesting Polish participation in international bodies concerned with Germany.) 1133 1125 [ Pg. 1125 is part of Doc. 1133 ] July 22 (tel. 3022–bis) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Report concerning the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the provisioning of the city of Vienna. 779 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] July 22 * United States Delegation Working Paper Recommendations with respect to the use of American property for war booty or for reparations exacted from the former German satellites. 839 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 838 and Doc. 839 ] July 22 * United States Delegation Working Paper Recommendations with respect to restitution of property seized by the enemy. 907 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] July 22 * United States Delegation Working Paper Suggested United States position on economic questions relating to Germany, Poland, and reparations. 908 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] July 22 * The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Suggestions for revising the approach to the reparations negotiations at the Berlin Conference. 909 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] July 22 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft paper on war booty and reparations. 910 853 [ Pg. 853 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] 1945 Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Alternative draft paper on war booty and reparations. 911 853 [ Pg. 853 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] July 22 * United States Delegation Working Paper Transmittal of a draft of a quadripartite declaration concerning the assumption of control over German external assets. 988 954 [ Pg. 954 includes portions of Doc. 987 and Doc. 988 ] July 22 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Recommendation for tripartite participation in the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe, the European Coal Organization, and the European Central Inland Transport Authority. 1161 1160 [ Pg. 1160 includes portions of Doc. 1160 and Doc. 1161 ] July 22 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to the future status of the International Zone of Tangier. 1356 1415 [ Pg. 1415 includes portions of Doc. 1355 and Doc. 1356 ] July 22 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to the regime of the Turkish Straits and the abrogation of the Montreux Convention. 1369 1427 [ Pg. 1427 includes portions of Doc. 1368 and Doc. 1369 ] July 22 * Sixth Plenary Meeting: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: withdrawal of Soviet forces in Austria; the Rapporteur’s report on the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers; the western frontier of Poland; an invitation to Polish leaders to attend the Berlin Conference to present their views; the coal supply for Germany; possible trusteeship for Italian colonial territories, for territories under mandate from the League of Nations, and for Korea; revision of the Montreux Convention concerning the Turkish Straits; Soviet-Turkish relations; Konigsberg; and repatriation of Ukrainians from a British camp in Italy. (Footnote: Extract from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 23, 1945, concerning the discussions at the Sixth Plenary Meeting and Mr. Stimson’s conversations of July 23.) 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] July 22 * Sixth Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] July 22 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government concerning the transfer of the Konigsberg area to the Soviet Union. 1020 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] July 22 * Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill Circulation of a memorandum by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and of a report by a delegation of the British Trades Union Congress with respect to conditions in Greece. (Annex I to document No. 1076 : Memorandum of July 21, 1945, by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, reporting on the situation in Greece and on the relative size of the forces under arms in Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.) 1066 , 1076 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 1076 ] 1945 July 22 * First Meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe: The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Summary of discussions concerning implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and freedom of press and radio correspondents in eastern Europe. 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] July 22 * Text Approved by the Foreign Ministers Text for inclusion in the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference and in the Conference Communiqué concerning the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers, with an attached text of an agreement by the Heads of Government on this subject. (This paper is dated July 22, 1945, but was not approved by the Foreign Ministers until July 23.) 714 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 714 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to policy toward Italy. 728 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] July 22 * The Chairman of the President’s War Relief Control Board to the President Transmittal of a memorandum giving historical information concerning the Turkish Straits. 1370 1428 [ Pg. 1428 includes portions of Doc. 1369 and Doc. 1370 ] July 22 [* Diary Entry by the Secretary of War ] [Extracts from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 22, 1945, concerning conversations with President Truman and General of the Army Arnold; quoted in footnote 1 to a memorandum of July 19, 1945, by Mr. Stimson (document No. 1157, page 1155 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] ) and in footnote 3 to a telegram of July 23, 1945, from Mr. Stimson to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (document No. 1310, page 1373 [ Pg. 1373 is part of Doc. 1310 ] ), q. v.] July 22 [* President Truman to President Bierut ] [Invitation to the Polish Government, issued on behalf of the three Heads of Government in conference at Potsdam, to send representatives to state to the Foreign Ministers at the Berlin Conference their views as to the western frontier of Poland: quoted in a note of July 23, 1945, from the American Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Polish Chargé in the Soviet Union (document No. 1147, page 1139 [ Pg. 1139 includes portions of Doc. 1146 and Doc. 1147 ] ), q. v.] July 22 (tel. 99) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Report on a propaganda broadcast to Japan by Captain E. M. Zacharias and on the release of the text of this broadcast by the Office of War Information. 1243 1273 [ Pg. 1273 is part of Doc. 1243 ] July 23 (tel. Victory 215) * The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Acting Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs Report that quadripartite joint programming of imports, exports, and reparations will not be feasible. 877 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] 1945 July 23 The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Polish Chargé in the Soviet Union Transmittal of an invitation for the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to send representatives to the Berlin Conference to state their views on the western frontier of Poland to the Foreign Ministers. 1147 1139 [ Pg. 1139 includes portions of Doc. 1146 and Doc. 1147 ] July 23 * Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: command in Indochina; provision of personnel shipping for the requirements of Allied governments other than the United States and the United Kingdom; a report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister; and United States policy in regard to lend-lease assignments. 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] July 23 (tel. Victory 218) * The Secretary of War to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee Request for further information on preparations for the atomic attack on Japan, including targets; notification that Secretary Stimson’s decision against one of the possible targets has been confirmed by highest authority. (Footnote: Extracts from Secretary Stimson’s diary for July 22 and 24, 1945, concerning conversations with President Truman and General of the Army Arnold on the above subjects.) 1310 1373 [ Pg. 1373 is part of Doc. 1310 ] July 23 (tel. Victory 221) * The War Shipping Administrator and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator to the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration, and the Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board Instructions that there should be no dealings with the Polish Government-in-Exile at London on matters relating to the United Maritime Authority. 1134 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] July 23 * President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill Request for British concurrence in the abolition of the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington. 1199 1204 [ Pg. 1204 includes portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] July 23 * Byrnes–Molotov Meeting: Bohlen Minutes Minutes of a discussion concerning reparations from Germany and war booty. 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] ] July 23 * The British Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State British approval of a proposed directive on German coal production and exports; views on possible methods of handling this question at the Berlin Conference. 1044 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 1043 and Doc. 1044 ] July 23 * The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Transmittal of an aide-mémoire concerning repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals in a camp near Cesenatico, Italy. 1164 1162 [ Pg. 1162 includes portions of Doc. 1163 and Doc. 1164 ] July 23 Byrnes-Eden Conversation: Editor’s Note Summary of information available on this conversation. 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] 1945 July 23 * Byrnes–Churchill Conversation: Editor’s Note Quotation of a note by Prime Minister Churchill concerning this conversation relating to Sino-Soviet negotiations and the United States attitude toward Soviet participation in the war against Japan. 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] July 23 * Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Department of State Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: review of questions on the agenda; reparations from Germany, Austria, and Italy; economic principles for the treatment of Germany; establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers; trusteeship for Italian colonial territories; a directive to Allied commanders-in-chief in Germany concerning agreements reached at the Berlin Conference; Soviet cooperation in solving urgent European economic problems; Iran; international discussions on the status of Tangier; invitations to China and France to join in establishing the Council of Foreign Ministers; the agenda for the Seventh Plenary Meeting; and the situation in Greece. 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] July 23 * Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the discussions in the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] ] July 23 * Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Rapporteur’s Report Report by Foreign Commissar Molotov to the Heads of Government on the discussions in the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] Undated * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Plan for the exaction of reparations from Germany. 920 863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 919 and Doc. 920 ] Undated * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposal with respect to procedures for advance deliveries from Germany of capital goods and of raw materials out of current production or inventories. 921 864 [ Pg. 864 includes portions of Doc. 920 and Doc. 921 ] July 23 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Draft text on the financing of imports into Germany. 872 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] July 23 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Revised draft of a text on the financing of imports into Germany. 873 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] July 23 * Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: approval of the minutes of the 198th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; employment of captured German passenger ships; trooplift programs in the North Atlantic in the first half of 1946; provision of personnel shipping for the requirements of Allied governments other than the United States and the United Kingdom; command in Indochina; the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister; and the control of Allied naval units other than United States units under the command of the Seventh Fleet. 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] 1945 July 23 (C.C.S. 679/9) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Counterproposals on the employment of captured enemy passenger shipping and trooplift programs in the North Atlantic. 1196 1201 [ Pg. 1201 is part of Doc. 1196 ] July 23 (tel.?) President Bierut to President Truman Acceptance of the invitation to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to send representatives to the Berlin Conference; composition of the Polish Delegation. 1148 1140 [ Pg. 1140 includes portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] July 23 (tel. 310) * The President to the Ambassador in China Transmittal of a message to Generalissimo Chiang concerning resumption of Sino-Soviet negotiations. 1216 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , and Doc. 1217 ] July 23 * The Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Transmittal of a draft of a Soviet-American protocol concerning policy toward China. 1217 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , and Doc. 1217 ] July 23 * The Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs to the Secretary of State Analysis of factors affecting the withdrawal of United States troops from Iran. 1331 1392 [ Pg. 1392 includes portions of Doc. 1330 and Doc. 1331 ] July 23 * Morse–Weston Conversation: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from unofficial sources on this conversation relating to shipping matters. 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] July 23 * The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Comments on the relationship between the Soviet proposal on a minimum import program for Germany and the provisions of the agreement on control machinery in Germany. 874 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 874 and Doc. 875 ] Undated * Proposal by the British Delegation Draft text on the financing of imports into Germany. 875 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 874 and Doc. 875 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper [ ? ] Draft text on the financing of imports into Germany. 876 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] July 23 (tel. 126) The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State Report that Marshal Konev has been instructed to facilitate the occupation of Vienna and that a quadripartite meeting to discuss occupation problems will be held on July 24, 1945. 780 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] July 23 * Informal Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Department of State Minutes Minutes of discussions concerning reparations from Germany and war booty. 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] 1945 July 23 (C.C.S. 900/1) * Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve a revised definition (text printed) of the boundary between the British and United States areas of command in the Southwest Pacific. 1272 1320 [ Pg. 1320 includes portions of Doc. 1272 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1272 (#1)] ] July 23 * The Commanding General, Army Service Forces, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Transmittal of a revised text with respect to cargo shipping submitted by the British Minister of War Transport; recommendation with respect thereto. 1265 1309 [ Pg. 1309 is part of Doc. 1265 ] July 23 (Appendix A to C.C.S. 900/2) * Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Comparison of United States and British proposals concerning the statement of basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war against Japan to be included in the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister. 1266 1310 [ Pg. 1310 is part of Doc. 1266 ] July 23 * United States Delegation Working Paper Recommendations with respect to reparations from Germany and related matters and with respect to economic principles for the treatment of Germany. 878 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 878 ] July 23 * Land–Leathers Conversation: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from unofficial sources on this conversation relating to shipping matters. 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] July 23 * Seventh Plenary Meeting: Department of State Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: the Rapporteur’s report on the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers; definitiveness of the decisions of the Foreign Ministers; the size of British military units in Greece and of Soviet units in Bulgaria; Soviet-Turkish relations; revision of the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits; free navigation of inland waterways; Konigsberg; the Levant crisis; withdrawal of Allied forces from Iran; the food supply for Vienna; recognition of the Renner government in Austria; and a recess of the Berlin Conference. 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] July 23 Seventh Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] July 23 Seventh Plenary Meeting: Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs Summary, dated July 24, of the discussion regarding Syria and Lebanon in the Seventh Plenary Meeting. 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] July 23 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposal for the free and unrestricted navigation of international inland waterways and for international regulation of such navigation; proposal for the establishment of interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. 755 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 754 and Doc. 755 ] 1945 July 23 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government for quadripartite consideration of the question of the situation in Syria and Lebanon. 1341 1399 [ Pg. 1399 includes portions of Doc. 1339 , Doc. 1340 , and Doc. 1341 ] July 23 (tel. Victory ) 230) * The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Notification that the British Government is taking the initiative to have the French and British Embassies at Moscow invite the Soviet Government to participate in the Paris conversations concerning Tangier. 1357 1416 [ Pg. 1416 includes portions of Doc. 1357 and Doc. 1358 ] July 23 (tel. 377) The Representative in Bulgaria to the Acting Secretary of State Suggestion that the Bulgarian authorities, by raising the question of regularizing diplomatic relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, have given the Heads of Government an opportune occasion to express themselves at the Berlin Conference on the internal political situation in Bulgaria and on elections in Bulgaria. 810 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] July 23 (tel. M 25084) ( Conf-mess 12) The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Further statistics on output in eastern Germany before World War II. 913 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] July 23 (tel. 3030) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Report on the reaction of Air Vice Marshal Stevenson to the Soviet proposals concerning the procedures of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania. 807 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] July 23 (SM–2621) * The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Notification of approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, of an attached report (text printed) by the State-War-Navy Subcommittee for Europe concerning the proposed statutes for the Allied Control Commission for Hungary. (Subattachment: Draft of revised statutes for the Allied Control Commission for Hungary.) 808 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 808 ] July 23 * The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to the Members of the Committee Panel at Babelsberg Transmittal of a draft memorandum to the Secretary of State recommending desiderata with respect to revised statutes for the Allied Control Commission for Hungary. 809 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] July 23 (tel. War 36791) The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee to the Secretary of War Report on the selection of Hiroshima, Kokura, and Niigata as targets for atomic attack. 1311 1374 [ Pg. 1374 includes portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , and Doc. 1313 ] July 23 (tel. War 36792) The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee to the Secretary of War Report on the tentative timetable for the first atomic attack against Japan. 1312 1374 [ Pg. 1374 includes portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , and Doc. 1313 ] 1945 July 23 (tel. Victory 233) * The War Shipping Administrator and the Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration, to the Acting War Shipping Administrator Report on conversations with British representatives at the Berlin Conference concerning the use of British ships in the Pacific. 1287 1340 [ Pg. 1340 is part of Doc. 1287 ] July 23 (tel. Victory 235) * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Washington Liaison Officer for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations Request for statistics on manufacturing and agricultural resources and industrial and agricultural output in East Prussia. 914 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] July 23 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of a proposal concerning reparations from Germany. 915 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 914 and Doc. 915 ] July 23 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government concerning reparations from Germany. 916 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 915 and Doc. 916 ] July 23 * Proposal by the British Delegation Suggestion for amending the United States proposals concerning reparations from Germany. 917 , 1045 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 916 and Doc. 917 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 1044 and Doc. 1045 ] July 23 * United States Delegation Working Paper Recommendation for attempting to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on economic aspects of the question of the western frontier of Poland. 918 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] July 23 (tel. 495) The Acting Representative in Rumania to the Acting Secretary of State Observations with respect to unilateral actions taken by Soviet officials in Rumania. 811 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , and Doc. 812 ] July 23 (tel. 7421) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State Report on steps taken by the British Government to liquidate the affairs of the Polish Government-in-Exile. 1135 1127 [ Pg. 1127 is part of Doc. 1135 ] July 23 [* Diary Entry by the Secretary of War ] [Account of Secretary Stimson’s conversations with President Truman and other members of the United States Delegation concerning Soviet demands at the Berlin Conference, the timing of the first atomic attack against Japan, and the need for Soviet entry into the war against Japan; quoted in footnotes to the minutes of the Sixth Plenary Meeting, July 22, 1945 (page 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] ), a memorandum of July 16, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State (document No. 1236, page 1265 [ Pg. 1265 is part of Doc. 1236 ] ), and a memorandum of July 16, 1945, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President (document No. 1275, page 1323 [ Pg. 1323 includes portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] ), q. v.] July 23 * Tripartite Dinner Meeting: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from published sources on this meeting. 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] 1945 July 23 * Tripartite Dinner Meeting’ The Assistant to the Secretary of State to the President Memorandum of July 24, 1945, summarizing toasts proposed by Prime Minister Churchill, President Truman, and Generalissimo Stalin at the tripartite dinner meeting on July 23, 1945. 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] ] July 23 (tel. Victory 241) * Mosely–Gusev Conversation: The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Report of a conversation between Mr. Mosely and Ambassador Gusev concerning instructions which have been sent to the Acting Soviet Representative on the European Advisory Commission to sign the agreement on additional requirements to be imposed on Germany. 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] July 23 (tel. Neter 77) The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Netherlands Comments concerning the desire of the Netherland Government to arrange for Netherland participation in the war against Japan. 1293 1347 [ Pg. 1347 includes portions of Doc. 1292 and Doc. 1293 ] July 23 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State Memorandum of a conversation with the French Ambassador concerning the French desire to participate in the war against Japan. 1294 1348 [ Pg. 1348 includes portions of Doc. 1293 and Doc. 1294 ] July 24 [* Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ] [Summary of the discussion regarding the Italian colonies in the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 22, 1945; printed in conjunction with the minutes for that meeting (page 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] ), q. v.] July 24 [* Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ] [Summary of the discussion regarding Syria and Lebanon in the Seventh Plenary Meeting, July 23, 1945; printed in conjunction with the minutes for that meeting (page 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] ), q. v.] July 24 [* The Assistant to the Secretary of State to the President ] [Summary of toasts proposed by Prime Minister Churchill, President Truman, and Generalissimo Stalin at the tripartite dinner meeting on July 23, 1945; printed under the editor’s heading for that meeting (page 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] ), q. v.] July 24 * President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill Request for Mr. Churchill’s ideas on the settlement of the Palestine problem; suggestion for Anglo-American discussions on this subject. 1344 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 1344 ] July 24 * Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman Comments on the President’s memorandum of July 17, 1945, with respect to lend-lease to the United Kingdom; transmittal of a memorandum on this subject by the British Chiefs of Staff. 1182 1180 [ Pg. 1180 includes portions of Doc. 1181 and Doc. 1182 ] July 24 (tel. M 1285) The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania to the War Department Outline of proposed action in the Allied Control Commission with respect to Soviet activities in Rumania. 812 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , and Doc. 812 ] 1945 July 24 (tel. 1951) The Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Transmittal of the text of a note of July 19, 1945, from the Bulgarian Foreign Minister to the Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria reviewing the situation in Bulgaria for the information of the participants in the Berlin Conference and requesting the establishment of regular diplomatic intercourse between Bulgaria and the Allied Powers. 813 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] Undated * Draft of Report by the Economic Subcommittee Draft of a report concerning the inability of the Economic Subcommittee to reach agreement on certain basic principles of a plan for reparations from Germany. 922 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 922 and Doc. 923 ] Undated * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Circulation of the text of a letter of July 12, 1945, from the Soviet Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary to the United States and British Representatives on that Commission outlining revised procedures for conducting the work of the Commission. 796 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 796 ] July 24 * Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Department of State Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: arrangements for receiving the Polish Delegation; reparations from Germany, Austria, and Italy; distribution of European oil supplies; implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; admission of Italy and Spain to international organizations; establishment of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; the agenda for the Eighth Plenary Meeting; reception of the Polish Delegation; and the western frontier of Poland. (Annex 1: Summary of statements made by members of the Polish Delegation who appeared before the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers with respect to the western frontier of Poland.) 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] July 24 * Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the views expressed by members of the Polish Delegation who appeared before the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers with respect to the western frontier of Poland. 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] ] July 24 * Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Rapporteur’s Report Report by Secretary of State Byrnes to the Heads of Government on the discussions in the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] 1945 July 24 * Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Minutes of the appearance of the Polish Delegation before the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers with respect to the western frontier of Poland. 1385 1517 [ Pg. 1517 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)] and Doc. 1385 ] July 24 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposal for the exaction of reparations from Austria in the amount of $250,000,000 over a six-year period. 769 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] July 24 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposal for the exaction of reparations from Italy in the amount of $600,000,000 over a six-year period. 1099 1092 [ Pg. 1092 includes portions of Doc. 1098 and Doc. 1099 ] Undated * Text Considered by the Subcommittee on Admission to the United Nations Draft of a statement to be issued by the Heads of Government with respect to the admission of Italy and the non-admission of Spain to the United Nations. 729 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] July 24 * Text Submitted to the Heads of Government Draft of a statement to be issued by the Heads of Government with respect to the admission of Italy and the non-admission of Spain to the United Nations. 1424 1592 [ Pg. 1592 includes portions of Doc. 1423 and Doc. 1424 ] July 24 * Proposal by the British Delegation Note by Foreign Secretary Eden with respect to the removal of Allied industrial equipment from Rumania by the Soviet authorities. 841 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] July 24 * Report by the Economic Subcommittee Second report of the Economic Subcommittee to the Foreign Ministers; report on the degree of agreement and disagreement in the Subcommittee with respect to reparations from Germany, Austria, and Italy, and with respect to distribution of European oil supplies. 766 , 923 , 1322 664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 765 and Doc. 766 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 922 and Doc. 923 ] , 1385 [ Pg. 1385 includes portions of Doc. 1322 and Doc. 1323 ] July 24 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft statement of the United States position with respect to removals of property from Austria. 767 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] July 24 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft statement of the United States position with respect to removals of property from Austria. 768 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] July 24 * Leahy-Churchill Conversation: Editor’s Note Summary of information available on this conversation. 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] July 24 * Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill: Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of the discussion, amendment, and approval of a report from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister summarizing the conclusions reached in their deliberations at the Terminal Conference. 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] 1945 July 24 * The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill Text, as approved by the President and the Prime Minister, of a report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff summarizing the conclusions reached at the Terminal Conference with respect to the over-all objective in the war against Japan; the over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war; basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war; strategic direction of the war; operations in the Pacific and in the Southeast Asia Command; reallocation of areas and command in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia Areas; French, Netherland, and Portuguese participation in the war; information for the Soviet Union concerning the war against Japan; and personnel and cargo shipping. (Appendix A: Memorandum on plans and operations in the Pacific.) (Appendix B: Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, with respect to his mission and the boundaries of his command.) (Appendix C: Definition of the boundary between the British and United States areas of command in the Southwest Pacific.) (Appendix D: Views of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with respect to Portuguese participation in the war against Japan.) (Appendix E: Memorandum for the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board with respect to passenger shipping requirements of the Allied nations.) 1381 1462 [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Undated * Proposal by the United States Delegation Draft of a proclamation to be issued by the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China calling for the surrender of Japan. 1244 1275 [ Pg. 1275 is part of Doc. 1244 ] Undated * Proposal by the British Delegation Proposed amendments in the draft of a proclamation to be issued calling for the surrender of Japan. 1245 1277 [ Pg. 1277 is part of Doc. 1245 ] July 24 (tel. 311) * The President to the Ambassador in China Instruction to request the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang in the issuance of a proclamation by the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China calling for the surrender of Japan. 1246 1278 [ Pg. 1278 includes portions of Doc. 1246 and Doc. 1247 ] July 24 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of the United States position with respect to exacting reparations from Italy. 1101 1094 [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , and Doc. 1102 ] July 24 (C.C.S. 896/1) * Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff Concurrence in the dispatch of a letter from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Department of State and the British Foreign Office with respect to internationalization of the Danube. 756 655 [ Pg. 655 includes portions of Doc. 756 and Doc. 757 ] July 24 [*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Department of State and the British Foreign Office ] [Suggestion that the agreement of the Soviet Government be sought to the creation of an interim Danube Navigation Agency; printed as enclosure A to a memorandum of July 21, 1945, by the United States Chiefs of Staff (document No. 754, page 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] ), q. v.] 1945 July 24 * Tripartite Military Meeting: Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: Soviet entry into the war against Japan; a review of the ground, naval, and air situation in the war against Japan; and future operations in the war. 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] July 24 * The United States Chiefs of Staff to the Soviet Chiefs of Staff Five questions relating to Soviet-American cooperation in the war against Japan. 1279 1327 [ Pg. 1327 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] and Doc. 1279 ] July 24 * Proposal by the British Delegation Proposed amendments to the draft agreement concerning political principles for the treatment of Germany. 879 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] July 24 (tel. Comea 340) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State Report on a meeting of the European Advisory Commission concerning the proposed agreements on the zones of occupation in Germany and on additional requirements to be imposed on Germany. 1031 , 1037 1003 [ Pg. 1003 includes portions of Doc. 1031 and Doc. 1032 ] , 1008 [ Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 1037 and Doc. 1038 ] July 24 (tel. 2667) The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State Report on a Soviet note to the British Chargé at Moscow concerning the Soviet press and radio campaign against the Greek Government and the British in Greece. 1067 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] July 24 * Byrnes–Eden–Molotov Luncheon Meeting and Byrnes–Molotov Meeting: Page Minutes Minutes of a discussion between Secretary Byrnes and Foreign Commissar Molotov concerning the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers. 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] Undated * Memorandum by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union Recommendations with respect to the agenda and procedure for a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and the Soviet Union. 1280 1328 [ Pg. 1328 includes portions of Doc. 1279 and Doc. 1280 ] July 24 * Truman–Bierut Conversation: Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union Memorandum of a conversation concerning the western frontier of Poland. 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] July 24 (tel. M 25095) ( Conf-mess 14) The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Statistics on the resources of East Prussia before World War II. 919 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 918 and Doc. 919 ] July 24 (tel. 1441) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Acknowledgment of the receipt of two messages; notification that the Ambassador will seek a meeting with the Soviet Acting Foreign Commissar. 1232 1260 [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 1232 and Doc. 1233 ] 1945 July 24 * Eighth Plenary Meeting: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: the Rapporteur’s report on the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers; the admission of Italy and the former German satellites and the non-admission of Spain to the United Nations; diplomatic relations with Italy and the former German satellites; European inland waterways; revision of the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits; preparation of the Conference Communiqué; the western frontier of Poland; repatriation of prisoners from a British camp in Italy; and the food supply for Vienna. 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] July 24 * Eighth Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] July 24 * Memorandum by the President’s Chief of Staff Note on the attitude of the United States with respect to the passage of ships through the Turkish Straits and fortification of the Straits. 1371 1434 [ Pg. 1434 includes portions of Doc. 1370 , Doc. 1371 , and Doc. 1372 ] July 24 (1346) The Ambassador in Greece to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a report by the Assistant Military Attaché concerning violations of the Greek-Yugoslav border. 1079 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 1079 ] July 24 * Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of a discussion concerning operations in the Southeast Asia Command. 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] July 24 * The Adviser on German Economic Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Recommended safeguards to be sought in any agreement with the Soviet Union concerning reparations. 924 867 [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] July 24 [ 25? ] * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposed plan for the exaction of reparations from Germany. 925 867 [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] July 24 (tel. 667) The Military Attaché in Sweden to the War Department Report of Soviet intentions to fly interned German aircraft out of Sweden as war booty. 990 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] July 24 * Morse-Weston Conversation: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from unofficial sources on this conversation. 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] July 24 * Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Notes on the conditions requisite for the establishment of a strong, free, and independent Poland. 1136 1128 [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] Undated * Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Notes on political and economic problems affecting Poland. 1137 1129 [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 1136 and Doc. 1137 ] July 24 * Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Statement in favor of the Oder-Neisse line as the western frontier of Poland; review of factors necessitating an immediate determination of this frontier. 1149 1140 [ Pg. 1140 includes portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] July 24 (tel. 7445) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State Summary of reports from the British Chargé at Warsaw to the Foreign Office concerning political conditions in Poland. 1138 1130 [ Pg. 1130 includes portions of Doc. 1137 and Doc. 1138 ] 1945 July 24 * Truman–Stalin Conversation: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from published sources on this conversation, during which the President told Generalissimo Stalin of the development of a new weapon of unusual destructive force. 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] July 24 * Byrnes Conversation With Members of the Polish Delegation: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of documentation on this conversation. 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] ] July 24 * Morse–Weston Conversation: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from unofficial sources on this conversation concerning the distribution of captured German vessels. 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] July 24 * Second Meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe: Editor’s Note Quotation from Mr. Walter Brown’s diary summarizing the discussion at this meeting. 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] July 24 (tel. 498) The Acting Representative in Rumania to the Acting Secretary of State Report of a conversation with Mr. Iuliu Maniu concerning the political situation in Rumania. 814 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 814 ] July 24 (tel. 746) The Ambassador in Greece to the Acting Secretary of State Report of the resignation of Foreign Minister Sophianopoulos; comments on the political situation in Greece. 1068 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] July 24 [* Diary Entry by the Secretary of War ] [Account of discussions with President Truman concerning the need for Soviet entry into the war against Japan, the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan, the Japanese dynasty, and targets for atomic attack in Japan; quoted in footnotes to a memorandum of July 16, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State (document No. 1236, page 1265 [ Pg. 1265 is part of Doc. 1236 ] ), a memorandum of July 20, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the President (document No. 1241, page 1271 [ Pg. 1271 includes portions of Doc. 1240 and Doc. 1241 ] ), a memorandum of July 16, 1945, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President (document No. 1275, page 1323 [ Pg. 1323 includes portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] ), and a message of July 23, 1945, from the Secretary of War to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (document No. 1310, page 1373 [ Pg. 1373 is part of Doc. 1310 ] ), q. v.] July 24 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State Memorandum of a discussion with the Portuguese Ambassador concerning Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor. (Attachment: Note of July 24, 1945, from the Portuguese Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State on the above subject.) 1301 1357 [ Pg. 1357 is part of Doc. 1301 ] July 24 (tel. 3047) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Report of a conversation between the British Ambassador at Belgrade and Marshal Tito concerning Greek-Yugoslav relations. 1078 1067 [ Pg. 1067 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] 1945 July 24 (tel. 4463) The Appointed Ambassador to Poland to the Acting Secretary of State Recommendation that the Secretary of State take up at the Berlin Conference the tactics used by the Soviet authorities in delaying Ambassador Lane’s departure for Warsaw. 1139 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 1138 and Doc. 1139 ] July 24 (tel. 2381) The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland Instructions to notify the Foreign Office that the powers occupying Germany claim title to or control over German-owned or controlled external assets. (Identical instructions were sent on the same date to the Minister in Sweden as telegram No. 1416; to the Ambassador in Portugal as telegram No. 1218; and to the Ambassador in Turkey as telegram No. 759.) 991 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] July 24 (tel. 115) The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Report that the Soviet Union is now demanding German bank stocks in Rumania. 989 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] July 24 (tel. 117) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Summary of notes of July 18 and 19, 1945, from the Yugoslav Foreign Office to the American Embassy at Belgrade with respect to Macedonia; recommendations concerning a reply thereto. 1077 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 1076 and Doc. 1077 ] July 25 * President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill Views as to the procedure for issuing the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan; notification that a new directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on lend-lease questions is being prepared. 1183 , 1248 1183 [ Pg. 1183 includes portions of Doc. 1183 and Doc. 1184 ] , 1279 [ Pg. 1279 includes portions of Doc. 1248 and Doc. 1249 ] July 25 * Truman–Mountbatten Conversation: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of documentation on this conversation. 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] July 25 * United States Delegation Working Paper Suggested language on the control of German external assets to be used to amend the proposed declaration on reparations and related matters. 992 957 [ Pg. 957 includes portions of Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , and Doc. 993 ] July 25 (tel. Victory 286) * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Minister in Sweden Summary of the status of the question of German external assets at the Berlin Conference. 993 957 [ Pg. 957 includes portions of Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , and Doc. 993 ] July 25 * The War Shipping Administrator to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Recommendations as to points concerning the division of German merchant tonnage which should be covered in the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference. (Attachment: Notes on the relationship of the Soviet Union to the United Maritime Authority.) 1009 973 [ Pg. 973 is part of Doc. 1009 ] July 25 * Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman Acknowledgment of the President’s letter of July 25, 1945, with respect to lend-lease; concurrence in the issuance of the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan; transmittal of the approved text of the proclamation with a suggested amendment. 1184 , 1249 1183 [ Pg. 1183 includes portions of Doc. 1183 and Doc. 1184 ] , 1279 [ Pg. 1279 includes portions of Doc. 1248 and Doc. 1249 ] 1945 July 25 (tel. 313) The White House Map Room to the Ambassador in China Request for an immediate answer with respect to Chinese concurrence in the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan. 1250 1281 [ Pg. 1281 includes portions of Doc. 1249 and Doc. 1250 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of a statement for the President to make at a plenary meeting of the Berlin Conference with respect to constitutional restraints on his treaty-making powers. 744 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 744 ] July 25 * Truman–Stalin Conversation: Editor’s Note Summary of information available on this conversation, during which Generalissimo Stalin handed to the President written Soviet answers to five questions relating to Soviet-American cooperation in the war against Japan. 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] July 25 United States Delegation Working Paper Agenda for the Ninth Plenary Meeting. 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] July 25 * Ninth Plenary Meeting: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: the western frontier of Poland; disposition of the German Fleet; transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland; constitutional restraints on the President’s treaty-making powers; reparations from Germany; German forces in Norway; European inland waterways; and repatriation of Soviet citizens from Austria and Germany. 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] July 25 * Ninth Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] July 25 United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the discussions in the Ninth Plenary Meeting. 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] July 25 * United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the status of problems before the Berlin Conference as of July 25, 1945. 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] July 25 * Dunn-Harriman-Mikolajczyk Conversation: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of documentation on this conversation; reference to three memoranda handed to Ambassador Harriman by Mr. Mikolajczyk. 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] July 25 (tel. 944) The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union Instruction to request a meeting with Foreign Commissar Molotov during the recess of the Berlin Conference to explain Japanese intentions; statement of the Japanese position with respect to Soviet desires in the Far East and unconditional surrender. 1233 1260 [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 1232 and Doc. 1233 ] July 25 * Stimson–Stalin Conversation: Memorandum by the Secretary of War Memorandum of discussions concerning military operations against Germany, the significance of the war, cooperation in the war against Japan, and Soviet-American relations. 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] ] 1945 July 25 * Eighth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: inland waterways; transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland; and preparation of the Conference Protocol and Communiqué. 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] July 25 * Eighth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Rapporteur’s Report Report by Foreign Commissar Molotov to the Heads of Government on the discussions in the Eighth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] July 25 * United States Delegation Working Paper List of Berlin Conference subcommittees with pending business, with a summary of assignments given to each subcommittee and the names of the United States representatives thereon. 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] July 25 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Statement of the United States position with respect to the use of Allied property for reparations or “war trophies” exacted from the former German satellites. 842 744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 841 and Doc. 842 ] July 25 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposed procedure concerning removals from Germany of properties of United Nations or neutral nationals. 926 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] July 25 (tel. M 25102) ( Conf-mess 16) The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Revised statistics on the resources of East Prussia before World War II. 928 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] July 25 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the President Transmittal of a report by Messrs. Luther Gulick and J. Howard Marshall on the removal of machinery from Berlin by the Soviet authorities. 929 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 929 ] July 25 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Transmittal of statistics on the resources of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. 930 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 930 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Statistics on prewar assets in the eastern zone of Germany (excluding Berlin) and in the area east of the Oder–Neisse Line. 931 879 [ Pg. 879 is part of Doc. 931 ] Undated United States Delegation Working Paper Statistics on food and raw material surpluses in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany (excluding Berlin) in 1936. 932 882 [ Pg. 882 includes portions of Doc. 932 and Doc. 933 ] 1945 Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft statistical proposal on reparations from Germany. 933 882 [ Pg. 882 includes portions of Doc. 932 and Doc. 933 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Statistics on the resources of East Prussia. 934 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 933 and Doc. 934 ] July 25 (tel. M 1296) The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania to the War Department Report of obstacles put in the way of travel by American officials in Rumania. 815 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 814 and Doc. 815 ] July 25 * The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Transmittal of an aide-mémoire complaining of alleged anti-Soviet activities in Austria and Germany. 790 , 1055 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 789 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)] , and Doc. 790 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 1054 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)] , and Doc. 1055 ] July 25 * The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Transmittal of an aide-mémoire on the status of German forces in Norway. 1056 1037 [ Pg. 1037 is part of Doc. 1056 ] July 25 Report by the European Advisory Commission Transmittal, for consideration and approval by the four member governments, of an agreement on certain additional requirements to be imposed on Germany, signed at London, July 25, 1945. 1038 1008 [ Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 1037 and Doc. 1038 ] July 25 * Clayton-Mikolajczyk Conversation: United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of discussions on the following subjects: Poland’s need for assistance in reconstruction; the relationship of Poland to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; the export of coal from Poland; the economic situation in Poland; and United States economic aid to Poland. 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] July 25 * Clayton-Mikolajczyk Conversation: Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Summary of the discussions described supra. 1386 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 1386 ] July 25 (tel. Victory 316) * Mosely–Strang and Mosely–Gusev Conversations: The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Report of conversations at the Berlin Conference concerning authorization sent to the British and Soviet Delegations to the European Advisory Commission to sign two pending agreements relating to Germany. 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] July 25 Conversation Concerning the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations: Editor’s Note Summary of information available on this conversation. 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] 1945 July 25 (tel. Victory 323) * The Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Rumania Notification that the question of revising Allied Control Commission procedures in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary is under discussion at the Berlin Conference; instructions to keep the matter open in local negotiations. (Parallel messages were sent on the same date to the Representative in Hungary as telegram No. Victory 324 and to the Representative in Bulgaria as telegram No. Victory 325.) 816 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] July 25 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to free and unrestricted navigation of international inland waterways. 757 , 1372 655 [ Pg. 655 includes portions of Doc. 756 and Doc. 757 ] , 1434 [ Pg. 1434 includes portions of Doc. 1370 , Doc. 1371 , and Doc. 1372 ] July 25 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposed agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to free and unrestricted navigation of international inland waterways, including an undertaking to support such free navigation in any revision of the Montreux Convention. 758 , 1373 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 757 and Doc. 758 ] , 1435 [ Pg. 1435 includes portions of Doc. 1373 and Doc. 1374 ] July 25 (tel. 381) The Representative in Bulgaria to the Acting Secretary of State Report on the political situation in Bulgaria with special reference to the forthcoming elections; observation that Allied intervention looking toward the postponement of those elections and revision of the electoral procedures is imperative; recommendation for the prompt exertion of American influence. 817 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] July 25 * The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Summary, in connection with preparation of the Conference Protocol, of the conclusions reached by the Heads of Government with respect to Tangier, disposal of the Italian colonies, the crisis in Syria and Lebanon, revision of the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits, and the withdrawal of forces from Iran; recommendation that clarification or expansion of the agreements in principle concerning the Montreux Convention and Iran be included in the Protocol. 736 , 1069 , 1332 , 1342 , 1358 , 1374 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 1068 and Doc. 1069 ] , 1393 [ Pg. 1393 includes portions of Doc. 1331 and Doc. 1332 ] , 1400 [ Pg. 1400 includes portions of Doc. 1341 and Doc. 1342 ] , 1416 [ Pg. 1416 includes portions of Doc. 1357 and Doc. 1358 ] , 1435 [ Pg. 1435 includes portions of Doc. 1373 and Doc. 1374 ] July 25 * The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Suggestion that items on Tangier, trusteeship, Syria and Lebanon, and Iran might be suitable for inclusion in the Conference Communiqué comments on these subjects. 1379 1441 [ Pg. 1441 is part of Doc. 1379 ] July 25 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of the United States position with respect to the exaction of reparations from Italy. 1102 1094 [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , and Doc. 1102 ] July 25 * United States Delegation Working Paper Alternative draft of the United States position with respect to the exaction of reparations from Italy. 1103 1095 [ Pg. 1095 includes portions of Doc. 1103 and Doc. 1104 ] 1945 July 25 (tel. 334) The Representative in Hungary to the Acting Secretary of State Report on a conversation with an officer of the Citizens Democratic Party with respect to elections in Hungary. 818 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] July 25 (tel.) The Ambassador in China to the President and the Secretary of State Notification that instructions concerning Chinese concurrence in the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan have been received, and that the text of the proclamation has been delivered to the Chinese Foreign Minister and will be delivered to Generalissimo Chiang tonight. 1247 1278 [ Pg. 1278 includes portions of Doc. 1246 and Doc. 1247 ] July 25 * Report by the Subcommittee on Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems Summary of discussions in the Subcommittee; report that the Soviet Union will participate in the European Inland Transport Conference and that it will review the question of participation in the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe and the European Coal Organization. 1162 1161 [ Pg. 1161 includes portions of Doc. 1162 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1162 (#1)] ] July 25 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs Memorandum of a discussion between the Greek Ambassador and the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs concerning a note from the Yugoslav Legation at Athens to the Greek Foreign Office with respect to Macedonia. 1080 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] July 25 (tel. 119) The Petroleum Administrator for War to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Summary of the petroleum situation in Europe; comments on the desirability of obtaining oil from eastern Europe for the supply of liberated European countries. 1323 1385 [ Pg. 1385 includes portions of Doc. 1322 and Doc. 1323 ] July 25 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposal for an agreement by the Heads of Government for the supply to the Allies of western Europe of oil from Hungary, Austria, and Rumania upon a purchase basis to be negotiated. 1324 1386 [ Pg. 1386 includes portions of Doc. 1323 and Doc. 1324 ] July 25 (tel. 1450) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Transmittal of the text of a statement made orally by Ambassador Sato to Acting Foreign Commissar Lozovsky and subsequently communicated to the latter in writing concerning the Japanese proposal to send Prince Konoye to Moscow on a special mission. 1234 1262 [ Pg. 1262 includes portions of Doc. 1233 and Doc. 1234 ] July 25 (tel. 1449) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Report of a conversation with Acting Foreign Commissar Lozovsky concerning the Japanese desire to send Prince Konoye to Moscow on a special mission. 1235 1263 [ Pg. 1263 includes portions of Doc. 1234 and Doc. 1235 ] 1945 July 25 (tel. 3057) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Report of Soviet action with respect to the provisioning of Vienna and of a directive by Field Marshal Alexander with respect to military government and occupational responsibilities for the British sector of Vienna. 781 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] July 25 (tel. War 38253) The War Department to the United States Delegation Request for views on a draft message to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, concerning civil administration in Venezia Giulia. 1206 1213 [ Pg. 1213 includes portions of Doc. 1205 and Doc. 1206 ] July 25 Prime Minister Tito and the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs to President Truman Comments on the administration of Venezia Giulia; proposal for elections in that area. (Enclosure: Note of July 17, 1945, from the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to the American Embassy at Belgrade protesting that the conduct of Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia has not been in accord with the Belgrade agreement of June 9, 1945.) 1207 1214 [ Pg. 1214 includes portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] July 25 (tel. 3062) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Summary of a report concerning repatriation problems at a British prisoner-of-war camp at Cesenatico. 1165 1163 [ Pg. 1163 includes portions of Doc. 1164 and Doc. 1165 ] July 25 * The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls Informal summary of the negotiations in the Economic Subcommittee with respect to reparations. 927 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] July 25 (tel. 121) The Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Report on Anglo-American discussions in Washington with respect to German supply problems. 880 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] July 25 (tel. 122) The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy Report on action taken by the American and British Embassies in Madrid in notifying the Spanish Government that the powers occupying Germany claim title to or control of German external assets and requesting Spanish cooperation; notification that instructions to take similar steps have been sent to the American Missions at Stockholm, Bern Lisbon, and Ankara. 994 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , and Doc. 995 ] July 25 (tel. 124) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Summary of messages received reflecting Soviet policy and methods in eastern Europe with respect to elections. 749 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] July 26 (tel. 131) The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Summary of an exchange between the British Embassy and the Department of State regarding the possibility that the constituent republics of the Soviet Union might enter separate reparations claims and seek separate representation on the Allied Commission on Reparations. 938 887 [ Pg. 887 includes portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] 1945 July 26 (tel.) The Ambassador in China to the President and the Secretary of State Transmittal of a message from Generalissimo Chiang giving Chinese concurrence in the issuance of the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan as submitted to him with an amendment to the first paragraph. 1251 1282 [ Pg. 1282 includes portions of Doc. 1251 and Doc. 1252 ] July 26 (tel.) The Ambassador in China to the President and the Secretary of State Report on a conversation with Generalissimo Chiang and his advisers concerning the proposed proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan. 1252 1282 [ Pg. 1282 includes portions of Doc. 1251 and Doc. 1252 ] July 26 (tel. 504) The Acting Representative in Rumania to the Acting Secretary of State Report concerning an interpretation of the Soviet proposals as to Allied Control Commission procedures in Rumania as they affect the size of the United States mission in that country. 820 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 820 and Doc. 821 ] July 26 (tel. 7519) (Co pre 2) The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs Report that a meeting at Potsdam on July 25, 1945, considered the question of the officers of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations and of its Executive Committee. 739 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] July 26 [ Messrs. Nikola Petkov, Assen Stambolisky, and Georgy Yordanov to the Bulgarian Prime Minister ] [Request that the Bulgarian Prime Minister ask that the forthcoming elections in Bulgaria be held under Allied control, even though such action might necessitate a postponement of the elections; quoted in a telegram of July 27, 1945, from the Representative in Bulgaria to the Acting Secretary of State (document No. 823, page 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 823 ] ), q. v.] July 26 (tel. 4505) The Representative in the Conversations Concerning Tangier to the Acting Secretary of State Report that the British and French are preparing an invitation to the Soviet Government to participate in the Paris conversations on Tangier. 1359 1417 [ Pg. 1417 includes portions of Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , and Doc. 1361 ] July 26 (tel. Victory 338) [* The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany ] [Directive to take all necessary steps to achieve stated objectives with respect to German coal production and exports; text of directive printed as an attachment to a memorandum of July 27, 1945, from President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin (document No. 1046, page 1028 [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 1046 ] ), q. v.] July 26 (tel. Victory 341) * The Assistant Secretary of War to the War Department Transmittal of an amendment to a message to be sent to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, with respect to civil administration in Venezia Giulia. 1208 1219 [ Pg. 1219 includes portions of Doc. 1208 and Doc. 1209 ] 1945 July 26 * Meeting of the United States and Soviet Chiefs of Staff: Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: establishment of weather stations in Siberia; definition of operational zones for United States and Soviet forces in the Far East; liaison arrangements between the United States and Soviet commanders in the Far East; use of Soviet Far Eastern ports and airfields for repairs to United States ships and planes and medical assistance for United States personnel; future operations against Japan; and a review of recent naval and air action against Japan. 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] July 26 * Third Meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe: The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Director of European Affairs Summary of discussions in the Subcommittee concerning freedom of the press in eastern Europe and revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; comments on the Soviet proposals for revising the Allied Control Commission procedures. —, 819 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] July 26 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Amended draft of a proposed agreement by the Heads of Government concerning freedom of the press in liberated Europe. 750 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] July 26 * Harriman–Grabski Conversation: Editor’s Note Cross reference to a memorandum on this conversation prepared by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister. 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] July 26 * Harriman–Grabski Conversation: Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Notes on a conversation between Ambassador Harriman and Vice President Grabski and other members of the Polish Delegation concerning Polish claims as to the western frontier of Poland and related economic problems. 1387 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 1387 ] July 26 * First Meeting of the Protocol Subcommittee: United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of discussions on the following subjects: texts and titles of the first three sections of the Conference Protocol; arrangement of the Protocol; and procedure for submission of texts for the Protocol. 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] July 26 Report by the European Advisory Commission Transmittal, for consideration and approval by the four member governments, of an agreement on zones of occupation in Germany making provision for a French zone of occupation and a French sector in Berlin, signed at London, July 26, 1945. (Footnote: Citation to the text of the agreement which accompanied this report.) 1032 1003 [ Pg. 1003 includes portions of Doc. 1031 and Doc. 1032 ] July 26 * Proposal by the United States Delegation [ ? ] Redrafted text of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to the admission of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania and the non-admission of Spain to the United Nations. 730 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] 1945 July 26 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft statistical proposal on reparations from Germany. 935 884 [ Pg. 884 includes portions of Doc. 934 and Doc. 935 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Statistics on physically movable capital equipment in manufacturing industries in Germany at the beginning of 1945. 936 885 [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 935 and Doc. 936 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Analysis of the problems involved in evaluating removable equipment in the Ruhr area. 937 886 [ Pg. 886 is part of Doc. 937 ] July 26 (tel. 7529) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State Notification of British concurrence in Soviet participation in the Paris conversations on Tangier. 1360 1417 [ Pg. 1417 includes portions of Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , and Doc. 1361 ] July 26 * Proclamation Proclamation by the Heads of Government of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, calling for the surrender of Japan, defining Allied policy in certain matters with respect to Japan, and warning Japan that the alternative to surrender is prompt and utter destruction. (Footnote: Text of Foreign Commissar Molotov’s statement of August 8, 1945, to the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow notifying the latter of the Soviet declaration of war on Japan.) 1382 1474 [ Pg. 1474 is part of Doc. 1382 ] July 26 * The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar Transmittal of a copy of the proclamation by the Heads of Government of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, calling for the surrender of Japan. 1253 1284 [ Pg. 1284 includes portions of Doc. 1253 and Doc. 1254 ] July 26 (tel. Victory 349) * The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Army–Navy Liquidation Commissioner Request for information on the status of a project to transfer American trucks to Poland. 1155 1153 [ Pg. 1153 includes portions of Doc. 1154 , Doc. 1155 , and Doc. 1156 ] July 26 Memorandum by the President’s Personal Representative Memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and the British Minister at Washington concerning a rotating chairmanship for the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. 740 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] July 26 (tel. Victory 352) (24) * The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to the Navy Department Notification of Soviet agreement to the United States proposal concerning weather stations in Siberia; request for information concerning shipment of equipment needed for this project. 1281 1332 [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 1280 and Doc. 1281 ] July 26 (tel. Victory 358) (25) * The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to the Navy Department Instruction for the appointment of an officer to serve on the Capcraft Commission to select tugs suitable for United States purposes. 1010 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 1009 and Doc. 1010 ] 1945 July 26 * Conversations Among United States Officials Regarding War Criminals: The Assistant Secretary of War to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a memorandum recording discussions during two separate conversations on the evening of July 26, 1945, with respect to United States policy regarding war criminals and renegades. 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] July 26 (tel. 339) The Representative in Hungary to the Acting Secretary of State Report of discussions with leaders of the Social Democratic Party concerning political and economic problems in Hungary. 821 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 820 and Doc. 821 ] July 26 (21/334/45) The British Embassy to the Department of State Summary of British policy with respect to civil aviation. 1188 1189 [ Pg. 1189 is part of Doc. 1188 ] July 26 (tel. 1439) [ The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden ] [Instructions to express to the Swedish Government the view that Sweden should not permit the disposition of German property as war booty; quoted in a telegram of July 31, 1945, from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State (document No. 1001, page 963 [ Pg. 963 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] ), q. v.] July 27 (tel. 385) The Representative in Bulgaria to the Acting Secretary of State Recommendation that American influence at the Berlin Conference be exerted in support of an appeal by leaders of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union to the Bulgarian Prime Minister to ask that the forthcoming Bulgarian elections be held under Allied control. 822 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] July 27 (tel. 386) The Representative in Bulgaria to the Acting Secretary of State Transmittal of the text of a letter of July 26, 1945, from Messrs. Nikola Petkov, Assen Stambolisky, and Georgy Yordanov to the Bulgarian Prime Minister requesting the latter to ask that the forthcoming Bulgarian elections be held under Allied control, even though such action might necessitate a postponement of the elections. 823 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 823 ] July 27 * The Information Officer in the Office of the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Report that Lieutenant General Hull would prefer that a Soviet complaint concerning alleged anti-Soviet activities in Austria and Germany be referred to the War Department in Washington. 791 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] July 27 * The Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation Notification that a Soviet complaint concerning alleged anti-Soviet activities in Austria and Germany has been referred to the appropriate United States military authorities. 792 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 792 ] 1945 July 27 * The Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation Comment that the problem of German forces in Norway, raised in a Soviet aide-mémoire of July 25, 1945, is an area of primary British responsibility; statement of the assumption that the British Government will therefore provide the necessary information. 1057 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 1057 and Doc. 1058 ] July 27 * The Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation Comment that the problem of a camp near Cesenatico, raised in a Soviet aide-mémoire of July 23, 1945, is entirely a British matter; statement of the assumption that the aide-mémoire was transmitted to the United States Delegation for information purposes only. 1166 1164 [ Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 1165 and Doc. 1166 ] July 27 (A–183) The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State Transmittal of the full text of a note of July 19, 1945, to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat with respect to an Anglo-American démarche to the Spanish Government concerning German assets in Spain. 997 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] July 27 * President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin Transmittal of a copy of a directive issued to General of the Army Eisenhower to take all necessary steps to achieve stated objectives with respect to German coal production and exports; expression of hope that the Soviet Government will issue parallel instructions to the Soviet commander in Germany. 1046 1028 [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 1046 ] July 27 * The Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs to the Secretary of State Recommendation that the President approve the agreement on the French zone of occupation in Germany signed in the European Advisory Commission on July 26, 1945. (The source text bears President Truman’s signature and the date of approval as July 28, 1945.) (Footnote: Citation to the text of the agreement referred to; summary of the exchanges of letters which accompanied the agreement.) 1033 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 1032 and Doc. 1033 ] July 27 (tel. 3074) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Report concerning the discussion which took place at the Berlin Conference on July 24, 1945, with respect to recognition of the Renner government in Austria. 763 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] July 27 * The President to the Chief of Staff, United States Army Directive concerning the withdrawal of United States forces from Tehran. 1333 1394 [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] July 27 * Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission Draft text concerning discussions on Austria at the Berlin Conference for inclusion in the Conference Communiqué. 783 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] 1945 July 27 * United States Delegation Working Paper Revised draft text concerning discussions on Austria at the Berlin Conference for inclusion in the Conference Communiqué 784 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 784 and Doc. 785 ] July 27 (tel. Victory 373) * The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Request for information on the status of proposed public statements concerning the European Advisory Commission agreements on Austria. 785 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 784 and Doc. 785 ] July 27 (tel. Victory 375) * The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China Transmittal of the text of an invitation to the Government of China to become a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers; instruction to Ambassador Hurley to present this invitation, in concert with his British and Soviet colleagues, upon receipt of further authorization. 715 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 715 ] July 27 (tel. 1018) The Ambassador in Turkey to the Acting Secretary of State Report of Anglo-Turkish conversations with respect to the discussion at the Berlin Conference of matters relating to Turkey. 1376 1437 [ Pg. 1437 is part of Doc. 1376 ] July 27 (tel. 1458) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Observations on the Japanese request to send a special envoy to Moscow and on the probability that the Soviet attitude is designed to compel Japan to make a concrete proposal; report on the proceedings at the Berlin Conference as related to the above subject, with emphasis on the significance of the fact that Generalissimo Stalin has for the first time participated in a discussion of the war in the Far East. 1256 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 1256 ] July 27 (tel. 550) The Ambassador in Iran to the Acting Secretary of State Summary of the views of the Persian Gulf Command with respect to the withdrawal of United States forces from Tehran. 1334 1394 [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] July 27 * Ninth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Department of State Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: review of problems before the Berlin Conference; admission of Italy to the United Nations; diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; reparations from Germany, Austria, and Italy; economic principles for the treatment of Germany; oil supplies from eastern Europe; Soviet participation in European economic organizations; and removal of oil equipment from Rumania. 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] July 27 * Ninth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] July 27 * Ninth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the discussions in the Ninth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] 1945 July 27 * Ninth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Rapporteur’s Report Report by Foreign Commissar Molotov to the Heads of Government on the discussions in the Ninth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] ] July 27 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Revised draft definition of war trophies. 939 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] July 27 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State Transmittal of, and summary of, a report on Soviet removals of equipment and personnel from the United States sector of Berlin. 940 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] July 27 [* The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations ] [Review of negotiations on the subject of reparations and explanation of the reasons for the submission by the United States of a proposal for taking removals on a zonal basis; printed as enclosure 2 to a letter of July 28, 1945, from Ambassador Pauley to the Secretary of State (document No. 942, page 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 942 ] ), q. v.] July 27 * United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the status of problems before the Berlin Conference as of July 27, 1945. 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] July 27 (tel. Victory 380) * The Director of European Affairs to the Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs Recommendation that Colonel James H. Douglas, Jr., be urged to reconsider his decision not to accept the post of Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission in Italy. 1115 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 1114 and Doc. 1115 ] July 27 * Byrnes–Molotov Meeting: Bohlen Minutes Minutes of a discussion concerning the issuance of the proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan and the question of reparations from Germany. 449 [ Pg. 449 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] July 27 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Suggestion for joint examination by Soviet and British representatives of the question of ownership of certain equipment removed from Rumania by the Soviet authorities. 843 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 842 and Doc. 843 ] Undated Department of State Memorandum Comparison of the terms of the proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan issued from the Berlin Conference on July 26, 1945, with the policy of the Department of State as to the matters touched upon in the proclamation. 1254 1284 [ Pg. 1284 includes portions of Doc. 1253 and Doc. 1254 ] July 27 (tel. 256) The White House Information Officer to the President’s Secretary Transmittal of a message from officials of the Office of War Information reporting on the handling of the proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan. 1255 1290 [ Pg. 1290 is part of Doc. 1255 ] 1945 July 27 * Meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways: The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs to the Secretary of State Memorandum of July 29, 1945, summarizing a discussion of European inland waterways and the Turkish Straits in a meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways, July 27, 1945. 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] July 27 * Proposal by the British Delegation Revised draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government concerning international inland waterways and revision of the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits. 759 , 1375 657 [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 1436 [ Pg. 1436 includes portions of Doc. 1374 and Doc. 1375 ] July 27 (tel. 318) The Chargé in Yugoslavia to the Acting Secretary of State Summary of a letter to President Truman from Prime Minister Tito and Foreign Minister Subašić, commenting upon the administration of Venezia Giulia and proposing elections in that area. 1209 1219 [ Pg. 1219 includes portions of Doc. 1208 and Doc. 1209 ] July 27 (tel. 319) The Chargé in Yugoslavia to the Acting Secretary of State Report on the Cabinet crisis in Yugoslavia caused by differences over parliamentary and electoral matters. 1203 1209 [ Pg. 1209 includes portions of Doc. 1202 and Doc. 1203 ] July 27 (tel. Comea 344) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission Report on the status of proposed public statements concerning the European Advisory Commission agreements relating to Austria. 786 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] July 27 (tel. Sgs 687) Headquarters, United States Forces Austria, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on quadripartite military consultations in Vienna with respect to the food situation in Austria. 782 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] July 27 (tel. 215) The Chief of the Division of African Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State Report of a conversation with the Spanish High Commissioner concerning the problem of Tangier. 1361 1417 [ Pg. 1417 includes portions of Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , and Doc. 1361 ] July 27 * Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Summary of the discussion, at a reception given by Generalissimo Stalin for the Polish Delegation, of the western frontier of Poland, cooperation among the Slavic nations, and the general election in the United Kingdom. 1388 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] July 27 (tel. 147) The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls to the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls Discussion of the possibility that a démarche to the Swiss Government would tend to discourage Swiss cooperation in tracing and disclosing German external assets; report on a conversation with the Swiss Chargé in Washington concerning deletions from the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals. 995 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , and Doc. 995 ] 1945 July 27 (tel. 148) The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy and the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls Revised estimates of total German assets in neutral countries. 996 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] July 27 (tel. 1256) The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy Notification that Colonel James H. Douglas, Jr., has requested that his nomination as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission in Italy be withdrawn, but that a final decision concerning his appointment depends upon discussions at the Berlin Conference. 1116 1103 [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 1115 and Doc. 1116 ] July 28 (tel. 952) The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union Instruction to arrange a meeting with Foreign Commissar Molotov without delay and to try to find out the attitude of the Soviet Union regarding the proclamation issued from the Berlin Conference calling for the surrender of Japan. 1257 1292 [ Pg. 1292 includes portions of Doc. 1256 and Doc. 1257 ] July 28 Press Conference Statement by Prime Minister Suzuki Statement of views that the proclamation issued from the Berlin Conference is but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration, that Japan should ignore it entirely, and that Japan must fight for the successful conclusion of the war. 1258 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 1257 and Doc. 1258 ] July 28 (tel. 554) The Ambassador in Iran to the Acting Secretary of State Views and recommendations concerning the withdrawal of United States forces from Tehran. 1335 1395 [ Pg. 1395 includes portions of Doc. 1334 and Doc. 1335 ] July 28 * The Ambassador to the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State Recommendation concerning the negotiation of a Soviet-American protocol on policy toward China. 1218 1243 [ Pg. 1243 includes portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] July 28 (tel.) * The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China Transmittal of a message for Prime Minister Soong recommending a resumption of Sino-Soviet negotiations. 1219 1245 [ Pg. 1245 includes portions of Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , and Doc. 1221 ] July 28 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a copy of a letter of July 28, 1945, from Sir David Waley to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations concerning the financing of imports into Germany, together with an enclosed British memorandum on the same subject. 881 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] July 28 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State Estimates of the amount of reparations which could be taken from Germany; suggestions concerning the course of negotiations with the Soviet Delegation on this subject. 941 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] 1945 July 28 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State Transmittal of ( a ) a copy of a letter of July 28, 1945, from Ambassador Pauley to the President, requesting approval of a proposed communication to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations, and ( b ) a copy of a letter dated July 27, 1945 (but not yet sent), from Ambassador Pauley to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations, reviewing negotiations on the subject of reparations and explaining the reasons for the submission by the United States of a proposal for taking removals on a zonal basis; request that Secretary Byrnes review the proposed communication to Mr. Maisky. 942 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 942 ] July 28 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State Statistics on German coal and food production and consumption. 1047 1030 [ Pg. 1030 includes portions of Doc. 1046 and Doc. 1047 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Proposed redraft of economic principles for the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. 882 818 [ Pg. 818 includes portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] July 28 * United States Delegation Working Paper Preliminary estimates of capital removals required to reduce German war potential. 943 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 942 and Doc. 943 ] July 28 * The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Comments on a memorandum concerning the restitution of art objects. 944 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] July 28 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of a memorandum to the Deputy Military Governor of the United States zone of occupation in Germany requesting the issuance of a decree by the Allied Control Council vesting German external assets. 998 960 [ Pg. 960 includes portions of Doc. 997 and Doc. 998 ] July 28 * The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Suggestions for handling the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee draft of revised statutes for the Allied Control Commission for Hungary. 824 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 823 and Doc. 824 ] July 28 (tel. Victory 391) * The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, to the Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army Interpretation of the Presidential directive for withdrawal of United States forces from Tehran. 1336 1396 [ Pg. 1396 includes portions of Doc. 1335 and Doc. 1336 ] July 28 (tel. Victory 392) * The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Instructions to amend the draft reply to be made to Yugoslav notes concerning Macedonia so as to indicate the willingness of the United States to recommend the appointment of an Anglo-Soviet-American commission to investigate the Yugoslav charges on the spot. 1081 1073 [ Pg. 1073 includes portions of Doc. 1081 and Doc. 1082 ] July 28 (tel. Cfb 2015) The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State Acknowledgment of instructions with regard to requesting Chinese acceptance of the invitation to membership in the Council of Foreign Ministers. 716 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , and Doc. 718 ] 1945 July 28 (tel.) [ The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ] [Transmittal of the text of a proposed quadripartite statement concerning consultation with other Allied governments in the exercise of the authority of the occupying powers in Austria; printed as attachment 3 to an undated memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State Dunn to the Secretary of State (document No. 788, page 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 788 ] ), q. v.] July 28 (tel. 1476) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Report that an immediate meeting with Foreign Commissar Molotov is out of the question; observations on a United States broadcast to Japan and on the indefinite and piecemeal nature of the Japanese approach to the Soviet Union. 1259 1294 [ Pg. 1294 is part of Doc. 1259 ] July 28 * Clayton-Mikolajczyk Conversation: United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of a discussion of the economic situation in Poland and of Poland’s import and credit requirements. 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] July 28 * Clayton-Mikolajczyk Conversation: Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Memorandum on the discussions described supra. 1389 1532 [ Pg. 1532 is part of Doc. 1389 ] July 28 * The Additional Secretary to the British Cabinet to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Transmittal of a draft text on the question of the Turkish Straits. 1377 1438 [ Pg. 1438 includes portions of Doc. 1376 and Doc. 1377 ] July 28 (tel. 128) The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State Report on military meetings with the Soviet authorities in Vienna on July 24, 25, and 26, 1945. 787 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 787 ] July 28 * Memorandum by the Polish Delegation Transmittal of a memorandum of July 28, 1945, by Vice President Grabski and of three supporting memoranda justifying on political, military, economic, and historical grounds the Polish claim to the Oder–Neisse Line as the western frontier of Poland. 1150 1141 [ Pg. 1141 includes portions of Doc. 1149 and Doc. 1150 ] July 28 (tel. 259) The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Ambassador in France Summary of negotiations with the Soviet Union before the Berlin Conference on the question of air traffic between the United States and the Soviet Union via Berlin. 1172 1168 [ Pg. 1168 includes portions of Doc. 1171 and Doc. 1172 ] July 28 * Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Notes on a Soviet-Polish conference regarding industrial dismantling and rolling stock. 1390 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] July 28 (tel. 378) The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Rumania Views on recommendations by Brigadier General Schuyler for United States policy with respect to actions taken by Soviet officials in Rumania. 825 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] 1945 July 28 The British Embassy to the Department of State Formal notification that the British Government agrees to Soviet participation in the Paris conversations on Tangier and that the British Ambassador at Paris has been instructed to inform the French Government of the extent of the discussion of this subject at the Berlin Conference. 1362 1418 [ Pg. 1418 includes portions of Doc. 1361 and Doc. 1362 ] July 28 * Truman–Attlee Meeting: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from published sources on this meeting, at which East Prussia, the Polish boundary question, and reparations were discussed. 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] July 28 * Tenth Plenary Meeting: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: the Rapporteur’s reports on the Eighth and Ninth Meetings of the Foreign Ministers; the Japanese proposal to send Prince Konoye to Moscow on a mission to ask the Soviet Government to take part in mediation to end the war; the admission of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Rumania, and the non-admission of Spain to the United Nations; and reparations from Austria and Italy. 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] July 28 * Tenth Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] July 28 (tel. 154) The Chief of the Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy Report on the status of a project to transfer American trucks to Poland. 1156 1153 [ Pg. 1153 includes portions of Doc. 1154 , Doc. 1155 , and Doc. 1156 ] July 28 (tel. 220) The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Yugoslavia Instructions to inform the Yugoslav Government that the United States is prepared to recommend the appointment of an Anglo-Soviet-American commission to investigate Yugoslav charges of violations by the Greek Government in Macedonia of the principles of international law. 1082 1073 [ Pg. 1073 includes portions of Doc. 1081 and Doc. 1082 ] July 29 (tel. Cfb 2087) The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a message from Prime Minister Soong concerning the latter’s return to Moscow to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union. 1220 1245 [ Pg. 1245 includes portions of Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , and Doc. 1221 ] July 29 [ *The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs to the Secretary of State ] [Summary of a discussion of European inland waterways and the Turkish Straits in a meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways, July 27,1945; printed under the editor’s heading for the meeting of the Subcommittee (page 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] ), q. v.] July 29 (tel. Victory 406) * The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Notification of Presidential approval of the European Advisory Commission agreement providing for a French zone of occupation in Germany and a French sector in Berlin and of the accompanying report. 1034 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 1034 and Doc. 1035 ] 1945 July 29 (tel. 282) The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State Comments on conversations which Ambassador Hurley had with Generalissimo Chiang and Prime Minister Soong concerning the Sino-Soviet negotiations. 1221 1245 [ Pg. 1245 includes portions of Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , and Doc. 1221 ] July 29 * Truman–Molotov Meeting: Bohlen Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: the illness of Generalissimo Stalin; the western frontier of Poland; reparations from Germany; disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine; and Soviet entry into the war against Japan. (Footnote: Memorandum of July 29, 1945, from Mr. Walter J. Brown to the Secretary of State transmitting a message from the Soviet Delegation concerning Generalissimo Stalin’s inability to attend a plenary meeting on July 30, 1945.) 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] July 29 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories up to the line of the Oder and the eastern Neisse be placed under Polish administration. 1151 1150 [ Pg. 1150 includes portions of Doc. 1151 and Doc. 1152 ] Undated * The Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs to the Secretary of State Transmittal, for approval, of the texts of three proposed public statements concerning the agreements relating to Austria recently concluded in the European Advisory Commission. (The memorandum bears the approval of the Secretary of State, dated July 29, 1945. Citations to two of the texts transmitted with the memorandum are given in lieu of the texts themselves.) 788 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 788 ] July 29 * The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Director of European Affairs Summary of recent difficulties with respect to the Allied Control Commissions for Hungary and Rumania. 826 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] Undated * The Secretary of State and the Secretary of War to the President Review of discussions within the United States Government with respect to financing imports into Germany; transmittal of a proposed letter of instructions for the President to issue to the Secretary of War on this subject. 883 820 [ Pg. 820 includes portions of Doc. 882 and Doc. 883 ] July 29 * The President to the Secretary of War Statement of objectives to which an import program for Germany should contribute; directive to the War Department to assume procurement and initial financing responsibility for all imports into Germany for which the United States assumes responsibility and for the United States share of any combined financing of imports. 884 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 883 and Doc. 884 ] July 29 * United States Delegation Working Paper Summary of further action needed at the Berlin Conference on German economic questions and related questions. 885 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] 1945 July 29 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Transmittal of a draft memorandum to the Deputy Military Governor of the United States zone of occupation in Germany concerning the restitution of art objects. 945 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] July 29 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State Transmittal of statistical information concerning reparations from Germany. 946 899 [ Pg. 899 is part of Doc. 946 ] July 29 * The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Secretary of State Comments and suggestions concerning the negotiations at the Berlin Conference on reparations from Germany. 947 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 947 ] July 29 * The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls Report that the constituent republics of the Soviet Union have not so far put forward separate, reparations claims. 948 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] Undated *The Adviser on Administration and Political Science on the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Summary of additional evidence on the removal of raw materials, industrial equipment, and art objects from Berlin. 949 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] Undated * The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany to Generalissimo Stalin Report on United States and British removals of rolling stock from the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. 950 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] July 29 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the President Transmittal of a report by Committee I of the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (text printed as attachment 1) concerning United States and British removals of factory equipment and personnel from the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. (Attachment 2: Undated report by the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany to Generalissimo Stalin concerning United States and British removals of factory equipment and personnel from the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.) 951 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 950 and Doc. 951 ] Undated * United States Delegation Working Paper Alternative drafts, for use in case of either agreement or disagreement at the Berlin Conference, of the conclusions of the Conference with respect to reparations from Germany. 952 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 951 and Doc. 952 ] 1945 July 29 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government concerning the exaction of reparations from Germany. 953 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] July 29 * United States Delegation Working Paper Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government concerning the disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine. 1011 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1010 and Doc. 1011 ] July 29 * Generalissimo Stalin to President Truman Undertaking to give appropriate study to the question of the use of German coal to satisfy European needs. 1048 1031 [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 1047 and Doc. 1048 ] July 29 * Generalissimo Stalin to President Truman Expression of agreement with the President’s proposal of July 20, 1945, concerning a change in the air route from the United States to the Soviet Union to a route via Berlin; suggestion that Soviet and American representatives study the technical questions involved. 1173 1169 [ Pg. 1169 includes portions of Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , and Doc. 1174 ] July 29 * President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee Transmittal of a copy of a directive of July 29, 1945, from the President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff interpreting his directive of July 5, 1945, on lend-lease questions; notification that Assistant Secretary of State Clayton has been instructed to engage in informal conversations with British officials in London concerning postwar Anglo-American economic arrangements. 1185 1184 [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1185 ] July 29 * Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation Draft text for inclusion in the Protocol of the Berlin Conference concerning consideration at the Conference of the situation in Syria and Lebanon. 1343 1401 [ Pg. 1401 is part of Doc. 1343 ] July 29 (tel. 323) The Chargé in Yugoslavia to the Acting Secretary of State Further report on the Cabinet crisis in Yugoslavia; comment that there is now a brief opportunity for the United States and the United Kingdom to show their support for democratic principles in Yugoslavia. 1204 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 1203 and Doc. 1204 ] July 29 * Truman–Attlee Meeting: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from published sources on this meeting. 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] July 29 * Forrestal-Bevin Conversation: Editor’s Note Quotation from Secretary of the Navy Forrestal’s diary for July 29, 1945, concerning a discussion with Foreign Secretary Bevin of political and economic questions in the United Kingdom, the advisability of maintaining the institution of the Emperor in Japan, trade patterns in Europe, and the Balkans. 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] July 29 * Despres–Minc Conversation: Memorandum by the Adviser on German Economic Affairs Memorandum of a discussion relating to a conference between Mr. Mine and United States military authorities, Polish membership in European economic organizations, Polish-American economic relations, and Soviet activities and problems in Poland and Germany. 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] 1945 July 29 (tel. Victory 416) * The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom Comments on the British coal position. 1049 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 1049 and Doc. 1050 ] July 29 (tel. 155) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Comments on a Yugoslav note concerning civil administration in Venezia Giulia. 1210 1220 [ Pg. 1220 includes portions of Doc. 1209 and Doc. 1210 ] July 29 * Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Summary of a discussion between President Bierut and Generalissimo Stalin concerning the western frontier of Poland, including the possibility of a compromise line along the Queiss River. 1391 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] July 29 * The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a message from the Soviet Delegation concerning the appointment of Soviet members of the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine. 1012 976 [ Pg. 976 includes portions of Doc. 1012 and Doc. 1013 ] July 30 (tel. Victory 419) * The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union Report concerning Soviet plans to fly interned German aircraft out of Sweden as war booty. 999 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] July 30 * Conversation Between Members of the United States and Polish Delegations: Editor’s Note Cross reference to a diary entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister relating to this conversation. 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] July 30 * Conversation Between Members of the United States and Polish Delegations: Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Notes on a discussion concerning the supply of coal from Poland to the American sector of occupation in Berlin. 1392 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] July 30 (tel. 560) The Ambassador in Iran to the Acting Secretary of State Report that the Persian Gulf Command has received new instructions concerning the withdrawal of United States forces from Tehran. 1337 1397 [ Pg. 1397 includes portions of Doc. 1336 , Doc. 1337 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)] ] July 30 * The Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State Request that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity be enabled to take control of Polish forces now under Allied command. 1140 1132 [ Pg. 1132 includes portions of Doc. 1139 and Doc. 1140 ] July 30 * United States Delegation Working Paper Comments on a Soviet proposal of July 29, 1945, concerning reparations from Germany. 954 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 954 ] July 30 * United States Delegation Working Paper Comments on a Soviet proposal of July 29, 1945, concerning reparations from Germany. 955 916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 955 ] 1945 July 30 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Secretary of State Comments on a memorandum of July 29, 1945, by Assistant Secretary of State Clayton with respect to reparations from Germany. 956 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 956 ] July 30 * Memorandum by the General Counsel of the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations Comments on the delivery of reparations from the western zones of Germany to the Soviet Union in return for shipments of food, fuel, and fertilizer from the Soviet zone to western Germany. 957 918 [ Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 957 ] July 30 * The President to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater Request for an investigation and report on Soviet charges concerning the removal of property from the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany by the United States Army. 958 919 [ Pg. 919 includes portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] Undated * Mr. Josiah E. DuBois, Jr., of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations, to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Analysis of the legality of treating gold as war booty. 959 919 [ Pg. 919 includes portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] July 30 [* President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin ] [Expression of regret at Generalissimo Stalin’s illness; quoted in footnote 2 to the minutes of the Truman-Molotov meeting of July 29, 1945 (page 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] ), q. v.] July 30 (tel. 180) The Assistant to the President’s Personal Representative at Vatican City to the Acting Secretary of State Report of conversations which Brigadier General Hume has had with the Pope and other ecclesiastical authorities concerning the withdrawal of Allied troops from Italy. 1109 1098 [ Pg. 1098 includes portions of Doc. 1108 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)] , and Doc. 1109 ] July 30 * Byrnes–Molotov Meeting: Bohlen Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: the western frontier of Poland; the admission of Italy to the United Nations; freedom of the press in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania; reparations from Germany; internationalization of the Ruhr; reparations from Austria and Italy; and war criminals. 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] July 30 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Revised draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories up to the line of the Oder and the western Neisse be placed under Polish administration. 1152 1150 [ Pg. 1150 includes portions of Doc. 1151 and Doc. 1152 ] July 30 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government concerning relations with Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania; the admission of those countries to the United Nations; and the non-admission of Spain to that organization. 731 629 [ Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 730 and Doc. 731 ] 1945 July 30 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Revised draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government concerning the satisfaction of Soviet and Polish reparations claims. 961 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] July 30 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposal for the international administration of the Ruhr industrial district. 1027 1000 [ Pg. 1000 includes portions of Doc. 1026 and Doc. 1027 ] July 30 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposal concerning the exaction of reparations from Austria and of reparations from Italy in the amount of $300,000,000. 1104 1095 [ Pg. 1095 includes portions of Doc. 1103 and Doc. 1104 ] July 30 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government concerning the trial of the principal German war criminals. 1016 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] July 30 [* Generalissimo Stalin to President Truman ] [Acknowledgment of the President’s note of sympathy on the Generalissimo’s illness and statement of the expectation that the latter will be able to take part in the Conference on July 31; quoted in footnote 2 to the minutes of the Truman-Molotov meeting of July 29, 1945 (page 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] ), q. v.] July 30 * Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Department of State Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: the agenda for the meeting; the invitation to China and France to participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers; notification to the French Government of the Conference decisions on political principles for the treatment of Germany; reparations from Austria, Germany, and Italy; admission of Italy to the United Nations; diplomatic relations with the former German satellites; the western frontier of Poland; economic principles for the treatment of Germany; disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine; German external assets; political principles for the treatment of Germany; Yugoslavia; war criminals; anti-Soviet activities in Austria and Germany; German forces in Norway; internationalization of the Ruhr; repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals; and the agenda for the Eleventh Plenary Meeting. 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] July 30 * Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the discussions in the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] July 30 (P 69) * Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Rapporteur’s Report Report by Foreign Secretary Bevin to the Heads of Government on the discussions in the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] July 30 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposal that the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and (if possible) France, issue a declaration assuming jurisdiction over German external assets; transmittal of alternative drafts of such a declaration. 1000 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] 1945 July 30 * Proposal by the British Delegation Statement of the British position with respect to a plan for the exaction of reparations from Germany. 960 920 [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 959 and Doc. 960 ] July 30 * Proposal by the British Delegation Proposal with respect to the sources of supply of food and coal for the zones of occupation in Germany, including the area of Greater Berlin. 1051 1033 [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 1050 and Doc. 1051 ] July 30 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposal for the disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine. 1013 976 [ Pg. 976 includes portions of Doc. 1012 and Doc. 1013 ] July 30 * Proposal by the British Delegation Review of the discussions at the Berlin Conference concerning the disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine; suggestions as to the decisions of the Conference on this subject. 1014 977 [ Pg. 977 includes portions of Doc. 1013 and Doc. 1014 ] July 30 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposed addition to that part of the draft agreement on political principles for the treatment of Germany dealing with central administrative machinery. 886 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] July 30 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Revision of an addition proposed by the Soviet Delegation to that part of the draft agreement on political principles for the treatment of Germany dealing with central administrative machinery. 887 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 887 and Doc. 888 ] July 30 * Proposal by the British Delegation Suggestion that the Berlin Conference issue a statement concerning the peaceful solution of existing differences in southern Europe and the democratic development of the area along the lines of such documents as the Varkiza and the Tito–Šubašić agreements. 1083 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 1082 and Doc. 1083 ] July 30 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Suggestion that the Heads of Government at the Berlin Conference accept the proposals put forward by Prime Minister Tito and Foreign Minister Šubašić of Yugoslavia concerning civil administration in the Trieste–Istria district. 1211 1221 [ Pg. 1221 includes portions of Doc. 1210 and Doc. 1211 ] July 30 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Revised draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government concerning the trial of the principal German war criminals. 1017 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] July 30 * Proposal by the British Delegation Transmittal of a suggested text for inclusion in the Protocol and Communiqué of the Berlin Conference concerning war criminals. 1018 986 [ Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 1018 ] July 30 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Proposed addition to the agreement by the Heads of Government concerning the exaction of reparations from Germany. 962 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] 1945 July 30 * Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation Complaint concerning the failure of the British authorities to repatriate citizens of the Baltic republics, the western Ukraine, and western Byelorussia. 1167 1165 [ Pg. 1165 includes portions of Doc. 1167 and Doc. 1168 ] July 30 * Proposal by the British Delegation Proposal that reparations should not be exacted from Austria and that future removals from Austria should be settled by the Control Council. 770 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] Undated * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Proposal that the British Government urge the Regent of Greece to reconstitute the Greek Government in the spirit of the Varkiza agreement. 1423 1592 [ Pg. 1592 includes portions of Doc. 1423 and Doc. 1424 ] July 30 * Proposal by the British Delegation Proposal for the inclusion of language concerning the “first charge” principle regarding payment for imports into Germany in the agreement on economic principles for the treatment of Germany. 888 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 887 and Doc. 888 ] July 30 * Proposal by the British Delegation Proposal concerning the liability of Italy to pay reparations. 1105 1096 [ Pg. 1096 includes portions of Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] July 30 * United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the status of problems before the Berlin Conference as of July 30, 1945. 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] July 30 (tel. Victory 444 of July 31) * Lane–Modzelewski Conversation: The Appointed Ambassador to Poland to the Acting Secretary of State Report, dated July 31, 1945, concerning a discussion between Ambassador Lane and Polish officials at the Berlin Conference on the following subjects: admission of press correspondents to Poland; establishment of United States Consulates in Poland; the diplomatic rate of exchange; policing in Warsaw; Polish-American economic problems; the possible appointment of Mr. Oskar Lange as Polish Ambassador to the United States; and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland. 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] July 30 (tel. 399) The Representative in Bulgaria to the Acting Secretary of State Analysis of the views of Prime Minister Georgiev of Bulgaria; report on the political situation in Bulgaria; recommendation for a public statement of United States views on the elections in Bulgaria, recognition of the Bulgarian Government, and the negotiation of a treaty of peace with Bulgaria. 827 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] July 30 * The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a memorandum from Mr. Clayton and Ambassador Pauley to the Deputy Military Governor of the United States zone of occupation in Germany concerning the restitution of objects of art. 964 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] July 30 The Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Acting Secretary of State Transmittal of a memorandum by Mr. William Yale, of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, concerning the probable attitude of the new British Government with respect to Palestine. 1345 1403 [ Pg. 1403 is part of Doc. 1345 ] 1945 July 30 (tel. 1480) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Speculation as to the Soviet relationship to the proclamation to Japan issued from the Berlin Conference by the Heads of Government of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom. 1260 1296 [ Pg. 1296 is part of Doc. 1260 ] July 30 (tel. Victory 439) * The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China Instructions to proceed at once in accordance with prior instructions concerning delivery of an invitation to China to become a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 717 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , and Doc. 718 ] July 30 (tel. Victory 440) * The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Notification of approval of the proposed public statements concerning the European Advisory Commission agreements relating to Austria. 789 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 788 and Doc. 789 ] July 30 * Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee: Editor’s Note Quotation from Mr. Walter J. Brown’s diary regarding this meeting. 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] July 30 [?] * Byrnes–Attlee Meeting: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from published sources on this meeting. 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] July 30 * Mosely–Ward and Mosely–Gusev Conversations: Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission Note concerning notification given to the British and Soviet Delegations at the Berlin Conference of United States approval of the proposed public statements concerning the European Advisory Commission agreements relating to Austria. 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#145)] ] July 30 [* The British Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Foreign Commissar ] [Report on the detention and disarming of German forces in Norway; printed as enclosure 1 to a note of July 31, 1945, from Foreign Secretary Bevin to the Secretary of State (document No. 1058, page 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 1057 and Doc. 1058 ] ), q. v.] Undated [* The Soviet Ambassador to the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs ] [Note transmitting the text of entries for the Protocol of the Berlin Conference on questions raised by the Soviet Delegation; quoted in footnote 8 to a memorandum on the First Meeting of the Protocol Subcommittee, July 26, 1945 (page 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] ), q. v.] Undated * Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation Draft text for inclusion in the Protocol of the Berlin Conference concerning consideration at the Conference of trusteeship questions. 1426 1594 [ Pg. 1594 includes portions of Doc. 1425 and Doc. 1426 ] 1945 Undated * Text Submitted by the British Delegation Draft text for inclusion in the Protocol of the Berlin Conference concerning consideration at the Conference of questions relating to Austria. 1427 1595 [ Pg. 1595 includes portions of Doc. 1426 and Doc. 1427 ] Undated * Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation Draft text for inclusion in the Protocol of the Berlin Conference concerning consideration at the Conference of the extension of the authority of the Provisional Government of Austria. 1428 1596 [ Pg. 1596 includes portions of Doc. 1427 and Doc. 1428 ] Undated * Text Submitted by the British Delegation Draft text for inclusion in the Protocol of the Berlin Conference concerning consideration at the Conference of the question of the western frontier of the Soviet Union and the ultimate transfer of the Konigsberg area to the Soviet Union. 1429 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 1429 ] Undated * Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation Draft text for inclusion in the Protocol of the Berlin Conference concerning consideration at the Conference of the question of the western frontier of the Soviet Union and the transfer of the Konigsberg area to the Soviet Union. 1430 1598 [ Pg. 1598 is part of Doc. 1430 ] Undated * Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation Draft text for inclusion in the Protocol of the Berlin Conference concerning consideration at the Conference of the question of the western frontier of the Soviet Union and the transfer of the Konigsberg area to the Soviet Union. 1431 1599 [ Pg. 1599 is part of Doc. 1431 ] Undated * Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation Draft text for inclusion in the Protocol of the Berlin Conference concerning consideration at the Conference of a Soviet aide-mémoire relating to a prisoner-of-war camp in the Cesenatico district in Italy. 1432 1600 [ Pg. 1600 includes portions of Doc. 1432 and Doc. 1433 ] Undated * Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation Draft text for inclusion in the Protocol of the Berlin Conference concerning consideration at the Conference of the necessity of revising the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits. 1433 1600 [ Pg. 1600 includes portions of Doc. 1432 and Doc. 1433 ] July 30 The Third Secretary of the British Embassy to the Assistant Adviser on German Economic Affairs Transmittal of an aide-mémoire notifying the Department of State of British approval of a proposed directive to the zone commanders in Germany on German coal production and exports. 1050 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 1049 and Doc. 1050 ] July 30 (tel. 1484) The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Report of a conversation with Acting Foreign Commissar Lozovsky in which Ambassador Sato attempted to expedite a Soviet reply to the Japanese proposal to send Prince Konoye on a special mission to the Soviet Union. 1261 1297 [ Pg. 1297 includes portions of Doc. 1260 and Doc. 1261 ] July 30 (tel. 3125) The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State Report on the formation of provincial governments in Styria and Carinthia. 764 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] 1945 July 30 (tel. War 41011) The Secretary of War to the President Request for authorization to release a Presidential statement concerning the projected atomic attack on Japan. 1313 1374 [ Pg. 1374 includes portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , and Doc. 1313 ] July 31 (tel. Cfb 2223) The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State Notification that Ambassador Hurley is proceeding to execute his instructions with reference to inviting China to become a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 718 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , and Doc. 718 ] July 31 * President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin Transmittal of the draft of a letter from the President to Generalissimo Stalin, to be signed and dispatched if the latter requested it after conclusion of the pending Sino-Soviet negotiations, giving the views of the United States as to Soviet cooperation with the powers at war with Japan in the light of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 and the Charter of the United Nations. 1282 1333 [ Pg. 1333 is part of Doc. 1282 ] July 31 * The British Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a copy of a letter from Mr. Bevin to Foreign Commissar Molotov surveying the situation with respect to German forces in Norway. 1058 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 1057 and Doc. 1058 ] July 31 * Truman–Rowan Conversation: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of documentation on this conversation. 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] ] July 31 * Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Request for the President’s agreement to suggested action with respect to the supplying of lend-lease to the United Kingdom; transmittal of a memorandum on British lend-lease requirements. 1186 1186 [ Pg. 1186 is part of Doc. 1186 ] Undated * Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Statement of factors to be considered before the Washington Munitions Assignments Board is abolished; suggestion that United States and British officials in Washington work out concrete proposals with respect to assignments machinery for submission to the President and the Prime Minister. 1200 1205 [ Pg. 1205 is part of Doc. 1200 ] July 31 * Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Acknowledgment of the receipt of President Truman’s memorandum of July 24, 1945, concerning Palestine; assurance that the British will give early careful consideration to the memorandum. 1346 1406 [ Pg. 1406 includes portions of Doc. 1345 and Doc. 1346 ] July 31 * The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs to the Secretary of State Transmittal of copies of United States and British proposals on navigation on international inland waterways and of a summary of a meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways; suggestions as to the future course of negotiations on this subject. 760 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)] ] July 31 * United States Delegation Working Paper Suggestion for implementing a British proposal concerning the “first charge” principle with regard to imports into Germany. 889 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] July 31 United States Delegation Memorandum Statement of the United States position with respect to the exaction of reparations from Italy. 1106 1096 [ Pg. 1096 includes portions of Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] 1945 July 31 * The Ambassador to the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State Recommendations for action by the United States with respect to Sino-Soviet relations. 1222 1246 [ Pg. 1246 includes portions of Doc. 1221 and Doc. 1222 ] July 31 * Meeting of the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of German Navy and Merchant Marine: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of minutes covering this meeting; cross reference to the text of the Subcommittee’s report. 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] ] July 31 * Byrnes–Molotov Conversation: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from published sources on this conversation. (Footnote: Note on the relationship of this conversation to the Byrnes–Molotov meeting of July 30, 1945, and on the presumption that a further meeting actually did take place on July 31, 1945.) 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] July 31 (tel. Victory 444) [* The Appointed Ambassador to Poland to the Acting Secretary of State ] [Report concerning a discussion of July 30, 1945, between Ambassador Lane and Polish officials at the Berlin Conference concerning admission of press correspondents to Poland, establishment of United States Consulates in Poland, the diplomatic rate of exchange, policing in Warsaw, Polish-American economic problems, the possible appointment of Mr. Oskar Lange as Polish Ambassador to the United States, and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland; printed under the editor’s heading for the Lane–Modzelewski conversation of July 30, 1945 (page 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] ), q. v.] July 31 (tel. 401) The Representative in Bulgaria to the Acting Secretary of State Report on the political situation in Bulgaria; comment that every friend of democracy in Bulgaria is looking to the Berlin Conference for some sign of hope. 830 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 829 and Doc. 830 ] July 31 * The Assistant Secretary of War to the Secretary of State Recommendations concerning the negotiations at the Berlin Conference on reparations from Germany. 965 925 [ Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 964 and Doc. 965 ] Undated *United States Delegation Memorandum Agenda for the Eleventh Plenary Meeting. 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] July 31 * Eleventh Plenary Meeting: Department of State Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: reparations from Germany; the western frontier of Poland; admission of states to the United Nations; German external assets; elections, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion in Poland; air communications with Warsaw and Moscow; economic principles for the treatment of Germany; internationalization of the Ruhr; political principles for the treatment of Germany; transfer of German minorities; disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine; revision of Allied Control Commission procedures in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; Greek-Yugoslav relations; Yugoslavia; war criminals; international inland waterways; the Turkish Straits; notification to the Polish Provisional Government of decisions of the Conference with respect to the Polish frontiers; preparation of the Conference Communiqué and schedule of meetings at the Conference. 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] 1945 July 31 * Eleventh Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] July 31 * United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of the discussions at the Eleventh Plenary Meeting. 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] ] July 31 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Redraft of language for inclusion in the agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to the reparations claims of the Soviet Union and Poland against Germany. 966 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] Undated * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to the exaction of reparations from Germany. 1425 1593 [ Pg. 1593 includes portions of Doc. 1424 and Doc. 1425 ] July 31 * Proposal by the United States Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions for Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. 828 732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] July 31 * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Draft of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions for Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. 829 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 829 and Doc. 830 ] July 31 * Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African Affairs Suggestion that the Polish Delegation to the Berlin Conference be notified of the decisions of the Conference with respect to the Polish boundary. 1153 1151 [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] July 31 (tel. 7709) ( Copre 4) The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations to the Director and the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs Report that Soviet agreement is awaited to a proposal made at Potsdam for a rotating chairmanship for the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. 741 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] July 31 (tel. 403) The Representative in Bulgaria to the Acting Secretary of State Report of the acceptance of the resignation of Mr. Nikola Petkov; request for information as to what the United States Government is really prepared to do about the political and election situation in Bulgaria. 831 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] July 31 (533) The Ambassador in France to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Transmittal of an invitation to the Government of France to participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers. 1395 1543 [ Pg. 1543 is part of Doc. 1395 ] 1945 July 31 (669) The Ambassador in France to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Transmittal of the text of the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference with respect to political principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period; expression of the hope that the Government of France will be able to associate itself with these principles. 1396 1544 [ Pg. 1544 includes portions of Doc. 1395 and Doc. 1396 ] Undated * Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Redraft of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to the exaction of reparations from Germany. 963 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] July 31 * The General Counsel of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations Recommendations for further action concerning the negotiations on reparations from Germany. 968 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] July 31 * Memorandum by the General Counsel of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations Suggestion as to procedure for incorporating the proposed agreement on reparations into the Protocol of the Berlin Conference. 969 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] July 31 (tel.) The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State Report that Ambassador Hurley has presented the matter of Chinese participation in the Council of Foreign Ministers to Generalissimo Chiang and Prime Minister Soong informally, that the Generalissimo will give a favorable reply when the question is presented formally by the American, British, and Soviet Ambassadors, and that the formal presentation of the matter will take place on August 1, 1945. 719 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 719 ] July 31 * Harriman Conversation With Members of the Polish Delegation: Editor’s Note Cross reference to a diary entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister relating to this conversation. 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)] ] July 31 * Harriman Conversation With Members of the Polish Delegation: Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Note on Ambassador Harriman’s call to invite the Polish Delegation to see President Truman on August 1, 1945. 1393 1540 [ Pg. 1540 includes portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] July 31 * Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee: Editor’s Note Quotations from Mr. Walter J. Brown’s diary regarding this meeting. 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] July 31 * United States Delegation Memorandum Summary of questions pending before the Berlin Conference as of July 31, 1945. 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] July 31 (tel. 4640) The Ambassador in France to the Acting Secretary of State Confirmation of French acceptance of the proposal for quadripartite supervision of elections in Greece. 1070 1048 [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] 1945 July 31 * The Soviet Delegation to the United States Delegation Request that Soviet repatriation representatives be permitted to enter American and British camps for German prisoners of war in order to establish the identity of Soviet citizens held in those camps. 1168 1165 [ Pg. 1165 includes portions of Doc. 1167 and Doc. 1168 ] July 31 (tel. Victory 454) * The Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador to Poland Transmittal of the text of the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference regarding the transfer of German populations to Germany; instructions to communicate this text to the Polish Provisional Government. (Parallel messages were sent on the same date to the Representative in Hungary as telegram No. Victory 455 and to the Chargé in Czechoslovakia as telegram No. Victory 456.) 1054 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 1053 and Doc. 1054 ] July 31 * Proposal by the British Delegation Redraft of an agreement by the Heads of Government with respect to the exaction of reparations from Germany. 967 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 966 and Doc. 967 ] July 31 (tel. 1710) The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union Instructions to approach the Soviet Government concerning the conduct of an investigation into Yugoslav charges concerning Macedonia. (Parallel instructions were sent on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as telegram No. 6375.) 1084 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] July 31 (tel. 164) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Notification of instructions sent to the American Legation at Stockholm to express to the Swedish Government the view that Sweden should not permit the disposition of German property as war booty. 1001 963 [ Pg. 963 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] July 31 (tel. 167) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Report that the Department of State is instructing the American Embassies at Moscow and London to approach the Soviet and British Governments concerning the conduct of an investigation into Yugoslav charges concerning Macedonia. 1085 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 1085 and Doc. 1086 ] July 31 (tel. 168) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Report of Mr. Cordell Hull’s views on United States policy toward Spain. 1178 1173 [ Pg. 1173 includes portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] Aug. 1 (tel.) The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State Notification of Chinese concurrence in the proposals for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers and of Chinese acceptance of membership in the Council. 720 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] Aug. 1 * Truman–Bierut Conversation: Editor’s Note Summary of information available from United States sources on this conversation; cross reference to a memorandum of the conversation prepared by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister. 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] 1945 Aug. 1 * Truman–Bierut Conversation: Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Notes on President Truman’s communication to the Polish Delegation of the decisions of the Berlin Conference with respect to the western frontier of Poland; notes on a brief conversation with Ambassador Harriman on this subject. 1394 1540 [ Pg. 1540 includes portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] Aug. 1 * The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Suggestion for substituting a revised page in a directive from the President to the Secretary of War with respect to financing imports into Germany. 890 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] Undated * The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar Notification of proposed action by the United States Government looking toward the control of Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian assets in neutral countries. 846 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] Aug. 1 * Report by the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine Transmittal of drafts of agreements by the Heads of Government (with certain passages still unagreed) with respect to disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine, and of a draft of an announcement on this subject to be made by the Conference. 1015 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1015 ] Aug. 1 * Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Acknowledgment of a letter from President Truman concerning the new weapon to be used on Japan; expression of appreciation for the President’s kind words about and personal consideration for Mr. Attlee. 1314 1375 [ Pg. 1375 includes portions of Doc. 1313 and Doc. 1314 ] Aug. 1 Eleventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Department of State Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: reparations from Germany; economic principles for the treatment of Germany; disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine; war criminals; use of Allied property in the settlement of satellite reparations; German external assets; oil supplies from eastern Europe; removal of oil equipment from Rumania; preparation of the Conference Protocol; anti-Soviet activities in Austria and Germany; repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals; treatment of Soviet prisoners of war; trusteeship; the Turkish Straits; Konigsberg; a statement on Austria; revised procedures for the Allied Control Commissions for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; freedom of the press and radio in eastern Europe; and acceptance by China of the invitation to be a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] 1945 Aug. 1 * Eleventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Rapporteur’s Report Report by Secretary of State Byrnes to the Heads of Government on the discussions in the Eleventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] Aug. 1 * Harriman–Mikolajczyk Conversation: Editor’s Note Note on the absence of documentation on this conversation. 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] Aug. 1 * The President’s Special Counsel to the Secretary of State Memorandum of a telephone conversation with the United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials on questions relating to war criminals. 1019 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 1019 ] Aug. 1 * The United States Representatives on the Economic Subcommittee to the Secretary of State Transmittal of, and comments on, the third report by the Economic Subcommittee to the Foreign Ministers, dealing with economic principles for the treatment of Germany, German external assets, and oil supplies from eastern Europe. 891 , 1002 , 1325 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] , 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 1324 and Doc. 1325 ] Aug. 1 (tel.) The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State Transmittal of the official reply of the Chinese Government to the invitation to China to become a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 721 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] Undated * Draft of Report by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany Summary of disagreements within the Drafting Committee with respect to the proposed agreement by the Heads of Government on the exaction of reparations from Germany. 970 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] Undated * Text Considered by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany Redraft of an agreement by the Heads of Government on the exaction of reparations from Germany, with an indication of points in the draft reserved by the Soviet and British Delegations. 971 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 970 and Doc. 971 ] Aug. 1 United States Delegation Working Paper Suggested agenda for the Twelfth Plenary Meeting. 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] 1945 Aug. 1 * Twelfth Plenary Meeting: Thompson Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: reparations from Germany; German external assets; an invitation to France to become a member of the Allied Commission on Reparations; the coal and food supply for Berlin; reparations from Austria; economic principles for the treatment of Germany; war criminals; use of Allied property for satellite reparations or war booty; oil supplies from eastern Europe; removal of oil equipment from Rumania; anti-Soviet activities in Austria and Germany; repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals; preparation of the Conference Protocol; revised procedures for the Allied Control Commissions for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania; notification to the Polish Delegation of the decisions of the Conference with respect to Poland; air communications with Warsaw; freedom of the press and radio in eastern Europe; disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine; a message to former Prime Minister Churchill and former Foreign Secretary Eden; inland waterways; and relationship of the Conference Protocol to the Conference Communiqué. 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] Aug. 1 * Twelfth Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] Aug. 1 Report by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany Report that the Drafting Committee has reached no agreement on a protocol of German reparations; transmittal of a redraft of an agreement by the Heads of Government on the exaction of reparations from Germany, with an indication of points in the draft reserved or not accepted by the Soviet, British, and United States representatives on the Committee. 972 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] Aug. 1 * Proposal by the British Delegation Suggestion that an instruction be issued to the Allied Control Council for Germany to draw up a program for the food, coal, and fuel which must be imported into the Greater Berlin area in the next six months, such amounts to be supplied by the Soviet Government as an advance delivery under the agreement on reparations. 1052 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] ] Aug. 1 (tel. 781) The Ambassador in Greece to the Acting Secretary of State Comments with respect to the Yugoslav charges concerning Macedonia. 1086 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 1085 and Doc. 1086 ] Aug. 1 (671) The Ambassador in France to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Transmittal of the text of the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference with respect to the transfer of German populations to Germany, and of an invitation to France to associate itself with that agreement. 1397 1545 [ Pg. 1545 includes portions of Doc. 1396 and Doc. 1397 ] 1945 Aug. 1 (675) The Ambassador in France to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Transmittal of the text of the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference with respect to the western frontier of Poland. 1398 1546 [ Pg. 1546 includes portions of Doc. 1397 , Doc. 1398 , and Doc. 1399 ] Aug. 1 (677) The Ambassador in France to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Transmittal of an invitation to France to become a member of the Allied Commission on Reparations. 1399 1546 [ Pg. 1546 includes portions of Doc. 1397 , Doc. 1398 , and Doc. 1399 ] Aug. 1 (678) The Ambassador in France to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Transmittal of the text of the statement agreed to at the Berlin Conference with respect to war criminals and of an invitation to France to associate itself with that statement. 1400 1547 [ Pg. 1547 includes portions of Doc. 1399 and Doc. 1400 ] Aug. 1 (tel.) * The President to the Ambassador in China Transmittal of a message to Generalissimo Chiang notifying the latter of the agreement reached by the President and the British Prime Minister, on the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with respect to boundaries of command in Indochina and requesting the Generalissimo’s concurrence in the proposed arrangements. 1273 1321 [ Pg. 1321 is part of Doc. 1273 ] Aug. 1 * The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar Notification of instructions issued to the United States commander in Germany with respect to restitution of objects of art. (An identical note was sent on the same date to the British Foreign Secretary.) 973 933 [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] Aug. 1 * Draft Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Request that the Deputy Military Governor of the United States zone of occupation in Germany urge the Allied Control Council for Germany to adopt an attached text with respect to principles of restitution. 974 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 973 and Doc. 974 ] Aug. 1 * The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany Request that the Deputy Military Governor of the United States zone of occupation in Germany urge the Allied Control Council for Germany to adopt an attached text with respect to Allied and neutral property in Germany. 975 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] Aug. 1 (tel. 7752) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State Further report on steps taken by the British Government to liquidate the affairs of the Polish Government-in-Exile. 1141 1133 [ Pg. 1133 includes portions of Doc. 1140 and Doc. 1141 ] Aug. 1 * Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee: Editor’s Note Quotation from Mr. Walter J. Brown’s diary regarding this meeting. 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] 1945 Aug. 1 (tel. 2732) The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State Recommendations with respect to routing couriers to Moscow. 1174 1169 [ Pg. 1169 includes portions of Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , and Doc. 1174 ] Aug. 1 (tel. 1270) The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal Report on a conversation of July 24, 1945, with the Portuguese Ambassador concerning Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor; summary of the current status of this question. 1302 1359 [ Pg. 1359 includes portions of Doc. 1301 and Doc. 1302 ] Aug. 1 * The President to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany Directive to urge the Allied Control Council for Germany to issue an attached draft decree vesting German external assets. 1003 964 [ Pg. 964 includes portions of Doc. 1002 and Doc. 1003 ] Aug. 1 (tel. 172) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Summary of reports from the Representative in Bulgaria; request for instructions for the guidance of the Representative in Bulgaria before the forthcoming Bulgarian elections. 832 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] Aug. 1 * The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to the President and the Secretary of State Transmittal of a revised draft of a Communiqué to be issued by the Heads of Government; analysis of and comments upon unresolved disagreements in the Communiqué Subcommittee. (Editor’s Note: Approval of the Communiqué by the Heads of Government.) (Footnote: Extract from Mr. Walter J. Brown’s diary for August 1, 1945, with respect to the report by the Communiqué Subcommittee.) 1380 1442 [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] Aug. 1 * The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar Proposal that the Allied Commission on Reparations convene in Berlin at once. 976 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 975 and Doc. 976 ] Aug. 1 * Thirteenth Plenary Meeting: Department of State Minutes Minutes of discussions on the following subjects: reparations from Germany; use of Allied property for satellite reparations and war booty; the western frontier of Poland; admission of states to the United Nations; approval of the Conference Protocol; revision of the draft of the Conference Communiqué; release of the Communiqué; comparison of English and Russian texts of the Protocol; signature of the Protocol and Communiqué; closing remarks; and adjournment of the Conference. (Footnotes: Extracts from Mr. Walter J. Brown’s diary for August 1, 1945, with respect to discussion of the Communiqué and signature of the final documents.) 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] Aug. 1 * Thirteenth Plenary Meeting: Cohen Notes Notes on the discussions described supra. 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] 1945 Aug. 1 m * Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference Record of the conclusions of the Heads of Government at the Berlin Conference on the following subjects: establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers; political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period; reparations from Germany; disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine; the city of Konigsberg and the adjacent area; war criminals; Austria; Poland; conclusion of peace treaties and admission to the United Nations; territorial trusteeship; revised Allied Control Commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary; the orderly transfer of German populations; oil equipment in Rumania; Iran; the International Zone of Tangier; the Black Sea Straits; international inland waterways; the European Inland Transport Conference; directives to military commanders on the Allied Control Council for Germany; and use of Allied property for satellite reparations or war trophies. (Editor’s Note and Footnotes: Explanation of the evolution of the text of the Conference Protocol; text of the additional section on military talks at the Conference and of the additional annex on the use of Allied property for satellite reparations or war trophies.) 1383 1478 [ Pg. 1478 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] and Doc. 1383 ] Aug. 2 * Communiqué Public report on the conclusions of the Heads of Government at the Berlin Conference on the following subjects: creation of a just and enduring peace; establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers; political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period; reparations from Germany; disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine; the city of Konigsberg and the adjacent area; war criminals; Austria; Poland; conclusion of peace treaties and admission to the United Nations; territorial trusteeships; revised Allied Control Commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary; orderly transfers of German populations; and military talks during the Conference. 1384 1499 [ Pg. 1499 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Aug. 2 * The Soviet Foreign Commissar to the Secretary of State Agreement that the Allied Commission on Reparations should meet at Berlin, provided that its permanent seat continues to be at Moscow. 977 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] Aug. 2 (tel. Victory 479) * The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy and the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls Notification that a memorandum has been delivered to Foreign Commissar Molotov concerning the control of Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian assets in neutral countries. 847 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 847 ] Aug. 2 (tel. Victory 480) * The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls Notification that the President has directed the Deputy Military Governor of the United States zone of occupation in Germany to urge the Allied Control Council for Germany to adopt a decree vesting German external assets. 1004 968 [ Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 1003 and Doc. 1004 ] 1945 Aug. 3 (W 10212/22/13) The British Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State to the Minister in the United Kingdom Transmittal of a communication containing a brief summary of discussions at the Berlin Conference with respect to the European Inland Transport Conference. 1163 1162 [ Pg. 1162 includes portions of Doc. 1163 and Doc. 1164 ] Aug. 4 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany Summary of discussions at the Berlin Conference concerning eastern European oil supplies. 1326 1388 [ Pg. 1388 is part of Doc. 1326 ] Aug. 6 White House Press Release Statement by the President announcing the first atomic attack against Japan, summarizing the wartime program of atomic research, and announcing the President’s intention to recommend to the Congress the establishment of a commission to control the production and use of atomic power in the United States. 1315 1376 [ Pg. 1376 is part of Doc. 1315 ] Aug. 6 (526) The French Chargé to the Acting Secretary of State Notification that the French Provisional Government has taken note of the acceptance in principle by the Allied Command of the French offers of military participation in the war against Japan; expression of the hope that the necessary agreement to render French participation effective can be concluded as soon as possible. 1401 1548 [ Pg. 1548 includes portions of Doc. 1401 and Doc. 1402 ] Aug. 6 (tel. 4722) The Ambassador in France to the Acting Secretary of State Report that the French Provisional Government is upset over the statements in the Communiqué of the Berlin Conference regarding reparations from Germany and is also concerned about the references in the Communiqué to the possibility of setting up a central government for Germany. 1402 1548 [ Pg. 1548 includes portions of Doc. 1401 and Doc. 1402 ] Aug. 6 (tel. 4728) The Ambassador in France to the Acting Secretary of State Transmittal of a translation of a note from the French Foreign Minister by which the French Provisional Government associated itself with the agreement of the Heads of Government at the Berlin Conference with respect to war criminals. 1403 1549 [ Pg. 1549 includes portions of Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , and Doc. 1404 ] Aug. 7 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat Summary of the questions discussed at the Berlin Conference and of the disposition made of those questions. 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] Aug. 7 (tel. 4743) The Ambassador in France to the Acting Secretary of State Report on the generally favorable French reaction to the results of the Berlin Conference. 1404 1549 [ Pg. 1549 includes portions of Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , and Doc. 1404 ] 1945 Aug. 7 (tel. 4769) The Ambassador in France to the Acting Secretary of State Notification that the French Foreign Minister has handed to the American, Soviet, and British Ambassadors six identical notes containing the views of the French Government on the decisions made at the Berlin Conference, the texts of which will be transmitted to Washington by telegram. 1405 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 1404 and Doc. 1405 ] Aug. 7 (tel. 4770) The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a translation of a note from the French Foreign Minister commenting upon the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference with respect to transfers of German populations. 1406 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , and Doc. 1407 ] Aug. 7 (tel. 4771) The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a translation of a note from the French Foreign Minister commenting upon the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference with respect to the western frontier of Poland. 1407 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , and Doc. 1407 ] Aug. 7 (tel. 4772) The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a translation of a note from the French Foreign Minister inquiring whether the information so far supplied to the French Government concerning the Berlin Conference covers the whole of the results of the Conference. 1408 1552 [ Pg. 1552 includes portions of Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , and Doc. 1409 ] Aug. 7 (tel. 4773) The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a translation of a note from the French Foreign Minister accepting the invitation to France to participate in the work of the Allied Commission on Reparations, designating the French representatives on that Commission, and reserving the right to make known at a later date the French position on the agreements reached at the Berlin Conference with respect to economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany and with respect to settlement of the reparations problem. 1409 1552 [ Pg. 1552 includes portions of Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , and Doc. 1409 ] Aug. 7 (tel. 4774) The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a translation of a note from the French Foreign Minister accepting the invitation to France to participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers but setting forth certain reservations with respect to the text on this subject agreed to at the Berlin Conference. 1410 1553 [ Pg. 1553 includes portions of Doc. 1409 and Doc. 1410 ] Aug. 7 (tel. 4775) The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State Transmittal of a translation of a note from the French Foreign Minister commenting upon the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference with respect to political principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period and suggesting an exchange of views among the powers which share the responsibility of the occupation and control of Germany. 1411 1554 [ Pg. 1554 includes portions of Doc. 1410 and Doc. 1411 ] Undated Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference Record of the President’s movements and appointments during his trip to the Berlin Conference, July 6–August 7, 1945. 710 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] 1945 Aug. 8 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat Summary of Soviet and British policy at the Berlin Conference with respect to Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. 833 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] Aug. 8 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat Summary of Soviet and British policy at the Berlin Conference with respect to Yugoslavia. 1087 , 1205 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 1086 and Doc. 1087 ] , 1212 [ Pg. 1212 includes portions of Doc. 1204 and Doc. 1205 ] Aug. 8 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat Summary of Soviet and British policy at the Berlin Conference with respect to Poland. 1142 , 1154 1135 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 1142 ] , 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] Aug. 8 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat Summary of Soviet and British policy at the Berlin Conference with respect to Spain. 1179 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 1179 ] Aug. 8 [ The Soviet Foreign Commissar to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ] [Notification of declaration of war by the Soviet Union on Japan; translation quoted in footnote 1 to the proclamation of July 26, 1945, calling for the surrender of Japan (document No. 1382, page 1474 [ Pg. 1474 is part of Doc. 1382 ] ), q. v.] Aug. 8 (tel. 6684) ( Preco 23) The Secretary of State to the Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Request for information concerning the discussions which took place at the Berlin Conference with respect to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. 742 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] Aug. 9 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat Summary of Soviet and British policy at the Berlin Conference with respect to trusteeship. 737 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , and Doc. 737 ] Aug. 9 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat Summary of Soviet and British policy at the Berlin Conference with respect to Italy. 738 , 1093 , 1107 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 1093 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 1107 and Doc. 1108 ] Aug. 9 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat Summary of Soviet and British policy at the Berlin Conference with respect to Turkey and the Black Sea Straits. 1378 1439 [ Pg. 1439 includes portions of Doc. 1377 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1377 (#1)] , and Doc. 1378 ] Aug. 9 (tel. 8019) The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs Report that the principle of rotation with respect to officers of the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations was discussed on the margin of the Berlin Conference but that the Soviet representatives had not given a definitive reaction on this subject. 743 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] 1945 Aug. 10 (tel. 2841) [ The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State ] [Transmittal of a translation of the Soviet declaration of war on Japan handed to the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow on August 8, 1945; quoted in footnote 1 to the proclamation of July 26, 1945, calling for the surrender of Japan (document No. 1382, page 1474 [ Pg. 1474 is part of Doc. 1382 ] ), q. v.] Aug. 11 (558) The French Ambassador to the Secretary of State Notification that the French Provisional Government has given its full consent to the proclamation of July 26, 1945, calling for the surrender of Japan; request that France be made a party to discussions regarding Japan’s offer to surrender and be permitted to participate in the signing of the act of surrender. 1412 1555 [ Pg. 1555 includes portions of Doc. 1411 and Doc. 1412 ] Aug. 14 (tel. 8243) The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to the Secretary of State Summary of discussions at the Berlin Conference with respect to the disposition of captured gold. 978 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] Aug. 15 (tel. 3860) The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France Authorization to inform the French Foreign Minister of seven decisions taken at the Berlin Conference which were not touched upon in the Conference Communiqué. 1413 1556 [ Pg. 1556 includes portions of Doc. 1412 and Doc. 1413 ] Aug. 16 (tel. 8296) The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Clarification of decisions taken at the Berlin Conference with respect to German economic questions. 892 , 979 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 892 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] Aug. 18 (tel. 163) The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem Summary of remarks made by the President at a news conference on August 16, 1945, regarding the extent of discussion at the Berlin Conference of the questions of a Jewish national state and Jewish immigration into Palestine. 1347 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 1347 ] Aug. 21 (tel. 7101) The Secretary of State to the Chief of the Aviation Division Reference to a statement made by Secretary of State Byrnes to Sir Alexander Cadogan at the Berlin Conference that a discussion of aviation questions was desired. 1189 1191 [ Pg. 1191 includes portions of Doc. 1189 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)] , and Doc. 1190 ] Aug. 23 Memorandum of Conversation Memorandum of a discussion between Secretary of State Byrnes and French Foreign Minister Bidault concerning the decisions of the Berlin Conference and the French reaction thereto, with special reference to the decisions relating to Germany. 1414 1557 [ Pg. 1557 includes portions of Doc. 1413 and Doc. 1414 ] Sept. 4 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Memorandum of a discussion between the Under Secretary of State and the French Ambassador with respect to the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference as to the disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine. (Attachment: Note No. 678 from the French Ambassador to the Secretary of State, dated September 4, 1945, protesting against the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference as to the disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine.) 1415 1564 [ Pg. 1564 includes portions of Doc. 1414 and Doc. 1415 ] 1945 Sept. 20 The Representative and the Associate Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations to the President Report on international negotiations in the period from February to September 1945 with respect to reparations from Germany. (Only part V of the report, summarizing reparations negotiations at the Berlin Conference, is printed.) 980 940 [ Pg. 940 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] Dec. 3 [ The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Counselor ] [Summary of discussions at the Berlin Conference on August 1, 1945, with respect to the use of Allied property for satellite reparations or war trophies; quoted in footnote 19 to the minutes of the Twelfth Plenary Meeting, August 1, 1945 (page 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] ), q. v.] 1960 Mar. 28 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Summary, based on contemporary notes and memory, of the discussion between President Truman and Generalissimo Stalin at Babelsberg on July 17, 1945, with respect to the following subjects: the agenda for the Berlin Conference; the general election in the United Kingdom; British attitudes toward the war against Japan; Soviet entry into the war against Japan; and the Stalin–Soong conversations which had recently taken place in Moscow. 1418 1582 [ Pg. 1582 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] and Doc. 1418 ] Mar. 28 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Summary, based on contemporary notes and memory, of a discussion between President Truman and Generalissimo Stalin at Babelsberg on July 18, 1945, concerning a message from the Emperor of Japan with respect to a mission of Prince Konoye and the reply to be made thereto. 1419 1587 [ Pg. 1587 includes portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] V. The president’s log V. The president’s log Contents Log of the president’s Trip to the Conference (Documents [Unnumbered document preceding Document 710 (#1)]-710) Log of the president’s Trip to the Conference Log of the president’s Trip to the Conference [[Unnumbered document preceding Document 710 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [710] Log of the President’s Trip to the Conference July 6 to August 7, 1945 White House Files Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document preceding Document 710 (#1)] Editor’s Note —A “Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference (July 6, 1945, to August 7, 1945)” was compiled by Lieutenant William M. Rigdon, U. S. N., who served as Personal Secretary to the President during the trip. This processed document consists of the following parts: (1) a table of contents; (2) a foreword by Lieutenant George M. Elsey, U. S. N. R.; (3) a summary of the President’s itinerary; (4) a list of the President’s party (see volume I, page 138 ); (5) the body of the Log, running to 53 pages; (6) an appendix entitled “The Story of the Augusta” ) (7) citations for certain awards of the Distinguished Service Medal; (8) the text of the proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan (see document No. 1382 ); (9) the text of the Report on the Conference (or Communiqué) (see document No. 1384 ); (10) the roster of military policemen who guarded the “Little White House” at Babelsberg; and (11) photographs taken during the trip. Printed below as document No. 710 are pertinent extracts of the body of the Log, i. e., the fifth section of the entire document, which itself is headed “Log of the President’s Trip to the ‘Berlin Conference’ “. Throughout the rest of the compilation this fifth section is referred to as the Log. All material in the Log which pertains to the work of the Conference has been included. The material omitted pertains to shipboard activities, navigation information, reports on ceremonial activities and inspections, routine messages of thanks and congratulation, menus, and other material having no bearing whatever on Conference proceedings. In order to avoid cluttering the text with too many rows of points to indicate deletions, brief sections of extraneous material falling between sections pertinent to the Conference have been left in; these will give the reader an indication of the general “flavor” of the Log. All times in the Log are expressed in Navy style, i. e., from 0001 hours (12:01 a.m.) to 2400 hours (midnight). No. 710 Log of the President’s Trip to the Conference White House Files No. 710 Log of the President’s Trip to the Conference July 6 to August 7, 1945 [Extracts] Log of the President’s Trip to the “Berlin Conference” Friday, July 6th: The President, accompanied by Mr. John Snyder, Secretary Charles G. Ross, Brigadier General Harry H. Vaughan, Captain James K. Vardaman, Jr., and Mr. Fred Canfil, left the White House at 2140 by motor car for the Union Station. The party arrived at the station (Team Track No. 2) at 2150 and boarded the special train at once. Mr. Snyder did not accompany us beyond this point. He saw the President aboard and then left the train. Secretary Byrnes came aboard at 2215. Fleet Admiral Leahy and other members of the Presidential party had boarded the train earlier in the evening. At 2300 the special train departed Washington, via the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad lines, for Newport News, Va. At Newport News the heavy cruiser Augusta (CA31) was waiting to receive the President and his party. Saturday, July 7th: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Our train arrived in Newport News at 0550 and was parked inside pier No. 6, at the U. S. Army Port of Embarkation. This is the same transfer point used by President Roosevelt on his trip to the Crimea and the Middle East earlier this year. The President left the train shortly after arrival in Newport News and was met at trainside by Rear Admiral Allan E. McCann, U. S. N. (Commander Task Force 68, Atlantic Fleet), Brigadier General John R. Kilpatrick, U. S. A. (Commanding General, Army Port of Embarkation), and Captain [James] H. Foskett, U. S. N. (Commanding Officer of the Augusta ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President, accompanied by members of his party, went aboard the Augusta at 0601. … The party was met at the ship’s quarterdeck by Captain Foskett, Commander C. L. Freeman, U. S. N. (Executive Officer), and the various Heads of Department of the Augusta , and shown to their respective quarters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A map room and communications center for the President was set up in the ship’s First Lieutenant’s office. It was staffed by Lieutenant George M. Elsey, U. S. N. R., Captain Frank H. Graham, A. U. S., and Ship’s Clerk Edwin L. Hoying, U. S. N. R., with Commander John A. Tyree, Jr., U. S. N., in general supervision. Lieutenant William M. Rigdon, U. S. N., acted as personal secretary to the President during the trip and, assisted by Ensign Cecil M. Fleener, U. S. N. R., also served as secretary for the party. After breakfast, the President, accompanied by members of his party, ascended to the flag bridge and from there, at 0655, he gave word for the Augusta to get underway when ready. At exactly 0700 the cruiser departed from Newport News for Antwerp, Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . At 0815 the Augusta joined up with the light cruiser U. S. S. Philadelphia , also headed out to sea. The Augusta took station in column one thousand yards astern of the Philadelphia . The two cruisers operated as “Task Force 68”—a special task force constituted for the purpose of transporting and escorting the President and his party from the United States to Europe and return. Task Force 68 was under the tactical command of Rear Admiral McCann. No destroyer escort or air escort was used for our voyage to Europe or for the return trip. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sunday, July 8th: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . At 0930, the President met with Secretary Byrnes, Admiral Leahy and State Department advisers Cohen, Matthews and Bohlen in the Secretary’s cabin in the first of a series of daily pre-conference business conversations. At 1000, the President and members of his party attended Protestant church services with the crew held below decks (#1 crew’s mess hall) because of inclement weather. The services were conducted by the ship’s chaplain, Lieutenant Commander K. D. Perkins. After church services—at 1045—the pre-conference conversations in the Secretary’s cabin were resumed and continued until 1200. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Monday, July 9th: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President took a nap after lunch and later in the afternoon met with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy for formal discussions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tuesday, July 10th: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President rested in his cabin for a few hours this afternoon and then met with the Secretary of State and Admiral Leahy for conference discussions that lasted until dinner time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wednesday, July 11th: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President, Secretary Byrnes, and Admiral Leahy conferred during the forenoon, and again during the afternoon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Thursday, July 12th: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President conferred with the Secretary of State and Admiral Leahy at length during the forenoon. … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The weather cleared during the afternoon and the President and Secretary Byrnes spent a short while in a brisk walk along the forecastle deck. The greater part of the afternoon, however, was spent by them in conference with Admiral Leahy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Friday, July 18th: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . After lunch, the President, Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy appeared on deck and posed together for still and motion pictures. The President, the Secretary, and Admiral Leahy spent most of the remainder of the afternoon in conference shaping up the agenda for the tripartite qonference and preparing a written brief on the problems that were expected to be brought up at the conference. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sunday, July 15th: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004: The Augusta moored (port side to) to the municipal dock (Compagnia Maritime dock) at Antwerp. (Total distance traveled, Newport News to Antwerp—3837 miles.) The Philadelphia tied up astern of the Augusta. Waiting on the dock to welcome the President were a delegation of Belgian officials, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, A. U. S. (the Allied Supreme Commander), Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. N. (Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Europe), Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, A. U. S. (Commanding General, Communications Zone, European Theatre), Major General G. Surtees (Commanding General, British Base and Lines of Communication), Brigadier General E. F. Koenig, A. U. S. (Commanding General, Chanor Section), Ambassador Charles Sawyer and Mrs. Sawyer, Major DeWitt Greer, Supervising Agent Anheier, Agents Rowley, Waters, Holmes, Campion, Torina, Boring, Kauffman, and Behn. … 1110: The President, accompanied by his party, left the ship. . . . 1115: The President and party embarked in waiting motor cars and departed for Brussels. There were approximately forty automobiles in the long motor car caravan. Riding with the President were Secretary Byrnes and Ambassador Sawyer. 1230: The President and party arrived at the Brussels-Evere airport (B–58), 2 several miles northwest [ northeast? ] of the city of Brussels. (Approximate distance traveled, Antwerp to airfield—35 miles.) General Eisenhower, Admiral Stark and General Lee accompanied the President to the airfield. Awaiting us at the field were Supervising Agent McGrath and Agents Barry, Gorham and Walker. The President was accorded honors here by a band and 400 picked men of the 137th Infantry Regiment. He then reviewed the honor guard. Each man in the guard was a “five-star” combat man. The President spoke with some of them before boarding his plane. Plane No. 2 (a C–54—Major Jesse Hayes pilot) was the first to take to the air and departed Brussels at 1245. Passengers were: Secretary Byrnes, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Bohlen, Brigadier General E. S. Hoag, A. U. S. (A. T. C. representative), Lt-Colonel A. M. McIntire, A. U. S. (A. T. C. liaison), Commander Tyree, Lieut. Elsey, Lieut. Edelstein, Lieut. Rigdon, Captain Graham, and Secret Service Agents Anheier, Hipsley, Torina, Waters, Holmes, McGrath and Boring[.] At 1300 the President’s plane (C–54, the “Sacred Cow”, piloted by Lt-Colonel Henry T. Myers) departed for Berlin. Passengers were: The President, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, Captain McMahon, Captain Vardaman, Mr. Canfil, and Secret Service Agents Maloney, Drescher, O’Driscoll and Rowley. At 1315 plane No, 3 (C–54) departed Brussels for Berlin. Embarked were: Ensign Fleener, Ship’s Clerk Hoying, Chief Pharmacist’s Mate Preston C. Taylor, U. S. N. (of the Augusta , who accompanied us to the Conference as Captain McMahon’s assistant), Chief Photographer’s Mate Belknap, Chief Stewards Prettyman, Abiba, Bautista, Calinao, Custodio and Estrada, and Chief Cooks Floresca, Olivares, Ordona, Orig, Palomaria and Licodo, Sergeant Philler, Secret Service Agents Behn, Kellerman, Gorham, Barry, Haman and Weir, and Lieutenant C. D. Sherman (A. T. C. liaison). Our baggage was transported in two C–47’s. A third C–47 was dispatched to Tempelhof Airport, Berlin with the seven White House newspaper correspondents and photographers accompanying the Presidential party. They proceeded on to Berlin despite the knowledge that, by agreement between the Big Three, they were not to be permitted to enter conference area. 3 The route followed by our flight was from Brussels to Liege, thence to Frankfurt, to Kassel, to Magdeburg and to Berlin (Gatow airport). We picked up a fighter escort (P-47’s) at Frankfurt that accompanied us on to Berlin. Twelve fighters covered the President’s plane and four each, planes No. 2 and No. 3. From Frankfurt to Berlin we were over Kussian-controlled territory and were required to stay within a ten-mile air corridor. Plane No. 2 arrived at Gatow at 1558. (Distance traveled, Antwerp to Berlin, 460 miles.) Plane No. 1 arrived at 1613. Plane No. 3 arrived at 1628. The President disembarked at once and was greeted here by a large delegation including Secretary Stimson, Assistant Secretary McCloy, Assistant Secretaries Clayton and Dunn, Ambassadors Harriman, Pauley and Murphy, Fleet Admiral King, Minister Lubin, Lieutenant General Clay, Major General Floyd Parks (Commanding General, Headquarters Berlin District), Soviet Ambassador Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador Gusev. Honors were accorded the President here by a detachment from the Second Armored Division (“Hell on Wheels”). The President then inspected the honor guard. At 1630 the President and party departed Gatow for his quarters in Babelsberg, approximately 10 miles distant. Secretary Byrnes, Ambassador Pauley, General Vaughan and Captain Vardaman rode in the car with the President. We passed through a section of Potsdam enroute from Gatow to Babelsberg. Part of the route was guarded by American and British troops, but the greater part of the route was patrolled by green-capped Soviet frontier guardsmen as this was a Soviet-controlled area. The American and British delegations to the conference were housed in Babelsberg in little territorial “islands” within the Soviet-occupied zone [ sector ] of Greater Berlin. 1700: The President and party arrived at his assigned quarters in Babelsberg. Babelsberg is a suburb of Berlin, about 12 miles southwest of the city, between Berlin and Potsdam. It lies along winding Griebnitz Lake and is in a thickly wooded area. It has a pleasant climate at this time of the year, with an average mean temperature in the low 60’s. The town was quite popular with the Germans as a summer resort and was also the seat of Germany’s movie colony. The President’s quarters at No. 2 Kaiser Strasse (called the “Little White House”) was a three-story stucco residence which was formerly occupied by the head of the German movie colony, who is now with a labor battalion somewhere in Russia. It is right on Lake Griebnitz and is surrounded on three sides by groves of trees and shrubbery forming a very beautiful garden that reaches down to the lake. The house was stripped of its furnishings during the war but had been refurnished by the Russians. It was nicely furnished during our stay but, like most European homes, the bathroom and bathing facilities were wholly inadequate. Nor was it screened, so that the mosquitoes gave us a “working over” during our first few nights there until the weather had cooled somewhat. The President occupied a suite on the second floor (north side), consisting of bedroom, sitting room, office and breakfast room. He also had a private sunporch outside his office. Secretary Byrnes occupied a suite (bedroom, sitting room and office) on the first floor. Also in residence here were Admiral Leahy, Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, Captain McMahon, Captain Vardaman, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Matthews, Lieutenant Rigdon, Ensign Fleener, Ship’s Clerk Hoying and Chief Warrant Officers Caldwell and Stoner. The President maintained his own mess at Babelsberg, employing Filipino cooks and stewards brought from the Potomac . Messing with the President were Secretary Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, Captain McMahon and Captain Vardaman. Food supplies and bottled water were brought from Washington and from the Augusta . Additional supplies were obtained through the Army Mess Officer at Babelsberg. Other members of the party messed in various Army officer messes in the area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department parties also lived in Babelsberg in close proximity to the Little White House. A map room and communications center was installed in the President’s house with direct wire service to Frankfurt and Washington. The center was staffed by Colonel Bowen, Commander Tyree, Major Greer, Lieutenant Elsey, Captain Graham, Ship’s Clerk Hoying, Warrant Officers Caldwell and Stoner and Sergeant Philler. The White House party had its own telephone exchange (“ Amco” ). The switchboard was set up in the basement of the President’s house and was operated by WACs, Cpl. Alma Bradley, Cpl. Mary Whiteus, Cpl. Charlotte Szostek, and Cpl. Eleanor Moynihan, of the WAC Detachment, Headquarters Command, U. S. F. E. T. (Main). The Prime Minister lived at 23 Ringstrasse in Babelsberg—about two blocks from the Little White House. His was a similarly large house but perhaps a bit better furnished than the President’s. Generalissimo Stalin also resided in Babelsberg, about one mile from the Little White House, on the route from the White House to Cecilienhof where the conference meetings were held. This arrangement required that the President and the Prime Minister make a three mile drive for each session of the conference, while the Generalissimo had a much shorter distance to travel. The Filipino messmen went into action immediately on arrival at the Little White House and at 1800 dinner was served the President and his party. Mr. Cohen, Mr. Matthews and Mr. Bohlen dined at the Little White House as guests of the President. 4 Mr. Maloney, Mr. Drescher and Mr. Rowley were subsisted from the President’s mess during our stay at Babelsberg. They ate in a separate dining room, however. After dinner, Ambassadors Harriman and Pauley called on the President. 5 Having had a full day, the President and most members of the party retired early this evening. It was still light at midnight, as this country has but about four hours of darkness each night at this time of the year. This was not conducive to much rest as one seemed to forget to go to bed until it was dark. Monday, July 16th: During the forenoon the President worked on his mail and conferred with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. 5 At 1100 Prime Minister Churchill, accompanied by the Right Honorable Anthony Eden, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Commander C. R. Thompson, R. N. (Naval Aide to the Prime Minister), and the Prime Minister’s daughter (Junior Commander Mary Churchill of the A. T. S.) called on the President. After exchanging greetings, the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Eden, and Mr. [ sic ] Cadogan conferred for some two hours. 6 A White House mail pouch arrived this afternoon. It had been sent from Washington by a J. C. S. courier. The President signed this mail, which included legislative bills S134, S233, S234, S574, S672 and S956. Generalissimo Stalin had not arrived at Potsdam, so the opening session of the conference scheduled for this afternoon was postponed to await his arrival. The President took advantage of the delay in the opening of the conference and made an unscheduled visit to Berlin. He left the Little White House by motor car at 1540, accompanied by Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. . . . The President and his party returned to the White House at 1735. The three Foreign Secretaries held regular daily meetings to prepare the work of the conference. The first of these meetings was held this afternoon at Cecilienhof with Secretary Byrnes presiding. 7 It was agreed, however, that the chairmanship of these planning meetings would be rotated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings in their conference hall at Babelsberg. After returning to the Little White House the President worked on his mail. He approved legislative bills S. J. Res. 31 and H. E. 3368. 8 2000: Ambassadors Harriman and Pauley and Mr. Davies were dinner guests of the President this evening. 9 A band from the Second Armored Division played a concert on the lower White House grounds during and after dinner. At 2200 Mr. Davies returned to the Little White House to deliver an urgent message to the President. 10 Tuesday, July 17th: While at Babelsberg the President arose at his customary early hour; had breakfast at 0800; and spent the forenoons working on his mail and papers, and studying reports on matters to come before the conference. This forenoon Colonel Henri [ Monti ] L. Belot, Medical Corps, U. S. A., called on the President and delivered to him a letter from the Mayor of Reims, France, inviting the President to visit Reims. Colonel Belot is commanding officer of the 178th General Hospital located at Reims. 1200: Generalissimo Stalin, accompanied by Mr. V. M. Molotov (People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs) and Mr. V. N. Pavlov (interpreter), called on the President at the Little White House. This was the first meeting of the President and Mr. Stalin. After greetings had been exchanged, the President, the Generalissimo, Secretary Byrnes, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov met in closed conference for more than an hour. 11 1320: The President entertained at lunch at the Little White House in honor of Generalissimo Stalin. Present were: The President, the Generalissimo, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Molotov, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Pavlov. After lunch the party moved to the porch and posed for pictures. 1430: Ambassadors Harriman and Pauley called at the Little White House this afternoon and conferred briefly with the President and also with the Secretary of State. 12 1640: The President, accompanied by his personal staff, left the Little White House by motor car for Cecilienhof for the opening session of the conference. The President arrived at Cecilienhof at 1650. The Prime Minister and the Generalissimo were there when he arrived. At 1700 the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin, and the delegates of the three Allied nations, assembled in the conference room (the former reception room of the Palace), where greetings were exchanged and motion and still pictures were made. At 1710 the Berlin Conference was officially called to order. 13 At the suggestion of Generalissimo Stalin, the President was selected to act as chairman of the conference. Delegates for the United States during the course of the conference included: President Truman, Secretary Byrnes, Fleet Admiral Leahy, Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, General of the Army George C. Marshall, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, General Brehon B. Somervell, Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Mr. Ben Cohen, Mr. H. Freeman Matthews and Mr. Charles E. Bohlen. Delegates for the United Kingdom included: Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee, The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin, Lord Leathers (Minister of War Transport), Sir Alexander Cadogan (Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs), Sir Archibald Clark Kerr (British Ambassador at Moscow), Sir Walter Monckton (Head of the U. K. Delegation to Moscow Reparations Commission), Sir William Strang (Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, British Zone in Germany), Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary of the Cabinet), Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal (Chief of the Air Staff), Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham (First Sea Lord), General Sir Hastings L. Ismay (Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense), Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander (Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre), and Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson (Head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington). The Soviet Delegation included: Generalissimo J. V. Stalin, Mr. V. M. Molotov (People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs), Mr. A. Ya. Vyshinski (Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs), Mr. F. T. Gousev (Soviet Ambassador in Great Britain), Mr. I. M. Maisky (Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs), Mr. A. A. Gromyko (Soviet Ambassador in U. S. A.), Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov (People’s Commissar for the Navy), and Mr. V. N. Pavlov (interpreter). Today’s meeting adjourned at 1855, when the conferees proceeded to the banquet room in the Palace where a buffet lunch was served them. It was noted that the maitre d’hotel at Cecilienhof was none other than Mr. Goberidge, who managed President Roosevelt’s cuisine at Yalta. The President and party left Cecilienhof at 1909 for the Little White House, where they arrived at 1920. Mail arrived from Washington this afternoon. 1945: Dinner at the Little White House. Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold were guests of the President. 14 Dinner music was provided by an excellent stringed orchestra with Sergeant Eugene List, noted American pianist, at the piano. After dinner the President signed mail that arrived in today’s pouch. At 2300 the President’s nephew, Sergeant Harry Truman (son of Mr. J. Vivian Truman) arrived at Potsdam. While talking to Lieutenant General Lee at Antwerp last Sunday, the President mentioned that his nephew was in the European Theatre and that he would like to see him. Sergeant Truman was on board the Queen Elizabeth ready to sail for home at the time, but General Lee got him off the ship in time and had him flown to Babelsberg for a visit with the President. Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam—where the conference was held—was the country estate of the former Crown Prince Wilhelm. The residence, a two-story brownstone house, is located near Griebnitz Lake and has beautifully landscaped gardens. The high-roofed house is built in four wings forming a square with a courtyard in the center. The courtyard was brilliantly carpeted with a 24–foot red star of geraniums, pink roses and hydrangeas planted by the Soviets. The flags of the three Allied nations flew over the main entrance to the Palace. Cecilienhof had been used as a hospital during the war by both the Germans and the Soviets and had been stripped of all its furnishings. The Russians performed a marvelous job in refitting it for the conference, however. It was, perhaps, furnished even better during the conference than originally. Its furniture and furnishings had been brought in from Moscow. At Cecilienhof President Truman, Mr. Churchill, and the Generalissimo each had a suite, and each delegation had a retiring room and offices. Wednesday, July 18th: Sergeant Truman had breakfast with the President this morning. The President conferred with the Secretary of State and a number of his advisers during the forenoon. 15 At 1315 the President, accompanied by Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, and Captain Vardaman, left the Little White House by foot for the Prime Minister’s quarters. There the President lunched privately with the Prime Minister 16 while Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, and Captain Vardaman had lunch with Junior Commander Mary Churchill and some, other members of the Prime Minister’s personal staff. At 1450 the President, together with the Prime Minister and Miss Churchill, left the Prime Minister’s residence and walked down the street to Mr. Eden’s quarters where they met Mr. Eden and Secretary Byrnes. The party then returned to the Prime Minister’s house. The President’s party assembled at the Prime Minister’s and left with him for Generalissimo Stalin’s quarters so that the President could return Marshal Stalin’s earlier call. At 1500 a pouch with mail for the White House was dispatched to Washington. 1504: The President and his party arrived at the Generalissimo’s quarters. The President was met as he alighted from his car by Mr. Molotov who escorted him and his party inside where Mr. Stalin awaited. Although most of our party had just left the luncheon table, we were ushered to a large dining table where a buffet lunch was served us. After lunch with attending toasts, the President talked briefly with the Generalissimo. 17 Then they posed for still and motion pictures. The President and party left the Generalissimo’s house at 1600 for Cecilienhof. We arrived at the Palace at 1608. At 1615 the second meeting of the Berlin Conference was convened. 18 The meeting adjourned at 1800, and the President and his party left immediately to return to the Little White House. 1930: Assistant Secretary Clayton, Assistant Secretary Dunn, and Mr. Donald Russell were dinner guests of the President. 19 The U. S. Headquarters, Berlin District, Army Band, under the direction of Warrant Officer Frank J. Rosato, played during the dinner hour. . . . Thursday, July 19th: 1000: [Assistant] Secretary McCloy and Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay (Staff of General Eisenhower) called at the Little White House and conferred with the President. 20 1300: Lunch at the Little White House. First Lieutenant James M. Vardaman, A. U. S. (Captain Vardaman’s nephew), Colonel Howard A. Rusk, Medical Corps, A. U. S., and Sergeant Truman were guests. The President and party left the Little White House at 1545 for Cecilienhof. The third session of the conference was called to order by the President at 1605. 21 The meeting adjourned at 1655 when the President and party left for the Little White House. Mr. Stalin invited the President to stay for a buffet lunch, but the President declined. We reached the Little White House at 1710. At 2030 the President entertained at a State Dinner at the Little White House in honor of Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Churchill. Present were: The President, Prime Minister Churchill, Generalissimo Stalin, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Attlee, Mr. Molotov, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Vyshinski, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Gromyko, Lord Cherwell, Mr. Pauley, Mr. Davies, Mr. Sobolev, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Pavlov, and Major Birse. 22 Friday, July 20th: Lieutenant Colonel James A. Blair, an old friend of the President on duty in the Berlin area, and Sergeant Truman had breakfast with the President. Shortly after breakfast Sergeant Truman left Babelsberg for Gatow to enplane for Paris and return to the United States. 1200: Generals Eisenhower and Bradley (Omar N. Bradley) called on the President. 23 1230: General Eisenhower, General Bradley and Colonel Howard A. Rusk were luncheon guests at the Little White House. 1330: The President, accompanied by Secretary Stimson, Assistant Secretary McCloy and Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, and Clay, left the Little White House by automobile for Berlin. Generals Eisenhower and Bradley rode with the President in an open car. 1400: The President and party arrived at the U. S. Group Control Council Headquarters (Teltower District, Berlin), where the President participated in the official raising of our flag over Berlin. . . . The President left the scene immediately after the ceremony and returned directly to the Little White House. At 1500 mail was dispatched to Washington. At 1545 the President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof. At 1605 the President called the fourth meeting of the Berlin Conference to order. 24 The meeting adjourned at 1840 when the conferees assembled in the Palace dining room for a buffet lunch. Our party left the Palace at 1855 for the Little White House. Colonel L. Curtis Tiernan, Chaplain Corps, U. S. A., arrived in Babelsberg this afternoon and was a guest of the President for the next several days. Colonel Tiernan was the chaplain of the President’s outfit during World War I, and is now Chief of Army Chaplains in the European Theatre. 2000: Dinner at the Little White House with Assistant Secretary McCloy, Admiral Land and General Clay as guests. 25 Sergeant List, accompanied by Pfc Stuart Canin (concert violinist), played during dinner. Saturday, July 21st: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1500: Mail arrived from Washington. 25a 1545: The President conferred with Secretary Byrnes. 26 1635: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof. We arrived at the Palace at 1645. The fifth meeting of the conference was called to order at 1700. 27 The conference adjourned at 1925, and the President returned to the Little White House at 1935. At 2015 the President, accompanied by Mr. Davies, Mr. Byrnes and Admiral Leahy, left the Little White House for Generalissimo Stalin’s residence where they attended a dinner given by the Generalissimo. Present were: The President, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Harriman, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Davies, Mr. Bohlen, Prime Minister Churchill, Mr. Eden, Mr. Attlee, Lord Leathers, Major Birse, Generalissimo Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Vyshinski, Mr. Beria (People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs), Mr. Gousev, Mr. Gromyko, and Mr. Pavlov. 28 The President returned to the Little White House at 2330. Sunday, July 22nd: The President, accompanied by his Military and Naval Aides and Captain McMahon, and Colonel Tiernan, attended Protestant church services at 1000. 28a The services were held in the Coliseum building (a former film laboratory) in the “ Masterwork ” area of the American Army camp and were conducted by Lieut. Colonel Lawrence Nelson, Second Armored Division Chaplain. Captain Ernest M. Northern, Jr., 67th Armored Regiment Chaplain, assisted Colonel Nelson. The President returned to the Coliseum at 1130 to attend a Catholic Mass conducted by his old friend, Colonel Tiernan. Prime Minister Churchill called on the President at 1215. They conferred for a full hour, 29 and Mr. Churchill left the Little White House at 1330. The Prime Minister declined the President’s invitation to lunch as he, himself, was having guests for lunch. 1500: Mail was dispatched to Washington. 1645: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof where he arrived at 1655. 1700: The sixth meeting of the conference was called to order. 30 The meeting adjourned at 1950 and the President and party returned to the Little White House immediately. 2030: Private John R. Thomas, Jr., U. S. A. (Captain McMahon’s nephew) was a dinner guest at the Little White House this evening. Music was furnished during and after dinner by the Headquarters Berlin District (U. S. Army) Band, playing from the lower White House lawn. Monday, July 23rd: Mail arrived from Washington during the forenoon; the President signed this mail shortly after it was delivered to him. 1000: General Parks called on the President and presented him the flag that had been raised at Berlin last Friday. Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace H. Graham, Medical Corps, U. S. A. (attached to the 24th Evacuation Hospital, Bremen) spent the day visiting with the President and members of his mess. 1100: Secretary Stimson called on the President. 31 1500: Mail was dispatched to Washington. At 1640 the President left the Little White House for Cecilienhof where he and his party arrived at 1650. At 1710 the seventh meeting of the conference was called to order. 32 The meeting adjourned at 1900 at which time the President and his party left to return to the Little White House. At 2020 the President, Secretary Byrnes, and Admiral Leahy left the Little White House by foot for the Prime Minister’s residence where they attended a State Dinner given by Prime Minister Churchill in honor of the President and Generalissimo Stalin. Those present included: The President, Secretary Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Mr. Bohlen, Generalissimo Stalin, Mr. Molotov, Army General A. I. Antonov, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, Marshal of Aviation F. Ya. Fodalev [ Falaleyevf ], Admiral of the Fleet N. G. Kousnetsov, Prime Minister Churchill, the Right Honorable C. R. Attlee, Mr. Eden, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Sir Edward Bridges, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Commander C. R. Thompson, and Major A. Birse. 33 Music for the occasion was furnished by a stringed orchestra from a Royal Air Force band. The menu included: Cold clear soup, hot turtle soup, fried sole, roast chicken, boiled new potatoes, peas, cold ham, lettuce salad, fruit salad, ice cream, and Scotch woodcock. The President, Secretary Byrnes, and Admiral Leahy returned to the Little White House at 2330. Tuesday, July 24th: Mail arrived from Washington this forenoon. The President signed this mail shortly after it was delivered to him. It included legislative bills HR 905, HR 3295 and H. J. Res. 228. 1000: The President took time out from his work to pose for pictures with Major Greer’s communications personnel, who included several of the WAC telephone operators who handled the “ Amco ” board. 1020: Secretary Stimson called on the President. 34 1035: Secretary Byrnes conferred with the President. 35 1130: The Combined Chiefs of Staff (U. S. and British) assembled at the Little White House and met in plenary session with the President and Prime Minister Churchill. 36 Their report 37 was approved by the President and the Prime Minister. 1430: The first meeting of the Tripartite military staffs (U. S., British, and U. S. S. R.) was convened at Cecilienhof. 38 1500: Mail was dispatched to Washington. 1620: A delegation of Poles (consisting of the President of the National Council of Poland and three members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity 39 ), escorted by Ambassador Harriman, called on the President at the Little White House. 40 They departed at 1645. 1650: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof, where they arrived at 1700. At 1715 the eighth meeting of the conference was called to order. 41 The meeting adjourned at 1930, and the President left Cecilienhof immediately to return to the Little White House. Wednesday, July 25th: 0920: Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in the India–Burma Theatre) called on the President at the Little White House. 42 1000: General Marshall called on the President. 1035: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof where they arrived at 1045. Before the conference was called to order, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Generalissimo posed in the Palace garden for still and motion pictures. Photographers (service and civilian) from all three nations were represented. 1100: The Big Three and other delegates entered the conference room and the ninth meeting of the Berlin Conference was called to order by the President. 43 The meeting adjourned at 1200, at which time the President left to return to the Little White House. Admiral Leahy, accompanied by Rear Admiral H. A. Flanigan, U. S. N., Captain Vardaman, Colonel Rusk, Lieutenant Elsey, Lieutenant Edelstein, Lieutenant Rigdon, and First Lieutenant Vardaman left Babelsberg this morning for a flight to London. They returned to Babelsberg Thursday afternoon. 2000: Ambassador Murphy, Ambassador Caffery, and General Somervell were dinner guests at the Little White House this evening. 44 Dinner music was played by an eight-piece band from the 278th Army Ground Force band with Staff Sergeant Joe Borrelli conducting. Vocal selections were rendered by Pfc Jules Navarra. Thursday, July 26th: At 0730 the President and certain members of his party left the Little White House by auto for the airport at Gatow. At Gatow they enplaned for Frankfurt to inspect U. S. Army personnel and facilities in that area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1830: The President’s plane arrived at Gatow. He and his party entered waiting motor cars here and left at once for the Little White House where they arrived at 1900. 1915: General Marshall called on the President. 45 Captain John B. Ross, Medical Corps, U. S. A. (Secretary Ross’ son) and Major Alfred K. Lee, JAGD, U. S. A. (a personal friend of the President) were dinner guests at the Little White House this evening. Captain Ross spent several days in Babelsberg visiting with his father. 2200: Ambassador Harriman called on the President. 46 The President, jointly with Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, issued a proclamation from Berlin this evening calling on the Japanese to surrender unconditionally now or suffer complete destruction. This document later became known as the “Potsdam Declaration”. A copy is appended. 47 There was no meeting of the Big Three today as Mr. Churchill, Mr. Attlee, and Mr. Eden were in England in connection with the official election count. Friday, July 27th: There was no meeting of the conference today as the British Delegation had not returned to Babelsberg. The President worked on his mail during the forenoon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, except for Admiral Leahy, departed Babelsberg this morning for the return trip to Washington. They traveled by air. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200: The President conferred with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. 48 A definition of lend-lease and the prospects of bringing the conference to an early close were among the subjects they discussed. Mail was dispatched to Washington this afternoon. 1830: Mr. Davies called on the President. 46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2030: Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, Special Assistant to the President, arrived Babelsberg this evening and joined the President’s party. Sergeant List played selected piano solos during dinner hour. The President today presented an autographed photograph of himself to Colonel Ernest R. Lee, U. S. A. Saturday, July 28th: This morning the President presented an autographed photograph to Major General Floyd L. Parks, U. S. A. 0930: The President conferred with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1930: Secretary Forrestal and Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke, U. S. N., were dinner guests of the President this evening. 50 Prime Minister Attlee and British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin returned to Babelsberg from London this afternoon. Their party having been defeated in the recent British election, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden remained in England. 2115: Prime Minister Attlee, Mr. Bevin, and Sir Alexander Cadogan called at the Little White House and conferred briefly with the President and Secretary Byrnes. 51 2215: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof. The tenth meeting of the conference was called to order at 2230. 52 The new Big Three posed for still and motion pictures before the meeting. Tonight’s meeting was adjourned at 0005, or five minutes past midnight. The President returned to the Little White House at fifteen minutes past midnight, at which time he was handed a telegram from Washington informing him that the Senate had ratified the United Nations Charter. 53 The President immediately dispatched the following statement to the press: “It is deeply gratifying that the Senate has ratified the United Nations Charter by virtually unanimous vote. The action of the Senate substantially advances the cause of world peace.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sunday, July 29th: 1000: The President attended Protestant church services at the Coliseum. The services were conducted by Captain Northern. 1130: Mr. Molotov, accompanied by Mr. Galounsky (interpreter) called at the Little White House. The President, Secretary Byrnes, Mr. Molotov, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Galounsky conferred for more than an hour. 54 Generalissimo Stalin was indisposed and could not attend. The President presented autographed pictures to Colonel General S. N. Kruglov, Lieutenant General N. D. Gorlinski and Colonel M. M. Koretsky of the Red Army. These officers, members of the Soviet Advance party, had charge of arrangements at Babelsberg for the housing and security of the Big Three.… Mail was dispatched to Washington this afternoon. 1630: Prime Minister Attlee, Mr. Bevin, and Sir Alexander Cadogan called at the Little White House. They conferred for some time with the President and Secretary Byrnes. 55 There was no meeting of the Big Three today. Generalissimo Stalin was still indisposed. 1930: Captain Ross was a dinner guest at the White House this evening. Dinner music was furnished by an Army band. Monday, July 30th: Secretary Forrestal, General Eisenhower, Admiral Cooke, Admiral Cochrane, General Clay, Commodore Schade and Captain E. B. Taylor, U. S. N., had breakfast with the President. Later they conferred with the President, Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy. 56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Generalissimo Stalin was still indisposed so there was no meeting of the Big Three today. 57 The Foreign Secretaries had a very long session however. 58 1800: Ambassador Pauley called on the President. 59 1900: Dinner at the Little White House. Sergeant List played a number of Chopin selections—the President’s favorites—during the dinner hour. Tuesday, July 31st: At 0900 Brigadier General Stuart Cutler, Commanding General, Berlin Headquarters District, came to the Little White House and called on the President and General Vaughan. 59 1000: Mr. Rowan, Prime Minister Attlee’s secretary, called on the President. 59 Mail was dispatched to Washington this afternoon. 1545: The President left the Little White House for Cecilienhof. 1600: The eleventh meeting of the Big Three was convened. 60 This turned out to be a long session as the meeting did not adjourn until 1915. The President left immediately for the Little White House. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wednesday, August 1st: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President spent the forenoon working on his mail and studying reports on subjects due to come up for discussion in the afternoon session of the conference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1445: The President left the Little White House for Cecilienhof, where he arrived at 1455. Shortly after his arrival at the Palace, the President and other members of the Big Three, together with their Foreign Secretaries and Admiral Leahy, posed for newsreel and still pictures. 1530: The twelfth meeting of the Big Three was convened. 61 The meeting adjourned at 1750, when it was announced that a final session had been called for 2100 tonight. The President left Cecilienhof at 1800 and returned to the Little White House. 1900: Captain Ross and First Lieutenant McDonald were dinner guests at the Little White House this evening. 2145: The President and party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof. The 2100 meeting was delayed until 2200 to permit the various delegations more time to complete drafts of the communiqué to be considered at tonight’s meeting of the conference. The President and Secretary Byrnes arrived at Cecilienhof at 2155 and devoted the next 30 minutes to the study of our proposed draft of the conference communiqué. 62 2230: The thirteenth meeting of the Berlin Conference convened. 63 This session was devoted almost entirely to the study of, and approval of, the final tripartite communiqué. The communiqué was agreed on shortly after midnight. Release time was agreed for 1730 (local time) tomorrow in Washington and concurrently in London and Moscow. A copy of the communiqué is appended hereto. 64 At 0030 (August 2nd, 1945) the Berlin Conference formally adjourned. The delegates spent the next few minutes saying goodbyes. The President and his party then, at 0040, left the Palace to return to the Little White House. Thursday, August 2nd: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President and his party left the Little White House at 0715 by motor car for Gatow Airfield. We arrived at the airfield at 0740. All hands immediately embarked in their respective planes. Ambassador Harriman and General Parks were among those on hand to see the President off. By special request of the President, no honors were rendered him at the airport. At 0755 Plane No. 2 (a C–54, Major Jesse Hayes pilot) departed for St. Mawgan Airport in Southwest England. The principal passenger was Secretary Byrnes. With him were: Mr. Ross, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Russell, Mr. Brown, Lt-Colonel McIntire, Major Mitchell, Lt. Elsey, Lt. Edelstein, Captain Graham, Lt. Rigdon, CWO Stoner, CWO Caldwell, Sgt. Philler, Agents Holmes, Haman, Campion, Waters, Spicer, Kearney and Gilliam, and Mr. Romagna. Plane No. 1 (a C–54, Lt-Col. H. T. Myers pilot) departed Gatow at 0805 for St. Mawgan. Passengers were: The President, Admiral Leahy, Judge Rosenman, General Vaughan, Captain McMahon, Mr. Maloney, Mr. Drescher and Mr. Hipsley. 0815: Plane No. 3 (C–54) with all other members of our party departed Gatow for England. Lieut. McCarthy returned to Plymouth with us in this plane. Our route from Gatow was via Magdeburg, Kassel, Brussels, Cape Gris Nez, Newhaven, over the Isle of Wight and Portland.… Our plans to land at St. Mawgan, where an official welcoming committee (including Ambassador Winant and Admirals Stark and McCann and General Lee and British civic officials) awaited us, were thwarted by the weather. When our planes were over Harrowbeer—about 10 miles outside Plymouth—we received word that the airport at St. Mawgan was closed at the moment because of fog. Observing that Harrowbeer was clear, the President decided to take no chance on the weather and instructed his pilot to set his plane down there. Plane No. 1 landed at Harrowbeer at 0940. Planes No. 2 and No. 3 followed in shortly afterwards in that order. (Distance traveled, Berlin to Harrowbeer, approximately 800 miles.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transportation was soon assembled and the President left Harrowbeer at approximately 1020 for the drive to Plymouth.… The President arrived at Mill Dock, Plymouth, at 1105. He was met here by Admiral Sir John [ Ralph ] Leatham, Commander in Chief, Plymouth. The President, Secretary Byrnes, Admiral Leahy and Admiral Leatham embarked in Admiral Leatham’s barge and left immediately for the Augusta , then at anchor in Plymouth Roads. They arrived on board the Augusta at 1120. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . At 1131 Ambassador Winant, Admiral Stark, General Lee and Admiral McCann arrived on board the Augusta and called on the President. They had been at St. Mawgan awaiting us, but on learning of the President’s landing at Harrowbeer, had hurried on to Plymouth. The British battle cruiser Renown and the U. S. S. Philadelphia were at anchor in Plymouth Roads with the Augusta . King George VI was in the Renown . He had come down from London by train this forenoon especially to welcome the President to England. At 1235 the President, Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy left the Augusta for the Renown to call upon the King. They lunched with the King on board the Renown . Other guests were Lord [ Sir Alan ] Lascelles, Viscount [ the Earl of ] Halifax, Admiral Leatham and Captain Campbell.… 1400: Lieut. McCarthy was dispatched to Washington via air with White House mail. At 1504, King George VI, accompanied by the Earl of Halifax, Sir Alan Lascelles, Admiral Leatham and Captain Campbell, came on board the Augusta to call on the President.… The King was greeted on the quarterdeck by the President, Secretary Byrnes, Admiral Leahy and Captain Foskett. He inspected the Marine Guard and made a brief tour of inspection of personnel on the weather decks forward. The party then retired to the President’s cabin. The visit concluded, the King and his party left the ship at 1534, at which time full honors were again rendered. After the King had left the Augusta the British White Ensign was hauled down. The Augusta got underway at 1549 and stood out of the harbor. The Philadelphia got underway at 1555 and followed in column astern.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President met with the members of the press (White House Correspondents Smith, Nixon, Vacarro and Beatty) shortly after our clearing the harbor and discussed the conference with them. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Friday, August 3rd: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President received the members of the press during the afternoon. He saw them frequently during the return voyage although he held no official press conferences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Saturday, August 4th: The President was up at 0500 this morning and spent some time strolling about decks. He appeared completely rested from the strain of the long and tiring conference discussions. He had breakfast early and spent most of the forenoon studying conference reports and working on the address he planned to deliver on his return to the United States. 65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President spent the afternoon working on his mail and his forthcoming speech and studying conference reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sunday, August 5th: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President spent most of the afternoon poring over voluminous conference reports and working on his report to be delivered to the nation on his return to Washington. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Monday, August 6th: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President and members of his party spent some time on deck this morning enjoying the sun and listening to a band concert by the ship’s band. Afterwards, the President worked on his address to the Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The President received the first news of the successful bombing of Japan with the newest and most powerful weapon ever invented by man, the atomic bomb, while he was eating lunch with the crew today. A few minutes before 1200, Captain Graham carried him a brief message from the Navy Department informing him that the Japanese port of Hiroshima had been bombed a few hours before, under perfect weather conditions and with no opposition. The results of the bombing were reported to be even more successful than previous tests of the new weapon had led us to hope for.… A few minutes later, the ship’s radio began to carry news bulletins from Washington about the atomic bomb, and radio stations throughout the United States broadcast a statement by the President which he had approved just before leaving Germany. 66 A draft of this statement had been sent to Babelsberg by special courier by Secretary Stimson. 67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tuesday, August 7th: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Augusta moored to Pier No. 6, Army Embarkation Dock, Newport News, Va., at 1654, completing a record run from Europe. The task force averaged 26.5 knots from the point of departure off Plymouth to buoy XS, off the Chesapeake Bay. (Distance, Plymouth to Newport News, 3,230 miles.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. John Snyder, Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, Rear Admiral D. M. LeBreton, Admiral McCann, and Brigadier General Kilpatrick came aboard the Augusta , as soon as we had tied up, to call on the President. Baggage and equipment had been transferred to the train by 1728. The President left the ship then and boarded the special train which was parked on the pier. Just two minutes after the President had left the ship (at 1730), the Augusta got underway from Pier No. 6 for the Naval Operating Base, Norfolk. At 1740 the special train departed Newport News for Washington. Mr. Snyder joined the party for the return trip to Washington. After a quick run, we arrived in Washington at the Bureau of Engraving Station, at 2245. The President and party disembarked at once and proceeded to the White House by automobile. The President found a number of members of his Cabinet on hand to greet him and welcome him back home. Summary of distance traveled: Miles Washington to Newport News and return 384 Newport News to Antwerp 3837 Antwerp to Berlin 495 Berlin to Frankfurt and return 600 Berlin to Plymouth 800 Plymouth to Newport News  3230 Total 9346 1 See vol. i , documents No. 214 . 2 The information in parentheses is apparently a map coordinate. 3 See vol. i , documents Nos. 88 and 89 . 4 No record has been found of the discussion that took place during this dinner meeting. 5 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting. 5 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting. 6 Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see post , p. 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] . 7 Cf. the minutes of the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the morning of July 18, post , p. 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . 8 Stimson called on Truman shortly after 7:30 p.m. Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see document No. 1303, footnote 2 . 9 No record has been found of the discussion that took place during this dinner meeting. 10 In a conference which Department of State historians had on January 24, 1956, with Truman and members of his staff, the information was supplied that the “urgent message” referred to at this point in the Log was not of an official character. 11 Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see post , pp. 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 1582 [ Pg. 1582 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] and Doc. 1418 ] . 12 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at these meetings. 13 For the minutes of the First Plenary Meeting, see post , p. 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . 14 No record has been found of the discussion that took place during this dinner meeting other than the extract from Stimson’s diary entry of July 17 quoted post , p. 43, footnote 3 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] . 15 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at the meeting or meetings referred to other than the extract from Stimson’s diary entry of July 18 quoted in footnote 2 to document No. 1304 . 16 Concerning the discussion that took place during this luncheon meeting, see post , p. 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] . 17 Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see post , pp. 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 1587 [ Pg. 1587 includes portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] . 18 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] . 19 No record has been found of the discussion that took place during this dinner meeting. 20 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting. 21 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 22 No record has been found of the discussion that took place during this dinner meeting, except for the fragmentary information cited post , p. 137, footnote 2 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] . 23 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting or during the luncheon which followed. 24 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] . 25 No record has been found of the discussion that took place during this dinner meeting. 25a Stimson called on Truman at 3:30 p.m. Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see document No. 1157, footnote 1 ; document No. 1305, footnote 1 . 26 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting. 27 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . 28 No record has been found of the discussion that took place during this dinner meeting. 28a Stimson had called on Truman at 9:20 a.m. Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see document No. 1157, footnote 1 ; document No. 1310, footnote 3 . 29 Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see post , p. 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] . 30 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 31 Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see post , p. 1266, footnote 6 [ Pg. 1266 is part of Doc. 1236 ] . 32 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 33 Concerning the conversation that took place during this dinner meeting, see post , p. 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] . 34 Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting—which, according to Stimson’s diary entry, bes;an at 9:20 rather than 10:20—see post , p. 1267, footnote 6 (to document No. 1236) [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] ; p. 1324, footnote 3 [ Pg. 1324 is part of Doc. 1275 ] ; p. 1373, footnote 2 [ Pg. 1373 is part of Doc. 1310 ] . 35 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting. 36 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] . 37 Document No. 1381 . 38 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] . 39 The Polish delegation which called on Truman included President Bierut, Vice President Grabski, Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski, Deputy Prime Ministers Mikołajczyk and Gomułka, Foreign Minister Rzymowski, Deputy Foreign Minister Modzelewski, and Marshal Rola-Zymierski. 40 For the record of this meeting, see post , p. 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] . 41 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . 42 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting or at Truman’s meeting with Marshall which followed. 43 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] . 44 No record has been found of the discussion that took place during this dinner meeting. 45 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting. 46 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting. 47 Document No. 1382 . 48 Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), p. 420. 46 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting. 49 Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see ibid. , p. 420. 50 Concerning Forrestal’s conversation with Truman, see Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), p. 78. 51 Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see post , p. 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] . 52 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] . 53 Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; ratification advised by the Senate, July 28, 1945 (Department of State, Treaty Series No. 993, 59 Stat. (2) 1031). 54 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] . 55 Concerning the discussion that took place at this meeting, see post , p. 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] . 56 See Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries , p. 81. 57 Stalin had suggested that Molotov might replace him at the plenary meetings (see post , p. 471, footnote 2 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] ), but plenary meetings were not resumed until Stalin was able to attend on July 31. 58 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] . 59 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting. 59 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting. 59 No record has been found of the discussion that took place at this meeting. 60 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 61 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] . 62 See the attachment to document No. 1380 . 63 For the minutes of this meeting, see post , p. 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 64 See document No. 1384 . 65 See Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 208. 66 Document No. 1315 . 67 See document No. 1313 . VI. Minutes and Other Records of Conference Proceedings VI. Minutes and Other Records of Conference Proceedings Contents Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)]) Truman–Churchill meeting, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)]) Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)]) Truman–Stalin meeting, noon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)]) Stimson–Churchill conversation, early afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)]) First plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)]) Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)]) First meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)]) Truman–Churchill luncheon meeting, about 1:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)]) Byrnes–Eden luncheon meeting, about 1:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)]) Truman–Stalin meeting, 3:04 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)]) Second plenary meeting, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)]) Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)]) Second meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)]) First meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)]) Stimson–Cherwell conversation, noon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)]) Stimson–Alexander conversation, early afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)]) Third plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)]) Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)]) Mosely–Vyshinsky conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)]) Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)]) Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, 10:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)]) Byrnes–Gromyko conversation, morning (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)]) Third meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)]) Byrnes–Churchill luncheon meeting, early afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)]) Land–Leathers conversation, 3 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)]) Informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 3:45 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)]) Fourth plenary meeting, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)]) Truman–Churchill conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)]) Truman–Stalin conversation, about 6:45 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)]) Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)]) Fourth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)]) Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12:15 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)]) Stimson–Churchill conversation, about 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)]) Fifth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)]) Tripartite dinner meeting, about 8:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)]) Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)]) Stimson–Churchill conversation, 10:40 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)]) Fifth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)]) Truman–Churchill meeting, 12:15 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)]) Sixth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)]) First meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)]) Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)]) Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 10:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)]) Byrnes–Eden conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)]) Byrnes–Churchill conversation, morning (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)]) Sixth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)]) Morse–Weston conversation, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)]) Informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)]) Land–Leathers conversation, 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)]) Seventh plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)]) Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)]) Mosely-Gusev conversation, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)]) Tuesday, July 24, 1945 Seventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:15 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)]) Leahy-Churchill conversation, morning (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Truman and Churchill, 11:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)]) Tripartite military meeting, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)]) Byrnes–Eden–Molotov luncheon meeting; Byrnes–Molotov meeting immediately thereafter, 3:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)]) Truman–Bierut conversation, 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)]) Eighth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 5:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)]) Morse–Weston conversation, afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)]) Truman–Stalin conversation, 7:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)]) Byrnes conversation with members of the Polish Delegation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)]) Morse–Weston conversation, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)]) Second meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)]) Truman–Mountbatten conversation, 9:20 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)]) Truman–Stalin conversation, about 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)]) Ninth plenary meeting, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)]) Dunn–Harriman–Mikołajczyk conversation, 11 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)]) Stimson–Stalin conversation, 12:25 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)]) Eighth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 12:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)]) Clayton–Mikolajczyk conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)]) Mosely–Strang and Mosely–Gusev conversations (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)]) Conversation concerning the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)]) Meeting of the United States and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)]) Third meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)]) Harriman–Grabski conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)]) First meeting of the Protocol Subcommittee (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)]) Conversations among United States officials regarding war criminals, 9 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)]) Ninth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)]) Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 6 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)]) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)]) Clayton–Mikolajczyk conversation, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)]) Truman–Attlee meeting, 9:15 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)]) Tenth plenary meeting, 10:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)]) Truman–Molotov meeting, noon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)]) Truman–Attlee meeting, 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)]) Forrestal–Bevin conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)]) Despres–Minc conversation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)]) Conversation between members of the United States and Polish Delegations (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)]) Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)]) Tenth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)]) Lane–Modzelewski conversation, 6 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)]) Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)]) Byrnes–Attlee meeting [?] (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)]) Mosely–Ward and Mosely–Gusev conversations (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#145)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#145)]) Truman–Rowan conversation, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)]) Meeting of the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine, 10:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)]) Byrnes-Molotov conversation, morning or early afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)]) Eleventh plenary meeting, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)]) Harriman conversation with members of the Polish Delegation, afternoon or early evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)]) Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)]) Truman–Bierut conversation, 10 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)]) Eleventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:25 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)]) Harriman–Mikołajczyk conversation, 12:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)]) Twelfth plenary meeting, 4 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)]) Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)]) Thirteenth plenary meeting, 10:40 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)]) Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. 1 1 J. C. S. 195th Meeting. The meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the first formal meeting of that organization, which took place in Washington on February 9, 1942. The 195th Meeting was the first held in connection with the Berlin Conference. Present Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill General Somervell Captain Stroop Lieutenant General Hull. Captain Oster Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Stone Major General Gross Colonel Cary 2 Major General Norstad Lieutenant Colonel Woodward Brigadier General Cabell Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore 2 Present for the consideration of cells 3 to 12 only. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)]] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 16, 1945, 10 a.m. J. C. S. Files Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 16, 1945, 10 a.m. [Extracts] top secret 1. Plan of Joint Chiefs of Staff for “Terminal” Meetings (J. C. S. 1422 and Memorandum by the Secretaries 3 ) Admiral Leahy said that J. C. S. 1422 expressed the idea that the Russians should bring up the subjects they wish to discuss and that they should take the initiative in the conversations with the United States Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall said that there were some subjects which we might wish to bring up also and that it was his understanding that we were not restricted to subjects proposed by the Russians. In reply to a question by General Marshall, Admiral King said that we should not commit ourselves to completing work with the British before undertaking our discussions with the Russians. Admiral Leahy suggested that the Secretaries inform the British Secretaries that it would be necessary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet with the Russians at the convenience of the latter and that this might interfere with meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved: a . The arrangements and attendance for conference meetings recommended by the Secretaries. b . The memorandum for the President in the Enclosure to J. C. S. 1422. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Proposed Agreement Affecting the Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in Far Eastern Operations (J. C. S. 1013/7 and 1013/8 5 ) Admiral Leahy read the recommendations in the subject papers and said that he considered it wise to get the Combined Chiefs of Staff reaction in regard to the employment of the French troops. General Marshall stated that the French had offered the troops to the United States for use in the Pacific and expressed the view that if this question was discussed with the British, the question of over-all command might arise. Admiral Leahy said, in connection with the use of the French troops in Indo-China, that that area was considered under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. General Marshall said that the use of the French troops involved the question of shipping and the quality of the troops. In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, he stated that the troops were armed but additional equipment would have to be supplied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandums in Enclosures “A” and “B” of J. C. S. 1013/7 and agreed that the memorandum for the Chief of the French Military Mission to the United States 6 should be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for comment or concurrence before any further action on J. C. S. 1013/7. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 895. 7 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. Chairmanship of Conference Meetings General Marshall brought up the question as to who would preside at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings in view of the fact that neither U. S. nor British members were in their home territory. Admiral Leahy stated that he might not always be able to be present and might have to leave before a meeting was finished. He suggested that if he were not present that Field Marshal Brooke should be asked to preside. General Marshall suggested that the British and United States Chiefs should alternate in presiding. Admiral King’s view was that when Admiral Leahy was not present Field Marshal Brooke should preside. Admiral Leahy expressed the view that the British and U. S. members should alternate in presiding. He thought that in meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Russian Chiefs of Staff the Russians should be asked to preside and that in tripartite meetings the Chiefs of Staff of the three nations should preside in turn. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Agreed: a . To propose that for meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Terminal , the British Chiefs of Staff and the United States Chiefs of Staff should preside alternately. b . To invite the Soviet Chiefs of Staff to preside at any meetings with the United States Chiefs of Staff at Terminal . c . To propose that, for tripartite meetings at Terminal , the chiefs of staff of each participating nation preside in turn. 11. Interpretation of the Presidential Policy on Lend-Lease Admiral Leahy said that he had discussed with the President the recent policy established in regard to Lend-Lease 8 since he had been informed that it was impossible to provide British and French forces employed in the occupation of Germany under the terms of the President’s policy. The President stated that there was no objection to using Lend-Lease for the redistribution of forces to the zones of occupation. He had tried to get the President to interpret his directive to cover this movement but the President had not desired to do this formally since a paper had been presented by the civilian agencies concerning the use of Lend-Lease for “proportional reconversion” by the British. 9 The President had declined to approve this paper. He had said, however, that there was no objection to the use of Lend-Lease for the redistribution of forces to the zones of occupation. General Marshall said that the question was not only that of redistribution to the zones of occupation but involved also the use of French and British service units for the redeployment to Japan. General Somervell said this would continue for general items until 1 September and for petrol, oil and lubricants until 1 October. He said that General Eisenhower was attempting to get the French to provide for themselves by 1 August by loan or credit in place of Lend-Lease. Admiral Leahy said that the idea of the President in establishing the Lend-Lease policy was to prevent the provision of arms and ammunition through Lend-Lease unless such equipment was to be used for the war against Japan. Admiral King suggested that Admiral Leahy take up with the President as soon as possible the question of Lend-Lease to Russia. Admiral Leahy said that the question of Lend-Lease to Russia was involved with the date that Russia might enter the war against Japan and that the date might not be determined at this conference since it might depend upon agreement between Russia and China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Took note that Admiral Leahy would consider the memorandum on this subject presented to him by General Marshall, 10 with a view to presenting to the President the memorandum contained therein. 12. Relations of the United States Chiefs of Staff With the Chiefs of Staff of Nations Participating in the War Against Japan General Marshall brought up the question of the command relationship in the Pacific as regards the British 11 and inquired as to the views of the Joint Chiefs. Admiral King stated that there should be no change in status in regard to the Pacific Theater, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should control all operational matters in that area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Neither printed. 4 Document No. 1275 , post . 5 Neither printed. Cf. document No. 1288 , post . 6 Major General Auguste Brossin de Saint-Didier. 7 Document No. 1288 , post . 8 See vol. i , document No. 542 . 9 Not printed. 10 Not printed. For Truman’s “memorandum directive” of July 29 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see the enclosure to document No. 1185 , post . 11 See vol. i , document No. 604 . Truman–Churchill meeting, 11 a.m. Truman–Churchill meeting, 11 a.m. 1 1 The meeting was held at Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg. Information as to time and participants from the Log ( ante , p. 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] ). Commander C. R. Thompson and Junior Commander Mary Churchill also accompanied Churchill on this call, but were apparently not included in the two-hour conversation mentioned in the Log ( ante , p. 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] ). Present United States United Kingdom President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Sir Alexander Cadogan [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Truman characterizes it as a “social visit” and summarizes it as follows (Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions (volume I of Memoirs by Harry S. Truman , Garden City, 1955), page 340): “No business of the conference was discussed. I did tell the Prime Minister that I had an agenda [cf. document No. 214, printed in volume I ] which I would like to present at the meeting and asked him if he had one. He said, ‘No, I don’t need one.’ Then we talked briefly about the latest news in the Pacific.” Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. 1 1 C. C. S. 193d Meeting. The meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the establishment of that organization, which held its first meeting in Washington on January 23, 1942. The 193d Meeting was the first held in connection with the Berlin Conference. Present United States United Kingdom Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham General of the Army Arnold Field Marshal Wilson General Somervell General Ismay Lieutenant General Hull Lieutenant-General Macready Vice Admiral Cooke Major-General Laycock Major General Norstad Major-General Hollis Captain McDill Captain Oster Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)]] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 16, 1945, 2:30 p.m. J. C. S. Files Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 16, 1945, 2:30 p.m. top secret 1. Program and Procedure for the Conference (C. C. S. 880/9 2 and 880/10 3 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Approved C. C. S. 880/10. 2. Estimate of the Enemy Situation (C. C. S. 643/3 4 ) Sir Alan Brooke referred to the last sentence on page 10 of the paper 5 where the survival of the institution of the Emperor was mentioned. He asked whether the United States Chiefs of Staff had given any thought to the question of the interpretation of the term “unconditional surrender.” From the military point of view it seemed to the British Chiefs of Staff that there might be some advantage in trying to explain this term to the Japanese in a manner which would ensure that the war was not unduly prolonged in outlying areas. If, for instance, an interpretation could be found and communicated to the Japanese which did not involve the dissolution of the Imperial institution, the Emperor would be in a position to order the cease-fire in outlying areas whereas, if the dynasty were destroyed, the outlying garrisons might continue to fight for many months or years. If an interpretation on these lines could be found an opportune moment to make it clear to the Japanese might be shortly after a Russian entry into the war. The United States Chiefs of Staff explained that considerable thought had been given to this subject on the political level. One suggestion was that some form of agreed ultimatum might be issued at the correct psychological moment, for example, on Russian entry into the war, the idea being to explain what the term “unconditional surrender” did not mean rather than what it did mean. Admiral Leahy suggested that as the matter was clearly a political one primarily, it would be very useful if the Prime Minister put forward to the President his views and suggestions as to how the term “unconditional surrender” might be explained to the Japanese. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— a . Took note of the estimate of the enemy situation in C. C. S. 643/3. b . Invited the British Chiefs of Staff to consider the possibility of asking the Prime Minister to raise with the President the matter of unconditional surrender of Japan. 6 3. Progress Reports on Operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia Command (C. C. S. 892 and 893 7 ) Sir Alan Brooke said that the only area not dealt with in these two reports was the China Theater. The British Chiefs of Staff would welcome a report of progress in this theater. General Marshall described certain features of the operations in the China Theater, particularly as to the effectiveness of Chinese troops when properly equipped. He further stated that a report of operations in the China Theater would be prepared and presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Took note:— a . Of the progress report on operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia Command in C. C. S. 892 and C. C. S. 893. b . That the United States Chiefs of Staff would submit later a report on operations in China. 8 4. Development of Operations in the Pacific (C. C. S. 880/4 9 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Took note of the memorandum on the development of operations in the Pacific in C. C. S. 880/4. 5. Report on Army Air Operations in the War Against Japan (C. C. S. 894 10 ) General Arnold commented in detail on certain aspects of the report. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Took note of the report on Army air operations in the war against Japan in C. C. S. 894, and of General Arnold’s explanatory remarks. 2 Document No. 220, printed in vol. i . 3 See vol. i , document No. 220, footnote 2 . 4 Not printed as a whole. Cf. footnote 5, infra . See also the first map facing p. 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , post . 5 The reference is to the italicized sentence in paragraph 3 (italics supplied) of the following extract from the conclusions of a report by the Combined Intelligence Committee as of July 8, 1945 (C. C. S. 643/3): “13. Possibility of Surrender . The Japanese ruling groups are aware of the desperate military situation and are increasingly desirous of a compromise peace, but still find unconditional surrender unacceptable. The basic policy of the present government is to fight as long and as desperately as possible in the hope of avoiding complete defeat and of acquiring a better bargaining position in a negotiated peace. Japanese leaders are now playing for time in the hope that Allied war weariness, Allied disunity, or some ‘miracle,’ will present an opportunity to arrange a compromise peace. “We believe that a considerable portion of the Japanese population now consider absolute military defeat to be probable. The increasing effects of sea blockade and cumulative devastation wrought by strategic bombing, which has already rendered millions homeless and has destroyed from 25 to 50 percent of the buildup [ sic ] area of Japan’s most important cities, should make this realization increasingly general. An entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat. Although individual Japanese willingly sacrifice themselves in the service of the nation, we doubt that the nation as a whole is predisposed toward national suicide. Rather, the Japanese as a nation have a strong concept of national survival, regardless of the fate of individuals. They would probably prefer national survival, even through surrender, to virtual extinction. “The Japanese believe, however, that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction. There are as yet no indications that the Japanese are ready to accept such terms. The ideas of foreign occupation of the Japanese homeland, foreign custody of the person of the Emperor, and the loss of prestige entailed by the acceptance of ‘unconditional surrender’ are most revolting to the Japanese. To avoid these conditions, if possible, and, in any event, to insure survival of the institution of the Emperor, the Japanese might well be willing to withdraw from all the territory they have seized on the Asiatic continent and in the southern Pacific, and even to agree to the independence of Korea and to the practical disarmament of their military forces . “A conditional surrender by the Japanese Government along the lines stated above might be offered by them at any time from now until the time of the complete destruction of all Japanese power of resistance. “Since the Japanese Army is the principal repository of the Japanese military tradition it follows that the army leaders must, with a sufficient degree of unanimity, acknowledge defeat before Japan can be induced to surrender. This might be brought about either by the defeat of the main Japanese armies in the Inner Zone or through a desire on the part of the army leaders to salvage something from the wreck with a view to maintaining military tradition. For a surrender to be acceptable to the Japanese Army, it would be necessary for the military leaders to believe that it would not entail discrediting [the] warrior tradition and that it would permit the ultimate resurgence of a military Japan.” The above passage is printed from “The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941–1945” (Washington, Department of Defense, processed, 1955), pp. 87–88. For the conclusions of the Combined Intelligence Committee with respect to the probable Japanese military and political strategy, see ibid. , pp. 85–87. Further extracts from the Committee’s report are printed in John Ehrman, Grand Strategy , vol. vi (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 280–283. 6 For the text of a minute on this question which Ismay submitted to Churchill on July 17, see Ehrman, Grand Strategy , vol. vi , p. 291. Churchill discussed the subject of unconditional surrender with Truman on July 18. See post , p. 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] . 7 C. C. S. 892 is not printed. C. C. S. 893 is not printed as a whole, but is summarized briefly in Ehrman, Grand Strategy , vol. vi , pp. 258–259. For appendix A to C. C. S. 893, see the map facing p. 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , post . 8 Not printed as a whole. For appendix D to the paper submitted, see the second map facing p. 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , post . 9 Document No. 599, printed in vol. i . 10 Not printed. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. 1 1 J. C. S. 196th Meeting. Present Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill General Somervell Captain Stroop Lieutenant General Hull. Captain Oster Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Stone Major General Gross Colonel Donnelly Major General Norstad Lieutenant Colonel Woodward Brigadier General Cabell Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)]] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 10 a.m. J. C. S. Files Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 10 a.m. [Extracts] top secret 1. Military Aspects of Unconditional Surrender Formula for Japan (J. C. S. 1275/5 2 ) Admiral Leahy stated that the Joint Strategic Survey Committee recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the memorandum which had been prepared by the State, War, and Navy Departments, 3 but suggested a change in the next to the last paragraph. He said that this matter had been considered on a political level and consideration had been given to the removal of the sentence in question. It was Admiral Leahy’s view that it was suitable for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to comment upon the paper from a military point of view and he asked for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the military features of the proposed draft. General Marshall stated that from a purely military point of view he considered that the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be that nothing should be done prior to the termination of hostilities that would indicate the removal of the Emperor of Japan, since his continuation in office might influence the cessation of hostilities in areas outside of Japan proper. General Marshall proposed that paragraph 3 of the report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee be used as the basis for the draft of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President which would express the military implications and would include the proposed changes in the draft of the statement prepared by the State, War, and Navy Departments. The memorandum to the President should also include the views he had previously expressed in regard to doing nothing to indicate that the Emperor might be removed from office upon unconditional surrender. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Directed the Secretary to prepare for consideration a suitable memorandum for the President in the light of the discussion. 4 2. Retention of United States Forces in Italy (J. C. S. 1411/1 5 ) Admiral Leahy asked what the President might do with the memorandum which it was proposed to send to him in regard to the retention of U. S. forces in Italy. General Marshall said that since the Secretary of State had cautioned the President that this matter might be brought up by the Prime Minister, 6 he believed that the President should give the memorandum to the Secretary of State. General Marshall also said that the Prime Minister had approached him on this subject of the retention of U. S. forces in Italy in a conversation on the preceding night. 6a The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum for the President in the enclosure to J. C. S. 1411/1, subject to the amendments proposed by General Marshall. 7 3. British Participation in the War Against Japan (C. C. S. 889; 8 J. C. S. 1424 9 ) Admiral Leahy explained the relationship of the two papers under consideration. General Marshall referred to the comment of General MacArthur on the employment of Commonwealth forces in Coronet and furnished Admiral Leahy with a copy of the dispatch containing the comment referred to. 10 General Arnold , in connection with this paper, asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the small contribution of aircraft by the British would add little to the effectiveness of air operations in the Pacific area and would complicate the problems of operation and support. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to J. C. S. 1424 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 889/1. 11 ) 4. Command and Control in the War Against Japan (C. C. S. 890, 12 J. C. S. 1407/2 and J. C. S. 1407/3 13 ) General Marshall said that he desired to make clear the difference in viewpoint of the British and U. S. Chiefs of Staff in regard to command and control in the war against Japan. He said that our insistence on retaining the present command relationship in the Pacific area might induce the British to ask for the same authority over the Southeast Asia Theater. He said we should offer no objections to a British proposal of this nature. Admiral Gardner pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should control the coordination of effort in the U. S. and British areas particularly in regard to timing. In this connection, Admiral Leahy said we should not refuse to consider any suggestions by the British Chiefs of Staff in regard to the problems of coordination and timing. The proposed draft memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and minor amendments were made thereto. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to J. C. S. 1407/3 as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 890/1. 14 ) 5. United States Policy Concerning the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal (J. C. S. 1418/1 15 ) Admiral Leahy said that the President had not given any consideration to this matter as yet. Admiral King read a digest of the report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, indicating the differences in points of view of the Army members and the Navy member. Admiral Leahy said that the attitude of the State Department was to agree with the views of Admiral Willson to the effect that the Dardanelles should be a free waterway without defenses by either Turkey or Russia. He said that although there had not been much discussion of the Kiel Canal, the general view of the State Department was that it should be open to all nations. Admiral Leahy asked if it was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that free passage of the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal would meet military requirements. Admiral King pointed out that the Cattegat was in the same status as the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal, since it was a waterway through both Danish and Swedish territorial waters. He thought therefore that the free passage of the Cattegat should be taken up at the same time. Admiral Leahy expressed the view that the fortifying of the Cattegat by the Danes or the Swedes on the ground of national defense could not be prevented. He said that the difficulty in regard to the Dardanelles would be that Russia would want to fortify it. Admiral King expressed the view that there was a good argument for demilitarizing the Dardanelles, Kiel Canal and the Cattegat, to which Admiral Leahy replied that there was also a good argument for demilitarizing the Panama Canal. General Marshall proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff accept Admiral Willson’s paper. The draft of Admiral Willson’s paper was discussed and minor amendments made thereto. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the reply to the Secretary of State in Appendix “A” to Enclosure “B” of J. C. S. 1418/1, as amended during discussion. 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Not printed. 3 See vol. i , document No. 592 , enclosure 2. 4 See post , p. 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] . 5 Not printed. 6 See vol. i , document No. 473 . 6a Marshall had been Churchill’s dinner guest on the evening of July 16 (see London Times , July 18, 1945, p. 4). No record has been found of the conversation on this occasion other than this reference in the minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 7 For the memorandum as approved, see document No. 1108 , post . 8 Document No. 615, printed in vol. i . 9 Not printed. 10 See document No. 1284 , post . 11 Document No. 1283 , post . 12 Document No. 604, printed in vol. i . 13 Neither printed. 14 Document No. 1267 , post . 15 Not printed. 16 For the memorandum as approved, see documents Nos. 751 and 1363 , post . Truman–Stalin meeting, noon Truman–Stalin meeting, noon 1 1 The meeting was held at Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg. Stalin and his party called on Truman at noon and stayed for luncheon. Information as to time and participants other than Vyshinsky from the Log ( ante , p. 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] ). Vyshinsky’s presence is mentioned in a diary entry by Truman dated July 19, printed in William Hillman, Mr. President: The First Publication From the Personal Diaries, Private Letters, Papers and Revealing Interviews of Harry S. Truman (New York, 1952), p. 123. Present United States Soviet Union President Truman Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Bohlen Mr. Pavlov Fleet Admiral Leahy 2 Mr. Vyshinsky 2 Leahy apparently joined the meeting when luncheon was served. See Leahy, I Was There , pp. 396–397. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)]] Bohlen Notes 12. July 17. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745 [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)]] The Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) [Babelsberg,] July 17, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745 Bohlen Notes 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] Bohlen Notes 3 12. July 17. M. S. 4 late. Truman —[blank] S—Chinese—delayed fly—no doctors Tr : glad to—looking forw— S—Personal relationship Truman no difficulty in agreeing— S—added—questions T—no. M 5 —reads—some already on agenda—i e 1 division on German fleet. 2 Reparations. 3 Polish Question—continued of continued—Art 6 —London Govt—western frontiers of Poland—(on list) S—Yalta—did not decide frontiers of 7 M—trusteeships for USSR. S—no question of changing regime of trusteeship—settled S. F. 8 — but maybe stupid—division of Italian colonies—other nationals—roughly [one word illegible] M—relations with Axis satellite— T—on ours M—Spain Franco regime T—ready— B 9 —trusteeship—other than Italian M—yes— S—Italian & other colonies. T—what time S—5 proposed—M & Eden B—I know habits of rise late—getting—opportunity T 5 today—4—after that S—I have changed my habits since B—[blank] T—Gen Marshall like your Chiefs—they ready to discuss—Antonov—Air Marshal. 10 T—Chiefs of staff—no. S—ours in Berlin could not attend. Re Franco—I should like to explain—F. regime not result of internal conditions of Spain—imposed on Spain—by Ger—Italian—thus a danger to Uni. Nations This regime harmful—by giving shelter to different fascist remnants—we thought it proper to break off with present regime & give change T—I hold no brief for Franco study S—right. T—I would like—certain matters—first to US—take into consider—orderly—way—but—reasons T—pleasure to meet for am 11 —your present—welfare Soviet reps—& U J I am here to—be yr friend—deal directly yes—or no—no diplomat S—good—help—work—USSR—always go along with US. T—Byrnes. B—[blank] T—friends—all subject differences settle—frankly S—good of course difference—but. T Churchill—called— S [one word illegible] B—[blank] S—I think so—Labor—surprise T—expressed same 2 to 1 80 majority S—yes—people won’t throw out W Ch 12 —self Preservation T—yes—1944 R 13 S—clever—Eng less clear Jap war—for—Russians & Amer—do their duty Eng think war mainly T—P. M 14 offered— S—peculiar—mentality—bombed by Ger—not Japan war over for them—these feelings may work vs 15 P. M. US people—give power to finish task—can Brit ask that—they believe war over—little interest in war vs Japan—may be T—we are—not in dire straits as Eng was in re Germany— S—we ready Aug mid of Aug needs agreement with China [one word illegible] T—I think that S—O M 16 agreed—long negations 17 —R. R. Dairen. P. A 18 —differences. Soong—not hopeful by cable—I noticed S understood us than Chungking 19 T—yes—I had long talk 20 He understands S—he prepared to return to Chungking—& persuade return end of July—He asked a statement assurance 21 re M 22 —part of China—sovereignty—gave that assurance S—asked assurances deal only with central govt & not with any nucleus. one Army—he had in mind Com army we shall give full assurances T—very happy to hear that—settle matter S—National 1 govt 1 army Treaty agreed—not. Ch 30 in place of 20 as Czech. 23 agree—non-interference Ch internal affairs Soong—Sinkiang—Conflict—Ch author. & local pop—no assistance to rebels—[one word illegible]—special provisions—vs. interference could not do it help—suggested concession—Ch [one word and figure illegible] %—rest non Chinese local native schools set up. Soong agreed—won’t be able to calm by stick—improvements—Soong agreed. T Soong—reasonable. B—pts of difference—failure on—misunderstanding. S—in Yalta agreement 24 said—re RR. joint preeminent interests. be safeguard—same in Dairen & P. A. The Chinese don’t recognize preeminent int & get around it—what is our preeminent interests—no profits—equally divided—altho built by Russian money—no guards as Japs had—Chinese protect RR themselves—old treaty 25 80 yrs—back to China we suggest 30 yrs—agreed satisfaction—but what preem int lie—like to 1 maj 26 vote on board of RR—Russian director they want Chinese director—& no maj—Dairen Chinese administration B—jt administration S—yes—but 1 Chinese maj—we propose—City Council—jt—board. Russian part T—effect on our right— S—free port—open—[one word illegible]. T—open door S—not all smooth with Chinese—that is why he went home S—mid August—as agreed at Yalta—we keep word M keep words T B—in accordance—with Yalta—OK—if in excess difficult S—our wishes—more liberal than Yalta—restoration of Russian rights—entitled to station troops—80 yrs exclusively Russian—we have formal right—not done so we do not wish to add or deceive Chungking don’t understand horse trading—slow. try to wangle every thing—big pictures—very T—big—Chin B— main interest free port T— B—when here from Soong S—end July—to finish negotiation—Chinese 22 years no ties—no repre—can’t lose what one does not have. 3 Transcribed for this volume from longhand notes in pencil. In interviews with Department of State historians on July 11, 1955, January 25, 1960, and February 8, 1960, Bohlen expressed certainty (since at earlier conferences of Heads of Government it had been his practice, without exception, to transcribe his notes into minutes or memoranda of conversation) that he transcribed these notes into a memorandum of conversation shortly after the meeting took place. Because of Stalin’s reference to the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, it is possible that such a memorandum would have been given special security handling, but a search of the Department’s various file collections and of the Truman and Byrnes Papers has failed to bring such a memorandum to light. A literal transcription of the original notes is therefore printed here. For a fuller reconstruction of the first Truman–Stalin conversation, prepared by Bohlen in March 1960 on the basis of these notes and from memory, see document No. 1418 , post . For other accounts of this meeting, see Hillman, Mr. President , p. 123; Truman, Year of Decisions , pp. 341–342; Leahy, I Was There , pp. 396–397; James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), pp. 68, 205; James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York, 1958), pp. 290–291. Byrnes’ second account (i. e., the account printed in All in One Lifetime ) erroneously ascribes to this meeting one subject—a peace feeler from Japan—actually discussed by Truman and Stalin on the following day, July 18. See post , p. 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] . Both Byrnes and Leahy mention the fact that Stalin discussed the death or disappearance of Hitler—a subject not mentioned in the Bohlen notes. Since Leahy apparently did not join the meeting until luncheon was served, it is probable that this subject was discussed during luncheon and that the Bohlen notes cover only the conversation before luncheon. Stimson’s diary for July 17 includes the following entry relating to the Truman–Stalin meeting of that date: “The President, however, told me briefly of his first meeting with Stalin and said he thought that he had clinched the Open Door in Manchuria.” 4 Marshal Stalin. Although Stalin had been raised to the rank of Generalissimo on June 27, he was frequently referred to at the Berlin Conference as “Marshal Stalin” or “the Marshal”. 5 Molotov. 6 Possibly an abbreviation for Arciszewski. 7 See document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 8 San Francisco; i. e., at the United Nations Conference on International Organization. Concerning the “regime of trusteeship” referred to, see chapters xi-xiii of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945 (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031). 9 Byrnes. 10 Cf. memorandum by the President, post , p. 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] . 11 Possibly an abbreviation for Americans. 12 Winston Churchill. 13 Roosevelt. 14 Prime Minister, i. e., Churchill. 15 Versus, i. e., against. 16 Outer Mongolia. 17 i. e., negotiations. 18 Port Arthur. 19 Concerning the Stalin–Soong conversations referred to, see vol. i , p. 857 . 20 See Truman, Year of Decisions , pp. 268–270. 21 The word “assurance” is an interlineation. 22 Manchuria. 23 The reference is to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Post-War Cooperation, signed at Moscow, December 12, 1943, which was to remain in force for 20 years. For text, see Department of State, Documents and State Papers , vol. i , p. 228. 24 i. e., the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, signed February 11, 1945. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984 . 25 For a description of and citations to the treaties referred to, see post , p. 1231 [ Pg. 1231 is part of Doc. 1215 ] . 26 Majority. The Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] The Assistant to the Secretary of State ( Bohlen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 17, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Dunn Molotov this morning outlined to the President and the Secretary the following additional points which the Soviet Government intends to place on the Agenda: (1) Question of Tangier[.] (2) The Levant[.] (3) The Disposition of the Captured German Naval and Merchant Vessels. (4) Franco Regime. On this point Stalin says that in the view of the Soviet Government the Franco Government was not native to Spain but had been imposed by the Axis Government[s] and as such was harmful to the United Nations. Some measure should be devised whereby the Franco Regime would be eliminated. (5) Polish Question. ( a ) The continued existence of the London Government. ( b ) The western frontiers of Poland. (6) Reparations. (7) Trusteeship for the U. S. S. R. Stalin said that this is not a question of changing the regime of trusteeship which was set up at San Francisco but the question of the division under trusteeship of Italian colonies and perhaps certain mandated areas. (8) Relationship with the Former Axis Satellite States. The Secretary would like to have you study these questions in preparation for the Soviet presentation. Charles E. Bohlen 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. Stimson–Churchill conversation, early afternoon Stimson–Churchill conversation, early afternoon Present United States United Kingdom Mr. Stimson Prime Minister Churchill Mr. Attlee Lord Leathers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. Stimson’s diary entry for July 17 contains the following summary: “I returned to Potsdam and lunched with the Prime Minister, Attlee, and Lord Leathers, … We had some talk about ships—the distribution of the German merchant marine, Europe and others. We discussed the coal situation in Great Britain and the United States—supplies of both were going to be short this winter. “As he 1 walked down to the gate I told him of Harrison’s message. 2 He had not heard from his own people about the matter. He was intensely interested and greatly cheered up, but was strongly inclined against any disclosure. 3 I argued against this to some length.” 4 1 i. e., Churchill. 2 Document No. 1303 , post . 3 Presumably this refers to any disclosure to the Soviet Union. 4 Cf. Churchill’s description of the concluding part of this conversation printed in Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (vol. vi of The Second World War ) (Boston, 1953), p. 637. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. 1 1 C. C. S. 194th Meeting. Present United States United Kingdom General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal General of the Army Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham General Somervell Field Marshal Wilson Lieutenant General Hull General Ismay Vice Admiral Cooke Lieutenant-General Macready Major General Norstad Major-General Laycock Captain McDill Major-General Hollis Captain Oster Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)]] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 17, 1945 2:30 p.m. J. C. S. Files Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 17, 1945 2:30 p.m. top secret 1. Approval of the Minutes of the C. C. S. 193 d Meeting The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the conclusions of the 193d Meeting and approved the detailed report of the meeting subject to any later minor amendments. 2. British Participation in the War Against Japan (C. C. S. 889 and 889/1 2 ) Sir Alan Brooke referred to a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff containing their views on the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff concerning British participation in the war against Japan. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff were very pleased to see that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed in principle to the participation in the final phase of the war against Japan of a British Commonwealth land force, subject to the resolution of certain operational problems with the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific, 3 and Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 4 and to the clarification of certain factors with which he then proposed to deal. Considering each of the subparagraphs of paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 889/1, Sir Alan Brooke made the following points:— a . The land forces which were being offered would not be involved in operations in Southeast Asia prior to Coronet . The force envisaged contained one Australian division which was now completing operation in Borneo; one New Zealand division which was re-forming in Italy; a British division which had been already withdrawn from the fighting in Southeast Asia, and an Indian division probably from Italy. This Indian division had operated in conjunction with Allied troops in Italy for some time and had, on one occasion, been under command of General Clark. It was considered a first-class division, and he thought that the difficulties incident to its employment and due to language complications would not prove insurmountable. The division had already been acclimatized. Sir Alan Brooke , continuing, said these forces might be used as three divisions in the initial assault with a follow-up of two divisions a good deal later on. This delay was necessitated by shipping limitations. The British Chiefs of Staff would very much like to participate in the assault as opposed to taking part only in the follow-up. The administrative factors could perhaps be discussed with General MacArthur. b . This question had been dealt with in a . above and Sir Alan Brooke hoped that it would be found possible to overcome any difficulties in this connection. c . When the question of British participation in the final assault had first been considered, the inclusion of Canadian forces had been envisaged. It had since been learned, however, that a Canadian division had been accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff, to be equipped with American equipment, with a view to operating under American command. Although the British Chiefs of Staff would like to include a Canadian element in the Empire forces, it was not desired to upset these plans and he therefore suggested that the matter might be left open to discussion. The Canadian division might be used in a follow-up role. Detailed discussions on this matter could be carried out with General MacArthur. d . It was hoped that answers would be received from the Dominions concerned in the near future. e . It was entirely agreed that the inclusion of a British force in the final phase of the war against Japan would lead to complicated logistical problems. These problems could be considered in detail with commanders on the spot. f . The question of where the forces should be concentrated prior to the operation would have to be carefully considered. The Australian division was at present well placed and it should be found possible to concentrate one or two additional divisions in a suitable area. This also could be discussed in detail with the force commanders. g . It had always been the intention of the British Chiefs of Staff to provide, from British resources, sufficient assault lift for two divisions. The provision of certain close-support craft, was, however, likely to be most difficult owing to the distances involved. h . Sir Charles Portal said that while it was realized that there would be adequate United States tactical air forces available, he very much hoped that the United States Chiefs of Staff would consider the inclusion of a small tactical air force consisting of about 15 squadrons (about 250 aircraft in all). He made this request as he felt that the Commonwealth forces would like to have supporting them some of their own tactical reconnaissance and fighter-bomber units. The forces he had in mind should not cause complications as they would be Mustangs similar to those operated by United States forces. General Arnold undertook to investigate the possibility of the inclusion of a force as indicated by Sir Charles Portal, and asked to be supplied with the necessary details to carry out this investigation. i . Sir Alan Brooke said that the effect of these proposals upon continued operations in the Southeast Asia Command would be to limit the capacity to undertake amphibious operations, as the proposals would necessitate the use of landing craft. It was proposed to submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a directive to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia, 5 for land operations across the Thailand–Burmese frontier and small amphibious operations to Sumatra and Java with the object of establishing small bridgeheads on those islands which could be developed later as the opportunity arose. The provision of shipping and assault craft was the limiting factor. Sir Alan Brooke explained further that in approaching this problem it had been the aim of the British Chiefs of Staff to produce the maximum effort against Japan, continuing meanwhile such operations in Southeast Asia Command as could be conducted without detracting from the effort against Japan. The limiting factors affecting the British proposals were the provision of shipping and administrative troops. Hence three alternative suggestions had been included in C. C. S. 889. As the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the proposals in principle, it was suggested that a force commander and his staff (of the nature of a corps commander and staff) should be appointed and sent out to discuss details with General MacArthur and to draw up concrete proposals for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall said that the dispatch of a corps commander and staff to the Pacific was acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur would be informed accordingly. General Marshall then read extracts from a dispatch from General MacArthur on the subject of the participation of a Commonwealth force in the final phase of the war against Japan. He undertook to make available to the British Chiefs of Staff suitable extracts from the dispatch. 6 General Hull said that tentative proposals had been made by the Australian Government to the United States Chiefs of Staff for the inclusion of an Australian force in the operation against Japan and for the inclusion of a small token force in Southeast Asia Command under Admiral Mountbatten. The proposal had merely expressed the desire of the Australian Government to participate in these operations and no details had as yet been discussed. Admiral King said that there were two factors concerning the employment of Australian forces with which he presumed the British Chiefs of Staff were familiar. The first was that the Australian military establishment was being reduced to approximately three divisions. The second was the question of the possible return to New Zealand of the New Zealand division concerned. Sir Alan Brooke said that while it had at one time been suggested that the New Zealand division should be returned to New Zealand, it had subsequently been agreed that the division consisting of two brigades would be available for operations in Southeast Asia Command. Arrangements had been made to send replacements to Italy and it would therefore not be necessary for the New Zealand division to return to New Zealand for rehabilitation. The views of the New Zealand Government on the present proposal had, however, not yet been received. Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff fully recognized that the participation of British troops in the final phase of the war against Japan would lead to certain complications and he expressed sincere gratitude on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff for the way in which the proposal had been received by the United States Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff welcomed the proposals and would be pleased to make room for the employment of British forces, within the limitations of shipping and logistic support. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— a . Agreed in principle to the participation of a British Commonwealth land force in the final phase of the war against Japan, subject to the satisfactory resolution of operational problems and to the clarification of certain factors which the United States Chiefs of Staff believe will be controlling. b . Agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should send out appropriate commanders and staff to visit General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz and draw up with them a plan for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. c . Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would keep the United States Chiefs of Staff informed of the reactions of the Dominions to the proposals. d . Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would take up with the appropriate theater commanders the possibility of establishing a small British tactical air force in support of the proposed Commonwealth land force. 2 Document No. 615, printed in vol. i , and document No. 1283 , post , respectively. 3 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. 4 Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. 5 Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. 6 See document No. 1284 , post . First plenary meeting, 5 p.m. First plenary meeting, 5 p.m. 1 1 This is the time given on the cover sheet of the Thompson minutes. The Log ( ante , p. 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) indicates that the meeting was called to order at 5:10 following a 10-minute period given over to an exchange of greetings and the making of motion and still pictures. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gromyko Mr. Pauley Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gusev Mr. Davies Sir William Strang Mr. Novikov Mr. Dunn Major Birse Mr. Sobolev Mr. Clayton Mr. Pavlov Mr. Cohen Mr. Matthews Mr. Bohlen Mr. Thompson 2 2 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 5 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 5 p.m. Truman Papers Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 5 p.m. top secret Premier Stalin proposed that President Truman preside over the meetings. Churchill seconded the proposal. The President accepted it and inquired if it were proper for him to propose some items for the agenda. 3 Stalin agreed. Eden asked if all members would have the power to add to the agenda. The President replied that they would. The President then took up the proposal for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers and read the document on this subject (Attachment 1 4 ). The President stated his second memorandum related to Germany. (The President did not read the proposed draft agreement in regard to Germany but handed it in for study. Attachment 2. 5 ) Churchill inquired if this meant they were not to give any consideration to these matters now. The President replied that he was merely proposing items for the agenda. Churchill proposed that the first item proposed by the President be referred to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Stalin said he agreed but he was not clear about the inclusion of China in the Council. He said he supposed that it was contemplated that the Council would discuss European problems. The President said that this could be discussed by the Foreign Ministers and then referred back to the meeting of heads of state. Churchill said it would be returned with the comments of the Foreign Ministers. Reverting to the question of the policy with regard to Germany The President said he proposed that the Control Council should commence to function immediately in accordance with the agreement which had already been entered into. 6 He said he was submitting a document containing the United States proposals on this matter. 7 Churchill said that he had only just seen this document and that he could not express any opinion. The President said he did not expect any expressions of opinion now. Stalin remarked that he also had not studied the document. Churchill said that this was such a wide subject that it was not appropriate for the Foreign Ministers but that the heads of state should study it and then discuss it. Stalin said they could take it up the next day but that it might be well to let the Foreign Ministers study it. Churchill said the Foreign Ministers would be busy enough with the other item that had been referred to them. Stalin agreed. The President then read the document on the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe 8 (Attachment 3 9 ). Before reading the United States proposal in regard to policy towards Italy 10 The President said that in view of the recent Italian declaration of war on Japan 11 he hoped that it would be possible for this meeting to agree to support Italian entry into the United Nations Organization in recognition thereof. If this was acceptable he thought that the Foreign Ministers might be instructed to prepare a suitable declaration. Churchill said that this was an important matter on which their positions were not the same. The British were attacked by Italy in 1940 at the time France was going down which was described by President Roosevelt as “a stab in the back”. The British fought the Italians for some time before the United States came in. At a most critical time we were obliged to send sorely needed troops to Africa and we fought two years on those shores until the arrival of the American forces. We also suffered very heavy Naval losses in the war with Italy in the Mediterranean. We provided 14 out of the 15 vessels which was the equivalent of the Russian share of the Italian fleet. The President proposed to read the American document on this question. Stalin intervened to suggest that the discussion be confined to the setting up of the agenda. The President agreed. Churchill said he was grateful to the President for opening up this discussion and for the positive contribution he had made in submitting his proposals which would have great advantage. He said, however, that the question must be given very careful consideration. He suggested that the President proceed to give his presentation now. Stalin agreed. The President then read the document on Italy (Attachment 4 12 ). The President said he wished to state that he appreciated the honor of having been made Chairman of the meeting. He said he had come gladly to the Conference but that he had come with some trepidation because in the United States he had had to succeed a man who could not be replaced and one who was on the friendliest terms with both the Prime Minister and Premier Stalin. He said that he hoped he would merit the same friendship. The questions he had presented were of the highest importance but he wished it understood that he could add under [ sic ] other questions and that both of the other representatives could do the same. Stalin said he agreed. Churchill said he should like to express on behalf of the British delegation his gratitude to the President for undertaking the Presidency of this momentous Conference and to thank him for presenting so clearly the views of the mighty republic which he heads. The warm and ineffaceable sentiments which they had had for President Roosevelt they would renew with the man who had come forward at this historic moment and he wished to express to him his most cordial respect. He trusted that the bonds not only between their countries but also between them personally would increase. The more they came to grips with the world’s momentous problems the closer their association would become. Stalin said that on behalf of the Russian delegation he wished to state that they fully shared the sentiments expressed by Mr. Churchill. Churchill then proposed that they go to the simple question of the agenda and either deal with items or refer them to the Foreign Ministers. The agenda was not complete but they had a program. The British, of course, wished to add the Polish problem to the agenda. The President said that he wanted the Prime Minister and Premier Stalin to add any questions to the agenda that they wished. Stalin said it would be well for the three delegations to set forth the questions they wanted discussed. The Soviet delegation wished to add the question of the division of the German merchant fleet and Navy. Some correspondence had been exchanged on this subject 13 and it was agreed that it should be discussed at this meeting. They also wished to add the question of reparations not only from Germany but also from Italy. Churchill asked what about Bulgaria and Rumania. Molotov said that was already taken care of. Stalin then proposed the question of territories to be placed under trusteeship. Churchill inquired whether Stalin was referring to areas in Europe or in general throughout the world. Stalin replied that this could be discussed. The Soviets had already mentioned 14 that they would like some territories of the defeated states. The Soviet delegation also wished to raise the question of relations with satellite states. Another question which the Soviet delegation wished to discuss was that of Franco Spain. The Spanish regime did not originate in Spain but was imported and forced on the Spanish people by Germany and Italy. It was a danger to the United Nations and he thought it would be well to create conditions which would enable the Spanish people to establish the regime they want. Churchill said they were only discussing the agenda. He agreed that this item should go on the agenda. Mr. Attlee said he would be very happy to see this item go on the agenda. Stalin said that perhaps the question of Tangier should be brought up, as well as that of Syria and Lebanon. Churchill said that Eden had pointed out to him that in the absence of the French this question could only be discussed provisionally. Stalin said it would be interesting to clarify the views held by the three powers. Stalin then added that he wished to propose a discussion of the Polish question. What they had in mind was the question of the present émigré Polish Government. Churchill said it was most necessary that the Polish question should be discussed. As a result of the discussions since Yalta sensible progress had been made. He agreed that the question should be discussed and that the winding up of the former London Polish provisional government was part of that question. He was sure that Premier Stalin and the President would realize that Britain had been the home of the Polish Government and the base from which the Polish Armies were maintained and paid. He thought their objectives were the same but the British would have a harder task than the other two powers because they would have the details to handle. They did not wish to release large numbers of soldiers in their midst without making proper provision for them. He thought they could handle this problem in a satisfactory manner. It was important to continue to carry out the Yalta agreement 15 and he, of course, attached great importance to the Polish elections in order that the will of the Polish people would be reflected. Stalin said he had no other questions to add. Churchill said they had already sent in their agenda. 16 He wished, however, to suggest that the three Foreign Secretaries meet today or tomorrow to pick out the questions which were to be discussed at the next meeting. They knew the questions and knew which were prepared for discussion but it would be well to have a definite program. The Foreign Ministers could prepare the dinner better than they could themselves. The President and Stalin had no objection. Churchill said that the broad presentation had been made and at the next meeting they would address themselves to the questions that were the most agreeable or perhaps he should say, the least disagreeable. Stalin observed that in any event they could not escape the disagreeable ones. He wished to know if they would proceed with their meeting this evening. Were there any matters they could take up before the Foreign Ministers had made their selection? The President asked if there were any suggestions. Stalin proposed that they discuss the question of the Council of Foreign Ministers and The President and Prime Minister agreed. The President said he had submitted his views and a draft proposal. Stalin said that the principles advanced by the American Delegation met with no objection on the part of the Soviet Delegation but they wished to question the inclusion of China if the Council is to deal with European problems. The President pointed out that China was one of the permanent members of the Security Council which [it] had been agreed at San Francisco to set up. Stalin said that at Yalta a decision had been taken for regular meetings of the three Foreign Ministers. 17 He wished to know if that was to be dropped now. The President said he did not understand that the arrangements relating to the three Foreign Ministers was a permanent one. Stalin replied that the arrangement was not permanent. It had been arranged that they were to meet several months later. He assumed that this was now dropped and also that the European Advisory Commission would now lapse. The President pointed out that the Council of Foreign Ministers was being set up for a definite purpose. Stalin said that they could deal with any other question. The Crimea decision should be regarded as having lapsed and in this case the European Advisory Commission would also lapse. These would be replaced by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The President said that it was satisfactory to him to interpret it in this way. Churchill said he had supposed that the three Foreign Ministers were to meet about every three months and that they would advise the three Heads of Governments on matters that are going on from day to day. He thought it was a complication, even though it might look like simplification, to bring in China. He was agreeable to China being represented and to the Foreign Ministers’ drawing up conditions of peace but day to day questions were very urgent. He questioned the advisability of bringing in from the other part of the world a country which had contributed little to the defeat of the enemy in Europe. It was easy to set up bodies that look well on paper but which do little in practice. Could not the future of Germany be decided without China? The President suggested that the question of the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers be passed over for the time being as this was another matter and they were now discussing his specific proposal. The President then read Annex I to Attachment I. 18 Stalin said they had the duty to prepare for the peace conference. The war was over in Europe and it would be for this Council to deal with the effect of this fact. The Council could also give them a hint as to the date. The President said that he agreed that the date might be fixed when we felt that it could be successfully concluded. Churchill said that there did not seem to him to be any difficulty in reconciling the objects they were pursuing. We ought to set up a peace conference. We ought not to replace the two useful bodies which have been set up, namely, the Three Foreign Ministers and the European Advisory Commission, which brings in France. It was a matter of the selection of the body to be used. He would be sorry to see these existing organisms destroyed. They can co-exist. Until the Japanese were defeated, he saw difficulties in China’s having an important voice in settling the tangled problems of Europe—the volcano from which war springs. He saw no useful purpose in including the Chinese in the European settlement. China was far away and did not see questions the way they did. Perhaps while the Council is sitting, we would receive better news from the Far East. He suggested that the world peace treaty be settled by the Five Powers but that European problems be dealt with by the Four Powers directly concerned and that the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers and the European Advisory Commission be continued. He did not see that China could give us good advice on handling the Rhineland question. It would have only an intellectual interest in the matter. The President said we might have to settle that problem here too. Stalin said that perhaps the question of the Council could be referred to the Foreign Ministers. The President observed that he had no objection to China being excluded from the Council. Churchill said he saw difficulties in a Power having full representation when its interests were not directly concerned. The President said the question was referred to the Foreign Ministers. Stalin observed that they would have nothing to do as all questions would be discussed by the Foreign Ministers. Churchill suggested that the Foreign Ministers look into the question of there being four or five members of the Council. Stalin interrupted to say “Or three members?” Churchill also suggested that the Council be confined to questions of peace and that meetings of the three Foreign Ministers and the EAC be continued. The Foreign Ministers would also pick out what questions were to be discussed at the meeting of the Heads of States. Stalin inquired whether it was a question of a peace treaty or a peace conference. Churchill said the Council would prepare a plan for the peace which would be submitted to the Three Heads of States. Stalin inquired as to the time. Churchill replied that this would depend on the progress which the Council made and upon the course of events. Stalin suggested that the Foreign Ministers discuss the extent to which it was necessary to preserve the EAC and the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers. The President said there should be something which they could discuss tomorrow and upon which they could arrive at a decision. He proposed that they meet at four instead of at five o’clock and that they now adjourn. Stalin agreed that they adjourn but there was one question he could raise now: Why does Churchill refuse to give Russia her share of the German fleet? Churchill exclaimed “Why?” and went on to say that he thought that the fleet should be destroyed or shared. He observed that weapons of war are horrible things. Stalin said, let’s divide it. If Mr. Churchill wishes, he can sink his share. The meeting adjourned. 19 3 Concerning the agenda, see vol. i , pp. 156 – 245 . 4 Document No. 711 , post . 5 Document No. 852 , post . 6 i. e., the agreement signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 124 . 7 Document No. 852 , post . 8 For the text of this declaration, see document No. 1417 , post , section v . 9 Document No. 745 , post . 10 Document No. 1089 , post . 11 See vol. i , document No. 242 . 12 Document No. 1089 , post . 13 See vol. i , documents Nos. 386 (footnote 2) and 143 . 14 At the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco. See enclosure 1 to document No. 734 , post . 15 See document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 16 See particularly vol. i , document No. 179 , attachment 1. 17 See document No. 1417 , post , section viii . 18 Attachment to document No. 711 , post . 19 At 6:55 p.m. See Log, ante , p. 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] . The following manuscript notes by Truman appear on a separate page following the record of this meeting: “Reparations, Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Austria “Spain. Franco Regime should be ended “Poland its Government in England “Above are Russian added topics “Churchill suggests minister[s] of foreign affairs prepare things to consider”. Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 17, 1945, 5 p.m. Generalissimo Stalin opened the meeting by suggesting that President Truman be asked to serve as the presiding officer. The Generalissimo’s suggestion was seconded by Mr. Churchill. President Truman said there was nothing he could do but yield to their wishes and to preside. He thanked them for their courtesy. President Truman then stated that he had some concrete proposals to lay before the Conference. He first pointed out the urgency of preparing for the European settlements. He submitted to the meeting a draft proposal for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers. 1 Mr. Churchill suggested that the paper be referred to the foreign secretaries. Generalissimo Stalin said he agreed with that procedure but only wished to mention that he had some doubt as to the inclusion of China in a Council of Foreign Ministers to deal with the European peace. President Truman then stated he desired to make a statement with regard to our policy toward Germany. (1) He thought that the Control Council should commence to function immediately in accordance with the agreement already entered into. For this purpose he was submitting for their consideration a draft containing the principles which should be followed by the Control Council in the administration of Germany. Mr. Churchill indicated that he had not had a chance to read the draft agreement and he would like to do so before the matter was referred to the foreign secretaries. (2) The President then read his prepared statement on the need for the implementation of the Yalta Declaration. Mr. Churchill also indicated that he wanted time to read the document which he probably generally concurred in. (3) The President then stated that the time had come for revision of our Italian policy. Italy had entered the war against Japan and he thought the time had come to admit Italy into the United Nations. He submitted a prepared proposal looking toward the establishment of peace with Italy. Mr. Churchill stated he thought we were preparing to deal with very important policies somewhat too hastily. He thought that these important matters required very deliberate consideration. Britain had fought for four years against Italy. Italy had entered the war against Britain at a most critical time. President Roosevelt himself had used the phrase regarding the dagger that stabbed the neighbor in the back with reference to Italy’s entrance into the war. Possibly he would not differ from the concrete proposals of the President but he wished more time to consider. President Truman pointed out that he had to step into the place of a man who really was irreplaceable. He knew that Mr. Roosevelt had gained their good will and their friendship both for himself and for his country and he hoped that he might be able to succeed in part to that friendship and good will. Mr. Churchill stated that he felt certain that both he and the Marshal wished to renew the great regard and affection that they had for Mr. Roosevelt with Mr. Truman. Their common friendship had served to hold their countries together in the most trying period of history. Mr. Truman has come to join them at a most critical time. He extended his cordial regard and respect to Mr. Truman. He had every hope and confidence that the ties that bound their nations together would be continued. Generalissimo Stalin on behalf of the whole Russian delegation, expressed the desire to join in the sentiments expressed by Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill suggested we go over various points proposed for discussion and try to agree on the agenda. President Truman : We have offered what we think is most important. Churchill : I would like to add the Polish question. Stalin : It would be well for the three delegations to set forth the questions they would like to discuss. Russia would like to discuss (1) the question of the division of the German merchant fleet and navy; (2) the question of reparations; (3) trusteeships for Russia under the San Francisco Charter; (4) relations with the Axis satellite states; (5) Franco regime imposed on Spain by the Axis. This regime should be changed. It harbors great danger to the United Nations. Churchill : We are only discussing things to go on the agenda. I agree that the matter of Spain should be discussed. Stalin : (6) the question of Tangier. Churchill : Mr. Eden has advised me we can reach only provisional agreement on Tangier in the absence of the French. Stalin : (7) The question of Syria and Lebanon; (8) the Polish question involving the determination of Poland’s western frontiers and the liquidation of the London Government. Churchill : We agree the Polish question should be discussed including the willing up of the London government. We hope the Marshal and the President will recognize that England was made the home of the Polish government which fought against the Axis. England has the burden of winding up these obligations. Our objectives are similar but probably more difficult for Britain. She can not force the liquidation of the Polish army before the arrangements have been made for taking care of the soldiers. With regard to Poland, Britain attaches great importance to the election that should give the people an opportunity to realize their wishes. Stalin : The Russians have no additional points to add to the agenda. Churchill : The British have submitted in writing their proposed agenda. I suggest the foreign secretaries meet tonight to agree on the agenda for tomorrow. They can prepare a menu for us better than we can at this table. Stalin and Truman agree. Churchill : So tomorrow we will have prepared the points most agreeable. Stalin : All the same, we will not escape the disagreeable. Churchill : We will feel our way up to them. Stalin : Shall we proceed with the meeting further today? Truman : Have you any suggestions? Stalin : We might take up the Council of Foreign Ministers. Truman : I have submitted my views. Stalin : The principles suggested by the American delegation present no difficulty, but I would like an explanation of the reason for China’s participation in European affairs. Truman : China is one of the five members of the Security Council. Stalin : The decision taken at Crimea provided for quarterly conferences of the foreign secretaries. Does President Truman’s suggestion supersede the Crimea proposal? Truman : The Crimea proposal was temporary. Stalin : Then the quarterly meeting of the secretaries will be dropped. Should not the European Advisory Committee [ Commission ] also be dropped? I have no objection to the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers, but I think it should be clear that the quarterly meeting of the foreign secretaries and the European Advisory Committee elapse [ will lapse? ]. Truman : That interpretation would be satisfactory to me. The foreign secretaries could meet but there probably would be nothing for them to discuss. Churchill : The quarterly meetings of the foreign secretaries are very helpful in advising us. I think it a needless complication to bring China in. When it comes to drawing up the peace, all countries must come in. The preliminary work cannot be done by telegram. I am content that China should be admitted to drawing up the general provisions for peace but not for the day to day work. China is far from Europe and has not contributed to the European war. Do you really wish to discuss the administration of Germany with the Chinese delegation? Truman : The problems to be considered by the Council are quite different from the ordinary meetings of the foreign secretaries. It is intended for a specific purpose. Let me read the draft proposal. (The draft proposal is read by Mr. Truman) Stalin : This will be a Conference to prepare for the future Peace Conference. Churchill : The Peace Conference. Stalin : The war is over in Europe and this Council will deal with reparations and will give an indication of the day when the Peace Conference should meet. Truman : The Peace Conference should not be convened until we are adequately prepared. Churchill : This does not seem to me to present any difficulty in reconciling our different objectives. We ought to have a council to prepare for the peace, but it should not supersede the two practical bodies, to wit: the quarterly meetings of the foreign secretaries, and the European Advisory Committee, which deal with current events. I would regret to see these two bodies to cease to exist. Until the Japanese war is over I see great difficulty in China’s having a voice in the trying problems of Europe. I see no advantage in introducing China with the European settlement. They have not fought in Europe. It is possible that while the Council is sitting, the war with Japan will end. Then China can and should come into the World Peace Conference. I do not see that China could help us in settling the question of the Reich. Stalin : Perhaps the matter can be referred to the foreign ministers. Truman : I have no objection to the foreign secretaries eliminating China if they think that that is best. Churchill : China might be present and come in when Asiatic matters are considered. Stalin : As all the questions are to be discussed by the foreign ministers, we shall have nothing to do (Laughter). Churchill : Our first task is making a peace in Europe—ultimately in the world. The quarterly meeting of the foreign secretaries should continue and the European Advisory Committee fitted in. The Council should make plans for the peace for submission to their governments when their governments are ready to come together for that purpose. Stalin : The time of the Conference. Churchill : That depends on events and the progress made by the Council. Stalin : The Foreign secretaries should discuss the necessity of preserving the European Advisory Committee as well as the quarterly meeting of the foreign secretaries. Truman : There should be some issue to discuss on which we can come to a conclusion tomorrow. Churchill : The secretaries should give us three or four points—enough to keep us busy. Truman : I don’t want just to discuss, I want to decide. Churchill : You want something in the bag each day. Truman : I should like to meet at 4:00 instead of 5:00. Churchill : I will obey your orders. Stalin : If you are in such an obedient mood today, Mr. Prime Minister, I should like to know whether you will share with us the German fleet. Churchill : We will share it with you or sink it. Tripartite Communiqué 1 The Berlin conference of the heads of government of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union met this afternoon at 5 o’clock. By invitation of his two colleagues, the President of the United States of America will preside at the meetings of the conference. A preliminary exchange of views took place on matters requiring decision by the heads of government. It was decided that the three foreign secretaries should hold regular meetings with a view to preparing the work of the conference. 1 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra . 1 Issued at 11 p.m., July 17, 1945. The text of this communiqué (apparently the only interim communiqué issued during the course of the Berlin Conference) is here reprinted from The New York Times for July 18, 1945, p. 1, no official text thereof having been found among the papers of the United States Delegation. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. 1 1 J. C. S. 197th Meeting. Present Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill General Somervell Captain Stroop Lieutenant General Hull. Captain Oster Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Riggs Major General Gross Colonel Stone Major General Deane Colonel Donnelly Major General Norstad Colonel Cary Brigadier General Cabell Lieutenant Colonel Woodward Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)]] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 10 a.m. J. C. S. Files Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 10 a.m. [Extracts] top secret 1. Memorandum for the President on Unconditional Surrender Formula for Japan (J. C. S. 1275/5 2 ) Admiral Leahy presented the draft of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President as prepared by the Secretary and amended by General Arnold. 3 The memorandum was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and amended in certain respects. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum for the President as amended during discussion. 4 2. Relation Between the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and of the Nations Participating in the War Against Japan (J. C. S. 1423 5 ) Admiral Leahy said that he had discussed this matter with the President, who considered that it was undesirable to bring up the question of a military alliance with the British at the present time. He considered that our relations with our allies were not sufficiently stabilized to warrant consideration of a permanent relationship between the military commands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan (C. C. S. 842/1 6 ) Admiral King and General Marshall each proposed changes in the draft memorandum contained in C. C. S. 842/1. These changes were discussed at some length and a draft by General Marshall was modified in accordance with suggestions by Admiral King. General Marshall also proposed changes in the draft letter by the British contained in C. C. S. 842. 7 He said that in case the British would not accept the draft proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff could consider the draft by the British as amended by him. General Marshall’s changes in the proposed draft by the British were reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and changes were made thereto. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the substitute memorandum to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed by General Marshall and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 842/2. 8 ) 7. Staff Conversations With Portugal (C. C. S. 462/25 9 ) Admiral Leahy asked why this matter was being brought up at the present time. Admiral King replied that it was because of the negotiations with the Portuguese in regard to Santa Maria which the Portuguese had insisted upon connecting with the question of liberating Timor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Agreed that C. C. S. 462/25 adequately expressed their views. 8. Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships (J. C. S. 1405/2 10 ) General Gross pointed out that the disposition of captured German passenger ships had already been covered by a memorandum to the President. 11 Since, however, he understood that the British Chiefs of Staff intended to bring this matter up before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, he considered it wise to present a paper to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the subject. He said that the point of issue was that the ships should be allocated in toto to the U. S. lift. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum in the Enclosure to J. C. S. 1405/2 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 679/6. 12 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Not printed. 3 The draft memorandum referred to is not printed. It had been prepared under a directive given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 17 (see ante , p. 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] ). 4 For the memorandum as approved, see document No. 1239 , post . 5 Not printed. For the aspect of the subject here discussed, as raised initially by the British Chiefs of Staff, see vol. i , document No. 550 . 6 Document No. 617, printed in vol. i . 7 Not printed. 8 Document No. 1289 , post . 9 Document No. 1296 , post . 10 Not printed. 11 Document No. 1005 , post . 12 Document No. 1190 , post . First meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11 a.m. First meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11 a.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Clayton Sir William Strang Mr. Gromyko Mr. Harriman Mr. Ward Mr. Gusev Mr. Cohen Mr. Sobolev Mr. Bohlen Mr. Novikov Mr. Thompson 2 2 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 11 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)]] Rapporteur’s Report Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 11 a.m. Truman Papers Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 11 a.m. top secret Mr. Molotov proposed that Mr. Byrnes preside at the meeting. Mr. Byrnes said that it had been agreed that they should discuss the creation of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The reasons for creating the Council were set forth in the memorandum which was submitted yesterday. 2 He would like to know the views of the other Foreign Ministers. Mr. Molotov again raised the question of China but said that if the Council was to deal with other than exclusively European affairs the objections to China’s participation would drop. Mr. Byrnes suggested that the Council be composed of five powers but that participation of China be limited to problems concerning the Far East or problems of world wide significance. He explained that if the war with Japan should end soon they would in this manner have established the organization to deal with the problems of peace in the Far East. The other reason for including China was that China is one of the permanent members of the Security Council. Mr. Eden said that if they were concerned only with European problems he would prefer four members and that in that case the meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries would merge with the new Council and probably also the European Advisory Commission would disappear and some form of secretariat would have to be set up. He agreed, however, that if the Council’s sphere was to be the world, China should be included. Mr. Molotov proposed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be established to deal with both European and non-European affairs and should be composed of five members. Mr. Eden inquired if this meant four members for European affairs. Mr. Molotov replied that so far as Europe was concerned the first task of the Council was to draft treaties of peace with Germany, Italy, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Finland for some reason appeared to be omitted. France did not participate in the armistices with these countries. 3 He had no question about French participation in the discussions relating to the peace with Germany and Italy but he thought that France should be excluded when the peace treaties with the other countries were being considered. Mr. Eden thought this would be complicated as there would be three members for some purposes, four for some, and five for others. Mr. Molotov pointed out that this was due to the actual situation. Mr. Eden thought that the Council would consider day to day problems as well as those of peace in which event it would be well to include France. Mr. Molotov pointed out that the last wording submitted by the United States delegation referred only to the peace treaties. Mr. Byrnes said that this was done to avoid delay which would occur if the Council were loaded with many diverse problems. He thought, however, that the Council might consider matters referred to it by the respective governments. Mr. Eden observed that at the Crimea Conference it had been agreed to set up the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers. 4 They had not had a formal meeting although they had an informal meeting in San Francisco. 5 Was the Council to do the work of that body as well as the peace? He thought that it should. Mr. Byrnes said that was also his thought. Mr. Molotov again pointed out that this differed from the American draft although the original draft 6 contemplated broader functions for the Council. He thought it best to be content with the more limited arrangement. Mr. Byrnes said it was true that the earlier draft had been changed. This was done because of fear that pressure for consideration of other questions might delay the work of the Council. He had no objection to including language to provide that it could consider questions referred to it by governments. There was no point in the three Foreign Ministers making a separate trip to meet when they were already meeting in the Council. Mr. Molotov thought it would be well to abide by the later American proposal and it would be possible subsequently to see whether it was advisable to widen the functions of the Council. Mr. Eden then inquired what would happen to the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers. Mr. Molotov thought this question might receive some consideration. He thought the European Advisory Commission should be terminated and that its members should be thanked. Mr. Eden then inquired if he understood clearly that the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers would be continued and that the Council would consist of four or five members. Mr. Byrnes replied that the Council would consist of five members and suggested language to provide that China’s participation, so far as European affairs are concerned, should extend only to matters affecting Asiatic interests or of world wide concern. Mr. Molotov asked if it were settled that Finland should be mentioned. Mr. Byrnes replied that it was. Mr. Molotov then proposed that paragraph 1 of the American draft be amended to provide that the composition of the Council should conform to the character of the matters under discussion. Mr. Eden preferred to leave paragraph 1 as it was. The Soviet amendment would involve much discussion as to who would be present at each meeting. Mr. Molotov said that while France had perhaps an interest in questions concerning Finland and Rumania, it was not a party to the armistice arrangements concerning those countries. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the United States had not been at war with Finland and although it would be interested at Council meetings it would not sign any peace treaty with Finland. He assumed that the Council would prepare recommendations to the Governments relating to the terms of peace and in doing so would consider the views of a government which had not been at war. The Council, however, would not be called upon to make recommendations to France in a case where France was not at war. Mr. Eden thought this would be difficult and pointed out that Vichy had not been at war with these countries whereas the de Gaulle movement was. France had not done much fighting against some of them but also the British had not done much fighting against the Finns because they could not get at them. Mr. Molotov said the point was that France did not participate in the deliberations for an armistice. Of course, France could sign the treaty but the question was who was to make the preparation for it. He said his objections were not directed against France but were based on the fact that France did not participate in the armistice. Mr. Eden then proposed amending the text to limit membership to those countries who had signed armistice agreements with the countries being considered. Mr. Byrnes agreed and thought that it would be possible to draft language in which all could concur. Mr. Eden proposed that a drafting committee be set up but he still wished to know what would happen to the meeting of the three Secretaries. They could not keep meeting all the time as they were very busy. He had thought that the Council might have taken over this work. Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Council would then have four members. He thought that it should be three and that if necessary they could add some other representatives. Mr. Byrnes said it had been his thought that the meetings of the three would not be affected. They could meet at the same time the Council met. It had been agreed at Yalta that they could discuss anything and he thought that this arrangement was not affected. Mr. Eden said he would have liked the three to become four but if his colleagues thought otherwise he would have to agree. Mr. Molotov proposed that they begin with three and see what happens. It would be possible to make changes if necessary. A drafting committee to draw up the text was then appointed consisting of Mr. Dunn, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Vishinsky, Mr. Sobolev, Mr. Ward, and Mr. Dean. The drafting committee reported back later in the meeting 7 and submitted a draft text (Attachment 1, final text 8 ). Germany Mr. Byrnes suggested that the Foreign Ministers now discuss the question of the authority of the Control Council in political questions. Mr. Molotov interposed that it would be desirable to discuss the disposition of the German fleet and merchant ships. Mr. Byrnes replied that he would prefer to begin with the discussion of the topic which he had suggested. He doubted if the Big Three could or should enter this afternoon into a discussion of the difficult and complicated mass of economic problems having to do with Germany. He suggested therefore that in so far as these problems were concerned the Foreign Ministers might appoint a subcommittee consisting of one or two representatives from their staffs which would examine these questions in the first instance and present to the Foreign Ministers those problems, one or two at a time, on which the subcommittee was unable to reach agreement. Such questions might be, for example, the relationship of restitution and war booty to the payment of essential imports or the application of the reparations program to the entire territory of Germany as it existed in 1937. Mr. Eden inquired whether the Big Three should discuss any of these questions this afternoon. Mr. Byrnes replied that for this afternoon he suggested that they discuss only the authority of the Control Council in political questions. As to the authority of the Council in economic questions he thought that they might follow the procedure he had suggested under which the subcommittee of experts would present to the Foreign Ministers problems on which the subcommittee disagreed, and the Foreign Ministers would determine which of these problems should be recommended to the Big Three for discussion and decision. Mr. Molotov remarked that the agenda for this afternoon’s meeting would therefore be: Topic 1—Procedures for the peace settlements; Topic 2—The political authority of the Control Council; and Topic 3—The appointment of the subcommittee to deal with German economic questions. Mr. Byrnes replied that the Foreign Ministers themselves might well appoint this subcommittee, leaving therefore only two questions for discussion by the Big Three this afternoon. Mr. Molotov reverted to his suggestion in regard to the disposition of the German fleet and merchant ships. He thought that the Big Three might well discuss more than three questions at this afternoon’s meeting. He added that the Polish question might also be considered. Mr. Eden remarked that the disposition of the German fleet is really the simplest of all the questions before the house and might well be held until another meeting. He promised that the fleet would not be sunk in the meantime. Mr. Molotov declared that he did not insist that this matter be settled today. He thought it should be dealt with rapidly. He pointed out that it is a question which is of a special interest [ of especial interest? ] to countries which have lost most of their fleet. Poland Mr. Byrnes said that he agreed that the Big Three might well discuss the question of the liquidation of the London Polish Government. Mr. Molotov added that this would include the discussion of all the problems related to the liquidation of that government. Mr. Eden pointed out that this is only part of the Polish question and that there should also be discussed the matter of the implementation of the Yalta agreement on Poland, 9 particularly the prompt holding of free and unfettered elections. Mr. Byrnes replied that all aspects of the Polish question should be discussed and there was general agreement on this point. German Economic Problems Mr. Byrnes returned to his suggestion of the appointment of a subcommittee to deal with German economic problems. He expressed the view that this subcommittee should deal with all German economic matters, including reparations. Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed. Agenda for Big Three Meeting It was thereupon agreed that the agenda for this afternoon’s meeting of the Big Three should consist of three items: 1. The procedures for peace negotiations and territorial settlements; 2. The political authority of the Control Council for Germany; 3. The Polish question, with particular reference to the liquidation of the London government, and the implementation of the Yalta agreement. German Fleet Mr. Molotov mentioned once again the disposition of the German fleet and merchant marine. It was agreed at Mr. Eden’s suggestion that the Foreign Ministers would take up this subject soon but that they would not do so today. Chairmanship of Foreign Ministers Meetings It was agreed that the Chairmanship of the meetings would rotate and that the chairman of the day would act as rapporteur to the heads of governments. Political Authority of the Control Council for Germany Mr. Molotov declared that he had no objection to the placing of this subject on the agenda but that he had a number of questions in regard to the U. S. draft which had been circulated yesterday. 10 As to paragraph (1) in regard to the authority of the Control Council, he felt that this matter had been decided upon in the EAC. If there were no changes of substance, he inquired why it was necessary to make any change in the language approved by the EAC. 11 Mr. Byrnes replied that there were no changes of substance or no intention to make any material change in the decisions reached by the EAC. Mr. Molotov said that the language seemed to be slightly different in its shades of meaning and he asked whether it was intended to strengthen the aspect of centralization as compared to the aspect of the zonal administration. Mr. Byrnes replied that there was no intention to change the relationship between the zones and the Control Council. Mr. Molotov said that if there was no intention to change, a drafting subcommittee could easily reconcile the language, and this suggestion was approved. Mr. Molotov then referred to 2 (i) ( a ). 12 He pointed out that prisoners of war cannot be said to be demobilized and inquired whether there was any intention by this paragraph to change the status of prisoners of war. Mr. Byrnes replied that there was no such intention. It was agreed that the drafting subcommittee could deal with the language on this point. Mr. Molotov said that he had an amendment to propose on paragraph 2 (i) ( b ) but that he would not go into the details of this at this time. Mr. Molotov proposed the following new wording for paragraph 3: “In addition to measures already adopted all Fascist law, as well as all Fascist decrees, orders, instruments should be abolished as directed against democratic liberties, civil rights, and the interests of the German nation. Discrimination on grounds of race, creed or political opinion established by Nazi law should be liquidated. No such discrimination, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.” Mr. Byrnes replied that this suggestion seemed to him at first glance to be satisfactory but that the drafting committee could work out the language. Mr. Eden pointed out that the British delegation had a number of small drafting points which they would turn over to the drafting committee. Mr. Molotov then suggested that the language of the last sentence [of] paragraph 5 should be eliminated in order to remove any possible loopholes for the retention of Nazis in office. Mr. Eden said he had thought the sentence referred only to non-Nazis. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that it might refer to those who had been only nominal participants in the Nazi party or who had been members of the party under duress. He thought that in some cases it might be useful to use persons of this type in public administration but he suggested, in order to make the point perfectly clear, the insertion of the word “other” before the word “Germans” in this sentence. Mr. Molotov stated that he preferred to drop the sentence altogether, and Mr. Byrnes said that he would have no objection. Mr. Eden felt that there should be somewhere in the document the concept of an official holding office only subject to good behavior. Mr. Molotov replied that he felt that this went without saying. Mr. Byrnes said that he was inclined to feel that there should be an indication of this kind in the document but that he would agree either to placing it at some other point or dropping it altogether. Mr. Molotov urged that it be dropped altogether. Mr. Molotov then referred to paragraph 7 (i). He inquired whether it is not too soon to start holding elections. Mr. Byrnes replied that the objective, i. e., decentralization of the political structure and development of local responsibility, is stated in the introduction to the paragraph and that the Control Commission will decide when it is appropriate to hold elections. He referred to paragraph 7 (iii), which states that elective principles shall be introduced into the higher political units as soon as the results of local self-government seem to warrant. Mr. Molotov still felt that elections at this time would be premature. Mr. Byrnes replied that if they are premature, they will not be held, and the matter is within the discretion of the Control Commission. Mr. Eden expressed the view that all would agree that elections at this moment are premature but that they should be held whenever possible. He felt that a reservation of the same character as that in 7 (iii) should be introduced into 7 (i). Mr. Byrnes agreed that this would be acceptable, pointing out that the essential is that the Germans should bear as much responsibility as possible for the carrying on of local affairs. Mr. Molotov suggested the following redraft of paragraph 7 (i): “Local self-government shall be restored all over Germany on democratic principles with due regard for safeguarding military and state security.” Mr. Molotov pointed out that this language contained no reference to elections. He felt that this should be left to the discretion of the occupying powers. There should be a general tendency in this direction but we should be cautious in proceeding with it. He felt the U. S. language to be too categorical. Mr. Byrnes said that he had no objection to qualifying 7 (i) in the same way as 7 (iii) but that he felt any reservation in regard to elections to be not strictly applicable since it is recognized the world over that elections are the proper means of having democratic governments. Mr. Eden suggested adding to 7 (i) the words “at the discretion of the Control Council.” Mr. Byrnes agreed, but Mr. Molotov felt the question should be further discussed. As to paragraph 7 (iv) Mr. Molotov inquired whether the prohibition on the establishment of a central German political government implied the establishment of some other form of government. Mr. Byrnes agreed that the word might well be stricken since any form of government is in fact political. Mr. Molotov inquired whether some form of central economic administration is intended. Mr. Byrnes replied that he assumed that some central administration for such matters as currency and transport would be necessary. Mr. Molotov concluded that he had some further additions to suggest but felt that they could be dealt with by the drafting subcommittee. Mr. Eden then suggested that in paragraph 8 after the words “shall be permitted” there be added the words “and any existing instructions will be progressively relaxed.” It seemed to him that it would be undesirable to give Germany freedom of the press all at once. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that under the terms of the paragraph freedom of the press would be subject to military security and inquired as to what other reasons [existed why] this freedom should be limited. Mr. Eden took the position that the matter should be clarified, pointing out that we would not allow the press to start preaching Nazi doctrine or attacking Allied governments. Mr. Molotov said that he also had an amendment on this paragraph but would refer it to the drafting subcommittee. Mr. Byrnes , returning to paragraph 7 (i) took the view that we would wish to consider this language very carefully. If in the U. S. zone we thought that a given community was ready to hold elections, to make this decision subject to the authority of the Control Council might be too restrictive. Mr. Eden expressed the view that in so far as possible we should attempt to follow the same policy in all zones. He felt that it would be a pity if some held elections while others did not. Mr. Byrnes replied that conditions might warrant elections in one place but not in another. Mr. Eden felt that in that case the four governments as represented in the Control Commission should decide where elections were warranted. Mr. Byrnes stated that we would be inclined to accept the British judgment as to whether elections were appropriate in a given community in the British zone and that no administering authority should be precluded from starting the democratic processes if it thought the communities in question were ready. He agreed, however, that the drafting subcommittee should work out appropriate language. Mr. Eden expressed doubt as to whether the drafting subcommittee could revise this document in time for consideration by the Big Three this afternoon. He thought, however, the Big Three might discuss the subject in general terms even though the draft of the text had not been completed. Mr. Byrnes agreed and said that he would wish to appoint on the subcommittee dealing with German economic problems Mr. Clayton and Mr. Pauley. Mr. Molotov said that he would appoint Mr. Maiski and Mr. Arutunian. Mr. Eden said that he would appoint Sir David Waley and Mr. Coulson. Mr. Byrnes then named as American representatives on the subcommittee working on German political questions Mr. Matthews and Mr. Cohen. Mr. Eden named Sir William Strang and Mr. Harrison. Mr. Molotov designated Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Semenov. The Foreign Ministers then returned to the discussion of the question of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the subcommittee appointed for this purpose having completed its proposed draft. 13 Mr. Molotov proposed that their draft be adopted although he still wished to consider the advisability of clarifying paragraph 1 of the American draft. Mr. Molotov proposed and was supported by Mr. Eden and Mr. Byrnes that the words “each of” be amended in the text submitted by the drafting committee. This was agreed to. Mr. Byrnes said that he thought that if each of the five Governments wished that the Council should consider a subject other than the question of peace they should be free to do so and he proposed that the sentence covering this point be included. Mr. Molotov thought that if the five were agreed this could of course be done but it would be better to omit much of it in order not to divert attention from the main task. Mr. Byrnes thought that the five Governments would refer only important questions to the Council and that it would be for the Council to determine the order in which they would be considered. Mr. Molotov agreed to this and said that it should be placed on record that the European Advisory Commission had finished its task. Mr. Eden suggested that it should be stated that the Control Commission would take over the remaining task of the EAC. He pointed out, however, that it would be necessary to have the agreement of the French. Mr. Byrnes said that the decision could be expressed in this way. Italy Mr. Byrnes observed that the President had yesterday raised the question of Italy becoming a member of the United Nations Organization and he wondered if it would not be possible to decide this matter. Mr. Molotov thought that this question should wait for a day or two as they had not had time to study it. The meeting adjourned. 2 Document No. 711 , post . 3 The following are the armistice agreements referred to: armistice with and instrument of surrender by Italy, signed respectively at Fairfield Camp, Sicily, September 3, 1943, and at Malta, September 29, 1943 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740, 2742); armistice with Rumania, signed at Moscow, September 12, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712); armistice with Finland, signed at Moscow, September 19, 1944 ( British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxlv , p. 513); armistice with Bulgaria, signed at Moscow, October 28, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 437; 58 Stat. (2) 1498); armistice with Hungary, signed at Moscow, January 20, 1945 (Executive Agreement Series No. 456; 59 Stat. (2) 1321); and the two acts of military surrender by Germany, signed respectively at Reims, May 7, 1945, and at Berlin, May 8, 1945 (Executive Agreement Series No. 502; 59 Stat. (2) 1858, 1860). French military representatives witnessed the two acts of surrender by Germany. 4 See document No. 1417 , post , section viii . 5 While the United Nations Conference on International Organization was in session there. 6 See vol. i , the attachment to document No. 228 . This draft had been communicated to Eden and Molotov on July 8. See vol. i , document No. 231 . 7 See document No. 712 , post . 8 See document No. 712 , post , footnote 3. 9 See document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 10 Document No. 852 , post . 11 In the agreement on control machinery in Germany signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 124 . 12 i. e., paragraph 2 (i) ( a ) of document No. 852 , post . 13 See document No. 712 , post . Rapporteur’s Report Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] Rapporteur’s Report 1 Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 11 a.m. Rapporteur’s Report of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Wednesday Morning, July 18, 1945 The Foreign Ministers agreed that they would recommend to the Heads of Governments that the subjects for discussion at the meeting this afternoon, July 18th, should be the following: (1) The question of procedure and machinery for peace negotiations and territorial settlements. (2) The question of the authority of the Control Council for Germany in political questions. (3) The Polish question, particularly the problems having to do with the liquidation of the former London Polish Government and with the implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Poland. I procedure for peace settlements (1) The draft proposal for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers, 2 presented by the United States, was approved in principle. (2) The following redraft of paragraph 3 of the United States draft was approved: [Here follows the text of paragraph (3) as printed in document No. 712 , post .] (3) The Soviet Delegation reserved the right to suggest a change in the first paragraph of the United States draft. (4) It was agreed that the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers approved at the Yalta Conference would not be affected by the establishment of the new Council of Foreign Ministers, though they might at times be held simultaneously with meetings of the Council. (5) It was agreed that the functions of the European Advisory Commission would, after agreement with France, be transferred to the Allied Control Councils (for Germany and Austria). 3 II political authority of the control council for germany (1) The political section of the proposed agreement, 4 presented by the United States, on the political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period was discussed by the Foreign Ministers. A number of amendments were suggested which were referred to a drafting subcommittee named by the Foreign Ministers. The subcommittee has not yet completed its work but the Foreign Ministers agreed that it would be desirable for the Heads of Governments at this afternoon’s meeting to have a preliminary and exploratory discussion of the authority of the Control Council for Germany in political matters. (2) The Foreign Ministers agreed that the economic questions connected with Germany are of such a difficult nature that they should be referred in the first instance to a subcommittee of experts. This subcommittee will at the earliest possible time report back to the Foreign Ministers those questions upon which the subcommittee is unable to reach agreement. The Foreign Ministers will then determine which of these questions they will recommend that the Heads of Governments will discuss and decide. 5 (3) The Foreign Ministers agreed that, while they would not discuss today the question of the disposition of the German fleet and merchant ships, they would take up this question at an early date. III polish question The Foreign Ministers agreed that they would recommend that the Heads of Governments discuss at this afternoon’s meeting the Polish question. They suggested two aspects of this question as requiring consideration: (1) all of the various problems connected with the liquidation of the former London Polish Government; and (2) the questions connected with the continued implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Poland, especially the arrangements for the early holding of free and unfettered elections. 6 1 Byrnes acted as Rapporteur for this meeting and read sections of his report at the afternoon meeting of Heads of Government (see post , pp. 89–91 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] ). 2 Document No. 711 , post . 3 At this point is the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Agreed to for further discussion of No 3 other sections approved HST”. This and the notations quoted in the following footnotes to this document were presumably made in the course of the Second Plenary Meeting on the afternoon of July 18. 4 Document No. 852 , post . 5 At this point is the following manuscript notation by Truman: “(1937) boundary agreed to”. 6 Following this paragraph are the following manuscript notations by Truman: “Poles should go back to Poland.” “Agreed to for change in Soviet wording.” Truman–Churchill luncheon meeting, about 1:30 p.m. Truman–Churchill luncheon meeting, about 1:30 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom President Truman Prime Minister Churchill [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. The Log ( ante , page 14) indicates that Truman and Churchill lunched privately at the latter’s quarters, 23 Ringstrasse, Babelsberg, then walked to Eden’s quarters, where they met Eden and Byrnes, and then returned with their Foreign Secretaries to 23 Ringstrasse. Churchill describes the luncheon meeting as follows in Triumph and Tragedy , pages 631–634: “On July 18 I lunched alone with the President, and we touched on many topics. I spoke of the melancholy position of Great Britain, who had spent more than half her foreign investments for the common cause when we were all alone, and now emerged from the war with a great external debt of three thousand million pounds. This had grown up through buying supplies from India, Egypt, and elsewhere, with no Lend-Lease arrangement, and would impose upon us an annual exportation without any compensatory import to nourish the wages fund. He followed this attentively and with sympathy, and declared that the United States owed Great Britain an immense debt for having held the fort at the beginning. ‘If you had gone down like France,’ he said, ‘we might be fighting the Germans on the American coast at the present time. This justifies us in regarding these matters as above the purely financial plane.’ I said I had told the election crowds that we were living to a large extent upon American imported food, for which we could not pay, but we had no intention of being kept by any country, however near to us in friendship. We should have to ask for help to become a going concern again, and until we got our wheels turning properly we could be of little use to world security or any of the high purposes of San Francisco. The President said he would do his very utmost; but of course I knew all the difficulties he might have in his own country. “I then spoke about Imperial Preference, and explained that it might cause a split in the Conservative Party if it were not wisely handled. I had heard that America was making great reductions in her tariff. The President said it had been reduced by 50 per cent, and he now had authority to reduce it by another 50 per cent, leaving it at one-quarter of its pre-war height. I replied that this was a great factor, and would have a powerful influence on our Dominions, especially Canada and Australia. “The President raised the subject of air and communications. 1 He had great difficulties to face about airfields in British territory, especially in Africa, which the Americans had built at enormous cost. We ought to meet them on this, and arrange a fair plan for common use. I assured him that if I continued to be responsible I would reopen the question with him personally. It would be a great pity if the Americans got worked up about bases and air traffic and set themselves to make a win of it at all costs. We must come to the best arrangement in our common interest. President Roosevelt knew well that I wished to go much further on this matter of airfields and other bases, and would have liked to have a reciprocal arrangement between our two countries all over the world. Britain was a smaller Power than the United States, but she had much to give. Why should not an American battleship calling at Gibraltar be able to get the torpedoes to fit her tubes and the shells to fit her guns? Why should we not share facilities for defence all over the world? We could add 50 per cent to the mobility of the American Fleet. “Mr. Truman replied that all these sentiments were very near his own heart. Any plan would have to be fitted in, in some way, with the policy of the United Nations. I said that was all right so long as the facilities were shared between Britain and the United States. There was nothing in it if they were made common to everybody. A man might propose marriage to a young lady, but it was not much use if he were told that she would always be a sister to him. I wanted, under whatever form or cloak, a continuation of the existing war-time system of reciprocal facilities between Britain and the United States about bases and fuelling points. “The President seemed in full accord with this, if it could be presented in a suitable fashion, and did not appear to take crudely the form of a military alliance à deux . These last were not his words, but give the impression I got of his mind. Encouraged by this, I went on with my long-cherished idea of keeping the organisation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in being, 2 at any rate until the world calmed down after the great storm and until there was a world structure of such proved strength and capacity that we could safely confide ourselves to it. “The President was replying to this in an encouraging way when we were interrupted by his officers reminding him that he must now start off to see Marshal Stalin. He was good enough to say that this had been the most enjoyable luncheon he had had for many years, and how earnestly he hoped the relations I had had with President Roosevelt would be continued between him and me. He invited personal friendship and comradeship, and used many expressions at intervals in our discussion which I could not easily hear unmoved. I felt that here was a man of exceptional character and ability, with an outlook exactly along the lines of Anglo-American relations as they had developed, simple and direct methods of speech, and a great deal of self-confidence and resolution.” The following notes by Churchill (reprinted from Ehrman, Grand Strategy , volume VI, pages 302–303) also relate to the Truman–Churchill luncheon meeting of July 18: “I said that the Japanese war might end much quicker than had been expected, and that the eighteen months period which we had taken as a working rule required to be reviewed. Also, Stage III 3 might be upon us in a few months, or perhaps even earlier. I imparted to the President the disclosure about the offer from the Mikado, 4 made to me by Marshal Stalin the night before; 5 and I told him he was quite free to talk it over with the Marshal, as I had informed him at the Marshal’s expressed desire.… “The President also thought the war might come to a speedy end. Here I explained that Marshal Stalin had not wished to transmit this information direct to him for fear he might think the Russians were trying to influence him towards peace. In the same way I would abstain from saying anything which would indicate that we were in any way reluctant to go on with the war against Japan as long as the United States thought fit. However, I dwelt upon the tremendous cost in American life and, to a smaller extent, in British life which would be involved in forcing ‘unconditional surrender’ upon the Japanese. It was for him to consider whether this might not be expressed in some other way, so that we got all the essentials for future peace and security, and yet left the Japanese some show of saving their military honour and some assurance of their national existence, after they had complied with all safeguards necessary for the conqueror. The President countered by saying that he did not think the Japanese had any military honour after Pearl Harbour. I contented myself with saying that at any rate they had something for which they were ready to face certain death in very large numbers, and this might not be so important to us as to them. He then became quite sympathetic, and spoke, as Mr. Stimson had to me two days [ one day? ] earlier, of the terrible responsibilities that rested upon him in regard to the unlimited effusion of American blood.” 6 It also seems probable that the following note by Churchill for the British War Cabinet, dated July 18, and printed in Triumph and Tragedy , pages 640–641, pertains to this meeting: “The President showed me telegrams about the recent experiment, 7 and asked what I thought should be done about telling the Russians. He seemed determined to do this, but asked about the timing, and said he thought that the end of the Conference would be best. I replied that if he were resolved to tell it might well be better to hang it on the experiment, which was a new fact on which he and we had only just had knowledge. Therefore he would have a good answer to any question, ‘Why did you not tell us this before?’ He seemed impressed with this idea, and will consider it. “On behalf of His Majesty’s Government I did not resist his proposed disclosure of the simple fact that we have this weapon. He reiterated his resolve at all costs to refuse to divulge any particulars.…” 1 See vol. i , document No. 547 . 2 See vol. i , document No. 550 . 3 i. e., the period of full reconversion from war to peace following the defeat of Japan. 4 See vol. i , documents Nos. 582 and 586 . 5 For Birse’s record of the Churchill–Stalin conversation of July 17, see Ehrman, Grand Strategy , vol. vi , p. 302. 6 Cf. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , pp. 641–642. 7 Presumably documents Nos. 1303 and 1304 , post . Byrnes–Eden luncheon meeting, about 1:30 p.m. Byrnes–Eden luncheon meeting, about 1:30 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] Editor’s Note —While Truman was having luncheon with Churchill, 1 Byrnes was a luncheon guest at Eden’s quarters in Babelsberg. 2 No record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. 1 See ante , p. 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] . 2 London Times , July 19, 1945, p. 4. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. 1 1 C. C. S. 195th Meeting. Present United States United Kingdom General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal General of the Army Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham General Somervell Field Marshal Wilson Lieutenant General Hull General Ismay Vice Admiral Cooke Lieutenant-General Macready Major General Norstad Major-General Laycock Captain Oster Major-General Hollis Captain McDill Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)]] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 2:30 p.m. J. C. S. Files Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 2:30 p.m. top secret 1. Approval of the Minutes of the C. C. S. 194 th Meeting The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the conclusions of the C. C. S. 194th Meeting and approved the detailed report of the meeting subject to the substitution in the first paragraph on page 3 of the words “dispatch of a corps commander and staff to the Pacific” for “above” 2 and subject to any-later minor amendments. 2. French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan (C. C. S. 842, 3 842/1, 4 and 842/2 5 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to C. C. S. 842/2 and directed the Secretaries to forward it separately to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 3. Staff Conversations With Portugal (C. C. S. 462/25 and 462/26 6 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office in the Enclosure to C. C. S. 462/25, as amended in C. C. S. 462/26. 4. Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific Area (C. C. S. 890/2 7 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of C. C. S. 890/2. In regard to paragraph 2, General Marshall asked the British Chiefs of Staff if they would express their reaction to dividing Indo-China into two parts, leaving the northern part in the China Theater. Admiral Cunningham pointed out that the line dividing Indo-China would be dependent to some extent on contemplated operations through Thailand. Admiral King stated that the division of Indo-China along the latitude of 15 degrees north was an arbitrary division and might be changed to suit contemplated operational requirements. The British Chiefs of Staff expressed the view that they should like to study the question of the dividing line before making any proposals in regard to the matter. The proposals contained in paragraph 3 were accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff without discussion. In the discussion of paragraph 4, Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were in doubt as to the commitment which they would be undertaking if they agreed to the transfer on a particular date. They did not know when the operations in Borneo were scheduled to be completed nor what sort of liability they would be accepting in the form of maintenance and support for those operations. In reply, General Marshall referred to the United States Chiefs of Staff reply to the questionnaire which the British Chiefs of Staff had submitted (C. C. S. 852 and 852/1), 8 and described the extent to which the United States Chiefs of Staff were proposing to support operations in the new British command. He said that most of the U. S. troops had been withdrawing from the area of the proposed new British command and that no further operations were scheduled in Borneo. He added that in any event there would be no question of “leaving the Borneo operations in the lurch.” General Marshall then went on to point out that it would be a great advantage to the United States Chiefs of Staff if the transfer of the area to Admiral Mountbatten could take place at an early date. General MacArthur is fully occupied with operations to the northward and it would be a considerable benefit to him if he could be relieved of these responsibilities as soon as possible. Sir Charles Portal said that Admiral Mountbatten also was fully occupied in his present and contemplated operations in the Southeast Asia Command, and since General MacArthur was familiar with and is dealing with the Australians at the present, it might be best to continue that procedure until Admiral Mountbatten was in a better position to undertake these new responsibilities. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed that it was desirable to effect a transfer of command in the Southwest Pacific Area at an early date, but considered that it would be necessary for them to study the matter before a definite time could be agreed upon. General Marshall suggested that as Admiral Mountbatten was about to visit General MacArthur in Manila, that he and General MacArthur might discuss the timing of the transfer of command. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— a . Agreed in principle that that part of the present Southwest Pacific Area lying south of the boundary proposed in paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 852/1, should pass from United States to British command as soon as possible. b . Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would investigate and report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the earliest possible date on which the transfer of the above area could be effected. c . Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would consider where the dividing line might lie in the event that approximately half of French Indo-China should be included in the new British command. (At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into closed session. 8a ) 5. Command and Control in the War Against Japan (Paragraphs 5 and 6, C. C. S. 890/2 9 ) General Marshall said that he wished to explain the point of view of the United States Chiefs of Staff. He pointed out that the general concept of operations in the Pacific had been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that the control of operational strategy lay with the United States Chiefs of Staff. He recognized that in the past the British Chiefs of Staff had not had all the information that they wanted and assured them that this would be remedied in the future. He felt, however, that the operational strategy in the Pacific must remain the responsibility of the United States Chiefs of Staff. He explained the extensive difficulties in the conduct of the strategy of the Pacific arising from the great distances involved and the enormous land, sea, and air forces employed. He said that the United States Chiefs of Staff felt that they could not, in addition to these problems, shoulder the burden of debating the “pros” and “cons” of operational strategy with the British Chiefs of Staff. The United States Chiefs of Staff would be glad to give the British Chiefs of Staff timely information of U. S. plans and intentions and to hear their comments. But they felt bound to retain freedom to decide ultimately what should be done. If then the British Chiefs of Staff felt that they could not commit British troops to the operations decided upon, then they would of course be at liberty to withdraw British forces from those operations; but he desired to make it clear that if this were done, it would be necessary for the United States Chiefs of Staff to be given ample warning of British intentions so that plans of United States Chiefs of Staff could be adjusted accordingly. Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had felt that they had been rather left out of the picture but confirmed that the British Chiefs of Staff entirely supported the strategy which the United States Chiefs of Staff had so far developed. For the future, they hoped that they would be consulted on the further development of strategy but had no wish to suggest that they should interfere in any way with the operational strategy. Admiral Cunningham asked if the British Chiefs of Staff would be consulted in regard to the strategy that would be adopted in the event of the Russians coming into the war. General Marshall said that the strategy to be adopted in these circumstances would be considered on a tripartite basis. Admiral King said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would consult with the British Chiefs of Staff, of course, but must reserve the final decision to themselves. General Marshall said that in the event of any disagreement, the British Chiefs of Staff would certainly be given the opportunity of convincing the United States Chiefs of Staff that they were wrong. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Agreed that with respect to the strategic control of the war against Japan:— a . The control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater will remain in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff. b . The United States Chiefs of Staff will provide the British Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and intentions. c . The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of Staff on matters of general strategy, on the understanding that in the event of disagreement, the final decision on the action to be taken will lie with the United States Chiefs of Staff. d . In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff as indicated in c . above, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as will permit them to make timely rearrangements. e . In the event the U. S. S. R. enters the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned. 2 This amendment has been made in the minutes of the 194th Meeting as printed ante , pp. 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] . 3 Not printed. 4 Document No. 617, printed in vol. i . 5 Document No. 1289 , post . 6 Documents Nos. 1296 and 1297 , post , respectively. 7 Document No. 1268 , post . 8 Neither printed. 8a This is presumably the occasion on which General Marshall reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the successful results of the test of the atomic bomb on July 16. See The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay (New York, 1960), p. 401; A Sailor’s Odyssey: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope (London, 1951), p. 646. 9 Document No. 1268 , post . Truman–Stalin meeting, 3:04 p.m. Truman–Stalin meeting, 3:04 p.m. 1 1 The meeting took place at Stalin’s quarters, Babelsberg. According to the Log ( ante , pp. 1415 [ Pg. 1415 includes portions of Doc. 1355 and Doc. 1356 ] ), the President’s party arrived at 3:04 p.m., and the President talked briefly with Stalin after a buffet luncheon. Present United States Soviet Union President Truman Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Bohlen [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)]] Bohlen Notes Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 3:04 p.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845 Bohlen Notes 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] Bohlen Notes 2 Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 3:04 p.m. 3 p . S: 3 [blank] M 4 [blank] Pres 5 —lakes—Black S—I must tell you the y the news—hands Pres note from Sato & message from the Emperor 6 B 7 —I remember that H— H— 8 S—worthwhile answer to answer— Pres no respect. S—not a war—will want lull—might answer as follows no specific—don’t know character—of K 9 Mission—can’t—answer=a refusal Pres satisfactory M—factual B—what [one word illegible] ins inspired it—fear of what you will do— M—I think they guess S—Can see our forces tanks etc M—not only to USSR S—to US. Eng & [one word illegible] Pres —we had indicati[on] from Sweden 10 2 Transcribed for this volume from longhand notes in pencil. In interviews with a Department of State historian on January 25 and February 8, 1960, Bohlen expressed certainty (since at earlier conferences of Heads of Government it had been his practice, without exception, to transcribe his notes into minutes or memoranda of conversations) that he transcribed these notes into a memorandum of conversation shortly after the meeting took place. Because of Stalin’s reference to the peace feeler from Japan, it is possible that such a memorandum would have been given special security handling, but a search of the Department’s various file collections and of the Truman and Byrnes Papers has failed to bring such a memorandum to light. A literal transcription of the original notes is therefore printed here. For a fuller reconstruction of this Truman–Stalin conversation, prepared by Bohlen in March 1960 on the basis of these notes and from memory, see document No. 1419 , post . For another account of this meeting, see Byrnes, Speaking Frankly , p. 205. Byrnes subsequently ( All in One Lifetime , p. 290) and erroneously ascribed the subject matter of this conversation to the Truman–Stalin meeting of July 17. See ante , p. 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] . 3 Stalin. 4 Molotov. 5 President Truman. 6 See vol. i , document No. 586 . 7 Byrnes. 8 Harry Hopkins. 9 Konoye. 10 See document No. 1420 , post . Second plenary meeting, 4 p.m. Second plenary meeting, 4 p.m. 1 1 This is the time given on the cover sheet of the Thompson minutes. The Log ( ante , p. 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) indicates that the meeting was called to order at 4:15 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Fleet Admiral Leahy Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gromyko Mr. Dunn Sir William Strang Mr. Gusev Mr. Davies Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Sobolev Mr. Harriman Mr. Pauley Mr. Bohlen 2 Mr. Cohen 3 Mr. Thompson 4 2 Bohlen acted as Truman’s interpreter at all the plenary meetings. 3 Cohen’s presence is assumed from the existence of his notes on the meeting, post , p. 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] . 4 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 4 p.m. top secret Press Churchill raised the question of the press in relation to the Conference. At Tehran it had been difficult for the press to obtain access to the Conference; at Yalta it had been impossible; here there were many representatives of the press outside the well-guarded fortress in which the Conference was taking place and they were raising a great outcry in the world press regarding the inadequacy of their access to information. Stalin inquired who had let them in. Churchill replied they were outside the compound. He recognized that secrecy and quiet were necessary for the work of the Conference. If his colleagues agreed he was willing to have a talk with the press not to explain the work of the meeting but rather why the press must be excluded or it might be delegated to the President or to someone else to do this. The President pointed out that each delegation had a press representative here and suggested that it be left to them to handle and that this meeting be kept secret as the others have always been. He was not worried about the correspondents who were mostly American. This was agreed to. Churchill said he had only offered himself as the lamb and that in any event he would only go if the Generalissimo would agree to rescue him. Rapporteur’s Report of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 18 The President said that the Foreign Ministers had agreed that the agenda of the present meeting should be the following: 1. The question of procedure for peace negotiations and territorial settlements. 2. The question of the authority of the Control Council for Germany in political questions. 3. The Polish question, particularly the problems having to do with the liquidation of the former London Polish Government and with the implementation of the Yalta agreement on Poland. 5 The President said it was agreed that the Secretary of State would present the report of the Foreign Ministers meeting and he would now ask him to do so. Procedure for Peace Settlements Mr. Byrnes then read section 1 of his report dealing with the procedure for peace settlements (Attachment 1). 6 Stalin said that the Soviet delegation withdrew its reservation to paragraph 1 of the United States draft and that the rest of the draft was acceptable. 7 Churchill said he wondered about the words “with a view to their submission to the United Nations”. Mr. Byrnes said that the Declaration of [ by ] United Nations of January 1, 1942 8 called for this. Churchill said he assumed this meant the ultimate submission of the treaties to the United Nations. Stalin said this made no difference as the three powers would represent the interests of all. Churchill said it was all right if this was clear. The President said that the report on the procedure for peace settlements was agreed to unanimously. Political Authority of the Control Council for Germany Mr. Byrnes read section 2 of his report (Attachment 1). 9 Churchill said the word “Germany” was used repeatedly. What was Germany for this purpose? Was it pre-war Germany. If this were meant he agreed. The President asked what was the understanding of the Soviet delegation. Stalin replied that Germany is what she has become after the war. No other Germany existed now. Austria for example was not now a part of Germany. The President proposed that for this purpose they consider Germany as it existed in 1937. Stalin proposed to add “minus what Germany had lost in 1945”. The President observed that Germany had lost all in 1945. Stalin replied that he was speaking geographically and said that it was impossible to get away from the results of the war. The President agreed but said it was necessary to have a line from which to start. Stalin referred to the Sudetenland which Germany had taken from Czechoslovakia. Did his colleagues propose that this be considered part of Germany? The President replied that he had suggested the Germany of 1937. Stalin agreed that from a formal point of view Germany might be considered in this way. He suggested that the Western frontier of Poland be fixed now and that the question would then become clear. The President said that this could best be done when it had been decided what to do with Germany. Stalin said that Germany was a country with no government and with no definite frontier. It had no frontier guards. It did have four occupied zones. The President said he still suggested that 1937 Germany be taken as a point from which to operate in considering this matter. Stalin replied that of course they would have to base themselves on some starting point and from this point of view the Germany of 1937 was satisfactory. Churchill said he agreed and The President noted that Germany of 1937 was agreed to. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that economic questions connected with Germany had been referred to the subcommittee and that it was not possible to finish with this question until the subcommittee had reported. It was, however, possible to discuss the political section of the report. 10 Certain changes in drafting had been referred to a subcommittee but that would not prevent discussion of political questions now. Stalin said the Soviet delegation accepted, in the main, all the points in the political section of this proposed agreement. The Soviet delegation, however, had one amendment to propose in point 5, 11 namely, the deletion of the last sentence. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the Foreign Ministers had already agreed to this. 12 Stalin noted that the Soviet delegation agreed to the document but said that the drafting could be looked over. Mr. Eden proposed that the Foreign Ministers look over the redraft the next morning and submit it to the next meeting of the heads of state. This was agreed to. Churchill drew attention to section 2, paragraph (1), ( b ), 13 which covered the destruction of arms, implements of war and so forth. There were many things which could not be destroyed such as wind tunnels and other technical facilities. Would it not be well to have some use of them? The President pointed out that the words of the report were “shall be seized or destroyed”. Stalin said that they were not barbarians and they would not destroy research institutions. Churchill said he meant they could share them and use them together. Stalin said he agreed that this could be done. The Polish Question Mr. Byrnes read section 3 of his report dealing with the Polish question (Attachment 1). 14 Stalin also presented a statement on the Polish question which was read by the interpreter (Attachment 2). 15 Churchill said that the burden of this matter lies on the British Government. When Hitler drove the Poles out of Poland, Great Britain received them. There was no property worthwhile belonging to the London Polish Government which the British have now disowned. There were about twenty million pounds in gold which has been frozen. He supposed it was the ultimate asset of the Central Polish Bank and that they must follow whatever is the normal course of such transfers. This gold was not, however, in the control of the London Polish Government. He added that the Polish Embassy in London had been vacated by Raczkiewicz and is available to the representative of the Polish Provisional Government. The Ambassador of the Polish Provisional Government may have it when he wants it and the sooner he arrives to take it the better. Churchill said he may be asked how the Polish Government had been financed. The answer was that it had been financed by the British Government which had expended about £120,000,000 to finance the Polish Army and to look after Poles who had fled the German scourge and who had taken refuge on British shores—the only asylum available to them in Europe. When the London Polish Government had been disavowed and they had recognized the new provisional government, the British had arranged that three months salary be paid to the employees of the London Government and that they be dismissed. He thought it would have been improper if they had not given these people an opportunity to look around to see what they would do. The expense of this fell on the British Government. Churchill asked the indulgence of the President in pointing out that the British position was unique. They had to deal with the transfer or liquidation of the Polish forces who had fought with them. Some Poles had got out of France, others had escaped from Switzerland to Italy. They got 40 or 50 thousand out of France before the French capitulation and had constructed a Polish Army of about five divisions which was based in England. There were a great many Poles in a Polish corps of three divisions in Italy which was also in a very excited frame of mind. This Polish Army of about 200,000, front and rear, fought with great bravery and discipline here in Germany and also in Italy. They suffered heavy losses and held the line with distinction. Relations with these men involved the honor of His Majesty’s Government. Pledges had been given to Parliament, but in any event they would feel obliged to treat them in a manner which the world as a whole would approve. Stalin interrupted to say “of course”. Churchill said that these men had taken an oath to President Raczkiewicz. He said it was necessary for him to state British policy toward these men. It was to persuade as many as possible to return to Poland. He had been very angry when he learned that General Anders, who is a good soldier, but who, Marshal Stalin knows, is anti-Russian in his views, told his troops that if they returned to Poland they would probably be sent to Siberia. Disciplinary action would be taken against this officer. This was the British policy but they needed a little time. This policy also applied to civilian employees. Of course, the better things were in Poland, the quicker they would go. Churchill wished to take this occasion to rejoice in the improvement which had developed in the Polish situation and to express the wish for the success of the new Polish Provisional Government. He referred to the fact that Mr. Mikolajczyk had contributed to its establishment. He had wished for more in the setting up of this Government but the progress made was a splendid example of the collaboration of the great powers. He had said in Parliament as a pledge, because feeling after the Crimea Conference was high on the Polish question, that if soldiers who had fought for Britain did not wish to return to Poland they would receive them in the British Empire. They could not cast adrift men who had been brothers in arms. He hoped as few as possible would remain and they would be encouraged to return to Poland. If the Polish Provisional Government could give them the assurance that they would be well received in full freedom and under appropriate economic conditions, this would be of great help. He would like them to feel assured in returning to their home which had been freed by the victory of the Red Army. The Foreign Ministers might discuss this matter. Mr. Churchill said he had read the Soviet paper on this question which had been submitted earlier in the meeting and his remarks were in answer to it. They showed that subject to what he had said he agreed with it and suggested that it be sent to the Foreign Ministers to see if anything should be added. He said the British were also submitting a paper on Poland. 16 Stalin said he appreciated the difficulties of the British Government. They had sheltered the former rulers of Poland and in spite of this these foreign rulers had caused much trouble to them. The Soviet draft was not intended to make the British position more complicated. Its purpose was to put an end to the position which still existed. The Government of Arciszewski continued to exist; it had means to conduct activities; it had agents and press representatives. This made an unfavorable impression on public opinion in all allied nations. If Mr. Churchill pointed out some items in the Soviet draft that complicated the British position he was prepared to withdraw them. He repeated that it was only intended to end the present situation. Churchill said the British delegation agreed with Stalin but he pointed out that when you cut off money and end a Government you cannot prevent—in England—individuals from going on talking. This included members of Parliament. After the departure of Mr. Mikolajczyk he had never seen the members of this Government nor had the Foreign Secretary. But what could be done if Arciszewski wandered through the streets of London and talked with journalists? He repeated that the British Government had nothing to do with these men and was giving them no facilities. They had to be careful, however, about the Army, if they were to prevent mutiny and possibly bloodshed in which case their own people would be killed. In this connection he said that many of them were in Scotland and that they only wanted to get rid of them. The British had the same objectives as the Soviets. They asked for help and a little time and also that Poland be made an attractive place for Poles to return to. Churchill said that they were willing for the draft of the Soviet Government to be examined by the three Foreign Secretaries in the light of this discussion and of the paper which he would submit. He agreed that this matter [should] be settled as soon as possible. The President observed that there was no fundamental difference. Churchill asked for time to get the Polish soldiers into a condition in which they would wish to return to Poland. Stalin had agreed to withdraw any points in the Soviet draft which would complicate the position of the British Government. The President stated that he was also interested in the Polish question. He recalled that the Yalta agreement had been reached on the holding of free and secret Polish elections as soon as possible. He hoped that this procedure would be carried out by the Polish Government. Stalin proposed that the question be referred to the Foreign Secretaries. Churchill agreed but suggested that the whole Polish question be referred to the Foreign Ministers and that they bring out a new draft. Stalin said he wished to state that the Polish Government had never refused to hold elections. Churchill inquired if it was agreed that they would continue tomorrow the discussion of the big question covered in section 2 of the report, 17 namely, the German question. The President replied in the affirmative and Stalin said it was only a question of wording. The President agreed. On the proposal of The President it was agreed that the agenda of the next meeting would be prepared by the Foreign Ministers. Churchill said he was impressed by the question of political principles to be applied to Germany and that it was well to discuss it at the next meeting. It was, however, a very big question. Were there to be uniform or different practices in the different zones? Stalin said he understood that they were all in favor of the uniform policy. The President stated that was correct. Churchill said he only wished to emphasize this. The meeting adjourned. 18 5 See document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 6 Ante , p. 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] . 7 The Cohen notes, infra , attribute to Molotov this statement and various other statements here attributed to Stalin. 8 Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1600. 9 Ante , p. 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] . 10 Ante , p. 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] . Cf. document No. 856 , post . 11 Of document No. 852 , post . 12 See ante , pp. 73–74 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . 13 Of document No. 852 , post . 14 Ante , p. 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] . 15 Document No. 1120 , post . 16 See document No. 1121 , post . 17 i. e., the Rapporteur’s report, ante , p. 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] . 18 At 6:00 p.m. See Log, ante , p. 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 4 p.m. Churchill : When we were at Teheran, there were no journalists. At Yalta, there were few. Here they are all about. They carry powerful weapons. They are making a great outcry. Molotov : Where are they? Churchill : They are not in the compound. We can only do our work in absolute secrecy. If my colleagues are willing I am willing to have a talk with them and explain as a newspaper man the need for secrecy. I am willing to speak to them or to have the President or the Marshal speak to them. Molotov : What do they wish? Are their demands known to everyone? Truman : We each have a press representative here. Let them handle it. We will make no communication until the end of the Conference. I am not disturbed by them. Most of them are Americans. Your election is over and so is mine. Let us proceed. The Foreign Secretaries have recommended the following items for discussion: 1. Machinery for peace settlement. Shall we discuss this? Molotov : I agree. Truman : Draft proposal for Council of Foreign Ministers (American proposal) 1 approved in principle. May I ask the Secretary of State to read the report of the Foreign Secretaries? Molotov : Yes. Churchill : Yes. (Secretary of State Byrnes reads report of the foreign secretaries). Three questions presented: 1. Peace machinery. 2. Control Commission for Germany. 3. Polish question. Truman : Is it your pleasure to proceed with the first point? Molotov : The Soviet Delegation withdrew its reservation in regard to paragraph 1, as to the rest, it agrees to accept. 2 Churchill : What is the meaning of reference to submission to the United Nations? Byrnes : This is required by United Nations undertaking not to make a separate peace. Churchill : It means with a view to their ultimate submission. Molotov : It makes no difference. The three powers represent the whole. Churchill : British Delegation agrees. Byrnes : (proceeds with reading of report.) Truman : What is your pleasure regarding the second item? This is the principles for the control of Germany. Churchill : What do we mean by Germany? If we mean pre-war Germany, I agree to such. Stalin : Germany is what has become of her after war. No other Germany exists. Austria is not a part of Germany. Truman : Why not say the Germany of 1937? Stalin : Minus what she has lost. Let us for the time being regard Germany as a geographical section. Truman : But what geographical section? Stalin : We cannot get away from the results of the war. Truman : But we must have a starting point. Stalin : Do you wish to restore German administration to Sudan line [ the Sudetenland ]? Truman : I said Germany of 1937. Stalin : It may be so understood from a formal point of view. If German administration appears in Koenigsberg, we would expel it. Truman : We said territorial changes are to be made at the peace conference. Stalin : Let us fix the western frontier of Poland. I have difficulty of [ in? ] saying what is the frontier of Germany now. No frontier guards, no troops. The country is broken up into four occupation zones. Truman : I am still suggesting we shall proceed from Germany of 1937. Stalin : We shall proceed from there as a starting point. Churchill : I agree. Truman : That is the Germany of the Versailles Treaty. So it is agreed that the Germany of 1937 should be the starting point. Stalin : Have we finished the political principles? Byrnes : The economic principles have been referred to a subcommittee. As to political section, it is reported complete and is ready for discussion. Stalin : The Russian Delegation accepts in the main all the points in the political section. There is one amendment to item 5. If possible, it would be well to delete the last four lines. We agree to the rest but wish a commission to go over the style of the document. Eden : I hope the foreign secretaries can go over the drafting committee’s draft tomorrow. Stalin : That would be better. Truman : That is agreed. Churchill : I refer to Section 2 (i) ( b ). There are experimental military stations (wind tunnels, etc.) in Germany which should not be immediately destroyed. Byrnes : The language is seized or destroyed. Churchill : We shall use them share and share alike. Molotov : The Soviet delegation has a draft to submit. Byrnes : (proceeds with reading of the report on Polish question.) Molotov’s paper is read. It suggests severance of all relations with the former Polish government, the transfer of all assets to the government of national unity, and the placing of Polish armed forces and fleet under the new Polish government. Churchill : The burden of this matter rests on Britain. We received the Poles when they were driven out by the Germans. There is no property of any kind or extent belonging to the old Polish government. There are 20 million pounds gold in London and Canada which is frozen and is the ultimate property of the Polish national state. There is a Polish Embassy vacated by the old ambassador which is available to the ambassador of the new government as soon as they send one and the sooner the better. The Polish Government has been financed during the last five years by the British Government. We have advanced 120 million pounds sterling for them and their troops. When the Polish Government in London was disavowed, it was arranged that three months’ salary should be paid all employees and they should be dismissed. It would have been improper to do otherwise. The expense has been borne by Great Britain. Our position is unique in another way. We must deal with the transfer of forces which have fought with us against the Germans. Some of them came from France after France fell. Some came to Italy from Switzerland. We built up five divisions of 50,000 escaped Poles. The Poles built up an army of 180 to 200 thousand men. These men have fought with great bravery and discipline. They have had heavy losses. I must make it perfectly clear that this involves the honor of His Majesty’s Government. We have given pledges to Parliament and we must treat them in a manner which the world as a whole will regard as just and fair. Stalin : Of course. Churchill : These men have taken an oath to their President and we have ceased to recognize him. What is the policy we are pursuing? Our policy is to persuade as many as possible to go back to Poland. I was angry when General Anders said to his troops that if they went back to Poland they will be sent to Siberia. This officer will not be permitted to make such prejudicial statements to the troops. Our policy is to persuade as many to go back to Poland as soon as possible. This applies also to civilian officials, and employees. The better things are in Poland, the quicker they will go. I rejoice in the improvement which has taken place in Poland and I wish every success to the new Polish government. It is not perfect but it is a great advance. I have said if there were Polish soldiers who have fought with us who do not go back we will receive them as British citizens. But we hope the great bulk will return. It would assist if the new Polish Government could give undertakings that those who do return will be safe in their livelihood. They should with proper assurances want to go back to the land of their fathers which has been liberated by Russian arms. Stalin : Have you read the draft of the Russian delegation? Churchill : I have read the draft. I agree in principle, subject to what I have said. I should be pleased to have the draft remitted to the foreign secretaries to be considered along with the British suggestion. Stalin : I appreciate the difficult position of the British who have sheltered their former rulers. 3 I know that despite this fact the former rulers have caused great difficulty for the British government. I assure Mr. Churchill my draft is not intended to make the position of the British government more difficult. It is intended only to put an end to the former Polish government. They have their agents and press which make an unfavorable impression on public opinion. The purpose of our draft is to put an end to this position. I am fully prepared to withdraw anything that will complicate the British situation. Our only purpose is to put an end to an indefinite situation. Churchill : If you cut off all financial aid, you can’t in England prevent their talking. We have no relations with them. But we have to be careful about the Army. They might mutiny. Our purposes are the same. We ask for trust and confidence in the making of [ in making? ] Poland a place which will attract them. Truman : It seems there is no fundamental difference. The Prime Minister is asking time for soldiers to get back. I think there should be an agreement. I am interested in the Polish Government, particularly in free elections assured by the Yalta agreement. Stalin : Let us refer this matter to the foreign secretaries, including the matter of elections. The Polish Provisional Government has never refused to hold elections. Truman : That is all the foreign secretaries have submitted today. Is there anything further? Shall I suggest that the foreign secretaries prepare another agenda for tomorrow? Churchill : I am concerned with the weight and scope of the political principles. Are we going to have uniform control or different practices in the four zones? Stalin : This is dealt with in the political section. My understanding is that we all favor a unified policy. Meeting adjourned. 1 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra . 2 The Thompson minutes, supra , attribute to Stalin this statement and various other statements here attributed to Molotov. 3 i. e., the Poles’ former rulers. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. 1 1 J. C. S. 198th Meeting. Present Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Lincoln General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Esposito Fleet Admiral King Captain McDill General of the Army Arnold Captain Stroop General Somervell Captain Oster Lieutenant General Hull. Colonel Peck Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Dean Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Donnelly Major General Gross Colonel Stone Major General Deane Colonel Riggs Major General Norstad Colonel Cary Brigadier General Cabell Lieutenant Colonel Woodward Brigadier General Jamison Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)]] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Postdam, July 19, 1945, 10 a.m. J. G. S. Files Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. G. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Postdam, July 19, 1945, 10 a.m. [Extract] top secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War (C. C. S. 884, 884/1 and 884/2 2 ) General Hull said that it was the desire of the British that information be given to the Russians on a combined basis. This had not been the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Intelligence Committee had prepared an intelligence report on the Japanese situation which had been presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 3 and the Joint Intelligence Committee had prepared a report which might be given to the Russians. 4 He said that he did not believe that the British would agree to giving the Russians the Combined Intelligence Committee report, but he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be willing to give the report of the Joint Intelligence Committee to the Russians. General Marshall said that he thought the British were more concerned in regard to intelligence that might be given the Russians on special projects than in regard to operational intelligence. General Deane said that he believed that the British had two motives in presenting their views: first, to share in the operational running of the war, and second, to exchange information with the Russians on a quid pro quo basis. He said that he believed that we should give the Russians operational intelligence without reference to the British. He agreed to a certain extent in the exchange of intelligence with the Russians on a quid pro quo basis, but it had been the policy of the Military Mission to Moscow to go further than that and to provide the Russians with information they needed to win the war. He felt that Russian security was entirely adequate and that they would not disclose information furnished them. It was his view that the only relations that the British would have with the Russians in connection with the war in the Far East was in the exchange of intelligence, whereas our interest was operational and much greater than that of the British. Admiral King said that he had noted that the British paper on the subject (C. C. S. 884/2) was written before yesterday’s meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and he felt that their motive at that time was to take an equal part with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operational strategy of the war against Japan. He thought there should be a delimitation between operational intelligence and general intelligence; that we should give the Russians directly such operational intelligence as we considered necessary and that general intelligence should be furnished the Russians on a common basis which would mean a continuation of the present arrangement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Agreed to discuss this subject with the British Chiefs of Staff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Documents Nos. 609 , 611 , and 614, respectively, printed in vol. i . 3 Not printed as a whole. See ante , p. 36, footnote 5 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] . 4 Not printed. Cf. post , p. 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] . Second meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11 a.m. Second meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11 a.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Gromyko Mr. Cohen Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gusev Mr. Page Mr. Novikov Mr. Thompson 1 1 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)]] Thompson Minutes Postdam, July 19, 1945, 11 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 11 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)]] Rapporteur’s Report Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 11 a.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1945 Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] Thompson Minutes Postdam, July 19, 1945, 11 a.m. top secret Mr. Eden in the Chair stated his understanding that the Agenda for today included— (1) German political questions, on which there was a revised draft; (2) Poland; and (3) German Economic Problems. Mr. Eden stated that before consideration of the agenda, he understood that Mr. Byrnes had a point to make on the paper concerning the Council of Foreign Ministers. 2 Mr. Molotov at this point asked whether he could add to the agenda. Reconsideration of Paper on Council of Foreign Ministers Mr. Byrnes stated that he wished to move reconsideration of the language of the paper on the Council of Foreign Ministers. He referred to the members charged with duties under section 3 and specifically to the language restricting membership to governments signatory to the terms of surrender. He pointed out that some governments were at war but were not signatory to the armistice terms and asked that the drafting committee on this subject be instructed to reconcile points of view on this phase of the matter. Mr. Molotov inquired whether paragraph 3 was referred to and stated that it was not quite clear to him what question was involved. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that France, for example, was at war with Italy but was not signatory to the armistice terms 3 and asked whether she would be permitted to participate in discussions regarding Italy. Mr. Molotov replied that he believed that she would. Mr. Byrnes stated that under the present language of this paper he did not believe that a state in such a situation could participate. Mr. Molotov asked whether the change would provide only for Italy. Mr. Byrnes replied that if Russia, for example, were at war with a country but was not a signatory to the armistice terms, Russia should not be excluded. Mr. Molotov then asked specifically whether France should take part in the formulation of the peace treaty with Rumania. Mr. Byrnes stated his belief that if France were not at war with any country she would be present during any discussions but would not necessarily participate in the decisions. Mr. Molotov then moved that Mr. Byrnes’ motion be accepted. Mr. Eden stated general agreement and asked Mr. Molotov what subjects he wished to add to the agenda. German Fleet and Merchant Marine Mr. Molotov stated that he had a draft on the German fleet and merchant marine which he wished his colleagues to study. He stated that the draft would be ready in 10–15 minutes. 4 Consideration of the Agenda Mr. Eden then brought the meeting back to the agenda and stated that the drafting committee on German political questions had a revised draft ready for presentation. He asked Mr. [ Sir William ] Strang to present it. Mr. Strang explained in some detail various changes made by the drafting committee in the text of this paper. (See Attachment 1 5 ) In paragraph 1 [ 2 ] (i) the word “demilitarization” was added after the word “disarmament” in order to bring this section in line with the declaration issued in Berlin on June 5. 6 Subparagraph ( a ) immediately after subparagraph (i) was altered to accord with EAC recommendations. 7 Subparagraph ( b ) was altered by the deletion of the word “seize” and the substitution of the phrase “held at the disposal of the Allies”, since most seizures had already been made. Mr. Molotov then thanked the drafting committee for its work, and was followed by Mr. Eden and Mr. Byrnes . Mr. Byrnes moved that the text be approved and this was agreed to. Poland Mr. Eden stated that the next item on the agenda was Poland. He added that the Prime Minister during the meeting on July 18 had promised to produce the text of a possible proposal. 8 Mr. Eden stated gratitude to the Generalissimo for his understanding of British difficulties even though their purposes were the same. The British Delegation had produced the text of a draft proposal and had attempted a Russian translation, which was only in manuscript form. This proposal 9 was delivered to the delegates and there was an interim period for consideration of it during which Mr. Molotov distributed copies of the Russian proposal. 10 After a brief period Mr. Eden again called the meeting to order. Mr. Molotov stated that the Russian Delegation had no objection to the first paragraph of the proposal. There was, however, some question about paragraph 2. The title [ paragraph? ] began “The British and U. S. Governments express their willingness.” This was not considered urgent enough and some expression of the need for immediacy was needed. Mr. Eden stated that he wished to say that a telegram had come giving information on this subject. The British have done more than the Prime Minister was able to indicate during the July 18 session of the Heads of Governments. 11 The British Government had taken under control the whole machinery of the former Polish Government, which was being liquidated rapidly. A Treasury committee has assumed full control of all Polish finances. All Polish ministries have been closed and diplomatic privileges have been withdrawn. All properties except the Polish Embassy have been taken by the British Government and all work not connected with the liquidation of the former Polish Government has been stopped. All recruiting for Polish armed forces has been stopped and the War Office is now supervising the activities of the Polish General Staff. Polish ships are under charter to the United Kingdom, which desires to discuss this question with the Warsaw government. Much has been done and is being done. Mr. Molotov then pointed out that since there is no representative of Poland here, it is impossible for the Soviet Delegation to speak for them. The principal question is to prevent the London Government from transferring assets and properties to private persons. Mr. Eden stated that he was able to give absolute assurances on this point. Mr. Molotov then pointed out that the law governing these matters was recent and that many transfers might have taken place in the past. Mr. Eden replied that British action had been taken from the moment that recognition was accorded to the Warsaw government. The British Government is now awaiting the arrival of a representative of the Polish Provisional Government in London in order that immediate discussions can begin. Mr. Molotov again raised the question of immediacy. Mr. Eden replied that discussions could not be begun with persons who are absent. Mr. Molotov then stated that he only wanted a statement stressing immediacy. Mr. Eden expressed the belief that such statement could be made and Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Byrnes then mentioned the fact that an attempt had been made to transfer the Polish Embassy property in Washington but that this had been stopped and the Embassy had been vacated and was now at the disposal of the Warsaw Government. Mr. Molotov then raised the matter of stocks, assets, and property and asked whether the sentence from the Russian proposal forbidding such transfers 12 could be used. Mr. Eden replied that he would consider a phrase noting that steps had been taken. Mr. Molotov then questioned practice in other countries, specifically mentioning Norway. Mr. Eden then agreed that a drafting committee might be appointed in order to try to find words which would meet Mr. Molotov’s wishes and asked whether there were any other points in the draft to which the Soviet Delegation took exception. Mr. Molotov inquired concerning the debts of the London Polish Government and asked for an indication of the totals. Mr. Byrnes replied that he was unable to give a definite answer on this point and pointed out that the statement in paragraph 2 concerning discussions which would take place on these matters apparently met Mr. Molotov’s point. Mr. Eden noted that the draft paper only suggests that discussions embrace this question and does not ask the Polish Provisional Government to accept a liability in advance. Mr. Byrnes suggested that the matter be referred to a committee to reconcile differences in language, and Mr. Molotov agreed. Mr. Eden felt that the meeting should hear more about remaining points first. Mr. Molotov then stated that the last words in paragraph 3 regarding the assurance of a livelihood carried an implication which no country could guarantee. Mr. Eden suggested the words “personal freedom and security.” Mr. Molotov suggested the inclusion of the words “without discrimination.” Mr. Molotov then asked whether the Crimea text 13 could not be used in the last paragraph and suggested that this point and other differences be left to the drafting committee. Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Eden agreed. Mr. Byrnes appointed Mr. Harriman and Mr. Bohlen to serve on the drafting committee. Mr. Eden appointed Ambassador Clark Kerr and Mr. Allen. Mr. Molotov appointed Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Golunski. Mr. Eden asked whether it was possible that a draft would be ready for the meeting this afternoon. Mr. Molotov stated that he would prefer to have the question discussed on July 20 since the matter should not be hurried. Mr. Byrnes then suggested that an effort be made to get a draft today, but if this was not possible it be held over until tomorrow. Mr. Molotov agreed. German Economic Problems Mr. Eden stated that the next item on the agenda was the consideration of German economic problems but that he understood that the drafting committee had no report ready since it had not been possible to meet yesterday. Therefore, neither this meeting nor the meeting of the Heads of States could consider this question today. Mr. Eden then suggested consideration of an agenda for the meeting of the Heads of States. Mr. Molotov asked that other matters be discussed first. These included the disposition of the German fleet and merchant marine, and Spain. A Russian proposal on Spain was distributed at this point. (See attachment 2 14 ). Mr. Eden inquired concerning the disposition of these two matters. Mr. Byrnes stated that he saw no reason why these two subjects should not be put on the agenda for discussion today by the Heads of States. Mr. Eden stated that it was impossible for him to discuss the German fleet without consultation with naval authorities, who were not now present. Mr. Byrnes reiterated his belief that both questions should be discussed by the Heads of States. He also suggested that the President’s paper on the implementation of the Yalta agreement 15 come up for consideration this afternoon. Mr. Eden remarked that the President’s paper dealt only with the Balkans and asked for permission to add two items on the British agenda. These are: one paper on Yugoslavia 16 and one on Rumania. 17 Mr. Byrnes agreed that these questions should be added and if not reached on the agenda today should go over until tomorrow. Mr. Molotov stated that he had no objection. Agenda for Meeting of Heads of States Mr. Eden then recapitulated the items agreed upon for discussion by the Heads of States on the afternoon of July 19. These were: 1. Agreed text on political control of Germany; 2. Poland; 3. The German fleet and merchant marine; 4. Spain; 5. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration; 6. Yugoslavia; 7. Rumania. Mr. Molotov asked whether there were any drafts available on items 6 and 7. Mr. Eden promised them by this afternoon. Mr. Eden , after asking whether there was anything else to come before the meeting, then declared the meeting adjourned. 2 Document No. 712 , post . 3 France signed neither the armistice with Italy concluded at Fairfield Camp, Sicily, September 3, 1943, nor the instrument of surrender signed at Malta, September 29, 1943. For texts, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740, 2742. 4 Document No. 1007 , post . 5 Document No. 856 , post (not attached, but clearly identified). 6 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649. Text also in Department of State Bulletin , vol. xii , p. 1051. 7 See the accompaniment to document No. 1038 , post , section i , paragraph 1. 8 See ante , p. 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] . 9 Document No. 1121 , post . 10 Presumably document No. 1120 , post . 11 See ante , pp. 91–93 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] . 12 See document No. 1120 , post , the last sentence of paragraph 1. 13 See document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 14 Document No. 1177 , post (not attached but clearly identified). 15 Document No. 745 , post . 16 Document No. 1202 , post . 17 Document No. 837 , post . United States Delegation Memorandum Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 11 a.m. Summary of Meeting of Foreign Ministers Thursday Morning, July 19 i. agenda of meeting of heads of governments It was agreed that the following subjects should be recommended to the Heads of Governments for discussion this afternoon: 1. Authority of the Control Council for Germany in Political Questions . 2 The redraft of the U. S. proposal 3 on this subject drawn up by the subcommittee named yesterday was approved by the Foreign Ministers and is ready for discussion by the Heads of Governments. 2. Polish Question . A British paper on this subject was referred to a subcommittee for drafting changes. If the subcommittee is able to report by four o’clock, this question will be ready for discussion by the Heads of Governments this afternoon; otherwise, it will be held over until tomorrow. 4 3. Disposition of German Fleet and Merchant Ships . A Russian paper on this subject has been presented for discussion. 5 4. Spain . A Russian paper proposing a policy to be adopted by the three Governments toward the Franco regime has been presented for discussion. 6 5. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States . The paper on this subject presented by the President at the opening meeting of the Conference is recommended for discussion. 7 6. Yugoslavia . The British will raise the question of the implementation of the Yalta declaration on Yugoslavia and hope to have a paper ready on this subject. 7. British and U. S. Oil Interests in Rumania . The British will raise this question and hope to have a paper ready for presentation. ii. council of foreign ministers The Foreign Ministers agreed that the document establishing a Council of Foreign Ministers, which was approved by the Heads of Governments yesterday, should be reconsidered and paragraph 3 thereof should be revised in such a way as to permit any member of the Council at war with a given state to participate in the peace settlement concerning that state, even if it was not a signatory of the armistice terms concluded with that state. It was understood that if a member of the Council was not at war with a given state, it might participate in the discussions of the peace settlement concerning that state but would not participate in the decisions connected with that peace settlement. 1 Authorship not indicated. Apparently this summary was before Truman during the Third Plenary Meeting. 2 Manuscript notation in the margin by Truman: “agreed to”. 3 For the documents referred to in this summary, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra . 4 Manuscript notation in the margin by Truman: “Tomorrow”. 5 Manuscript notation in the margin by Truman: “For future disposition”. 6 Manuscript notation at the end of the paragraph by Truman: “Postpone”. 7 Manuscript notation at the end of the paragraph by Truman: “Postponed”. Rapporteur’s Report 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1945 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] Rapporteur’s Report 1 Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 11 a.m. Plenary Meeting , 19 th July 1945 Report by Mr. Eden on the Meeting of the Foreign Secretaries on July 19 th (1) The United States Secretary of State informed the meeting that the United States Government desired to propose an amendment to the redraft, adopted by the Foreign Secretaries meeting on July 18th, of paragraph 3 of the United States draft proposal for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers. 2 The meeting agreed to refer this point to a drafting committee. (2) Germany. Political questions . The Foreign Secretaries have given further consideration to the political section of the proposed agreement on the Political and Economic Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period circulated by the United States Delegation. Preliminary consideration was given to this draft by the Heads of Governments at their meeting yesterday and the Foreign Secretaries were asked to submit a report on this draft at the present meeting. The Foreign Secretaries now submit a revised draft (Flag A) 3 of the political section of the proposed agreement, which is already in the hands of Delegations. In addition to clarifying the draftmanship of the text, the Foreign Secretaries have supplemented it in a few places with new material. They now recommend it for acceptance by the Heads of Governments. When the economic section has been discussed and agreed upon, it will be for consideration whether the whole agreement should be made public. (3) Poland . The United Kingdom Delegation put forward a redraft of the draft “Statement of the Heads of the Three Governments on the Polish Question” put forward by Marshal Stalin at the Plenary Meeting on July 18th. The meeting agreed to refer this redraft to a drafting committee. agenda for the plenary meeting The meeting agreed to submit the following points for discussion at the Plenary Meeting this afternoon: ( a ) Germany: political questions . ( b ) Poland . This item to be on the agenda if the report of the drafting committee is ready in time. ( c ) The German Navy and Merchant Marine . A memorandum by the Russian Delegation has been circulated. ( d ) Spain . A memorandum by the Russian Delegation has been circulated. ( e ) The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe . A memorandum of July 17th on this subject by the United States delegation has been circulated. ( f ) Yugoslavia . The British Delegation proposed discussion of the situation in Yugoslavia and the fulfilment of the Tito–Šubašić Agreement 4 and undertook to submit a paper on the subject. ( g ) Rumania . The British Delegation proposed discussion of the question of the removal as booty of Allied industrial equipment, especially in Rumania, and undertook to submit a paper on the subject. 1 Eden acted as Rapporteur for this meeting. 2 For the documents referred to in this report but not separately cited, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, ante , pp. 101–106 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] . 3 Presumably document No. 856 , post . 4 Text in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251 – 254 . First meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, 11 a.m. First meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, 11 a.m. 1 1 Time of meeting from the heading cited in footnote 1 to document No. 858 , post . Present 2 United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Mr. Clayton Mr. Turner Mr. Maisky Mr. Murphy 2 With respect to the usual representation on this subcommittee, see post , p. 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] . [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)]] Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) Potsdam, July 19, 1945. Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Germany ( Murphy ) 3 Potsdam , July 19, 1945. Memorandum Subject: Subcommittee of Experts on Economics. This committee agreed to proceed informally. The scope of its discussion was limited to a statement of principles and it is expected to report back items on which the members do not agree. Mr. Maisky led off by inquiring what was meant by decentralization. Mr. Clayton explained that this related to the breaking up of trust cartels and monopolies, while Mr. Turner stated that it meant the elimination of a tight central control of industry and commerce. The following definition of decentralization was agreed upon: “The German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified by cartels, syndicates, trusts, and other monopolistic arrangements.” Item No. 10 . 4 Mr. Maisky said he had no quarrel with this principle. Item No. 11 ( a ). Mr. Maisky inquired what is meant by relief of liberated areas. Item No. 11 ( b ). Mr. Turner inquired whether we were talking about the Germany included in the 1937 frontiers. At this point Mr. Maisky made no comment. With respect to the minimum subsistence standard in Germany, a formula was suggested under which it would be essential to maintain in Germany the average standards of living which would not exceed the average living standards in the European countries (European countries excluding the U. K. and U. S. S. R.). Item No. 11 ( c ). Mr. Turner pointed out that [ sic ] the desire to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports. Mr. Maisky said we will consider this point. Item No. 11 ( d ). No grant of credit shall be permitted except with the approval of the Control Council. Item No. 12 . The principles (and proposals)—this was added language by Pauley, here agreed. New Item No. 12 ( a ). This was submitted for consideration. Item No. 13 . To the effect that Germany was to be treated as an economic unit. Agreed. Item No. 13 ( 1 ). Mr. Turner submitted a re-draft. 5 3 Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. Murphy’s memorandum on the meeting of the Economic Subcommittee on July 20 ( post , p. 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] ) is a continuation of this memorandum. 4 These items refer to the numbered paragraphs of document No. 852 , post . 5 Not found. Stimson–Cherwell conversation, noon Stimson–Cherwell conversation, noon Present United States United Kingdom Mr. Stimson Lord Cherwell Mr. Bundy [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. Stimson’s diary entry for July 19 contains the following summary: “At twelve o’clock Lord Cherwell called, and he and Bundy and I sat out under the trees and talked over S–l. He was very reasonable on the subject of notification to the Russians, feeling about as doubtful as we. He reported Churchill as being much pleased with our luncheon together last Monday [ Tuesday ] 1 and much cheered by the talk.” 1 See ante , p. 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] . Stimson–Alexander conversation, early afternoon Stimson–Alexander conversation, early afternoon Present United States United Kingdom Mr. Stimson Field Marshal Alexander Mr. McCloy Field Marshal Wilson [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] Editor’s Note —No official minutes of this conversation have been found, but Wilson reported upon it later in the day to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (see post , page 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] ). Stimson’s diary entry for July 19 contains the following summary: “After lunch at two o’clock Field Marshal Alexander and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson came in. The main subject of their call was the appointment of Colonel James H. Douglas to be the American member of the Italian Control Commission. There had been delay and some complications about it and Alexander reported that there had been news reports which had been embarrassing to the present incumbent, Admiral Stone. He thereupon proposed a solution by suggesting that Douglas come out on a visit of inspection preparatory to assuming the duties of the office, and invited him to stay with him. Then he would take office later in September. This was agreed to and the telegrams were drawn up and sent. 1 I talked over with Alexander his campaigns in Italy and complimented him on their success which seemed to please him. It is the first time I had met him personally, he having been absent when I visited both Africa and Italy. We talked over the episodes of Tito and de Gaulle in their incursions into Italy.” 1 See document No. 1113 , post . Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. 1 1 C. C. S. 196th Meeting. Present United States United Kingdom General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal General of the Army Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham General Somervell Field Marshal Wilson Lieutenant General Hull General Ismay Vice Admiral Cooke Major-General Laycock Major General Norstad Major-General Hollis Captain Oster Captain McDill Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Captain Moore Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)]] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 18, 1945 J. C. S. Files Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 18, 1945 top secret 1. Approval of the Minutes of the C. C. S. 195 th Meeting , 18 July 1945 The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— a . Approved the conclusions of the C. C. S. 195th Meeting subject to the following amendments: 2 (1) Change item 4 a . to read: “Agreed in principle that that part of the present Southwest Pacific Area lying south of the boundary proposed in paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 852/1, should pass from United States to British command as soon as possible.” (2) Change item 5 e . to read as follows: “In the event the U. S. S. R. enters the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned.” b . Approved the detailed report of the meeting subject to later minor amendments. 2. Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in Far Eastern Operations (C. C. S. 895, 895/1, and 895/2 3 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the reply to the Chief of the French Military Mission in the United States in the Enclosure to C. C. S. 895/2. 3. Combined Chiefs of Staff Machinery After the War With Japan (C. C. S. 891 and 891/1 4 ) Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 891/1. The British Chiefs of Staff were prepared to discuss the matter or to take note of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff as the latter desired. General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not in a position to discuss at this date the post-war relationship between the respective military staffs. Admiral King said that the second paragraph of C. C. S. 891/1 was meant to refer to the procedure envisaged in the changed conclusion under 5 e . of the minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 195th Meeting. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Took note of C. C. S. 891 and 891/1. 4. Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War (C. C. S. 884, 884/1, and 884/2 5 ) Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that it was desirable that the policy adopted in imparting information concerning the Japanese war to the Russians should be coordinated with the policy of the United States Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had considered the matter raised in the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff and had come to the following conclusion:— a . The United States Chiefs of Staff desired to retain freedom of action regarding the passing of purely operational information and intelligence to the Russians. b . On matters of information and intelligence which were not purely operational, the United States Chiefs of Staff would agree not to pass such information to the Russians without consulting the British Chiefs of Staff. c . As regards information and intelligence from purely British sources, this would not be passed without permission of the British Chiefs of Staff. Sir Charles Portal said that there was considerable technical information which had been developed by joint effort, and he asked whether this information would be handled the same as operational information. Admiral King said that information on technical equipment was not included in purely operational information. Operational information or intelligence included information on such matters as weather and the composition and disposition of enemy forces. The technical information referred to by Sir Charles Portal would not, therefore, be handled under a . above. General Marshall said that it was the policy of the United States Chiefs of Staff to pass purely operational information and intelligence freely to the Russians and not to withhold it for bargaining purposes. If such information contributed to the efficiency of the Russian armies or aided in the prosecution of the war the United States Chiefs felt that it should be given to the Russians regardless of whether or not the Russians reciprocated. Sir Alan Brooke said that this policy would be agreeable to the British Chiefs of Staff as they felt that it would be better for the British and United States Chiefs of Staff to pursue the same policy in this matter since both countries have military missions in Moscow. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Agreed: a . Operational Information and Intelligence That the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff will pass to the Russians such operational information and intelligence regarding the theatres in which they are respectively responsible as either may wish and without bargaining. b . Information and Intelligence Other than Operational The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will consult together before passing to the Russians any information and intelligence other than operational. Neither party will pass to the Russians information or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party’s sources without their consent. 5. Planning Date for the End of Organized Resistance by Japan (C. C. S. 880/8 6 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Agreed that for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan be 15 November 1946; that this date be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war. 6. Appointment of Colonel Douglas to Allied Commission in Italy Field Marshal Wilson reported that he had attended that afternoon a meeting between the U. S. Secretary of War, 7 the U. S. Assistant Secretary of War, 8 and Field Marshal Alexander at which the appointment of Colonel Douglas as Chief Commissioner to the Allied Commission in Italy had been discussed. 9 It was proposed at that meeting that Colonel Douglas should visit Italy for a month or so to examine the situation on the spot. He could then take over the appointment from Admiral Stone in September, when all Italian territory, excluding Venezia Giulia, would have been handed back to the Italian Government and a change in the status of the Control Commission to more of a civilian basis would take place. This proposal had been accepted by the United States and British representatives present at the meeting, and subject to approval by Colonel Douglas which was being requested from Washington, 10 it was decided to adopt the above suggestions provided the Department of State and the Foreign Office agreed. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Took note of Field Marshal Wilson’s statement. 2 These amendments have been made in the minutes of the 195th Meeting as printed ante , pp. 83–86 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] . 3 Documents Nos. 1288 , 1290 , and 1291 , post , respectively. 4 Document No. 550, printed in vol. i , and document No. 1197 , post , respectively. 5 Documents Nos. 609 , 611 , and 614, respectively, printed in vol. i . 6 Document No. 602, printed in vol. i . 7 Henry L. Stimson. 8 John J. McCloy. 9 See ante , p. 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] . 10 Douglas subsequently declined the appointment referred to. See document No. 1114 , post , footnote 2, and document No. 1116 , post , footnote 2. Third plenary meeting, 5 p.m. Third plenary meeting, 5 p.m. 1 1 This is the time given on the cover sheet of the Thompson minutes. The Log ( ante , p. 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) indicates that the meeting was called to order at 4:05 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Davies Sir Alexander Cadogan Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov Mr. Harriman Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gromyko Mr. Pauley Major Birse Mr. Gusev Mr. Dunn Mr. Sobolev Mr. Matthews Mr. Pavlov Mr. Cohen Mr. Bohlen Mr. Thompson 2 2 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 5 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 5 p.m. Truman Papers Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 5 p.m. top secret Bulgarian–Greek Frontier Incident Mr. Churchill said he wished to refer to a point which Stalin had raised at the previous meeting concerning an incident on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier. He had made inquiries. The British Government had heard of no fighting. These people did not like each other very much and he did not doubt but that there had been some sniping. There was no Greek field division in northern Greece, however. The British knew this, as they had their own people there. There were seven thousand Greek guards on the Albanian and Yugoslav frontiers. They were there for purposes of internal order. On the other side of the frontier there were 30 thousand Albanian, 30 thousand Yugoslav and 24 thousand Bulgarian troops. He only mentioned this because this Conference of the Great Powers should make clear that there should be no marauding attacks and that frontier questions should be settled by the peace conference. It should be indicated that those who try to violate frontiers are likely to prejudice their own claims. The President said he had never heard of this and that he did not hear it mentioned at the previous meeting. He agreed that frontier matters should be settled at the peace conference. Stalin said there had been some misunderstanding. He had not raised this matter at the previous meeting but in a personal talk with Mr. Churchill. 3 This did not affect the fact that this Conference could consider the matter and he might wish to raise the matter at a later date. Churchill agreed that it was not raised at the meeting, although it had been brought up at this table. He agreed with Mr. Stalin that it could be raised at the Conference. The President then proposed that Mr. Eden submit his report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers. 4 Mr. Eden said that the United States Secretary of State said this morning that he wished to submit an amendment to the redraft of paragraph 3 of the document on the Council of Foreign Ministers. 5 This had been referred to a drafting committee. German Political Question The second point examined at their meeting was the German political question. The Foreign Ministers had considered the economic and political principles that were to guide the Control Council of Germany. Preliminary consideration had been given to this matter by the Heads of Government at a previous meeting. 6 The Foreign Ministers were now submitting a redraft of the political section of the document on this question. 7 In addition to redrafting, they had added some new material. They suggested that when the economic part had been agreed upon, they would consider it and refer it to the meeting of the Heads of Government. The political section of the document was approved as revised. Poland Mr. Eden said that the British had submitted a new draft 8 to replace the paper submitted by the Soviet Delegation 9 on the Polish question at the previous meeting. The Foreign Ministers had had a useful discussion on this subject and had submitted it to a drafting committee. They hoped to present it tomorrow. Churchill observed that when the drafting committee had finished its work, they would discuss it. The President and Stalin agreed. Mr. Eden said that apart from the two subjects already mentioned, the Foreign Ministers proposed the following subjects as the agenda for the present meeting: 1. German Merchant and Naval Fleet. 2. Spain. Mr. Eden pointed out that the Russians had submitted a memorandum on this subject. 10 3. The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. Mr. Eden stated that the United States Delegation had circulated a memorandum on this subject. 11 4. Yugoslavia. The United Kingdom had submitted a paper on this. 12 5. Rumania. Eden said that the British had prepared a memorandum on the removal of oil equipment as trophies. 13 Eden commented that as the meeting of Heads of Government had finished their previous session at an early hour, a long list had been prepared for the present meeting. Disposition of German Merchant and Naval Fleet The President said that with respect to the first question, the disposition of the German fleet, the first thing to consider was, what is reparation and what is war booty. The merchant fleet was to be classified as reparations, as he thought it should; the matter would eventually have to be referred to the Reparations Commission. He said he was interested in the merchant fleet because the United States wanted it to operate under the present control in the Japanese war zone. Stalin said that war material taken by armies in the course of a war is booty. Armies that laid down their arms and surrendered, turned in their arms and these arms were booty. The same thing applied to the navy. It was stipulated in the military proposals put forward by the Three Powers 14 that the navy be surrendered. It was therefore, booty. It was possible, however, to discuss the question whether the merchant fleet was booty or reparations. Regarding the navy, there was no question about the matter. He recalled the case of Italy in which both naval and merchant fleets had been treated as booty and no question had been raised. Mr. Churchill said he did not want to approach this matter from the juridical standpoint. The President said he held the same view. Churchill said he wanted to reach an agreement on this matter between the three powers as a part of their general agreement at the Conference. In saying this, he was speaking only of the German war fleet. He said that they had the whole of the German merchant fleet in their keeping at the present time. Should a general agreement be reached at this Conference and a friendly settlement of their problems be achieved, he would not be opposed to a division of the German fleet. He felt that the question of the Italian fleet could better be discussed in connection with the settlement with Italy. He went on to observe, however, that replacement of losses was relevant to this matter. The British had had immense naval losses in the war. Speaking from memory, they had lost about 10 capital ships and aircraft carriers, 20 cruisers and literally hundreds of destroyers, submarines and various kinds of small crafts. The question of U–Boats stood on a somewhat different footing. These U–Boats had a limited legal use. The Germans had used them in contravention of the international agreements on this subject. 15 As many of them as possible should in his opinion be destroyed. The latest German U–Boats, however, might contain valuable information for the future and that should be reasonably shared by the three Powers. He did not look at the matter solely from a naval point of view. He was aware of the tremendous sacrifices which the Russians had made in the field. He suggested that there should be no final discussion today but he thought that the bulk of the U–Boats should be sunk and the remainder shared equally. With respect to the other naval vessels he thought that they should be divided equally, provided a general agreement was achieved at the Conference and that they parted amicably from this meeting. He had no objection to the Soviet proposal that the German naval fleet be divided. He did not feel that a nation as great and mighty as Russia should be denied this. It should have its flag welcomed. As it took so long to build new vessels, these vessels would be a means of developing a Russian navy and training personnel and would facilitate showing the Russian flag on the ocean. With respect to the German merchant fleet Churchill said he felt that while the Japanese war continued, all captured ships should play their role to the full and contribute to the ending of that war. The limit of the conduct of the Japanese war was shipping. They had sufficient men, planes and naval ships but merchant ships were needed for the movement of men and materials. There was also the difficulty in feeding the British Isles and liberated Europe. Every ton was needed in this critical period. They had all placed all of their shipping in the shipping pool. 16 He would be sorry if this German fleet was not used to conclude the war with Japan. He pointed out that the Finns had had a merchant fleet of some 400 thousand tons which had passed into the hands of their Russian ally. Two Rumanian ships, from available troop ships, had also fallen into Russian hands. If the German fleet was to be divided by three, the Rumanian and Finnish fleet should also be divided. Stalin interrupted to state that the Russians had not taken a single merchant ship from Finland and had taken only one ship from the Rumanians which was used for carrying wounded troops. Churchill replied that he was speaking of the basis of the question. He went on to say that there were others besides the three at this meeting. The Norwegians had suffered terrible losses. Their oil tanker fleet had been very valuable and it had been made use of freely. Other Powers not at the meeting had suffered heavy losses. Perhaps the German fleet should be divided into four and the fourth part might be used for the other Powers not represented at this meeting. He only threw out these suggestions which he thought should be considered. The President said he would be agreeable to a three-way division of the German merchant and naval fleets but he should like it to be done after the Japanese war. We needed these ships not only for the conduct of the war but also to haul food and supplies for rehabilitation of Europe, to our great ally, Russia, Greece, and others. The President said that we will need every bomb and every ton of food. Stalin said what about the navy? The President said he was ready to dispose of them now. He added that when the Japanese war was over, the United States would have merchant and naval ships for sale but he did not want to upset our war against Japan now. Stalin inquired, “Are not the Russians to wage war against Japan?” The President replied that when Russia was ready to fight Japan, she would be taken in the shipping pool the same as the others. He added that we wanted them in the pool. Stalin said he was interested in the question of Principle. Churchill suggested that the vessels could be earmarked, if they had any ears when the Japanese war was over; if any were damaged they could be made good from our general resources. He said he must avow himself as a supporter of the request of Marshal Stalin that the Russians receive a share of these war and merchant vessels. The only alternative was the sinking of the naval vessels. This would be a harsh procedure, when one of our trusty allies has a desire for them. The President observed that they were not apart on this question. Stalin inquired what sort of ships were meant. Was it merchant ships? Churchill replied that he referred to merchant ships. Stalin said that of course it was not possible to depict the Russians as having the intention to interfere with the war against Japan and the matter could not be put in a way to imply that they were to receive a gift from the Allies. They were not after a gift. Churchill interrupted to state that he did not mention that. The President said that he had not either. Stalin continued that he should like for the matter to be cleared up as to whether Russia was to have the right to claim one third of the German merchant and naval fleet and that what they would receive they would receive by their right; if his colleagues thought otherwise, they should say so. The President said he did not think otherwise. Stalin said that if the principle were recognized, the Russians would be satisfied. With regard to the use to which the merchant fleet would be put, including the one third to be handed over to Russia, of course they would raise no obstacles to the use of their third in the war against Japan. The President said he had no objection to this proposal. Stalin said then he agreed that this matter be settled at the end of the Conference as suggested by Mr. Churchill. There was one thing he should like to see accomplished, however. His people were not allowed to see the German fleet. The Russians had set up a Commission to deal with this question but they were not allowed to see the fleet nor were they even given a list of the vessels. Was it not possible to list them and to allow this Commission to inspect the ships and to find out what ones were there? Churchill replied that it was quite possible but the British would want reciprocal facilities to be given them to see German installations in the Baltic. He believed that the Russians had obtained 45 German U–Boats in Danzig. They could arrange an exchange. Stalin observed that these submarines were out of use but said that they could agree to Mr. Churchill’s request that the exchange of facilities be mutual. Churchill said that all they were asking for was fair play and equality. The President said that so far as the United States zone was concerned, the Russians were at liberty to see anything they wanted, only we would expect that this would be reciprocal. Churchill said he had made a distinction between U–Boats and other ships. He knew that Marshal Stalin would appreciate the sensitiveness of an island power which grows only two-thirds or less of its own food. They had suffered much from the U–Boats and the submarine was not consequently a popular form of naval vessel in Great Britain. He strongly suggested that the bulk of them be sunk. Great Britain had very nearly perished from them twice. Those who live with a large population on a small island do not welcome any nations of the world extending their construction of submarines. His consent was conditioned on further discussion of how many are divided and how many are sunk, but he agreed that they be divided equally. In this war, German submarines had damaged them severely and had eaten up a large part of their war making capacity. Stalin stated he was also in favor of sinking a large proportion of the U–Boats. The President then said he thought that was sufficient discussion on this subject. The Spanish Question Mr. Eden said that the next question on the agenda was that of Spain. Stalin said the Soviet proposals 17 had already been submitted and he had nothing to add. Churchill said that his Government had a strong distaste for General Franco and the government of his country. He had been misrepresented as having been friendly to this gentleman. All he had said was that there was more to Spanish policy than drawing rude cartoons of Franco. The taking out of jail prisoners who had been in jail for years and shooting them for what had happened long before indicated that Spain was not a democracy in accordance with British ideas on that subject. Therefore, when Franco had written him a letter proposing that he and Churchill organize the western states against that terrible country, Russia, he had, with the approval of the British Cabinet, sent him a chilly reply. Mr. Molotov would remember that he had sent him a copy of this reply and a reply [ copy? ] had also been sent to the President. 18 British feeling was against the Franco regime. Stalin stated that they had received the copy of the British reply. Churchill said that he saw some difficulty in Stalin’s proposal, particularly in the first paragraph concerning the breaking off of all relations with Franco Spain. It seemed to him that taking such a step in regard to a nation having a character like that of Spain, which was proud and touchy, might rally around Franco those elements now deserting him and making his position more precarious. The breaking of relations was not a satisfactory process. It would be a pleasure to do so but after that they would have no contact. Ambassadors were needed most of all in times of difficulty. If they took such action as this it would be a shock. The result might strengthen Franco’s position. He has an army although it was not very good. If this action resulted in strengthening him, it would be necessary to consider whether to take a rebuff or to intervene with force. He was against the use of force. He was against interfering with countries which had a different regime unless we are molested by them. In the countries which we control, we have, of course, set up democratic governments. Insofar as the liberated areas are concerned, we cannot allow a Fascist regime to be set up. With respect to the countries which have not taken part in this war, however, there should be no exchange of cannon fire. His Majesty’s Government would have to give prolonged consideration to Stalin’s proposals to break relations with Spain. He was prepared to take every measure by all proper diplomatic means to speed the departing guest. The breaking of relations with a state because of its internal conduct of affairs was a dangerous principle. He added that he would greatly deplore anything which would lead Spain to civil war. Spain had suffered terribly from its civil war in which two million people had been killed. The British would be sorry to intervene as a government in an active manner in the Spanish affair at this juncture. Forces there were working for a change for the better. He pointed out that the World Organization which had just been agreed upon at San Francisco had a provision against interference in domestic affairs. 19 While they were preparing to ratify the charter drawn up at San Francisco, it would be inconsistent to resort to action which would be prohibited under it. The President said that he had no love for Franco. He had no desire to have any part in starting another civil war in Spain. There had been enough wars in Europe. He would be happy to recognize another government in Spain but he thought that Spain itself must settle that question. Stalin observed that this meant that everything would be unchanged in Spain. In his opinion, the regime of Franco was gaining strength. It was feeding semi-fascist regimes in other countries. Reference had been made to internal affairs. This was not an internal affair. The Spanish regime had been imposed on the Spanish people by Hitler and Mussolini whose regimes they were in the process of destroying. He believed that his colleagues had no love for Franco but this should be proved in deeds. He was not proposing military intervention nor that civil war be let loose, but he wished the Spanish people to know that the three Governments had taken a stand on the side of the democratic forces among the Spanish people and that the Spanish people should have ground to believe that they were against Franco. There was a diplomatic means of showing that they were against Franco and that they were for the democratic Spanish people. He said that suppose they assumed that the means of breaking relations was too severe. Was there not a more flexible means of letting the Spanish people know that the three Governments are in sympathy with the Spanish people and not with Franco. It was dangerous to let the Spanish regime remain as it was now. Public opinion in Europe and in America was not in sympathy with Franco and if the three Governments were to pass by in silence this cancer in Europe, it might be considered that they sanctioned Franco. That would be a grave charge. Churchill observed that the Soviet Union had no relations with Spain now. Stalin replied that he had the right to raise and settle this question. Why should they be silent. People presumed that the Big Three could settle such a question and he was one of them just as Mr. Churchill was. Must they keep silent about what was going on in Spain, as well as to refrain from action against Spain which was giving shelter to Fascists? They could not shut their eyes to the grave danger of Franco Spain. Churchill said that individuals were not enjoined by governments from expressing opinions. Also the press, to which Marshal Stalin had referred, spoke very freely on this matter in the Soviet Union as did the British and sometimes the American press. His Majesty’s Government had spoken very frequently to Franco and to his Ambassador. 20 They did not like, however, to break relations. Churchill referred also to the valuable trade relations which Britain maintained with Spain. Spain sent them many useful products and received British manufactured goods in return. This was an old and well established trade. Unless he were convinced that it would bring about the desired result, he did not want this trade stopped. He fully understood the feeling of Marshal Stalin. Franco had had the audacity to send a Spanish Blue Division to Russia. Russia was in a different position, having been molested. Insofar as the British were concerned in this war, they 20a had refrained from taking action against the British at a time when such intervention could have been disastrous. Churchill continued that during the Torch operation merely opening fire on the ships and Air Corps concentrated in the area of Gibraltar would have done them great harm. Stalin interrupted to say that the Spaniards were afraid. They would have been doomed if they had dared to take such action. Churchill continued that they had not been specifically injured by the Spaniards. No one doubted that Marshal Stalin had no love for the Franco regime and he had no doubt that the majority of the English people shared this view. Churchill said he only intended to emphasize that the Russians had been injured in a way in which others had not. Stalin said he thought that Great Britain had also suffered from Spain, which had provided bases on its shores for German submarines. He considered that all Allied Powers had suffered in this way. He did not wish, however, to look at the question from this point of view. What was important was the danger to Europe. This should be remembered. Some steps should be taken even if the breaking of diplomatic relations was too severe. They should say that they thought that the aspirations of the Spanish people were just. They had only to say this and nothing would be left of Franco. He considered that the Foreign Ministers should consider whether a milder statement could not be agreed upon. The President stated that he agreed. Churchill said he was opposed. The matter must be settled at the meeting of the Heads of Government. Stalin pointed out that it would be settled by them. The Foreign Ministers would only give it preliminary study. Churchill said he did not think this was advisable. It was a question of principle. To interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries was very dangerous. He might not like some things in the United States, but he did not consider it wise to attempt to intervene. Stalin said that this was not a question of a domestic affair. The regime of Franco was of external origin. Churchill rejoined to state that anyone could say this about any country. Stalin replied that no other country in Europe had such a regime. Churchill observed that Portugal might be accused of being under a dictatorship. Stalin replied that it was not the dictatorship that mattered. The regime in Portugal resulted from internal developments, whereas the regime of Franco resulted from intervention by Hitler and Mussolini. Franco’s behavior was provocative. He gave shelter to Nazis. Churchill said he was not prepared that any government in which he participated should interfere in the internal affairs of other states. This has always been their policy. Moreover, to push things might make matters worse. He would be very glad, although he knew this idea would not be received with enthusiasm, if the regime were overthrown and replaced by a constitutional monarchy with free democratic principles, elections, etc. If, however, he or any British Government pushed this proposal, all would turn against it in Spain. No country likes to be told how it is to be run. There was intervention on both sides in the Spanish civil war. The Soviet Union intervened on one side and then Hitler and Mussolini came in on the other. But that was already long ago. Action taken at this meeting was more likely to rivet Franco in his place. The British Government did not give the slightest support to Franco Spain other than trade, which they have always carried on. The President stated that he would be happy to have the matter sent to the Foreign Ministers to see if agreement could not be reached. Stalin said he also fully appreciated the British difficulties, but felt that this matter could be facilitated by action here. He proposed that they prepare an appraisal of the regime of Franco, including observations made by Mr. Churchill on the trend of developments in Spain. This would be one of the items in the declaration to be made on Europe. He assumed that they would have some sort of declaration on the results of their work. This statement on Spain should be included in them. It would not be binding on the British Government. It would be a short statement on the situation in Spain which would make clear to public opinion that their sympathies were with the Spanish people. This was a most mild form—milder than the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia 21 and Greece. 22 He suggested that they let the Foreign Ministers consider what form this declaration could take. Churchill replied that he had not agreed to any declaration on Spain and he gathered that the President had also not agreed. Stalin said it was not a question of a declaration on Spain alone, but on all countries. Churchill said that the line he had taken was that in all countries involved in this war that they should not interfere in their domestic affairs. This was a question of principle. There were many things in regard to Yugoslavia and Rumania which he did not like. They were involved in the war which gave us greater freedom there. He repeated that there was great danger in the intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. If there were to be a declaration of the principles on which democratic governments were founded—he personally had always liked the statement in the American Constitution—and a statement on what governments had not fulfilled these principles, he could consider it, but he pointed out that many governments in Europe now do not fulfill these principles. He did not know what the Spanish people thought. There were many shades of opinion in Spain. Most of them would doubtless like to get rid of Franco without interference from outsiders. The President said there appeared to be no chance for agreement at the moment. He suggested that they pass on to something else upon which they could reach a decision and that they come back to the Spanish question at a later session. Stalin suggested that it be referred to the Foreign Ministers to consider. Churchill said that this was the point on which they were not in agreement. He did not suggest an adverse decision but merely that they leave it for the moment. The President said that they could return to it at any time. Stalin said that he agreed. Declaration on Liberated Europe The President said that the document on this matter had been submitted at the first session. 23 Stalin suggested that discussion of this question be put off as the Soviet Delegation had another document on this question which they wished to submit. 24 This was agreed to. Yugoslavia Eden pointed out that the British Delegation had submitted a document on this question. 25 Stalin said that he thought they could not discuss this question without having the Yugoslavs present—at any rate they would be unable to achieve any results without them. Eden pointed out that they had agreed upon a declaration at Yalta 26 although no Yugoslavs were present. Stalin replied that Yugoslavia was an Allied country and that it was not possible to settle this matter without the Yugoslavs. When they had met at Yalta there had been two Yugoslav governments which could not reach agreement. Now there was one legitimate government and he proposed that the representatives of that government be called in. Churchill inquired if he meant Tito or Šubašić. Stalin said they could call in anyone. Churchill said, however, that the Yugoslavs were in extreme disagreement. Stalin said this was the first time he had heard of it. He proposed that they verify this and let the Yugoslavs tell them all about it. The President inquired whether the Prime Minister’s information was serious enough to warrant sending for the Yugoslav representatives. Churchill replied that it was a very serious matter and pointed out that at Yalta they had reached an agreement on this subject which had not been carried out; there had been no elections; the assembly (AVNOJ) has not been re-organized; juridical procedure has not been restored; Tito has imposed a strict party organization with police control and with the press almost as strictly controlled as in fascist countries. Yugoslavia has not in any way borne out the hope we had entertained at Yalta. We gave arms and support to Tito. We could not give much as we were heavily engaged but we gave all we could. He was very disappointed at the way things had turned out at the present time. The British proposal was a very modest one to restate what had been set at Yalta. Stalin said that Mr. Churchill had passed to a discussion of the substance of the question but he had not answered whether he considered it worthwhile discussing the matter. If the President desired, he could make a statement on the substance of the question. The President asked him to do so. Stalin said that the information given by Mr. Churchill in regard to the infringement of the Crimean decisions was unknown to us and does not agree with our information. Perhaps he is right; perhaps not, but he, Stalin, thought it would be useful to give the Yugoslavs a chance to reply to this accusation. Churchill pointed out that he had not made an accusation, but a complaint. Stalin said I can agree to a discussion of the subject, but it is not possible to try the Yugoslav state without hearing its representatives. Churchill then stated that he had had time to think the matter over and that perhaps it would be useful to hear both sides—Tito and the other side separately. Perhaps they would be able to settle their difficulties. He inquired if Stalin thought they would be willing to come. Stalin said he did not know but they could inquire of the Yugoslavs. The President said that he was here as a representative of the United States to discuss world affairs. He did not wish to sit here as a court to settle matters which will eventually be settled by the United Nations Organization. If we do that, we shall become involved in trying to settle every political difficulty and will have to listen to a succession of representatives, de Gaulle, Franco, and others. He did not wish to waste time listening to complaints but wished to deal with the problems which the three Heads of Government had come here to settle. If they could not do that their time was wasted. Stalin said that this was a correct observation. Churchill said he wished to observe with great respect that the United States was very interested in the carrying out of the Yalta agreement. Great allowances had to be made for Tito, in view of the recent end of the war and the great disturbances in that country. The British memorandum merely expressed the wish that there be carried out the decisions which were made at the Crimean Conference. The President’s predecessor 27 had attached importance to this matter and, if I recall correctly, much of the drafting of this declaration had been done by the Americans. The President said he desired to see the Yalta declaration carried out. “Insofar as the United States is concerned, I intend to carry it out to the letter.” Stalin said that according to their information the Yalta agreement was being carried out. The President observed that complaints had also been received by his government. He thought that they could be passed on without the Yugoslavs. Churchill said that as the British paper had not met with support, he was prepared to withdraw it. The President suggested that it be postponed for a session or two. Churchill said that he wished to thank Stalin for his patience. If they could not settle their affairs here, where could they settle them? Stalin replied that they could be settled here but that they should hear those who were concerned. Churchill said he was agreed but the President was opposed. Stalin said that the matter must then be dropped for the time being. British and American Oil Equipment in Rumania Churchill said that the British had submitted a paper on this subject 28 which they thought the Foreign Ministers could discuss and perhaps reach agreement. They would, in any event, benefit from the discussion between the Foreign Ministers. He observed that it was a rather detailed question. Stalin said he thought this was a trifling matter which could be settled through diplomatic channels without raising it at this conference. Since it had been brought up, however, he wished to rectify one misstatement. No British property had been taken by the Soviet Union in Rumania. The property of some of these oil companies had been obtained in Germany. The Germans had captured it and had used it against the Allies. We removed some quantity of this type because the Germans destroyed our oil industry. He had no objection to the question being referred to the Foreign Ministers, but it would be better to handle it through the usual diplomatic channels in order not to trouble the conference. Churchill stated that this was not a trifling matter. It was true that the Germans had stolen their pipe, which they had obtained from Germany, but they had paid for it. The British view was that if this pipe which was taken by the Soviet Union was considered as reparations, Rumania should reimburse the British for it. He inquired whether it would be agreeable if the Soviet and British representatives here got together to settle the matter. The President observed that the United States was also interested. There was a similar situation with regard to the Standard Oil Company and the Shell Company. Why would it not be possible to let the Foreign Ministers discuss the matter. This was agreed to. Meeting adjourned. 29 3 See Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , p. 635. 4 Ante , p. 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] . 5 See ante , pp. 101–102 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] . Cf. documents Nos. 712 and 713 , post . 6 Ante , pp. 89–91 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] . 7 See document No. 856 , post . 8 Document No. 1121 , post . 9 Document No. 1120 , post . 10 Document No. 1177 , post . 11 Document No. 745 , post . 12 Document No. 1202 , post . 13 Document No. 837 , post . 14 This presumably refers to the terms of article 2 of the Declaration of June 5, 1945 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649). 15 The only international agreement governing the conduct of submarines in wartime to which Germany was a party and which was in effect at the outbreak of World War II was the Treaty on Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, signed at London, April 22, 1930 (Treaty Series No. 830; 46 Stat. (2) 2858). 16 Allied shipping was “pooled” and controlled through the operations of the United Maritime Authority and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards. 17 Document No. 1177 , post . 18 For a summary of the correspondence referred to, see Stalin’s Correspondence With Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941–45 (New York, 1958), vol. i , p. 395, note 80. This work is a reissue (including the original title pages and with the original pagination but bound in one volume) of the two volumes of Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and the Presidents of the U. S. A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1944–1945 (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957; Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication). For a citation to the Russian-language edition of this work, see ante , p. xxix [ Pg. XXIX is part of Introduction ] . 19 i. e., article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945 (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031). 20 The Duke of Alba. 20a i. e., Spain. 21 See document No. 1417 , post , section vii . 22 There was no Yalta declaration on Greece, except insofar as that country was included within the terms of the Declaration on Liberated Europe. See document No. 1417 , post , section v . 23 Document No. 745 , post . 24 Documents Nos. 804 and 1064 , post . 25 Document No. 1202 , post . 26 See document No. 1417 , post , section vii . 27 Franklin D. Roosevelt. 28 Document No. 837 , post . 29 At 4:55 p.m. See Log, ante , p.15. Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 5 p.m. Churchill : One point Marshal Stalin raised [was] that there was some trouble on the Greek-Albanian frontier. I made inquiries. We have heard of no fighting but people don’t like one another very much and there is no [ some? ] sniping. There is no field division in northern Greece at all. There are many more troops on the borders in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria than there are in Greece (citing certain figures). We should make it clear to small states we will not tolerate marauding parties across frontiers and the frontiers will be settled by the Peace Conference. Truman : These are matters to be settled by the Peace Conference—not by direct action. Stalin : I did not raise the question at this meeting but privately, and I will explain my views on other [ another? ] occasion. Eden : At the beginning of our meeting Secretary Byrnes said that he wanted to propose revision of [the document on] the Council for [ of ] Foreign Ministers and this was referred to the drafting committee. The second point examined was the political principles for Germany. We submit a revised draft. Churchill : We agree to revised draft. Stalin : I agree. Truman : It is accepted. Eden : The Polish question is next. We hope to have a draft ready for meeting tomorrow afternoon. Churchill : We are agreed that the Polish question shall be discussed as soon as drafting committee settles its work. Eden : Following additional items for the agenda today: (1) German Navy and merchant marine; (2) Spain (3) Yalta declaration on liberated Europe; (4) Yugoslavia; (5) Rumania (removal of industrial material as booty). Truman : First question is disposition of German fleet and marine[.] [There] must be decision as to what is war booty and war reparations, and if war booty then how we are to share the booty. I am interested in German fleet because I want that to continue under present control until the Japanese war is over. Stalin : Any weapons taken in the course of the war by army represents booty. Armies surrender to those to whom they surrender. The same applies to the navy. The navy had to be surrendered. Therefore it is booty. It may be possible to discuss whether merchant fleet is booty. In case of Italy both battle and merchant fleet were placed in the category of booty. Churchill : I do not want to approach this matter from a juridical standpoint. Truman : I do not either. Churchill : I hope we may solve these problems by agreement. We have the whole of these vessels in our hands. We are not opposed in principle to the division of the German fleet. I am not speaking of the Italian fleet. Of course in these matters the replacement of losses is relevant. We have had tremendous losses. The questions of U–boats stand on a different footing. They have a limited legitimate use. The way they were used by Germany was prohibited by treaty. These vessels should be sunk. The latest U–boats contained valuable information on future construction. That knowledge should be shared. But the bulk of U–boats should be sunk and the remainder divided equally. The surface ships should be divided equally. We are not opposed in principle to Russia’s demand for one-third of the German fleet. Her flag should be welcomed on the seas by her allies. As to merchant ships, until the war with Japan comes to an end, these should be fully utilized. The prosecution of the war is limited by shipping. The transport of men and the feeding of civilians is limited by shipping. There is another point. The Finnish fleet has passed into the hands of our Russian Allies. The Rumanian fleet, containing two very valuable troop ships, has fallen into their hands. It would seem that the three fleets should be shared. Stalin : We have not taken a single ship from Finland and only one troop ship from Rumania, which is being used to carry the wounded. Churchill : There is also a question of others. The Norwegians have suffered terribly. The oil fleet was a great part of the nation’s strength. It is a question whether the merchant fleet should be divided into four parts and the fourth part given to those not represented here. I should deprecate a hasty treatment of this subject. Truman : The subject [is] most interesting from our point of view. I should be very happy to make a division of the merchant fleet, but we must use these ships for the war and relief for liberated areas and the carrying of goods to our Russian Ally. Stalin : What about Navy? Truman : I am ready to dispose of it at any time. Further, when the Japanese war is over, the United States will have merchant ships and navy ships for sale. But until the war is over, I don’t want to disturb the situation. Stalin : Are the Russians not interested in the Japanese war? Truman : Of course, and I desire to see Russia in the shipping pool with us. Churchill : But we all have our difficulties. Ships could be earmarked before being put into the pool. The advance of the Russians along the Baltic makes untenable the German harbors. I want to support the Marshal’s request that Russia should in principle receive her share of war and merchant vessels. The only alternative is sinking and this seems wrong as long as one of our Allies desires the war vessels. Truman : We are not apart. Stalin : What ships will be earmarked? Churchill : The merchant ships. Stalin : Of course it is not possible to treat Russia as having the intention of interfering with the war against the Japanese. Nor can it be considered that this is a gift from the Allies. The matter should be cleared up. Have the Russians a right to receive a third of these ships? They want only their right. If my colleagues think otherwise, let them say so and I will obey. I want only clarity. The Russians are satisfied if their right to a third is recognized. If one-third is allocated to Russia, we will raise no objection to their use against Japan. So I suggest that the matter be settled at the end of the Conference as suggested by Churchill. One thing I should like. Our people are not allowed to see the fleet and are not given a list of them. Would it not be possible to lift this ban so that a Russian Naval Commission can inspect these ships? Churchill : You seized a number of U–boats in the Baltic. We could make an arrangement for an interchange of inspections[.] Stalin : All the U–boats are damaged but we can arrange for you to see them. Churchill : All we want is reciprocity. Stalin : Your people can see them. Truman : So far as the United States is concerned we are willing to exchange inspections, but we want it reciprocal. Churchill : I made a distinction between U–boats and surface fleets. The Marshal will appreciate the sensitiveness of an island power producing only two-thirds or less of its food about U–boats. I would argue that the bulk be sunk, the balance divided. My consent is conditioned on discussion of U–boats’ disposition. I must ask pardon because of our special position. Stalin : I am also in favor of sinking a large proportion. Truman : That seems enough discussion. Let us proceed. The next subject is Spain. Stalin : Our proposals have been submitted. 1 Churchill : His Majesty’s Government and past government have strong distaste for General Franco and the government of Spain, All I said for Franco was that there was more in Spanish politics than drawing cartoons of Franco. But I view with disgust the killing of people for what they did five or six years ago. When Franco asked me to line up against the menace of Soviet Russia, I sent him a most chilling reply and I sent correspondence to Marshal Stalin and the President. We all detest the Spanish regime. The difficulty with the Marshal’s proposal is with the breaking off of relations with Spain. It may cause them to rally to his support. Breaking off relations breaks your influence. Ambassadors are needed particularly in time of difficulty. The course suggested would strengthen Franco’s position, and he has an army. Should we take a rebuff or use force? I am against that. I am against interfering in the internal affairs of a country which has not molested us. I would greatly regret embroiling ourselves in their internal affairs. At the present time Franco’s powers are undermined. We should speed the parting guest. But breaking off relations because of its internal conduct is a dangerous principle in this war. Nor would I like to see a renewal of the Spanish Civil War. The San Francisco Charter has a provision against interfering in internal affairs. Truman : I have no love for Franco. I have no desire to get into a Spanish Civil War. We would be most happy to recognize another government. But Spain must settle it. Stalin : That means everything remains unchanged in Spain. Truman : No. Franco is weakening. Stalin : Franco is gaining strength. He is encouraging Fascism elsewhere. I believe you have no love for Franco, but you must prove it by acts. I do not propose a civil war, but I wish the Spanish people to know that we are on the side of the democratic forces of the Spanish people and against the regime of Franco. There are diplomatic means of showing this to the Spanish people. Let us assume breaking relations too severe. There must be more flexible means. We should not pass by this cancer. Otherwise we sanction it. It is presumed that the Big Three can settle such questions. Are we entitled to keep silent? We cannot shut our eyes to the dangers that the Franco regime holds out for all Europe. Churchill : We cannot favor breaking relations. We have valuable trade relations and could not interfere unless we were certain of success. I appreciate how the Marshal feels as they sent the Blue Brigade against him. But they refrained from using arms when we went into Africa when they could have done us great harm. Stalin : I suggest that the foreign secretaries try to find some means of making it clear that we are not in favor. Truman : I agree. Churchill : I should deprecate this. The question should be decided by the Big Three. Truman : I urge the Prime Minister to let the foreign secretaries discuss the question. Churchill : It is a matter of principle against interfering with internal affairs. Stalin : It is not a matter of internal affairs. No such regime exists in any country of Europe. Churchill : Portugal might be considered a dictatorship. Stalin : Portugal’s government arose from internal forces; Spain from foreign forces. I do not place on the same level Spain and Portugal. Churchill : Franco is moving to his finale. He came to power many years ago. The Russian government as well as the fascist government[s] took part in the civil war. Stalin : The foreign secretaries should prepare an appraisal of the regime of Franco, including the sentiments express[ed] by Mr. Churchill. This will not bind the government of Great Britain. I suggest [a] most mild form of influence—less than we applied to Greece and Poland. Churchill : I am not agreed in principle to making any Allied declaration and I did not understand that the President was. Stalin : Statement need not be in reference to Spain alone but to all Europe. Churchill : Our action in other countries is because of their involvement in the war. Of course if you wish to make a declaration of general principles regarding governments which have not achieved those principles, that is different. That declaration is in the American Constitution. We can’t improve upon it. I don’t know what the Spanish people think but I feel that they do want to be rid of Franco. Truman : There seems to be no chance of agreement. Let us pass on and come back to this question later. Stalin : But let us refer this matter to the foreign secretaries. Perhaps they can find a formula. Churchill : That is the very question we are debating. I suggest we leave the question without decision for the moment. Truman : Let us consider the declaration on Liberated Governments. I recommend discussion of paper submitted by me at first meeting. Stalin : I suggest we defer this as we have written another document to submit on this. Truman : The next question is Yugoslavia. Stalin : We can not consider this question until we hear the Yugoslavs. Yugoslavia is an Ally. Churchill : The two sides (Tito and Šubašić) are in disagreement. Stalin : I have no such information. Let us verify this. Let us summon them. Churchill : The Tito–Šubašić agreement 2 has not been carried out. Tito has imposed a partisan organization. Yugoslavia has not realized the hopes we entertained at Yalta. We supported Tito, and are grieved and disappointed at the way things have turned out. Our proposal is very modest. Stalin : Mr. Churchill has passed to the discussion of this question in substance without answering the President’s question whether the question is worth discussing. The information which Mr. Churchill has given is not known to us. Perhaps Mr. Churchill is right but his information may not be correct. It would be just to hear the Yugoslavs on Mr. Churchill’s accusations. Churchill : I made complaints, not accusations. Stalin : It is not a matter of words. I cannot agree to substitute complaints for accusations. Churchill : I must think over this. But it might be well to have Tito and Šubašić come here. Do you think they would be willing to come? Truman : I am here to discuss world affairs with Soviet and Great Britain government[s]. I am not here to sit as a court. That is the work of San Francisco. I want to discuss matters on which the three heads of government can come to agreement. I did not come to hear Tito, de Gaulle, and Franco. Stalin : That is the correct observation. Churchill : I thought that this was a matter in which the United States was very interested, particularly in view of their Yalta papers. Truman : That is true. I want to see the Yalta agreement carried out. Stalin : According to our information, Tito is carrying out the Crimea decisions. Churchill : Our paper is a repetition of what we have already said. Truman : Let us drop it. Churchill : It is very important. Truman : We are dropping it only for the day as we did with Franco. Churchill : I had hoped that we could discuss these matters frankly. Stalin : But we must hear the Yugoslavs first. Truman : We turn to the British paper on Rumanian oil property taken as booty. Churchill : I suggest that this be discussed by the foreign secretaries. Stalin : I think that these matters can be settled by the usual diplomatic channels. But since the question has been raised, I should like to correct an inaccuracy. No British property was taken in Rumania. There were tubes purchased by the British before the war. The Germans captured them and used them. We took these tubes because Germany devastated our wells in the Caucasus. The Conference should not be troubled by this trifling matter. Churchill : This is not a trifling matter. Our people paid for these tubes. We have made no progress through diplomatic channels. Perhaps the British and Russian foreign secretaries could settle it. Eden : The United States is interested too. Truman : Why not let the three foreign secretaries see what they can do? Stalin : No objection. Adjourned. 1 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra . 2 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251 – 254 . Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m. Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m. 1 1 Truman as host. The meeting was held at Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg. Information as to time and participants from the Log ( ante , pp. 15–16 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] ). Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Mr. Attlee Foreign Commissar Molotov Fleet Admiral Leahy Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Harriman Lord Cherwell Mr. Gromyko Mr. Pauley Major Birse Mr. Sobolev Mr. Davies Mr. Pavlov Mr. Bohlen [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. 2 2 Fragments of the conversation, as recalled by Sergeant Eugene List (who played the piano for Truman and his guests), are reported in The New Yorker , December 29, 1945, p. 15. Mosely–Vyshinsky conversation Mosely–Vyshinsky conversation Present United States Soviet Union Mr. Mosely Mr. Vyshinsky [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)]] The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Babelsberg, July 20, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2045: Telegram The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2045: Telegram [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)] The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) [Extract 1 ] secret Babelsberg , July 20, 1945. Victory 115. From Mosely at Babelsberg to London for Winant and State Department at Washington for Grew. Vyshinsky informed Mosely today 2 Soviet Government has approved agreement on additional requirements 3 except new title and new first paragraph; he expects latter will be cleared shortly. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 For the full text of this message, see document No. 1036 , post . 2 i. e., July 19. 3 See vol. i , pp. 604 – 606 . 4 Cf. the following passage in a personal letter from Mosely, dated at Babelsberg July 24, to E. Allan Lightner, Jr., Secretary of the United States Delegation to the European Advisory Commission (file No. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2445): “With regard to the Agreement on Additional Requirements, I found from Vyshinsky last Thursday that the new title and preamble had to be referred to the Marshal [ Generalissimo Stalin ] before Saksin could be instructed to sign. Vyshinsky was inclined to revert to the title of ‘General Order’ but I gave him a vigorous sales talk in favor of our preferred title.” Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m. 1 1 J. C. S. 199th Meeting. Present Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill General Somervell Captain Stroop Lieutenant General Hull. Captain Oster Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Donnelly Major General Gross Colonel Stone Major General Deane Colonel Riggs Major General Norstad Colonel Cary 2 Brigadier General Cabell Lieutenant Colonel Woodward Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore 2 Present for the consideration of cells 6 to 10 only. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)]] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 10 a.m. J. C. S. Files Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 10 a.m. [Extracts] top secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. Basic Objectives, Strategy and Policies General Marshall presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff certain proposals 3 by Lord Leathers for amending C. C. S. 877, 4 the United States Chiefs of Staff paper on this subject. Admiral Leahy read out the proposed changes and these were compared with C. C. S. 877. Admiral Leahy read a paragraph in regard to shipping 5 which General Somervell proposed for inclusion in C. C. S. 877. General Marshall said that Lord Leathers would probably accept as a part of the basic objectives the proposal made by General Somervell but he thought that it might better appear as a commentary on the basic objectives rather than as an integral part thereof. Admiral King pointed out that Lord Leathers’ paper in fact involved a change in national policy, and therefore, in his opinion the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not consider it. General Somervell asked if his paragraph would be accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister. Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not approve the paragraph outright at the present time but he was sure they viewed it in a favorable light. The other Chiefs of Staff concurred. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— a . Authorized General Somervell to inform the British Minister of War Transport that the proposed amendments to the basic objectives were not acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff. 6 b . Informed General Somervell that they viewed in a favorable light his memorandum of comment on the basic objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9. Air Transport Route Between the United States and Moscow General Arnold recalled that it had taken one year to get air transport operations established with Russia via Teheran. Attempts had been made to shorten the route via Turkey, and although Turkish acquiescence had been obtained, the Russians had not agreed to the adoption of this shorter route to Moscow. Mr. Harriman had informed General Arnold that since the capture of Berlin he had endeavored to arrange with Mr. Molotov for an air route to Moscow through Berlin but he had found it impossible to complete such arrangements. 7 Mr. Harriman had asked General Arnold to submit two memoranda for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this connection. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum to the President enclosing the message to Generalissimo Stalin as presented by General Arnold. 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Not positively identified. Cf. documents Nos. 1262 and 1263 , post . 4 See vol. i , document No. 600, footnote 1 . 5 Not printed. 6 See document No. 1262 , post . 7 See document No. 1172 , post . 8 Documents Nos. 1170 and 1171 , post . Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, 10:30 a.m. Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, 10:30 a.m. 1 1 Time of meeting from the heading cited in footnote 2 to document No. 861 , post . Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Mr. Clayton Sir Walter Monckton Mr. Maisky Mr. Pauley Sir David Waley Mr. Sobolev Mr. Murphy [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)]] Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) [Babelsberg,] July 20, 1945. Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Germany ( Murphy ) 2 [ Babelsberg ,] July 20, 1945. The following is an exposition of ideas submitted by Messrs. Maisky and Sobelev: 1. The main task of the Control Council is the elimination of the German war potential. 2. For purpose of [blank] war potential in the future, the general policy which will be carried out uniformly in all zones of occupation will be in preventing recovery of those parts of the economy which are the basis of the heavy industry and at the same time giving Germany a free hand in agriculture and in light industry. 3. Guiding ideas for the Control Council and for the German administration: (1) Reparation obligation according to plan which will be established, and (2) Meeting needs of occupying armies. (Russians try to establish that “first” general principle governing the Control Council will be reparations). ( Maisky ) It would be undesirable politically to say that imports have priority over reparations. Everybody would say that reparations come first and imports after because we have suffered so much—capitalists want to have profits from foreign trade and don’t care about reparations for those who suffered. Also when Germans know about it they will try to prove that without very considerable imports they can’t live and can’t export. Same as after last war and there is no reason to believe they won’t repeat same joke again as after last war. German economy after this war will be a very strictly regulated economy, otherwise she couldn’t pay reparations etc. This regulated economy should provide the necessary means. It should be quite feasible to guarantee reparations and necessary imports. On (?) 3 of principle we have a conviction that if there is a conflict between reparations and imports, then imports must give way. Political repercussions. Monckton says political objectives are met by (1) Imports approved by Government’s consent[.] (2) Pauley said we are not going to consider that this will be a charge against once for all deliveries (capital assets, etc.). Clayton —American people will not again, as they did after last war, finance Germany. That was President Roosevelt’s position. Germany has very little in way of natural resources except coal, potash, and some poor quality iron ore. Maisky suggests also that question of economic regime in Germany and machinery which will regulate this economy—proposes that in postwar period economic life of Germany should be regulated by comprehensive program on annual basis by Control Council and reparations authorities which we should have soon—(?) 4 by Control Council and German authorities. Naturally supervisory power lies—with Control Council to approve and German authorities to execute. This program should include (1) production, (2) distribution of goods, including unified system of rationing taking into account local conditions, and (3) program of exports and imports, (4) currency, (5) railroad communications and water transport. These are main items. Maisky also pointed out that pre-war Germany lived on a very high scale as compared with other European countries. Now he said we must visualize quite another Germany whose level will be that of “Middle” Europe which is very much lower. Therefore imports will be much lower and we will be able to use German iron ore and not Swedish. Clayton said he was thinking of principle of minimum standards of living only and Reparations . Bankers will not finance. Maisky said question is theoretical. Waley —This is not a school debating society. This is practical. Clayton suggests that we report this as one principle on which we cannot agree. No —Approval of new paragraph 12. No —Approval of new paragraph 13. 2 Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. This memorandum is a continuation of Murphy’s memorandum of the First Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, July 19 ( ante , p. 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] ] ). 3 As in the original. The sentence should probably read: “On question of principle”. 4 As in the original. Byrnes–Gromyko conversation, morning Byrnes–Gromyko conversation, morning Present United States Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Mr. Gromyko [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] Editor’s Note —In a letter to Byrnes dated July 20 ( document No. 734 , post ) Gromyko referred to “our conversation this morning”, at which the question of trusteeship was discussed. No minutes of this conversation have been found. Third meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:30 a.m. Third meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:30 a.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Gromyko Mr. Cohen Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gusev Mr. Page Mr. Novikov [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)]] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 11:30 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 11:30 a.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)]] Rapporteur’s Report Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 11:30 a.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 Department of State Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 11:30 a.m. top secret The meeting of Foreign Ministers began at 11:30 on Friday, July 20, 1945. Mr. Molotov was in the Chair. Mr. Molotov stated that the first question on the agenda was the German economic paper, which unfortunately was not yet ready. The question must therefore go over until tomorrow. He inquired concerning the status of the Polish paper, which was the second question on the agenda. Mr. Vyshinski stated that the committee had met yesterday and today but had not yet been able to produce a report. He hoped for results by tonight. Mr. Molotov passed the subject over until tomorrow. Council of Foreign Ministers Mr. Molotov stated that the third question on the agenda was that of the peace settlement or the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Byrnes had suggested that a subcommittee be appointed to draft on this matter. He asked whether the subcommittee’s report was ready. Mr. Molotov stated that no subcommittee had been appointed. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the paper had been referred back to the drafting committee established to consider it. Mr. Molotov asked whether there is a general drafting committee to cover all questions. Mr. Byrnes replied that a special committee had been appointed to draft the document on the Council of Foreign Ministers. The committee is working, and Mr. Byrnes wished to know whether they had completed their report. Mr. Molotov asked who was acting on behalf of the American delegation. Mr. Byrnes stated that Mr. Dunn and Mr. Cohen had been appointed. Mr. Cohen stated that because of the fact that Sobolev was busy the committee had not been able to meet until this morning and its work was not yet finished. Mr. Byrnes remarked that nothing could be done until the committee had reported. Mr. Byrnes then suggested that the document on the implementation of the Yalta declaration on liberated areas 1 be placed on the agenda for the meeting of the Heads of States this afternoon. Mr. Molotov replied that this question would come up next and that the Russian delegation also wanted to reach agreement on the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Byrnes stated that the American delegation is extremely anxious to reach agreement on the Council of Foreign Ministers and that he was willing to ask his appointees to leave the table to begin work immediately. Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet member of the drafting committee is now in an economic meeting. Mr. Byrnes inquired whether it was possible to substitute someone else for him since the economic meetings had been going on for a long time and might continue. Mr. Molotov then suggested that the matter be settled by the Foreign Ministers without reference to the subcommittee. Mr. Byrnes stated it was his understanding that there were two or three separate proposals being considered by the subcommittee. Mr. Molotov then said that it was better to leave the matter to the subcommittee and not discuss it in the present meeting. Mr. Eden suggested that the matter go over until tomorrow. Mr. Byrnes then asked if agreement could be reached that the proposal under consideration by the subcommittee 2 should be submitted to the Heads of State this afternoon. He remarked that the Foreign Ministers could, if necessary, meet a few minutes before the regular meeting to discuss it. Mr. Byrnes went on to suggest that if Mr. Eden preferred a short recess could be taken to discuss the matter. Mr. Molotov then pointed out that the document was not available. Mr. Byrnes thereupon renewed his request for consideration at 4 p.m. Mr. Molotov suggested 3:45 p.m., and this was agreed to. 3 Discussion of Agenda Mr. Molotov suggested that the day’s agenda be concerned with (1) the Yalta declaration; (2) the western frontiers of Poland; (3) trusteeship questions; and (4) the fixing of an agenda for the Big Three. Mr. Byrnes asked whether this agenda was for the present meeting or for the afternoon meeting. Mr. Molotov stated that the last point on today’s agenda is the Big Three agenda. He asked whether the agenda suggested was acceptable and stated that the Soviet delegation had certain draft proposals to circulate. Mr. Eden remarked that neither the trusteeship question nor the Polish boundaries had been referred to the present meeting by the Heads of State. Mr. Byrnes suggested that the paper on the implementation of the Yalta declaration be placed on the Big Three agenda, and added that he had no objection to consideration of the western frontiers of Poland. Mr. Molotov stated that the meeting was not discussing at this time the agenda for the afternoon meeting but for the present meeting. Mr. Eden insisted that the Foreign Ministers’ agenda should be based on matters referred to them by the Big Three. Mr. Molotov replied that this was not necessarily so. If the Foreign Ministers didn’t want to discuss a matter, it went to the Big Three, but he wanted to discuss the matters he had mentioned. Mr. Byrnes replied that the Big Three had assigned certain questions to the Foreign Ministers and that these questions should be discussed first. He asked what questions had been so assigned. Mr. Molotov mentioned the German economic question, the Polish question, and the implementation of the Yalta declaration. He asked what other matters had been assigned to them. Mr. Byrnes stated that the declaration on liberated Europe had been passed over on the request of the Generalissimo since he had wanted to circulate a paper. 4 Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation had the paper now and asked whether the Soviet draft 5 could be considered. After consideration by the Foreign Ministers the question will pass to the Big Three. Mr. Byrnes remarked that it would be helpful to circulate the paper and consider it in the present meeting. Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to make it clear that the agenda mentioned by him was for this meeting. Mr. Eden again remarked that he was unable to understand the consideration of questions not referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Chiefs of State. Mr. Molotov then suggested that the meeting dispose of all questions referred to them. Mr. Eden replied that these questions did not include either Poland or trusteeship. Mr. Molotov stated that the Yalta declaration had not been discussed yesterday because no draft 6 was available. He would now circulate drafts, after which it could be discussed. Mr. Eden agreed but asked why other items referred to them were not used. Mr. Molotov asked about specific items. Mr. Eden cited the questions of Spain and Rumanian oil. Mr. Molotov asked whether Spain would be considered. Mr. Byrnes replied that the question had been referred to the Foreign Ministers. He went on to state that on July 17 the President had proposed that the three Heads of State support the admission of Italy to international organizations. 7 Mr. Byrnes now proposed the appointment of a subcommittee to draft a declaration on this matter. Mr. Byrnes went on to propose that instructions to the committee should include a statement that the three powers would not support the entrance of Spain into international organizations so long as Spain remained under the control of the present regime there. Mr. Molotov asked whether he correctly understood that Mr. Byrnes was suggesting the appointment of a subcommittee on Italy and Spain. Mr. Byrnes replied that this subcommittee should be appointed only to carry out the President’s suggestion of the 17th, in addition to the inclusion of a mention of Spain. Mr. Molotov agreed to both. Mr. Eden asked what committee was contemplated. Mr. Byrnes replied, a drafting committee composed of persons who are not too busy. Mr. Eden pointed out that this was not entirely a drafting matter but was primarily political. Mr. Molotov agreed that the subcommittee could not work without the delegates. Mr. Byrnes suggested that a subcommittee could prepare a document for discussion by the Big Three. Mr. Eden stated his belief that the Foreign Ministers must agree on principles on which the committee could work. Mr. Molotov agreed that the matter could be put on the agenda. Mr. Eden asked whether it would come up in the present meeting. Mr. Byrnes stated that if Mr. Eden wanted to discuss it now he agreed. Mr. Molotov then reraised the matter of the agenda, which he recapitulated as 1. Italy. 2. Liberated Europe. 3. Rumania. Other items could be added if these are not enough. Mr. Byrnes asked for a consideration of the Big Three agenda. Mr. Molotov said that the first question is Italy. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the American position on Italy had been set forth in the President’s paper of July 17. 8 Mr. Eden stated his general agreement with the American position. He thought it was a good idea to favor the admission of certain states and clearly to state that we do not favor the admission of Spain into international organizations. He asked whether more could not be done. Specifically he recommended the admission into international organizations of all neutral governments but Spain, since this would make the reference to Spain more pointed. Mr. Byrnes agreed. His suggestion 9 had been for the admission of Italy and the declaration regarding the non-admission of Spain. He agreed to the British suggestion that other neutral governments be added. Mr. Molotov inquired what governments Mr. Eden had in mind and asked whether this was a secret. Mr. Eden mentioned Sweden, Portugal, and Switzerland. Mr. Byrnes stated his assumption that this was only to strengthen stated disapproval of Spain. Mr. Eden pointed out that the situation in Portugal was not the same as that in Spain. Mr. Byrnes believed that this would strengthen the statement and would be in line with the Generalissimo’s position. Mr. Eden suggested that we say that we favor the entrance of all neutral states except Spain. Mr. Molotov then asked whether Italy would be liable for the payment of reparations. Mr. Byrnes asked what they would pay with. Mr. Eden agreed but stated that in principle Italy would be liable. Mr. Molotov stated his understanding that Italy had signed an instrument of unconditional surrender. 10 Mr. Eden remarked that any declaration on the admission of Italy into international organizations should contain the phrase “on conclusion of peace”. Mr. Molotov insisted that somebody must consider the question of Italian reparations. Mr. Eden pointed out that this question would be dealt with in the peace settlement. Italy’s admission into international organizations would be conditional upon the fulfillment of her engagements. However, he frankly felt that Italy would be unable to pay. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the United States Government has already advanced $200,000,000 to Italy and would probably have to advance $400,000,000 or $500,000,000 more. Therefore reparations do not seem to the United States to be an immediate problem. Mr. Molotov asked whether it would be just to have small Finland paying large reparations and large Italy paying none. He asked how this would be understood by the world. Mr. Eden asked what connection the question of reparations had with admission into international organizations. Reparations would be settled in the peace treaty and should have no effect on entrance into international organizations. Mr. Molotov pointed out that United Nations do not pay reparations. Mr. Byrnes remarked that when the peace treaty was concluded it might be possible to work out some plan for Italy in future years to arrange some form of payment. However, in the best spirit he felt that he must say that the United States does not intend to make advances to any country in order that reparations may be paid by them. Mr. Molotov stated that he had not suggested this. Mr. Byrnes replied that he knew that but wanted to make the situation perfectly clear. Mr. Molotov suggested that the subcommittee to be appointed might consider the question of the advisability of reparations from Italy. Mr. Byrnes stated that the American position was that reparations should be decided at an early peace settlement. The United States wanted the peace settlement done and out of the way. He went on to state that the President’s specific proposal in the last paragraph did not contemplate the question of reparations. He read the section of the proposal in question. Mr. Molotov stated that he had no objection to the appointment of a subcommittee but that reparations should be discussed. Mr. Byrnes felt that it was unnecessary for the subcommittee to consider this point: it must be considered by the Big Three. The Foreign Ministers could make recommendations but the subcommittee could not help us decide on revision of the short-term surrender document. The only purpose of the committee suggested is to draft a statement on the admission of Italy into international organizations and our objection to Spain becoming a member thereof. Mr. Molotov then suggested that when the Foreign Ministers reported to the Big Three on the establishment of this subcommittee it be suggested that the question of reparations be referred to this or another subcommittee. Mr. Byrnes stated that he would not object to the reference of the reparations question to the subcommittee charged with the consideration of reparations matters. Mr. Molotov agreed and then referred to the fact that Mr. Eden had mentioned states other than Italy. He asked for the inclusion of states which were enemy states but are now cobelligerents. Mr. Eden stated that this could be considered and Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Eden then pointed out that from the British point of view it was essential that the conclusion of the peace treaty precede admission into international organizations. Mr. Molotov agreed. Mr. Eden remarked that the contrast between neutral states and Spain was greater than between other states and Spain. Mr. Byrnes suggested that the reparations subcommittee might also consider the question of Austrian reparations. Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed. Mr. Molotov asked that members of the committee to draft on admissions into international organizations be named. Mr. Byrnes named Mr. Matthews and Mr. Cannon. Mr. Eden named Mr. Hoyer Millar and Mr. Dean. Mr. Molotov named Mr. Maisky. Mr. Byrnes then restated his understanding that reparations questions go to the present reparations committee. Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe Mr. Molotov then raised the question of the Yalta declaration on liberated Europe and circulated the Soviet draft. 11 Mr. Eden , with some warmth, stated that he would like to say at once that the description of Greece given in the Soviet proposal is a complete travesty of fact. The Soviet Government had no representatives in Greece, although they were free to go there. The press of the whole world was free to go to Greece and see for themselves and tell the world without censorship what was going on. Unfortunately this was not possible in either Rumania or Bulgaria. The Greeks proposed regular elections open to all parties. The present Greek Government had invited international observers to regulate these elections. Unfortunately the situation in Rumania and Bulgaria was not the same. Mr. Molotov stated that there were missions in Rumania and Bulgaria, including British representatives. Mr. Eden replied that these representatives had few facilities to see anything and still less to get anything done. In addition, the press was not permitted freely to operate in these countries. Mr. Molotov remarked that the number of British representatives in Rumania and Bulgaria was greater than the number of Soviet representatives. It was true that there were no British troops, but there were many political representatives. It was his understanding that the British Government had enough people there to keep it informed. In addition, Mr. Eden knew that the Soviet representatives had recently made proposals for greater cooperation. 12 Mr. Eden replied that he now hoped that the situation would improve. Mr. Molotov asked what suggestions there were. Mr. Byrnes stated that so far as the United States was concerned it had hoped that the spirit of the Yalta declaration would be carried into effect. However, the governments in the countries concerned have restricted the movement of our representatives and the press has been denied admission. This had become a source of great irritation among our people. They believe that the Yalta agreement contemplated early elections. Mr. Byrnes considered that the determination of policy in these countries should not be the sole burden of one of the three powers but should be shared by all of them, and he felt that steps should be taken to see that the governments in question should not discriminate against either the Soviet, British, or American Governments. In view of the attitude of the governments concerned, we could not recognize them at this time. At Yalta we agreed in the declaration on liberated Europe, among other things, to form interim governments broadly representative of all democratic elements of the people and pledged to the earliest possible establishment of a government through free elections. If such elections were held, the United States would gladly recognize any governments resulting therefrom. It cannot do so now. As long as the governments in question deny to American representatives and press an opportunity to observe and report on conditions, recognition will be difficult. Mr. Molotov stated that there were no excesses in Bulgaria or Rumania comparable to those taking place in Greece. He cited the American and British press as authority for this statement. He went on to say that there was no trouble in Bulgaria or Rumania. He admitted restrictions on British and American representatives during the war but stated that things will be different now. The Soviet representatives in the countries in question have therefore already made suggestions in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania to the American and British representatives regarding the future operation of the control councils. He was willing to discuss the matter at this meeting. He pointed out that no elections had been held in Italy despite the fact that Italy had been out of the war for some time. Nevertheless, the United States has diplomatic representatives there. It was therefore difficult to understand why the United States should not recognize Bulgaria and Rumania, which gave greater assistance to the war effort than Italy. In any event, the Soviet Government can no longer delay diplomatic recognition of these countries. He suggested the consideration of a draft either in the present meeting or in a subcommittee. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that our press was able to get an account of conditions in Greece but was unable to do so in Bulgaria and Rumania. Many misunderstandings might disappear if the press was permitted to operate in these countries. Mr. Molotov stated that there was no objection to this. Mr. Byrnes replied that he was sure that the Soviet Union did not object but the governments of these countries do. In Greece the United States is impressed by the fact that the Greeks invite us to supervise their elections. He had just this morning addressed to Mr. Molotov a letter inviting Russia to participate in the supervision of these elections. 13 Mr. Molotov stated that there was no doubt of free elections in Rumania and Bulgaria, which would be held as soon as candidates could be nominated. Mr. Byrnes asked whether the British Empire had been consulted regarding elections in Rumania and Bulgaria. Mr. Eden replied that it had not. Mr. Molotov confirmed this statement. Mr. Eden pointed out the difference between Greece, where all parties would participate in the elections, and Bulgaria, where the vote would be only for or against a set list. This did not meet the British idea of democracy. The press of the world could send anything out of Greece, and this included the TASS representative. On the other hand, British press representatives could send nothing out of Rumania or Bulgaria without extremely heavy censorship. Mr. Molotov said that censorship had been hard during the war but would be better now. Mr. Byrnes recalled that at Yalta we, and particularly President Roosevelt, had wanted to see Poland and other governments bordering Russia friendly to the Soviet Union. The United States has no interest in the Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria except that they be representative of the people and permit our representatives and press to observe conditions freely. Mr. Molotov suggested that methods be discussed. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that if elections are held without asking for supervision by the Big Three, and governments were established which were distrusted generally by the people of our country, it will affect our relations. If the Big Three will see to it that free elections are held, the United States would recognize any government formed. We are interested in having governments friendly toward Russia. Mr. Molotov stated that there was no reason to fear delay or that elections would not be free. However, the situation in Greece was different. The situation was dangerous. Mr. Molotov cited warlike speeches made in Greece against neighboring countries. Mr. Eden interjected that he was aware that the Yugoslav press and radio were accusing Greece of aggressive intentions. The same charges were contained in the document presented this morning by the Soviet delegation. Mr. Molotov insisted that there is no connection between the Soviet document and the Yugoslav Government. Mr. Eden replied that he had only said that the language was the same. He pointed out that the Prime Minister yesterday had given figures proving that it was ludicrous to talk about an aggressive Greece. 14 This was quite apart from the presence of British troops in Greece. He could only suppose that our Soviet Allies do not accept British assurances regarding the number of Greek troops. Greece has neither the intention nor the means to be aggressive. Mr. Molotov remarked that Mr. Eden’s logic was correct, but the facts were that warlike speeches were being made. Mr. Eden replied that he was well aware of the storm of abuse coming over the Moscow and Yugoslav radios regarding Greece, but could only say that these stories were not correct. Mr. Molotov stated the facts had been obtained from the American and British press. Mr. Eden at this point stated his hope that the Soviet paper would be withdrawn. It was an unhappy paper regarding an Ally. Mr. Molotov replied that he was asking for consideration and for the facts. Mr. Eden said that it was easy for the Soviet Government to go and look at the facts. Mr. Molotov suggested that an end should be put to the reign of terror in Greece and that the Government should be reorganized. Mr. Eden reiterated that there was no terror. Mr. Molotov again remarked that he had read about it in the British press. Mr. Byrnes stated that it was unwise to base actions of this sort on press accounts. He was impressed by the fact that we could send representatives to Greece freely and to evaluate information received regarding conditions in that country. Since we are unable to do the same in Rumania and Bulgaria, all sorts of rumors are flying about which affect relations so long as we cannot check them. Mr. Molotov asked that the American and British Governments say what they want and promised that they could have it. Mr. Byrnes replied that Mr. Molotov should see that we could send representatives where they wished to go and also permit the press to come in in order that information might flow freely. Mr. Molotov insisted that American representatives now have the right and the press also, except for essential military censorship. Mr. Byrnes remarked that the difficulty is that the Soviet Foreign Minister is not there. Our representatives say that they are not permitted privileges. When they report that they are denied such privileges, we must accept their report. Mr. Molotov again referred to the suggested improvement in operations made by the Soviet representatives in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Mr. Eden remarked that there was no reference to the press in these suggestions. Mr. Byrnes welcomed the statement that we should consult and decide. The difficulty had arisen out of the fact that we haven’t been consulted. He felt that the recent proposals constituted a step forward even though they did not cover the press. Mr. Molotov stated that there was no doubt about the situation of the press. It would be the same as in Italy. Mr. Eden said “or in Greece”. Mr. Byrnes stated that if we can accomplish that with certainty, we would be making great progress. Mr. Molotov stressed the necessity for a common understanding. The government in Greece must be more representative and not warlike. Mr. Eden remarked that the Greeks were only warlike in the imagination of their neighbors. He stated that only this morning he had suggested Soviet participation in the supervision of elections. 14a Mr. Byrnes added that our information is that the Greek Government wishes us to supervise elections. Mr. Eden pointed out that we would like the same procedure in other countries. He stated that he did not know what more the Greek Government could do than they were doing. Mr. Molotov referred to the Varkiza agreement, 15 which he termed excellent, but added that it was not being carried out and people were complaining. Mr. Eden stated that he wished to report on the Soviet document to the Prime Minister, since it contained grave charges against the British Government. Mr. Molotov denied this and stated that the charges were against the Greek Government. Mr. Eden replied that Mr. Molotov knew very well that the British have troops in Greece. It was necessary to take the gravest exception to this Soviet document. Mr. Byrnes stated that the American Government is not anxious to supervise elections in any country. It regrets the necessity for so doing. But because we are satisfied that it is necessary in order to improve conditions, we would be willing to participate in the supervision of elections in Italy, Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The world knows we meant what we said at Yalta. Settlement of this matter would remove a source of irritation between us. Mr. Eden suggested that each delegation draft its own requirements about what we want in each country. Mr. Molotov , referring to the Soviet document, said that the Soviet suggestions are ready. Mr. Eden replied that the Soviet suggestions stated that everything was all right in Rumania and Bulgaria and all wrong in Greece. Mr. Byrnes suggested that instead of finding fault with each other an agreement be drafted providing for the supervision of free elections in Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Hungary, in addition to provision for freedom of the press. Mr. Eden remarked that this was exactly what he had meant. Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation had set forth its position in its document. He saw no reason to supervise elections in Rumania and Bulgaria. The press was now more free. However, he was willing to consider written suggestions. He suggested that drafts be prepared and hoped that they might be finished today. Agenda for Meeting of Heads of State The following agenda was set for the meeting of Heads of State on July 20: 1. Council of Foreign Ministers. 2. Italy (on this point Mr. Byrnes made it clear that the document to be discussed was the President’s paper circulated on July 17 16 and not the question of admission to international organizations, 17 or reparations, 18 which had been referred to appropriate subcommittees). 3. Austria. 4. The western borders of Poland (Soviet paper and maps circulated). 19 5. Trusteeship (paper circulated). 20 1 Presumably document No. 745 , post . For the text of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, see document No. 1417 , post , section v . 2 Not found. Cf. documents Nos. 712 and 713 , post . 3 No minutes for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers preceding the afternoon meeting of the Heads of Government have been found. Cf. post , p. 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] . 4 See ante , p. 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 5 Documents Nos. 804 and 1064 , post . 6 i. e., no Soviet draft. 7 See ante , p. 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . 8 Document No. 1089 , post . 9 See document No. 727 , post . 10 See the instrument of surrender by Italy signed at Malta, September 29, 1943 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2742). 11 Documents Nos. 804 and 1064 , post . 12 See document No. 309, printed in vol. i , and documents Nos. 796 and 797 , post . 13 Document No. 1061 , post . For Molotov’s reply, see document No. 1063 , post . 14 See ante , p. 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 14a Presumably in a communication parallel to Byrnes’ invitation ( document No. 1061 , post ). 15 Of February 12, 1945, between the Greek Government and the Greek National Liberation Front. See vol. i , documents Nos. 442 and 443 . The text of the Varkiza Agreement is printed in C. M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in Their International Setting (London, 1948), p. 308. 16 Document No. 1089 , post . 17 Document No. 727 , post . 18 No document on reparations from Italy circulated on or before July 20 has been found. Cf. ante , pp. 148–150 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . 19 Document No. 1145 , post . Maps not found. 20 Document No. 733 , post . United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 11:30 a.m. Summary of Meeting of Foreign Ministers Friday Morning, July 20 i. agenda of meeting of heads of governments It was agreed that the following subjects would be recommended to the Heads of Governments this afternoon: 1. Procedure for Peace Settlements. The Foreign Ministers are meeting 15 minutes before the meeting of Heads of Governments with a view to reaching agreement on the redraft of paragraph 3 of the proposal for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was approved July 18. 2 If they reach agreement the redraft will be presented to the Heads of Government at this meeting. 2. Policy Toward Italy. It is recommended that the basis of discussion be the U. S. paper presented to the Conference by the President on July 17. 3. Situation in Austria, Particularly in Vienna. The Prime Minister will make an oral statement on this subject. The question involved is the ratification by the three Governments of the agreements already approved by the European Advisory Commission on control machinery 3 and zones of occupation for Austria and Vienna. 4 4. The Western Boundary of Poland. A Russian paper on this subject, together with a map, has been prepared for discussion. 5. Trusteeship. A Russian paper on this subject has been presented for discussion. ii. economic policy for germany The Foreign Ministers were unable to act on this question as the subcommittee has not yet reported. iii. polish question—liquidation of the london government and implementation of the yalta agreement The Foreign Ministers were also unable to act on this question as the subcommittee has not yet reported. iv. statement on entry of italy and spain into the united nations The U. S. presented a draft statement under which the three Governments would support the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization but would not support the entry of Spain as long as the present regime continues. This paper was referred to a subcommittee. It was also understood that reference might be made in the statement to other neutral countries and to other ex-enemies which fought on the side of the Allies. v. italian and austrian reparations The Soviet delegation having raised the question of Italian reparations, the question of reparations from Italy as well as from Austria was referred to the subcommittee now dealing with German reparations. vi. implementation of the yalta declaration on liberated areas The Soviets presented the redraft to that presented by the U. S. After prolonged and inconclusive discussion it was agreed that the three delegations would each prepare concrete statements of the action they believed should be taken in Rumania, Bulgaria, 5 Hungary, and Greece and that these statements would be considered at a later meeting. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 For the documents referred to in this summary, see the footnotes to the minutes, supra. 3 Document No. 282, printed in vol. i. 4 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1600; 61 Stat. (3) 2679. 5 Poland changed to Bulgaria in a marginal correction by Byrnes. Rapporteur’s Report 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] Rapporteur’s Report 1 Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 11:30 a.m. [Translation] Mr. Molotov’s Report on the Meeting of Foreign Ministers July 20 th Agenda of the meeting of Three Foreign Ministers included the following questions: 1. economic principles related to germany It was stated that Commission authorized to prepare this question has not completed its work and therefore the question was not factually discussed. Resolved: to ask the Commission to complete its work not later than July 21st. 2. polish question Announcement was made that Commission dealing with this question has not yet completed its work as result of which the question was not factually discussed. It is resolved to ask the Commission to complete its work not later than July 21. 3. on peace settlement In view of the fact that Commission authorized to prepare the draft on this question was not able to do it, members of the Commission being engaged in other Commissions, [it] was resolved: Foreign Ministers meet to-day at 15–45 2 in order to prepare the question for submission to the meeting of the Heads of Three Governments. At this meeting of the three Foreign Ministers was adopted the amendment to the paragraph 3 and in the result of it this paragraph reads as follows: “(3) As its immediate important task, the Council would be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established. For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be comprised of the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other members should be invited to participate when matters of interest to them are under discussion. Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the States members thereof.” 4. on yalta declaration on liberated europe People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov handed to Minister for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain A. Eden and Secretary of State of USA J. Byrnes the Soviet draft proposals on this question. 3 In connection with the submitted draft the question of the situation in Roumania and Bulgaria on one hand and in Greece on the other were discussed. As a result of the discussion it was found out that Foreign Ministers vary in their estimation of the situation in these countries. In particular M[ess]rs. J. Byrnes and A. Eden stated that in Rumania and Bulgaria there are limitation[s] for the press. V. M. Molotov pointed out that there were certain inevitable limitations for press under wartime conditions. Of course at present time in view of termination of war the possibilities for work of the press representative] may be extended. This point raises no doubt. Secretary of State of USA Byrnes proposed that three Powers conclude an agreement on arranging for an observation by three Powers on procedure of elections in Italy, Greece, Roumania, Bulgaria, [and] Hungary and on provisions for the free access of press representatives of USA, USSR and Great Britain and for their unrestricted travels and possibility to freely send information. Mr. Eden seconded this proposal. People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov stated he sees no necessity to send special observers to Roumania and Bulgaria. As far as Greece is concerned the Soviet Government position was stated in the submitted document. Mr. Molotov stated that in case Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and USA submit written proposals on this question they can be discussed at the meeting of Three Ministers. 5. on italy Secretary of State J. Byrnes submitted the draft decision of the Heads of Three Governments to the effect that they will support joining by Italy the Organization of the United Nations, but that they will not support the Spanish joining the Organization of the United Nations until [ while ] Spain remains under the control of the present regime in that country. Mr. Eden Foreign Minister of Great Britain stated that he supported this proposal and if any declaration on this question is worked out he would consider it expedient to mention in it that the Three Powers would also support the admittance to the membership of the United Nations of some neutral states, for example Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal. V. M. Molotov put a question whether this proposal could cover such countries, which were enemy states and now become cobelligerent states in the fight against Germany. Mr. A. Eden stated that this question could be discussed, but that he personally felt that such States could be admitted to the membership of the United Nations only after signing of the peace treaties with them. To study this question a subcommission of Matthews and Kennan [ Cannon ] of USA, Hoyer Millar and R. [ P .] Dean of Great Britain and Maisky and Goussev of USSR was set up. In connection with this it was agreed to ask the Commission dealing with reparations to consider the question of the reparations from Italy and Austria. 6. on western polish frontier V. M. Molotov handed to Foreign Ministers [of the] USA and Great Britain the Soviet Government’s proposal on delimitation of the Western frontiers of Poland with the appropriate map. It was decided to submit the question to the meeting of the Three Heads of Governments July 20, 1945. 7. on trusteeship territories V. M. Molotov handed to Foreign Ministers of the USA and Great Britain the Soviet Government’s proposals about trusteeship territories. It was decided to put the question on the agenda of the Three Heads of Governments July 20, 1945. 8. on agenda of the meeting of the three heads of governments Agreed to recommend to the Three Heads of Governments the following agenda: 1. The peace settlement. 2. Of the USA President’s memorandum of July 17 on the policy toward Italy. 3. The situation in Austria and particularly in Vienna (The Prime Minister’s of the Great Britain information) [ sic ]. 4. The Western Polish frontier. 5. The Trusteeship territories. 1 Molotov acted as Rapporteur for this meeting. The typed notation “Informal translation from Russian” appears in the upper right-hand corner of page 1. A somewhat different translation is included in the minutes of the afternoon meeting of Heads of Government; cf. post , p. 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] . 2 i. e., 3:45 p.m. 3 For the documents referred to in this report, see the footnotes to the minutes, ante , pp. 143–155 [ Pgs. 143–155 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . Byrnes–Churchill luncheon meeting, early afternoon Byrnes–Churchill luncheon meeting, early afternoon 1 1 Byrnes was Churchill’s guest for luncheon, presumably at the latter’s quarters, 23 Ringstrasse, Babelsberg. All information on this meeting is from the London Times , July 21, 1945, p. 4. Present United States United Kingdom Secretary Byrnes Prime Minister Churchill Lord Cherwell [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)] Editor’s Note —No record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. 1 1 C. C. S. 197th Meeting. Present United States United Kingdom General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal General of the Army Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham General Somervell Field Marshal Wilson Lieutenant General Hull General Ismay Vice Admiral Cooke Lieutenant-General Macready Major General Norstad Major-General Laycock Rear Admiral Flanigan Major-General Hollis Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Captain Moore Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)]] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 19, 1945 J. C. S. Files Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 19, 1945 top secret 1. Approval of the Minutes of the C. C. S. 196 th Meeting , 19 July 1945 The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— a . Approved the conclusions of the C. C. S. 196th Meeting subject to the amendment of the conclusions 2 under item 4 to read as follows:— “ a. Operational Information and Intelligence That the United States and British Chiefs of Staff will pass to the Russians such operational information and intelligence regarding the theatres in which they are respectively responsible as either may wish and without bargaining. “ b. Information and Intelligence Other than Operational The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will consult together before passing to the Russians any information and intelligence other than operational. Neither party will pass to the Russians information or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party’s sources without their consent.” b . Approved the detailed report of the meeting, subject to any later minor amendments. 2. Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia (C. C. S. 892/1 3 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 4 proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff. The United States Chiefs of Staff proposed a few amendments to the text of the directive. General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the directive on the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff would be responsible for obtaining the approval of the Australian, New Zealand and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command set-up in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia, since these governments had been party to the original arrangements. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— a . Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, in C. C. S. 892/1 as amended during the discussion. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 892/2. 5 ) b . Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would take steps to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command set-up in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia. 3. Disposal of Enemy War Matériel in Germany and Austria (C. C. S. 706/11 and 706/14 6 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Approved Appendices “A” and “B” to C. C. S. 706/11, as amended in C. C. S. 706/14. (Subsequently dispatched to SACMed as [message number] Fan 603.) 2 These amendments have been made in the minutes of the 196th Meeting as printed ante , pp. 112–115 [ Pgs. 112–115 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] . 3 Documents Nos. 1269 and 1285 , post . 4 Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. 5 Not printed as such. For the amendments referred to, which were incorporated into C. C. S. 892/2, see the enclosure to document No. 1285 , post , footnotes 5–9. 6 Document No. 361, printed in vol. i , and document No. 895 , post , respectively. Land–Leathers conversation, 3 p.m. Land–Leathers conversation, 3 p.m. 1 1 The conversation took place at 51 Ringstrasse, Babelsberg. All information on it is based on rough informal notes taken by Morse, the gist of which was given to Department of State historians by Morse in a conversation of November 30, 1955. Present United States United Kingdom Vice Admiral Land Lord Leathers Major General Gross Major-General Holmes Mr. Morse Brigadier Greaves Mr. Bissell Mr. Weston Mr. Nicholson Mr. Picknett [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] Editor’s Note —No official record of this conversation has been found. The following subjects were discussed: allocation of shipping for civilian and military passengers; 2 extension of the time during which the United States should have the use of the Queen Elizabeth and the Queen Mary ; 3 the conversion of 100 vessels by the United Kingdom; the allocation of captured German passenger vessels for United States use in the movement of troops; 4 the use and possible conversion of the Gripsholm and the Drottningholm; American and British trooplift programs; 3 the possible admission of Italy to the United Maritime Authority and the Mediterranean Shipping Board; 5 possible British payment of charter hire for Italian vessels; the distribution of captured German vessels and their use during the war against Japan; 4 and problems relating to the striking Polish crews on British-operated Polish vessels. 6 2 The discussion of this subject presumably centered on the report of the Combined Transportation Committee which was circulated on July 21 as C. C. S. 897. See document No. 1192 , post . 3 See document No. 1191 , post . 4 See document No. 1190 , post . 3 See document No. 1191 , post . 5 See document No. 1110 , post . 4 See document No. 1190 , post . 6 See documents Nos. 1124 and 1125 , post . Informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 3:45 p.m. Informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 3:45 p.m. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] Editor’s Note —At the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers ( ante , page 145) it was agreed that they would meet at 3:45 p.m. The Rapporteur’s report ( ante , page 158) indicates that the meeting was actually held, but no minutes therefor have been found. Fourth plenary meeting, 4 p.m. Fourth plenary meeting, 4 p.m. 1 1 This is the time given on the cover sheet of the Thompson minutes. The Log ( ante , p. 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) indicates that the meeting was called to order at 4:05 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Maisky Mr. Clayton Sir William Strang Mr. Gromyko Mr. Davies Mr. Gusev Mr. Harriman Mr. Sobolev Mr. Pauley Mr. Murphy Mr. Matthews Mr. Bohlen 2 Mr. Cohen 8 Mr. Thompson 4 2 Bohlen acted as Truman’s interpreter at all the plenary meetings. 8 Cohen’s presence is assumed from the existence of his notes on the meeting, post , p. 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] . 4 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)]] United States Delegation Working Paper Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers United States Delegation Working Paper Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] United States Delegation Working Paper 5 Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 4 p.m. Agenda for Meeting of Heads of Three Governments July 20, 1945 4:00 p.m. 1. Council of Ministers. 6 2. Italy in the United Nations, including reference to Spain. 7 3. Vienna—Austria (paper to be presented by Mr. Churchill). 8 4. Western frontiers of Poland (paper presented by U. S. S. R. this morning). 9 5. Trusteeship (paper presented by U. S. S. R. this morning). 9 6. Turkey (paper to be presented by Mr. Churchill). 9 5 This paper, presumably a United States Delegation working paper prepared for Truman, was apparently before the President during the course of the meeting. For the documents referred to, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, infra. 6 At this point is the following manuscript notation by Truman: “disposed of”. 7 At this point is the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Referred to For[eign] Sec[retarie]s”. 8 At this point is the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Settled”. 9 At the end of this item is the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Postponed”. 9 At the end of this item is the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Postponed”. 9 At the end of this item is the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Postponed”. Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 4 p.m. top secret Mr. Molotov presented his report as rapporteur of the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers which was as follows: 1 “1. Economic Policy for Germany. “Mr. Molotov said that notice had been taken by the Foreign Ministers of the fact that the subcommittee which was dealing with the question of economic policy for Germany had not yet reported. “2. Polish Question. “The Foreign Ministers also noted that the committee on this question had not finished its work and they decided to ask it to finish its report by July 21. “3. Peace Settlement. “Since the subcommittee instructed to prepare the draft on this subject had not had time to finish its work the Foreign Ministers had arranged to meet just before the present session and had agreed upon a text which they would submit to the present meeting. “Mr. Molotov read the revised text of paragraph 3 of the document on this question (attachment l). 2 “4. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Areas. 3 “Continuing the reading of his report Mr. Molotov said that at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers he had submitted a Soviet draft proposal on this question. 4 As a result the situation in Rumania and Bulgaria was discussed on the one hand and the situation in Greece on the other. The discussion revealed the different views held by the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Byrnes proposed that an agreement be concluded by the Big Three with regard to the supervision of elections in Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Hungary; with assurances for the free admission of the press into these countries with opportunity to move freely and to be able freely to send in their reports. Mr. Eden associated himself with the proposal. Mr. Molotov had no reason for an agreement on this subject with reference to Bulgaria and Rumania. So far as Greece was concerned the Soviet delegation had submitted a document on this subject. If the United States and Great Britain wished to submit proposals in writing on this subject they could be considered.” The President interrupted to state that he had understood that Mr. Molotov had agreed in principle that an agreement be drawn up. Mr. Molotov replied that he wanted to discuss the proposals which Mr. Eden and Mr. Byrnes intended to submit. So far no proposals had been submitted. Mr. Byrnes rejoined that he had understood Mr. Molotov to agree on the necessity of drawing up an agreement and that it was merely a question of drafting. Mr. Molotov replied that he had literally stated that since Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Eden were anxious to submit their proposals the Soviet delegation was prepared to discuss them. Mr. Churchill intervened to state that in his opinion this should be done but that the word “supervision” should not be used as the British had not contemplated control of the elections. The President said that he had no desire to superintend elections in these countries. Mr. Byrnes suggested that “observe” would be a better word. Mr. Churchill explained that the British wished to know what went on; they would not wish to have responsibility for the elections. There being no further discussion, Mr. Molotov proceeded to read the next point in his report which related to Italy. “5. Italy. “Mr. Byrnes proposed that there be submitted for decision to the three Heads of Government a proposal that they support the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization and that they not support the entry of Spain while that country was under its present regime. 5 Mr. Eden supported this proposal and said that if any declaration of the three powers was made on this subject the British declaration [ delegation ] would also support association with the United Nations of neutrals such as Switzerland, Portugal, and Sweden. Mr. Molotov had inquired if this would extend to the states which had become cobelligerents. Mr. Eden had replied that he was ready to discuss this question but that in his opinion the entry of these countries into the United Nations Organization could occur only after peace treaties had been contracted with them. This question had been submitted to the subcommittee consisting of Mr. Matthews, Mr. Cannon, Mr. [Hoyer] Millar, Mr. Dean, Mr. Maisky, and Mr. Gusev. “6. Western Frontier of Poland. “Mr. Molotov had submitted the proposals of the Soviet Government for the establishment of the western frontier of Poland with a relative map. 6 It was agreed that this question should be taken up by the Heads of Government at the present meeting on July 20. “7. Trusteeship. “Mr. Molotov had submitted the Soviet proposals on this subject 7 and it had been decided to refer it to the Heads of Government at the present meeting. “8. Agenda of Meeting of Heads of Government, July 20. “Mr. Molotov said that the Foreign Ministers had then drawn up the agenda for the present meeting of the Heads of Government which was as follows: “1. Procedure for Peace Settlements. 2. Policy toward Italy. 3. Situation in Austria, Particularly in Vienna. 4. Western Boundary of Poland. 5. Trusteeship.” Mr. Churchill raised a point of procedure and suggested that the meeting of Heads of Government be fixed for five o’clock in the afternoon. This was agreed to. The President said he would also like to suggest that the Foreign Ministers not prolong their meetings and that they submit their reports not later than three o’clock in the afternoon. I [ 1 ]. Procedure for Peace Settlements The American document on this subject with paragraph 3 as revised at the morning [ afternoon? ] meeting of the Foreign Ministers was approved. 8 The President remarked that the only remaining questions on this subject were those of the time and place of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Eden added that there was the question of the secretariat. The President said he was willing to refer these questions to the Foreign Ministers to decide. Mr. Churchill said he was pleased for the question to be discussed but he also held a clear opinion that the Council should have London as a permanent home of the secretariat. Meetings could be held elsewhere if necessary. He pointed out that London was the Allied capital which had been most under fire of the enemy and the longest in the war. It was, he believed, the largest city in the world, although there might be some dispute about this, and it was one of the oldest. Moreover it was more nearly half way between the United States and Russia than any location on the continent. Stalin interrupted to say that the geographic position was the most important question. Churchill remarked that he had six times crossed the Atlantic during the war and that he had also visited Moscow on several occasions. With the exception of Mr. Molotov’s visit, Great Britain had not been used as a meeting ground in the whole of this war. There was strong feeling in London on this matter and he would ask Mr. Attlee to add a word in support of his position. Mr. Attlee said he entirely agreed with the Prime Minister and added that they had a right to see some of these famous people in England. British people had suffered very much and attached importance to this matter. He also thought that the geographic argument was a very strong one. The President said that he also agreed and he felt that the United States had had its share by being host to the recent San Francisco Conference. He also thought that the geographic position was important. Stalin said that he agreed. The President said he did not want what he had said to preclude his inviting the Heads of Government to the United States. Mr. Churchill thanked the President and Marshal Stalin for their courteous acceptance of his suggestion. The President said he thought the Foreign Ministers should take steps to insure that France and China take part in the Council of Foreign Ministers. Stalin said he agreed. The President noted that the timing of the meeting of the Council was left for the decision of the Foreign Ministers. II [ 2 ]. Policy Toward Italy The President said he had handed in a paper on this subject on the first day. 9 It is proper to recognize the contribution which Italy has made to defeat Germany. In this document he had suggested that the short terms of surrender 10 and the obsolete clauses of the long terms 11 be terminated and he had proposed that they be replaced by the following undertakings on the part of the Italian Government: “1. That the Italian government will refrain from any hostile action against any of the United Nations pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace. “2. That the Italian government will maintain no military, naval or air forces or equipment, except as authorized by the Allies, and will comply with all instructions on the subject of such forces and equipment. “Under this interim arrangement, control of Italy should be retained only so far as is necessary: “ a . To cover Allied military requirements, so long as Allied forces remain in Italy or operate therefrom. “ b . To safeguard the equitable settlement of territorial disputes.” Stalin said it would be well for the three Foreign Ministers to discuss this question. He had no objections in principle, but it might well be that certain drafting amendments and improvements would be necessary. It would be advisable to refer this paper for final consideration of the Foreign Ministers and to ask them to discuss preliminaries [ sic ] with the question of Italy the other satellite states of Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. They had no grounds to single out the question of Italy in the consideration from the other satellites. There is no doubt that Italy was the first to surrender, but she had helped Germany. It was true that the forces she supplied were small but they had helped. She now proposed to come into the war against Japan which counted in her favor. The day after the surrender these countries had moved their troops into action against Germany. Bulgaria had sent eight divisions against Germany and Rumania had sent ten or twelve. He was bound to say that these divisions had fought well. With reference to Finland, he said that this country had not given much support against Germany, but her behavior had been all right. It would also be well to improve and facilitate her position. The same thing applied to Hungary. It would, therefore, be well in improving the position of Italy if they would also improve the position of the other satellite states and throw them all together. If his colleagues agreed, his proposal was that the three Foreign Ministers be instructed to examine the question of improving the situation of Italy and of the other satellite states. The President pointed out that his reason for bringing up the question of Italy was that Italy was the first to surrender and that the armistice terms imposed upon Italy had been more harsh than those imposed upon the other satellite states. He agreed with Marshal Stalin that the question of the other satellite states should be taken up. He had taken up Italy first for the reasons given and he agreed with Marshal Stalin’s proposals. Mr. Churchill said that the British position with regard to Italy was not quite the same as that of his two honored colleagues. The British had been attacked by Italy in June 1940. They had suffered very heavily in naval losses in the Mediterranean and heavy losses in Africa at a moment when they were in very grave danger themselves. Their losses in warships in the Mediterranean had been very heavy, as had been their land casualties on the North African shore, when Italy put troops in there. Moreover, without help they had had to undertake the campaign in Abyssinia which had restored the Emperor to his country. Detachments of Italian planes had also been sent to bombard London. It should also not be forgotten that Italy had made a dastardly attack upon Greece; just before the war began Italy had made a lawless attack upon Albania and had seized that country. All this had occurred when the British were alone. He said he mentioned this because he thought it should be remembered and in order that it could not be said that they had not suffered most grievously at the hands of Italy. Moreover, he was bound to state that they could not acquit the Italian people of responsibility any more than they could acquit Germany, because it had come under the control of Hitler. Nevertheless, they had endeavored to keep alive the idea of the renewal of Italy as one of the important powers in Europe and the Mediterranean. When he had gone there a year ago he had made a series of proposals to President Roosevelt, the bulk of which with some improvement made by the President were embodied in a joint declaration. 12 He had said this to show that he was not against Italy nor motivated by a feeling of vengeance. When it was agreed, as was decided at Tehran, 13 to divide the Italian fleet between the three powers, or that if a division were not made the Soviet Union would receive a corresponding number of ships, of the fifteen ships provided the British had contributed fourteen, including the HMS Royal Sovereign and four submarines of a new type. He repeated that he mentioned all this to show the injuries they had received and that they were prepared to proceed in a broad manner with respect to the question of Italy’s future. He had seen it said that they were hostile to Italy. It had been said when they spoke against Count Sforza that they wished to see Italy plunged into misfortune. He repudiated these press statements. He spoke in the name of his government and with a clean heart. He was anxious to join with the President and the Marshal in the principle of making a gesture to the Italian people who have suffered terribly and have aided in expelling the Germans from their land. They did not dissent from the proposal to make a peace with Italy. This work will certainly take several months, however, and one wonders whether a general peace conference will be so far away when that work is finished. He also noticed that the Italian Government at the present time had no democratic foundation derived from free and unfettered elections. It simply consists of politicians who call themselves leaders of different political parties. It was the intention of the Italian Government, he understood, to hold elections before the winter. While he agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should start on this work of preparing the peace treaty, he thought it was not advisable that they come to a final conclusion until the Italian Government rests on a democratic foundation. Meanwhile, he was not in full agreement with the memorandum of the United States Delegation on the interim measures providing that the long and short terms of the armistice be withdrawn and replaced by an interim arrangement pending the conclusion of a final peace treaty. No government could be depended upon to carry out its undertakings if it were without a democratic foundation chosen by its people. If their existing rights in Italy were abolished, the long and short armistice terms withdrawn, and there was a considerable interval before the peace settlement, they should have lost their power to enforce their rights except by the use of force. He added that no one wanted to use force. They were entitled to receive from Italy compliance with the various terms which they had the right to ask from her. He pointed out that there would be a gap or a hiatus between the withdrawal of the armistice terms and the time when Italy would have a responsible government which could conclude a peace treaty. He said, for example, that paragraph one of the American proposal which describes the undertakings which the Italian Government would give does not cover the future of the Italian fleet, the Italian colonies, the question of reparations and other important points. If they lost their existing rights under the surrender in the interval, they would not have the power to secure the peace to which they were entitled. Finally, he must venture to submit to the President that the terms of surrender have been signed by a great many other people. Australia and New Zealand had lost many dead on African soil. The Greeks had, of course, also lost many men, but other countries had signed the armistice terms as well. He did not wish today to go further than to assent in principle to a peace treaty and he should be glad if it received priority by the Council of Foreign Ministers. With regard to the other countries he was bound to say that Bulgaria had no claim to regard from Britain. It had struck them a blow and had done them all the harm it possibly could. It was not for him to say what the Bulgarians had done against the Russians. Bulgaria had hardly suffered at all in this war. She lay crouching in the Balkans, fawning on German aid. She had also committed many cruelties in Greece and Yugoslavia. She had prevented Turkey’s entry into the war when this would have been most helpful. There had been no proposal to disarm Bulgaria; on the contrary, he believed Bulgaria had some fifteen divisions. No arrangements had been made for reparations from Bulgaria. Bulgaria had also ill treated British and American prisoners of war. Their sympathies lay much more with concluding a peace with Italy than with Bulgaria. He thanked his colleagues for listening to him and said he thought it was important that they have all the facts before them. He differed in some points from the President and Marshal Stalin. Stalin stated it seemed to him that the question with regard to Italy and that with regard to the other satellite states generally were questions of high policy. The purpose of such a policy was to separate these countries from Germany as a great force. There were two methods by which this could be done. One was the use of force. This method had been successfully applied by the Allies in Italy and by the Soviet forces in other satellite states. But the use of force alone was not enough to separate the satellite states from Germany. If they confined themselves to the use of force alone, there was danger that they would create a medium unfavorable [ favorable? ] 14 to the association of these countries to Germany. Therefore, it was expedient to supplement the method of force by the method of improving the position of these satellites. This seemed to him to be the only means to rally the satellites around them and to detach them once and for all from Germany. Compared with these considerations of high policy the questions of revenge and complaints lapsed. It was in the light of these considerations that he viewed the paper presented by the President and he felt that the President’s paper was in full harmony with this policy of detaching the satellites from Germany by easing their position. Therefore, he had no objection in principle to the proposal, but repeated that there might be some improvements of a drafting nature. He also wished to refer to another aspect of the matter. Of course, Italy had committed great sins. It had committed sins against the Russians as well, but they had not been great ones. They had fought Italy on the Don and in the Ukraine, for they had penetrated that far into his country. He thought, however, it would be incorrect to be guided by the remembrance of injuries. The feeling of revenge, hatred or the desire for redress was a bad adviser in politics. He said it was not for him to teach, but he thought he should be guided in politics by the weighing of forces. The question was, do they wish to have Italy on the side of the United Nations so as to isolate all possible forces which might arise against them from Germany. This determined everything and the same principle applied to the other satellites. He pointed out that there had been many difficulties and sacrifices caused to them by the satellite states. Rumania had used twenty-two divisions against them. At the termination of the war Hungary had twenty-six divisions and still greater injuries were caused to them by Finland. Of course, if it had not been for the help of Finland, Germany could not have maintained the blockade at Leningrad. Finland had moved twenty-four divisions against Soviet troops. Smaller injuries had been caused them by Bulgaria. She had helped Germany against Russia, but she did not send her troops against them. On the other hand, she had caused harm to the Allies, Yugoslavia and Greece. Bulgaria should be punished for this and he was not opposed to punishing her. The armistice terms provided for reparations to be paid to these two countries. He said not to worry, for the Russians would compel this payment. It was also contemplated in the armistice terms that Bulgaria was to provide troops to fight Germany. This armistice agreement 15 had also been signed by the United States and the United Kingdom. The armistice terms provided that after the end of hostilities against Germany the Bulgarian army was to be reduced to normal. He said that this was being done and that it would be carried out. Bulgaria had no right to resist the execution of the armistice terms and the Soviets would see to it that they did not resist. Such were the sins committed by the satellite states against the Allies generally and the Soviet Union particularly. If they started to take revenge against them for their brazen behavior and the losses which they had caused, this was one policy and he was against it. The Control Commission of the Three Powers started functioning to keep these countries under control. It was time for a different policy and for easing the position of these countries—not in such measure as the case of Italy—but still it was necessary. The only means to do this was to dig a channel between the Germans and the satellite states. The specific proposals submitted by the President did not propose that a peace treaty with Italy be immediately prepared. All he had proposed was that the way be cleared for the conclusion in the near future of a peace treaty with Italy and that an intermediate arrangement be concluded which would cover the situation created by the ending of the armistice terms before the conclusion of a peace treaty. It was difficult to oppose this because it was practical and right. With regard to the satellites, he did not propose that peace treaties be signed with them nor even that some intermediate position be accorded them as the President had proposed for Italy. He thought they could start by resuming diplomatic relations with them. With regard to the statement that there were no freely elected governments in the satellite states, he pointed out that no such government existed in Italy and that in spite of this they had resumed diplomatic relations with Italy. The same thing was true of France and Belgium. Churchill pointed out that these were Allies. Stalin replied that he understood this, but that democracy was democracy everywhere, no matter whether it was a question of allies or satellites. The President stated that as he understood the position he had made a concrete proposal. The armistice agreement with Italy had been signed by the three governments represented here. The same was true of the other armistice arrangements. He had made a proposition with regard to Italy and Marshal Stalin had made a proposal with regard to the others. Stalin interrupted to point out that the Dominions had not signed these agreements. Mr. Eden replied that the three countries had signed in the names of all the other United Nations. The President interrupted to state that he would like to keep the argument on the questions which they had been discussing, if his colleagues did not mind. On the agenda of their meeting there had been the suggestion of a statement of policy on Italy. Marshal Stalin has raised the question of Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland. The suggestion of Marshal Stalin is that the matter of these satellite states be referred to the Foreign Ministers. The President thought that agreement could be reached on all of these satellite countries. The United States policy in this matter is that it was trying to bring about a feeling of peace in the world and that this did not have to wait a final peace conference for the world as a whole. They were faced with the situation where the United States must expend enormous sums of money because of countries in Europe. With reference to the question of reparations from Italy, it was necessary to take into consideration that the United States was spending from 750 million to a billion dollars to feed Italy this winter. The United States was rich but it could not forever pour out its resources for the help of others without getting something in return. Unless they were able to get these governments on a self-supporting basis, and there was no prospect of getting them on a self-supporting basis the way things were now going, the United States would not be able to continue indefinitely to maintain them when they should be able to help themselves. They had to try at this meeting to prepare conditions which would bring about a situation in which these countries could help themselves. He hoped that they could send this question to the Foreign Ministers and get agreement on all these countries. Churchill replied that they certainly thought that they were agreed that the preparation of a peace with Italy should be remitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers. He had only deprecated tearing up the surrender terms for that would remove their right to obtain a proper peace. The President replied that he was not proposing to sweep away that right. Churchill replied that he agreed to the easing of the burden on Italy. He supposed that there was no objection to a declaration of policy on Italy. The President said he thought they should include the other satellite states. Churchill said he agreed with what had been said on the subject of not allowing the future to be governed by a spirit of revenge. It had been a great pleasure for him to hear these words from the leaders of the great communities which his colleagues represented. He had great sympathy for Italy. He had mentioned reparations but the British did not want them for themselves. They were thinking of Greece. The President pointed out that he had submitted concrete proposals with reference to Italy and that Stalin had submitted proposals with reference to the other satellite states. He suggested that they refer these proposals to the Foreign Ministers. Churchill replied that he could agree here and now to the preparation of a treaty by the Council of Foreign Ministers. With regard to the armistice terms for Italy he agreed that this could be referred to the Foreign Ministers at the morning meeting. Stalin said that he suggested that the Foreign Ministers discuss the satellites as well and he urged Churchill to accept this. Churchill replied that he agreed and that he had not objected to this. 3. The Situation in Austria, Particularly in Vienna Churchill said that he regretted in the discussion today he appeared to be arguing against the Soviet view. The situation in Austria was very unsatisfactory. It had been agreed that sectors be assigned to them in Austria. The discussion on this matter had been going on for a very long time. Two months ago they were humbly asking that British officers be allowed to go to Vienna in order to look into the question of accommodations. All this had been agreed to in principle. It was with the greatest difficulty that this had been arranged and he had had to address several communications to Marshal Stalin. 16 There had been no satisfactory results from this inspection. The British had no one in Vienna now and they were not allowed to take up their positions. The entry of British troops into Syria [ Styria ] had not been allowed, although this had been agreed to. Three or four months ago Austria had been liberated by the Soviets. Field Marshal Alexander had submitted a very unsatisfactory report on the situation. 17 The British did not have a foothold. He thought they should be allowed to go to Austria and take up their zone. At the meeting yesterday Marshal Stalin had raised the question of a visit to the German ships. He proposed that they proceed in a reciprocal manner and pointed out that cities occupied by the Russians should also be opened up. He said that the information reaching them regarding conditions in their zone indicated that they were not satisfactory. In the north in Germany they had retreated to their occupation line and the United States forces had retreated from an enormous territory in occupying their zone, but they had not been allowed to set foot in their zone in Austria. Stalin said that a general agreement had been reached on the question of zones in Austria. No agreement had been reached on the zones in Vienna. It had taken some time to hold negotiations and agreement had only been reached yesterday. The President pointed out that he had signed the document on this matter today. 18 Stalin said that there was also the question of airfields. Agreement had also been reached on this matter, but the French had only communicated their agreement yesterday. For some reason the French were always late. They agreed to fix the date of entry of the Allied troops into Vienna and the date for the Soviet troops to leave. The movement of troops could begin today or tomorrow. 19 He said that Mr. Churchill appeared to be indignant. He wondered why. The Soviets had not been permitted in the United Kingdom zone in Germany. They did not complain. They knew how hard it was to move troops. They had no intention of violating an obligation. If only Austria and Vienna were in question, this question was settled. A wiser action was taken in the case of Berlin and the question of occupation was settled more quickly. Field Marshal Montgomery [ Alexander ] 20 had acted less skillfully. This was one of the factors that delayed matters. He behaves as if Russian troops were under his control. The British and American commanders in the German zone had behaved well and everything was all right there. There was no objection to each army occupying its zone whether in Vienna or in Austria. Only yesterday that agreement had been reached. Churchill observed that he was very glad to know that matters were now settled. With regard to Field Marshal Alexander, he wished to say that he really did not think that he had been able to give sufficient attention to all of these matters. Stalin said that he had no complaints against Field Marshal Montgomery [ Alexander ], although he had not checked up on the matter. Churchill replied that he would be glad to have any complaints, if there were any. Stalin said he did not wish to institute an investigation. Churchill said he was bound to say that in the absence of any complaint Field Marshal Alexander retains the complete confidence of His Majesty’s Government. Stalin replied that he understood this. He had no complaint. He had only stated what he had been informed of by his commanders and that this was one of the factors that caused the delay. Churchill pointed out that the British were not the only people involved. There were American deputies involved and it was on record that the United States had been far from satisfied. The President agreed. 4. Western Frontiers of Poland Stalin suggested that if his colleagues were not ready today they might discuss this matter at the next meeting. This was agreed. 5. Trusteeships On the suggestion of Stalin , this matter was also postponed until the next meeting in order to give the President and Churchill time to consider these Soviet proposals. Meeting adjourned. 21 1 Cf. ante , p. 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] . 2 Document No. 713 , post . 3 For the text of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, see document No. 1417 , post , section v . 4 Documents Nos. 804 and 1064 , post . 5 Document No. 727 , post . 6 Document No. 1145 , post . Map not found. 7 Document No. 733 , post . 8 Document No. 713 , post . 9 Document No. 1089 , post . 10 i. e., the Conditions of an Armistice, signed September 3, 1943 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740). 11 i. e., the Instrument of Surrender of Italy, signed September 29, 1943 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2742). 12 See Department of State Bulletin , vol. xi , p. 338. 13 The records of the Tehran Conference are scheduled for subsequent publication in a volume in this series. See Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring (vol. v of The Second World War ) (Boston, 1951), p. 393. 14 Cf. the Cohen notes, post , p. 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] . 15 Signed at Moscow, October 28, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 437; 58 Stat. (2) 1498). 16 See particularly Churchill’s message of May 17, printed in Stalin’s Correspondence , vol. i , p. 356. 17 See document No. 773 , post . 18 See document No. 772 , post , footnote 1. 19 See document No. 780 , post . 20 Cf. the Cohen notes, post , p. 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] . 21 At 6:40 p.m. See Log, ante , p. 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 20, 1945, 4 p.m. The Report of the Foreign Ministers 1 was received. A change in paragraph 3 ii of Council of Foreign Ministers was adopted. This was to provide for permanent secretariat. There was considerable discussion as to what the foreign secretaries did favor regarding Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece. Molotov, however, indicated that there should be a relaxation of present restrictions now that the war has ended. Churchill : On elections—I want to [make] clear that supervision of elections does not mean control. Byrnes : Observation is a better word. Churchill : I wanted to make it clear that we did not have the responsibility. Continued discussion of the foreign secretaries’ report. Byrnes proposed admission of Italy to the United Nations as suggested by President at first meeting, with a declaration against admission of Spain. Eden suggested also examination of question of the admission of neutrals. Molotov inquires about Rumania and Bulgaria and sentiment in favor of admitting such countries upon the conclusion of the peace treaty. Churchill : May I raise a small point of procedure? There is really not time between meetings of foreign secretaries in the morning and the meeting of the Big Three in the afternoon. I suggest that we meet at 5:00. Truman : I should like us to have the Report of the foreign secretaries by 3:30. The first matter is Council of Foreign Ministers. Churchill : I think the meeting place should be in London. London is the capital city most under the fire of the enemy and the longest in the war. It is the largest city in the world. It is more nearly half way between the United States and Russia than any place on the continent. I have twice gone to Washington, twice to Moscow, but London has not been used in the whole of this war. There is great feeling in England on this. I would ask my colleague, Mr. Attlee, to say a word on this. Attlee : I entirely agree with the Prime Minister. The people of London have a right to see these distinguished people and the geographic argument is a strong one. Truman : I agree. The United States feels it has had its share. London is entitled to its share and the geographical position is right. Stalin : I agree. Churchill : May I express our thanks to the President and the Marshal for their acceptance of our invitation. Truman : What about the time? Churchill : We will leave that to the foreign secretaries. Stalin : I agree. Truman : The next point is our policy toward Italy. The gist of my statement is surrender terms should be terminated and replaced by simple undertakings and peace concluded as rapidly as possible. Stalin : It would be well for the foreign secretaries to discuss this question. I have no objection in principle but certain drafting amendments, and improvements may be necessary. It would be well to refer this paper to the foreign secretaries and to bring up the question of the other satellites, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary at the same time. We have no right to single out Italy. Italy helped Germany. Bulgaria and Rumania moved their troops against Germany. I am bound to say that their armies fought well. Finland did not give support in the war against Germany, but her position is all right and should be facilitated. The same applies to Hungary. It would be well in facilitating the position of Italy to facilitate the positions of the other satellite countries. If you agree, the foreign secretaries may be asked to examine the question of satellites as a whole. Truman : I brought up Italy because she surrendered first and surrender terms were the hardest. After Italy has been taken care of, we shall take up the others. Churchill : Our position regarding Italy is a little different. We were attacked by Italy in 1940 and suffered heavy losses in Egypt and in the Mediterranean. Unaided we had to undertake the Abyssinian campaign. Special Italian air detachments were sent to bombard London. Italy made most dastardly attack on Greece, our Ally; just before the war, she seized Albania. All these things happened when we were alone. We suffered most grievously from Italian action. We can not entirely acquit the Italians of responsibility. Nevertheless, we have tried to keep alive the vitality of Italy. Mr. Roosevelt and I made a joint declaration on it. When there was a question of dividing the Italian ships into three parts, it was agreed that Russia should have her share or the equivalent. We are not hostile to Italians simply because we spoke harshly of Count Sforza who did foolish things. I am anxious to join with the Marshal in sending a message to the Italian people. Therefore, the British government does not object in principle to making peace in Italy. This work will take several months and one wonders whether the peace conference can be so far away. I also notice that the Italian government has not yet had its elections. It is the intention of the Italian government that elections should be held before winter. Therefore, while I agree that the foreign secretaries should start on this work, I do not think a final conclusion should be reached until the Italian government rests on a recognized democratic base. In the meanwhile, I do not find myself in full agreement with the President’s position to replace surrender terms with undertakings which the Italian people are no[t] prepared to assume. There would be a gap. The proposed undertakings do not cover the future of Italian fleet, colonies, reparations, etc. We would lose our rights under the surrender. Finally, the terms of surrender were signed by the Dominions. They would have to be consulted. I do not wish to go further than to assent to the preparation of a peace treaty. I am bound to say that I can not feel that Bulgaria has any particular claim on Great Britain. She struck us a deadly blow and did what she could to hurt us in the Balkans. Bulgaria has hardly suffered at all in this war. She did injury to Greece and Yugoslavia, her neighbors. She was a menace and kept Turkey out of the war. Stalin : The question of Italy and the satellite countries are questions of great policy. The purpose of such a policy is to separate from Germany the main aggressive forces, these satellite countries. There are two ways. We could use force. Force was successfully applied during the war. But the use of force is not enough to separate satellites from Germany. If we use force alone there is danger that we shall create a medium that will favor the association of these countries with Germany. Therefore, it is expedient to add to force a policy which would wean the satellites from Germany. This is the only means to rally the satellites about us and to separate them from Germany. All consideration of revenge, all complaints for suffering lapse in the face of this high policy. So I favor in principle the paper presented by the President on Italy and would extend it to other satellite countries. There is another aspect of this question I have in mind. The second part of Mr. Churchill’s speech. Of course Italy committed sins against Britain. She committed sins against Russia also but not as great. Italians fought as far as the Don and the Volga but it would be incorrect to be guided by injuries or feelings of retribution. The feelings of revenge and retribution are poor guides in politics. We should be guided in politics by the calculation of forces. Do we want to have Italy on the side of the United Nations? I think so. The same must be said with regard to the other satellites. Many difficulties were caused by satellites like Rumania, Hungary. Great defeats were caused to us by Finland. It was Finland’s help that enabled Germany to blockade Leningrad. Less injuries were caused to us by Bulgaria but she also helped Germany to fight Russia, but she did not declare war or send her troops to Russia, but she caused harm to our Allies in Greece and Yugoslavia. Bulgaria should be punished and should pay reparations. But it is also contemplated in the Armistice that Bulgaria should fight Germany. Bulgaria’s Army must be demobilized and reduced to peacetime strength. Such are the sins of the satellites against the Allies and the Soviets in particular. After the satellites have been brought to their knees and the Control Commission has taken over, it is high time to pass over to another policy. And now as to specific proposals. President Truman does not propose immediate peace treaty. All he proposes is that the way should be cleared. For the time being, he proposes an intermediate state of affairs. I think it is difficult to be opposed to such a proposition. As to other satellites, I do not propose this intermediate state, but I do think that we can start having diplomatic relations with them. Democracy is Democracy the world over. Truman : I have made clear my position on the recognition of the satellites. I have no objection to Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary as well as Italy having their position facilitated by us. While nations must be punished, we want no peace of revenge. The United States can not, moreover, pour out its resources without prospective return. We want to get satellites on a self-supporting basis. I will not sanction the continued handing out of funds to nations which should be self-supporting. We want to help these nations to become self-supporting. I am hopeful that this matter can be referred to the foreign secretaries. Churchill : I think we are agreed that preparations of the peace should be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. I merely point out we can not give up the surrender terms while we prepare peace terms. There is no objection to announcing peace treaties with Italy will be prepared—and also with the satellite countries. I have great sympathy with the view expressed against the peace of vengeance and I have great sympathy with Italy. I mentioned reparations. We will not claim reparations from Italy for ourselves but for Greece. Truman : Let us refer the easing of the surrender terms to the foreign secretaries. Churchill : I am for the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy but I think the interim steps should be considered by the foreign secretaries. Stalin : I should like to have the foreign secretaries discuss the question of other satellite countries. Churchill : I have no objection. Truman : Let us proceed. The next point is Vienna and Austria. Churchill : I regret to have to speak against the Soviet view. The situation in Vienna and Austria is very unsatisfactory. We have been unable to agree on zones which had previously been agreed upon in principle. We have not been able to enter the sector assigned to us. We agreed to reciprocity with respect to inspecting seized ships. Our going into Vienna ought not to be obstructed. The British and Americans retreated in Germany to give Russia her promised zone, but we are unable to enter our sector in Vienna. Stalin : General agreement was reached as to zones in Austria, but not as to zones in Vienna. But today an agreement was reached. Agreement on air fields took time. The French communicated their agreement to us only yesterday. The French also [ always? ] 2 delayed. We will now, at once, fix a date for the movement of the troops—today or tomorrow. Mr. Churchill seems indignant but he has no grounds. We were kept out of our zone a whole month and we did not complain. The removal of troops is complicated. There was quicker action in Berlin. Field Marshal Alexander was not skilled in handling these matters. He behaves as if Russian troops were under his control. Churchill : I am glad to know that the matter is at last settled and we shall be allowed to move into our assigned zone and allocation. I do not think that Field Marshal Alexander is to blame. Stalin : There are no complaints against Eisenhower. I am not complaining against Alexander. I am only reporting the difficulties. Truman : If the matter is satisfactorily settled, let us proceed to the western frontier of Poland. Stalin : If you are not prepared, this may go over until tomorrow. Truman : The next subject is trusteeship. Stalin : If you are not prepared, we shall postpone for tomorrow. Adjourned. 1 For documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra. 2 Cf. the Thompson minutes, ante , p. 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] . Truman–Churchill conversation Truman–Churchill conversation Present United States United Kingdom President Truman Prime Minister Churchill [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)]] Memorandum by the President [Babelsberg,] July 20 [1945.] Truman Papers Memorandum by the President Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] Memorandum by the President 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 20 [1945.] Told Churchill about it. 2 Also asked Churchill not to let any proclamations be issued by control council while we are in session here[.] 1 This brief memorandum is a manuscript notation by Truman on the Leahy memorandum quoted in footnote 2, infra . The conversation referred to presumably took place either immediately before or immediately after the Fourth Plenary Meeting, July 20. 2 The reference is to the subject matter of the following undated manuscript memorandum by Leahy: “President inform Churchill. The French Government in an adjustment of the exchange value of the franc is paying $17 per month to American soldiers serving in France at the present time.” Truman–Stalin conversation, about 6:45 p.m. Truman–Stalin conversation, about 6:45 p.m. 1 1 This conversation took place at the Cecilienhof Palace after the Fourth Plenary Meeting, perhaps during the buffet luncheon which was served in the dining room of the Palace following adjournment of that meeting (see ante , p. 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] ). Present United States Soviet Union President Truman Generalissimo Stalin [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)]] Memorandum by the President [Undated.] Truman Papers Memorandum by the President Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] Memorandum by the President 2 [Undated.] Question 3 asked of Stalin after meeting on 20th. Had already asked him when he called. 4 Agreed to it in a few days. 2 This brief memorandum is a manuscript notation by Truman on the Leahy memorandum quoted in footnote 1 to document No. 1275 , post . 3 i. e., when the Soviet Chiefs of Staff would meet with the United States Chiefs of Staff. 4 See ante , p. 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] . Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening 1 1 The date is deduced from the reference in document No. 1025 , post , to “Maisky’s proposal of July 20 for immediate internationalization of the Ruhr.” The time is deduced from Maisky’s reference to “tonight”. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Mr. Murphy Sir Walter Monckton Mr. Maisky Mr. Clayton Mr. Turner Mr. Pauley [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)]] United States Delegation Memorandum [Undated.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] United States Delegation Memorandum 2 [Undated.] Notes on Soviet Suggestions That the Ruhr Be Internationalized Maisky : To ensure control of German War Potential, U. S. S. R. has considered internationalization of the Ruhr area of four million people under Four Powers, U. S., U. S. S. R., U. K. and France which would regulate production of Ruhr area. If sympathetic, Economic Sub Committee should prepare plan for Foreign Secretaries. Monckton : Area? Timing? Maisky : Whole industrial area. As soon as possible and “more or less permanently”. Murphy : Under Control Council? Maisky : Probably a special organization. Clayton : Rhineland and Ruhr? Maisky : Probably but no definite area tonight. Clayton : More than four million people. Turner : Westphalia and Rhineland—eleven million people. Pauley : 25X50 miles—all black coal plus much industry. Monckton : Can only take note. Can’t say a word. Seems political as well as economic. Clayton : Leave Germans there? Maisky : Yes. Clayton : Leave them in ownership of properties? Maisky : That is another question. Clayton : Which direction will products flow? Maisky : That is for Governments to decide. Clayton : Agree Monckton as to political—can’t take into this Committee without instructions. Maisky : Please consult individual ministers. Monckton : Is there a Soviet paper? Otherwise Molotov should bring up. Maisky : No paper. Please think over. Pauley had mentioned in Moscow. Pauley : If you could control coal—you could turn it on and off. 2 Authorship not indicated. Saturday, July 21, 1945 Saturday, July 21, 1945 Contents Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)]) Stimson–Churchill conversation, about 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)]) Fifth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)]) Tripartite dinner meeting, about 8:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)]) Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)]) Fourth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon Fourth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Dunn Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gromyko Mr. Clayton Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Maisky Mr. Murphy Mr. Ward Mr. Sobolev Mr. Matthews Mr. Novikov Mr. Cohen Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Russell Mr. Thompson 1 1 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2145 [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)]] Rapporteur’s Report Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2145 United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2145 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] United States Delegation Memorandum 2 Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon top secret Agenda Meeting of Foreign Ministers July 21, 1945 1. Date of establishment of Council of Foreign Ministers. It was agreed at yesterday’s meeting of the Big Three that the Foreign Ministers should decide at what date the newly approved Council of Foreign Ministers should be formally set up. 2. German Economic Questions. The subcommittee which has been working for some days on these questions is presenting its first report. 3. The Polish question—Liquidation of the London government and implementation of the Yalta agreement . The subcommittee which has been working on this question is ready to report. 4. Implementation of the Yalta agreement on liberated Europe and satellite states. In accordance with the decision taken at yesterday’s meeting of Foreign Ministers, the U. S. is presenting a new paper on this subject setting forth in specific terms the steps which we believe should be taken in the countries in question in order that the Yalta Declaration may be implemented. 5. Italy and the other satellites. The Big Three at yesterday’s meeting referred to the Foreign Ministers the question of easing in the near future the armistice terms imposed on Italy and the other satellites. The U. S. is presenting new proposals on this subject. 6. Turkey. It is understood that the British Delegation desires to raise orally with the Soviet Delegation the question of Soviet desires concerning the modification of the Montreux Convention and concerning other aspects of Soviet-Turkish relations. 2 Authorship not indicated. For the reports and papers referred to in this memorandum, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, infra. Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon top secret The meeting of Foreign Ministers began at 12 noon on Saturday, July 21, 1945. Secretary Byrnes was in the Chair. Date of Meeting for the Council of Foreign Ministers Mr. Byrnes said that the first item of business was the fixing of the date of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He proposed not later than September 1. Mr. Molotov inquired what day of the week this would be. Mr. Eden replied that it was Sunday. Mr. Molotov said he agreed. It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet at a date not later than September 1. Mr. Molotov inquired in what composition would the Council of Foreign Ministers meet. Mr. Byrnes replied that they had agreed first of all to meet in London and that they would have a formal meeting there to set up the Council. Mr. Molotov inquired if this meant five members. He pointed out that the composition of the Council would determine the type of questions to be discussed. Mr. Byrnes replied that it would be five, because there was the question of organizing the Council and deciding the procedure to be followed. Mr. Eden pointed out that he did not wish to be grasping. It had been decided that the Secretariat would be in London but the Council might wish to meet elsewhere. He thought this might be said. Mr. Molotov thought they might rotate the meetings. Mr. Eden proposed that they approve the addition of language to state that the Council should normally meet at London, which would be the seat of its Secretariat, but that it might meet elsewhere by common agreement. Mr. Byrnes said it was decided that they would communicate with France and China before final announcement was made of the creation of the Council. He proposed that they each appoint a representative to draft a telegram. Mr. Byrnes named Mr. Matthews, Mr. Molotov named Ambassador Gromyko, and Mr. Eden named Mr. Ward, for the purpose of drafting a telegram. Report of Subcommittee on German Economic Questions Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the Subcommittee on German Economic Questions had presented its report. 1 Mr. Molotov said that the Subcommittee had finished its work late at night and he had had no time to get acquainted with its report. If possible, he would prefer that this question be taken up as item 1 on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting the next day. This was agreed to. Mr. Molotov inquired if they would have any agenda for the present meeting today. Mr. Byrnes said that they would first consider the questions submitted to them by the Big Three. Then they would take up the reports of the subcommittees which they, the Foreign Ministers, had appointed. Finally, they could consider the agenda for the Big Three meeting. Polish Question Mr. Byrnes said that papers on this subject had been submitted by the British and Soviet delegations. These had been considered by a subcommittee, and he would now call on the chairman of the subcommittee for his report. Mr. Vyshinski said that the subcommittee set up to deal with the Polish question had not reached full agreement on their report. 1a They had had three papers before them: (1) a British paper of July 19, (2) an amended text of the British draft of July 19 which the British had submitted, (3) a Soviet amended draft of the same British text. 2 They were guided in their discussions by the second draft submitted by the British. In drafting the final text on this question there were five matters upon which no agreement was reached. These were: (1) The first disagreement related to the question of the transfer of the assets of the London Polish Government to the new Provisional Government. The last sentence of paragraph 2 of the British draft was not acceptable to the Soviet delegation, which thought that no discussion of the question of liabilities of the Polish Government should be included in the declaration. The Soviet delegation thought that this was a matter of Polish-American and Polish-British relations. The amount and character of the assets and debts was not known to the Soviet delegation, and they thought that this question should be dealt with separately. (2) The second difference related to the last sentence of paragraph 4 of the British draft, which related to assurances for the return of Poles to Poland. Mr. Vyshinski pointed out that there were three thoughts embodied in this sentence. The Soviet delegation welcomed the last thought, namely, that the Poles who returned to Poland should have equal rights with other Poles. With respect to the other two thoughts, namely, the question of assurances to Poles and the thought that as many Poles as possible should come home, the Soviet delegation considered that it was not proper to include the mention of these assurances, and they thought that it was already clear that it was desired that as many Poles as possible return to Poland. The Soviet delegation had therefore suggested a shorter sentence, to the effect that the three Governments expect that those Poles that return home will be accorded equal rights with all Polish citizens. The British delegation did not agree with this proposal because of the word “expect”. The British delegation thought that the Polish Government should give assurances. (3) This disagreement related to the proposal of the Soviet delegation that the declaration include a statement to the effect that the British Government would undertake not to arrest Poles who wanted to return home. (4) This related to the sentence to the effect that the three powers took note that the Polish Government had undertaken to hold free and unfettered elections, etc. The Soviet delegation agreed to this except for the word “pledge”, which they objected to because the Crimea decision had said “should pledge” and not “pledge”. 3 When the new Polish Government was formed it had given this pledge. A proposal had been made to state “It is the confident hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be conducted in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all democratic and anti-Nazi sections of Polish opinion have been able to express their views freely, and thus to play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life.” Mr. Vyshinski said that if this meant that all sections of public opinion in Poland, including Nazis, had been able to express their views freely, it was not acceptable. If it meant otherwise, the Soviet delegation proposed to avoid repetition by merely adding to the first part of this paragraph a reference to democratic parties fully participating in the country’s political life. (5) This difference referred to the freedom of the press to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections. This wording was unlimited and meant that unrestricted freedom of the press was proclaimed. Hostilities had just finished, and the Soviet delegation thought that this would be difficult. They were of the opinion that the press should have greater freedom now because conditions had changed, but this was a Polish internal question and it was impossible to decide it without the Poles. These five differences the Subcommittee had referred back to the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Vyshinski added that he should mention that there had been other serious differences which had been settled and, with the exception of the five points he had mentioned, the draft had been unanimously agreed upon. Mr. Byrnes proposed that they discuss these points in order. (1) Liabilities and Assets of the Polish Government Mr. Byrnes said that the chairman of the Subcommittee had suggested that the liabilities of the Polish Provisional Government should not be mentioned, because that was a question to be handled between the Polish and American and the Polish and British Governments. He felt, however, that the same thing was true of the question of Polish assets. The United States had recognized the Provisional Polish Government. It had promptly taken steps to protect those assets. He saw no reason to believe that the United States would not transfer them to the government which it has recognized. He was sure that the Polish Provisional Government had no doubt about the United States transferring to it property which belonged to it. The United States was unwilling to make any statement with respect to Polish assets without stating at the same time that we would discuss the question of liabilities through diplomatic channels. Otherwise, a statement with respect to Polish assets might deceive people in Poland and elsewhere, because transfers of this kind must be made subject to any liens under the laws of the United States. Secondly, he did not know what debts might be due to the United States by the Provisional Government of Poland. The Polish Government need have no doubt but that our attitude would be sympathetic, because our attitude toward Poland had always been sympathetic. He disliked to mention in a public statement that we would transfer property to the Polish Government that belonged to them now that we had recognized that Government. That followed as a matter of course. Since, however, his colleagues wanted a statement on this subject, the American representative on the Subcommittee had proposed the following language: “The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.” Mr. Byrnes said that he had already stated to the Conference 4 that on the day before the United States had recognized the Polish Provisional Government, the United States Government had learned of a proposal to transfer the Polish Embassy to a third party. The United States Government had intervened and had been prepared to institute proceedings to recover the property had that been necessary. The Polish Government knows this and needs no assurance that it will be treated fairly under the law. Mr. Molotov said he found it difficult to discuss this question without the participation of the Polish Government. Mr. Byrnes said that this was also his position—namely, that the matter could only be discussed with the Poles. He did not know what the debts were, but he would not wish to tell the Poles that we would transfer assets and then find that there were liabilities against these assets. In such a case we would be charged with bad faith. He therefore proposed that they mention neither the transfer of assets nor the payment of liabilities. Mr. Eden said that they also did not know the extent of the liabilities and debts. They might be sure, however, that the British would not drive a hard bargain. He added, however, that if you deal with the assets you must deal with debts. The British also did not know the amount of the Polish assets. He could assure his Soviet Allies, however, that the British would act in accordance with the obligation they had undertaken by recognizing the Polish Provisional Government. He thought it was best to drop this paragraph altogether. Mr. Molotov said that he did not agree that if they mentioned assets they must mention liabilities. He drew the attention of his colleagues to the manner in which the Polish question was being discussed here and the manner in which it had been discussed at the Crimea. Here the question was a one-sided one. At the Crimea the question was whether or not the British and American Governments would recognize the Polish Provisional Government and not whether the Polish Government would recognize the British and American Governments. He hoped that all these questions of liabilities would be discussed by the parties. There was no need to say anything about it here. He pointed out that the question which had been discussed at the Crimea was only that of the transfer of property which was held by the London Polish Government. Mr. Byrnes said he recalled that Marshal Stalin had raised the question of the transfer of property and that President Roosevelt had said that of course the property of the London Government would be transferred when the new Polish Government was recognized. 5 Mr. Byrnes said he could say the same thing of the Soviet Government. When the Soviet Government recognized the Polish Government, he assumed that it transferred the property of the Polish Government. He assumed also that in making such transfer the Soviets were obliged to take account of Soviet laws and of any liabilities against this property. He would not ask for a declaration that the Soviet Government would comply with its own laws. He knew that it would. Mr. Molotov said that all other questions could be decided by bi-lateral negotiations. Mr. Byrnes said that so far as the United States is concerned they would be decided at the earliest possible date. He did not think that any statement should be made that pressure had to be brought on the United States Government to transfer to the Polish Government property that belonged to that Government. Mr. Eden pointed out that they had frozen Polish funds. Mr. Molotov suggested that the matter be referred to the Big Three. Mr. Eden suggested that Mr. Molotov study the American draft that had been presented during the meeting. Mr. Byrnes said he had offered this substitute draft but he would not be frank if he did not make clear that he would tell the President that, in his opinion, the President should not be a party to a statement in the press that the United States Government would give to Poland property which is rightfully the property of the Polish Government, which it has recognized, without coupling such statement by [ with? ] a statement that the Polish Government had never questioned that the United States would transfer to the Polish Government the property that belongs to it. Since Mr. Molotov did not have the Russian text of the new language which had been proposed, the matter was passed over, in order that Mr. Molotov would have time to consider it. (2) Return of Poles to Poland Mr. Byrnes pointed out that there were two versions of this proposal: one submitted by the Soviet delegation and one submitted by the British delegation. Mr. Molotov said he thought the general idea of both versions was essential and that this general idea should be retained. All the rest was unnecessary and might be offensive to the Poles. Mr. Eden remarked that he did not see what there was that would be offensive to the Poles. Their object was to get Poles home. He was prepared to agree, however, to some change in the drafting. Mr. Molotov said he did not see why this matter was insisted upon. The Soviet version made clear that the Poles would not be persecuted. Mr. Eden said that if Mr. Molotov thought the language was offensive, they would accept the Soviet version subject to a minor drafting suggestion. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that there was a change suggested by the Soviet representative, in the last paragraph on page 2—namely, to substitute for the words “is pledged” the words “in conformity with the Crimea decision has agreed”. 6 This was agreed to. (3) Arrest of Poles by British Mr. Byrnes said that the next question was the proposed undertaking that the British Government would take steps on British territory and territory under British control not to arrest Poles who wished to return home. Mr. Eden said he could not accept in a declaration designed to assure the return of Poles to Poland that they would undertake not to do the opposite. He pointed out that the London Polish Government did not now have any power. Power had been transferred to the new Polish Government. Mr. Molotov said that there would probably be no more such acts and that they could drop the paragraph. Mr. Eden pointed out that certain governments had been given rights on British territory. The London Polish Government did not now have these rights. Mr. Molotov said that there had been some recent incidents. Mr. Eden replied that there had been none since recognition of the new Polish Government. (4) Polish Elections Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the proposed sentence on the free expression of views in the election had not been agreed to. 7 Mr. Molotov said that this sentence would be unpleasant for the Polish Government, that all the thoughts had been expressed in the previous sentence. This sentence would give the impression of mistrust. Mr. Eden offered to leave out the first part of this sentence if Mr. Molotov would agree to include the last sentence of the draft relating to freedom of the press. Mr. Vyshinski drew Mr. Eden’s attention to the fact that in the Subcommittee the British representatives had made just the opposite proposal. Mr. Eden said that he had not known this. Mr. Byrnes said that at the meeting yesterday Marshal Stalin [ Molotov ] expressed agreement in principle with the thought that the press should be allowed to report freely on what went on in these countries. 8 Hostilities had ceased and the situation was changed. It would be of great importance in the future relations of the Polish Provisional Government that there be no question in regard to the freedom of the press. Mr. Molotov inquired if there were any complaints that the Allied press could not work in Poland now. Mr. Eden said it was one thing to let the press in but that it was another as to whether they could say what they wished. Mr. Molotov inquired whether the correspondents who had visited Poland had complained. Mr. Byrnes said that his information was that for a long while no press representatives had been permitted to visit in Poland. Mr. Molotov pointed out that there had been no government of national unity at that time. Mr. Byrnes continued that a group of correspondents did visit Poland and that they were not restricted. We did not, however, have any regularly appointed press representatives in Poland. Mr. Molotov inquired if there were any applications pending for American correspondents to go to Poland. Mr. Byrnes said we did not know how these correspondents would be treated if they went to Poland and we only wished to express the hope that they would have freedom. Mr. Molotov said that this would make a bad impression. Mr. Byrnes then proposed that the question be submitted to the Big Three along with the other difficulties that had arisen. This was agreed to. Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe Mr. Molotov said that they had not had time to have the document on this question 9 translated into Russian. At his request it was agreed to pass over this question until he could study the document. Italian Declaration Mr. Molotov observed that two papers had been submitted on this matter—one on Italy and one on the other satellites. 10 Marshal Stalin had suggested at the meeting yesterday that they simultaneously settle these two questions, 11 and it was Mr. Molotov’s proposal that they consider merging the two drafts. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that at the meeting yesterday it had been recognized that there was a difference between the situation of Italy and that of the other satellites. Italy had signed more severe armistice terms 12 than had the other countries. He preferred two separate declarations rather than one. Mr. Molotov suggested that they could be merged in the drafting committee. Mr. Byrnes suggested that the reason for separate texts was that the United States had not recognized the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments. Also, the United States was not at war with Finland. If it was merely a question of drafting, he urged Mr. Molotov to let them take up the matter in two separate papers. Mr. Molotov said that he was proceeding from the suggestion made yesterday by Marshal Stalin. Both of these papers dealt with armistice terms signed by these countries. He was fully aware of and understood the difference between them. The subject of both documents was the same. He could not give a final opinion as he had only had time to read them once. The drafts contained good working material. Mr. Byrnes said that the question was whether there should be one draft or two, and he proposed to refer the matter to the Big Three. This was agreed to. Agenda for the Big Three Meeting Mr. Molotov observed that the Soviet delegation stuck to its suggestion for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, and Hungary. Mr. Eden said that he was circulating a paper on Persia, 13 but he did not ask that it be taken up today. Mr. Byrnes said that he wished to submit a paper which he thought should go to the economic subcommittee. This paper dealt with the necessity of making available increased supplies of oil from Rumania and the use of about 200 tankers to transport this oil. 14 It was agreed to refer this question to the economic subcommittee. The agenda of the Big Three meeting was drawn up as follows: 1. The Polish question—Implementation of the Yalta Agreement and transfer of the Property of the London Polish Government. 2. Declaration on Italy and Satellite States. 3. The Western Frontiers of Poland. 4. Trusteeships. 5. Turkey. The meeting adjourned. 1 See documents Nos. 863 and 902 , post . 1a Document No. 1129 , post . 2 For the British draft of July 19, see document No. 1121 , post . The British redraft referred to has not been found as a separate paper but can be largely reconstructed from document No. 1129 , post . For the “Soviet amended draft” referred to, see document No. 1421 , post . 3 The English text of the decision referred to read: “This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.” See document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 4 See ante , p. 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] . 5 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 776 . 6 Cf. paragraph 4 of document No. 1121 , post , and the fourth paragraph of document No. 1131 , post . 7 See paragraph 4 of document No. 1121 , post . 8 See ante , pp. 151–153 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . 9 Document No. 748 , post . 10 Documents Nos. 1092 and 805 , post , respectively. 11 See ante , pp. 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] . 12 See Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740. 13 Document No. 1330 , post . 14 Document No. 1320 , post . Rapporteur’s Report 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2145 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] Rapporteur’s Report 1 Potsdam, July 21, 1945, noon top secret Rapporteur’s Report of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Saturday Morning, July 21, 1945 i. council of foreign ministers The Foreign Ministers discussed the date of the formal establishment of the Council and agreed that it should be set up not later than September 1. It was also agreed that telegrams of invitation to participate in the work of the Council should be dispatched to the Government of China and the Provisional Government of France before public announcement of the establishment of the Council is made. At the request of the British Delegation, the drafting committee which has been dealing with this question was asked to make a few minor changes in the present text of the proposal. ii. german economic questions Since the report of the subcommittee on this question 2 had only just been presented and the various delegations have not had an opportunity to give it adequate study, it was agreed to delay the discussion of this subject until tomorrow. iii. polish question—liquidation of the london government and implementation of the yalta declaration The Chairman of the subcommittee which has been dealing with this subject presented the subcommittee’s report. Since the subcommittee have been unable to reach full agreement, the points of disagreement were discussed at length. The Foreign Ministers were able to reach an understanding on several of these points, but the following were referred to the Heads of Governments for final decision: a . The paragraph relating to the transfer of assets and the recognition of liabilities by the Provisional Government. (The U. S. substitute draft of this paragraph was presented for consideration.) b . The paragraph relating to the holding of elections and to freedom of the press. iv. implementation of the yalta agreement on liberated europe and satellite states The U. S. circulated a paper on this question at the meeting but it was decided to postpone discussion of the paper in order to allow time for further study. v. italy and the other satellite states The U. S. presented in this connection two papers: one on policy toward Italy and one on policy toward Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The Foreign Ministers agreed to refer these papers to a drafting subcommittee. A point of difference arose, however, as to whether the drafting subcommittee should be instructed to deal with policy toward all these states in a single paper or to deal separately with Italy on the one hand and with Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland on the other. The Soviet Delegation favored a single paper and the U. S. favored two separate papers. It was agreed that, since the question of policy toward Italy and the other satellites had been referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Heads of Governments, the Heads of Governments should be asked to decide at today’s meeting whether or not the drafting subcommittee should be instructed to prepare a single paper on all of these countries or two papers based on the U. S. drafts. vi. agenda of the meeting of heads of governments It was agreed that the Foreign Ministers would recommend to the Heads of Governments that their agenda for this afternoon should include the two questions referred to above, which had previously been referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Heads of Governments and on which the Foreign Ministers now desire further instructions, as well as three questions carried over from the agenda of yesterday’s meeting of the Heads of Governments. The recommended agenda for this afternoon’s meeting would therefore be as follows: 1. The Polish Question—Liquidation of the London Government and the Implementation of the Yalta Agreement. 2. Question as to whether in drawing up a policy toward Italy and the other satellites the subcommittee should prepare a separate recommendation on Italy or should prepare a single recommendation on all of the countries in question. 3. Polish Western frontier. The Soviet Delegation yesterday presented a paper on this subject. 4. Trusteeship. The Soviet Delegation also presented yesterday a paper on this subject. 5. Turkey. It is understood that the British Delegation wishes to raise this question orally. 1 Byrnes acted as Rapporteur for this meeting. His report was read at the afternoon meeting of Heads of Government (cf. post , p. 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] ). 2 For documents referred to in this report, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12:15 p.m. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12:15 p.m. 1 1 J. C. S. 200th Meeting. Present Fleet Admiral Leahy 2 Brigadier General Jamison General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill General Somervell Captain Stroop Lieutenant General Hull. Captain Oster Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Donnelly Rear Admiral Maples Colonel Stone Major General Gross Colonel Riggs Major General Deane Colonel Cary Major General Norstad Lieutenant Colonel Woodward Brigadier General Cabell Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore 2 Present for the consideration of cells 1 to 8 only. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)]] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 12:15 p.m. J. C. S. Files Contents Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 12:15 p.m. [Extracts] top secret 1. Basic Objectives, Strategy and Policy (C. C. S. 877/4 3 and J. C. S. 1366/2 4 ) Admiral Leahy recommended for clarity that the term “this war” be changed wherever appearing in J. C. S. 1366/2 to “the war against Japan”. General Somervell read out the wording 5 which he expected Lord Leathers to propose in lieu of the paragraph on cargo shipping appearing on page 21 of the enclosure to J. C. S. 1366/2. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff oppose the change since it does not take into account various shipping problems that are the concern of the United States only. He said that Lord Leathers would wish to include this paragraph in the statement of the basic objectives. He considered that the United States Chiefs of Staff might well accept Lord Leathers’ proposal in this regard. In reply to a question by General Marshall, Admiral Gardner said that he saw no reason for singling out the question of shipping for inclusion in the statement of the basic objectives since there were other matters such as questions of food and of petroleum products, of the same nature as shipping, that might equally well be included in the statement. General Somervell said that Lord Leathers would also propose to insert in paragraph III 4 c “for use as base or line of communication troops” after “areas” in the third line. He suggested that the United States Chiefs of Staff accept this change provided it was made clear that the change related to British bases in India. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum in the Enclosure to J. C. S. 1366/2, as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 877/5. 6 ) 2. Review of Combined Procedures for Munitions Assignments (J. C. S. 1397/2 and 1397/4 7 ) General Arnold proposed a new paragraph 2 to replace that in the enclosure to J. C. S. 1397/4. The change proposed by General Arnold was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Leahy said that there were so many important matters for the President and the Prime Minister to discuss that he thought that the question raised in this paper might well be handled in a routine manner after the conference is over. He asked if there was any pressing reason why this should be handled at the present time. General Somervell said that the only reason was that there was now an opportunity for the President and Prime Minister to discuss the question. Admiral King suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the draft memorandum to the President and that if Admiral Leahy found an opportunity to take the matter up with the President during the conference that he might do so. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum in the Enclosure to J. C. S. 1397/4 as amended during the discussion and requested Admiral Leahy to present it to the President at such time as he considered most appropriate. 8 3. Internationalization of the Danube River (J. C. S. 1426 9 ) Admiral Cooke pointed out the urgency of acting on this matter at the present time and recommended that the memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in the enclosure be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Hull said that the Department of State had developed a similar policy in regard to the internationalization of the Danube River 10 and said that a paper approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff would support the Department of State and the Foreign Office in obtaining an agreement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum in the Enclosure to J. C. S. 1426 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 896. 11 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. British Troop Ship Employment in U. S. Trans-Atlantic Programs—First Half of 1946 (C. C. S. 679/7 12 ) General Somervell said that the British Chiefs of Staff would request a delay in consideration of this question since sufficient data were not available to them at the present time and since it was affected by the decision which might be reached on C. C. S. 679/6. 13 He thought that the United States Chiefs of Staff should urge the British Chiefs of Staff to complete their studies of personnel shipping and be prepared to discuss the matter with the United States Chiefs of Staff by 15 September 1945. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— a . Confirmed their position as indicated in C. C. S. 679/7 and b . Agreed to urge that the British Chiefs of Staff complete their survey of passenger ships and be prepared to discuss this subject with the United States Chiefs of Staff by 15 September 1945. 6. Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships (C. C. S. 679/6) General Somervell said that he understood that the British would offer the Europa for trans-Atlantic service on a 50–50+ basis and that they would agree to the assignment of five of the captured German passenger ships for United States use in the Pacific. He said that the United States wanted all seven of the captured German passenger ships and he thought that the British would agree to the assignment of seven provided the United States Chiefs of Staff made a flat statement that the ships would be used in the Pacific and would not replace there any United States ships for repatriation in the Atlantic. General Gross said that the British might propose that the Europa be used for repatriation of 16,000 Canadians before 31 December 1945. Admiral Flanigan suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should agree that half the capacity of the Europa be used for the repatriation of Canadian troops up to a maximum of 16,000, by 31 December 1945. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— a . Confirmed their position as indicated in C. C. S. 679/6. b . Agreed to accept a proposal, if made by the British Chiefs of Staff, to employ the equivalent of half the capacity of the Europa for the repatriation of Canadian troops up to a maximum of 16,000 by 31 December 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9. Collection of Weather Information in Eastern Siberia Admiral King proposed a memorandum to the President on the above subject. Admiral Cooke said that this memorandum related to getting United States personnel into Russia in connection with coming operations and that he considered the matter most vital. He thought that the President should press the question involved with Generalissimo Stalin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum for the President on this subject proposed by Admiral King. 14 3 Document No. 1263 , post . 4 Not printed. 5 Not found. Cf. document No. 1265 , post . 6 Document No. 1264 , post . 7 Neither printed. 8 For the memorandum submitted to Truman, see document No. 1198 , post . 9 Not printed. 10 See vol. i , document No. 266 . 11 Document No. 754 , post . 12 Document No. 1191 , post . 13 Document No. 1190 , post . 14 Document No. 1277 , post . Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3:30 p.m. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3:30 p.m. 1 1 C. C. S. 198th Meeting. Present United States United Kingdom Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham General of the Army Arnold General Ismay General Somervell Lieutenant-General Macready Lieutenant General Hull Major-General Hollis Vice Admiral Cooke Major General Norstad Rear Admiral Flanigan Captain McDill Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Captain Moore Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)]] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 20, 1945 J. C. S. Files Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 20, 1945 top secret 1. Approval of the Minutes of the 197 th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff , 20 July 1945 The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— a . Approved the conclusions of the C. C. S. 197th Meeting subject to the amendment 2 of conclusion b . under item 2 to read as follows: “Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would take steps to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command setup in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia.” b . Approved the detailed report of the meeting, subject to: (1) The amendment of the 3d paragraph under item 2 to read as follows: “ General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the directive on the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff would be responsible for obtaining the approval of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command set-up in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia, since these governments had been party to the original arrangements.” (2) Any later minor amendments. 2. Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies (C. C. S. 877, 3 877/1, 877/2, 877/4, and 877/5 4 ) Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered C. C. S. 877/5 and had come to the conclusion that the matter had now reached a stage which was outside the scope of the British Chiefs of Staff. He said that the hands of the British Chiefs of Staff were bound just as were those of the United States Chiefs of Staff. He regretted, therefore, that nothing further could be done in the matter until a decision had been reached on a higher level. He requested that the matter be deferred until such time as a decision on a higher level was forthcoming. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Agreed to defer consideration of C. C. S. 877/5. 3. British Troopship Employment in U. S. Trans-Atlantic Programs, First Half of 1946 (C. C. S. 679/7 5 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Agreed to defer consideration of this matter. 4. Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships (C. C. S. 679/6 6 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Agreed to defer consideration of this matter. 2 This amendment and the following one have been made in the minutes of the 197th Meeting as printed ante , pp. 161–162 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] . 3 See vol. i , document No. 600, footnote 1 . 4 Documents Nos. 600 and 601, printed in vol. i , and documents Nos. 1263 and 1264 , post , respectively. 5 Document No. 1191 , post . 6 Document No. 1190 , post . Stimson–Churchill conversation, about 4:30 p.m. Stimson–Churchill conversation, about 4:30 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Mr. Stimson Prime Minister Churchill Mr. Bundy Lord Cherwell [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. Stimson’s diary entry for July 21 contains the following summary: “I then left the ‘Little White House’, picked up Bundy, and went to the Prime Minister’s house where we conferred with him and Lord Cherwell. I turned over the paper 1 to Churchill and he began reading it but was interrupted a few minutes before five in order to hurry to the Big Three Conference at five o’clock. He asked me to return on the following morning to finish up the report.” 1 Document No. 1305 , post . Fifth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. Fifth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gromyko Mr. Pauley Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gusev Mr. Davies Sir William Strang Mr. Novikov Mr. Dunn Major Birse Mr. Sobolev Mr. Clayton Mr. Pavlov Mr. Cohen Mr. Matthews Mr. Bohlen [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)]] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 5:15 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 5:15 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)]] United States Delegation Memorandum [Babelsberg, July 21, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2145 Department of State Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 5:15 p.m. top secret The meeting of the Heads of States opened at 5:15 p.m. 1 on Saturday, July 21, 1945. The President opened the meeting by stating that the Secretary of State had a report to deliver. Mr. Byrnes delivered a report on the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the morning of July 21, 1945 (copy of report attached). 2 Mr. Byrnes read the portions of this report dealing with the Council of Foreign Ministers and German economic questions. Mr. Byrnes then reported that the Chairman of the subcommittee which has been dealing with the Polish question, 3 including the liquidation of the London Government and the implementation of the Yalta declaration, had presented the subcommittee’s report. 4 Since the subcommittee had been unable to reach full agreement, points of disagreement were first discussed by the Foreign Ministers who were likewise unable to reach agreement and had agreed to refer the matter to the Heads of Government for final decision. Mr. Byrnes called attention to the difference existing in connection with the second paragraph of the proposed statement on the Polish question. (Annex 2). 5 This paragraph concerns the question of the transfer to the Polish Provisional Government of assets and property belonging to the Polish state located in the United States and Great Britain. After reading this paragraph, Mr. Byrnes asked whether it was desired to act on this question while it was fresh in the minds of the Heads of State rather than proceed to the other points. Stalin asked that Mr. Byrnes proceed with his report. Mr. Byrnes stated that on the third paragraph of the report there was no disagreement, but that on the fourth paragraph disagreement existed. Mr. Eden had agreed to the withdrawal of this paragraph, provided that the last sentence was retained and a new paragraph added regarding freedom of the press. He read the proposed new paragraph. 6 The President stated that in the United States it was impossible to transfer assets without taking liabilities into account, either legally or otherwise. As he had stated before, there was no intention in the United States for America to assume burdens of this sort. It was therefore absolutely necessary for liabilities to be taken into consideration. We will give the Polish Provisional Government everything coming to it and we want to be friendly. Churchill stated that the British were content with the President’s proposal, particularly the words stating that assets would not be released except on condition that liabilities would be assumed. Churchill went on to ask how the re-draft of paragraph two of the statement on the Polish question covered the question of liabilities. The President asked Mr. Byrnes to read the paragraph again. Mr. Byrnes stated that the language made no specific mention either of assets or liabilities and then read the paragraph in question. Churchill repeated that this paragraph dealt neither with assets nor liabilities. The President stated that we were proposing to deal with the Polish Provisional Government under American law. Churchill remarked that there is no provision at all in the case of the British for any transfer of liabilities, particularly in connection with the 120 million (pounds) advanced by the British Government to the former Polish Government in London. Mr. Byrnes stated that there is not. It is the American position that the settlement of property rights is a matter that lays [ sic ] between the Polish Provisional Government and the United States Government. Churchill inquired whether the same position would apply to the British. Mr. Byrnes answered that it would, of course, and also to the Soviet Government. He saw no reason for a special declaration by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Government or the United States on the transfer of property to the Polish Provisional Government. Churchill stated his understanding that we were abandoning arrangements for the transfer of the assets and liabilities insofar as this conference is concerned. He pointed out that it is a much more serious question for the British than for the United States, since the British had made much larger grants to the Polish Government. The President stated he believed that it was not necessary to single out the United States or United Kingdom Governments for a special statement. The United States meets its obligations and always has. Stalin asked whether the British Government proposed to exact from the Polish Provisional Government full return for advances granted to Polish forces. Churchill replied that this matter would be discussed with the Polish Provisional Government. Stalin then said that the Soviet Union had granted large credits to the Polish Provisional Government and to Polish forces. It is the Soviet opinion that Polish forces have redeemed these advances and that the account is regarded as closed. He believed the American proposal to be acceptable, but it needed polishing. He suggested an amendment to the American proposal which was read. 7 The differences between the two texts will be that there will be none of the usual juridical delay. The President stated that there is no intent on the part of the United States to procrastinate. Stalin then stated that the proposal might be accepted as is. The President thanked him and asked that the Conference pass to the next paragraph. Mr. Byrnes stated that the next paragraph concerned the holding of elections. The issue would be presented by Mr. Eden on behalf of the British. Mr. Eden suggested the deletion of certain words. 8 Stalin remarked that it was good of Mr. Eden to come part of the way and suggested that in the interests of the dignity of Poland it would be well if Mr. Eden could take another step. He stated that the preceding paragraph embodied everything necessary regarding freedom of the press. Press correspondents remain in Poland and enjoy freedom. There is no use repeating. The Poles are very touchy and will be hurt. They will suspect us of accusing them of being unwilling to accord a free press. Therefore, Stalin suggested that the document end with the paragraph regarding the election in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part. Churchill stated that this suggestion was in no way a compromise. Stalin replied that it was a compromise insofar as the Polish Provisional Government is concerned. Churchill remarked that he had hoped to strengthen the declaration rather than weaken it. The President pointed out that the United States is very much interested in the Polish elections. There are six million Poles in the United States. A free election in Poland reported to the United States by a free press would make it much easier to deal with these Polish people. The President stated that it seemed to him that the Polish Provisional Government knew that the Three Powers would expect the press freely to report the elections and would expect this matter to be raised. Stalin said that he could see that this compromise is not acceptable and then suggested an amendment of the last paragraph which was read. 9 The President stated that this amendment suited him. Churchill asked whether the President was content and pointed out that the paragraph was now governed by the word “note.” However, Churchill believed that the amendment was all right and did not make much difference. 10 Mr. Byrnes then read section IV of the report of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. This concerned the implementation of the Yalta agreement on liberated Europe and the satellite states. It had been decided to postpone discussion of this paper 11 to allow time for further study. Mr. Byrnes next read section V of the report regarding Italy and the other satellite states. The President stated that on the first day of the meeting the American Government had presented two papers, one on policy toward Italy 12 and the other on policy toward the satellite states. 13 He remarked that the surrender terms for Italy were much more drastic than the surrender terms for those other satellite states which surrendered later. The American Government felt that there should be two separate papers on these matters, rather than one. Stalin stated that he had an amendment to make to the American proposal concerning policy toward Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. 14 He had no objection in principle to the American proposal. However, he wanted an addition made to paragraph two, which he read. 15 This amendment, among other things, provided for recognition of the governments of these countries. The President stated that he could not agree to this amendment. Stalin then said that the two questions would have to be postponed, since Italy could not be dealt with alone. The President stated that the American Government was unable to recognize the governments of the other satellite countries. When these countries were established on a proper basis, the United States would recognize them and not before. The President stated that the meeting would proceed and that this question would be passed over. Churchill pointed out that time was passing, that the Heads of State had been here for a week and that many papers had been passed over. On this point he wanted to say that the position of the British Government was similar to that of the United States. Mr. Byrnes then read section VI of the report dealing with the agenda set by the Foreign Ministers in their morning meeting for the present meeting of the Heads of State. The remaining matters dealt with the Polish western frontiers, trusteeships and Turkey. The President stated that he wished to make a statement regarding the Polish frontiers. As the Crimean Declaration 16 read it was decided that Germany would be occupied by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and France, and that the Polish frontiers would be favorably considered by the four governments but that final settlement of these frontiers would be effected at the peace conference. During the first [ second ] day’s meeting it was decided that in considering the boundary of Germany the 1937 frontiers would be the point of departure. 17 The three governments had decided upon the zones and their boundaries had been set. 18 We have already gone back to the zone assigned to us and the British have done the same. It now appears as if another occupying government was being assigned a zone. This was being done without consultation. If the Poles were occupying a zone this should have been agreed on. The President stated that he was unable to see how reparations or other questions could be decided if Germany was carved up. These matters should be considered at the present conference. He was very friendly toward the Polish Provisional Government and it is probable that full agreement could be reached on what the Soviet Government desires, but he wanted consultation. Stalin replied that the Crimean decision says that the three Heads of Government felt that the eastern frontiers should follow the Curzon line. 19 In regard to the western frontiers, it was decided that Poland should receive cessions of territory in the north and west. The declaration goes on to say that the three Heads of Government had decided that a new Polish government should consult at the appropriate time on the final settlement of the western frontiers. The President stated that this was correct, but that it was not correct to assign a zone. He agreed with Stalin’s reading of the Crimean declaration. Stalin stated that on the basis of the Crimean declaration the Polish Provisional Government had already stated its views in regard to the western frontiers. The President replied that this had not been done to the United States Government to his knowledge. Stalin remarked that he had in mind the Polish Provisional Government. The President then stated that he now understood that the Secretary of State yesterday had received a communication from the Polish Provisional Government 20 which he, the President, had not seen. Stalin stated that the Soviet Union proposed that the Conference express an opinion on the wishes of the Polish Government regarding the western frontiers. It made no difference whether this was done today or tomorrow. The final settlement would, of course, be left to the peace conference. In regard to the statement that the Russians had given the Poles a zone of occupation without agreement, Stalin claimed that this was not quite accurate. Several communications had been received from the American and British Governments to the effect that Polish administration should not be established in certain areas until the western frontiers had been finally set. 21 The Soviet Union could not accept the suggestions, since the German population in these areas had followed the German army to the west and the Poles had remained. The Red Army had needed local administration in this territory, since it was not accustomed to setting up an administration, fighting and clearing out enemy agents at the same time. The American and British Governments had been so informed. The Soviet Government was more ready to permit the functioning of the Polish administration, since Poland was to receive territorial cessions in the west. He was unable to see what harm was done by the establishment of a Polish administration where only Poles remained. The President stated that he had no objection to an expression of opinion regarding the western frontiers, however, he wanted it distinctly understood that the zones of occupation will be as established. Any other course will make reparations very difficult, particularly if part of the German territory is gone before agreement is reached on what reparations should be. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union was not afraid of the reparations question and would if necessary renounce them. The President replied that the United States would get no reparations anyhow. This made no difference. We were trying to keep from paying more, as we did before. Stalin remarked that everything the President said was interpretative since no frontiers had been ceded at the Crimea except for the provision that Poland would receive territory. The western frontier question is open and the Soviet Union is not bound. The President repeated: “You are not?” Stalin replied: “No.” Churchill said that he had a good deal to say about the actual line, but gathered that the time for saying it was not yet. The President stated that it was not possible for the Heads of State to settle this question. It was a matter for the peace conference. Stalin remarked that it would be very difficult to restore a German administration to this area. Stalin stated that he would like the President to understand the Russian conception, to which they adhered both in war and during the occupation. An army fights in war and cares only for its efforts to win the war. To enable an army to win and advance it must have a quiet rear. An army cannot fight the enemy and the rear. It fights well if the rear is quiet and better if the rear is friendly. Even if the Germans had not fled, it would have been difficult to set up a German administration in these areas since the majority of the population was Polish. He asked the President to imagine the establishment of a German administration which would stab one in the back while the Poles were there who received the Soviet army enthusiastically. Since such a situation existed, it was natural that the Soviet Government set up an administration of friends. The President stated his agreement and sympathy for this situation but pointed out that there were other aspects of the matter. Stalin insisted that there was no other way out. Soviet action does not imply that the Russians had settled the question themselves. If the President did not agree, the question should be suspended. Churchill inquired whether the question could be suspended. There is also the question of supply, which is very urgent. The region in question is a very important source of food from which Germany is to be fed. Stalin asked who will work to produce the grain; who will plow the fields; this must be borne in mind. The President pointed out that each was stating in a friendly way his own point of view. The question was not one of who occupied an area, but a question of the occupation of Germany. We occupy our zone, the British theirs, the French theirs, and the Soviet Union should occupy theirs. There is no objection to the discussion of the western frontiers. The President did not believe that they were far apart on this matter. Stalin insisted that on paper these areas constituted German territory, but practically, they were Polish territories since there is no German population. The President remarked that nine million Germans are a lot. Stalin maintained that they had all fled. Churchill remarked that in case this was true consideration should be given to the means of feeding them in the regions to which they had fled, as the produce of the land they had left was not available to nourish Germany. Churchill stated his understanding that under the full Polish plan put forward by the Soviet Government, 22 one quarter of the total arable land of 1937 Germany would be alienated from the German area on which food and reparations were based. This was tremendous. Insofar as the populations were concerned, it appeared that three to four million people would be moved from east of the Curzon line, but the pre-war population of the German territory to be transferred amounted to 8¼ [ 8½? ] 23 millions. It was apparent that it was a serious matter to effect wholesale transfers of German populations and burden the remainder of Germany with their care if their food supply had been alienated. The President interjected to ask where we would be if we gave France the Saar and the Ruhr. Stalin replied that the Soviet Government had not made a decision in regard to French claims but had done so in regard to the western frontier of Poland. Churchill remarked that in regard to Stalin’s statement that all Germans had left the areas in question there are figures showing that there are about two and a half millions left. This should be explored. Stalin stated that the questions of frontiers had been up for discussion but that the Conference was now on the question of food supplies. He had no objection. Churchill replied that he had only wanted to point out the implications of this question. Stalin stated that the Soviet Union fully appreciated the burden and admitted the difficulties which would arise from the transfer of this territory but that the German people were principally to blame for these difficulties. Churchill had quoted the figure of eight and a half million, said to be the population of this area. It should be remembered that there had been several call-ups during the war and that the rest of the population had left before the Soviet Army. They had found that the Stettin population of 500,000 had almost entirely disappeared, only 8,000 remaining. The majority of the Germans had gone west behind the line. Some, however, had gone to the Koenigsberg area since they had heard that the Russians would be in Koenigsberg and they preferred to deal with the Russians rather than with the Poles. No single German remained in the territory to be given Poland. Between the Oder and the Vistula the Germans had quitted their fields which are now being cultivated by the Poles. It is unlikely that the Poles would agree to the return of these Germans. This situation should be borne in mind. The President stated that he wanted again to declare that the occupation zones should be occupied as agreed upon. The question of whether the Poles should have part of Germany cannot be settled here. Churchill stated that he agreed to compensation for Poland at the expense of Germany for that territory taken from the east of the Curzon Line. However, he had thought that a balance would be maintained. Poland was now taking a far greater territory than that they lost. This could not be for the good of Europe. Millions of people would be moved across the Curzon Line and other millions would be moved elsewhere. These vast transfers of population constituted a great shock to his country. It would seem to bring about a position not possible for him. Moreover, he did not believe that it was good for Poland. If it was true that the Germans have run away, they should be encouraged to come back. Poland which owes all to the Great Powers has no right to bring about a catastrophe. He wanted to emphasize these things since he was anxious that Stalin should see our difficulties. We see his. We do not want to be left with a German population deprived of sources of food supply. Take the immense population of the Ruhr which is in the British zone. If food is not found, we might be confronted with a condition similar to that in the German concentration camps but on a far larger scale. Stalin maintained that Germany had always had to import food and will need to continue. Churchill replied that this was certainly true if their feeding grounds were taken. Stalin remarked that the Germans could buy food from the Poles. Churchill insisted that he did not admit that this territory is Polish. Stalin stated that the territory is inhabited by Poles who cultivated the fields, not by Germans. It is impossible to ask the Poles to cultivate the fields and give the food to the Germans. Churchill pointed out that certain conditions in this great area in which Poles have been introduced are most peculiar. He understands that the Poles are selling Silesian coal to Sweden. They are doing so at a time when England had to go through a fireless winter. Great Britain stands on the general principle that the supply of food from the 1937 German territories should be available to the whole German people in proportion to their number irrespective of the particular zone in which the food is produced. Stalin asked who is to produce the coal. The Germans do not, the Poles are producing the coal. Churchill said, “You mean the Silesians?” Stalin said they all fled. Churchill remarked that they had fled from fright and could now return. Stalin stated that these people were reluctant to return and that the Soviet Union is not in sympathy with them. He was afraid that the Poles would hang them if they returned. Churchill then remarked that he had been deeply impressed by what Stalin had said about the mistake of letting past bitterness influence future problems. 24 We should not have a mass of people dumped upon us, while the Poles acquire food which the Germans need. Stalin replied that what he had said yesterday did not apply to war criminals. Churchill interjected that surely the eight and a half million were not war criminals. Stalin stated that he had in mind the proprietors. He went on to state that the Soviet Union is purchasing coal from Poland since Russia has coal shortages. The President stated that it seems to be an accomplished fact that a large piece of Germany has been given to the Poles. The United States is short of coal but has made arrangements to ship considerable quantities to Europe. The Silesian mines are a part of Germany for reparations and feeding purposes. Under these conditions we will talk about boundaries but the Poles have no right to take this territory now and remove it from the German economy. Simply stated, the case is are the zones valid until peace, or are we giving Germany away piecemeal. Stalin insisted that no one can exploit this region but the Poles. Russia is short of labor and there are no Germans there. Apparently German propaganda had carried the day. Either all production would be stopped or the Poles would operate it. Stalin pointed out that the Poles operated in their country rich coal areas. Now Silesia had been added. The Poles are now working the mines. We cannot take their coal for nothing. Churchill pointed out that the Silesian mines had always operated with large numbers of Polish miners. There is no objection to the mines being operated as an agency of the Soviet Government but not for the Polish Government. Stalin stated that this was not possible because it would disturb normal relations between two states. He would like to draw Churchill’s attention to the fact that there is a serious German shortage of labor. Most enterprises during the advance of the Soviet army employed foreign labor. When Russian troops entered, the foreign labor had been freed and the laborers went home. Where have the German workers gone? They are either killed or captured. Such is the situation. A vast German industry existed with few German laborers. Everything fell to pieces before our army. Either these enterprises are closed or the local population, here, the Poles, should be given a chance to work. This is not a result of deliberate policy but the result of a situation. No one but Germany is to blame. In regard to Churchill’s statement about the western frontier to the effect that Poland was getting too much, he agreed that the Provisional Government’s proposal for territory would create difficulties for Germany. Churchill interjected, “For us all”. Stalin went on to state that our policy is to create difficulty for the Germans in order to make it difficult for German power to rise again. It was better to make difficulties for the Germans than for the Poles. The President remarked that it was bad to create difficulties for the Allies. Stalin stated that the less industry there was in Germany the greater the market would be for American and British goods. He asked what is the best. We had brought the state which competed with our countries to its knees. Germany was a dangerous business rival because it had lower living standards. He repeated, “What is best”. Churchill remarked that we did not wish to be confronted by a mass of starving people. Stalin replied “there will be none”. Churchill said that Mr. Attlee wished to make a statement. Mr. Attlee stated that he wanted to say in regard to the immediate situation on the part of the occupation powers that aside from the boundaries between Germany and Poland we are faced with a country in chaos and a country which as an economic unit depends to a considerable extent for coal and food on the eastern area partly inhabited by Poles. It would seem that pending the final settlement the resources of the whole 1937 Germany would have to bear a first charge on the sustenance of the whole people and if a part of Germany is to be detached in anticipation, it would be a very heavy burden on the powers charged with the occupation of the western and southern zones. Any labor needed to exploit the eastern areas should be made available from the rest of Germany including released army forces. They should be directed to such places as they can work most usefully. The Allies should not be confronted by an impossibly difficult situation. Stalin replied that Mr. Attlee should bear in mind that Poland is also an Ally. Attlee replied that this was so but it should not be compensated at the expense of the rest of the Allies. The President said that he wished to make a frank statement of what he thought. He could not agree to the separation of the eastern part of Germany under these circumstances. This must be considered in connection with reparations and the supply problems of the whole German people. Stalin said, Are we through today? The President replied that the Conference had apparently reached an impasse on this matter. Churchill added that they were not through but that there were more agreeable things to come. He suggested later consideration. The President announced that the Conference was adjourned 25 until 5 p.m. on July 22. 1 The Log ( ante , p. 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) and the original cover sheet for the minutes both indicate that the meeting was convened at 5 p.m. 2 Ante , p. 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] . 3 Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky. 4 Ante , pp. 187–189 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] . For the text of the Yalta declaration referred to, see document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 5 Document No. 1130 , post . 6 See the last sentence of document No. 1129 , post , and the last paragraph of document No. 1130 , post . 7 Not found. 8 Cf. the Cohen notes, post , p. 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] . 9 Not found as a separate document, but cf. the final paragraph of document No. 1130 , post , with the corresponding paragraph of document No. 1131 , post . 10 For the revision of document No. 1130 on the basis of the discussion here concluded, see document No. 1131 , post . 11 Document No. 748 , post . 12 Document No. 1089 , post . 13 Document No. 745 , post . 14 Stalin’s amendment was not to the United States proposal of July 17 ( document No. 745 , post ), to which Truman had referred, but to a United States proposal of July 21 ( document No. 805 , post ). 15 Not found. 16 See document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 17 See ante , p. 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] . 18 By a protocol signed in the European Advisory Commission at London, September 12, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, November 14, 1944. For texts, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, pp. 2078, 2087; Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 118 , 121 . 19 See the map facing p. 748 in vol. i . For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , pp. 793 – 794 . 20 See document No. 1146 , post . 21 See vol. i , document No. 510, footnote 4 . 22 Document No. 1145 , post . 23 Cf. Stalin’s statement, infra , and Churchill’s statement, post , p. 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . 24 See ante , pp. 172–173 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] . 25 At 7:25 p.m. See Log, ante , p. 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 21, 1945, 5:15 p.m. The report of the foreign secretaries 1 was read. It was recommended that notice of the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers should be sent to France and China before the public announcement thereof. Minor verbal changes in the draft of the document were also recommended. The economic subcommittee had not yet finished its work. The subcommittee on the Polish question was not fully agreed nor could the foreign secretaries reach a complete agreement on this question and the points of the difference were to be referred to the heads of state. Truman : The first question then is the Polish question. Byrnes : The first point of difference relates to the problem of the transfer of assets without mentioning liabilities. Truman : So far as our laws are concerned, when our assets are transferred, liabilities must be transferred. We do not intend to assume the liability of the old Polish government and give the new Polish government the assets. Churchill : We are content with the proposals put forward by the President and particularly with the proposition that there can be no release of assets without a consideration of liabilities. Mr. President, how does your redraft cover liabilities? Byrnes : It protects the property but deals neither with transfer of assets nor liquidation of liabilities. Churchill : This is a more serious question for Britain than the United States. Stalin : Does the British government propose to exact from the Polish government to the full their advances for the Polish forces? Churchill : No. We will discuss it with the Poles. Stalin : We gave credits to the Sikorski government. We consider those advances redeemed. The American proposals are accepted but needs [ sic ] polishing up. I suggest we amend the American proposal. Stalin offers a verbal amendment but after a little discussion states that the American draft is acceptable as is. Eden : This morning we agreed to compromise by combining the first two sentences of the third paragraph. Stalin : It is good that Mr. Eden is meeting us half way. If he strikes out reference to the press, we will applaud it. Foreign correspondents came to Poland and they remained there and they are enjoying full freedom. The Poles are very touchy. Churchill : There is no compromise on that. I had hoped to strengthen this by adding representatives of Allied governments and the press. Stalin : They are enjoying freedom to report. Truman : The Poles in America are much interested in the Polish election and this will help the President very much with his Polish constituents. Stalin : I suggest that we add reference to the press in the preceding sentence. (This suggestion was accepted) Secretary Byrnes proceeds with reading the report of the foreign secretaries. He points out that consideration of the Yalta agreement was postponed. United States had presented two papers, one on Italy and one on the satellite states. Foreign secretaries agreed to refer these papers to drafting subcommittee. Question was whether there should be two papers or one. Truman : Italy was first to surrender and terms of surrender were more drastic. We thought that Italy should be considered separately. Stalin : I have an amendment to the American proposals concerning the policy as to Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland. I have no objection in principle to the American proposal but I want to make an addition to paragraph 2. The three governments should make a statement that they will renew diplomatic relations with the satellite governments. Truman : I can not agree. Stalin : Then these two questions will have to be postponed. Truman : We will not recognize these governments until they are set up on a satisfactory basis. Churchill : I dislike to see these questions postponed. Byrnes : The next questions are Polish western frontier, trusteeships and Turkey. Truman : I propose that the matters of the Polish frontier be considered at the peace conference after consultation with the Polish government of national unity. We decided that Germany with 1937 boundaries should be considered starting point. We decided on our zones. We moved our troops to the zones assigned to us. Now another occupying government has been assigned a zone without consultation with us. We can not arrive at reparations and other problems of Germany if Germany is divided up before the peace conference. I am very friendly to Poland and sympathetic with what Russia proposes regarding the western frontier, but I do not want to do it that way. Stalin : The Crimea decision was that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line. As to the western frontier, it was decided that Poland was to receive territory in the west and north in compensation. Truman : That is right, but I am against assigning an occupation zone to Poland. Stalin : The new Polish government has already expressed its views on boundaries. What is our proposal for the Polish western frontier? Truman : I understand that the Secretary of State has received a communication from the new Polish government but I have not seen it. Stalin : Our view is that we should express our view in accordance with that of the Polish government, but final question should be left to the peace conference. As to our giving the Poles a zone of occupation without consulting the other powers, this is not accurate. We received several proposals from the American and British governments that we should not permit the Poles in the disputed western frontier area. We could not follow this because German population fled and Poles remained. Our armies needed local administrations. Our armies are not set up to fight and clear country of enemy agents at the same time. We so informed our British and American friends. The more ready we were to let the Polish administration function, the more we were sure the Poles would receive territory to the west. I do not see the harm of permitting the Poles to set up administrations in territories in which they are to remain. Truman : I wanted the administrations in the four zones to be as we have agreed. We can not agree on reparations if parts of Germany are given away. Stalin : We are concerned about reparations but we will take this risk. Truman : We are not concerned about reparations for ourselves but we do not want to pay reparations as we did before. Stalin : The western frontier of Poland then remains open and no discussions are binding on us. Churchill : I have a good deal to say on the line, but I don’t think from what the President has said that this is the time. Stalin : It will be more difficult to restore territory as the German population has fled. Truman : The Poles may remain under the Russian occupation. Stalin : Our practice is as follows. An army is fighting when the war is on. Its efforts are concentrated on the war. To advance, it must have a quiet rear. An army can fight the enemy but it can not at the same time fight well with the enemy in its rear. It needs the quiet and, if possible, a sympathetic rear. Even if the Germans have not fled, it would be difficult to use Germans as the majority in the area are Polish. Imagine a situation where the Germans shrink or flee and the Polish population receives us. It is natural under those circumstances to set up a sympathetic administration. There was no other way out. But that does not mean that we determined ourselves a frontier. If you do not agree, the matter can be arranged later. Churchill : It is from these regions that a very important part of the supplies from which Germany is to be fed come. Stalin : Who will work in these areas? There is no one but the Poles who will plow the land. Truman : The question is not who occupies the country, but how we stand on the question as to who is to occupy Germany. I want it understood that the Soviet [Union] is occupying this zone and is responsible for it. I don’t think we are far apart on our conclusions. Stalin : On paper it is formerly German territory but in fact it is Polish territory. There are no Germans left. The Soviet [Union] is responsible for the territory. Truman : Where are the nine million Germans? Stalin : They have fled. Churchill : How can they be fed? I am told that under the Polish plan put forward by the Soviets that a quarter of arable land of Germany would be alienated—one-fourth of all the arable land from which German food and reparations must come. The Poles come from the East but 8¼ [ 8½? ] million Germans are misplaced [ displaced ]. It is apparent that a disproportionate part of the population will be cast on the rest of Germany with its food supplies alienated. Truman : France wants the Saar and the Ruhr. What will be left? Stalin : As regards the claims of France, we have made no decision. As to the Poles, we have. Churchill : As to the Marshal’s figures that all Germans have fled, we should bear in mind that there are other figures indicating that two or three million Germans remain. Stalin : We discussed the question of frontiers but we are getting into the question of food supplies for Germany. Churchill : We are only considering complications which arise from the frontier question. Stalin : I fully appreciate this burden and the difficulties of supply, but the Germans are principally to blame for these difficulties. Mr. Churchill has cited the figure of 8K million Germans in this area, but bear in mind that the men from this area were conscripted in this area several times and others fled. They got word that the Russians were to be in Koenigsberg and they preferred to deal with the Russians rather than the Poles. Now, look at the turn of events. In the west between the Oder and the Vistula the Germans have quit their fields and these are being cultivated by the Poles. It is unlikely that the Poles will agree to let the Germans cultivate these lands. Truman : Again I want to make it clear that our zone agreement should be kept. I do not think we can settle boundaries here. Churchill : Of course I am deeply committed to compensate Poland for what has been taken from her, but I thought there should be a balance. Poland is now claiming a [ sic ] vastly more territory than she gave up. I can not concede that such an extravagant movement of populations should occur. So vast a movement of population will be a great shock to public opinion to [ in ] my country at least. It puts us in a position that I can not possibly defend. I do not think it is good for Poland. If the Germans have run out they should be encouraged to return. The Poles have no right to create a catastrophe in the feeding of Germany. I press my point in hope that the Marshal will appreciate the difficulties. We do not wish to be left with a vast German population on our hands deprived of its food supply. Take your population of the Ruhr. If enough food is not found we may be confronted with conditions like those in the German concentration camps, even on a vaster scale. Stalin : Germany has never done without the import of grain. Let Germany buy more bread from Poland. The territory is cultivated by the Poles, not the Germans. Churchill : In addition, the condition of this territory into which Poles are being introduced is most peculiar. I am told the Poles are selling coal from Silesia to Sweden when we in England must go through a bitter, fireless winter, worse than that experienced during the war. We stand on the general principle that the supply of food of 1937 Germany should be available for the support of the German people irrespective of the zones of occupation. Stalin : But who is to produce the coal? It is the Poles who are mining the coal. Churchill : They fled from the cannons. Now that the firing has ceased they should come back. Stalin : We have little sympathy with these scoundrels and war criminals. Churchill : I was impressed by what the Marshal said yesterday about not letting past bitterness color our decisions. Stalin : What I said yesterday does not apply to war criminals. I had in mind only the proprietors who have fled. We ourselves are purchasing coal from the Poles who are mining it. Truman : I am concerned that a piece of Germany, a valuable piece has been cut off. This must be deemed a part of Germany in considering reparations and in the feeding of Germany. The Poles have no right to seize this territory now and take it out of the peace settlement. Are we going to maintain occupied zones until the peace or are we going to give Germany away piece-meal? Stalin : Nobody can exploit this region but the Poles. Are [ We ] are short of labor for our own enterprises. There are no Germans in this area. Herr Goebbels’ propaganda has achieved its purpose. No production comes from this area except from the Poles. We can not take coal from them for nothing. The Silesian mines have always been mined by a large number of Polish miners. Churchill : There is no objection to the Poles’ mining this area for the Russian occupiers of the zone. Stalin : It is not possible. It would disturb all normal relations between the two states. The Germans themselves were short of labor. Most of the enterprises were employing foreign forced labor and when Russian troops entered the region these foreign laborers went back to their own country. Most of the Germans had been called up for the army. They were killed or taken captive. These enterprises must now be closed down or must be worked by the Poles. That is the situation as it spontaneously arose. No one but the Germans are to blame. As to Mr. Churchill’s claims that the Poles are receiving too much, undoubtedly Polish proposal creates difficulty for Germany, but Germany created this situation. Churchill : This situation creates difficulties for us as well as for the Germans. Stalin : We may have to create further difficulty for the Germans then. The less industry we leave in Germany, the more markets there will be for your goods. We have destroyed for you a competitor with low living standards and low prices. Attlee : From the point of view of the occupying power, we are faced with a country in chaos, formerly, an economic unit depending for its food and coal from [ upon? ] the eastern areas partly inhabited by Poles. If part of Germany is detached, it puts an onerous burden on occupying states in the west and south. If labor is needed for exploiting the eastern areas, it should be available from western Germany. Pending final settlement that labor force should be directed to where it can be employed so as to relieve the western allies from an impossible burden. Truman : I shall state frankly what I think. I can not consent to the removal of eastern Germany from contributing to the economy of the whole of Germany. Stalin : Are we through? Churchill : Can’t we sleep on it? Adjourned. 1 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the minutes, supra . United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2145 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 top secret [ Babelsberg , July 21, 1945.] Status of Problems Before the Conference i. problems on which substantial agreement has been reached 1. Council of Foreign Ministers . This proposal 2 has been substantially approved, although the Drafting Committee has been asked to make minor textual improvements. London has been fixed as the place of meeting, and the date is set at September 1 at the latest. A telegram of invitation is being drafted to the French and Chinese Governments. 2. Authority of the Control Council for Germany in Political Questions . A revised document 3 on this subject has received final approval. 3. Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine . It has been agreed in principle that the fleet and merchant marine shall be divided in three parts. It is also agreed, however, that (1) a substantial proportion of the submarines shall be destroyed and (2) all of the merchant marine, including the Russian share, shall be available for the prosecution of the war against Japan. 4. Austria and Vienna . The EAC agreements on zones of occupation 4 and control machinery 5 for Austria and Vienna having been finally approved, the Soviets have agreed that U. S. and British forces may immediately occupy their zones. 5. The Polish Question—Liquidation of the London Government and Implementation of the Yalta Agreement . A document 6 on this matter has received final approval. ii. problems pending for consideration before the heads of government or foreign ministers 1. German Economic Questions . The Subcommittee has reported on this question, and the report 7 is ready for consideration. 2. Italian and Austrian Reparations . This matter has been referred to the Subcommittee which has been dealing with German economic questions. 3. Oil for Western Europe . The U. S. has circulated a paper 8 urging that oil from Rumania, Hungary, and Austria be made available to Western Europe. 4. Italy and Spain in the United Nations. 9 Two papers have been prepared on this question, one supporting Italy’s claim to become a member of the United Nations as soon as the peace treaty has been concluded, the other supporting, in general, the entry of other neutrals into the United Nations but opposing the entry of Spain as long as the present regime remains in power. 5. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States . A revised U. S. paper 10 on this subject has been circulated and is ready for consideration. 6. Italy and the Other Satellite States . The U. S. has presented two papers, one on policy toward Italy 11 and the other on policy toward Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. 12 It had originally been intended to refer these papers to a subcommittee, but Marshal Stalin has now taken the position that, unless the U. S. and Britain are prepared to recognize the present Governments of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, this question should not be discussed further. 7. Rumanian Oil . The British have presented a paper, 13 which was referred by the Big Three to the Foreign Ministers, protesting the seizure by the Soviets of British-owned oil equipment in Rumania. 8. The Western Boundary of Poland . This question has been discussed inconclusively by the Big Three. 9. Trusteeship . The Russians have presented a paper 14 on this subject but it has not yet been discussed. 10. Turkey . This has been placed on the agenda of the Big Three by the British but has not yet been discussed. 11. Withdrawal of Troops from Iran . The British have circulated a paper 15 on this subject, which is now ready for consideration. iii. problems which have been discussed and dropped without agreement 1. Yugoslavia . The British raised the question of the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia 16 but, in the absence of support for their position, have apparently decided not to press the matter. iv. questions on the original agenda of the three powers which have not yet been raised before the conference 1. U. S. Proposals. a . Soviet Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems. This matter has not yet been discussed at all. b . Admission of American Press Correspondents into Eastern Europe. This question has not been raised as a separate issue but is being dealt with in connection with the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and will presumably not be raised as a separate problem. 2. British Proposals. a . War Crimes. This question has not been discussed at all. 3. Soviet Proposals. a . Tangier. b . The Levant. 1 Authorship not indicated. This memorandum bears the manuscript notation: “July 21 (?)”. This date is confirmed by a comparison of this status report with the minutes of the meetings on July 21 and July 22. 2 Document No. 713 , post . 3 Document No. 856 , post . 4 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1600; 61 Stat. (3) 2679. 5 Document No. 282, printed in vol. i . 6 Document No. 1131 , post . 7 Documents Nos. 863 and 902 , post . 8 Document No. 1320 , post . 9 The two papers referred to in this paragraph have not been identified. Cf. document No. 727 , post . 10 See document No. 748 , post . 11 Document No. 1092 , post . 12 Document No. 805 , post . 13 Document No. 837 , post . 14 Document No. 733 , post . 15 Document No. 1330 , post . 16 See document No. 1202 , post . Tripartite dinner meeting, about 8:30 p.m. Tripartite dinner meeting, about 8:30 p.m. 1 1 Stalin as host. The dinner was held at Stalin’s quarters at Babelsberg. List of participants from the Log ( ante , p. 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] ). Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Harriman Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky Fleet Admiral Leahy Lord Leathers Mr. Beriya Mr. Davies Major Birse Mr. Gusev Mr. Bohlen Mr. Gromyko Mr. Pavlov [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] Editor’s Note —No record has been found of the substance of the conversation at this meeting. Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening Meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, evening Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Mr. Pauley Sir Walter Monckton Mr. Maisky [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] Editor’s Note —No minutes of this meeting, at which the question of war booty was discussed, have been found. For a later summary of the discussion, see document No. 980 , post , pages 942–943 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] . Stimson–Churchill conversation, 10:40 a.m. Stimson–Churchill conversation, 10:40 a.m. Present United States United Kingdom Mr. Stimson Prime Minister Churchill Mr. Bundy Lord Cherwell [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. Stimson’s diary entry for July 22 contains the following summary: “At ten-forty Bundy and I again went to the British headquarters and talked to the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell for over an hour. Churchill read Groves’ report 1 in full. He told me that he had noticed at the meeting of the Three yesterday that Truman was evidently much fortified by something that had happened and that he stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner, telling them as to certain demands that they absolutely could not have and that the United States was entirely against them. He said ‘Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday. I couldn’t understand it. When he got to the meeting after having read this report he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting’. Churchill said he now understood how this pepping up had taken place and that he felt the same way. His own attitude confirmed this admission. He now not only was not worried about giving the Russians information on the matter but was rather inclined to use it as an argument in our favor in the negotiations. The sentiment of the four of us was unanimous in thinking that it was advisable to tell the Russians at least that we were working on that subject and intended to use it if and when it was successfully finished.” This conversation is apparently the one referred to in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , page 638. According to Bundy (“Remembered Words”, The Atlantic , March 1957, page 57), Churchill exclaimed after learning the contents of the report of the first atomic test: “Stimson, what was gunpowder? Trivial. What was electricity? Meaningless. This atomic bomb is the Second Coming in Wrath.” 1 Document No. 1305 , post . Fifth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:10 a.m. Fifth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:10 a.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Dunn Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gromyko Mr. Clayton Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Maisky Mr. Murphy Mr. Ward Mr. Sobolev Mr. Pauley Mr. Novikov Mr. Matthews Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Cohen Mr. Russell Mr. Allen 1 Mr. Thompson 1 1 Allen’s presence for at least part of the meeting is assumed from his authorship of a memorandum on the discussion at this meeting of the question of the Italian colonies ( post , p. 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] ). Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. 1 Allen’s presence for at least part of the meeting is assumed from his authorship of a memorandum on the discussion at this meeting of the question of the Italian colonies ( post , p. 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] ). Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 11:10 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)]] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) Berlin Conference, July 24, 1945. 865.014/7–2445 [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 11:10 a.m. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2245 [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)]] Rapporteur’s Report Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 11:10 a.m. Truman Papers Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 11:10 a.m. top secret The Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers took place on Sunday, July 22, 1945, Mr. Eden being in the Chair. The meeting opened at 11:10 a.m. Mr. Eden stated his belief that mention should be made of all outstanding subjects which appear on the agenda, in order that the meeting could decide which were ready to discuss. He mentioned first the admission of neutral states, except Spain, into world organizations. Mr. Molotov asked about Italy. Mr. Eden replied that Italy was linked to this subject. Mr. Eden went on to mention the Council of Foreign Ministers and German economic questions. Mr. Byrnes inquired about the status of the proposal for the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Eden asked that he be permitted first to state the questions on the agenda. He mentioned the implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe and the removal, as war booty, of Allied equipment from Rumania, and asked about the condition of each of the foregoing subjects. Mr. Byrnes remarked that he had suggested the question of the supply of oil for Western Europe. Mr. Molotov stated that there were other questions, including German and Austrian reparations, on which a subcommittee is working. He inquired about Spain. Mr. Eden stated his assumption that Mr. Molotov meant the general paper on Spain. He remarked that Spain was included in the paper regarding the admission of Italy into international organizations. 2 The question on policy towards Spain was discussed by the Big Three and was still before them. Mr. Byrnes stated that the Big Three had discussed the question of withdrawal of recognition from Spain, but when agreement was not reached the question had been passed over. Mr. Eden replied that it had not been passed on to the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Byrnes agreed that it had not, but remained on the Big Three agenda. Mr. Molotov recalled that there had been a suggestion for special mention of Spain. Mr. Byrnes agreed that the drafting committee had been instructed to state, in connection with the admission of Italy into international organizations, that Spain should not be so admitted. The committee’s report is not yet ready. Mr. Eden agreed, except that it had been suggested that Spain be linked with the neutrals. The whole question was now in the hands of a subcommittee. Mr. Molotov inquired whether a committee had been appointed. Mr. Byrnes said Yes and that Maisky had been appointed for the Soviet Union. Mr. Molotov then raised the question of Tangier 3 and the question of the admission of neutral states into the United Nations. Mr. Byrnes remarked that the latter subject was connected with the proposal he had just mentioned. It had been referred to the same committee that was dealing with Spain and Italy. Mr. Molotov stated his agreement and asked about Tangier. Mr. Eden replied that the question had not yet been discussed but could be put on the agenda. Mr. Molotov stated that although the question had not been referred to the Foreign Ministers, he had no objection. Mr. Byrnes then stated that he had another item to suggest. This was a paper concerning international cooperation for the solution of European economic problems. Mr. Eden asked whether the meeting had a paper on this subject. Mr. Byrnes replied that the paper will soon be circulated, 4 but if Mr. Eden wished, he would suggest it for discussion by the Big Three in order that it might be referred back to the Foreign Ministers. This would take another day. Mr. Eden pointed out that five big items were already on the agenda, but suggested that a start be made on them and, if possible, this extra item may be considered. Mr. Molotov pointed out that the question was not before the meeting and that no document was available. Implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe Mr. Eden announced that the first question before the meeting was the implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe (Annex l). 5 Mr. Molotov stated that he had studied the American suggestion and had two questions on it. The first is the provision for the supervision of elections. The Soviet delegation did not like this provision and had already stated that it did not approve. It believed supervision to be unnecessary. The second question concerned the press. There is no doubt that conditions have now changed and that the end of the war will mean more favorable treatment of the press. He had no doubt that everything possible will be done. He did not understand the need for such a statement. On the question of the control commissions, Mr. Molotov stated that this was not clear. No doubt the American and British members know that in the countries in question the Soviet representatives have submitted suggestions for the improvement of conditions. If his colleagues do not know about the suggestions, he would be glad to furnish information in order that they might be discussed. He was willing to amend them, and any amendments made could be inserted. He had just received a telegram from Voroshilov stating that the American and British representatives on the Control Council in Hungary had been given the text of the Soviet suggestions. 6 Voroshilov believed that they approved of them. Mr. Molotov would like to hear comment regarding these suggestions. Mr. Byrnes in reply referred first to the last question. It is the American position that just as the representatives of the Three Powers gather around the present conference table in order to exchange views and make suggestions, the representatives of the Three Powers in the satellite states should follow the same procedure. Up to now this had not been done, according to reports received from our representatives. Our representatives report not only that suggestions are not made by Soviet representatives, but that action is taken without consultation. Mr. Byrnes believed that the Soviet Government should consult prior to taking action, just as the Conferees were doing here. All paragraph 3 7 does is to assert that as a desirable thing. There could certainly be no objection to this. As to the press, we have heretofore stated that the American press representatives are refused freedom of movement and freedom to report to their papers. Marshal Stalin had agreed that the end of the war meant an improvement in this situation. 8 We are only stating in our document what he suggested. As to paragraph 1, Mr. Byrnes stated that he could only repeat that we do not like the idea of the supervision of elections but that we have become convinced that it is the wise thing to do in order to remove suspicion regarding the conduct of elections. These suspicions may be unjustifiable, but they can only be removed by supervision of elections; that was agreed to at Yalta. Mr. Eden stated that the British had been asked to put forward a paper on this subject. This had not been done because the document before the Conference is entirely acceptable to the British Government. In regard to Mr. Molotov’s suggestion regarding the modification of the control councils, Mr. Eden believed that it would be useful if we could have the text of these suggestions here. It is difficult to follow the exact nature of the modifications proposed. Perhaps Mr. Molotov could arrange to make the text available, in which case a subcommittee could be appointed to consider them. In regard to the supervision of elections, Mr. Eden agreed with the paper. We do not wish to supervise elections but must do so in order to fulfill the spirit of the Yalta Agreement. In regard to the press, this was not wholly a question of freedom of movement but a question of the right to report free from political censorship. That is why the British like the proposal in this paper and hope that their Soviet Allies will be able to accept it. Mr. Molotov pointed out that in the paragraph dealing with the supervision of elections five countries were mentioned, including Italy. However, in paragraph 3 of the paper, dealing with control commissions[,] only three countries were mentioned. It is evident that Greece could not be mentioned in paragraph 3 since there is no control council there, but this is not true in Italy. Why was Italy omitted? Mr. Byrnes replied that Italy had been omitted because no complaint had been received regarding the operation of the Council. Mr. Molotov asked whether a tripartite basis would be approved in Italy. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the Commission is an Allied commission in Italy and that the Soviet Government has representatives. Mr. Molotov insisted that the Soviet representatives took no part in the work and were not kept informed. Mr. Byrnes replied that this was the first that the United States had heard about the Soviet representative not being kept informed. He was certain that he must be. The United States sought nothing in Rumania, Bulgaria, or Hungary which it was not willing to make available to the Soviet Union in Italy. Mr. Molotov stated that he believed that it would be best to circulate the Soviet suggestions regarding the Control Council as suggested by Mr. Eden. Of course, there were slight differences in conditions in the three countries, but the principles would be the same. Perhaps somebody would suggest an improvement in the work of the Allied Control Commission in Italy. Mr. Byrnes replied that any suggestion would be considered and reiterated that this was the first time he had heard any complaint about operations in Italy. Mr. Molotov stated that he had mentioned on several occasions, to American and British representatives, that conditions in Italy constituted a model for the control commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The Russians had read about the reorganization of the Italian Commission in the press but had decided not to do anything about it. Mr. Byrnes agreed that the Soviet representative should have been informed. Mr. Molotov asked whether Mr. Byrnes was satisfied that American and British representatives in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary should have the same working conditions as the Soviet representative in Italy. Mr. Eden pointed out that if conditions in Italy are not satisfactory to the Soviet Union, they would be changed gladly. Mr. Eden had heard nothing about this. Mr. Byrnes agreed, and stated that our representative should take no action without consultation with the Soviet representative. We wanted the same treatment. Mr. Eden stated that it was agreed that Mr. Molotov would furnish the text of the proposals and any comment he wished regarding conditions in Italy. Mr. Molotov then stated that on the question of the supervision of elections the statement was unnecessary and would cause suspicion. He pointed out that up to now elections in ex-enemy countries had been held only in Finland, and asked whether there is any suspicion that this election had not been free. Mr. Byrnes agreed that so far as we knew this election had been all right. Mr. Molotov then said there was no other election and inquired what grounds there were for suspicion. Mr. Byrnes replied that we would, frankly, always be suspicious of elections in countries where our representatives are not free to move about and where the press cannot report freely. Our representatives in every one of these countries had reported such conditions, but they had not done so in Finland. Elections might be conducted as fairly as is possible to conduct them, but so long as our representatives are not permitted to move about and there is no free press, no one will believe that the elections are free. Great harm might result where no reason existed for such harm. Mr. Molotov stated that he had no objection to the discussion of the American proposal if this discussion at the same time included the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Mr. Byrnes stated that the press had reported freely about the Finnish election and that the public was satisfied regarding conditions under which it was held. Mr. Eden , referring to Mr. Molotov’s last statement, said that he believed that there might be something in this. If elections were held under conditions set forth in this proposal, it would be much easier to bring about some form of recognition of these countries. However, it must be borne in mind that Constitutionally Great Britain was unable to extend full recognition until the conclusion of peace. Full diplomatic relations had not yet been established with Italy for this reason. Mr. Byrnes stated that the President had made plain the other afternoon that there could be no question, so far as the United States is concerned, of recognition under existing conditions and that, therefore, the United States would not recognize these governments. 9 He hoped that elections would be held under conditions which would permit prompt recognition of any government set up by the people. Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet Union could not agree to the supervision of elections. He could understand that other Allies wanted better facilities for their representatives in these countries. Now that the war was at an end, there is every reason to give greater freedom both to these representatives and to the press. They would have every opportunity fully to be informed regarding the elections. Mr. Molotov suggested that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the proposal be referred to a subcommittee. Mr. Eden stated that he would report to the Big Three that paragraphs 2 and 3 had been referred to a subcommittee but that no agreement had been reached regarding the supervision of elections. Mr. Byrnes interjected to inquire whether Mr. Molotov would agree to accept paragraphs 2 and 3 if paragraph 1 was withdrawn. Mr. Molotov stated that there were drafting points, since certain parts of the paper were not clear. If the Conference was willing to state that conditions would be the same as in Italy, there would be no objection. Mr. Byrnes remarked that we were going in circles. Mr. Eden suggested that the matter go forward as suggested by him and that a subcommittee be appointed. Mr. Byrnes appointed Mr. Cannon and Mr. Russell. Mr. Eden appointed Mr. Hayter. Mr. Molotov appointed Mr. Sobolev[.] German Economic Questions Mr. Eden next raised the report of the economic subcommittee (Annex 2). 10 Mr. Byrnes suggested that this afternoon’s consideration of this report be confined to those matters agreed to by the subcommittee. Mr. Molotov asked for clarification of this point. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that if the Foreign Ministers approved those portions of the report of the subcommittee [already?] approved by it, they could be referred to the Big Three and progress would be made. Among the disagreements is the question of reparations, and Mr. Byrnes did not wish to have this question considered this afternoon. Mr. Eden stated his understanding of the need to leave out reparations, but asked whether there weren’t other sections which must be considered before a report was made to the Big Three. Mr. Byrnes agreed, except for reparations. Mr. Molotov asked what report was meant. Mr. Eden replied that they were considering the report of the economic subcommittee. In this report the last half dealt with reparations. Under the American proposal this meeting would deal with all questions but reparations. Mr. Byrnes agreed that questions not dealt with this afternoon should be first on the agenda of the next meeting. Mr. Eden brought up the report. Mr. Byrnes asked that paragraph 4 be passed. Mr. Eden failed to see the connection between paragraph 4 and reparations. Mr. Byrnes replied that he did not wish to discuss paragraph 4 and renewed his request that matters in disagreement not be discussed now but be placed first on the next agenda. Mr. Molotov stated that it was not quite clear to him what the meeting was discussing. Mr. Eden replied that he understood that the drafting committee had agreed on this report except where specifically indicated and that it had been agreed that the Foreign Ministers would discuss only portions agreed upon. Eighteen principles had been agreed upon. They would be taken in order. Mr. Eden mentioned paragraph 10. 11 Mr. Molotov suggested that in the last sentence the phrases providing that “production shall be destroyed” and “or shall be removed” be reversed. Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Eden raised paragraphs 11 and 12, and they were agreed to. Mr. Molotov submitted an amendment to paragraph 13 which consisted of the addition of the clause “according to detailed instructions to be issued by the Control Council” at the end of the first sentence. He pointed out that Germany cannot be considered a single economic unit in all respects and cited the language of paragraph 11 as proof of his contention. Therefore he believed that more specific instructions were needed. Mr. Byrnes stated that he wished to give more consideration to this matter. In the report, the principle was stated that during the occupation period Germany would be treated as a single economic unit. The language of Mr. Molotov’s proposal would modify this principle and make it subject to directives from the Control Council. If any member of the Control Council objected on a specific issue, Germany would not be treated as a single economic unit on that issue. Mr. Byrnes was in agreement with the language of the committee’s report but not with that of the amendment. Mr. Molotov stated his belief that the amendment was necessary. The language of the present draft was too general. Mr. Byrnes remarked that this would mean that in every single case the Control Council would decide whether Germany was to be treated as an economic unit. Mr. Molotov insisted that he had not been understood. He is not denying that it had been decided that Germany would be treated as an economic unit. However, he had another idea. He felt that the Control Council should be instructed to sit and look at the situation in detail. After some months of experience the Control Council might recommend a new basis based on their experience. He believed this to be essential. Mr. Byrnes suggested that this matter be passed over. He stated that he was willing to take Mr. Molotov’s suggested language and see whether agreement could be reached. Mr. Eden then raised paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 and they were agreed to. Mr. Molotov suggested the deletion of paragraph 18. The effect of the war is serious and great changes have been made. Stalin yesterday had said that it was impossible to restore pre-war conditions in Germany. 12 It is difficult for us now to say in what respect pre-war Germany can be restored. Mr. Eden pointed out that the matters dealt with in paragraph 18 are already contained in paragraph 5 on which agreement had not been reached. Therefore, we must reserve on paragraph 18 and note that no agreement had been reached. He inquired whether the meeting was willing to consider paragraph 7 which did not deal with reparations. 13 Mr. Molotov asked about the annex. 14 Mr. Eden replied that it dealt entirely with reparations. Mr. Molotov pointed out that article 16 referred to the annex and that note must be made that the annex had not been considered. This was agreed to. Mr. Eden then suggested consideration of paragraph 7. Mr. Molotov replied that he had not read the report. Mr. Eden stated that there are only a couple of sentences. Mr. Molotov repeated that he had not read it. Mr. Eden agreed that it should be passed over. Industrial Equipment in Rumania Mr. Eden then raised the matter of the seizure of British and American owned industrial equipment in Rumania. 15 A British company had a lot of equipment bought and paid for. Some had come from Germany; some from other countries. When the Germans invaded Rumania they had seized these companies and the equipment. The British had assumed that when Rumania fell to the Allies this equipment would be returned. They were naturally much concerned when the equipment had been taken by our Russian Allies. Mr. Molotov asked that the losses of this British corporation be compared with the losses of the Soviet oil companies. Mr. Eden pointed out that the British had not taken Soviet property because of British losses. Mr. Molotov maintained that German property had been taken. Mr. Eden denied that the property was German. Mr. Vyshinski then made a long statement containing statistics concerning the equipment in question. He maintained that after Soviet seizures had been completed enough equipment remained to insure three years’ output. He asserted that the pipe in question had been imported by the Germans from Germany in order to build a pipeline for pumping Soviet oil. He denied that the equipment had been paid for by British companies. Mr. Eden intervened to state that he had heard this story before and that it had been disproved. Mr. Vyshinski continued his statement alleging that the Germans had imported these pipes and transferred them to firms already made German. He also made an extended argument attempting to justify the Soviet action under the armistice terms and purporting to prove that the equipment constituted war booty. Mr. Eden intervened to state that no Allied property in any country is booty to another Ally. Mr. Vyshinski continued his argument based on the surrender terms. Mr. Byrnes interposed to state that the question does not concern the right of the Soviet Government to take German property as war booty, but concerns the Soviet claim to the right to take the property of American citizens as booty. The question is whether the property in question is the property of American citizens. If it was German, the Russians had a right to take it. The case must be solved on facts and the facts must be determined by somebody [ some body? ] like the Reparations Committee. Mr. Byrnes wished the three powers to agree to the general proposition that the property of American citizens should not be confiscated as war booty by the three powers here represented. Byrnes stated his understanding that all four of the armistice terms [ agreements ] 16 contained appropriate provisions governing these cases. Mr. Eden stated that he wished to make a point. Mr. Vyshinski remarked that he had not finished his statement. He stated that the Control Council in Rumania was satisfied that the pipes were not British or American property. Mr. Eden pointed out that this was a unilateral action of the Soviet High Command which had never been agreed to. However, we are used to such unilateral acts. Mr. Molotov then stated that the Soviet armies had covered big distances in their advance and that there had only been this one case on which dispute arose. Mr. Vyshinski then continued his argument insisting that the equipment in question had not been paid for before the war and could not have been paid for during the war. He mentioned that the high octane Astra–Romana plant though legitimately war booty had not been removed by the Soviet Union since its removal would have affected Rumanian production. He reiterated that enough equipment had been left to guarantee three years’ supply and insisted that according to all the facts the equipment removed was German property. Mr. Byrnes inquired whether it was contended that the Germans owned the oil in the ground. Mr. Vyshinski replied that they had used the oil against the Allies and had also used the pipes. Mr. Byrnes stated that if the German Army uses your property, such use does not take title away. Mr. Vyshinski then argued that the matter would have been different if the pipes had come from the United States and had been seized from [ by? ] the Germans. However, they had been brought from Germany. He asked how they could be considered Allied property. Mr. Byrnes asked whether the American citizen owned the oil or whether he had lost the title to it because the Germans had seized the well. If the oil were to be taken out of the ground now, would the American citizen be paid? Mr. Vyshinski stated that the Soviet Union received oil as reparation from the Rumanian Government. The Soviet Union is taking nothing from American firms. In any event, we were dealing with equipment, not oil. Mr. Eden remarked that the argument could go on for a long time. He thought this matter should be examined by a committee. It should be remembered that: 1. Not only the question of the pipes should be considered; 2. The great majority of the pipes had been bought and paid for before the war; and 3. Great Britain had not objected to the removal of surplus property but did object to indiscriminate removal. He believed that if the Committee investigated the matter it could be cleared up. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that it would be difficult to determine the owner of specific pipes. The matter should be left to the Reparations Commission or some similar body. We ought to agree here on general principles. He suggested the reference of the case to a committee which could arrive at principles governing such cases. Mr. Eden stated his belief that there should be a meeting of experts to determine what had happened. The Soviet Government had issued orders in the name of the Control Council without consulting either the British or American representatives. Mr. Byrnes suggested the appointment of a committee to reconcile opposing points of view. Mr. Molotov queried the usefulness of such a committee. He could understand that the firms in question wanted the use of these pipes even though they were enemy. Mr. Eden remarked that he had said many times that this was not enemy property. If Mr. Molotov did not wish to discuss it, it would be necessary to leave it as it is, and in that event he would have to tell Parliament. Personally he thought it best that he should not have to take this course. Mr. Byrnes stated that it was not wise to leave a subject of such disagreement. It would be much better if each appointed a representative to discuss the situation in order to avoid future difficulty. If American citizens submitted complaints it would be necessary to investigate these complaints and claim restitution. It was better to try to settle the issue here. Mr. Eden suggested that the question be thought over for later consideration. He continued that since it was now 1:30 p.m. it was necessary to produce an agenda for the afternoon meeting. Questions still before the afternoon meeting included Western Frontiers of Poland, adjourned from yesterday. Mr. Molotov then raised the question of Koenigsberg and the Koenigsberg area in German territory which is to go to the Soviet Union. 17 He asked whether there was any objection to opening the agenda with the question of the Western frontiers of the Soviet Union. Eden inquired whether this subject was desired on the agenda. Mr. Molotov stated that it should not go first on the agenda but should be considered after the Western Frontiers of Poland. Mr. Eden said that the second item would be Trusteeship; the third, Turkey; and that the Western Frontiers of the Soviet Union could be added as the fourth item if Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Byrnes agreed and added that other territorial questions might well be added since they were all interrelated. Mr. Eden then stated that he would circulate a paper on Iran 18 and asked whether there was any objection to its inclusion. This would be the fifth item on the agenda. Mr. Molotov inquired about German economic questions. Mr. Eden stated that a report would be made on this subject but that consideration had better be postponed because of reparations. Mr. Byrnes stated that there were two matters which he wished added to the agenda. Each would in due course be referred back to the Foreign Ministers by the Heads of States. The President would first present a paper on Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems. 19 He would also propose the issuance of a draft [ directive ] by the Heads of Governments stating the principles governing the control of Germany. 20 Mr. Molotov stated that the second point was not quite clear to him. Mr. Byrnes stated that the directive proposed would be issued by the respective governments to their commanders occupying Germany in order that what was agreed by this Conference might be carried out. Mr. Eden stated that this could not be discussed now. Mr. Byrnes agreed and added that it would not be discussed this afternoon since it must be referred to a committee. Mr. Molotov asked about the object of this proposal. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had wanted the matter on the agenda this morning but was unable to get it included. The President will now present it in order that it can be referred to the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Eden asked whether it could not be taken up tomorrow morning. Mr. Molotov asked whether military questions or economic had been included. Mr. Byrnes stated that if the Conference agreed, the proposal could be read and referred to a committee. Such action would save time in the afternoon meeting. Mr. Molotov stated that he wished a short explanation of the subject. Would it include military, economic or political matters? Mr. Byrnes replied that whatever we agreed to here must be sent to our commanders. It will be only a directive to our commanders to carry out our agreements. Mr. Eden asked whether it could not be agreed that it would be considered tomorrow morning. Mr. Molotov asked that it go to the Big Three for reference back to the Foreign Ministers. The meeting then adjourned. 2 Eden was presumably referring to documents Nos. 727 and 1177 , post . 3 See document No. 1356 , post . 4 See document No. 1161 , post . 5 Document No. 748 , post (not annexed but clearly identified). For the text of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, see document No. 1417 , post , section v . 6 See document No. 796 , post . Cf. document No. 797 , post , and document No. 309, printed in vol. i . The United States and British representatives referred to were Major General William S. Key and Major-General Oliver Pearce Edgcumbe, respectively. 7 Of document No. 748 , post . 8 The reference may be to statements made by Molotov on July 20, See ante , pp. 151–153 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . 9 See ante , p. 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . 10 Documents Nos. 863 and 902 , post (not annexed but clearly identified). 11 Of the attachment to document No. 863 , post . 12 Cf. ante , p. 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . 13 The paragraphs 5 and 7 referred to by Eden are presumably the fifth and seventh unnumbered paragraphs of document No. 863 , post . 14 i. e., annex i to the report of the Economic Subcommittee (not printed separately, but identical with attachment 1 to document No. 894 , post ). 15 See document No. 837 , post . 16 For the text of the armistice with Rumania, signed at Moscow, September 12, 1944, see Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712. 17 See document No. 1020 , post . 18 Document No. 1330 , post . 19 See document No. 1161 , post . 20 See document No. 870 , post . Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) 865.014/7–2445 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) Memorandum Subject: Discussion in the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on July 22, 1945, regarding Italian Colonies . Mr. Molotov recalled that at the San Francisco Conference the Soviet Delegation had gone on record as expressing the intention of the Soviet Government to apply for designation as a trustee power. 1 He said that Mr. Eden had recently made a statement in the House of Commons 2 that Italy had lost its colonies in Africa and the Mediterranean. Mr. Molotov wanted to know by what right Great Britain had decided this question, and who had “found” the colonies. Mr. Eden said that Italy had lost her colonies to the British Army. He said they were under British military occupation pending their final disposal in the peace treaty with Italy. Mr. Molotov said that his delegation would introduce [ had introduced? ] a paper 3 on the subject and hoped it might be discussed at the next meeting. G[ eorge ] V A[ llen ] Berlin Conference, July 24, 1945. 1 See document No. 734 , post . 2 On October 4, 1944, Eden had answered in the affirmative when asked in the House of Commons whether he would “assure the House that His Majesty’s Government is opposed to the return of the colonies to Italy, and that their declaration that the Italian Empire in Africa is irrevocably lost will be strictly adhered to.” See Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report , 5th series, vol. 403, col. 908. On January 17, 1945, Eden stated in the House of Commons: “The future of Italy’s prewar possessions in Libya and Tripoli must await consideration by the United Nations at the conclusion of peace.” In answer to further questions, he restated the British position as follows: “It is that the Italian Government have no right to the return of any one of their colonies. What is done about the colonies is a matter, in some part, for discussion in the future.” See ibid ., vol. 407, col. 137. 3 Molotov was presumably referring to document No. 733 , post , which had been submitted on July 20. United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2245 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 11:10 a.m. top secret Summary of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers Sunday Morning, July 22, 1945 1. Yalta Declaration on Liberated Areas and Satellite States. It was agreed to report to the Heads of Governments that no agreement could be reached on paragraph 1 of the U. S. paper relating to the observation of elections. 2 Paragraphs 2 and 3 relating to freedom of the press and the Control Commissions were referred to a subcommittee which was instructed to examine the improvements recently made in the conduct of the Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary and to examine Soviet complaints in regard to the operation of the Allied Commission in Italy. 2. German Economic Questions. A number of paragraphs in the proposed agreement on economic principles presented yesterday by the Economic Subcommittee were approved. No presentation is made to the Heads of Governments, however, until the Foreign Ministers have discussed the subject further. 3. Rumanian Oil Equipment. There was extended discussion but no agreement on the question of the treatment of British and American oil equipment in Rumania. 4. Agenda for this afternoon’s Meeting of Heads of Governments. It was agreed that the following questions should be recommended to the Heads of Governments for their agenda for this afternoon: (1) Western Frontier of Poland—carried over from yesterday. (2) Trusteeship—carried over from yesterday. (3) Turkey—carried over from yesterday. (4) Western frontier of the Soviet Union. Mr. Molotov explained that he referred to that portion of East Prussia including Koenigsberg which the Soviet Union desires to annex. (5) Iran—The British have presented a paper on this subject. (6) Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems. Mr. Byrnes said that he would ask the President to present a paper on this subject with the recommendation that it be referred to the Foreign Ministers for consideration. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 For the documents referred to in this summary, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, ante , pp. 226–238 [ Pgs. 226–238 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] . Rapporteur’s Report Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] Rapporteur’s Report 1 Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 11:10 a.m. Report to the Plenary Meeting on the Meeting of Foreign Secretaries on the Morning of 22 nd July by the Chairman ( Mr. Eden ) The meeting took note that the following subjects were still on the Agenda of the Foreign Secretaries: 1. The admission of neutral states to the World Organisation, and the exclusion of the present Spanish Government. 2. The Council of Five Foreign Ministers. 3. Reparations from Italy and Austria. 4. European oil supplies. 5. Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe. 6. German economic questions. 7. The removal as booty of Allied industrial equipment especially in Roumania. The meeting observed that questions 1–4 had been referred to various sub-committees or drafting committees and could not therefore be discussed at the meeting of Foreign Secretaries this morning. They therefore proceeded to a discussion of the three remaining questions. yalta declaration on liberated europe The meeting had before it a memorandum submitted by the United States delegation on July 21st. 2 This memorandum dealt with three questions: 1. The observation of elections in certain European countries. 2. Facilities for press representatives in liberated and former Axis satellite states. 3. Procedure of Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The British delegation expressed agreement with the United States memorandum. The Soviet delegation was unable to agree with the proposal in regard to the observation of elections. As regards the second and third questions it was agreed that these should be referred to a subcommittee for discussion. This committee consisted of: United States Mr. Cannon and Mr. Russell Soviet Union Mr. Sobolev United Kingdom Mr. Hayter The Soviet delegation undertook to provide a memorandum showing recent improvements in the status of the British and American representatives on the Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Soviet delegation also agreed to prepare a memorandum showing the changes which they felt desirable in regard to the procedure of the Allied Commission in Italy. german economic questions The Foreign Secretaries had before them a report by the Economic Sub-Committee. The United States Delegation asked for discussion on reparations to be postponed to a subsequent meeting and the Soviet Delegation asked that discussion should be confined to the economic principles which had been agreed by the Sub-Committee. The Foreign Secretaries therefore decided to discuss the agreed principles and not the principles in dispute or reparations questions. It was agreed that reparations should figure as the first item on the Agenda of the Foreign Secretaries for their meeting on July 23rd. 3 Paragraphs 11, 12, 14, 15 and 17 of the principles were agreed, subject to agreement on the points remaining in dispute. As regards the remainder:— Paragraph 10 . It was agreed to amend the last sentence to read as follows:— “Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan, recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned, or, if not removed, destroyed”. Paragraph 13 . The Soviet Delegation proposed the addition to the first sentence of wording to the following effect:— “according to detailed instructions to be issued by the Control Council in accordance with the principles set out in this Agreement.” The U. S. Delegation asked for time to consider this and the point was therefore reserved. Paragraph 16. It was pointed out that this paragraph referred to an annex dealing with reparations and was therefore reserved. Paragraph 18. The Soviet Delegation asked for the deletion of this paragraph. As, however, this paragraph was one of those in dispute, it was agreed that it must be reserved. removal as booty of allied industrial equipment especially in roumania A general discussion took place on this question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on July 19th. No agreement was reached and the question was adjourned for further consideration. agenda for the plenary meeting The Foreign Secretaries agreed to recommend as the agenda for this afternoon’s meeting the following items: 1. The western frontier of Poland (resumption of discussion). 2. Trusteeship (adjourned from yesterday’s plenary meeting). 3. Turkey (adjourned from yesterday’s plenary meeting). 4. Partial change of the western frontier of the Soviet Union (proposal of the Soviet Delegation). 5. Persia (memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on July 21st). Certain further topics were proposed for remission to the Foreign Secretaries’ meeting on July 22nd. These were as follows: Co-operation in solving immediate European economic problems (proposal of U. S. delegation). Directive from heads of Governments for the control of Germany in accordance with the principles heretofore agreed (proposal of U. S. delegation). Tangier (proposal of Soviet delegation)[.] Syria and Lebanon (proposal of Soviet delegation)[.] It is hoped that it may be agreed to refer these at once to the Committee of Foreign Secretaries without discussion at this stage by the plenary meeting. 1 Eden acted as Rapporteur for this meeting. The source copy of this report was apparently before Truman during the afternoon meeting of the Heads of Government. A copy of this report, endorsed “Corrected copy” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2245), bears manuscript changes and deletions which make it substantially identical with the report read by Eden at the Sixth Plenary Meeting, July 22. Cf. post , pp. 244–246 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 2 For the documents mentioned in this report, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, ante , pp. 226–238 [ Pgs. 226–238 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] . 3 Opposite this paragraph is the following marginal manuscript notation by Dunn: “Put off any discussion until more complete report can be made by Foreign Secretaries”. Truman–Churchill meeting, 12:15 p.m. Truman–Churchill meeting, 12:15 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom President Truman Prime Minister Churchill [Fleet Admiral Leahy?] [General of the Army Marshall?] [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. The Log ( ante , page 17) indicates that Truman and Churchill conferred for an hour at Truman’s quarters beginning at 12:15. It appears from Stimson’s diary entry for July 22 ( ante , page 225) and the passage from Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , page 638, summarizing Groves’ report, 1 that this is the meeting referred to by Churchill in the following passage (also on page 638): “The President invited me to confer with him forthwith. He had with him General Marshall and Admiral Leahy.” Cf. the following passage in Truman, Year of Decisions , page 419: “The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me.… I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used. The top military advisers to the President recommended its use, and when I talked to Churchill he unhesitatingly told me that he favored the use of the atomic bomb if it might aid to end the war.” 1 Document No. 1305 , post . Sixth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. Sixth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gromyko Mr. Pauley Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gusev Mr. Davies Sir William Strang Mr. Novikov Mr. Dunn Major Birse Mr. Sobolev Mr. Clayton Mr. Pavlov Mr. Cohen Mr. Matthews Mr. Bohlen Mr. Thompson 1 1 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 5 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 5 p.m. Truman Papers Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 5 p.m. top secret Stalin announced that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in Austria had begun today. He said that they would have to withdraw for a distance of about 100 kilometers and that the movement would be completed by July 24. Mr. Churchill said that he was very gratified that Marshal Stalin had so quickly carried out his agreement. 2 The President said that he was also appreciative. Stalin replied that it had merely been their duty. The President called upon Mr. Eden to present his report of the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Eden then read the following report: 3 “The Foreign Ministers this morning had discussed the following subjects: “1. The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. “The meeting had before it a memorandum submitted by the United States delegation on July 21st. 4 This memorandum dealt with three questions: “1. The observation of elections in certain European countries. “2. Facilities for press representatives in liberated and former Axis satellite states. “3. Procedure of Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. “The British delegation expressed agreement with the United States memorandum. “The Soviet delegation was unable to agree with the proposal in regard to the observation of elections. As regards the second and third questions it was agreed that these should be referred to a subcommittee for discussion. “The Soviet delegation undertook to provide a memorandum showing recent improvements in the status of the British and American representatives on the Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. 5 The Soviet delegation also agreed to prepare a memorandum showing the changes which they felt desirable in regard to the procedure of the Allied Commission in Italy. 6 “2. German Economic Questions. “The Foreign Secretaries had before them a report by the Economic Sub-Committee. 7 The United States Delegation asked for discussion on reparations to be postponed to a subsequent meeting and the Soviet Delegation asked that discussion should be confined to the economic principles which had been agreed by the Sub-Committee. The Foreign Secretaries therefore decided to discuss the agreed principles and not the principles in dispute or reparations questions. It was agreed that reparations should figure as the first item on the Agenda of the Foreign Secretaries for their meeting on July 23rd. “Paragraph 10 was slightly amended and agreed to. The wording of paragraph 13 is still under discussion. “Paragraphs 11, 12, 14, 15, and 17 of the principles were agreed subject to agreement on the points remaining in dispute. Paragraphs 16 and 18 were reserved.” Mr. Molotov interrupted to state that this was not accurate as paragraphs 13 and 18 remained. Mr. Eden pointed out that he had said that paragraph 13 was still under discussion. Continuing the reading of his report Mr. Eden said that the only other questions discussed were: “3. Removal as Booty of Allied Industrial Equipment Especially in Roumania. “A general discussion took place on this question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on July 19th. 8 No agreement was reached and the question was adjourned for further consideration. “4. Agenda for the Plenary Meeting. “The Foreign Secretaries agreed to recommend as the agenda for this afternoon’s meeting the following items: “1. The Western Frontier of Poland (resumption of discussion). “2. Trusteeship (adjourned from yesterday’s plenary meeting). “3. Turkey (adjourned from yesterday’s plenary meeting). “4. Partial change of the Western Frontier of the Soviet Union (proposal of the Soviet Delegation). 9 “5. Persia (memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on July 21st). 10 “Certain further topics were proposed for remission to the Foreign Secretaries’ meeting on July 22nd. These were as follows: “Cooperation in solving immediate European economic problems (proposal of U. S. delegation). 11 “Directive from heads of Governments for the control of Germany in accordance with the principles heretofore agreed (proposal of U. S. delegation). 12 “Tangier (proposal of Soviet delegation). 13 “Syria and Lebanon (proposal of Soviet delegation). 14 “It is hoped that it may be agreed to refer these at once to the Committee of Foreign Secretaries without discussion at this stage by the plenary meeting.[”] The President asked if the agenda as proposed was accepted. Stalin said he had no objection. Churchill said he did not know what the proposals were with regard to Syria and Lebanon. These matters affected the British very much. Only British troops were involved. They were ready to withdraw from Syria and Lebanon; they did not want anything there. There was difficulty in doing this at the present time as their withdrawal would be followed by the massacre of the French. He would like to know what was proposed before he made up his mind. Molotov said that what they had in mind was that the Government of Syria had approached the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government had addressed a note on this matter to the United States, British and French Governments. 15 Churchill inquired if a communication had been sent to China. Molotov replied that it had not. He went on to say that they would like to have some information in the matter since it affected Soviet interests. He thought that a preliminary discussion could be held in the Foreign Minister’s meeting. Stalin said that the Soviets had made no proposals with regard to the removal of the troops of any country. Churchill said he persisted that the discussion be opened up at the present meeting. The President suggested that the first three of the four topics proposed for remission to the Foreign Ministers be referred to them and that the fourth question relating to Syria and Lebanon be discussed by the Heads of Government at the next meeting. This was agreed to. Western Frontier of Poland The President said that he had already stated the case so far as the United States was concerned. 16 Molotov said that the Soviet delegation wished to place another matter on the agenda of the meeting today. They wished to make a statement with regard to the prisoner-of-war camp in Italy in which Soviet prisoners were held. This was agreed to. Churchill inquired if the camp were under British or American control. Stalin replied that it was under British control. 17 Churchill said that he had nothing to add to his statement on Poland. 18 Stalin inquired if his colleagues had seen the statement made by the Polish Government. 19 The President and Churchill said that they had read the Polish statement. Stalin then observed that all delegations maintained their views which meant that the question remained unsettled. The President proposed to proceed to the next question. Churchill inquired if this meant that nothing would be done. The President said that the question could be brought up again at any time while they were in session. Churchill said that they must hope that the matter would be ripe for discussion sometime before their departure. It would be very unfortunate if they parted with an important question like this unsettled, leaving the matter to be discussed in the parliaments of the world. Stalin then suggested that they comply with the request of the Polish Government. Churchill rejoined that this was totally unacceptable. Stalin asked why. Churchill said he had given a number of reasons the day before, the chief of which were: (1) that it had been agreed that boundaries should be determined at the peace settlement. (2) that it was not advantageous to Poland to take so much German territory. (3) that it would rupture the economic position of Germany and throw an undue burden on the occupying powers. (4) that they would have a grave moral responsibility for the transfer of enormous populations. The British had accepted in principle the transfer of the population from the east of the Curzon line. 20 He was bound to state, however, that he considered that to transfer a population of from 8½ to 9 million people would be wrong. (5) that the data on this subject was not agreed. The British information was that from 8 to 9 million Germans were in this area. The Soviet delegation said that they had already gone. This should be cleared up. The British did not now have any opportunity to know what the facts were but until they had some evidence to the contrary they would have to use their own estimates. Churchill said there were other reasons for opposing the proposal but he did not wish to burden the Conference with them now. Stalin said he was not undertaking to oppose Mr. Churchill’s views on all the points he had raised but there were two that were particularly important. With regard to the question of fuel, he said that Germany would have fuel in the Ruhr and the Rhineland. There was no great difficulty for Germany caused by the loss of Silesia for Germany’s main base for coal was in the west. The second important point was the question of the transfer of populations. There were neither 8 nor 6 nor 3 million Poles [ Germans ] in this area. There had been several call ups of troops in this area and many of these people had been killed. Very few Germans had remained there and those who remained had fled before the Red Army. He said that this could be checked. They can arrange for representatives of the Polish Provisional Government to come to the Conference where they could hear what they had to say. Churchill said he hesitated to support this proposal because of the views expressed by the President the other day with regard to representatives of the Yugoslav Government. 21 Stalin then proposed that they let the Council of Foreign Ministers which was being set up call in the Polish representatives and hear them. The President said he did not object. Mr. Churchill pointed out that the Council would not meet until September 1. Stalin said that all three parties would be able to collect information by that time. Churchill said that this would merely transfer the difficulty from this Conference to the Council of Foreign Ministers. They were in a better position at this meeting to decide the matter. Stalin said that under the Crimean decisions 22 they were bound to hear the Poles on the question of frontiers. Churchill inquired if the President agreed to send this whole matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The President said that doing this would not prevent further discussion at this meeting. They could not agree now and he proposed that they take up something else. Stalin said he continued to urge that they adopt the decision that the Council of Foreign Ministers should call representatives of the Polish Provisional Government to hear their point of view on the frontier question. Churchill inquired how this could be decided in that way when it was a question which had to be decided at the peace conference. The President pointed out that the Council of Foreign Ministers would not take a final decision. Their discussions would, however, be helpful. Stalin said that this was correct. Churchill said he would regret that this grave matter should be sent to a body of less importance. Stalin rejoined that they should then invite the Poles to come to this meeting. Churchill said he would prefer this because the matter was urgent. He added however that the Poles would ask for more than he could accept. Stalin pointed out that if they invited the Poles, the Poles would not be able to accuse the Big Three of not hearing them. The President said he did not see the urgency of the matter. It would be helpful to have a preliminary discussion and the matter would not finally be settled until the peace conference. Churchill said that with great respect he wished to explain the urgency of the matter. If the settlement of the question were delayed the present local situation would be consolidated. Poles would be digging themselves in and taking effective steps to make themselves the sole masters of this territory. The longer the problem waited the more difficult it would be to settle it. They should at least see where they stood. There was no use of Poles coming to London when the great powers did not even know the broad outline of where they stood. Meanwhile the whole problem of food remained unsettled and the burden of feeding fell upon them. He pointed out that the British zone had the largest concentration of people and the smallest supply of food of any other zone. He suggested that they suppose that the Council of Foreign Ministers having heard the Poles could not agree, which was a possibility, and said that in this case there would be indefinite delay. The matter could not then be settled until there was another meeting of the Heads of Government. He was anxious to meet the practical difficulties which Stalin had put forward yesterday and which had resulted from the movement of troops. He was ready to suggest a compromise solution to cover the provisional period, that is, the period between the present time and the final conclusion of peace. He had in mind a line which might be drawn east of which the territory would be occupied by the Poles as a part of Poland. West of that line they would be working as agents of the Soviet Government which would be dealing with the zone in accordance with the agreement which had been reached with regard to the zones of occupation in Germany. He had had several talks with Marshal Stalin since the Tehran meeting and they were broadly in agreement on the line of the Oder. 23 Of course the matter could not be so simply expressed. The difference between Marshal Stalin and himself was that the British did not want to go so far as the Soviets but they agreed that the Poles should have a large amount of territory. He said that when he referred to the line of the Oder he was using an expression which had been used when they had discussed the matter two years before. This was a very rough description but the British had a line which they were prepared to submit for the consideration of the Conference. To adjourn until September and then have long discussions with the Poles would leave the matter unsettled by which time winter would be upon them. He thought that they should have some agreement on principle. He would like the Council of Foreign Ministers to meet and consider the matter on something like a general understanding between the three powers. Otherwise they would be left with all of their difficulties unsolved and after several months had elapsed a solution would be virtually impossible. He repeated that the line of the Oder was an approximate line and that it would be necessary to look at a map to see the line which the British had in view. He urged that they persevere in considering this matter. He inquired what would be the situation in Berlin if this matter were referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Berlin had obtained a portion of its coal from the Silesian mines. This was an important matter for the British. What would happen if the Governments were of the same opinion in September? Stalin interrupted to say that it was Zwickau in Saxony from which Berlin drew its coal. He suggested that they let the Ruhr supply the coal, but he thought that Zwickau would be enough. He said there was good coal there and that they made briquettes out of brown coal. Churchill pointed out he had only said that a portion of the Berlin coal came from the Silesian mines. The President then read the pertinent portion of the Yalta Declaration concerning Poland’s western frontier. 24 He said that this agreement had been reached between President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. He was in complete accord with it. His point was that Poland had been assigned a zone of occupation in Germany and that there were now five occupying powers. They could agree to assigning a zone to Poland but he did not like the manner in which Poland had occupied a zone without any discussion of the matter between the three powers concerned. He appreciated the difficulties mentioned by Churchill and Stalin and he also had these difficulties in mind. The main problem was that of their occupation of Germany. That was his position yesterday, that was his position today, and that would be his position tomorrow. Stalin said that if they were not bored with the question of frontiers, he would like to make a further statement. He also proceeded on the basis of the Crimean Conference decision. The exact character of this decision was that after the Government of National Unity was formed in Poland they were bound to receive the opinion of the Polish Government on the question of Poland’s western frontiers. There were two possibilities. One was to approve the Polish proposal and in this case it would not be necessary to call in the Poles. If they did not approve the Polish proposal, they could hear the Poles and then settle the question. He thought it was expedient to settle the matter now. As they were not in agreement with the Polish Government’s proposals they should hear their representatives. The view had been expressed that it would not be worthwhile to hear the Poles now. Then, they should send the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers. He wished to remind Mr. Churchill as well as others who were at the Crimea that the view held by the President and Churchill with regard to the western frontier and with which he did not agree was that the line should begin from the estuary of the Oder and follow the Oder to where the Eastern Neisse joins the Oder. He had insisted on the line of the Western Neisse. 25 The plan proposed by President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill left the town of Stettin on the German side as well as Breslau and the region west of Breslau. (At this point Stalin walked around the table and showed the President this line on a map). The question to be settled was that of the frontier and not that of a temporary line. They could settle the matter and they could put it off, but they could not ignore it. Churchill said he agreed that they could not settle the matter without the Poles, unless, of course, they accepted the Polish proposal. Stalin said that with regard to the President’s observation that a fifth country had been brought in to occupy Germany and that he was displeased by the manner in which Poland had been brought in, he wished to state that if the President thought that anyone was to blame it was not just the Poles—circumstances and the Russians were to blame. The President remarked that he agreed and said that this was what he had been talking about. Churchill said he withdrew any objection to the Poles coming here and to their attempting to reach some kind of practical solution which could last until the matter was finally settled at the peace conference. The President said he agreed that they could come here and be heard by the Foreign Ministers. He did not wish to go into the matter. Stalin remarked that this was satisfactory. Churchill said that the Foreign Ministers should then report to the Big Three. This was agreed to. Churchill inquired as to who would issue the invitation. Stalin said that it should be issued by the Chairman. 26 This was agreed to. Trusteeship Molotov said that the Soviet proposals had been submitted in writing. 27 He said that the statement made by the Soviet Delegation arose as a result of the San Francisco Conference. The trusteeship system had been settled in principle by the Charter. 28 There was now the question of specific territories. It would not be possible to give a detailed consideration of the matter at this conference, but they could make some progress. He said that in the first place they could discuss Italy’s colonies in Africa and the Mediterranean. They had put forward two alternative proposals. These could be referred to the meeting of Foreign Ministers. Secondly, there was the question of territories under mandate from the League of Nations. Eden inquired what ones he had in mind and pointed out that there were only a few left to England and France. Molotov replied that it was a question worthy of the attention of the three Governments in accordance with the decision that had been taken at the San Francisco Conference. He said he thought they should also exchange views on the question of Korea. Churchill said he was ready to exchange views on any subject, but if they reached no agreement there would simply have been an interesting discussion. His impression was that the case of the existing mandates had been dealt with at San Francisco. The President then read Article 77 of the proposed Charter of the United Nations which deals with the question of trusteeships. He said that he took it that it was under section 2 of this Article that the Soviet Government wished to discuss this matter. He was ready to agree to refer it to the Foreign Ministers. Churchill said they had agreed to the project brought up at San Francisco and nothing more. He said that if the matter was in the hands of the World Organization he doubted if expressions of opinion around this table would be the best way to deal with it. The President said it was just as appropriate to discuss this matter as it was to discuss Poland or anything else. Churchill observed that Poland was not being dealt with by the International Organization. The President rejoined that it would be. Molotov said that his point was that the matter should be given some preliminary consideration. The final decision should be taken at the peace conference, the same as the case of Poland. Churchill said that their position had been settled secretly at Yalta 29 and publicly at San Francisco and that it was not capable of being changed. The President remarked to Churchill that the British position was amply protected by another Article of the Charter 30 and that he did not see why it could not be discussed. Molotov said that he had learned from the foreign press that Italy had lost its colonies once and for all. The question was “who had received them and where had this matter been decided.” Churchill replied by referring to the heavy losses which the British had suffered and the victories which the British army had achieved by conquering alone all of the colonies of Italy except Tunis. The President inquired “all?” Molotov pointed out that Berlin had been conquered by the Red Army. Churchill replied that when he referred to the Italian colonies he meant those of Libya, Cyrenaica, and Tripoli. They had conquered these at a time when they were under heavy attacks and were without help, at least during the early part. Stalin replied that no one denied this. Churchill continued that they were not expecting gain out of this war. They had suffered terrible losses. Their losses had not been so heavy in human life as those of their gallant Soviet allies. They came out of the war, however, a great debtor to the world. There was no possibility of their regaining naval equality with the United States. During the war they had built only one capital ship and had lost ten or twelve. In spite of the heavy losses they had suffered, they had made no territorial claims—no Koenigsberg 31 —no Baltic states—nothing. It was, therefore, having acted with complete rectitude, that they approached the question of the Italian colonies. With regard to these colonies Mr. Eden had said he regarded Italy as having lost these colonies, 32 but that meant that Italy had no claim of right to these colonies. This did not preclude the peace conference from considering that some of these colonies should not be [ should be? ] restored to Italy. He did not say he favored that proposal but it was entirely open for discussion in the Council of Foreign Ministers when they were dealing with the peace with Italy and, of course, in the final peace settlement as well. Having visited Tripoli and Cyrenaica, he had seen reclamation work done by the Italians which was of an admirable character. While they did not declare themselves in favor of restoration, neither did they say that it was precluded from discussion. At present the British held these colonies. Who wanted them. If there were claimants they should put forward their claims. The President said that the United States did not want them nor did the United States want a trusteeship over them for ourselves. We had enough poor Italians to feed. Churchill said that they had wondered if any of these colonies were suitable as a place of settlement for the Jews, but those with whom they had discussed the matter had not been interested. He said, of course, the British had great interests in the Mediterranean and that any marked alteration in the status quo in the Mediterranean would need long and careful examination. Molotov said that the Soviet proposal[s] had been submitted in writing and that they would like the Conference to consider them. Churchill said he did not see what their Soviet allies wanted. Did Stalin wish to put forward a claim to one of these Italian colonies. Stalin replied that they would like to learn whether the meeting would consider whether Italy would lose her colonies and that in such an event they could decide to what states they would be transferred for trusteeship. If it were premature to deal with the matter, they could wait. Churchill said he had not considered the possibility of the Soviet Union desiring to acquire a large tract of the African shore. If that were the case it would have to be considered in relation to many other problems. Stalin said that at San Francisco the Soviet delegation had stated that they were anxious to receive mandates for certain territories, in a communication to Secretary Stettinius. 33 Churchill said that the British did not seek territory. Stalin repeated that the question was who would receive the colonies. Churchill said they would have to decide if they should be taken, as they had a right to do, and then to decide to whom they would be assigned to under trusteeship. This question belonged to the discussion of the peace treaty. The ultimate administration belonged to the United Nations Organization. Stalin inquired if Mr. Churchill was suggesting that the present conference was not competent to settle this question. Churchill replied that it was not competent to settle the matter; that was for the peace conference. Of course, if they agreed here, that would facilitate matters. Stalin said they were proposing not to settle the matter but to consider it. Churchill rejoined that they were considering the matter now. Stalin inquired then why he objected to the Soviet proposal to have it discussed. Churchill said he was not objecting, that if Stalin could say what he wanted, he, Churchill, would address himself to the question. Stalin said the matter did not lie with him. The question was set forth in the Soviet paper. The President pointed out that the Soviet proposal was for the Foreign Ministers to discuss the matter and he had no objection on his part. Churchill said he also had no objection but pointed out that they were throwing much work on the Foreign Ministers. He said there were many more urgent matters to discuss here. They had decided that the question of the Italian peace terms were [ was ] to have priority at the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He was against burdening the present meeting of the Foreign Ministers but the matter could be put on their agenda for consideration after they had disposed of more urgent business. Stalin proposed that the matter be referred to the Foreign Ministers. Churchill added the reservation “provided it does not delay more urgent business.” Stalin said that such a reservation was not acceptable. Churchill said that if they insisted he would give way. It was agreed that the matter be referred to the meeting of Foreign Ministers. Turkey Churchill said this was not the first time he had discussed this matter with Marshal Stalin. 34 It became important because of the admitted need to modify the Montreux Convention. 35 He had agreed with the Marshal in these discussions that insofar as the British Government was concerned they favored revision. Revision could only be made by agreement with the signatories with the exception, of course, of Japan. He had also frequently expressed his readiness to welcome an arrangement for the free movement of Russian ships, naval or merchant, through the Black Sea and back. He, therefore, opened the discussion on the basis of a friendly agreement. At the same time he wished to impress on Marshal Stalin the importance of not alarming Turkey. Undoubtedly Turkey was very much alarmed by a strong concentration of Bulgarian and Soviet troops in Bulgaria; 36 by continuous attacks in the Soviet press and radio; and, of course, by the turn which the conversations between the Turkish Ambassador 37 and Mr. Molotov had taken in which modifications of Turkey’s eastern frontier were mentioned, as well as a Soviet base in the Straits. 38 This led Turkey to fear for the integrity of her empire and her power to defend Constantinople. He understood, however, that these were not demands on Turkey by the Soviet Government but that the Turks had asked for an alliance and then Molotov had stated the conditions for such an alliance. He quite saw that if Turkey asked for an offensive and defensive alliance, this would be the occasion when the Soviets would say what improvement they wanted in the Turkish situation. However, the Turks were alarmed by the mention of these conditions. He did not know what had happened beyond these conversations. What he should like to know was the present Russian position on the subject. Molotov said that he would circulate a letter to the President and Churchill giving the point of view of the Soviet Government on this question. 39 He would like to explain the origin of the matter. The Turkish Government had taken the initiative through the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow and had proposed an alliance. This question had been brought up before their Ambassador in Ankara 40 and again in Moscow at the end of May by the Turkish Ambassador. Early in June he had had two conversations with the Turkish Ambassador. In reply to the Turkish proposals he had stated that the Soviet Government had no objection to a treaty of alliance subject to certain conditions. He pointed out the fact that in doing so they should settle their mutual claims. On the Soviet side there were two. The conclusion of a treaty of alliance meant that they undertook each to defend the frontiers of both states. He had pointed out that there were several sections of their frontiers which they considered unjust. In 1921 a portion of their territory had been torn from Soviet Armenia and Soviet Georgia. 41 ’ He pointed out that he was bound to settle this question before the conclusion of a treaty of alliance. The second question was that of the Black Sea Straits. The Soviet Union had repeatedly let their allies know that they could not regard the Montreux Convention as a correct arrangement and that they were not satisfied with it. The rights of the Soviet Union under this Convention were equal to those of the Japanese Emperor. It seemed to them that this did not correspond to the present situation. On behalf of the Soviet Government he had presented certain proposals which had been set forth in the Soviet paper which he was now circulating. 42 At the same time, he had pointed out to the Turks that if both of these issues were settled the Russians were ready to conclude an alliance. He had also informed the Turks that the Soviet Union was prepared to settle any questions which the Turks raised on their side. He had added that if the Turkish Government were not prepared to settle these two questions the Soviet Government was prepared to make an agreement on the Straits alone between the Black Sea Powers. Churchill said that this was an important document which went far beyond the conversations between Eden and himself and Stalin and Molotov. 43 Molotov said that the treaty of alliance with Turkey had not been under consideration at that time. Churchill inquired whether the words “proper regular procedure” in paragraph one of the Soviet paper meant that all signatories except Japan would be consulted. He repeated [that] different questions were raised in this paper, when a Russian base in the Straits was asked for; also by the proposal that no one had anything to do with the Bosporus and the Dardanelles except Russia and Turkey. He was certain that Turkey would never agree to this proposal that was being made. Molotov said that similar treaties had existed in the past between Russia and Turkey. Churchill asked if he meant the question of a Russian base in the Black Sea Straits. Molotov replied that he meant treaties which provided for the settlement of the Straits question only by Turkey and Russia. He referred to the treaties of 1805 and 1833. 44 Churchill said he would have to ask his staff to look up these ancient treaties and added that he had only pointed out the difference between these proposals and those which had earlier been discussed. He said that the British were not prepared to push Turkey to accept these proposals. Stalin said that they had not discussed the proposals before but had only had conversations. Molotov said that they had proposed to submit the matter to the June meeting of the Foreign Ministers which had not taken place. 45 Churchill said that he stood by his conversations with Stalin in which he, Churchill, expressed the willingness to press for the revision of the Montreux Convention side by side with Stalin. That agreement still stood, but he felt quite free with regard to these new proposals. Stalin said: “Yes,” he was free. The President said he was not ready to express an opinion and suggested that they defer consideration of the question. This was agreed to. The President said that they were sending a telegram to the Polish Government 46 and as the matter was sure to leak out he suggested that they prepare a communiqué. 47 Churchill inquired whether it would mention the purpose of the visit. Stalin said it would be better not to mention the purpose of the visit, but it made no difference to him whether they issued a communiqué or not. Stalin thought it better not to release the whole text of the invitation. The President said he agreed. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation would send in its proposal with regard to Koenigsberg in writing. 48 Treatment of Soviet Prisoners in a British Camp in Italy 49 Molotov said that the camp referred to was camp no. 5 which was located near Rimini. He said that this camp, which was under British authorities, contained Ukrainians. The first statement they had received from the British stated that there were about 150 prisoners in this camp. When their representatives came to see the camp they found that there were 10,000. Churchill inquired from whom they had obtained these figures and on what date. Molotov said he would give particulars. Churchill said that the British did not make false statements. Molotov said that he understood that the British had formed a whole division of twelve regiments of these Ukrainians with officers selected from those who had been in the ranks of the German army. When their representatives had visited this camp they had found that 665 persons stated their willingness to return to their native country. Churchill said they welcomed inspection by the Russians of all of their camps. Perhaps some of these persons were Poles. In any event, he would have an investigation made and obtain a report. 50 Molotov replied that there were only Ukrainians in the camp. He added that they had received a telegram from General Golikov, who was in charge of the repatriation of Soviet prisoners, only today. Meeting adjourned. 51 2 See ante , p. 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] . 3 Cf. ante , pp. 240–243 [ Pgs. 240–243 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] . 4 Document No. 748 , post . For the text of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, see document No. 1417 , post , section v . 5 See document No. 796 , post . 6 Such a memorandum was apparently never circulated. 7 Documents Nos. 863 and 902 , post . 8 Document No. 837 , post . 9 Document No. 1020 , post . 10 Document No. 1330 , post . 11 Document No. 1161 , post . 12 Document No. 870 , post . 13 Document No. 1356 , post . 14 See document No. 1341 , post . 15 For the substance of the Soviet note of June 1, 1945, to the United States, see vol. i , document No. 636 . 16 See ante , pp. 207–215 [ Pgs. 207–215 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] . 17 For a continuation of discussion on this subject, see post , p. 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 18 See ante , pp. 210–213 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . 19 Document No. 1146 , post . 20 See the map facing p. 748 in vol. i . For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , pp. 793 – 794 . 21 See ante , p. 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 22 See document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 23 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 203 ; Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, eds., Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946: The Realignment of Europe (London, 1955), pp. 184, 186; Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland (New York, 1958), pp. 275, 277, 287. Concerning the various lines for the western frontier of Poland mentioned in this discussion, see the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , post . 24 See document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 25 Concerning the discussion of the western frontier of Poland at the Yalta Conference, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 669 , 716 – 718 , 777 , 898 – 899 , 905 – 906 . 26 See document No. 1147 , post . Leahy states ( I Was There , p. 408) that he thinks it was during the discussion of Poland at this meeting that Churchill mentioned the rights of Catholics in Poland and Stalin replied, “How many divisions has the Pope?” This same remark, however, had been attributed to Stalin in connection with the Tehran Conference. See Time , December 27, 1943, p. 46. Bohlen, in an interview with Department of State historians on April 18, 1956, stated that he had heard this anecdote long before World War II and that, at least so far as plenary meetings of the wartime conferences were concerned, it was apocryphal. 27 Document No. 733 , post . 28 i. e., the Charter of the United Nations (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031). 29 See document No. 1416 , post , section i . 30 The reference is presumably to article 79. 31 Cf. document No. 1020 , post . 32 Concerning Eden’s statements on this subject in the House of Commons, see ante , p. 239, footnote 2 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] ] . 33 See document No. 734 , post , enclosure 1. 34 See footnote 43, post . 35 Regarding the regime of the Turkish Straits, signed at Montreux, July 20, 1936 (League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 213). Text of the substantive provisions also in Harry N. Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947; Department of State publication No. 2752), p. 25. 36 See documents Nos. 457 , 459 , 685 , 686 , 691 , 693 , 699 , and 700, printed in vol. i , and document No. 1072 , post . 37 Selim Sarper. 38 See vol. i , document No. 684 . 39 The reference is apparently to document No. 1369 , post . 40 Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov. 41 See vol. i , document No. 683 . 42 Document No. 1369 , post . 43 The conversations referred to took place at Moscow in October 1944. See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 328 ; Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , p. 242. 44 Texts of the pertinent passages of the treaties referred to (the Treaty of September 23, 1805, and the Treaty of Unkiar Eskelessi of July 8, 1833), together with the texts of other treaties relating to the Straits in the period from 1774 to 1936, are printed in Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits , pp. 14 ff. 45 i. e., the meeting agreed upon at the Yalta Conference. See document No. 1417 , post , section viii . 46 Cf. ante , p. 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . For the text of the message referred to, which was transmitted to Warsaw by way of the American and Polish Embassies at Moscow, see document No. 1147 , post . 47 No communiqué announcing the issuance of an invitation to a Polish Delegation to come to Potsdam has been found. The Cohen notes ( post , p. 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] ) indicate that the idea of issuing a communiqué was dropped. 48 Document No. 1020 , post . 49 Cf. ante , p. 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . See also document No. 1164 , post . 50 See document No. 1165 , post . 51 At 7:50 p.m. See Log, ante , p. 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Stimson’s diary entry for July 23 contains the following information relating to this meeting: “At ten-fifteen Ambassador Harriman arrived and he and McCloy, Bundy, and I had a talk over the situation, Harriman giving us the information of yesterday afternoon’s meetings. He commented on the increasing cheerfulness evidently caused by the news from us [cf. ante , p. 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] ], and confirmed the expanding demands being made by the Russians. They are throwing aside all their previous restraint as to being only a Continental power and not interested in any further acquisitions, and are now apparently seeking to branch in all directions. Thus they have not only been vigorously seeking to extend their influence in Poland, Austria, Rumania, and Bulgaria, but they are seeking bases in Turkey and now are putting in demands for the Italian colonies in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. He told us that Stalin had brought up yesterday the question of Korea again and was urging an immediate trusteeship. The British and the French are refusing to consider a trusteeship on Hong Kong and Indo-China, and I foresee that if that is continued the Russians will probably drop their proposal for trusteeship of Korea and ask for solitary control of it. “At eleven o’clock I went down to the ‘Little White House’ to try to see the President or Byrnes.… When I got there I found Byrnes out, and I asked for the President who saw me at once.… I then told him of matters that came up in the conference with Mr. Harriman this morning which I just referred to, … We had a brief discussion about Stalin’s recent expansions and he confirmed what I have heard. But he told me that the United States was standing firm and he was apparently relying greatly upon the information as to S–1. He evidently thinks a good deal of the new claims of the Russians are bluff, and told me what he thought the real claims were confined to.” Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 22, 1945, 5 p.m. Stalin : The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the north Soviet zones in Vienna has begun, and should be completed in a few days. Churchill : The British government is pleased to learn of this prompt action. Truman : So is the American government. Eden : (reads the report of the Foreign Secretaries). 1 The paper of the American delegation on the southeastern European satellite countries 2 was presented to the Foreign Secretaries. The British agreed with the paper, but the Soviets were unable to agree with the provisions for the reorganization of the government and the election. The matter of the press and the control exercised by the control commissions were referred to the subcommittee for discussions. The Soviet delegation agreed to submit a memorandum on the improvement of the control commission in Italy. The Secretaries considered the economic committee’s report on German economic problems. The United States asked postponement of disputed issues for subsequent meeting. Foreign Secretaries agreed to discuss only principles agreed to by the subcommittee. These agreed principles were accepted, except for the wording of paragraph 13. The discussions on paragraph 18 and annex to paragraph 16 were also reserved. The Foreign Secretaries also discussed the removal of Allied industrial equipment in Kumania, on the ground that it was booty, but no conclusions were reached. The agenda for the Big Three Meeting was submitted. It included the western frontier of Poland, trusteeships, the straits, the western frontier of the Soviet Union, and Iran. It was suggested that certain problems be referred by the Big Three to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion, to save the time of the Big Three. These problems included cooperation on European economic problems, Tangier, and the problem of Syria and the Lebanon. Stalin : I agree that we should submit these problems to the Foreign Secretaries without further discussion here. Churchill : Syria and Lebanon affect us specially. We want to withdraw from there as soon as possible, but our immediate withdrawal would mean the massacre of the French. I should like to hear more on this here. Possibly we can discuss it here. Stalin : The government of Syria has asked the Soviet [Government] to intervene. We should like some information on this matter. This might be discussed by the Foreign Secretaries. We do not propose the removal of troops from any country. Truman : I suggest that this matter be deferred until tomorrow and that the other questions go to the Foreign Secretaries. (This was agreed). Truman : We now may discuss the western frontier of Poland. I have already stated my views. Molotov : (First brought up the question of certain Soviet war prisoners held in Italy. He gave notice that he would like to say a few words on this subject at the close of the meeting.) Stalin : Have you seen the statement by the Polish government on the frontiers? Churchill and Truman both indicated that they had. Stalin : That means all the delegations maintain their existing views, and the question remains in suspense. Truman : Next subject is trusteeships. Churchill : We must hope that the Polish question will become ripe for discussion before we leave. It would be unfortunate to have all these problems discussed in Parliament. Stalin : Let us accept the Polish proposal. Churchill : I am sorry we cannot. The matter, of course, is for the peace table, but the Polish problem is not advantageous for Poland. It destroys Germany’s economic integrity, and puts an undue burden on the occupying powers. I have grave moral scruples regarding great movements and transfers of populations. Nine million people are involved. True, there is no agreement on the population data. The Soviets say only a few million are left. We should clear up the facts. I could give other reasons, but I won’t burden you now. Stalin : I have undertaken [ shall not undertake? ] 3 to oppose Mr. Churchill’s views on all these points, but I will deal here only with two. One, Germany will have resources in the Ruhr and the Rhineland, so there is no great difficulty if Silesian coal basin is taken from Germany. Two, the movement of population does not present the difficulties Mr. Churchill anticipates. There are neither eight nor six nor three million Germans in this area. There have been several call-ups of troops in this area. Few Germans remain. Our data can be checked. Could we not arrange for representatives of the Polish government to come here and be heard? Churchill : I should hesitate to support that, in view of the strong views of the President regarding hearing the Yugoslavs. Stalin : Let the Foreign Ministers in London call them and hear them. Truman : That is satisfactory. Stalin : The Polish government must be heard in answer to the Crimea decision. I continue to urge the meeting to adopt the decision that the Foreign Ministers in London should hear the Polish government on the western frontier. Churchill : How can the frontier be discussed that way? I regret that this grave matter should be adjourned to a lesser body. Stalin : We must not be accused of settling the frontier without hearing the Poles. Truman : I cannot see the urgency. The question can be settled only by the peace conference. Churchill : There is urgency, Mr. President. The local situation will be unremedied. The Poles who have been assigned this large area will have digged [ sic ] themselves in. This process will continue and it will be more difficult to settle or to revise as time passes. So I still hope that some arrangement will be made here. The situation will not be improved by hearing the Poles when the great Allies are not agreed on principles. The burden falls on us, the British in particular. Our zone has the smallest supply of food and the greatest density of population. Suppose the Foreign Ministers, having heard the Poles, cannot agree. Then there will be indefinite delay, at least until another meeting of the heads of government. I am anxious to meet practical problems due to the march of events which the Marshal referred to. We should be prepared to consider a compromise solution to cover the period between now and the peace settlement. We would be ready to suggest a provisional line. The Poles west of that line would be working for the Soviet occupying authority. I think Marshal Stalin and I agree up to this point, that the new Poland should advance to the Oder. But the difficulty between the Marshal and me is that I do not go quite as far as the Marshal. Is there no use for us to look at anything like this suggested compromise, Mr. President? We should not despair of solutions. We should seek a halfway house. Delay now might make it impossible to alter the consolidated position of the Poles later. Berlin draws its coal from the Silesian mines, which have long been worked by Polish miners. What is to happen to Berlin’s coal during the winter? Stalin : Berlin draws her coal from Saxony. Let the Ruhr give her coal. There are different opportunities for supplying Berlin with coal. Truman : May I re-state my view point. The eastern frontier should follow the Curzon line, with slight digression in favor of Poland. The Allies recognize that Poland must receive substantial compensation in the north and west. They believe the new Polish government should be heard, and the final settlement await the peace conference. That was the agreement of Mr. Roosevelt with the Big Three at Crimea. I am in complete accord with it; but Poland has in fact been assigned a zone of occupation contrary to our agreement. We can agree, if we wish to give the Poles an occupying zone, but I don’t like the way the Poles have taken or been given their zone. Stalin : I also proceed on the decision of the Crimea Conference cited by the President. After the Government of National Unity has been formed, we are bound to seek its opinion. The Polish government have communicated their views. We have two alternatives: one, to approve the Polish proposal; or, two, to hear the Poles and settle the question. I think it expedient to settle the question now. As we are not in agreement with the Polish government, the Poles should be summoned here. But the view was expressed by the President that the Poles cannot be heard here, so we must remit the question to the Foreign Ministers. At Crimea, the President and Mr. Churchill suggested the line should be along the Oder until it joined the Neisse. I insisted on the western Neisse. Under Churchill’s plan, Stettin and Breslau would remain German. The question to be settled is the frontier, and not a temporary line. We can either settle the question or ignore it. Churchill : Or decide it without the Poles. Stalin : If we disagree with the Poles we cannot decide it without them. It has been said that a fifth country has been brought into occupied Germany, and in a manner contrary to our agreement. If anyone is to blame, circumstances as well as the Russians are to blame. Churchill : I withdraw my objection to the Poles coming here and trying to work out arrangements pending the peace conference. Truman : I have no objection to the Poles coming here, and for the Foreign Secretaries to hear them. Stalin : The Chairman should invite them. Truman : The matter of trusteeships is now before us. We will hear the Soviet delegation. Stalin : Mr. Molotov is our expert. Molotov : The proposals of the Soviets are submitted in writing. The principal question has been settled by the San Francisco Charter. We have before us specific questions regarding the assignments of territorial trusteeships. It is not possible for us to give detailed answers to these questions, but some progress can be made. First, we can discuss Italian possessions in Africa. We can proceed in one of two ways. We suggest that the matter go to the Foreign Secretaries, or we could consider the questions here tomorrow. There is also the question of the mandated territories. Eden : Do you want our mandates? Stalin : There are other mandates. The question deserves the attention of the Big Three. One point more, we could exchange views on Korea. Churchill : We can exchange views on any subject, but at the end we have had only an interesting discussion. The existing mandates were dealt with at San Francisco. ( Truman reads Articles 77 to 79 of the Charter. He points out that mandated territory cannot be [placed under?] trusteeship without the consent of the mandatory power. He assumes that it is the territory detached from the present enemy powers that the Soviets wish to discuss, and indicates that he is willing to have the matter referred to the Foreign Secretaries.) Churchill : We have agreed to the San Francisco draft, nothing more. As this matter is in the hands of the world organization, I doubt that this is a matter to be discussed around this table. Teuman : Article 79 gives you complete protection on your mandated territory. Stalin : Eden said Italy lost her colonies. Who gets them? Churchill : The British alone conquered the Italian armies. Truman : Alone? Stalin : But Berlin was taken by the Red Army. Churchill : I meant the Italian colonies, Mr. President, were taken by us. Stalin : No one denies. It is to the honor and glory of Britain. Churchill : We do not seek territorial aggrandizement. We have suffered grievous losses, though not so great in human life as has Russia. We come out of the war a great debtor. We have no possibility of regaining naval equality with the United States. Yet, in spite of all these losses, we have made no territorial claims. We have no Koenigsberg, nor Baltic States. We claim nothing. Having acted with rectitude and complete disinterestedness, we approach the question of the Italian colonies with good conscience. Mr. Eden made the statement in Parliament that Italy had lost her colonies. That meant she had no claim to them as a matter of right. That does not preclude the return of certain colonies to her, if the peace conference so decides. I do not say I favor the return of the colonies, but so far as we are concerned, it is a question open for discussion. I have seen the excellent reclamation work done by the Italians in Libya and Cyrenaica. At present we hold these colonies. Who wants them? Truman : We do not want them. We do not want a trusteeship for them. We have enough “poor Italians” to feed in the United States [ in Italy? ]. 4 Churchill : We considered them for Jewish settlement, but the Jews are not attracted to them. Of course, we have great interest in the Mediterranean. Stalin : Our proposals are submitted in writing, and we would like the conference to consider them. Churchill : Does the Marshal wish to put forward a claim to these colonies, or to a trusteeship for them? Stalin : Do we consider it necessary for Italy to lose these colonies? If so, to what states do we propose to entrust the trusteeships? If it is premature to deal with this question, we can wait, but we will have to deal with it sooner or later. Churchill : I am frank to say I have not considered the possibility of Russia claiming territory in the Mediterranean. Stalin : The Soviet delegation stated at San Francisco that we were anxious to receive mandates for certain territories. Truman : I have a copy of the statement that Mr. Molotov gave Mr. Stettinius. Churchill : We have the right to take the colonies from Italy, but to whom shall we give them? That belongs to the discussion of the peace treaty. The administration of trusteeships is for the world organization. Stalin : Is it your position that the present conference is qualified to settle the question? Churchill : Of course, if we three agree, it facilitates settlement. Stalin : Of course the conference is qualified to consider. Churchill : I make no objection. I am prepared to hear the Marshal’s views. Stalin : The question has been submitted in writing. Truman : Let the Foreign Secretaries consider it. Churchill : I have no objection, but we are over-burdening the Foreign Secretaries. There are more urgent problems. We are agreed that the Italian treaty should have priority when the council of Foreign Ministers meets in September. Stalin : Let us submit the question to the Ministers. Churchill : Yes, if they have time after considering more urgent questions. Stalin : There should be no reservation. Truman : Let us turn to the British paper regarding Turkey. Churchill : This comes up because of the need to modify the Montreux Conference [ Convention ]. At Yalta, I told the Marshal we would favor the revision of the Convention, but that can be done only with the consent of the signatories, except Japan, with whom we are at war. I have also expressed our readiness to welcome the free movement of Russian ships, whether war or merchant ships, in or out of the Black Sea in time of peace or war. So we start on a friendly basis. Still, I wish to impress on the Marshal the importance of not alarming Turkey. Undoubtedly Turkey is much alarmed, because of the concentration of Russian and Bulgarian troops on her borders, by the attacks on her by the Russian radio, and the course of the conversation between the Turkish Ambassador and Mr. Molotov, at which a modification of the Turkish eastern frontiers was mentioned. Also, a base in the Straits. This led Turkey to fear for the integrity of her empire, and the power to defend Constantinople. I understand that these were not demands made on the Turkish government, but were stated as conditions of alliance proposed by the Turks. I can see that in the consideration of such alliance, the Russians would state what improvements they desired in the Turkish situation. But the Turks were under alarm. What I should like to know is, what is the present Russian position on this subject? Molotov : I have now circulated the views of the Soviet government as set forth in writing. I should like to explain the origin of the question. This was brought up by the Turkish government with our Ambassador, and later by the Turkish Ambassador with me. Early in June I had two conversations with the Turkish Ambassador. In reply to the Turkish proposal for an alliance, I stated Russia had no objection, subject to certain conditions. We should first settle mutual claims. I mentioned two questions on our side. The treaty of alliance means we jointly undertake to defend the frontiers of two states. I pointed out that we could not undertake to defend certain sections of the frontier which we considered unjust. In 1921 part of this territory was torn from the Soviet Union—part of Armenia and part of Soviet Georgia. I pointed out that these territories should be restored. We should also have an alteration of our rights in the Straits. And a base. On behalf of the Soviets, I have put forward our claims in the paper circulated. I pointed out to the Turks that if they were prepared to settle the two questions, we were prepared to make an alliance and settle any questions they wished to have settled. If the Turkish government was not prepared, the Soviets were prepared to make an agreement regarding the Straits only. Churchill : May we have a moment to read your statement? Molotov : Yes. Churchill : This is a very important document. It goes far beyond any of our discussions. I presume “regular procedure” in paragraph one means consultation with all signatories but Japan. Quite a different question is raised when Russia asks for a military base and asks that no powers be permitted to participate in control of the Straits but Russia and Turkey. I am quite certain Turkey will never agree to this. Stalin : Similar treaties existed between Turkey and Russia at other times. Churchill : What times do you refer to? Stalin : In 1805 and 1833. Churchill : These suggestions are wholly different from our previous talks. I stand by my talk with the Marshal when I promised to support revision of the Montreux Convention, but I feel quite free as to these new proposals. Stalin : You are quite free. Churchill : I thank you. Molotov : May we submit our proposals on Koenigsberg to the President and the Prime Minister? Truman : Certainly, and the invitation to the Poles to appear before the Foreign Secretaries has gone out. Should we discuss the communiqué before it leaks out? Stalin : Yes. Churchill : It is breaking the principle we have followed. Stalin : It is agreeable to me one way or the other. Truman : We will drop it. 1 Ante , pp. 244–246 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 2 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra . 3 Cf. the Thompson minutes, ante , p. 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 4 Cf. the Thompson minutes, ante , p. 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . First meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening First meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening Present United States United Kingdom 2 Soviet Union Mr. Cannon 1 Mr. Gromyko Mr. Golunsky 2 Hayter was named as the British member of this subcommittee (see ante , p. 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] ), but the name of the British representative attending the meeting is not given in the Cannon summary. 1 Russell was also named as a member of this subcommittee (see ante , p. 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] ), but it is not known whether he attended. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)]] The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Potsdam, July 22, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2245 The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2245 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal ( Cannon ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 3 Potsdam , July 22, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Dunn The subcommittee to consider sections 2 and 3 of the document “Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe” 4 met this evening (July 22). Ambassador Gromyko and Mr. Golunko represented the Soviet Government. They said that they were not prepared to discuss point 3 because, as Mr. Molotov had agreed, a Soviet paper concerning the recent changes in procedure for the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary 5 will be circulated tomorrow morning, but it was not yet ready this evening, and it of course must be taken into account in considering this subject. It was accordingly agreed that we would work on point 2 but submit no report to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers until we had also considered point 3 in subcommittee. On point 2 the Soviet Delegation presented a revision reading as follows: “The three Governments agree that in view of the cessation of hostilities in Europe measures can now be adopted to facilitate the entry of representatives of the world press and radio into liberated or former Axis satellite states, and their freedom of movement, and the dispatch of their reports without political censorship or other restrictions than those which result from the security requirements of the occupying forces in those countries which are under the regime of occupation.” In the discussion which followed they receded even from this text and when the meeting closed they left as points of difference the use of the word “entry”, and the specification of “political censorship”. In other words, they hoped not to specify in the text that there were difficulties about entry, on the argument that the other facilities would imply admission, and they wished not to “dot the i’s” of political censorship. They agreed that we would report to our several Ministers that these words need to be worked over in our next session. They also objected to the last four lines on the first page of our text as mimeographed, 6 to which ad referendum I tentatively agreed, as did the British representative, since this part of the text is not of great substance. Far more important and the matter which will probably need to be discussed around the Foreign Ministers table is the final provision of Article 2 (see top of page 2 in our text), which applies to domestic freedom of the press in the several countries. They advanced various specious arguments about interference with the sovereignty of other states, and about the authority of the Control Commissions in the satellites, proposing that anything along this line should be handled by a directive to the Control Commissions. I said that this was a provision to which the American Government attaches great importance, and while for administrative reasons it would probably be necessary in any case to send a directive to the ACC’s, it would also be necessary to make some reference to freedom of the press in whatever might publicly be said at the conclusion of the Conference, if the matter is taken up at all. I drew their attention particularly to the phrase “the three Governments express their desire to see removed”, as largely answering the arguments which they had presented. They asseverated that they had not discussed this question with their top people and the best we could get out of them was an agreement that each of us should report on the details of this meeting to our respective Ministers and receive instructions for the next meeting, which will probably be held after the morning session tomorrow. 3 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. 4 Document No. 748 , post . For the text of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, see document No. 1417 , post , section v . 5 No single Soviet paper dealing with changes in procedure in all three countries has been found. Cf. document No. 309, printed in vol. i , and documents Nos. 796 and 797 , post . 6 The reference is presumably to the last three and one-half lines on the page, viz., “thus providing to world public opinion the basis for an enlightened interest in the welfare and progress of these peoples and a knowledge of the conditions in which they seek to re-establish their ties with other peoples”. Monday, July 23, 1945 Monday, July 23, 1945 Contents Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)]) Mosely-Gusev conversation, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)]) Seventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:15 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)]) Leahy-Churchill conversation, morning (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Truman and Churchill, 11:30 a.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)]) Tripartite military meeting, 2:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)]) Byrnes–Eden–Molotov luncheon meeting; Byrnes–Molotov meeting immediately thereafter, 3:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)]) Truman–Bierut conversation, 4:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)]) Eighth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)]) Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 5:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)]) Morse–Weston conversation, afternoon (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)]) Truman–Stalin conversation, 7:30 p.m. (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)]) Byrnes conversation with members of the Polish Delegation (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)]) Morse–Weston conversation, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)]) Second meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)]) Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9:30 a.m. Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9:30 a.m. 1 1 J. C. S. 201st Meeting. Present Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill General Somervell Captain Stroop Lieutenant General Hull. Captain Oster Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Donnelly Major General Gross Colonel Stone Major General Norstad Colonel Cary Brigadier General Cabell Colonel Cary Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)]] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 9:30 a.m. J. C. S. Files Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 9:30 a.m. [Extracts] top secret . . . . . . . 4. Command in Indo-China (C. C. S. 890/3 2 ) Admiral King read a memorandum 3 relating to the approach by the United States and British Governments to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in regard to the reallocation of the southern part of Indo-China to the Southeast Asia area. General Marshall proposed the amendment of the statement in paragraph 3 of C. C. S. 890/3 which the British had recommended for inclusion in the final report to the President and the Prime Minister. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the amendment to paragraph 3 of C. C. S. 890/3 proposed by General Marshall and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 4 7. Provision of Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of Allied Governments (C. C. S. 897 5 ) The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendation of the Combined Military Transportation Committee in paragraph 5 b of C. C. S. 897 subject to the amendment of Enclosure “A” as follows: a . Substitute in paragraph 3 c “when satisfactory arrangements in regard to the movement of civilians cannot be” in lieu of “as regards the movement of civilians for which provision is not”. b . In paragraph 5 delete the words “statement of”. 8. Report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 900 6 ) The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered C. C. S. 900 and amended it in several particulars. Admiral King stated that he considered that the United States Chiefs of Staff should insist on the inclusion under Section III of the numbered paragraphs now omitted from the final report to the President and Prime Minister, since the report should be complete and since the substitutes for these paragraphs dealing with rehabilitation did not come under the purview of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff :— a . Agreed to recommend approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the final report to the President and Prime Minister in the Enclosure to C. C. S. 900 as amended during the discussion. 7 b . Agreed to recommend the inclusion under Section III of C. C. S. 900 of appropriate paragraphs as set forth by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the Enclosure to C. C. S. 877/5. 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. Policy in Regard to Lend-Lease Assignments General Marshall asked Admiral Leahy if he had discussed with the President the question of Lend-Lease assignments to the United Nations. Admiral Leahy said that he had discussed the question with the President and was trying to get him to change the basic directive on Lend-Lease to permit General Eisenhower to continue his present course of action. He believed that the President would approve the delivery of maintenance supplies to occupational forces in Europe but that he would not approve the delivery of arms and ammunition. General Somervell said that he had proposed three policies which might be approved by the President, as follows: (1) The support of that portion of the forces of such nations as in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be profitably employed against Japan in furtherance of our agreed strategy or for such other purposes connected with the war against Japan as may be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2) Supply of maintenance items for United States equipment now in possession of Allied Armies of occupation. (3) Such exceptional military programs as the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. General Somervell said that if the President would approve these three policies as a substitute for the policy he had announced on 5 July 1945, 9 the Chief of Staff of the Army could then issue specific directives for assignment of Lend-Lease to the countries concerned which would accord with the three policies established by the President. He said we are receiving demands from the British for maintenance supplies and that some means of providing them is necessary. He felt that some decision must be reached promptly in regard to the delivery of maintenance supplies in order that the production problem might be controlled. Admiral Leahy said that he recognized that this problem must be settled and that perhaps some basis for barter with the British might be found. Possibly the supply of United States material against reimbursement as provided for in Section 3 c of the Lend-Lease Act 10 would be the solution. 2 Document No. 1271 , post . 3 Not printed. 4 At their 199th Meeting, July 23; see post , p. 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] . For the amended paragraph included in the report to the President and the Prime Minister, see document No. 1381 , post , paragraph 14. 5 Document No. 1192 , post . 6 Not printed. 7 The draft report was further amended in the course of the 199th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, July 23. See post , p. 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] . The draft report, as thus further amended, was circulated on July 23 as the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2. It is identical with the text of the report as approved on July 24 ( document No. 1381 , post ) except as noted in the footnotes to that document and except that minor variations of punctuation, capitalization, and abbreviation have not been annotated. 8 Document No. 1264 , post . 9 See vol. i , document No. 542 . 10 55 Stat. 31. Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 10:30 a.m. Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 10:30 a.m. Present United States Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Bohlen Mr. Pavlov [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)]] Bohlen Minutes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 9:30 a.m. Truman Papers Bohlen Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] Bohlen Minutes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 9:30 a.m. top secret The Secretary said he had asked to see Mr. Molotov because he was deeply concerned at the development of the question of reparation from Germany. He said that as Mr. Molotov knew the United States Government had always favored and still favored the adoption of a friendly overall policy for the Three Powers which would treat Germany as an economic whole. He said, however, after listening to the discussions here and hearing the report of the Reparations Committee 1 he did not see how certain of the positions taken by the Soviet Government could be reconciled by [ with? ] the adoption of an overall reparation plan. For example, the question of the transfer now to Polish administration of a large part of 1937 Germany would expose the British and Americans in their zones to serious dangers in connection with an overall reparation plan. Another factor which worked against the overall plan was the definition put in by Mr. Maisky of “war bounty [ booty? ]”. 2 The Secretary said he wished to make it very plain that the United States did not intend to pay out money to finance imports to Germany and thus repeat the experience after the last war when in fact United States funds had been used to pay reparations to others. Mr. Molotov said he fully understood that point of view and he wished to say that Mr. Maisky had not fully made clear the position of the Soviet Government on the definition of “war bounty [ booty? ].” The Secretary continued that he was also very much afraid that the attempt to resolve these conditions in practice would lead to endless quarrels and disagreements between the three countries at a time when unity between them was essential. Mr. Molotov said he thought that these difficulties could be reconciled here at the Conference and that he intended to put forward at the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers concrete proposals 3 which he hoped would be carefully studied by the British and American Delegations. The Secretary said that under the circumstances he wondered whether it would not be better to give consideration to the possibility of each country taking reparations from its own zone. For example, according to their estimates, about 50% of the existing wealth of Germany was in the Soviet zone 4 and that, therefore, the Soviet Union could receive its share of reparations from its own zone. He added that if they wished to obtain certain equipment or materials from the British or American zones they could do so in exchange for food or coal needed to feed and warm the German population in the west. He added that Marshal Stalin had indicated some such proposal when he had said yesterday that if the British wished to obtain coal from Silesia they could do so by exchanging other goods with the Poles. 5 He added that his suggestion for zonal as against overall treatment applied only to reparations but that in other matters, such as currency, transport, etc. Germany would be treated as an economic whole. Mr. Molotov said he knew that the Marshal strongly favored an overall plan for reparations and he said that they would be quite prepared to consider reducing their reparation claims. As it was then time for the meeting, it was agreed that if agreeable with Mr. Eden the three Foreign Secretaries would meet informally this afternoon in order to discuss the matter further. In conclusion, The Secretary repeated that the United States could not agree to anything which would require them to finance the feeding of Germans in their zone so that the latter could work on behalf of reparations for other countries. 1 See document No. 902 , post . 2 See document No. 904 , post . 3 See post , p. 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . 4 See document No. 930 , post , attachment 1. 5 The statement referred to has not been identified in the minutes. Cf. ante , pp. 212–213 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . Byrnes–Eden conversation Byrnes–Eden conversation Present United States United Kingdom Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] Editor’s Note —At an informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers held at 4 p.m. on July 23, Byrnes stated that he had expressed the views of the United States on the subject of reparations from Germany to Molotov at their meeting on the morning of July 23 and that he had subsequently informed Eden of this talk (see post , page 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] ). No other record of this Byrnes–Eden conversation has been found. Byrnes–Churchill conversation, morning Byrnes–Churchill conversation, morning Present United States United Kingdom Secretary Byrnes Prime Minister Churchill [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] Editor’s Note —No United States record of this conversation has been found. The following note by Churchill is reprinted from Ehrman, Grand Strategy , volume VI, page 292: “Mr. Byrnes told me this morning that he had cabled to T. V. Soong advising him not to give way on any point to the Russians, but to return to Moscow and keep on negotiating pending further developments. 1 “It is quite clear that the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan.” 1 See document No. 1216 , post . Sixth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:30 a.m. Sixth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:30 a.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Dunn Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gromyko Mr. Clayton Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Maisky Mr. Murphy Mr. Ward Mr. Sobolev Mr. Pauley Mr. Novikov Mr. Matthews Mr. Cohen Mr. Russell [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)]] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)]] Rapporteur’s Report Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 Department of State Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m. top secret The sixth session of Foreign Ministers opened at 11:30 a.m. on July 23, 1945. Mr. Molotov was in the Chair. Mr. Molotov first announced that he wished to state the questions which were up for discussion. They were: 1. Reparations from Germany and Italy; 2. Economic Principles Regarding Germany; 3. The Report of the Subcommittee on the Council of Foreign Ministers; 4. Trusteeships; 5. The Directive to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany; 6. Paper on Cooperation in Solving urgent European Economic Problems; 7. Perhaps Iran. Mr. Eden pointed out that Iran was on the Big Three agenda. Mr. Molotov agreed and suggested that it be passed over. Mr. Molotov then suggested Tangier, and Mr. Eden agreed. Mr. Molotov then suggested the proposed text of the invitations to China and France and added that the morning agenda would conclude with the preparation of an agenda for the Big Three. He asked whether there were any other questions. If so, they should be stated. He remarked that several questions now before subcommittees were not yet ready for discussion. These included the questions of Italy and Spain and several others. Reparations Mr. Molotov then brought up the matter of reparations and circulated a paper containing the principal suggestions of the Soviet delegation on this matter. The first paper was entitled “Plan for Reparations from Germany.” 1 He then mentioned the draft considered by the Commission regarding advance deliveries from Germany 2 and submitted a Soviet draft. 3 He stated that there were other reparations questions which could not be raised now. There was need for time to study them and consideration could be postponed until tomorrow. Mr. Byrnes agreed that it was best to postpone consideration since documents had been received only now and time would be needed to study them. Mr. Eden remarked that he was certainly not now prepared to comment on the Soviet proposals. Mr. Molotov accepted this position but asked whether informal conversations could not be held on the matter in the present meeting. Mr. Eden asked that the Economic Subcommittee work at the drafts. Mr. Molotov agreed. Mr. Byrnes agreed that the papers should not be considered during the present meeting. Mr. Eden then asked about Molotov’s reference to informal conversations. Mr. Molotov stated that the question of reparations is linked with other economic questions, such as war booty, and it would be a good idea to have informal exchanges of view. However, he is ready to accept any proposal. Mr. Byrnes then asked for postponement until tomorrow and that there should be no informal conversations. Mr. Molotov agreed. Mr. Molotov then stated that the second question concerned economic principles, which was not finished yesterday. He stated his readiness to withdraw his amendment to paragraph 13 and hoped that his colleagues could agree on 18. 4 Mr. Byrnes replied that it was the American position that paragraph 18 should remain in the document. Mr. Eden agreed and pointed out that paragraph 18 is linked with paragraph 5 of the report of the Committee. Mr. Molotov then made a statement regarding the paragraph mentioned by Mr. Eden. He maintained that the subcommittee report was not accurate. The present Conference should not discuss how to deal with German territory. He knew that the idea is to supply Germany as far as possible from territories where supplies were drawn before the war. However, heavy damage in some areas has radically changed the situation. He did not believe that it was possible for the Conference to know where conditions have changed and to what degree. This matter should be referred to the Council. It was the affair of our representatives and should be referred to them. They can deal with the questions specifically. He mentioned the opposing views of Stalin and Churchill on this matter and therefore concluded that nothing could be accepted as being generally binding. He wished to decide these matters by means of our representatives in Germany who if they did not agree could refer questions to their governments. If they attempted to write a paper applicable to Germany as it was before the war, the Soviet Union could not agree. He suggested that the question in paragraph 18 should not be decided either way at this meeting. There should be no binding decision taken at this time. It should be decided in accordance with future developments in Germany. Mr. Eden doubted that it would help much to pass the question on to the Control Council. There were already differences of opinion in the Council on temporary problems on how to fuel Berlin. A temporary arrangement had been reached on this matter in order to tide it over this Conference. 5 A common solution must now be found in order to meet the situation adequately. Mr. Molotov insisted that if he did accept this suggestion, it would make no practical difference since all disagreements would remain. He pointed out that there are no figures on how much coal, food and other materials are available or are necessary. This must be decided by the Control Council when data is available. The Control Council at that time will be able to reach a common agreement or will refer the matter to their governments. If this article is accepted there would still be no practical solution. The question would still go back to the governments. He suggested that if agreement could not be reached, the matter be referred to the Big Three. Mr. Eden admitted the truth of Mr. Molotov’s contention to the effect that agreement on this principle would not solve the practical problems of coal and food. On the other hand, this principle would constitute a good basis upon which the Control Council could make decisions; otherwise, there would be no basis to guide them. Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet Union could not accept now because of differences in conception of the German problem. He suggested that the question be studied in a business-like fashion for several weeks or for several days. Mr. Byrnes inquired whether Mr. Molotov would object to a statement of general principles to the effect that in the absence of a specific reason, supplies would as far as possible be drawn from the same areas as before the war. He pointed out that the statement actually says “so far as practicable.” Such a statement would be a guide to assist the Control Council in their determinations of such questions. If we simply referred the matter to them Mr. Byrnes feared that they would be unable to decide and would only send the question back to their governments. Mr. Molotov replied that he could not agree now because he had no data. Time was needed. When the study had been made the matter might be reconsidered. He suggested reference to the Big Three, and all agreed. Mr. Molotov then raised the question of the relative priority of exports and reparations. He asked for consideration of the Soviet draft 6 which he distributed and inquired whether his suggestion was clear. Mr. Byrnes replied that the American position is clear. It is the position of the United States that there will be no reparations until imports in the American zone are paid for. There can be no discussion of this matter. We do not intend, as we did after the last war, to provide the money for the payment of reparations. Mr. Molotov gave an example of the sense of his suggestion. He supposed the possibility that 2 million tons of coal would be produced, and the total requirements for internal use, export and reparations would amount to 2,200,000 tons. In this case he suggested that exports and reparations be reduced 10 per cent to make up the difference. It would mean that both exports and reparations would be little less and that over a period of a year’s time the situation might be balanced. If during the whole year there was still a shortage of 10 per cent, all three factors, including internal consumption, would be reduced 10 per cent. Mr. Molotov considered this to be a simple and fair solution. He stated that if production were increased over the figure set the reparations amount would not change. This would mean a surplus either for internal use or for export as the Control Council should decide. He asked whether this was not a fair arrangement. Mr. Eden stated that it seemed to him that either imports should be a first charge or reparations should be a first charge or that as now suggested they should have an equal status. He considered it certain that if exports were not sufficient to cover imports someone must make deliveries without payment therefor. Mr. Molotov replied that imports could be reduced. Mr. Eden pointed out that the Soviet Union had agreed to a minimum import program which must be fulfilled and which cannot be cut to meet reparations. Mr. Molotov thought that shortages in coal exports might be compensated by increased exports of other commodities. Mr. Byrnes remarked that he had stated his position. Imports must be a first charge and not a dollar will be paid on reparations until imports are paid for. Mr. Molotov then made another suggestion. Such German exports as had been agreed to by the Control Council should have a first priority. On other exports reparations would have first priority. All exports approved by the Control Council would be carried out in the first instance. 7 He suggested that if the Foreign Ministers were unable to agree, that the matter be referred to the Big Three. Mr. Eden asked for permission to clarify the situation. He pointed out that the Control Council has agreed to a minimum export program. If this program is cut in any way it can only be done at the expense of someone, say the miners who are producing coal. In order to avoid such a situation someone must bring in supplies without payment. Therefore, imports must be a first charge. Mr. Molotov stated that this was not quite clear to him and asked Mr. Eden to repeat the statement. Mr. Eden did so. Mr. Byrnes stated that if we lessened food supplies we lessened production. Mr. Molotov suggested the possibility of cutting internal consumption. Mr. Byrnes stated that we have started with a program of minimum import needs and it was therefore impossible to reduce internal consumption in order to provide for reparations. Mr. Molotov pointed out that he had made the suggestion that where the Control Council had approved imports they would be a first charge although they might possibly affect reparations. Mr. Eden stated that everything must be approved by the Control Council. Mr. Molotov gave another example of his meaning. Say the Control Council had decided on the export of 500,000 tons of coal at a time when it was planned to produce 2,000,000 tons. Suppose the British then wanted to export 700,000 tons. His suggestion would mean that the 500,000 tons would be a first charge and the supplementary 200,000 tons would be subject to reparations needs. To summarize, the exports approved by the Control Council for the payment of imports is to be a first charge. In other cases reparations have priority. In the example cited the 500,000 ton exports would have priority but the 200,000 additional would be subject to a reparations priority. However, if the Control Council agreed that the 200,000 tons should be exported in order to pay for imports then they would also have priority over reparations. He again suggested reference of the matter to the Big Three. Council of Foreign Ministers Mr. Molotov stated that there was a final draft on the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 8 He had no comment and after asking for comment asked that the draft be considered as approved. Trusteeship Mr. Molotov then raised the subject of trusteeship and asked for comments on the Soviet draft. 9 He pointed out that the Soviet draft deals in the first place with the Italian colonies and suggested that a definite determination be made of the future status of these colonies. If they are to be separated from Italy, a joint trusteeship under the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union should be established. Mr. Eden pointed out there were two problems in regard to the Italian colonies. The first problem is whether Italy lost the war or not. The British have said that Italy has no right to get her colonies back but have not gone beyond that point. The British believe that this question should be considered in connection with the settlement of a peace treaty by the Council of Foreign Ministers. When our minds are made up whether colonies go back to Italy or not, then it is probable that the United Nations organization would decide on the form of trusteeship, if any. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the American position had been stated by the President yesterday afternoon. 10 At the President’s suggestion it was tentatively agreed that the conclusion of the peace treaty with Italy would be the first business of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 11 As a result the Foreign Ministers and their governments must determine the disposition of the colonies and the Trieste boundaries and any other decisions in regard to Italian territory. Mr. Byrnes did not see how the Conference could decide what territories should be taken from Italy and what trusteeships should be established. It is true that the Charter 12 provided that there can be an agreement as to trusteeships. The colonies referred to by the Soviet Union are now in the custody of the United Kingdom. If there was an agreement between them the matter could be considered here; but there is no agreement and there can be no disposition until peace is concluded. Mr. Byrnes did not see how the conference could decide this question. Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to make a statement. Eden had publicly stated in Parliament several times the British position. 13 Therefore their position can be clearly seen; but it has not been disclosed to the Allies, The colonies are now in the custody of the British Army. Under these conditions there was ground to believe that the British might wish to express an opinion. If they do not wish to do so now perhaps they will later. The trusteeship question had been raised in San Francisco and even in Moscow by the United States. Mr. Molotov had no doubt that the American Government has considered this question. He hoped that the United States Government would give an expression of its views to the Allies. The Soviet Government will express their views. If the matter is not to be discussed now, he would agree. That is why the Soviet Government had suggested discussion in the Council of Foreign Ministers. The matter will be referred to the first meeting in London. Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States had presented both at Dumbarton Oaks 14 and at San Francisco its general views on trusteeships. However, it did not state its views on specific colonies. The Council of Foreign Ministers at its first meeting would pass on this and must necessarily make a decision regarding the disposal of the colonies. If it was determined that the colonies or some of them were to be taken from Italy, it was proper and necessary to decide the question of administration. Mr. Eden added that the British Government has not yet decided whether some or all of the colonies should be taken from Italy. He agreed that this should be discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers in the London meeting at the time they drew up the peace treaty with Italy. Until then it was not worth while to talk about trusteeships. However, he thought that the new world organization should decide this question. Mr. Byrnes asked whether it was agreed that this question would not be disposed of here. Mr. Molotov then suggested that the Soviet memorandum be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers for consideration at its first meeting in London. Mr. Eden remarked there was no point in referring the Soviet memorandum since the first task of the Council will be the preparation of peace terms for Italy and the matter would come up automatically. Mr. Molotov stated that he of course fully agreed. However, the question of the western frontiers of Poland was a question to be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers in their preparation of peace treaties. Despite this the matter is being dealt with now. In any event, Mr. Molotov asked that note be taken of the fact that the matter would be raised in the first meeting of the Council. Mr. Byrnes stated that this is fully understood. Directive to Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany Mr. Molotov stated that the next subject up for discussion was the proposed directive to Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany. Mr. Byrnes stated that this paper 15 was proposed because in the opinion of the American representative on the Control Council 16 it was desirable to have such a directive issued giving instructions to the Commanders in each zone to carry out whatever agreement was reached at this Conference. Therefore, he suggested that the matter be referred to a committee in order that the Soviet and British Delegations could make any suggestions they desired regarding the proposal. The directive would simply give the Commanders instructions from their Heads of State and each Commander would have the same instructions. Mr. Eden stated that he was a little puzzled regarding the need for this directive. He pointed out that they had had before them principles on [ of? ] agreement in the handling of Germany. The political principles had been approved. 17 They were based on an American draft 18 which he considered to be extremely well set up. He had assumed that these principles would go to the British Commanders in order to guide them. He thought that this would be enough. The proposed discussion [ directive? ] covers to some extent similar grounds [ sic ]. Some things are left out and some added. Some very good things had been left out. Mr. Byrnes stated that his purpose is to have the matter referred to a committee in order that past and future agreements of the Conference could be put into a directive from the Heads of States to the Commanders. We should transmit to each Commander everything decided at this Conference. This should be done before the Conference ends. Mr. Molotov believed that there was some point in Mr. Eden’s remarks. The proposed directive repeats what has been said in the document on political principles plus some economic. He asked whether it was advisable to have two wordings on the same points a ad stated that he did not know how to solve this difficulty. If the purpose is to give additional direction, the Soviet Government might consider; but decisions have already been taken on political directives and are to be taken on economic matters. These would be sent to the Commanders and the advantage of the directive is not clear. Mr. Byrnes agreed that the language should be the same. His only idea was to make certain that the Commanders would know what had been decided at this Conference. He suggested the appointment of a committee to incorporate the language previously approved plus any that may be approved in the future, into a directive. Either we can do this or let the Commanders read about it in the press or perhaps they could be sent a copy of the communiqué. Army people generally want written directives and General Eisenhower has asked for this. Mr. Eden thought General Eisenhower might not have known that we had adopted a set of political principles based on the draft submitted by the United States. Mr. Eden agreed entirely that the directives given to the Commanders must be written and the British had intended to send their Commander all agreed principles. Mr. Eden suggested that before agreements were communicated to the Commanders, France should be consulted in order that the directive should be uniform in all four zones. Mr. Byrnes agreed to this proposal and restated his desire for some machinery to send to the Commanders whatever was decided at the Conference. Mr. Eden asked whether consideration would be given to bringing France in line. Mr. Molotov agreed and inquired about the composition of the subcommittee. Mr. Byrnes named Mr. Murphy and Mr. Riddleberger. Mr. Eden named Mr. [ Sir William ] Strang and Mr. Harrison. Mr. Molotov named Mr. Gusev and Mr. Sobolev. Cooperation in Solving Urgent European Economic Problems Mr. Molotov stated that the next question concerned cooperation in solving urgent European economic problems. 19 He thought it advisable to establish a subcommittee to consider this matter. Mr. Byrnes agreed that this was the best thing to do. Mr. Molotov named Mr. Arutunian and Mr. Goroshenko. Mr. Eden named Mr. Brand and Mr. Phillips [ Coulson ]. 20 Mr. Byrnes suggested that the matter be referred to the Economic Committee [ Subcommittee ]. Mr. Molotov replied that this committee was not suitable. Mr. Byrnes then named Mr. Clayton and Mr. Pauley. Iran Mr. Molotov then raised the question of Iran. Mr. Eden stated that this would be considered at another time. Tangier Mr. Molotov then brought up the question of Tangier. Mr. Eden stated that there was to be a preliminary discussion of this matter in Paris soon and that we would welcome Soviet participation in the discussion. 21 He stated that he was in entire agreement with the principles contained in paragraph 1 of the Soviet draft 22 to the effect that the Zone should remain international and that steps should be taken to put an end to Spanish occupation. It was to consider how best this could be done that the suggestion was made that the meeting should be convened in Paris. Mr. Eden stated the hope that all governments signatory to the Act of Algeciras 23 would meet before final decisions were taken. He did not feel that the four powers could ignore the interests of the small powers. He hoped that a full conference could meet before long. He did not think that it was right for the Conference to consider the subject since there was to be a meeting soon and the French have considerable interest in the matter. The position of Spain would of course have to be considered in the Paris meeting. Mr. Molotov asked what was suggested. Mr. Eden replied that he suggested an early Paris meeting between the representatives of the three powers here and the French. Mr. Molotov suggested the adoption of paragraph 1 and agreement that the four powers would meet. Mr. Eden replied that he must say that he had told the French that the British would not join in a settlement of the Tangier situation without the French. Mr. Byrnes asked whether it was agreed that the four powers should work out an agreement. He stated his assumption that Mr. Eden would prefer no publicity in the press. Mr. Eden wondered whether such a paradise was possible. Mr. Byrnes then asked whether the Soviet Union wanted an announcement. Mr. Eden stated that it would be unwise to make an announcement that we are going to the French capital in order to decide the Tangier question. Also, there were the other signatories of the Act to be considered. It is enough that we here agree to have conversations. Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Union would not insist on an announcement. He suggested agreement among the Foreign Ministers without publicity that we accept paragraph 1 of the Soviet paper and that we will meet in Paris. This was agreed to. 24 Invitations to China and France Mr. Molotov brought up the subject of the proposed invitations to China and France. He suggested that after the words “members of Council” there should be added the words “by agreement between them.” After looking at Mr. Byrnes’ draft he agreed that it was all right without this change. 25 Agenda for Big Three Mr. Molotov then asked for consideration of an agenda for the Big Three. Mr. Byrnes intervened to suggest that a time should be set for sending the invitations to China and France. He remarked that if they were sent now they might become known to the press. He suggested sending the invitations the day before the issuance of the communiqué and the end of the Conference. Mr. Eden thought that there should be a little more notice than one day in order to give a chance for an answer to be received. He suggested 48-hour notice. This was agreed to. Agenda for Big Three Mr. Molotov again asked for the formulation of an agenda for the afternoon Big Three meeting. He stated that there would be: 1. Turkey 2. Koenigsberg 3. Syria and the Levant 4. Persia Mr. Molotov mentioned the question of reparations from Germany and Italy, but it was agreed that this should not go on the agenda but should be discussed in the next day’s meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Molotov also raised the question of economic principles but this was put over until the next day. Mr. Byrnes then brought up the fact that the question of the admission of Italy into international organizations and the exclusion of Spain from them had been referred to a committee, 26 which had not yet reported. He understood that part of the paper had been agreed to and suggested that the committee report back if it was unable to agree. There had been a suggestion that there would be two separate papers and then a proposal that they be combined into one paper. At the present time they were incorporated in one paper. 27 He thought that this matter might be disposed of. Mr. Molotov asked what suggestions Mr. Byrnes had. Mr. Byrnes replied that he suggested that the matter be acted on now and disposed of. He understood that there was no difficulty about the matter except whether there should be two papers or one. He was willing to take either. Mr. Eden suggested the drafting committee have one more try and that otherwise the matter would be considered tomorrow. Mr. Molotov stated that it was not entirely a question of whether there should be one or two documents. Mr. Byrnes then asked for a report from the subcommittee either for or against the paper tomorrow. Mr. Eden then circulated a note by the Prime Minister on the Greek situation. 28 The meeting then adjourned. 1 Document No. 920 , post . 2 It has not been determined what draft is here referred to. 3 Document No. 921 , post . 4 Cf. ante , pp. 233–234 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] . The paragraphs 13 and 18 referred to are in the attachment to document No. 863 , post; paragraph 5 is in document No. 863 proper. 5 See vol. i , document No. 433 . 6 Document No. 872 , post . 7 Cf. document No. 873 , post . The Rapporteur’s report ( post , p. 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] ) indicates that Molotov put forward as an alternative an actual draft. 8 Document No. 714 , post . 9 Document No. 733 , post . 10 See ante , pp. 253–255 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 11 See document No. 714 , post . 12 Of the United Nations (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031). 13 See ante , p. 239, footnote 2 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] ] . 14 Concerning the general nature of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations referred to, see Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949; Department of State publication No. 3580), p. 301. No provisions regarding trusteeship were included in the proposals agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks; ibid ., appendix 43, p. 611. 15 Document No. 870 , post . 16 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. 17 Document No. 856 , post . 18 Document No. 852 , post . 19 See document No. 1161 , post . 20 The Rapporteur’s report ( post , pp. 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] and 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] ) names Coulson as the second British member. There was no Phillips on the British Delgation. 21 See vol. i , pp. 980 – 1009 , and documents Nos. 1350 , 1352 , 1353 , and 1357 , post . 22 Document No. 1356 , post . 23 Signed April 7, 1906. For text, see Treaty Series No. 456; 34 Stat. (3) 2905; Foreign Relations , 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495 . 24 See document No. 1383 , post , section xvi ( xv ). 25 See document No. 1383 , post , section i . 26 See ante , pp. 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] . 27 Presumably document No. 729 , post . 28 Document No. 1066 , post . United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m. Summary of Meeting of Foreign Ministers Monday Morning, July 23, 1945 1. Reparations by Germany, Austria and Italy . Discussion of this question was postponed in order to enable the Economic Subcommittee to study two new papers on the subject presented by the Soviet Delegation. 2 2. German Economic Questions . The Soviet [Delegation] objected to paragraph 18 of the proposed agreement on economic principles, stating that each occupation zone should so far as practicable draw its supplies from the areas in Germany from which it had drawn before the war. It was agreed that this question should be referred to the Heads of Governments. The Soviet Delegation presented a draft of a new paragraph 19 dealing with comparative priority between reparations and exports from Germany in payment of imports. Since no agreement could be reached on this question it was also referred to the Heads of Governments. 3. Council of Foreign Ministers . The revised text on this subject was given final approval. 4. Trusteeship . It was agreed that the disposition of the Italian colonies would be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers in connection with the negotiation of the peace settlement with Italy. 5. Directive to Military Commanders in Germany . A subcommittee was named to prepare directives to the respective military commanders in Germany embodying the decisions of this conference and to make recommendations as to the manner of consulting the French in regard thereto. 6. Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems . A subcommittee was named to deal with this problem. 7. Iran . It was agreed that this question should be discussed by the Heads of Governments. 8. Tangier . The Foreign Ministers agreed to the first paragraph of the Soviet paper on this subject stating that Tangier should remain international. It was also agreed that the three Governments would participate with France in preliminary discussions of this question to be held in Paris in the very near future and that the other matters raised in [the] Soviet paper would be discussed at that time. 9. Telegram to the Chinese and French Governments concerning the Council of Foreign Ministers . The draft telegram on this subject was approved without change. It was agreed that these telegrams should be dispatched 48 hours before the issuance of the communiqué at the conclusion of this Conference. 10. Agenda for this afternoon’s meeting of the Heads of Governments . It was agreed to recommend to the Heads of Governments that the following subjects should constitute their agenda this afternoon. (1) Turkey. A Soviet paper on the Black Sea Straits was circulated yesterday. (2) The Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg area in East Prussia. A Soviet paper on this subject was circulated yesterday. (3) Syria and Lebanon. (4) Iran. British paper on this subject has been circulated. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 For the documents referred to in this summary, see the footnotes to the minutes, supra . Rapporteur’s Report 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] Rapporteur’s Report 1 Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 11:30 a.m. [Translation] V. M. Molotov Report on the Meeting of Foreign Ministers on July 23 d 1945 to the Heads of the Three Governments Agenda of the meeting of the three Ministers was as following: 1. reparations from germany, austria and italy V. M. Molotov handed to Secretary of State Byrnes and Minister for Foreign Affairs Eden the draft proposals of the Soviet Delegation on reparations from Germany and on advance deliveries from Germany in [ on ] account of reparations. 2 It was decided to charge the Economic Commission [ Subcommittee ] with preliminary examination of the both drafts and to discuss them at the next meeting of the three Ministers. 2. economic principles in regard to germany Paragraphs 13 and 18 were discussed same [ as well ] as paragraph 19. proposed by the Soviet Delegation. V. M. Molotov said he withdrew the proposed by him amendment to paragraph 13 and proposed to exclude paragraph 18, questions related to this paragraph to be examined by the Allied organs in Germany with subsequent solution in the Control Council; in case no agreement is reached in the Control Council the questions are to be agreed upon by the Governments. On this point there was no agreement reached and it was decided to submit the question of paragraph 18 to the meeting of the Heads of Three Governments to be decided upon. V. M. Molotov submitted to Mr. Eden and Mr. Byrnes the draft of new paragraph 19 proposed by the Soviet Delegation. Mr. Byrnes stated this draft cannot be accepted by the United States Delegation. V. M. Molotov proposed an alternate draft of paragraph 19 according to which the approved by the Control Council export from Germany to cover the import is realized prior to all other deliveries. In all other cases priority is given to reparations. The agreement was not reached and it was decided to submit this question to the meeting of the Heads of Three Governments to be decided upon. 3. on the council of foreign ministers Presented by the Drafting Committee draft was approved without amendments. 4. on trust territories The draft of the Soviet Delegation was discussed. Mr. Eden stated that first of all should be solved the question of whether the Italian colonies should be detached from Italy and if so, which ones specifically. This question should be solved simultaneously with the drafting of the peace agreement with Italy. The question of who should be given the trusteeship over all former Italian colonies to be detached from Italy, must be solved by the International Organization of United Nations. Mr. Byrnes proposed to postpone the decision on this question until the signing of the peace agreement with Italy, when all territorial problems concerning Italy would be solved. V. M. Molotov proposed to refer the Soviet Memorandum to the first meeting of the Council of the Foreign Ministers that will take place in London next September. Mr. Eden said that he thought that there was no necessity to refer the Soviet Memorandum to the Council of the Foreign Ministers because in working out the Peace Treaty with Italy question of the Italian colonies will be automatically brought up. V. M. Molotov asked to take into account that the questions Soviet Memorandum is dealing with will be put by the Soviet Government before the September meeting of the Council of the Foreign Ministers in London. 5. on directives to allied commanders-in-chief in germany ( proposal of the us delegation ) It was decided to inform all Commanders in Chief of the Allied occupational forces in Germany of all concerning them decisions of the Conference upon securing confirmation of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on these decisions. For this objective [it] was decided to organize a Committee composed of: United States Murphy and Riddleberger, Great Britain Strang and Harrison, Soviet Union Goussev and Sobolev. 6. on cooperation in solving immediate european economic problems For preliminary examination of the memorandum submitted by the United States Delegation to organize a Committee composed of: United States Clayton and Pauley Great Britain Brand and Coulson Soviet Union Arutiunian and Geraschenko. 7. on tangier The Soviet draft was discussed. Resolved: 1. To approve the first paragraph of the Soviet Delegation’s draft which reads as the following: “International Zone of Tangier. Having considered the question of the zone of Tangier we agreed that this zone which includes the town of Tangier and the area adjoined to it shall owing to it[s] special strategic importance remain international”. 2. It was decided to discuss in immediate future the whole question on [ of? ] Tangier at the meeting in Paris of the representatives of the Four Governments—USSR, USA, Great Britain, and France. 8. approval of the text of address to governments of china and france Text of address proposed by the Committee is approved without amendments. It is decided to send the address forty eight hours before communiqué on the results of the Conference is published. 9. on agenda of the meeting of the heads of the three governments on july 23d, 1945 It was agreed to recommend to the Heads of the Three Governments the following agenda: 1. On Turkey; 2. On Koenigsberg region; 3. On Syria and Lebanon; 4. On Iran[.] 1 Molotov acted as Rapporteur for this meeting. The typed notation “Informal translation from Russian” appears in the upper right-hand corner of page 1. A somewhat different version of the report is included in the minutes of the afternoon meeting of Heads of Government; cf. post , p. 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 2 For the documents referred to in this report, see the footnotes to the minutes, ante , pp. 276–287 [ Pgs. 276–287 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:30 a.m. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:30 a.m. 1 1 C. C. S. 199th Meeting. Present United States United Kingdom Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham General of the Army Arnold Field Marshal Wilson General Somervell General Ismay Lieutenant General Hull Lieutenant-General Macready Vice Admiral Cooke Major-General Laycock Major General Norstad Major-General Holmes Rear Admiral Flanigan Major-General Hollis Captain McDill Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Captain Moore [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)]] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 21, 1945 J. C. S. Files Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 21, 1945 top secret 1. Approval of the Minutes of the 198 th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff , 21 July 1945 The Combined Chiefs of Staff :– Approved the conclusions of the 198th Meeting and approved the detailed report, subject to any later minor amendments. 2. Employment of Captured Enemy Ocean-Going Passenger Shipping and British Troopship Employment in U. S. Trans-Atlantic Programs in the First Half of 1946 (C. C. S. 679/6, 679/7, 679/8, and 679/9 2 ) Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered C. C. S. 679/9 and regretted that the amendments proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff were not acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff. It appeared to be the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that if the seven captured German ships were moved to the Pacific they would be unable to make more than one trip before the 31st of December, 1945. If then, as a result of the review of the combined requirements and combined resources for the first half of 1946, it was decided that these seven captured ships should no longer be allocated to the United States, their initial assignment to the Pacific in 1945 would prove uneconomical. He said he appreciated the point of view of the United States Chiefs of Staff. Sir Alan Brooke pointed out, however, that the very fact that these ships had been moved to the Pacific would be a strong argument for retaining them there. This argument would be weighed with all the other arguments when it came to the combined review which the British Chiefs of Staff had proposed in paragraph 6 of C. C. S. 679/8. To exclude these ships from the review at this stage seemed to the British Chiefs of Staff to be wrong. Admiral King proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept C. C. S. 679/8, provided that the combined study on the lines suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff be undertaken as a firm commitment to be completed by mid-September. The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— a . Agreed to allocate the total lift of the seven ships listed in C. C. S. 679/6 for United States employment up to 31 December 1945. b . Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would allocate to the United Kingdom a lift of 16,000 during the remainder of 1945 for the movement of Canadians. c . Directed the Combined Military Transportation Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, to submit by 15 September 1945 a report, on the lines of C. C. S. 679/1, 3 of the combined requirements and combined resources (including captured enemy trooplift) for the first half of 1946, the study to cover the recommendation in paragraph 7 of C. C. S. 679/7 and the employment during the first half of 1946 of the seven ships listed in C. C. S. 679/6. 3. Provision of Personnel Ships for the Requirements of Allied Governments (C. C. S. 897 4 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the memorandum in Enclosure “A” to C. C. S. 897, subject to amendments agreed in discussion, and directed that it be dispatched to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. 5 4. Command in French Indo-China (C. C. S. 890/3 6 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Approved the recommendation in paragraph 3 of C. C. S. 890/3, and directed that the statement contained in that paragraph, as amended in discussion, be included in their final report to the President and Prime Minister. 7 5. Report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 900 8 ) The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Approved C. C. S. 900, as amended in discussion. 9 6. Control of Allied Naval Units Other Than U. S. at Present Under Command of Seventh U. S. Fleet The Combined Chiefs of Staff :— Took note that upon the dissolution of the U. S. Seventh Fleet pursuant to the reallocation of areas and change in command in the Southwest Pacific, as proposed in C. C. S. 890/1, 10 it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet 11 to release to British control those Allied naval units other than U. S. at present incorporated in the U. S. Seventh Fleet. 2 Documents Nos. 1190 , 1191 , 1195 , and 1196 , post , respectively. 3 Not printed. 4 Document No. 1192 , post . 5 For the text of this memorandum, as finally approved, see appendix E to document No. 1381 , post . 6 Document No. 1271 , post . 7 See document No. 1381 , post , paragraph 14. 8 Not printed. 9 The draft report, as amended, was circulated on July 23 as the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2. It is identical with the text of the report as approved on July 24 ( document No. 1381 , post ) except as noted in the footnotes to that document and except that minor variations of punctuation, capitalization, and abbreviation have not been annotated. 10 Document No. 1267 , post . 11 Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. Morse–Weston conversation, 2:30 p.m. Morse–Weston conversation, 2:30 p.m. 1 1 All information on this conversation is based on rough informal notes taken by Morse, the gist of which was given to Department of State historians by Morse in a conversation of November 30, 1955. Present United States United Kingdom Mr. Morse Mr. Weston Mr. Bissell Mr. Nicholson [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] Editor’s Note —No official record of this conversation has been found. The principal subject covered was the discussion of Swedish requisitioning of shipping which was expected to take place at a forthcoming meeting of the United Maritime Authority. Informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 4 p.m. Informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 1 4 p.m. 1 In the set of minutes for the meetings of the Foreign Ministers the morning meeting on July 23 is called the Sixth Session and the morning meeting on July 24, the Seventh Session. It was agreed on the morning of July 23 ( ante , p. 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] ) to hold an “informal” meeting in the afternoon. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Clayton Sir David Waley Mr. Maisky Mr. Pauley Mr. Harrison Mr. Golunsky Mr. Bohlen Mr. Coulson Mr. Potrubach Major Theakstone [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)]] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers Department of State Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 4 p.m. top secret The Secretary said that he had expressed the views of the United States on the subject of reparations from Germany to Mr. Molotov this morning and had subsequently informed Mr. Eden of this talk. 2 He said it would not, therefore, be necessary for him to repeat all that he had said but he merely wished to state that in our view it was difficult to reconcile certain positions of the Soviet Government with the principle of an overall plan of reparation. He said that since Mr. Maisky was here he would like to have confirmation or clarification of the Soviet definition of “war booty”. As it had been reported to him by the American representative on the Separations Committee it covered all supplies and equipment, including plants and other materials. 3 Mr. Molotov then handed in what he said was the true definition from the Soviet point of view of “war booty”. (Annex 1 4 ) The Secretary then said he would like to ask Mr. Molotov a question not in any attitude of hostility but with the simple desire of ascertaining the facts in the situation, and that was, whether it was true that the Soviet authorities had taken large quantities of equipment and materials out of their zone. He said that they had even heard that household equipment, such as plumbing, silver, furniture, etc. had also been removed. Mr. Molotov replied that “Yes, this was the case,” that a certain quantity of property had been removed. He said that if this was what was worrying the Secretary that they agree to deduct from their reparation plans a suitable figure to cover removals already made. He said in this connection it should be borne in mind that the Soviet Union had suffered direct losses of many billions of dollars. He offered to knock off 300 million for miscellaneous removals. The Secretary said that every country had suffered in this war, that the United States had spent 400 billion dollars so far in the war and its national debt had risen to 250 billion dollars, but we were not talking about that and he felt it was idle to discuss it on that basis. Mr. Molotov said that they would be prepared to reduce their claims from 10 billion 5 to 9 billion in order to cover removals already made and thus dispose of the question. The Secretary said that according to our estimates approximately 50% of the present wealth of Germany lay in the Soviet zone. 6 Mr. Molotov said that that was not their figure. The Secretary then said that our figures did not agree and it would be difficult to establish agreed figures on this subject. There was some discussion between Mr. Maisky and Ambassador Pauley as to the figures of German resources in the Soviet zone. Mr. Molotov then remarked that having agreed to give Poland compensation in the west 7 he could not believe that at Yalta any of us had had in our minds to strip the territory of everything in reparations before turning it over to the Poles. He felt that such a step would be impossible. He added, however, that it was possible to consider the equipment and materials in the area as Poland’s share of reparations. Mr. Eden then remarked that since this territory was to go to Poland only at the time of the peace treaty, until that time it should be considered part of Germany for the purposes of economics. Mr. Molotov said that he had meant that the treatment of the part to go to Poland must of necessity be considered differently; he did not mean that it should be entirely excluded from consideration. Mr. Eden said that a part of the question was that during the period of occupation we had a problem of feeding and retaining approximately the same number of Germans, but under the Soviet suggestions on conditions which would cut off the source or a large part of the source from which this same population formerly drew its sustenance. The Secretary then remarked that even if the Soviet plan was put at 9 billion, thus making the total 18 billion, it was still a mystery to him where any such amount of reparations was to come from. Mr. Molotov remarked that this had been the figure accepted as the basis for discussion at Yalta. 8 The Secretary replied that since then our armies have invaded Germany and have destroyed literally billions of dollars worth of property and that this would inevitably alter the situation. He added that we were faced with a terrible problem with regard to feeding the German population in our zone, that we had 800,000 more people in our zone [ sector ] in Berlin than had lived there before and approximately 4 million more in our zone as a whole. He said that counting fifty cents per day per person it would cost the United States in the first year some billion and a half dollars to maintain this excess population. They would, of course, work but they would work for the production of reparations for others and that was what we could not agree to. He said under the suggestion he had made this morning, that if each country should take reparations from its own zone, it would be possible to exchange goods between the zones. In this manner the Soviet Union would get its share from its own zone and the United States and Great Britain from theirs and would be able to take care of the needs of France, Belgium, Holland, etc. He repeated that according to our figures, approximately 50% of German resources were in the Soviet zone, 30% in the British and 20% in the American and French zones combined. Mr. Molotov then inquired what about the Ruhr; that the Soviet Union desired in the form of reparations certain industrial equipment and machines from the Ruhr. He said they would be prepared to reduce their reparation figure even to 8½ or 8 billion, but they must insist on a fixed amount, say two billion, from the Ruhr. He said they could agree to no plan which did not contain such a provision. Mr. Eden remarked that they were thinking of the immediate problem which faced them this winter, which was either to have wholesale starvation in their zone or to pay for the necessary imports, since it was apparent from the discussion that the Soviets were unwilling to turn over food and coal from the zone which they wished to give to Poland. Mr. Molotov said this was a question that could be discussed. The Secretary remarked that he was worried that quarrels would develop between the Soviet, British and American Governments over these matters since there would obviously be a disposition on the part of the Soviet authorities to question the need for imports which would reduce the amount available for reparations from the western zones. Mr. Molotov in conclusion repeated his willingness to reduce their figure but repeated Soviet insistence on a fixed quantity of reparations from the Ruhr. He reiterated his belief that agreement could be reached. He inquired as to what was to be the future status of the Ruhr, whether it was to be internationalized or not. Both Mr. Eden and The Secretary said that this was another subject of great political importance, but that they were thinking now of the immediate situation confronting the United States and Great Britain in their tasks of occupying Germany. 2 See ante , pp. 274–275 [ Pgs. 274–275 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] . 3 See document No. 904 , post , and footnotes 1 and 2 thereto. 4 No document annexed. Since a “second” Soviet definition of war booty ( document No. 939 , post ) was presented on July 27, the paper presented by Molotov on July 23 was presumably the definition submitted by Maisky to the Economic Subcommittee on July 21 ( document No. 904 , post ). 5 See document No. 1416 , post , section v ; cf. document No. 920 , post . 6 See document No. 930 , post , attachment 1. 7 For the Yalta agreement referred to, see document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 8 See document No. 1416 , post , section v . Land–Leathers conversation, 4:30 p.m. Land–Leathers conversation, 4:30 p.m. 1 1 All information on this conversation is based on rough informal notes taken by Morse, the gist of which was given to Department of State historians by Morse in a conversation of November 30, 1955. Present United States United Kingdom Vice Admiral Land Lord Leathers Mr. Morse [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] Editor’s Note —No official record of this conversation has been found. The following subjects were discussed: the use of British vessels in the Pacific for Coronet ; 2 United States agreement not to request the conversion of 18 British cargo vessels to troopships, subject to the allocation of the Milwaukee to the United States; the allocation of captured German passenger vessels to the United States; 3 the question whether the Milwaukee should be converted in the United States or the United Kingdom and whether this vessel should be manned by American or British crews; 4 the inability of the United Kingdom to supply France with coal during the coming winter and the allocation of American shipping for this purpose; United States support of British coal requirements for bunkering, either on a lend-lease or a pay basis; possible British payment of charter hire for Italian vessels; possible Italian membership in the United Maritime Authority; 5 shipping aspects of a possible revision of the Italian armistice terms and of a peace treaty for Italy; disposition of captured German vessels, the use of the Soviet share in the war against Japan, and the possibility that the Soviet Union might wish to man these vessels; possible Soviet membership in the United Maritime Authority; the relationship of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to the United Maritime Authority; 6 British consent to United States participation in the work of the Capcraft commission 7 in the light of needs of the United States Navy for sea-going tugs for use in Coronet ; the mechanism in London to be used for the division of captured German vessels as between the United States and the United Kingdom; and a draft British paper 8 on shipping programs intended for submission to the August meeting of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. 2 See document No. 1287 , post . 3 See documents Nos. 1195 and 1196 , post . 4 See document No. 1193 , post . 5 See document No. 1110 , post . 6 See documents Nos. 1132 and 1134 , post . 7 See documents Nos. 1006 and 1010 , post . 8 Not found. Seventh plenary meeting, 5 p.m. Seventh plenary meeting, 5 p.m. 1 1 This is the time given on the cover sheet of the Department of State minutes. The Log ( ante , p. 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) indicates that the meeting was called to order at 5:10 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Davies Mr. Attlee Mr. Gromyko Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Bohlen Major Birse Mr. Pavlov Mr. Allen 2 Field Marshal Alexander 4 Mr. Cohen 3 2 Allen’s presence for at least part of the meeting is assumed from his authorship of a memorandum of the discussion at this meeting of the question of Syria and Lebanon ( post , p. 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] ). 4 For part of the meeting. See post , p. 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 3 Cohen’s presence is assumed from the existence of his notes on the meeting, post , p. 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] . [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)]] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 5 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 5 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)]] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) Berlin Conference, July 24, 1945. 890d.00/7–2445 Contents Department of State Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 5 p.m. top secret Mr. Molotov presented the following report as Rapporteur of the Morning Meeting of the Foreign Ministers: 5 “The following questions were discussed by the Foreign Ministers: (1) Reparations by Germany, Austria and Italy. It was decided to instruct the Economic Commission [ Subcommittee ] to give preliminary examination to the two drafts which had been submitted 6 and to have the matter considered by the Foreign Ministers. (2) Economic Principles with Regard to Germany. There was a discussion of paragraphs 13 and 18, 7 as well as a new paragraph 19, 8 submitted by the Soviet Delegation. At the meeting Molotov said that he withdrew his amendment regarding paragraph 13 and he suggested that paragraph 18 be deleted on the understanding that the matter would be given study by the Allied authorities in Germany and that in case no agreement was reached in the Control Council the matter be decided by the Governments concerned. Agreement was not reached on this matter and it was referred to the Big Three. Molotov had submitted to the British and Americans a new paragraph 19. Secretary Byrnes said it was not acceptable. Molotov then submitted a new paragraph dealing with the question of priority between reparations and exports in payment for German imports. 9 No agreement was reached and this matter was referred to the Heads of Government. (3) Council of Foreign Ministers. The text submitted by the Drafting Commission [ Committee ] was approved without amendment. 10 (4) Trusteeship. The draft of the Soviet Delegation on this question 11 was discussed. Mr. Eden said that in the first place they should settle the question as to whether colonies should be detached from Italy and if so which. He had argued that this should be settled when the peace treaty is drawn up. The question of to whom the trusteeship of any Italian colonies should be given should be settled by the United Nations Organization. Secretary Byrnes proposed that the matter be put off until the conclusion of the peace treaty. Molotov had proposed to refer the Soviet memorandum to the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September. Eden had stated that there was no need to refer the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers, since the question of the Italian colonies would arise automatically when the peace treaty with Italy was drawn up. Molotov asked that notice be taken that all of the questions in the Soviet memorandum would be raised at the September meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. (5) Directive to Military Commanders in Germany. On the proposal of the American Delegation 12 it was agreed to convey to the Commanders-in-Chief of Allied troops in occupation of Germany all decisions of this Conference relating to them after they had been agreed upon with the Provisional Government of France. It was decided to set up a sub-committee to deal with the matter, consisting of Messrs. Murphy, Riddleberger, Strang, Harrison, Gusev and Sobolev. (6) Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems. A commission was appointed to give preliminary consideration to the memorandum of the United States Delegation, 13 consisting of Messrs. Clayton and Pauley, Brand and Coulson, and Arutunian and Garachin [ Gerashchenko ]. (7) Tangier. The Soviet draft 14 was discussed and it was agreed to accept the first paragraph of the Soviet paper on this subject stating that the area including the city of Tangier and the zone adjacent to it should remain under international control. It was also agreed that the whole question of Tangier should be discussed at the next conference in Paris of the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. (8) Approval of Telegram to China and France. The text submitted by the commission 15 to consider this matter was approved with no amendment. It was decided that the telegram should be sent forty-eight hours before the publication of the communiqué on the results of the Conference. (9) Agenda for the Meeting of the Heads of Governments. The following agenda was agreed upon for the afternoon meeting of the Heads of Governments: (1) Turkey. (2) Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg area. (3) Syria and the Lebanon. (4) Iran.” 1. Turkey and the Black Sea Straits Stalin said that it appeared that what had been approved by the Foreign Ministers was automatically approved by the Big Three. The President said that this was satisfactory to him. Stalin inquired if the decisions of the Foreign Ministers was [ were ] regarded as accepted. The President replied in the affirmative. Returning to the subject of Turkey, The President remarked that he did not think that the Prime Minister had finished his remarks when they had adjourned at the last meeting. 16 Churchill replied that he had finished his remarks at the last meeting when he had stated that he could not consent to the establishment of a Russian base in the Straits and that he did not think that Turkey would agree to that proposal. Stalin remarked that yesterday Churchill had said that the Russians had frightened the Turks and that one of the chief points was that the Russians had concentrated too many troops in Bulgaria. He considered it necessary to give information on this point. Churchill’s information was out of date. He did not know what information Churchill had been given by the Turks, but Russia had less troops in Bulgaria than the British had in Greece. Churchill inquired how many Stalin thought the British had in Greece. Stalin replied: “Five divisions.” Churchill said there were only two. 17 Stalin inquired with respect to armored units, and asked how strong the British divisions were. Churchill said they had about 40,000 troops altogether. Stalin replied that they had about 30,000. 18 Churchill said he hoped that the meeting would hear Field Marshal Alexander as he preferred that he give the figures. Stalin replied that he was not seeking for accuracy but that he believed Churchill 100%. He said that should it prove necessary General Antonov could make a detailed report, but one thing was clear—the Turks had nothing of which to be afraid. The Turks had about twenty-three divisions and there was nothing to be afraid of. That was the Russian information. As to the rectification of the frontiers, which might have frightened the Turks, he said that perhaps it was the possible restoration of the pre-war frontiers that had existed under the Czar that had frightened the Turks. He said that he had in mind the area of Kars, formerly in Armenia, as well as Ardahan, formerly in Georgia. He pointed out that this question of the restoration of frontiers would not have been brought up if the Turks had not brought up the question of an alliance. An alliance meant that they would defend the frontiers of Turkey, just as Turkey would defend the frontiers of the Soviet Union, but in the Soviet opinion the frontiers in the area mentioned was [ were ] incorrect and they had told the Turks that if there was to be an alliance the frontiers had to be rectified. 19 If this were not done the question of an alliance would be dropped. What was there to be afraid of? The third question was that of the Straits. He drew their attention to the fact that the position of such a great state as the Soviet Union was the following. The Montreux Convention 20 had been decided against Russia. Russia considered it inimical. Turkey had the right under this treaty to block the Straits to any shipping not only if Turkey were at war but also if it seemed to Turkey that there was a threat of war. The Convention also left it to Turkey to decide when this threat appeared. Thus, an impossible situation was created in which Turkey was free to block the Straits when she thought they were threatened. The situation at the moment was that the Russians had the same rights in the Straits as the Japanese Emperor. This was ridiculous, but it was a fact. The result was that a small state supported by Great Britain held a great state by the throat and gave it no outlet. He said that they could imagine what commotion there would be in England if a similar regime existed in Gibraltar or in the Suez Canal, or what a commotion there would be in the United States if such a regime existed with regard to the Panama Canal. Hence, the point at issue was to give Soviet shipping the possibility to pass to and from the Black Sea freely. As Turkey was too weak to guarantee the possibility of free passage in case complications arose, the Soviet Union would like to see them defended by force. Churchill , who appeared to misunderstand, said: “Not law?” Stalin replied that force was necessary just as in the case of the Panama Canal, which was defended by the American navy and for shipping through the Suez Canal, which was guaranteed by the British navy. He said that if they thought that naval bases in the Straits were unacceptable to the Turks, then let them give the Soviet Union some other base where the Russian fleet could repair and refuel and where in cooperation with its allies the Russian fleet could protect the Straits. For the situation to continue as it was would be ridiculous. The President said that the attitude of the American Government was that the Montreux Convention should be revised, thought, however, that the Straits should be a free waterway open to the whole world and that they should be guaranteed by all of us. He had come to the conclusion after a long study of history that all the wars of the last two hundred years had originated in the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic and from the eastern frontier of France to the western frontier of Russia. In the last two instances the peace of the whole world had been overturned; by Austria in the case of the previous war, and by Germany in the case of this war. He thought it should be the business of this Conference and of the coming peace conference to see that this did not happen again. He thought that to a great extent this could be accomplished by arranging for the passage of goods and vessels through the Straits on the basis of free intercourse just as was the case in American waters. He said that he was presenting a paper and that he wanted to see Russia and England and all other countries have free access to all the seas of the world. The President then read his paper on the free and unrestricted navigation of inland waterways. 21 The President then continued that he did not want to engage in another war twenty-five years from now over the Straits or the Danube. He said that our ambition was to have a Europe that was sound economically and which could support itself. He wanted a Europe that would make Russia, England, France and all other countries in it happy and with which the United States can trade and be happy as well as prosperous. He thought that his proposal was a step in that direction. He said that the question of territorial concessions was a Turkish and Russian dispute which they would have to settle themselves and which the Marshal had said he was willing to do, but he pointed out that the question of the Black Sea Straits concerned the United States and the whole world. Churchill said that he strongly supported Stalin’s wish for a revision of the Montreux Convention with the object of securing for Soviet Russia free and unrestricted navigation of the Straits by merchant and war ships alike in peace or war. He entirely agreed with the President when he said that this should be guaranteed by all of us. A guarantee by the Great Powers and the powers interested would certainly be effective. He earnestly hoped that the Marshal would consider this alternative in contrast to that of a base in close proximity to Constantinople. With regard to the other waterways, they were in full accord with the general line that the President had taken in his statement. He thought that the Kiel Canal should certainly be free and open and guaranteed by all the Great Powers. He also attached great importance to the free navigation of the Danube and the Rhine. He felt that there was a great measure of agreement between the Three Powers represented at the Conference. The President said there was no doubt regarding their agreement on the question of the revision of the Montreux Convention. Churchill added “and on the purpose of that revision.” Stalin said that he would have to read attentively the proposal made by the President, which was now being translated, before he could discuss it. 2. Transfer to the Soviet Union of Koenigsberg Stalin said that this question had been discussed at the Tehran Conference. 22 The Russians had complained that all ports of the Baltic freeze. They froze for a shorter or longer period but they froze. The Russians had stated that it was necessary to have at least one ice-free port at the expense of Germany. Stalin’s arguments in favor of this were that the Russians had suffered and had lost so much blood that they were anxious to have some piece of German territory so as to give some small satisfaction to the tens of millions of their inhabitants who had suffered in this war. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister had raised any objections and this question had been agreed upon by the three of them. He said they were anxious to see this agreement approved at this Conference. The President said he was ready to agree in principle although it would be necessary to study ethnographic and other questions, but in principle he agreed. Churchill said that Stalin was right in saying that the matter had been raised at Tehran and he added that it had also been discussed between Stalin and himself in October 1944 in Moscow in connection with the question of the Curzon line. 23 He had made a speech in Parliament on September [ December ] 15, 1944 in which he had mentioned the Soviet wish to secure the ice-free port of Koenigsberg and that the Soviet frontier should run south of that point. 24 He had made it clear that His Majesty’s Government was in sympathy with this wish. The only question which arose was that of the legal occasion to transfer. At the present time the position was that the Soviet draft 25 as put in would require each of them to admit that East Prussia did not exist and also to admit that the Koenigsberg area was not under the authority of the Allied Control Council in Germany. It would also commit them to the recognition of the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. He pointed out that all these matters really belonged to the final peace settlement. So far as His Majesty’s Government was concerned they should support the Soviet wish to have this port of Germany incorporated into the Soviet Union. He made this statement as one of principle. They had not examined the Soviet line on a map. This could be examined at the peace conference but he would like to assure the Marshal of their continued support of the Russian position in this part of the world. Stalin replied that they were suggesting nothing more than this at the present time. Of course, the matter would be settled at the peace conference. He said they were satisfied that the British and American Governments approved. Churchill said that there would have to be certain redrafting of the Russian statement and in the communiqué which would be issued at the end of the Conference he recommended that more general terms be used. The agreement of the Three Powers would be recorded in the minutes of this meeting. 3. Syria and Lebanon Molotov said that the Soviet delegation wished to present a short paper on this subject (annex 2). 26 Churchill said that the burden of defending Syria and Lebanon had fallen upon the shoulders of the British. They did not wish to receive any advantage there not enjoyed by other powers. At the time they entered Syria and Lebanon to throw out the Germans and the troops of Vichy they had made an arrangement with the French in which they both recognized Syria and Lebanon. 27 In consideration of the very long historical connection of France with these countries the British had said that they would not object to France having a favored position there if this were satisfactorily arranged with the new independent Governments of those countries. The British had told General de Gaulle that the moment he made a satisfactory treaty with Syria and Lebanon which was satisfactory to those countries, the British would withdraw their troops. If they withdrew their troops now it would lead to the massacre of the French civilians and the small number of troops there. They would not like to see this happen and he pointed out that it would lead to great excitement throughout the Arab world. He also said that it would affect their task of keeping the peace in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. There would be a great outbreak of turbulence and warfare which might affect Egypt too. There could not have been a worse moment than this for creating such a disturbance in the Arab world because it would endanger their lines of communication through the Suez Canal which was being used in the war against Japan by both the United States and Great Britain. The line of communications for the war against Japan was important to the United States as well as to Great Britain. General de Gaulle had acted very unwise[ly] in this region. Against their advice and entreaties about 500 men had been sent to Syria and this had caused a serious outbreak which had still not died away. How silly this was for what could 500 men do? They had, however, been a spark and this uprising had followed immediately. The Government and people of Iraq had wanted to go to the help of the Syrians. All of the Arabic world was convulsed with excitement in regard to this matter. Later, however, General de Gaulle had agreed to hand over the so-called “ Troupes Spéciales ” to the Syrian Government. 28 He trusted that they should be able to reach an agreement with the French. He could not say agreement but a settlement with de Gaulle which would guarantee the independence of Syria and Lebanon and which would reserve for the French some recognition of their cultural and commercial interests which they had built up over such a long period of time. He wished to repeat before this council that Great Britain had no wish to remain there one day longer than necessary. The British would be delighted to withdraw from what was a thankless task assumed in the interest of the Allies. Having regard to the fact the matter rested between them and the French, and of course Syria and Lebanon, and the British did not welcome a proposal to have the Conference in which the United States and the Soviet Union would enter with Great Britain and France and come to a decision [ sic ]. The whole burden had been borne by them, except for diplomatic approval of the United States which they had enjoyed. The British would not welcome the whole matter being reviewed by a body of this kind. Of course, if the United States wanted to take their place that would be a different matter. The President replied “no thanks”. He added that when this controversy arose there had been an exchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister and himself. 29 The Prime Minister had said that the British had sufficient troops to keep peace in this area and to stop the outbreak of war in that region. He had asked the British to do so immediately for the United States was also much interested in this line of communications to the Far East through the Suez Canal. The President said, however, that we thought that no country should have special privilege. The French did not deserve a special position after the way they had stirred up all this trouble. All should have equal rights. 30 Stalin inquired if he might infer of this that his colleagues did not recognize any privileged position of the French in this area. Churchill replied that the British position was that they wanted to see France have a special position and that he had promised this to the French at a time when the British were weak. This promise was made of course only so far as the British were concerned. They had no power to bind others nor had they undertaken to make serious exertions to procure special rights for the French. If they could get them the British would not object and would smile benignly on their achievements. Stalin inquired from whom the French could obtain these special rights. Churchill replied that they could obtain them from Syria and Lebanon. Stalin queried, “them alone?” Churchill replied in the affirmative. He added that the French had many schools there, and archeological institutes, etc.; many French live there and the French even had a song which went “Nous partous tour La Syrie” [ Partant pour la Syrie? ]. They dated their claims back to the Crusades. But he pointed out that the British were not embarking on a serious quarrel with the great powers on this matter. The President said that the United States stood for equal rights for all. Churchill asked the President if he would endeavor to prevent the Syrians from giving special rights to the French. The President replied that he had no qualms in this respect as he was sure that the Syrians would not want to grant special rights. Stalin observed that they were reluctant. He said that the Russian delegation thanked Mr. Churchill for the information that he had given and that they withdrew their proposal. Churchill and The President said they wished to thank Stalin for this action. 4. Iran Churchill said they had submitted a paper 31 to the Council and he would be very glad to hear the views of the other great powers. Stalin said that the British proposals were based on the presumption that the term for the presence of Allied troops in Iran had expired. The Soviets proceeded on the assumption that the term had not expired and that it would do so only after the termination of the war against Japan. He pointed out that this was stipulated by the treaty. 32 Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation concurred with paragraph 1 of the British paper that their troops be withdrawn from Tehran and he suggested that they let it go at that. The President said that we had been ready for a long time to withdraw but pointed out that we had many supplies in Iran and that we wished to guard them for use in the war against Japan. Stalin said that the Russian delegation had no objection to the presence of American and British troops in Iran but he agreed that troops from Tehran might be withdrawn. The President said he thought that there were no American troops in Tehran. Stalin said that even if there were the Russians had no objection. He proposed that they confine themselves to the immediate withdrawal from Tehran. Churchill said that the British were anxious to proceed to the other points raised in the British paper. Of course only two and one-half months had elapsed since the termination of the war against Germany. The British would like for the removal of troops to continue on both sides because they had promised that they would go when the German war was over. They would, therefore, like to withdraw when the other two stages were completed. Stalin said that they would like to have time to think this over. The treaty said that the troops should be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of the war with Germany and her associates. That included Japan. They had until six months after the completion of the war with Japan. This gave them plenty of time. Churchill suggested that they accept the proposal to withdraw from Tehran and that they let the Foreign Ministers take another look at the matter when they met. The President said that we were proceeding with our withdrawal because we needed our troops in the Far East. He said that we expected to be out within sixty days. Stalin said that the United States was fully entitled to look after their supplies. He added, “So as to rid the United States of any worries we promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran.” The President said he thanked Stalin for this statement. (Field Marshal Alexander entered the room at this point and Stalin walked around the table to shake hands with him after which he greeted the President.) 5. Occupation of Vienna Churchill said that with respect to the zones [ sectors? ] allotted to British and American troops it appeared that so far as the British were concerned that in the principal zone of Vienna there were 500,000 people. As the feeding grounds of Vienna lay to the east of Vienna, they would not be able to undertake the feeding of those 500,000 persons. What they suggested, therefore, was a provisional arrangement under which the Russians would go on feeding until a more permanent arrangement could be worked out. He called upon Field Marshal Alexander to speak. Field Marshal Alexander said that there were about 500,000 people in Vienna to be fed. He did not have the food to send from Italy. There was a small reserve in Villach in the Klagenfurt area. This could be provided but he thought he was correct in stating that it would be enough for only about three weeks or one month. If they took on the obligation to feed these people the food would have to come from the United States. Churchill pointed out that this would be in addition to the population in the United States zone of Vienna. The President said that there were about 375,000 in our zone. He said that our transport was almost totally engaged in transporting supplies in the Japanese war and in supplying Italy, France, Russia, and other countries in Europe. Stalin asked what about the French zone. The President said he did not know. Stalin said he would have to talk with Marshal Konev. He was acquainted with the matter. He would like to know what period they had in mind. Was it until the next harvest? Churchill said the difficulty was that the people in Vienna had always drawn their food from the East. Stalin said that they had made an arrangement with the Austrian Government that they would undertake to provide a small quantity of food for money until the next harvest. This would continue until August or September. He would have to talk, however, with Marshal Konev. Churchill pointed out that Field Marshal Alexander was entering Styria with his troops but was reluctant to enter Vienna because of the difficulty in regard to food. Stalin asked if the food situation in Vienna was so bad now. Churchill replied that they had not been there. Stalin said that it wouldn’t seem to be so bad so far as the population was concerned. Field Marshal Alexander said that if the Generalissimo could help them with food they were ready to go forward and take up their work. Stalin said that he would let them know that evening or the next day. Churchill thanked the Marshal for this. Stalin said it would be well if the British and American Governments would agree to extend the authority of the Renner Government to their zones. This would not imply diplomatic recognition but they should be placed in the same position as Finland. The authority of the Renner Government should be extended to the British and American zones in order to help them in the collection of food. The President said that he thought that as soon as we had moved in and had looked into the matter we would be able to agree to this. Churchill referred to his remark of the previous day [ earlier today ] 33 when he had said that they had two divisions in Greece and he proposed to ask Field Marshal Alexander to speak on this subject. Stalin interrupted and said he disagreed and as he had said at the previous meeting a Churchill statement could not be impugned. 33 Churchill said he wished to raise a question of procedure. He had drawn the attention of his colleagues to the fact that Mr. Attlee and he had interests 34 to attend to in London on Thursday. They, therefore, had to leave by lunch time on Wednesday, taking the Foreign Secretary 35 with them, and that they would be back for the evening sitting on the 27th. He added, “or some of us will be back”. Could they not meet on Monday [ Wednesday ] morning before his departure. This was agreed to. Churchill suggested that the Foreign Ministers continue to meet and that in Mr. Eden’s absence Sir Alexander Cadogan would represent him. This was agreed to. The meeting adjourned. 36 5 Cf. ante , p. 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] . 6 Documents Nos. 920 and 921 , post . 7 Of the attachment to document No. 863 , post . 8 Document No. 872 , post . 9 Probably document No. 873 , post . 10 Document No. 714 , post . 11 Document No. 733 , post . 12 Document No. 870 , post . 13 Document No. 1161 , post . 14 Document No. 1356 , post . 15 See document No. 1383 , post , section i. 16 See ante , pp. 256–258 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 17 Cf. documents Nos. 1071 (enclosure 2), 1072 , and 1076 (annex i), post . 18 Cf. documents Nos. 457 and 459, printed in vol. i , and document No. 1072 , post . 19 See vol. i , documents Nos. 683 and 684 . 20 Signed July 20, 1936. For full text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 213. Substantive provisions printed also in Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits , p. 25. 21 Document No. 755 , post . 22 The records of the Tehran Conference are scheduled for subsequent publication in a volume in this series. See Churchill, Closing the Ring , p. 403; Herbert Feis, Churchill–Roosevelt–Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 1957), p. 287. 23 See the map facing p. 748 in vol. i . For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , pp. 793 – 794 . 24 See Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report , 5th series, vol. 406, col. 1478. 25 Document No. 1020 , post . 26 Document No. 1341 , post . 27 For further particulars on this and other matters referred to by Churchill in his discussion of Syria and Lebanon, see vol. i , document No. 636 , and Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , pp. 561–566. 28 See vol. i , document No. 642 . 29 See vol. i , document No. 636, footnote 2 . 30 The following additional information on this statement by Truman is given in a personal letter dated August 18, 1945, from Allen to Minister George Wadsworth at Beirut (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–1845): “When Churchill referred to the continued privileged position for France I whispered to Jimmy Dunn, reminding him that the United States had never concurred with this position and that we regarded our recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence as being full and unrestricted. We did not concur in a privileged position for anyone in the area. Jimmy immediately wrote this down on a small piece of paper and handed it to Mr. Byrnes, who was sitting at the big table. Mr. Byrnes, after reading it, passed it on to President Truman. As soon as Churchill stopped speaking, Truman placed the American position before the Conference.” 31 Document No. 1330 , post . 32 i. e., the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of January 29, 1942. Text in Department of State Bulletin , vol. vi , p. 249. 33 See ante , p. 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 33 See ante , p. 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 34 i. e., the announcement of the results of the general election which had taken place in the United Kingdom, as the result of which Attlee succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister on July 26 and returned to the Berlin Conference as head of the British Delegation on July 28. 35 Anthony Eden. 36 At 7:00 p.m. See Log, ante , p. 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 23, 1945, 5 p.m. Molotov reads the report of the Foreign Secretaries. 1. The economic subcommittee was instructed to consider Soviet proposals on reparations. 1 2. Economic principles for Germany were discussed. Russia withdrew her proposed amendment to paragraph 13 thereof. Russia asked the deletion of paragraph 18 for further study by the Allied Control Commission. No agreement was reached, and the question was referred to the Big Three. 3. Proposal for council of Foreign Ministers was approved with verbal amendments. 4. Trusteeships were discussed. It was agreed that the disposition of the Italian colonies should be taken up by the council of Foreign Ministers. 5. It was agreed that all decisions of the conference affecting the work of the Allied commanders in Germany should be communicated to them, and that a committee should be empowered to draft such communication. 6. The matter of collaboration of the three powers in European economic problems was discussed. 7. Tangier. It was agreed that Tangier should be returned to its international status, and that the question should be discussed in a conference of the four powers, including France, in the near future. The invitation to China and France to participate in the council of Foreign Ministers was approved, and it was agreed that this should be sent 48 hours before the release of the final communiqué. The agenda proposed for the Big Three discussion today included Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, and Iran. Truman : First subject is Turkey. Churchill : I thought we would renew the discussion of the problem of feeding Germany. (It was agreed that matters referred to the Foreign Secretaries and agreed to by them could be regarded as accepted by the Big Three, unless some objection was raised.) Churchill : Before I finished talking yesterday, I made it clear that we could not support Russia’s claim against Turkey for a military base in the Black Sea. Stalin : Yesterday, Mr. Churchill asserted Russia had frightened Turkey, particularly by concentrating troops in Bulgaria. Mr. Churchill’s information is out of date. Russia has very few troops in Bulgaria, but the British have more in Greece. Churchill : We have only 40 thousand troops in Greece. Stalin : Russia has less. The Turks have nothing to be afraid of. The Turks have 23 divisions on the frontier. As to rectification of the frontier, I refer to the two provinces [Kars and Ardahan]. 2 This question of the rectification of the frontiers would not have come up if the question of an alliance had not come up. If the alliance is dropped, the rectification of the frontiers will lapse. So far as the Straits are concerned, the position of Russia is deplorable. The Montreux Convention is inimical to Russia. Turkey has a right to block our ships. More than that, Russia has less rights than Japan. Small states controlled by Britain have real control of the Straits. Turkey is not capable of keeping control of the Straits. The Straits must be defended by force, the same as the [Panama Canal is defended by the] 3 American navy, the same as the British navy defends the Suez. Truman : The Montreux Convention should be revised. Most of the wars in the last twenty years have arisen in this area. It should be the business of the peace conference to see that that does not happen again. There must be freedom of intercourse in all that section. I want to see Russia, Britain and the United States have access to all the seas in the world. I will distribute a paper on this subject. (The President reads the paper. He emphasizes that there should be free and unrestricted traffic on inland waterways, and such waterways should be controlled by the representation of all states concerned. As initial step, there should be international agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The function of these agencies should be the development of navigation on the rivers in question. The membership of these agencies should include the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the Riparian States. The same procedure should apply in the case of the Kiel Canal, and the Montreux Convention should be similarly revised.) Truman : I do not want to fight another war in twenty years because of a quarrel on the Danube. We want a prosperous, self-supporting Europe. A bankrupt Europe is of no advantage to any country, or to the peace of the world. The territorial dispute between Russia and Turkey should be settled by themselves, but the waterways are of interest to the whole world. Churchill : I strongly support Marshal Stalin’s wish for the revision of the Montreux Convention, with the objective of security for Russia, and free and unrestricted navigation of the Straits between the Black Sea and the Aegean by merchant ships and by warships, whether in time of peace or war. I agree with the President that that freedom should be guaranteed by all of us. I earnestly hope that the Marshal will consider that alternative to the establishment of a Russian base in close proximity to Constantinople. As to the other waterways, we are in full accord with the general lines of the President’s statement. The Kiel Canal should be free and open, and guaranteed by the great powers. We also attach great importance to free navigation of the Danube and the Rhine. Truman : There is no disagreement on the revision of the Montreux Convention. Churchill : Nor on the purpose for which it is to be revised. Stalin : I must read attentively the President’s paper. Perhaps in the meantime we might consider the next question. Truman : The Koenigsberg area. Stalin : This was brought up at Yalta. 4 We stated it was necessary to have at least one ice-free port at the expense of Germany. Too much blood has been spilled by the Soviet Union not to have some piece of German territory. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister raised any objection at Yalta, so the question was agreed upon. We are anxious to have that agreement confirmed at this conference. Truman : No objection in principle, but technical and ethnic details must be considered. Churchill : I spoke in the Commons in 1944, and referred to the Soviets’ wish to have Koenigsberg, which would mean that Poland’s frontier would run to the south of that. I made it clear that the British government sympathized with the Russian desires. Truman : The next question is Syria and the Lebanon. Molotov : The Soviet delegation submits a short draft on this question. Churchill : The burden of maintaining order falls on our shoulders. We are seeking no advantage for ourselves which will not go to all other countries. Both France and Britain have recognized the independence of this area, when a troop settlement was made. In consideration of France’s long, historic connection with Syria and the Lebanon, we agreed not to object to France having a favored position, if that could be satisfactorily arranged with the governments of Syria and the Lebanon. We have told General de Gaulle that as soon as he makes a satisfactory treaty with Syria and the Lebanon, we will withdraw our troops. The withdrawal of our troops now would lead to the massacre of French civilians and French troops there. We should not like to have that happen. It would lead to great excitement throughout the Arab world, and make the maintenance of peace more difficult in Palestine and Iraq. It might affect Egypt, too. We could not have a worse moment for this disturbance. It would endanger lines of communication through the Suez Canal through which both British and American supplies are proceeding for the war against Japan. General de Gaulle has acted very unwisely in this region, against our advice and entreaty. The outbreak was caused by 500 troops being sent on the ship. They could do nothing but strike a spark. Lately, de Gaulle has agreed to hand over the “ Troupes Spéciales ” to the Syrian government, and 1 trust we shall be able to reach, if not an agreement then some sort of settlement with him which would guarantee the independence of Syria and the Lebanon, and secure some recognition for the French—their cultural and commercial interests, which they have built up over so many years. Let me repeat, Britain will not remain there one day longer than necessary. We will be delighted to withdraw from a thankless task, assumed in the interest of our Allies, as well as ourselves. In view of the states interested, we do not welcome the proposal to have a conference in which the United States and the Soviet Union would enter with Great Britain and France. The whole burden has been borne by us. Eden : (interrupting) Except for the diplomatic approval of the United States. Churchill : (continuing) If the United States desires to take our place, it might open a new question. Truman : No thank you, Mr. Churchill. The British reported to us on the disorders in Syria, and advised us that they had troops to protect the situation affecting the lines of communications. The United States told the Prime Minister to go ahead. We might, however, be in disagreement on one point. We do not think any country entitled to special privilege. We are for equality for all. Stalin : I may assume that my colleagues do not recognize privileged rights in Syria and the Lebanon? Truman : Yes. Churchill : We promised France a favored position when we were very weak. We cannot bind others. If France cannot get them, we would not object. Stalin : From whom can France obtain these privileges? Churchill : From the Syrian and Lebanese republics. Stalin : From them alone? Churchill : Yes. Truman : We shall stand for equal rights. Churchill : Would you prevent the Syrians from giving privileges? Truman : That will not be necessary. Stalin : The Soviet delegation thanks Mr. Churchill for his information, and withdraws their paper on this subject. Truman : Iran is the next subject on our agenda. Stalin : The British proposals are based on the assumption that the term for Allied troops in Iran has expired. We proceed on the contrary assumption. The term expires only after the war with Japan. Nevertheless, the Soviets accept the first paragraph of the British proposal, that troops should be immediately withdrawn from Tehran. Truman : We would be willing to withdraw at any time, but we have vast quantities of supplies to protect. Stalin : The Russian delegation has no objection to American and British troops in Tehran, but our troops will be withdrawn. Truman : We have no troops in Tehran. Stalin : We would not object, but let us withdraw from Tehran. Churchill : We would like the movement to continue. We promised to go out. We would like the other two phases to proceed. Stalin : I think we still have time to think. The treaty says six months after all hostilities with Germany and her associates. That implies Japan. Churchill : Shall we agree to withdraw from Tehran now, and look at the problem again in September, when the council of Foreign Ministers meets? Truman : We will be out in sixty days. We need the troops and supplies in Japan. Stalin : Of course, the United States has the right to do so. We promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran. (Field Marshal Alexander arrives, and is greeted by Marshal Stalin and President Truman). Churchill : We are unable to undertake the feeding of the population in our zone in Vienna. We suggest Russia continue to feed this zone until more permanent arrangements can be worked out. Alexander : There are 500 thousand Viennese to be fed. I have not the food to send from Italy. The reserves available will not last three weeks. So if we undertake to feed, the food must come from the United States. Truman : There are 375 thousand in our zone. Stalin : Let me have a talk with Marshal [Konev]. 5 The situation does not appear to us to be so bad, and I will let you know tonight or tomorrow. Churchill : I thank the Marshal. Stalin : It will be a good thing if the American and British governments would allow the Renner government to extend its authority to their zones. This need not imply recognition. This will facilitate the distribution of food. Truman : We will be glad to consider this. Churchill : We also. Churchill : Field Marshal Alexander will give the figures of our troops in Greece. Stalin : The Prime Minister has given the figures, and his figures cannot be impugned. Churchill : My memory may have been bad. Alexander : 40 thousand. Stalin : The Prime Minister’s figures cannot be impugned. Churchill : We must leave Wednesday at lunch-time, and will [be] back in the evening of the 27th; so we would suggest a morning session Wednesday, and we will be back for the Friday session. I also suggest the Foreign Secretaries continue to meet with Sir Alexander Cadogan, acting as Eden’s Deputy. Truman : That is satisfactory. 1 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the minutes, supra . 2 The Cohen notes read “Quas and Ardhandheim (???)”. The correct place names supplied from the minutes, ante , p. 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 3 The words in brackets have been inserted on the basis of the minutes, ante , p. 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 4 The minutes say Tehran; cf. ante , p. 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 5 Name supplied from the minutes, ante , p. 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) 890d.00/7–2445 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) 1 top secret Memorandum Subject: Discussion in Big Three Meeting on July 23, 1945, regarding Syria and Lebanon . When this item on the agenda was reached, Stalin stated that he would circulate a draft of a proposed brief statement to which he hoped the Conference could agree on this subject (a copy of the draft is attached 2 ). Churchill : At present the burden of maintaining order in Syria and Lebanon has fallen on our shoulders. We have no intention or desire to gain advantages there except those enjoyed by other countries. When we entered this area in 1941 to throw out the Germans and Vichy French, we and the Free French both agreed to recognize the independence of Lebanon and Syria. In consideration of the very long historical connection of France in these countries, we agreed not to object to France having a continued favored position there. We have told General de Gaulle that when he makes a mutually satisfactory treaty with these two countries, we shall withdraw our troops. If we withdraw now, it would lead to a massacre of the French civilians and small number of French troops there. The outbreak would affect security in Palestine and Iraq and possibly also in Egypt. There could not be a worse moment than the present for such a disturbance. The area constitutes an important line of communications to the Far Eastern war. The recent troubles started when the French sent 500 reinforcements to the area. This was a ridiculous action. What could 500 men do? But the entire Arab world was immediately convulsed with excitement. Lately General de Gaulle has agreed to hand over to Syria and Lebanon the Troupes Spéciales . I trust that agreement will be reached on independence and some recognition given to the French cultural and commercial position in the area. We repeat, we have no desires except to withdraw from a thankless task, assumed on behalf of the Allies. Since the matter rests between us and the French, we do not welcome the proposal for a conference in which the United States and the U. S. S. R. would enter. The whole burden has been borne by us with no help (after prompting by Mr. Eden, Mr. Churchill added: “except for the diplomatic approval and support of the United States”). If the United States cares to take our place, that would offer a new consideration. Truman : No, thank you. When the trouble started, I had some correspondence with the Prime Minister on the subject. Mr. Churchill wrote to me, saying that another war was about to commence in the Near East and he had the troops to stop it. I said: “Please do so by all means. We do not want a war near the Suez route to the Far East”. We are in slight disagreement with the Prime Minister, however, in one regard. We are in favor of equal treatment for everybody in the area, with no one having a privileged position. Stalin : Including France? Truman : Yes. Stalin : May I infer that my colleagues do not recognize any special privileges for France in the area? Truman : I certainly do not. Churchill : We would like to see France have a privileged position there. We agreed to this when we were weak. We cannot change now. This agreement, however, was only as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. We would not make any serious effort to help France obtain privileges. If they do so, we shall smile benignly. Stalin : From whom can France get these privileges? Churchill : From Syria and Lebanon. Stalin : Only Syria and Lebanon? Churchill : Only. The French have large interests there. They even have a tune: “Pars [ Partant? ] pour la Syrie”. (Laughter). Their interests go back to the Crusades. Truman : The United States favors equal rights for everyone. Churchill : Will you prevent Syria from giving privileges to France? Truman : No, but we are certain that the Syrians will not give France privileges. Stalin : The Syrians are reluctant to do so. (Laughter). I welcome the full explanation given to us on this subject by Mr. Churchill and am happy to withdraw my paper. (This item on the agenda was considered as having been completed with the foregoing discussion). George V. Allen Berlin Conference, July 24, 1945. 1 Printed from the ribbon copy, which bears only a typed signature. 2 Document No. 1341 , post . Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m. Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m. 1 1 Churchill as host. The dinner was held at Churchill’s quarters, 23 Ring strasse, Babelsberg. List of participants (other than Moran) from the Log, ante , p. 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Army General Antonov General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Alexander Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham Marshal of Aviation Fodalev [ Falaleyev ?] General of the Army Arnold Field Marshal Wilson Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetzov Mr. Bohlen Sir Edward Bridges Field Marshal Montgomery Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal Field Marshal Brooke Commander Thompson Major Birse Lord Moran 2 2 Moran’s presence is mentioned in Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York, 1952), p. 614. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)]] Editor’s Note Babelsberg, July 24, 1945. 811.001 Truman, H. S./7–2445 Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] Editor’s Note —Aside from the Bohlen memorandum printed immediately below, no official record has been found of the substance of the conversation at this dinner meeting. Cf. the following account in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , pages 668–669: “… There were many speeches, and Stalin, without even ensuring that all the waiters and orderlies had left the room, proposed that our next meeting should be in Tokyo. .… 3 I had another very friendly talk with Stalin, who … seemed to have no inkling of the momentous information about the new bomb the President had given me. 4 He spoke with enthusiasm about the Russian intervention against Japan, and seemed to expect a good many months of war, which Russia would wage on an ever-increasing scale, governed only by the Trans-Siberian Railway. “… After a pause Stalin said, ‘If you find it impossible to give us a fortified position in the Marmora, could we not have a base at Dedeagatch [ Alexandroupolis ]?’ I contented myself with saying, ‘I will always support Russia in her claim to the freedom of the seas all the year round.’” 811.001 Truman, H. S./7–2445 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] The Assistant to the Secretary of State ( Bohlen ) to the President 5 Babelsberg , July 24, 1945. Memorandum for the President The following, as near as I can remember it, is the Prime Minister’s toast to you yesterday evening, your reply, and Marshal Stalin’s additions: The Prime Minister said they had already drunk to the President as Head of State, but he wished now to propose a toast to the President as a man. He said that he had not had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Truman until this Conference, but he was sure that everyone present had been as impressed as he had with the firm, decisive and business-like direction of their deliberations. He said that they had all been struck also with the President’s sincerity, frankness and powers of decision. The President, Mr. Churchill continued, reflected in his character and abilities the best qualities of the great republic which he headed. He said he knew he was speaking for Marshal Stalin when he said they were glad to welcome the President into association and friendship and he wished to raise his glass to a man who was sincere in purpose, clear in speech, and true in deed. The President , in reply to this toast, expressed his deep appreciation for the kind words of the Prime Minister and said that he was naturally a timid man and that when the Prime Minister had suggested and Marshal Stalin had supported the proposal that he be made presiding officer over this Conference 6 he had been literally overwhelmed. He said he would continue to do his utmost for the success of the Conference and for the future peace and well-being of the world, and he wished to say what a great pleasure and privilege it was for him, a country boy from Missouri, to be associated with two such great figures as the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. Marshal Stalin then arose to say that in his opinion modesty such as the President’s was a great source of strength and a real indication of character; he added that this was particularly true when it was coupled, as in the case of President Truman, with real strength and character and honesty of purpose. He concluded that he wished to associate himself fully with the remarks of the Prime Minister and was delighted to welcome President Truman into their midst. 7 Charles E. Bohlen 3 Cf. H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 590. 4 See ante , pp. 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] . 5 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 6 See ante , p. 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . 7 Concerning Churchill’s toast at this dinner meeting to the next Leader of the Opposition, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , p. 668; The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay , p. 402. The Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) to the President 811.001 Truman, H. S./7–2445 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] The Assistant to the Secretary of State ( Bohlen ) to the President 5 Babelsberg , July 24, 1945. Memorandum for the President The following, as near as I can remember it, is the Prime Minister’s toast to you yesterday evening, your reply, and Marshal Stalin’s additions: The Prime Minister said they had already drunk to the President as Head of State, but he wished now to propose a toast to the President as a man. He said that he had not had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Truman until this Conference, but he was sure that everyone present had been as impressed as he had with the firm, decisive and business-like direction of their deliberations. He said that they had all been struck also with the President’s sincerity, frankness and powers of decision. The President, Mr. Churchill continued, reflected in his character and abilities the best qualities of the great republic which he headed. He said he knew he was speaking for Marshal Stalin when he said they were glad to welcome the President into association and friendship and he wished to raise his glass to a man who was sincere in purpose, clear in speech, and true in deed. The President , in reply to this toast, expressed his deep appreciation for the kind words of the Prime Minister and said that he was naturally a timid man and that when the Prime Minister had suggested and Marshal Stalin had supported the proposal that he be made presiding officer over this Conference 6 he had been literally overwhelmed. He said he would continue to do his utmost for the success of the Conference and for the future peace and well-being of the world, and he wished to say what a great pleasure and privilege it was for him, a country boy from Missouri, to be associated with two such great figures as the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. Marshal Stalin then arose to say that in his opinion modesty such as the President’s was a great source of strength and a real indication of character; he added that this was particularly true when it was coupled, as in the case of President Truman, with real strength and character and honesty of purpose. He concluded that he wished to associate himself fully with the remarks of the Prime Minister and was delighted to welcome President Truman into their midst. 7 Charles E. Bohlen 5 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 6 See ante , p. 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . 7 Concerning Churchill’s toast at this dinner meeting to the next Leader of the Opposition, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , p. 668; The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay , p. 402. Mosely-Gusev conversation, evening Mosely-Gusev conversation, evening Present United States Soviet Union Mr. Mosely Mr. Gusev [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)]] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Babelsberg, July 23, 1945. 740.00119 EAC/7–2345: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 740.00119 EAC/7–2345: Telegram [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) secret Babelsberg , July 23, 1945. Victory 241. To AmEmbassy London for Winant. Info [Acting] SecState Washington. (Message has been sent to MA, London.) Gousev informed Mosely tonight instructions sent Saksin last night or this morning to sign EAC agreement on additional requirements. 1 Byrnes 1 See ante , p. 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)] ] , and post , pp. 1006–1023 [ Pgs. 1006–1023 include portions of Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] . Seventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:15 a.m. Seventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:15 a.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Dunn Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gromyko Mr. Clayton Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev Mr. Harriman Sir William Strang Mr. Maisky Mr. Murphy Mr. Ward Mr. Sobolev Mr. Pauley Mr. Novikov Mr. Matthews Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Cohen Mr. Russell Poland 1 President Bierut Deputy Prime Minister Mikolajczyk Deputy Prime Minister Gomulka Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski Foreign Minister Rzymowski Mr. Modzelewski Vice President Grabski Marshal Rola-Żymierski 1 The Polish representatives were present for the last part of the meeting only. See post , p. 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . On the cover sheet of the minutes, after the names of Bierut, Osóbka-Morawski, Grabski, and Mikolajczyk, is the following note: “(Upon request of the Delegation four other members of the Delegation were present in the room)”. The annex to the minutes mentions the presence of Rzymowski. Gomulka, Modzelewski, Rola-Żymierski, and Stańczyk are listed in Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy , p. 407, as present at this meeting. The Mikolajczyk Papers indicate, however, that Stańczyk did not arrive at Babelsberg until July 29. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)]] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:15 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)]] United States Delegation Memorandum [Babelsberg, July 24, 1945.] Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)]] Rapporteur’s Report Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:15 a.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2445 Department of State Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:15 a.m. top secret The Seventh Session of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers opened at 11:15 a.m. on Tuesday, July 24, 1945. Mr. Byrnes was in the Chair. Mr. Byrnes asked that the meeting review some of the matters pending before the Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Ministers had been requested to hear a statement from the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government. Mr. Byrnes had been informed that these gentlemen have now arrived and he suggested that the Foreign Ministers should proceed with the consideration of other matters before them and fix an hour, say 12:30, to invite the gentlemen to come into this room. Mr. Molotov agreed. Mr. Byrnes stated that he would have a message to this effect communicated to the Polish representatives. German Economic Questions and German Reparations Mr. Byrnes then raised the matter of German economic questions and German reparations. Mr. Molotov added the question of reparations by Italy. Mr. Byrnes agreed and asked whether the economic subcommittee was ready to report. Mr. Molotov asked whether he could suggest something. Mr. Byrnes replied that he was glad to receive the suggestion and asked Mr. Molotov to proceed. Mr. Molotov stated that the first question concerned reparations from Germany. He had a suggestion regarding German [ Austrian? ] reparations here. He was sorry that it is only a Russian text. 2 The next paper circulated concerned Italian reparations. 3 Mr. Molotov added that of course the principal question concerned Germany. Mr. Byrnes after reading the paper asked concerning the pleasure of the Foreign Ministers regarding its disposition. He stated that he had been informed that the subcommittee was meeting tonight in order to discuss Austrian and Italian reparations. It might be well to refer these documents to the committee. Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed. Mr. Byrnes stated that this would be done. Mr. Byrnes then referred to German reparations and asked whether there was any reason further to discuss this matter at this table or whether the economic subcommittee should be permitted to continue discussions in hope that they might be able to arrange for some report. Mr. Molotov had no objection to the last suggestion since it might then be possible to discuss the matter tomorrow. Mr. Byrnes stated that the matter would be passed in this session. European Oil Supplies Mr. Byrnes raised the matter of European oil supplies. He pointed out that a paper had been presented on this subject by the American delegation on July 20. 4 He asked whether the meeting was prepared to discuss it. Mr. Molotov asked whether it had been discussed by the economic subcommittee. Mr. Byrnes replied that he was advised that the question was so discussed but that the Soviet representative had asked for further time to consider and that this question is also coming up tonight. Therefore he assumed that this question must also be passed. Implementation of Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe Mr. Byrnes then stated that the discussion on the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe 5 was still pending. He had been informed that the subcommittee on this subject had not met since night before last when the Soviet representative, 6 who was Chairman, stated that he would have a new proposal to submit. He asked whether it could be ascertained whether the subcommittee can meet today. Mr. Molotov stated that he could give some information on this question. He had seen the draft of the Soviet representatives which will be submitted to the committee. In connection with the Control Councils he had had to receive the text of the suggested changes mentioned during the last meeting [ the meeting on July 22 7 ] from Moscow. They had been circulated this morning. 8 He asked whether the American and British representatives had received them. Mr. Eden stated that they had arrived but were in Russian and were now being translated. Mr. Byrnes added that the paper in Russian had been delivered only a few moments ago. Consideration would have to wait until it had been translated. Admission of Italy and Non-Admission of Spain Into International Organizations Mr. Byrnes stated that the next question remaining open is the admission of Italy and the non-admission of Spain into international organizations. In regard to this matter the subcommittee had been requested to submit its report. The American representative 9 had advised Mr. Byrnes that the Soviet representative 10 was not able to arrange a meeting. There has been no meeting of this subcommittee since July 21. Mr. Byrnes asked whether the Foreign Ministers could not proceed with the discussion of this question at this table. Mr. Molotov stated that he was not quite familiar with the draft. 11 However, he could study it now if Mr. Byrnes wished. Mr. Byrnes suggested that he do so. So long as there are five or six questions of this character remaining open, we ought to dispose of them as rapidly as possible. Mr. Molotov replied that he was always in favor of progress. Mr. Eden asked for a minute or two to read the paper. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had been informed by the American representative on the committee that part of this paper had been drafted by the subcommittee and agreed to. Mr. Molotov stated that he had not been informed of this. Mr. Byrnes continued that he had been further advised that on the first two paragraphs the reasoning had been suggested by the Soviet representative but that the American and British had not agreed to Mr. Maisky’s language. The language of this draft had been suggested by the American and British representatives. 12 Mr. Molotov asked what it is about. He pointed out that the document mentioned Italy, mentioned the neutrals, but the countries who fought with us against the enemy were not mentioned. This would not do. He suggested reference to the Big Three. Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Eden asked whether they would not look at the draft before reference to the Big Three. Mr. Molotov stated that he would not look at the draft in this form. Mr. Eden replied that he had wanted to make verbal changes only. Mr. Byrnes stated that he would consider any suggestion, but the best way to dispose of the question was to refer it to the Big Three. Mr. Eden stated that he would give his changes anyway. He suggested leaving out the last sentence of paragraph [one]. 13 Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Eden also pointed out that the document talked about peace with Italy and that other nations were concerned with this matter. He would redraft to make this clear. 14 Mr. Byrnes then stated that he had been handed a draft 15 and would read it to see if Mr. Eden agreed. Mr. Molotov interjected to state that he was sorry that he could not take part in these changes since they did not deal with substance. Mr. Eden stated his assumption that what Mr. Molotov wants is to add to the text something regarding the cobelligerents Rumania and Bulgaria. The changes suggested by Mr. Eden did not deal with this matter. Mr. Molotov inquired whether mention could be made here of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the question of establishment of diplomatic relations was discussed by the Big Three. The President has stated that the United States was unwilling to recognize these countries and gave the reasons for that attitude. 16 Therefore, that matter may well be discussed in the Big Three if they wish. The American Delegation will agree to the language suggested by the British. Therefore, I suggest that this paper be reported to the Big Three as agreed between the British and American Delegations. 17 It should also be reported that the Soviet Delegation was unable to agree because they wish action taken regarding Rumania and Bulgaria. Mr. Molotov stated that he would like it to be mentioned in the report that the Soviet Delegation refused to take part in this discussion because his colleagues had refused to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations. It is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation that the choice between Switzerland and Portugal on the one hand and Rumania and Bulgaria on the other hand should be resolved in favor of those who helped us to win the war. He wouldn’t object to steps being taken to make things easier for Italy if similar steps were taken for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary did more to help to defeat Germany than Italy, which had played only a small part. Mr. Eden replied that these governments are not regarded by us as representative and that is why we do not wish to recognize them. Mr. Molotov asked why they were less representative than Italy. Mr. Eden replied that the Italian Government contained representatives of all parties in the state, while Rumania and Bulgaria were minority governments mainly composed of Communists. Mr. Molotov stated that in all these governments the Communist Party formed a small minority. Mr. Eden stated that there is another story behind this one. Mr. Molotov replied that it was not a Communist story. He pointed out that the King had appointed the government in Rumania. Mr. Eden interjected, “with a little help from Vyshinski, perhaps.” 18 Mr. Vyshinski entered the conversation to state that he had helped many to enter the government who were not Communists. Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation would like this question considered in all its phases and not on the basis of the exception of some countries, but that the Soviet suggestion had been ignored. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had a suggestion to propose for consideration by the Russian Delegation. He read: “The three Governments also hope that the Council of Foreign Ministers may without undue delay prepare peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. It is also their desire on the conclusion of these peace treaties with responsible democratic governments of these countries to support their application for membership in the United Nations Organization.” Mr. Byrnes pointed out regarding the first sentence that the Council of Foreign Ministers was already charged with that duty. 19 Therefore, the only question concerned the second sentence. He went on to suggest to Mr. Molotov that the language agreed to regarding Italy be changed in a way that he believed would meet Mr. Molotov’s approval. 20 The change would make the language regarding Italy the same as the language regarding the governments in which Mr. Molotov had expressed an interest. Mr. Molotov stated that he was not speaking of the exact wording, but of the essence of the suggestion. His general position was that Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland should not be in a position as to the Allies worse than that of Italy. If this principle was accepted he suggested the appointment of a drafting committee to prepare a paper for discussion. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that so far as a subcommittee is concerned there is no change in the position of the United States regarding recognition of these governments. The United States did not regard them as governments having broad representation of all democratic parties. Mr. Molotov replied that he was not suggesting that the United States now establish diplomatic relations. Mr. Byrnes then said that so far as the statement under consideration is concerned he was satisfied that as now amended it would place Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria in the same position as Italy because it says that on the conclusion of peace treaties with representative governments it would be possible to support their admission into the United Nations Organization. The same language as used for Italy would be used in the paragraph referring to Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. He reread his suggested amendment. Mr. Molotov stated that he thought the wording could be improved. The important thing for the Soviet Delegation is to arrive at an understanding on substance. He asked what the situation was in Italy. The American and Soviet Governments have established diplomatic relations with Italy. The British have not. He asked whether France has an Ambassador there. Mr. Eden stated that he would check since he did not know. He thought the position of France was the same as the British position. Mr. Molotov stated that perhaps the United States had grounds not to establish relations with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The meeting had before it a very complicated question affecting many countries, including Italy, the neutral states and Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. He suggested that a wording be worked out in order that Rumania, Bulgaria, [and] Hungary not be placed in a worse position than Italy. This is a condition for the participation of the Soviet Union in this matter. The Delegation had no authority to do otherwise. If this suggestion that Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary and Finland be not placed in a worse position than Italy is accepted, it would be easy to agree. If not, it would not be possible to arrive at a common decision. Mr. Byrnes repeated that the proposed language did place Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary in the same position as Italy so far as this statement is concerned. Mr. Eden interposed to state his belief that we must not try too much to use words to paper over facts. He pointed out that there actually is a real difference between Italy and some of the countries mentioned by Mr. Molotov. The difference is that the British would be willing to make peace with the present Italian Government, and the present British position is that it is not prepared to do so with the governments in Rumania and Bulgaria. This is the fact and Mr. Eden did not think that it should be covered over with words. Mr. Molotov asked that the matter be referred to the Big Three. This would be another good issue. He stated that the Big Three are more reasonable people than we and find a way out. Rumanian Oil [ Equipment ] Mr. Byrnes stated that the question of Rumanian oil [equipment] is still pending. The British Delegation wished to make a further statement. Mr. Eden stated that he had an idea that he thought might help. He circulated a proposal. 21 Mr. Byrnes referred to the proposal that a committee of three Allied nationals be appointed and asked how it would be drawn up. Mr. Eden stated his idea that it should not be composed of representatives of the three nations here or of Rumania. Mr. Molotov asked what committee and where it would come from. Mr. Byrnes replied that it was on the question of whether the pipes were the property of a British national or Germans. Mr. Molotov asked what the committee’s functions would be. Mr. Byrnes went on to state that the committee’s functions would also include questions of where American citizens said their property had been taken. Therefore, this question could not be decided here but should be decided only after an investigation of the facts. He associated himself with the suggestion for the appointment of representatives of other countries. If this committee said the property was German, then the Russians would have a right to it. If they said it was American, he assumed that the Russians would agree. Mr. Molotov stated that there was no such question on the agenda. Mr. Byrnes replied that we had put it on. Mr. Molotov insisted that he hadn’t received any such suggestion. Mr. Byrnes stated that the question had been on the agenda and had been discussed for some hours. Since the matter was before the meeting it should be disposed of. Now the British had submitted a proposal. Mr. Molotov then stated that he wished to have a Russian text of this paper. Agenda for Big Three Meeting Mr. Byrnes asked for suggestions for the agenda for the afternoon meeting. Mr. Eden asked what was on the list. Mr. Byrnes stated that up to now there was very little. Mr. Molotov stated that he had a short clear paper [ two papers ] regarding Italian and Austrian reparations. 22 Mr. Byrnes replied that it was his understanding that this matter had been referred to a subcommittee meeting this evening and that the Soviet paper would be considered at that time. Mr. Molotov replied that he knew this but that since there was some free time the matter could be considered. Mr. Byrnes remarked that with regard to free time, he had been informed that the delegation of the Polish Provisional Government had arrived. Mr. Eden then asked whether Mr. Molotov wanted this matter considered in the afternoon meeting. Mr. Molotov withdrew his suggestion. Mr. Byrnes again asked for suggestions for the agenda for the afternoon meeting. Mr. Eden asked what was on the agenda now. Mr. Byrnes said that he did not know of any questions except that of Italy and the neutral countries. He thought that it had been agreed that this should be discussed. He pointed out that of the questions considered by the Big Three yesterday afternoon one had not been decided. This is the question of the Straits. The President had submitted a paper 23 to be studied and this paper can be considered this afternoon. He did not recall any other questions on the Big Three agenda not yet decided. Mr. Molotov mentioned the western frontiers of Poland. Mr. Byrnes agreed that this was still undetermined but pointed out that it would be decided by the Foreign Ministers after hearing the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government whether to add it to the agenda. Mr. Molotov stated that he had another question. The question of the German fleet should be settled before the end of the meeting. Mr. Byrnes replied that the question was proposed earlier and therefore should be noted. Mr. Molotov stated that he wished agreement as to when it would be decided. Mr. Eden stated that according to his notes it had been agreed to keep this matter for settlement at the end of the Conference. Mr. Molotov replied that the end is now here and he wanted it discussed. Mr. Eden asked whether we are at the beginning of the end or at the end of the beginning. Mr. Byrnes replied that he thought that we were at the beginning of the end. The United States Delegation wants to dispose of pending matters so that the Conference can end. Mr. Molotov reverted to his question and asked when the German fleet would be discussed. He suggested tomorrow. Mr. Eden stated that the matter was really one for the Big Three. Mr. Molotov suggested that it be put on their agenda either today or tomorrow. Mr. Eden agreed. Mr. Byrnes agreed that it should go on tomorrow’s agenda. Mr. Molotov then stated that the question of the partition of reparations among the Allies must be decided. There had been agreement in the subcommittee, to which the Soviet Delegation did not object. Mr. Byrnes stated his understanding that there is no agreement yet in the economic subcommittee on anything. He thought it might be well to report to the Big Three that they had been unable to reach a decision. Mr. Molotov stated that that was why he said that we should consider the draft submitted by the Reparations Commission. 24 Mr. Byrnes entirely agreed and stated there were some matters in disagreement and that there was no apparent chance of reaching agreement. Mr. Molotov insisted that questions on which the Commission has agreed could be discussed here. Mr. Byrnes replied that the American representative, Mr. Pauley, had called attention to certain portions of this draft. He read a brief statement. 25 Mr. Molotov argued that the British and American Delegations had circulated papers as agreed documents. 26 Mr. Byrnes replied that they had but had wound up with the statement just read. This statement means that there is absolutely no agreement so far as the United States Delegation is concerned. He suggested that the matter should not be discussed here but should be reported tomorrow. If in the meantime anything had been agreed to, it could be so stated in the report. Mr. Molotov agreed. Western Frontier of Poland Mr. Byrnes announced that the Polish Delegation was waiting and upon his proposal they were invited to come to the table and present their views on the question of the western frontier of Poland. A summary of their statement is attached (Annex 1). Mr. Molotov inquired if any other Polish delegates wished to speak. Mr. Byrnes said that they would certainly invite any other gentlemen present who wished to present his views and if there were any he would ask them to submit them in writing. 27 Mr. Molotov said that the position of the Soviet Union was different from that of the other countries. It was common knowledge that at Yalta they had discussed the eastern as well as the western frontier of Poland. Because of the action taken on the eastern frontier the Soviet Union was in a special position. The question of the Polish border was important not only for Poland and her neighbors but also for the whole world. He said what he would say on the question of the western frontier was not new as the Soviet view was well known. He felt it his duty to say, however, that this was a matter of justice. He considered that the views put forward by the Polish Government were just and that justice required that Germany be turned out of this area in the interests of the people of Europe and the whole world. It would cause a considerable weakening of Germany and permit the correction of the situation of Poland. It would mean that Poland as a racial state would be strong and one of the pillars of peace in Europe. Germany would be weakened from the point of view of her aggressive intentions and strengthened only from the point of view of her legitimate interests. All Poles would be brought together in one state which would be democratic and economically strong. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation hoped that sympathetic intention [ attention? ] would be given to the request of the Polish Government. Mr. Eden said that as the matter was before the Big Three he had no comments to make. Mr. Byrnes said that they would present to the Heads of Governments the views expressed by the Polish Delegation. Mr. Molotov repeated that the Soviet position was a special one and that they had certain obligations to Poland. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that although the United States was not a neighbor of Poland they had always been a friend of Poland. Mr. Eden said that it was because of Poland that Great Britain had entered the war. The meeting adjourned. [Annex 1] Summary of Statements Made by Members of the Polish Delegation to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, July 24, 1945 top secret Mr. Bierut said that the war had begun in Poland and that Poland had suffered enormous losses in men and material. Poland was losing 180,000 square kilometers in the east to the establishment of the new Polish frontier there. Poland considered that the new eastern frontier which had been regulated on the basis of nationality was correct but their position was that they should acquire territory in the west. They considered the matter from the security and economic points of view. They considered that the territories in the west were one unit from the economic point of view. They proposed a line running from the Baltic on the north through Swinemünde including Stettin in Poland, along the Oder River and thence along the Western Neisse River to Czechoslovakia. 28 The territory thus included in Poland would be smaller than that which Poland had lost in the east. Under this arrangement the total area of Poland would be reduced from 388,000 square kilometers to 309,000 square kilometers but it would give Poland a sound economy. The population of Poland which had been 34 million would be reduced to 26 million but it would be homogeneous. A great many Germans had fled and he thought many of the other one to [one and] one-half million Germans left would be willing to leave. The population east of the Curzon Line 29 had included many Ukrainians, White Russians and some Lithuanians. It had also included about 4 million Poles which they expected would be repatriated to Poland. The density of the population of Poland before the war was 83 persons to one square kilometer. To preserve the same density they would need to have 314,000 square kilometers but they would get only 309,000 square kilometers. Thus the density would increase but they would be better off from an economic point of view. If they received the territory proposed it would no longer be necessary for Poles to emigrate to the United States or Germany as was the case before the war. Thousands of Poles had formerly worked in this territory in the west, chiefly on farms. It was prejudicial to Poland that these workers gave their labor whereas their production went to others. Mr. Rzymowski pointed out that the war began with the attack by Germany on Poland, that Poland had been under German occupation longer than any other country, and that the manner in which the Germans had behaved in Poland was proof that they wanted to destroy Polish civilization. It was the only country in which there were so many death camps. The Germans had tried to kill off the population to obtain “ Lebensraum ” for Germans and had attempted to destroy Polish culture. It would be an expression of historical justice that a Polish state be created that was powerful and which had the possibility to resist any German aggression. There should be a place in Poland for those Poles who lived east of the Curzon Line and for those who had emigrated elsewhere. There should also be a place for the increase in the population which amounted yearly to 250,000 people. Poland had ceded territory in the east for the sake of peace and it was right that Germany should also cede territory for the sake of peace. It was in the interest of peace in Europe that Germany should be deprived of this territory as a “ place d’armes ” in the east. Poland would be a territory without national minorities which would make for peace. Under Germany the industries of Silesia were an armament factory but in Poland they would be devoted to satisfy the peaceful needs of the Polish people. Polish rights in Silesia were justified also by the fact that the population would consider themselves as Poles once the German administration and pressure was removed. The line proposed was the shortest boundary possible between the Germans and Poles and would be the easiest to defend. This would give Poland the opportunity to reconstruct its social and economic structure. Before the war Polish rural districts were overpopulated. There were about 4 million unemployed living in villages who could not be absorbed in the urban districts. The acquisition of Silesia would enable these people to be employed. Stettin had always been an outlet under the Germans for the products of Silesia and their claim to Stettin was justified by the fact that it was needed as a Poland [ Polish ] outlet for Silesian products. Mr. Mikolajczyk agreed with the opinions of his colleagues. It was in the interest of all that Germany should not be able to undertake any aggressions. The Germans had two bases for their imperialism. One was the armament industry and the second the profit which they made as an intermediary between other nations. One of the bases of German armaments was the territory which they claimed for Poland. Among its basic resources were zinc and coal. The Poles thought that these resources should not be in German hands. With respect to the profits which Germany had made as an intermediary, he said that in 1937 Germany had transported to Czechoslovakia 2,300,000 tons; to Hungary 400,000 tons; to Rumania 500,000 tons; and to Yugoslavia 200,000 tons in addition to the goods transported to Poland. He argued that the Oder River and its whole basin should go to Poland. Poland had to export and import in large quantities in order to give work to Polish workers. One river system, the Vistula, was not enough for this purpose. It would be necessary to control the whole of resources of water of the Oder. These sources are in the Neisse area and if not controlled by Poland they could be cut off. Summing up, he said his arguments in favor of the Polish proposal were: 1. To take from the Germans one of the bases of their armaments. 2. To take from Germany the control of commerce and her role as an intermediary between other states. 3. Turning this area over to Poland would not only contribute to security and peace of all nations and of Poland but it would create a new economic and commercial system in which Poland would be able to prosper. Relatively Germany which had lost the war would lose less territory than Poland. If Polish claims were satisfied Poland would lose 20 percent of her territory whereas Germany would lose 18 percent. He asked for a speedy decision and for full agreement between the powers pointing out the necessity for the repatriation of the Poles from the Soviet Union and the other countries to which they had been driven by the war in order that they could participate in the reconstruction of their country. 30 2 The Rapporteur’s report ( post , pp. 336–337 [ Pgs. 336–337 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] ) and these minutes ( post , p. 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] ) indicate that Molotov circulated papers at this meeting on Austrian and Italian reparations. The Austrian paper is document No. 769 , post . If there was an additional Soviet proposal concerning German reparations circulated at this meeting, it has not been identified. 3 Document No. 1099 , post . 4 Document No. 1320 , post . 5 For the text of this declaration, see document No. 1417 , post , section v. 6 Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko. For a memorandum on the subcommittee meeting referred to, see ante , p. 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] . 7 See ante , pp. 228–230 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] . 8 The reference is apparently to document No. 796 , post . 9 H. Freeman Matthews. 10 Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky. 11 Document No. 729 , post . 12 The British representative was Frederick Hoyer Millar. 13 Blank in the original. Paragraph number supplied from the Rapporteur’s report, post , p. 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] . 14 See post , p. 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , and paragraph 2 of document No. 1424 , post . 15 Not identified. 16 See ante , p. 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . 17 See document No. 1424 , post . 18 See vol. i , p. 374 . 19 See the attachment to document No. 714 , post . 20 See post , p. 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . 21 Document No. 841 , post . 22 Documents Nos. 769 and 1099 , post . 23 Document No. 755 , post . 24 Molotov was presumably referring to attachment 3 or attachment 4 to document No. 894 , post , or both. 25 Not found. 26 Attachments 3 and 4 to an American proposal ( document No. 894 , post ) were both headed “Agreed in the Allied Commission on Reparations”. 27 For the views submitted in response to this invitation, see document No. 1150 , post . 28 See the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , post . 29 See the map facing p. 748 in vol. i . For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii . pp. 793 – 794 . 30 For Mikolajczyk’s minutes of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers with the Polish Delegation, see document No. 1385 , post . United States Delegation Memorandum Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 [ Babelsberg , July 24, 1945.] Summary of the Views Expressed by the Polish Delegation to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers July 24, 1945, on the Subject of Poland’s Western Frontiers The delegation considered that Poland’s western frontier should run from the Baltic through Swinemünde, including Stettin in Poland, along the Oder River to the Neisse, and along the Western Neisse to Czechoslovakia. The principal arguments they put forward were the following: 1. Poland would lose 180,000 square kilometers in the east and should be compensated for this in the west. 2. The territory under consideration was one unit from an economic point of view. 3. Under the proposed arrangement Poland would acquire less than it had lost in the east. The whole area would be reduced from 388,000 square kilometers to 309,000 square kilometers. The population would be reduced from 34,000,000 to 26,000,000 but would then be homogenous [ homogeneous? ]. 4. There were about 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 Germans left in this area, but they would be willing to return home. This territory would enable Poland to support its population without recourse to emigration. This would enable Poland to enjoy the results of the labor of Poles who had formerly emigrated to work in this area. 5. From the point of view of security, this was the shortest possible frontier between Poles and Germans and would be easy to defend. 6. The Germans had attempted to destroy the Polish population and ruin Polish culture. It would be an expression of historical justice to create a powerful Polish state which could resist any German aggression. 7. Poland had ceded territory in the east for the sake of peace and it would be right that Germany should cede territory for the same purpose. 8. The proposed solution would deprive Germany of a “ place d’armes ” in the east. 9. Poland would be a territory without national minorities. 10. Before the war Poland had an excess of rural population which could not be absorbed in its urban centers. This territory was necessary to enable them to be employed and to enable the Poles forced abroad by the war to return to Poland and obtain employment. 11. This area was one of the bases of German armaments and had resources in zinc and coal. This was one of the bases of German imperialism. 12. Taking this area from Germany would deprive Germany of the other basis of its imperialism, namely, profits made as an intermediary between other countries. In 1937 Germany transported 2,300,000 tons of goods to Czechoslovakia, 400,000 tons to Hungary, 500,000 tons to Rumania, and 200,000 tons to Yugoslavia, in addition to that transported to Poland. 13. The whole basin of the Oder River should go to Poland to enable Poland to have an economic base which would support its whole population and in order to prevent the possibility of cutting off the source of water supply to the Oder which lay in the Neisse area. 14. Stettin should be in Polish hands because it was the natural outlet for Silesia. 15. Germany which had lost the war would lose less than Poland. If Polish claims were satisfied, Poland would lose 20 percent of her territory whereas Germany would lose only 18 percent. 16. A speedy decision and full agreement among the Powers was necessary because of the need to repatriate Poles from abroad in order that they could participate in the reconstruction of Poland. 1 Authorship not indicated. Rapporteur’s Report 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2445 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] Rapporteur’s Report 1 Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:15 a.m. Rapporteur’s Report of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, July 24, 1945 1. german, austrian and italian reparations and german economic questions The Chairman declared that the subcommittee dealing with the German economic questions and German reparations was not yet ready to present a further report on these matters. Mr. Molotov pointed out that these committees had also been assigned the question of Austrian and Italian reparations. He presented two brief papers in regard to reparations from these two latter countries. 2 It was agreed that these papers should be referred to the economic subcommittee for study. It was also agreed that discussion of German reparations and German economic questions should be postponed until tomorrow. 2. european oil supplies The Chairman inquired whether a report was ready on the U. S. paper on this subject which had been presented on July 20. He was informed that this paper was still before the economic subcommittee and it was agreed that discussion on this subject should be postponed until that committee reports. 3. implementation of the yalta declaration on liberated europe and satellite states The subcommittee dealing with this subject was also not yet ready to report and it was agreed to postpone discussion until that report is available. 4. admission to the united nations The Chairman suggested that, since the subcommittee dealing with this matter had also not been able to come to any agreement, the question should be considered at this meeting by the Foreign Ministers on the basis of the document on which the subcommittee had been working. Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation would not be able to take part in the discussion of this document since it omitted reference to the admission to the United Nations of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland. Mr. Eden suggested that the last sentence of the first paragraph of the paper in question be dropped and Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Eden proposed a redraft of paragraph two of the paper which would take into account the interest of other countries concerned with the peace treaty with Italy. This paragraph is embodied in the revised document “Admission to the United Nations” attached to this report. 3 The Chairman proposed the following additional paragraph to be inserted in the document in order to meet the point which Mr. Molotov had raised: “The three Governments also hope that the Council of Foreign Ministers may without undue delay prepare peace treaties for Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. It is also their desire on the conclusion of the peace treaties with responsible democratic governments of these countries to support their application for membership in the United Nations Organization.” Mr. Molotov urged that it be agreed in principle that Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland not be put in a worse position than Italy in connection with the matter under discussion. After some further discussion it was agreed that, since full agreement could not be reached, the problem should be referred to the Heads of Government and placed on the agenda for this afternoon. 5. rumanian oil equipment The British Delegation circulated a new paper in regard to the disposition of British and U. S. oil equipment in Rumania. The Soviet Delegation asked for time to study this paper and discussion of this question was therefore adjourned. 6. agenda for meeting of heads of government It was agreed that the following subjects should be recommended to the Heads of Government for their agenda this afternoon: 1. Admission to the United Nations. The paper presented to the Foreign Ministers this morning is available to the Heads of Government as a basis for discussion. 2. The Black Sea Straits and Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways. Discussion of this question was adjourned from yesterday’s meeting in order to afford an opportunity for study of the paper on “Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways” which the President circulated. 7. agenda for tomorrow’s meeting of the heads of government It was agreed that the following subjects should be recommended to the Heads of Government for the agenda of their meeting tomorrow morning: 1. Disposition of the German fleet and merchant marine. 2. German reparations. 8. the polish western frontier A delegation representing the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and headed by President Bierut, which appeared in response to the invitation sent on July 22 by President Truman in accordance with the decision of the three Heads of Government, 4 stated its case in regard to the Polish Western Frontier. A summary of the principal points covered in their presentation is attached to this report. 5 1 Byrnes acted as Rapporteur for this meeting and read his report at the afternoon meeting of Heads of Government (see post , p. 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] ). 2 For the documents referred to in this report, see the footnotes to the minutes, ante , pp. 322–332 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . 3 Not attached, but tentatively identified as document No. 1424 , post . 4 See ante , p. 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , and document No. 1147 , post . 5 Not attached. See ante , p. 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] ] . Leahy-Churchill conversation, morning Leahy-Churchill conversation, morning Present United States United Kingdom Fleet Admiral Leahy Prime Minister Churchill [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] Editor’s Note —No minutes of this conversation have been found. The conversation and the subject discussed are referred to, however, in the following memorandum of July 24 (in the Truman Papers) by Captain James K. Vardaman, Jr., Naval Aide to the President: “Remind the President Wednesday morning to write a letter to Mr. Churchill and send him a copy of telegram despatched to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and also copy of revised Lend Lease document read to Churchill by Leahy on the porch this morning.” 1 1 For the letter which was sent to Churchill on July 25, see documents Nos. 1183 and 1248 , post . The “revised Lend Lease document” referred to has not been identified. Cf. the enclosure to document No. 1185 , post . Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Truman and Churchill, 11:30 a.m. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Truman and Churchill, 11:30 a.m. 1 1 Designated a “Plenary Meeting” in the papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, It was held at Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg. Present United States United Kingdom President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Fleet Admiral Leahy Lord Leathers 2 General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal General of the Army Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham General Somervell General Ismay Field Marshal Wilson Major-General Laycock Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Major-General Hollis Brigadier Cornwall-Jones 2 Leathers was present for only part of the meeting (see post , p. 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] ). [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)]] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:30 a.m. J. C. S. Files Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes 3 Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:30 a.m. top secret Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 900/2 4 ) The Meeting had before them C. C. S. 900/2, the draft of the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister on the results of the Terminal Conference. The President and The Prime Minister proceeded to examine the report paragraph by paragraph. With respect to paragraph 4, Admiral Leahy explained that there was a divergence of opinion on two or three points in connection with the basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war and that the respective views of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff were set out in Appendix “A.” 5 Appendix “A” paragraph 4 Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed to include the following:— “ a . Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth. “ b . Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the British Commonwealth in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan.” The British Chiefs of Staff on the other hand wished to combine these two paragraphs into the following:— “Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept.” The view of the United States Chiefs of Staff was that the basic commitment in this respect should be confined to the maintenance of war-making capacity in so far as it was connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, whereas the British Chiefs of Staff felt that it should be extended to include the occupation of Germany and Austria, as provided in the strategic concept. The Prime Minister said that he supported the British Chiefs of Staff and suggested that the holding down of Germany and Austria was certainly a very vital matter. He felt therefore that this commitment should be embraced in this particular section of the basic undertakings. He called attention to the extent to which the British industrial effort had been interwoven with that of the United States by reason of agreements reached earlier in the war and his own discussions with President Roosevelt at Quebec. 6 As a result of these agreements many British units were equipped with U. S. equipment and no provision had been made to replace this equipment from British sources. To make such provision would take time and he hoped very much that the President would be able to make it possible for him to pass smoothly from this position of dependence on the United States to one in which British forces could be independent. He feared that a rigid interpretation of an undertaking to maintain the British war-making capacity only in so far as it was connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, would place him in great difficulties. He hoped also that the rules applied to the supply of lend-lease equipment would not be held to limit British sovereign rights over British equipment. He must be free to give British equipment, for example, to the Belgians, if His Majesty’s Government felt that this was desirable, and he hoped that this would not result in the drying up of equivalent supplies from the United States. The President explained that he was handicapped in his approach to this matter by the latest renewal 7 of the Lend-Lease Act. 8 As Vice President, he had worked out its clauses together with Senator George, who had explained to the Congress that the Act was intended to be a weapon of war only. The President was now striving to give to the Act the broadest interpretation possible and he had no intention of causing the British any embarrassment in the matter of furnishing supplies to the British troops or the maintenance thereof. However, he must ask the Prime Minister to be patient as he wished to avoid any embarrassment with Congress over the interpretation of the Act and it might be necessary for him to ask for additional legislation in order to clear the matter up. With respect to the basic undertaking under discussion, The President said that he thought that the holding down of Germany and Austria was quite definitely a part of war. After all, we were technically still at war with Germany and Austria. 9 General Marshall said in view of the foregoing that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted the paragraph proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff. The President agreed. Appendix “A” paragraph 4 c . The Prime Minister said that he could not see very much difference between the two subparagraphs proposed. He suggested that the proposal of the United States Chiefs of Staff should be accepted. The President agreed. Appendix “A” first sentence of paragraph 6 c . Admiral Leahy explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were anxious to add a clause at the end of the first sentence of this paragraph which would extend the combined liability to provide assistance not only to such of the forces of the liberated areas as could fulfill an active and effective role in the present war but also to such of those forces as were “required to maintain world order in the interests of the war effort.” In his view, therefore, the issue before the meeting was whether or not the United States was prepared to undertake a commitment to equip and supply forces of occupation other than American. The Prime Minister asked what the British Chiefs of Staff had in mind in proposing this clause. Field Marshal Brooke instanced the Belgian and Dutch forces and Admiral Cunningham suggested that such French divisions as were not going to the Far East would also fall into this category. In the light of this explanation, The Prime Minister felt that the point had already been covered under paragraphs 4 a . and b . above, where it had already been agreed that occupational forces should be included in that particular basic undertaking. It was agreed that the point would be adequately covered if the words “in accordance with the over-all strategic concept,” were added to the first sentence of paragraph 6 c , in lieu of the clause proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff. Appendix “A” paragraph 7 . At this point Lord Leathers entered the meeting. The Prime Minister said that he attached great importance to the United Kingdom import program and would not wish to see it lose its status in a document of this nature. The President said that he was not quite clear how far he could accept liability for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom under existing United States law. Therefore, if this paragraph were intended to indicate any such liability his acceptance of it would have to be on the understanding that the necessary authority did exist. Admiral King and General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff felt that the matter contained in this paragraph was out of place among the basic undertakings. General Marshall drew attention to paragraphs 20, 21, and 22 at the end of the report 10 and pointed out that there was no more reason for including cargo shipping among the basic undertakings than the similar matters dealt with in these paragraphs. He suggested that this paragraph should also be placed at the end of the report under the heading “Miscellaneous.” Lord Leathers pointed out that the inclusion of the United Kingdom import program had been implicit in the basic undertakings at previous conferences. 11 In consonance with the changed situation, a major change was now being made in the presentation of the basic undertakings. As shipping requirements for military and civilian needs were closely interlocked, his view was that the United Kingdom import program would be more properly associated with military requirements if it were linked to them in the basic undertakings. General Marshall said that he did not consider that any great change had been made in the presentation of the basic undertakings. He still felt that the matter would be more appropriately placed at the end of the report under the heading “Miscellaneous.” The Prime Minister inquired whether this would result in the sweeping aside of the United Kingdom import program. The President said the Prime Minister could take his word for it that the United Kingdom import program would not suffer from this change. He suggested that General Marshall’s proposal be accepted and the paragraph incorporated at the end of the report. The Prime Minister said that on this undertaking he would certainly agree that the paragraph should be included at the end of the report. Appendix “A” last sentence of paragraph 6 c . Lord Leathers suggested that as it had now been agreed that paragraph 7 should be removed from the basic undertakings and placed at the end of the report, the last sentence of paragraph 6 c . would more properly be deleted. However, if it were held that this sentence merely referred to supplies and not to shipping, he thought it might remain. The President and The Prime Minister agreed that the last sentence of paragraph 6 c . should stand. [ C. C. S. 900/2, paragraph 8 d . 12 ] The Prime Minister referred to paragraph 8 d . of the report in which it had been agreed that “In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as would permit them to make timely rearrangements.” The Prime Minister said that he hoped it would not be thought the British Chiefs of Staff would wish to take advantage of this arrangement. What was good enough for the United States would certainly be good enough for the British. Admiral King said that the United States Chiefs of Staff did not expect the British Chiefs of Staff to invoke this paragraph and General Marshall explained that it had been put in at his suggestion. After Olympic for example, if the British Chiefs of Staff did not agree with the action proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, they would, under this paragraph, be free to take such action as they thought fit. The paragraph was a result of an attempt on his part to cover both sides. The Prime Minister thanked the United States Chiefs of Staff for their explanation and the spirit in which this provision had been made. The President and The Prime Minister accepted and approved the report as amended in the above discussion and directed the [ that ] copies of the revised version be submitted to them for signature. (The report in its approved form was subsequently circulated as CCS. 900/3. 13 ) 3 The papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that “These Minutes were transcribed from notes taken by the United States Secretaries, Combined Chiefs of Staff.” 4 The draft report to the President and the Prime Minister circulated as the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2 is identical with the text of the report as approved ( document No. 1381 , post ) except as noted in the footnotes to that document and except that minor variations of punctuation, capitalization, and abbreviation have not been annotated. 5 For the text of appendix A, see document No. 1266 , post . 6 The records of the Quebec Conferences are scheduled for subsequent publication in volumes in this series. 7 Approved April 16, 1945; 59 Stat. 52. 8 Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31. 9 The United States had not declared war on Austria, and the Department of State announced in 1946 that Austria was not regarded “as an ex-enemy state or a state at war with the United States during the second World War”. See Department of State Bulletin , vol. xv , p. 865. 10 See document No. 1381 , post , paragraphs 20–22. 11 Cf. Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 827 – 831 . 12 See document No. 1381 , post , paragraph 8 d . 13 Document No. 1381 , post . It appears that the revised report was not actually signed by Truman and Churchill. Tripartite military meeting, 2:30 p.m. Tripartite military meeting, 2:30 p.m. 1 1 The meeting was held in the Cecilienhof Palace. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke Army General Antonov General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham Marshal of Aviation Falaleyev General of the Army Arnold Field Marshal Wilson Lieutenant General Slavin Lieutenant General Hull General Ismay Vice Admiral Cooke Major General Norstad Major General Deane Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Lieutenant-Colonel Mallaby Captain Moore Interpreters Lieutenant Chase Major Lunghi Major Evsekov [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)]] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 2:30 p.m. J. C. S. Files Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes 2 Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 2:30 p.m. top secret General of the Army Antonov asked Fleet Admiral Leahy to preside at this, the first tripartite meeting of the Chiefs of Staff at Terminal . 3 Admiral Leahy said that he was glad to accept the duties of presiding officer at this session. Admiral Leahy then asked that General Antonov outline the intentions and plans of the U. S. S. R. with reference to the Japanese. General Antonov said that Soviet troops were now being concentrated in the Far East and would be ready to commence operations in the last half of August. The actual date, however, would depend upon the result of conferences with Chinese representatives which had not yet been completed. 3a The objective of the U. S. S. R. in the Far East was the destruction of the Japanese troops in Manchuria and the occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula. After the defeat of Japan in combination with the Allied armies it was the Russian intention to withdraw their troops from Manchuria. General Antonov said that at the present time the Japanese have in Manchuria approximately 20 infantry divisions, two tank divisions, and a sufficient number of depot divisions, separate brigades and separate battalions to bring the total Japanese forces up to a strength of approximately 30 divisions. In addition to these there were approximately 20 divisions of Manchurian troops, making an aggregate of approximately 50 divisions in all on the Russian front. If the Russian operations were to be successful it was important to prevent the Japanese from strengthening their Manchurian front by reinforcements from China and the Japanese Islands. It was estimated that the Japanese might bring for this purpose 10 divisions from China and 7 from the Japanese Islands. If, therefore, the U. S. S. R. was to be able to carry out its operations successfully it was necessary to prevent any such reinforcement. General Antonov said he wished to call attention to the fact that there was only a single railroad line connecting Central Russia with the Far East; the effect of this was to limit rail movements of all kinds and effectively prevent any rapid movement of troops. Admiral Leahy then asked General Marshall to outline the situation of the Japanese with respect to ground troops. 4 General Marshall said that it is estimated that the Japanese have at present approximately 1,800,000 Japanese troops in Japan proper; there are approximately 500,000 troops in Kyushu and a fairly large garrison in the Ryukyus outside of Okinawa. The Japanese garrison in Formosa has recently been increased to about 260,000 men. In the Philippines there are now about 12,000 to 14,000 Japanese survivors collected in the mountains of northern Luzon for the final death struggle. In Mindanao there are about 20,000 troops scattered throughout the central plateau, all of the coastline positions having now been lost. In the remainder of the Philippines there are approximately 25,000 troops who are widely scattered. There are, throughout the Pacific islands, isolated garrisons who are under constant surveillance and periodic bombing and whose presence cause no inconvenience to United States forces. There are a considerable number of isolated Japanese troops in Borneo, in New Guinea and the Celebes, in Bougainville in the Solomons group and in the Bismarck Archipelago. The Japanese troops in the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago are confronted by the Australians, who are also taking care of a considerable force in the north central part of New Guinea. All of these island garrisons are suffering from gradual exhaustion of their military supplies. In New Guinea they are suffering, in addition, from malaria and other tropical diseases. The remaining garrisons in Java and Sumatra have been reduced by movements to the Malay Peninsula. The United States Chiefs of Staff estimate that there are about a million Japanese in China. At the present time the most noticeable movements of Japanese troops have been towards Kyushu. In the last three months two divisions from Manchuria had been identified there and it is understood that these divisions have left in Manchuria the cadres for two additional divisions. Two divisions have recently been moved from Korea to the Japanese homeland. One of these is composed of depot troops and the composition of the other is unknown. In the recent past deceptive measures instituted by U. S. forces have resulted in the concentration of Japanese troops in the Kuriles north of Hokkaido. It is known now, however, that the Japanese are moving troops out of the Kuriles and a division of these troops has recently been identified in Kyushu. U. S. troops now have firm control of Okinawa where they are busy improving harbors and developing numerous airfields. It is expected that in addition to the naval and Marine Corps planes now on Okinawa that General MacArthur’s air force will have 2,000 planes there before the end of the summer. On Luzon strenuous efforts are being made to develop the necessary base facilities for incoming troops. Because of harbor destruction and the sinking of 500 ships in Manila Bay this has been a difficult task but satisfactory progress is being made. With reference to General Antonov’s remark regarding the severing of Japanese communications with Manchuria, General Marshall said it is the present understanding the Japanese communications have been seriously interfered with by U. S. submarine action in the Sea of Japan, and by the continued laying of submarine mines by B–29’s at the western entrance of the Inland Sea near Shimonoseki and the blockade of such harbors on the west coast of Honshu as Niigata. The ferry service between Japan and Fusan [ Pusan ] and shipping in the Yellow Sea has been terminated. Ferry service to Fusan has been moved to the ports further north in Korea. Mine laying by B–29’s has extended north along the Korean coast from Fusan to Genzan [ Wonsan ]. Mines have also been laid in the Inland Sea in the Bungo Channel and in the Bay of Tokyo. Naval air action has extended to northern Honshu and Hokkaido and numerous coastal ports have been attacked by naval aircraft and by direct bombardment. In recent months aircraft based in the Philippines have reduced the normal traffic from ports as far south as Indo-China to Japan from forty convoys a day to none whatever at the present time. By these various actions the Japanese have been compelled to stop all operations at sea except minor operations in the Sea of Japan and coastal lugger traffic in the Java Sea and along the coasts of Malaysia. As a result of increased naval action and mining by super-bombers, there is little likelihood of any Japanese troop movements between Japan and Manchuria. By September or October we expect it to be impossible for the Japanese to move any cargo over this route. It is believed that Japanese operational shipping of one thousand tons and over has been reduced from seven or eight million tons at the beginning of the war to 1¼ million tons at the present time. In referring to General Antonov’s remarks relating to the movement of Japanese reinforcements from China to Manchuria, General Marshall said that the general movement of Japanese troops in China indicates a withdrawal from the south. Garrisons in Indo-China and to the southward have been cut off by Chinese forces. It appears that the Japanese are establishing a fortress garrison of about 150,000 men for the defense of Hong Kong and Canton. A similar garrison is being established in Shanghai, including Chusan Island. An inland fortress garrison is being established in Hankow. Our evidence indicates that in spite of their efforts to withdraw their forces to the northward, the continued air attacks on the single-track railroad and sabotage by Chinese guerrillas will prevent the Japanese from moving more than a trickle of troops to the north. Not only is the rail route interrupted, but the rolling stock is in bad condition. They are, therefore, dependent largely on water transportation. In the course of time the Japanese could move troops from North China to Manchuria through the Peking–Kalgan and the Tientsin regions. The redeployment of troops from the European Theater to the Pacific is now well underway. The first troops have reached Manila. Our first requirement is for engineering and similar troops to restore the harbors and prepare cantonments. Six divisions from Germany with the attached corps and army troops are now in the United States. They will be moved from the west coast of the United States as rapidly as shipping is available. In the Pacific at the present time the principal difficulty is to find ground room for troops and aircraft we wish to deploy there. The early requirement for engineering troops in the Philippines is thus apparent. The divisions already in the Pacific have largely been withdrawn from combat and are now being reconditioned and trained for the next operation. The next most important difficulty in the Pacific is the provision of shipping. By the improvement of harbors, by decreasing the turnaround of our vessels and by making all possible air transport available we hope to overcome the shipping shortage. In closing, General Marshall said that attacks upon Japan from the air and the sea are now proceeding in tremendous volume, but the intensity of these attacks would increase each week. Admiral King said that he would briefly supplement General Marshall’s remarks. He said that since Yalta the United States Navy had participated in the complete conquest of the Philippine Islands. Commencing in April the conquest of Okinawa and adjacent islands had been accomplished, and bases for land, sea, and air forces were being developed preparatory to the next move against the Japanese homeland. In addition to the Okinawa operation, carrier task forces had attacked air and naval bases in Japan proper. Recently the Third Fleet, under Admiral Halsey, had bombarded the Tokyo area and northern Honshu and Hokkaido. Commencing with the Ryukyus campaign a part of the British Fleet had operated as a task force of the U. S. naval forces. The Japanese navy is now only one-third of its maximum strength and most of the remaining units are of questionable military value, except perhaps for suicide purposes. Naval reconnaissance aircraft now range to the Shantung Peninsula, Korea and the Sea of Japan. Our submarines are operating against the sea communications between Japan and Korea, in Japanese home waters and in the Sea of Japan. We have developed naval bases in Guam and Saipan, in the Marianas group, and are now developing a base in Okinawa. 5 General Arnold said that he would furnish some additional details regarding the matters discussed by General Marshall. The limited land areas in the Pacific Theater make it impossible to utilize at present all of the large number of airplanes which had been used in the European Theater. When commencing the air campaign against Japan proper we were limited in operations by the airfields we could develop in the Marianas. From these islands the B–29’s performance enabled us to carry out attacks against the Japanese industrial areas in Honshu. During the first part of the campaign Japanese air opposition, as well as anti-aircraft fire, was intense. Navigation problems were most difficult. The weather through which we had to fly had an effect on the ability of the plane crews to carry the maximum weight in bombs. With the increase in the strength of our attacks the opposition by the enemy decreased. After the capture of Iwo Jima we were able to base fighter planes there which were able to accompany the B–29’s on their attacks on Japanese Islands. Not long after the employment of long-range accompanying fighters was initiated the Japanese Air Force assumed a condition of impotency and we have records of many instances when B–29’s reached their objectives without encountering any enemy air opposition. We have learned more about Japanese weather and this and experience gained enabled us to add 30 percent to the bomb load of our B–29’s. With fields established on Okinawa B–24’s will be able to operate to the north of Port Arthur and B–29’s to a range of 200 miles north of Harbin. We will be able to carry maximum bomb loads against Japanese industries and lines of communication in Manchuria. The B–29’s operating from Okinawa will carry a bomb load of 20,000 pounds. The difficulty of operating air units from Okinawa will be appreciated when it is realized that the island is only 80 miles long and that only 48 miles of its length can be used for airfields. This usable part of the island is only six or seven miles wide at the widest part. We expect to operate between 2,000 and 3,500 planes from the fields we are building there. General Arnold said that the exact proportion of Japanese industry now operating in Manchuria was not known but it was estimated to be about twenty percent. He said that the Japanese Air Forces now have some 5,000 planes, a larger number than they have ever had before, but their air force is at its weakest point operationally. The 5,000 planes referred to above include all types of planes—operational and non-operational—reconnaissance, photographic and combat. Of these the Japanese have set aside about 1,200 for suicide operations. These are now concentrated largely in northern Honshu where the crews are being given special training in suicide technique against airplanes both on the ground and in the air and against ships—warships as well as cargo ships unloading at our ports such as Okinawa. The Japanese have lost many of their best air leaders—most of their experienced pilots and large numbers of their maintenance crews. They are also very short of gasoline and oil. As a result, Army and Navy planes operating over Hokkaido, Honshu, and the Ryukyus rarely encounter more than 70 or 80 planes. General Antonov asked General Marshall if he thought it would be possible for the Japanese to move large forces from Japan to Manchuria and from China to Manchuria. In reply, General Marshall said that he believed no troops could be moved from Japan to Manchuria. He thought the Japanese would be unable to move a large number of troops from China to Manchuria by rail but, given time, they could increase their forces in Manchuria from Central China via the Peking–Kalgan route or via Tientsin. The rail line south of Shantung is susceptible to air attack and sabotage. For this reason it would be a slow process to move large numbers of troops over this route. General Wedemeyer, the United States Commander in China, has 1,000 planes of the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces under his command to operate against this railroad. Continuing, General Marshall said that at the present time 100,000 tons of supplies a month are being moved into China by air over the mountains and via the old Burma Road. Over this route heavy movements of Chinese troops have been made from Burma to China. The movement of troops and supplies to China has been undertaken in order to have ready by August, 15 Chinese divisions of 10,000 men each equipped with American arms, trained by American officers and enlisted men, and directed under American guidance. He said he mentioned this movement of troops and their equipment from Burma since these movements had prevented an increase in the gasoline supply to China. As the equipping of these divisions is completed and the operations to be undertaken succeed, a greatly increased gasoline supply will be available which will enable heavy attacks to be made on the railroad to North China. Chinese troops in August will attack Fort Bayard, a port on the China Sea north of Hainan and south of Canton. This port is within 150 miles of the area from which the American-trained Chinese troops will advance on Canton and Hong Kong. It had been estimated that one Liberty ship in Fort Bayard was the equivalent of three or four in Calcutta; one transport plane in Fort Bayard was the equivalent of ten or more in Burma, and 20,000 men in Fort Bayard was the equivalent of 150,000 in Burma. All of these advantages would be reflected in the air operations against the railroad in China. General Marshall said that the Chinese troops had given a good account of themselves in Burma and their effectiveness was encouraging beyond expectations. He thought that with heavy air support the Chinese troops would operate with considerable success against a Japanese withdrawal to the northward. With support of the Chinese forces by ship rather than through Burma he thought that the air forces would be able to completely destroy the Chinese railroad, and although the railroad could be attacked from Okinawa it would not be a profitable target for aircraft based there. General Antonov asked if the United States would operate against the Kuriles in order to open the line of communications to Siberia. He said that they had some strength in Kamchatka and would like to assist with some forces, and that he considered opening this sea route to be most important. He also asked if it would be possible for the United States forces to operate against the shores of Korea in coordination with the Russian forces which would be making an offensive against the peninsula. Admiral King said that it would not be possible to operate against the Kuriles and that he saw no reason why a line of communications could not be maintained through the Kuriles as the passages were wide and deep. In reply to the question in regard to operations against Korea, General Marshall said that such amphibious operations had not been contemplated, and particularly not in the near future. To undertake amphibious operations against Korea would seriously expose our shipping to Japanese suicide attack by air and surface vessels until we had completely destroyed enemy air strength in southern Korea and until certain portions of the Japanese homeland had been brought completely under our control. To stage such an operation would require a great number of assault ships which would be engaged in three landings on Kyushu. There were no additional assault ships which would permit a landing in Korea. With only a small amphibious force landings could be made on the China coast south of Shanghai which would be of great assistance to General Wedemeyer. He realized the importance of Korea to the Russian operations but said that the possibility of an attack on Korea would have to be determined after the landings on Kyushu. He thought that Korea could be controlled from airfields that would be established in Kyushu. Admiral King said that he hoped and expected that after the Kyushu operation we would have such control over the waters of Japan and Korea that we could establish a line of sea communications through those waters to Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces. General Marshall pointed out that we had already severed the line of communications between Korea and the main islands of Japan. General Marshall said that he had with him some questions which he would leave with General Antonov to be answered at his convenience since he did not think that he would be prepared to give the answers at the present time. 6 Admiral King said that he would like to call the attention of the Russian Chiefs of Staff to the conversation that took place at Yalta regarding La Perousse Strait, the control of which, we understood, would be undertaken by the Russians by capturing the southern end of Sakhalin Island at as early a time as the Russian Chiefs of Staff thought practicable. 7 General Antonov said that the first task facing the Russians would be the destruction of the Japanese troops in Manchuria. Because of the distance of Sakhalin, additional troop movements would be required in order to complete its capture in time to be of value in opening La Perousse Strait. Therefore, the attack on southern Sakhalin would be undertaken as a second offensive. General Marshall then gave General Antonov a book explaining the experiences of our forces in fighting the Japanese which he thought might be of value to him. 8 He also gave him an estimate of the situation in the Far East. 8 General Antonov said that he was grateful for the very valuable information which General Marshall had given him and said that it would be truly exploited. In regard to operations in Southeast Asia under Admiral Mountbatten, Sir Alan Brooke said that the reconquest of Burma had recently been completed but that some Japanese still remained in Burma where they had been cut off by the advance on Rangoon. These Japanese had been making an attempt to join other enemy forces in Siam and five hundred of them had been killed in the last two days. Operations in Burma were being interfered with by the monsoon which was still continuing. When the weather clears, Sir Alan Brooke said that Admiral Mountbatten would continue on towards Siam. In Burma there were the remnants of nine enemy divisions facing the British and behind these remnants was one division in Siam and four in Indo-China. Sir Alan Brooke said that they were preparing for an operation to secure Malaya and Singapore and to open the Straits of Malacca. The opening of these straits would shorten the line of communications for the support of British forces operating in the Pacific Theater against the main islands of Japan. In Malaya there were little more than two divisions of Japanese troops which were being reinforced from Java and Sumatra. Plans were being prepared for a small expeditionary force to cooperate with the United States forces in the attack on Japan. The limiting factor for operations in this area was shipping. Admiral Cunningham said that only remnants of the Japanese Fleet in the Southeast Asia area remained and that within the last two months the two efficient Japanese cruisers had been sunk. Only two damaged ones remained in Singapore. The British East Indies Fleet was unrestricted in its movements except in the very narrow parts of Malacca Strait. Sir Charles Portal said that the British and United States air forces in Southeast Asia maintained complete supremacy over the Japanese air forces in that area. His estimate of the strength of enemy air forces in Burma, Siam, Malaya, Sumatra, and Indo-China on 15 July was 260 operating aircraft plus 150 training units. He said he considered any substantial increase in air strength most unlikely and that Admiral Mountbatten had ample aircraft for his future operations. Admiral Leahy asked General Antonov if he desired to ask the British Chiefs of Staff any questions, to which General Antonov replied that he did not. General Antonov said, however, that he would require some time to consider the questions which had been presented to him by General Marshall and that when he was prepared he would like to arrange another meeting. He said he was very grateful for the information that had been furnished him by the United States and the British Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Leahy expressed the appreciation of both the United States and the British Chiefs of Staff for the information given to them by the Russian Chiefs of Staff. 2 The papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that “These Minutes were transcribed from notes taken by the United States Secretaries, Combined Chiefs of Staff.” 3 This was the only tripartite meeting of Chiefs of Staff at the Conference. 3a Cf. ante , p. 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , and document No. 1418 , post . 4 Cf. the two maps facing this page: (1) “The Armed Forces: Ground, 18 June 1945” (annex to appendix B to C. C. S. 643/3) and (2) “Ground Situation in China, 6 June 1945” (appendix D to C. C. S. 893/1). 5 Cf. the map facing p. 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] : “Pacific Situation, 1 July 1945” (appendix A to C. C. S. 893). 6 For the text of the questions referred to, see document No. 1279 , post . For the answers, see post , pp. 409–413 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] . 7 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 835 , 840 . 8 Not printed. 8 Not printed. Byrnes–Eden–Molotov luncheon meeting; Byrnes–Molotov meeting immediately thereafter, 3:30 p.m. Byrnes–Eden–Molotov luncheon meeting; Byrnes–Molotov meeting immediately thereafter, 3:30 p.m. 1 1 This time, given on the cover sheet of the Page minutes, is apparently the time of the beginning of the Byrnes–Molotov conversation. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden 2 Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Pavlov 2 Eden left immediately after luncheon. The minutes do not indicate whether he was accompanied by an interpreter. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)]] Page Minutes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 3:30 p.m. Truman Papers Page Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] Page Minutes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 3:30 p.m. top secret Council of Foreign Ministers At lunch today with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden, The Secretary took occasion to express his views on the work of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Eden was obliged to leave immediately after lunch and was not present during the majority of the conversation. The main points which Secretary Byrnes brought out and Mr. Molotov’s reactions thereto are as follows: 1. The Secretary expressed the desirability, in general, to avoid a general peace conference made up of delegates from fifty-odd nations. Such a conference would result in endless discussions and in no satisfactory results. Small nations not having direct interests in important European questions should not be given the opportunity to air their views thereon. The Prime Minister and Mr. Eden did not appear to agree, but it was not likely [ unlikely? ] that they would do so when they had given more thought to the matter. Mr. Molotov indicated that he was in accord with the Secretary’s views on the desirability of avoiding a general peace conference. 2. In reply to Mr. Molotov’s inquiry, The Secretary stated that he thought the Council of Foreign Ministers should convene in London on September 1. This meeting should be of an organizational character in which directives would be issued to the staffs of the Foreign Ministers and then the Foreign Ministers should return home. This, as other meetings, should not require the presence of the Foreign Ministers for more than a week or ten days on each occasion. Mr. Molotov stated that he agreed that the first meeting should take place on September 1 and appeared pleased to hear the Secretary’s views to the effect that the Foreign Ministers would not have to be away from their respective governments for more than a week or ten days. 3. The Secretary stated that it was of major importance that a high ranking assistant to the Foreign Secretaries be appointed. Such assistants or deputies should have power and authority to reach decisions on questions not having primary importance without referring back to their respective governments or Foreign Ministers. Mr. Molotov fully agreed. He stated that the Foreign Ministers were too busy to give attention to matters not having primary importance. He asked whom the United States would designate as Mr. Byrnes’ deputy. Mr. Byrnes stated that the man had not been chosen. Mr. Molotov indicated that the Soviet Government had not as yet selected his deputy. 4. Mr. Byrnes recommended that a competent staff of experts be appointed to work on the problems at issue and, when the decisions were reached, to present their briefs to the Foreign Ministers. This work should be done in the interim periods between the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. After consideration of these briefs the Foreign Ministers should convene again, and if considered advisable, in the localities of the question under consideration (Trieste, for example) to examine the question. If necessary the parties interested in the issue might be called in. Mr. Molotov appeared to be fully in accord with Mr. Byrnes’ views on this question. 5. Mr. Byrnes further suggested that the United Nations be informed of action contemplated or taken by the Three Governments on recommendation of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Molotov again concurred. 6. In reply to Mr. Molotov’s inquiry as to whether any draft Italian peace treaty had been drawn up, The Secretary answered in the negative. He suggested that upon the return of the Foreign Ministers to their respective capitals instructions immediately be issued to prepare such drafts and that the views of the Three Governments be exchanged prior to the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Molotov indicated his approval of this suggestion. Truman–Bierut conversation, 4:30 p.m. Truman–Bierut conversation, 4:30 p.m. 1 1 The meeting was held at Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg. Present United States Poland President Truman President Bierut Mr. Harriman Vice President Grabski Mr. Dunn 2 Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski Mr. Bohlen 2 Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk Mr. Matthews 2 Deputy Prime Minister Gomułka Foreign Minister Rzymowski Mr. Modzelewski Marshal Rola-Żymierski 2 The presence of Dunn, Bohlen, and Matthews is recorded in notes on the meeting taken by Mikołajczyk. For an account of the meeting based on those notes, see Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy , pp. 408–409. 2 The presence of Dunn, Bohlen, and Matthews is recorded in notes on the meeting taken by Mikołajczyk. For an account of the meeting based on those notes, see Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy , pp. 408–409. 2 The presence of Dunn, Bohlen, and Matthews is recorded in notes on the meeting taken by Mikołajczyk. For an account of the meeting based on those notes, see Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy , pp. 408–409. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)]] Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) Babelsberg, July 24, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2445 Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2445 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) top secret Babelsberg , July 24, 1945. Memorandum of Conversation Subject: Poland Mr. Bierut presented on behalf of the Polish Delegation the basis of the Polish claims to the German territory as far as the Oder–Lower Neisse line along the general lines of his presentation to the Foreign Ministers. 3 The President explained that he had great interest in Poland and its future and would do all he could to see that they got justice; on the other hand in frankness he pointed out that he did not like the arbitrary manner in which the boundary question was being handled by the Soviet and Polish governments. He explained that the title would not be valid unless approved at the peace settlement and that a disagreement would be a source of trouble in the future. In answer to Bierut’s argument that it was German territory that was being taken, the President pointed out that under agreement there were four occupying countries responsible for the entire territory of Germany and that he did not wish to have a fifth. He further pointed out that France might wish the Ruhr and the Rhineland but that there was no question of any territory in the western part of Germany being given to France until the matter could be considered in an orderly way with full allied agreement. 4 Mr. Bierut said that he understood the legal point of view but that there were many homeless people who had to be settled in the new territory which all agreed Poland was to have in compensation for the loss of territory in the East. He spoke of the 4,000,000 Poles east of the Curzon Line 5 and 3,000,000 Poles in Germany or in western Europe. The conversation ended with a statement by the President that the boundary question must be determined at the peace settlement and that it could not be settled here. As the Poles were fifteen minutes late, having been with Prime Minister Churchill, 6 and as the President had a meeting of the Big Three, the conversation lasted only fifteen to twenty minutes. W A H[ arriman ] 3 See ante , pp. 332–333 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , and the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , post . 4 Cf. ante , pp. 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . 5 See the map facing p. 748 in vol. i . For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , pp. 793 – 794 . 6 For an account of the meeting with Churchill, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , p. 661; Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy , p. 408. Eighth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. Eighth plenary meeting, 5 p.m. 1 1 This is the time given on the cover sheet of the Thompson minutes. The Log ( ante , p. 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) indicates that the meeting was called to order at 5:15 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Davies Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev Mr. Bohlen Manor Birse Mr. Pavlov Mr. Cohen 2 Field Marshal Alexander 4 Mr. Thompson 3 2 Cohen’s presence is assumed from the existence of his notes on the meeting, post , p. 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] . 4 Alexander was present for the last part of the meeting only (see post , p. 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] ). 3 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 5 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 5 p.m. Truman Papers Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 5 p.m. top secret Mr. Byrnes read his report as rapporteur of the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers (annex l). 5 1. Admission of Italy and the Other Satellite States Into the United Nations Organization The President said that the first topic of the agenda was the admission of Italy and the other satellite states into the United Nations Organization. Mr. Byrnes said he understood that agreement had been reached by the United States and the British delegations on the draft as it now stood. Mr. Eden said that the British had been in full agreement with the first paper submitted by the United States 6 but he had some question with regard to the second draft. 7 As drafted it looked as though they were undertaking to reconstruct the Italian Government before Italy could be admitted to the United Nations and he questioned the effect of this on the present Italian Government. Mr. Byrnes replied that it had been agreed that there should be no odious comparisons. He submitted to the British delegation that there was no doubt nor reflection on the present Italian Government as the language proposed related only to the contraction of a peace treaty. It was not known what Italian Government there would be at that time and it was not a reflection on the present Italian Government. Mr. Eden remarked that it was only a question of drafting and he felt that they could reach agreement. Stalin said that if the point at issue was to ease the position of the satellite states then all satellite countries should be mentioned. The position of the Italian Government would be eased and it would be difficult to object to this. An abnormal position was being created for the other satellite states and an artificial distinction was being drawn between them. It appeared that Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland were being put in the category of leprous states in which fact the Soviet delegation saw a danger that attempts would be made to discredit the Soviet Union. What were the merits of Italy as compared with the other satellite states? It was the first to capitulate but it had done more harm and its behavior had been worse than that of the others. There was no doubt that Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland had done less harm to the Allies than had Italy. He asked if the Italian Government was really more democratic than the Governments of these countries. Was the Italian Government more responsible? No democratic elections had been held in Italy or in the other satellite countries. He, therefore, did not understand the cause of such a benevolent attitude towards Italy as compared with the others. The position of Italy was eased when the first step was taken, namely, the resumption of diplomatic relations. Now a second step was proposed. He agreed to take this second step but thought that they should take this first step with regard to the other satellite states and resume diplomatic relations with them. Italy would still occupy a first place which was due to the fact that it was the first to surrender. This would be so in spite of the fact that she had done more harm than the others. Churchill said that the British were in general agreement with the United States delegation on this matter. The President said that he had a different point of view with regard to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary than in the case of Italy. We had not been able to have free access to the former countries and had not been able to get information concerning them. Everybody had free access to Italy—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and other countries. He declared that when Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria were set up on a basis where we would have free access to them we would recognize them but not sooner. To meet the Soviet position the language in the American document was the same in regard to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary as it was in the case of Italy. 8 Molotov stated that Italy, however, already maintained diplomatic relations with the other powers. 9 The President replied that the satellites could have diplomatic relations if they would comply with our requirements which they had not done. Stalin inquired what requirements were referred to and added that none of these satellite governments could hamper allied agents to move freely and to have access to information. The President replied that nevertheless they did. Molotov pointed out that there were also restrictions on the Soviet representatives in Italy. 10 The President said that we were asking for the reorganization of the other satellite governments along democratic lines as had been agreed upon at Yalta. 11 Stalin said he wished to assure the President that the Governments in those countries were more democratic than that in Italy and that they were closer to the people than the Italian Government. The President pointed out that the language of the proposal meant that they would have the same status for the Council of Foreign Ministers. Molotov pointed out that if their status was equal that would include maintaining diplomatic relations. The President replied that this was not the case and that with respect to diplomatic relations he had said that we could not recognize them until they were set up on democratic lines. 12 Molotov said that his proposal had been that the satellites would be placed in a position of equality 13 and that he could not agree that the wording corresponded to the suggestion he had made. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that in the paper which he had circulated 14 reference was made to the effort to ease the situation in Italy. The only way—— Molotov broke in to say that there was some misunderstanding. Mr. Byrnes had suggested two amendments orally. The Soviet delegation had one of those amendments before them in writing and in Russian translation. That amendment referred to the four small satellites. 15 The second amendment proposed by the Secretary concerning Italy they did not have in writing. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the American delegation had circulated the final text of the document which included that amendment. Molotov replied that they did not have it in circulation. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the only way in which it was proposed to ease the situation of Italy was to give support to the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization. In an effort to meet the objections of the Soviet delegation, the United States delegation had submitted language which read, “The conclusion of such a peace treaty with the democratic and responsible Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support the admission of Italy into the United Nations Organization.” In the next paragraph referring to Finland, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria the same language was used with regard to Italy and the other satellite states. He also drew attention to the fact that this statement had been used to do what Stalin had asked to be done, namely, express a view upon the Government of Franco. This was set forth in the last paragraph of the statement. Stalin said that the words “responsible and democratic governments” should be deleted as it served to discredit these countries. The President said that this language was used to show that the only way in which they could obtain our support for entry into the United Nations Organization was for them to have democratic governments. Stalin said that these were not Fascist governments. There was a far less democratic government in Argentina which in spite of this had been admitted to the United Nations. “If a government is not Fascist a government is democratic.” If the word “responsible” was used it would discredit these governments. 16 Molotiv proposed to add to the paragraph on diplomatic relations that each of the three Governments would consider separately the resumption of diplomatic relations with those countries. In Italy the United States and the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations now with Italy. There were no diplomatic representatives there for Great Britain and France—only political representatives not holding the rank of Ambassador. Churchill said the British considered their Ambassador in Italy 17 as fully accredited. Molotiv pointed out that he was not called an Ambassador. Churchill said this was because the British were at war with Italy and that the status of their Ambassador did not obtain full formality but that for practical purposes he was an Ambassador. The distinction was made for technical reasons. Molotiv repeated that he was not called an Ambassador. Churchill replied that he was so called and that he was 90 percent a full ambassador. Stalin remarked that their representative was not the same as those of the Soviet Union and the United States. He suggested that the same kind of ambassador could be sent to Rumania and Bulgaria as the British had in Italy. The President said that the United States was making every effort to arrive at a point where they could send an ambassador. He had already stated the difficulties which prevented this. Stalin remarked that that was in the past and that there were no such difficulties now. Speaking generally it was hard for the Soviet delegation to adhere to this resolution as they would be discredited by it. The President replied that we had had no such intention. Stalin admitted this but insisted that this is what would happen. Churchill said that they wanted no words which would be a slur on any of them. He would like to put in a plea for Italy. It was not only because Italy was first out of the war that this proposal was made. Nearly two years had passed since Italy went out of the war. It was a very short time since the other satellites had been fighting against them. Stalin rejoined that diplomatic relations with Italy had been resumed seven to ten months after Italy’s surrender. Churchill continued that Italy had been out of the war for two years and had been fighting on their side all of that time. They had been living in Italy and knew all about political conditions there. That was not the case in Bulgaria and Rumania. Italy had not been a united country. The great democratic north had been under the enemy until two months ago. Italy had given a great measure of help. It had always been recognized that Italy could not have a completely democratic government until the north was liberated. He had been in agreement with Stalin with respect to holding on to Badoglio longer and had disagreed with the Americans on this. The march of events had carried things in a different way. They had built up considerable sympathy for Italy. There was no censorship there. He had been frequently attacked in Italian newspapers only a few months after Italy had unconditionally surrendered. There was a considerable growth of freedom in Italy. Now that the north was liberated they were going to have democratic elections. He did not see why they could not discuss peace with them. With regard to Rumania and particularly with regard to Bulgaria they knew nothing. Their mission in Bucharest had been penned up with a closeness approaching internment. Stalin broke in to ask if it were really possible for him to cite such facts that had not been verified. Churchill said that they knew this by their representatives there. Stalin would be very much astonished to read a long catalog of difficulties encountered by their mission there. An iron fence had come down around them. Stalin broke in to exclaim, “All fairy tales.” Churchill said that of course they could call each others statements fairy tales and added that he had complete confidence in his representatives there. He had known Stevenson for many years. The conditions in the British mission there had caused them the greatest distress. It was not for him to make a statement in regard to the experience of the United States. Even their motor cars which circulated within the permitted bounds were followed by other cars which supervised their every movement. There had been complaints from their Soviet friends with regard to the size of their mission which had not been large. The Control Commission which was supposed to consist of three representatives almost always met as two. The Soviet representative sometimes saw the American representative, sometimes the British, but rarely both together. 18 In Italy Soviet representatives were welcomed and many Russians had come. Stalin broke in to say that this was not the case. The Russians had no rights in Italy. Vyshinski had never been on the Control Commission. He sat on the Advisory Council. Churchill said that their position was that the Russians were welcome to come to Italy and to go anywhere. The position there was not on the same footing as that in the other satellite states. The President said that there had been many difficulties encountered by our mission in Rumania and Bulgaria 19 and that these had caused us much concern. He added, however, that we had no intention to make any reflection upon Stalin or upon his Government at this Conference. Mr. Byrnes said that in the hope of reaching agreement he suggested an amendment which was to substitute the word “recognize” [ recognized ] for the word “responsible”. Stalin said this was more acceptable but he would like also that the words suggested by Molotiv be added at the end of the amendment proposed by Mr. Byrnes. Molotiv then read his amendment which was as follows: “The three Governments agree to consider each separately in the immediate future the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.” Churchill said that this amendment did not reflect what they had been saying. Stalin rejoined that it was not right to say this. They had decided to prepare peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, and the other satellites. This could not be done if they did not have diplomatic relations. The President said he saw no objection to Molotiv’s amendment. Stalin said that in this case they had no objections to the draft as a whole. Churchill thought this would be covering with words, which would be read by the whole world, a difficulty which had not been removed around the conference table. He thought that the President had said that he would not recognize the present governments of Rumania and Bulgaria. The President admitted that this was correct, but said that they were now agreeing only to examine the question. Churchill said that this in no way removed the disagreement and that it would mislead the public. Stalin inquired: “Why?” Churchill replied because the purport of the statement would be that there would be immediate recognition of these governments; whereas, he understood that this was not the position of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments. Stalin suggested that the President could speak for himself. It had already been accepted by the British and the Council for [ of ] Foreign Ministers was charged with the preparation of peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. 20 A peace treaty could be concluded only after recognition; this meant that the question of recognition was on the agenda. If they made no mention of the resumption of diplomatic relations then the paragraph in regard to peace treaties should be left out. Churchill inquired if the President contemplated that in the autumn the representatives of Rumania and Bulgaria would come to the Council of Foreign Ministers and that they would discuss a peace treaty with representatives of the present governments of those countries. The President replied that the only government that could be dealt with was one that they could recognize. Stalin replied that that was correct. Churchill said that the present governments would not be recognized and that there could be no peace treaty with them until they were. Stalin said he did not see how that followed. Churchill said it should follow. Stalin replied that it did not. He said that these governments might be recognized or they might not. All of them might be recognized or some of them might be recognized. It should be understood in the following way. A peace treaty with them would be considered when they had been recognized. Churchill said that anyone reading this paragraph would not realize that the United States, insofar as he had gathered, would not recognize the present governments of Rumania and Bulgaria. If other governments were created which they could recognize, then they would take up the preparation of the peace treaties. He was sorry to press on these points but this document would be published and this must be explained. They would have to say that they would make treaties with governments which they recognized, but that they did not intend to recognize these governments. That was almost meaningless. The President proposed to refer the question to the Foreign Ministers again. Stalin remarked that Churchill was not right. There was no reference to the conclusion of the peace treaties, but only to their preparation. Peace treaties could be prepared even if governments were not recognized. Churchill replied that of course they could prepare them by themselves. He referred then to the word “with” in the second line of paragraph three. 21 Suppose they substituted the word “for.” Stalin said that he had “for” in his text. That was what was meant. Churchill expressed his thanks and agreed that it be sent to the Foreign Ministers to be looked at again. This was agreed. 2. Question of the Black Sea Straits The President pointed out that he had circulated a paper on in-land waterways 22 and inquired if it had been considered. Stalin pointed out that this paper did not deal with the question of Turkey and the Straits but dealt with the Danube and the Rhine. The Soviet Delegation would like to receive a reply to their proposal in regard to the Black Sea Straits. 23 The President replied that he wished the two questions to be considered together. Stalin said he was afraid they would not be able to reach an agree-ment in regard to the Straits, since their views differed so widely. He said that perhaps they should postpone the question and take up the next question. Churchill said he understood that it was agreed that freedom in the Black Sea Straits should be approved and guaranteed by the Big Three and other powers and that the United States would come into that kind of an organization and said that to his mind this was a remarkable and important fact. The President said that the Prime Minister had clearly stated the position of the United States. Churchill pointed out that this was a big step. Stalin said that this was correct with respect to freedom of passage for the British were in favor of freedom for all traffic. Churchill said that they hoped that the guarantee proposed would be more than a substitute for the fortification of the Straits. Molotiv inquired if the Suez Canal were under the same principle. 24 Churchill rejoined that it was open in war and peace to all. Molotiv inquired if it were under the same international control as was proposed for the Black Sea Straits. Churchill said that this question had not been raised. Molotiv said that he was asking. If it was such a good rule why not apply it to the Suez. Churchill said that they had an arrangement with which they were satisfied and that this arrangement had operated for some seventy years with no complaints. Molotiv said there had been a lot of complaints. They should ask Egypt. Eden said that Egypt had signed the treaty 25 with them. 26 Molotiv said that the British asserted that international control was better. Churchill said that their suggestion had been made to meet the Russian position that Russia should be able to move freely in and out of the Black Sea and that they were prepared to join in a guarantee with other nations and were prepared to press It upon Turkey. Was it to be supposed that Turkey would resist when the three Great Powers agreed and took an interest in the matter. Freedom could be attained in this way and without trouble for Turkey. He quite agreed that the question must be put off, but he hoped that the tremendous fact that they had heard at this meeting should not be underestimated by their Russian friends. The President said he wished to make clear his understanding of an international guarantee of the freedom of the Straits; it meant that any nation had free ingress for any purpose whatever. He did not contemplate any fortifications of any kind. 27 Churchill said he fully sympathized and agreed with Stalin that a great power, such as the Soviet Union, must not have to go to a smaller power, like Turkey, hat in hand, any time it wanted to send ships through the Straits, only because Turkey said she had fears of war. He did not oppose Stalin’s complaint in this respect. Stalin pointed out that this question had been raised at the Conference by Great Britain. It was evident that they differed in their views. They had many more urgent questions before them and this one could be put off. Churchill said the question had been brought up following all their conversations with the Russians regarding the Soviet wish to change the Montreux Convention, 28 which position they were prepared to support. Stalin said the question was not yet ripe. Some talks with the Turks should take place. Churchill inquired “With Turkey by whom?” Stalin replied that the Russians had interrupted their conversations with the Turks, 29 but only temporarily. The United States could talk with Turkey as well as Great Britain. He was not certain whether Turkey would be prepared to agree to international control. Churchill said it was more likely that they would agree to this than to the construction of big fortifications in the Straits. Stalin replied that this might be, he did not know. The President drew attention to the word “control.” If the Straits were free there would be no control. He said that we would endeavor to make Turkey see our point of view. Stalin then proposed that each of them work on the matter. 3. Preparation of the Communiqué The President pointed out that the Conference would have to be wound up in not more than a week or ten days and that a communiqué would have to be prepared. He proposed that a committee be appointed to start working on it and suggested that the Foreign Ministers make a proposal to them the next day. Stalin inquired if they were to meet the next day. The President said he was anxious to do as much work as possible because when there was nothing more upon which they could agree he was returning home. He had much business in the City of Washington. Churchill said that Mr. Attlee and he would have to be back in England on the eighth and that he could not stay longer than the sixth. 4. Question of Poland’s Western Frontiers This question was postponed upon the proposal of Mr. Churchill who said he was having talks with the Poles. 30 5. Soviet Prisoners of War in a British Prison Camp in Italy Churchill said the position was the following. It was true that there were 10,000 persons in this camp. 31 It should be remembered that they had just taken one million prisoners. These 10,000 were in the process of being sifted by the Russian Mission at Rome. This Mission had full access to the camps in question. The personnel in these camps was said to be chiefly non-Soviet Ukrainians and to include numbers of Poles who, insofar as they could find out, were domiciled within the 1939 Polish frontiers. Six hundred and sixty-five persons within this camp wanted to return to their native Soviet Union and their return was being arranged. The British would hand over any others who would go without the use of force. The question of how much force would be used must be considered and must be carefully handled. This 10,000 had surrendered almost intact as an enemy division. They had retained the division as organized under their own general for administrative reasons exclusively. 32 They would have been glad if General Golikov had made his complaints to Field Marshal Alexander at his headquarters. Field Marshal Alexander said that he would like everyone present to know that he had always given the Russian representatives in Italy complete freedom of movement and assistance to see anything and everything they wished to see at any time. In questions of this sort where they had a great number of Russian soldiers on their hands it was a great help to receive advice from responsible Russian representatives. He hoped that the Generalissimo would agree and that these facilities could continue to be made available. Stalin said that under the treaty 33 concluded between them they were bound to give each other admission to such camps and not to raise obstacles in the way of returning Soviet nationals to their own country. If Field Marshal Alexander thought this was possible he would be grateful. Churchill said that if Stalin would send his generals they would examine the situation and see if it could be done. Stalin replied: “All right.” 34 6. Occupation of Vienna Stalin said he had talked to Marshal Konev 35 and that they were ready to continue to issue rations to all zones in Vienna until such time as the British and Americans found it possible to make some other arrangements. Churchill said that as soon as they got to Vienna one of the first things they would examine would be the question of the extension of the administrative control of the Renner Government in the American and British zone and that in principle they thought this could be done. 36 Stalin said that this would be a good thing to do. The President remarked that he agreed with the Prime Minister. Meeting adjourned. 37 5 Ante , p. 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] . 6 Document No. 1424 , post . 7 Not found. See document No. 1424 , post , footnote 1. 8 The remarks here attributed to Truman are attributed to Churchill in the Cohen notes, post , p. 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] . 9 This statement is attributed to Stalin in the Cohen notes, post , p. 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] . 10 This statement is attributed to Stalin in the Cohen notes, post , p. 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] . 11 See document No. 1417 , post , section v . 12 See ante , p. 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . 13 See ante , pp. 326–328 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . 14 Not found. See document No. 1424 , post , footnote 1. 15 See ante , pp. 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] . It appears that Molotov had before him the Rapporteur’ s report and its attachment (see p. 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , ante , and document No. 1424 , post ), whereas Byrnes had before him the later draft (not found) mentioned in footnote 1 to document No. 1424 , post . 16 The last sentence of this statement is attributed to Molotov in the Cohen notes, post , p. 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] . 17 Sir Noel Charles, Bart., British High Commissioner to Italy. 18 The representatives referred to are: Colonel General Ivan Zakharovich Susaikov, Soviet Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania; Brigadier General Cortland T. Van R. Schuyler, Chief of the United States Military Representation on the Commission; and Air Vice Marshal Donald Stevenson, British High Commissioner in Rumania. 19 See vol. i , pp. 357 – 419 , passim. 20 See the attachment to document No. 714 , post . 21 Of the draft (not found) mentioned in footnote 1 to document No. 1424 , post . 22 Document No. 755 , post . 23 Document No. 1369 , post . 24 This statement and the next four statements here attributed to Molotiv are all attributed to Stalin in the Cohen notes, post , pp. 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] . 25 i. e., the treaty signed at London, August 26, 1936, with supplemental agreements. Text in British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxl , p. 179. 26 This statement is attributed to Churchill in the Cohen notes, post , p. 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] . 27 Cf. document No. 1371 , post . 28 Signed July 20, 1936. For full text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 213. Substantive portions printed also in Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits , p. 25. 29 See vol. i , documents Nos. 683 , 684 , 686 , and 701 . 30 See Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , pp. 661–667. 31 At Cesenatico. See ante , p. 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , and document No. 1164 , post . 32 Cf. document No. 1165 , post . 33 i. e., the Anglo-Soviet repatriation agreement (not printed) which paralleled the Soviet-American agreement concerning liberated prisoners of war and civilians, signed at Yalta, February 11, 1945. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 505; 59 Stat. (2) 1874; Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 985 . For a draft text of the Anglo-Soviet agreement referred to, see ibid. , p. 417 . 34 Cf. document No. 1432 , post . 35 See ante , p. 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 36 Cf. document No. 763 , post . 37 At 7:30 p.m. See Log, ante , p. 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] . For information on a Truman–Stalin conversation which took place immediately after adjournment of the plenary meeting, see post , p. 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] . Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 5 p.m. Secretary Byrnes reads the report of the Foreign Secretaries. 1. The economic committee [ subcommittee ] was not yet ready to report on German reparations. They have not yet reported on reparations for Austria and Italy. The Russian delegation submitted papers on Austria[n] and Italian reparations. 1 These economic matters have been postponed a day. The economic committee will meet tonight. 2. The United States had submitted a paper on European oil supplies, but action was postponed pending the committee’s report. 3. Implementation of Yalta Declaration on Europe and satellite states. The subcommittee was not ready to report, and the matter was postponed. The paper proposed eventual admission—Italy and neutrals, excluding Spain—into the United Nations, which was discussed. Disagreement of the Foreign Secretaries was to be submitted to the Big Three. Soviets’ objection to the paper was because it omitted reference to Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Mr. Eden proposed certain changes regarding Italy, and these changes were agreed to. Secretary Byrnes proposed a paragraph to include reference to admission of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland when peace treaties were concluded, with responsible democratic governments of these countries. The Chairman had hoped that this would meet the objection of Mr. Molotiv. As Mr. Molotiv was not satisfied, it was referred to the Big Three. 4. Rumanian oil equipment. British paper proposing arbitration referred to committee. Agenda for Big Three meeting to include admission of Italy, neutrals, and satellite countries to United Nations organization, Polish western frontier, and the Straits. Byrnes : The Foreign Secretaries heard representatives of the Polish provisional government this morning. I assume the Foreign Secretaries have each made their own report to the beads of state, but I will give a brief summary, if desired. The Polish government proposed the Oder and western Neisse, including the city of Stettin as the basis of their western frontier. The principal arguments in support of this thesis were: Poland should be compensated in the west for what was taken from her in the east. The territory proposed in the west comprises one economic unit. Poland will receive less in the west than she lost in the east. The population would be reduced, but would be more homogenous. Only one to one and a half million Germans [were?] left in area, but they would be willing to return to Germany. This territory would enable Poland to support her population without resort to emigration. This frontier would enable many Poles to return to Germany. It is the shortest possible frontier, and the most easy to defend. Germany had attempted to destroy the Polish population, and it would be an act of historic justice to give this territory to Poland. Poland had ceded territory in the east for world peace. It was right that Germany should also cede territory for this purpose. Territory sought would take away Germany’s war potential in the east. It would leave Poland without a large minority. It would absorb excess urban population in the west, which is not absorbable in old Poland’s industries. It would enable Poles abroad to return. Territory to be taken was one of the bases of Germany’s imperialism. It would deprive Germany of her profits from the exploitation of this area. If not given this territory, Poland would lose more territory in the war than Germany. A speedy decision was urged so that Poles abroad could return and participate in the reconstruction of Poland. Truman : The first question before us is the statement on the admission of Italy, neutrals, and other satellites to the United Nations. Byrnes : The British and American delegations are agreed on the statement. Truman : What has the Soviet delegation to say? Stalin : To ease the situation of all satellite countries, all of them should be mentioned on an equal basis. The artificial distinction drawn prompts us to believe that satellites other than Italy are put in a leprous category. Such a distinction tends to discredit the Soviet armies. Italy was the first to surrender, but she did more harm than any other satellite state. There is no doubt that the other satellites did less harm than Italy. Is the Italian government really more democratic than the governments of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland? Is it more responsible? No elections have been held in Italy. It is not clear to me that the benevolent attitude towards Italy has been shown to the other satellites. Italy’s position has been eased by the renewal of diplomatic relations. Now a second step is proposed. Yes, let us take the second step towards Italy. But let us also take the first step towards the other satellites. That would be just. You can renew diplomatic relations with the other satellites and then you can make a peace treaty with Italy first. Churchill : We are in general agreement with the United States. Our point of view is divergent only with reference to these other satellites. We have been unable to get information, or to have free access to the satellite states. As soon as we have proper access to them, and proper governments are set up, we will recognize them—not sooner. The language is the same in the proposed document regarding Finland, and the southeastern European satellite states, as it is regarding Italy. 2 Stalin : But you have recognized Italy. Truman : The other satellite states will be recognized when they meet the same conditions as Italy has met. Stalin : No one of these governments can prevent access to information to the Allied governments. There were restrictions on the Soviet government’s representatives in Italy. Truman : We are asking reorganization of these governments along democratic lines. Stalin : The other satellites have democratic governments closer to the people than does Italy. Truman : I have made clear we will not recognize these governments until they are reorganized. Molotiv : It was my suggestion that the satellites other than Italy be put on the same basis, including diplomatic recognition. Byrnes : May I ask whether the Marshal has had translated the paper that has been circulating? Molotiv : We have an amendment concerning the small satellites. Byrnes : We submitted the whole paper in amended form. I should like it translated and read to the Marshal. It is an effort to treat Italy and the other satellites on the same basis, and to find a vehicle to condemn Franco’s Spain. Stalin : The reference to “responsible and democratic government” should be deleted. Truman : We cannot make peace with them until we recognize them. Molotiv : Reference to responsible democratic governments discredits the satellite governments. There should also be a reference to the recognition of these governments. My proposal is to add words that each of the governments will consider the resumption of diplomatic relations. Churchill : We do not want to use words to slur these governments. I would like to put in a word for Italy. It is not that she was the first out of the war, but two years have passed since she got out of the war. The other countries are out of the war only a few months. Our mission in Bucharest has been practically confined. I am sure the Marshal would be amazed to read the long list of incidents which have occurred. Stalin : They are all fairy tale[s]. Churchill : Statesmen may call one another’s statements fairy tales, if they wish. Stalin : The same condition prevails in Italy. Churchill : That is not accurate. You can go where you like in Italy. Truman : Our missions have encountered great difficulties in the satellite states. Byrnes : I suggest that we use the term recognize [ d ] democratic governments in the proposed statement, in lieu of responsible democratic governments. Stalin : That is more acceptable, but I should also like that the amendment added by Mr. Molotiv be put at the end; that is, add to the Byrnes paragraph on satellites a provision that the three governments will consider each separately in the near future, the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland and Hungary. This does not run counter to what has been said. Treaties cannot be concluded until countries are recognized. Churchill : This gives the impression that we were considering recognizing the present governments. That is not the position of the President, nor is it ours. Truman : May I suggest that we again refer the matter to the Foreign Ministers? Stalin : Mr. Churchill is not right. Peace treaties can be prepared even though governments are not recognized. Churchill : Then we should provide for the conclusion of treaties for not with these countries. Stalin : That will be more satisfactory. Churchill : Thank you, Marshal. Stalin : Don’t mention it. Churchill : It would be a good thing for the Foreign Secretaries to have another look at the wording. Truman : We may now discuss the problem of the Straits. I circulated a paper on this. Stalin : The paper put in by President Truman refers to the Danube and the Rhine, and not the Straits. We would like a reply to our statement on the Straits, and a base. Truman : I should like to consider them together. Stalin : I am afraid we won’t reach an agreement on the Straits. Our ideas differ widely. Perhaps we can pass over this point now. Churchill : I think that the freedom of the Straits in war and in peace, for war and merchant vessel[s], should be guaranteed by the three great powers. That is a proposal worthy of discussion. Stalin : We are also for the freedom of all traffic. Churchill : We should think that an international guaranty would be more than the equivalent of a base. Stalin : What will be done about the Suez Canal? Churchill : It will be open. Stalin : What about international control? Churchill : That question has not been raised. Stalin : I am raising it. Churchill : We have an agreement, with which we are satisfied. There have been no complaints. Stalin : Egypt should be consulted. Churchill : We have a treaty. Stalin : You suggest that international control is preferable. We want a treaty with Turkey. Churchill : We should be prepared to press on Turkey the acceptance of this idea, which will give the Soviets a guarantee of freedom for their traffic. I quite agree that this must be put off, but I hope that the proposal put forth at this table, which gives the Soviets absolute security, will not be underrated by the Marshal. Truman : I want to make it clear that this guarantee is for freedom of traffic for all of us, without any fortifications by anyone. Churchill : I fully sympathize and agree with the Marshal that he should not have to go cap in hand to a smaller power like Turkey every time he wants to send a ship through the Straits. Stalin : This question was brought up for discussion by Great Britain. It becomes evident that we differ in our views. We have more urgent questions than the Straits, so this question can be passed. Churchill : It was brought up by Great Britain because the Marshal indicated he wanted a revision of the Montreux Convention. Stalin : The question is not ripe for discussion. There must be further talks with the Turks. Truman : I have made my position clear. Stalin : The United States and the British can talk to Turkey as well as we. I am not sure that Turkey will agree to international control. Truman : Control by international guarantee that the Straits are open, means freedom of traffic, and no control. We shall endeavor to make Turkey see our point of view. I have a suggestion. I hope we can wind up the conference in a week or ten days. I think a committee should be appointed to work on a communiqué so that everything will not have to be done at once. I hope the Foreign Secretaries will report to us on this tomorrow. Stalin : Do we meet at eleven tomorrow? Eden : We had doubt[s] whether there would be enough on the agenda for the Big Three for tomorrow, but as today’s agenda is not completed, you can meet. Truman : As soon as we can finish, I must be back in Washington. Let us meet tomorrow. Stalin : There is the Polish frontier to discuss. Churchill : Field Marshal Alexander is waiting. Truman : Shall we talk about Poland? Stalin : Have we time to discuss it? Churchill : I am having a talk with Bierut in the morning. We can postpone it. Truman : Bring in Marshal Alexander then. Churchill : In a few words, following is our position about the Soviet war prisoners in Italy, about which the Soviets have asked information. The Soviets have full access to the camp in question. These prisoners are said to be mainly non-Soviet Ukrainians, and they include Poles not domiciled within the 1939 Russian boundaries, and those who wish to return to Russia may go. We will hand over the others who will go, without the use of force. This body of about 10 thousand personnel surrendered almost intact as a Polish division. We would have been glad if the commanding general had made his complaint direct to Field Marshal Alexander. Alexander : I have nothing to add to the Prime Minister’s statement. I should like everyone here to know the following: I have always given Russian representatives in Italy freedom of movement to see anything at any time. I think this is a good thing to do, when we have Russian soldiers to look after in our camps. I hope that the Generalissimus will enable me to give the fullest facilities to his representatives. Stalin : Under our treaty, we must both grant each other admission, and not raise obstacles to the return of men to their own country. I will be grateful if Field Marshal Alexander would so arrange. Churchill : Will the Generalissimus send his representatives to investigate? Stalin : I have already talked to Marshal [Konev]. 3 I will give you time to work this out. Churchill : There was also the question of giving the Renner government civilian administrative authority in all zones. This is one of the first questions which we will tackle when we get into Vienna. We agree that in principle this is desirable. Truman : I agree with the Prime Minister. 1 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra. 2 Concerning discrepancies in the attribution of these and other remarks during this meeting as between the Thompson minutes and the Cohen notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra. 3 Name supplied from the Thompson minutes, ante , p. 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , The Thompson minutes indicate that this remark introduced a new subject, namely the occupation of Vienna. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 5:30 p.m. Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 5:30 p.m. 1 1 C. C. S. 200th Meeting. Present United States United Kingdom General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal General of the Army Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham General Somervell Admiral Mountbatten Lieutenant General Hull Field Marshal Wilson Vice Admiral Cooke General Ismay Major General Norstad Lieutenant-General Macready Captain McDill Captain Oster Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Major-General Hollis Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Lieutenant-Colonel Mallaby [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)]] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 5:30 p.m. J. C. S. Files Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 5:30 p.m. top secret 1. 200 th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note that this was their 200th Meeting. 2. Operations in Southeast Asia Command General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to extend a welcome to Admiral Mountbatten and take this opportunity of congratulating him personally on the conclusion of his great campaign in Burma. Admiral Mountbatten thanked the United States Chiefs of Staff and then proceeded to give an account of past, present, and future operations in his command. In recounting the broad tale of events in Southeast Asia from the Sextant Conference in 1943 to the capture of Rangoon in May, 1945, he emphasized two points of importance:— a . Air transport was the lifeblood of all operations in his command. They had saved the day when things looked black in the spring of 1944 and had enabled him to complete successfully the great overland campaign to recapture Burma which had previously been thought impracticable. The Dakota was far and away the best transport aircraft for his purposes. b . The tremendous steps in the reduction of casualties made possible by preventive medicine. In describing the current situation in Burma, Admiral Mountbatten explained that:— a . He had some 56,000 Japs still to destroy. At the moment seven divisions were employed on the job, three of which would soon be withdrawn to take part in forthcoming operations. Considerable fighting was still going on. b . He had a big problem in getting supplies through to the native population in the face of one of the worst monsoons in history. He was being forced to use some air transport for this as well as for the maintenance of the troops. c . His air transport squadrons were some 20 percent under strength. As regards future operations, the Supreme Commander paid tribute to the immense effort being put forward by the India Command to organize India as a base for these operations which were the largest that had ever been undertaken from the country. He drew a picture of the problem of mounting operation Zipper ; the vast distances over which the forces would have to converge on the objective; the fact that they would have to rely on carrier-borne air support for the landing; and the degree of opposition they were likely to meet. Risks were involved but these were calculated risks which he was prepared to accept. Finally, he paid tribute to the morale of the troops and the high degree of inter-Allied cooperation that had been built up in the past two years. This spirit, he felt, would carry the command through forthcoming operations in spite of the disappointments inevitably involved in the acceptance of a second priority in the war as a whole. Sir Alan Brooke then invited the United States Chiefs of Staff to put any questions they would like to Admiral Mountbatten, observing that the British Chiefs of Staff would have the opportunity at subsequent discussions in London. General Marshall suggested that it might be possible to use more submarines to prevent the infiltration into Malaya of further Japanese reinforcements. Sir Andrew Cunningham said that no specific demand for further submarines for this purpose had been made from the theater and that within reason there was no limitation on the number that might be employed. There were, however, very few worthwhile targets left in the area. Admiral Mountbatten said that he felt that the present distribution of submarines, balanced as it was to meet the various tasks to be carried out, was satisfactory. General Marshall asked the Supreme Commander how soon he thought he would be able to take over the new command, 2 explaining that the United States Chiefs of Staff were very anxious to relieve United States commanders in the Pacific of their responsibilities for the area at the earliest possible moment. Admiral Mountbatten said that he had not expected to be called upon to assume these new responsibilities until Mailfist had been completed. He would like a little further time to consider the idea of taking them on earlier, but assured the United States Chiefs of Staff that he would do his best to meet them. When assured by General Marshall that the forces now in the area would be left there, he said that this certainly made things easier. It appeared that the problem would be merely a matter of assuming the higher direction of operations in the area. General Marshall asked what Admiral Mountbatten thought of the idea of splitting French Indo-China into two and placing the southern half, south of 16° N, in the Southeast Asia Command. 3 Admiral Mountbatten said that he had just heard of the proposition and that his first reactions were favorable. He would have liked some latitude in the actual northern limit of the area in case his operations were to develop either to the north or to the south of the degree of latitude suggested, but did not feel very strongly on the point. He thought the French might find the proposition a little less agreeable. General Marshall explained the background to the French offer of two French divisions for operations in the war against Japan, 4 and said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were agreed that the best place to employ these divisions would probably be in French Indo-China. One of these two divisions had had battle experience and had done well. Both were composed of white men and the French proposal specifically provided that they would arrive with corps-supporting and service units. He asked Admiral Mountbatten’s opinion as to the acceptance of these two divisions in Southeast Asia Command. They could not be moved out for several months and it would probably be the late spring of 1946 before he could expect to get them. Admiral Mountbatten said that, subject to the views of the British Chiefs of Staff, he would certainly welcome these two French divisions provided they came with a proper proportion of service and supporting units. The obvious place to employ them would be in French Indo-China where he would be relieved of the necessity of dealing with a problem which could be satisfactorily handled only by Frenchmen. General Hull said that General MacArthur had drawn up a list of the supporting and service units which these two divisions would require if they came out to the Pacific, and this list has been communicated to the French. He undertook to provide Admiral Mountbatten with this list. 5 2 See document No. 1381 , post , paragraphs 12 and 13, and appendices B and C. 3 See document No. 1381 , post , paragraph 14. 4 See documents Nos. 1288 – 1291 and 1381 , post . 5 Not printed. Morse–Weston conversation, afternoon Morse–Weston conversation, afternoon 1 1 All information on this conversation is based on rough informal notes taken by Morse, the gist of which was given to Department of State historians by Morse in a conversation of November 30, 1955. Present United States United Kingdom Mr. Morse Mr. Weston [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] Editor’s Note —No official record of this conversation has been found. The principal subject of conversation was the accuracy of Soviet statements relating to Finnish shipping captured by the Soviet Union. 2 2 Cf. ante , p. 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . Truman–Stalin conversation, 7:30 p.m. Truman–Stalin conversation, 7:30 p.m. 1 1 This conversation took place at the Cecilienhof Palace immediately after the adjournment of the Eighth Plenary Meeting. Present United States 2 Soviet Union President Truman Generalissimo Stalin Mr. Pavlov 2 2 Byrnes ( All in One Lifetime , p. 300) mentions Bohlen’s presence as Truman’s interpreter at this conversation, and, in a conference which Department of State historians had with Truman and members of his staff on January 24, 1956, Truman supplied the information that both Bohlen and a Soviet interpreter were present at this conversation. In a conversation with a Department of State historian on January 26, 1960, however, Bohlen stated categorically that Truman walked over to Stalin alone, in order to give the conversation a more casual flavor, and that Pavlov did the interpreting. 2 Byrnes ( All in One Lifetime , p. 300) mentions Bohlen’s presence as Truman’s interpreter at this conversation, and, in a conference which Department of State historians had with Truman and members of his staff on January 24, 1956, Truman supplied the information that both Bohlen and a Soviet interpreter were present at this conversation. In a conversation with a Department of State historian on January 26, 1960, however, Bohlen stated categorically that Truman walked over to Stalin alone, in order to give the conversation a more casual flavor, and that Pavlov did the interpreting. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] Editor’s Note —No official record of this conversation has been found. Truman gives the following account of the conversation in Year of Decisions , page 416: “On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make ‘good use of it against the Japanese.’” Byrnes gives the following information on the conversation in Speaking Frankly , page 263: “At the close of the meeting of the Big Three on the afternoon of July 24, the President walked around the large circular table to talk to Stalin. After a brief conversation the President rejoined me and we rode back to the ‘Little White House’ together. He said he had told Stalin that, after long experimentation, we had developed a new bomb far more destructive than any other known bomb, and that we planned to use it very soon unless Japan surrendered. Stalin’s only reply was to say that he was glad to hear of the bomb and he hoped we would use it.” Leahy’s account is as follows ( I Was There , page 429): “At the plenary session on July 24, Truman walked around to Stalin and told him quietly that we had developed a powerful weapon, more potent than anything yet seen in war. The President said later that Stalin’s reply indicated no especial interest and that the Generalissimo did not seem to have any conception of what Truman was talking about. It was simply another weapon and he hoped we would use it effectively.” Churchill, who was also an eye-witness to the conversation, gives the following information ( Triumph and Tragedy , pages 669–670): “Next day, July 24, after our plenary meeting had ended and we all got up from the round table and stood about in twos and threes before dispersing, I saw the President go up to Stalin, and the two conversed alone with only their interpreters. I was perhaps five yards away, and I watched with the closest attention the momentous talk. I knew what the President was going to do. What was vital to measure was its effect on Stalin. I can see it all as if it were yesterday. He seemed to be delighted.… As we were waiting for our cars I found myself near Truman. ‘How did it go?’ I asked. ‘He never asked a question,’ he replied.” Byrnes conversation with members of the Polish Delegation Byrnes conversation with members of the Polish Delegation Present United States Poland 1 Secretary Byrnes 1 It has not been determined who represented Poland at this conversation. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] Editor’s Note —No record of this conversation has been found other than Truman’s statement at the Ninth Plenary Meeting, July 25, “that the Secretary of State had talked with the Poles and expected to have more talks” (see post , page 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] ). Cf. Truman, Year of Decisions , page 388. Morse–Weston conversation, evening Morse–Weston conversation, evening 1 1 All information on this conversation is based on rough informal notes taken by Morse, the gist of which was given to Department of State historians by Morse in a conversation of November 30, 1955. Present United States United Kingdom Mr. Morse Mr. Weston [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] Editor’s Note —No official record of this conversation has been found. The principal subject of discussion was the distribution of captured German vessels. In the course of the conversation Morse communicated to Weston a draft memorandum from Land to Clayton on this subject. 2 2 Document No. 1009 , post . Second meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening Second meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening Present United States United Kingdom 2 Soviet Union Mr. Brown 1 Mr. Gromyko 2 Hayter was named as the British member of this subcommittee (see ante , p. 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] ), but it is not known whether he attended this meeting. 1 Russell and Cannon were named as United States members of this subcommittee (see ante , p. 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] ), but it is not known whether they attended this meeting. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Brown’s diary entry for July 24 contains the following summary: “There was a conference tonight on freedom of press and movement in liberated areas in Balkans. Gromyko came up with a weasel-worded statement on assuring correspondents the right to report out of these countries. He still insisted on military censorship and admitted this could cover political censorship of certain stories. Would not agree to affirmative declaration against political censorship and freedom of press in these areas. Meeting adjourned with no agreement.” Truman–Mountbatten conversation, 9:20 a.m. Truman–Mountbatten conversation, 9:20 a.m. 1 1 The meeting was held at Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg. Information as to time, place, and participants from the Log, ante , p. 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Present United States United Kingdom President Truman Admiral Mountbatten [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] Editor’s Note —No record of the substance of this conversation has been found. Truman–Stalin conversation, about 11 a.m. Truman–Stalin conversation, about 11 a.m. Present United States Soviet Union President Truman Generalissimo Stalin [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] Editor’s Note —At a meeting of the United States and Soviet Chiefs of Staff on July 26, Army General Antonov stated that Stalin had handed to Truman the Soviet answer to document No. 1279 , post , at 11 a.m. on July 25 (see post , page 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] ). No other record of this transaction, which presumably took place at the Cecilienhof Palace immediately before the Ninth Plenary Meeting, has been found. Ninth plenary meeting, 11 a.m. Ninth plenary meeting, 11 a.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Davies Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Bohlen Mr. Attlee Mr. Cohen 1 Mr. Thompson 2 Mr. Gromyko Mr. Pavlov 1 Cohen’s presence is assumed from the existence of his notes on the meeting, post , p. 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] . 2 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)]] United States Delegation Working Paper Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m. J. C. S. Files [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2545 United States Delegation Working Paper Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] United States Delegation Working Paper Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m. Agenda for the Meeting of Heads of Governments, July 25, 1945 1. Polish Western Frontier 3 2. Disposition of German Fleet and Merchant Marine 4 3. German Reparations 4. Transfer of populations from Poland & Czechoslovakia 5 [5.] Waterways 6 3 Opposite this item is the following marginal manuscript notation by Dunn: “Eden opposed to discussing this morning”. 4 Items 2 and 3 are bracketed together with the following marginal manuscript notation by Dunn: “Br[itish] ask to postpone”. 5 Item 4 was added in manuscript by Dunn with the following marginal notation: “British will ask to add to agenda.” 6 The last item was added in manuscript by Truman. Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m. top secret 1. Western Frontier of Poland Churchill said that he had had a talk with President Bierut and that Mr. Eden had seen the Polish delegation for two hours last evening. 1 The Poles were all in agreement that about one and one-half million Germans were left in the area in the west which was under discussion. Mr. Churchill said he thought that this question was mixed up with the question of reparations and the question of the four-power occupational [ sic ] zones. The President observed that this was true. He added that the Secretary of State had talked with the Poles and expected to have more talks. 2 He suggested that the question go over to the Friday meeting. This was agreed to. 2. Disposition of the German Fleet The President said he thought that they had agreed on this matter. 3 Churchill replied that some concrete proposals would have to be made. A paper was being drawn up for discussion. 4 The President said that Admiral Land and Assistant Secretary Clayton were in consultation on this matter. He said he had only just received the papers on the question 5 and had had no time to study them. It was agreed that consideration of this matter should be postponed. 3. Transfers of Populations Churchill said that he thought this question should be discussed at some time or other. There were a large number of Germans to be moved out of Czechoslovakia. It was necessary to consider where they would go. Stalin said that the Czechs had evacuated these Germans and that they had gone to Leipzig, Dresden, and other cities. Churchill said he understood that there were two and one-half million of these Germans in the Sudetenland. Moreover there were about 150,000 Reich Germans in Czechoslovakia. The British information was that only a few thousand of these Germans had left Czechoslovakia. He said it was a big question. Churchill asked Stalin if they were all being moved into the Russian zone. Stalin replied in the affirmative. Churchill hastened to add that the British did not want them. Stalin said he did not suggest that the British take them. Churchill observed that they brought their mouths with them. He said he understood that emigration had not begun on a large scale yet. Stalin said his information was that the Czechs gave them two hours notice and then threw them out. With respect to Poland he said that the Poles had retained one and one-half million to help with the harvest. As soon as the harvest was over the Poles would evacuate them. Churchill said he did not think that they should. Stalin replied that the Poles did not ask but did as they liked. Churchill pointed out that with respect to Czechoslovakia the situation was different from that of Poland. The Poles were evacuating Germans from an occupational zone. This area was part of the Russian zone and Poles were driving the Germans out. He should have thought that this ought not to be done without consideration being given to the question of food supply, reparations, etc., which matters had not been decided. The position was that the Poles had little food and fuel and that the British had a mass of population thrown on them. Stalin said that they should appreciate the position in which the Poles found themselves. They were taking revenge on the Germans for the injuries which the Germans had caused them in the course of centuries. Churchill pointed out that their revenge took the form of throwing the Germans into the American and British zones to be fed. The President said he agreed that this should not be done. He was sympathetic with the Poles and with Marshal Stalin in regard to the difficulties they were up against. He had already made his position very clear. 6 If the Poles were to have a zone this matter should be considered very carefully. The occupying powers of Germany were Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and the United States. If the Poles were to have a zone, they were responsible to the Soviet Union for it. He wanted to be as helpful as he could and the position he had taken was that the frontier should be fixed at the peace conference. The President at this point said that he wished to make clear to his colleagues what his powers were in respect to the question of the treaty of peace. When they were discussing matters appropriate for inclusion in the peace treaties he wanted all to understand that under the Constitution of the United States a treaty could only be concluded with the consent of the United States Senate. Of course they could be sure that when he supported a proposal at the Conference he would use his best efforts to support the matter when it came up for consideration in the Senate. This did not preclude, however, his coming back and saying that he considered that the political sentiment in the United States was such that he could not press the matter without the danger of injuring their mutual relations. He said that he made these remarks not in order to change the basis of any discussion with his colleagues nor to change the basis upon which the discussions with President Roosevelt had been held but to make clear what his Constitutional powers were. He had to consider these matters from the standpoint of the United States people and he wished to be able to be in a position to get the best arrangements approved by the Senate. He concluded by saying that he was convinced that world peace could only be maintained by the three of them present at the table. 7 Stalin inquired if his remarks referred only to the peace treaties or to the whole discussion. The President replied only to those agreements or treaties that under the Constitution had to be sent to the Senate for ratification. Stalin observed that only certain treaties were in question. The President replied in the affirmative and added that he had wide powers the same as his colleagues but he did not wish to abuse these powers for he was obliged to have the support of the American people for his policies. Stalin said that he understood. Churchill proposed to return to the question of the Polish advance so far to the west. Stalin said he was not prepared for this question which had come up by accident but he was ready to exchange views. Churchill said he only wanted to say that this matter lay at the root of the success of the Conference. For example, if the Conference ended in ten days time; and if there were no agreement regarding the present state of affairs in Poland; and with the Poles practically admitted as a fifth occupational power; and with no arrangement made for the spreading of food equally over the whole population of Germany; this would undoubtedly mark a breakdown of the Conference. In such an event he supposed they might have to fall back on the proposal of Secretary Byrnes 8 and each would hold on to what was in their areas. The definition given by Mr. Maisky of war booty was a very wide one. 9 As given it would certainly cover ships of war. He had hoped to succeed in reaching agreement on this network of problems that lay at the heart of their difficulties. No progress had been made so far on this point. Stalin said that coal and steel were much more important than food in the question of supplies for Germany. 90 percent of Germany’s metal came from the Ruhr and 80 percent of its coal. Churchill said that if supplies from the Ruhr were to be given to the Russian and Polish zones, these would have to be paid for by food from the Russian zone. He could not take the position that everything behind the Russian line was to be disposed of by the Russians without British and American agreement while the Russians could demand plants and materials from them. Stalin said that if the Ruhr was to remain in Germany its supplies would have to be drawn upon for the whole of Germany. Churchill inquired then why not food. Stalin said that this could be discussed. There were two points, the Ruhr and food. Churchill inquired how the miners would get the coal out without food and where the food was to come from. Stalin said this was a point they were discussing. It was a question of imports and exports. Germany had always imported large amounts of food and had to export to pay for its imports. Churchill then inquired how they could pay reparations. Stalin rejoined that they would be able to pay. Churchill said he would not be responsible for agreeing to anything which would lead to starvation conditions in the British zone this winter while the Poles had the feeding grounds for themselves. Stalin said the Poles had asked the Russians for bread as they were short of food until the next harvest. Churchill said he hoped that Stalin would recognize their difficulties as they would recognize his. He pointed out that in England they would have the most fireless winter of the war this year. Stalin inquired why. Churchill replied because coal was short. Stalin replied that England had always exported coal. He suggested that they make their prisoners of war work. The Russians were working the ones they held in the mines and it would be difficult to dispense with them so far as coal was concerned. He said that the British had 400,000 German soldiers in Norway who were not even disarmed. No one knew what they were waiting for. Churchill said it was their intention to disarm them. He did not know exactly what the situation was but said that the arrangements had been made under SHAEF. However, he said he would inquire. 10 The British were short of coal because they were exporting to Holland, France, and Belgium. They were denying themselves and they found it odd that the Poles sold coal, taken from ground which they did not recognize as Polish, to Sweden and other countries. Stalin said the Poles were not selling coal from the territory in question but from other sources. He was not accustomed to make complaints but he pointed out that the Russian situation was still worse than that of the British. They had lost over five million men in this war. He was afraid that if he started complaining Churchill would burst into tears so difficult was the situation in Russia. Churchill said they were eager to barter coal from the Ruhr in exchange for food for the German population. Stalin said that this question must be discussed. Churchill replied that he did not expect a decision today but before his departure and the resulting interruption of the Conference he did not think they should consider that they had solved the major problems. Churchill said that the British position would be more difficult after the war than it had been during the war although it might be less deadly. Stalin observed that as they had tackled the war properly they would be able to tackle the peace. Eden reverted to the question of the transfer of population. They had received a message from Dr. Beneš asking that the question be examined here. Could not the Foreign Ministers look at it. Stalin inquired whether they should not summon the Czechs to the Conference. Churchill said he would be very glad to see his old friend Dr. Beneš. Stalin asked if this would not mean serving the mustard after supper. He assured Mr. Churchill that these transfers had already taken place. Eden said he thought that all three Governments had received a note from the Czechs asking that the question be discussed here. 11 He thought they ought to do so. Churchill said he thought there had been an agreement between the Soviets and the Czechs that not more than 1,000 of these Germans would depart at one time and that since there were two and one-half million of them the transfer would take a long time. Stalin said there had been no such agreement. Churchill then proposed that the Foreign Ministers at least look into the matter and ascertain the facts. This was agreed to. The President said he would like to call the attention of the Conference to the question of the inland waterways upon which he had circulated a paper. 12 He would like the Foreign Ministers to examine it. This was agreed to. Molotiv said that the Soviet delegation would circulate a memorandum on the obstacles in the way of the return of Soviet citizens from Austria and Germany. 13 He also wished to circulate a memorandum regarding the presence of German troops in Norway. 14 The President said that any memorandum could be circulated. Churchill said he could at once give assurance that these troops would be disarmed immediately. They did not want to keep them up their sleeves. He would have a report made. 15 The meeting adjourned. 16 1 For an account of these meetings, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , pp. 661–667; Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy , pp. 408–409. 2 Concerning conversations held between United States officials and Polish leaders, see ante , p. 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , and post , pp. 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 1386 ] , 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 1387 ] , 1532 [ Pg. 1532 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] , and 1540 [ Pg. 1540 includes portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] . 3 See ante , pp. 118–122 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 4 For a British paper on this subject, see document No. 1014 , post . 5 Presumably document No. 1009 , post , and the attachment thereto. 6 See ante , pp. 207–215 [ Pgs. 207–215 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 7 Cf. document No. 744 , post . 8 See ante , pp. 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] . 9 See document No. 904 , post . 10 See documents Nos. 1056 and 1058 , post . 11 See vol. i , document No. 439 . 12 The Cohen notes ( post , p. 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] ) indicate that Truman referred to his “suggestion on the waterways, the Rhine, the Danube, the Kiel Canal and the Bosporus”. Document No. 755 , post , is the only document on waterways known to have been circulated by the United States Delegation by July 25, but it contains no reference to the Kiel Canal or the Bosporus, although Truman, in introducing it, apparently referred in the course of his remarks to the Kiel Canal and to revision of the Montreux Convention (see the Cohen notes on the Seventh Plenary Meeting, July 23, ante , p. 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] ). Document No. 758 , post , dated July 25, was presented in the meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways on July 27 (see post , p. 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] ) but may have been circulated earlier and thus may be the document referred to. Cf. document No. 757 , post . 13 Documents Nos. 790 and 1055 , post . 14 Document No. 1056 , post . 15 For a subsequent British communication on this subject, see document No. 1058 , post . 16 At 12 noon. See Log, ante , p. 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] . It was anticipated that the Tenth Plenary Meeting would be held at 5 p.m. on Friday, July 27 (see the Cohen notes, post , p. 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] ). When the results of the British general election were made known, however, and Attlee was entrusted with the formation of a government, the Tenth Plenary Meeting was postponed until the evening of Saturday, July 28, in order to give Attlee sufficient time to complete his immediate and urgent tasks in London before returning to the Conference. See Stalin’s Correspondence , vol. i , p. 373. Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m. Truman : Shall we discuss the Polish western frontier? I think the Prime Minister had something to say. Churchill : I saw Mr. Bierut this morning. The Foreign Secretary saw the Polish delegation last night. They all agree that there are about one and a half million Germans in this area. The issue is all mixed up with the reparation issue, and the four power zones of occupation. Truman : Secretary of State Byrnes expects to have further conversations with the Poles also. In view of the British and American conversations with the Poles, it might go over to Friday. The German fleet and merchant marine are also on the agenda. I thought we had agreed on that. Churchill : Obviously, we must have some concrete proposals. Truman : Secretary Byrnes tells me that [Assistant] Secretary Clayton and Admiral Land are working on such proposals. Stalin : Let us postpone it. Churchill : We must at some time discuss the question of the transfer of populations. There are a large number of Poles [ Germans ] 1 to be moved from Czechoslovakia. We must consider where they are to go. Stalin : The Czechs have already evicted them. Churchill : The two and a half million of them? Then there are the Germans from the new Poland. Will they go to the Russian zones? We don’t want them. There are large numbers still to come from Sudetenland. Stalin : So far as the Poles are concerned, the Poles have retained one and a half million Germans to help as laborers. As soon as the harvest is over, the Poles will evict them. The Poles do not ask us. They are doing what they like, just as the Czechs are. Churchill : That is the difficulty. The Poles are driving the Germans out of the Russian zone. That should not be done without considering its effect on the food supply and reparations. We are getting into a position where the Poles have food and coal, and we have the mass of the population thrown on us. Stalin : We must appreciate the position of the Poles. The Poles are taking revenge for centuries of injuries. Churchill : That consists in throwing them on us, and the United States? Truman : We don’t want to pay for Polish revenge. If Poland is to have an occupation zone, that should be clearly defined, but at the present time there are only four zones of occupation. If the Poles have an occupation zone they should be responsible for it. The boundary cannot be fixed before the peace conference. I want to be helpful, but Germany is occupied by four powers, and the boundary cannot be changed [now;] only at the peace conference. I must make clear at this point my constitutional powers. (Reads formal statement 2 ). Peace treaties must be confirmed by our Senate. When I indicate my support of a proposal, I will use my best efforts to secure its acceptance. That does not guarantee its acceptance, nor does it preclude my coming back and informing you that my continuing to press it might endanger our common interests in the peace. I make this statement, not to change the basis of our discussions, but to make clear beyond misunderstanding my constitutional authority. This is particularly important with reference to the Polish question. I want a treaty of peace which can be ratified by the Senate. Stalin : May I ask a few questions? Does your statement refer to peace treaties only, or to other questions? Truman : Only matters which must go to the Senate. I have large war powers, as have the rest of you, but I do not wish to use them to the point that they may endanger the final conclusion of peace. Churchill : If the conference ends in ten days without agreement on the present state of affairs in Poland, and with the Poles practically admitted as a fifth occupation power, and no arrangement for the spreading of food over the whole of Germany, it will mark the breakdown of the conference. I suppose we will have to fall back on the proposal of the Secretary of State, and each of us fall back on our own zones. Maisky’s definition of booty is a very wise one (???). 3 I do hope that we will reach a broad agreement. We must recognize that we have made no progress so far on this point. Stalin : Coal and metal from the Ruhr is more important than the food supply. Churchill : Coal will have to be paid for by food. We could not agree that Russia could dispose of everything in her zone and still claim supplies and reparations from our zone. Stalin : Supplies will have to be drawn from the whole of Germany. Churchill : Why not food? Stalin : That should be discussed. The question is under discussion. Germany has always had to import foodstuff. Churchill : How will she pay reparations? Stalin : There is much fat in Germany. Churchill : I am not going to consent to arrangements which will lead to starvation in the Ruhr, when the Poles have all the feeding grounds. Stalin : Only recently the Poles requested help by the way of bread from us until their new harvest. Churchill : We in England are going to have the most fireless winter since the war. Stalin : How is this? England has always exported her coal. Let the prisoners of war work. They work in the mines in Russia. You have 400 thousand German soldiers in Norway who have not been disarmed. Churchill : It is our intention to disarm them. I thought that they were disarmed. I will inquire about it. Churchill : (continuing) We are short of coal because we export coal to France, Holland and Belgium. We find it odd, when we need coal, that the Poles should be selling coal from lands which we do not regard as Polish, to Sweden and other countries. Stalin : The Poles are selling their own coal, not the coal from the former German territories. I am not accustomed to complaining. We have lost five million men in this war. We are short of coal and many other things. If I described our situation and our needs, I might make the Prime Minister weep. Churchill : We will sell coal from the Ruhr for food. Stalin : This question must be discussed, or thought over. Churchill : We were only exchanging views. I am finished. Stalin : What a pity. Truman : We shall adjourn until Friday at five p.m. Churchill : I hope to be back. Stalin : Judging from the expression on Mr. Attlee’s face, I do not think he looks forward avidly to taking over your authority. We have tackled the problems of the war successfully. We should be able to tackle the problems of the peace as well. Eden : The Prime Minister referred to the transfer of populations. President Beneš has sent some communication to us. May the Foreign Secretaries look at it? Stalin : Yes. May we not have to summon the Czechs? Churchill : I shall be glad to see Beneš. He is an old friend. Stalin : But is this not serving mustard after supper? The Germans have already been driven out. Churchill : They have some agreement for gradual transfer. Stalin : No such agreement exists. Churchill : There is still the problem how this is to be done. May the Foreign Secretaries look into it? Stalin : Yes. Truman : I should like my suggestion on the waterways, the Rhine, the Danube, the Kiel Canal and the Bosporus considered by the Foreign Secretaries. Stalin : All right. Molotiv : May I circulate a memorandum on the obstacles in the way of return of Soviet citizens from Austria and Germany, and also a memorandum on the presence of German troops in Norway. Truman : Yes. Churchill : I wish to assure the Marshal that I intend to disarm the troops in Norway. I am not keeping them up my sleeve for use, if any misunderstanding arises in the north. Perhaps the Marshal will let me make a report. Stalin : I promise in advance, and I shall not criticise. 1 Cf. the Thompson minutes, ante , p. 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] . 2 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra. 3 The Thompson minutes ( ante , p. 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] ) read “wide one”. For the Maisky definition referred to, see document No. 904 , post . United States Delegation Memorandum J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m. top secret Meeting of Heads of Governments , 25 July 1945 1. The information herein regarding the meeting of the Heads of Governments held at Cecilienhof at 1100, 25 July 1945 was furnished by the Secretary General of the U. S. Delegation. 2 2. The Heads of Governments acted on the items of the agenda as follows: a. Polish Western Frontier . Deferred until next meeting. b. Disposition of German Fleet and Merchant Marine . Deferred until papers have been prepared by U. S. and British representatives. c. German Reparations . Not considered. d. Transfer of German Populations from Czechoslovakia and Poland . Referred to Council of Foreign Ministers 3 for examination and report. e. Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways ( Enclosure ). 4 This paper which had been introduced by the U. S. representatives was referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. 3. The Council of Foreign Ministers appointed sub-committees to study items d and e above, which had been referred to them, and a sub-committee to work on the Protocol of the Conference and on communiqués relative to the Conference. 4. The next meeting of the Heads of Governments is scheduled for Friday, 27 July 1945 at 1700. 5 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 Charles W. Yost. 3 i. e., the three Foreign Ministers at the Conference, not the Council of Foreign Ministers established by the Conference. 4 Document No. 755 , post , is the paper enclosed, but see ante , p. 387, footnote 12 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] . 5 i. e., 5 p.m. United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2545 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m. top secret Status of Problems Before the Conference July 25, 1945 i. problems on which substantial agreement has been reached 1. Council of Foreign Ministers . The final text of the agreement in regard to the Council of Foreign Ministers, a draft passage for inclusion in the final protocol and communiqué, and telegrams on the subject to the Governments of China and France have all been approved. 2 2. Authority of the Control Council for Germany in Political Questions . The draft on this question has been approved 3 but the British have asked for the inclusion of two additional paragraphs 4 which the Russians did not believe were appropriate for the economic agreement concerning Germany. 3. Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine . It has been agreed in principle that the fleet and merchant marine shall be divided in three parts. It is also agreed, however, that (1) a substantial proportion of the submarines shall be destroyed and (2) all of the merchant marine, including the Russian share, shall be available for the prosecution of the war against Japan. The Russians are, however, asking for a specific and definitive agreement on this subject. 4. Austria and Vienna . The Soviets have agreed that U. S. and British forces may immediately occupy their zones. The Soviets have also agreed to continue to feed the populations of the U. S. and British zones until the U. S. and British are ready to assume this responsibility. The U. S. and British moreover have agreed in principle that the administrative authority of a central Austrian government should be extended throughout Austria and that this question should be first on the agenda of the Control Council when we enter Vienna. 5. The Polish Question,—Liquidation of the London Government and Implementation of the Yalta Agreement . A document on this matter 5 has received final approval. 6. Trusteeship . It has been agreed that the disposition of the Italian colonies will be dealt with by the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in connection with the negotiation of a peace treaty with Italy. 7. Turkey and the Straits . No tripartite agreement was reached on this subject but it was dropped with the understanding that each of the three Powers would consult the Turks, the British and Americans with a view to establishing an international guarantee of free passage of the Straits for all nations at all times; the Russians presumably with a view to obtaining either exclusive Soviet-Turkish control of the Straits or Soviet-fortified bases on the Straits. 8. Withdrawal of Troops from Iran . It was agreed that troops of the three Powers should be withdrawn from Tehran at once. It was also agreed that further withdrawals would be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers in September, though it was recognized that troops might according to the treaty remain until six months after the close of the Japanese war. The U. S. stated its intention to withdraw its troops within 60 days. 9. Tangier . It was agreed that Tangier should remain international and that the three Governments would participate with France in preliminary discussions of this question to be held in Paris in the very near future. 10. Syria and Lebanon . After hearing the British explanation of their position in regard to this matter, the Soviets withdrew the proposal 6 which they had made. 11. The Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg Area in East Prussia . There was agreement in principle that this area should be transferred to the Soviet Union, with the understanding that the transfer would have to be finally confirmed by the Peace Conference. ii. problems pending for consideration before the heads of governments or foreign ministers 1. German Economic Questions . The subcommittee has presented a first report 7 on these questions, some portions of which have been approved by the Foreign Ministers. Other parts, however, on which no agreement could be reached have been referred to the Big Three. The subcommittee is in the meantime continuing its work. 2. German Reparations . The subcommittee is still at work on this question. 3. Italian and Austrian Reparations . The subcommittee is considering Soviet papers 8 which have been presented on these matters. 4. Oil for Western Europe . The Economic Subcommittee is still considering a U. S. paper 9 on this subject. 5. Admission to the United Nations . A paper 10 has been under consideration by the Foreign Ministers and the Big Three expressing the support of the three Governments to the admission to the United Nations Organization of Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, when peace treaties have been concluded with the recognized governments of those countries, and of neutral countries when they can comply with the requirements for admission to the United Nations, but opposition to the admission of Franco Spain as long as the present regime remains in power. Though general agreement on this paper seems to have been reached it has been referred back to the Foreign Ministers for reexamination. 6. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States . A subcommittee is working on paragraphs 2 and 3 of the U. S. paper 11 on this subject dealing with the freedom of the press and the Control Commissions. There seems no likelihood of reaching agreement on paragraph 1, which deals with observation of elections. 7. Italy and the other Satellite States . The U. S. has presented two papers, one on policy toward Italy 12 and the other on policy toward Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. 13 It had originally been intended to refer these papers to a subcommittee, but Marshal Stalin has now taken the position that, unless the U. S. and Britain are prepared to recognize the present governments of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, this question should not be discussed further. 8. Oil Equipment in Rumania . The British have presented a new paper 14 proposing an examination by representatives of three neutral countries of the ownership of the oil equipment in question. 9. The Western Boundary of Poland . This question is still being discussed by the Big Three, to whom the Foreign Ministers have reported the views of the Polish Provisional Government. 10. Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems . A U. S. paper 15 on this subject, urging Soviet participation in the EEC, ECO and EITO [ ECITO ] is still being considered by a subcommittee. iii. questions on the original agenda of the three powers which have not yet been discussed by the conference 1. British Proposals. a . War Crimes b . Transfer of German populations from Poland and Czechoslovakia 2. All items on the original U. S. and Soviet agenda have now been raised before the Conference. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 See document No. 714 , post , and document No. 1383 , post , section i . 3 Document No. 856 , post . 4 See document No. 879 , post . 5 Document No. 1131 , post . 6 Document No. 1341 , post . 7 Documents Nos. 863 and 902 , post . 8 Documents Nos. 769 and 1099 , post . 9 Document No. 1320 , post . 10 See documents Nos. 729 and 1424 , post . 11 Document No. 748 , post . 12 Document No. 1092 , post . 13 Document No. 805 , post . 14 Document No. 841 , post . 15 Document No. 1161 , post . Dunn–Harriman–Mikołajczyk conversation, 11 a.m. Dunn–Harriman–Mikołajczyk conversation, 11 a.m. 1 1 The date and time given in the heading are drawn from a list of appointments in the Mikołajczyk Papers. Cf., however, (1) a memorandum of July 28 from Harriman to Dunn and Matthews (file No. 860c.01/8–945) transmitting translations of memoranda which Mikołajczyk had handed to Harriman “the night we saw him” and (2) a memorandum of August 9, 1945, from Dunn to Matthews (same file) which refers to “the evening you and I and Mr. Harriman had a talk” with Mikołajczyk. Present United States Poland Mr. Dunn Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk Mr. Matthews [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] Editor’s Note —No minutes of this conversation have been found. For three memoranda handed to Harriman by Mikołajczyk, see documents Nos. 1136 , 1137 , and 1149 , post . Stimson–Stalin conversation, 12:25 p.m. Stimson–Stalin conversation, 12:25 p.m. 1 1 This meeting was a courtesy call by Secretary of War Stimson on Stalin, who served also as People’s Commissar for Defense. Present United States Soviet Union Mr. Stimson Generalissimo Stalin Mr. Page Mr. Pavlov [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)]] Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) [ Babelsberg ,] 25 July 1945. Stimson Papers Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) Stimson Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] Memorandum by the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) Conference With Generalissimo Stalin 25 July 1945[,] 1225 to 1243 at Schloss Cecilienhof, Potsdam, Germany I stated to Stalin that I was very grateful for the privilege of paying my respects to him; that I was sorry that my duties in the United States called me away from the Conference before its conclusion. I said that there was another reason for my being grateful to the Generalissimo—I had followed during the course of the war the records of the Conferences at Teheran and Yalta, and in that respect I greatly appreciated the help and attitude which the Generalissimo had taken regarding a project I was greatly interested in, namely, the crossing of the Channel as well as the landings in southern France. I distinctly remembered the Generalissimo’s language—it was terse and clear—that he distinguished between a supporting action and an action which was a mere diversion. I considered that the position he had taken contributed to our success—not only to the success in France, but also later, in Germany. Stalin stated that this was an epochal war unparallelled in history. He greatly appreciated what I had said, and continued saying that he was afraid that he had said less at Teheran and Yalta than he should have said, especially with respect to the Channel operations. This was unparallelled in history. Now we were faced with the Japanese War—also unparallelled in history. I said that I was particularly interested in the Pacific war. My experiences when I was Governor General in the Philippines made me familiar with the terrain and people in the Pacific. At this point Stalin again interjected that the Pacific war was unparallelled in history because of its magnitude. I agreed and continued, saying that I hoped that the combination of the forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, would bring a speedy victory—not only complete, but short. Stalin stated that we all would operate on the same field of battle—it was high time for this. I said that I hoped our common effort would not only bring success, but bring it promptly. Stalin said that Three Power intervention in the Pacific would surely speed up victory. This was a good thing for the entire world as it would reduce losses. I stated this was one thing we were anxious to have for all. I stated that I was familiar with history and that I had taken great satisfaction in knowing that the two countries—Russia and the United States—had had no issues or differences during the time of the existence of my Government. Stalin said that that was our great fortune. I continued that this was largely because we had no reasons for dispute, and that our natural objectives were the same. The Generalissimo stated that the Russians and the Americans easily understood each other—more so than in the case of the Russians and the British or the Russians and the French. Russians and Americans had something in common. I stated that I hoped that that was so. I continued that I would do everything in my power to follow that line. I stated that I had noticed, as doubtless the Generalissimo had, that our soldiers encountered no difficulty in working together. I therefore thought that it was important that our commanders should make every effort to live together like our soldiers. Stalin appeared to be entirely in agreement with this view. [ Babelsberg ,] 25 July 1945. Eighth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 12:30 p.m. Eighth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 12:30 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Sir Alexander Cadogan Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Dunn Sir William Strang Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Clayton Major Birse Mr. Gromyko Mr. Harriman Mr. Gusev Mr. Bohlen Mr. Golunsky Mr. Thompson 1 1 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 12:30 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)]] Rapporteur’s Report Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 12:30 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)]] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 12:30 p.m. top secret Inland Waterways Mr. Byrnes said that the President had drawn attention at the morning meeting of the Heads of Government to the American paper on Inland Waterways. 2 He suggested that they appoint a committee to consider it. Molotov said he had not thought the matter had been referred to them, but after the Secretary had assured him that it was, 3 it was agreed to set up a committee consisting of Messrs. Ward, Dean, Riddleberger, Russell, Labrishchev and Gereschenko. Transfer of Populations Mr. Byrnes pointed out that they had also been asked to deal with the question of the transfer of populations in respect to Czechoslovakia 3 and he inquired what suggestions his colleagues had. Cadogan pointed out that it was not only the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia that were involved. It was also the question of the transfer of Germans from western Poland. It was true that they had been told that a large majority had fled from the territory now claimed by Poland, but this did not entirely dispose of the question if these people were to transfer their domicile permanently. There were a number of arrangements to be made. There was a similar question on a smaller scale in connection with Hungary. The Hungarians wished to transfer to Germany a certain number of people. The British have no detailed plan but they thought that in view of the difficulty that would be caused by this movement the matter should be under the Allied Control Council, acting with the cooperation of the governments concerned. The Secretary agreed that the Control Council was about the only body competent to regulate the matter. If there were a gradual removal it would not aggravate the food problem, but he assumed that the difficulty was that of unilateral action in trying to force the removal at one time of all of these people. Could they not agree to instruct the Control Council to provide for the orderly removal of these people. Molotov inquired if anybody had complete and detailed information on the question. The Secretary said it seemed to him that the Control Council was the only body that could regulate it. If they could agree to direct them to prevent the wholesale removal of these people and on the contrary to arrange for their gradual transfer, it would be a great help. Molotov said that of course the Control Council could deal with it, but he pointed out that these people were coming from other countries. The Control Council could only close the frontier. It could not take any action in Czechoslovakia. Cadogan inquired if they could not ask the Control Council to look into the problem as it already existed. If many were already gone they could examine the existing situation and give an estimate of the rate at which others could be received. Could they not at the same time tell the three governments concerned that this was being done so that they might hold up while they were considering the matter. With regard to Hungary he thought the Allied Control Commission could deal with the matter. The Secretary suggested that they authorize the Control Commission in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary accordingly. Molotov pointed out that until now the Control Commission had not been authorized to confer with other governments. He thought that someone should draw up concrete proposals. The Secretary agreed and said he had been impressed by Mr. Molotov’s statement that the Control Commission could only stop them from coming in and they might avoid a very bad situation by authorizing the Control Commission to consult with the governments in order to avoid such a situation occurring. He agreed that a draft could be drawn up by a sub-committee and with the approval of his colleagues a committee was appointed consisting of Messrs. Cannon, Harrison, Sobolev and Semenov. The Secretary proposed also that they set up committees to deal with the drafting of the protocol and the communiqué. After some discussion as to whether there should be one committee or two, it was decided that there should be two separate committees which however could consult together. The following persons were appointed to these committees: Communiqué: Mr. Brown Mr. Foote Mr. Sobolev Mr. Galunski Protocol: Mr. Dunn Mr. Matthews Mr. Cohen Mr. Gromyko Mr. Kausurev Mr. Gribanov Cadogan named Sir E. Bridges, Mr. Brook, Mr. Hayter and Mr. Dean to cover both committees and said that they would arrange to divide the duties between themselves. It was agreed to adjourn until Friday morning, at which time the sub-committees which would continue their work would report. 2 See ante , p. 387, footnote 12 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] . 3 See ante , p. 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] . 3 See ante , p. 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] . Rapporteur’s Report Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] Rapporteur’s Report 1 Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 12:30 p.m. [Translation] top secret Statement of Peoples’ Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. M. Molotov , Concerning the Meeting of the Three Ministers on July 25, 1945 (1) The Secretary of State of the USA, Mr. Byrnes, proposed that the question concerning waterways be discussed at the meeting. Mr. Byrnes stressed the desire that this question be discussed in advance in a commission [ subcommittee ]. Mr. [ Sir Alexander ] Cadogan and Mr. Molotov supported this proposal, as a result of which a commission was formed as follows: From the USA: Mr. Russell Mr. Riddleberger 2 From Great Britain: Mr. Ward From the USSR: Mr. Gerashchenko Mr. Lavrishchev (2) In addition Mr. Byrnes touched on the question of the transfer of the German population from Czechoslovakia. Mr. Cadogan stated that it was not only a question of the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia, but also from western Poland and Hungary. He assumed that the question of the transfer of these German populations would be under the control of the Allied Control Council acting in collaboration with the Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. V. M. Molotov proposed referring this question to the preliminary examination of a commission in order that a draft prepared by it might then be examined at a meeting of the three Ministers. Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Cadogan agreed with this proposal. The commission was formed as follows: From the USA: Mr. Cannon. From Great Britain: Mr. Harrison. From the USSR: Mr. Sobolev Mr. Semenov (3) Mr. Cadogan introduced a proposal concerning the formation of a commission to draw up a draft communiqué on the work of the conference and a commission to prepare a draft general protocol of the decisions at the Conference. Mr. Byrnes and V. M. Molotov agreed with this proposal. It was decided to form the following commissions: ( a ) to prepare a draft communiqué on the work of the Conference: From the USA: Mr. Walter Brown. Mr. Wilder Foote. From the USSR: Mr. Loev [ Sobolev ]. 3 Mr. Golunski. ( b ) to prepare a draft general protocol of the decisions of the Conference: From the USA: Mr. Dunn. Mr. Matthews. Mr. Cohen. From the USSR: Mr. Gromyko. Mr. Kozyrev. Mr. Gribanov. From Great Britain: (on both commissions): Messrs. Bridges, Brook, Hayter and Dean. With this the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs terminated. 1 Molotov acted as Rapporteur for this meeting and read his report at the meeting of Heads of Government on July 28 (see post , p. 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] ). 2 In the Russian original (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545) Riddleberger is named as the British member and Ward’s name is omitted. Cf. the Thompson minutes, supra. 3 The minutes (p. 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ) and the Russian text of the Rapporteur ’s report name Sobolev on the subcommittee for the drafting of a communiqué. United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] United States Delegation Working Paper [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. 1 Subcommittees With Pending Business 1. Economic Subcommittee . Assignments: German Economic Questions. German Reparations. Austrian Reparations. Italian Reparations. Oil for Western Europe. U. S. Representatives: Mr. Clayton. Mr. Pauley. 2. Subcommittee on Admission to the United Nations . Assignment: Drafting a statement in regard to admission to the United Nations of Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland and neutral countries and the non-admission of Spain. U. S. Representatives: Mr. Matthews. Mr. Cannon. 3. Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration . Assignment: Drafting a statement on the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and the Satellite States. U. S. Representatives: Mr. Russell. Mr. Cannon. 4. Subcommittee on Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems . Assignment: Discussing the scope and functions of the EEC, ECO and EITO [ ECITO ]. U. S. Representatives: Mr. Clayton. Mr. Pauley. 5. Subcommittee on Directives to Military Commanders in Germany . Assignment: To prepare directives for issuance, after consultation with the French, to the Allied military commanders in Germany in regard to the agreements reached at this Conference. U. S. Representatives: Mr. Murphy. Mr. Riddleberger. 6. Subcommittee on Navigation of Inland Waterways . Assignment: To recommend action on U. S. paper 2 on free and unrestricted navigation of international inland waterways. U. S. Representatives: Mr. Russell. Mr. Riddleberger. 7. Subcommittee on Transfer of German Populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary . Assignment: To prepare a concrete proposal on this subject. U. S. Representative: Mr. Cannon. 8. Subcommittee on the Protocol . Assignment: To prepare the protocol of the Conference. U. S. Representatives: Mr. Dunn. Mr. Matthews. Mr. Cohen. 9. Subcommittee on the Communiqué . Assignment: To prepare the communiqué of the Conference. U. S. Representatives: Mr. Brown. Mr. Foote. 1 The date appears as a manuscript notation on the file copy. 2 Document No. 755 , post . Cf. document No. 758 , post . Clayton–Mikolajczyk conversation Clayton–Mikolajczyk conversation Present United States Poland Mr. Clayton Deputy Prime Minister Mikolajczyk Mr. Dunn Deputy Prime Minister Gomulka Mr. Harriman Foreign Minister Rzymowski Mr. Murphy Mr. Modzelewski Mr. Collado Mr. Despres [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)]] United States Delegation Memorandum [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Memorandum of Conversation Mr. Clayton opened the conversation by indicating that Ambassador Harriman had reported his discussion with President Bierut of Poland’s immediate and reconstruction needs. 2 Mr. Clayton was hopeful that we could shortly arrange to make 1000 surplus military trucks available, and that Ambassador Lane would communicate full details as soon as they became definite. The Poles expressed their pleasure. Ambassador Harriman indicated that Ambassador Murphy was attempting to arrange for the immediate provision of six sedans for members of the Government. Mr. Clayton then asked whether there were any particular questions for discussion, to which the Poles stated that there were no economic specialists in their party, but that they would like information regarding the help the U. S. would furnish in connection with Polish reconstruction. Mr. Clayton turned to UNRRA, asking whether the mission had arrived and whether supplies were coming in. The Poles indicated that the mission was to have left Washington on the 18th, that some supplies were coming in through Constanta but that Polish needs were much greater than UNRRA deliveries particularly in the case of fats which UNRRA is not supplying. Mr. Clayton asked how long it would be until Poland no longer required UNRRA aid, to which the Poles replied that it might be a very long time. Agricultural capital had been destroyed. Although no complete or reliable statistics were available, it was believed that only 10% of the horses and 15% of the cattle remained. It would take several years to rebuild stocks. When asked by Mr. Clayton concerning the prospects for the wheat harvest, the Poles stated that it would probably be satisfactory; that they were not worried about grain and bread, but about fats. Mr. Clayton pointed out that there exists a world deficiency in fats of 10%. Later on the Poles indicated that they were slaughtering livestock beyond any proper limits and asked whether they could buy in the U. S. or Canada livestock—pigs and cattle—for breeding purposes. Mr. Clayton replied that they might be able to obtain a small number, but that there was a great deficiency at home. In response to a question regarding Polish representation at the UNRRA Council meeting in London, Mr. Dunn suggested that the Poles communicate the names of their proposed delegation through Ambassador Lane; that there should be no difficulty now that the political situation had been clarified. The Poles also stated that the first UNRRA ships were due in Danzig on August 23, although they hoped they might arrive sooner. Ambassador Harriman said that the port would be all prepared by August 5, and that already Poland was loading coal for Leningrad. At this Mr. Clayton inquired regarding prospects for other coal shipments. The Poles stated that they were concluding arrangements with Sweden and hoped to sell coal to Denmark and Finland. They would have some for France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and had proposed that it be shipped in the returning UNRRA ships. Mr. Clayton then asked how much coal might be available for Western Europe before January 1, 1946, to which the Poles replied that they would send the figures from Warsaw. They have talked to Italy, but encounter transport difficulties. The Poles further stated that they needed more food for the miners and better transport in order to increase coal production. To Ambassador Harriman’s query as to the volume of coal production, the Poles stated that the prewar production of old Poland was 35 million tons, mostly of hard coal, a year; that Germany in 1943 produced 101 million tons in all Upper Silesia by forced production “robbing the mines”; that they were now producing 2 million tons per month, an increase of 100% in the last three months, of which only 10–20% came from German Silesia; that they expected to produce 3 million tons by the end of 1945; and that when the miners returned from Germany they expect to produce 80–100 million tons a year. The discussion turned to general reconstruction, Mr. Clayton pointing out that while we were looking into urgent Norwegian and Danish cases we had not made any actual loans as yet. We were trying to put together a picture of overall demands. What were Poland’s total requirements for imports necessitating foreign exchange? The Poles repeated that there were no economic specialists in their group, and stated that no complete estimates were yet available. Total destruction was estimated at some 20 billion gold zlotys or $4 billion. They listed the following priority of reconstruction needs: 1. Ports and port equipment. 2. City of Warsaw (they will use local materials) 3. Transport—railways, cars, locomotives; bridges, highways, trucks, road-building machinery. They asked where to apply for reconstruction financing—to the U. S. Government or the International Bank. Mr. Clayton replied that the International Bank would not be functioning for some time, and that they should now apply to the Export–Import Bank. To Ambassador Harriman’s query regarding the number of trucks in Poland, the Poles replied that it was ridiculously low: a month ago 6000 vehicles of all kinds including motorcycles in all Poland; now perhaps 10,000 all in very bad shape. Mr. Clayton inquired whether there was sufficient local production of steel for bridges, buildings, etc. The Poles indicated that there was sufficient for present consumption. A full speed program including the rebuilding of Warsaw would require imports of steel or preferably of blooming mills and rolling mills. These statements, of course, included the German area. The Poles indicated that their need for foreign technical aid would depend largely on the extent to which skilled Poles returned to Poland. When Ambassador Harriman recalled that President Bierut had been anxious to get some technicians, the Poles stated that the President had had in mind specialists. The Poles indicated that they would need some agricultural machinery—tractors and combines. Their textile industry was in good condition although the Germans had not made any new investments. It was adequate for present needs. They needed to import cotton; had an agreement with the U. S. S. R. 3 and would seek a trade arrangement with the U. S. later. Mr. Clayton asked whether the Germans had removed spindles and looms at Łódź. The Poles answered that they had, but that, although the productive capacity of old Poland had declined as a result, the total capacity of old Poland and the German area had increased. Mr. Clayton suggested that the Poles present a memorandum indicating the amounts and types of U. S. materials required by the end of 1946, indicating priority of requirements. The Poles agreed to do so. Mr. Clayton further suggested that when the new Polish Ambassador goes to Washington, he be accompanied by a good economic man who could talk to the Export–Import Bank. Not an economic mission at the present time; eventually perhaps a purchasing mission. In reply to Ambassador Harriman’s question as to Polish export prospects, the Poles indicated that they were now slim, should grow, and eventually be substantial. Potential exports include coal, cement, glass, soda, zinc soon, no timber. All from the old area except some coal. Food exports will take some time; pigs—2 years; mushrooms and eggs—sooner; grain—rye after the next year’s crop. Mr. Clayton asked whether the new Government intended to continue in UMA. The Poles replied that they had not considered this matter, but might wish to withdraw some ships for their own use. Mr. Clayton urged that they study the matter and decide promptly. He concluded by stating that the United States recognizes the reconstruction needs of Poland and wants to be helpful, and by asking that the Poles remember that we have calls for materials and credits from all sides. The Poles expressed their understanding but emphasized that Poland is the most devastated country, it has a most politically sensitive geographical position, and its economic position is important to the whole world. 1 Authorship not indicated. Printed from a copy typed subsequently in the Department of State. For Mikolajczyk’s minutes of this conversation, see document No. 1386 , post . 2 See vol. i , document No. 522 . 3 For the Russian text of the Soviet-Polish commercial treaty signed at Moscow, July 7, 1945, see People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade of the U. S. S. R., Bнeшняя Toproвля, July–August 1945 (Nos. 7–8), p. 15. The accompanying agreement for the mutual delivery of goods between the Soviet Union and Poland, including a Soviet commitment to deliver 25,000 tons of cotton to Poland during the last six months of 1945, is summarized in Raymond H. Fisher, “Agreements and Treaties Concluded by the U. S. S. R. in 1945”, Department of State Bulletin , vol. xv , pp. 395–396. Mosely–Strang and Mosely–Gusev conversations Mosely–Strang and Mosely–Gusev conversations Present 1 United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Mr. Mosely Sir William Strang Mr. Gusev 1 It has not been determined whether Mosely spoke to Strang and Gusev separately or together. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)]] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Department of the Army Files: Telegram [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Victory 316. For Ambassador Winant[.] London’s 44360 July 24 2 received. Strang told Mosely today FonOff has full authority instruct Hood accept Soviet final paragraph covering report on French zone. 3 Meanwhile US, UK and French commanders have agreed on French area in Berlin. 4 Strang obviously does not understand FonOff delay. Gousev told Mosely today instructions sent Saksin yesterday to accept title of agreement on additional requirements with inclusion of words “to be imposed.” Byrnes 2 Document No. 1031 , post . 3 Cf. the following passage in a personal letter from Mosely, dated at Babelsberg July 24, to E. Allan Lightner, Jr., Secretary of the United States Delegation to the European Advisory Commission (file No. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2445): “Strang has just told me that instructions were sent to Hood on July 22 to accept the Soviet formula for the final sentence of the report. The British agree that the exact definition of the French sector should be done by military agreement and need not be incorporated into the EAC Agreement.” 4 See document No. 1028 , post . Conversation concerning the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Conversation concerning the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] Editor’s Note — Document No. 739 , post , mentions a meeting of July 25 which considered the question of officers of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations and of the Executive Committee of that Commission. It is not clear whether the meeting referred to was a bilateral Anglo-American conversation or whether Soviet representatives participated as well. It appears, however, that there were later tripartite discussions of this subject at the Berlin Conference. See document No. 743 , post . Meeting of the United States and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m. Meeting of the United States and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m. 1 1 The meeting was held in the Cecilienhof Palace. Present United States Soviet Union General of the Army Marshall Army General Antonov Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov General of the Army Arnold Marshal of Aviation Falaleyev Lieutenant General Hull Lieutenant General Slavin Vice Admiral Cooke Admiral Kucherov Major General Norstad Major General Deane Rear Admiral Gardner Rear Admiral Maples Captain McDill Secretariat Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore Interpreters Lieutenant Chase Major Evsekov [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)]] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes Potsdam, July 26, 1945, 3 p.m. J. C. S. Files Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes J. C. S. Files [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes 2 Potsdam, July 26, 1945, 3 p.m. top secret General Antonov asked General Marshall if he would preside at the meeting. General Marshall said that he appreciated the honor but under the circumstances he suggested General Antonov preside and he hoped that he would accept. General Antonov asked if General Marshall had had an opportunity to become acquainted with the answers to the five questions General Marshall had given him at the meeting on 24 July 3 (See Annex to these minutes). 4 He said that Generalissimo Stalin had handed the written answers to President Truman yesterday at eleven o’clock a.m. General Marshall said that he was sorry that he had not seen the answers which had been prepared by General Antonov. General Antonov then read the answer to the first question as follows:— The Soviet Command agrees to establish in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk radio stations for transmitting weather data in accordance with the request made in a letter from President Truman delivered on 23 July 1945. 5 The Soviet Command is ready to accept and use the radio stations and equipment proposed in that letter for the above purpose. As regards the personnel for maintaining and operating the stations, we consider it wiser to use Soviet personnel which already has a great deal of experience in working with American radio stations. In addition to these two stations we shall increase the network of local stations in order to give better information on weather. When the reading of the answer to the first question was completed, General Antonov asked if he should proceed to read the answers to the remaining questions. General Marshall replied that the United States Chiefs of Staff would prefer to discuss the answer to each question as it was read. Admiral King said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were disappointed that American personnel was not acceptable for liaison purposes at the central weather stations, since they felt that it would increase the efficiency of the Russian effort as well as our own. He thought, therefore, that we should request reconsideration of this point. If American personnel were used, he said that it was the intention to have 18 officers and 42 enlisted men at Khabarovsk and 9 officers and 24 enlisted men at Petropavlovsk. He had a memorandum relating to the details of equipment and personnel 6 which he thought the Russian High Command should have for use in connection with the reconsideration requested. General Antonov said that Russian personnel had had experience in the use of the equipment and in the communication procedure in the vicinity of Sevastopol and Odessa as well as near Murmansk. The proposal to use Russian personnel had been made because it had been considered that the operation of these stations would then be more simple. However, if the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on American personnel at these stations, there would be no objection to employing them. Admiral King then gave General Antonov the memorandum he had previously mentioned. General Antonov pointed out that he had not received an answer as to whether the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on the use of American personnel. General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would prefer to use American personnel and pointed out that the major service rendered by this personnel would be to U. S. naval forces and to the strategic air forces. For this reason he thought that American personnel would be more satisfactory. General Antonov said that the first question could then be considered solved and American liaison personnel would be employed at the stations under discussion. General Antonov then read the answer to the second question as follows:— Separate zones of naval and air operations are to be set up for the United States and the U. S. S. R. in the Sea of Japan. The boundary between these zones will be along the lines connecting Cape Boltina on the coast of Korea to point 40° north 135° east to point 45° 45’ north 140° east thence along the parallel 45° 45’ north to the line connecting Cape Crillon (Kondo) (on the southern tip of southern Sakhalin) with Cape Soya Missaki (Soyasaki) (on the northern tip of Hokkaido). The U. S. S. R. naval and air forces will operate north of this line. United States naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This line shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine craft and for aviation. Depending upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line may be subject to change. United States naval and air operations north of this boundary line and Soviet naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be subject to coordination. In the Sea of Okhotsk there shall be a zone of mutual operations for the naval and air forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Operations in the Okhotsk Sea will take place in accordance with mutual agreements. In the Bering Sea there shall be a zone of mutual operations of our Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation bounded on the north, east and south by a line going from Cape Dezhnev to Diomede Island and thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of the U. S. S. R. and the United States to parallel 51° 30’ north and thence through 50° 35’ north 157° east; thence to 49° 50’ north 156° 20’ east and thence along the parallel 49° 50’ north to the Fourth Kurile Strait. The remainder of the Bering Sea as well as bordering regions of the Pacific Ocean shall be the zone of operations of the United States Fleet. General Marshall said that the line of demarcation for sea and air operations in the Sea of Japan was acceptable. Admiral King said that he desired to confirm the proposed conditions in the Sea of Okhotsk. He said he understood that this sea would be free for operations of both the United States Navy and the Navy of the Soviet Union and that coordination would be arranged through mutual understanding and cooperation. He asked also if the area to the north of the red line shown on the chart 7 prepared by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, and described in the answer to the second question, was subject to joint control by the United States and the Soviet Navies, in the same manner as in the Sea of Okhotsk. Admiral King’s understanding was confirmed by Admiral Kuznetsov . General Marshall said that with this understanding, the proposals by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable. General Antonov repeated that the areas as set forth in answer to the second question were for both sea and air operations, and there was agreement on this answer. General Antonov then read the answer to the third question as follows:— The boundary line between operational zones of the United States and Soviet air forces in Korea and Manchuria shall be as follows: Cape Boltina, Changchun, Liaoyuan, Kailu, Chihfeng, Peking, Tatung and thence along the southern boundary of Inner Mongolia. United States aviation will operate south of this line including all the above-named points. U. S. S. R. aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. United States air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line must be coordinated. General Arnold said he would like to call attention to the fact that the boundary line as proposed by the Russian Chiefs of Staff would deprive the United States air forces of certain railroad centers and lines of communication north of the line as targets unless each individual mission were arranged for separately. He asked if the United States air forces could send missions north of the boundary line within 24 hours after application had been made to the local Russian authorities. He thought that if his understanding as to local coordination was correct, the desired operations of the United States air forces could be worked out satisfactorily. He called the attention of the Russian Chiefs of Staff to the range of the heavy bombers, medium bombers, and light bombers, as indicated on a map which he presented, 7 and pointed out where the United States bombing effort could be made effective to the north of the boundary line. Air Marshal Fallalev said that the boundary line suggested by the Russian Chiefs of Staff was to the northward of the principal railroad junctions. These junctions would therefore be available to attack by the United States air forces. If it became necessary to attack targets to the north of the line, reliable communications would permit arrangements to be made within 24 hours. Since, however, the communication might not always be reliable, this question might involve some difficulties. General Marshall said that with the understanding that if the means of communication for coordinating attacks north of the boundary line were too slow, the question of its position would be discussed again, the proposals made by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable. However, he said, there was an additional matter he would like to raise in regard to both the second and third questions previously discussed. This concerned the flight of individual reconnaissance aircraft, and he asked that the Russian Chiefs of Staff comment on this point. Air Marshal Fallalev said that it was considered that as a general rule, the boundary proposed should apply to reconnaissance aircraft as well as to bombing flights. When necessary to fly reconnaissance aircraft beyond the boundary line, the flight should be coordinated through the liaison officers. General Antonov then read the answer to the fourth question as follows:— The Soviet Command agrees that beginning with military operations of the Soviet Union against Japan, to establish liaison groups between the American and Soviet commanders in the Far East. To accomplish this liaison it is suggested that there be Soviet liaison groups with General Mac Arthur, with Admiral Nimitz, and in addition, in Washington, to have a Soviet Military Mission. American liaison groups will be located with the Soviet High Commander in the Far East, Marshal Vassilievski, in Khabarovsk; and with the commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yemashev, in Vladivostok. The Soviet Command is ready to accept the radio-teletype equipment for installation at the indicated points. General Marshall said that the proposal of the Russian Chiefs of Staff appeared entirely acceptable, but he wished to ask if it was the intention that the liaison groups to be provided should make it possible for immediate coordination of operations. He asked if operations in the Sea of Okhotsk, for example, or in any other special area, would normally be referred to Washington and Moscow, or whether the necessary decisions would be made in the field with the minimum delay. General Antonov replied that Marshal Vassilievski is the commander in chief of all forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East. Marshal Vassilievski had authority to solve all questions of local coordination which were included in the tasks assigned him by the High Command of the Soviet Union. He said that similarly Admiral Yemashev is the commander in chief of all Russian naval forces in the Pacific. He said that these two officers would be able to solve the questions of coordination of action within the limits of the questions and answers which were being discussed here. General Marshall said that the statement of General Antonov made the answer to the fourth question entirely acceptable. General Antonov then referred back to the third answer and asked if the question of liaison was now clear. General Marshall replied that his question had concerned the employment of reconnaissance aircraft and that he considered the question of liaison as provided for in the fourth answer entirely satisfactory. He said, moreover, that as the operations proceeded he hoped that there would develop such an intimacy in liaison that we would find later that the commanders in the field would develop an even greater intimacy. This would of course depend on them. General Antonov read the answer to the fifth question as follows:— The Soviet Command agrees to select ports and airfields for ships and planes in need of repairs and to make available, as far as possible, repair facilities and medical assistance to the personnel of the above-mentioned ships and planes. For this purpose we can designate:— a. Naval ports: In the Japanese Sea, Port Nakhodka (America Strait); in the Okhotsk and Bering Sea regions—Nikolaevsk, on the Amur, and Petropavlovsk, on Kamchatka. b. Airfields: In the region of Vladivostok, in the region of Alexandrovsk on Sakhalin Island and in the region of Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka. General Marshall said that the proposals of the Russian Chiefs of Staff were entirely acceptable. General Arnold asked if the matter of identification of aircraft at the Russian airbases which would be available to United States aircraft would be handled as a local matter. He said that sometimes a plane was so disabled that it was necessary to come into a landing field from any direction, identifying itself by radio signal only. Air Marshal Fallalev said that the names of airfields, methods of approach, corridors and other details would be furnished and that the requirements of the aircraft and personnel upon landing would be provided. He said that a disabled aircraft, after making a certain signal, could land from any direction without other formality. Aircraft crews should be instructed, however, not to fly over such ports as Vladivostok, because of the danger of being fired upon by anti-aircraft batteries. General Arnold pointed out that his inquiry was in regard to whether arrangements of this nature would be made locally, to which Air Marshal Fallalev replied that the principle was being established here, and that the details would be determined on the spot by the commanders in the field. General Antonov said that he now considered that the five questions given him by General Marshall on 24 July had been answered. He wished, however, to make an additional statement in regard to them. He said that he considered that all of the arrangements provided for under the five questions would come into being on the entry of Russia into the war against Japan. General Marshall asked if it would be possible to get the communication equipment discussed in the first question into Siberia before that date, or if it would be necessary to wait until after Russia had entered the war. General Antonov said that preliminary arrangements for the liaison wireless stations could be made beforehand, and that agreements could be reached with reference to each particular question raised. General Antonov said that at the meeting on 24 July, Admiral King had pointed out that after the seizure of Kyushu communications might be opened from Kyushu to Vladivostok. 8 This line of communications was very important, since the Straits of Tsushima could be used throughout the year, whereas the route through the Kuriles and through La Perousse Strait was closed during part of the year by ice. He asked General Marshall when the invasion of Kyushu would take place and when the opening of the sea route from the south could be expected. General Marshall said that the occupation of Kyushu depended on three factors. The first was the movement of troops from Europe. This was being done as rapidly as possible, and engineering troops were being moved first in order to prepare the way for the full application of air power. The movement involved two oceans and one continent, and although we could not be certain of carrying out the entire movement on schedule, and were now somewhat behind on both personnel and cargo, he hoped that all difficulties would be overcome. The second factor was the movement of large amounts of supplies from the Solomons, New Guinea, and Halmahera, north to the Philippines and Okinawa, to be loaded on assault ships for the tremendous amphibious effort against Kyushu. The third factor was the recent withdrawal of our divisions engaged in the Philippines and Okinawa from heavy fighting, and the problem of rehabilitation and training for the next operation. Finally, he said, the weather conditions in the area made landings in September and early October too hazardous to undertake, although this was not a controlling factor as to date. At the present time he expected the landing on Kyushu to take place the last part of October. General Marshall said further that the assault on Japan by naval and air forces which would extend also to Korea and the Liaotung Peninsula would be continued and increased. By these means he anticipated that by the time of the landing on Kyushu we will have destroyed Japanese oil, other material production, and communications, and will have virtually destroyed the Japanese air force. He said that Admiral King has added that the Japanese Navy would be destroyed as well. He said that all plans for the operation against Kyushu were complete, shipping was being assembled, the construction of bases was proceeding at top speed, and the operations of the United States Fleet and all air forces would proceed with increased vigor from now on. He thought, however, that the Tsushima Strait could not be opened before the end of October. The difficulties of opening Tsushima Strait would involve the sweeping of the passage for mines. The most serious threat to these operations would be from Japanese suicide planes which had caused us so much difficulty in previous operations. General Antonov said that he would be much pleased if the route to Vladivostok via Tsushima Strait could be opened in October since by that time communications through the Kuriles and La Perousse Strait would be closed by ice. General Marshall said he understood and appreciated the urgent necessity to the Russian Chiefs of Staff of opening the southern route and said that we would do all in our power to clear the straits as early as possible. General Marshall said that Admiral King had pointed out that the operations to open Tsushima Strait could not take place until after the landing in Kyushu and until after our air forces were established in northwestern Kyushu. It would be necessary, of course, for our minesweepers to have adequate air cover during their operations in clearing the straits of mines. The time required to establish the necessary airfields would depend to a large degree on Japanese resistance in Kyushu and the straits might not be opened until the middle of December or about six weeks after the first landing on Kyushu. He pointed out that we would make every effort to expedite the operation for the benefit of our forces as well as for the benefit to the Russians. He wanted to make this point clear since he desired to avoid any misunderstanding as to our capabilities in clearing Tsushima Strait for traffic to Vladivostok. General Marshall then read a memorandum 9 which he said related to this discussion and which gave the progress, from partial reports, covering the last ten days of naval and air action against Japan. General Antonov expressed his appreciation for the information contained in the memorandum read by General Marshall. General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to furnish to the Russian Chiefs of Staff, until operations against Japan were commenced by the Soviet Union, a weekly report of operations similar to that contained in the memorandum, through General Deane or his naval associate. Thereafter, reports of such operations would be furnished through the commanders in the field. General Antonov said that he would be glad to receive this information and asked if there were any other questions to be considered at this meeting. General Marshall said that directions had been given to furnish the Russian Chiefs of Staff with copies of the minutes of this meeting in order to provide a means of determining if there was a mutual understanding of the conversations which had taken place. In the absence of comment by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, it would be assumed that the record was a correct basis for understanding and guidance. General Antonov said that he would examine the minutes and if he had any comment he would inform the United States Chiefs of Staff thereof. 10 General Marshall said that it was planned that he, Admiral King and General Arnold would leave for the United States tomorrow. Admiral Leahy would remain until the conference was completed. He said that the principal assistants of the Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Cooke, General Hull and General Norstad would remain at the conference to handle any matters that might arise. He said that if he, Admiral King and General Arnold leave tomorrow as planned, he desired to take this occasion to express for the United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the opportunity afforded to discuss these important matters with the Russian Chiefs of Staff. He was gratified that they had been able to reach decisions so satisfactory to all. General Antonov also expressed his pleasure and satisfaction over the results of the conference and said that he hoped that his close contact with General Marshall would be continued in the future so that all questions that might arise might be settled promptly. He then gave General Marshall a map showing the areas which had been considered in the discussion. 11 General Marshall said that he regretted that through a misunderstanding the United States Chiefs of Staff had not received the answers to the five questions and were, therefore, not well prepared for the afternoon’s discussion. He thanked General Antonov for his patience in reading the answers which he had presented. 2 The papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that “These minutes were transcribed from notes taken by the United States Secretaries.” 3 See ante , p. 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] . 4 Document No. 1279 , post . 5 Document No. 1278 , post . 6 Not printed. 7 Not printed. 7 Not printed. 8 See ante , p. 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] . 9 Not printed. 10 In conformity with Marshall’s statement, a copy of the minutes of this meeting was transmitted to the Soviet Chiefs of Staff the next day, July 27, under a memorandum which repeated the observation that in the absence of comment by the Soviet Chiefs of Staff their approval would be assumed. There is no evidence that any reply was made. 11 Not printed. Third meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, afternoon Third meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, afternoon Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Mr. Cannon 1 Mr. Hayter Mr. Gromyko Mr. Golunsky 1 Russell was also named as a member of this subcommittee (see ante , p. 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] ), but it is not known whether he attended this meeting. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)]] The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews) [Babelsberg,] July 26, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2645 The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2645 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal ( Cannon ) to the Director of European Affairs ( Matthews ) 2 [ Babelsberg ,] July 26, 1945. Memorandum The third meeting of the Committee to consider the second and third points of the paper on Liberated Europe was held this afternoon. On point 2 (freedom of the press) we could only reaffirm that the divergence between our position, generally supported by the British, and the Soviet position left no alternative but to report the disagreement back to the respective Foreign Ministers. The British representative (Mr. Hayter) attempted to put through a new text, 3 but even this, a watered-down modification of ours, was rejected by the Russians (Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Golunski). The Russian proposal, attached hereto, 4 is of course impossible. The first paragraph is just not true, and the second paragraph talks only of better facilities for foreign correspondents, subject to “security” restrictions which Mr. Gromyko admitted may involve political censorship. The text ignores completely the question of freedom of the domestic press. On point 3 (procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary) the Russians repeated their earlier argument that this is now superfluous in view of their proposals made in the respective capitals which would grant us and the British a better position. 5 After a brief discussion of the points requiring elucidation it was clear that there will not be time to work out all these details during the present Conference. We finally drew up a statement to be shown to our respective delegations, as a basis for the discussion at tomorrow’s meeting. It reads as follows: “The Three Governments have taken note that the Soviet Representative on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased. These proposals include provisions for regular and frequent meetings of the three representatives, improved facilities for British and American representatives, and prior joint consideration of directives. Subject to elaboration of details which will be worked out through diplomatic channels the three Governments consider that these proposals constitute a basis for the future work of the Allied Control Commissions, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. For the passages omitted here, see document No. 819 , post . To this memorandum is attached a carbon copy of the following summary: “ Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe “Original paper presented by United States. “Point 1 (Elections) warmly discussed and held over without agreement. “Point 2 (Freedom of the Press) and Point 3 (Revision of Allied Control Commission Procedures) discussed with wide difference of opinion but referred to a sub-committee (Mr. Gromyko, Chairman). See underlying memorandum for the information of our Delegation.” 3 Not found. 4 Document No. 750 , post . 5 See document No. 309, printed in vol. i , and documents Nos. 796 and 797 , post . Harriman–Grabski conversation Harriman–Grabski conversation 1 1 Information as to date and participants is drawn from document No. 1387 , post . Present United States Poland Mr. Harriman Vice President Grabski Deputy Prime Minister Gomulka Mr. Modzelewski Deputy Prime Minister Mikolajczvk Mr. Zebrowski 2 2 Zebrowski acted as interpreter. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] Editor’s Note —No United States record of this conversation has been found. For Mikolajczyk’s minutes of the conversation, see document No. 1387 , post . First meeting of the Protocol Subcommittee First meeting of the Protocol Subcommittee Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Mr. Dunn Mr. Brook Mr. Gromyko Mr. Matthews Mr. Ward Mr. Kozyrev Mr. Cohen Mr. Dean Mr. Lavrentyev Mr. Bohlen Mr. Yost [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 26, 1945 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2645 United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2645 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 26, 1945 Meeting of Protocol Subcommittee, July 26, 1945 Mr. Gromyko was elected chairman of the subcommittee. It was agreed that the Protocol of the Berlin Conference should follow exactly the form of the Protocol of the Crimea Conference. 2 1. It was agreed that the title of the first heading should be “Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers” which should be followed by the text which has already been approved by the Conference. 3 There would then be inserted the approved text of the invitation to be sent by the three governments to the Governments of China and France. 4 2. It was agreed that the title of the second heading should be “The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period” and that this should be followed by two sections “(A) Political Principles” and “(B) Economic Principles.” The first of these subheadings would be followed by the text already approved. 5 3. It was agreed that the third section would have to do with Poland and that the title of the section would be suggested by the U. S. S. R. This would be followed in the first instance by the text on the Polish question already approved by the Conference. 6 A draft of these first three headings of the Protocol is attached hereto. 7 It was agreed that the following subjects would be dealt with under succeeding headings: IV Tangier V Iran VI Western Frontier of the U. S. S. R. VII Territorial Trusteeship VIII Government in Austria IX Turkey and the Straits The exact title of all of these will be subject to further consideration. The text will be supplied by the Delegations which raised the questions before the Conference. In other words, the Soviet Delegation will present texts on Tangier, the Western Frontier of the U. S. S. R., Territorial Trusteeship and Government in Austria. 8 The British Delegation will present texts on Iran and Turkey and the Straits. It was also agreed that decisions taken by the subcommittee are purely tentative and subject to revision after the various representatives have consulted their foreign ministers. The next meeting of the subcommittee was fixed for Friday, July 27, immediately after the Big Three meeting. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 See document No. 1416 , post . 3 Document No. 714 , post . 4 See document No. 1383 , post , section i . Cf. documents Nos. 715 and 1395 , post . 5 Document No. 856 , post . 6 Document No. 1131 , post . 7 No attachment found. 8 Cf. the following translation of an undated letter from Gromyko to Dunn (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2845): “I am sending you herewith the text of the protocol entries on questions raised at the Conference by the Soviet Delegation.” The attachment to this letter, however, consists, not of “entries” on questions raised by the Soviet Delegation, but of a Russian text of sections i and ii A of document No. 1383 , post . Cf. documents Nos. 1343 , 1426 , 1428 , and 1430 – 1433 , post . Conversations among United States officials regarding war criminals, 9 p.m. Conversations among United States officials regarding war criminals, 9 p.m. Present Secretary Byrnes 1 Colonel Cutter Mr. Justice Jackson Mrs. Douglas Mr. McCloy Colonel Gill 2 Brigadier General Betts Colonel Gerhardt 2 Miss Fite Major Coleman 2 Mr. Fahy 1 Present for the first conversation only. 2 Present for the second conversation only. 2 Present for the second conversation only. 2 Present for the second conversation only. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)]] The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Secretary of State Washington [Babelsberg], 27 July 1945. 740.00116 EW/7–2745 The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Secretary of State 740.00116 EW/7–2745 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] The Assistant Secretary of War ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State confidential Washington [ Babelsberg ], 27 July 1945. Dear Mr. Secretary [:] I send you herewith a copy of our minutes of the conference held in your office yesterday evening on war crimes. Sincerely yours, John J McCloy [Enclosure] Memorandum of Conference in the Office of the Secretary of State , 2 Kaiser Strasse, Babelsberg , 26 July 1945 at 2100 Hours 3 Present: The Secretary of State, Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, Mr. John J. McCloy (Assistant Secretary of War), Brigadier General Ed C. Betts (J. A., ETO), Miss Katherine Fite, State Department, Mr. Charles Fahy (USGCC Legal Adviser), Colonel R. Ammi Cutter (Office of The Assistant Secretary of War), and Mrs. Douglas (Mr. Justice Jackson’s secretary). Mr. Justice Jackson reviewed the course of his negotiations with the Russians, French and British in an attempt to reach a protocol governing the trial of the principal war criminals. 4 He also urged that there be established promptly a policy and procedure on the surrender of war criminals and renegades requested by any of the United Nations or by Italy. The substance of the pending IPCOG paper 5 on the subject was reported by Mr. McCloy, Miss Fite and Colonel Cutter. The following decisions of policy were made by the Secretary of State after full discussion: 1. With respect to the surrender of war criminals and renegades requested by the United Nations or by Italy, the Secretary of State took the position that this matter should be dealt with by the U. S. military commander having custody of the demanded prisoner. The U. S. commander should make surrender upon presentation of a request from such a government, accompanied by a reasonably full statement that charges were pending or had been made that the prisoner had committed acts constituting either a war crime or an offense constituting him a traitor or renegade. In cases of doubt the military commander should refer the matter to the Control Council to be disposed of without reference to Washington, unless political or other guidance was affirmatively desired by the U. S. representative on the Control Council. (It was understood that Mr. Justice Jackson, Mr. McCloy, General Betts, and the others would go over the pending IPCOG paper on war criminals and the pending EAC paper on United Nations Renegades and Quislings 6 and determine whether these papers in all particulars complied with the policy mentioned above). Mr. McCloy pointed out that this decision to leave the matter to the decision of the military commander was in some degree a departure from the United States’ traditional policy of affording asylum to political offenders. Despite this the Secretary of State expressed the opinion that the only practical place for the decision of these questions was in the field, where the military commander had full access to the facts, under a policy which left him free in cases of doubt to throw the request into the Control Council for decision. 2. With respect to the arrangements being negotiated by Mr. Justice Jackson, the Secretary of State expressed the view that Mr. Justice Jackson should not make any sacrifices of or deviations from principle, either as to the place of trial, procedure, or definition of the criminal offenses. He should not make any agreement which he felt in any way derogated from fundamental axioms of justice. He should make reasonable attempts to reach an agreement for complete Russian participation on a sound basis. If he found it impossible within a fairly short time to effect such an agreement, satisfactory to him, the Secretary of State would approve his reaching an agreement with the Russians and the others, or any of them, but preferably including the Russians, defining in general terms the criminal offenses to be tried and providing for the trial by each nation (or any group of one or more of the four nations) of the criminals in their own custody, in accordance with procedures satisfactory to the nations conducting the trials. Secretary Byrnes suggested that there was ample reason for adopting this view (which could be duly explained to the public at the proper time) in (1) the administrative difficulties (due to language, differences in the national jurisprudences, etc.) of a four party trial; (2) in the inevitable delays in reaching agreement; and (3) in the necessity for speedy trials on a basis which the United States would regard as fair. 3. With respect to the substance of the protocol for the trial of the principal war criminals, the Secretary of State expressed the view that this was in general a matter committed by the President to Mr. Justice Jackson and to be decided by him. In this respect he referred to such matters as the substantive law to be applied, definitions of crimes, provisions governing procedure, etc. Following the meeting above-mentioned, a further meeting was held at #1 Dom Strasse with all of the above present, except Mr. Byrnes. In addition, there were present Colonel Gill, Colonel Gerhardt and Major Coleman. It was agreed: (1) That the IPCOG paper on War Criminals 7 and the SWNCC paper on United Nations Renegades and Quislings 8 conformed to the policy stated by the Secretary of State and could be carried out in detail by the U. S. Military Government, which properly under the directive could prescribe regulations as to the form of requests, the extent to which proof of the existence of charges of war crimes should be required, and the standards for determining when the request should be referred to the Control Council; (2) that the matter of requests by former satellite nations should be considered further, but that probably they should be granted (in the absence of unusual circumstances) where concurred in by the U. S. representative on the Control Council of the former satellite; and (3) that the regulations governing requests worked out by the Control Council or the U. S. Zone Commander should be communicated to the other United Nations through diplomatic channels. 3 i. e., 9 p.m. 4 See Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949; Department of State publication No. 3080). 5 See vol. i , document No. 395 , annex 3. 6 Circulated to the European Advisory Commission in February 1945, at the request of the British Representative on that Commission. On May 26 the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee recommended certain changes in the EAC draft. The following consolidated text shows the original EAC draft together with the changes recommended by SWNCC, recommended deletions being indicated by canceled type, recommended additions by italics: Draft Directive on United Nations’ Renegades and Quislings 1. This directive is issued to you as commander in chief of the U. S. ( U. K .) ( U. S. S. R .) ( French ) forces of occupation. As a member of the Control Council, you will urge the adoption by the other occupying powers of the principles and policies set forth in this directive and pending Control Council agreement, you will follow them in your zone . 2. This directive is limited to concerned with United Nations’ renegades and quislings as such . and It does not apply to war criminals on which concerning whom a separate directive will be issued. 2 . 3 . Appropriate measures must be taken against persons of United Nations’ nationality who have assisted or collaborated with the enemy. You will require the German authorities to give whatever assistance may be necessary to this end in all such ways as you may specify. 3 . 4 . You will be furnished by each United Nations’ Government with a list of their nationals whose apprehension is desired. You will take all possible steps in your zone to apprehend the persons named is such lists and you will hand them over to the appropriate authority of the United Nations’ Government concerned as arranged with that Government. In the event of any Government being unable for any reason to accept delivery, you should nevertheless apprehend and detain any such persons if you consider such action desirable for security reasons. those persons: a. Whose names are contained on lists furnished to you by any of the United Nations showing their nationals whose apprehension is desired, when accompanied by a specification of the offense with which the individual is charged; 4. You should also apprehend any persons of United Nations’ nationality b. Whom you have reason to believe are of the nationality of any one of the United Nations and whose names do not appear on any such list, if you have grounds for suspecting that they come within one of the following categories: have, following their country’s entry in the war: (i) persons who have been prominently engaged during the war in conducting propaganda on behalf of the enemy; (ii) ( 1 ) persons, whether prisoners of war or not, who, during the war, have voluntarily engaged in activities calculated to assist the enemy’s operations; enemy in any way whatsoever; or (iii) ( 2 ) persons who have applied for and assumed or obtained, enemy nationality during the other than and are not members of communities who have been obliged to accept German nationality. 5. Those whom you do not consider it necessary to detain on grounds of military security, you will, if you think fit, hold for such reasonable time as will enable the appropriate national authorities to be notified and, if they so desire, to interrogate the suspects. Upon the apprehension of any such persons you will notify the respective United Nations’ Governments of such apprehension. You will hold such persons pending decision by the respective governments as to their disposition and upon request you will hand them over to the appropriate authorities of the United Nations’ Governments concerned, unless they are required to be detained as war criminals or for other reasons. If, in the light of conditions which you encounter, you believe that certain persons within these categories, other than war criminals, should not be subjected immediately to this treatment, you may postpone action reporting to your government the facts and giving your recommendations and the reasons therefor . 6. In the event of any Government being unable for any reason to accept delivery of any persons referred to in paragraph 4, you will nevertheless apprehend and detain such persons if you consider such action desirable for security or other reasons . 6 . 7 . The possession claim of German nationality, in addition to the nationality of a United Nation, will not be a reason for failing to apprehend the persons concerned, if he is on one of the lists referred to in paragraph 3 above or comes under included within any of the categories of persons described in paragraph 4. It will be for the authorities of the appropriate United Nation to consider how far the possession of German nationality merely mitigates his offence or affords a defence in law to a charge of treason. 7 . 8 . With a view to the prosecution of persons apprehended, it is important that all relevant evidence should be collected and, further, that both the evidence itself, the manner in which it is made available and the form in which it is presented shall conform to the requirements of the law and judicial procedure of the country in which it is to be used. Special arrangements to this end will be made with you by the various national authorities and you will take all possible steps to procure evidence of the kind, and in the manner and form required. In the event that information and physical evidence is immediately available, you will obtain and preserve the same for delivery to the authorities of the appropriate United Nation and will afford assistance to such authorities in their collection of evidence . You will cause the German authorities to afford you or the authorities of the appropriate United Nation the fullest assistance and all necessary facilities for this purpose, including the inspection of any books, documents, records, or archives, the provision of documentary evidence for use in court and of witnesses in a position to give oral evidence. 7 See vol. i , document No. 395 annex 3. 8 See footnote 6, ante . Ninth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 4 p.m. Ninth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 4 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Sir Alexander Cadogan Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Dunn Sir William Strang Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Clayton Major Birse Mr. Bohlen Mr. Cohen 1 1 Cohen’s presence is assumed from the existence of his notes on the meeting, post , p. 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] . [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)]] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2745 [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)]] Rapporteur’s Report Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2745 Department of State Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m. top secret Mr. Molotov was in the Chair[.] Mr. Molotov proposed that they take up first the question of the satellite states as there was little left to do since the Big Three had discussed it and come to agreement on most points. 2 Mr. Byrnes said he did not think that the Big Three had decided the question. Mr. Molotov proposed that they discuss it nevertheless. This was agreed to. Mr. Byrnes said he had a list setting forth the status of the problems before the Conference which he proceeded to read. 3 These questions were as follows: 1. German Economic Questions. Mr. Molotov said that the question of reparations was even more urgent because unless this was settled there could be no progress on the economic matters. Mr. Byrnes said he did not dispute the order in which these questions were considered. 2. Reparations. Mr. Byrnes said he had no objection to considering this question before that of German economic matters. 3. Italian and Austrian Reparations. 4. Oil for Western Europe. 5. Admission into the United Nations Organization. 6. Implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe. 7. Italy and the Other Satellite States. 8. The Rumanian Oil Equipment. 9. The Western Boundary of Poland. 10. Cooperation in [Solving] Immediate European Economic Problems. Mr. Byrnes said to the best of his recollection that all items on the original United States and Soviet agendas had already been raised at the Conference. Two questions had not been raised at the Big Three meeting, namely: (1) War claims [ crimes ] which had been proposed by the British delegation, and (2) Transfer of populations from Poland to [ and ] Czechoslovakia. Although there had been a brief discussion on this matter during the Conference Mr. Molotov pointed out that a Committee had been set up to consider this matter. 4 Mr. Byrnes said he was speaking of the questions not yet considered by the Big Three. Mr . [ Sir Alexander ] Cadogan said that there was another question—that of German political matters. Two points which had been raised in the economic discussions had been considered more political than economic. 5 Mr. Molotov also recalled that there was the question of the disposition of the German fleet. He suggested that they refer the question of war criminals to the Big Three. Mr. Byrnes said he agreed. He also wished to call attention to the question of the American paper on inland waterways. 6 This was also in the hands of a committee. 1. Italy Mr. Byrnes said he understood that the Prime Minister did not agree with the paper presented as amended 7 and that the question had been passed over. Mr. Molotov said he understood that the President had indicated his”consent subject to an examination of the drafting. Mr. Cadogan stated that the Prime Minister had been unable to agree to the proposed Soviet amendment to paragraph 3 concerning the resumption of diplomatic relations with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. He thought it might be useful for him to explain that it was Constitutionally impossible for the British to enter into full diplomatic relations with a country with which they were at war. The British might be able to accept some language to the effect that the conclusion of peace treaties with the governments of these states would enable the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with them to be undertaken. Mr. Molotov pointed out that this entirely differed from the Soviet proposal. The Prime Minister had accepted the first sentence after the substitution of “for” for the word “with”. He had proposed no other amendments. Mr. Cadogan said this was true but he also pointed out that the Prime Minister had said he could not accept the Soviet amendment to paragraph 3. Mr. Byrnes said that the Prime Minister had made the statement that he did not approve the language proposed in which the President had acquiesced and had said that he thought it was unwise. Mr. Byrnes said he remembered this because when he had learned that there was no agreement on the matter he regretted that he had brought forward the paper on Italy. 8 He had proposed it because he thought there would be no difficulty in regard to it. When he had put it forward it had met a proposal that all neutrals be considered. Next there was a proposal to modify the language with reference to the Italian Government and in an effort to reach agreement he had accepted amendments to that paragraph. Next there had been a proposal to include Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary. After days of discussion there had been no agreement on that. After the Prime Minister had taken his position Mr. Byrnes said he had reached the conclusion that it was best to withdraw his proposal because it was most important for the states represented here to be in agreement. If the Soviet and British delegations could not agree with his proposal as amended, he withdrew his proposal with regard to the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization. There were many important matters which they should agree upon in the few days that they intended to remain here and he did not want his proposal to delay them. He proposed that they should put on the agenda such important matters as those of reparations, the German fleet, and the western boundary of Poland, and other matters that are vital and prepare for final adjournment in the next few days. Mr. Molotov said that he had several times discussed this question, the American delegation had taken the initiative in the matter, and the Soviet delegation had the impression in the Big Three meeting that there was agreement between the United States and the Soviet delegation and that it was only the British delegation that was opposed. Mr. Byrnes said that the American delegation had agreed subject to a reconsideration of the drafting. Mr. Molotov suggested that the question be referred to the Big Three who could withdraw the proposal or could discuss it. The Foreign Ministers had no right to dispose of the matter themselves. It was agreed to refer the matter to the Big Three. 2. Reparations Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet delegation regarded the work done by the Commission on Reparations 9 as unsatisfactory. He said that they should have clear replies to the questions under discussion or should direct them to other channels in case they were unable to solve them themselves. He asked the United States delegation if the decision with regard to reparations which was taken at the Crimea Conference remained in force. He suggested that perhaps the United States delegation held a different view than it held at the time of the Crimea Conference. The Soviet delegation was anxious to learn if what was agreed at the Crimea was still valid. He then cited paragraph 4 of the Crimea decisions with regard to reparations. 10 Mr. Byrnes replied that certainly the United States delegation agrees to that statement which explicitly stated that the Moscow Reparations Commission should take the Soviet proposal as a basis for discussion. Pursuant to that agreement the question was submitted to the Reparations Commission for study. If Mr. Molotov meant that by agreeing that it be studied we had agreed to an amount of the reparations then he was not in accord for we had not agreed to any amount. Mr. Molotov said that he understood this but he had heard that three days ago Mr. Pauley had officially withdrawn this opinion of the American delegation. 11 He would like to know if the American delegation withdrew this agreed opinion, that is, that 20 billion dollars be taken as a basis for discussion. Mr. Byrnes said he wanted no misunderstanding. At Yalta the American delegation had expressed no opinion. The figure had been suggested by Mr. Maisky and not by Mr. Roosevelt. Mr. Roosevelt had said that the statement would be accepted as a basis for discussion and that it would be referred to the Moscow Reparations Commission. 10 Mr. Byrnes said he had asked Mr. Pauley with regard to this statement attributed to him and Mr. Pauley informed him that he had received and considered the proposal and that in view of the circumstances now existing he regarded it as impractical. Mr. Molotov asked if he was to understand Mr. Byrnes to mean that at Yalta 10 billion dollars in reparations had been allocated to the Soviet Union but that now this sum was considered to be impossible. Mr. Byrnes repeated that neither the President nor anyone else had agreed to 20 billion dollars. All that was done was to accept the proposal as the basis for discussion. If he were asked for a million dollars and he said he would discuss it, this did not mean that he would write a check for it. Mr. Molotov said he only wanted to know what remained from the Crimea decision as a basis for discussion. Mr. Byrnes knew that the Soviet delegation was willing to consider reducing the amount of reparations. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that they had been talking about the matter for two weeks. Mr. Molotov recalled the United States delegation at Yalta had agreed to take as a basis for discussion the proposal that 20 billion dollars, of which one-half would be allocated to the Soviet Union, be fixed as the amount of German reparations. With this in mind the Soviet delegation had put its proposals to this Conference 12 and had indicated from which branches of German economy and on what dates these reparations could be exacted. Yet Mr. Maisky had informed him that Mr. Pauley had officially withdrawn agreement to accept the Yalta proposal as a basis for discussion. Mr. Molotov suggested that perhaps the President had authorized him to make such a statement. Mr. Byrnes thought there had been a misunderstanding. Mr. Pauley had accepted the Yalta proposal as a basis for discussion. He had been in Moscow for 35 days and had discussed it. He had come to Berlin and had continued to discuss it. He had made an investigation after which he had determined that it was now in his opinion impractical. Mr. Byrnes said there were so many reasons for this that he could understand Mr. Pauley’s view. He had already gone into the matter with Mr. Molotov 13 and he could do so again if it would be helpful. Since the proposal had been accepted as a basis for discussion Mr. Pauley had learned that the Russian Army had destroyed a lot of property in Germany and what they did not destroy the American Army did. He had not discussed figures with Mr. Pauley but if Mr. Pauley told him that there were not [ now ] the same possibilities of reparations as there were when Mr. Maisky had made his proposal he would not have a good opinion of Mr. Pauley’s judgment. At Yalta the discussion was based on the whole of Germany and not on the present basis when a large part of Silesia had been turned over to Poland. Moreover, he knew that there were differences of opinion as to what constituted war booty and reparations. Mr. Clayton and Mr. Pauley informed him that in the American zone of Berlin they had seen the plant of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company which was practically stripped of all machinery. They had seen other plants equally stripped which had made rayon, ice, and optical instruments. 14 Mr. Pauley said that circumstances made it impossible now to know what reparations should be exacted from Germany. He supposed he had in mind these conditions. The United States Delegation had thought that these plants would be available for reparations. He saw many difficulties in trying to reconcile two views so different as those of our representatives on the Reparations Commission. He wanted them to reach agreement but did not see how they could do it in the light of these conditions. Mr. Molotov stated that perhaps the American Delegation could suggest a different basis for discussion. Mr. Byrnes said he understood that they had suggested a different plan. 15 He thought it very important that they adopt another plan, because the attempt to carry out the present one would be a constant source of irritation between us, whereas the United States wanted its relations with the Soviet Union to be cordial and friendly as heretofore. Mr. Molotov said he understood Mr. Byrnes’ proposal to be that each country should take reparations from its zone. He pointed out that if they failed to agree on reparations the result would be the same as under Mr. Byrnes’ plan. Each would draw reparations from their respective zones. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the United States was not seeking reparations for its own people. It was entitled to reparations and it asserted its claims because we knew that we must look after other people, such as Belgium, Holland and Yugoslavia. He pointed out that the United States had already sent 500 million dollars of assistance to Italy and that we must send more to France. He emphasized that we were simply trying to do the best we could in a complicated situation. What had impressed him the most—it was more important than the money involved—was the desire to remove any source of irritation between our two governments. The instructions to the American army had been not to remove equipment from Germany. According to his information this had been carried out with only one or two exceptions where certain equipment was needed in order to provide a model. 16 Mr. Molotov pointed out that neither the United States nor Great Britain had had their territory occupied by Germany, whereas a large part of the Soviet Union had been occupied and their plants and towns had been laid waste by the Germans. He thought that the Soviet Union and Poland had the right to claim reparations. Perhaps factories had been removed from German territory, but this was small compensation for the damage done by the German soldiers who, he repeated, had not been on United States or British territories. If Great Britain and the United States found that not a dollar of reparations should be exacted, the Soviet Government would still stand on its position but it was willing to discuss the question of the amount of reparations which it should claim. He said that they were entitled to a clear answer to their questions. The Economic Sub-Committee had been marking time and had departed from the decisions taken at Yalta. It was, therefore, necessary to clarify this situation. Mr. Byrnes said he understood that there was no question but that the Soviet Union should have substantial reparations. Mr. Molotov replied that this was an empty sentence which did not satisfy them. The Secretary said that it was probable that it would not satisfy anyone. He was only anxious to devise some plan and to do the best thing possible under trying conditions. Mr. Molotov asked what he suggested. Mr. Byrnes said that they could probably make no headway until Mr. Attlee’s return. 17 It was necessary to consider the British position. For example, the machinery referred to in the Ruhr was in the British zone. Mr. Cadogan thought he could make no useful contribution at this stage except to say that the British Government had accepted and had not abandoned the Yalta agreement. There was no desire to deprive Russia of her due share of reparations. Mr. Byrnes suggested that the question be passed over until the next day. Mr. Molotov asked if it would be referred to the Big Three. Mr. Byrnes said he did not see how it could be discussed usefully along the lines of the discussion today. He suggested that when the British returned they make one more effort to reach agreement and if they could not they should so inform the Big Three. Mr. Cadogan said his latest information was that Mr. Attlee would return for a late meeting the next day. Mr. Molotov summed up the position to be: 1. The question be postponed to the next meeting of the three Foreign Ministers. 2. After it had been considered at the next meeting the results should be reported to the Big Three. 3. That the Foreign Ministers discuss it the next day or the day after that. Mr. Cadogan said that Mr. Attlee might bring the Foreign Secretary 18 with him or he might instruct Cadogan to act. He agreed that if possible they should discuss it the next day; if not possible, the day after. This was agreed to. 3. Reparations From Austria and Italy Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation regarded the work done by the Economic Sub-Committee on this question as unsatisfactory. In his opinion they should discuss the proposals made by the Soviet Delegation at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers. They had proposed three paragraphs for consideration in regard to reparations from Austria 19 and asked that this be the basis for discussion. They proposed that Austrian reparations be fixed at 250 million dollars and he pointed out that this amount was less than that which had been settled for the satellite states. The kind of goods in which reparations should be paid could be discussed later. The period for reparations should be fixed at six years. The Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States and Yugoslavia should be the recipients of reparations from Austria. He inquired if this could be taken as the basis for an agreement on Austrian reparations. Mr. Byrnes said that insofar as the United States was concerned its representatives on the sub-committee held the view that it was impossible to hope for any reparations from Italy and Austria, that is, as to current production. The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada had already supplied 500 million dollars to Italy to prevent disease and unrest. They realized that they will be required to furnish that much more. He knew they would be unwilling to advance hundreds of millions of dollars that would be used for the payment of reparations and that United States representatives on the committees had stated that they were prepared to consider the possibility of removals of machinery and equipment that had been used in war industries and that had no value for peace time production. Certainly the United States did not want them and would be agreeable to their going to the Soviet Union as reparations. As to current production, in view of the fact that there could be none unless we put up money for that purpose, we were unwilling to agree. Mr. Molotov said that no one had proposed this. Mr. Byrnes said that the situation was that we knew that unless we advanced money no current production would be available. Mr. Molotov said that Austria would be bound to pay either by her exports or by payment in the future for credit. Mr. Byrnes said that the sub-committee did not see how there would be production for the payment of exports. We realized we would not get back any of the money we had put in there. Frankly he did not see how anything could be got out of Italy except war plants. Mr. Molotov again referred to the fact that the United States had not been occupied by Austrian troops, whereas the Austrians had wrought great devastation in the Soviet Union and they could not let the Austrians go unpunished. Mr. Byrnes said he appreciated the sacrifices of the Soviet people in human lives but nothing material could ever compensate them for the lives lost. Mr. Molotov replied that he was speaking of the destruction of property. Mr. Byrnes said that with respect to property there was not much difference between destroying a building worth $100,000 and our paying out $100,000. He pointed out that the United States had paid out 400 billion dollars in the war. This was a property loss. Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet war expenditures were immense, but he had not referred to them. He was speaking of devastation. He thought they could not let these people go unpunished. If Rumania were paying compensation because she occupied territories, who would understand such a position with respect to Austria and Italy. The Rumanian armistice terms 20 bore the signatures of the United States and Great Britain. It would be unjust to exempt Austria. Mr. Byrnes said the United States had signed the armistice terms with Rumania, but we knew that we could not get reparations from Rumania. Mr. Molotov replied that Rumania was paying reparations. The United States could renounce its claims against Austria, as its territory had not been occupied. Mr. Byrnes replied that we were merely trying to be practical. With respect to Italy he was sure that Greece could make a claim for reparations and ask for prior consideration for the same reason advanced by the Soviet Union in the case of Austria. Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Union had expected that Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania would receive reparations. Mr. Byrnes replied that they would ask for prior consideration. Mr. Molotov proposed that they agree to give it to them. Mr. Byrnes stated that Greece had not presented a claim and that in any event our position would have to be that where we saw no money there should be no reparations, as in the case of Italy, except capital plants, machinery and materials which he had described. He was advised that Austria would have to get relief from UNRRA. Mr. Molotov rejoined that this had no relation to the question of reparations. Mr. Byrnes said that his understanding was that no country paying reparations was eligible for relief from UNRRA. He supposed the theory was that if they were able to pay reparations they did not need relief. Mr. Molotov proposed referring the whole question to the Big Three. Mr. Cadogan said the British position was the same as that expounded by Mr. Byrnes and that this had been made clear in the sub-committee session. Mr. Molotov asked if they could place on record the different views held by the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the United States and Great Britain on the other. He said that the American and British Delegations held the view that it was possible to exact reparations from Austria and Italy only if they were taken in the shape of plants and materials. Mr. Byrnes said only if they had been used for war purposes. Mr. Molotov said that materials used for war purposes were “war booty.” He suggested that they should say “equipment,” because war material had no relation to reparations. Mr. Byrnes said that Mr. Molotov could record his own position, but Mr. Byrnes thought that he also wished to state his own. He said that the removal of machinery and equipment could be made from war industries, provided they had no peace time use. Mr. Molotov asked that this be put in the record. He also wished to make clear that UNRRA had no limitations to the fact [ effect? ] that a country paying reparations had no claim for relief. Mr. Byrnes said he would have to look the matter up as his information was to the contrary. 4. Economic Principles Mr. Molotov said he felt that provided they reached agreement on all the other remaining questions, it would be possible for them to reach agreement on the question of exports. Mr. Byrnes said he felt that this depended on the outcome of the discussion on reparations. Mr. Molotov agreed. 5. Oil for Western Europe Mr. Byrnes said the sub-committee was not ready to make its report, but hoped to do so later. He understood that the Soviet representative had not received certain information needed and it was, therefore, useless to discuss it now. It was agreed to put off the discussion on this question. 6. Cooperation in Solving European Economic Problems Mr. Molotov said they had no objection to the report on the matter. 21 Mr. Byrnes said he had just read it for the first time. He noted that it stated that the Soviet Government was willing to participate in the European Inland Transport Organization. As this was the first progress they had noted for some time, he thought they should thank that committee. He noted that the first paragraph of the report stated that the Soviet Government would review the documents on the other Organizations. He inquired whether the meeting should report now or wait for this further consideration. Mr. Molotov suggested that the report of the committee be approved. It was agreed that they should report it to the Big Three at once. 7. Rumanian Oil Equipment Mr. Cadogan inquired if Mr. Molotov had had time to consider the British proposals on this question. 22 Mr. Molotov replied that the Soviet Delegation had just sent the British Delegation a memorandum on this question. 23 Meeting adjourned. 2 See ante , pp. 357–364 [ Pgs. 357–364 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . 3 Cf. ante , pp. 394–395 [ Pgs. 394–395 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] . 4 See ante , pp. 398–399 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] . 5 See document No. 879 , post . 6 See ante , p. 387, footnote 12 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] . 7 The draft which was before the Eighth Plenary Meeting, July 24, has not been found (see document No. 1424 , post , footnote 1). Concerning the discussion of that draft by the Heads of Government, see ante , pp. 357–364 [ Pgs. 357–364 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . The paper discussed had since been redrafted on July 25 (see document No. 730 , post , footnotes 2 and 3) and again on July 26 (see document No. 730 , post ). 8 Document No. 727 , post . 9 i. e., the work done on reparations by the Economic Subcommittee. 10 See document No. 1416 , post , section v . 11 Cf. post , p. 871 [ Pg. 871 is part of Doc. 927 ] . 10 See document No. 1416 , post , section v . 12 Document No. 920 , post . 13 See ante , p. 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] . 14 See documents Nos. 929 and 940 , post . 15 Document No. 925 , post . 16 See document No. 940 , post . 17 Attlee had taken office as Prime Minister on July 26, following the announcement of the results of the British general election. 18 Ernest Bevin. 19 Document No. 769 , post . For the Soviet proposal concerning reparations from Italy, see document No. 1099 , post . 20 Signed at Moscow, September 12, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712). 21 Document No. 1162 , post . 22 Document No. 841 , post . 23 Document No. 843 , post . Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m. Mr. Molotov acted as Chairman. Molotov : Our first question relates to Italy and the other satellite states being admitted to the United Nations. This question was virtually settled at the meeting of the Big Three. Byrnes : I did not so understand. Molotov : Let us discuss this question today. What other questions are there? Byrnes : I have a list of questions for discussion by the Big Three. I think I should read it as we are approaching the end of the Conference. The pertinent questions are: [1.] German economic question[.] Molotov : The question of reparations is even more urgent. Byrnes : I agree. That is the next question on my list. You may put it first if you wish. 2. German reparations. 3. Italian and Austrian reparations. 4. Oil for western Europe. 5. Admission of Italy and satellites to United Nations. Molotov : I thought that was our first item on this afternoon’s agenda. Byrnes : That is right. I am merely listing the questions without regard to priority. 6. Implementation of Yalta agreement on the satellite states. 7. Policy toward Italy and other satellite states. The paper of the United States 1 has not been acted upon. Molotov : What is that? Byrnes : The paper presented the first day. Molotov : What is contemplated? Byrnes : It refers to the terms of the Armistice. 8. British paper on oil equipment in Rumania. 9. Western boundary of Poland. 10. Cooperation in solving immediate European economic problems. All items on the original United States and Soviet agenda have been raised before the Conference. Two questions have been raised and not fully discussed or disposed of—war crimes and the transfer of German population from Czechoslovakia and Poland. Molotov : A committee has been set up to deal with the latter question. Byrnes : I am now ready to discuss the paper submitted by the United States on the admission of Italy into the United Nations. Cadogan : There is a question of political significance which could be taken from the economic principles regarding Germany and put into the political principles. Molotov : We must have an interchange of views. You have recalled all your questions? Then I should like to recall the disposition of the German fleet. There is also the question of war criminals. Should this not first be discussed by the Big Three? Byrnes : I do not see on my list another question—that of inland waterways. This is also in the hands of a committee. As to policy for Italy. My understanding was that the Prime Minister did not agree with the paper as submitted or amended and it was passed over. Molotov : So far as I understand, the President indicated his assent. Byrnes : That is true, subject to drafting changes. Cadogan : It is not possible for us to enter into complete diplomatic relations with a government with which we are at war. We could say that the conclusion of a peace treaty with a responsible democratic government should make possible the resumption of diplomatic relations and its entrance into the United Nations. I offer this suggestion as a possible compromise. Molotov : It differs entirely from what the Soviet Delegation proposed. The Prime Minister suggested that the first sentence should be made to read treaty “for” and not “with” these states. No other amendments suggested. Cadogan : That is true but he was unable to accept the Soviet amendment. I offered [ offer this? ] text as compromise. Byrnes : The Prime Minister made the statement that he did not approve the language the President acquiesced in. I do not know if the entire statement was translated. I have regretted that I had proposed the paper regarding the admission of Italy. I thought it was a matter as to which there would be no objection. I was then presented with a proposal to agree to a policy regarding the admission of neutrals and then to a proposal for the admission of the other satellite states on the same basis as Italy. After days of discussion we could not agree. I have reached the conclusion that the United States paper on Italy should be withdrawn. If the Soviet and British delegations do not agree on the language proposed, I withdraw entirely our proposal. There are many important matters which should not be delayed, such as reparations, the German fleet and western boundary of Poland, which are all immediate and vital. We should prepare for final adjournment within the next day or two. Molotov : We have spent many a day on this. The American delegation brought it up. President Truman accepted the amendment. Byrnes : That is true, subject to drafting changes. He had in mind one word. Molotov : I propose we refer it to the Big Three to consider or withdraw. We can’t do it ourselves. Mr. Attlee will come tomorrow. The President and Generalissimo will be present. Byrnes : I have no objection. I am simply stating the position of our delegation which has the approval of the President. The paper was proposed by the United States but it related only to the admission of Italy as other proposals had [been?] added. In the absence of agreement, we should withdraw it if we can’t agree. Molotov : I propose the question be referred to the Big Three. The next question is German reparations or German economic problems. Which shall we discuss first? Cadogan : I am at the disposal of the Chairman, but I don’t see what we can do now. Byrnes : My information is that the Committee is far apart. Molotov : I propose we discuss reparations. The Soviet delegation regards the work done by the economic committee [ subcommittee ] as unsatisfactory. We should direct these questions then to other channels that [ when? ] we are not able to settle them ourselves. I should like to know if the American delegation has changed their views expressed at Yalta. Is the Yalta understanding still valid as regards fixing the total sum of reparations and its distribution among the Allies. Yalta took as a basis for discussion 20 billion dollars and 50 percent should be allocated to the Soviets. Yalta provided for discussion at Moscow. Byrnes : Yalta merely says that reparations commission should take Soviet total figure as basis of discussion and study. If you mean by submitting the questions to study we agreed to the amount, the answer is no. Molotov : I understand. But I have heard that Mr. Pauley officially withdrew the view taken by the American delegation at Yalta. That may be necessary but I should like to know whether the American delegation withdraws its Yalta opinion. I am not insisting on this. I want simply to find out. Byrnes : At Yalta the United States expressed no opinion as to amount. Maisky suggested figures, not Mr. Roosevelt. At the conclusion of discussion Mr. Roosevelt said it would be all right to accept it as a basis for discussion and study. Mr. Pauley says what he stated was he had received and considered proposals and in view of circumstances now existing he regards it as impractical. Molotov : Should Secretary Byrnes be understood to state that in [ at ] Yalta ten billion dollars for the Soviets was considered possible and now it is not? Byrnes : Neither the President nor anyone else agreed to 20 billion at Yalta. When you ask for 20 billion and I say I will discuss it, it does not mean that I shall write a check for it. Molotov : The same applies to our position. The Soviet delegation is willing to reduce the amount. Mr. Maisky says that Mr. Pauley officially withdrew the basis. Byrnes : Mr. Pauley did discuss this basis at Moscow. Molotov : Maybe the American government has made a new decision. Byrnes : Mr. Pauley did consider it at Moscow and here. Investigating conditions, he did determine in his opinion that it was impracticable. I have already gone over this matter with Mr. Molotov. Since Yalta a lot of property has been destroyed by the Russian Army and by the American Army. They did a tremendous job. I do not know Mr. Pauley’s view of the figures. But if he told me the figures had not been altered by events, I would not have a good opinion of his judgment. No opinion was expressed at Yalta. Twenty billion dollars [was] suggested for the whole of Germany, including Silesia. Since then there has been a great dispute as to what is war booty and what is war reparations. Mr. Pauley and Mr. Clayton tell me that in the American zone in Berlin they saw a plant of the I. T. and T. stripped of all machinery and four other plants were stripped, rayon plant, Zeiss plant, and others. When Mr. Pauley said circumstances made it impossible under these conditions to tell what reparations are available in Germany, it was certainly the understanding of the American delegation that such plants would be available for reparations. It is difficult to reconcile the views of our representatives and the Soviets on the reparations commission. I want to see an agreement but I do not see how they can reach one. Molotov : Perhaps the American delegation can suggest a different basis. Byrnes : I understand that the American delegation has. I think it important to find another plan. We do not want a plan which will cause constant friction between us. Molotov : My understanding, Secretary Byrnes, is that you have in mind the proposal that each country should take reparations from its own zone. If we fail to reach an agreement the result will be the same. Byrnes : Yes. As I stated, the United States is not seeking reparations. We would not trouble in agreeing on what we want for ours [ ourselves ]. We assert our claim because we have to look after others, Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia. We have already sent five hundred million dollars to Italy. We must send more to France. We are trying to do the best we can in a very complicated situation. What impresses me is that more important than the money involved is the removal of the source of irritation between our two governments so that we may work together. Molotov : I understand. Byrnes : Our instructions to the Army were not to remove factories. Only one or two experimental [plants?] or models were removed from our zone. Molotov : Neither United States nor Great Britain was occupied. Our plants were laid waste. We think that our right to reparations [is] inalienable. The United States’ and Great Britain’s position morally is entirely different. Countries which were occupied have a right to reparations. Perhaps certain plants were removed from Germany but this is small compensation for our losses. We shall maintain our view even though the United States and Great Britain find that not a dollar of reparations should be exacted. We do not insist on the Yalta figures but we want a clear reply from the United States and Great Britain. The right of occupied and invaded countries to reparations is inalienable. Economic committee is marking time and it is high time that we have our answer. Byrnes : The economic committee recognizes your right to reparations. Molotov : It is unsatisfactory. Byrnes : It is not satisfactory to anyone. We can’t satisfy anyone. Molotov : What do you suggest? Byrnes : I have made one suggestion. If that is not satisfactory I suggest we pass it over until tomorrow when Mr. Attlee will be here. The Soviets spoke of the Ruhr. That is in the British zone. We can’t make progress until the British delegation can discuss this with us. Molotov : Perhaps the British representative can speak for the British government. Cadogan : Not at this stage. The British [Government?] accepted and has not abandoned the Yalta agreement. No one wants to deprive Russia of her due share of reparations. Molotov : Secretary Byrnes wishes to pass the question over until tomorrow. Byrnes : We can’t do anything before then. My suggestion is that we pass it over until tomorrow. Molotov : Shall it come up before the Big Three? Byrnes : I don’t see how it can be discussed on the basis we have discussed here. We must make another final effort before we refer it to the Big Three. Can you tell us, Sir Alexander, when Mr. Attlee will come? Cadogan : Mr. Attlee simply said he hoped to be here for a late meeting tomorrow. Molotov : Three ministers think it advisable to postpone question until their next meeting. After such consideration results should be reported to the Big Three. Cadogan : Mr. Attlee may bring a foreign secretary with him or he may instruct me. Molotov : We will discuss it tomorrow if possible. If not, the following day. We passed the question of reparations from Austria and Italy. The work of the economic committee on this subject is unsatisfactory to the Soviet delegation. We suggest that the foreign ministers discuss this. We propose three paragraphs for reparations from Austria and I ask that these be taken as a basis for further discussion. We propose regarding Austria two hundred fifty million dollars reparations[—]less than that exacted from the satellites. The kind of goods can be agreed upon later. The period of time would be six years. Reparations would go to the Soviet [Union], Great Britain and United States and Yugoslavia. Byrnes : Our representatives on the commission think it is impossible to hope for reparations from Berlin [ Italy? ] 2 and Austria out of current production. The United States, Great Britain, and Canada have already supplied a half billion dollars to Italy to prevent starvation and unrest. That much [more] will be required. We would be unwilling to advance money and goods to be used for reparations. Our representatives are prepared to consider the removal of war equipment having no peacetime use. The United States does not want this war equipment. It can be paid as reparations to the Soviets. As to current production, there can be none unless we advance money and we are unwilling to do this. Molotov : No one suggests that. Austria will be bound to pay for her imports by her exports. Byrnes : We can not get the money back we put in there. Molotov : United States territory was not occupied by Austria. Byrnes : Nothing material can compensate you for the lives lost. Molotov : I speak of land and property devastated. Byrnes : That is different. When it comes to property there is not so much difference between the destruction and [ of? ] buildings and money costs. We have paid out 400 billion dollars. Molotov : Our war expenditures were immense. I have not referred to them. Can we let our land be devastated and not be compensated? Why should Rumania pay and not Austria? United States was a party to the Rumanian armistice. Byrnes : The United States does not expect reparations from Rumania. Molotov : Rumania is paying reparations. Byrnes : Not to us. Molotov : It is your right. You can waive it if you like. Byrnes : As to Greece, she has a claim against Italy—a prior claim. Molotov : Yes, Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. We can provide a prior claim for Greece and other invaded countries. Byrnes : I can not see reparations from these countries except their war plants. Austria must get relief from UNRRA. Molotov : This has no application to reparations. Byrnes : No country paying reparations is entitled to relief from UNRRA. Let us place our differences on record and report to the Big Three. Cadogan : Our views accord with those of the American delegation. Molotov : Can we place on record this difference in views? The American and British governments favor reparations only from equipment. Byrnes : Only war plants and equipment having no peacetime use. Molotov : Let us say equipment. This [is] reparations, not war booty. Byrnes : I say machinery and equipment from war industries having no peacetime use. Molotov : Let us put that on the record. I should make it clear that no provision is in the UNRRA document that a country paying reparations is not entitled to relief. Byrnes : My information is otherwise. We will have to look it up. Molotov : Next question is the economic principles for Germany. Paragraphs 18 and 19 3 should be considered. Byrnes : This depends on other economic questions. Let us pass it. Molotov : Next question—oil for western Europe. Byrnes : Committee is not ready to report. Soviet representative was to secure information. Molotov : Let us put it off. Byrnes : We should discuss the cooperation in solving immediate European economic problems. I have copy of report. Molotov : I have it but must read it. We have no objection. Byrnes : It states that the Soviet government will participate in the inland transport conference. I think we should thank the committee for reaching an agreement. But other parts merely say that the Soviets will review documents. Do you want to report it that way? Molotov : Whichever way you like. Cadogan : We could add Soviet government is considering further participating in the other agencies mentioned. Molotov : I suggest that report of committee be approved. Byrnes : I agree. Molotov : Next question. Byrnes : I have no further question. Cadogan : Has Soviet delegation considered our Rumanian oil proposal? Molotov : We have sent a memorandum on the subject today. Adjourned. 1 Document No. 1089 , post . For the other documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the minutes, supra . 2 Cf. the minutes, ante , p. 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] . 3 See documents Nos. 863 , 872 , 873 , 875 , and 876 , post . United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2745 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m. top secret Topics Discussed at Meeting of Foreign Ministers , 4 p.m., July 27, 1945 1. German Reparations . This matter was discussed and passed over for further examination. 2. Admission to the United Nations . Mr. Byrnes stated that as the U. S. proposal 2 in this matter had become complicated by additions and modifications by the other delegations, he preferred to withdraw the paper rather than to delay the Conference by further discussion. 3. German Economic Paper . This matter was deferred until the subject of German reparations was further explored. 4. Italian and Austrian Reparations . This matter was discussed. The American view was that countries which were in need of relief could not be expected to support reparations payments and the subject was deferred to a later time. 5. Oil for Western Europe . The Russian delegation said that they had a paper to present to the Conference on this subject. This paper has not yet been received. 6. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe . No report has been received from the subcommittee on this subject. 7. Oil Equipment in Rumania . This matter was not discussed. 8. The Western Boundary of Poland . This matter was not discussed. 9. Cooperation in European Economic Policies . This matter was discussed. The Soviet delegation stated they were ready to enter the European Inland Transport organization and were studying the other economic and coal organizations with a view to arriving at their decision as to whether to join them. 10. German Political Paper . Sir Alexander Cadogan stated that there were two items which had been rejected by the Economic Committee from the economic principles applying to Germany on the basis that they belong properly in the political principles. He suggested that these points be brought before the Big Three. The points were as follows: ( a ) Uniform treatment of Germans. ( b ) Free circulation of all nationals of the Four Allies in all zones. 11. Inland Waterways . The subcommittee appointed to study this question was not ready to report. Mr. Byrnes asked that the subcommittee expedite this report to the Conference. 12. [ German Fleet .] Mr. Molotov asked that the item referring to the German naval and merchant vessels be put on the agenda. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 For the documents referred to in this memorandum, see the footnotes to the minutes, ante , pp. 425–435 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] . Rapporteur’s Report Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] Rapporteur’s Report 1 Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m. [Translation] Statement of V. M. Molotov to the Heads of the Three Governments Concerning the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, July 27, 1945 The following questions remain on the agenda of the meeting of Foreign Ministers: ( 1 ) Regarding unsettled questions it was stated that up to the present time the following unsettled questions remain: (1) regarding the economic principles with relation to Germany; (2) regarding German reparations; (3) regarding Italian and Austrian reparations; (4) regarding European oil supplies; (5) regarding the acceptance of Italy and other former satellites as members of the United Nations Organization; (6) regarding the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; (7) regarding the lightening of the armistice conditions for Italy and other former satellites; (8) regarding the export of oil equipment from Rumania; (9) regarding the western frontiers of Poland; (10) regarding collaboration in the solving of immediate European economic problems; (11) regarding military [ wart ] criminals; (12) regarding the transfer of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; (13) regarding the additions [ addition? ] to the political principles of [ for? ] the treatment of Germany of two points taken from point 13 concerning the economic principles; (14) regarding the German fleet; (15) regarding internal [ inland ] waterways. ( 2 ) Regarding the admission of Italy and other countries which have concluded an armistice and which have become co-belligerents on the side of the Allies into the United Nations Organization . The Secretary of State of the USA, Mr. Byrnes, stated that if agreement between the Soviet and British Delegations on the wording of the document on this question is not reached, he, with the approval of the President of the USA, proposed to withdraw completely this question from the agenda of the Conference. Mr. Byrnes added that according to his opinion it was first of all necessary to examine the vitally important questions, namely, the questions concerning reparations, the German fleet and the western frontiers of Poland. Mr. [ Sir Alexander ] Cadogan proposed to change the wording of the last phrase of the third paragraph, as introduced by the Soviet Delegation, by the following phrase: “The conclusion of peace treaties with responsible democratic governments in the states will permit the three Governments to renew normal diplomatic relations with them and to support proposals on their side to become members of the United Nations Organization.” V. M. Molotov stated that this amendment was unacceptable. It was agreed that since the meeting of the three Ministers could not attain agreement on this question, it should be referred for settlement to the Chiefs of the three States. ( 3 ) Regarding German Reparations . V. M. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation considered the work of the Reparations Committee unsatisfactory and proposed that the question of reparations from Germany be examined immediately at the meeting of the three Ministers. This proposal did not evoke any objection. V. M. Molotov thereupon read point 4 of the Crimea Protocol on reparations and, referring to Mr. Pauley’s statement in the Reparations Committee to the effect that he withdrew the agreement of the Government of the USA to the decision set forth in this point, inquired of Mr. Byrnes whether the Government of the USA continued to support the Crimea decisions on this question, or whether it had changed its position. Mr. Byrnes answered that this was a misunderstanding. The Government of the USA had agreed in the Crimea to accept the figure of $20,000,000,000 as a basis for discussion, but since then the Soviet and Allied Armies had caused great destruction in Germany, several areas had been taken away from Germany, and now it was practically impossible to proceed from that general figure which had been adopted by the American Delegation at Yalta as a possible basis for discussion. Mr. Cadogan stated that he would refrain from submitting any proposals. On the proposal of Mr. Byrnes it was recognized as advisable to postpone the examination of this question until the next meeting of the three Ministers, after which this question should be reported to the Heads of the three Government[s]. ( 4 ) Concerning Austrian and Italian Reparations . V. M. Molotov proposed to accept as a basis for the further study of this question the proposals on reparations from Austria and reparations from Italy submitted by the Soviet Delegation (see enclosures Nos. 1 and 2). 2 Mr. Byrnes stated that the American Delegation did not consider it possible to exact from Austria and Italy reparations in the guise of current production. In the opinion of the American Delegation it was only possible to remove at one time equipment of the war industries which could not be used for peaceful objectives. Mr. Cadogan stated that the British Delegation supported the opinion of the Delegation of the USA. In view of the non-obtaining of agreement, it was decided to report the manifested disagreement to the Heads of the three Governments. ( 5 ) Regarding the Economic Principles with Relation to Germany . On the proposal of Mr. Byrnes discussion of this question was postponed. ( 6 ) Regarding European Oil Supplies . The discussion of this question was postponed since the Commission had not concluded its work. ( 7 ) Regarding Economic Collaboration in Europe . It was decided to approve the report of the commission on this question and to inform the Heads of the three Governments accordingly (see enclosure No. 3 3 ). 1 Molotov acted as Rapporteur for this meeting and read his report at the meeting of Heads of Government on July 28 (see post , p. 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] ). 2 Documents Nos. 769 and 1099 , post , respectively. 3 Document No. 1162 , post . United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2745 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 4 p.m. Pending Problems Before the Conference, Close of Business July 27, 1945 i. problems before the big three 1. Western Boundary of Poland. 2. Disposition of German Fleet and Merchant Marine. (Awaiting completion of U. S. and British papers outlining concrete proposals.) 3. Admission to the United Nations. (Referred to the Big Three by the Foreign Ministers on July 27.) 4. War Crimes. (This British agenda topic was referred to the Big Three by the Foreign Ministers on July 27.) 5. Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems. (The subcommittee report, 2 which states that the Soviets will attend the EITO [ ECITO ] Conference, but are still studying the question of participation in EEC and ECO, was referred to the Big Three by the Foreign Ministers on July 27.) 6. Austrian and Italian Reparations. (It will apparently be necessary to report to the Big Three that the Foreign Ministers have been unable to reach any agreement in regard to Austrian and Italian reparations.[)] 7. Spain. (If the U. S. suggestion is approved that the proposed paper on the Admission to the United Nations 3 be dropped, the Soviet proposal for a tripartite statement on the Franco regime 4 will still be pending before the Conference.[)] ii. problems before the foreign ministers 1. German Reparations. (To be considered at the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers who, if they are unable to reach an agreement at that meeting, will refer the question to the Big Three.) 2. German Economic Questions. (Decision on the outstanding questions, paragraphs 18 and 19 in regard to the source of supply for zones of occupation in Germany and to the payment for essential imports, is dependent on the decision concerning German reparations.) 3. Rumanian Oil Equipment. (The Soviets are circulating a paper, 5 a reply to the British paper 6 on this subject.) 4. German Political Questions. (The British have presented a paper 7 proposing that two additional points be added to the German political document already approved by the conference.) iii. problems before subcommittees 1. Oil for Western Europe. (The Economic Subcommittee is still considering the U. S. proposal 8 on this subject.) 2. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States. (The subcommittee report on this question has not yet been presented to the Foreign Ministers.) 3. Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways. (The subcommittee report on this question has not yet been presented to the Foreign Ministers.) 4. Transfer of German Populations from Poland and Czechoslovakia. (The subcommittee has not yet submitted its report on this topic.) 5. Directive to Military Commanders in Germany on Agreements Reached at the Conference. (It is impossible for this subcommittee to complete its work until the German economic questions have been resolved.) 6. Protocol and Communiqué of the Conference. (Subcommittees are engaged in preparation of these documents.) 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 Document No. 1162 , post . 3 Document No. 730 , post . 4 Document No. 1177 , post . 5 Document No. 843 , post . 6 Document No. 841 , post . 7 Document No. 879 , post . 8 Document No. 1320 , post . Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 6 p.m. Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 6 p.m. Present United States Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Bohlen Mr. Pavlov [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)]] Bohlen Minutes Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 6 p.m. Truman Papers Bohlen Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] Bohlen Minutes Potsdam, July 27, 1945, 6 p.m. top secret The Secretary said first of all he wished to tell Mr. Molotov that his request for a two or three day postponement in the issuance of the statement on Japan 1 had only reached him this morning when it was too late. Mr. Molotov replied that he had sent the word last night 2 as soon as he had received the Secretary’s letter. 3 The Secretary explained that even then it would have been too late since at 7:00 o’clock the statement had gone to the press for early morning release. He explained that the President for political reasons had considered it important to issue an immediate appeal to the Japanese to surrender. Two days ago he had discussed it with the Prime Minister and he had received his consent to the issuance of the statement 4 and had cabled Chiang Kai Shek. 5 On his return yesterday from Frankfort the President had found a telegram from Chiang Kai Shek agreeing to the issuance of the statement. 6 Mr. Molotov said that thus they had not been informed until after the release. 7 The Secretary said that we did not consult the Soviet Government since the latter was not at war with Japan and we did not wish to embarrass them. Mr. Molotov replied that he was not authorized to discuss this matter further. He left the implication that Marshal Stalin would revert to it at some time. The Secretary then said that he had also wanted to discuss privately with Mr. Molotov the difficult question of reparations. He said he had closed off the discussion at the Foreign Ministers meeting this afternoon since nothing could be accomplished until the new British delegation had returned to the Conference. 8 Mr. Molotov agreed. The Secretary asked Mr. Molotov whether he had had an opportunity to think over the suggestion which the Secretary had made, 9 namely, that each country would obtain its reparations from its own zone and would exchange goods between the zones. Mr. Molotov said would not the Secretary’s suggestion mean that each country would have a free hand in their own zones and would act entirely independently of the others? The Secretary said that was true in substance but he had in mind working out arrangements for the exchange of needed products between the zones, for example, from the Ruhr if the British agreed, machinery and equipment could be removed and exchanged with the Soviet authorities for goods—food and coal—in the Soviet zone. The Secretary said that he felt that without some such arrangement the difficulties would be insurmountable and would be a continued source of disagreement and trouble between our countries. Mr. Molotov pointed out that whereas removals of capital equipment from the British and American zones could be done in a short period of time, payment for these in the form of products from the Soviet zone must of necessity extend over a longer period of time. The Secretary agreed and said that was a point of course that would have to be worked out. Mr. Molotov then inquired what amount he thought the United States Government could agree to in respect of removals of industrial equipment for transfer to the Soviet zone under Mr. Byrnes’ plan. He said that they had spoken of 2 billion dollars. 10 The Secretary pointed out that the Ruhr lay in the British zone and that it would be necessary to consult with them. He said he would talk with Messrs. Clayton and Pauley and when the new British delegation arrived he would discuss possible amounts with them. The Secretary reiterated the advantages of his proposal repeating again that the United States Government would not this time pay out money in order to keep Germans working to produce reparations for others. The Secretary then said that he felt that Mr. Molotov’s question at the meeting in regard to the Yalta decision 11 was based on a misunderstanding. He said in our understanding the words “basis of discussion” merely mean that the subject would be discussed and in no way meant that there had been any agreement as to the sum of German reparations. Mr. Molotov agreed with that and said that he had had in mind the impression that they had received at Yalta, namely, that the United States was in accord with the Soviet view that we should exact as much reparations as possible from Germany whereas at Yalta the British had not shared this view and had fully reserved their position. 11 He said now at this Conference the Soviet delegation had received the impression that the United States no longer held that view and that that was the reason why he had referred to the Yalta Agreement. The Secretary replied that there had been no change in view on the part of the United States Government and that we were still willing to discuss the Soviet proposal but that he must agree that many conditions had changed since Yalta. There had been first of all the extent of the destruction in Germany and secondly questions as to definitions of war booty and then the de facto alienation to Poland of a large and productive part of former Germany. He said that our aim remained the same and that all he was trying to do was to find a way which would on the one hand be acceptable to all and would on the other take cognizance of existing realities. Mr. Molotov replied that in February the Soviet Government had thought the destruction of the Ruhr was greater than it turned out to be. He said that from their reports only from ten to fifteen percent of the productive capacity of the Ruhr had been destroyed. As a whole, machine tools and the basic equipment remained serviceable. He inquired again what amount of removals from the Ruhr Mr. Byrnes had in mind to exchange for products from the Soviet zone. The Secretary repeated that he would have to consult with his advisers and the British on this point. Mr. Molotov inquired whether it was still the intention of the United States Government to reduce the production capacity of the Ruhr as a measure of security. The Secretary replied that that was still our intention. The only question was how much equipment would be available for transfer to the Soviet zone in return for goods over a longer period of time from that zone. Mr. Molotov in conclusion then said that as he understood it what Mr. Byrnes suggested was in fact an exchange of reparations between the zones. The Secretary said this was correct. Mr. Molotov then inquired on another subject why the Secretary had decided to withdraw our proposal with regard to Italy and the other satellite states. 12 The Secretary explained that we had wasted a good many days on that and that our original proposal 13 had been amended many times. He agreed, however, that the President had accepted Marshal Stalin’s amendment concerning the consideration of the question of the recognition of the satellite states but that Mr. Churchill had objected to it. 14 He said at one time the British and American delegations had been in agreement but that the Soviets had not 15 and that subsequently the Soviet and American delegations were in agreement but that the British objected. He said he felt that there were more important matters to deal with but if the British and Soviet delegations could reach agreement the Conference could still adopt the proposal. It was agreed that nothing could be done until Mr. Attlee’s return. 1 Document No. 1382 , post . 2 By telephone. See Byrnes, Speaking Frankly , p. 207; Byrnes, All in One Lifetime , p. 296. 3 Document No. 1253 , post . 4 Document No. 1249 , post . 5 See document No. 1246 , post . 6 Document No. 1251 , post . 7 Cf. the following passage in Truman, Year of Decisions , p. 387: “Stalin could not, of course, be a party to the proclamation [calling for the surrender of Japan] itself since he was still at peace with Japan, but I considered it desirable to advise him of the move we intended to make. I spoke to him privately about this in the course of the conference meeting.” 8 See ante , p. 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] . 9 See ante , pp. 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] . 10 See ante , p. 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] . 11 See document No. 1416 , post , section v. 11 See document No. 1416 , post , section v. 12 See ante , p. 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] . 13 Document No. 727 , post . 14 See ante , pp. 363–364 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . 15 See ante , pp. 325–328 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . Meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways Meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways Present United States United Kingdom 1 Soviet Union 1 Mr. Riddleberger 1 It has not been determined who attended this meeting on behalf of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. 1 It has not been determined who attended this meeting on behalf of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)]] The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945. 840.811/7–2545 The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State 840.811/7–2545 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs ( Riddleberger ) to the Secretary of State 2 [ Babelsberg ,] July 29, 1945. Memorandum to the Secretary Subject: Free and unrestricted navigation of international inland waterways. The Sub-Committee on inland waterways met on July 27 at which time the American and British representatives presented draft proposals, copies of which are attached herewith. 3 While the British and American drafts are cast in somewhat different form, they both incorporate essentially the same ideas and agreement can no doubt be quickly reached on them providing the Soviet member was willing to go along. The Soviet representative presented no memorandum and stated that his delegation had not expected this question and was not sufficiently informed to present a statement. He said it would be necessary to obtain more information from his Government before the Soviet views could be made known to the Committee. Furthermore he doubted that the Committee could extend its mandate to include the Kiel Canal and the “Straits” without referring the question to the Foreign Ministers. To this objection the United States member pointed out that the Straits had been the subject of a lengthy discussion in the Big Three meeting 4 and that the Kiel Canal was in any case under the jurisdiction of the Control Council for Germany; the Sub-Committee had been established after this discussion and therefore we thought that these subjects could be properly included. The British member agreed. The Soviet representative said that he would take up these points with Mr. Molotov. The remainder of the discussion was devoted to explanatory comment by the American and British representatives on their respective drafts, largely in reply to questions by the Soviet representative. The Sub-Committee adjourned with a promise by the Soviet representative to discuss the question again when his delegation had received the information it required which he hoped would be by July 29. The Soviet representative has not called back on this question and our efforts to get in touch with him have been fruitless. I have the impression that the Soviets do not desire to discuss this question at this time and I doubt if we shall make any progress unless pressure is applied to the Soviet delegation at a higher level. 2 Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. 3 For the United States proposal, see documents Nos. 758 and 1373 , post . For the British proposal, see documents Nos. 759 and 1375 , post . 4 See ante , pp. 256–258 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 303–305 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . Clayton–Mikolajczyk conversation, 2:30 p.m. Clayton–Mikolajczyk conversation, 2:30 p.m. 1 1 The time is supplied from Mikolajczyk’s diary of the Conference. For Mikolajczyk’s minutes of this conversation, see document No. 1389 , post . Present United States Poland Mr. Clayton Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk Mr. Harriman Mr. Modzelewski Mr. Collado Mr. Minc Mr. Despres Mr. Rajchman Mr. Bergson Mr. Zebrowski [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)]] United States Delegation Memorandum [Babelsberg,] July 28, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2845 United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2845 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] United States Delegation Memorandum 2 [ Babelsberg ,] July 28, 1945. Memorandum of Conversation Subject: Polish Economic Position, Necessary Imports, Available Exports and Credit Requirements for Reconstruction (Mr. Clayton presiding for the U. S.; speaker for the Poles, Mr. Minc, Ministry of Industry.) 1. Agriculture A grain balance can be realized with some hardship in the year 1945–46. The livestock position, however, is bad, with cattle numbers at 25% of the 1939 level and the number of horses below 20% of prewar. Thus the meat and fat position is catastrophic. A small surplus of potatoes and sugar is expected. In the harvest year 1946–47 grain supplies are expected to increase. The meat and fat position will continue to be difficult. Reference is to the entire area currently administered by the Polish Government. 2. Lumber While Poland was a pre-war exporter of lumber, cuttings now would have to be stopped for 16 years to restore reserves to normal. There will be shortages of timber for industrial purposes, e. g. in the coal mines and for the production of cellulose, and reconstruction generally will be limited. 3. Industry Generally In the area of 1939 Poland, industry is operating at 50% of pre-war levels. In December 1944 the textile industry was worked at the capacity of available spindles, which was 60% of pre-war in old Poland. Raw cotton supplies are adequate under the trade agreement with Russia. 3 There is a wool deficit. In the case of shoes, there is a serious deficiency due to the lack of raw materials, including tannery materials. The tanneries are intact. 4. Coal Currently the daily output is 18,000 tons including output of German Upper Silesian mines but excluding the output of the Walden-burg area, which is about 7,000–8,000 tons. Production and employment in the German Upper Silesian mines has been as follows in the past five months: Production Thousands of Tons Miners Employed February 40.5 3,900 March 92.0 6,900 April 123.0 20,300 May 258.0 21,000 June 473.0 25,500 All the miners employed are Poles. The total output including the output in German Upper Silesian mines, which was 1,860,000 in June, is expected to be 3,750,000 in December. The total production in the five months ending with December is expected to be 15,000,000 tons. Domestic consumption in the same period will be 6,250,000, while export commitments, which actually have been made or are expected to be made to the Soviet Union, Sweden, 4 be a balance available for export over and above these commitments amounting to about 5,000,000 tons in the last five months of 1945. Stocks currently are 1.5 million tons. Coal export prices at the port of Danzig, as fixed in existing export commitments, average 8.42. The surplus referred to above will be available at the pits. However, the transport situation is extremely tight. Unless additional transport facilities are available, it will not be possible to move this surplus to ports for export. The domestic consumption of 6,250,000 tons is a minimum, and the total will be increased if it is not possible to export the calculated surplus. Transport requirements to move the coal to local industrial users are small as compared with requirements to move the coal to ports of export. To move the 5,000,000 tons of the calculated surplus in the next five months to, say, the port of Danzig, 14–16,000 additional railway cars would be required. Sixteen hundred 20 ton cars will be received from Sweden. Locomotives are not in as short supply as cars. No cars are currently being received from Germany. The percentage of “sick” cars is about the same as before the war. The combined daily handling capacity at the ports of Danzig and Gdynia is now about 4,000 tons as compared with 30,000 pre-war. By the middle of August it is expected that 16–17,000 tons can be handled daily. If more transport facilities were available additional harbors would be accessible. By the summer of 1946 it is expected that the total output of coal will rise to 5 million tons monthly and that there will be an export surplus of 2½–3 million tons. 5. Other Exports Available, over and above those committed under trade agreements a . Zinc —In the area of old Poland in June 1945, there was a surplus available for export for [ of? ] 21,000 tons of zinc ore, 3,500 of zinc concentrates, and 4,300 tons of zinc. Some additional supplies are available from German Upper Silesia. For the 18 month period, August 1945 through December 1946, 40,000 tons of zinc will be available for export, almost entirely from the area of old Poland (that is, old Poland west of the Curzon line 5 ). b . Cement —For the same 18 month period, there will be a surplus available for export of 350,000 tons. c . For the same 18 month period, there will be surpluses available for export of 200 to 300 tons of cadmium, 7,000,000 tons of coke, a half million meters of glass, and 50,000 tons of soda. These figures refer to the area of old Poland west of the Curzon line. For the entire area currently administered by the Poles, there will be a potential export surplus of 160,000 tons of iron and steel. d . [ 6 .] Import Requirements, other than capital goods for reconstruction, and not including supplies to be obtained from UNRRA $380,000,000 of imports will be required in the 18 month period, August 1945 through December 1946. Among the requirements are: Tons Rubber 8,000 Industrial belting 60 Tires and tubes 5,500 Wool 20,000 Wool Waste 15,000 Cotton 60–70,000 Scrap iron 300,000 Copper 30,000 Aluminum 2,500 Nickel 1,000 Petrol 100,000 Meat, including: canned 100,000 Fish, including canned 50,000 Butter 20,000 Lard 20,000 Bacon 20.000 Potassium salts, nitrates 750,000 Machinery imports of $35,000,000 are required, including steam boilers, combustion engines, locomotives, turbines, pumps and compressors, wood working, metal working, molding machinery, pneumatic drills, textile and sewing machinery, milling machinery, road construction machinery, excavators and crushers. Ships of all types, including barges and tugs but excluding ocean going types, will be required to the amount of $15,000,000. Agricultural machinery also will be needed, including 5,000 tractors, to the amount of $10–15,000,000; and 1,000 autos and 10,000 trucks. All the above imports are additional to future imports, the purchases of which have already been arranged. 6. [ 7 .] Credit Requirements Of the total imports of $380,000,000 referred to above, about 50% can be paid for with expected exports. Thus $190,000,000 credits would be required to purchase the balance. It is desired that such credits be for a period of about five years. The imports of $380,000,000 do not include imports of capital goods required for long-term reconstruction purposes. These requirements are estimated at $500,000,000 over a period of six to seven years. Long-term credits are desired to finance these imports. The above credit requirements are additional to any aid received from reparations. 2 Authorship not indicated. Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. 3 See ante , p. 406, footnote 3 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] . 4 There appears to be an omission in the source text at this point. 5 See the map facing p. 748 in vol. i . For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , pp. 793 – 794 . Truman–Attlee meeting, 9:15 p.m. Truman–Attlee meeting, 9:15 p.m. 1 1 The meeting was held at Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg. Information as to time and participants from the Log ( ante , p. 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) and from Leahy, I Was There , p. 420. Truman states in Year of Decisions , p. 395, that Stimson and Marshall were also present at this meeting, but Stimson had left Babelsberg on July 25 and Marshall on July 27. Present United States United Kingdom President Truman Prime Minister Attlee Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Bevin Fleet Admiral Leahy Sir Alexander Cadogan [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Byrnes gives the following summary of the meeting ( Speaking Frankly , page 79): “Soon after their arrival, Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin called on the President and the four of us discussed the work of the conference. The President mentioned the Soviet demand for East Prussia and indicated on a map the changes in the boundary lines of Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union that thus would be effected. Mr. Bevin immediately and forcefully presented his strong opposition to those boundaries.” Leahy gives the following account ( I Was There , page 420): “Prime Minister Attlee and his newly appointed Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, arrived shortly after 9 P.M. and called on the President. Byrnes and I were present and the conversation quickly centered on the possibility of settling the Polish boundary question and reparations.” Tenth plenary meeting, 10:30 p.m. Tenth plenary meeting, 10:30 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Attlee Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Bevin Foreign Commissar Molotov Fleet Admiral Leahy Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Davies Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Gusev Mr. Bohlen Major Birse Mr. Cohen 1 Mr. Thompson 2 1 Cohen’s presence is assumed from the existence of his notes on the meeting, post , p. 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] . 2 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 28, 1945, 10:30 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 28, 1945, 10:30 p.m. Truman Papers Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, July 28, 1945, 10:30 p.m. top secret Mr. Molotov read his reports of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers held on July 27 and July 25 (attachment no. I). 3 The President inquired if the list of questions drawn up by the Foreign Ministers was agreed to. There was no objection. Stalin suggested that they add the question of the disposition of the German fleet. He inquired how much time they had at their disposal at the meeting and suggested that they meet for one hour. This was agreed to. Stalin went on to say that the Russian Delegation had received a new proposal from Japan. Although the Soviet Delegation had not been informed when the document was drawn up against Japan 4 they, nevertheless, were informing the other countries of this approach. The translator then read the communication from Ambassador Saito which was marked strictly confidential and which was to the following effect: At our last meeting on July 13 the Ambassador had had the honor to submit the proposal of the Japanese Government to send Prince Konoe to Moscow. 5 He had received the reply of the Soviet Government which did not see the possibility of giving a definite reply to the approach because no definite proposal had been made. 6 In order to make the matter more precise he was communicating the following. The mission of Prince Konoe was to ask the Soviet Government to take part in mediation to end the present war and to transmit the complete Japanese case in this respect. He would also be empowered to negotiate with respect to Soviet-Japanese relations during the war and after the war. Simultaneously, he wished to repeat that Prince Konoe was especially charged by His Majesty, the Emperor, to convey to the Soviet Government that it was exclusively the desire of His Majesty to avoid more bloodshed by the parties engaged in the war. In view of the foregoing he hoped that the Soviet Government would give favorable attention to his request and would give its consent to the arrival of the mission. He added that the Soviet Government was aware of the position which Prince Konoe occupied in Japan. 7 Stalin said there was nothing new in this except that it was more definite than the previous approach and that it would receive a more definite answer than was the case the last time, and that the answer would be in the negative. 8 The President thanked Marshal Stalin. The President added that he understood the Soviet Delegation had two questions to take up this evening. Molotov said these were [the] questions of Italy and the satellite states and the question of reparations from Austria and Italy. He added that besides the questions covered in the report of the Foreign Ministers it would be desirable to discuss the disposition of the German fleet and the western boundaries of Poland. The President stated that they could discuss any question and that he would be prepared to express his opinion on any matter raised. Attlee expressed regret that domestic occurrences in Great Britain had interfered with the work of the Conference and said that he was prepared to stay as long as necessary to complete the work of the Conference. 1. Admission of Italy and the Satellite States Into the United Nations Organization Molotov said that this question had already been discussed at a previous meeting of the Big Three. The Foreign Ministers had held different opinions as to the results of this discussion. 9 His own impression was that the proposal 10 had been agreed to by the Big Three with respect to Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, subject to an amendment substituting the word “for” for the word “with.” The proposal had then been referred to the Foreign Ministers meeting for the final draft. In the Foreign Ministers meeting, however, the British representatives had proposed a new amendment. 11 Stalin said that this amendment had been rejected at the Big Three meeting. The question was whether to describe those satellite governments as “responsible” or to “recognize” them. The opinion of the Soviet Delegation was that the word “responsible” would offend the governments of those countries. If they said “recognize” it would not offend them and each of the governments represented at this conference could recognize them when it thought they were responsible. This had been accepted in principle by the Big Three, then the Foreign Ministers had gone to a meeting and had rejected it. This was not right. Mr. Byrnes said that at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers it was stated by Mr. Molotov that he was under the impression that the United States had agreed to the amendment offered by Marshal Stalin or offered by the Soviet Delegation and approved by Stalin. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had stated that this was correct. The President had agreed in principle with the amendment offered by the Soviet Delegation. The President did suggest that the question be examined by a drafting committee and he had had in mind changing one word, namely, the substitution of “examine” for “consider.” 12 Therefore, there was no disagreement between the Soviet Delegation and the United States Delegation. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had stated to the Foreign Ministers meeting, however, that when the President had agreed, his recollection was that the Prime Minister did not agree. The Prime Minister had advised him at the conclusion of the meeting that he did not agree. Mr. Byrnes said that he had advised the meeting of Foreign Ministers that the United States had offered its proposal 13 originally in order to give some confidence to Italy. We had asked only for a declaration that the Three Powers support the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization. The British Delegation had asked that we include neutrals and we had agreed. Then the Soviet Delegation expressed opinions with regard to the Franco Government of Spain and in the hope of getting an agreement we had added to the declaration that we would not support the entry of the Franco Government into the United Nations Organization. Then the Soviet Delegation had asked for the inclusion of the paragraph concerning Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland and we had agreed to that. Then the Soviet Delegation had asked that the paragraph regarding Italy be modified to accord with the language used in reference to the other satellite states and we had agreed to that. 14 Unfortunately, we had found that if we agreed with the Soviet Delegation, the British Delegation did not agree; if we agreed with the British Delegation, the Soviet Delegation disagreed. It was now up to the Soviet and British Delegations to see if they could get together. If not, we would withdraw our modest request for the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization. Cadogan observed that the paper related to the entry of Italy and the other states into the United Nations Organization. There were two doubtful points. Otherwise, they were agreed. Marshal Stalin had referred to one in regard to which he thought there was no difficulty. The original text had said “responsible” governments and the Soviet Delegation proposed substituting the word “recognized.” Cadogan thought that several days ago they had been prepared to agree to that. A more formidable difficulty was the proposal of the Soviet Government for an addition to paragraph three. Mr. Churchill had explained that while he was prepared to agree to consider the recognition of these governments, to put this in a declaration might be misleading, because the British could not in fact re-establish diplomatic relations with countries with which they were technically still at war. Cadogan said he had suggested a compromise but that this had not been satisfactory to the Soviet Delegation. 15 Stalin said he understood Cadogan’s remarks to mean that he agreed to substitute the word “recognized” in place of the word “responsible.” Cadogan replied in the affirmative. The President said that this was satisfactory to us. Stalin then continued that there was no difference in the position toward the arrangements for Italy on the one hand and the other satellite states on the other, because none of these countries had democratic governments except Finland because they had held no elections. Mr. Churchill had referred to the fact that Great Britain had recognized Italy 90%. 16 Stalin pointed out that the proposal did not provide for the establishment of full diplomatic relations but only that they consider the question. He did not understand the distinction made between Italy and the other satellites. Bevin suggested that the difference was that they knew about the Italian Government but that they did not know anything about the other governments. Stalin said it was not proposed that they recognize them; until such time as they did recognize them they could obtain information. Bevin inquired why they were being asked to commit themselves first. Stalin rejoined that the Russians had also known little about the Italian Government when they had established diplomatic relations with them, perhaps even less than the British knew about the other satellites. He pointed out that with respect to Italy the first step was the resumption of diplomatic relations, which occurred six to eight months after their surrender. The proposal to admit Italy into the United Nations Organization was a second step. The task now was to give the other satellite governments the hope that eleven months after capitulation relations with them would be resumed. If they agreed to ease the situation of Italy, something should be done for the other satellites. Attlee repeated that it was impossible for them to enter into diplomatic relations with countries with which they were not at peace and the proposed statement would give the impression that they would do what was impossible. The proposed British amendment stated what was possible. Stalin then suggested that they might favor “to consider each separately the question of establishing of a complete or partial diplomatic relation.” He was willing to accept the American proposal to substitute “examine” for “consider”. Attlee replied that the change of words did not alter the substance of the matter. One question in Parliament would bring out the real difficulty. Stalin said that in any event the British would study the matter. He thought that the British Delegation could accept the proposal and lose nothing. Bevin said that Parliament would ask what they meant by what they had done and he wanted to be perfectly straight with the British people. If he were going to recognize these governments, he would recognize them and he did not want to clothe things with words. He would rather take the latest American view and leave the whole question to a later date. Stalin said he agreed. 2. Italian Reparations The President said that as he had stated on the first day that this question had been discussed 17 that we had found it necessary with the Government of Great Britain to contribute 500 million dollars for the feeding and rehabilitation of Italy. We recognized that probably that much more would be needed to keep Italy from starving to death. As he had made it plain at this conference, the United States did not intend to provide money for the payment of reparations. If there were war plants that the Soviet Government needed, we agreed that they should take them, but contributions made to support Italy should be a first claim on exports. Stalin said that it was possible to agree not to exact reparations from Austria, as this could be understood but the Soviet people would not understand if this were the case with Italy. Italy had sent armies to the Volga. Austria did not have her own armed forces, whereas Italy did have. The President said that if any reparations could be obtained from Italy he was perfectly willing, but the United States could not spend money to rehabilitate Italy just to enable Italy to pay reparations to other countries. Stalin said he quite understood this. He referred to the moral right of the Soviet Union to reparations as being based on the fact that for three and one-half years its territory had been occupied and much devastation caused. The President had said that if there were some equipment available in Italy it could be used for reparations. He did not want to ask too much. It was necessary to find out what sum this would constitute. In the cases of Rumania, Hungary and Finland it had been 300 million dollars. He inquired what sum Italy could pay. Perhaps the President was not ready to answer. He repeated he wanted to know what sum this would amount to. The President said he was not able to answer now. Stalin said that the answer could be postponed. Bevin inquired if this were on the assumption that the supplies furnished by the United States and Great Britain would be protected. Stalin said that he did not wish to ignore the interests of America. Attlee said he agreed with the President and said that they had full sympathy for the Russian people in the suffering they had undergone. He pointed out that Britain had also suffered from attacks by Italy. Britain also had ravaged lands and they could imagine the feelings of the British people if Italy had to pay reparations which actually came from Britain and America. The fact was that Italy had to receive help in order to live. If military equipment, there was no objection. Stalin said he agreed to take reparations in the form of equipment. Bevin asked “military equipment?” 18 Stalin replied “yes, military equipment.” Attlee inquired if this would be once-and-for-all removals and not levies on war production. Stalin replied: “Yes, once-for-all removals.” Bevin inquired if this meant military equipment having no peace time value. Stalin replied that military factories could be used for any purpose. It was the same as equipment taken from Germany. Attlee said it should be equipment having no peace time usefulness. Stalin replied that all equipment could be adjusted for peace time production. The Soviet Union was adjusting theirs now. There was no such equipment which would have no peace time use. Bevin observed that it was so difficult to tell what the Russians would take away. Stalin said of course they could not say now. He wanted only a decision in principle. The President said he thought that Marshal Stalin wanted a decision in principle that Italy would pay reparations. Stalin observed that the sum of reparations asked could be reduced. The President said he thought they were not far apart on the principle. He only wanted to protect the help we were giving. Stalin said he agreed and that the Russians did not want to touch the advances the United States was making to Italy. Bevin inquired if it were not then a question of priorities. The first priority should be given to what Great Britain and the United States had supplied, reparations would be next. Stalin said he wanted to give no bonus to aggressors without their paying a small part of the damage they had caused. The President said he agreed to this. Stalin remarked to Attlee that he should not forget what Italy had done to Britain. Attlee replied that they would not forget. It was agreed to meet the next day at 4:00 p.m. The meeting adjourned. 19 3 Ante , pp. 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] ] and 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] , respectively. 4 Document No. 1382 , post . 5 See vol. i , documents Nos. 582 and 586 . 6 See document No. 1226 , post . 7 There is no indication that the actual text of Sato’s communication was circulated at the Conference. See document No. 1234 , post . 8 See document No. 1261 , post , and footnote 3 to that document. 9 See ante , pp. 357–364 [ Pgs. 357–364 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 426–428 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] . 10 Not found. See document No. 1424 , post , footnote 1. 11 The Cohen notes ( post , pp. 467–468 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] ) attribute these statements to Stalin. 12 In the Soviet amendment quoted ante , p. 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . Cf. the third paragraph of document No. 731 , post . 13 Document No. 727 , post . 14 See ante , pp. 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 124–126 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 146–147 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 324–328 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 360–364 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . 15 See ante , pp. 363–364 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 426–427 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] . 16 See ante , p. 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . 17 See ante , p. 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] . 18 This question is attributed to Attlee in the Cohen notes, post , p. 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] . 19 At 12:05 a.m., July 29. See Log, ante , p. 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 28, 1945, 10:30 p.m. Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin now head the British delegation. Mr. Molotov reports on the last two meetings of the foreign secretaries. At the July 26 [ 25 ] meeting of the foreign secretaries the following points were considered: 1. The Secretary of State Byrnes proposed that the question of inland waterways be discussed and that the matter be referred to a subcommittee. It was so agreed. 2. Secretary Byrnes brought up the question of the removal of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland. Cadogan suggested that a procedure for collaboration to secure their orderly transfer be worked out. A subcommittee was appointed to consider this. 3. Mr. [ Sir Alexander ] Cadogan suggested that the subcommittees for the drafting of protocol and communiqué at the conclusion of the conference be appointed. It was agreed to set up two committees for this purpose. In the meeting of the foreign secretaries on July 27 the following questions were considered: 1. The foreign secretaries made up a list of the pending questions on which final decision had not yet been made. 2. There was further discussion of the paper regarding the admission of Italy and the other satellites and Spain into the United Nations. 1 Secretary Byrnes stated that if the Soviets and British could not agree he would withdraw the paper from the agenda. Mr. Cadogan suggested an amendment to the effect that the conclusion of peace with responsible governments would make possible the resumption of diplomatic relations. Mr. Molotov stated the amendment was not acceptable. It was agreed to refer the question to the Big Three. 3. Reparations from Germany. Soviet delegation considered committee report unsatisfactory. It was agreed to refer the question to the Big Three. Molotov pointed out that Mr. Pauley had withdrawn the Crimea decision as a basis for discussion. Mr. Molotov asked Mr. Byrnes for an explanation of the American position. Mr. Byrnes explained that the Crimea figures were taken only as a basis for discussion and that the destruction wrought by the Allied armies as well as further study had indicated that that basis was impractical. 4. Reparations from Austria and Italy. Molotov stated the committee report was unsatisfactory. Byrnes stated reparations from Italy impossible except for removal of war equipment not usable for peace purposes. It was agreed to report the differences to the Big Three. 5. German economic principles. Secretary Byrnes suggested the discussion be postponed. 6. European oil supplies. Discussion was deferred because committee was waiting for further information. 7. Economic collaboration. In the solution of urgent economic problems (European), a report of subcommittee was approved for submission to the Big Three and was read. Truman : The last document was agreed to by the foreign secretaries? It is satisfactory to me. Attlee : To me also. Truman : Shall we take up Poland? Stalin : We have also the German fleet and Italy to discuss. How much time have we? An hour? Truman : ’Til 12:00. Stalin : I wish to make a statement. Last night the Russian delegation was given a copy of the Anglo-American declaration to the Japanese people. We think it our duty to keep each other informed. I inform the Allies of the message that I received from the Japanese Emperor through the Japanese ambassador. I sent a copy of my answer to this peace plea which was in the negative. I received another communication informing me more precisely of the desire of the Emperor to send a peace mission headed by Prince Konoye who was stated to have great influence in the Palace. It was indicated that it was the personal desire of the Emperor to avoid further bloodshed. In this document there is nothing new except the emphasis on the Japanese desire to collaborate with the Soviets. Our answer of course will be negative. (The foregoing was the gist of the translator’s remarks, but they were not heard clearly and, consequently, they may be inaccurate as to detail). Truman : I appreciate very much what the Marshal has said. If Mr. Molotov will now bring up the questions that he wants answered, I will endeavor to give my answers. Molotov : These are reparations, the admission of Italy, and the satellites, the German fleet and the western Polish boundary. Truman : We may discuss any question you wish. I will give my opinion. Attlee : I regret our domestic situation has caused delay in the Conference. We are willing to sit as long as necessary. Stalin : First question is the admission into the United Nations of Italy and the other satellites. This was discussed by the Big Three. The foreign ministers had different impressions of what was agreed. I thought it was agreed as to satellites as well as to Italy. Mr. Churchill’s suggestion of substituting “for” in place of “with” was accepted. Then draft was submitted to foreign secretaries for final polishing. Then Cadogan suggested new amendment. 2 He suggested describing governments as “responsible”. “Responsible”—would suggest that these governments are now irresponsible. The Big Three have agreed on this question. It is not right for the foreign secretaries to change our decision. Byrnes : At the meeting of foreign ministers, Molotov said he understood the United States had agreed to Soviet delegation amendment. In behalf of United States I said that was correct in that the President had agreed in principle. The President said he thought it should be submitted to drafting committee. He had in mind changing only a word. The word “examine” should be substituted for “consider” so there was no difference between the United States and the Soviet delegation. I stated that when the President agreed Mr. Churchill did not agree. I advised the foreign ministers that the United States had offered this proposal originally to give some comfort to Italy. We asked only for a declaration for the support of Italy’s admission into the United Nations on the conclusion of peace. The British ask that we include neutrals. We agreed. Soviet delegation asked express rejection of Franco’s admission. We agreed. Then Soviet asked inclusion of paragraph covering other satellites. We agreed. Then we were asked to modify language on Italy to conform to language on other satellites. We agreed. Unfortunately, we find when we agree with the Soviets the British disagree and when we agree with the British the Soviets disagree. If the British and Soviets can get together it is satisfactory to us. If they can’t agree we will withdraw our proposal. ( Attlee asks Cadogan to state British position.) Cadogan : So far as I understand it, the text would be agreed except for two doubtful points. The Marshal refers to one. Stalin proposes “recognize” instead of “responsible”, governments. We agreed. The more formidable objection in the proposal is that we consider in the near future the establishment of diplomatic relations with satellites. Mr. Churchill explained we could agree to consider that but it would be misleading because we can not constitutionally establish diplomatic relations with countries with which we are still at war. I suggested compromise. It is not satisfactory. I suggested a further compromise and it is not satisfactory to the Marshal. Stalin : There is no difference between Italy and the other satellites. In none of the countries but Finland has there been an election. Italy was recognized by the Soviets, the United States and Great Britain, at least 90 percent. I can not understand this difference. Bevin : We know about the Italian government, but we don’t know about the others. Stalin : We are not asking an undertaking to recognize, only asking you to consider. We knew very little about Italy. We first recognized Italy. Now we propose to consider her admission to the United Nations. We should at least start with the first phase with the other satellites. That is recognition, when we are considering the second stage with Italy. Attlee : The Soviets’ suggestion was not constitutionally possible for us. Stalin : Say, then, that you will consider the establishment of complete or partial relations. Attlee : I don’t think that the suggestion will meet the case. Stalin : Take the American proposal. Say “examine” instead of “consider.” You will help yourselves with the satellite countries. Bevin : But I must be perfectly straight with the House of Commons. I do not quote things in words of doubtful meaning. I will take the last suggestion of the American delegation and leave the whole matter to later consideration. Truman : We now pass to Italian reparations. I stated that we found it necessary to go with the British government to contribute five hundred million dollars to the feeding of Italy. It will probably require that much more to get them through the winter. The United States does not intend to contribute money to pay reparations. War equipment may be transferred but we want it understood that our contribution to feed Italy is the first lien on her supportable surplus. That is all I have to say. Stalin : We can agree not to exact reparations from Austria which had no separate army, but Italy sent her army to devastate our country. Truman : We don’t object to reparations, but we are not going to send the money to pay them. Stalin : I understand the point of view of the President but I want him to understand mine. What gives the Soviet the moral right to reparations is the occupation and devastation of her land by Italy. Truman : I am in entire sympathy with the Russian point of view. Stalin : The President says war equipment may be used for reparations. I do not ask much. It will be necessary to find what sum this equipment would come to. Hungary or [ and? ] Finland, [and?] Rumania agreed to pay 300 million dollars. I want to know the sum the Italian equipment represents. Bevin : This would not come out of what the American and British people have delivered to Italy. Stalin : I don’t want to ignore the interest of America. Attlee : I agree with the President. I have sympathy with Russia’s suffering. We have also suffered from Italy. You can imagine how our people would feel if having suffered at the hands of them, they felt they had to assist Italy to pay reparations. Stalin : We quite agree to accept equipment as reparations. Attlee : That would be once and for all, removal of war plants but not levy on the product. May I ask is this equipment military equipment, not peacetime? 3 Stalin : Have you in view the equipment of military nature which could be used for any purpose? Attlee : I was suggesting machinery that has no peacetime utility. Stalin : War equipment can be adjusted for peacetime production. There is no equipment which has no peacetime utility. Ammunition plants are producing motor cars, etc. Bevin : It is so difficult to define what you can take away without affecting the economic life of a nation. Stalin : We want recognition of the principle. Truman : I think I understand that the Marshal wants the recognition of the principle. Stalin : I agree that the amount should be reduced. Truman : We are concerned about our advances to keep Italy going. Bevin : Does that not resolve itself into the question of priorities? First claim is for advances, then reparations. Stalin : We can’t let the aggressors inflict damage without holding them responsible for some compensation. Truman : I agree with that. Stalin : England should not forget that they fared very badly at the hands of Italy. Attlee : I do not understand whether [ when? ] we should meet in plenary session. Truman : Since foreign secretaries are not meeting tomorrow let us meet at 4:00 p.m. Adjourned. 1 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra , and to the minutes of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers on July 25 and 27, ante , pp. 397–399 [ Pgs. 397–399 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] and 425–435 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , respectively. 2 The foregoing remarks are attributed to Molotov in the Thompson minutes, ante , p. 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] . 3 This question is attributed to Bevin in the Thompson minutes, ante , p. 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] . Truman–Molotov meeting, noon Truman–Molotov meeting, noon 1 1 The meeting took place at Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg. The Bohlen minutes give the time as 12 noon. The Log ( ante , p. 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) indicates that Molotov and Golunsky arrived at 11:30 a.m. Present United States Soviet Union President Truman Foreign Commissar Molotov Secretary Byrnes Mr. Golunsky Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Bohlen [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)]] Bohlen Minutes Potsdam, July 29, 1945, noon Truman Papers Bohlen Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] Bohlen Minutes Potsdam, July 29, 1945, noon top secret Mr. Molotov said that Marshal Stalin had caught cold and that his doctors would not let him leave his house. Therefore, he asked that the President excuse him for not coming to the agreed meeting and it would also be impossible for the Marshal to have a meeting this afternoon. 2 After a suitable expression of regret at the Marshal’s indisposition, etc., The President said he would ask Mr. Byrnes to take up the points he had had in mind to discuss with Marshal Stalin. The Secretary said that there were two principal questions, in his opinion, which remained outstanding and if they could reach a decision on those it would be possible to consider winding up the Conference. These questions were: 1. The Polish western boundary. 2. German reparations. The Secretary said that if we were able to get an agreement on reparations along the lines of his proposals to Mr. Molotov that the United States was prepared to go further to meet the Soviet wishes in regard to the Polish western frontier and would make the following proposal in that regard. (He handed Mr. Molotov a copy of the proposed United States suggestion with regard to the Polish western frontier, copy attached 3 ). After it had been translated, Mr. Molotov said that this would not put under Polish administration the area between the Eastern and Western Neisse. He said the Poles were most insistent upon receiving this and he recalled that Mr. Mikołajczyk had made a most convincing and definite argument before the three Foreign Ministers as to the vital importance of this area for Poland. 4 The Secretary pointed out that this was true, but that since the final determination of the boundary would await the peace settlement, it did not follow that Poland might not receive this additional area if the peace conference so desired. He then said that as the President had frequently remarked, it had been agreed at Yalta and elsewhere that there would be four occupying powers in Germany, but that we now had a situation when there was in fact a fifth—Poland—which had been assumed without consultation or agreement with the United States, French, or British Governments. 5 Mr. Molotov replied that this was no one’s fault; it was an extraordinary condition, since all Germans had fled the region. The President then remarked that he had thought that this suggestion would be agreeable to the Soviet Delegation, since in his opinion it represented a very large concession on our part and he hoped Mr. Molotov would submit it to Marshal Stalin. Mr. Molotov replied that he would, of course, do so but he thought he could say here that Marshal Stalin was most insistent that this region as well should be placed under Polish administration. The Secretary pointed out that for the purpose of the occupation of Germany we had, of course, thought that all of this area would be the responsibility of the Soviet occupying forces. Mr. Molotov replied that even though the Poles were administering this, Soviet troops were still in the area. He repeated, however, that he would submit the proposal to Marshal Stalin. The Secretary then inquired whether Mr. Molotov had had an opportunity to really think about his proposal in regard to reparations, namely, that each country look to its own zone for reparations and then exchange reparations between zones. Mr. Molotov said that the Secretary’s proposal was acceptable in principle but that the Soviet Delegation would like to have clarity on certain points, in particular, the amount of equipment which would be turned over from the Ruhr to the Soviet Union. He said they had spoken of equipment to the amount of two billion dollars or five or six million tons. 6 (Mr. Molotov did not specify exactly what he meant by five or six million tons, whether productive capacity or actual weight of equipment). The Secretary explained that our experts felt that it was impossible to put any specific dollar value or tonnage on the equipment which would be available for reparations from the Ruhr, but that our proposal was to offer the Soviet Union 25% of the total equipment considered as available for reparations from the Ruhr. Mr. Molotov said that 25% of an undetermined figure meant very little and that they wished to have a fixed sum or quantity agreed upon. The Secretary replied that at Yalta Mr. Maisky, who was the only one who would mention figures, had suggested in his proposal a total of twenty billion for reparations from Germany, of which ten billion would go to the Soviet Union. 7 He said that from further study and the discussions here it had been made clear that these figures had no relation to reality and that this was a very good illustration of the danger of attempting to fix sums prematurely. He added that if we were to do that now, in the absence of sufficient data, six months from now if the figure turned out to be incorrect the Soviet Government might charge we were going back on the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference. There was further discussion on this point, with Molotov maintaining his position that some fixed sum be set otherwise the percentage would be meaningless, and The Secretary maintaining from our point of view that it would be impossible to give any fixed figure. There was an extended discussion as to the Soviet share of reparations, with the Secretary maintaining that according to our calculations 50% of the national wealth of Germany lay in the Soviet zone, and with Mr. Molotov stating that according to their calculations only 42% lay in the Soviet zone. Mr. Molotov said that under their figures the Russians would be entitled to obtain some reparations from the British, American and French zones in order to complete the 50%. The Secretary said that in his opinion percentage figures fixed at Yalta were no more agreed to except as a basis of discussion than had been the actual amounts of reparations. 8 The President stated that what they were trying to do here was to fix a workable plan for reparations and that he desired to see the Soviet Union receive 50% of the total. Mr. Molotov expressed his appreciation at the President’s statement. The Secretary reviewed his argument in favor of his proposal, pointing out that it would do away with almost certain points of friction in the future. Mr. Molotov inquired whether we still intended to have some central German administration, not a government, but some central organization through which the Control Council could operate in matters affecting finance, transport, foreign trade, etc. on which it had been agreed to treat Germany as an economic whole. He pointed out that if reparations were not treated as a whole, what would happen to overall treatment of economic matters. The Secretary pointed out that under his scheme nothing was changed in regard to overall treatment of German finance, transport, foreign trade, etc. The Secretary subsequently repeated this statement in reply to a further observation of Mr. Molotov that the reparation proposal would affect the overall economic administration of Germany. The Secretary then said there was one other subject he had forgotten to mention, namely, that of the division of the German navy and merchant fleet. The President stated that in his opinion they had reached agreement on that, namely, that Russia was to get one-third of the navy now and that the merchant fleet was to be utilized in the war against Japan, with one-third earmarked for the Soviet Union. The Secretary thought it would be well to embody that agreement in writing and suggested the formation of a sub-committee for that purpose. He added that part of the agreement had been Mr. Churchill’s suggestion that a large part of the submarines be destroyed. 9 Mr. Molotov said what they desired was one-third of the navy and one-third of the merchant fleet. He said that the Soviet Union was also interested in shipping for the Far Eastern war and that, of course, they would be used for that purpose. The President said it was his understanding that the merchant fleet should be used for the prosecution of the war against Japan. The Secretary said that the Russian portion should be earmarked and used in the Pacific. Mr. Molotov repeated that the Soviet Union would use these ships in the Pacific. The Secretary said in addition to that question, it would be important to clarify the question of replacement. For example, if the Soviets did use them in the war and they were sunk, it would be necessary to consider the question of their replacement. Reverting to the subject of reparations, Mr. Molotov said he wished to have the Secretary’s proposal clearly in mind; as he understood it the Soviet Union would look to its own zone for a fixed amount of reparations and would receive as reparations 25% of the equipment from the Ruhr available for reparations. The Secretary replied that this was not quite accurate, since in the first place the Soviet Union would take what it wished from its zone, and second, the 25% to go to the Soviet Union from the Ruhr would be exchanged for food, coal and other products needed in western Germany from the Soviet zone. Mr. Molotov said they [ the United States? ] had understood that all the equipment which the Soviets might receive from the Ruhr would have to be balanced off by exports from the Soviet zone. He said he had understood that only part would be so covered and that in any event it was a matter for discussion as to how much and what the Soviet zone could offer in return. The Secretary added that there had been another possibility, namely, instead of 25% from the Ruhr alone, the Soviets could receive 12½% of equipment available for reparations from the French, British and American zones taken together. Mr. Molotov returned to the question of a fixed sum and inquired whether the Secretary could give him even a rough estimate of what we thought might be available to the Soviet Union. The Secretary repeated that he was unable to do this[—]that all our experts agreed that it was impossible to place any value on the equipment available for reparations for the following reason[s]: 1. It was difficult to agree on a standing valuation to be placed on the equipment; and, 2. The Soviets would undoubtedly have preferences as to the type of machinery which would affect the valuation. Mr. Molotov replied that they were interested in heavy metallurgical machinery, machine-building and chemical installations. He added that they had proposed using 1938 prices. The Secretary answered that our experts thought it was impossible at this stage to fix any value; it would require long study on the spot and therefore we preferred the percentage basis. During the course of this discussion the Secretary remarked that at Yalta at one point Mr. Maisky had suggested ten billion in reparations for the United States 10 and that our experts considered that there were only three or four billion dollars in all of possible reparations in western Germany. 11 What, therefore, would Mr. Molotov say if we should ask for an additional six billion from the Soviet zone to make up the figure mentioned by Mr. Maisky. The Secretary added that he was merely citing this illustration to show the danger in agreement on any fixed sum. Mr. Molotov said that in conclusion he had one other matter that the Marshal wished him to take up and that was the immediate cause of the Soviet entry into the Far Eastern war. He said that the Soviet Government considered that the best method would be for the United States, England and the other allies in the Far Eastern war to address a formal request to the Soviet Government for its entry into the war. He said that this could be based on the refusal of the Japanese 12 to accept the recent ultimatum to surrender 13 and made on the basis of shortening the war and saving of lives. He added, of course, that the Soviet Government was assuming that the agreement with the Chinese 14 would be signed before the Soviet Union entered the war. The President said that he would, of course, examine carefully this Soviet request. 15 2 Cf. the following memorandum of July 29 from Walter J. Brown to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2945): “Tonight at 11:22 Pavlov called and asked that the following message be transmitted to the President: “‘Generalissimo Stalin will not be able to go out tomorrow but he has expressed the view that the meeting of the Big Three should continue. Generalissimo Stalin feels that Mr. Molotov can fully replace him at these meetings.’” Resumption of plenary meetings, however, awaited Stalin’s recovery. On July 30 Truman wrote the following longhand note to Stalin (no copy was retained; the text below is reprinted from Stalin ’s Correspondence , vol. ii , p. 257): “I regret very much to hear of your illness. I hope it is not of a serious nature and that you will fully recover at an early date. “You have my very best wishes.” Stalin replied as follows later on July 30 (translation in the Truman Papers): “I thank you for your letter of July 30. I feel better today and tomorrow, July 31, I count on taking part in the Conference.” 3 Document No. 1151 , post . 4 See ante , pp. 334–335 [ Pgs. 334–335 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] ] . 5 See ante , pp. 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 6 See ante , pp. 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 450–451 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] . 7 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 702 , 707 , 809 . 8 See document No. 1416 , post , section v . 9 See ante , pp. 118–122 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 10 The only specific Soviet suggestion at the Yalta Conference as to the amount of reparations which the United States might receive from Germany which appears in the United States records of that Conference is the Soviet proposal of February 7, 1945, suggesting that 8 billion dollars in reparations be allocated to the United States and the United Kingdom together. See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 707 . In the discussion of this proposal at Yalta, however, Molotov indicated that the amount of reparations for the United States and Great Britain was entirely the concern of those countries. See ibid. , p. 703 . 11 No written estimate to this effect was found in the United States records of the Yalta Conference. Cf. document No. 941 , post . 12 See document No. 1258 , post . 13 Document No. 1382 , post . 14 See vol. i , p. 857 . 15 For Truman’s response to this request, see document No. 1282 , post . Truman–Attlee meeting, 4:30 p.m. Truman–Attlee meeting, 4:30 p.m. 1 1 The meeting was held at Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg. Information as to time and participants from the Log, ante , pp. 22–23 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Present United States United Kingdom President Truman Prime Minister Attlee Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Bevin Sir Alexander Cadogan [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Truman states in Year of Decisions , page 402, that at this meeting the British participants were informed of the suggestion made by Molotov earlier in the day (see ante , page 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] ) concerning a formal request to the Soviet Government to enter the war against Japan. Forrestal–Bevin conversation Forrestal–Bevin conversation Present United States United Kingdom Mr. Forrestal Foreign Secretary Bevin [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Forrestal’s diary entry for July 29 gives the following summary (Forrestal Papers): “From there went to see Ernest Bevin and found Bevin in very good form. He said in answer to my question that the only industries they proposed to nationalize were power, railroads, mines, and textiles up to the spinning mills. He indicated he had no use for Laski. He spoke highly and appreciatively of Anthony Eden. He said he was quite familiar with tactics of the Communists because he had had to deal with them in his own labor unions in England. “I asked him a question about the Emperor in Japan, whether he thought we ought to insist on destruction of the Emperor concept along with the surrender. He hesitated and said this question would require a bit of thinking, but he was inclined to feel there was no sense in destroying the instrument through which one might have to deal in order to effectively control Japan. He then made a rather surprising statement—for a liberal and a labor leader: ‘It might have been far better for all of us not to have destroyed the institution of the Kaiser after the last war—we might not have had this one if we hadn’t done so. It might have been far better to have guided the Germans to a constitutional monarchy rather than leaving them without a symbol and therefore opening the psychological doors to a man like Hitler.’ “He said he was determined to get going what he called the three historic axes of European trade—the Baltic axis, that is to say, the old Hanseatic League; the Antwerp axis, and the Genoa axis. He said these three were the classic foci of European trade for hundreds of years back, that if they could be restored to activity, it would do much to bring about revival of commerce in Europe. “I asked him how he was going to deal with Southeastern Europe, that is, the Balkans, which would be under the control of Russia, and he said he didn’t think the Balkans amounted to much in the way of business. I differed with this.” Despres–Minc conversation Despres–Minc conversation Present United States Poland Mr. Despres Mr. Minc Mr. Rajchman 1 1 Rajchman acted as interpreter. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)]] Memorandum by the Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres) [Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2945 Memorandum by the Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2945 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] Memorandum by the Adviser on German Economic Affairs ( Despres ) 2 [ Babelsberg ,] July 29, 1945. Memorandum of Conversation I conveyed to Mr. Minc Mr. Clayton’s regret that he was unable to accept the Minister’s invitation to visit the Silesian coal fields, explaining that Mr. Clayton was heavily engaged with other matters as the conference drew toward a close. I then told Mr. Minc that we thought it would be useful for him to talk to the American military authorities in Berlin, who were now transporting coal from the Ruhr to meet their share of Berlin’s requirements; in order to explore the possibility of drawing upon Silesian coal instead, and I said that, subject to his acceptance of the invitation, we had arranged an appointment for him with Maj. General Echols. Mr. Minc replied that he would consult the other members of his Government and let me know. (He subsequently accepted, and a meeting with General Echols took place the following morning. 3 ) I then outlined the scope of functions of EECE, ECO and the projected Inland Transport Organization and expressed the hope that the Polish Government would acquaint itself with these organizations with a view to active participation in their work. Mr. Minc asked a number of questions regarding the functions, activities to date and membership of these organizations and said that he would look into the matter further. Mr. Minc then stated that he was most eager to acquaint the United States Government as fully as possible with the present economic position and needs of Poland, in order to enable us to consider against a background of knowledge their requests for imports and for credits. He asked how this might best be accomplished. I said that we proposed to attach a well-qualified economic man to Ambassador Lane’s staff, and that we hoped that the Polish Government would extend to such man the fullest opportunities for familiarizing himself with the situation. I suggested that it would also be useful for the Polish Government to send a small number of well-qualified people to Washington for financial and supply matters. Mr. Minc expressed the personal view that it would be most desirable if the United States Government could send a special survey mission to Poland which would spend a couple of months there and then return to Washington and report. I suggested that before extending any formal invitation along these lines, it would be well to discuss this matter informally with Ambassador Lane. After my conversation with Minc had been completed, Dr. Rajchman furnished the following bits of information: (1) It is a criminal offense for a Russian commander to allow any freight cars to move eastward empty. Large amounts of supplies are seen passing through Poland, including numbers of German livestock. (2) Dr. Rajchman believes that the Russians have adopted a three-year program of removals from their zone of occupation. They have set a physiological minimum standard of living for the German population and plan to leave only enough resources to support this minimum. (3) For a time the Russians carried out removals from the territory newly transferred to the Polish administration, but under an agreement with the Polish Government these removals were discontinued on a specified date. (4) The Red Army is having considerable difficulty in effecting the redeployment of their forces from Germany. They are believed to have had 12 million men on the whole Eastern Front. There are a number of roving bands of Red Army troops (AWOL). They are shot when caught, but drastic punishment has not solved the problem. (5) Except for Warsaw, which has been far more thoroughly demolished than Berlin, material damage in Poland has not been serious. Loss of life is estimated at 5,500,000, over half Jews. 2 Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. 3 See post , p. 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] . Conversation between members of the United States and Polish Delegations Conversation between members of the United States and Polish Delegations 1 1 It is not known definitely who participated in this conversation, although it appears from Despres’ memorandum of his conversation with Minc on July 29 ( ante , p. 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] ) that Major General Echols was one of the participants for the United States. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] Editor’s Note —No United States record of this conversation has been found. For Mikołajczyk’s diary entry concerning the conversation, see document No. 1392 , post . Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 4:30 p.m. Byrnes–Molotov meeting, 4:30 p.m. Present United States Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Bohlen Mr. Pavlov [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)]] Bohlen Minutes Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 4:30 p.m. Truman Papers Bohlen Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] Bohlen Minutes Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 4:30 p.m. top secret The Secretary said he wanted to talk to Mr. Molotov on two or three questions of importance still open before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting this afternoon. He said, first of all, he wished to tell Mr. Molotov that in regard to the Polish western frontier, we were prepared as a concession to meet the Soviet desire and he, therefore, had a revised paper on this subject (copy attached). 1 He pointed out that this would put Polish administration up to the western as against the eastern Neisse. Mr. Molotov expressed his gratification at this proposal. The Secretary then said the next question was Italy and the entry of Italy into the United Nations. He had again been endeavoring to find a compromise between his British and Soviet friends. He proposed a new sentence at the end of the third paragraph and a new paragraph regarding freedom of the allied press to report on events in Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland (copy attached). 2 Mr. Molotov , after hearing a translation of these changes, said while he could not say finally he believed that they would be acceptable to the Soviet Delegation. The Secretary then said we come to the most difficult of all the questions, namely, that of reparations. He said that he had a new proposal to make and handed Mr. Molotov the revised United States formula (copy attached). 3 He emphasized that this was a United States proposal and that he had not yet consulted the British, adding that if they could reach agreement here on this question he would go to see the British this afternoon and endeavor to persuade them to agree. Mr. Molotov studied the new proposals and then asked who was to determine what equipment was suitable for reparations. The Secretary replied that he thought since the Ruhr lay in the British zone that that would be for the British to determine on the basis of what must be left there in order to maintain the minimum required standard of living. Mr. Molotov said he thought that determination of reparation materials should be done on an Allied basis in which the Soviets would participate. He suggested that it either be the Control Council or the Reparations Commission. The Secretary said that that was a possibility and should be studied. He said the Control Council operating for all Germany could determine the general norms of living standards, but that the final authority would probably remain in the commander-in-chief of the given zone, since he was responsible for that zone. Mr. Molotov remarked that the Secretary’s draft did not mention any possibility of the Control Council or the Reparations Commission determining what equipment was available for reparations. Mr. Molotov then proposed that instead of the 12% [ 15%? ] of reparations to be received without exchange 4 that that figure be raised to 25%, thus making 25% from the Ruhr to be exchanged and 25% without exchange to the Soviet Union. The Secretary said he doubted if the British would agree to any such figure. He felt that it would be difficult enough to get them to agree to his proposal. Mr. Molotov then reverted to his argument of yesterday 5 and to the necessity of having a fixed figure either in dollars or in pounds. He repeated all his arguments on this point. The Secretary replied for his part, giving the arguments as to why it was impossible and dangerous for us to attempt to fix a definite figure either for tonnage or for dollar value at this time. Mr. Molotov said he could only give a preliminary opinion and would, of course, have to consult Marshal Stalin. He said he thought the three points of difficulty would be: (1) who was to determine reparations equipment, (2) the absence of a fixed sum, and (3) the question of deliveries from the Soviet zone. He said that before meeting Mr. Byrnes today they had prepared a counter suggestion and he handed the Secretary a copy in Russian (copy in translation attached). 6 He then said he wished to talk about the Ruhr, that he felt that in confining the removals for the Soviet Union to the Ruhr area it narrowed the base, since there was industrial equipment in the United States zone as well. The Secretary explained that the United States from its zone would have to help meet claims from other countries, such as France, Holland, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and others. He said that under his scheme the Soviet Union would be responsible for reparations to Poland, but that the reparations for other countries would come from the western zones. Mr. Molotov said that despite the difference still existing he felt that some progress had been made in this question of reparations and he would so report to Marshal Stalin. He then said they had a proposal in regard to the question of the Ruhr as a whole. He recalled that there had been much discussion at previous conferences in regard to the internationalization of the Ruhr, but he said that nothing lately had been heard of it. The Secretary reminded Mr. Molotov that at one time President Roosevelt had been in favor of the dismemberment of Germany but had subsequently changed his mind. He recalled Marshal Stalin’s talks with Mr. Hopkins last spring on this point. 7 Mr. Molotov agreed and said that the paper he was now handing to the Secretary merely dealt with the setup of an Allied Commission composed of the four occupying powers to administer the Ruhr under the general direction of the Control Council (copy attached). 8 Mr. Molotov said he had two other papers to hand the Secretary: one in regard to Italian and Austrian reparations based on the discussions of the Big Three, and the other, concerning war criminals which listed the first ten of such war criminals which were to be brought to trial in the near future. 9 (Copies attached). The Secretary remarked that he had understood that Marshal Stalin had agreed to drop reparations from Austria. 10 Mr. Molotov replied they might be prepared to withdraw the reference to Austria but that the Yugoslavs would be offended, adding however, that if Yugoslavia received reparations from other sources she might be satisfied. The Secretary , in conclusion, said he wished to emphasize once again that these proposals were United States proposals and had not yet received British consent. 1 Document No. 1152 , post . 2 Document No. 731 , post . 3 Document No. 961 , post . 4 Fifteen percent is the figure in document No. 961 , which was attached to these minutes as the paper under discussion. 5 See ante , p. 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] . 6 Not attached to the minutes, and not positively identified. Cf. document No. 953 , post . 7 See vol. i , document No. 26 . 8 Document No. 1027 , post . 9 Documents Nos. 1104 and 1016 , post , respectively. 10 See ante , p. 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] . Tenth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 5 p.m. Tenth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 5 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Bevin Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gromyko Mr. Clayton Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Vyshansky Mr. Page Major Theakstone Mr. Gusev [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)]] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)]] Rapporteur’s Report [Babelsberg,] 31st July, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 Department of State Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m. top secret Mr. Bevin in the chair. Mr. Bevin suggested that the following questions might be disposed of: 1. The invitation to the Governments of France and China to participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers. 2. Notification to the French Government of the decision on political principles with respect to Germany. 3. Reparations from Germany, Austria and Italy. 4. Disposition of the German fleet and merchant navy. 5. Political principles in the first stage of the control period in Germany—additional points. 6. Yugoslavia. 7. War crimes. Mr. Byrnes proposed that they consider the question of German external assets and submitted a paper on this question. 1 He pointed out that there were also several matters referred to sub-committees upon which reports had not yet been received. Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had circulated a memorandum on German troops in Norway 2 which should be placed on the agenda today. The Soviet Delegation was circulating a memorandum on the question of fascist activities in Austria and Germany 3 and another memorandum on the question of the Ruhr area. 4 He also suggested that they discuss the agenda for the Big Three meeting. 1. Invitation to the Governments of France and China To Participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers Mr. Bevin proposed that they today send a telegram to the French and Chinese Governments on this question. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that it was understood that the message would be delivered 48 hours before adjournment. 5 He agreed to its being sent now. Mr . [ Sir Alexander ] Cadogan said that the sub-committee had agreed on a text but that the Foreign Ministers’ meeting had not considered it. In the final paragraph referring to the dissolution of the EAC he suggested the words “the three governments” rather than the words “the conference.” This was agreed to as well as the despatch of the telegram to the Governments of France and China. 6 2. Notification to the French Government of the Decision in Respect to Political Principles for Germany It was agreed without discussion to notify the French Government of the decision taken on this matter. 7 3. Reparations From Germany, Austria and Italy Mr. Bevin said they should have a clear understanding of what they had decided on this matter. Mr. Molotov said he had submitted a draft of the Soviet proposals. 8 Mr. Byrnes said he would like to submit for consideration a proposal involving three matters: (1) On the subject of reparations, he wished to read a proposal which he had made to the British and Soviet Delegations. (Mr. Byrnes then read the American paper on this subject 9 ). He wished to add that they had discussed the question of Italian and Austrian reparations on several occasions. The position of the President had been made clear in the meetings of the Big Three 10 and he thought it would not be helpful to discuss it further at the present meeting. The agreement which he now proposed on reparations was conditional upon agreement on two other proposals which he would read now because they must be considered together. (2) The approval of the paper on the admission into the United Nations of Italy and the question of relations with the other satellite states. He proposed two amendments to the document on this question in an attempt to compromise the differences between the Soviet and British Delegations. 11 (3) Mr. Byrnes said that this concerned the question of the western frontier of Poland on which he had already presented a paper to the British and Soviet Delegations. 12 The proposal would permit the administration by the Poles of the area which they claimed pending the final determination of the disposition of this area. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this proposal represented a sacrifice of the views held and expressed by the United States Delegation on this question. It was made in a spirit of compromise and that if agreement could be reached on these three proposals he would be satisfied. If not, he was willing to report to the Big Three and they could decide whether to continue the discussion or refer the matter to some future conference. He pointed out that on the settlement of these questions rested the settlement of several other matters, such as that concerning the economic principles for Germany. Mr. Cadogan said he had submitted a paper on the question of reparations to the Soviet and United States Delegations. 13 (A translator read the document in Russian translation). Mr. Bevin pointed out that this proposal was connected with the next document which he would present. 14 Mr. Molotov pointed out that under the British proposal the Soviets would receive 10% from the western zone. Under the American proposal they would receive 25% against payment and 15% without payment. Mr. Bevin pointed out that this was from the Ruhr, whereas the British 10% was from the whole western zone. They had not received the American paper when their proposals were made. He inquired which Mr. Molotov liked best. Mr. Molotov observed that the American draft provided for 25% reparations to be taken in exchange for other goods. Mr. Bevin said the British had in mind the economic principles drawn up for Germany as a whole. They were prepared to treat the supply of goods in Germany separately. He was concerned that the exchange proposed might lead to disputes. It would be difficult to exchange potatoes for chemical machinery. He was hoping that they could get an agreement for supplies over the whole of Germany and treat reparations separately. The question as to how supplies would be paid for by exports was dealt with in a separate paper. The difference between the United States and British approach was one of method. In order that the question could be examined in the full knowledge of their ideas on the subject, he proposed to read his second paper 15 which he pointed out was linked to the first. (The translator then read in Russian translation the British paper on the question of supplies in Germany). Mr. Bevin pointed out that the paper on economic principles 16 should also be considered in this connection. (The translator read in Russian the paper on this subject). Mr. Molotov said he felt the proposals made by Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin contained a number of elements that could be taken to formulate general principles, but they required amendment and some additions. He had only just read Mr. Bevin’s proposal and would have to study it. It seemed to contain a number of points on which agreement could be reached. Mr. Byrnes’ proposals appeared to raise these questions in a more simple manner. The substance of the views of the Soviet Government were the following. The Soviet Union was anxious to receive German equipment to replace destroyed factories. He felt that the proposals of Mr. Byrnes were closer to their wishes on this. The principal question of interest to the Soviet Delegation, however, remained obscure in both proposals. They both spoke of percentages but of an unknown figure. He proposed an amendment to Mr. Byrnes’ proposal to the effect that the 25% mentioned in the Byrnes draft should be not less than 800 million dollars or two million tons of equipment. The Soviet Delegation was anxious to know what minimum was contemplated. They would, of course, prefer to speak not only of the Ruhr but of the western zones. The question could be settled if they would accept the figures given. Mr. Byrnes said as he had stated before he realized the Soviet desire for an estimate in dollars but it was impossible for us to make an estimate as we had no information as to the amount of equipment that would be available for the payment of reparations. The same applied to an estimate in tons. The amount available for reparations was dependent upon the amount necessary to maintain the economy. With respect to the dollar value it was also the question of what the value was today. The United States representatives on the Reparations Commission 17 as well as other experts did not agree on an estimate of what was available either in dollars or in tons. Our Soviet friends must accept our statement that the economy would be maintained in accordance with the decision to maintain German economy on a uniform basis. The statement on percentages was all they should say now, if they were to avoid quarrels in the future. As an example, he asked whether the two million tons referred to the weight of the equipment or the capacity. Mr. Molotov replied weight of equipment. Mr. Byrnes asked if Mr. Molotov did not think that when our experts disagree his proposal would cause all kinds of misunderstandings. They were going to trust each other on matters of much greater importance than this. When we said 40% of the equipment over and above what was necessary to maintain the economy, he must take this on good faith. Our British friends did not agree on the percentage and he spoke only of his own proposal. He was not wedded to any particular plan but thought our proposal more specific and simpler and that it would avoid misunderstandings. Mr. Bevin pointed out that in the British proposal the 10% referred to the plants that it would be agreed would be available. Mr. Byrnes urged that [the] advantage to an agreement of this kind was that the determination of what was available in the Soviet zone would concern neither the British, French nor United States and they would not, therefore, be interfering in that determination. Mr. Molotov said he felt Mr. Byrnes’ proposal was in the main acceptable but he would like some indication of the minimum amount. He repeated, however, it was better to speak of the western zone and not the Ruhr. Mr. Byrnes added that when agreement was reached on the percentage of the equipment to come from the Ruhr, the United States would have to agree with their British friends on the amount of machinery necessary to come from the American zone so as fairly to compensate the British and to take care of the claims of France, Belgium and Holland. He confined his percentages to the Ruhr because it was simpler and in order to prevent a situation in which there would be competing claimants. We would have to settle this ourselves. Mr. Bevin said he was not in a position to state a figure because he did not know what it could be. He did not suppose that Great Britain would receive very much. Mr. Molotov inquired who would determine what equipment would be made available in the western zone. Mr. Bevin said the zone commander. Mr. Molotov suggested adding “and the Control Council.” Mr. Bevin agreed that the Control Council should be added. Mr. Byrnes said that the thought of the United States Delegation was that the Control Council should determine the matter but subject to the final determination of the zone commander. Mr. Molotov suggested that this should be included in the text proposed by Mr. Byrnes. Mr. Bevin said that the question of the ascertainment of the material to be removed would be subject to investigation by the Control Council but that the zone commander should have the right of veto at the time of the decision. Mr. Byrnes agreed that in case of dispute the commander of the zone would have to make the decision. Mr. Molotov suggested that the Control Council should have final decision. Mr. Byrnes disagreed, saying the commander in our zones and in the Soviet zone was the one who was charged with the maintaining of the economy and who had to have the final decision. Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation could not conceive of a decision which did not contain minimum figures and he thought the matter should be referred to the Big Three. On the question of who was to determine the equipment available he suggested the Control Commission or the Reparations Commission so that the Russians could take part in the matter. Mr. Byrnes repeated that he could not agree to take away the right of veto from the commander of the zone. Mr. Molotov repeated who was to formulate the general program. Mr. Bevin replied that it should be the Reparations Commission with the French added, which would work in association with the Control Council. Mr. Molotov asked that this be placed in the record. Mr. Byrnes replied that so long as the commander had the right of veto he thought he could agree. 18 Mr. Molotov asked if they could accept as a basis for discussion the draft of Mr. Byrnes. Mr. Bevin said he was sorry he could not, as he would have to defend at home the whole of this equipment being taken out of the British zone. Mr. Molotov proposed that they take both zones as the basis. Mr. Byrnes replied there was no objection if the percentage was changed. In each case the percentage mentioned would have to be halved; in place of 25% it would be 12½% and in place of 15% it would be 7½%. Mr. Molotov said this would mean reducing the figure too much. Mr. Bevin said he had been working on the British figure of 10% which he thought was very high. Mr. Molotov said the Soviets were the ones most interested in receiving equipment. A large figure had been discussed at Yalta. Mr. Byrnes said that if they could agree to designate the Ruhr and if we and the British could reach agreement, then the percentages in the American proposal were all right. If the Soviets now wanted to fix a percentage covering the two zones, it would mean simply cutting the figures in half. The Soviets would be getting 20% of the equipment in both zones. If that were done, it would be well to emphasize the Ruhr in the document because he understood that most of the equipment the Soviets wanted was there. Mr. Molotov said the Soviet proposal was 25% of reparations by way of exchange and 25% without payment. They had in mind chiefly the Ruhr[.] Mr. Byrnes suggested that the United States and the British reach an agreement now to make an adjustment between them and added that this could be put into the protocol. Mr. Bevin said he would rather say 12½% in exchange for other goods and 7½% without exchange. That would save him from political trouble and he added that he had the French and other claimants to think of. Mr. Molotov said he was prepared to accept 20% with exchange and 25% without exchange from both zones and have it stated that they had in mind chiefly the Ruhr. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that Mr. Bevin’s proposal gave the Soviets the same amount as did his proposal. He referred again to the proposal with regard to the Polish frontier 19 which involved a greater concession on our part than this one from the Soviets. The paper referring to the United Nations 20 involved a concession on the part of our British friends. He knew it was a concession for the Soviets to agree to percentages but if we made concessions, the Soviets should also. Mr. Molotov said it was a concession to Poland and not to them. Mr. Byrnes said he had heard his friend, Mr. Molotov, make a plea on this matter when the Poles were present and he had made a more eloquent plea than the Poles. 21 Mr. Molotov said they had received territory from the Poles 22 and were obliged to hold to their position with respect to the western frontier of Poland. Mr. Bevin said the British had not agreed to the American proposal on this matter 23 and he thought it was a very good offer that was being made to the Soviets. Mr. Molotov disagreed and said that they would be left with very little equipment as reparations in spite of the fact that the Germans had destroyed Soviet industries. They needed agricultural machinery and [means?] to rehabilitate their railroads. He asked if they could accept a suggestion of 25% from the Ruhr and 15% from the two zones, but added that what was important was the total figure. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this proposal was equivalent to 55% from the Ruhr instead of 40%. He inquired if Mr. Molotov was in a position to make a final disposition today of the three questions involved in his proposal. Mr. Molotov thought it should be referred to the Big Three and that the main question was that of an absolute figure. Mr. Bevin said that it should be quite plain that the British could not agree to an absolute figure. They would not know what would remain for their other allies. Mr. Molotov replied that since the Soviets would receive only a percentage the balance would remain. Mr. Bevin raised the question of imports being a fixed [ first? ] charge on exports. 24 Mr. Molotov thought that the sentence on this should be supplemented by the words “to the extent to which these exports will be approved by the Control Commission, and as regards the extent of these imports not agreed by the Control Commission, priority will be given to reparations,” or it might be more simple if stated “as regards the rest, priorities should be given to reparations as compared with the satisfaction of other economic needs.” Mr. Molotov repeated a previous example he had given with respect to coal. 25 If the Control Commission decided that 500,000 tons of coal should be exported, but one member proposed an additional 200,000, the 500,000 would have priority over reparations. With respect to the remaining 200,000 priority would be given to reparations. Mr. Bevin inquired what would happen if his own Commander bought wheat and had to export coal to pay for it. Suppose in this case approval for the export of this coal was not given and he was faced with almost starvation in the zone. Would reparations take precedence in the face of a breakdown in the whole administration. Mr. Molotov replied that it must be assumed that all parties were interested in a certain volume of exports. He wished to give another example. Suppose it were planned to arrange for the production of two million tons but only one and one-half million tons were produced. There was no certainty that production could be carried out and it was not possible definitely to fix a figure but 90 percent or 80 percent agreement could be reached. He had made another proposal which would cover such a case. 26 If there were a shortage of certain resources, exports and imports should be equally curtailed as well as internal consumption. If they produced 10 percent less coal, then they should plan to reduce by the same percentage imports, reparations, and internal consumption. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that in the early days of the Conference it became evident that it would be difficult for the Soviet delegation to reach agreement with the British and ourselves. One of the reasons he had proposed the plan discussed this afternoon was to avoid such situations and disputes arising. If the Soviets agreed to his plan they would have no interest in exports and imports from our zone. Any difficulty in regard to imports and exports would have to be settled between the British and ourselves. The Soviets would have no interest and they would get their percentage regardless of what happened to us. Mr. Molotov said that if they could fix a definite figure for reparations this could be arranged. Mr. Bevin said that so far as reparations were concerned the percentage they proposed would be delivered in any case and would not be affected by this proposal which related to the normal flow of goods. He suggested it was better to leave the question and to deal with Mr. Byrnes’ proposal on the Western frontier of Poland. Mr. Byrnes replied that his proposal was a compromise proposal on three questions. He could not agree to the [separate] settlement of any one of them and suggested that they all be passed over. He could not agree to the other two if there were no agreement on reparations. Mr. Molotov said it seemed that they could reach agreement on reparations but that they had left to the Big Three the one question of an overall figure. On the rest they could reach agreement. Mr. Byrnes said that they might as well send the other two questions along to the Big Three for he could not agree to them unless there was an agreement on reparations. 4. Disposition of the German Merchant Fleet and Navy Mr. Bevin said the British were submitting a paper making proposals to settle the differences that had arisen. 27 He proposed that it be submitted to a technical committee. Mr. Molotov also wished to submit a Soviet draft on this matter. 28 A technical committee was appointed consisting of Admiral McCarthy and Mr. Weston for the British, 29 Admiral Cooke and Mr. Russell for the United States, and Admiral Kuznetsov and Mr. Sobolev for the Soviets. 5. German External Assets Mr. Byrnes proposed that his paper on this question 30 be referred to the economic sub-committee. This was agreed to. 6. Political Principles for Germany Mr. Bevin said he had submitted a paper on this. 31 Mr. Molotov proposed that the sentence in paragraph 1 regarding treatment of the population should read, “in so far as it is practicable the treatment of the German population should be the same throughout Germany.” He thought that the last sentence of the British draft which referred to the principle of free communications between zones was not in their competence, that they were not familiar with the details. He suggested that the British could raise this on the Control Council. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that while the Control Council would have the final determination this was only a declaration of principles to guide them. Mr. Molotov thought it should have more study. Mr. Byrnes proposed adding the words “subject to normal regulation by the Control Council”. He agreed that the Control Council must be charged with the regulation of these questions. Mr. Bevin proposed accepting the paper without the paragraph on this question and that this paragraph could be sent to the Control Council for examination and it could then be discussed at the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers later in the year. Mr. Molotov thought it would suffice for the British to bring it before the Control Commission; otherwise they would have to set up a special committee to go fully into the matter. Mr. Bevin inquired if they agreed to the rest of the document and pointed out that the decision in paragraph ( a ) would have to be included in the message to the French. Mr. Molotov read a proposal for an addition to paragraph 8, sub-paragraph 4, of the document on political principles. 32 This related to the question of a central German administration to deal with economic questions. There were hints regarding this in the document but he thought that it should be stated explicitly and that it was necessary to create such an administration subject to certain limitations. Mr. Byrnes said he saw no objection to accepting Mr. Molotov’s proposal. Mr. Bevin wondered if this were wise unless the proposal could be shortened and confined to a statement of principles instead of a detailed proposal. He suggested that the Control Commission be asked to advise them in regard to the steps to be taken to establish a central German administration, its constitution and its functions. They were here establishing a central administration without consultation with the Control Commission. Mr. Byrnes said the Big Three had been adopting directives to the Control Commission; if they thought a central administration was necessary he saw no objection to saying so. The British thought the outlining of its functions should be done by the Control Commission. He proposed that they agree to the first paragraph and to the first two lines of the second paragraph stopping with the word “Council”. 33 Mr. Bevin said he accepted the idea but wanted the British delegation to have a look at it that evening. 7. Yugoslavia Mr. Bevin said they had circulated a paper on this question 34 and added that the British were interested in stopping all private wars. Mr. Molotov said he would also want to circulate a document on Yugoslavia. 35 (The translator read a Russian translation of the British paper.) Mr. Molotov commented that it was difficult for a reader to understand what was implied as different things were combined in one statement. If they should summon representatives of Yugoslavia to the Conference they could ascertain what could be done. Mr. Bevin pointed out that an understanding had been reached that until peace was established, the status quo should be maintained and that frontiers should not be altered by force. Mr. Molotov said that the paper did not mention any country by name. He would need more time to examine the draft. Mr. Bevin said he must have more time to study the Soviet draft. 8. War Criminals Mr. Molotov submitted the Soviet draft proposal 36 which he said had already been handed to the American delegation. 37 He pointed out that many people would expect the Berlin Conference to say a word on this question. The Soviet proposal was that the first ten war criminals who were in the hands of the Allies and who were well known be dealt with. Mr. Byrnes said that the United States representative on the War Crimes Commission, 38 Justice Jackson, had discussed with him the situation in regard to German war criminals. 39 The Commission had not reached agreement but hoped to do so in the immediate future as to the definition of war crimes. So long as they had a Commission of prominent representatives dealing with this matter they might communicate the proposal to them before taking action and see if they had any recommendation with regard to the language. He agreed that it might be well if the Conference made a statement on this matter, but he would like to first telephone Justice Jackson to ascertain the status of the Commission’s negotiations. Mr. Molotov then suggested that they discuss the matter the next day. He had information to the effect that the disagreements in the War Crimes Commission had been disposed of with two exceptions which would be easy to settle. There had been a disagreement as to the place where the tribunal should sit—whether in Berlin or in Nuremberg. He said the Soviets would agree to either place. Mr. Bevin said he was glad of this because the British delegation preferred Nuremberg. He asked if the British proposal 40 could not be accepted. He pointed out that he did not mention neutrals nor particular names. The British also had a list of names but it was not necessary to state them. Mr. Molotov replied that names were of interest to all. Mr. Byrnes thought it wiser not to mention persons. The men they had selected to prepare these cases had ideas as to which criminals should be tried first. He pointed out that the list which Molotov had given him earlier today 41 differed from the list he was now submitting. The British also had a list of names. Mr. Molotov suggested that they take only the names concerning which there was no doubt. Mr. Byrnes said the fact that there were two lists showed that the question was disputable. It would be better to leave the order of the names to those they had chosen to represent them. (The translator read a Russian translation of the British proposal.) Mr. Byrnes said he thought the British proposal would be a wiser statement than the Soviet proposal and he added that we each had our pet German war criminals. Mr. Molotov thought the British proposal was not enough. What was said in 1943 was not enough in 1945. He asked for time to think about it and said it was not bad but should be improved. 9. Fascist Activities in Germany and Austria Mr. Molotov said information had reached them to the effect that certain Fascist agents were operating in the American and British zones in Austria and Germany. 42 These were persons who had been in the employ of Hitler. The Soviet delegation felt that they should not be allowed to continue to agitate among the Soviet nationals remaining in the U.S. and British zones. He would be satisfied to receive a short statement from the United States and British to the effect that inquiries would be made in such cases and that an end would be put to these hostile activities. Mr. Byrnes said that he had asked for a report from the Army Commander and hoped to receive it the next day. 43 When he did so he would see what steps could be taken to meet the views of Mr. Molotov. Mr. Bevin said the British had also asked for information but it was not sure whether they would receive it the next day. If not they would take the matter up with the Soviet Government through official channels. Mr. Molotov said the Soviets hoped for a statement at the Conference. Mr. Bevin said that he could not be asked to take action before the facts were received and he was not going to allow any government to make him do so. Mr. Molotov said they would wait. Mr. Molotov said the next question he wished to raise was that concerning the information which the Soviets had received that many Germans [in Norway?] had not been disarmed. 44 Mr. Bevin replied that the British were sending him a complete reply in writing. 45 Mr. Molotov inquired if they should send the questions of reparations from Italy and Austria to a sub-committee. Mr. Bevin said he thought Mr. Byrnes had withdrawn this until the main question was settled. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that he had said that this question had already been considered by them and referred to the Big Three. He understood that Marshal Stalin did not insist upon reparations from Austria but did insist upon reparations from Italy. 46 Mr. Molotov said he was only referring to Italy. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the Big Three had discussed the question at great length and could not reach agreement. If his colleagues wished they could tell the Big Three that they had not finished their work and put it on their agenda again, but he saw no purpose in doing so. Mr. Molotov said he did not regard the question as finished. Mr. Byrnes said he agreed that they could ask the Big Three to decide it but he wanted the report to state that this was being done on the proposal of Mr. Molotov. Mr. Molotov said he agreed. Ruhr 47 Mr. Molotov said he had presented Mr. Byrnes a paper on the Ruhr 48 and he was now submitting it to Mr. Bevin. He did not propose that it be discussed now. Mr. Bevin said it was impossible for them to discuss this without the French. Mr. Molotov observed that they had discussed other important questions without the French. Mr. Bevin said he was willing to study the paper but he was not willing to decide a matter as serious as this without the French. Mr. Molotov said he wished to submit a paper in regard to certain misunderstandings which the Soviet delegation wished to bring to the attention of the British and American delegations in regard to nationals of the Ukraine, White Russia, etc. 49 10. Agenda for the Big Three Meeting On the proposal of Mr. Bevin it was agreed that the agenda be arranged by consultation. 1 Document No. 1000 , post . 2 Document No. 1056 , post . 3 Documents Nos. 790 and 1055 , post . 4 Document No. 1027 , post . 5 See ante , pp. 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] . 6 The Subcommittee’s draft has not been found. Cf. document No. 714 , post . For the invitation to France as delivered by the American Ambassador at Paris, see document No. 1395 , post . Concerning the invitation to China, see documents Nos. 715 and 717 , post . 7 See document No. 1396 , post . 8 The Soviet draft on reparations from Austria and Italy is document No. 1104 , post . The draft on reparations from Germany has not been positively identified (cf. document No. 953 , post , and ante , p. 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] ). 9 Document No. 961 , post . Cf. document No. 962 , post . 10 See ante , pp. 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] . 11 Document No. 731 , post , includes the amendments referred to (cf. ante , p. 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] ). 12 Document No. 1152 , post . 13 Document No. 960 , post . 14 Document No. 1051 , post . 15 Document No. 1051 , post . 16 Presumably the attachment to document No. 863 , post , or possibly a later version thereof. There is a later British version (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045) with paragraphs renumbered as in the final text, but since a text with the old numbering was still under discussion on July 31 (see post , pp. 520–521 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] ), it can hardly be the paper read here. This later British version is identical in substance with document No. 1383 , post , section ii , paragraphs 11–19, except that it contains the following three paragraphs in lieu of paragraph 19 as printed in document No. 1383 : “19. Payment of reparations should leave sufficient resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. “20. Payment for imports into Germany approved by the Control Council shall be a first charge against the proceeds of exports out of current production and out of stocks of goods. “21. The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4( a ) and 4( b ) of the Reparations Agreement.” 17 Edwin W. Pauley and Isador Lubin. 18 See document No. 962 , post . 19 Document No. 1152 , post . 20 See document No. 731 , post . 21 See ante , pp. 331–332 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . 22 See document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 23 It appears from the Mikołajczyk Papers ( a ) that Attlee and Bevin had met with Bierut and other members of the Polish Delegation at 3 p.m. on July 29 and again at 11:30 a.m. on July 30 and had been dissatisfied with Bierut’s exposition at the latter meeting (see Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy , p. 410) of the Polish position on holding elections in conformity with the Yalta agreement on Poland; ( b ) that on the morning of July 31 Bevin submitted to the Polish Delegation, through Mikołajczyk, a series of written questions to which the British Delegation wanted satisfactory answers before it would take a position on the western frontiers of Poland; and ( c ) that Bevin discussed these matters further with Beirut and other members of the Polish Delegation at 2:45 p.m. on July 31 and, on the basis of oral assurances obtained from the Poles at that time, indicated that the British Delegation would support the line of the Oder and the Western Neisse at the Eleventh Plenary Meeting later in the afternoon. See post , p. 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , for the report of the Polish assurances which Bevin gave to the three Heads of Government. 24 For the text of Bevin’s proposal, see the Rapporteur’s report, post , p. 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] . Cf. document No. 888 , post . 25 See ante , p. 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . 26 See ante , pp. 279–280 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . 27 Document No. 1014 , post . 28 Document No. 1013 , post . 29 According to the Rapporteur’s report ( post , p. 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] ), Ward was also appointed a British member of this committee. 30 Document No. 1000 , post . 31 Document No. 879 , post . 32 Document No. 886 , post . 33 See documents Nos. 886 and 887 , post . 34 Document No. 1083 , post . Cf. document No. 1202 , post . 35 Document No. 1211 , post . 36 Presumably document No. 1017 , post . 37 See ante , p. 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] . Cf. document No. 1016 , post . 38 i. e., the International Conference on Military Trials meeting at London. 39 See ante , p. 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] . 40 Document No. 1018 , post . 41 Document No. 1016 , post . 42 See documents Nos. 790 and 1055 , post . 43 No such report has been found. 44 See document No. 1056 , post . 45 Enclosure 1 to document No. 1058 , post . 46 See ante , pp. 464–465 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] . 47 This is an unnumbered manuscript heading appearing at this point in the margin. 48 Document No. 1027 , post . 49 Document No. 1167 , post . United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m. top secret Summary of Meeting of Foreign Ministers July 30, 1945 1. German Reparations. The U. S. Delegation presented the proposals attached hereto (Attachments l a , 1 b , and 1 c ) 2 in regard to German reparations, to the Polish Western Frontier and to the admission of certain countries to the United Nations. The British Delegation presented two papers in regard to German reparations which are also attached hereto (Attachments 2 and 3). 3 The Soviet Delegation urged that a specific figure of Soviet reparations from Western Germany be named and suggested 8 hundred million dollars and 2 million tons. They also preferred that the proposal specify reparations from the U. S. and British zones rather than from the Ruhr alone. The question of the specification of a definite figure was referred to the Big Three though the British Foreign Minister stated categorically that he could not agree to such specifications. There was also discussion of who should determine what amounts from Western Germany would be available for reparations and the U. S. presented the suggestion which is attached hereto (Attachment 4). 4 2. Economic Principles To Govern Treatment of Germany. Decision on this question was put off until the question of German reparations was settled. 3. German External Assets. The U. S. presented a paper on this subject which was referred to the Economic Subcommittee for examination. (Attachment 5). 5 4. Polish Western Frontier. Mr. Byrnes stated that he could not discuss this question unless agreement could be reached on all three of the proposals which he had presented at the opening of the meeting, i. e., the proposal on German Reparations, proposal on the Polish Western Frontier, and the proposal on Admission to the United Nations. 5. Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine. Both the British and Soviet papers on this subject, which are attached hereto (Attachments 6 and 7), 6 were referred to the subcommittee which has been set up to deal with this question. 6. Additional Points To Be Included in the Political Principles for Germany. The British paper on this question which is attached hereto (Attachment 8) 7 was considered. The first point was approved. The second point was not approved but was referred for consideration to the Control Council for Germany. The Soviet Delegation also presented a paper on this question, which is attached hereto (Attachment 9). 8 The British and U. S. Delegations approved the Soviet proposal in principle but took the position that the details should be left to the Control Commission for Germany. The U. S. therefore suggested a modification to the Soviet proposal, which is also attached hereto (Attachment 10). 9 It was agreed that a final decision should be reached on these proposals tomorrow. 7. Southeastern Europe. The British presented a paper on this subject which the Soviets asked for further time to study. The paper is attached hereto (Attachment 11) 10 as well as a Soviet paper presented at the same time on conditions in the Trieste–Istria district (Attachment 12). 11 8. War Crimes. Both the British and the Soviets presented papers on this subject which are attached hereto (Attachments 13 and 14). 12 There was general agreement that the Conference should make a statement on this subject and the consensus of opinion seemed to be that the statement should not include the names of possible war criminals. It was agreed that Mr. Byrnes would consult Justice Jackson and the Soviets would study the British draft with a view to discussing the question again tomorrow. 9. Fascist Activities in Germany. The Soviets referred to the paper they had circulated 13 in regard to Nazis who are said to be active in the British, French and U. S. zones in Germany and Austria. U. S. and British representatives said that they have asked their commanders for reports on this subject and that they will communicate with the Soviet Government as soon as the reports are received. 10. German Troops in Norway. The Soviets referred to their paper previously circulated 14 on German troops in Norway who are said not to have been disarmed. The British said that they are preparing a reply to this note, 15 which they hope to have tomorrow. 11. Austrian and Italian Reparations. The Soviets presented a new paper on this subject, which is attached hereto (Attachment 15). 16 Mr. Byrnes pointed out that Generalissimo Stalin had already agreed that War reparations would not be asked of Austria. On Mr. Molotov’s motion it was decided once more to refer the question of Italian reparations to the Big Three. 12. The Ruhr Industrial Area. The Soviets presented a paper on this subject, which is attached hereto (Attachment 16). 17 Mr. Bevin stated that he could not discuss this subject without the French but agreed to study the paper. 13. Soviet Citizens from the Baltic, Western Ukraine and White Russia . The Soviets presented a paper on this subject, which is attached hereto (Attachment 17). 18 The British and U. S. Delegations agreed to give the matter consideration. 14. Big Three Agenda. It was agreed that this agenda should be drawn up by informal consultation among the three delegations. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 Documents Nos. 961 , 1152 , and 731 , post , respectively. 3 Documents Nos. 960 and 1051 , post . 4 Document No. 962 , post . 5 Document No. 1000 , post . 6 Documents Nos. 1014 and 1013 , post respectively. 7 Document No. 879 , post . 8 Document No. 886 , post . 9 Document No. 887 , post . 10 Document No. 1083 , post . 11 Document No. 1211 , post . 12 Documents Nos. 1018 and 1016 , post , respectively. Although document No. 1016 is the paper actually annexed as attachment 14, document No. 1017 was apparently the paper submitted by Molotov at the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. 13 Documents Nos. 790 and 1055 , post . 14 Document No. 1056 , post . 15 Enclosure 1 to document No. 1098 , post . 16 Document No. 1104 , post . 17 Document No. 1027 , post . 18 Document No. 1167 , post . Rapporteur’s Report 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] Rapporteur’s Report 1 secret P. ( Terminal ) 69 [ Babelsberg ,] 31st July, 1945. Report on Meeting of Foreign Secretaries on 30 th July * (As submitted to the Plenary Meeting, 31st July, 1945) 1. Mr. Bevin was in the Chair. The meeting began by conveying to Generalissimo Stalin an expression of the regret with which they had heard of his illness and their hope for a speedy and complete recovery. 2. The meeting then agreed to the immediate despatch by each of the Three Governments of telegrams to the Governments of France and China inviting their participation in the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers . The telegram to the French Government would also refer to the dissolution of the European Advisory Commission. 3. The meeting also approved the despatch of telegrams to the French Government communicating to them the text of the statement of political principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. 4. Reparations The Foreign Secretaries considered a proposal by the United States Delegation as follows:— “Reparations claims of Russia and Poland to be satisfied from the Russian zone plus: ( a ) 25% of such industrial capital equipment as we determine is not necessary for a peace economy and should be removed from the Ruhr on condition that there would be exchanged an equivalent value in food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products and oil products, to be made available to us by the Soviets. ( b ) An additional 15% of such industrial capital equipment as is determined unnecessary for a peace economy should be transferred from the Ruhr to the Soviet Government without payment or exchange of any kind in return.” 2 5. The U. S. Delegation made it clear that there were two other questions which must be settled at the same time. The first was the proposal for admission of neutral and ex-enemy states to the United Nations as regards which the U. S. Delegation had circulated a revised note; the second was a proposal concerning the Western frontier of Poland, according to which the U. S. Delegation would agree that the Polish Provisional Government should administer the area claimed by them pending final arrangement of the actual frontier at the Peace Conference. The U. S. Delegation insisted that all three proposals must be the subject of agreement at the same time. 6. The Foreign Secretaries also considered proposals about reparations and sources of supply for the zones of occupation put forward by the U. K. Delegation. 7. The discussion showed that there was general agreement with the lines of the American proposal, subject to the following two points:— (i) The U. S. and U. K. Delegations considered that the figures in the U. S. proposal should be 12½% from all the western zones in exchange for goods, and 7½% from all the western zones without payment. The Soviet Delegation on the other hand maintained that these figures should be 25% from the Ruhr on the basis of exchanges and 15% from each of the Western zones free. (ii) The Soviet Delegation wished to see a minimum figure of either weight or value stated in addition to the percentages. The U. S. and U. K. Delegations could not accept this suggestion. As there was no agreement on this question, the other two proposals by the U. S. Delegation were not discussed. 8. Economic Principles The British Delegation proposed that the following should be included in the Economic Principles:— “Payment for approved imports into Germany shall be a first charge against the proceeds of exports out of current production and out of stocks of goods”. The Soviet Delegation asked for the addition of the following sentence:— “As regards the rest, priorities should be given to reparations, as compared with the satisfaction of other economic needs”. The U. S. and U. K. Delegations were unable to accept the Soviet suggestion. 9. German Fleet and Merchant Navy The U. K. and Soviet Delegations submitted memoranda on the subject. These memoranda were referred to a Sub-Committee composed as follows: U. S. Delegation: Admiral Cooke and Mr. Russell U. K. Delegation: Admiral McCarthy, Mr. Weston and Mr. Ward Soviet Delegation: Admiral Kuznetsov and M. Sobolev 10. German External Assets The U. S. Delegation submitted a memorandum on this subject, which was referred to the Economic Sub-Committee. 11. Germany—Political Principles The U. K. Delegation had proposed two additions to the statement on political principles. The first of these, which was adopted, reads as follows: “So far as is practicable there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population.” The second proposed addition was as follows: “Subject to normal regulations there shall be free circulation of nationals of the Powers represented on the Control Council in all zones by land and air.” 12. It was agreed that this should be referred for examination by the Control Council for Germany, who should be asked to submit their recommendations about it to the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945. 13. The Soviet Delegation then suggested a third addition to the statement on political principles as follows: “Assistance will, however, be rendered to the establishment of a central German administration composed of secretaries for respective branches of administration—in the first instance of central administrative institutions for foreign trade, industry, finance, transport and communications. The central German administration shall act under the direction of the Control Council, and it will be their task to coordinate the activities of the Provincial Governments in order to ensure the fulfilment of the decisions of the Control Council and the exercise of functions connected with the solving of problems of an all-German character.” 14. It was agreed to defer this until the Delegations had had an opportunity to study it. 15. Yugoslavia Memoranda on this subject were circulated by the U. K. and Soviet Delegations. It was agreed to consider these memoranda at a subsequent meeting. 16. War Crimes Memoranda on this subject were circulated by the U. K. and Soviet Delegations. It was agreed to consider these memoranda at a subsequent meeting. 17. Activities of Russian Fascists in Germany and Austria The Soviet representative referred to the memorandum circulated by the Soviet Delegation on 27th July. The U. S. and U. K. Delegations said that they had asked for reports from the competent military authorities, which had not yet been received. 18. German Troops in Norway The Soviet representative referred to a memorandum on this subject circulated by the Soviet Delegation on 27th [ 25th? ] July. The U. K. representative said that a reply on this topic had been received and would be sent to M. Molotov as soon as possible. 19. Administration of the Ruhr Industrial Area The Soviet Delegation circulated a memorandum on this subject. 20. Repatriation of Soviet Citizens from the Baltic, Western Ukraine and White Russia The Soviet Delegation circulated a memorandum on this subject. 1 Bevin acted as Rapporteur for this meeting. His report was circulated before the meeting of Heads of Government on July 31 (see post , p. 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] ). For the documents referred to in this report, see the footnotes to the minutes and to the summary memorandum, ante , pp. 483–497 [ Pgs. 483–497 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] and 497–499 [ Pgs. 497–499 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , respectively. * F. ( Terminal ) 11th Meeting. [Footnote in the source text. It appears from this footnote that the British Delegation’s numbering of meetings of the Foreign Ministers differed from that used by the United States Delegation. This difference presumably arose from difference in treatment of the “informal” meetings (see ante , pp. 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] ).] 2 Cf. document No. 961 , post . United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m. Pending Problems Before the Conference, Close of Business, July 30, 1945 i. problems before the big three 1. German Reparations 2. Western Frontier of Poland 3. Admission to the United Nations The U. S. has presented proposals on all three of these questions and has insisted that they be considered as a unit. 2 The British also presented yesterday a new proposal on German Reparations. 3 There seemed to be general agreement on the U. S. proposal concerning reparations, made applicable to the entire British and American Zones rather than to the Ruhr alone, with a corresponding reduction in the percentages. The specific question referred to the Big Three was whether or not a definite figure, in dollars or tons, for the Soviet share of reparations from western Germany should be specified. 4. Economic Principles for Germany It was agreed that decision on this question will depend on the decision on German reparations. 5. Italian Reparations Mr. Molotov’s motion on this question was referred back once more to the Big Three. ii. problems before the foreign ministers 1. Additional Points for Inclusion in the German Political Principles The British proposed two additional points 4 the first of which was accepted and the second referred to the Control Commission for Germany. The Soviets also presented a new point 5 which is still before the Foreign Ministers. 2. Southeast Europe and Trieste—Istria District British and Soviet papers on these subjects 6 are still before the foreign ministers. 3. War Crimes The Soviet and British papers 7 on this subject were presented. It was agreed in principle that a statement on the subject should be issued by the Conference. The question of the exact form of this statement is still before the Foreign Ministers. 4. Fascist Activities in the U. S., British and French Zones of Germany and Austria The U. S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note 8 on this subject. 5. German Troops in Norway The U. S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note 9 on this subject. 6. Disposition of Soviet Citizens from the Baltic, the Ukraine and White Russia now in Allied Territories The U. S. and British Secretaries of State have agreed to reply as soon as possible to a Soviet note 10 on this subject. 7. Ruhr Industrial Area The Soviet paper 11 on this question is before the Foreign Ministers but the British have stated they could not discuss the subject without the French. 8. Allied Oil Equipment in Rumania The Foreign Ministers have not yet acted on the latest British proposal 12 for dealing with this subject. iii. problems before subcommittees 1. German Fleet and Merchant Marine British and Soviet papers 13 on this subject are before the subcommittee. 2. German External Assets A U. S. proposal 14 on this subject was referred to the Economic Sub-committee. 3. Oil for Western Europe The Economic Sub-committee has not yet reported on the U. S. proposal 15 on this subject. 4. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported. 5. Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported. 6. Transfer of German Populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary The Sub-committee on this subject has not yet reported. 7. Directive to the Military Commanders in Germany The Sub-committee on this subject is awaiting completion of the work of the Conference in relation to Germany. 8. Protocol and Communiqué of the Conference The Sub-committees are engaged in preparation of these documents. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 See documents Nos. 731 , 961 , 962 , and 1152 , post . 3 Document No. 960 , post . 4 Document No. 879 , post . 5 Document No. 886 , post . 6 Documents Nos. 1083 and 1211 , post , respectively. 7 See documents Nos. 1016 , 1017 , and 1018 , post . 8 Documents Nos. 790 and 1055 , post . 9 Document No. 1056 , post . 10 Document No. 1167 , post . 11 Document No. 1027 , post . 12 Document No. 841 , post . 13 Documents Nos. 1014 and 1013 , post respectively. 14 Document No. 1000 , post . 15 Document No. 1320 , post . Lane–Modzelewski conversation, 6 p.m. Lane–Modzelewski conversation, 6 p.m. 1 1 The conversation took place at the headquarters of the Polish Delegation, 10 Domgasse, Babelsberg. While Lane was meeting with Modzelewski, two members of his staff, Gerald Keith and C. Burke Elbrick, had a separate conversation with Tadeusz Żebrowski. See Arthur Bliss Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People (Indianapolis, 1948), pp. 130, 132. The time of these conversations is drawn from Mikołajczyk’s diary of the Conference. Present United States Poland Mr. Lane President Bierut 2 Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk 2 Mr. Modzelewski 2 Bierut and Mikołajczyk were present for only the last part of the meeting. See Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed , pp. 130–134. 2 Bierut and Mikołajczyk were present for only the last part of the meeting. See Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed , pp. 130–134. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)]] The Appointed Ambassador to Poland (Lane) to the Acting Secretary of State Babelsberg, July 31, 1945. 860c.00/7–3145: Telegram The Appointed Ambassador to Poland (Lane) to the Acting Secretary of State 860c.00/7–3145: Telegram [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] The Appointed Ambassador to Poland ( Lane ) to the Acting Secretary of State 3 secret Babelsberg , July 31, 1945. Victory 444. To Acting Secretary of State from Lane. Called yesterday on Modzelewski former Polish Ambassador Moscow now Assistant Minister Foreign Affairs, President Bierut and Mikołajczyk also joined group. Following is summary of Modzelewski’s remarks: 1. Newspaper correspondents should be able to enter Poland before end August. Only present obstacle poor quality telegraphic communications. (As Modzelewski mentioned censorship this may also be reason for short delay.) 2. Consulates can be established Danzig, Poznan, Lodz and Cracow. (Depending on outcome of western frontier we may suggest Breslau also.) 3. Rate of exchange for diplomatic corps will have to be arranged. Present rate of eleven zlotys and fraction impossible for us to subsist on. 4. Policing entirely adequate. Polish Government will furnish sufficient guards. Unnecessary for us bring military detachment. (Shall report further on arrival Warsaw.) 5. Coal deal being arranged with U. S. here. 4 They want goods in return principally fats, meats and oils. 6. Requested my personal advice re Oskar Lange as Ambassador to U. S. I replied I thought it might create unfortunate impression because his U. S. Citizenship. 7. Soviet troops being withdrawn from Poland except for portion west of 1939 west frontier. (Repeated to Moscow and Paris for Lovell.) 8. Soviet, Czech, Yugoslav, French Ambassadors and Swedish and British chargés now in Warsaw. 3 Sent over the signature of Byrnes. 4 See document No. 1392 , post . Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening Present United States United Kingdom 2 Soviet Union Mr. Brown 1 2 The British members of this subcommittee were Bridges, Brook, Hayter, and Dean (see ante , p. 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ). It is not known which of these members represented the United Kingdom at this meeting. 1 Foote was also named as a member of this subcommittee (see ante , p. 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ), but it is not known whether he attended this meeting. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] Editor’s Note —No record has been found of the substance of the discussion at this meeting. Brown’s diary entry for July 30, however, contains the following reference to it: “… Met with communiqué committee after Foreign Ministers, British and Soviets seemed to like draft. Foote and I had prepared it. All of it had previously been submitted to British. …” 3 Sobolev and Golunsky were the Soviet members of this subcommittee (see ante , p. 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ), but it is not known who represented the Soviet Union at this meeting. Byrnes–Attlee meeting [?] Byrnes–Attlee meeting [?] Present United States United Kingdom Secretary Byrnes Prime Minister Attlee Foreign Secretary Bevin [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] Editor’s Note —No official record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Byrnes makes the following reference to the meeting in Speaking Frankly , page 84: “As soon as Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin returned I visited them and, after several hours discussion, obtained their agreement in principle to our proposal [on reparations from Germany].” It seems probable from the minutes of the Byrnes-Molotov meeting and the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers on July 30 ( ante , pages 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 484–487 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] ) that Byrnes’ discussions with the British representatives took place at some time following adjournment of the latter meeting, although the chronology of events described in Speaking Frankly , page 84, would indicate that the Byrnes–Attlee meeting took place on July 28. Mosely–Ward and Mosely–Gusev conversations Mosely–Ward and Mosely–Gusev conversations Present 1 United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Mr. Mosely Mr. Ward Mr. Gusev 1 It has not been determined whether Mosely spoke to Ward and Gusev separately or together. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#145)]] Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) [Babelsberg, July 30, 1945.] 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2945 Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2945 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#145)] Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) 2 [ Babelsberg , July 30, 1945.] Informed J. G. Ward (UK) and Gousev (U. S. S. R.) July 30, of U. S. approval 3 and timing arrangement. Telegram to Mr. Winant, July 30. 4 P[ hilip ] E. M[ osely ] 2 This memorandum is in the form of a manuscript endorsement to document No. 788 , post . 3 Of three quadripartite statements relating to Austria. See document No. 788 , post . 4 Document No. 789 , post . Truman–Rowan conversation, 10 a.m. Truman–Rowan conversation, 10 a.m. 1 1 The meeting was held at Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg. Rowan was Attlee’s Principal Private Secretary. Information as to participants and time and place of meeting from the Log ( ante , p. 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] ). Present United States United Kingdom President Truman Mr. Rowan [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] Editor’s Note —No record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found. Meeting of the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine, 10:30 a.m. Meeting of the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine, 10:30 a.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Vice Admiral Cooke Rear Admiral McCarthy Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov Mr. Russell 1 1 Although Russell did not sign the Subcommittee’s report ( document No. 1015 , post ), he apparently was present during its preparation. Cf. the following passage in telegram No. Victory 462 of August 1 from Cooke to the Navy Department (Department of the Army files): “A tripartite subcommittee with myself and Mr Russell of the State Department as US members have submitted a report for consideration by the Tripartite Conference in plenary session … this afternoon.” [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] Editor’s Note —No minutes of this meeting have been found. For the Subcommittee’s report, see document No. 1015 , post . Byrnes-Molotov conversation, morning or early afternoon Byrnes-Molotov conversation, morning or early afternoon 1 1 The relationship of this conversation to the Byrnes–Molotov meeting of July 30 (see ante , p. 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] ) is not entirely clear. Byrnes, in Speaking Frankly , gives no summary of the July 30 meeting, and his summary of the conversation ascribed to July 31 in part duplicates the official minutes for the meeting of July 30. At the same time, the fact that there are certain portions of Byrnes’ summary of the conversation ascribed to July 31 which are not reflected in the official minutes of the July 30 meeting—particularly Byrnes’ statement that he and Truman would leave for the United States the next day—strengthens the presumption that another (and more outspoken) Byrnes–Molotov conversation actually did take place on July 31. Present 2 United States Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov 2 Presumably at least one interpreter was also present at this conversation. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] Editor’s Note —No official record pertaining to this conversation has been found. Byrnes ( Speaking Frankly , page 85) states that he told Molotov on July 31 that there were three outstanding issues at the Conference: reparations from Germany, Polish administration of a part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany, and admission of Italy and the Balkan states to the United Nations. He states further that he submitted a proposal containing the only concessions which the United States was willing to make; 3 that he asked Molotov to present “the three proposals” to Stalin so that they might be considered at the meeting of the Heads of Government on July 31; that the United States “would agree to all three or none”; and that he and Truman would leave for the United States the next day. 4 3 This may refer to a paper on reparations from Germany. See post , p. 512, footnote 2 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . The United States position on the other two questions at issue had been given to Molotov by Byrnes on July 30. See documents Nos. 731 and 1152 , post , and see ante , p. 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] . 4 Cf. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime , p. 302. Eleventh plenary meeting, 4 p.m. Eleventh plenary meeting, 4 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Attlee Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Bevin Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Davies Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Bohlen Major Birse Mr. Golunsky Mr. Cohen 1 Mr. Maisky Fleet Admiral Leahy 2 1 Cohen’s presence is assumed from the existence of his notes on the meeting, post , p. 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . 2 Leahy’s presence is established by the Cohen notes, post , p. 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , and by Leahy, I Was There , pp. 422–424. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 31, 1945, 4:00 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)]] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 31, 1945, 4:00 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 31, 1945, 4:00 p.m. Traman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 31, 1945, 4:00 p.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3145 [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)]] United States Delegation Memorandum Potsdam, July 31, 1945, 4:00 p.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3145 United States Delegation Memorandum Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] United States Delegation Memorandum 3 Potsdam, July 31, 1945, 4:00 p.m. Points of Especial Interest to the United States 1. The 3–point Program of the Secretary of State: ( a ) U. S. proposal in regard to German reparations (copy attached); 4 ( b ) U. S. proposal in regard to Poland’s western frontier (copy attached); ( c ) U. S. proposal in regard to admission to the United Nations (copy attached). 2. Economic Principles to Govern Treatment of Germany. Decision on this question was put off until the question of German reparations was settled (copy of the draft under discussion is attached). 3. Use of Allied Property for Satellite Reparations or “War Trophies” ( copy attached ). No action has yet been taken on the paper on this question circulated by the U. S. on July 25th. 4. Revised Procedure for Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. A new paper on this subject to be presented by the President (copy attached). 5. Transfer of German Populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland and, Hungary. A new paper on this subject to be presented by the President (copy attached). 6. Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways. The U. S. seeks agreement on the part of the Three Governments to the principles of unrestricted navigation of international inland waterways (a copy of the U. S. proposal on this subject, dated July 23rd, is attached). 3 Authorship not indicated. This paper was apparently before Truman during the meeting. 4 No attachments found. For the papers referred to, see the footnotes to the minutes, infra. Department of State Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, July 31, 1945, 4:00 p.m. top secret Mr. Bevin suggested that as the Rapporteur’s report 1 had been circulated it not be read. This was agreed to. The President proposed that they take up the U. S. proposals on Reparations, 2 the Western Frontier of Poland, and Entry into the United Nations Organization. 3 Mr. Molotov said he wished to circulate the Soviet proposals on this question. 4 Mr. Byrnes said the paper [ papers? ] presented on behalf of the U. S. Delegation set forth as part of one proposition proposals with respect to three controversial questions—reparations, the western frontier of Poland, and entry into the United Nations Organization. The U. S. Delegation had explained in the meeting of the Foreign Ministers that concessions made with respect to Poland and the United Nations Organization question were conditional upon acceptance of all three proposals. 5 Mr. Stalin pointed out that these questions were not connected and dealt with different subjects. Mr. Byrnes agreed that they were different subjects. He pointed out, however, that they had been before the Conference for weeks without agreement having been reached. They were presented in the hope of reaching agreement. The U. S. Delegation was not willing to accept one without the others. As to reparations the U. S. proposal was that 25 percent of the industrial capital equipment in the Ruhr which was determined to be unnecessary for a peacetime economy be delivered to the Soviet Union in exchange for certain commodities. It was proposed further that an additional 15 percent of such capital goods unnecessary for peacetime economy be delivered to the Soviet Union without any payment or exchange. In a discussion in the Foreign Ministers meeting the British Delegation had said it could not agree if the transfer was to be made only from the Ruhr but could agree if it were to be from the three western zones. 6 They agreed that the only difference would be one of percentages and if made to apply to three western zones the percentages would be one-half those stated with respect to the Ruhr. This would not affect the total to be received by the Soviet Union. The percentages would be 12½ and 7½ respectively. Mr. Molotov said there had been no agreement on this. Mr. Byrnes agreed that it had not been agreed by the Soviet Foreign Minister but it had been suggested by the British Foreign Minister and he had agreed, and he thought it was better from the point of view of the administration of the French, British and American zones. He also considered that it would be advantageous to their Soviet friends. Mr. Stalin agreed that the three zones would be more advantageous. Mr. Byrnes continued that under this plan the Soviets could get a factory from the American zone and would not be confined to plants from the Ruhr. It had been suggested at the Foreign Ministers meeting that it should be decided by whom the determination of the equipment not needed for a peacetime economy should be made. He had added to his proposal that it should be made by the Control Commission under policies fixed by the Reparations Commission, subject to the final approval of the Commander in the zone from which the equipment was removed. He had suggested the Control Council because the four governments were represented on it and it was an administrative body charged with executive functions, whereas the Reparations Commission was a policy making body. He had also added to his proposal that removals of industrial capital equipment should be completed within two years and the products to be delivered by the U. S. S. R. in exchange should be delivered within five years. He also thought it should be stated that reparations claims of other countries should be met from the western zones of occupation. The Polish proposal was that advocated by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union 7 at the time the Polish Delegation had presented its case and it gave to the Polish Government the internal administration of all the territory it claimed. The paper on Admission to the United Nations Organization had been withdrawn by the U. S. Delegation last Saturday. 8 As reintroduced it contained language which he hoped would meet with the approval of the Soviet Delegation. Their British friends could not accept the language in the first draft because they could not recognize the countries with which they were at war. Marshal Stalin had asked if the British would agree to extend a complete or partial recognition. He therefore suggested language to the effect that they would consider recognition to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with the countries concerned. The British said they had some difficulties in this connection but that they tentatively would agree to the language. Mr. Stalin said he had no objection in principle to this wording. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the other change in wording related to freedom of the press. Mr. Stalin suggested in the sentence on this subject that they replace the words “express the desire” by the words “have no doubt that.” The British and American Delegations agreed to this change. Mr. Byrnes concluded by stating that the three proposals were submitted together and he hoped they could be adopted. Reparations From Germany (The Translator read the Soviet proposal on Reparations from Germany). 9 Mr. Stalin said that Mr. Byrnes suggested that the three questions be linked. He understood this and it was for Mr. Byrnes to use any tactics be wanted but he could not undertake to reply with such tactics and the Soviet Delegation would vote separately on these questions. The most debatable question was that of Reparations from Germany. The Soviet proposals had just been read. They had accepted the point of view of the Americans. They had agreed not to mention a definite figure of reparations but had accepted a statement of percentages. Mr. Stalin said he had received some new material on British and American removals from the western zones. They included 11,000 railroad cars. What the fate of this property would be in the future he did not know. Would it be returned to the Russian zone, or would they be compensated? The President said that the American view was that there should be a central transport administration. 10 Mr. Stalin continued that the Soviets did not remove railroad equipment from the American zone although the Americans had charged the Russians with taking everything. He mentioned this to show that not only the Russians had sinned but also the British and Americans. 11 With reference to the substance of the question he thought that they had a common basis now. The principle in the American plan that each country exacts reparations from its own zone was accepted; also, it was agreed that reparations from the west should come not only from the Ruhr but from the three western zones. It was agreed that part of the equipment to be removed from the Ruhr could be compensated by goods. It was agreed that the Control Commission would determine the equipment that should be removed. All these had been accepted. What was the difference that remained? The Russians were anxious that a time limit be fixed for determining the equipment to be removed. The President said he agreed to fixing a time limit. Mr. Stalin said they suggested three months and inquired if that was enough time. The President said he would agree. Mr. Bevin thought three months was not enough. Mr. Stalin said make it three, four or five, but there should be a time limit. Mr. Bevin said he would accept six. Mr. Stalin agreed to accept six. The President also agreed. Mr. Stalin said that the only remaining question was the figure of the percentage. He hoped the British and Americans would meet the Soviet wishes. Mr. Bevin should have in mind that the Russians have lost much equipment. They should receive a small part of it back. Mr. Bevin said that the British had had in mind equipment after determination of the amount needed for the maintenance of the economy. Mr. Stalin said this was in his proposal. If he thought it over, Mr. Bevin would accept it. Mr. Bevin replied that he could not. He had used the words “equipment not needed for peacetime economy.” This was not in the Soviet document. Mr. Stalin reread the Soviet proposal on this point. Mr. Bevin said he did not give the basis on which the determination would be made. Mr. Stalin insisted it was the same thing. Mr. Bevin asked if he would then accept the British wording and said he did not want a misunderstanding. Mr. Stalin said the Russians had in view 15 percent of the equipment to be removed which was not necessary for peacetime economy but was not clear about it. Mr. Bevin again cited the British language which he said reflected the views agreed upon by the British and American Delegations. 12 Mr. Stalin said that he would accept this language. Mr. Byrnes observed that the only remaining differences were the percentages in the Soviet proposals in regard to the shares of German companies and gold holdings. He pointed out that it might be proved that the gold belonged to others and must be returned. Mr. Stalin said the Russians meant German gold. Mr. Byrnes said his information was that it was all looted gold and the question was would they return it to the countries from which it was removed. He inquired if the Soviet Delegation was insisting on the increase in percentages and on this 30 percent of German foreign assets and the shares of German companies. Mr. Stalin said yes, he would like to receive this if possible. Mr. Bevin asked what he had in mind. 13 Mr. Stalin said he had in mind the foreign assets of Germany frozen in other countries, including America. Mr. Byrnes observed that in America this was a matter which required action by Congress; that Congress had already fixed the manner of establishing claims. There were no doubt many people, including refugees, who had valid claims. The U. S. Delegation certainly could not agree to anything disposing of these assets in the U. S. He added that in Latin America many countries have claims against Germany for shipping and other losses and no doubt they would use these assets to satisfy their claims. Mr. Bevin said that yesterday they had agreed that France be added to the Reparations Commission in order to work out these questions 14 and he would like France to be added to the Reparations Commission. Mr. Stalin replied, I have no objection. Mr. Bevin said with regard to percentages, we thought we had met you yesterday in the meeting of Foreign Ministers. I agreed to 12½ percent and thought that we had treated your claim liberally. Mr. Stalin said that it was the opposite of liberal. Mr. Bevin said then it was generous. They had different points of view. He took it that this question of reparations would not interfere with the ordinary exchange of goods within Germany. He referred to the document on economic principles for Germany. 15 Mr. Stalin replied that could be discussed in connection with the consideration of those principles. Mr. Bevin said that the Soviet proposal in regard to gold was difficult for the British. He asked if Stalin would agree that their proposal in regard to foreign assets be limited to neutral territory. Mr. Stalin said he would agree. Mr. Byrnes said the American position was that we did not agree to the Soviet proposals that had been added. The President said that he had just been informed by Stalin that there had been unauthorized removals by the American Army. He wished to state that they were not made under instructions of the American Government and that they would be accounted for. He said he had addressed a communication to General Eisenhower 16 and was having an investigation made. He added that no people had been removed by the American Army. Mr. Stalin suggested that they discuss paragraph 3 of the proposal; everything in the Soviet document 17 was true. The President said if the Russians would leave off their paragraph 4 he would agree to the percentage they proposed. 18 Mr. Bevin pointed out that they had to satisfy France. He said that if the Russians would drop all of the second page of their proposal 19 he would agree to 12½ percent–10 percent. Mr. Stalin pointed out that paragraph 5 should remain. Mr. Bevin said that he meant that paragraph 4 should be dropped. Mr. Stalin observed that the U. S. was willing to meet the Soviet wishes—why was Britain unwilling? Mr. Bevin said that because they were responsible for the zone from which the Soviet claims were to be satisfied. They were also responsible for satisfying the claims of France and other countries. Mr. Stalin pointed out that France had signed an armistice with Hitler and had suffered no real occupation. France should be satisfied with a small amount. He said that 150 divisions had been sent to Russia from France or had been supplied from France. Mr. Bevin repeated that they had to satisfy France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Holland. 20 The British wanted nothing except some raw materials. Mr. Byrnes said that the American proposal used the language “other countries entitled to reparations.” He urged that this language be accepted. Mr. Stalin said he agreed to this. Mr. Bevin said that the percentage the Soviets asked plus reparations from their own zone gave them more than 50 percent. Mr. Stalin insisted that it would be less than 50 percent and pointed out in addition that they were supplying goods to the equivalent of 15 percent. The Soviet proposal was a minimum. The Soviets received only 10 percent—the others got 90 percent. He agreed to 15 percent and 10 percent and thought it fair. The Americans agreed. He hoped Bevin would support them. Mr. Bevin said “All right then.” Mr. Stalin expressed his thanks. Mr. Bevin said he understood that the American paper as amended was accepted. Mr. Stalin said he thought they had settled all their differences and should appoint a committee to draw up a text. The committee consists of Mr. Clayton and Mr. Pauley for the U. S.; Sir D. Waley and Mr. Turner for the British; and Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Gromyko for the Soviets. Polish Western Frontier Mr. Bevin said his instructions were to stand for the eastern Neisse and he would like to ascertain what was involved in this new proposal. 21 Would the zone be handed over to Poles entirely and would Soviet troops be completely withdrawn? He said he had met the Poles and had discussed this question in the light of the declaration referred to in the U. S. document. 22 He had asked them what their intention was in giving effect to this decision. He pointed out that any decision had to be defended in Parliament. He had asked the Poles [what their intention?] was in regard to the actual holding of free and secret elections on the basis of the 1921 Constitution. They had assured him that elections would be held as soon as possible and they hoped not later than early 1946. He pointed out that this was subject to conditions being made possible for the holding of elections. The Poles also agreed to freedom of the press and to foreign correspondents sending reports abroad without interference. They had also assured him in regard to freedom of religion. An important matter was the return of the troops under Allied command as well as return of civilians. He had asked the Poles to make a declaration to insure that these people would be treated equally with those in the country. A point that concerned more particularly the Soviet Government and the British and which the Polish Government could not now settle was the question of a British military air service between Berlin and Warsaw and London to enable His Majesty’s Government to maintain regular communications with its Embassy at Warsaw. On that point he should like to get agreement immediately. In the U. S. document it was stated that this territory would be under the Polish state and not part of the Soviet zone of occupation and that it would pass out of Soviet responsibility. He took it that notwithstanding the placing of this zone under Polish administration it would technically remain under Allied military control. Otherwise, they would be transferring territory before the peace conference. If it were a question of transfer, he would have to get approval of the French. Mr. Stalin replied that this concerned the Russian zone and that the French had nothing to do with it. Mr. Bevin inquired if the British could give away pieces of their zone without approval from the other governments. Mr. Stalin replied that in the case of Poland this could be done for they were dealing with a state which had no western border. This was the only such situation in the world. Mr. Bevin pointed out that the authority of the Control Commission was to extend over the whole [of] 1937 Germany. Mr. Byrnes said they all understood that the cession of territory was left to the peace conference. They had found a situation where Poland was administering with Soviet consent a good part of this territory. By this action the three powers agreed to the administration in the interim by Poland in order that there would be no further dispute between them in regard to the administration of the area by the Polish Provisional Government, He added that it was not necessary that the Poles have a representative on the Control Commission. 23 Mr. Bevin said he did not press the matter. He asked what would happen in this zone now. Would the Poles take over and the Soviet troops withdraw? Mr. Stalin said the Soviet troops would withdraw if this territory did not constitute a line of communications with their army in Germany. There were two roads there, one to Berlin to the north and the other to the south. These two roads were the ways by which the troops of Marshal Zhukov were supplied in the same way that Holland and Belgium were used by the British. Mr. Bevin inquired if these troops would be limited to the lines of communication. Mr. Stalin replied that they would. The Soviets had already removed four-fifths of their troops from Poland and they were contemplating a further reduction. As to the transfer of the territory to the Poles he pointed out that the territory was now actually already administered by Poles. There was no Russian administration. Mr. Bevin asked if Stalin could help them with this question of air communication. The Poles had not been able to manage this. They 24 wanted one or two planes a week and this involved the Soviet military command because they had to fly over the Russian zone. Mr. Stalin said that British planes now flew up to Berlin. Mr. Bevin asked if he could agree to their going to Warsaw. Mr. Stalin replied that this would have to be discussed with the Poles and that they could then agree if the Soviet planes could go to London and France. He said that as to communication to Moscow along this line, Russian pilots would fly the part of the route where they were and as to Russian needs for communication with France and London, French and British pilots would fly. Then they would have a line from Moscow to London. That was the way the Russians looked at the matter. Mr. Bevin said he was willing to discuss this but it was too big to decide at this meeting. He asked, however, that Stalin help them with the question of communications with Warsaw as a matter of convenience to the British. Mr. Stalin agreed to do all he could. The President said then they were all agreed on the Polish question. Mr. Bevin asked if they should inform the French of the changes in the Polish arrangement. Mr. Stalin said he thought that they should. This was agreed to. 25 Admission Into the United Nations Mr. Byrnes said that the American paper 26 had been circulated. Mr. Molotov suggested substituting “have no doubt” in place of “express the desire” in the fourth paragraph. He also suggested the word “will” instead of “shall” in the paragraph referring to freedom of the press. This was agreed to. Economic Principles for Germany The President said that this had been laid aside pending the reparation settlement. He supposed there would be no difficulty in agreeing to it now. Mr. Molotov said the Soviets had proposed a new paragraph 19, which he read. 27 Mr. Byrnes said he thought that now that they had agreed to the reparations plan that provided for delivery of a certain percentage to the Soviet Union there was no need for this paragraph in regard to imports and exports. Mr. Stalin agreed. It was agreed to drop paragraph 19. Mr. Byrnes proposed two changes, one relating to paragraph 13 28 which had reference to a common policy in regard to currency, banking, central taxation and customs. He also proposed a new [sub-] paragraph ( g ) in regard to transport and communications. 29 Mr. Byrnes proposed that the last sentence in subparagraph ( d ) of paragraph 14 be altered to read, “Except where determined by the occupying power concerned to be required for necessary imports, no grant or credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign persons or governments can be permitted.” Mr. Molotov asked if this would be applicable in all the zones. Mr. Byrnes replied of course. Mr. Bevin proposed that the whole sentence be deleted. Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Byrnes proposed that paragraph 18 be agreed to as a result of the reparations agreement. This was agreed to. Mr. Bevin pointed out that he had raised the question of first charges at the Foreign Ministers meeting yesterday. 30 Mr. Stalin pointed out that they had agreed to delete the whole paragraph. The President said that this was what he had understood. Mr. Bevin said he did not agree. Mr. Byrnes asked why they did not handle this in their own way since they were in control in their zone. Mr. Bevin replied because it cut across the agreement to treat Germany as a whole economy. It would divide Germany into three zones. Mr. Stalin said that for this purpose they would need a centralized German administrative machinery. This would be discussed and was the next point on the agenda. Mr. Bevin proposed that they then pass over this question until they had decided the question of political principles. Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviets had circulated a paper on the Ruhr. 31 Mr. Bevin said he could not discuss this without the French being present. It was a very big point of principle. Mr. Molotov asked if there were any doubts that the Ruhr should be considered a part of Germany. 32 The President said there were no doubts in his mind. Mr. Stalin suggested that they might postpone all points in the paper except the thought in the first paragraph. The President said the Ruhr was under the Control Council. Mr. Bevin asked why the matter was raised. Mr. Stalin replied that because at Tehran 33 the point had been raised that this whole region should be separated from Germany under the control of the great powers. Several months afterwards he had discussed this question with the British on the occasion of Churchill’s visit to Moscow and it had been said that perhaps it was a good thing to establish the Ruhr under an international control. 34 This discussion was a consequence of the consideration of the general dismemberment of Germany. Since then the views of the great powers had changed and dismemberment was considered inadvisable. The Russian Delegation would like to know if it were agreed that the Ruhr should not be detached. The President said his opinion was that the Ruhr was part of Germany and would be so administered under the Control Council. Mr. Stalin said the Soviets agreed but thought it should be mentioned somewhere. He asked if the British Delegation agreed. Mr. Bevin said he could not agree because he did not now have all of the previous discussions with him. He was aware that the idea of internationalizing the Ruhr to reduce the war potential of Germany had been discussed. He agreed that it remained under the administration of the Control Commission until it should be decided that it should be disposed of otherwise. He would want to discuss the question with his government and was willing that it should go to the Council of Foreign Ministers. This was agreed. Political Principles for Germany Mr. Bevin said the Soviet Delegation had circulated a draft on proposals for administrative machinery. 36 He proposed a short draft 36 in place of the long one submitted by Molotov. This draft was accepted. Mr. Bevin asked if paragraph 19 could go back to the committee to be reconsidered in the light of this decision. 37 Mr. Byrnes said he was agreeable. Mr. Molotov inquired if they had sufficient time. Mr. Bevin suggested it could be done immediately. Mr. Stalin agreed. Transfer of German Minorities Mr. Byrnes stated that he understood that the document on this question was acceptable, except for the last sentence. 38 He urged that the last paragraph be agreed to because it was necessary in order to make the document effective. Mr. Molotov pointed out that the document was intended to make this business orderly. It was apt to be misunderstood by the Polish, Czech and Hungarian Governments. He considered that it was hardly possible to adopt a decision here in Berlin without the Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments. This would create difficulties. The matter could have been arranged if these Governments had been represented here. Mr. Stalin stated that he was afraid that if the Conference adopted this document it could not be carried out. The fact of the matter was that officials of the Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments had taken the position which made the Germans want to leave. Such conditions have been created that it is impossible for the Germans to remain. Of course, the Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments could give their formal consent to this document, but such a decision would be a shot in the void. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the last paragraph contains a statement to the effect that the Governments named would be requested to suspend action pending consideration of these problems. If these Governments were not expelling Germans and were not forcing them to leave, the document would not, of course, have any effect. Otherwise, these Governments should be required to cooperate and to regulate these matters in an orderly manner. Of course, there was a difference in the statements of fact on this matter. It is our information that in some cases Germans have been forced to leave. Their departure for other countries increased burdens intolerably. It is only proposed to ask for the cooperation of these governments to the extent possible. Mr. Stalin replied that the Poles and Czechs would tell the Conference that their Governments had given no orders. The Germans have fled. However, if the others insisted, Mr. Stalin would agree. The President stated that he would appreciate very much the Marshal being able to agree. Perhaps the document would not change the situation very much, but it would help. Mr. Attlee agreed that the Conference ought to bring to the attention of these Governments the activities of their people. Mr. Stalin stated that he had no objection. Mr. Bevin inquired whether there was any objection to communicating the decision to the French. 39 The President stated that there was no objection and remarked that the French were in the Control Council. German Fleet and Merchant Marine Mr. Stalin stated that he wished to arrive at a final decision regarding the question of the German fleet. If the matter was not ready for discussion today, it could be decided tomorrow. The President replied that the Admiral 40 states that he is not ready. Mr. Stalin then suggested that it go on the agenda for tomorrow. The President agreed, although he stated that he had had it in mind to get away tomorrow. Mr. Stalin then argued that agreement in principle had already been reached, that one-third of the fleet be given to Russia. 41 However, details had not been worked out and he wished the problem to be determined. The President agreed that the committee would report tomorrow. Mr. Stalin then suggested that the Foreign Ministers might consider the matter. Mr. Byrnes noted that the committee acting on this question has hopes of agreement and will meet tonight. In order to save time, we should await their action. Mr. Stalin again stated that it had been decided that Russia would get one-third of the fleet, except submarines which would be submerged, and except for the fact that Russia had agreed that the merchant marine would be used in the war against Japan. 41 He wanted no further delays on this matter and asked that it be disposed of tomorrow. The President and Mr. Attlee agreed. Revision of Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary The President stated that the United States had presented a paper regarding the revision of the procedure in the Allied Control Commission in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Mr. Byrnes stated that a paper concerning the implementation of the Yalta agreement on liberated Europe 42 had been circulated and considered. Some parts had not been agreed to by the three delegations, but substantial agreement was reached on two paragraphs. He asked that these paragraphs be considered and read the American draft entitled “Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary” dated July 31, 1945. 43 Mr. Stalin insisted that this question was not on the agenda and stated that he would perhaps not object when he had had time to read it. The President suggested that Mr. Stalin read the document and that it be discussed tomorrow. It was agreed. Yugoslavia Mr. Stalin stated that the Soviet delegation had just circulated a paper on this question which was principally directed toward Greece. 44 Mr. Bevin pointed out his feeling that the British had put in one reasonable proposal regarding Yugoslavia 45 and that the Soviet delegation had thereupon promptly put in two. 46 Mr. Bevin suggested that all three be dropped. Mr. Stalin replied: “Yes, welcome.” The President indicated that he was satisfied. War Crimes The President then raised the matter of war crimes. Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation had agreed to accept as a basis for discussion the British document on this subject. 47 They had one small amendment to propose. After the word “criminals” in the last sentence the Soviet delegation proposed the insertion of “such as Goering, etc.” 48 Mr. Attlee pointed out that it was difficult to select defendants to be included. Perhaps they would want to put more in. He thought it was best to leave the selection of names of war criminals to people working with this problem. Mr. Stalin replied that the Soviet amendment did not imply that those named would necessarily be judged. The Soviet proposal states “such as.” He contended that we cannot further avoid mention of some persons. The people want war criminals to be named. If we keep silent regarding the names of these criminals, it will cast a shadow over our work. It would be a political gain to name these persons and European public opinion would be satisfied. If they are named as an example only, there can be no difficulty. If none of the names proposed were wrongfully accused, he could see no ground for objection. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that when the matter had been discussed yesterday he had agreed that it would be unwise to attempt to determine the guilt of certain individuals and name them. 49 Every country has its favorite Nazi war criminal and if the Conference failed to include such favorites it would be difficult to explain why they were not on the list. Mr. Stalin replied that that was why the Soviet amendment stated “such as … 50 and others.” Mr. Attlee stated that he could not see how a list of names would strengthen the document. He stated that he understood there is some doubt about whether Hitler was alive and he was not on the list. 51 Mr. Stalin replied that Hitler was not at our disposal. Mr. Attlee stated that the amendment gave instances. Mr. Stalin thereupon replied that he was willing to make a concession. Hitler should be added. 52 Mr. Attlee remarked that he thought the world well knew who were the major war criminals. Mr. Stalin agreed but stated that some people might think that we intended to save the major criminals if they were not mentioned. Mr. Byrnes thereupon stated that this morning he had talked to Justice Jackson, a Justice of the American Supreme Court who represented the United States on the War Crimes Commission 53 now in London. Justice Jackson had expressed the hope that the Commission meeting this afternoon or tomorrow morning would agree on an international tribunal. If the Marshal could instruct his representatives to try to reach agreement it would be well. Justice Jackson was telephoning Mr. Byrnes tomorrow morning concerning this tribunal. 54 An announcement on this subject would be good news to the people who favored a speedy trial for these war criminals. Mr. Stalin stated that this was another question. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that such an announcement could be included in the statement and make it very effective. Mr. Stalin insisted that if some of the most hated war criminals were not named the Conference’s decision would not have its full effect. He had consulted some Russian lawyers on this subject who agreed with him. The President remarked that since he expected to hear from the Conference in London tomorrow this could be discussed tomorrow together with the question of the German fleet. Mr. Stalin agreed. International Waterways The President stated that he was greatly interested in the matter now under discussion. He wished a discussion regarding the freedom of waterways and if possible a declaration on this subject. He had discussed this question at some length on July 23 55 and it had then been referred to a committee which he understood had never met. 56 The President stated that it was his honest opinion that some definite proposal should be worked out. European waterways had been a hot bed for breeding wars during European history. He believed that proper control would bring about very good results. He realized that it might not be possible to reach agreement at this Conference because of the necessity for detailed consideration, but he considered the matter to be of vital importance to the peace of Europe. Mr. Attlee stated that he was in general agreement with the President on this point. Mr. Stalin stated that this question had arisen in connection with the Black Sea Straits. He pointed out that the Black Sea Straits question has been postponed. Other parts of the question needed study in order to be decided. 57 Mr. Molotov interjected to state that it was a new question even for those of us who know this subject. The President then suggested that the matter be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. There would be plenty of time then to get the facts from experts. Mr. Stalin and Mr. Attlee agreed. Notification to Polish Government Regarding Polish Boundaries The President inquired whether it would be proper officially to notify the Polish Government of the decision reached regarding Polish boundaries. Mr. Stalin remarked that this would be a good thing. The President suggested the appointment of representatives of each country to notify the Polish Government. Mr. Stalin stated that Polish representatives should be invited to the meeting to be informed of the Conference’s decision. 58 The President stated “As you wish.” Communiqué Mr. Bevin stated that the issuance of the communiqué should be arranged. The President pointed out that a committee had been appointed and he understood that it was up to date. 59 The President asked about meeting times tomorrow. Mr. Stalin stated that it should be as the President liked. The President suggested 4:00 p.m. Mr. Byrnes interjected to state that the Foreign Ministers were meeting at 11:00 a.m. The President then asked whether the Big Three could meet at 3:00 p.m. Mr. Stalin agreed and stated that they should first meet at 3:00 p.m. and again in the evening. All agreed and the meeting adjourned. 60 1 Ante , p. 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] . 2 It has not been determined whether the document before the meeting was document No. 961 , post (as amended by document No. 962 , post ), or document No. 966 , post , or a suggested amendment to that paper incorporated in document No. 980 , post , or a document not found. None of the papers listed completely fits Byrnes’ description of the United States proposal. 3 Documents Nos. 1152 and 731 , post , respectively. 4 Document No. 1425 , post . 5 See ante , pp. 484–485 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 491–492 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] . 6 See ante , p. 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] . 7 See ante , p. 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , and document No. 1385 , post . 8 See ante , p. 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , and document No. 730 , post . 9 Document No. 1425 , post . 10 See post , p. 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 11 For reports from Zhukov to Stalin concerning American and British removals from the Soviet zone of occupation, see document No. 950 and attachment 2 to document No. 951 , post . Cf. document No. 951 , post . 12 This statement is attributed to Byrnes in the Cohen notes, post , p. 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . 13 This question is attributed to Byrnes in the Cohen notes, post , p. 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . 14 See ante , p. 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] . 15 See ante , p. 486, footnote 16 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] . 16 See document No. 958 , post . 17 The document referred to is presumably attachment 2 to document No. 951 , post . 18 This proposal is attributed to Bevin in the Cohen notes, post , p. 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . 19 The Russian text of document No. 1425 , post , is a one-page document. Bevin and Byrnes apparently had an English translation in which paragraphs 4 and 5 appeared on page 2. Cf. post , p. 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . 20 The Cohen notes ( post , p. 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] ) give these countries as “Yugoslavia, Greece, Belgium and Holland as well as France”. 21 Document No. 1152 , post . 22 The reference is presumably to the agreement on Poland reached at the Yalta Conference, sometimes referred to as the Yalta Declaration on Poland. See document No. 1417 , post , section vi . 23 Cf. document No. 1133 , post . 24 i. e., the British. 25 For the communication addressed to the French Government by the American Ambassador at Paris, see document No. 1398 , post . 26 Document No. 731 , post . 27 Not found. Cf. documents Nos. 872 , 873 , and 891 , post . 28 The paragraphs under discussion are those of the attachment to document No. 863 , post , or possibly of a later version of that document. 29 This appears to be the first proposed change, in which case the word “also” should be deleted from this sentence and inserted in the next. 30 See ante , pp. 490–491 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] . 31 Document No. 1027 , post . 32 This question is attributed to Stalin in the Cohen notes, post , p. 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . 33 The records of the Tehran Conference are scheduled for subsequent publication in a volume in this series. See Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1948), pp. 797–798. 34 See Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , p. 241. 36 Not found. Cf. document No. 1383 , post , section ii 9 ( iv ). 36 Not found. Cf. document No. 1383 , post , section ii 9 ( iv ). 37 Cf. ante , p. 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 38 The draft before the meeting has not been found as a separate document. For the agreed text, see document No. 1383 , post , section xiii ( xii ). 39 For the communication on this subject addressed to the French Government by the American Ambassador at Paris, see document No. 1397 , post . 40 According to the Cohen notes ( post , p. 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] ), Fleet Admiral Leahy stated at this point: “The committee will be ready in the morning.” Vice Admiral Cooke was the American naval member of the subcommittee working on this question. 41 See ante , pp. 118–122 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 41 See ante , pp. 118–122 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 42 This reference is probably to document No. 748 , post . For the text of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, see document No. 1417 , post , section v . 43 Document No. 828 , post . 44 Document No. 1423 , post . 45 See document No. 1083 , post . Cf. document No. 1202 , post . 46 The Cohen notes ( post , p. 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] ) suggest that the two Soviet proposals referred to were those on Greece ( document No. 1423 , post ), and on the Trieste–Istria district ( document No. 1211 , post ). 47 Document No. 1018 , post . 48 Cf. the Cohen notes, post , p. 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . 49 See ante , p. 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] . 50 Ellipsis in the original. 51 The Cohen notes ( post , p. 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] ) attribute this remark to Bevin. 52 Cf. post , p. 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . 53 i. e., the International Conference on Military Trials. 54 See document No. 1019 , post . 55 See ante , pp. 303–304 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 56 Cf. ante , p. 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] . 57 These remarks are attributed to Molotov in the Cohen notes, post , p. 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . 58 Cf. the Cohen notes, post , p. 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . See also post , p. 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , and documents Nos. 1153 and 1394 , post . 59 See ante , p. 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , and post , p. 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] . 60 At 7:15 p.m. See Log, ante , p. 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Cohen Notes Traman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, July 31, 1945, 4:00 p.m. Mr. Bevin reports for the Foreign secretaries. 1 Truman : The first point on the agenda is the United States proposal regarding reparations, Polish frontier, and admission into the United Nations of various categories of states. Mr. Byrnes presents reparations paper. Molotov : We should like to circulate our own draft. Byrnes : The United States proposal on reparations is one part of a proposal dealing with three controversial subjects. The other subjects are the western frontier of Poland and admission of states to the United Nations. The United States delegation has made it plain that concessions in proposals were conditioned on the acceptance of all three points. Stalin : The questions are not connected. Byrnes : The subjects are different but they have been before the Conference for two weeks. The United States is making concessions which it would not make except to obtain an all around settlement. As to the first question, reparations, United States proposes a [ that ] 25 percent of the industrial capital equipment determined to be unnecessary for the peace economy should be exchanged for an equivalent of food, coal, potash, timber and other articles from Soviet zone and additional 15 percent of such equipment not necessary for peace economy should be removed and transferred to Soviet [Union] on reparation account without further consideration. In our original proposal this equipment was to come from the Ruhr zone. In the foreign secretaries’ meeting the British said they could not agree if exactions were from the Ruhr only but could agree if they came from the three western zones. It was agreed that the only difference would be one of percentages and that the percentage would be just one-half of what was in the American proposal regarding the Ruhr; that is if all the unneeded equipment in the western zones is included, the percentages would drop to 12½ and 7½ percent. Molotov : Those figures were not agreed upon. Byrnes : They were suggested by the British and I agree that they are better from an administrative point of view and more advantageous to our Soviet friends. Stalin : We agreed, not only the Ruhr but all the zones should be considered. Byrnes : As to the reparations proposal, there were two or three suggestions made at the foreign secretaries’ meeting which ought to be adopted. There was the machinery for the determination of equipment not needed for peace, therefore available for reparations. The Soviet delegation stated that they wished to be specific as to how this should be done. This should be done by the Allied Control Commission in accordance with policies laid down by the reparations commission subject to the approval of the zone commander. I suggest determination be made by the Control Commission because four governments are on that Council and it is an administrative body while the reparations commission is a policy body. The removal of the industrial equipment should be completed in two years in exchange for instalments to be delivered over five years. It should also be stated that the reparations claims of other countries except Poland should be met from the western zones. My other proposals relating to Poland’s western frontier and the admission of states into the United Nations. The Polish paper gives to the Polish government the interim administration of all the territory they have asked for. The admission of states to the United Nations paper contains language which I hope meets the approval of the Soviet. It originally provides that the three governments in the near future should examine the question of the resumption of diplomatic relations with the satellites. The British stated that that presented constitutional difficulties for them. Mr. Churchill said they could recognize them 90% but not completely until peace was concluded. Finally, Marshal Stalin asked if the British would agree to recognize them completely or partially. I, therefore, suggest that we examine the question of diplomatic relations in the near future in the light of conditions prevailing to the full extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace. Our British friends have not been pleased but have agreed to accept this proposal in principle. Stalin : We have no objection in principle. Byrnes : The other changes are the insertion of a provision that the three governments expressed the desire that the representatives of the Allied press be given freedom to report developments in the satellite states. The language is substantially the same as used in the Polish paper. Stalin : I have an amendment. I should say three governments have no doubt that the Allied representatives will have freedom to report. Byrnes : That is satisfactory, is it not, Mr. President? Truman : Yes. Attlee : It is satisfactory to us. Byrnes : Those are my proposals. Stalin : Our suggestions are circulated, (paper read) Mr. Byrnes suggests tying three questions together. Mr. Byrnes can use such tactics as those if he wishes, but the Russian delegation will vote on each question separately. I have just read our suggestions on reparations. The Soviet delegation has accepted the view of the American delegation not to mention a definite amount. I must also read paper circulated on removals made from the Russian zone by the Americans and British. Today we have a report that American and British have taken 11,000 railroad cars. Should they be returned or compensated? You will see that the Russians are not the only ones to remove equipment. Truman : I think there should be a central transport authority for this purpose. Stalin : I want to make it clear that not only the Russians have sinned but the Americans and British have also. We should now be able to agree on reparations. Exactions should come from the three western zones. Part of the equipment will be exchanged for products for five years. Council determines the equipment to be removed from the western zone [ zones? ]. We want time limit when the amount of equipment to be removed is mentioned. Truman : We agree. Byrnes : We provide two years for the removal of equipment and five years for the exchange of products. Stalin : I have in mind a time limit for determination what equipment is to be removed, say three months. Bevin : That is not sufficient. Stalin : Let it be three or five months. Bevin : I will agree to six. Stalin : All right. I hope my friends will agree. Bevin : Your basis is 15 percent of the total. Our proposal was 15 percent of what was left after the retention of enough equipment to keep the economy going. I am sorry I can not support it. The Soviet refers to total industrial equipment. Our proposal refers to what is left after retention of what is needed for peace economy. Stalin : The Allied Control Commission determines what should be removed. Bevin : I must insist that the Control Commission first determine what is necessary for peace economy. Stalin : It is the same. Bevin : Will you accept our word [ wording ]? Stalin : What is the difference? Bevin : I don’t want any misunderstanding. Stalin : We have in mind 15 percent of what is to be removed and is not needed for peacetime industry. The Control Council decides. Byrnes : But we have it in our proposal. (Byrnes rereads his proposal regarding authority of control council.) 2 Stalin : I agree. Byrnes : If that is so, the only point in dispute is the percentage. You want 15 and 10 instead of 12½ and 7½. In addition you add on the second page of your proposal, you want shares in industrial and transport companies to the amount of 500 million dollars and 30 percent of foreign assets and 30 percent of gold. As to gold, our staff contends the ownership of this is identifiable. It is looted gold. It should be returned to its owners. Is the Soviet insisting on the five [ 500? ] million in shares in addition to increases in percentages of 30 percent of gold and foreign assets? Stalin : That is what we would like to have. Byrnes : What have you in mind in reference to foreign assets? Stalin : Assets that have been frozen. Byrnes : That is a matter to be determined by our Congress. The President has called my attention to the fact that the Congress has already determined this. There are claims of refugees. We could not make such an agreement. There will be claims for reimbursement of losses. Bevin : Yesterday we agreed on determination that France be added to the reparations committee. Stalin : I don’t object. Bevin : In regard to percentage we thought we had met you yesterday by agreeing to 12½ and 7½. We thought that was very liberal. Stalin : That was not liberal—just the opposite. Bevin : It was generous. Stalin : We have a different point of view. Bevin : I take it reparations will not interfere with the exchange of goods. We take it it involves no departure from our economic principles arrived at in our report of July 20. Stalin : These should be discussed. Bevin : The gold presents very great difficulties. As to German foreign assets, we could consider limiting this to neutral territory. Stalin : We could agree. Bevin : I do not know if my American friends can agree. Byrnes : We stand on our proposals and we can not accept the additional point added by the Soviets. Stalin : Then we should increase the percentage. You have taken equipment from our zone. Truman : We have been informed by the Russians of these alleged removals. We have asked General Eisenhower to investigate. The removals were not authorized by the American government and you need not worry about them. Stalin : I quite accept it. Truman : Neither were any people removed by the authorities. We have too many people to take care of now. Stalin : Let us agree to the percentages 15 and 10. Truman : I agree if our British friends do. Stalin : I agree. Bevin : Take out paragraph 4 and I will give you 12½ and 10 percent. Stalin : Paragraph 5 remains. If America agrees will not the British agree? You need not worry about France. She signed an armistice with Hitler. Neither Great Britain, Holland, nor Belgium broke the common front. France did. Bevin : But we must also take care of Yugoslavia, Greece, Belgium and Holland as well as France. 3 I want nothing but raw materials. Neither Holland nor Belgium broke the common front as France did. Byrnes : In the proposal of the American delegation, it is stated that claims other than Poland should be met from the western zone. I ask you to consider the language of that proposal. Stalin : You wish not to mention the names of the countries? We have no objection. Bevin : My impression is that this will give you more than 50 percent of the reparations. Stalin : No, less than 50 percent. The 15 percent is in exchange. Our proposals are the minimum. We received [ receive? ] from you only 10 percent. Bevin : I will give you 17½ percent on exchange and 7½ on the free. Stalin : That is your suggestion. Bevin : I think that it is better. Stalin : We receive only 7½ percent then? I think 15 and 10 is fair. Bevin : Well, I will agree. Truman : The next question is Poland. Byrnes : I need not read the proposal. I hope our British and Soviet friends will agree. Bevin : I think the document should be read. Byrnes reads the proposal, indicating that the Poles are to have provisional administration of the area bounded by the Oder and the Western Neisse. Bevin : I have been instructed to hold for the eastern Neisse. Does it mean that the zone will be handed over to the Poles entirely and that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn? I have met the Poles on this question and in the light of the declaration in the United States document, I have asked them what their intention really is because any change of a territory must be defended in Parliament. That defense will be effected but what will happen in the new Poland? I asked the Poles their intention in regard to free election[s] on universal suffrage. They assured me that they will hold elections as soon as possible, not later than January, 1946, subject to conditions beyond their control. They also agreed to the freedom of the press. They gave assurance on the freedom of religion. But one very important matter is repatriation of troops. I asked them if they would make a declaration so we would be sure that they would receive equal treatment. Another point which concerns the Soviets and ourselves that the Poles can not settle with us is the establishment of an air service between Poland and London so as to enable His Majesty’s Government to maintain regular communications with the embassy at Warsaw. I should like an agreement on that immediately. In the United States document it says area under the administration of Polish state and not part of Soviet occupation. That means it is under Poles for all matters. Truman : That is subject to the peace treaty. It is only for administration. Bevin : Although it is under the Polish administration, technically it is under Allied control. I only wish to get this point clear. If it is a transfer, would I not have to get French approval? Stalin : The French have nothing to do with it. It is the Russian zone. Bevin : Can we do this, Marshal, without the consent of those on the Control Council? Stalin : In this case, yes. The Polish state must have a border but it is subject to the final decision of the Peace Conference. Bevin : I want to settle this but does not the Control Council agreement give it jurisdiction over Germany with its 1937 boundaries? I don’t press the point. What happens in this zone? The Poles take over and the Soviet forces withdraw. Stalin : The Soviet troops would withdraw if territory did not constitute a line of communication with our troops in Germany. There are two communication lines running through Poland. These are the routes through which our armies are fed just as your[s] are fed through the roads of Belgium and Holland. Bevin : Troops are limited to your communication needs? Stalin : Yes. We have already removed four divisions of our troops and we contemplate further reduction by agreement with Polish government. This zone is now actually administered by the Poles. Bevin : Could you help in this interim period with this air communication? We only want one or two planes a week taking in and out officials and mail. The Soviet military command is involved. We must fly over Russian zone. Stalin : They fly now over the Russian zone to Berlin. Bevin : Can you agree to Warsaw? Stalin : This must be discussed with the Poles. We can agree if our planes can go to London from France. As to communication to Warsaw, you could use Russian pilots from France. We would use French and British pilots. Bevin : That is too complicated to settle here. It would assist if we could settle Warsaw–London communication here. Stalin : I will do all I can. Truman : This settles the Polish question. Stalin : Stettin is in the Polish territory. Bevin : Yes. We should inform the French. Stalin : Yes. Truman : Next question. Mr. Byrnes will speak. Byrnes : This is the proposal regarding the admission of states to the United Nations. Bevin : We agree. Stalin : Mr. Molotov will speak. Molotov : Amendment to paragraph 4. We want to say the governments have no doubt instead of the governments express their wish that the Allied press will have full freedom to report. Truman : A few other things. Economic principles for Germany were postponed. There should be no trouble now. Molotov : Paragraph 19. Our draft deals with priority of reparations. Byrnes : Since we have agreed to reparations plans giving the Soviet claim to equipment only, there is no need for this paragraph. Stalin and Molotov : That is right. There is no need for it at all. Byrnes : In this paper there are two amendments I should like to submit. On page 2 there is enumerated a common policy embracing various items. The section regarding the currency should read currency, banking, central taxation and customs. A new subheading should also be added to include transportation and communication. Truman : That takes care of your freight cars. Stalin : There will be need for central machinery. Byrnes : My suggestion on page 3, paragraph 14, amendment on extension of credit. No credit except where determined by occupying power necessary to pay for imports. In view of reparations agreement it would not affect our Soviet friends. Stalin : This would be applicable in all zones. Byrnes : Yes. Bevin : I propose we delete sentence altogether. Stalin : I agree. Byrnes : For the same reason we propose deletion of paragraph 18. Bevin : We propose approved imports should be first charge on proceeds on exports from current production. Stalin : There is no necessity for this. Byrnes : You have control in your zones. Bevin : But this is cutting the zones up. The [ That ] presents great difficulty. Molotov : We have circulated a paper on the Ruhr. In this draft the Ruhr should be part of Germany but there should be a control by four powers and a four power council. Bevin : I can’t discuss this without the French. It is an important point of principle. They are vitally affected. Stalin : Is theie any doubt that the Ruhr should be considered part of Germany? Truman : Not for purposes of the occupation and control. Stalin : Let us confine ourselves to the paragraph that the Ruhr is a part of Germany and under the control council. Stalin : Perhaps we should mention it. This question is being raised because at Tehran the point was raised that the Ruhr should be made a region separate from Germany under the great powers. When Churchill visited Moscow he was favorable to the separation of the Ruhr. This idea was the consequence of the principle of dismemberment. Since then the views of the leaders have changed and they think dismemberment inadvisable. The Russian delegation wants to know if the Ruhr is to remain with Germany. Truman : The Ruhr is part of Germany and is under the jurisdiction of the Control Council. Bevin : I can [not] agree on this question now. I know that the internationalization of the Ruhr has been discussed, but it must remain under the Control Commission pending further discussion. I should be quite willing for this to go to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Truman : That is agreeable to me. I think the American delegation has circulated a paper regarding the Allied property in the satellite countries. Bevin : Before going into that, I should like to discuss the Soviet amendment to the economic [ political ] principles for Germany which would authorize the establishment of Central Germany and [ central German ] administrative agencies to assist the Control Council. I have a redraft of the Soviet amendment. It is really a short version of the Soviet proposal. Stalin : It is acceptable to us. Truman : We accept it. Bevin : I should also like to suggest paragraph (9) [ 19 ] of the economic principle[s] should go back to the Economic Committee [ Subcommittee ] for further consideration. Stalin : When will the committee discuss it. Truman : Immediately. The next question relates to the transfer of populations from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Byrnes : My understanding is that the proposal was agreed to by the committee except for the last paragraph requesting the deferment of further expulsions pending report of the Control Council. I urge acceptance of the last paragraph. Molotov : The document intended to make all this business orderly. That is the way it can be understood by the Poles and the Czechs, but it is not possible to adopt the decision without hearing the Poles and the Czechs. Stalin : If we adopt the decision it could not be carried out. The Germans themselves prefer to get away because of conditions. If we adopt the decision proposed it would be a shot in the void. Byrnes : There is a difference in the information that we have received. According to our information these expulsions are forcible. Stalin : I will agree if you insist. Attlee : These governments should realize that they are creating a burden for other countries. Stalin : I have no objection. Bevin : I wish the French to be notified of this decision. Truman : Next item is the German Fleet. Stalin : We should like a final decision today, if not today, tomorrow. Truman : I agree, although I had hoped to get away. Leahy : The committee will be ready in the morning Stalin : As the principle has been decided on, perhaps we could leave this for the Foreign Ministers. Byrnes : We may be able to settle it here. Stalin : It has been decided that we get one-third of the Navy, except the submarines, the greater part of which are to be sunk and that the merchant fleet will be at the disposal of the Allied Command for use in the war [against Japan] and decide it at the end of the war. Let us settle it here. Truman : I agree that it should be settled before we leave. We now consider our paper on the implementation of the Yalta Agreement. Byrnes : Most of our proposal was not agreed to. The committee has simply agreed on two paragraphs for revised and improved procedures for the Allied Control Commission in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Stalin : The question was not on the agenda. We may not object until [ after? ] we have read it. Truman : We will defer it until tomorrow. Molotov : We have circulated the draft on Greece yesterday. We circulated the paper [on] Trieste. Bevin : We presented a reasonable request regarding Yugoslavia. In view of the lateness of the hour, I do not think we can consider Greece or Yugoslavia, or Trieste. Stalin : We will drop it then. Truman : The next item relates to the war criminals. Molotov : The Soviet delegation agrees to accept the British draft with one amendment. The amendment is in the last sentence after the words “War criminals”. We wish to add specific names “Such as Goering, Hess, Rosenberg, Ribbentrop, etc.” Attlee : It is not wise to put in names. Stalin : We merely suggest that such people as Goering and Ribbentrop be tried. If we remain silent it will cast a shadow on our prestige. If we name persons as an example we do not leave out the others. It is no offense to the prosecution. It will be helpful politically. Byrnes : Yesterday I urged it was unwise to name names. Every country has its favorite criminal. It will be difficult to explain to each country why its pet criminal was not named. Stalin : We suggest only “such as”. Bevin : There is some doubt whether Hitler is alive. He is not on the list. Stalin : But he is not in our hands. I quite agree that Hitler should be hanged. Attlee : The world knows quite well who are the major criminals. Stalin : But if we remain silent the world thinks we want to save them and to go after only the minor ones. Byrnes : This morning I spoke to Justice Jackson. He expressed the hope that this afternoon or tomorrow morning his committee might reach an agreement. If Stalin could urge his representatives to agree an announcement as to the agreement on a tribunal and place a [ of ] trial could be made. This would be good news. Stalin : That is another question. Byrnes : We could include it in our statement. Stalin : If we do not mention criminals known co the whole world by names our work will not have the same worth. Russian lawyers advise us that naming the defendants help them and give them the needed orientation. Truman : I have been interested in the freedom of waterways. I should like to have some discussion of my paper on this subject. The committee appointed for this purpose never met. Some policy regarding the Rhine and Danube should be worked out. It would be a great preventative of future wars. I do uot expect an agreement on details here, but it should be discussed. Attlee : I am in general agreement with the President. Molotov : This question has arisen in connection with the Straits and that question has been proposed postponed ]. The question of internal waterways requires study. We need people who know something about it. Truman : I suggest the matter be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Stalin : All right. Attlee : We agree. Truman : Would it be proper to notify the Polish officials of our decision on the Polish Boundary. Stalin : The President, as our chairman, can act or designate others to act for or with him to advise the Poles on our decision. Truman : The Foreign section [ Secretaries ] will meet at 11:00 o’clock tomorrow and we will meet at 3:00. Adjourned. 1 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the minutes, supra . 2 Concerning discrepancies in the attribution of this and other statements made at this meeting as between the minutes and the Cohen notes, see the footnotes to the minutes, supra . 3 Cf. the minutes, ante , p. 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3145 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 31, 1945, 4:00 p.m. Summary of Meeting of Heads of Government, July 31, 1945 1. German Reparations . The U. S. draft on this subject 2 was accepted with the following changes: a . The figure of 12½% for compensated deliveries to the Soviets was changed to 15% and the figure of 7½% for uncompensated deliveries was changed to 10%. b . France was added to the Reparations Commission for the purpose of determining equipment available for reparations. c . Six months was fixed as the final term for determination of the amount of equipment available for reparation. A subcommittee was named to prepare the final draft on this subject. 2. Polish Western Frontier . The U. S. draft on this subject was accepted. It was further agreed ( a ) that Stettin should be considered as included within the area of Polish administration; (6) that the French should be informed of the decision on the Polish frontier; and ( c ) that the President should notify the Poles of this decision. 3. Admission to the United Nations . The U. S. paper on this subject was approved with three minor verbal changes. 4. German Economic Principles . Several U. S. suggestions were approved including the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 14 d . Paragraph 18 was dropped. Paragraph 19 was referred to the Economic Subcommittee for final consideration. 5. The Ruhr . On the motion of Mr. Bevin the Soviet proposal on this subject was referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The U. S. and Soviets were in agreement that the Ruhr is a part of Germany and all three governments were in agreement that the Ruhr is under the authority of the Control Commission. 6. German Political Principles . The British redraft of the Soviet proposal for an additional point on a central German administration was accepted. 7. Transfer of German Populations From Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary . The U. S. paper on this subject was accepted. It was agreed that this decision should be communicated to the French. 8. Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine . It was agreed that the subcommittee dealing with this subject should present its report tomorrow. 9. Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary . It was agreed that the U. S. proposal on this subject should be discussed tomorrow. 10. Yugoslavia . It was agreed to drop both the British and Soviet proposals on this subject. 11. War Crimes . This question was put over until tomorrow. The Russians agreed to the British text on this subject except that they wish to insert some of the names of the principal war criminals. 12. Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways . It was agreed that this question should be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 For the documents referred to in this summary, see the footnotes to the minutes, ante , pp. 511–528 [ Pgs. 511–528 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3145 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] United States Delegation Memorandum 1 Potsdam, July 31, 1945, 4:00 p.m. Pending Questions Before the Conference, Close of Business, July 31, 1945 1. German Reparations . A subcommittee is to present a draft embodying the agreement reached today. 2. German Economic Principles . The economic subcommittee is to present a final draft on this subject, particularly in regard to paragraph 19. 3. Italian Reparations . As no decision has been reached on this question, the Soviets may raise it again. 4. Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine . The subcommittee on this question will report tomorrow. 5. Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary . The U. S. paper 2 on this subject will come up for discussion tomorrow. 6. War Crimes . The Soviets have approved the British draft 3 but the question of whether or not certain prominent war criminals should be named remains open. 7. Use of Allied Property for Satellite Reparations or “War Trophies ”. The U. S. paper 4 on this subject has not yet been acted upon. 8. German External Assets . The U. S. proposal 5 on this subject is still before the economic subcommittee. 9. Oil for Western Europe . The economic subcommittee has not yet reported on the U. S. proposal 6 on this subject. 10. Allied Oil Equipment in Rumania . The latest British proposal 7 on this subject has not yet been acted upon. 11. Directive to the Military Commanders in Germany . The subcommittee is awaiting completion of the work of the Conference in relation to Germany. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 See document No. 828 , post . 3 Document No. 1018 , post . 4 Document No. 842 , post . 5 Document No. 1000 , post . 6 Document No. 1320 , post . 7 Document No. 841 , post . Harriman conversation with members of the Polish Delegation, afternoon or early evening Harriman conversation with members of the Polish Delegation, afternoon or early evening 1 1 All information on this conversation is drawn from document No. 1393 , post . Present United States Poland 2 Mr. Harriman 2 It has not been determined who represented Poland at this conversation. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)] Editor’s Note —No United States record of this conversation has been found. For Mikołajczyk’s diary entry concerning the conversation, see document No. 1393 , post . Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee, evening Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Mr. Brown 1 United Kingdom 2 Mr. Golunsky 3 1 Foote was also named as a United States member of this subcommittee (see ante , p. 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ), but it is not known whether he attended this meeting. 2 The British members of this subcommittee were Bridges, Brook, Hayter, and Dean (see ante , p. 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ). It is not known which of these members represented the United Kingdom at this meeting. 3 Sobolev was also named as a Soviet member of this subcommittee (see ante , p. 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ), but it is not known whether he attended this meeting. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] Editor’s Note —No official minutes of the discussions in the Communiqué Subcommittee have been found. Brown’s diary entry for July 31, however, contains the following reference to this meeting: “… Communiqué Committee met after Big Three meeting. We were well up with our work. …” Brown’s report of August 1 to Byrnes indicates that agreement was reached in the Subcommittee on July 31 on the inclusion in the Communiqué of “a single sentence stating Chiefs of Staffs of the three Governments conferred’ on military matters of common interest.’ “See document No. 1380 , post Cf. the following passage in Brown’s diary entry for August 1: “In first draft, I had confined military talks to affairs in Europe. Golunski wanted limitation stricken to appear military talks included Japanese war.” Cf. post , page 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] . Truman–Bierut conversation, 10 a.m. Truman–Bierut conversation, 10 a.m. 1 1 The time of this conversation is drawn from Mikołajczyk’s diary of the Conference. The list of participants is taken from document No. 1394 , post . Present United States United Kingdom President Truman President Bierut Secretary Byrnes Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk Mr. Bohlen Vice President Grabski Mr. Harriman Mr. Modzelewski Mr. Żebrowski 2 2 Żebrowski served as interpreter. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] Editor’s Note —Truman reported at the Twelfth Plenary Meeting (see post , page 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] ) “that the President of the Polish Provisional Government and members of the Polish Delegation had called on him this morning and he had informed them of the action which the Conference had taken with respect to Poland.” No other United States record of this conversation has been found. For Mikołajczyk’s minutes of the conversation, see document No. 1394 , post . Eleventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:25 a.m. Eleventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:25 a.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Bevin Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gromyko Mr. Clayton Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Page Major Theakstone Mr. Gusev [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)]] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 11:25 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)]] Rapporteur’s Report Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 11:25 a.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–145 Department of State Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 11:25 a.m. top secret The final meeting of the Foreign Ministers opened at 11:25 a.m. on August 1, 1945 under the chairmanship of Mr. Byrnes. German Reparations Mr. Byrnes stated that he would read a list of questions which were pending. First was the question of German Reparations. He inquired whether the Committee [ Subcommittee ] was ready to report and stated that he was informed that this Committee was now in session. Therefore, for the time being the subject would be passed over. He believed Mr. Vyshinski was on the subcommittee and wondered whether there was anything Mr. Vyshinski could say. Mr. Vyshinski replied that the subcommittee had examined this matter and that some questions were in a state of suspense. Also new questions had arisen. Mr. Byrnes stated his assumption that the Committee would not be able to report in this case. Mr. Molotov agreed. Mr. Byrnes announced that the subject would therefore be submitted to the Big Three at 3 p.m. Mr. Vyshinski stated that this had been assumed. Mr. Byrnes suggested that the agenda for the Big Three be prepared as the meeting progressed. German Economic Principles The second question concerned German economic principles. The same subcommittee had this question and was drafting on it, particularly on paragraph 19. 1 Mr. Molotov pointed out that not one economist was present. Mr. Bevin interjected to state that the meeting might settle the matter if the economists were absent. German Fleet Mr. Byrnes stated that the third question concerned the disposition of the German fleet. He understood that there was a division of opinion on this subject and wondered whether it could be discussed profitably at this meeting. Mr. Molotov pointed out that members of the Committee were not present. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had received a report 2 from the U. S. representative and assumed that the British and Soviet delegates had also received reports. He inquired whether this is true. Mr. Molotov suggested that the members of the Committee be called in since he did not know about their last conclusions. Mr. Byrnes remarked that he had been advised regarding the differences of opinion and that the British Foreign Minister had also received information. If members of the Committee were called in the question could be discussed. Mr. Molotov then stated that he would try to become acquainted with recent developments while the meeting was in session. He went on to suggest an adjournment of ten minutes when the representatives arrived in order that the matter might be studied. War Crimes Mr. Byrnes then raised the matter of war crimes which had not been settled by the Big Three. 3 The British draft on this subject 4 had the approval of the U. S. delegation and the substantial approval of the Soviet delegation which desired, however, to name certain criminals. Mr. Bevin stated that the British delegation was opposed to naming the specific criminals and felt on this matter like the American delegation. He thought that it would be misunderstood if it was done before the court sat. It would contravene certain principles upon which the British Judiciary works. The British therefore feel strongly that the British proposal meets the case. It also feels that every step should be taken in our power to get on with the trials at the earliest possible moment. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the U. S. delegation, as stated yesterday, feels that the determination of prisoners to be prosecuted should be left to the prosecutors selected by the three governments and that the decision should not be taken from them. 5 He hoped that our Soviet friends could agree. Mr. Molotov suggested reference to the Big Three. Mr. Byrnes agreed. Allied Property Used in Satellite Reparations Mr. Byrnes next raised the matter of the use of Allied property in the settlement of satellite reparations. Mr. Molotov pointed out that on this question it was difficult to do without the Commission [ without consideration by a subcommittee? ] particularly since the proposal had only been received yesterday. Mr. Byrnes replied that the proposal 6 had been circulated on the 25th of July. Mr. Molotov insisted that that had been a different document. Mr. Byrnes stated his belief that he was misunderstood. He asked for the consideration of the document circulated on the 25th which referred to the property of Allied nationals. Mr. Molotov again asked whether they were discussing the July 25th document. Mr. Byrnes confirmed this. Mr. Bevin then asked for a copy. Mr. Molotov stated that it was probable that the July 25th document had not been circulated at a regular meeting but had been distributed in a Committee. He and Mr. Vyshinski had only seen this document yesterday. It is an important question which should be given full consideration. He again wondered how the meeting could proceed without the commission. He asked whether the commission could consider the matter today. Mr. Byrnes agreed and stated that a Committee would be appointed. Mr. Bevin again asked which document was meant and read one before him. Mr. Byrnes agreed that this was the document. Mr. Molotov interjected that Mr. Bevin knew as little about it as the Russians. He pointed out that there were two documents. Mr. Byrnes asked to look at the two documents and then stated that on July 25 the paper in Mr. Byrnes’ hand regarding the removal of Allied property from Rumania [ Germany ] 7 had been circulated. On the same day another one regarding the use of Allied property in satellite reparations 8 had been distributed. This was the one which he wished to have discussed. Mr. Molotov inquired about the first document. Mr. Byrnes stated that the paper referring to Germany was withdrawn. He would not ask for consideration. Mr. Bevin stated that the question now concerned the appointment of a drafting committee. Mr. Byrnes named Mr. Russell and Mr. Cannon. Mr. Molotov named Mr. Gusev and Mr.———. 9 Mr. Bevin named Mr. Turner and Mr. Coulson. German External Assets Mr. Byrnes stated that the next paper circulated concerned German external assets. 10 This subject was before the economic subcommittee and would have to be passed. Oil for Western Europe Mr. Byrnes stated that the document regarding oil for Western Europe 11 was also before the Economic Subcommittee which was waiting to hear from the Soviet representative. Allied Oil Equipment in Rumania Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the latest British proposal regarding Allied oil equipment in Rumania 12 had not yet been acted upon. Mr. Molotov stated that on this question the Soviet delegation had made a written proposal 13 to the British five days ago. Mr. Bevin asked whether he would receive this written proposal today. Mr. Molotov repeated that it had been sent several days ago, probably on July 28. Mr. Bevin then stated that he had the document before him now. Mr. Bevin pointed out that there were real differences between the British and Soviet drafts since the British have proposed arbitration and the Soviet proposal was for a joint Soviet-British investigating committee. Mr. Molotov stated that this Commission would make a general spot investigation of all documents and facts. Mr. Bevin replied that the British preferred a neutral, since investigation on a lower level would mean no agreement. Mr. Molotov replied that until now the question had been discussed on a diplomatic level. The Soviet Government now proposes that representatives of both sides should be appointed to investigate. Neither the documents nor the facts in this case have been examined. Mr. Bevin wished to know what would happen when the investigation had been made. Mr. Molotov stated that they hoped for a settlement. If the Committee failed, however, the next step should be examined. However, no investigation had yet been made. Mr. Byrnes stated that he wished to add that when the paper on this subject 14 had been presented, the U. S. delegation had pointed out that American as well as British interests were invloved. 15 Therefore any Commission must have an American representative. Mr. Molotov replied that so far as the American proposal was concerned, a bilateral commission should also be set up. Mr. Byrnes agreed. He thought that they should first make an effort to settle this matter between themselves. He pointed out that American experts have been there for several weeks but up to now have been unable to obtain any agreement from the Soviet experts. He thought that the orderly way to settle this matter is for Mr. Molotov to have his experts meet ours. Mr. Bevin stated that he wished clarification. He inquired whether it was proposed to set up two bilateral commissions. Mr. Molotov replied that he had suggested two bilateral investigations. Mr. Byrnes asked whether a date could be agreed upon since our experts were already there. He suggested a meeting in 10 days. Mr. Molotov agreed. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this meeting would be in Rumania. Mr. Molotov stated that it would be on the basis of their documents. Mr. Byrnes asked that the investigation not be limited by any document. Mr. Molotov agreed that the Commission should discuss this matter. Mr. Byrnes insisted that the Commission should not be limited by a document but should be permitted to investigate the facts. Mr. Molotov stated that the Russians would not limit discussions. Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Bevin stated his assumption that steps would be taken to give all necessary facilities to the experts to go about in Rumania. Mr. Molotov replied that this went without saying. Both the British and Russians would take the necessary steps. Protocol Mr. Byrnes then stated that he had been advised by the Protocol Committee of certain differences. He wished to know whether his colleagues had also received a report on this subject in order that the points of difference could be discussed. He stated that the questions before the meeting are: 1. Trusteeship Territories. Mr. Molotov interjected to state that the Soviet delegation had circulated a document regarding activities in Germany and Austria hostile to the Soviet Union. 16 Mr. Bevin stated that this document had been sent to London for the preparation of a reply. Mr. Molotov asked whether it could not be agreed that the British and American delegates will insist upon a rapid investigation of this case and take measures to stop such activities. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had thought that we had made it plain that we had taken steps to investigate. An inquiry had been sent to the Army Commander. 17 Mr. Molotov suggested that the meeting might confine itself to the following: The American and British Delegates had taken steps to investigate and will let the Soviet Government know of the results and also stated that activities of hostile organizations will not be tolerated. Mr. Byrnes repeated that we have asked for a report from our Army Commander. If he reports that there is nothing to these allegations there will be nothing to do. If these statements are substantially correct, proper steps will be taken. Mr. Molotov asked whether if it were evident that such organizations existed, then they would not be tolerated. Mr. Byrnes replied that when a report was received, it would be sent to Mr. Molotov. Then there could be a discussion of the steps to be taken. Mr. Bevin pointed out that at Crimea we had undertaken not to allow hostile activities against the U. S. S. E. 18 Therefore he could see no necessity for another document. If the Soviet Union had complaints to the effect that such activities were being carried on contrary to the agreement, attention should be called to that fact as had been done. It would then be our duty to act in accord with the spirit of the agreement. Mr. Molotov agreed that this was sufficient. He went on to refer to another document presented by the Soviet Union regarding the repatriation of Soviet citizens coming from the Baltic and the Western Ukraine who were now in Norway and England. 19 This document had been circulated on July 29. The memo was of primary interest to the British. Mr. Bevin stated his belief that this case which had been handed to him after his arrival would be an easy matter to settle through diplomatic channels. He had asked London to go into it immediately and he undertook to deal with it immediately upon his return. Mr. Molotov stated that this is satisfactory. Mr. Molotov went on to state that he was going to circulate another document dealing with complaints received from citizens who state that the agreement with the Soviet Union regarding Soviet prisoners of war is not being observed. This was a sore question with the Soviet Union. Many Soviet nationals had not yet been returned to their homes despite the fact that the war had been over for some time. He wished to ask that Soviet representatives on repatriation be admitted to camps where Soviet nationals were held. Mr. Bevin pointed out that this matter had nothing to do with the Protocol. Mr. Byrnes replied that Mr. Molotov had asked for delay in consideration of the Protocol in order that other matters could be taken up. Mr. Molotov continued that the question was contained in the document circulated beforehand [ just circulated? ]. 20 He had no other questions if his colleagues promised to assist on this. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had been informed that our military was doing everything in their power. They want all of these people to return. We have enough people to feed without encouraging other people to remain. Mr. Molotov could rest assured that we would do everything possible to facilitate this matter. Mr. Molotov repeated that he wished to have some attention paid to this question which was a burning one. There were many complications. Trusteeship Territories Mr. Byrnes again referred to disputed questions before the Protocol Committee. The first question under dispute concerned trusteeship territories. He was informed that the Soviet representative had taken the position that the proposal should mention that the Soviet Government intended to raise with the Council of Foreign Ministers the disposal of all territories subject to trusteeship. 21 The U. S. and British delegations want agreement among the [Big] Three to limit discussion to the disposal of Italian territory. They felt that only this could be mentioned in the Protocol. Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviet memorandum 22 which was circulated dealt with two questions. The first concerned the Italian colonies and the second the League of Nations Mandates. The Soviet question had been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. The Soviet delegation had agreed. 23 He wished to ask that in drawing up the Protocol there should be a short recapitulation of the Soviet memorandum inserted with the conclusion that the declaration had been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. He wished to ask that the tone of the Soviet memorandum be reflected in the Protocol. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this was not in accord with his recollection of the action taken by the Big Three. The fact is that the Soviet paper had asked for consideration of the whole question. Nevertheless discussion at the table was limited to Italian Colonies. The U. S. delegation contended that the question of what should be done to the Italian Colonies depended in the first instance on whether the Colonies would be separated from Italy. This question should be determined in the Peace Treaty, originally to be prepared in the Council of Foreign Ministers and therefore the question regarding trusteeship for Italian Colonies should be settled in the London Council of Foreign Ministers. The question of trusteeship as presented in the Soviet request was much broader and it was not his understanding that the Big Three had agreed to refer it to the Council of Foreign Ministers. In the discussion reference had been made to the language of the United Nations Charter 24 which provided for agreement in certain circumstances 25 but he did not understand that the Big Three had agreed to refer the whole question of trusteeships to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Molotov stated that he would not press this matter. He would accept the wording of the British proposal with a slight amendment. He stated that the amendment would read as follows: (He read). 26 Mr. Byrnes agreed. Black Sea Straits Mr. Byrnes next raised the question of the Black Sea Straits. He stated that on this question he did not think there would be much trouble in reaching agreement. The Soviet draft had referred to the recognition of “necessity”. The British draft had mentioned “need”. 27 Mr. Molotov stated that he had no objection to “need”. Western Frontier of the U. S. S. R. Mr. Byrnes stated that the third question concerns the Western Frontier of the U. S. S. R. There are a number of questions in dispute here including the title and the Soviet representative had also objected to certain qualifying words which make it clear that the arrangement is provisional and subject to the peace settlement. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the President had taken a position on all discussions such as this that it must be understood that the cession of territory would have to be left until the peace settlement. 28 Mr. Molotov stated that everyone agreed to this. Mr. Byrnes replied that it seemed to him then that we should be careful to use language which would not mislead people into believing that we intended an immediate transfer of territory. The question was no doubt misunderstood because of the difference in language. The word “transfer” would in English carry a meaning of the cession of territory. 29 Mr. Molotov suggested an amendment to the title which would read “pending final settlement of territorial questions at the peace settlement”. Mr. Byrnes asked what difference the title made as long as the Soviet Union got the territory it wanted. Mr. Molotov asked for suggestions. Mr. Byrnes replied that as long as there is no difference between us, they should be able to find words. He suggested that the title be changed to “city of Koenigsberg and Adjacent Area”. Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin agreed. Mr. Molotov went on to state that there were certain difficulties in the text. If his colleagues agreed to his language, there would no longer be any difficulty. Mr. Bevin stated that he had read what Mr. Churchill had said 30 and this draft 31 expressed Churchill’s thought clearly. He wanted to keep as close to the undertakings given by Churchill as possible. He suggested that Molotov agree to the British draft and then the Conference would be unanimous. Mr. Molotov pointed out that he also had a good text. 32 Mr. Bevin then asked that the British draft be read and added that he thought it was all right. His interpreter read the draft. Mr. Molotov stated that this was all right except for the word “provisionally”. The same paragraph said “pending final decision”. The idea had already been expressed. He proposed that the word “provisionally” be deleted in the first paragraph. Mr. Byrnes stated that he agreed that the only reason he could see for this difference is that the question had been raised. There must be a meeting of minds. So long as we agree with “a transfer pending final determination”, he would not insist on this word. He again asked Mr. Molotov whether he agreed that there is no question but that this is a transfer pending final determination. Mr. Molotov replied “Of course”. Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin then agreed to strike out the word “provisionally”. Mr. Molotov then suggested that the last part of the sentence reading “subject to expert examination” be deleted. Mr. Bevin stated that this wording is vital to the British. Churchill, speaking for the British, had made it quite clear. The Soviet delegation had at that time made no objection to these experts. He thought that during all history boundaries had been determined in such a manner. Mr. Molotov agreed that it could not be otherwise. There would be no authority until the boundary had been mapped. Mr. Byrnes asked why in this case Mr. Molotov objected. Mr. Molotov stated that he thought this not nice but if you are so anxious we agree. Mr. Molotov then proposed a last amendment. He suggested that the words “in principle” be deleted from the last paragraph since they appear in the preceding paragraph. It was enough to mention this once. Mr. Byrnes then suggested that the words “agreement of the conference” be inserted after the words “they will support”. Mr. Molotov stated that this would be all right without the words “in principle”. Mr. Bevin then suggested the words “conclusions of conference” instead of the word “agreement”. This would avoid misunderstanding. Mr. Molotov then suggested the word “proposal”. Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes agreed. Austria Mr. Byrnes stated that the next question concerned Austria. The Soviet representative maintained that the Protocol should record the agreement of the three governments that the authority of the Provisional Government should be extended to all zones. The U. S. and British Governments were prepared to state that this question would be examined after the entry of their forces into Vienna. Mr. Molotov stated that he had no objection to this. However, the last paragraph concerning Koniev had no bearing on the subject. 33 Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin agreed that it should go out. Mr. Byrnes then stated that so far as he knew, the differences of the Protocol Committee had been settled. He suggested that the Conference agree to direct the Protocol Committee to include only important decisions of the Conference. The Protocol should certainly be limited to decisions. Any attempt to insert proposals would lead to difficulties and the insertion of other proposals. Mr. Molotov agreed. Mr. Byrnes stated that the Protocol Committee could then be asked to return to its work. Mr. Bevin agreed and asked whether the decision regarding Rumania 34 should be put in. Mr. Byrnes stated that only a factual statement should be inserted. Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary Mr. Byrnes stated that the U. S. delegation had yesterday 35 asked for consideration today of a paper regarding revised Allied Control Commission Procedure for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. 36 He had the impression that there is no serious difficulty here and would like to dispose of the matter, if possible. Mr. Molotov stated that he could accept this proposal but that the second sentence was not exact. He suggested the deletion of the second sentence. Mr. Byrnes suggested that this sentence be read. Mr. Byrnes noted that our representatives in these countries had been saying that there had not been regular and frequent meetings of the Control Commission and that no information had been advanced before the issuance of directives. 37 Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet proposals 38 contained these points. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the difficulty is that Mr. Molotov was asking to have deleted the assurance that is really important to our representatives there. Nothing would hearten them more than to know that there would be a change and that there would be frequent meetings. He was sure that the Soviet delegation would agree that this was the right thing. He asked to have the second sentence remain. Mr. Molotov insisted that it was all in the Soviet proposal in detail and in accurate form. He pointed out that we had agreed to accept the Soviet proposal as a basis for discussion. 39 Mr. Byrnes remarked that if it was really meant that we intend to do what is in this sentence, he could not see why it was objected to. Mr. Molotov stated that if it was thought necessary to keep the second sentence, it should be drafted more accurately. He had no objection. However, he thought that since the Soviet proposal had been accepted as a basis for discussion, the second sentence was not necessary. Mr. Byrnes asked what proposal. Mr. Molotov went on to state that regular meetings were all right but not too frequent. He suggested the deletion of the word “frequent”. Mr. Byrnes asked why they should not have frequent meetings. Mr. Molotov stated that he was not opposed to frequent meetings but that the words might mean they would have to meet every day. The Soviet proposals had contained specific language regarding frequency. Mr. Byrnes suggested regular meetings weekly and added that we do not want regular to mean three times a year. Mr. Molotov then suggested regular meetings two or three times a month. Mr. Byrnes replied that this was better than two or three times a year. He pointed out that in the proposed directive for Rumania 40 it was drafted that there should be meetings every 10 days. Mr. Molotov stated that they would perhaps be more frequent. Mr. Byrnes suggested that it should be stated that they would meet at least once in 10 days. Mr. Molotov reiterated that perhaps the meetings would be even more frequent. He added that it was not a question for decision at Berlin. Mr. Byrnes replied that we had not been able to fix this matter otherwise. Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Soviet delegation had made a written proposal which had been accepted. Mr. Byrnes stated that it had not been accepted as to details. Mr. Molotov admitted that it had been accepted as a basis for discussion. Mr. Byrnes agreed and stated that he would now accept Mr. Molotov’s provision for meetings at least once in ten days. Mr. Molotov said all right and inquired about the language concerning the importance of facilities for American and British representatives. It was not clear what was implied. The Soviet draft had contained specific proposals. Were these accepted or not. Mr. Byrnes asked for a moment to read. Mr. Bevin asked whether Mr. Molotov referred to the document relating to Rumania as his specific proposal. Mr. Molotov stated that the proposals concerned Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. He pointed out that the Conference had settled the question of the meeting at least once in ten days or of tener, if required. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that his wording “at least” would permit meetings every day, if necessary. He submitted that the language in the U. S. draft regarding the importance of facilities is the wisest suggestion. The Soviet proposal concerned two question[s]. Mr. Byrnes considered that it would be better to have general language. If the British have a copy of the Soviet proposal and will accept the language contained in their paper dated July 12 referring to Hungary, 41 he considered the language in 3, 4 and 5 to be entirely satisfactory. It could apply to all countries and might do good and remove the source of irritation. Mr. Bevin stated that he would accept the draft on Hungary as applicable to all countries. Mr. Byrnes stated that he would so instruct the drafting committee. Mr. Molotov asked that Mr. Bevin’s proposal to extend the Hungarian proposal to Bulgaria and Rumania be accepted. Mr. Byrnes suggested reference to a drafting committee. Mr. Molotov asked why it should go to a drafting committee. Mr. Byrnes replied that this would be done only to insert 3, 4 and 5 in the paper instead of the language Mr. Molotov wished to have deleted. Mr. Byrnes named Mr. Russell and Mr. Cannon. Mr. Bevin suggested reference to the Protocol Committee. Mr. Molotov thought that it should be a special committee. He named Mr. Novikov and Mr.———. 42 Mr. Bevin named Mr. [Hoyer] Millar. Mr. Byrnes then stated that the sentence to which Mr. Molotov had objected would be eliminated and the three paragraphs proposed by him would be inserted instead. Freedom of the Press Mr. Byrnes pointed out in the papers concerning Poland and Rumania and Bulgaria reference had been made to freedom of the press. On the paper regarding Admission to United Nations Organization and on the Polish paper where the words “freedom of the press” were used, he had been informed that radio was not necessarily governed. 43 He therefore suggested the addition of the words “and radio.” Mr. Molotov pointed out that the press and radio were not the same thing. Mr. Byrnes agreed although in some places they were construed to mean the same thing and in others not. He assumed that Mr. Molotov would not desire to discriminate against radio. Mr. Molotov pointed out that in some cases radio was run by the government unlike the press. The American rules hardly apply in these cases. He hardly thought it was possible to find a common rule. Mr. Byrnes stated that the only result of the present wording is to give representatives of the Allied press full freedom to report to the world. He was sure that the Soviet Delegation would not feel that representatives of Allied radio should not be permitted to report. There was no essential difference between a newspaperman reporting to his paper and a radioman reporting over the radio. Mr. Molotov suggested that they conform to the decision already adopted. Mr. Bevin asked whether it was meant that correspondents and radio representatives would be allowed to repeat [ report? ] on the same basis. Mr. Byrnes replied that the insertion after the word “press” of the word “radio” would mean this. If this word were not included, newspapermen would be all right but radiomen would not. Mr. Bevin asked whether Mr. Molotov objected to radiomen being able to report. Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation would not be able to deal with this question at this moment since different things were involved. He suggested that the question not be raised at all at this time. There should be neither permission nor prohibition. Mr. Byrnes remarked that every morning at eight he listened to a correspondent reporting the news from Moscow. Mr. Molotov rejoined that the Soviet Government would not permit a Hearst correspondent to talk over its radio. It all depended on the situation. Mr. Bevin stated that he did not want Mr. Molotov to put British socialized institutions like the BBC at a disadvantage as compared to private press. Mr. Molotov doubted that the Conference had time to examine this question. Mr. Byrnes suggested that it be passed and that the Big Three be advised. Chinese Acceptance of Invitation to Join Council of Foreign Ministers Mr. Byrnes announced that he had just received word that the Chinese Government has accepted with pleasure the invitation sent to them to join the Council of Foreign Ministers. 44 German Fleet Mr. Byrnes stated that according to the naval subcommittee the unresolved questions on this subject are__________ Mr. Molotov interrupted to ask for a ten-minute adjournment. Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Byrnes after the adjournment again raised the question of the German fleet and merchant marine. He stated that the first unresolved question is that of distribution. The British Delegation had asked that the French share in the distribution of certain ships. 45 Mr. Molotov pointed out that it had already been decided by the Big Three that the fleet would be divided equally among the three powers. 46 Mr. Byrnes asked for British comment. Mr. Bevin asked whether they were now dealing purely with the fleet since he had reservations regarding merchant vessels. After receiving an affirmative answer, he agreed to the one-third division. Mr. Byrnes then passed to the question of the merchant marine. Mr. Bevin interrupted to mention the question of submarines. There were some differences here. The question is how many submarines should be saved and how many should be destroyed and how should they be divided. Churchill had laid down the British position on this subject to the effect that only token submarines should remain. The British were very sensitive on this point. The British and American Delegations had agreed that thirty submarines should be saved and the rest destroyed. 47 Mr. Molotov remarked that the Soviet Union would like to save more. Mr. Bevin replied that he knew this. However, if the Russians asked for a big submarine fleet after what the British had suffered, no statesman would survive. Mr. Molotov must go along with him on this. It was a tender point with the British Navy. U–boat warfare had cost the lives of 30,000 British seamen carrying supplies. The main thing, therefore, is that submarines be saved for experimental purposes only. The number suggested by the American and British Delegations would be adequate for this purpose. He hoped that the Soviet Delegation would agree. Mr. Molotov after asking whether any addition could be made agreed to saving thirty submarines. Mr. Bevin thanked him. Mr. Byrnes then reverted to the subject of the merchant marine. Mr. Bevin stated that the British were anxious to see a reasonable amount of shipping left to care for the German economy. He was willing to have the Allied Control Commission examine the problem very carefully in order to determine the number and type of ships suitable for Baltic and other uses. When the Control Commission had determined the amount of tonnage and type, there would be a balance left. He would then agree to a division provided that the Soviet Delegation out of their one-third would take care of Poland proportionately as the British and Americans would take care of others. Mr. Molotov proposed that the British-American Delegation draft 48 be accepted. This does not mention specific countries. Mr. Byrnes remarked that Holland may make claims, and Norway also. As he understood Mr. Bevin he had agreed that after the German economy had been taken care of there would be a division, provided that the Soviet Union took care of Poland and we of the others. Mr. Molotov again referred to the necessity for determining the ships necessary for the German economy. Mr. Byrnes stated his understanding that the British Foreign Minister had covered this point and had said that thereafter there would be a one-third division but that the Soviet Union would take care of Poland and we would provide for the reasonable claims of others. Mr. Bevin interjected to state that he wished to limit distribution of the British and American portions to Norway, France, the Dutch and possibly Belgium. Mr. Byrnes inquired about Greece. Mr. Bevin agreed that Greece should be included. Mr. Molotov suggested that the question be decided in accordance with the agreement by the American and British Delegations, namely that subparagraph ( d ) states that part of the German [merchant] fleet shall be held for the German economy. Mr. Bevin pointed out now that this had been accepted. Mr. Molotov went on to state that the rest of the merchant fleet should be divided into three parts. Mr. Byrnes stated that this was correct and in accord with the committee report 49 but the British Delegation wished to make clear which countries should not look to the Soviet Union for part of their share. Mr. Molotov stated that he understood but added that it had been provided in the [text on?] reparations that the Soviet Union will meet Polish claims and the other Allies other claims. 50 Mr. Bevin stated that this must be clarified. This concerns the distribution of booty, not reparations. He wished to know who has a claim to booty. The British lost 48 percent of their merchant fleet, the U. S. A. 15 percent, Norway 10½ percent, France 7 percent, the Dutch 5½ percent. He interrupted himself at this point to state that he had been quoting wrongly and that the figures mentioned by him applied to the percentage of total loss. After recapitulating he stated that the U. S. S. R. had suffered one percent of the losses and that he had no figures for the Poles. Mr. Molotov asked where he had gotten the Soviet figure, which was not correct. Mr. Bevin replied that he had a figure of 240,000 tons lost. His position is that in the distribution of booty he could not admit legal claims on the British in accordance with the Churchill statement but will give a fair interpretation to what Churchill had stated in this connection. 51 Therefore he was willing, together with the U. S. to meet the claims of the other Allies, but he asked for a definite understanding that Poland should out of this booty have their proportionate share out of the Soviet one-third. He undertook with American approval to deal with the Norwegians, the French, the Dutch and the Greeks. Mr. Molotov inquired about the Yugoslavs. Mr. Bevin said “No. Why?” Mr. Molotov stated that he thought their opinion should be sought. Otherwise, they would be offended. Mr. Bevin replied that he would leave the Yugoslavs to the Soviet Union out of their generosity. Mr. Molotov asked why. Mr. Bevin stated that he did not think that Great Britain after their tremendous losses should satisfy the claims of every other Ally. This is asking too much. Mr. Molotov inquired about the United States position. Mr. Byrnes stated that in consideration of this question heretofore it had been recognized that ships, even merchant marine, was war booty in British possession, Churchill had agreed at this table to a division subject to the condition that ships under the Combined Maritime Authority would be used in the war against Japan. 51 He wondered whether it was wise to enumerate the countries whose claims are to be considered. He thought that it might induce them to file claims. He thought some South American countries had lost ships and would like to file claims. If agreement was reached that the Soviet Government would out of its one-third care for the Polish claim and in addition look after Yugoslavia, it would make it easy. Mr. Molotov stated that the question is whether there would be any ships left after their use by Russian allies against Japan. Mr. Byrnes replied that there would be [an] ample number of ships left if the Soviet Union looked after Poland only. Mr. Molotov again asked if there would be any left after the Far Eastern war. Mr. Byrnes replied that no one could say but he believed that we were not losing many merchant ships at this time. He again repeated his belief that to enumerate ships would be to invite others to make claims. He wondered whether it was necessary. Mr. Bevin stated that he only mentioned it as an example. Mr. Byrnes restated his understanding that the ships were in the possession of the British and when division had been made other claims would be determined. We did not want to commit ourselves. It would be for British and American Governments to decide whether Yugoslavia would be allowed any ships. Mr. Bevin stated that if the Soviet Union would agree that Poland would receive the same percentage of losses as America and Great Britain gave the other Allies, then he would undertake with the United States to take care of Yugoslavia. He wanted to get this point settled. Mr. Molotov reserved his views on this matter. Mr. Bevin referred to the proposed public announcement regarding ships and submarines. Mr. Molotov replied that there is a draft announcement for publication, 52 which seems to be proper. Mr. Byrnes suggested that this question be submitted to the Big Three unless Mr. Molotov wished to let us know his view later. Mr. Molotov thought it should be submitted to the Big Three. Mr. Bevin asked what was to be submitted. Mr. Molotov stated the proposal regarding the fleet and merchant marine. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that certain items had been agreed upon and that if they were not referred it would save time. Mr. Molotov agreed that what had been agreed upon was all right, but he reserved his views on other sections. He referred to the last subparagraph of the British proposal. 53 Mr. Bevin stated that this had been withdrawn. Mr. Molotov then referred to the agenda for the Big Three. Mr. Byrnes replied that the Big Three agenda had been made up as we went along. External Assets of Germany Mr. Byrnes stated that a report had been received from the Economic Subcommittee regarding external German assets. 54 Mr. Molotov stated that this question must go to the Big Three. Mr. Byrnes said that it would be placed on the agenda. Article 19— Economic Principles Mr. Byrnes reported that the Economic Subcommittee had failed to agree on Article 19 of Economic Principles. 55 Mr. Bevin asked whether agreement could be reached now. Mr. Molotov suggested adjournment until three. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the Big Three would meet at three—the meeting adjourned. 1 See ante , pp. 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 2 Document No. 1015 , post . 3 See ante pp. 525–527 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 4 Document No. 1018 , post . 5 Cf. ante , p. 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 6 Document No. 842 , post . 7 Document No. 926 , post . 8 Document No. 842 , post . 9 Blank in the original. 10 Document No. 1000 , post . 11 Document No. 1320 , post . 12 Document No. 841 , post . 13 Document No. 843 , post . 14 i. e., the first British paper on this subject ( document No. 837 , post ). 15 See ante , p. 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] . 16 Documents Nos. 790 and 1055 , post . 17 Not found. Cf. document No. 792 , post . 18 The reference is to the Anglo-Soviet agreement which paralleled the Soviet-American agreement concerning liberated prisoners of war and civilians signed at Yalta, February 11, 1945, by Major General John R. Deane and Lieutenant General Anatoly Alexeyevich Gryzlov. Cf. the following passage in article 2 of the Soviet-American agreement: “Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.” Text of the Soviet-American agreement is printed in Executive Agreement Series No. 505; 59 Stat. (2) 1874; Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 985 – 987 . 19 Document No. 1167 , post . 20 Document No. 1168 , post . 21 See document No. 1426 , post . 22 Document No. 733 , post . 23 See ante , pp. 282–283 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 300–301 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 24 Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031. 25 See chapter xii of the Charter. 26 Neither the British proposal nor Molotov’s amendment has been found. For the language agreed upon see document No. 1383 , post , section xi ( x ). 27 For the Soviet draft referred to, see document No. 1433 , post . The British draft referred to (not printed as a separate document) is identical with section xvii ( xvi ) of the Protocol ( document No. 1383 , post ). 28 See, for example, p. 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , ante . 29 The unqualified word “transfer” appears in two variant texts submitted by the Soviet Delegation ( documents Nos. 1430 and 1431 , post ). The British text on this subject ( document No. 1429 , post ) used the phrase “ultimate transfer”. 30 See ante , pp. 305–306 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 31 Document No. 1429 , post . 32 Document No. 1430 or 1431 , post . 33 See document No. 1427 , post . For a Soviet text on the same subject, see document No. 1428 , post . 34 This presumably refers to the decision reached earlier in the meeting (see pp. 547–548 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] ) to establish bilateral commissions to investigate the matter of oil equipment in Rumania. See document No. 1383 , post , section xiv ( xiii ). 35 See ante , p. 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 36 Document No. 828 , post . 37 See, for example, document No. 317, printed in vol. i , and document No. 797 , post . 38 See document No. 309, printed in vol. i , and documents Nos. 796 and 797 , post . 39 See ante , p. 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] . 40 Enclosure to document No. 797 , post . 41 Document No. 796 , post . 42 Blank in the original. 43 See document No. 1383 , post , sections ix ( viii ) and x ( ix ). 44 See document No. 721 , post . 45 See document No. 1014 , post . 46 See ante , pp. 118–122 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 47 See document No. 1015 , post , enclosure A. 48 i. e., subparagraph ( d ) of enclosure B to document No. 1015 , post . 49 Enclosure B to document No. 1015 , post . 50 See the attachment to document No. 972 , post . 51 See ante , pp. 118–120 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 51 See ante , pp. 118–120 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 52 i. e., the final paragraph of document No. 1015 , post . 53 i. e., subparagraph (f) of enclosure B to document No. 1015 , post . 54 Attachment to document No. 1002 , post . 55 See the attachment to document No. 891 , post . Rapporteur’s Report 740.00119 Potsdam/8–145 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] Rapporteur’s Report 1 Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 11:25 a.m. Rapporteur’s Report of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers August 1, 1945 1. german reparations It was agreed that the heads of Government should be asked to consider the draft on this subject prepared by the subcommittee. 2 2. german economic principles It was agreed that the report of the Economic Subcommittee 3 on this subject should be presented to the Heads of Government. 3. war crimes It was agreed that the Heads of Government should be asked to decide the one outstanding issue in this connection, that is, whether certain prominent war criminals should be referred to by name in the decision of the Conference. 4. use of allied property for satellite reparations or “ war trophies ” A subcommittee was named to consider the U. S. paper on this subject which was circulated on July 25th. 4 The American Secretary of State withdrew the U. S. paper circulated at the same time on “Removals from Germany of Properties of United Nations or Neutral Nationals”. 5. german external assets The U. S. paper on this subject is still before the Economic Subcommittee, which will report to the Heads of Government. 6. oil for western europe The U. S. proposal on this subject is also before the Economic Subcommittee which will report to the Heads of Government. 7. allied oil equipment in Rumania The Foreign Ministers agreed that there should be two bilateral commissions, one British-Soviet and one U. S.-Soviet, to meet August 10 in Rumania to examine the documents and the facts in connection with this question. It was agreed that these commissions would be accorded all necessary facilities to perform their task in Rumania. 8. fascist activities in u. s. and british zones in germany and austria The U. S. and British representatives stated that their Governments are investigating the situation reported in the Soviet paper on this subject and that they will inform the Soviets of the results of these investigations and will at that time discuss what further steps should be taken. 9. repatriation of soviet citizens The British representatives stated that they are looking into the situation reported in the Soviet paper circulated already on this subject and that they would deal with it as soon as they returned to London. The Soviet representatives circulated a new paper on the subject and laid great stress on the importance which they attached thereto. The U. S. and British representatives stated that they would deal with the matter as promptly as possible. 10. disputed questions before the protocol committee The American Secretary of State presented four questions on which the Protocol Subcommittee had been unable to reach agreement: (1) Trusteeship Territories; (2) Black Sea Straits; (3) the Koenigsberg Area; and (4) Austria. The Foreign Ministers were able to agree upon texts on all of these questions. They also agreed that only important decisions of the Conference should be included in the Protocol. They approved a suggestion that the decision reached this morning creating bilateral commissions to deal with the question of Allied oil equipment in Rumania should be mentioned in the Protocol. 11. revised procedure for allied control commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and hungary The U. S. draft on this subject was accepted with the exception of the second sentence. It was agreed that for this sentence there should be substituted the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of the Soviet paper on the Control Commission in Hungary. A drafting committee was named to prepare the final document for presentation to the Heads of Government. 12. facilities for radio representatives in poland, hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and finland The American Secretary of State proposed that in the papers already approved by the Conference on the Polish question and on admission to the United Nations, where certain facilities were stipulated for representatives of the allied press, the words “and radio” be added in order that these same facilities might be available to representatives of the Allied 5 radio. The Foreign Ministers were not able to reach agreement on this question and it was decided so to advise the Heads of Government who might then determine whether or not they wished to discuss the question. 13. disposition of german fleet and merchant marine The report of the subcommittee on this subject was considered by the Foreign Ministers. It was agreed that 30 German submarines should not be destroyed. Other points in dispute were not settled and it was agreed that they should be brought before the Heads of Government this afternoon. 1 Byrnes acted as Rapporteur for this meeting. 2 Document No. 972 , post . 3 See the attachments to documents Nos. 891 and 1002 , post , and document No. 1325 , post . 4 For this document and other papers referred to in the following sections of this report, see the footnotes to the minutes, supra . 5 The word “Allied” at this point is a manuscript correction in pencil of the typed word “American”. Harriman–Mikołajczyk conversation, 12:30 p.m. Harriman–Mikołajczyk conversation, 12:30 p.m. 1 1 Mikołajezyk’s diary of the Conference mentions this conversation and the time at which it took place, but nothing as to its substance. Present United States Poland Mr. Harriman Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] Editor’s Note —No record of the substance of this conversation has been found. Twelfth plenary meeting, 4 p.m. Twelfth plenary meeting, 4 p.m. 1 1 This is the time given on the cover sheet of the Thompson minutes. The Log ( ante , p. 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) indicates that the meeting was called to order at 3:30 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Attlee Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Bevin Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Davies Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Bohlen Major Birse Mr. Golunsky Mr. Cohen 2 Mr. Maisky Mr. Thompson 3 2 Cohen’s presence is assumed from the existence of his notes on the meeting, post , p. 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] . 3 Thompson’s presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes, post , p. 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] . [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)]] United States Delegation Working Paper Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)]] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman Papers United States Delegation Working Paper Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] United States Delegation Working Paper 1 Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 4 p.m. Suggested Agenda — Meeting of Heads of Governments August 1, 1945 1. German Reparations . The subcommittee will present its report on this subject. 2. German Economic Principles . The Economic Subcommittee has presented the report on this subject, as well as on two immediately following points. 3. German External Assets . 4. Oil Supplies for Western Europe . 5. Use of Allied Property for Satellite Reparations or ” War Trophies .” A subcommittee was appointed by the Foreign Ministers this morning to consider this subject. 6. War Crimes . The question of whether or not certain prominent war criminals be designated by name remains unsettled. 7. Procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary . The Foreign Ministers reached substantial agreement on this subject this morning and a subcommittee was named to prepare a final draft. 8. Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine . The subcommittee on this subject reported to the Foreign Ministers this afternoon. 9. Facilities for Representatives of the Allied Radio . The U. S. Secretary of State proposed to the Foreign Ministers this afternoon that reference be made in the papers on “the Polish Question” and “Admission to the United Nations” to representatives of the Allied radio as well as to representatives of the Allied press. No decision could be reached by the Foreign Ministers and it was agreed that the Heads of Governments should be so advised. 1 This is the time given on the cover sheet of the Thompson minutes. The Log ( ante , p. 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) indicates that the meeting was called to order at 3:30 p.m. Thompson Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] Thompson Minutes Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 4 p.m. top secret Mr. Byrnes said they had taken up many questions in the Foreign Ministers meeting. He thought it would be helpful to take them up one at a time. 1. German Separations Mr. Byrnes read the report of the drafting committee on the protocol of [ on? ] German reparations. 1 He said the question was whether the Big Three had yesterday reached agreement on reparations when the Soviet delegate had said that he would not press the Soviet claim to 30 percent of the German gold, foreign assets, and shares. 2 Mr. Stalin inquired what was meant by the expression “western zones” in the document. The President said it meant the zones occupied by France, Great Britain, and the United States. Mr. Stalin suggested that they might reach agreement along the following lines. The Russians would not claim the gold which their Allies had found in Germany. 3 With regard to shares and foreign investments, perhaps the demarcation line between the Soviet and western zones of occupation should be taken as the dividing line and everything west of that line would go to the Allies and everything east of that line to the Russians. The President inquired if he meant a line running from the Baltic to the Adriatic. Stalin replied in the affirmative and said that with respect to foreign investments, all investments in Europe west of this line would go to the Allies and all investments in Eastern Europe to the Russians. He said that for example German investments in Rumania and Hungary would fall to the Russians. Mr. Bevin asked if German investments in other countries would be theirs. Mr. Stalin replied that they would and mentioned France, Belgium, and America as examples. Mr. Bevin said he agreed and asked if Greece would belong to Britain. Mr. Stalin said the only questions related to Austria and Yugoslavia. Austria was divided into three zones. Yugoslavia was partly in the Russian zone. What should they do with investments there. Mr. Bevin suggested that they be given to them. Mr. Stalin asked if he wanted Austria too. Mr. Bevin replied that he did not. Mr. Stalin suggested that the Allies take Yugoslavia and Austria would be divided into zones. Mr. Byrnes asked what Stalin had to say with respect to the shares of German corporations that had been included in Stalin’s proposal yesterday but later withdrawn. Mr. Stalin said that the shares of enterprises located in the American zone would belong to the Americans. Mr. Byrnes said that he understood from this that the Russians would make no claim to shares of enterprises located in the American zones. Mr. Stalin replied that he would not. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that yesterday Stalin had asked for 30 percent of German foreign assets. What percent did he now ask of these assets. Mr. Stalin said he did not know but it would be very small as most of them were west of the demarcation line. Mr. Bevin said he understood that yesterday the Soviet Government had renounced all claim to foreign assets. Mr. Stalin replied that they were speaking of the western zone of Europe and not the eastern zone. They had yesterday asked for 30 percent of the foreign assets in the west. This had been withdrawn but the Allies should also renounce those in the east. Mr. Bevin said he understood the Russians had renounced all claim to German foreign assets yesterday. Mr. Stalin said not those in Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, and Hungary. Mr. Byrnes asked in the case of a Berlin corporation which owned assets located in the American zone or in the United States or in South America, if the Russians claimed a share of the property elsewhere even though [ because? ] the headquarters were located in the Soviet zone. Mr. Stalin replied that if the enterprises were west of the line the Russians would have no claim on them. Mr. Byrnes said that then if the enterprises themselves were in the United States or elsewhere the Russians would not claim them. Mr. Stalin replied that he would not and added that those in Norway, Switzerland, Spain and other countries in the west would all fall to the Allies. Mr. Bevin pointed out that this was rather going back on the agreement reached yesterday and asked if Stalin would renounce all claims to German foreign assets outside the zone of Russian occupation. Mr. Byrnes asked what would happen to the previous Soviet claim on gold. Mr. Stalin replied that the Russians would have no claim whatsoever. Mr. Byrnes said he thought it was important to have a meeting of minds. Mr. Bevin’s question was whether the Russian claim was limited to the zone occupied by the Russian Army. To that he understood Mr. Stalin to say “yes”. If that were so he was prepared to agree. Mr. Stalin replied in the affirmative. Mr. Byrnes said that only a few minutes before a claim had been made to assets outside of Germany and to avoid disputes in the future it would be well to have an understanding now. As he understood it the Russians would make no claim to foreign assets unless they were in the zone occupied by the Soviet Army. Mr. Stalin said he considered Finland to be in this zone. Yugoslavia was not but the eastern part of Austria was in their zone. Mr. Bevin said he assumed it was clear that assets owned by British and Americans in those areas would not be touched. Mr. Stalin replied of course they would not and said that they had not been at war with Great Britain. Mr. Bevin pointed out that these assets might have been taken over by the Germans. Mr. Stalin replied that in such cases it would be necessary to decide the matter on the merits of each case. The President pointed out that doubtless Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and other countries would claim assets in their territory. Mr. Stalin replied that Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were in the Allied zone for this purpose. The President said that he agreed with the Soviet proposal. Mr. Bevin said he also agreed. Mr. Stalin said he thought the decision should be put in the Protocol but not published. Mr. Byrnes agreed that it should be put in the Protocol to avoid misunderstanding. The President said he thought it should be published. Mr. Stalin said he would agree. Mr. Byrnes referred to the statement in the third paragraph of the report drafted by the committee 4 referring to the situation of the claims from other countries to German external assets. He assumed there would be no objection to that language in view of the agreement just reached. Mr. Stalin suggested the language, “and respective German assets abroad”. He added that it could be defined in the Protocol. Mr. Byrnes suggested that they decide that the language to carry out the agreement just reached be added to the report and that the matter be referred back to the sub-committee. This was agreed to. 2. Invitation to France to Become a Member of the Reparations Commission Mr. Attlee proposed that the French Government be invited by the three Governments to become a member of the Reparations Commission today. 5 Mr. Stalin suggested that they also invite Poland as Poland had suffered very much. Mr. Attlee said he understood it had been agreed that France be invited. Mr. Stalin asked why they should not invite Poland. The President said that they had agreed yesterday that the Soviet Government could take care of Poland with respect to reparations and that the Allies could take care of the others. Why mix other hands in the pie? Mr. Attlee pointed out that France had a zone of occupation in Germany. Mr. Stalin asked if Attlee was anxious to have France participate. Mr. Attlee replied in the affirmative. Mr. Stalin then said he would agree. 3. Delivery of Food, Coal, and Fuel to Berlin Mr. Attlee read the paper which he had submitted on this question 6 which stated that an agreement had been reached on the delivery of 40,000 tons of food per month and 24,000 [ 2,400 ] tons of coal per day by the Soviets for the British and American zones in Berlin for thirty days running from July 15. 7 He proposed that the Control Commission should be instructed to draw up a program of food, coal, and fuel to be imported during the next six months into the greater Berlin area. The amount furnished by the Soviet Government could be considered as an advanced delivery under paragraph 4 of the Reparations Agreement. 8 Mr. Stalin pointed out that this was a new question upon which he did not know the opinion of the Control Council. He did not think it possible to have a high standard of living for Germany in the near future. They should ask the Control Commission for the facts and for plans for the future. Mr. Attlee replied that it was not a question of a high standard of living. He pointed out that deliveries of capital goods from the Ruhr were to begin now and the supply of necessary food should also begin now. The quantity could be determined by the Control Commission. Mr. Stalin said that in principle of course there should be an agreement but it was impossible to discuss figures here. The military people on the Control Commission could arrange such matters better. Mr. Attlee replied that this was what he was asking. Mr. Stalin said he did not know how this matter stood now and added that he could not take a decision now and pull figures out of the air. Mr. Attlee said he did not ask for figures. Mr. Stalin replied that he had mentioned figures in his memorandum. Where had they come from? Mr. Attlee said that these figures had been agreed upon. Mr. Stalin replied that he did not know about it. Mr. Bevin pointed out that a temporary agreement was already in existence. The British asked that they decide in principle that when the Control Commission drew up the figure, the Soviet Government would supply the goods. He asked who was going to supply Berlin when the month covered by the present agreement was up. Mr. Stalin said that they should refer the question to the Control Commission. Mr. Attlee said that he understood that the Russians wanted supplies of capital goods to come forward from the Ruhr regularly. They were proposing the same thing from the Russian side. Mr. Stalin said he understood. He would like to have the opinion of the Control Commission in order to have something on which to base his decision. He pointed out that there was no similarity between the agreements to supply capital equipment and food since they were to be completed within different periods of time. Mr. Attlee replied that the Russians were asking for advance deliveries before the value of the equipment had been set. Mr. Stalin replied that they could refuse to make those advance deliveries. Mr. Bevin said that they did not wish to do that. They wished to accommodate each other. Mr. Stalin asked what he could do if he was not ready to decide the matter. Mr. Bevin said then they would postpone it. [3 a .] Austrian Reparations Mr. Attlee said he understood that the Generalissimo had said that Austria would not be called on for reparations, 9 and that this matter was not quite clear. He asked if this were a firm decision. Mr. Stalin replied that it was and that it could be put in the Protocol. 10 4. Economic Principles for Germany Mr. Byrnes made a proposal for the inclusion in the document on economic principles for Germany of paragraph 18. 11 Mr. Stalin inquired if this were an amendment or a new proposal. Mr. Byrnes said that a paper had been circulated some days ago and that the sub-committee had reported, 12 recommending the inclusion of this paragraph. Mr. Molotov said that perhaps this amendment would be needed as they had decided on the language with respect to reparations. If they thought it was affected by the decision just taken, they would have to refer it back to the committee. It related to the control of the property of German citizens abroad. Mr. Stalin said he had read the language and could accept it. This was agreed to. Mr. Byrnes said that the Soviet Government had yesterday asked for time to consider paragraph 19. 13 Mr. Molotov asked if the British draft of paragraph 19 14 could be accepted and said they had no objection to this draft. Mr. Byrnes said he understood that the British representatives had agreed with the United States representatives that if paragraph 19 was adopted, the words proposed by the American representatives 15 should be added. This was necessary because of the agreement on reparations reached yesterday. Mr. Stalin said he agreed. Mr. Attlee also agreed. Mr. Bevin said that this disposed of the paper on economic principles. Mr. Bevin informed [ was to inform? ] the French that this was agreed to. 16 5. War Crimes Mr. Byrnes said that the question was whether certain war criminals should be referred to by name in the decision of the Conference. The British and American Foreign Ministers thought that this should be left to the prosecutor. Mr. Stalin said that names were necessary. If they were going to try certain German industrialists they should say so. The Soviets had included the name of Krupp for this reason. If they would rather name another German industrialist, he had no objection. The President said he did not like any of them and thought that by naming some of them the others might think they would escape. Mr. Stalin pointed out that they mentioned them only as examples. Public opinion was interested in this matter. They wondered why Hess was well fed and cared for. Mr. Attlee said they need not worry about that. Mr. Stalin said what was important was the opinion of the people in the occupied countries. Mr. Bevin said that if they were in any doubt about Hess, he could give an undertaking that Hess would be handed over and he added that they would also send along a bill for his keep. Mr. Stalin said he wanted advanced [ advance? ] delivery. Mr. Attlee replied that he had already received advanced delivery on some of them. He had Goebbels. Mr. Stalin said he personally needed no undertaking. There was a question of public opinion that had to be satisfied. The President said that as Mr. Stalin knew the United States had appointed one of its most able jurists to the Commission set up to deal with this question. Justice Jackson advised him that it would be a handicap to him if persons were named before the commission was ready to bring them to trial, which he expected would be within thirty days. All of these people would be named in the indictment and the Marshal need not worry for they would be tried and punished. Mr. Stalin suggested that they might not mention so many. Perhaps three. Mr. Attlee suggested Hitler. Mr. Stalin said they did not have Hitler at their disposition but he had no objection to naming him. Mr. Stalin then suggested that perhaps they could say that within one month the first list of war criminals would be published. This was agreed to. 17 6. Use of Allied Property for Satellite Reparations or War Trophies The President said a paper 18 on this had been handed to the Soviet Delegation yesterday. Mr. Molotov said he had had no recess from the meetings in which to study it. His first impression had been favorable. Perhaps they could consider it at the evening meeting. 19 7. Oil for Western Europe Mr. Byrnes said that this question was now before the Economic Sub-Committee. 8. Allied Oil Equipment in Rumania Mr. Byrnes said that the Foreign Ministers had agreed that there should be two bilateral commissions, one British-Soviet and one United States-Soviet, to meet within ten days in Rumania to examine the documents and facts in connection with this question. It was agreed that these commissions would be accorded all necessary facilities to perform their task in Rumania. 20 The decision of the Foreign Ministers was approved. 21 9. Fascist Activities in the U. S. and British Zones in Germany and Austria Mr. Byrnes said that the United States and British representatives in Germany and Austria were investigating the situation reported in the Soviet paper on this subject 22 and that they would inform the Soviets of the results of these investigations and would at that time discuss what further steps should be taken. 10. Repatriation of Soviet Citizens The British representatives stated that they are looking into the situation reported in the Soviet paper circulated already on this subject 23 and that they would deal with it as soon as they returned to London. The Soviet representatives circulated a new paper on the subject 24 and laid great stress on the importance which they attached thereto. The U. S. and British representatives stated that they would deal with the matter as promptly as possible. 25 11. Disputed Questions Before the Protocol Committee The American Secretary of State presented four questions on which the Protocol Subcommittee had been unable to reach agreement: (1) Trusteeship Territories; (2) Black Sea Straits; (3) the Koenigsberg Area; and (4) Austria. The Foreign Ministers were able to agree upon texts on all of these questions. They also agreed that only important decisions of the Conference should be included in the Protocol. They approved a suggestion that the decision reached this morning creating bilateral commissions to deal with the question of Allied oil equipment in Rumania should be mentioned in the Protocol. 26 12. Revised Procedure for Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary The United States draft 27 on this subject was accepted with the exception of the second sentence. It was agreed that for this sentence there should be substituted the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of the Soviet paper on the Control Commission in Hungary. 28 A drafting committee was named to prepare the final document for presentation to the Heads of Government. 29 Mr. Byrnes said the committee had reported that the document should read as set forth in the paper which he was now circulating. The committee’s report was accepted. 30 13. The Polish Question The President at this stage said he wished to report that the President of the Polish Provisional Government and members of the Polish Delegation had called on him this morning 31 and he had informed them of the action which the Conference had taken with respect to Poland. 32 The Poles had agreed to say nothing about it until the report of the Conference was made public. They had asked him to transmit the thanks of the Polish Government to all three Governments at the Conference. Mr. Bevin said he wished to announce with reference to the matter he had raised yesterday 33 that he had arrived at an agreement with the Poles for a reciprocal air service from London to Warsaw. He added that he was very pleased about this. Mr. Byrnes said that the United States representative had suggested to the Foreign Ministers meeting that in the documents on Poland 32 [and on admission to the United Nations] 34 the words “and radio” should be added wherever the press was mentioned. Mr. Stalin said he did not think this advisable. Mr. Attlee agreed that it would not be advisable. The President said that the United States had a different system from the other two governments. Radio was controlled in Great Britain by the government. Ours was set up on the same basis as the newspapers. Pressure was being brought on him for radio representation. He pointed out that American radiomen would have nothing to do with radio in the country concerned. They would merely act as correspondents for the radio in the United States. Mr. Stalin suggested that they arrive at an agreement with the respective governments. Mr. Bevin asked if Mr. Stalin would have any objection to an agreement between the governments. Mr. Stalin replied that he would not. The President asked if he would object to the United States’ arranging for the same treatment to be accorded to the press and to the radio. Mr. Stalin said he would not object, but that it should not be mentioned here. This was agreed to. 14. Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation withdrew its objection to the question of Poland receiving her share of ships from the Soviet share. Mr. Byrnes said that then there was agreement on this report. 35 If the experts were agreed, one paragraph of the report 36 would be published in the joint statement. Mr. Bevin suggested that the following language be used with respect to the Polish and other shares: “The United Kingdom, and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied states whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland.” This was agreed to. Mr. Attlee suggested that a message be sent to Mr. Churchill and to Mr. Eden thanking them for the parts they had played in the Conference. This was agreed. 37 At this point the meeting recessed to await reports of the committees. The meeting was resumed twenty minutes later. Mr. Byrnes inquired if Mr. Molotov had had time to read the document on the use of Allied property as reparations. 38 Mr. Molotov said he had not, but would try to do so before the evening meeting. Mr. Attlee suggested that the paper needed some examination. Its provisions were not fully equitable. Mr. Attlee pointed out that when Allied property was removed from a satellite state, he thought the country which took it should either pay for it or credit it as reparations. Mr. Byrnes inquired if Mr. Attlee proposed doing nothing about this question. Mr. Attlee replied that something should be done, but the language should be improved. He also thought that paragraph three with respect to “ valuta ” needed discussion. He did not see why valuta should be treated any different from other exports with respect to reparations. 39 Mr. Stalin said he thought the American draft was nearer to the correct solution of this problem than Mr. Attlee’s [suggestion?]. 40 He suggested that it be postponed to the evening session. 15. Inland Waterways Mr. Byrnes said that this question which had been submitted by the President 41 had been discussed and it had been decided to refer it to the Council of Foreign Ministers. 42 The Protocol and Communiqué Committees could not agree to state this fact. The President said all he wanted was a factual statement that it had been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Attlee said he agreed. Mr. Stalin said there was already enough in the protocol. The President pointed out that the action was taken by the Conference and he had agreed to the inclusion of a great many things in the communiqué. He was only pressing this one thing. Mr. Stalin said it had not been discussed at the Conference. The President said he had discussed it at length on three [ two? ] different days 43 and a committee had had it under consideration for ten days. Mr. Stalin said the question was not mentioned in a list of questions submitted before the Conference 44 and the Russians were not in a position to discuss it. They should not be in a hurry to dispose of the matter. The President said that he did not ask that it be disposed of, but merely that it be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers and that this be stated. Mr. Stalin pointed out that there was nothing in the communiqué in regard to the Black Sea Straits. The question of inland waterways was raised in connection with the question of the Black Sea Straits. Why should they give preference to this. The President pointed out that the question of the Black Sea Straits would be mentioned. Mr. Stalin did not think it should be mentioned. The President at first said he agreed, but then continued that he did not see why matters decided at the Conference should not be in the communiqué and in the protocol. Mr. Stalin said because it would make them too long. The President said that be was trying to prevent a situation in which it could be charged that secret agreements were concluded at the Conference. Mr. Stalin said that the answer was that there were no secret agreements. Mr. Byrnes said he wished to submit that they had agreed to refer this document to the Council of Foreign Ministers. As long as they had taken that action, could they not agree to state it. If it were not in the communiqué they would not want to make a statement in the United States about it. Mr. Stalin said that at Tehran and at previous conferences there were two kinds of decisions. One kind was included in the protocol and these were greater than those published in the communiqué. This did not mean that they were secret. It meant that there was no need to publish them. Policy decisions were put in the protocol. Decisions of a formal nature, not affecting the substance of the question, should not be mentioned in the communiqué but only in the protocol. This did not mean that decisions [not] in the communiqué were secret. The President said he had no objection if this applied to all questions, but he wanted to be free to mention this matter of inland waterways in any statement he might have to make before the Senate. Mr. Stalin said of course he had this right. Meeting adjourned. 45 1 Document No. 972 , post . 2 Concerning the Soviet claim referred to, see document No. 1425 , post , paragraph 4. Concerning the discussion of this subject by the Heads of Government on July 31, see ante , pp. 514–518 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 3 Cf. document No. 978 , post . 4 Attachment to document No. 972 , post . 5 This proposal is attributed to Bevin in the Cohen notes, post , p. 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] . For a communication on this subject from the American Ambassador at Paris to the French Foreign Office, see document No. 1399 , post . 6 Document No. 1052 , post . 7 With respect to this agreement, see vol. i , document No. 433 . 8 See the attachment to document No. 972 , post . 9 See ante , p. 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] . 10 See document No. 1383 , post , section viii ( vii ). 11 Cf. document No. 1002 , post . 12 See document No. 1000 , post , and the attachment to document No. 1002 , post . 13 Cf. ante , p. 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 14 See the agreed language quoted in document No. 891 , post . 15 See document No. 891 , post . 16 See document No. 1409 , post , footnote 3. 17 See document No. 1383 , post , section vii ( vi ). 18 Document No. 842 , post . 19 In a memorandum of December 3, 1945, from Collado to Cohen, headed “American Properties and Interests in the Satellites in Relation to Reparations and Soviet Economic Policy” (file No. 740.00119 EW/12–345), there is the following additional information concerning the disposition of the paper under discussion: “5. In a session on the afternoon of the last day, the matter was referred to a special drafting committee consisting of Mr. Russell (with me assisting on the drafting), Mark Turner, and two of the Russians. We prepared a committee report [not found] with general agreement on all but one point from which the Russians dissented. “5. [ 6 .] After supper you and the Secretary had some question about one point which had been agreed by all members of the committee. While we were preparing alternative sentences, the Big Three session began. When this item appeared and the committee draft was distributed, Marshal Stalin stated that the matter was too technical for detailed consideration at such a late date, and agreed to accept the U. S. paper [i. e., document No. 842 ] (not the committee draft) in principle subject to subsequent diplomatic discussion as to its implementation. This agreement was recorded in Section xx of the Protocol …” Cf. post , p. 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , and document No. 1383 , post , section xxi ( xx ). 20 See ante , pp. 547–548 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . 21 See document No. 1383 , post , section xiv ( xiii ). 22 Documents Nos. 790 and 1055 , post . Cf. ante , pp. 548–549 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . 23 Document No. 1167 , post . 24 Document No. 1168 , post . 25 See ante , pp. 549–550 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . 26 For the agreed texts on these matters, see document No. 1383 , post , sections xi ( x ) (trusteeship); xvii ( xvi ) (the Straits); vi ( v ) (Koenigsberg); viii ( vii ) (Austria); and xiv ( xii ) (oil equipment in Rumania). Concerning the discussion of these subjects by the Foreign Ministers, see ante , pp. 550–554 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . 27 Document No. 828 , post . 28 Document No. 796 , post . 29 See ante , pp. 554–556 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . 30 The drafting committee’s report has not been found as a separate document. It was presumably identical with document No. 1383 , post , section xii ( xi ) and the annex to that section. Cf. document No. 829 , post . 31 No other United States record of this conversation has been found. Cf. document No. 1394 , post . 32 See document No. 1383 , post , section ix ( viii ). 33 See ante , pp. 518–520 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 32 See document No. 1383 , post , section ix ( viii ). 34 See document No. 1383 , post , section x ( ix ). The words in brackets have been introduced on the basis of the minutes of the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers, ante , p. 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . 35 Document No. 1015 , post , as amended. 36 i. e., the final paragraph of document No. 1015 , post . Cf document No. 1384 , post , section v . 37 For the texts of the messages to Churchill and Eden, see London Times , August 3, 1945, p. 4. 38 Document No. 842 , post . 39 The Cohen notes ( post , p. 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] ) attribute a part of these remarks to Byrnes, and Stalin’s remarks, which follow, to Molotov. 40 No Attlee draft on this subject has been found. 41 See documents Nos. 755 , 757 , and 758 , post . 42 See ante , p. 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 43 See ante , pp. 303–304 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 44 See vol. i , document No. 189 . 45 At 5:50 p.m. See Log, ante , p. 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 4 p.m. Truman : I ask for the reading of the Committee’s report on reparations. 1 Byrnes : At the meeting of the Foreign section [ Secretaries ] this morning, many questions were considered which might be taken up here one by one. First is reparations. The Committee reported no agreement on text for the protocol. The United States and British representatives consider that in return for the capital equipment allocated the Soviets, the Soviets have agreed to refrain from asserting claim to gold, industrial shares and foreign assets. Therefore, they maintain that German external assets should be included as a source of reparations for countries other than Russia and Poland. They took the view that unless this was done the percentages would be unacceptable. The Soviet representatives consider that the Soviets had not relinquished claim to German external assets. The American and British representatives agreed to the balance of the report with the reservation that the Soviets must relinquish their claim to foreign assets. Stalin : The question which must be made clear is, what is meant by the western zones. The Soviets agree not to claim anything from the western zones. Truman : The zones occupied by America, Britain and France are the western zones. Stalin : We don’t claim gold. As to shares in foreign investments everything west of the military demarcation line is relinquished by us. Everything east of the line should go to us. Truman : That implies [ appliesf ] only to German investments east of the line. Stalin : For example, German investments in Rumania and Bulgaria. Attlee : I agree. Bevin : Greece belongs to the British. Stalin : Austria is divided into parts—how shall we deal with those. Bevin : You better give it to us. Stalin : You want all of Austria? You can have part of Austria and Yugoslavia. Byrnes : What is the status of the investments in Germany? Stalin : The shares of enterprises in our zone are at our disposal and those in your zone at yours. Byrnes : Suppose Berlin companies own assets in our sphere, those assets should go to us. Stalin : If property is in your zone it would be yours whether it is in United States, Norway, Sweden or Honduras. Bevin : This is going back on what we agreed yesterday. Would you, Marshal, renounce all claims outside zones occupied by the Russian Army. Stalin : We only ask for the property from Finland east as far as Austria. Bevin : It is clear that assets owned by Americans and British in these zones would not be affected. Stalin : We are not at war with Great Britain. Truman : We are supposed to settle with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in regard to their reparations claim. These countries will, of course, claim German assets within their jurisdiction. Stalin : Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and western Austria are in your zone. Truman : We agree. Stalin : Should the agreement go into the protocol? Need it be published in the communiqué? Byrnes : We think it should go into the protocol and also [be] published in the communiqué. The committee reports should make it clear that other countries are to be satisfied from western zones and from external assets. Stalin : From the respective external assets. Byrnes : The committee should be asked to add appropriate language to cover this. Stalin : Does Secretary Byrnes object to the words “respective assets” in paragraph 3? Byrnes : Appropriate assets might do better, but I suggest that the committee fix up the language. Stalin : All right. Bevin : The French Government should be invited to become a member of the Reparation Committee. 2 Stalin : Why should we not invite Poland? Truman : I don’t see the reason for bringing in others. Stalin : If the British insist on France we will not object. Attlee : We have an agreement regarding the feeding and fueling of Berlin for the next 30 days. I suggest that we instruct the Control Commission to provide a program to provide uniform subsistence standards for the next six months. This is a practical matter which requires immediate action. Stalin : That is a new question. It has not been studied. I do not think it will be possible in the near future to have a high standard of life in Germany. We must first ask the Control Council how they will provide for Berlin needs. We can not come to any decision now. Attlee : I am not asking for figures, I am asking for the Control Commission to draw up a program. We understood that you wanted capital goods from the Ruhr. We want the flow of goods from the other way also. Stalin : I want the report of the Control Council first. Attlee : But you are asking for advance deliveries. Stalin : What can I do if I am not ready to take a decision. Bevin : We will postpone it. Attlee : There is one other point. The Generalissimo said that Austria should not be called upon for reparation. Is this a firm decision for the protocol? Stalin : Yes, you can put it in the protocol. Byrnes : With regard to German external assets, the United States and Britain recommend that steps be taken to control German external assets in nations not part of the United Nations which have taken active part in the war against Germany. This paper was circulated a few days ago. Stalin : I learned of this only after we agreed on reparations. Byrnes : The committee failed to agree on paragraph 19 of the economic principles and on the problem of oil supplies to western Europe. Molotov : We will accept the British draft on paragraph 19. Byrnes : I believe it was understood that if Article [ paragraph ] 19 proposed by the British is accepted there should be added a clause at the end indicating that it is not to apply to stipulated deliveries to the Russians from the western zones. The next subject discussed by the Foreign section [ Secretaries ] was war criminals. Should the prominent prisoners be referred [to] by names. British and American representatives believe that the naming of defendants should be left to the prosecutors. Soviets accepted the British draft as to language, but wished to add some names. Stalin : Names are necessary and are very important to give proper orientation. The people should know that we are going to try some industrialists, that is why we mentioned Krupp. Truman : I don’t like any of it. If you name some, others will think they have escaped. Stalin : People wonder about Hess living comfortably in England. Attlee : You need not worry about that. Stalin : I want advance delivery. We should satisfy public opinion. Truman : We have appointed a judge of our highest court, an able lawyer to work on these problems for us. He is very strongly opposed to giving names in advance. But the Marshal need have no doubt as to our attitude with regard to the prosecution of these men. Stalin : We will be satisfied with three names. Attlee : Our lawyers take the same view that the Americans do. Stalin : Our lawyers differ, perhaps you will mention that the first ten principal defendants to be tried will be named within thirty days. It was so agreed. Byrnes : On the subject of inland waterways, the Soviet delegation wanted more time. Stalin : We are ready. We are favorably inclined and we will discuss it tonight. Byrnes : The economic principles for Germany and the problem of oil for western Europe were being considered by our respective committees, to which they had been referred, 3 with regard to the Soviet proposal that action had been taken by the British and Americans in their zones to stop Fascist activity being carried on in Germany and Austria against the Soviets. The British and Americans agreed to make an investigation and to act if the results of their investigation so warrant it. The Soviet Foreign Minister also brought up the matter of the repatriation of Soviet Citizens. The British promised to investigate this problem as it primarily related to their zone. The Foreign section [ Secretaries ] also considered four disputes referred to them by the Protocol Committee and settle [ settled these? ] disputes. They instructed the Protocol Committee that only important decisions should go into the protocol. It was agreed that Rumanian oil investigation procedure should be included in the protocol. The Foreign section [ Secretaries ] agreed on a paper concerning a revision of the Control Commission’s procedures in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. The Committee’s draft was agreed to with an amendment substituting for one sentence in the Committee’s report. 4 The new agreement for improved procedures for the Control Commission in Hungary. That is, it was agreed that the Hungarian agreement should be basis for the improved machinery in all three countries. Truman : Is the report of the Foreign section [ Secretaries ] on this point satisfactory? Attlee : Yes. Stalin : No objection. Truman : The President of the National Council of Poland and three delegates called on me this morning and I informed them of our decision of the provisional frontier of western Poland. They asked me to convey the thanks of the Polish Government to all three governments. Bevin : I am also happy to announce that the London-Warsaw air communication has been satisfactorily arranged. Byrnes : The next question considered by the Foreign section [ Secretaries ] was the question whether we should add in two of our papers where we referred to representatives of Allied President [ press ], the words “and radio”. Stalin : I don’t think it would be advisable to mention radio. Attlee : I also think it would not be advisable. Truman : Our radio is not government owned or controlled. It is set up on the same basis as newspapers. I don’t think there should be any discrimination. Stalin : I don’t think it is advisable to go into the matter of radio. Truman : The radio reporters report only to the United States. Stalin : It is not advisable for us to go into this. Bevin : You would have no objection to arrangements between the governments? Stalin : No. Byrnes : The next question discussed by the Foreign section [ Secretaries ] was the distribution of the German merchant marine. The Committee report was agreed to. It was also agreed that a joint statement should be published later by the three governments. Bevin : I have drafted a clause relating to Poland’s participation in the distribution. It was accepted. Byrnes : That disposes of the questions considered by the Foreign section [ Secretaries ], There are some matters still in the hands of the Committee. Truman : I suggest a short adjournment of ten minutes. Attlee : Before we should adjourn, I should like to suggest that the conference send a message to Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden thanking them for their part in its deliberation. It was so agreed, and Mr. Attlee was asked to draft the messages. A short adjournment was taken. Byrnes : May I ask if Mr. Molotov has had a chance to read our paper on Allied property in the satellite states? Molotov : I can do it only in the evening. If that is not possible, we must dispose of it through diplomatic channel. Byrnes : I hope that Mr. Molotov may have a chance to read the document before this evening. We will have to have an evening session in any event and I hope very much that we can agree to this paper here. Molotov : I see no difficulty in substance, but the wording of the paper must be exact. Byrnes : We will try to make the wording exact by night. Molotov : I will try. Attlee : I am not satisfied with the paper as it is drafted. It is not equitable. Byrnes : In what respect is it inequitable? Attlee : When property is removed as booty according to the document the satellite must make compensation. Byrnes : The paper says the United States looks to the occupying power. Where it is not returned, the United States must demand compensation from the satellite. We also have a question on the point of foreign exchange. There is no more reason for foreign exchange here than there is in the case of reparations or any other support [ export? ]. The foreign exchange requirement ties up the satellite too tightly. Byrnes : That is why the paper was circulated on July 26 so that these objections could be raised and considered. Molotov : I figure that the Americans are nearer the problems than Mr. Attlee. We will discuss it further this evening. Truman : Shall we consider the communiqué. Attlee : Let us have the Protocol and the Communiqué Committees get to work and we will convene as soon as they have finished—say at 9:00 o’clock. Truman : I should like a mention in the communiqué of the matter of inland waterways which I brought up. Stalin : We did not discuss it. It was not mentioned in the lists of subjects to be covered by the conference. We should not be in a hurry[.] Truman : We discussed it several times. Stalin : Why should we give preference to the discussion of the waterways over the discussion of the Straits. Truman : The Straits are in the protocol and in the communiqué. Stalin : Have we finished. Truman : I don’t think so. Stalin : I suggest both be mentioned in the protocol but not in the communiqué. Truman : All right. Bevin : I should like to ask if [ that ] the French be associated with our decision on war crimes. Truman : I don’t see why if things are acted on here they should not be mentioned in the protocol and in the communiqué. Byrnes : We only wish to say that the matter should be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Stalin : If we go back to the practice of our previous conferences we find that there are two kinds of decisions, one kind for the protocol and another for the communiqué. The communiqué was much shorter. The other agreements were not secret. There was simply no need for their publication in the communiqué. Truman : That is all right if I make mention of the decision on inland waterways on [ in? ] my own report? Stalin : Of course, you have this right. Adjournment taken at 2:30 [ 5:50? ] p.m. 5 1 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra . 2 Concerning discrepancies in the attribution of this and other statements made at this meeting as between the Thompson minutes and the Cohen notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, supra . 3 There is an apparent omission at this point in the source text. 4 This sentence should probably be consolidated with the following sentence with the insertion at this point of the words “paragraphs 3 to 5 of”. 5 Cf. the Log, ante , p. 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 710 ] . In the original typescript the Cohen notes for the evening meeting ( post , p. 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] ) follow at this point without a break. Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee Meeting of the Communiqué Subcommittee Present United States United Kingdom 2 Soviet Union Mr. Brown 1 Mr. Golunsky 3 2 Bridges, Brook, Hayter, and Dean were named as the British members of the subcommittee (see ante , p. 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ), but it is not known which British representatives attended this meeting. 1 Foote was also named as a United States member of this subcommittee (see ante , p. 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ), but it is not known whether he attended this meeting. 3 Sobolev was also named as a Soviet member of this subcommittee (see ante , p. 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ), but it is not known whether he attended this meeting. [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] Editor’s Note —No official minutes of the discussions in the Communiqué Subcommittee have been found. Brown’s diary entry for August 1 contains the following information on Subcommittee discussions on that date: “The Foreign Ministers met at 11:00 and sat almost continuously until the Big Three meeting at 3:00 p.m. The Big Three met and a number of points were agreed on. “I was busy working on communiqué. We had an agreement except on introduction, Tangier, Rumanian oil equipment removal and military talks. Discussion on this latter item interesting. In first draft, I had confined military talks to affairs in Europe. Golunski wanted limitation stricken to appear military talks included Japanese war. Today he wanted to go back to original draft, eliminating [ reinstating? ] limitations. We decided to pass to Big Three.” 4 4 Cf. post , pp. 1443–1444 [ Pg. 1443 is part of Doc. 1380 ] . Thirteenth plenary meeting, 10:40 p.m. Thirteenth plenary meeting, 10:40 p.m. 1 1 This is the time given in the Department of State minutes. The Log ( ante , p. 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 710 ] ) and the Cohen notes ( post , p. 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] ) indicate that the meeting was called to order at 10:30 p.m. Present United States United Kingdom Soviet Union President Truman Prime Minister Attlee Generalissimo Stalin Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Bevin Foreign Commissar Molotov Mr. Davies Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky Mr. Bohlen Major Birse Mr. Golunsky Mr. Brown 1a Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Maisky Mr. Cohen 2 1a Brown’s presence for at least part of the meeting is assumed from his diary entry on the meeting (see post , p. 594, footnote 35 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , and p. 596, footnote 38 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] ). 2 Cohen’s presence is assumed from the existence of his notes on the meeting, post , p. 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] . [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)]] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 10:40 p.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)]] Cohen Notes Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 10:40 p.m. to August 2, 1945, 12:30 a.m. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)]] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 7, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745 Department of State Minutes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] Department of State Minutes Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 10:40 p.m. Top secret The last meeting of the Big Three convened at 10:40 p.m. on Wednesday, the first of August 1945. The President stated that Mr. Byrnes had a report from the Economic Subcommittee. 3 Mr. Byrnes stated that the Economic Subcommittee had reported regarding reparations and it was his understanding that agreement had been reached by all delegations. Mr. Byrnes then read the text. 4 Mr. Byrnes called attention to sections 8 and 9 of the reparations report. He disliked greatly to suggest amendments but felt that he should in the interests of all parties concerned. Paragraph 8 read as follows: “The Soviet Government renounces all claims to enterprises located, etc.” He suggested the insertion after the word “claims” the words “in respect of reparations.” The purpose of this change would be to avoid creating the impression that the Soviet Government had claims other than reparations. The same language should be inserted in the next paragraph with respect to the United States and the United Kingdom. Mr. Byrnes stated that this is the only change and asked whether the reparations document could be considered to be approved. Mr. Bevin asked for the text of the proposed amendment and cited as an example the possibility that the Germans had taken over works belonging to British nationals for war purposes before 1939. In such a case the British by this amendment would be renouncing that property. Mr. Byrnes replied that the language provides that the Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect to reparations. In the case cited by Mr. Bevin the amendment would not affect the situation but if the language was not there it would affect it. Mr. Attlee agreed. Mr. Byrnes then asked whether Mr. Molotov agreed with the paper on war trophies.) 5 Mr. Molotov proposed that an insertion be made in the record to the effect that the Conference had adopted the American suggestion 6 in principle. The Soviet Delegation did not have time to discuss this paper and the wording should be agreed on afterward. The Soviet Delegation agreed in regard to its substance. Everyone had been busy on either the protocol or committees. Mr. Byrnes stated that he had before him a paper which he was informed the three members of the committee had tentatively agreed to. Mr. Molotov stated that he hadn’t read it. Mr. Byrnes asked the President whether there was anything else to do but agree. The President agreed. Mr. Byrnes stated that in regard to the protocol he had been informed that there was agreement between the three representatives. 7 Therefore, it was unnecessary to read portions regarding the settlement of disputed questions unless there was some objection here to these agreements. It should be added to the protocol that they had agreed in principle regarding the trophy paper. 8 Mr. Molotov then suggested an amendment concerning the question of the western frontier of Poland in paragraph 2. 9 This paragraph stated that the line ran from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde. He suggested the substitution of the words “west of” instead of “through.” Mr. Attlee agreed. The President asked how far west. 10 Mr. Molotov stated that it was shown on the map. 11 Mr. Attlee stated that the map showed a line west from Swinemünde. 12 Stalin suggested the words “immediately west of.” The President and Mr. Attlee agreed. Mr. Molotov then suggested an amendment to the last section of the paragraph. Instead of the words “subject to examination by experts” he suggested the words “exact line on ground should be established by experts of the U.S.S.R. and Poland.” Mr. Bevin stated that the British could not cut themselves out of this. Stalin replied that the question concerned the frontiers of Russia and Poland. Mr. Bevin admitted this but stated that the line must be recognized by the United Nations. He went on to say that we have agreed at the peace settlement to support this line but it is too much to ask that we accept the line established by the Russians and Poles. Stalin pointed out that the conditions for the borderline have been given in the document. All that remained to be done was to establish the exact frontier. This would mean only a variation of a kilometer or so including a village here or there. This is all that remains. Since the question is between the Russians and the Poles they should decide. Stalin asked who the British wanted on the commission. Was it British, Americans or Australians? Mr. Attlee stated that we had agreed in principle to the transfer but that the ultimate transfer had been left to the peace conference and this was being anticipated by the proposed amendment. Stalin asked what Attlee desired. Mr. Bevin replied that they wished to have a commission of experts appointed by the peace conference. Stalin indicated that he could not understand this attitude. Mr. Byrnes thought the original language to be desirable since if the two countries most concerned were in peaceful agreement between themselves he assumed that no one else would be concerned. If there was disagreement, the line could be settled only by expert examination provided for by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Stalin then suggested leaving the old wording and Mr. Attlee agreed. The President stated that if the Soviet and Polish Governments were in agreement we would have no objection. Mr. Molotov stated that he had another amendment. The section regarding admission into the United Nations, 13 paragraph 1 should be amended. The first sentence of paragraph 1 now reads: (wording read). This wording had been accepted before agreement had been reached on the wording of paragraph 3, which provides for possible resumption of diplomatic relations before the conclusion of peace. These two sections were contradictory and it was evident that the word “thereafter” [in paragraph 1] should be deleted. Mr. Attlee pointed out that this was not quite correct. Paragraph 2 [ 3? ] read “to the extent possible.” If “thereafter” was deleted it would go farther than intended. It should be left in. Mr. Molotov pointed out that paragraph 1 says that relations will be restored only after the conclusion of peace, but paragraph 3 provides for possible resumption before then. 14 Mr. Attlee replied that that was exactly why the British wanted this in. The first paragraph was mandatory and provides that relations will be restored after the conclusion of peace. The second [ third? ] provides that an attempt will be made before then. Stalin stated that he could not agree to this. Mr. Attlee again pointed out that the first paragraph speaks of normal relations while the second [ third? ] paragraph means that we would get as close as possible to relations. There is no conflict. Mr. Bevin stated that he would agree to the insertion of “as soon as possible thereafter full diplomatic relations, etc.” Stalin again stated that he could not agree to such an interpretation. He gave the example of Finland and stated that there is no ground for failing to give recognition to the present Finnish Government. Mr. Bevin pointed out that Britain was still at war with Finland. Mr. Molotov stated that technically speaking we were at war with Italy but America and the Soviet Union have established relations with that country. 14 Mr. Attlee then stated that they were now going back to old discussions. He thought that the British had explained fully that they can’t go farther than this constitutionally. 15 They had already made great concessions here and could not make more. Stalin stated that it was not possible to arrive at an understanding. Finland has more right to recognition than Italy. It has a freely elected government. Finland got out of the war a long time ago and fought against Germany. Why should not the resumption of diplomatic relations with Finland be permitted. Mr. Bevin stated that he was anxious to agree. He read a suggested amendment 16 to which Stalin and The President agreed. Mr. Molotov then stated that he had no other amendments. Mr. Byrnes announced that the protocol had now been agreed to. He went on to state that the remaining business was the communiqué. Mr. Bevin stated that he had a slight amendment to offer on page l [ Pg. [1] is part of V. The president’s log ] . 17 Mr. Byrnes stated that he had a British paper 18 to be substituted for page 1 [ Pg. [1] is part of V. The president’s log ] . The change was very slight and he had no objection. Stalin asked where the change was. Mr. Byrnes replied that it was on the second page of the committee report. 19 Apparently two paragraphs had been combined. There was no material difference. Mr. Attlee then read the British substitute. Stalin suggested postponement of the question of the preamble until other questions had been discussed. The President expressed agreement. Stalin asked that they begin with section 2 20 regarding the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The President agreed and asked whether section 2 was satisfactory. Stalin and Attlee agreed. The President then asked about section 3. Mr. Byrnes referred to the fact that there had been some objection to the words “loudly applauded.” He had no objection to striking them out. Stalin suggested the words “openly approved.” Mr. Byrnes suggested the words “blindly obeyed.” 21 Mr. Bevin suggested “obeyed stupidly.” Stalin suggested, “whom at time of their success they openly expressed approval of and blindly obeyed.” The President and Attlee agreed. The President asked whether there were other changes. Stalin replied that there were none. The President then raised section 4. Mr. Bevin pointed out that in the words of the Economic Principles there is some repetition. Paragraph 12 and paragraph 9 (iv) 22 contained exactly the same language. He suggested that this should be deleted from the Economic Principles and left in the Political. 23 Stalin announced that he had no amendments on the Economic Principles. The President next brought up reparations. Stalin remarked that before Political Principles they have a small ( a ) and that therefore there should be a ( b ) before Economic Principles. 24 The President agreed and stated that there were no amendments to 4. The President then brought up no. 5, the disposition of the German fleet and merchant marine. Stalin had no amendments. The President then brought up no. 6, City of Koenigsberg and adjacent area. Stalin agreed to this. The President brought up no. 7, war criminals. Mr. Molotov thought that paragraph 1 25 should be deleted. 26 Mr. Attlee and The President stated that it had been deleted on their copies. Mr. Molotov then stated that he had a suggestion regarding Austria. 27 He suggested that this should not be included in the communiqué. It should be left only in the protocol. He felt that there should be no mention of it in the communiqué. He thought it was not proper to publish the decision regarding Austrian reparations. It would be in the protocol. The President said it would be taken out. Stalin said only about reparations. The President replied that he would take all out or part. Stalin said only the last paragraph. The President then raised the matter of Poland. 28 Mr. Bevin suggested a slight amendment. The document says that “the following states approve [ statement was approved? ], etc.” He suggested that “on the Polish Provisional Government they defined their attitude in the following statement.” The opening words would stand. Stalin and The President agreed. Mr. Bevin then proposed that on page 2 [ Pg. [2] is part of V. The president’s log ] the words “following was conclusion reached” be inserted. The President interjected to state that he had told the Polish Government we had agreed to that. Stalin suggested that it be left as it is. Mr. Bevin stated that it would then be necessary to amend the words [“through Swinemünde” to] “immediately west of Swinemünde”. 29 This was agreed. Stalin then mentioned no. 10, Conclusion of Peace Treaty with Italy. Mr. Bevin presented a suggested amendment 30 which he stated would have psychological value. Mr. Byrnes stated that he could see no difference in the text. Mr. Bevin stated that it read better than the present one. Mr. Byrnes did not agree. Mr. Bevin stated that the new draft presents a different picture to his people. Stalin interposed to remark that he thought the present wording contained the same idea but was shorter and clearer. The President announced that he would accept either wording. Mr. Bevin asked Stalin whether he would agree. Stalin replied that the first draft is shorter and was best. However, he would accept either. Mr. Bevin insisted that he preferred his. Stalin stated that if Bevin insisted his proposal could be accepted. The President agreed. The President then announced that Mr. Byrnes had a suggestion to make on no. 4 31 and asked that they turn back to reparations. Mr. Attlee then interposed to state that all changes in the protocol would be embodied in the communiqué. The President stated that the next subject was no. 11 on Trusteeship. Stalin stated that the Russians were given very little in this paper. However, he had no objection. The President then raised no. 12 regarding the revision of Allied Control Commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Stalin agreed to this. The President next brought up no. 13, “Transferring of German Populations”. Stalin stated that he would agree to all the rest. The President mentioned no. 14 regarding the bilateral commission investigating the removal of oil equipment from Rumania. Mr. Molotov then suggested that this section and the section regarding Tangier 32 be deleted from the communiqué but remain in the protocol. Mr. Attlee supported this. Mr. Molotov then suggested the same procedure for Iran. 33 Mr. Attlee agreed. 34 Mr. Byrnes asked why these were being left out. Mr. Bevin announced that they were anxious to leave Tangier out. Mr. Attlee called attention to the fact that it had been agreed that there would be no publicity regarding Tangier. Mr. Bevin stated that the British agreed to the deletion of Tangier and Rumania but to keep Persia in. Stalin insisted that all three go out. Mr. Bevin did not agree. He wanted Tangier out and was willing to have Rumania out but Iran was important in the Near East. Stalin then suggested that Tangier be left in. Mr. Attlee then called attention to the fact that Molotov had not asked for a public announcement regarding Tangier. Mr. Molotov stated that he did not insist upon publicity now but that he did think that the oil question and Iran should not be publicized. Mr. Byrnes asked whether it could not be agreed to eliminate Tangier and the oil question since the British wanted one out and the Soviets wanted one out. Stalin insisted that after such big, serious decisions the communiqué would be spoiled if small decisions were put in. Mr. Byrnes asked for agreement that 2 would be out. Stalin refused. Rumania and Tangier should be out. However, the Russians were not going to keep the Iran decision secret. They just didn’t want it in the communiqué. Mr. Bevin asked whether he could make an announcement in the House of Commons. Stalin replied, “Of course”. The President then stated that all three would be out. The President then raised no. 17, Military Discussions. Mr. Bevin queried one word and Stalin and The President agreed to its deletion. 35 Stalin stated that he had no objection to this section of the communiqué. The President then asked about the preamble. Mr. Bevin asked to refer back to paragraph 12. The words of the last line referred to a proposal but the proposal was not published. He suggested the addition of the words, “and accepted as a basis an agreed proposal”. Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Molotov pointed out that this should be changed [also] in the protocol. Stalin stated his assumption that there would be a list of participants at the end of the communiqué. The President again raised the preamble. Stalin said he had no objection. Mr. Byrnes said he wished to object on behalf of the Foreign Ministers. It said that the Foreign Ministers had separate meetings alone. He suggested instead of “separate” the word “regular”. Mr. Molotov agreed. He offered a suggestion regarding the signature of the communiqué. He had before him the Tehran communiqué. This communiqué was first signed by the British Prime Minister. It was the same at the Crimea. It was agreed that at the next conference the first signature would be that of the Soviet Government. Two documents were issued at Tehran. On one the first signature had been that of President Roosevelt. On the other the first signature had been the British Prime Minister. The President stated he had no objection. Mr. Attlee interjected to state that he voted for an alphabetical listing. There he would score over Marshal Zhukov. Stalin stated that if the President preferred another order of signature could be arranged. The President stated he had no objection. Stalin inquired about publication time. Mr. Bevin stated that he would like to release the communiqué for publication in the Friday morning papers. It would be given out tomorrow. Stalin agreed. Mr. Bevin stated that this followed the Yalta formula. The time would be 9:30 GMT. Stalin asked when it would be on the radio. Mr. Attlee replied after release. Mr. Byrnes asked whether the time had been agreed upon. Mr. Bevin repeated Thursday night, 9:30 p.m. GMT. Stalin said “August 2”. The President said right, August 2, for the Friday morning papers. The President then announced that Mr. Byrnes had a protocol matter to present. Stalin repeated Thursday, 9:30 GMT. Mr. Byrnes stated that he wished to call attention to the fact that in the English protocol there was no reference to the Ruhr industrial area. He had been told that there was such a reference in the Russian text. 36 He thought this should be settled so there would be no misunderstanding. He had no recollection that the disposition mentioned in the Soviet text had been made. However, he had been told that his recollection was faulty. The President interjected to state that he had suggested reference to the Council of Foreign Ministers. 37 Mr. Byrnes then suggested that the draftsmen should consider more exact language in regard to the intent. The Soviet text did not say what was referred. Mr. Molotov suggested that it be written down. Mr. Byrnes stated that it should be the same in all three texts. Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet text had been submitted in writing. Mr. Byrnes replied he was informed that the Soviet suggestion had not been ready to submit today. Stalin then said that he thought it better to withdraw this point altogether. The matter should not be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was withdrawn. Mr. Byrnes agreed that this was better. Mr. Attlee then suggested that top copies be signed by the Big Three. He thought Churchill and Eden would like to have them. These and other documents were then signed. 38 Stalin then asked how agreement would be reached on the final draft of the protocol. Mr. Byrnes suggested the appointment of a committee to compare texts. He thought that language suggestions should be considered. The President asked whether it was satisfactory that each appoint a representative to compare texts and let the rest go home. This was agreed to. Mr. Byrnes appointed Mr. Dunn. Mr. Attlee appointed Sir Edward Bridges. Stalin appointed Vyshinski. The President stated that there was nothing further. The meeting should adjourn until they could meet again which he hoped would take place in Washington. Mr. Attlee stated that he wished to express his thanks to the Generalissimo for the excellent arrangements made for this meeting and for our comfort and also to the President for having presided over this Conference. He expressed the hope that the Conference would be a milestone on the road the three nations were pursuing together toward permanent peace and that the friendships between the three meeting here would be strengthened. Stalin stated that this was the Soviet desire. The President expressed appreciation of the American Delegation to Stalin for his kind treatment and also joined in all that the Prime Minister had said. Stalin stated that the Russian Delegation joined in the thanks to the President for presiding over the Conference. The President stated that he had appreciated the privilege and hoped that it had been satisfactory to the Marshal and the Prime Minister. Stalin said that he wished personally to express his thanks to Mr. Byrnes who seemed to work harder than any one else. Mr. Byrnes expressed his deep appreciation of these kind words. He hoped that with his two colleagues he had been able to make a contribution to this Conference. The President said that he also wished to thank the other Foreign Ministers and others who had worked to get the three to agree. The meeting adjourned. 39 3 Not found in this form. The Cohen notes ( post , p. 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] ) indicate, however, that it was a report of the Protocol Subcommittee which was discussed; cf. document No. 1383 , post , section iii . 4 Not found as a separate document. It is presumably identical with document No. 1383 , post , section in (Stage 1 text) 5 The paper referred to is apparently a subcommittee draft which has not been found. See ante , p. 573, footnote 19 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] . 6 Document No. 842 , post . 7 On the Protocol Subcommittee. The draft Protocol before Truman at this meeting was incorporated bodily into the United States original of the final Protocol. Changes made in it during the course of the meeting are noted in the footnotes to document No. 1383 , post . 8 See document No. 1383 , post , section xxi ( xx ). 9 See document No. 1383 , post , section ix ( viii ) B. 10 This question is attributed to Byrnes in the Cohen notes, post , p. 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] . 11 The map which was before the Heads of Government has not been found. See the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , post . 12 This statement is attributed to Bevin in the Cohen notes, post , p. 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] . 13 See document No. 1383 , post , section x ( ix ). 14 This statement is attributed to Stalin in the Cohen notes, post , p. 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] . 14 This statement is attributed to Stalin in the Cohen notes, post , p. 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] . 15 See ante , pp. 426–427 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] . 16 Bevin’s amendment was apparently the deletion of a clause at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 1. Cf. the Cohen notes, post , p. 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , and document No. 1383 , post , section x ( ix ), especially footnote 64. 17 Of the attachment to document No. 1380 , post , section i , alternative B. 18 Attachment to document No. 1380 , post , section i , alternative C. 19 The first page of alternative B of section i of the draft Communiqué ends with the words “Views were exchanged” (paragraph 5). The first page of alternative C ends with the words “on a number of other questions” (paragraph 5). Bevin, in mentioning a change on page 1 [ Pg. [1] is part of V. The president’s log ] , presumably referred to the omission from paragraph 5 of the clause “and they are announced in this report”. Byrnes, in calling attention to the changes on page 2 [ Pg. [2] is part of V. The president’s log ] , presumably referred to the modification and consolidation of the last two paragraphs of section i (alternative B) into a single final paragraph (alternative C). See the attachment to document No. 1380 , post . The “committee report” text referred to by Byrnes is apparently alternative B. For a memorandum to Byrnes by an American member of the Communiqué Subcommittee commenting upon the draft text of the Communiqué, see document No. 1380 , post . 20 The section numbers mentioned in this and succeeding paragraphs refer to sections of the attachment to document No. 1380 , post . 21 This suggestion is attributed to Bevin in the Cohen notes, post , p. 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] . 22 Of section ii of the attachment to document No. 1380 , post . 23 The suggested deletion from paragraph 12 was not made in the Russian text. See post , p. 1484, footnote 24 [ Pg. 1484 is part of Doc. 1383 ] . 24 There is an indicator “B.” before the heading “Economic Principles” on the draft Communiqué which was before Truman during this meeting; see the attachment to document No. 1380 , post , section in B. This indicator, however, did not appear before the comparable heading in Truman’s copy of the Protocol; see document No. 1383 , post , section ii . 25 Cf. documents Nos. 1016 and 1018 and the attachment to document No. 1380 , post , section vii . 26 This statement is attributed to Stalin in the Cohen notes, post , p. 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] . 27 See the attachment to document No. 1380 , post , section viii . 28 See the attachment to document No. 1380 , post , section ix . 29 To bring the language of the Communiqué into harmony with the language approved earlier in the meeting for the Protocol. See ante , p. 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 30 Not found as a separate document. It appears, however, from a comparison of the report by the Communiqué Subcommittee (attachment to document No. 1380 , post ) with the text of the Communiqué as finally issued ( document No. 1384 , post ) that Bevin’s amendment probably involved the substitution of text ( b ) below for text ( a ) in the first paragraph of section x of the Communiqué: ( a ) “In view of the victorious end of the war in Europe and the necessity of establishing as soon as possible the conditions of lasting peace, the Conference agreed upon the following statement of common policy:”[.] ( b ) “The Conference agreed upon the following statement of common policy for establishing, as soon as possible, the conditions of lasting peace after victory in Europe:”[.] 31 Byrnes’ suggestion was presumably the insertion of the words “in respect of reparations” in section iv of the Communiqué, paragraphs 8 and 9. Cf. the attachment to document No. 1380 , post , and document No. 1384 , post; and see ante , pp. 586–587 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 32 See the attachment to document No. 1380 , post , section xvi . 33 See the attachment to document No. 1380 , post , section xv . 34 This and the three preceding paragraphs, which here constitute an exchange between Molotov and Attlee, appear as an exchange between Stalin and Bevin in the Cohen notes, post , p. 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] . 35 The words deleted on the draft Communiqué which was before Truman during this meeting were “affecting Europe”. Cf. the attachment to document No. 1380 , section xvii ; document No. 1384 , section xiv ; and the Cohen notes, post , p. 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] . The following passage in Brown’s diary entry for August 1, relating to the consideration of the Communiqué at the Thirteenth Plenary Meeting, confirms the conclusion that the two words “affecting Europe” constituted the deletion referred to in the minutes: “… Then came communiqué. British produced new introduction which was satisfactory to us and after passing Russians accepted with some bantering. Russia got Rumanian oil equipment stricken from communiqué. Great Britain had Tangier knocked out, and Iran got knocked out in the meantime. Stalin said other part of communiqué so important that those matters detracted. President unable to get inland waterways in. There were some other changes in verbiage. On military talks, Stalin immediately had the words ‘in Europe’ stricken, and said he wanted that [i. e., the section on military talks] in communiqué, showing he wanted the world to think his moving in on Japan was coming.…” Cf. ante , p. 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] . 36 Not found. 37 Cf. ante , p. 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 38 Brown’s diary entry for August 1 states: “… A few minutes after midnight, papers were signed.…” 39 At 12:30 a.m., August 2. See Log, ante , p. 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 710 ] . Cohen Notes Truman Papers [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] Cohen Notes Potsdam, August 1, 1945, 10:40 p.m. to August 2, 1945, 12:30 a.m. Evening meeting—10:30 p.m. Truman : We will take up the report of the Protocol Committee. 1 Secretary Byrnes takes up the Reparation Section. Byrnes : I suggest an amendment to the paragraph renouncing claims to industrial shares outside of their respective zones, so as to make such claims refer only to claims in respect of reparations. This amendment was agreed to. Secretary Byrnes then brought up the question of Allied property in satellite countries. Molotov : I suggest that the conference adopt the American proposal in principle but the wording should be agreed to through diplomatic channel. We did not have time to consider the wording. Byrnes : I understood that the Committee had agreed to a substitute which was satisfactory to the Soviet representative with a single reservation. Molotov : We have not had a chance to consider it. Byrnes : All right then, it will have to be agreed in principle and then followed through diplomatic channel. Molotov : I have a suggestion regarding the description of the western frontier of Poland. It refers to a line running to the Baltic Sea to the town of “S”. 2 This might go through the town. It should rest [ read ] west of the town “S”. Byrnes : How far west. 3 Bevin : Immediately west. Stalin : Immediately west will satisfy us. Truman : That is ah right. Attlee : Agreed. Molotov : I have a suggestion regarding the section on Koenigsberg. At the end of the second paragraph I suggest we substitute for the clause “subject to examination by experts” a clause which will provide for [ that ] the exact line on the ground should be established by experts of the USSR and Poland. Bevin : That is really asking too much. That is a matter for the United Nations. Stalin : I think there is a misunderstanding. The boundary line is drawn by this conference. The drawing of the line should not involve a degradation [ digression? ] of a kilometer one way or the other. We think it should be arranged between the USSR and Poland. If you want other experts say so and we will agree. Attlee : This would anticipate the work of the peace conference. Stalin : What would you suggest, a committee of experts appointed by the peace conference. Byrnes : The two countries most concerned are the USSR and Poland. If they agree there will be no problem. If there is a disagreement there must be experts appointed by the Council of Foreign Ministers to decide. Stalin : Let us leave the old wording then. Truman : If the Soviets and Poland agree we will have no objection. Molotov : In the section dealing with the admission of states to the United Nations, I have an amendment to offer. The first paragraph of this section was agreed to before we agreed to paragraph 3. The word “Thereafter” should be removed from the first paragraph. It is misleading. Attlee : I do not think that is correct. Paragraph 3 refers to the establishment of diplomatic relations so far as possible. The first paragraph refers to Poland [ sic ] complete diplomatic relations which in our case are possible only after the conclusion of peace. Stalin : Paragraph 3 is denied by paragraph 1. Attlee : No, paragraph 1 refers to full normal relations, while paragraph 3 refers to necessarily incomplete relations. Bevin : We would say that as soon as possible “full” diplomatic relations may be established. That will draw a distinction between partial and complete diplomatic relations. Stalin : Take Finland. There is no ground for denying full diplomatic relations with Finland. Bevin : We are still at war with Finland. Stalin : We have relations with Italy, although technically we are still at war with Italy. Attlee : We went a long way to meet the Soviets in view of our constitutional difficulties, we [do not?] want to go back now to the wording that caused so much trouble. Stalin : Then we won’t reach an agreement. Why should not those who want it resume diplomatic relations with Finland now? Bevin : I am very anxious for an agreement. I will make another suggestion with reference to the resumption of diplomatic relations in the first paragraph which might be omitted entirely. It would then read that the three governments considered it desirable that anomalous position of these states be terminated by the conclusion of the peace treaties. Stalin : All right. Byrnes : The protocol then is accepted subject to the one change to be made in the part dealing with the American proposal regarding Allied property in the satellite countries. The American proposal on this [is] accepted on [ in? ] principle but the exact wording will be worked out in diplomatic channel. We can now consider the communiqué. Stalin : I suggest we postpone consideration of the preamble. Truman : Is section #2 satisfactory? It was agreed to. Truman : Section 3? Byrnes : There was objections [ sic ] to the words “loudly applauded”. We have no objection to striking it out. Stalin : Why not say openly approved. Bevin : —and blindly obeyed. Truman : It will be read then, openly approved and blindly obeyed. Truman : Any other changes—section 4? Bevin : In the economic principles we have a repetition of some things contained in the political principle[s]. I suggest we leave out of the economic principles the thought contained in paragraph 9 for [ 9 ( iv ) of? ] the political principle[s]. This was agreed to. Truman : Section 5, the disposition of the German Navy and merchant ships? Stalin : No amendment. Truman : Section 6? Koenigsberg. Stalin : Agreed. Truman : Section 7, war criminals? Stalin : First section of this paragraph could be eliminated. Molotov : I have a suggestion regarding Austria. We should not publish the statement about reparations in the communiqué. It may be published in the protocol. Its publication in the communiqué would tie our hands unnecessarily. It is better for Austria to hope for this decision than to be advised that it has been made. Truman : Poland? Stalin : No amendments. Bevin : I suggest a slight verbal change which was agreed to by Stalin and Truman. Bevin also proposes that on page two, reference be made to the fact that the conclusion was reached instead of the agreement being reached. Truman : I told the Poles that we agreed. Bevin : I withdraw my suggestion. A number of other minor verbal suggestions were made and discussed. Most of these suggestions as to style were made by Mr. Bevin. At one point where Mr. Bevin criticized the English of the communiqué, Stalin implied that English that was acceptable to the Americans was acceptable to the Russians. Stalin : The sections on Rumanian oil equipment and on Tangier should be deleted from the communiqué, also Iran. Bevin : I agree. Byrnes : Why? Bevin : I do not want to say anything about Tangier. Byrnes : We agreed to delete the paragraph on Rumania and Tangier. Bevin : But we would like Persia to remain. Byrnes : We have not agreed to the omission of Iran. Stalin : All or none. Bevin : We don’t care about Tangier and Rumanian equipment, but Iran is important throughout the Middle East. Stalin : Then leave in Tangier and Iran. Byrnes : Leave out Rumania and Tangier if you like, but leave in Iran. Stalin : After such big decisions, these small decisions are spoiling the communiqué. We need not keep our decision secret, I just don’t want the minor decisions in the communiqué. Bevin : I can speak of this then in the House of Commons? Stalin : Of course. Truman : Then leave out all three. Stalin : There is no objection to the reference in the communiqué to military talks on matters of common interest. I do not insist on any qualification limiting these talks to Europe and the paragraph should go in the communiqué and [be] published. At the end of the communiqué will be a list of the participants. Truman : Yes. The preamble is now satisfactory. Molotov : In our previous conferences it was agreed that the signatures should be rotated. According to this procedure the Russians would sign the present communiqué first. Truman : I have no objections. Attlee : I favor alphabetical order[;] that is where I would score over Marshal Zhukov. Truman : When are we going to publish it. Bevin : For the Friday morning press. Stalin : Today is Wednesday. Bevin : If you will follow Yalta precedence [ precedent ] it would be 9:30 p.m., Greenwich time Thursday. Byrnes : I refer back to the protocol. A paragraph on the Ruhr is in the Russian protocol, but not in ours. I have no recollection of such disposition, but I am told that my recollection is faulty. Truman : The Ruhr was referred at my suggestion to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Byrnes : If so, I suggest the draft be made more definite. Certainly it should be in all three texts. Stalin : I think we will withdraw our suggestion. The messages to Churchill and Eden were agreed to. Truman made a note of the fact that the business of the conference be concluded and that they were now ready to adjourn. He expressed the hope that the next meeting would be at Washington. Stalin : God willing. Attlee : I want to thank Generalissimo Stalin for the excellent arrangements he has made for this conference. I also want to thank the President of the United States for arranging to come so great a distance to personally participate in our deliberations. I hope that it will be a milestone on the road to peace between our countries and in the world. Stalin : That is our desire also. Truman : I wish to join in the sentiments expressed by Prime Minister Attlee. Stalin : The Soviet delegation wishes to join in the thanks expressed by the Prime Minister to the President for his personal appearance at this conference. I should also like to express our thanks to Secretary Byrnes who has worked harder perhaps than any one of us to make this conference a success. He has worked hard and he has worked very well. He has helped us to reach agreements. Those sentiments, Secretary Byrnes, come from my heart. Byrnes : I thank you very much, Generalissimo. I sincerely hope I have been helpful. Stalin : We can call this conference successful. Truman : I want to add my thanks to all the Foreign Secretaries. Molotov : I want to thank Bevin and Eden for all their arduous labours which have facilitated the work of the conference. Adjourned at 12:30 a.m., August 2, 1945. 1 For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the minutes, supra. 2 i. e., Swinemünde. 3 Concerning discrepancies in the attribution of this and other statements made at this meeting as between the minutes and the Cohen notes, see the footnotes to the minutes, supra. Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745 [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] August 7, 1945. Questions Discussed at the Berlin Conference and Their Disposition i. procedures for the peace settlement 1. Council of Foreign Ministers Disposition—As reported in the communiqué. 2. Meetings of the three Foreign Ministers as provided at the Yalta Conference Disposition—It was agreed that, in spite of the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers, periodic meetings of the U. S., British, and Soviet Foreign Ministers might still usefully be held. 3. European Advisory Commission Disposition—It was agreed that the Commission should be dissolved. 4. General Peace Conference to settle questions arising from the present war Disposition—Such a conference was constantly referred to as an agency for ratifying decisions reached at Berlin or by the Council of Foreign Ministers, but no definite decision was taken as to whether or not such a conference should in fact be held. ii. german questions 5. Political principles in regard to the treatment of Germany during the interim control period Disposition—As stated in the communiqué. 6. Economic principles for the treatment of Germany during the initial control period Disposition—As stated in the communiqué. 7. German reparations Disposition—As stated in the communiqué. 8. French participation in the Reparations Commission Disposition—It was agreed that France should become a member of the Commission. 9. German external assets . The U. S. presented a proposal on this subject. Disposition—Final action was as stated in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the section on German reparations in the communiqué. 10. The Ruhr . The Soviets presented a paper stating that the Ruhr is to be considered an integral part of Germany and proposing a quadripartite administration of the area. Disposition—It was originally agreed to refer this question to the Council of Foreign Ministers but at the time of the drawing up of the final Protocol it was dropped. 11. Königsberg area Disposition—As stated in the communiqué. 12. Directives to military commanders on Allied Control Council for Germany Disposition—As stated in the Protocol. 13. Disposal of the German Navy and Merchant Marine Disposition—As stated in the Protocol. 14. War criminals Disposition—As stated in the communiqué. 15. Transfer of German populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary Disposition—As stated in the communiqué. 16. Disarming of German troops in Norway . The Soviets raised this question and the British presented a reply. 17. Fascist activities in U. S. and British zones in Germany and Austria . The Soviets presented a statement on this subject. The U. S. and Britain said that they had asked their zone commanders for reports and that they would inform the Soviets of the tenor of these reports and would take whatever action seemed to be required. 18. Delivery of food, coal and fuel to Berlin . The British presented a proposal on this subject for the delivery of these materials by the Soviets. Disposition—The Soviets asked for time to study the proposal and no action was taken. 19. Repatriation of Soviet citizens from Germany and other areas . The Soviets presented two statements on this subject to which the U. S. and British agreed to give sympathetic consideration. iii. austria 20. Austria . The British raised the question of the entry of British and U. S. forces into Vienna and Stalin stated that this question had just been settled. At the British and U. S. request Stalin agreed that the Soviets would continue to provide food for the population of the U. S. and British zones in Vienna until the U. S. and British commanders were ready to take over this task. Agreement in regard to the Austrian Provisional Government and to Austrian reparations is as stated in the Protocol. iv. poland 21. Liquidation of the London Polish Government Disposition—As stated in the communiqué. 22. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration in Regard to Poland Disposition—As stated in the communiqué. 23. Western frontier of Poland Disposition—As stated in the communiqué. v. italy 24. Italy . The U. S. presented a proposal for easing the position of Italy. Disposition—The Conference approved only that action set forth in the section of the communiqué on “Conclusion of Peace Treaties and Admission to the United Nations Organization”. 25. Italian reparations . The Soviets presented two proposals in regard to reparations from Italy but in view of U. S. and British opposition no action was taken. 26. Trusteeship territories . The Soviets proposed that the Council of Foreign Ministers be authorized to work out proposals for bringing into effect provisions of the trusteeship system in regard to ex-enemy territories and to League mandates. Disposition—The action finally taken related only to Italian colonial territories and is as stated in the communiqué. 27. Treatment of Soviet prisoners in a British camp in Italy . The Soviets raised this question and the British presented an explanation which was accepted as satisfactory. vi. spain 28. Spain . The Soviets presented a proposal that the Conference recommend to the United Nations that they break off all relations with the Franco Government and support the democratic forces in Spain. Disposition—The action of the Conference in regard to Spain was limited to the final paragraph of the section of the communiqué entitled “Conclusion of Peace Treaties and Admission to the United Nations Organization”. vii. southeast europe 29. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States . The U. S. presented a proposal providing for the following action in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary: (1) supervision of elections, (2) greater facilities for the press, and (3) revised Control Commission procedure. Disposition—No action was taken on the first point. The second point is covered to some extent in the fourth paragraph of the section in the communiqué on “Conclusion of Peace Treaties and Admission to the United Nations Organization”. The third point was disposed of as stated in Section XII of the communiqué. 30. Use of Allied property for satellite reparations or “war trophies” . The U. S. presented a proposal on this subject, final action being as stated in the Protocol. 31. Facilities for radio representatives . The U. S. sought to have the same facilities which had been agreed to for Allied press representatives in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland extended to Allied radio representatives. Disposition—The Soviets would not agree. 32. Oil equipment in Rumania Disposition—As stated in the Protocol. 33. Yugoslavia . The British presented a proposal for the implementation of the Yalta Declaration concerning Yugoslavia. Stalin maintained that the Yalta Declaration was being carried out and refused to act unless Yugoslav representatives were allowed to state their case to the Conference. Disposition—No action was taken. 34. Greece . Both the Greek internal situation and Greek relations with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania were discussed. The U. S. and Britain proposed that the three powers join in supervising the Greek elections but the Soviets refused. The Soviets accused the Greek Government of an internal reign of terror and of aggressive action against Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which the British refuted. Disposition—No action was taken. 35. Southeast Europe . The British presented a proposal for the mediation of differences between Yugoslavia and Greece. 2 Disposition—The Soviets did not agree and no action was taken. viii. general european 36. Cooperation in solving urgent European economic problems . The U. S. proposed that the Soviets participate in the work of the EEC, the ECO and the EITO [ ECITO ]. Disposition—The final action was as stated in the Protocol. 37. International inland waterways . The U. S. presented a proposal for insuring the free and unrestricted navigation of international waterways and for establishing interim international regimes to this end for the Rhine and the Danube. Disposition—Final action was as stated in the Protocol. 38. Oil supplies for Western Europe . The U. S. presented a proposal for the supply of oil to Western Europe from Rumania, Hungary and Austria. The Soviets agreed to study the proposal but did not give any final reply before the end of the Conference. ix. near east 39. Turkey and the Black Sea Straits . After the British had raised the question as to Soviet intentions toward Turkey, the Soviets introduced a proposal providing for the abrogation of the Montreux Convention and for exclusive control of the Straits by Turkey and Russia with provision for Soviet bases on the Straits. Disposition—The action finally taken was as described in the Protocol. 40. Tangier Disposition—As stated in the Protocol. 41. Syria and Lebanon . The Soviets proposed quadripartite consultation on this question but after a statement by Churchill dropped that proposal. 42. Iran . The British presented a proposal for the evacuation by stages of Soviet, British and U. S. troops from Iran. Disposition—Final action was as stated in the Protocol. x. far east 43. Japanese peace proposal . Stalin informed the Conference of the latest proposal and of the Soviet reply thereto. 44. Korea . The question of trusteeship for Korea was raised by the Soviets but not discussed. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. 2 Cf. p. 1078 [ Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 1087 ] , post , footnote 3. VII. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers VII. Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers Contents Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers and dissolution of the European Advisory Commission (Documents 711-[Unnumbered document following Document 721 (#1)]) United Nations: Admission of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, and Spain (Documents 722-[Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)]) Possible trusteeship for Italian colonial territories and Korea (Documents 732-738) Officers of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Documents 739-743) Constitutional restraints on the President’s treaty-making powers (Documents 744-744) General European questions: Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; freedom of the press in eastern Europe (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 744 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)]) Inland waterways (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)]) Austria: Extension of the authority of the Renner government (Documents 761-[Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)]) Reparations (Documents 765-[Unnumbered document following Document 771 (#1)]) Agreements on zones of occupation and control machinery; occupation of the western zones and of Vienna; provisioning of Vienna (Documents 772-[Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)]) Alleged anti-Soviet activities (Documents 790-792) Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania Governments, control commissions, elections, conclusion of peace treaties, and diplomatic relations (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 792 (#1)]-833) Use of Allied property for reparations or war booty (Documents 834-[Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)]) Control of external assets (Documents 845-847) Germany: (Documents 879-892) Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period (Documents 848-878) Reparations, restitution, and war booty (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)]-980) External assets (Documents 981-[Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)]) Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)]) War criminals (Documents 1016-[Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)]) Soviet annexation of Königsberg and northern East Prussia (Documents 1020-[Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)]) The Rhineland and the Ruhr (Documents 1021-1027) The French zone of occupation and the French sector in Berlin (Documents 1028-1034) The “additional requirements” agreement (Documents 1035-1038) Coal and food (Documents 1039-[Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)]) Transfers of population (Documents 1053-[Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)]) Alleged anti-Soviet activities (Documents 1055-1055) German forces in Norway (Documents 1056-1058) Government and elections (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1058 (#1)]-1070) Relations with Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia (Documents 1071-1087) General policy, revision of surrender terms, and conclusion of a peace treaty (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1087 (#1)]-1093) Reparations (Documents 1094-1107) Retention of Allied forces and of a combined command in Italy (Documents 1108-1109) Admission to the United Maritime Authority (Documents 1110-1110) Proposed appointment of James H. Douglas, Jr., as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission (Documents 1111-1116) Government and elections; liquidation of the affairs of the Government-in-Exile (Documents 1117-1142) Frontiers and areas of administration (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)]-1154) Economic assistance from the United States (Documents 1155-1156) General policy; sharing of information on atomic energy (Documents 1157-1157) Participation in European economic organizations (Documents 1158-1163) Repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals (Documents 1164-1168) Air traffic between the United States and the Soviet Union (Documents 1169-1174) Lend-lease; need for Anglo-American financial discussions (Documents 1180-1186) Civil aviation policy (Documents 1187-1189) Allocation of shipping (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)]) Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery (Documents 1197-1200) Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia (Documents 1201-1205) Attitude on civil administration in Venezia Giulia (Documents 1206-1211) China: Negotiations with the Soviet Union (Documents 1212-1222) Japan: Peace feelers through the Soviet Union (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)]) Issuance of a proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan (Documents 1236-1261) Basic military objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan (Documents 1262-[Unnumbered document following Document 1266 (#1)]) Control and command in the war against Japan (Documents 1267-1273) Relationship of the Soviet Union to the war against Japan (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)]-1282) British Commonwealth participation in the war against Japan (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)]) French and Netherland participation in the war against Japan (Documents 1288-[Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)]) Portuguese participation in the war against Japan (Documents 1295-1302) Use of atomic weapons in the war against Japan (Documents 1303-1315) Release of tankers for the war against Japan through altered distribution of European oil supplies (Documents 1316-1326) Near Eastern and African Questions Iran: Withdrawal of Allied forces (Documents 1327-[Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)]) Lebanon and Syria: The crisis in Franco-Levantine relations (Documents 1338-1343) Palestine: Jewish immigration; suggestion for Anglo-American discussions (Documents 1344-1347) Tangier: Future of the international zone; Soviet participation in the Paris conversations on Tangier (Documents 1348-[Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)]) Turkey: The Straits question; relations with the Soviet Union (Documents 1363-1378) Preparation of the Conference Communiqué (Documents 1379-1380) Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States and the United Kingdom (Documents 1381-1381) Proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom (Documents 1382-1382) Protocol of Proceedings and Communiqué, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom: Protocol of Proceedings (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)]-1383) Communiqué (Documents 1384-1384) General Questions General Questions Contents Admission of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, and Spain (Documents 722-[Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)]) Possible trusteeship for Italian colonial territories and Korea (Documents 732-738) Officers of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Documents 739-743) Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers and dissolution of the European Advisory Commission Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers and dissolution of the European Advisory Commission [711] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg, July 17, 1945.] Truman Papers [712] Report by the Subcommittee on the Council of Foreign Ministers [Potsdam, July 18, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1845 [713] Text Approved by the Heads of Government [Babelsberg, July 20, 1945.] Truman Papers [714] Text Approved by the Foreign Ministers [Babelsberg,] July 22, 1945. Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference [715] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) [Babelsberg,] July 27, 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [716] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State Chungking, 28 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [717] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [718] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State Chungking, 31 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [719] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State [Chungking,] 31 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [720] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State [Chungking,] 1 August 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [721] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State [Chungking,] 1 August 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 721 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 711 Proposal by the United States Delegation Truman Papers No. 711 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 top secret [ Babelsberg , July 17, 1945.] Memorandum Subject: Draft Proposal for the Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers One of the most urgent problems in the field of foreign relations facing us today is the establishment of some procedure and machinery for the development of peace negotiations and territorial settlements without which the existing confusion, political and economic stagnation will continue to the serious detriment of Europe and the world. The experience at Versailles following the last war does not encourage the belief that a full formal peace conference without preliminary preparation on the part of the leading powers is the best procedure. Such a conference without such preparation would be slow and unwieldy, its session would be conducted in a heated atmosphere of rival claims and counterclaims and ratification of the resulting documents might be long delayed. I therefore propose as the best formula to meet the situation the establishment of a Council composed of the foreign ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States, namely, the countries which compose the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations organization. It is my thought that this Council should meet as soon after our meeting as preparations therefor can be completed. I should like to present therefore a draft proposal along these lines which I have drawn up for your consideration. [Attachment] Draft Proposal for the Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers (1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States. (2) The Council shall meet at ___________ 2 and its first meeting shall be held on ____________. Each of the Foreign Ministers shall be accompanied by a high-ranking deputy duly authorized and capable of carrying on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister. He will likewise be accompanied by a small staff of technical advisers suited to the problems concerned and to the organization of a joint secretariat. (3) As its immediate important task, the Council would be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, 3 and Hungary and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established. (4) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question. It is not intended, however, to fix hard and fast rules but rather to permit the Council to adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it might desire to hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases the Council might desire to convoke a formal conference of the States chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem. It is so authorized. 1 Attachment 1 to the minutes of the First Plenary Meeting, July 17. See ante , p. 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . 2 The blanks in this sentence are in the original. 3 Byrnes, on his copy of document No. 214 (see vol. i ) , has made a manuscript note in the margin that “Finland” should be inserted here. Cf. ante , pp. 68–69 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . No. 712 Report by the Subcommittee on the Council of Foreign Ministers 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1845 No. 712 Report by the Subcommittee on the Council of Foreign Ministers 1 top secret [ Potsdam , July 18, 1945.] I. Procedure for Peace Settlements (1) The draft proposal 2 for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers, presented by the United States, was approved in principle. (2) The following redraft of paragraph 3 of the United States draft was approved: “(3) As its immediate important task, the Council would be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established. For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the Terms of Surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. * Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the States Members thereof.” 3 (3) The Soviet Delegation reserved the right to suggest a change in the first paragraph of the United States Draft. (4) It was agreed that the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers approved at the Yalta Conference 4 would not be affected by the establishment of the new Council of Foreign Ministers, though they might at times be held simultaneously with meetings of the Council. (5) It was agreed that the functions of the European Advisory Commission would, after agreement with France, be transferred to the Allied Control Councils (for Germany and Austria). [Annex 5 ] Council of Five Foreign Ministers Alternative Drafts Considered by Drafting Committees A. ( Accepted by U. S. and British members of Drafting Committee ). For the discharge of each of these tasks the conclusions of the Council will be prepared for submission to the United Nations by those members who represent States which are at war with the enemy State concerned, but other members may be invited to participate in the Council’s discussions. B. ( Proposed by Soviet member of Drafting Committee ). For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned, but other members may be invited to participate in the Council’s discussions. 6 C. ( Possible compromise ). For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other members should be invited to participate when matters of interest to 7 them are under discussion. 8 1 Submitted during the course of the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 18. See ante , p. 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . 2 Document No. 711 . * For alternative texts considered by drafting committee see annex. [Footnote in the original.] 3 This text of paragraph 3, with the notation “Text Submitted by the Drafting Committee as Amended and Approved”, constitutes attachment 1 to the minutes of the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 18. See ante , p. 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . 4 See document No. 1417, section viii . 5 Not annexed to the file copy; supplied from the Truman Papers. 6 Alternatives A and B have been marked out in pencil, and the marginal notation “Decided” has been entered opposite them. 7 The words “of interest to” have been changed by hand to read “directly concerning”. 8 At the end of the paper is the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Agreed to”. No. 713 Text Approved by the Heads of Government Truman Papers No. 713 Text Approved by the Heads of Government 1 [ Babelsberg , July 20, 1945.] Approved Proposal for the Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers (1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States. (2) The Council shall meet at London and its first meeting shall be held on ________. 2 Each of the Foreign Ministers shall be accompanied by a high-ranking deputy duly authorized and capable of carrying on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister. He will likewise be accompanied by a small staff of technical advisers suited to the problems concerned and to the organization of a joint secretariat. (3) As its immediate important task, the Council would be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary 3 and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established. For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other members should be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion. 4 (4) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question. It is not intended, however, to fix hard and fast rules but rather to permit the Council to adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it might desire to hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases the Council might desire to convoke a formal conference of the States chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem. It is so authorized. 1 Attachment 1 to the minutes of the Fourth Plenary Meeting, July 20. See ante , p. 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] . 2 Blank in the original. 3 It is clear from document No. 712 and from the Rapporteur’s report ( ante , p. 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] ) that this passage should read “Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland”. 4 It appears from the Rapporteur’s report ( ante , p. 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] ) that the following subparagraph has been omitted at this point: “Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the States members thereof.” No. 714 Text Approved by the Foreign Ministers Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference No. 714 Text Approved by the Foreign Ministers 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 22, 1945. Draft Passage for Inclusion in the Final Protocol and Published Report of the Conference The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:— (Here insert final text. 2 ) It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, and for the inter-Allied control machinery in these countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the co-ordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Commission at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly the Conference agreed to recommend to the Member Governments of the European Advisory Commission that the Commission might now be dissolved. [Attachment] top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 22, 1945. The Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers (1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States. (2) (i) The Council shall normally meet at London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorised to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advisers. (ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time. (3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilised for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established. (ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion. (iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments. (4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question. (ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the States chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem. 1 Approved at the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 23. See ante , p. 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . 2 Printed as attachment to this document. No. 715 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 715 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) secret urgent [ Babelsberg ,] July 27, 1945. Victory 375. The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America have agreed that, in order to provide appropriate machinery for dealing in an expeditious manner with peace negotiations and territorial settlements arising from the present war, it would be desirable to establish a Council of Foreign Ministers charged with this responsibility. We are of the view that this Council should, in order that it may represent those nations having the broadest interest in the peace settlements in Europe and Asia, be composed of the Foreign Ministers of those States which, in accordance with the decision of the San Francisco Conference, are to have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. 1 The text of the proposal approved by the three Governments here at Potsdam is as follows: [Here follows the text of the attachment to document No. 714 .] Pursuant to this agreement, it gives the three Governments represented here great pleasure to invite the Government of China to become a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers described above and to participate in its work. We are convinced that our association with China in this new body which will be charged with such important functions in establishing a stable peace will offer an essential and fruitful introduction to our future association as permanent members of the Security Council. 2 We expect to give you authorization within a day or so to present, in concert with your British and Soviet colleagues, 3 the foregoing invitation to President Chiang Kai-shek and to obtain his acceptance. Please do so immediately upon receipt of authorization in order that your telegraphic notification of Chiang’s acceptance may be in our hands before the conclusion of the Conference. If it is not possible to concert your action with that of your colleagues you are authorized to proceed alone without delay. 1 See article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945 (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031). 2 For the parallel invitation to France, see document No. 1395 . 3 Sir Horace Seymour and Appolon Alexandrovich Petrov, British and Soviet Ambassadors to China, respectively. No. 716 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 716 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret urgent Chungking , 28 July 1945. Cfb 2015. For the Eyes alone of Byrnes, Secretary of State, Potsdam, Germany from Hurley, signed ComGenChina. Received your Victory 375, July 27. 2 Will be prepared to obtain acceptance by Chiang Kai-Shek quickly and in the method suggested on receipt of authorization. 1 Sent by the Commanding General, United States Forces, China, via Army channels. 2 Document No. 715 . No. 717 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 717 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) secret urgent [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Victory 439. Please proceed at once in accordance with the instruction in our telegram Number 375 of July 27 1 inasmuch as we wish to have President Chiang’s reply within the next 48 hours. Byrnes 1 Document No. 715 . No. 718 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 718 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret urgent Chungking , 31 July 1945. TopSec and Urgent Personal for Byrnes, Secretary of State, Potsdam, Germany Cfb 2223 from Hurley signed ComGenChina. Received your unnumbered message July 30, 2 1040 hours, 3 Chungking time, July 31. Proceeding immediately on instructions contained in your Victory number 375. 4 1 Sent by the Commanding General, United States Forces, China, via Army channels. 2 Document No. 717 . 3 i. e., 10:40 a.m. 4 Document No. 715 . No. 719 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 719 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret urgent [ Chungking ,] 31 July 1945. (The following message is top secret and urgent for the eyes alone of Byrnes, Secretary of State, Potsdam, Germany, from Hurley.) After receiving your directive 2 today in regard to the Council of Foreign Ministers I arranged a meeting with British and Soviet Ambassadors. Neither British nor Soviet Ambassadors had at that time received text of agreement on Council of Foreign Ministers from their Governments. Since then the British Ambassador has received the text. Both the British and Soviet Ambassadors agreed that it would be proper for me to suggest to Chiang Kai-shek that the proposed agreement in regard to the Council of Foreign Ministers will be submitted to him officially by the three Ambassadors tomorrow. Both of my colleagues authorized me to advise Chiang Kai-shek informally of the contents of the agreement so that when the official presentation is made he will be prepared to give an immediate answer. I presented the matter informally to the Generalissimo and Prime Minister Soong at 2000 hours 3 Chungking time July 31st. They were favorably impressed and indicated that when the matter is officially presented the Generalissimo will give a favorable reply. I consented to the postponement of the official presentation until tomorrow morning for the purpose of giving the Soviet Ambassador an opportunity to get a directive from his Government. Whether the Soviet Ambassador receives a directive or not we will proceed with the official presentation tomorrow, 1 August, before noon and we are certain that we will be able to despatch a reply from the Generalissimo immediately. 1 Sent by the Commander, Naval Group, China, via Navy channels. 2 Document No. 717 . 3 i. e., 8 p.m. No. 720 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 720 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret urgent [ Chungking ,] 1 August 1945. Sent by ComNavGr China. (The following message is top secret and urgent for Byrnes, Secretary of State, Potsdam, Germany, from Hurley.) Reference your Victory 375. July 27th. 2 At 1240 hours, 3 Chungking time, August 1st, the Generalissimo authorized the Soviet Ambassador, the British Ambassador and myself to cable at once the following to our respective Governments. (1) The Chinese Government concurs in the proposals for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers. (2) The Chinese Government takes pleasure in accepting membership in the Council. British and American Ambassadors presented notes. The Soviet Ambassador stated that he had received the directive from his Government but that a translation had not been completed. The Generalissimo then suggested that each of the Ambassadors immediately notify his Government as above. The Generalissimo’s written concurrence and acceptance to follow as soon as Soviet Ambassador presents note which will be today. 1 Sent by the Commander, Naval Group, China, via Navy channels. An identical message, numbered Cfb 2327, was sent by the Commanding General, United States Forces, China. 2 Document No. 715 . 3 i. e., 12:40 p.m. No. 721 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 721 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret urgent [ Chungking ,] 1 August 1945. ComNavGrp China sends. (The following message is secret and urgent for Byrnes Secretary of State, Potsdam, Germany from Hurley.) Reference my immediately preceding telegram. I am now in receipt of the official reply for the Chinese Government from the Minister of Foreign Relations received at 1630 2 Chungking time, August 1. It states “The Chinese Government concurs in the proposal and takes great pleasure in accepting the invitation to become a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers and to take part in its work, and it fully shares your conviction that China’s association with her American, British, Soviet and French Allies in this new body will offer an essential and fruitful introduction to our future association as permanent members of the Security Council”. 1 Sent by the Commander, Naval Group, China, via Navy channels. An identical message, numbered Cfb 2386, was sent by the Commanding General, United States Forces, China. 2 i. e., 4:30 p.m. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 721 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1478 [ Pg. 1478 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] and Doc. 1383 ] , 1500 [ Pg. 1500 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . Admission of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, and Spain Admission of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, and Spain [722] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , July 16th, 1945. 740.00119 P. W./7–1645 [723] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 16, 1945. 500.CC/7–1645 Telegram [724] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Babelsberg, July 16, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1645: Telegram [725] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs (Reber) [Washington,] July 18, 1945. 865.01/7–1545 [726] Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) Potsdam, July 20, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 [727] Proposal by the United States Delegation July 20, 1945 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 [728] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–245 [729] Text Considered by the Subcommittee on Admission to the United Nations [Undated.] Pauley Files [730] Proposal by the United States Delegation [?] [ Babelsberg ,] July 26, 1945. 501.AA/7–2645 [731] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [[Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 722 The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.00119 P. W./7–1645 No. 722 The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire On July 15th the Foreign Office received the following message from the United States Embassy:— “The State Department was recently told by the Italian Ambassador at Washington 1 that Italy had decided to declare war on Japan and that her declaration would be published on July 15th. The State Department would accordingly announce on July 17th (Tuesday) the intention of the United States Government to support officially Italy’s admission in due course to the World Security Organization. The United States Embassy was instructed to inform the Foreign Office and to express the hope that His Majesty’s Government would feel able to support the United States decision”. 2. After considering the matter, the Foreign Office that afternoon made the following oral communication to a member of the United States Embassy. 3. The State Department’s communication had created a somewhat unfortunate impression both as regards method of procedure and substance. 4. As regards method of procedure, Italy’s intention to declare war on Japan had been known for several weeks. There was therefore no reason why the State Department should present His Majesty’s Government with this statement of their intentions at such short notice and on a more or less take it or leave it basis, to expect [ basis. To expect ] His Majesty’s Government to give a snap decision on an important question of principle at a time when the Prime Minister and Secretary of State 2 were known to be out of the country was bad enough. It was even worse when a matter concerning Italy was at stake. His Majesty’s Government had always been at pains to try to co-operate most closely with the United States Government on all questions of principle concerning Italy, and they thought that in view of all Great Britain had had to put up with from Italy during the war, they were entitled to more consideration from the United States authorities. 5. As regards the substance of the State Department’s proposals it seemed in the first place that they were attaching altogether too much importance to Italy’s declaration of war on Japan. In the second place, the question of Italy’s admission to the World Security Organisation was closely connected with the question of making a peace treaty with Italy. His Majesty’s Government had consistently maintained in their discussions with the United States Government that it would be a mistake to make a preliminary peace treaty, merely giving Italy all the jam and none of the powder. They were still of this opinion and were convinced that it would be most unfortunate to make any definite concessions or promises to Italy about her future status until it was possible to agree among the Allied Governments on the complete peace treaty. His Majesty’s Government therefore saw serious objections to giving Italy a formal undertaking here and now that her candidature for admission to the World Security Organisation would be supported by the Allied Governments. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. His Majesty’s Government hoped, therefore, that the State Department would agree to take no further action in the matter until the question had been discussed at Terminal and until it had been decided whether any statement would be issued there on the subject of the conclusion of the peace treaty. The Foreign Office would inform the United Kingdom Delegation at Terminal of the position and hoped that the United States Delegation might be similarly informed by the State Department. Washington , July 16th, 1945. 1 Alberto Tarchiani. 2 Winston S. Churchill and Anthony Eden, respectively. 3 For the text of paragraph 6, see document No. 1088 . No. 723 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 500.CC/7–1645 Telegram No. 723 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] July 16, 1945. 32. London’s 7146, July 15 1 reports Eden is to discuss with you our proposed announcement of support for Ital admission to World Security Organization (our 16, July 11 2 ), Brit meanwhile urging we withhold announcement until Ital status discussed at Big Three meeting. We still feel that it is important both here and abroad to announce our support as soon as possible after Ital declaration of war on Japan (officially announced yesterday). Moreover in the light of SAC’s 3 report (Caserta’s 2964, July 15 4 ) on Brit FonOff position re Italy … we believe it even more necessary to issue following statement without awaiting Big-Three discussions. Begin Statement. The Govt of the US is convinced time has come to recognize new democratic Italy—allied with UNations in war against Germany and now in war against Japan—as member of family of nations. It therefore intends to support Italy’s admission to World Security Organization as soon as that Organization is in position to consider this application for membership. This decision does not spring from the consideration that Italy has already paid heavily—and will long continue to pay—for the fascist crimes conceived on Ital soil. It is motivated by conviction that cause of world freedom, peace, and progress requires bringing into World Security Organization the energies of every nation as soon as it can prove dedication to that cause; and it is based on spirit and achievements of Ital people in this sense during past two years of grave moral and material suffering. The people of Italy have thrown off Fascism, established democratic laws and procedures, formed a representative govt, fought courageously and well against Germans, joined in struggle against Japan. They merit the recognition of the UNations for their contribution as cobelligerents and the support of the UNations in their earnest efforts to build a sound democratic pol and econ order so that they will not again be brought through confusion into totalitarianism. End Statement. Do you approve of issuing this statement July 18? We would likewise inform the other permanent members of the Security Council of our proposed announcement. [ Grew ] 1 Document No. 244, printed in vol. i . 2 Document No. 240, printed in vol. i . 3 Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander. 4 Document No. 471, printed in vol. i . No. 724 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1645: Telegram No. 724 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State top secret Babelsberg , July 16, 1945. Victory 35. Top secret to Acting Secretary of State. British Delegation informs us Department proposes issuing statement July 17th that United States will support Italy’s admission to international organization and has asked British Government to do likewise. Would prefer that you postpone action on this as I desire to give consideration to some statement regarding Italy into which would be incorporated if possible reference to this subject and to which I would like to consider inviting Soviet Government to join. Byrnes No. 725 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs (Reber) 865.01/7–1545 No. 725 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs ( Reber ) [ Washington ,] July 18, 1945. Memorandum of Conversation Participants: Mr. George H. Middleton, Secretary of British Embassy Mr. Samuel Reber, EUR Mr. Middleton called this morning at my request to discuss the appended aide-mémoire from the British Embassy 1 concerning the British Government’s objections to any announcement at this time that Italy, in due course, would be admitted to the World Security organization. As regards the substance of their objection I explained we felt that a simple announcement that in due course the United States would favor Italy’s admission to the World Security organization did not preclude discussions of the proposed peace treaty with Italy along the lines which the British Government had proposed. After pointing out that in our opinion the tone of the note did not seem calculated to produce the most helpful results, I invited Mr. Middleton’s attention to a telegram from our Embassy at Rome dated July 15th 2 to the effect that the Italian press had published, apparently with the knowledge and consent of the government and the Soviet Embassy, a statement indicating that the Soviet Ambassador 3 had informed the Prime Minister 4 that Russia would be the first to take the initiative at the Potsdam meeting and would unconditionally support the admission of Italy to the United Nations. I said I assumed that in view of the British communication to us they had made a similar one to the Soviet Government which had taken this step without informing either the United States or British Governments. I then explained to Mr. Middleton that should we delay all steps relating to Italy’s future status until after agreement on the peace treaty, many months would have elapsed and conditions in Italy would have deteriorated to a point which we could not now foresee. Mr. Middleton then said he would communicate the foregoing observations to London and added that whereas he felt the British Government was in general agreement with our aims and future policy toward Italy it did not always agree on the timing of proposed steps and announcements. The British felt the peace treaty should precede any other steps. S[ amuel ] R eber 1 Document No. 722 is the aide-mémoire referred to, but it is not attached to the file copy of this memorandum of conversation. 2 Document No. 245, printed in vol. i . 3 Mikhail Alexeyevich Kostylev. 4 Ferruccio Parri. No. 726 Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 No. 726 Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal ( Cannon ) 1 Potsdam , July 20, 1945. Memorandum In presenting this paper 2 the Secretary may wish orally to restate the interest of the United States Government in the early admission of Italy to the United Nations Organization, and to observe that this matter is being handled separately by a Sub-Committee. Cavendish W. Cannon 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 Document No. 1091 . No. 727 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 No. 727 Proposal by the United States Delegation July 20, 1945 top secret Declaration on Italy and Spain Proposal Presented to Foreign Ministers July 20, 1945 1 In the statement on the policy toward Italy introduced by the President on July 17 2 we propose that there be included a statement to the effect that the Three Heads of Government will support the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization. The Three Heads of Government further declare that they will not support the entry of Spain into the United Nations Organization, so long as Spain is under the control of the present regime in that country. 1 See ante , p. 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . 2 Document No. 1089 . No. 728 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–245 No. 728 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Italy The three Governments consider that the time has come to terminate the present anomalous position of Italy. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution. She has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions. She gives promise of becoming a firm supporter of a policy of peace and resistance to aggression. The three Governments have therefore resolved that very early steps should be taken to conclude a peace treaty with Italy and have included the preparation of this [treaty] among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. 2 The conclusion of such a peace treaty will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations Organisation. 1 Authorship not indicated. This appears to be a draft prepared between the submission of document No. 1092 on July 21 and the preparation of document No. 729 . 2 See document No. 713 . No. 729 Text Considered by the Subcommittee on Admission to the United Nations Pauley Files No. 729 Text Considered by the Subcommittee on Admission to the United Nations 1 [Undated.] Admission to the United Nations The three Governments consider that the time has come to terminate the present anomalous position of Italy. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions. She gives promise of becoming a firm supporter of a policy of peace and resistance to aggression. 2 The three Governments have therefore resolved that very early steps should be taken to conclude a peace treaty with Italy and have included the preparation of this among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. The conclusion of such a peace treaty will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations Organization. As regards the admission of other States, Article IV of the Charter of the United Nations 3 declares that: 1. membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; 2. the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The three Governments so far as they are concerned will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above. The three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded on the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership. 4 1 This paper was discussed at the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 24. See ante , p. 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . 2 The final sentence of this paragraph has been stricken from the draft. See ante , p. 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . 3 Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031. 4 For a redraft of this paper, dated July 24, see document No. 1424 . Concerning a further redraft of July 24, see document No. 1424, footnote 1 . No. 730 Proposal by the United States Delegation [?] 501.AA/7–2645 No. 730 Proposal by the United States Delegation [ ? ] 1 top secret Admission to the United Nations The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties, so that as soon as possible thereafter relations between them and the ex-enemy States can, where necessary, be reestablished on a normal footing. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views. For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty with Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. 2 Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized 3 democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations. The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. 2 The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic Governments in these States will also enable the Three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. 4 As regards the admission of other States, Article IV of the Charter of the United Nations declared that: 1. membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; 2. the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above. The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership. [ Babelsberg ,] July 26, 1945. 1 This is probably the draft which was before the Ninth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 27. See ante , p. 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] . 2 See the attachment to document No. 714 . 3 An earlier version of this paper, dated July 25 (file No. 501. AA/7–2545), reads “responsible and” instead of “recognized”. 2 See the attachment to document No. 714 . 4 The version referred to in footnote 3, supra , has the following additional sentence in this paragraph: “The Three Governments agree to consider each separately in the immediate future the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania.” Cf. ante , p. 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . No. 731 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 731 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Admission to the United Nations U. S. Proposal The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties, so that as soon as possible thereafter relations between them and the ex-enemy States can, where necessary, be reestablished on a normal footing. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views. For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty with Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations. The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic Governments in these States will also enable the Three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the ratification 2 of peace treaties with these countries. The three Governments express the desire 3 that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press shall 4 enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declared that: 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; 2. the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above. The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership. 1 Attachment 1 c to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . Byrnes had given Molotov a copy of this proposal at a private meeting immediately preceding the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. See ante , p. 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] . 2 On a second copy of attachment 1 c to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045), the word “ratification” has been changed to “conclusion” in Byrnes’ handwriting. 3 On the copy referred to in the preceding footnote, the words “express the desire” have been changed to “do not doubt” in Byrnes’ handwriting. See ante , pp. 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 4 On the copy referred to in footnote 2, ante , the word “shall” has been changed to “will” in Byrnes’ handwriting. See ante , p. 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . Possible trusteeship for Italian colonial territories and Korea Possible trusteeship for Italian colonial territories and Korea [732] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President [Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945. 740.0011 P.W./7–1645 [733] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 20, 1945 501.BE/72045 [734] The Soviet Ambassador (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 20, 1945. 800.014/6–2045 [735] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Babelsberg, July 21, 1945. 895.01/7–2145: Telegram [736] The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 [[Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [737] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 9, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–945 [738] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 9, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–945 No. 732 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President 740.0011 P.W./7–1645 No. 732 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President 1 [Extract 2 ] top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 16 July 1945. Memorandum for the President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . trusteeship for korea I understand this matter was not the subject of a formal agreement at Yalta although the matter was discussed orally. 3 It was the late President’s 4 view, I am informed, that there should be an international trusteeship of Korea, pending such time as the Koreans are prepared to govern themselves. The Russians, I am told, have agreed to a four-way trusteeship but no further details have been agreed upon. I understand that. Stalin has urged that no foreign troops be stationed in Korea. The Russians, I am also informed, have already trained one or two divisions of Koreans, and, I assume, intend to use them in Korea. If an international trusteeship is not set up in Korea, and perhaps even if it is, these Korean divisions will probably gain control, and influence the setting up of a Soviet dominated local government, rather than an independent one. This is the Polish question transplanted to the Far East. My suggestion is that the trusteeship be pressed. I suggest also that at least a token force of American soldiers or marines be stationed in Korea during the trusteeship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Henry L Stimson 1 Submitted to Byrnes for transmittal to Truman. See document No. 1236 . 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see the enclosure to document No. 1236 and documents Nos. 1212 and 1274 . 3 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 770 . 4 Franklin D. Roosevelt. No. 733 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 501.BE/72045 No. 733 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 20, 1945 [Translation] top secret On Trust Territories Russian Proposal Presented to Foreign Ministers July 20, 1945 1 In connection with the fact that the Charter of the United Nations Organization 2 provides for bringing into effect the trusteeship system, the Conference deems necessary to lay down in conformity with the Charter measures for settlement, in the nearest future, of the question of the trust territories. By this are understood categories of territories defined in decision of the Crimean Conference 3 and in the above mentioned Charter of the International Security Organization. For the purpose of elaborating practical measures in order to bring into effect provisions on trusteeship system provided in the Charter the Conference deems necessary to authorize the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider in detail this question and work out practical proposals. In considering the question of preparing such proposals on category of territories which are detached from enemy states, the Council of Foreign Ministers shall be guided by the necessity of solution in the nearest future of the problem relating to the terms of trusteeship on the former colonial possessions of Italy in Africa and in the Mediterranean having in view herewith the possibility of establishing the trusteeship system exercised by individual states or by USSR, USA, and Great Britain jointly on the above-mentioned former colonial possessions of Italy. The Council of Foreign Ministers shall also work out practical measures for reaching agreements on trusteeship system provided by the Charter of the United Nations including proposals on the further regime of territories now held under mandate of the League of Nations. 1 See ante , p. 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . For the draft entry on this subject submitted by the Soviet Delegation for inclusion in the Protocol, see document No. 1426 . 2 Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031. 3 See document No. 1416, section i . No. 734 The Soviet Ambassador (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State 800.014/6–2045 No. 734 The Soviet Ambassador ( Gromyko ) to the Secretary of State [Translation] secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 20, 1945. Dear Mr. Secretary : I am sending you herewith in accordance with your request expressed at the time of our conversation this morning, a copy of my letter and the letter of former Secretary of State Stettinius on the question of territorial trusteeships. We exchanged these letters while at San Francisco at the time of the United Nations Conference. A. Gromyko [Enclosure 1—Translation] The Soviet Ambassador ( Gromyko ) to the Former Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) secret Text of Letter From Ambassador Gromyko Dated June 20, 1945, to Former Secretary of State Stettinius On the 9th of June in the study of the American document on trusteeship, I informed the member of the American Delegation, Mr. Stassen, of the desire of my Government to acquire under trusteeship some territory in conformity with point 3, section b , of the said document. 1 Mr. Stassen replied that he had to consult his Government on this question. The same day Mr. Stassen informed the member of the Soviet Delegation, Mr. Novikov, that the American Government was prepared to support the Soviet Government in the turning over to it of trusteeship territories. At the same time you, Mr. Secretary, in a conversation with me on June 9th confirmed your agreement to satisfying the desire expressed above of the Soviet Government. In accordance with our agreement my Government has directed me to define more clearly the question of trusteeship territories for the U. S. S. R. I hope that you will agree to discuss this question before the termination of the present conference. [Enclosure 2] The Former Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) to the Soviet Ambassador ( Gromyko ) 2 [ San Francisco ,] June 23, 1945. My Dear Mr. Ambassador : I have your letter of June 20 in which you refer to the conversation which took place between Commander Stassen and yourself on June 9 concerning the attitude held by the Soviet Government with reference to territorial trusteeship and your desire that our two Governments should be in accord on this matter. Commander Stassen promptly conveyed to me your point of view, stating that your Government would like to be assured of the favorable attitude of the United States if the Soviet Government, at some future time, proposed a territory for trusteeship. He added that you indicated that you had no specific territory in mind but that you hoped that the two Governments could agree in principle upon this question. Commander Stassen also reported that he was certain that your Government understood that, in accordance with the Yalta agreement, no specific territories were to be discussed at San Francisco and that the method by which a trusteeship would arise would be by the state which had the jurisdiction over a territory making a proposal to the appropriate body of the Organization. 3 I told Commander Stassen that I thought your point of view was eminently reasonable and that we would be happy to support in principle the Soviet proposal as to the eligibility of your Government as a potential administering authority. Your letter of June 20 carries the point raised to a further stage beyond the principle agreed upon in the conversation. In accordance with the Yalta agreement no specific territories were to be discussed at the San Francisco Conference but I shall, of course, be glad to know your views on this subject, even though the matter falls outside the scope of the Conference. It might be more convenient, however, to both of us, to take this matter up after our return to Washington. With kind regards [etc.] [E. R. Stettinius ] 1 i. e., under the category of “territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of this war”. See The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 25 to June 26, 1945: Selected Documents (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946; Department of State publication No. 2490), p. 235. 2 Enclosure 2 is a Russian translation of this paper, dated June 24. The text printed here is from the file copy of the English original (file No. 500. CC(PC)/9–2745). 3 See document No. 1416 , section i . No. 735 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 895.01/7–2145: Telegram No. 735 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State restricted Babelsberg , July 21, 1945. Victory 167. 1. The President has received from Syngman Rhee a telegram 1 requesting Churchill, Stalin and the President to issue a joint statement repudiating any secret agreement that might affect the political, administrative and territorial integrity of Korea, and recognizing “The Provisional Government of Korea”. The telegram requests opportunity for the “Provisional Government” to collaborate in military operations against Japan and gives undertaking to hold national election not later than one year after return to Korea. 2. Please make acknowledgment to Rhee in such informal manner and in such terms as you may consider appropriate. 2 Byrnes 1 Not printed. 2 The Acting Secretary of State acknowledged the receipt of Rhee’s telegram on July 24 (file No. 895.01/7–2145). No. 736 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 No. 736 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 [Extracts 2 ] [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Dunn Subject: Matters relating to the Near Eastern and African Area for inclusion in the Final Protocol There is outlined below my understanding of the final decisions reached with regard to the five items on the agenda which relate to the Near Eastern and African Area: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Trusteeship . It was agreed that the question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies in Africa and the Mediterranean would come up automatically before the Council of Foreign Ministers at its first meeting in London, since the first item of business of the Council will be to consider the peace treaty with Italy. 3 [The Soviet Delegation gave notice of the Soviet Government’s intention to raise at this meeting the question of the disposal of these colonies, with a view to “the possibility of establishing the trusteeship system exercised by individual states or by U. S. S. R., U. S. A. and Great Britain jointly on the above-mentioned former colonial possessions of Italy.” 4 ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . George V. Allen 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see documents Nos. 1069 , 1332 , 1342 , 1358 , and 1374 . 3 See ante , pp. 282–283 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 290–291 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 300–301 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] ; cf. ante , pp. 550–551 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . 4 Handwritten brackets have been inserted around this sentence, with the following manuscript notation in the margin: “omit.” Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . No. 737 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–945 No. 737 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] August 9, 1945. Berlin Conference Trusteeship Soviet Policy The Soviet proposal on this question 2 involved a rather general reference to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the whole question of trusteeship as envisaged in the United Nations Charter. They specified in their proposal particularly the disposition of the Italian colonies in the Mediterranean and in Africa and the treatment of League of Nations mandates. They also referred in the discussion to the disposition of Korea. They referred to the letter sent to Mr. Stettinius at San Francisco 3 stating that the Soviet Union was desirous of being assigned trusteeships under the Charter. In the discussion at the Conference they did not, under questioning by Churchill, lay specific claim to particular territories but limited themselves to insistence that the matter be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers. They made it quite clear, however, that if it was decided by the Council that any Italian territories were to be placed under trusteeship they would expect to be given some share in these trusteeships. They finally consented to the decision of the Conference as recorded in the Protocol being limited to the reference to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the question of the disposition of Italian colonies, 4 but it was clear that they continued to cherish their original proposal. British Policy Churchill took the position that the question of the assignment of territories to trusteeship was one for the United Nations Organization. He consented to the reference to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the question (1) as to whether or not Italy should lose her colonies and (2) whether the states represented on the Council might recommend to the United Nations Organization that territories taken from Italy should be placed under trusteeship. He made it perfectly clear, however, that he would not be inclined to support an extension of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and Africa through the participation of the Soviet Union in trusteeship administration of former Italian colonies. The British also were unsympathetic to any discussion of placing under trusteeship former League mandates now under British or French administration. 1 Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. For the minutes of the discussions summarized in this memorandum, see ante , pp. 252–256 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 550–551 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . 2 Document No. 733 . 3 Document No. 734 , enclosure 1. 4 See document No. 1383 , section xi ( x ). No. 738 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–945 No. 738 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 [Extracts 2 ] top secret [ Washington ,] August 9, 1945. Berlin Conference Italy Soviet Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In connection with the question of trusteeship the Soviets presented a proposal for consideration by the Council of Foreign Ministers on the disposition of Italy’s colonies in Africa and the Mediterranean. 3 They suggested that the Council consider the possibility of assigning some or all of these territories under trusteeship to the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union either separately or jointly. They stated that they had learned from the foreign press that Italy had lost its colonies once and for all and wished to know how they were to be disposed of. They referred to the letter sent to Mr. Stettinius at San Francisco 4 stating that they were anxious to receive mandates for certain territories. They did not, however, under questioning by Churchill, definitely commit themselves to a claim for Italian territory but merely urged that their proposal be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The decision on the question was as stated in the communiqué. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . British Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As to the Italian colonies Churchill pointed out that Mr. Eden’s public statement on the question 6 meant that Italy had no longer a right to these colonies but that did not preclude the peace conference from deciding that some of the colonies might be restored to Italy. He himself was open to arguments on this point. The British had conquered these colonies by their own efforts but they claimed nothing for themselves. They wished to know if there were any other claimants. He emphasized that the British had great interest in the Mediterranean and that any marked alteration in the status quo in the Mediterranean would need long and careful examination. He said he had not considered the possibility of the Soviet Union desiring to acquire a large tract of the African shore. If that were the case, it would have to be considered in relation to many other problems. He was willing for the matter to be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers but the question of the ultimate administration under trusteeship of any territories not returned to Italy by the peace treaty is one which would have to be settled by the United Nations Organization. There was no very clear indication of the attitude toward Italy by the new Labor Ministers except that they supported those portions of the communiqué having to do with … the reference to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the disposition of Italian colonies.… 1 Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. For the minutes of the discussions summarized in this memorandum, see ante , pp. 252–256 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see documents Nos. 1093 and 1107 . 3 Document No. 733 . 4 Document No. 734 , enclosure 1. 5 See document No. 1384, section xi . 6 See ante , p. 239, footnote 2 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] ] . Officers of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Officers of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations [739] The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Gerig) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolsky) and the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) London, July 26, 1945—11 a.m. 500.CC/7-2645: Telegram [740] Memorandum by the President’s Personal Representative (Stettinius) [Washington,] July 26, 1945. 500.CC (PC)/7–2845 [741] The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Gerig) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) and the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) London, July 31, 1945. 500.CC/7–3145: Telegram [742] The Secretary of State to the Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Gerig) Washington, August 8, 1945—7 p.m. 500.CC(PC)/8–845: Telegram [743] The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Gerig) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) London, August 9, 1945—4 p.m. 500.CC (PC)/8–945: Telegram No. 739 The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Gerig) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolsky) and the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) 500.CC/7-2645: Telegram No. 739 The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations ( Gerig ) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State ( Pasvolsky ) and the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs ( Hiss ) 1 [Extracts] secret London , July 26, 1945—11 a.m. 7519. Copre 2. From Gerig for Pasvolsky and Hiss. Meeting at Potsdam yesterday considered the question of the officers of ExCom (Executive Committee), and PreCo, (Preparatory Committee), Jebb flying over to attend. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . British thinking of proposing that present mandatory powers be provisional members trusteeship council, which together with all other permanent members and elected members, would enable trusteeship council to organize and act provisionally, pending negotiation of agreements. Believe this would be feasible and would hasten and facilitate negotiation of agreements. Soviet raised question at Potsdam of their being a trust power. 2 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Winant. 2 See document No. 733 . No. 740 Memorandum by the President’s Personal Representative (Stettinius) 500.CC (PC)/7–2845 No. 740 Memorandum by the President’s Personal Representative ( Stettinius ) 1 [ Washington ,] July 26, 1945. Memorandum of Conversation Participants: Mr. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. Mr. John Balfour British Minister Mr. John Balfour, British Minister, called upon me this afternoon at his request at my apartment at 2:30. He stated he had just received a wire dated July 26 from London this morning in which he was instructed by the Foreign Office to call on me and inquire whether or not we would be willing to agree to have the chairmanship of the executive committee of the interim commission 2 rotate between the five. 3 He stated that their first position would be to have one chairman, presumably a Soviet chairman, but if they could not agree on one, he asked if we would agree to rotate. I stated that Mr. Dunn had a memorandum 4 with him at Potsdam on this subject and it was our thinking also that this was the best procedure—we should try for one chairman but if we couldn’t get agreement on one we would then accept rotation. I said, however, that I had heard that Mr. Jebb had flown to Potsdam yesterday on this subject and, of course, our delegation in Potsdam was prepared to deal with the whole subject right there on the ground. He said that was most satisfactory and he would communicate that to the Foreign Office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy forwarded by Stettinius on July 28 to Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs. 2 i. e., the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. 3 i. e., China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 4 Document No. 255, printed in vol. i . No. 741 The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Gerig) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) and the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) 500.CC/7–3145: Telegram No. 741 The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations ( Gerig ) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs ( Hiss ) and the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs ( Ross ) 1 [Extract] plain London , July 31, 1945. 7709. Copre 4. From Gerig for Hiss and Ross. Regarding officers for ExCom (Executive Committee) and PreCo (Preparatory Committee) agreement of Soviet awaited on proposal at Potsdam of rotation among five powers in ExCom with small or middle-sized powers as officers of PreCo.… 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Winant. No. 742 The Secretary of State to the Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Gerig) 500.CC(PC)/8–845: Telegram No. 742 The Secretary of State to the Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations ( Gerig ) restricted u. s. urgent Washington , August 8, 1945—7 p.m. 6684. Preco 23. For Gerig. Our Delegation at the Potsdam Conference is not informed of any discussions relating to Preparatory Commission. British Embassy here seems to be equally uninformed of any discussions of this kind. Have you had any confirmation of the statement made in the first sentence of your 7519, July 26, 11:00 a.m. 1 and your Copre 4 of July 31? 2 We are naturally interested in any developments relating to the subject of officers of ExeCom and PreCo and would appreciate your communicating any such information urgently. Byrnes A[lger] H[iss] 1 Document No. 739 . 2 Document No. 741 . No. 743 The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (Gerig) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) 500.CC (PC)/8–945: Telegram No. 743 The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations ( Gerig ) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs ( Hiss ) 1 [Extract] confidential London , August 9, 1945—4 p.m. 8019. For Hiss from Gerig. Your Preco 23, 2 Jebb informs he discussed question of officers ExCom (Executive Committee) and PreCo (Preparatory Committee) on margin of Potsdam conference with Dunn Gromyko and others and that rotation principle for ExCom was suggested for consideration. Soviet group seemed favorable but have not yet replied definitely;… 1 Sent to the Secretary of State over the signature of Winant. 2 Document No. 742 . Constitutional restraints on the President’s treaty-making powers Constitutional restraints on the President’s treaty-making powers [744] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg, July 25 (?), 1945.] Truman Papers No. 744 United States Delegation Working Paper Truman Papers No. 744 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg , July 25 (?), 1945.] Draft Statement for President When we are discussing matters which are appropriate for inclusion in the peace treaties, I am sure it is understood that these treaties under our Constitution must be made with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States. Of course when I indicate my support of a proposal, I shall use my best endeavors to secure its acceptance. That naturally does not guarantee its acceptance. Nor should it preclude my coming back and informing you when I find that political sentiment at home on a proposition is such that I cannot continue to press its acceptance without endangering our common interests in the peace. I make this statement, not to change the basis of my discussions with you or the bases of President Roosevelt’s discussions with you, but only so that there will be no misunderstanding of my constitutional authority or any question of my exceeding it. 1 This paper bears the following manuscript notation by Byrnes: “For consideration & possible use before adjournment,—for the record.” Truman read a formal statement, apparently this draft, at the Ninth Plenary Meeting, July 25. See ante , pp. 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] . European Questions European Questions Contents Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; freedom of the press in eastern Europe (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 744 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)]) Inland waterways (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)]) Extension of the authority of the Renner government (Documents 761-[Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)]) Reparations (Documents 765-[Unnumbered document following Document 771 (#1)]) Agreements on zones of occupation and control machinery; occupation of the western zones and of Vienna; provisioning of Vienna (Documents 772-[Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)]) Alleged anti-Soviet activities (Documents 790-792) Governments, control commissions, elections, conclusion of peace treaties, and diplomatic relations (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 792 (#1)]-833) Use of Allied property for reparations or war booty (Documents 834-[Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)]) Control of external assets (Documents 845-847) Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period (Documents 848-878) Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; freedom of the press in eastern Europe Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; freedom of the press in eastern Europe [[Unnumbered document following Document 744 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [745] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg, July 17, 1945.] Truman Papers [746] The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State Budapest, July 17, 1945—4 p.m. 864.918/7–1745: Telegram [747] The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Berlin Conference, July 19, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1945 [748] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg, July 21, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2145 [749] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 25 [1945.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545: Telegram [750] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg, July 26, 1945.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2645 [[Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 744 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Related papers will be found under the following headings: ( a ) Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania—Governments, Control Commissions, Elections, Conclusion of Peace Treaties, and Diplomatic Relations, post , page 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 792 (#1)] and Doc. 793 ] ; ( b ) Germany—Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period, post , page 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 848 ] ; ( c ) Greece—Government and Elections, post , page 1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1058 (#1)] and Doc. 1059 ] ; ( d ) Poland—Government and Elections, post , page 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 1117 ] ; and ( e ) Yugoslavia—Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia, post , page 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1201 ] . No. 745 Proposal by the United States Delegation Truman Papers No. 745 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 top secret [ Babelsberg , July 17, 1945.] Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe In the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe signed February 11, 1945, 2 the three governments assumed certain obligations in regard to the liberated peoples of Europe and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states. Since the Yalta Conference, the obligations assumed under this declaration have not been carried out. In the opinion of the United States Government the continued failure to implement these obligations would be regarded throughout the world as evidence of lack of unity between the three great powers, and would undermine confidence in the sincerity of their declared aims. 3 The United States Government proposes, therefore, that the following steps to carry out the obligations of this Declaration be agreed upon at this meeting: 1. The three Allied Governments should agree on necessity of the immediate reorganization of the present governments in Rumania and Bulgaria, in conformity with Clause ( c ) of the third paragraph of the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe. 2. That there be immediate consultation to work out any procedures which may be necessary for the reorganization of these governments to include representatives of all significant democratic elements. Diplomatic recognition shall be accorded and peace treaties concluded with those countries as soon as such reorganization has taken place. 3. That in conformity with the obligations contained in Clause ( d ) of the third paragraph of the Declaration on liberated Europe, the three governments consider how best to assist any interim governments in the holding of free and unfettered elections. Such assistance is immediately required in the case of Greece, and will in due course undoubtedly be required in Rumania and Bulgaria, and possibly other countries. 4 1 Attachment 3 to the minutes of the First Plenary Meeting. See ante , p. 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . 2 For the text of the Yalta Declaration, see document No. 1417, section v . 3 There is in the Department of State files a different version of this proposal (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845). It is in mimeographed form, undated, but it has not been definitely established that it was circulated internationally. In this version the following text has been substituted for the first paragraph: “With the adoption of the Declaration on liberated Europe signed at Yalta February 11, 1945 the three Governments published to the world an intention of unity in action in the fulfillment of obligations, under certain agreed principles, toward the liberated peoples of Europe and the peoples of the former axis satellite states. In order that there should be clear demonstration of the sincerity of the three Governments in carrying out the principles set forth in this Declaration, it is necessary, in the opinion of the United States Government to adopt effective methods for fulfilling these obligations. The cessation of hostilities in Europe and the resultant safety of communications and supply now enable the three Governments to review the means by which this may best be accomplished.” 4 In the version referred to in footnote 3, the following text has been substituted for the last three lines of subparagraph 3: “is immediately required [in the case] of Greece; plans for elections in Bulgaria likewise require the attention of the three governments; also in the case of Rumania and possibly other countries assistance will undoubtedly be required in due course.” No. 746 The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State 864.918/7–1745: Telegram No. 746 The Representative in Hungary ( Schoenfeld ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Budapest , July 17, 1945—4 p.m. 297. Gregoriev[,] Pushkin’s Assistant[,] has asked Balogh for list Hungarian newspapermen previously correspondents wholly or in part for foreign newspapers and who will presumably engage in reporting subsequent to reestablishment international communications. This is first evidence Russians will raise blackout on foreign correspondents but there are no indications they will permit uncontrolled reporting. Schoenfeld 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 65 of July 19 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–1945). No. 747 The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1945 No. 747 The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal ( Cannon ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 Memorandum Subject: Work Sheet on Question of Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe (Annex 3 of United States Agenda 2 ). 1. It is important to keep in mind the distinction between the Yalta formula and the armistice control in the satellite states. In our view Yalta should not be invoked to change the armistice administration, which was set up by specific negotiation and which, much as it needs improvement, should be negotiated ad hoc . This distinction is important at the moment, because the Soviet Government may well try to sidestep the issue of implementing Yalta by referring to their new move to give better treatment to the United States and United Kingdom delegations in the armistice commissions. 3 The British proposal for discussing the Rumanian petroleum question 4 at this afternoon’s session suggests that they may expect the Yalta formula to help out in ameliorating United Kingdom and United States positions under the armistice regimes. We consider that the petroleum problem may indeed require negotiation above the level of the ACC, but that it is not germane to the Yalta Declaration. 2. The British paper on Yalta (their No. 8) 5 favors concluding peace treaties as the first step toward the creation of conditions for the emergence of democratic government. We think that only after some change in the composition of the government in Rumania and Bulgaria should we proceed to normalizing relations. We need not make our demands so rigid as to shut off the means of dealing with an imperfect regime, if we can work out a substantial broadening of the base as a beginning. 3. The “consultation” proposed in point 2 of our paper 6 might be by our Ambassadors at Moscow, or our political representatives at Bucharest and Sofia, but preferably not by the Control Commissions, for the reasons mentioned above. 4. The British are proposing adding Yugoslavia to this topic. The Soviet Government would probably object to making a joint “statement” at the conclusion of the conference. Much of the desired effect could be achieved by a joint “message” (not made public) on the basis of which we could exert pressure at Belgrade at appropriate times. C. W. Cannon Berlin Conference, July 19, 1945. 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 See document No. 214, printed in vol. i . 3 See document No. 309, printed in vol. i , and documents Nos. 796 and 797 , post . 4 Document No. 837 . 5 Not found. 6 Document No. 745 . No. 748 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2145 No. 748 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 top secret [ Babelsberg , July 21, 1945.] Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe The Three Governments agree upon the following steps of immediate urgency in the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe: 1. In conformity with the obligations contained in clause ( d ) of the third paragraph of the Declaration on Liberated Europe the three Governments agree to adopt adequate measures to enable them to become informed of proposed electoral procedures, and to provide for the observation of elections, in Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary for the choice of Governments responsive to the will of the people. 2. The three Governments agree that in view of the cessation of hostilities in Europe measures should now be adopted to assure prompt and effective procedures to facilitate the entry of representatives of the world press and radio into liberated or former Axis satellite states, and to permit of their freedom of movement, and to afford adequate opportunity for the despatch of their reports without restriction by reason of political censorship, thus providing to world public opinion the basis for an enlightened interest in the welfare and progress of these peoples and a knowledge of the conditions in which they seek to re-establish their ties with other peoples; further, that the three Governments express their desire to see removed, within the countries in question, such restrictions on freedom of the press as may have been imposed to prevent access to news from abroad or the dissemination of news and expression of opinion. 3. The three Governments agree that the Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, in acknowledgment of the changed conditions since the cessation of hostilities in Europe, will henceforth operate on a tri-partite basis under revised procedures providing for tri-partite participation, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries. 1 This paper, undated, is apparently the proposal on this subject submitted by Byrnes at the Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 21. See ante , p. 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] . It is certainly the American draft before the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 22, and before a subcommittee which met July 22. See ante , pp. 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] . No. 749 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545: Telegram No. 749 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] July 25 [1945.] 124. Several telegrams just received reflect Soviet policy and methods in Eastern Europe with respect to elections. Lane’s 4463 from Paris 1 has already been repeated to you. Others are condensed below for your and the President’s information in connection with current discussions. British Foreign Office has received disquieting reports from its Chargé in Warsaw. 2 He reports Mikolajczyk pessimistic about participation of all major parties in elections, since Christian Labor Party has been told it could not participate. Mik anticipates similar decisions with respect to other parties during coming weeks. Grabski states Polish people enjoy practically no civil liberties, that Soviet officials are behind each local Government and that secret service under Soviet direction is making many arrests. Mik also alarmed at tendency of Lublin group to make Praesidium, on which Grabski is outnumbered five to one, into real governing body of Poland. Moscow Embassy still unsuccessful in obtaining entry for Treasury representative Patterson into Bulgaria and Rumania and pessimistic as to chances. Our Political Officer in Bucharest 3 advised by Julius Maniu he is restraining activity of his National Peasant Party pending Potsdam decisions despite “intimidating or provocative tactics by National Democratic Front and Soviet officials who sought to disrupt party meetings.” Maniu considered adequate tripartite ACC supervision of elections impossible and favored their supervision either by non-political or by representative coalition Government. He reiterated that his country would be foolish to oppose the Soviet Union but that his party could not permit Rumania to be governed by an incompetent Communist minority. Soviet Foreign Office has rejected British protest at Soviet press campaign against Greek Government and British forces in Greece on grounds New Times not organ of Soviet Government. Dekanozov also called British Government’s attention to anti-Soviet speeches in Greece, which he said were increasing in frequency and vigor and were “wholly incorrect” in country where British troops were stationed. Sofianopolous tells MacVeagh he resigned because Molotov convinced him satisfactory relations with Soviets possible only through Greek Government representative of all parties (which coincides with new line of EAM). Sof apparently wishes to head such a Government. MacVeagh considers coincidence of Potsdam discussions, Sof’s Russian-inspired resignation and threatening Yugoslav note to suggest Soviets may base refusal to join in supervising elections on alleged inability of non-representative Government to control “chaotic” situation and hold fair elections. [ Grew ] 1 Document No. 1139 . 2 Hon. Robert M. A. Hankey. 3 Roy M. Melbourne. No. 750 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2645 No. 750 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation?] [ Babelsberg , July 26, 1945.] Proposed Soviet Redraft of Paragraph 2 of the Paper on Liberated Europe ( Freedom of the Press ) The Conference takes note of the fact that now the representatives of the press of the Allied countries in the countries liberated from German invaders have received the opportunity to work in normal conditions and to describe on a large scale in the press the situation in these countries. At the same time in view of the termination of the war in Europe conditions have been created which permit to grant greater facilities for the work of the representatives of the allied press in the countries with which armistice agreements have been concluded, provided the interests of the security of allied occupational forces in these countries be observed. 1 Discussed at the Third Meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, July 26. See ante , p. 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on these subjects, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1491–1493 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . Inland waterways Inland waterways [[Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)]] Editor’s Note [751] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Washington [Babelsberg], 17 July 1945. SWNCC Files [752] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State Moscow, July 17, 1945—5 p.m. 840.811/7–1745: Telegram [753] The Under Secretary of the Navy (Gates) to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (Gardner) [Washington,] 21 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [754] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 21 July 1945. 840.811/7–2545 [755] Proposal by the United States Delegation Berlin Conference, July 23, 1945. Traman Papers [756] Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 24 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [757] United States Delegation Working Paper Berlin Conference, July 25, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2545 [758] Proposal by the United States Delegation Berlin Conference, July 25, 1945. 840.811/7–2545 [759] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg, July 27, 1945.] 840.811/7–2545 [760] The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 31, 1945. 840.811/7–2545 [[Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)] Editor’s Note —Papers relating specifically to Soviet participation in the European Central Inland Transport Organization and in the European Inland Transport Conference are printed post , page 1158 [ Pg. 1158 includes portions of Doc. 1158 and Doc. 1159 ] , under the heading: Soviet Union—Participation in European Economic Organizations. No. 751 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee SWNCC Files No. 751 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 1 [Extracts 2 ] top secret SM–2610 Washington [ Babelsberg ], 17 July 1945. Memorandum for the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Subject: United States Policy Concerning Dardanelles and Kiel Canal It is assumed that the request of the State Department 3 for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the future of the Dardanelles is based upon the fact that we have agreed to discuss the Montreux Convention 4 at Terminal . A similar request 3 concerning the future of the Kiel Canal indicates that that subject may also be brought up for discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . If, however, notwithstanding the above considerations, 5 it is necessary to discuss and possibly reach a decision concerning the Kiel Canal, then it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that from the long range and over-all security point of view, the position of the United States should be that in any case, the Kiel Canal should be demilitarized, and: a . Preferably—the Kiel Canal should be placed under the United Nations Organization and be operated by a mixed commission appointed by and reporting to the Security Council. b . As the first alternative—the German State of Schleswig–Holstein, which includes the Kiel Canal, should be constituted a strategic area under the trusteeship system with Denmark accepting responsibility as the administrating authority, the Kiel Canal then to be operated by Denmark under supervision of the Security Council. c . As the second alternative—the German State of Schleswig–Holstein, which includes the Kiel Canal, should be annexed to Denmark, with that nation’s consent, and the responsibility for the operation of the Kiel Canal should then be assumed by Denmark. d . Any proposal by Russia giving her control of or a preferred position concerning the Kiel Canal should be firmly opposed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A J McFarland Brigadier General, U. S. A., Secretary . 1 Concerning the approval of this memorandum by SWNCC and its transmittal to Byrnes, see documents Nos. 1364 and 1365 . 2 For the paragraphs of this memorandum not printed here, see document No. 1363 . 3 Not printed. 4 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 213. 3 Not printed. 5 For the general considerations referred to, see document No. 1363 . No. 752 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State 840.811/7–1745: Telegram No. 752 The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Acting Secretary of State confidential Moscow , July 17, 1945—5 p.m. 2598. Creation of a Danube commission (to Dept as 2598 rptd London 369 Bucharest 92 Belgrade 24 Budapest 26 Sofia 68) is a question still under study by Soviet authorities, Vyshinski told Brit Amb 1 in letter of July 11 replying (Embs 1931, June 6 2 ) to Brit query on subject. Kennan 1 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. 2 Not printed. This telegram (file No. 840.811/6–645) reported that a Soviet naval representative in Hungary had indicated his expectation of the early establishment at Budapest of a central international organization for the control of the Danube and that the British Ambassador at Moscow had asked for confirmation from the Soviet. Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, adding that the British Government would expect to participate in such an organization. No. 753 The Under Secretary of the Navy (Gates) to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (Gardner) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 753 The Under Secretary of the Navy ( Gates ) to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet ( Gardner ) secret priority [ Washington ,] 21 July 1945. ComNavEu passes action UnderSeeNavs 212100 to CominCh and CNO for Rear Admiral Matthias B. Gardner. Please see Joint Chiefs memorandum to State War Navy Coordinating Committee 17 July 1945 1 original of which was delivered to Colonel Harrison Gerhardt at Terminal on 17 July 1945. … 2 We 3 feel you should vigorously support treatment of Kiel [Canal] recommended by Joint Chiefs if question of Kiel cannot be avoided. 1 Document No. 751 . 2 For the sentence omitted here, see document No. 1368 . 3 i. e., Gates and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. No. 754 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 840.811/7–2545 No. 754 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff secret C. C. S. 896 ( Terminal ) [ Babelsberg ,] 21 July 1945. Internationalization of the Danube River 1. The free efficient use of such rivers as the Rhine, the Weser, the Elbe, and the Danube in the supply of the armies of occupation and in maintaining the bare needs of the civilian populations under their control is essential in view of the limited means of transportation available to fulfill their task. 2. Adequate machinery in the formation of the Rhine Navigation Agency under the Allied Control Council in Germany, and the active measures presently under way to clear the river of obstruction, scheduled for completion in the United States and British zones by 1 September and in the French zone by 15 October, promise to meet the basic needs served by the Rhine. Russia has now no representative on that agency because it has no supply interest. However, politically, it might be expedient to consider favorably a request from Russia for such membership. 3. The Weser and the Elbe while important in the restoration of the German economy are not so vital to the fulfillment of immediate supply needs of the occupying armies. 4. The Danube, however, though largely clear of obstructions and open to use, cannot fulfill its proper role as a transportation artery in the supply of the armies of occupation and of the populations under their control, unless a Danube Navigation Agency similar to that set up for the Rhine is organized promptly. The need for action is stated in Scaf 471, 3 July 1945, (Enclosure “B”). 5. There are certain embarrassments to the formation of such an agency. Local Russian commanders have no authority to act. The river lies both in Germany and Austria and its regulation therefore involves the Allied Control Councils of both countries. The request does not include French membership although politically they are necessarily eligible and no vital disadvantage should result from their inclusion. A Russian protest to representation of the British and the French on the ground that they have no frontage on the river may lead to their request for membership on the Rhine Navigation Agency. 6. The opportunity for the creation of a Danube Navigation Agency will probably never be more favorable than at this conference attended by the heads of state and their foreign ministers to whom the Chiefs of Staff may now so effectively appeal for assistance. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff forward the enclosed letter (Enclosure “A”) to the Department of State and to the Foreign Office. [Enclosure A] Draft secret Letter to Department of State and the Foreign Office 1 The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 2 on 3 July 1945, urged the consideration at Terminal of internationalization of the Danube. While recognizing the necessity to re-establish at the earliest practicable date the international character of the Danube waterway to meet the over-all question of navigation of the Danube and the rights of all states having interest, he emphasizes the immediate need of an interim Danube Navigation Agency composed of U. S., U. K. and U. S. S. R. representatives, set up in a manner similar to that followed in the creation of the present Rhine Navigation Agency to meet the current problems of supplying the armies of occupation in Austria and the populations dependent upon them. There are certain difficulties to the creation of such an interim agency. Local Russian commanders lack authority to discuss questions involving navigation of the river within the Russian zone. The river flows through both Germany and Austria thus involving the two Allied Control Councils of Germany and Austria. These councils include the French. The Rhine Agency has no Russian membership. The SCAEF proposal does not include a French representative for the Danube Agency. It is evident that politically all four nations must be eligible to membership on such an agency. It is equally apparent that in the creation of a Danube Navigation Agency there should be but one national representative for each of the four allied nations mutually acceptable to the Allied Control Councils of both Germany and Austria. It is believed that the opportunity presented by this conference to come to an agreement with the Russian Government creating an interim Danube Navigation Agency should be seized in order to meet the immediate military needs and responsibilities of our armies of occupation in their own supply and that of the civilian population under their control. It is accordingly recommended that the necessary action be taken to consummate this purpose at Terminal. [Enclosure B—Paraphrase] The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force ( Eisenhower ) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff secret [SHAEF,] 3 July 1945. Scaf 471. The urgency of the international problem discussed herein would suggest its inclusion on the agenda of the forthcoming Conference of the Big Three, if such action is deemed appropriate. Before the official date of the surrender of the German Armed Forces, all craft on the Danube were moved into the American zone by the officer commanding the Combined German-Hungarian Navies. We have affidavits that this move was completed by the date specified. The Soviet authorities contend that certain craft did not arrive until after the date mentioned, and have demanded through the American Third Army that certain of these ships be returned to the Soviet zone of occupation. The Soviet authorities have been told that consideration is now being given at the governmental level to restitution of such property. We have offered, however, for our mutual benefit, to enter into local agreements for the employment of such shipping. Soviet commanding officers who were approached did not have authority to discuss matters which had to do with large-scale navigation of that part of the Danube which lies within the Soviet zone of occupation. Clarification is needed for over-all questions concerning navigation of the river and the rights of various allied nations, including Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, which, together with other countries, formerly owned much of the shipping now under our jurisdiction. The immediate problems which demand decision soon are (1) to reach agreements, so as restore navigation on the Danube, for the mutual use of available shipping; (2) to define policy for returning shipping to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia; and (3) to assign relative priorities. I recommend that our policy aim at re-establishing the international character of the Danube, and, as a first step in this direction, that an interim Danube Navigation Agency, similar in nature to the corresponding agency dealing with the Rhine, be set up as soon as possible, membership in the first instance to be confined to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States, but to be expanded, when expedient, to include all other countries concerned in navigation of the Danube, with a view to re-establishing eventually a permanent International Danube Authority. 1 This letter was dispatched on July 24. See document No. 756, footnote 2 . 2 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. No. 755 Proposal by the United States Delegation Traman Papers No. 755 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 Berlin Conference , July 23, 1945. Subject: Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways. The United States Government proposes that there be free and unrestricted navigation of such inland waterways as border on two or more states and that the regulation of such navigation be provided by international authorities representative of all nations directly interested in navigation on the waterways concerned. As an initial step there should be set up as soon as possible interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The functions of the interim navigation agencies should be the restoration and development of navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and the establishment of uniform regulations concerning use of facilities, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar questions. Membership on these agencies should include the United States, the United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R., France, and the sovereign riparian states recognized by these Governments. 1 Submitted at the Seventh Plenary Meeting, July 23. See ante , p. 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . No. 756 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 756 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff secret C. C. S. 896/1 [ Babelsberg ,] 24 July 1945. Internationalization of the Danube River 1. The British Chiefs of Staff have considered the memorandum 1 by the United States Chiefs of Staff in which they recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should forward a letter (Enclosure “A” to C. C. S. 896) to the Department of State and the Foreign Office. 2. The British Chiefs of Staff concur in the despatch of this letter as proposed. 2 1 Document No. 754 . 2 The letter (enclosure A to document No. 754 ) was dispatched on July 24. No. 757 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2545 No. 757 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 Berlin Conference , July 25, 1945. Subject: Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways. The U. S. A., the U. K. and the U. S. S. R. are in accord that there should be free and unrestricted navigation of such inland waterways as border on two or more states, the Kiel Canal, and the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, which are comprised under the general term “Straits”. The navigation on these waterways should be regulated by international authorities representative of all nations directly interested in navigation on the waterways concerned. As an initial step there should be set up as soon as possible interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The functions of the interim navigation agencies should be the restoration and development of navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and the establishment of uniform regulations concerning use of facilities, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar questions. Membership on these agencies should include the United States, the United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R., France, and the sovereign riparian states recognized by these Governments. With respect to the Kiel Canal, it is likewise suggested that an interim navigation agency be established with functions similar to those for the Danube and the Rhine rivers. For the time being, membership on this interim navigation agency for the Kiel Canal should be restricted to the U. K., U. S. S. R., U. S. A. and France, as the occupying powers of Germany. Consultation with other nations directly interested in the Kiel Canal could be subsequently arranged. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 For the final paragraph of this working paper, see document No. 1372 . No. 758 Proposal by the United States Delegation 840.811/7–2545 No. 758 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 Berlin Conference , July 25, 1945. Draft Proposal by American Delegation Subject: Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways. The U. S. A., the U. K. and the U. S. S. R. are in accord that there should be free and unrestricted navigation of such inland waterways as border on two or more states, of the Kiel Canal, and of the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, which are comprised under the general term “Straits”. This free and unrestricted navigation on these waterways should be assured by international agreement. As an initial step there will be set up as soon as possible interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The functions of the interim navigation agencies will be the restoration and development of navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and the establishment of uniform regulations concerning use of facilities, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar questions. Membership on both these agencies will include the U. S., the U. K., the U. S. S. R., and France; on the agency for the Rhine River, Switzerland and the Netherlands will be invited to participate; on the agency for the Danube River, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania will be invited to participate. Arrangements with respect to the eventual membership of Austria and Germany will be subject to subsequent agreement among the U. S., the U. K., the U. S. S. R., and France. In accordance with the principle of free and unrestricted navigation, it is likewise agreed that the Control Council in Germany shall provide for equal treatment of all traffic passing through the Kiel Canal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Submitted at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways, July 27. See ante , p. 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] . For the final paragraph of this proposal, see document No. 1373 . No. 759 Proposal by the British Delegation 840.811/7–2545 No. 759 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg , July 27, 1945.] Draft Proposal by the British Delegation International Inland Waterways It was agreed that there should be free and unrestricted navigation on such inland waterways as border on the territories of two or more States and that such free and unrestricted navigation should be guaranteed by international agreements. As an initial step there should be set up as soon as possible interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The functions of the interim navigation agencies should be the restoration and development of navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for the nationals of different states, and the establishment of uniform regulations concerning the use of facilities, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar matters. The United States, the United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R. and France would be members of both these agencies, together with the riparian States, provided that the admission of Austria and Germany should be a matter for subsequent agreement among the Four Powers on the Control Council for Germany and the Allied Council for Austria. Other United Nations with a substantial interest in navigation on these rivers might be invited to participate by agreement between the Governments represented on each agency. It was also agreed that similar principles should be applied to the Kiel Canal, but that in present circumstances this would be a matter for the Allied Control Council in Germany and would be subject to the requirements of the Allied authorities in Germany. The three Governments decided that consideration should be given by the Council of Foreign Ministers to arrangements of this character for the Danube, the Rhine, and the Kiel Canal, in the course of the preparation of the Treaties of Peace with enemy States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Submitted at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways, July 27. See ante , p. 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] . For the final paragraph of this proposal, see document No. 1375 . No. 760 The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State 840.811/7–2545 No. 760 The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs ( Riddleberger ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 31, 1945. Memorandum for the Secretary of State Subject: Inland Waterways. Attached are copies of the American and British proposals presented at the Sub-Committee meeting on Inland Waterways on July 27 2 together with a copy of my memorandum of July 29 3 on the outcome of that meeting. The American and British proposals have been mimeographed for circulation in case you desire to circulate them at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers tomorrow. There is also attached a copy of the President’s original proposal of July 23 4 on this subject. From the discussions which we have had in the Sub-Committee, I very much doubt if the Soviet Delegation will agree to any mention of the Straits. With respect to the Kiel Canal, this waterway lies entirely within German territory and will therefore be technically subject to decisions of the Control Council for Germany. I therefore would suggest that if anything is to be accomplished on this subject at this Conference we should press the Soviet Foreign Minister to agree to the establishment of interim agencies for the Rhine and Danube and to drop the question of the Straits and question of the Kiel Canal if it looks as if we could obtain an agreement on the Rhine and Danube Commissions. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. 2 Documents Nos. 758 and 759 , respectively. 3 Ante , p. 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] . 4 Document No. 755 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference text on this subject, as included in the Protocol, see post , page 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] . Extension of the authority of the Renner government Extension of the authority of the Renner government [761] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Washington, July 17, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–245 [762] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs (Erhardt) Washington, July 21, 1945—1 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–745: Telegram [763] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Caserta, July 27, 1945—1 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2745: Telegram [764] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Caserta, July 30, 1945—midnight. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–3045: Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 761 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–245 No. 761 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 1 top secret Washington , July 17, 1945. Memorandum for the Secretary of State Charles of Hapsburg requested the Ambassador in Paris 2 to accept the enclosed sealed letter for transmission to the President. When the Ambassador raised a question as to whether the President was prepared to receive such communications Charles stated that a similar message had been sent from Brussels and that a reply had been delivered to his brother the Archduke Felix. In accordance with the instructions of President Roosevelt the State Department had authorized certain missions to transmit sealed material to President Roosevelt. Does the President wish this practice continued? Joseph C. Grew [Enclosure] The Archduke Otto of Austria to President Truman 3 July 2, 1945. Dear Mr. President , In view of the impending international decisions I take the liberty to write to you on the Austrian situation. I believe that I can do so as I am in daily contact not only with the former Austrian Resistance Movement, but also with the majority political parties and local administrations. The situation after two months of liberation is certainly not as it should be. Divided into four zones of occupation, the living body of the Austrian State is cut to pieces. There is no overall economic and no overall political planning. The economic situation is almost desperate. The Allied troops of occupation, despite orders, are living on the country. The Provincial Administrations are receiving no authority—with the exception of the one in the French occupational zone—and have thus no means to fight the spreading doom. Owing to the inactivity of the Allied military authorities there is no harvesting, the factories do no longer run. There is general unemployment. Inflation is spreading. All this will lead to an unprecedented catastrophe in a few weeks. In the Russian zone the Russian troops of occupation have carried away the complete industrial equipment and are looting systematically the private dwellings. To top the economic difficulties the Americans and British have issued a policy of non-fraternisation, in contrast to the French. This policy of non-fraternisation, which creates a feeling that the Allies are treating the Austrians as if they were Germans, is considered by the Austrians as a grave injustice. To this are added general interdictions to travel or to ship goods, suppression of the mails, the telephone and the telegraph, general abuses in the requisition and a curfew for the population, all things justified in conquered aggressor countries, but not for liberated friends. We were the first country to fight the Germans, and if we collapsed in 1938 it was because we were hopelessly outnumbered and abandoned by the Western Powers. Our Resistance Movement was as strong, considering the situation, as in other countries. The political freedom has not been re-established. We have no free press and no means of creating a healthy democratic public life. The Russians have been sponsoring a communist-dominated regime of their own in Vienna. There have been rumours that the Allies will eventually recognize this communist regime, the so-called “provisional Government”. I can assure you that the overwhelming majority of the Austrians would refuse to accept such a Government, because they do not want the elections controlled by the Austrian Communists, who avowedly strive for dictatorship and would do anything to impair the honesty of the elections. They furthermore will not accept to be ruled by the communist party. This is the situation. May I take the liberty to suggest a few measures that ought to be taken in order to bring Austria again to a life of freedom and to do justice to the Austrian people. 1) Authorization of the establishment of strong Governments in each of the Provinces, who can act under their own responsibility. (These Provinces are: Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, Kaernten, Oberoesterreich and Steiermark. This does not include Niederoesterreich, Burgenland and Vienna, who are under Russian occupation). 2) Liberty for the Austrian Governments of the Provinces to communicate with each other and to come to understandings on common matters. 3) Assurance that the self-styled provisional Government of Vienna, presided by Dr. Renner, will not be recognized by the Allies. 4) Abolishment of the policy of non-fraternisation by the American and British forces. 5) Authorization of the establishment of a free press. 6) Stoppage of the present inflation through a united plan for the whole Austrian area. 7) Inclusion of Austria in the general Allied relief program. 8) Liberty for the Governments of the Austrian Provinces to deport German citizens who are at this time a major scourge for the country. I am certain, Mr. President, that these measures would permit a rapid consolidation inside Austria. They would give Austria the start it needs to rise from its ruins. On the other hand, a continuation of the present policy will lead the country to anarchy. Knowing your generous sympathies for my country, I am bringing these problems before you because I am convinced that in pursuance of the great policy of America with regards to Austria you will order that my country be started as soon as possible on the way to consolidation and freedom. Wishing you the blessings of the Almighty in these days when one of the greatest responsibilities in human history will lie on your shoulders, I am [etc.] Otto of Austria 1 The original bears the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Officially referred to Sec of State HST”. 2 Jefferson Caffery. 3 The original bears the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Referred to Mr. Byrnes Sec. State 7/28/45 Harry S Truman”. An acknowledgment was made by Byrnes on August 20 (file No/740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–245). No. 762 The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs (Erhardt) 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–745: Telegram No. 762 The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs ( Erhardt ) secret Washington , July 21, 1945—1 p.m. 36. Dept notes with interest Brit political directive regarding Austrian Govt in Caserta[’]s 2884 July 7 1 to Dept repeated to you. While no corresponding directive has been issued by this Govt, Depts instruction 42 July 16 2 airmailed for your background information copy of a Departmental memo on question of recognition of an Austrian Govt satisfactory to Allied Govts. 3 This memo was prepared for current meeting of heads of state and is not to be communicated as such to reps of other Govts. Its approach is different from Brit directive in that it recommends that as soon as Allied Commission is established and our reps are in position to consider the situation on the spot we give prompt consideration to recognition of Renner Govt, with any cabinet changes that may then appear appropriate, as a provisional Govt of Austria pending election and establishment of a representative Govt through democratic processes. Grew H[enry] P L[everich] 1 Not printed. Cf. document No. 272, printed in vol. i . 2 Not printed. 3 See vol. i , document No. 268 . No. 763 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2745: Telegram No. 763 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Caserta , July 27, 1945—1 p.m. 3074. Message from British Delegate Potsdam to McCreery, CG (Commanding General) Eighth Army, stated that at meeting July 24 Stalin raised question recognition Renner Govt’s authority in British zone Austria. Churchill replied he considered this was one of first things to be tackled when Allies established in Berlin [ Vienna? ] and added that in principle it desirable work through single Austrian administration and that British wanted disturb local administrative arrangements little as possible. 1 Kirk 1 Cf. ante , p. 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] . No. 764 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–3045: Telegram No. 764 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Caserta , July 30, 1945—midnight. 3125. Report from Gen. McCreery on political situation in Styria states Machold was informed of British wishes on July 24, immediately offered his resignation, agreed to form new Provisional Govt and undertook that it would not enter into relations of any sort with Renner Govt. Machold said he knew and admired Renner, found British Govt’s attitude natural, and had always maintained no central Austrian Govt could last or exercise real authority unless it enjoyed confidence of all four occupying powers. Machold also indicated that in his new govt he would reduce Communist representation as much as possible. Present equality between Social Democrats, People’s Party and Communists had been imposed by Russians. Machold was extremely friendly and created favorable impression. Other members of Provisional Govt duly offered collective resignation upon explanation of British policy. In Carinthia parallel with above development, Dr. Piesch was asked to reform his Consultative Committee [as?] Provisional Govt of Carinthia. Provisional Govt formed on July 25 and consists of 4 Social Democrats, 3 People’s Party, 1 Carinthian Slovene (Dr. Tischler) and 1 Communist. Kirk Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1507 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . For draft texts on this subject, see documents Nos. 1427 and 1428 . Reparations Reparations [765] British Text of a Draft Report by the Economic Subcommittee [ Babelsberg ,] 21st July, 1945. Pauley Files [766] Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Babelsberg, July 24, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [767] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945. Pauley Files [768] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945. Pauley Files [769] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg, July 24, 1945.] Truman Papers [770] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [771] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [[Unnumbered document following Document 771 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 765 British Text of a Draft Report by the Economic Subcommittee Pauley Files No. 765 British Text of a Draft Report by the Economic Subcommittee 1 [Extracts 2 ] Draft Report of the Economic Sub-Committee of the Foreign Secretaries on the Subject of the Liability to Reparations of Italy and Austria The Sub-Committee have regarded it as outside their competence to discuss the question whether reparations should or should not be exacted from Italy and Austria on political grounds. From the economic point of view, the Committee makes the following report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. Austria A number of the above considerations 3 also apply, in the opinion of the Sub-Committee, to the question of exacting reparations from Austria. In the immediate future relief imports into Austria will be necessary. It is desirable that these should be furnished by UNRRA and UNRRA will not furnish relief for the purpose of enabling Austria to pay reparations. The Committee consider, therefore, that reparation deliveries from current production should not be exacted from Austria. 2. The Committee recommend that consideration should be given to the question whether, and to what extent, Austria should make once-for-all deliveries of capital goods. The Committee are of the view that decisions as regards once-for-all deliveries should be left over for later settlement until actual conditions in Austria can be stated and form the subject of agreed conclusions. The Sub-Committee point out that from the economic point of view, once-for-all removals under the heading of war booty have the same effect as removals under the heading of reparations. S. D. W[ aley ] [ Babelsberg ,] 21st July, 1945. 1 Printed from the ribbon copy, which bears only typed initials. 2 For the section of this draft dealing with Italy, see document No. 1097 . 3 i. e., the considerations mentioned in the section dealing with Italy. See document No, 1097 . No. 766 Report by the Economic Subcommittee 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 766 Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Extracts 1 ] top secret [ Babelsberg , July 24, 1945. 2 ] Second Report of the Economic Sub-Committee to the Foreign Ministers 1. The Economic Sub-Committee regrets to have to report that after extensive discussions of the problems of German, Austrian, and Italian reparations, it has failed to come to agreement and consequently must refer these matters back to the Foreign Ministers for decision. 2. The Sub-Committee has recognized the liability of Germany, Austria, and Italy to exactions on account of reparation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. The Soviet representatives believe Austria capable of delivering the equivalent of $250,000,000 in kind over six years, and Italy the equivalent of $600,000,000, particularly as Italy and Austria will no longer have their former military expenditures. 3 The British and American representatives, on the other hand, point out that both Austria and Italy will require aid from abroad for some time to come, that the U. K., U. S. and Canada have already supplied more than $500,000,000 of goods to Italy to prevent disease and unrest, and that any reparations deliveries from these countries would in fact be financed by the nations supplying such goods. They are thus unable to agree to the imposition of any reparation levies on the current production of Austria and Italy. They would be prepared to consider the possibility of certain once-for-all removals of machinery and equipment from direct war industries having no peace-time utility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 For the other sections of this report, see documents Nos. 923 and 1322 . 2 So dated in the “Index of Attachments to Summary of the Negotiations in the Economic Sub-Committee” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145). 3 A variant version of this document (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145) identical with this paper in other respects, has the following final clause in this sentence: “particularly as in the case of Italy she will no longer have her former military expenditures.” No. 767 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 767 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 24, 1945. U. S. Position on Removals From Austria Removals of property from Austria, whether as war booty, reparations, restitution, exports, or otherwise shall be limited to the following: (1) All finished war material, not including equipment used to produce war material. What constitutes war material shall be defined by the Control Council for Austria. (2) Such equipment especially adapted to the production of war material as may be approved by the Control Council. (3) Stocks of goods and current production during the period of six years from July 1, 1945, to the extent approved by the Control Council. The Control Council shall be guided by the principle that the necessary means must be provided for payment of imports before reparation deliveries are made from stocks of goods or current production. (4) Restitutions of identifiable art, religious, historical educational or cultural objects and such other property as may be approved by the Control Council. (5) Exports which are paid for in currencies acceptable to the Control Council. 1 This paper bears the drafting initials “JD” [Josiah DuBois?]. No. 768 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 768 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 24, 1945. U. S. Position on Removals From Austria Removals of property from Austria, whether as war booty, reparations, restitution, exports, or otherwise shall be limited to the following: (1) Finished war material, not including equipment used to produce war material. (2) Such equipment especially adapted to the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, as may be approved by the Control Council. (3) Restitution of identifiable art, religious, historical, educational or cultural objects, and such other identifiable property as may be approved by the Control Council. (4) Exports which are paid for in currencies acceptable to the Control Council[.] 1 Authorship not indicated. No. 769 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Truman Papers No. 769 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg , July 24, 1945. 2 ] Regarding Reparations From Austria (1) To establish the general sum of reparations from Austria of $250,000,000, to be liquidated in equal parts during six years commencing with July 1, 1945. (2) To exact reparations generally in the form of deliveries of products of Austrian industry. (3) Reparations to be exacted to compensate for losses caused by the war to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States of America, Yugoslavia. 1 Enclosure 1 to the Rapporteur’s report of the Ninth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 27. See ante , p. 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] . This proposal was submitted, however, at the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 24. See ante , p. 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . 2 Another translation in the Pauley Files is so dated. No. 770 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 No. 770 Proposal by the British Delegation [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Austrian Reparations British Proposal Reparations will not be exacted from Austria. Removal of plant and equipment and other goods from Austria as war booty or otherwise will, in future, be a matter to be settled by the Control Council. No. 771 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 771 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Regarding Reparations From Italy and Austria Soviet Proposal 1. Italy and Austria must pay reparations in compensation of those losses which they caused the United Nations by their participation in the war on the side of Germany. 2. Reparations shall be paid in the form of immediate removals of equipment from those branches of their economy which are the most important elements of their military potential. Such removals should be concluded during a period of one year. 3. … The Allied Reparations Commission shall define the amount of reparations from Austria. 4. … Austria [shall pay reparations] to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 1 Attachment 15 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . Molotov had given Byrnes a copy of this proposal at a private meeting immediately preceding the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. See ante , p. 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] . For the full text, see document No. 1104 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 771 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference text on this subject, as included in the Protocol, see post , page 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] . Agreements on zones of occupation and control machinery; occupation of the western zones and of Vienna; provisioning of Vienna Agreements on zones of occupation and control machinery; occupation of the western zones and of Vienna; provisioning of Vienna [772] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] 17 July 1945. London Embassy Files—101 (Austria) Control Machinery [773] The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (Alexander) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Caserta, 18 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [774] The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs (Erhardt) to the Acting Secretary of State Verona, July 19, 1945—2 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–1945: Telegram [775] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 19 [1945.] 740.00119 Control Austria/7–1945: Telegram [776] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Babelsberg, July 20, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2045: Telegram [777] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Caserta, July 20, 1945—10 a.m. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2045: Telegram [778] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Caserta, July 20, 1945—11 a.m. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2045: Telegram [779] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Caserta, July 22, 1945—3 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2245: Telegram [780] The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs (Erhardt) to the Acting Secretary of State Verona, July 23, 1945—2 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2345: Telegram [781] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Caserta, July 25, 1945—10 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2545: Telegram [782] Headquarters, United States Forces Austria, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Verona?], 27 July [19]45. 863.5018/7–2745: Telegram [783] Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) [Babelsberg, July 27, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2745 [784] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg, July 27, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2745 [785] The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Babelsberg, July 27, 1945. 740.00119 EAC/7–2745: Telegram [786] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) London, July 27, 1945—8 p.m. 740.00119 EAC/7–2745: Telegram [787] The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs (Erhardt) to the Acting Secretary of State Verona, July 28, 1945—3 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2845: Telegram [788] The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State [Undated.] 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2945 [789] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Babelsberg, July 30, 1945. 740.00119 EAC/7–3045: Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 772 United States Delegation Working Paper London Embassy Files—101 (Austria) Control Machinery No. 772 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 secret [ Babelsberg ,] 17 July 1945. 2 Draft Memorandum for the Secretary Subject: Approval of the Two Agreements on Austria. The four-Power Agreement on control machinery in Austria 3 was approved by the European Advisory Commission on July 4 and transmitted to the four governments for their consideration and approval. Similarly the agreement on the zones of occupation in Austria and the administration of the city of Vienna 4 was approved by European Advisory Commission on July 9. (The texts of the two agreements are attached). On July 12 the British representative on the European Advisory Commission 5 stated that his Government had approved both agreements. The French representative 6 stated that his Government approved the agreement of July 4 and would shortly approve the agreement of July 9. Since April the American Government has been pressing for the conclusion of these two agreements. The Zones Agreement comes into force as soon as it is approved by the four Governments and the control machinery agreements [ sic ] comes into force at the same time, provided it too has been approved by the four governments. The two agreements conform in every respect to the instructions which were despatched to Ambassador Winant in the course of the negotiations. In view of our interest in expediting the establishment of Allied control and occupation in Austria I suggest that you will wish to approve the attached telegram 7 instructing Ambassador Winant to inform the representatives of the other three Governments of American approval of the two agreements. I have consulted Mr. McCloy who concurs in this recommendation on behalf of the War Department. 1 Prepared for Dunn’s signature. It seems probable that the final text of this memorandum (not found) was similar in form to document No. 1033 and was the paper signed by Truman on July 20. See ante , p. 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] . 2 So dated in a manuscript notation. 3 Document No. 282, printed in vol. i . 4 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1600; 61 Stat, (3) 2679. 5 Sir Ronald I. Campbell. 6 René Massigli. 7 Not attached. See document No. 776 . No. 773 The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (Alexander) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 773 The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean ( Alexander ) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 1 [Paraphrase] top secret urgent Caserta , 18 July 1945. Naf 1042, FX 24640. Cite Fhgct . Sent to the Special Signals Office of the Air Ministry for the British Chiefs of Staff, and to the Adjutant General, War Department, for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Repeated for information to the Berlin Conference for the personal attention of Field Marshal Alexander. There follows an outline, for your information, of a report which the Commanding General of the Eighth Army, General McCreery, has made concerning contacts of recent date with Soviet officers. On July 16, 1945, Eighth Army representatives, 2 accompanied by representatives of France and the United States, 3 held two meetings in Vienna with the Soviet authorities. The British, French, and United States parties left Vienna the following day. The Soviet authorities refused to discuss such questions as civilian supplies, railways, roads, and signal communications, despite the fact that Marshal Konev, in writing to McCreery, had agreed to hold the meeting and had stated his belief that the meeting could settle many questions. The reaction of the Allied representatives to the uncooperative Soviet attitude forced the referral of the matter by the Soviet representative to Konev, who agreed that a quadripartite discussion, by specialist officers, should take place at once concerning these questions. The meeting then made good progress on most of the abovementioned subjects. Guarantees were received for telegraph and telephone facilities both ( a ) between Vienna and the occupation zones and ( b ) within the city itself. The meeting reached agreement on establishing combined signals and railways boards, which will not function, of course, until we have reached agreement on moving advance parties into Vienna. Agreement was also reached on road communications. The Soviet authorities claimed that, since the European Advisory Commission agreements have not been approved at the governmental level, they lacked authorization from Moscow to reach any decisions to implement those agreements. Therefore they could not discuss the movement into Vienna of advance parties of the three Allies or the occupation of Styria on the part of the Eighth Army. Unless steps are taken at the highest level to ensure that Moscow sends the necessary instructions to Konev, it is clearly possible for the Soviet authorities to continue to block any move into Styria or Vienna. Our belief is that we can accomplish nothing more through local contacts. We approached the Soviet authorities on July 1 with respect to the occupation of Styria, and we believe that it would be undesirable to run the risk of a third rebuff on the part of the local Soviet commander. The Chief of Staff 4 to Konev stated that the Marshal would extend invitations to the three Allied commanders for staff meetings, to be followed by a meeting of the commanders, as soon as he had received instructions from Moscow. Alexander 1 Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 19 as a retransmission from the War Department. This message was signed with Alexander’s name although Alexander himself was at the Conference. 2 The ranking British representative was Major-General John Winterton. 3 Brigadier General Paul-Raymond-Philippe Cherriére and Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, respectively. 4 Army General Ivan Efimovich Petrov. No. 774 The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs (Erhardt) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–1945: Telegram No. 774 The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs ( Erhardt ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret us urgent Verona , July 19, 1945—2 p.m. 118. Dept should see telegram to AGWar for JCS signed Clark sent 1250 o’clock July 18, Jcs [ Sgs ] 634 2 reporting on visit of Gruenther Winterton and Cherriére to Vienna July 16 to 17. Upshot is that Petrov, Chief of Staff for Koniev[,] met with Allied representatives in cordial atmosphere but explained that EAC agreements have not yet been ratified and that it would be impossible for reconnaissance detachments to enter Vienna until specific instructions were received from Moscow. One technical discussion was held dealing with communications et cetera. When question of food supply for Vienna was raised, Petrov replied it was [too] complicated to discuss at present. In a specialists meeting a Russian [staff officer stated that it would probably be necessary to pool Austrian 3 ] food resources in order provide for Vienna, and also that under surrender terms no food was to be brought in for Austrians. Gruenther [and] Winterton consider reasonable progress was made. Cherriére displeased by Soviet obstructionism. Petrov told Allied representatives they will be invited to another meeting as soon as EAC agreements are ratified and all matters will then be settled to their satisfaction. I am keeping in contact with British Political adviser 4 while awaiting entry into Vienna. Rptd to Moscow as 11. Erhardt 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 80 of July 20 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2045). 2 Not printed. 3 The words in brackets have been supplied from telegram Sgs 634 (Department of the Army Files) to clarify an omission at this point in the message here printed. 4 William H. B. Mack. No. 775 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control Austria/7–1945: Telegram No. 775 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret u.s. urgent [ Washington ,] July 19 [1945.] 60. State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee has informed Dept that draft American-Soviet-British-French agreements on control machinery SWNCC 30/3 1 and zones of occupation in Austria and administration of the city of Vienna and covering report SWNCC 25/8 as recommended by EAC have been approved by State War and Navy Departments and JCS. Texts were carried to Berlin by Riddleberger. Please inform the President and, if he approves, authorize Ambassador Winant to sign agreements on behalf of the United States. Sent to London and Florence for their information. [ Grew ] 1 The SWNCC papers are not printed as such. For the text of the agreement on control machinery, see vol. i , document No. 282 . For the text of the agreement on zones of occupation, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1600; 61 Stat. (3) 2679. No. 776 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2045: Telegram No. 776 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) top secret Babelsberg , July 20, 1945. Victory 143. Action AmEmbassy London, information Department of State Washington, D. C. AFHQ Caserta, Italy please pass USPolAd Florence, Italy. The President has approved the draft agreements on control machinery in Austria and Zones of Occupation in Austria as recommended by the EAC. You are authorized to sign 1 these agreements on behalf of the US Government and to notify the EAC of their approval by the US Government. 1 The agreements had already been signed ad referendum . Their approval was discussed at the Fourth Plenary Meeting, July 20. See ante , p. 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] . Notification of approval by the United States Government was given on July 24. No. 777 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2045: Telegram No. 777 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Caserta , July 20, 1945—10 a.m. 2999. Our 2987 July 19. 2 McCreery has reported following items of interest. Meeting took place in British sector (District 13) where missions also quartered. No signs seen of any Russian preparations to evacuate this zone. French continue to be treated as “poor relations”. Although General Cherriére was finally permitted to accompany Americans on tour of city he was not permitted to visit French sector. Russian air staff officer told Russian chief of staff in presence of allied missions that “we have plenty of air fields and can easily spare two”. Soviet garrison in Vienna will equal size of British and United States contingents; amounts at present to one division. Soviet Political adviser called Kissilev attended both meetings. Showed some knowledge of control machinery and English is excellent. Russians still removing machinery; agricultural machinery seen on railway sidings. Modern coaxial cable installed by Germans for relaying broadcasts and television being removed. General aspect of Vienna better than at time of Winterton’s previous visit (see our 2571, June 11 2 ). Some clearing up done and number of shops open. Syrian [ Styrian ] people showed signs of pleasure at passage of British Mission. General impression gained by Winterton that Russian staff is friendly and cooperative but that they do not know picture in Moscow and do not know terms or [ of ] agreements re Austria. Therefore they do not dare engage in discussion which might reveal this ignorance. Several times Soviet Chief of Staff General of Army Petrov apologized to Winterton for attitude he felt compelled to adopt. “The important thing is that we have met and like one another” Petrov said. Kirk 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 90 of July 21 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2145). 2 Not printed. 2 Not printed. No. 778 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2045: Telegram No. 778 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Caserta , July 20, 1945—11 a.m. 3000. General McCreery reports that during Winterton’s visit to (re our 2987, July 19 2 ) Vienna effort was made to discover Russian attitude toward British provision of supplies for civil population in British sector of city. He states he thought Russians might make entry into Vienna dependent on such provisioning. Russian view is that at present Vienna is adequately fed from supplies provided by Red Army. Kissilev made this point at meeting of C/S. During separate detailed discussions with General Leluk chief supply officer central group of armies following points made: 1. Austria to be treated as one economic whole. 2. All resources of country to be pooled for internal use. 3. Uniform scale of rations should be established for whole country and distribution of pooled resources should be controlled by AC. 4. AC should also direct disposal of national surplus and making good of national deficiencies by barter with other countries. It was made clear that in accordance with terms of instrument of surrender armies of occupation must have first claim on resources of country. It is pointed out that as long as this attitude is maintained and Austria is regarded as an ex-enemy country it is evident that surplus production of Russian zone on which rest of Austria must depend economically will not enter pool and sound economic basis for future will not be established. Therefore, in General McCreery’s opinion practical result will be that British will have to provide for civilians in their zone. To meet such a need there is available only 4000 tons wheat on allocations from CCAC which would give 300 gram bread ration British sector for one month, supply to be continued as long as CCAC approves bids and if supplies are received in time. Eighth Army cannot provide any other supplies or any fuel for public utilities. McCreery requests guidance of War Office in case the situation he envisages should arise. Kirk 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 106 of July 23 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2345). 2 Not printed. No. 779 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2245: Telegram No. 779 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Caserta , July 22, 1945—3 p.m. 3022–bis. JCS Berlin have indicated based on experience there (reference our 3000 of July 20 2 ) desirability of obtaining quadripartite agreement prior to US occupation of sector in Vienna although not as a condition for such occupation on full and proportionate utilization of Austrian food supply to feed city’s population. It is pointed out that we should not repeat in Vienna if it can be avoided interim arrangement now on in Berlin where each sector commander is responsible for feeding sector without being able to draw on resources from other Allied zones normally feeding city. 3 Desirability is suggested of having from beginning a quadripartite procurement agency responsible for allocating Austrian resources to fulfill Vienna’s needs. Kirk 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 106 of July 23 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2345). 2 Document No. 778 . 3 See vol. i , document No. 433 . No. 780 The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs (Erhardt) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2345: Telegram No. 780 The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs ( Erhardt ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Verona , July 23, 1945—2 p.m. 126. July 21 Koniev sent letter to United States, British, and French commanders stating he had been instructed facilitate occupation of various sectors Vienna by our forces. Gruenther, Winterton and Cherrière invited to Vienna meeting 1 p.m., July 24, to settle problems discussed at July 16 conference re taking over and they have accepted. US reconnaissance party moving to Vienna July 22 and July 24. Soviet began evacuating Styria July 22 but were not quite ready to move into Upper Austria north of Danube. Soviet Genl who went to Linz for preliminary arrangements was reported as most cooperative. Erhardt 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 126 of July 25 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2545). No. 781 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2545: Telegram No. 781 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Caserta , July 25, 1945—10 p.m. 3057. Msg (Message) from Potsdam to Chief of Staff AFHQ 1 (Allied Force Headquarters) advises that Stalin announced at session July 24 2 that Marshal Koniev (reference our 3000, July 20 3 ) would continue to provide food for whole of Vienna until an alternative arrangement can be agreed with British and Americans. In view of above Field Marshal Alexander directed that Commander Eighth Army assume military government and occupational responsibilities for British sector of Vienna as previously arranged. British Chiefs of Staff have assumed Americans will do likewise. Kirk 1 Lieutenant-General W. D. Morgan. 2 See ante , p. 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] . 3 Document No. 778 . No. 782 Headquarters, United States Forces Austria, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 863.5018/7–2745: Telegram No. 782 Headquarters, United States Forces Austria, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff top secret urgent [ Verona ?], 27 July [19]45. From Austria from OpDiv for General Hull only from USFA to Terminal for JCS for action and for info to Terminal for Hilldring, USGCC Germany for Clay for Hilldring, AGWar for Handy War pls pass to Terminal , USFET for Adcock AFHQ ref nr Sgs 687. 1. This message deals with food situation in Austria with particular reference to Vienna as developed in the deputy commanders conference (Generals Winterton, Cherriére, Gruenther) with General Petrov in Vienna on 24, 25, 26 July. 2. The political implications of the food supply of Vienna are such that the Soviet officials were extremely reluctant to discuss the subject stating it is a matter to be settled only by the Allied Council for Austria. They did, however, make following points: ( a ) They are providing food for city bulk of which they claim has to be imported by Red Army from outside Austria. Soviets state that food yield in Niederdonau which previously furnished considerable portion of Vienna needs has been reduced to 40 percent of normal because of military actions thereby providing no surplus for Vienna. Russians claim they have brought 45,000 head of cattle into Austria for food and dairy purposes. ( b ) Soviets will continue to feed Vienna until Allied Commission for Austria is organized. Political advisor stated that Russians have already turned sufficient food stockpile to last until 15 September but Soviet food expert in Office of City Commandant estimates food will last only until 1st September. ( c ) The components of the Vienna ration for normal consumers provides about 1,050 calories. 3. Soviets frequently made the point in conferences that as long as their food is being distributed to the population in Vienna they will insist on supervision of distribution in all districts, although they were usually careful to add, “unless procedure is changed by Allied Council.” We are not sure of the implications involved in the supervision of distribution but we shall know more in a few days since our officers have moved into all Bezirks in our zone today. They will work in the office of the Russian Bezirk commander in order to become familiar with his duties. On July 28th the members of the Allied Kommandatura will meet and their specialists will work together for familiarization purposes. No date of takeover of national zones in Vienna has been designated. 4. From conferences with Soviets it is evident that no quadripartite procurement agency can be formed prior to establishment of Allied Commission. It is also clear that while exchange of food supplies between zones may accomplish better distribution the net food position will show a deficiency requiring considerable food imports. 5. Through most cooperative action by G–5 Section USFET sufficient food is now being stockpiled at Linz to meet food needs of US and French zones Vienna for month of August based upon 1,500 calory ration for normal consumers. Request for allocation of food for requirements of US and French zones Vienna for September, October, November was submitted to CCAC within past few days by USFET in supplement to Mel airgram number 65 dated 12 July 1945. 1 In normal procedure receipt of food against this allocation if approved cannot be expected for at least 135 days. 6. In order to insure a continuous supply of food for the US and French zones of Vienna following assumption of command by US and French authorities it is requested that USFET and/or AFHQ be instructed to make available US and French Vienna requirements for September, October and November from stocks now on hand replacement to be made later from stocks received against Vienna allocation for that period. Request similar instructions be given regarding food for September, October and November requirements for the US and French zones of Austria excluding Vienna as covered in Mel airgram number 65 in order to insure uninterrupted supply to those areas. 7. Clarification is requested as to USFA responsibility for civil supplies for the French occupied zone in Austria including Vienna. We have not advised French that we are attempting to secure food for their zone nor shall we do so until JCS policy on that point is indicated. 8. This Headquarters concurs in proposed method of placing Austrian supply requirements as outlined by Hilldring in his message V[ ictory ]–259 CRAB. 2 1 Not printed. 2 Not printed. No. 783 Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2745 No. 783 Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) 1 [ Babelsberg , July 27, 1945.] During the course of the Conference the three Heads of Governments considered and approved the Agreement on Zones of Occupation in Austria and the Administration of the City of Vienna and the Agreement on Control Machinery in Austria, recommended by the European Advisory Commission. Upon approval by the three Governments and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, it was decided to place in effect at once the two Agreements which provide, in the spirit of the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, 2 on Austria, for Allied occupation and control of Austria. It is contemplated that a joint statement will be issued shortly regarding the arrangements which have been entered into for the purpose of carrying out the declared policy of establishing a free and independent Austria. 1 This paper bears the following manuscript notation by Mosely: “P E M[osely] draft July 27, 1945, for inclusion in Conference Communiqué?’ Cf. document No. 784 . 2 Text in Department of State Bulletin , vol. ix , p. 310. No. 784 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2745 No. 784 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg , July 27, 1945.] Austria During the course of the Conference the Agreement on Zones of Occupation in Austria and the Administration of the City of Vienna, and the Agreement on Control Machinery in Austria, recommended by the European Advisory Commission, were considered and approved. The two Agreements have likewise been approved by the Provisional Government of the French Republic. It has therefore been decided to place in effect at once the two Agreements which provide for Allied occupation and control of Austria. A joint statement of the arrangements which have been entered into for these purposes and for the purpose of carrying out the declared intention of establishing a free and independent Austria in accordance with the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, will be issued by the four governments on ______________, 2 1945. 1 This paper (unsigned, but presumably drafted by Mosely) bears the following manuscript notation by Mosely: “Revised draft, July 27, 1945.” Cf. document No. 783 . 2 Blank in the original. No. 785 The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 740.00119 EAC/7–2745: Telegram No. 785 The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) 1 secret Babelsberg , July 27, 1945. Victory 373. To American Embassy London, repeated to Department of State, Washington from Mosely. French approval EAC (European Advisory Commission) agreement of control machinery in Austria noted. Have French approved agreement on zones of occupation Austria? Has EAC completed preparation agreed texts of joint statements on (1) zones of occupation (2) control machinery (3) consultation with governments of other United Nations? If three summaries are ready, have they received approval of the four governments? We assume exact texts do not require reference to United States, United Kingdom, and French Governments, but Soviet EAC delegation may wish refer exact texts. If this supposition is true it might save time to refer exact texts to Potsdam to expedite Soviet clearance. Has EAC discussed a date for issuance of three joint statements in four capitals? Conference communiqué should contain reference to the two Austrian agreements and to intended four power statement which should be issued very shortly after issuance communiqué. Please inform urgently status these agreed joint statements. 1 Sent over the signature of Byrnes. No. 786 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) 740.00119 EAC/7–2745: Telegram No. 786 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) 1 secret London , July 27, 1945—8 p.m. French representative 2 in letter July 16 informed me his government’s approval agreement on zones occupation Austria and its covering report as reported my telegram to Dept 7205 July 17, 3 repeated AusPolAd as 24 and Frankfurt for Murphy and Mosely as 40. EAC (European Advisory Committee) this evening approved texts summaries of agreements on zones occupation and control machinery Austria and agreed present them next Tuesday to representatives other Allied governments including representative new Polish Government. Summary of control machinery agreement is brief and contains no mention names of MG (Military Government) divisions. Sent Babelsberg for Mosely Secret from Winant and to Dept July 27, Comea 344. US, UK and French representatives are ready to recommend that these summaries together with statement on consultation with other United Nations governments re Austria be published simultaneously as joint statements in four capitals. Soviet representative 4 also agrees but must first obtain his government’s approval of texts. At my suggestion to expedite approval US, UK and Soviet representatives are transmitting texts these three statements to Potsdam and French representative transmitting texts to Paris. Publication date can be arranged upon approval by all four governments. Winant 1 Printed from the text received in the Department of State as telegram No. 7588. 2 René Massigli. 3 Not printed. 4 i. e., Georgy Filippovich Saksin, the Acting Soviet Representative on the European Advisory Commission. No. 787 The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs (Erhardt) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Austria)/7–2845: Telegram No. 787 The Political Adviser for Austrian Affairs ( Erhardt ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Verona , July 28, 1945—3 p.m. 128. Following developments occurred at meeting of 4 deputy commanders in Vienna July 24, 25 and 26. Use of road, rail and air facilities between US Zone and Vienna was settled satisfactorily but serious difficulty was encountered in allocation of communication facilities. This has not yet been settled. Gruenther, Winterton and Cherriére judge that Soviet objective is to reduce drastically the size of their three headquarters in Vienna. Attitude of Soviet staff was far from generous although personal relations were cordial. Soviets first pressed for early meeting of Commanders-in-chief but later wanted to defer this until after Potsdam Conference. Arrangements were made for our military officers to function as observers attached to their opposite numbers in xalbezirks [ sic ]. 2 US reconnaissance parties in Vienna now total 70 officers and 400 enlisted men. Soviets are facilitating inspection of buildings. Komegratura [ Kommandatura? ] is scheduled to meet today with specialists working together. Tulln airport is in operation. Soviets stated bulk of foods for Vienna is being imported since yield in lower Austria is 40% normal. They say they have brought in 45,000 head of cattle. Present basic ration in Vienna 1050 calories. Soviets will continue to feed Vienna until ACC (Allied Control Commission) is organized. Their food expert says present supplies will last until September 1st. As long as they supply the food they will insist on supervising distribution throughout city “unless procedure is changed by Allied Council”. They state food supply problem can be settled only by Allied Council. It is clear that net food position in Austria will show deficiencies requiring considerable imports. Extensive removals of furniture etc. from our sector are taking place. At Tulln underground fuel shortage [ storage ] tanks were being removed but after protest this was stopped. Repeated to Moscow as 12. Erhardt 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 157 of July 30 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–3045). 2 A parallel message from Headquarters, United States Forces Austria, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff speaks at this point of “opposite numbers in district and municipal government offices”. No. 788 The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2945 No. 788 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of State 1 [Undated.] Memorandum for the Secretary of State Subject: Proposed Joint Statements on Austria. Attached are three telegrams from London containing texts of three proposed joint statements on Austria for publication in Washington, London, Moscow and Paris, upon approval. The first statement summarizes the agreement on zones of occupation in Austria, and the second statement summarizes the agreement on control machinery in Austria. The third statement follows the precedent set in the case of the declaration on Germany and announces the intention of the four Governments to consult with Governments of the United Nations in connection with the exercise of Four Power authority in Austria. These proposed statements are, of course, based upon agreements that have been approved by the United States Government. If you and the President are in agreement I should like to instruct our Embassy in London that the United States Government agrees to the issuance of these statements and to ask Ambassador Winant to have the European Advisory Commission determine the date of simultaneous release of the statements in the four capitals. J[ ames ] C[ lement ] D[ unn ] Approved : James F. Byrnes , July 29, 1945. Secretary of State [Attachment 1] [ Editor’s Note .—The text contained in this attachment was made public on August 8, 1945. See Department of State Bulletin , volume xiii , pages 221–222.] [Attachment 2] [ Editor’s Note .—The text contained in this attachment was made public on August 8, 1945, with the following modification: The text as published omitted from the primary tasks of the Allied Commission for Austria the first of those tasks as stated in the attachment, viz.: “To ensure the enforcement in Austria of the provisions of the declaration regarding the defeat of Germany signed at Berlin on 5 June, 1945”. See Department of State Bulletin , volume XIII, page 221.] [Attachment 3] 2 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) secret priority London , 28 July [19]45. For Mosely secret from Winant, signed Tindall. Ref mytel for Mosely July 27 sent Dept as 7588 Comea 344, 3 following is text proposed joint statement re consultation other Allied Govts for publication four capitals upon four govts approval: Title: Statement by Govts of US, UK and USSR and Provisional Govt French Republic on consultation with other United Nations Govts. Begin Text: In a statement issued on June 5, 1945 4 the Govts of US, UK and USSR and Provisional Govt French Republic announced their intention to consult the Govts of other United Nations in connection with the exercise of supreme authority in respect to Germany assumed by declaration re defeat of Germany signed at Berlin June 5, 1945. 5 The Govts of the four powers hereby announce that it is also their intention to consult the Govts of the United Nations in connection with the exercise of this authority in Austria. End Text. 6 1 This paper bears the following manuscript notation by Mosely: “Informed J. G. Ward (UK) and Gousev (U. S. S. R.) July 30, of U. S. approval and timing arrangement. Telegram to Mr. Winant, July 30. P. E. M[osely].” See document No. 789 . 2 Not attached; printed from the file copy (file No. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2845). Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. 3 Document No. 786 . 4 See Department of State Bulletin , vol. xii , p. 1053. 5 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649. 6 Although this draft statement was approved by Byrnes (see document No. 789 ), it appears that it was never issued. No. 789 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 740.00119 EAC/7–3045: Telegram No. 789 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) top secret Babelsberg , July 30, 1945. Victory 440. To American Embassy, London, information State Department, Washington, D. C. For Winant. Re your 65481, July 28, repeated to Department 7606, Comea 345 1 and re your 65482, July 28, repeated to Department as 7607, Comea 346 2 and re your 281045, July 28. 3 United States Government has approved three proposed public statements re zones of occupation in Austria, control machinery in Austria and consultation with governments of other United Nations in exercising four-power authority in Austria. US Government approves simultaneous issuance three joint statements in four capitals at a time to be determined in each. Publication of three joint statements should not precede publication of conference communiqué. Each might agree that three joint statements be issued 24 or 48 hours after publication of conference communiqué. Mosely has informed Gousev of US approval of three statements and of proposal for their issuance immediately after conference communiqué. Gousev has not yet reported re Soviet clearance of three statements and timing of their publication. Byrnes 1 This message was attachment 1 to document No. 788 . 2 This message was attachment 2 to document No. 788 . 3 Attachment 3 to document No. 788 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts with reference to the occupation of Vienna, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . Alleged anti-Soviet activities Alleged anti-Soviet activities [790] The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Berlin, July 25, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2545 [791] The Information Officer in the Office of the Secretary of State (Reams) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) [Babelsberg,] July 27, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2545 [792] The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) Berlin, July 27, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2545 No. 790 The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2545 No. 790 The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation ( Novikov ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) [Translation] Berlin , July 25, 1945. Dear Mr. Dunn : Under instructions of Peoples’ Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, I enclose herewith an Aide-Mémoire concerning the activities, which is unfriendly to the Soviet Union, in British, American and French Zones of occupation in Austria and Germany on the part of white-immigrants and other persons and organizations hostile to the U. S. S. R. I would appreciate it, Mr. Dunn, if you would confirm the receipt of this letter. Sincerely yours, K Novikov [Enclosure—Translation] Aide-Mémoire The Administration on the Repatriation of Soviet citizens has received information that in the British, American and French zones of occupation in Germany and also in the British and American zones in Austria, activities, having as their purpose to prevent the return to their homeland of Soviet citizens, are being carried on by white-immigrants and other persons and organizations hostile to the U. S. S. R. On Austrian territory such activities are being carried on in areas occupied by the troops of the 8th British and 5th American Armies. It is stated that in the city of Salzburg under the official name “Engineering-Technical Firm of Karyakin” a committee is actually working and is carrying on this activity directed by a Russian immigrant, Colonel Bobrovi. In the suburbs of Salzburg a committee headed by Slipchenko and Mishshenko is working on the non-return of Ukrainians to their homeland. In the region of Klagenfurt agents of the former Vlasov Corps under the command of Colonel Rogozhin are in action. The general leadership in Austria of the hostile activities vis-à-vis the U. S. S. R. is a “center” in which the well-known whiteimmigrants, General Kreiter, Engineer Voskresentsev, Ivanov and Lavrov, have entered. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and of the British Government the above-mentioned facts. [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. 1 For the paragraph of this aide-mémoire relating to Germany, see document No. 1055 . No. 791 The Information Officer in the Office of the Secretary of State (Reams) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2545 No. 791 The Information Officer in the Office of the Secretary of State ( Reams ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 27, 1945. Mr. Dunn : General Hull prefers that this matter be presented to the War Department in Washington. However, if you feel that there is some special need for haste, he is prepared to take it up with General Eisenhower and the War Department from Potsdam. R. Borden Reams 1 Printed from a ribbon copy on which there is a typed signature. No. 792 The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2545 No. 792 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation ( Novikov ) Berlin , July 27, 1945. Dear Mr. Novikov : I refer to your note of July 25, 1945 1 with which you enclosed an aide-mémoire concerning activities in the British, American and French zones of occupation in Germany and Austria considered by you to be unfriendly to the Soviet Union. I have referred this matter to the appropriate military authorities of the American Government in order that information may be obtained upon which an answer, so far as the American zone is concerned, may be prepared. 2 Sincerely yours, James Clement Dunn 1 Document No. 790 . 2 No further reply was made to the Soviet Delegation during the course of the Berlin Conference. Governments, control commissions, elections, conclusion of peace treaties, and diplomatic relations Governments, control commissions, elections, conclusion of peace treaties, and diplomatic relations [[Unnumbered document following Document 792 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [793] The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department [Bucharest,] 16 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [794] The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs (Reber) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews) [Washington,] July 16, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7–1645: Telegram [795] The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State Budapest, July 16, 1945—6 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7–1645: Telegram [796] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 12, 1945 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2645 [797] The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State Bucharest, July 17, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–1745 [798] The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) Washington, July 17, 1945—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7–1345: Telegram [799] The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State Budapest, July 17, 1945—2 p.m. 864.00/7–1745: Telegram [800] The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State Sofia, July 17, 1945—3 p.m. 874.00/7–1745: Telegram [801] The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State Budapest, July 18, 1945—12 p.m. [sic] 740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7–1845: Telegram [802] The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State Bucharest, July 19, 1945—5 p.m. 871.00/7–1945: Telegram [803] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 20, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2045: Telegram [804] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 20, 1945 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 [805] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2145 [806] The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State Bucharest, July 22, 1945—noon. 871.00/7–2245: Telegram [807] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Caserta, July 23, 1945—6 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2345: Telegram [808] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Washington [Babelsberg], 23 July 1945. SWNCC Files [809] The State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Members of the Committee Panel at Babelsberg [Babelsberg,] 23 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 [810] The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State Sofia, July 23, 1945—6 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/7–2345: Telegram [811] The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State Bucharest, July 23, 1945—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2345: Telegram [812] The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department [Bucharest,] 24 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [813] The Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Sofia, 24 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2445: Telegram [814] The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State Bucharest, July 24, 1945—8 p.m. 871.00/7–2445: Telegram [815] The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department [Bucharest,] 25 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [816] The Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [817] The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State Sofia, July 25, 1945—5 p.m. 874.00/7–2545: Telegram [818] The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State Budapest, July 25, 1945—6 p.m. 864.00/7–2545: Telegram [819] The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews) [Babelsberg,] July 26, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2645 [820] The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State Bucharest, July 26, 1945—10 a.m. 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2645: Telegram [821] The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State Budapest, July 26, 1945—11 p.m. 864.00/7–2645: Telegram [822] The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State Sofia, July 27, 1945—10 a.m. 874.00/7–2745: Telegram [823] The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State Sofia, July 27, 1945. 874.00/7–2745: Telegram [824] The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Berlin Conference, July 28, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2845 [825] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) Washington, July 28, 1945—1 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2345: Telegram [826] The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews) Berlin Conference, July 29, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2945 [827] The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State Sofia, July 30, 1945—6 p.m. 874.00/7–3045: Telegram [828] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 31, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [829] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 31, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–3145 [830] The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State Sofia, July 31, 1945—4 p.m. 874.00/7–3145: Telegram [831] The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State Sofia, July 31, 1945—6 p.m. 874.00/7–3145: Telegram [832] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] August 1 [1945.] 874.00/8–145: Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 832 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [833] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 8, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 792 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Related papers, dealing with broader discussions in which Bulgarian, Finnish, Hungarian, and Rumanian matters were combined with matters affecting other countries, are printed under the following headings: ( a ) Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers and Dissolution of the European Advisory Commission, ante , page 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 711 ] ; ( b ) United Nations—Admission of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, and Spain, ante , page 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 722 ] ; and ( c ) Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, Freedom of the Press in Eastern Europe, ante , page 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 744 (#1)] and Doc. 745 ] . No. 793 The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 793 The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania ( Schuyler ) to the War Department 1 top secret priority [ Bucharest ,] 16 July 1945. Top secret. M 1240. AFHQ pass to AGWar for War OPD info to ComGenMed, ACC Hungary and ACC Bulgaria from Schuyler Rumania. In my M–1227 of 13 [ 14 ] July, 2 I outlined certain additional rights and privileges which I feel this delegation should be authorized to exercise if we are to be able to carry our full share of duties and responsibilities as US Representatives on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania. It is earnestly hoped that some definite agreement with respect to these rights and privileges will be arrived at during the course of the Berlin Conference. On the basis of my 8 months experience here and in view of the uncooperative attitude which has been exhibited by the Russians throughout that period, I feel that specific and detailed agreement on the highest levels is absolutely essential to the proper continuance of our work here. It must be remembered that the Allied Control Commission, as it now operates, is the supreme authority in Rumania; it is a policy making body and an executive agency as well; it exercises complete and autocratic control over all phases of Rumanian national life; hence, even though we may secure certain concessions which result in a broadening of the present Rumanian Government so as to render it more nearly representative of all parties, nevertheless such concessions might and probably would be completely nullified by actions of the Allied Control Commission unless we could assume ourselves a suitable executive role on that body. For these reasons, the importance of securing for this delegation the minimum additional rights and privileges set forth in my M–1227 cannot be overemphasized. 1 Sent to the Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, for relay. Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 17 as a retransmission from the War Department. 2 Document No. 318, printed in vol. i . No. 794 The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs (Reber) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews) 740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7–1645: Telegram No. 794 The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs ( Reber ) to the Director of European Affairs ( Matthews ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 16, 1945. 34. For Matthews from Reber. New “order of procedure” for ACC Hungary in second period set forth in Voroshilov’s note to Genl Key 2 meets main point of our proposals (Deptels 1168 May 28 3 and 1391 June 23 4 to Moscow) by providing for tripartite agreement on ACC directives on “principal questions” and tripartite participation in meetings of various ACC subdivisions (Retels 281 5 and 286 6 July 13 from Budapest). Other minor points we proposed are also included, (such as frequent and regular meetings, free movement of our personnel in Hungary, rapid clearances for entry of planes and couriers) but the wording of these clauses is not entirely satisfactory. Reference in clause 2 to mixed commissions is not understood, as this phrase appears neither in existing statutes nor in our suggested revision. We believe Soviet note offers real basis for agreement on reorganized ACC. However, since original statutes were negotiated by three Allied Governments, their revision should be result of further negotiation and agreement of all three and not of decision of Soviet Govt alone. If agreement in principle on truly tripartite ACC, which seems possible on basis of Soviet proposals, can be reached at Potsdam, we think detailed working out of statutes might well take place at Moscow after Conference or at Budapest. Dept is suggesting to Schoenfeld that he and Key send you any further comment they may wish to make after further study of the Soviet note. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 See document No. 796 . 3 See vol. i , document No. 287, footnote 5 . 4 Document No. 294, printed in vol. i . 5 Document No. 311, printed in vol. i . 6 This message transmitted a translation of note No. 428 from Voroshilov to Key. For variant translations of this note, see document No. 796 and the annex to section xii ( xi ) of document No. 1383 . No. 795 The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7–1645: Telegram No. 795 The Representative in Hungary ( Schoenfeld ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret priority Budapest , July 16, 1945—6 p.m. 291. My telegrams 281 2 and 286, 3 July 13. Key tells me meeting of ACC is scheduled for tomorrow night when he expects to seek further clarification of Voroshilov’s note regarding changes in ACC procedure. Key does not intend to commit himself to acceptance of Soviet proposal pending further clarification and possible instructions, He is particularly desirous of securing statement from Voroshilov as to meaning of third paragraph of first section of latter’s note July 11 which seems to make directives of ACC on principal questions dependent on agreement with American and British representatives as proposed in your 57, May 28. 4 Sent Dept repeated to Moscow as No. 26 and London as No. 7. Schoenfeld 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 43 of July 17 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–1745). 2 Document No. 311, printed in vol. i . 3 See document No. 794, footnote 6 . 4 See vol. i , document No. 287, footnote 5 . No. 796 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2645 No. 796 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 July 12, 1945 [Translation] secret Text of a Letter Transmitted on July 12 to the Representatives of the U. S. and U. K. governments on the allied Control Commission in Hungary In view of the changed situation in connection with the termination of the war against Germany, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to establish the following order of work for the Allied Control Commission in Hungary: 1. 1. During the period up to the conclusion of peace with Hungary the President (or Vice President) of the ACC will regularly call conferences with the British and American representatives for the purpose of discussing the most important questions relating to the work of the ACC. The conferences will be called once in 10 days, or more frequently in case of need. Directives of the ACC on questions of principle will be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission after coordinating these directives with the English and American representatives. 2. The British and American representatives in the ACC will take part in general conferences of heads of divisions and delegates of the ACC, convoked by the President of the ACC, which meetings will be regular in nature. The British and American representatives will also participate personally or through their representatives in appropriate instances in mixed commissions created by the President of the ACC for questions connected with the execution by the ACC of its functions. 3. Free movement by the American and British representatives in the country will be permitted provided that the ACC is previously informed of the time and route of the journeys. 4. All questions connected with permission for the entrance and exit of members of the staff of the British and American representatives in Hungary will be decided on the spot by the President of the ACC within a time limit of not more than one week. 5. The bringing in and sending out by plane of mail, cargoes and diplomatic couriers will be carried out by the British and American representatives on the ACC under arrangements and within time limits established by the ACC, or in special cases by previous coordination with the President of the ACC. I consider it necessary to add to the above that in all other points the existing Statutes regarding the ACC in Hungary, which was confirmed on January 20, 1945, shall remain in force in the future. 1 Circulated by the Soviet Delegation at the Berlin Conference, apparently on July 24 (see ante , p. 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] ) and certainly before July 26 (see document No. 819 ). It is placed here because of its close connection with document No. 797 . Cf. document No. 1383 , section xii ( xi ), and document No. 794, footnote 6 . For similar proposals relating to Bulgaria and Rumania, see vol. i , document No. 309 , and document No. 797 , infra. No. 797 The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–1745 No. 797 The Acting Representative in Rumania ( Melbourne ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 410 Bucharest , July 17, 1945. Subject: Revised Administrative Procedure for the Allied Control Commission in Rumania. Sir : I have the honor to attach an English translation of a copy of a letter delivered on July 16th to General Schuyler, heading the American representation on the ACC, from the Deputy Chairman of the ACC, Colonel General Susaicov, which announces revisions in the administrative procedure for the ACC in Rumania. In content it appears that the phrasing of these six points is like that announced for the ACCs in Bulgaria 1 and Hungary. 2 Both General Schuyler and I agree, after an examination of the points, that virtually every difficulty encountered by the American representation upon the ACC since its beginnings to date could have occurred during that time with the six points in force, if, as has been the case until now, goodwill on the part of the Soviet Executive of the ACC was lacking. It might be pointed out that repeated promises have been made by the Soviet Executive to hold a conference at least every ten days or two weeks, but when the occasion was deemed unsuitable for such a conference by the Russians, in order to avoid discussion that might be embarrassing, they did not hesitate to postpone it indefinitely. Also the irony of the situation, as set forth in points 2 and 3 of the attached letter, apparently escaped General Susaicov when, at the very time he handed the attached note to General Schuyler, he announced that unilaterally the Russians on the ACC were going to demand of the Rumanian government all nominally German-owned bank stocks in the country, as well as continuing with the unilateral demands upon Rumania for all nominally German-owned oil stocks. Points 4, 5, and 6, are considered as being virtually no concessions, since point 4, that of freedom of travel, is practically the existing situation; point 5 is almost unnecessary since the present composition of the American and British delegations is considered ample; while point 6 simply describes the existing situation for the receipt and shipment of mail, cargo, and the dispatch of couriers. Respectfully yours, Roy M. Melbourne [Enclosure—Translation] The Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania ( Susaikov ) to the Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania ( Schuyler ) 3 No. SH–1363 Bucharest , 16 July 1945. In view of the changed situation resulting from the cessation of hostilities with Germany, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to establish the following working procedure for the Allied Control Commission in Rumania: 1. The Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of the Allied Control Commission will regularly call conferences with the British and American Representatives for discussion of the more important questions concerning the activities of the Allied Control Commission. A conference will be held every ten days, and, whenever the need arises, more frequently. 2. Directives of the Allied Control Commission on questions of principle will be issued by the Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of the ACC following previous discussion on the directives planned, with the British and American Representatives. 3. British and American Representatives will take part in the general conferences of Chiefs of Sections and Representatives of ACC, on questions of principle, which have been called by the Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of ACC, 4 but they may also, either personally or through their Representatives, participate, in the appropriate cases, in mixed commissions set up by the Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of ACC on questions connected with the carrying out of its functions by the Allied Control Commission. 4. The freedom of travel throughout the country is permitted to British and American Representatives provided that the ACC is informed beforehand of the time and route of the trips. 5. The British and American Representatives in ACC have the right to determine the number and composition of their representatives. 5 6. Deliveries and shipment by air of mail, cargo and the dispatch of diplomatic couriers of the British and American Representatives in ACC will be made at the time and following the procedure established by the Allied Control Commission, and, in special cases, after previous agreement with the Chairman (Deputy Chairman) of ACC. To this, we feel, should be added that on all other points, “The Statutes of the ACC in Rumania”, 6 which 20/9/1944 was communicated to the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America will continue to remain in force. Susaicov Chief of Staff Allied Control Commission for Rumania Lt General Vinogradov 1 See vol. i , document No. 309 . 2 See document No. 796 . 3 A telegraphic text of this enclosure was received by the United States Delegation at Babelsberg on July 18 as a retransmission from the War Department of telegram No. M 1250 from Schuyler. A variant translation was circulated at the Berlin Conference by the Soviet Delegation. 4 The variant translation referred to in footnote 3, supra , has at this point the following additional clause: “which conferences shall take place regularly”. 5 In the variant translation referred to in footnote 3, ante , this paragraph ends as follows: “composition of their own missions”. 6 Not printed. No. 798 The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) 740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7–1345: Telegram No. 798 The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative in Hungary ( Schoenfeld ) secret us urgent Washington , July 17, 1945—7 p.m. 197. Your 281 1 and 286 2 July 13 have been repeated to Potsdam together with Depts views to the effect that the Russian “order of procedure” appears to cover several of the points we had suggested, notably provision for tripartite agreement on policy directives, but that the language was not entirely satisfactory. While unilateral revision of statutes is of course not in conformity with our position as one of the parties to their original negotiation, we believe Soviet proposals form good basis for tripartite discussion and agreement on revised statutes for second period. Any further clarification which Key may obtain should be telegraphed Potsdam through military as well as Dept. It is assumed that he will take no action implying acceptance of the Russian revision pending appropriate instructions. (Re your 291 July 16 3 ). Meanwhile Dept hopes that political aspect can be worked out at Potsdam along lines of our and Genl Key’s proposals (Deptels 57 May 28 4 and 124 June 23 5 ) with details to be worked out later in Moscow or Budapest. Grew S[amuel] R[eber] 1 Document No. 311, printed in vol. i . 2 See document No. 794, footnote 6 . 3 Document No. 795 . 4 See vol. i , document No. 287, footnote 5 . 5 See vol. i , document No. 294, footnote 3 . No. 799 The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State 864.00/7–1745: Telegram No. 799 The Representative in Hungary ( Schoenfeld ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Budapest , July 17, 1945—2 p.m. 296. Rákosi has recently returned from Moscow apparently with new instructions and we learn from Foreign Office he obtained diplomatic passport there July 14 possibly to join Soviet delegation at Big Three Meeting. Signs indicate new instructions include increasing attacks on all bourgeois and non labor elements and attempts at disrupting the organization of their parties by accentuating existing cleavages. My 271, July 10. 2 Moscow is apparently disturbed by growing anti-semitism and fact Communist Party in Hungary is being too closely associated with Jews due to fact four chief leaders are Jewish as are large majority of Communist controlled political police. There is now reported to be party order that Communists of Jewish origin are not to be encouraged to take govt positions or put themselves in forefront of party activity. Communist Party has withdrawn pressure for early election since time is now needed to counteract widespread anti-Russian feeling. Interim period is to be utilized to prevent consolidation of opposition. Drive for new membership is based on pardon for previous activities of labor masses in support former Nazi regimes. Reference A–145, July 10, 2 item 8. It seems probable that local rumors of our interest in electoral decree which was reported imminent last month led to suspension of intended promulgation. We surmise that intensified effort on part of extreme leftist parties to purge administration of non sympathizers with their policies and replace them with their own men is alternative to proposed early election, results of which now appear more dubious to them. ReDeptel [185] July 13. 3 It is hardly open to question that Hungarian authorities will be increasingly unable to guarantee free election with increased leftist control of provisional govt unless ACC procedure as revised following agreement on pending proposals leads to tripartite intervention by ACC in matter of electoral law and in supervising election. Key is well aware supervision would impose very heavy burden and doubtless would require increased American personnel in his mission but I believe we must keep in mind eventual need of such supervision. Repeated to Frankfort as 4 for Matthews. Schoenfeld 1 The same message was sent directly to the Office of the Political Adviser at Frankfurt for transmittal to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg. 2 Not printed. 2 Not printed. 3 Document No. 314, printed in vol. i . No. 800 The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State 874.00/7–1745: Telegram No. 800 The Representative in Bulgaria ( Barnes ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 top secret urgent Sofia , July 17, 1945—3 p.m. 367. Top Secret, not for distribution. The President’s telegram to Stalin 2 as paraphrased in Depths 168, June 8 3 and statement on pages 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 710 ] and 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] of June 28 Current foreign Relations 4 on US position with respect to peace treaties with ex-satellites, encourage me to hope that the admirable statement of views in Dept’s 84 of Mar 29 3 on elections in Bulgaria is as expressive today of Dept’s thought on this crucial matter as when statement was originally drafted. In absence of info from Dept I, of course, have no way of knowing whether Bulgarian election situation will be deeply probed at meeting of Big Three and, if so, whether views as set forth in documents referred to above will be reiterated at this time by the US. These are considerations which now crop up daily in conversations with local political leaders who are casting about desperately to know what line to take in the face of Communist determination to retain their grasp on the FF and hence on country. If democratic elements within and outside the Front could be made aware of views to which I have referred and that such views will be reiterated at Potsdam, they would be galvanized into a resistance against Communist designs, which in absence of public encouragement from US, could only appear futile and hazardous to them. At the same time it might be hoped Communist leaders would become more reasonable in proportion to degree that doubts of all-out Russian support for a plebiscite to perpetuate Communist domination (instead of free democratic elections) could be instilled in their minds. The election mold has already been fashioned by Communists and the mixture of metal to be melted down and poured into it is about ready for the furnace. If Yalta declaration on liberated Europe 5 is to be applied effectively in Bulgaria, prompt action by the US is necessary. I, therefore, feel obliged once again to ask the Dept to authorize me to use in my conversations with Bulgarian political and govt leaders the expressions of views that I have referred to in this telegram. If for some reason the Dept perceives serious objection to full revelation of our views, perhaps it could at least authorize use of substance of first three paragraphs of its 84 and statement of our position on peace treaties with ex-satellites. Whatever its decision I should be promptly instructed. My British colleague 6 continues to urge that his govt take a forthright position with respect to electoral situation here. But putting together all I have picked up from various sources I judge that London possibly having situation in Greece uppermost in its mind, is again prepared to discount Bulgaria and this time to leave to us the burden of any effort somewhat to retrieve matters here, if that is at all possible. My deep interest in the electoral situation here is motivated by the hope that the fiasco of the ACC aided and abetted by Eden’s concessions to Molotov during armistice negotiations in Moscow last October, will not be perpetuated by the signature of peace with a minority-dominated FF govt. I am equally of opinion that we should do everything possible to avoid the stalemate of a policy of nonrecognition, if British and Russia are prepared to recognize the Bulgarian Govt. In this dilemma there seems only one wise course, namely, to do everything we can at present to assure the freest election possible with the widest democratic participation that pressure from US at this time can effect. Repeated to Moscow as 194. 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 48 of July 18 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–1845). 2 See vol. i , document No. 285, footnote 5 . 3 Not printed. 4 The statement referred to is as follows: “We consider that it is desirable to conclude peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania as soon as possible but do not think this can be done in a brief period. Meanwhile we would like truly tripartite ACCs. We are by no means convinced, especially in Bulgaria and Rumania, that we could preserve democratic principles and the interests of the peoples involved if we conclude peace with the present regimes. We will continue to press for application of Yalta in such important matters as the preparations for elections and the constitution of governments.” 3 Not printed. 5 See document No. 1417, section v . 6 W. E. Houstoun-Boswall. No. 801 The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7–1845: Telegram No. 801 The Representative in Hungary ( Schoenfeld ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret priority Budapest , July 18, 1945—12 p.m. [ sic ] 304. Mytel 291, July 16. 2 Key has telegraphed War Department reporting substance of discussion at last night’s meeting of ACC which indicates that new procedure more satisfactory to US is actually contemplated and has begun without formal agreement. Key did not press for formalization of new procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sent to Dept, repeated to USPolAd Frankfort as 8 and to Moscow as 30. Schoenfeld 1 The same message was sent directly to the Office of the Political Adviser at Frankfurt, presumably for transmittal to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg. 2 Document No. 795 . No. 802 The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State 871.00/7–1945: Telegram No. 802 The Acting Representative in Rumania ( Melbourne ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Bucharest , July 19, 1945—5 p.m. 481. Every informed source I have consulted believes the NDF Govt in its current joint Soviet Rumanian company negotiations involving oil, marine and river transport, banking and other matters are conceding economic concessions greater than present circumstances and available information of Soviet pressure would appear to warrant. (Rptd to Moscow as 132) Instead of employing classic Rumanian delay tactics particularly in view of Potsdam Conference the political faction of Tatarescu which is charged with the current economic negotiations has given ground with more than common rapidity and ineptness. After careful consideration of all local factors I can only conclude that the above phenomenon is based upon calculations of Tatarescu and his group concerning their political future at a time when the country’s own immediate fate may be decided at Potsdam. They fear possible recognition of Anglo American interpretation of Yalta agreement and personnel [ sic ] pressure that may force temporary eclipse of Tatarescu faction. Accordingly by playing the Soviet game at this critical time, by claiming Anglo American helplessness to safeguard countries territorial integrity (my telegram 478, July 19 2 ) Tatarescu and his group may hope to maintain their present political importance. Melbourne 1 The file copy of this message is actually addressed to the Secretary of War, but this is believed to be a clerical error arising from the fact that it was transmitted via Army channels. The gist of the message was included in telegram No. 80 of July 20 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2045). 2 Not printed. No. 803 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2045: Telegram No. 803 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] July 20, 1945. 79. General Schuyler has telegraphed War Dept outline of Soviet “new procedure” for second period ACC Rumania which is in substantially same form as that for Bulgaria 1 (Re Dept’s 30 July 16 2 ). It contains similar article providing for “discussion” prior to issuance of directives on questions of principle. We view this procedure as unsatisfactory since it does not provide for prior agreement by British and American representatives. The comparable article in the Hungarian proposal (See Tel 286 July 13 from Budapest to Dept repeated to you 3 ) appears more satisfactory. We believe it highly important that every effort be made to obtain agreement at Potsdam on this fundamental matter. [ Grew ] 1 See vol. i , document No. 309 . 2 Not printed. See vol. i , document No. 310, footnote 1 . 3 Not printed. See document No. 794, footnote 6 . For text of the proposal referred to, see document No. 796 . No. 804 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 No. 804 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 20, 1945 [Translation—Extracts 1 ] The Yalta Declaration “On Liberated Europe” Russian Proposal Presented to Foreign Ministers, July 20, 1945 2 In connection with the note of the USA delegation 3 regarding the Yalta declaration on liberated Europe the Soviet Government deem it necessary to declare that they cannot agree to the statements regarding Rumania and Bulgaria expounded in the above-mentioned note. The Soviet Government feel obliged to draw the attention of the USA Government to the fact that in Rumania and Bulgaria as well as in Finland and Hungary since the signature of the instruments of surrender by the Governments of these states, 4 due order exists and legal power in acting [ sic ], which has authority and is trusted by the population of these states. The governments of these states faithfully carry out the obligations assumed by them under their respective instrument of surrender. Rumania and Bulgaria gave the United Nations serious assistance by their armed forces in the struggle against German troops having put out against our common enemy 10–12 divisions each. Under these circumstances the Soviet Government see no reasons for interfering in the domestic affairs of Rumania or Bulgaria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In accordance with the aforesaid the Soviet Government consider necessary: (1) to restore in the nearest days diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary as further delay in this respect could not be justified; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Soviet Government express their assurance that the above-mentioned measures will find the support of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America and will be carried out. 1 For the paragraphs of this proposal not printed here, see document No. 1064 . 2 See ante , p. 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . 3 Document No. 745 . 4 i. e., the armistice with Rumania, signed at Moscow, September 12, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712); the armistice with Bulgaria, signed at Moscow, October 28, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 437; 58 Stat. (2) 1498); the armistice with Finland, signed at Moscow, September 19, 1944 ( British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxlv , p. 513); and the armistice with Hungary, signed at Moscow, January 20, 1945 (Executive Agreement Series No. 456; 59 Stat. (2) 1321). No. 805 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2145 No. 805 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 21, 1945. Policy Toward Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland The objectives of the three Governments with regard to Rumania Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, as in the case of Italy, 2 are the early achievement of political independence and economic recovery, and the exercise of the right of the respective peoples ultimately to choose their own form of government. 1. The preparation of peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland will be undertaken by the Council of Foreign Ministers as soon as possible. 3 2. The three Governments will make such public declarations on matters of joint concern with respect to these countries as may be appropriate. 3. The three Governments recommend to the respective Control Commissions that steps be taken for the progressive transfer of responsibility to the Rumanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Finnish Governments, respectively. 4. The three Governments agree to the revision of the respective terms of armistices with these countries as clauses thereof may become inoperative. 1 Submitted at the Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 21. See ante , p. 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] . 2 See document No. 1092 . 3 See document No. 713 . No. 806 The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State 871.00/7–2245: Telegram No. 806 The Acting Representative in Rumania ( Melbourne ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret priority Bucharest , July 22, 1945—noon. 491. Coincident with opening of Potsdam Conference all National Peasant and National Liberal Party leaders except Dinu Bratianu who was unavoidably absent met with Prince Stirbey on July 17 and decided upon a political program to demonstrate locally and abroad that organized opposition to NDF is an effective force and to forestall during the conference a sudden Soviet inspired token reshuffle of present Cabinet. Rptd Moscow as 135. This decision reversed previous opposition policy of quiescence until Potsdam results were known and from available indications was deliberately taken without informing Anglo Americans as a question of internal politics. Later it was learned Julius Maniu said “this policy should be taken in such a manner as to avoid any grounds for suspicion that the program had prior approval of Anglo Americans.” Maniu opened political offensive July 18 with speech to university students who were leaving for vacations. Speech was not published but was extensively distributed. A summary will be sent in a subsequent telegram. 2 Maniu explained democratic principles of his party and stated categorically “the govt must go. The country must no longer tolerate dictatorial govts imposed from abroad. We want a freely elected Parliament; we want a govt which is morally and politically capable of holding free elections.” That evening several hundred Peasant Party supporters demonstrated briefly for the King and Maniu in the Palace square. No police opposition was encountered. Dinu Bratianu the evening of July 20 addressed about 700 members of National Liberal youth organization at the party club. His speech (text of which will be forwarded by despatch 2 ) is reported as being stronger than Maniu’s in condemnation of NDF govt and in calling for a change. Following speech Liberal Youth proceeded to Palace square, shouted for the King, Bratianu, Maniu and liberty and paraded through streets drawing encouraging applause from spectators. At dispersal point demonstrators were met by Red Army trucks filled with Rumanian Communists. According to a Liberal source a brief struggle resulted in 32 Liberals being arrested and two injured. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other NDF political groups are restive. Some Communists are openly blaming prominent Central Committee members for party errors and one prominent official is quoted as saying present govt cannot continue since it does not enjoy confidence of King or people. Ana Pauker this week again reportedly failed to induce Dr Lupu to head his wing of National Peasants into a new camouflage govt. Premier Groza on July 20 conferred with Plowman’s Front leaders on disturbed situation and latter reportedly told one source that Russians would not consider any govt except with himself as Premier. July 19 Tatarescu and his group also consulted over former’s alleged failure to secure Communist assent to a plan revising the govt making Tatarescu Premier and giving his faction a more prominent place so the Russians could state to Anglo-Americans there is a bourgeois democratic Cabinet. All signs point to a continuance of present opposition tactics with leaders openly expressing confidence that at Potsdam Rumania’s political problems will be solved in accord with Yalta agreement. NDF factions obviously expecting Cabinet changes and fearing shifts detriment as to their respective groups consult and await outcome of Potsdam Conference as conclusive for their political future. Melbourne 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 106 of July 23 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2345). 2 Not printed. 2 Not printed. No. 807 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2345: Telegram No. 807 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Caserta , July 23, 1945—6 p.m. 3030. Air Vice Marshal Stevenson at Bucharest has telegraphed to Foreign Office along lines of Schuyler’s M 1226 2 and M 1227 3 of July 14 to AGWar with regard to changes in working of ACC Rumania. Stevenson met with Susaikov on July 20, at which time he was given note showing changes in working of ACC Rumania proposed by Moscow as result of end of European war. These proposed changes included regular meetings under chairman or deputy chairman with Schuyler and Stevenson, to take place every ten days or so to settle important matters. Directives involving principles would be given to Rumanian Govt by chairman or deputy after discussions with British and American representatives. Representatives of Britain and America would also participate in general conferences of heads of sections of a legation character [ sic ]. Commissioners or their representatives would in addition take part in mixed commissions appointed by chairman on ACC matters. Both missions would have free movement, with ACC being informed of dates and routes. Personnel of missions would be matter for mission heads to decide. Plane clearance would be arranged according to names and dates approved by ACC, chairman deciding on special cases. ACC working rules would continue as notified to London and Washington on Sept 20 except for aforementioned changes. In commenting on this new Moscow charter, Stevenson says he thinks it must be admitted it is very favorable provided the Russians are acting in good faith. However, based on his observations of Russians while in Bucharest, he believes there is nothing to be lost by maintaining the pressure. He believes Russian stand in Balkans may be weakening as result of Anglo-American protests and therefore feels following points should be aired [ asked? ] for: There should be no restrictions on entrance and exit of aircraft provided ACC are notified in advance of routine and special flights both of which have a seasonal change, and with respect to directives of ACC, agreements with British and American representatives should be mobilization [ sic ] before directives of any sort are given to Rumanian government. At end of meeting Stevenson arranged with Susaikov that first new meeting of ACC should be on July 25. Stevenson expressed hope that new machinery would work in good faith and Susaikov thought this would be case. Stevenson opines that until new machinery is in motion it cannot be assumed new administration will be as tripartite as first two points of new directive would indicate. Susaikov also met with Schuyler who has informed Stevenson that all this is mere window dressing to give impression Russia intends to discharge major undertakings in good faith when she has little actual intention of doing so. Stevenson does not feel he can diverge from this point of view because “with Russians handsome is as handsome does” and results must be awaited. He thinks Russian interpretation may result in continued unilateral direction policy and executive in Rumania unless agreement is reached on submission of no directives to Rumanians without prior coordination with British and American representatives. Kirk 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 126 of July 25 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2545). 2 Document No. 317, printed in vol. i . 3 Document No. 318, printed in vol. i . No. 808 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee SWNCC Files No. 808 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee secret SM–2621 Washington [ Babelsberg ], 23 July 1945. Memorandum for the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Subject: Proposed Statutes for Allied Control Commission for Hungary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the report by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Europe on “Proposed Statutes for Allied Control Commission for Hungary” and perceive no objection from the military point of view. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A. J. McFarland , Brigadier General, U. S. A. Secretary. [Attachment] 1 secret [Undated.] Proposed Statutes for Allied Control Commission for Hungary References: a . SWNCC 151/D (J. C. S. 1416) 2 b . J. C. S. 722/9 3 Report by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Europe the problem 1. To consider the recommendations of the Chief, U. S. Section, Allied Control Commission for Hungary for proposed statutes of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary for the period from the end of hostilities against Germany to the conclusion of peace with Hungary (Appendix “A”, SWNCC 151/D) (Appendix “A” JCS 1416) and to make recommendations to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). facts bearing on the problem 2. An Allied Control Commission in Hungary has been operating under a protocol 3 containing the Statutes of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary (J. C. S. 722/9, Appendix “C”) since the signing of armistice terms for Hungary on 20 January 1945. 4 In their present form those Statutes prescribe the organization and procedure, in certain respects, only for the first period of the Armistice, i. e., from the date of the Armistice Agreement to the end of hostilities against Germany. 3. The proposed Statutes are intended to cover the second period, i. e., from the end of hostilities against Germany to the conclusion of peace with Hungary. 4. As indicated by the comments of the Chief, U. S. Section, Allied Control Commission for Hungary (Annex “B” to Appendix “A”, SWNCC 151/D) (Annex “B” to Appendix “A” JCS 1416) an effort has been made in the draft of the proposed Statutes to retain as much of the agreed phraseology of the present Statutes as possible and at the same time make provision for a greater participation by the U. S. and British on a more truly tripartite basis. 5. A redraft of the proposed Statutes (Tab to Annex to Appendix “B”) 5 has been prepared, incorporating certain policy changes, explained below, and certain minor changes. The more important changes are: a . The deletion of the word “principal” in paragraph 1 in describing the functions of the Commission. It is felt that the advantages obtained by its inclusion would be outweighed by the disadvantages in the implied broadening of the scope of activities of the Commission beyond enforcement of the armistice terms, and that the functions which General Key mentions in his comments 6 on this article may justifiably continue to be carried out when necessary under other provisions of the statutes. b . Article 2 has been clarified to describe the Chairman as representing the Soviet Government and the Soviet Military Command in Hungary. c . Section ( b ) of Article 5 has been included in substance in Article 4 to insure that proposals of all three members be included in the agenda; section ( e ) is being deleted as being included in substance in Article 2 and 4. Article 4 has also been modified by the deletion of the phrase “Questions of policy shall be referred to the governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.” Since questions of policy which could be decided only at a governmental level would naturally be referred to the participating governments, this provision has been omitted and the sentence now reads “Decisions of the Commission shall be made only upon the concurrence of the principal representative of each of the three participating governments.” conclusion 6. The proposed Statutes should be adopted as redrafted (Tab to Annex to Appendix “B”) on the basis of the suggestions given in paragraph 5 above. recommendations 7. It is recommended: a . That this report be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration from the military point of view. b . That if the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objections the memorandum in the Annex to Appendix “B” be forwarded to the Secretary of State by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee. 7 [Subattachment] Draft of Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary secret ( Note : By this draft it is intended to prescribe the organization and procedure of the Commission during the second period of the Armistice, i. e., from the end of hostilities against Germany, May 8th, to the conclusion of peace. In their present form the Statutes prescribe the organization and procedure, in certain respects, only for the first period of the Armistice, i. e., from the date of the Armistice Agreement, January 20th, to the end of hostilities against Germany. Consequently certain old provisions, applicable only to the first period, may now be omitted, and certain new provisions are required. So far as feasible the form and terminology of the present Statutes have been retained.) 1. The functions of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary shall consist of the regulation and control, for the period up to the conclusion of peace, over the exact fulfillment of the Armistice terms set forth in the Agreement concluded on the 20th January 1945 between the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, on the one hand, and the Provisional National Government of Hungary on the other. 2. The Allied Control Commission shall be headed by a Chairman who shall be a representative of the Soviet Government and of the Soviet Military Command in Hungary. The Chiefs of the American and British Missions shall be Vice Chairmen of the Commission. The Chairman may also appoint a third Vice Chairman of the Commission and such political and military assistants as may be required, and a Chief of Staff of the Commission. Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States will be included in the composition of the Control Commission and of each division thereof. The Allied Control Commission shall have its own seal and its headquarters shall be at Budapest. 3. The Allied Control Commission shall be composed of: ( a ) A staff. ( b ) A political division. ( c ) An administrative division. ( d ) A military division. ( e ) An air force division. ( f ) A river fleet division. ( g ) An economic division. The staff will include officers of the armed forces of all three participating governments and will have a liaison section. The duties of the liaison section will include receipt from and transmission to the Hungarian Government of all communications, reports, directives, or other documents relating to the fulfillment of the Armistice terms. 4. The Chairman shall call meetings of the Commission at least twice each month and shall cause agenda, which will include proposals of any of the principal representatives of the three participating governments, to be prepared for such meetings and delivered to each of them at least two days in advance of the meeting for which prepared. In the absence of unanimous agreement of such principal representatives, only matters appearing on the agenda shall be considered at each meeting. Decisions of the Commission shall be made only upon the concurrence of the principal representatives of each of the three participating governments. 5. Representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States shall have the right ( a ) To receive oral and written information from any official of the Commission on all matters connected with the fulfillment of the Armistice Agreement; ( b ) To receive promptly copies of all communications, reports and other documents which may interest their respective governments; ( c ) To make journeys and move freely anywhere, and by any means of transportation, on Hungarian territory, with complete freedom of entrance from outside Hungary to any point within Hungary, and with complete freedom of exit from Hungary; ( d ) To communicate with the Hungarian Government or any of its agencies, through the liaison section of the staff; ( e ) To determine the size and composition of their own delegations; ( f ) To communicate directly with their respective governments by cypher, telegram and by diplomatic mail, for which purpose they shall have the right to receive and dispatch diplomatic courier[s] by air at regular intervals, upon notification to the Chairman; ( g ) To determine the amount of money required from the Hungarian Government for the expenses of their respective staffs and to obtain such funds through the Commission; ( h ) To transport personnel, mail and supplies to and from Hungary by airplane or by motor or other transportation, upon notification to the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission; ( i ) To call in specialist-officers or other experts for consultation, for making surveys or for working out special questions which arise during the work of the Allied Control Commission. 6. The Allied Control Commission shall have its representatives in the provinces, districts, ports, and at the most important enterprises for the organization of local control. 1 Although this report is attached to a certified copy of the above memorandum in the SWNCC Files, there is no indication that it accompanied the original of the memorandum as delivered to SWNCC. 2 Not printed as such. Concerning Key’s recommendations contained in the documents cited, see vol. i , document No. 289 , enclosure 1. 3 Not printed. 3 Not printed. 4 Executive Agreement Series No. 456; 59 Stat. (2) 1321. 5 See the subattachment, infra. 6 “The Mission has cared for and repatriated a great many U. S. airmen and numerous escaped U. S. prisoners of war, has obtained information concerning the military, economic and political situation in Hungary, et cet.” 7 See the attachment to document No, 809 . No. 809 The State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Members of the Committee Panel at Babelsberg 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 No. 809 The State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Members of the Committee Panel at Babelsberg top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 23 July 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Dunn Mr. McCloy Admiral Gardner Subject: Proposed Statutes for Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Reference: JCS 1416 Series SWNCC 151 Series The attached memorandum to the Secretary of State, embodying a report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the SWNCC on the proposed Statutes for the Allied Control Commission for Hungary is circulated for informal consideration. It is requested that you indicate your comments or concurrence. 1 For the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee[:] H A Gerhardt Colonel, G. S. C. Acting Secretary S. W. N. C [. C .] [Attachment] secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 23, 1945. Memorandum to the Secretary of State The War–State–Navy [ sic ] Coordinating Committee has considered the proposed Statutes for the Allied Control Commission for Hungary recommended by the Chief of the U. S. Section, Allied Control Commission for Hungary (SWNCC 151/D, Appendix “A”) (Appendix “A” to J. C. S. 1416). 2 The Committee recommends the amendment of the proposed Statutes as redrafted in the form attached. 3 As so amended, the committee recommends that the Secretary of State endeavor to secure the adoption by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States of a Protocol embodying those Statutes, or so much thereof as may be possible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objections from a military point of view. 4 James C. Dunn 5 Chairman, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 1 Approval was given by the War and Navy Department members of the SWNCC panel at the Conference. The Department of State member withheld approval, however, because the matter was under negotiation at the Conference. See document No. 824 . The draft statutes in the subattachment to document No. 808 were approved in Washington, however, following the Conference, and on August 16 they were sent to the American members of the Allied Control Commissions in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, with instructions to initiate discussions on the revision of the Commission statutes in each country and to press for adoption of the points covered in the draft statutes for Hungary in so far as possible. 2 See vol. i , document No. 289 , enclosure 1. 3 See the subattachment to document No. 808 . 4 See document No. 808 . 5 This typed signature appears on the draft memorandum. No. 810 The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/7–2345: Telegram No. 810 The Representative in Bulgaria ( Barnes ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret priority Sofia , July 23, 1945—6 p.m. 377. Please see General Crane’s telegram 1951 to JCS 1 reporting text of communication from min[ister of Foreign Affairs and Cults 2 to the Deputy President ACC 3 requesting establishment of regular diplomatic relations with Bulgarian Govt. I have reported my views on this subject so fully during past few months that only comment now necessary seems to be to point out that in raising question Stainov has given Govts of the US, UK and USSR opportune occasion in connection with Potsdam meeting to express themselves on thoroughly unsatisfactory internal political and election situation. Now would seem to be the time to demand postponement of elections and amendment of electoral law in interest of truly democratic procedures permitting all political parties within framework of FF or other democratic groups that may so desire to put forward programs with right freely to bring individual platforms to attention of electorate and to present separate lists of candidates. Full safeguards to protect rights of electorate in period preceding elections and to assure liberty of polling and secrecy of ballot should be exacted. Since July 15 it has seemed a militia rule rather than the exception for political visitors to the house of Agrarian Minister Petkov to be arrested and subjected to intimidating interrogation. Barnes 1 Document No. 813 . 2 Petko Stainov. 3 Colonel General Sergey Semenovich Biryuzov. The passage in brackets has been supplied to correct a garble in the original. No. 811 The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2345: Telegram No. 811 The Acting Representative in Rumania ( Melbourne ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Bucharest , July 23, 1945—7 p.m. 495. See Telegram M–1285 July 23 [ 24 ] 1 sent by Schuyler to War Dept outlining and asking for comment on his proposed course of action in view of Soviet proposed ACC procedure. General considers and I concur it is necessary to make clear American viewpoint on significant continuing unilateral actions taken by Soviet officials on ACC or risk assumption that now they are countenanced by Schuyler. Melbourne 1 Document No. 812 . No. 812 The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 812 The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania ( Schuyler ) to the War Department 1 secret priority [ Bucharest ,] 24 July 1945. M 1285 from Schuyler Rumania to AGWar for WarOpDiv info ComGenMed, ACC Hungary, ACC Bulgaria, and ComGenMilMis. Under the new plan for operation of the ACC as outlined to you in my M 1250 of 16 July, 2 frequent discussions are to be held by the Chief Allied representatives relative to important ACC activities. This new operational policy places on the chief US and British representatives the specific responsibility for examining and discussing in joint conferences all current or proposed future ACC policies and for having [been?] either definitely in agreement with or opposed to each such policy. In this situation I feel that as chief US representative I can no longer remain silent relative to certain policies which have been placed in effect in the name of the ACC and which I believe the United States Government would not desire to support. Full information on these policies has already been furnished. The position which I feel I should take in each case is summarized briefly below: 1. Under Article 7 3 the ACC has required the delivery to Russia as “War Booty” of considerable quantities of industrial equipment including oil pipe, tubing and casing, on the ground that such equipment originated in Germany. I propose to protest that [ the ] application of this policy to any industrial equipment, regardless of its origin, which can be shown to have been actually purchased and paid for prior to 23 August 1944. 4 I am informed that a similar protest has been made to the Soviet Government by the US Ambassador in Moscow. 5 2. Under Article 8 the ACC has required delivery to USSR of German held oil shares and bank stocks in Rumania. Since I have already protested this action, no further steps are necessary. Moreover I am aware that the matter is being discussed on governmental levels. 3. Under Article 10 the ACC is requiring Rumania to maintain and subsist large Russian forces which are now being retained on Rumanian soil, apparently for the convenience of Soviet Russia. I propose to protest the application of Article 10 after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany to any Russian forces other than those actually in transit back to Russia. I do not feel it necessary to discuss at this time a previous interpretation by Russia under which, prior to the end of hostilities, Rumania was required to subsist large Russian forces outside of Rumanian territories. 4. I propose to protest the present ACC interpretation of Article 12 whereby Rumania is being required to repay Russia in kind for large amounts of grain, cattle and other similar items removed or consumed by Rumanian forces during their occupation of Russian territory. My position will be that articles and materials to be returned to Soviet Russia under this article would not include products of the soil or subsoil or other items which have since been consumed, destroyed or otherwise removed from Rumanian territory, compensation for removal of all such items being provided by the reparations payments under Article 11. 5. I propose to recommend a change in present censorship policies under Article 16 so as to prohibit Rumanian censors from preventing the publication or distribution on Rumanian territory of American newspapers and magazine articles or other American literature or films. I propose to take the stand that the only censorship in Rumania for Russian, British or American literature or films should be that exercised by the ACC itself. (See Mr. Melbourne’s cable number 71 [ 471 ] dated 15 July 6 ). 6. I propose to point out that the continued retention by Soviet Russia of vessels of the Rumanian Navy is not provided for in the armistice, and to urge that since hostilities have now ceased, all such vessels be returned to Rumania. I shall of course await your concurrence or other instructions before proceeding further with this matter. I have discussed the question with the Acting US Representative in Rumania who concurs in the desirability of bringing the entire matter to your attention at this time. 1 Sent to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Caserta, for relay. Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 24 as a retransmission from the War Department. 2 See document No. 797, footnote 3 . 3 Of the armistice with Rumania signed at Moscow, September 12, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712). 4 i. e., before the surrender of Rumania. 5 W. Averell Harriman. See vol. i , document No. 323 . 6 Document No. 321, printed in vol. i . No. 813 The Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2445: Telegram No. 813 The Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria to the Joint Chiefs of Staff unclassified urgent Sofia , 24 July 1945. From U. S. Delegation, Sofia, Bulgaria to War Department for JCS info CG U. S. Army Forces Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Caserta, Italy. Reference number 1951. Following quoted communication has been received from the Chairmanship of the Allied Control Commission. No comment. “Sofia 19 July 1945. Ministère Des Affaires Étrangères Et Des Cuites of Bulgaria. Reference nr. 6275–3. To Colonel General S. S. Buriusoff Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission City. My Dear General. I have the honor to request the Allied Control Commission to bring to the knowledge of the Allied … 1 Governments of the USSR the United States of America and the United Kingdom, and more particularly to the knowledge of their supreme representations at Potsdam, the contents of the following note: Since the signing of the Armistice 2 the Bulgarian Government has had the task of fulfilling the engagements of the armistice agreement most loyally and so far the Allied Control Commission has had no occasion to observe the fulfillment of any of the obligations of this treaty with failure. The Bulgarian Government prompted by its own initiative, before taking obligations by virtue of this treaty, declared war on Germany and took a most active part in the war operations against the German forces. Its Armies at the price of thousands of sacrifices, participated in the liberation of Macedonia and Serbia from the German forces in Yugoslavia, entered Hungary and, fighting their way through, reached Austria from where they returned these days. The Bulgarian Government accomplished this without the demand of advance conditions from the Allies as a compensation for its collaboration. This war effort of Bulgaria cost her 40,000 in killed and wounded. The Bulgarian Government, however, had the satisfaction to realize that, after the faults and the crimes of the former rulers of the country who were rejected and condemned by the nation, it was able to offer a modest but sincere contribution to the just cause of the Allies to which the Bulgarian nation has always been attached. While as German forces were still in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian nation and the underground movement operation against the Germans and their agents gave also for this same cause thousands of sacrifices and sustained most frightful sufferings in the final achievement to put down the power of the German agents who governed the country and to expel the German forces from Bulgarian territory. To our great regret, this self denying endeavor of the Bulgarian underground movement and these war effort[s] of Bulgaria were not properly appreciated and the Bulgarian soldier, who fought and died together with the Allied soldiers during the subsequent war operations, was not recognized in his capacity as cobelligerent. In spite of that, the Bulgarian Government continued to stand firmly on the positions it had taken when, through a national uprisal [ sic ], it overturned the pro-German Governments of the past and went with Allied forces to the side of the Allies. Lately, however, a wave of false and tendentious reports tend to ascribe to Bulgaria intentions which she does not possess and to set her on a background which has no relation whatsoever to the actual state of affairs in the country. Not only irresponsible news and radio broadcasting agencies but even some responsible factors in the foreign countries have directed public accusations against Bulgaria which have not [ nothing? ] in common with the truth. They state, for instance, that Bulgaria has started military manoeuvres in the frontier districts with the purpose of exercising pressure on her neighbors and that she is concentrating armed forces on the borders in order to invade neighboring territories, even to the extent of having despatched armed formations in these frontier zones. The Bulgarian Government is duty bound to state that all these [ this ] is an absolute and willful misrepresentation and to appeal to the Allied Control Commission which is in a position to check and confirm the truth. The Bulgarian Government sites [ sic ] for peace in the Balkans and seeks all possible ways of collaboration for the attainment of a peaceful solution of all questions affecting the vital interests of the Balkan nations and for a friendly life and relationship with the neighboring countries. Even at the time when, for considerations relating to the internal condition of neighboring Greece, several thousand slave Macedonians took refuge in our country, the Bulgarian Government did not waver from its present line of attitude and action and the Bulgarian press did not give vent to foul attacks against our neighbors. Bulgaria is taken up with the process of healing up her wounds from the criminal policy of the past pro-German Governments and from the consequences of the war. She has devoted herself completely to her political and economic reconstruction. Because of the defeatism established in the spirit and the body of the country by the former governments and because of the position occupied by the pro-German factors and the administrative acts promulgated by them, the Bulgarian nation, which had to force them down and out of the government, is still preoccupied with the difficult task of reconstructing the whole life and machinery of the administration on new democratic principles. It follows and will continue to follow this road, in spite of the economic and other hardships which inevitably surge in similar turns of politics, like the one which Bulgaria had just made and in a war time situation like the present. It is hoped that the efforts of the Bulgarian nation and the initiatives of the Bulgarian Government to overcome these handicaps might be understood and appreciated properly by the Allies. The Bulgarian Government wishes to believe that the Allied Governments would take pains in acquainting themselves adequately with the situation in the country, with the attitude of the Bulgarian people and the sincere endeavors of the Bulgarian Government and that, in the name of justice, good understanding and peace in the Balkans, they would accord a treatment to Bulgaria which would enable her to continue with greater success her work for economic reconstruction and rehabilitation, for democratic regeneration and for a Balkan peaceful collaboration. The Bulgarian Government hopes that the Allied powers will not put off any longer the establishment of regular diplomatic intercourse with Bulgaria which will bring about her closer and more efficient contact with the great Allied powers and would facilitate further the continuation of the course which started with the war participation of the Bulgarian forces, on the side of the Allies. The Bulgarian Government is of the opinion that the war efforts of its nation and its government to the cause of peace and Balkan understanding are sufficient ground for the crossing over into a new phase of Bulgaria’s relations to the Allies, actually toward the conclusion of a peace treaty which will direct regenerated Bulgaria, definitely and once for all, on the road which she chose on the side of the Allies. I have the honor, sir, to reiterate to you the assurance of my highest consideration. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cults, Commissar for the Fulfillment of the Armistice Agreement. Signed Prof. P. Stainoff.” 1 Ellipsis in the original. 2 Executive Agreement Series No. 437; 58 Stat. (2) 1498. No. 814 The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State 871.00/7–2445: Telegram No. 814 The Acting Representative in Rumania ( Melbourne ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Bucharest , July 24, 1945—8 p.m. 498. Yesterday evening in an interview requested by Mr. Julius Maniu he stated that to demonstrate its existence the political opposition last week had engaged in small scale activities that also were needed for party morale (my 491 July 22 2 ). (Repeated Moscow as 140) These activities had been limited in order not to impede considered decisions upon Rumania at the Potsdam Conference, since the opposition wished to avoid what it considered to be the unhappy example of Poland in taking unilateral action. Despite what Maniu maintained to be intimidating or provocative tactics by the NDF (National Democratic Front) and Soviet officials who sought to disrupt party meetings the National Peasants were remaining calm as they awaited results at Potsdam which they expected would implement the Yalta Declaration. 3 Maniu stated he had counseled his party that US and Great Britain if they wished could secure Soviet acquiescence to a democratic interpretation of Yalta. He remarked that he considered such an act necessary for America to translate its [e]nunciated principles into acts or have its influence irreparably damaged in this area. In considering measures to implement the Yalta Declaration Maniu expressed his belief in the impossibility of adequate tripartite ACC (Allied Control Commission) supervision of national elections. He expressed his preference for a non-political technician’s government to conduct the elections or, failing this, a democratic coalition government truly representative of party political strength in Rumania. He considered the National Peasants could confidently expect an overwhelming electoral majority with free elections and suggested in a coalition government that the party be given the War, Interior, and Propaganda Ministries since it would be to its interest to conduct the elections in an unbiased manner with an inevitable large National Peasant majority emerging with the responsibility of government. If the Groza Government is retained or mere minor changes decided at Potsdam Maniu significantly stated that his party will organize energetic country wide opposition, including demonstrations, agains[t] the NDF Government. In measured words he said that for such intensified action he was certain of support from the dissatisfied Rumanian Peasants who would unite with townspeople to defend country’s democratic traditions. Maniu again repeated his fundamental premise that he is not anti-Russian since he views events in light of political forces rather than emotionally. He flatly said country would be foolish to adopt an opposition course to Soviet Union but that his party could never approve of an incompetent Communist minority governing Rumania. Melbourne 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 135 of July 26 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2645). 2 Document No. 806 . 3 On liberated Europe. See document No. 1417 , section v . No. 815 The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 815 The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania ( Schuyler ) to the War Department 1 secret priority [ Bucharest ,] 25 July 1945. M 1296. AFHQ pass to War OpDiv, OpNav, DNI, War G–2 info to ComGenMed, ACC Bulgaria, ACC Hungary from Schuyler Rumania. In my M 1240 of 16 July 2 I listed specific objections to the attitude displayed by General Susaikov in the administration of the affairs of the Allied Control Commission. I had hoped that the changes in Allied Control Commission Policy announced by General Susaikov on 16 July and reported in my M 1250 of 16 July 3 presaged a more cooperative spirit on the part of the Soviet officials in solving mutual problems. Accordingly on 18 July I advised General Susaikov that I proposed to inspect the Danube Ports of Brăila Galatz Tulcea and Sulina and requested his assistance in procuring coal for a vessel made available by the International Danube Commission for the purpose. On 21 July I received a report that General Susaikov’s authority extends no further than Selatz [ Galatz? ]. As the Allied Control Commission currently has representatives at Tulcea and Sulina this reply is not acceptable. The incident is considered important in its bearing on possible changes in the procedure and method of operation of the Allied Control Commission. Recommended changes were included in my M 1250 [ 1240 ] of 16 July. 2 Nevertheless unless the rights and powers of the American Representative are clearly and unequivocally expressed ameliorative changes in procedure would be nullified by the negative and uncooperative attitude of the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commission. 1 Sent to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Caserta, for relay. Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 26 as a retransmission from the War Department. 2 Document No. 793 . 3 See document No. 797, footnote 3 . 2 Document No. 793 . No. 816 The Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 816 The Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Rumania ( Melbourne ) 1 secret urgent [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Victory 323. The question of the revision of the Control Commission procedures in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary is under discussion at the Berlin Conference. Please inform General Schuyler requesting him to keep matter open but not to indicate our acceptance of the Soviet proposal pending receipt of further instructions. Byrnes 1 Messages identical with this telegram, except that they refer respectively to Key and Crane instead of Schuyler, were dispatched at the same time to the American Missions at Budapest and Sofia as telegrams Nos. Victory 324 and 325. No. 817 The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State 874.00/7–2545: Telegram No. 817 The Representative in Bulgaria ( Barnes ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret priority Sofia , July 25, 1945—5 p.m. 381. United FF (Fatherland Front) lists of candidates for the 23 electoral districts into which Bulgaria has been divided for the forthcoming general elections, still scheduled for August 26 have been published in this morning’s press. The formula of 95, 95, 46, 31 and 9 2 (remytel 341, July 7 3 ) has been adhered to. All Agrarian and Socialist candidates are Obbovists and Neikovists. All Zveno candidates are supporters of Kimon Georgiev who recently has gone so far in trailing along with the Communists as to alienate many of his former admirers. The anomaly of the domestic political situation as revealed by the lists published this morning is that Petkov Agrarians and Cheshmedjieff Socialists along with certain independents who have made common cause with Petkov and Cheshmedjieff and support of democratic process against Communist domination of the FF are still nominally supporters of and participants in the FF Govt, while in fact they have already been excluded from the FF. The only basis now left for participation by these democratic forces in the forthcoming elections is article 53 of the electoral law which provides for candidates based on petitions signed by ten registered voters. A few well administered beatings by Interior Minister Yugov’s militia will probably limit such petitions to a minimum; also Petkov Cheshmedjieff and other opponents of Communist domination have little or no time in which to act independently as today is the last day for the registration of candidatures with the local courts. Even should they succeed in filing lists their chances of successful participation in the elections will remain small as they possess no medium of public expression and must rely upon surreptitious means of informing the voter as to their program and candidates. Hence immediate intervention by three principal Allies looking to postponement of the elections at least until the end of October and to democratic revision and control of electoral procedures seems imperative if Bulgaria is not to witness on August 26 a Hitlerite plebiscite staged to confirm control of the country by Communists and their stooges, the Obbov and Neikov led Agrarians and Socialists and by the totalitarian minded Zveno. Last minute changes in the electoral law which emphasize once again that Minister of Interior is leaving nothing to chance were announced yesterday. One of these changes states that common list ballots will not be invalidated if the voter scratches any of the names on the list and ballot will be counted for all names printed thereon. Assistant Minister of War General Lekarsky said in a public statement yesterday that “the army is very pleased with the decision of the FF to come out with a common ticket” and that “attempts to put forward separate lists are disrespectful of the memory of those who gave their lives in a patriotic war in support of national unity”. He also said that the Bulgarian soldier of the Peoples Army is writing in blood a new history of Bulgaria on the first page of which the following program is inscribed: “Eternal brotherly alliance with Tito’s Yugoslavia and all other Slavic nations; eternal brotherly alliance with the people of USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) who bring freedom to all enslaved people; unity between people and army; a fighting alliance among all really democratic forces in the country; death to every open or concealed enemy of those slogans and close cooperation with all honest democratic nations to assure peace of the world”. (It would be interesting to have his list of dishonest democratic nations). Also yesterday the Minister for Foreign Affairs 4 replying to a comment by me to the effect that a month still remains during which time the Allies could advise postponement of elections, laughingly made mention of the old proverb about time and tide, adding that it is already too late for the Allies to change matters much. I am sure Dept is fully aware of direct bearing of all the foregoing on questions of recognition and negotiation of a peace treaty which problems presumably are now under active discussion at Potsdam. Surely any govt that might issue from (better to say be confirmed by) a Hitlerite plebiscite would hardly be one to merit our confidence without winning it by a record of fair and honest dealing. I therefore continue to believe the only course of wisdom open to us is the exertion without delay in the interest of the freest possible elections of whatever influence we may possess. As the MinForAff suggested, politics have a characteristic in common with time and tide. Rpd to Moscow as 196. 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 150 of July 28 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2845). 2 i. e., 95 seats for the Communists, 95 for the Agrarians, 46 for the Zveno group, 31 for the Socialists, and 9 for Independents. 3 Not printed. 4 Petko Stainov. No. 818 The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State 864.00/7–2545: Telegram No. 818 The Representative in Hungary ( Schoenfeld ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Budapest , July 25, 1945—6 p.m. 334. Alexander Szent-Iványi, administrative vice president of Citizens Democratic Party, informed me today that Teleki resigned his chairmanship of party yesterday and that for present the three vice presidents will direct party activities pending election of new chairman which may be deferred for some time. Szent-Iványi mentioned that the other parties constituting the coalition remained suspicious of his part[y] but he had good reason to know all except Communists and extreme Left Wing of Peasant and Social Democratic parties were anxious to hold free national election. Members of all parties favoring holding free election were unanimous however that without active support of the Allies in form of what he described as a special electoral commission no free elections could take place in Hungary. He asked me directly whether there was any chance of such commission being instituted to supervise election here. Stating that I could answer question only in general terms, I called attention to significance of Crimea declaration and my surmise that its implementation was now subject of discussion at Potsdam. As to so called electoral commission, I intimated personal opinion that instrumentality for making effective Allied guarantee of free election here already exist[s] in ACC. I also mentioned Acting Secretary Grew’s recent letter to Senator Vandenberg 2 on Polish election as demonstration of our interest in free democratic process in liberated and exsatellite countries. I emphasized as I have done in conversations with other Hungarians that from American standpoint full and frank discussion of political issues has [ is? ] essential part of democratic process and that Hungarian leaders had responsibility not only for guiding Hungarian political activity but also to make their political needs known to Allies in order to facilitate cooperation between representatives of Allied governments on ACC here and constructive elements in Hungarian life. (See my airgram 291. July 18. 3 ) Sent to Dept, repeated to Frankfurt as No. 10. Schoenfeld 1 The same message was sent directly to the Office of the Political Adviser at Frankfurt for transmittal to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg. 2 Document No. 1117 . 3 Not printed. No. 819 The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2645 No. 819 The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal ( Cannon ) to the Director of European Affairs ( Matthews ) 1 [Extract 2 ] [ Babelsberg ,] July 26, 1945. Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . If any of the delegations are willing to accept this text, 3 note that either the British or the Soviet representative will propose a suitable passage to cover Finland. If we accept something along the lines of the foregoing text, the title must be changed. We might propose: Statement on Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary ( and Finland ). Copies of the Soviet proposals [on revising the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania], to which reference is made above have been handed to us here. Translations of these for Hungary and Rumania are attached. 4 We have been informed that the proposals for Bulgaria 5 and Finland are identical with those for Rumania. By way of comment it may be said: 1. Our representatives on the Allied Control Councils as well as the Department, seem to think these proposals give us most of what we wanted. I agree. 2. We have in mind some requests for elucidation as well as some desirable additions. We might submit them to the Soviet Delegation here in the form of a personal letter. Though we could hardly expect a reply here, this would perhaps be better tactics than to start fresh through diplomatic channels. I think we could prepare a statement of these items in a couple of hours. Can we handle here the question of concurrence of the Joint Chiefs? If not, the delay of clearance through the Department might make it too late to get the letter into Soviet hands before the Conference closes. 3. The Soviet proposal for Hungary would give us what purports to be a status of concurrence in decisions of the Allied Control Council, i. e., a fairly full tripartite status in matters of policy at least. In working for revision we should try to obtain this same status as regards Rumania and Bulgaria, thus achieving uniformity in a region where our interests are identical for the three countries, and where the military reasons for a distinction no longer apply. 4. We may have to make some concession from our position of full tripartite participation. The substance of our desiderata would be achieved, however, if we obtain effective consultation prior to the issuance of directives. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. 2 For the portions of this memorandum summarizing the Third Meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, July 26, see ante , p. 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] . 3 The text referred to is the quoted paragraph printed ante , p. 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] . 4 For the attached paper relating to Hungary, see document No. 796 . Concerning the Soviet proposals relating to Rumania, see document No. 797 . 5 See vol. i , document No. 309 . No. 820 The Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2645: Telegram No. 820 The Acting Representative in Rumania ( Melbourne ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Bucharest , July 26, 1945—10 a.m. 504. Soviet officials of the Allied Control Commission on July 24 verbally stated that the program providing for a revised operation of Allied Control Commission as reported in General Schuyler’s War Dept telegram July 16 No M–1250 2 did not apply to this mission (This is 504) with respect to permitting it to determine unilaterally the number of its personnel. Melbourne 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 140 of July 27 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2745). 2 See document No. 797, footnote 3 . No. 821 The Representative in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Acting Secretary of State 864.00/7–2645: Telegram No. 821 The Representative in Hungary ( Schoenfeld ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Budapest , July 26, 1945—11 p.m. 339. Arpad Szakasits[,] President of Social Democratic Party[,] accompanied by Szalai[,] Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee of party[,] called today to explain that prerequisite to smooth transition to democratic processes in Hungary was assurance of work and essential supplies and individual freedom in default of any of which it would be difficult to stem resort to authoritarian rule in this country. They desired assurance that it 2 would use its moral and material power to bring about improved transport conditions and revival of trade in Europe generally and particularly in this area and to exert American influence in behalf of democratic political organization. Szakasits said he deemed it essential on economic side to facilitate transport equipment for Hungary and to remove trade barriers. He noted that notwithstanding sincere effort of Hungarian people as a whole to win confidence of democratic states Hungarians are still being treated as Nazi satellite nation with attendant discrimination by western powers which discouraged our friends. Social Democrats felt it was indispensable that US should take active part in democratic reconstruction in Eastern Europe naturally in harmony with its Allies. He referred to Acting Secretary Grew’s recent letter to Senator Vandenberg on Polish election 3 and to recent editorial in London Times and inquired as to prospects of cooperation among Allies in this area in economic and in political matters. I intimated there was possibility of early attention being given to transport question with view to meeting this essential need. (Urtel 206, July 19 4 ) I assured him US was hopeful of securing cooperation among Allies on general issue of removal of trade barriers. I added US was interested in practical implementation of Crimea Declaration in political matters though I could not predict form it would take but I expressed confidence agreement on such implementation among Allies would result from Potsdam Conference. … He 5 inquired directly whether US proposed to intervene in Hungarian national election when it takes place and whether Soviet garrison would be withdrawn. I answered I had no information as to any such plan but that if Allied supervision of election here were deemed necessary we would expect to have equality in any action taken by Allies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sent Dept repeated to Frankfurt as No. 11 for Matthews. Schoenfeld 1 The same message was sent directly to the Office of the Political Adviser at Frankfurt for transmittal to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg. 2 i. e., the United States. 3 Document No. 1117 . 4 Not printed. 5 i. e., Szakasits. No. 822 The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State 874.00/7–2745: Telegram No. 822 The Representative in Bulgaria ( Barnes ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret us urgent Sofia , July 27, 1945—10 a.m. 385. Next following telegram (386 2 ) is translated text of letter sent yesterday by Nikola Petkov, regularly elected secretary of Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, Asen Stamboliisky regularly elected editor of the union’s newspaper and Georgi Yurdonov, Chief Agrarian Prime Minister [ sic ], with copies to chairmen and members of ACC and to Regents. Document constitutes in effect an appeal to the three principal Allies to assure Allied control over forthcoming elections and application to Bulgaria of Yalta declaration on Liberated Europe. It is the fulfilment of the prediction of Senior Regent Ganev, reported in my telegram No. 382, July 25. 3 The document deals clearly but in an entirely unprovocative manner with every doubtful point in the present political situation. These points have been elaborated on in my recent political telegrams to Department. I belivee that I can say without any reservation whatever that the letter accurately reflects the election views of all democratic currents of opinion in the country; also that the great mass of the Bulgarian people is democratically minded and urgently desires that the elections be held as requested in the letter to the Prime Minister. 4 The “independents” in the present government, such as Finance Minister, Stoyanov, and the Cheshmeddieff Socialists are making common cause with the Agrarian leaders behind the letter and yesterday they and the Petkov Agrarians succeeded in filing joint opposition list of candidates in most of the electoral districts. If yesterday’s appeals or [ for ] the application of the Yalta Declaration to Bulgaria and for Allied control over the forthcoming elections receives the attention at Potsdam that it merits, the Bulgarian political situation should take on a much brighter aspect. I, therefore, urge most strongly that the Department give this appeal its closest attention and that US influence at Potsdam be exerted to the utmost in support of the appeal. The first results of the document are bound to be repressive measures by the Communists acting through the militia. Early encouraging signs of US support should do much to sustain Bulgarian Democrats in the courage which they have at long last found. Repeated to Moscow as No. 199. Barnes 1 The gist of this message was included in two telegrams from Grew to Byrnes: No. 150 of July 28 (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2845) and No. 156 of July 30 (file No. 874.00/7–2745). 2 Document No. 823 . 3 Not printed. 4 Kimon Georgiev. No. 823 The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State 874.00/7–2745: Telegram No. 823 The Representative in Bulgaria ( Barnes ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 plain Sofia , July 27, 1945. 386. Following is Petkov, Stamboliski, Yurdonov letter to Prime Minister (please see my 385 July 26 [ 27 ] 2 ): “The elections which are about to be held in Bulgaria have great historical importance in view of the domestic and international position of this country. In order to justify this importance, however, they should be completely free and democratic and should be conducted in accordance with our constitution and with principles proclaimed at Yalta, in order that they may give the Bulgarian people the opportunity to express their true will regarding their political destiny. The voters [ government? ], fully conscious of the importance of the coming elections, has through the Minister of Interior 3 taken a clear and firm position regarding the complete freedom of the elections and has taken all possible measures to the end that this freedom be fully guaranteed. We nevertheless believe that in view of the present domestic and international position of our country it is not sufficient that the government itself be aware of the absolute necessity of free elections. It is much more important that the voters themselves be imbued with the conviction that the elections will in fact be free and that they will run no risk whatsoever in freely expressing their will as voters. It is no less important that public opinion here and abroad be imbued with this same conviction. At the same time it is no secret that, despite all announcements and expression of goodwill on the part of the government, the Bulgarian voters and foreign public opinion are by no means convinced that the freedom of elections, so authoritatively asserted by the government, will be respected by all. The Bulgarian voter is still under the impression of certain fresh memories of revolutionary excesses and recent evidence of the inadequate discipline of the organs of the militia. He [is] still under the influence of impressions resulting from the present international position of our country, which is as yet place[d] in the position, although in a mild form, of a defeated country. For these reasons we permit ourselves to present to you the following petition: We request that you ask the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria to agree that the elections should be held in Bulgaria under Allied control. Such control, in our view is the logical consequence of our present international position. It also derives from the principles which were proclaimed at Yalta, and which are the responsibility not only of ourselves but also of the great democracies. They, no less than we should be convinced that the elections are in fact free and express true will of people. Moreover, such a control would strengthen the faith of Bulgarian voter that, despite the domestic and international position of our country, the freedom of elections is fully guaranteed. It is possible that the organization of such a control may require the postponement of the elections. In this we see no inconvenience. On the contrary such a postponement would greatly contribute to the freer and fuller expression of the will of the people. It would make it possible for the elections to be held at a time when the Bulgarian voters, the great majority of whom are agricultural workers engaged in the active cultivation of their fields until the middle of October would be able to take a greater part in the pre-election deliberations and in the elections themselves. Such a postponement would also permit a more complete organization of the elections, with a better supply of paper and more time to send out electoral appeals manifestos and so on. It would also provide the government with a further opportunity to improve its discipline, particularly with regard to the militia, and to make the latter, in its entirety and in every one of its organs, a thoroughly prepared instrument, fully subordinated to laws of land. Finally, it would provide an opportunity for the full and definitive reestablishment of the constitutional freedoms, the freedom of speech, of press and of association, without which freedoms no free elections are possible. We hope that this petition of ours, which is justified by international and domestic considerations and which is in full accord with the international and domestic juridical needs of our country, will be given due consideration by you”. Repeated to Moscow as No. 200. Barnes 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 156 of July 30 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 874.00/7–2745). 2 Document No. 822 . 3 Anton Yugov. No. 824 The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2845 No. 824 The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal ( Cannon ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) Berlin Conference , July 28, 1945. Memorandum Subject: Proposed Statutes for ACC for Hungary. The document covered by Colonel Gerhardt’s memo of July 23 1 is a draft of statutes for the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, to replace, for the “second period” of the armistice, the statutes adopted at the time the armistice was negotiated. This matter is in active discussion at the present Conference, on the basis of letters of modifications in the armistice control procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. We understand that Mr. Molotov will present a paper on the subject at the next meeting of the Foreign Secretaries. 2 It is suggested that the SWNCC draft be regarded as superseded by events, or, if that is not administratively practicable, that it be held pending, for revision in the light of the discussions now in course. The State Department could entirely approve this draft. The discussions now taking place indicate, however, that the Soviet Government will probably be unwilling to accept some of these provisions. The Delegation is holding the paper for use in the current negotiations. C. W. Cannon 1 Document No. 809 . 2 See document No. 829 . No. 825 The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2345: Telegram No. 825 The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Rumania ( Melbourne ) secret Washington , July 28, 1945—1 p.m. 378. New procedure for ACC set forth in Genl Schuyler’s M–1250 July 16 1 and your despatch no. 410 July 17 2 is of course definite improvement over that which has been in effect heretofore. Organization of ACC is, however, a question which we regard as requiring agreement of all three Allied Govts signatory to Armistice and not one for determination by Soviet Govt alone. Procedure outlined in M–1250 should therefore be regarded as Soviet proposal rather than as definitely established statutes for ACC for second period. Soviet Govt has proposed for Hungarian ACC procedure whereby directives to local Govt require agreement of three chief reps. As there is still a possibility that tripartite agreement may be reached on application of same principle in Rumania, we think it would be advisable for Genl Schuyler to defer presentation of American views on specific articles of Armistice mentioned in his tel M–1285 July 24 3 (reurtel 495 July 23 4 ) pending results of discussion on basic principles for operation of satellite ACC’s which may be taking place at Potsdam. At such time as interpretation of various articles of Armistice may be discussed in ACC after tripartite agreement has been reached on its organization and procedure, Genl Schuyler should of course feel free to present this Govt’s views when occasion arises. On the six articles mentioned in his M–1285 his views are in general concurred in by Dept. We would not, however, regard any specific protest on Article 7 as called for at the present time since Soviet Govt has several times been apprised of this Govt’s position and matter is under discussion at governmental level as part of question of defining war booty in all ex-enemy countries. Dept approves protests already made by Schuyler under Article 8 on delivery of German-held oil shares and bank stocks (see Schuyler’s M–1264 July 18 and Deptel 372 July 25 5 ). Dept does not wish to dispute at this time claims of Soviet High Command to subsistence for troops in Rumania under Article 10 in view of clear wording of that article and absence of limitation of obligation to period of hostilities. Dept agrees with Genl Schuyler’s interpretation of Article 12, his recommendation on censorship policies under Article 16, and his proposal respecting the return of Rumanian navy. This telegram has been cleared with War Dept. Grew S[amuel] R[eber] 1 See document No. 797, footnote 3 . 2 Document No. 797 . 3 Document No. 812 . 4 Document No. 811 . 5 Neither printed. No. 826 The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2945 No. 826 The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal ( Cannon ) to the Director of European Affairs ( Matthews ) 1 Berlin Conference , July 29, 1945. Memorandum Here are some new items, if the Soviet Government reopens the matter of how well everything is going in the Balkans: 1. When our representative on the ACC in Hungary asked the ACC to approve the entry of 6 newspaper correspondents, he received a reply (June 11) saying: “We cannot agree to workers of this category coming as the present situation in the Allied Control Commission does not contemplate the presence of press correspondents on the territory of Hungary.” ( Note : The foregoing quotation is from the British files, but we have no reason to question its accuracy. I had not seen the text of the letter when I left Washington in June. In any event, the correspondents have not been admitted.) 2. On July 18 General Schuyler, our representative in Rumania asked the Soviet Chairman of the ACC for a minor courtesy (facilities for obtaining coal for a boat to visit the lower Danube). General Susaikov replied that his authority extends no further than Galatz (the first of the places to be visited), though General Schuyler knows that the ACC has representatives at the other places. (War Department tel. M–1296 July 25 2 ). 3. Our representative at Bucharest telegraphs that the Soviet officials on the ACC in Rumania contend that the revised ACC procedure does not permit our mission to decide “unilaterally” the number of its own personnel. 3 This is important, since the Soviet Delegation here insists that the Conference need not take up the matter, because under the revised statutes everything is now wonderful. Note that the language of the Soviet revision of the statutes 4 is unequivocal on this point: “The British and American representatives in the ACC will have the right to determine the numbers and composition of their own missions.” In connection with the foregoing, and with the argument on freedom of the press, it is interesting to have another look at the Soviet paper (see attached) in rejoinder to our paper on Liberated Europe. 5 C. W. Cannon 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 Document No. 815 . 3 See document No. 820 . 4 See the enclosure to document No. 797 . 5 Not attached. See document No. 804 . No. 827 The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State 874.00/7–3045: Telegram No. 827 The Representative in Bulgaria ( Barnes ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret urgent Sofia , July 30, 1945—6 p.m. 399. From the time it has been clear that Prime Minister Georgiev would string along with Communists in their determination to hold general elections on August 26 on basis of united lists I have been trying to satisfy myself as to Prime Minister’s motives other than fact that Zveno is not a real political party and by making common cause with Communists and their Agrarian and Socialists [ sic ] stooges Zveno stands to gain far larger representation (47 seats it now appears) in Parliament than it could otherwise hope to obtain. The nature of Prime Minister’s remarks in stormy Cabinet session provoked by Petkov’s letter (my telegram 393, July 28 2 ) demanding tripartite Allied control of elections has served to confirm me in following estimation of Prime Minister’s view, 1. He detests the British. He believes support given by them at that time to King Boris was largely responsible for his ejection from power early in 1935 and his subsequent imprisonment by King. He ignores fact his head and that of Damian Velchev were saved by British intervention with King. 2. He sees world as largely divided between three great powers and their respective spheres of influence. It is his belief Balkans fall” squarely within Russian sphere. He considers himself too much of a realist to accent [ accept? ] the view that spheres of influence are outmoded and world today is confronted with extremely difficult problem of finding a way by which two such disparate systems as that of western democracies and Russian totalitarianism can live side by side. He cannot be persuaded that estimate of US with respect future possibilities will be determined largely, at least for time being, by whether or not Russia in its policy in eastern and South Eastern Europe will live up to its obligations under Yalta declaration on liberated Europe. Instead he considers the interest of US in what is happening in eastern and South Eastern Europe to be purely platonic and therefore an interest we would be prepared to forego for advantages of a concrete nature in areas which he considers to be American spheres of interest. The fact for example that US supports participation by Russia in matter of Tangier 3 merely means to him that war has brought home to US the importance of Morocco to it, hence United States seeks Russian support in problem of Tangier against British and French policy. To him world wide cooperation in interests of world wide security is a formula designed only to dupe people who react against war and who are not sufficiently realistic to accept his estimate of forces that really shape destiny of world. 3. While a true conservative in his views of the sacredness of private property (otherwise he could never have held highest political office in country) he is a Simon pure totalitarian when it comes to party govt and state control of private initiative. He believes devoutly in one party system for countries such as Bulgaria and he hopes that his support of govt control in the economic field can save for Bulgaria the principle of private property from Communist doctrine. 4. Given the foregoing, it is not unnatural that he should be prepared to go along with Communists who want to take country full way along Soviet road and who will never be content merely with a permanent pro-Soviet orientation of Bulgarian foreign policy. The real struggle in this country between the Communists and democratic currents of opinion is the determination of the former to assure a pro-Soviet foreign policy by a Soviet internal structure whereas the democratic elements accepting as a matter of fact the necessity for a pro-Soviet orientation in foreign policy, do not recognize as a prerequisite to the assurance of such a policy the abandonment of democratic procedures in the internal life of the country. 5. All other things being equal the Prime Minister would probably favor an internal totalitarian structure somewhat different from the Soviet formula but he also believes that something in the nature of the permanent occupation of Bulgaria by Russian forces is foreordained by Russia’s interest in the Straits. Hence his willingness for something in the nature of an avowed marriage between Zveno and the Communists. At yesterday[’]s official opening of the FF (Fatherland Front) electoral campaign he emphasized the need for these two disciplined groups to work together, especially as the Agrarians and the Socialists are embroiled in internal strife. The foregoing estimate explains the Prime Minister’s violence against Petkov at the Cabinet Meeting three days ago. Petkov defended himself against the accusation of treason which was the Prime Minister’s characterization of his demand for tripartite Allied control of elections, by referring to the “hundreds of times” when the Prime Minister had informed the Cabinet that “General Biryusov desired so and so” and by a specific reference to the time when the Communists had had General Biryusov convoke the Cabinet to tell its members “as slaves” that their decision to reintegrate officers and men into the army no matter what their past had been if they were willing to fight against Germany, must be revoked. The Prime Minister replied that Petkov’s sin had not been merely venial but had been a mortal sin because he had distributed copies of his letter to members of the ACC (Allied Control Commission) thus giving the British and Americans an opportunity to intervene between the Bulgarian people and their liberator and proven friend. The Prime Minister added that Petkov would have to answer for his crime before a court of justice. Petkov replied by saying that his resignation was available to the Prime Minister so that the process of his trial might be facilitated by not confronting the court with the problem of trying a Minister of State. The Cabinet session ended with a statement of the Prime Minister that he had taken note of Minister Petkov’s statement, but since then he has not asked Petkov for his resignation in writing. However at yesterday[’]s opening of the FF electoral campaign the four speakers, the Prime Minister[,] Costov the Secretary General of the Communist Party[,] and the Communist stooges Obbov and Neikov, concentrated on making effective the charge of treason against Petkov. Yesterday I picnicked clandestinely in nearby mountains with Petkov and his immediate entourage. Bulgarian political leaders either of the FF or those in opposition to it are very chary of appearing publicly to have any intimate ties with the British or ourselves. I found Petkov still full of courage but very fearful that if no sign is forthcoming from the US and UK and particularly from the US, of favorable reaction to his resistance to FF-rigged elections, the independents such as Stoyanov and the Socialist Chesmedjiev, will waiver [ waver ] in their loyalty to his leadership in this matter. As he said, it is quite impossible to maintain heart in the face of all the pressure that can be brought to bear when all means of public expression are completely controlled by the Communists and Zveno and when at the same time no public encouragement is forthcoming from those countries that declared at Yalta that democratic procedures should be applied to liberated Europe. He told me that he and his associates had been able to file lists of candidates only in 16 of the 23 electoral districts. He said efforts of his followers to file in Varna district had resulted in arrest of over 300 persons. He anticipates that during five day period of delay during which the Govt may change opposition lists, beatings and charges of Fascism will bring about the invalidation of all opposition candidatures except a few which the Govt may desire to maintain in order to sustain argument of the existence of any opposition and therefore that free elections are being offered to the Bulgarian people for the first time in their history. The charge of Fascism against the supporters of Petkov was freely made yesterday by every participant in the opening ceremony of the electoral campaign. I realize that this is a very long telegram on what may quite naturally appear to many in the Dept as a situation very remote from real and active American interests. I report at such length in the hope of still convincing the Dept of the desirability of some public statement or communication to the Bulgarian Govt of our views on the elections and such problems as recognition of Bulgarian Govt and the negotiation of peace with it. I judge that the Russian point of view at Potsdam has been that all is well in Bulgaria and that no need emits [ exists? ] for tripartite control of elections. Zveno and Communists confidently count on the Russians “getting away” with this point of view. If the Russians do, every American in this part of the world will blush for years to come when he meets an honest man. Communist Party Secretary General Kosnov [ Rostov ] yesterday inspired his audience by statement that “if Bulgarian people give FF their confidence and possibility of continuing in power for period of 10 to 15 years that is to say for 2 or 3 five year plan periods there will be factories everywhere, hydroelectric power stations[,] heavy industry[,] greatly developed agriculture and housing projects and city planning such as one has never dreamed of”. I should like to add my own belief that if by general elections on August 26, the Communist Party is permitted to consolidate its hold in this country, Kostov’s promise that “Bulgaria will acquire an entirely new visage” will be realized in terms of months so far as FF opponents and their families are concerned. It is my firm conviction if present totalitarian Govt can later claim to hold office by virtue of general elections the drastic measures on part of the militia and peoples court against the democratic opposition will be as the rehearsal of amateurs compared to the finished performance of a highly professional troupe. Repeated to Moscow as 206. Barnes 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 175 of August 1 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/8–145). 2 Not printed; for the letter referred to, see document No. 823 . 3 See vol. i , documents Nos. 661 , 667 , 675 . No. 828 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 828 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 31, 1945. Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania , Bulgaria , and Hungary U. S. Draft The Three Governments have taken note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased. These proposals include provisions for regular and frequent meetings of the three representatives, improved facilities for British and American representatives, and prior joint consideration of directives. The Three Governments agree that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries will now be undertaken, using as a basis of discussion the above-mentioned proposals, and taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries. 1 Submitted at the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, July 31. See ante , p. 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . It is also referred to as a United States draft in the minutes of the Twelfth Plenary Meeting, August 1. See ante , p. 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] . A copy in the Truman Papers, however, without date and without the subheading “U. S. Draft”, bears the manuscript notation: “Later Committee Proposal”. No. 829 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–3145 No. 829 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg ,] July 31, 1945. Revised Procedure of the Allied Control Commission in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary The Three Governments have noted that the Soviet representatives in the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary have communicated to their colleagues of the United Kingdom and of the United States proposals on the improvement of the work of the Control Commissions when the hostilities in Europe have terminated. The Three Governments have agreed that a revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries will now be made, taking into consideration the interests and the responsibilities of the Three Governments which jointly presented the conditions of the armistice to the respective countries and taking as a basis with respect to all three countries the proposals of the Soviet Government for Hungary, which are enclosed herewith. 2 1 This paper appears to be a Soviet revision of document No. 828 and to have formed the basis of the section of the Protocol on this subject, although the English text of this section of the Protocol used wording from document No. 828 rather than from this translation. See document No. 1383 , section xii ( xi ), and ante , p. 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] . 2 For a translation of the enclosure, see document No. 1383 , annex to section xii ( xi ). No. 830 The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State 874.00/7–3145: Telegram No. 830 The Representative in Bulgaria ( Barnes ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret priority Sofia , July 31, 1945—4 p.m. 401. The FF (Fatherland Front) pack is now in full cry after Petkov. My next following telegram No. 402 1 reports portions of radio speech by Tsola Dragoicheva and text of an editorial in this morning[’]s FF newspaper. The fact that Petkov’s letter was a request of [ to? ] the Prime Minister that he, the Prime Minister, assure freedom of elections by arranging for Tripartite Allied control has of course not been revealed by Petkov’s pursuers and he (Petkov) has no effective means of bringing the nature of the document in question to attention of Bulgarian people. It is just this situation that senior Regent Ganev had in mind when he suggested several days ago that the “Voice of America” in Bulgaria reveal the substance of Petkov’s letter to the Bulgarian people (my telegram 395, July 28 2 [)]. No objective observer here can doubt that lives of Petkov and his leading supporters are in danger. Every friend of democracy in Bulgaria is looking to Potsdam for some sign of hope. Barnes 1 Not printed. 2 Not printed. No. 831 The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Acting Secretary of State 874.00/7–3145: Telegram No. 831 The Representative in Bulgaria ( Barnes ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret us urgent Sofia , July 31, 1945—6 p.m. 403. I have just been told the Prime Minister has informed Regents he has “accepted” Petkov’s resignation and decree confirming Petkov’s departure from Govt has already been signed. I fear in absence of any encouraging signs from Washington, London and Potsdam of Anglo-American interest in Bulgarian election situation Petkov’s “departure” may not be followed, as I had hoped it would be, by resignations of Stoyanov, Cheschmedjieff, Pavlov and Derzhanski. I feel very strongly that time has come whe[n] Dept must tell me what, if anything, the US Govt is really prepared to do about local political and election situation. If for some reason we can not make a stand against measures that will force total disintegration of democratic elements in this country I believe that I and the local leaders who have been resisting the Communists should be told the facts. … Rptd to Moscow as 210. Barnes No. 832 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 874.00/8–145: Telegram No. 832 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] August 1 [1945.] 172. While we realize that during closing stages of conference there may be no opportunity for further consideration of situation in Bulgaria, a series of telegrams just received from Sofia of the same tenor as those summarized in my 156, July 30, 1 as supplemented by further report included in general summary 2 sent you yesterday suggest that Petkov’s appeal to Prime Minister and ACC for allied control of elections may constitute last chance for Western powers to support exercise of democratic procedures in those elections. Barnes now states that Fatherland Front is in full cry after Petkov, that Prime Minister has informed regents he has “accepted” Petkov’s resignation from cabinet, and that he fears in absence of encouraging signs from Washington, London or Potsdam of Anglo-American interest in elections Petkov’s supporters in Government may waver. He adds that every friend of democracy in Bulgaria is looking to Potsdam for some sign of hope. Accordingly, I shall appreciate instructions as to anything which Department in the light of the discussions at Potsdam might tell Barnes for his guidance prior to the election on August 26. Barnes and his British colleague 3 state in connection with British proposal to ask for meeting of ACC for consideration of Petkov’s appeal that they are of the opinion that only effective action US and UK can take would be immediate public declaration and communication to Bulgarian Government to effect that neither government could contemplate official relations and the signing of peace with a Bulgarian government that did not issue from free democratic elections. British representative in Sofia is recommending this course to his Government. [ Grew ] 1 Not printed. This telegram summarized documents Nos. 822 and 823 . 2 Not printed. 3 W. E. Houstoun-Boswall. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 832 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on Allied Control Commission procedures in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1494 [ Pg. 1494 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1511 [ Pg. 1511 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . For the final Conference texts on the conclusion of peace treaties and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania and on freedom of the press in those countries, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . No. 833 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 No. 833 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] August 8, 1945. Berlin Conference Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland Soviet Policy A number of aspects of Soviet policy toward these countries were brought out during the Conference. Stalin indicated that the basic objective of his policy in this regard was to separate these countries permanently from Germany. The first method for accomplishing this aim had of course been the use of force but he felt that if the Allies confined themselves to the use of force alone these countries might ultimately be driven back into the arms of Germany. He therefore maintained that in order to detach these countries permanently from Germany it was necessary to forget thoughts of revenge and to take all appropriate measures to bring these countries into free collaboration with the Allies. As far as their present governments are concerned, the Soviet position was that these governments are “democratic” and are such as to have fulfilled the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Areas. (Light is shed on this characterization by Stalin’s remark that “if a government is not Fascist it is democratic”.) Stalin on one occasion referred to them as “closer to the people” than the present Government of Italy. Molotov maintained that in all these governments the Communist Party formed only a small minority. The Soviets urged at great length that these governments be recognized either at once or in the very near future by the United States and Great Britain. They were unwilling to accord to Italy more favorable treatment in the easing of the armistice terms and other matters than to Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, which they claimed had made a greater contribution to the Allied war effort. The Soviets took the position that it was superfluous and undesirable for the Great Powers either to supervise or to observe the elections in those countries. They stated that the elections in Finland had been “free and unfettered” and that it therefore followed that they would also be so in the other three countries. The Soviets agreed that it was desirable, in view of the termination of the war, to revise the procedures of the Control Commissions in these countries but stated that the proposals which their representatives on these Commissions had just put forward 2 constituted a satisfactory revision. They would not admit that United States and British representatives in these countries had been unduly restricted in the past and in fact Stalin described Churchill’s catalog of their difficulties as “all fairy tales”. The Soviets agreed that termination of the war also would make it possible for Allied press representatives to have greater facilities in these countries but were not willing to take action in this regard beyond the statement contained in the communiqué that the Conference “had no doubt” that these greater facilities would be extended. 3 They were furthermore unwilling to support the same facilities for Allied radio representatives as for Allied press representatives. British Policy The British policy on this question as presented at the Conference was closely parallel to United States policy. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. For the minutes of the discussions summarized in this memorandum, see ante , pp. 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 172–175 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 228–232 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 324–328 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 357–364 [ Pgs. 357–364 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 461–463 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 513–514 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 554–557 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 575–576 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] . 2 See document No. 309, printed in vol. i , and documents Nos. 796 and 797 , ante. 3 See document No. 1384, section x . Use of Allied property for reparations or war booty Use of Allied property for reparations or war booty [834] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) Washington, July 16, 1945—5 p.m. 871.6363/6–2945: Telegram [835] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State Moscow, July 17, 1945—4 p.m. 871.6363/7–1745: Telegram [836] The Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow) and the Acting Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Phelps) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) [Washington,] July 18 [1945.] 740.00119 EW/7–1845: Telegram [837] Proposal by the British Delegation Terminal , 19th July, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1945 [838] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State Moscow, July 19, 1945—midnight. 871.6363/7–1945: Telegram [839] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg, July 22, 1945.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 [840] The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department [Bucharest,] 24 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [841] Proposal by the British Delegation Potsdam , 24th July, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2445 [842] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg, July 25, 1945.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2845 [843] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] 27th July, 1945. 023.1/9–1454 [844] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) Washington, July 28, 1945—1 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2345: Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 834 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) 871.6363/6–2945: Telegram No. 834 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) 1 secret us urgent Washington , July 16, 1945—5 p.m. 1621. Embassy may have received Dept’s Instruction No. 678 of July 2 2 containing purported text Russo-Rumanian economic agreement of May 8 3 summarized in Bucharest’s tel May 17 reported [ repeated? ] to Moscow as 97. 2 Dept’s A–276 June 29 4 contains instructions for protest to Soviet Govt on removal of oil equipment from Rumania and gives general guidance for further discussions with Soviets on petroleum matters. Bucharest’s telegram of July 8 repeated to Moscow as 121 2 indicates possibility of new “fait accompli” based on agreement of May 8. Dept now feels that strong presentation of views of this Govt both about the economic pact and the oil arrangement foreshadowed in Bucharest 121 to you should not be delayed pending receipt of A–276. You are therefore requested immediately inform appropriate Soviet authorities of this Govt’s concern over the possible application of the Russo-Rumanian trade pact in view of the policy of United States Govt of conducting trade with every nation free of discrimination arising from exclusive economic arrangements between nations, and also in view of our common interest in an equitable allocation of products in short supply in reconstruction period during which Soviet presumably wishes United States’ cooperation. Please further inform Soviet authorities that conclusion of any arrangement affecting Rumanian oil or other industries such as indicated in Bucharest 121 July 8 would by same token be of equal concern to this Govt and should be deferred pending forthcoming tripartite discussions. This issue and the principles involved therein are on the United States agenda. With specific reference to petroleum, please point out sacrifices accepted by American people in rationing of fuel oil and gasoline substantially restricting their military, industrial, and civilian consumption and sacrifices accepted by U. S. oil industry in allocation of equipment to the U. S. S. R. You should point out that oil picture in Rumania is only one aspect of a world-wide problem and that conclusion of treaties granting exclusive rights and of monopolistic corporate arrangements between Soviet and Rumanian Governments as well as arbitrary measures such as removing equipment, monopolizing petroleum supplies and delaying entry of American petroleum experts may force the United States to reconsider its policies which have hitherto been so favorable to Soviets with respect to supplying petroleum, technical data, equipment and products. Please inform Harriman. Repeated to Bucharest as 354 of July 16. Grew J[ohn] A. L[oftus] 5 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 43 of July 17 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–1745). 2 Not printed. 3 Signed at Moscow. Text in British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxlix , p. 876. 2 Not printed. 4 Document No. 323, printed in vol. i . 2 Not printed. 5 Loftus’ initials as the official authorizing the dispatch of this message are not in his own handwriting, although he personally initialled the message elsewhere. No. 835 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State 871.6363/7–1745: Telegram No. 835 The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Moscow , July 17, 1945—4 p.m. 2597. By letter to Vyshinski of July 11, British Ambassador 2 stated British Government could not accept Soviet Government views expressed in February 26 Foreign Office note on removal oil field equipment from Rumania. (To Dept, repeated Bucharest 91, London 368) Clark Kerr protested continued Soviet requisitioning and removal British equipment. Kennan 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 65 of July 19 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–1945). 2 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. No. 836 The Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow) and the Acting Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Phelps) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) 740.00119 EW/7–1845: Telegram No. 836 The Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs ( Durbrow ) and the Acting Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Phelps ) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) 1 secret us urgent [ Washington ,] July 18 [1945.] 51. For Collado from Durbrow and Phelps. If subject matter of Department’s document on “American and Russian Economic Relationship in Countries of Eastern Europe” 2 should come up for discussion Department suggests emphasis on three points not made explicit in recommendations: First. Distinction between property wholly or substantially owned by United States nationals, and lesser property interests, is not to be construed as meaning that payment is not to be made for such lesser interests. While we may not be in a position, on the basis of the interests of American nationals, to oppose removals of property in which those nationals have less than a substantial interest, we should state our position so as to avoid any implicit waiver of right to compensation in any case merely because of degree of interest. Second. Our objection to removals of property wholly or substantially owned by our nationals covers removals either as war booty or for reparation. Third. Our right to compensation for value, regardless of size, of interest in property removed in past or future includes removals both as war booty and for reparation. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 Document No. 322, printed in vol. i . No. 837 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1945 No. 837 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 secret P ( Terminal ) 10 The Removal as Booty of Allied Industrial Equipment Especially in Roumania Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation Large sums of British capital are invested in companies producing oil in Roumania. In October, 1944, the Soviet authorities in Roumania removed large quantities of equipment from these British companies and from other Allied-owned companies, on the grounds that it was war booty. 2. The resulting damage to British interests was very considerable. Furthermore, the action taken has reduced the total output of Roumanian oil wells by one million tons a year, at a time of grave oil shortage. As a result, Roumania’s capacity to pay reparations and the revenue earning capacity of British and other Allied capital was diminished. 3. In January, 1945, the Soviet Government agreed to discontinue removals of equipment. But the equipment already removed was not returned, nor did the Soviet Government agree to regard it as deliveries on account of reparations. 4. Further oil equipment was removed from a British-controlled company in April. 5. His Majesty’s Government ask that the equipment which has been removed from these British companies shall be returned as soon as possible. Furthermore, they ask that no further action damaging to these British companies shall be taken by the Soviet authorities, and that the consent of the British representative on the Allied Control Commission in Roumania shall be sought before any action in their regard is undertaken. Terminal , 19th July, 1945. 1 At British request, the subject of this memorandum was placed on the agenda for the Third Plenary Meeting by the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 19. See ante , pp. 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] . No. 838 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State 871.6363/7–1945: Telegram No. 838 The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Moscow , July 19, 1945—midnight. 2634. Letter went forward to Foreign Office in conformity with Department’s 1621, July 16, 2 warning that exclusive Soviet Rumanian trade pact and monopolistic agreements on oil would cause serious concern in United States Government and might compel United States Government to reconsider present favorable oil policy toward USSR. (To Department, repeated Bucharest 94, London 372). Harriman has been informed. Kennan 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 106 of July 23 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2345). 2 Document No. 834 . No. 839 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 No. 839 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg , July 22, 1945.] Use of American Property for Satellite Reparations or “War Booty” 1. The burden of reparation (and “war booty” by broad Soviet definition) should not fall on American nationals. 2. The Soviet Government should make such adjustments in its reparations demands and its economic and trade relationships to insure that the burden of reparation not be shifted to American nationals because of the inability of the satellite to make adequate, effective, and prompt compensation for loss of American property. 3. Capital Equipment. We object to its being removed as reparation, “war booty”, or under any other guise. Loss would accrue to American nationals as a result of destruction of plants and the consequent loss of markets and trading connections. Seizure of American property makes impossible the fulfillment by satellite of its obligation under the armistice to restore intact the rights and interests of the U. S. and its nationals. The United States looks to the U. S. S. R. for the return of any equipment already removed and no further removals. Where such equipment will not or cannot be returned by the U. S. S. R., the U. S. will demand of satellite adequate, effective and prompt compensation to American nationals, and that such compensation have priority equal to that of the reparations payment. These principles apply to all property wholly or substantially owned by American nationals, or to property wholly or substantially owned by Allied nationals in which Americans have an interest. While the U. S. may not be in a position to oppose removals of property in [which] the American as well as the entire Allied interest is less than substantial, adequate, effective, and prompt compensation must nevertheless be made. 4. Current Production—While U. S. cannot oppose reparation out of current production of American investments, the satellite must provide immediate and adequate compensation to the American nationals including sufficient foreign exchange or products so that Americans can ultimately recover reasonable foreign currency expenditures and transfer a reasonable return on their investment. Such compensation must also have equal priority with reparations. 2. [ 5. ] U. S. S. R. should agree not to include [ conclude ] treaties, agreements or arrangements which give to the U. S. S. R. an exclusive or monopolistic position in the trade, raw materials, or industry of these countries, or which deny to American nationals access, on equal terms, to such trade, raw materials and industry; and appropriately to modify existing arrangements which have that effect. 1 The source copy bears the following manuscript notation by Mosely: “Collado July 22, 1945 Potsdam”. No. 840 The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania (Schuyler) to the War Department Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 840 The Chief of the Military Representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania ( Schuyler ) to the War Department [Extract 1 ] secret priority [ Bucharest ,] 24 July 1945. M 1285. … 1. Under Article 7 2 the ACC has required the delivery to Russia as “War Booty” of considerable quantities of industrial equipment including oil pipe, tubing and casing, on the ground that such equipment originated in Germany. I propose to protest that [ the ] application of this policy to any industrial equipment, regardless of its origin, which can be shown to have been actually purchased and paid for prior to 23 August 1944. 3 I am informed that a similar protest has been made to the Soviet Government by the US Ambassador in Moscow. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 For the full text of this message, see document No. 812 . 2 Of the armistice with Rumania signed at Moscow, September 12, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712). 3 i. e., before the surrender of Rumania. 4 W. Averell Harriman. See vol. i , document No. 323 . No. 841 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2445 No. 841 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 secret Removal of Allied Industrial Equipment Especially in Roumania Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Our case can, I think, be stated simply as follows. There are only two articles in the Roumanian Armistice under which property can be removed from Roumania. One of these is Article 11 which provides for the payment of reparations. The Soviet Government do not claim that the oil equipment was removed under this Article, but that it was taken as booty. The second is Article 7, which provides that the Roumanian Government should hand over as “trophies” war material of Germany and her Satellites located on Roumanian territory. (It is clear from Article 1 that Satellites here exclude Roumania). It is clear therefore that the only property which can be claimed as booty is German property or the property of another Satellite of Germany. The question is whether any of the property now in question is German property. The Soviet Delegation have not claimed that any equipment acquired by Allied nationals before the war can be regarded as German property and I cannot understand why this property has not been returned at once without further argument. The more difficult case is that of property acquired by the companies during the war when they were under German management. But even this is clear if we examine it carefully. The companies at the time when they were seized by the Germans had certain assets (money, equipment, oil concessions). When under German management, they parted with some of these assets (money or oil) and received from Germany other assets in return (equipment). Thus the equipment was indubitably the property of the company at the time of liberation. If any British company had on its premises property which clearly belonged to Germany and had merely been deposited there for custody, its removal as booty would of course be justified. As a means of settling this question I now propose that the ownership of the disputed property should be subject to impartial and expert investigation. This might be entrusted to a Committee of three allied nationals drawn from States not interested in this dispute . If the property is found to belong to Germany, we would agree that it should be retained by the Russians. If it is found to belong to one of the British companies the property should be returned by the Soviet Government or compensation paid to the company. Potsdam , 24th July, 1945. 1 Submitted at the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 24. See ante , p. 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . This paper was apparently designated by the British Delegation as P. ( Terminal ) 40 (see post , p. 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 842 and Doc. 843 ] ), although this number does not appear on the source copy. No. 842 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2845 No. 842 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg , July 25, 1945.] Use of Allied Property for Satellite Reparations or “War Trophies” 1. The burden of reparation and “war trophies” should not fall on Allied nationals. 2 2. Capital Equipment —We object to the removal of such Allied property as reparations, “war trophies”, or under any other guise. Loss would accrue to Allied nationals as a result of destruction of plants and the consequent loss of markets and trading connections. Seizure of Allied property makes impossible the fulfillment by the satellite of its obligation under the armistice to restore intact the rights and interests of the Allied Nations and their nationals. The United States looks to the other occupying powers for the return of any equipment already removed and the cessation of removals. Where such equipment will not or cannot be returned, the U. S. will demand of the satellite adequate, effective and prompt compensation to American nationals, and that such compensation have priority equal to that of the reparations payment. These principles apply to all property wholly or substantially owned by Allied nationals. In the event of removals of property in which the American as well as the entire Allied interest is less than substantial, the U. S. expects adequate, effective, and prompt compensation. 3. Current Production —While the U. S. does not oppose reparation out of current production of Allied investments, the satellite must provide immediate and adequate compensation to the Allied nationals including sufficient foreign exchange or products so that they can recover reasonable foreign currency expenditures and transfer a reasonable return on their investment. Such compensation must also have equal priority with reparations. We deem it essential that the satellites not conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which deny to Allied nationals access, on equal terms, to their trade, raw materials and industry; and appropriately modify any existing arrangements which may have that effect. 1 Printed from an undated mimeographed copy. United States Delegation notes on the agenda for the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, July 31 ( ante , p. 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] ), state that this proposal was circulated on July 25. Cf. ante , pp. 545–546 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . The proposal became an annex to the Conference Protocol; see post , p. 1498, footnote 99 [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 1383 ] . 2 A working draft of this proposal (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2845) has the following additional paragraph at this point: “2. We deem it essential that each Allied Government make such adjustments in its reparations demands and its economic and trade relationships to insure that the burden of reparation not be shifted to nationals of other Allies because of the inability of the satellite to make adequate, effective and prompt compensation for the loss of Allied property” This working draft also has minor variations in wording from the proposal as presented. No. 843 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 023.1/9–1454 No. 843 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Translation] [ Babelsberg ,] 27th July, 1945. P. ( Terminal ) 46. Removal of Allied Industrial Equipment Especially in Roumania Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation In its memorandum of the 24th July (P. ( Terminal ) 40) 1 the British Delegation once more raises the question of the legitimacy of the removal by the Soviet Command from Roumania of oil equipment by way of war booty. The Soviet Government has repeatedly explained its point of view on this question and referred to definite facts proving that the oil equipment under discussion, consisting mainly of pipes, is German military equipment and war booty for the Red Army. 2 It should be recalled that beginning as long ago as the summer of 1940, the British Oil Companies and enterprises in Roumania were seized by the Germans and used by them up to the 23rd August, 1944, for supplying the German Army with oil products. In aide-mémoires from the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R. 3 dated the 30th November, 1944, and the 4th January, 1945, full details were already quoted to confirm the above statement nor [ not ] leaving any doubt that the Allied Control Commission in Roumania had in this matter acted in full accord with Article 7 of the Agreement on the Armistice with Roumania and with Article 2 [ B ] of the Protocol [ Annex ] to this Agreement. There is, therefore, at the present time, no need to expound the Soviet point of view on this question. As to the suggestion contained in the British Memorandum of the 24th July to instruct a committee, consisting of three persons who are citizens of Allied countries, to investigate the problem as to whether these pipes were British or German property, the Soviet Delegation considers the reference of this problem to a joint examination by Soviet representatives and British representatives in respect of oil equipment and pipes removed from the territory of the enterprises with the participation of British capital to be more useful. The Soviet representatives, together with the British representatives, could examine the facts and documents which could be presented to the British party. 1 Document No. 841 . 2 See ante , pp. 234–236 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] . 3 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. No. 844 The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) 740.00119 Control (Rumania)/7–2345: Telegram No. 844 The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Rumania ( Melbourne ) [Extract 1 ] secret Washington , July 28, 1945—1 p.m. 378. … . . . . . . . . … On the six articles mentioned in his 2 M–1285 3 his views are in general concurred in by Dept. We would not, however, regard any specific protest on Article 7 as called for at the present time since Soviet Govt has several times been apprised of this Govt’s position and matter is under discussion at governmental level as part of question of defining war booty in all ex-enemy countries. … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grew S[amuel] R[eber] 1 For the full text of this message, see document No. 825 . 2 i. e., Brigadier General Schuyler’s. 3 See documents Nos. 812 and 840 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol, see post , pages 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1497–1498 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] . Control of external assets Control of external assets [845] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) Washington, July 19, 1945—5 p.m. 800.515/7–1445: Telegram [846] The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/8–245 [847] The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) and the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) Babelsberg, August 2, 1945. 800.515/8–245: Telegram No. 845 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) 800.515/7–1445: Telegram No. 845 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) secret priority Washington , July 19, 1945—5 p.m. 1641. Dept forwarding memo 1 to Collado, Potsdam, discussing entire problem freezing satellites (reurtel 2570 Jul 14, repeated to London as 360, 2 and related cables) and suggesting desirability discussion Russian authorities. Dept continues to feel total freeze desirable in view administrative difficulties which will undoubtedly be encountered if neutrals are requested to freeze on partial basis. Matter will be held in abeyance pending reply. Sent to Moscow, repeated to London and Stockholm. Grew C[ovey] T. O[liver] 1 Not found. 2 Document No. 326, printed in vol. i . No. 846 The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) 740.00119 Potsdam/8–245 No. 846 The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar ( Molotov ) 1 top secret [Undated.] Memorandum for the Soviet Foreign Minister The Government of the United States, as you are aware, has during the course of the war in Europe conducted a campaign of economic warfare largely directed against German holdings in the neutral countries A large part of this campaign has been the effort to uncover German assets concealed in the names of neutrals, and in the accounts of satellite countries or their nationals. During the past year, efforts have particularly been made to isolate and preserve such assets. As my Government has informed your Government, it is proposed to request neutral countries to block assets of countries which were formerly German occupied and of their nationals. The long period of German domination of such countries makes it certain that substantial German assets are concealed in such accounts. Moreover, my Government’s long experience with methods of economic warfare and economic controls leads it to believe that only through the census which would accompany such blocking can full disclosure of concealed funds be accomplished. It is also felt, based on experience both at home and abroad, that the line of demarcation between governmental and private assets, which your Government has proposed, 2 is not feasible from an administrative viewpoint. On the other hand, my Government recognizes the validity of the point which has been made by your Government 2 that the Governments of the ex-satellite nations, having declared war on Germany, should have sufficient assets at their disposal. My Government therefore proposes to take the following steps: 1) My Government will request the neutral Governments immediately to block all assets belonging to Bulgaria, Hungary or Rumania, or to their nationals. 2) At the same time, the neutrals will be requested to institute a census of such assets, with appropriate penalties for failure to make full disclosure. 3) The neutrals will be requested to make the results of such census available to the Allied Governments. 4) The results of the census will be made available, when obtained by my Government, to the Allied Control Council [ Commission ] having jurisdiction in the particular ex-satellite nation. 5) My Government will stress, in requesting such blocking, that a general license should be granted to approved agents of the ex-satellite countries to operate governmental accounts in the neutral countries for such purposes as may be approved by the relevant Allied Governments. Reports on any transactions undertaken under such general licenses will be required. 6) In accordance with its usual practice in all matters of economic warfare (such as the administration of the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals 3 ) my Government will concert in this matter with the British Government before making representations to the neutral Governments. It is believed that this procedure will benefit all of the Allied Nations, will help to attain economic security, and will eliminate a dangerous loophole in present controls, while at the same time giving full weight to the expressed desire of your Government (in which my Government concurs) to allow full scope to legitimate operations of the authorized and approved representatives of the ex-satellite countries. In accordance with what is understood to be the desire of your Government, no request to block governmental assets of Finland will be made to any of the neutral countries. A copy of this memorandum has been handed to the British Foreign Secretary. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. A copy of this memorandum was given to Bevin. See document No. 847 . 2 See document No. 325, printed in vol. i . 2 See document No. 325, printed in vol. i . 3 Concerning the Proclaimed List, see Green H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940–1944), vol. vii , pp. 654–656. No. 847 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) and the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) 800.515/8–245: Telegram No. 847 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) and the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Rubin ) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Oliver ) 1 secret Babelsberg , August 2, 1945. Victory 479. To Acting Secretary of State for Oliver from Collado and Rubin. Repeated to AmEmbassy Moscow. For your information memo has been delivered to Molotov with copy to Bevin stating our feeling that all Rumanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian assets in neutral countries should be blocked, on grounds that otherwise blocking of private assets is ineffective, that licenses issued to authorized representative can permit approved governments to use their foreign funds, and that complete census (and blocking) is necessary to uncover German assets. 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Byrnes. Germany: Germany: [879] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945. 9.00110 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [880] The Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Washington,] July 25 [1945.] 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2345: Telegram [881] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State Berlin, July 28, 1945. Pauley Files [882] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [883] The Secretary of State and the Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President [Undated.] Truman Papers [884] The President to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington [Babelsberg], July 29, 1945. Department of the Army Files [885] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2945 [886] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [887] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [888] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg, July 30, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [889] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 31, 1945. Pauley Files [890] The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Babelsberg,] August 1, 1945. 800.515/7–545 [891] The United States Representatives on the Economic Subcommittee to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] August 1 [1945]—1:00 p.m. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [[Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [892] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) London, August 16, 1945—5 p.m. 862.50/8–1645: Telegram Contents Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period (Documents 848-878) Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period [848] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg, July 16, 1945.] 740.00119 EW/7–1645 [849] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State Potsdam , 17 July 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1745 [850] The Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council, Germany (Heath) to the Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) [Babelsberg?], July 17, 1945. Frankfurt USPolAd Files—800 Germany [851] Memorandum by Major Harold Zink, of the Political Division, United States Group, Control Council, Germany [Undated.] 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2645 [852] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg, July 17, 1945.] Truman Papers [853] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 18, 1945. Pauley Files [854] The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Secretary of State [Babelsberg, July 18, 1945.] 800.515/7–545 [855] Memorandum by the Central Secretariat [Washington,] July 18, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1745 [856] Report by the Subcommittee on German Political Questions [Babelsberg, July 19, 1945.] Truman Papers [857] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 19, 1945. Pauley Files [858] Texts Considered by the Economic Subcommittee [Babelsberg, July 19, 1945.] Frankfurt USPolAd Files—600 Berlin Conference [859] Draft of Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Undated.] Pauley Files [860] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] Pauley Piles [861] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 20, 1945. Pauley Files [862] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 20, 1945. Pauley Files [863] Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Babelsberg, July 20, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [864] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] Pauley Files [865] The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) Washington [Babelsberg], 20 July 1945. 800.515/7–2045 [866] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Department of State Babelsberg, July 21, 1945. 840.50 unrra/7–2145: Telegram [867] The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State Frankfurt [sic], July 21, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2145 [868] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference [869] The Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany (Clay) to the Secretary of State Berlin, 21 July 1945. Department of the Army Files [870] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2145 [871] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President Berlin , 22 July 1945. 840.50/7–2445 [872] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg, July 23, 1945.] Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference [873] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg, July 23, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [874] The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) [Babelsberg,] July 23, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–2345 [875] Proposal by the British Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [876] United States Delegation Working Paper [?] [Undated.] Pauley Files [877] The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) and the Acting Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs (Reinstein) Babelsberg, [July 23, 1945.] 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2345: Telegram [878] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 23, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–2345 No. 848 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 EW/7–1645 No. 848 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg , July 16, 1945.] Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period 1. The authority of the Control Council to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole shall be paramount in Germany, and those plans and decisions shall be carried out in each zone of occupation by the national Commander-in-Chief concerned. 2. In its work the Control Council will be guided by the Crimea Declaration, 2 by the Declaration of June 5, 1945, on the Defeat of Germany, 3 and by the provisions of the Agreement on Additional Requirements 4 which is in the final stage of negotiation in the European Advisory Commission. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief will apply the additional agreed political and economic principles set forth below in this Agreement. Political Principles 3. War criminals, including those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes, shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders and influential Nazi supporters and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned. 4. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Those Germans who are permitted to remain in, or are appointed to, official posts (e. g. in the police or the administration) should understand that they hold office only during good behavior. 5. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the development of democratic ideas. 6. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end: (i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany through elective councils. (ii) anti-Nazi political parties together with freedom of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany. (iii) Representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state ( Land ) administration as rapidly as results of local self-government seem to warrant. (iv) For the time being no central German Political Government shall be established. 7. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted. The Control Council will supervise the dissemination of public information in Germany. 8. The Commander-in-Chief will assure the representatives of United Nations and neutral news-gathering agencies all reasonable facilities for the collection and transmission of news material. Economic Principles 5 9. The German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present, excessive concentration of economic power. To the extent required for carrying out the purposes set forth herein, the Control Council shall permit or secure the establishment of central controls. 10. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls, German authorities shall to the fullest extent practicable be ordered to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. 11. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only as may be necessary: ( a ) to carry out programs of military and industrial disarmament; ( b ) to carry out programs of reparation and rehabilitation of devastated areas; ( c ) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to prevent starvation, disease or civil unrest; ( d ) to ensure the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones; 12. The production of arms, ammunition and implements of war, including all types of aircraft and ocean-going ships, shall be prohibited and prevented, and specialized facilities for the manufacture of these articles shall be held for removal or destruction. Production of synthetic oil and rubber, and of aluminum and magnesium shall also be prohibited and the productive facilities held for removal or destruction. Production of other metals, chemicals (including synthetic nitrogen) and machinery shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to minimum, peacetime needs. Excess facilities shall be held for removal or destruction. 13. The principles agreed upon or under negotiation in the Reparation Commission at Moscow to govern the exaction of reparations from Germany are set forth in Annex 1 6 to this agreement. 14. 7 To secure the fulfillment of immediate economic objectives, the Control Council will undertake the formulation and prompt execution of uniform programs in the following fields: a ). Development of exports for the purpose of (i) Meeting a reparation program as formulated by the Reparations Commission. (ii) Meeting urgent external needs for relief and reconstruction. (iii) Providing means of payment for Germany’s minimum imports. Immediate attention should be given to the export of coal and to transfers of railroad rolling stock and live stock for purposes of reparation and economic restoration of Allied countries. b ). Formulation of a single program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole and determination of basis for sharing procurement and financing responsibility. c ). Establishment of machinery to assure equitable distribution of available supplies within Germany. d ). Establishment of uniform ration scales within Germany. e ). Formulation of immediate steps to secure adequate agricultural and coal output, essential repair of internal transport and emergency repair of housing, electric power and other utilities. f ). Formulation of initial measures for curtailment of metal, chemical and machinery industries to conform to minimum, peacetime needs, and elimination of selected, key industries in these fields. g ). Uniform regulation and control of currency, credit and public finance. 8 h ). Uniform controls of Germany’s international frontiers and recording of movements of persons and goods. i ). Integrated controls and operation of transport and communications. 15. The Control Council is charged with the practical implementation of the basic policies agreed between the occupying powers in the agreements listed in Article 2 above and in the present agreement. The Commander[s]-in-Chief will refer to their respective governments any proposals for modifications of or additions to the basic principles and objectives set forth herein. 16. This agreement does not apply to Austria. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy which bears the following manuscript notation by Mosely: “Prepared July 16, 1945, P E M[osely] and E. Despres Potsdam.” In an “Index of Attachments to Summary of the Negotiations in the Economic Sub-Committee” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145), the same text—except that paragraph 11 reads, “Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy to the extent necessary:”—is identified as follows: “Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period—text by Clayton, Collado, Mosely and Despres—not used.” Cf. appendix A to document No. 327, printed in vol. i , and document No. 852 , post . 2 See document No. 1417, section ii . 3 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649. 4 See the accompaniment to document No. 1038 . 5 This is an interpolated manuscript heading on the source copy. 6 No annex to this draft has been found. For the annex to the United States proposal as introduced on July 17, see document No. 894 . 7 In a variant working draft of this paragraph (renumbered 15), the preliminary language and subparagraph (a) read as follows: “15. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end, the Control Council will promptly formulate programs in the following fields: “(a) Development of exports for the purpose of “(i) Providing means of payment for Germany’s minimum imports, “(ii) Meeting a reparation program as formulated by the Reparations Commission. “Immediate attention should be given to the export of coal from Germany.” 8 In the variant draft referred to in the preceding footnote, this subparagraph has the following additional phrase: “(including customs)”. The next subparagraph is omitted from the variant draft, and the final subparagraph in that draft is therefore lettered ( h ). No. 849 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1745 No. 849 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the Secretary of State top secret Dear Mr. Secretary [:] I am enclosing herewith the original and a copy for your files of a memorandum to the President relating to the problem of the administration of Germany. This is the memorandum referred to in my note 1 delivered to you yesterday evening. At your earliest convenience I would very much like to see the President with you about this memorandum and the memorandum on Japan 2 sent to you yesterday. Faithfully yours, Henry L Stimson Potsdam , 17 July 1945. [Enclosure] The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President 3 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 16 July 1945. Memorandum for the President The matters with which I am primarily concerned, namely the administration of Germany and the conduct of the war with Japan, are, upon analysis, inextricably related to the general problem of post war rehabilitation and the achievement of the strategic aims for which we have been fighting. the condition of central europe We have occupied Germany following a devastating conquest which has laid waste wide areas of middle Europe, extending from France to well within the boundaries of Russia, and extending from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Mediterranean. Germany, which has been responsible for loosing the forces which resulted in the two World Wars, is herself laid waste and is in the geographical center of the area of devastation. This area in the main was a highly industrialized one, its industrialization being evidenced by the number of large and prosperous cities within it. All who have visited Germany and the portions of Poland and Russia overrun by the war, testify to the great destruction visited upon those cities. Almost without exception, cities large and small have been torn by explosives of greater power than have been developed in any previous wars. It may be true, as was stated before the Kilgore Committee of the Senate, 4 that many of the plants could, with industry, be restored or set in motion with relatively little or no repair. But there is a great difference between the mere physical existence of a plant and its capacity to operate as a going concern. That capacity has been destroyed, at least temporarily, by the destruction of the means of communication to and from the plant, and by the general collapse following defeat. A paralysis of commerce has set in due to the lack of transportation, raw materials, and the means of trade. This paralysis is not limited to Germany, but may grip all western Europe as well. As occupiers of portions of this area, we shall have many serious administrative problems to cope with, problems which will be greatly accentuated by lack of food and fuel. For this reason alone it should be our policy to make it possible for the people we control to work, and thus relieve us to the maximum possible extent of the burden of their idleness and want. I take it that all our objectives are included in one fundamental purpose—the achievement of security and peace under conditions which preserve to us our concepts of liberty. While it is our object to disarm Germany, it should not be our purpose to make it impossible for the German people to live and work. We should not remove their capacity for aiding in the restoration of stable conditions in Europe and the world. On the one hand it is clear that Germany has created, and twice misused, a swollen war industry—one substantially beyond her peaceful needs, and even though this capacity has been greatly impaired by defeat, certain physical steps can and should be taken to hamper the regrowth of her industrial capacity to more than reasonable peacetime needs. On the other hand from the point of view of general European recovery it seems even more important that the area again be made useful and productive. Considering Germany alone, the figures show that the commerce of Europe was very largely predicated upon her industry. There was a period, substantially before the war, when Germany became the largest source of supply to ten European countries—viz. Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria, and the second largest supplier of Great Britain, Belgium and France. At the same time she became the best customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, and the second best of Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark. Germany, according to estimates we now have, will continue to have about the same number of people she had before the war, and they will have to be fed, clothed, and housed in some manner. Of her approximately 70,000,000 people (including Austria), about 25,000,000 have been supported by industrial rather than agricultural activity. England and France, at the moment, do not have sufficient production to take care of their own needs by a long measure. There will be a scarcity of products which will plague all Europe for a substantial period to come, and the effects of it are bound to be felt by the other countries of the world. The problem which presents itself therefore is how to render Germany harmless as a potential aggressor, and at the same time enable her to play her part in the necessary rehabilitation of Europe. the impracticability of destroying german industry It is my view that it would be foolish, dangerous and provocative of future wars to adopt a program calling for the major destruction of Germany’s industry and resources. Not only would any reasonable prospect for the reestablishment of European industry be dissipated by such action, but such destruction would be bound to leave a focus of economic and political infection which might well destroy all hope we have of encouraging democratic thinking and practices in Europe. What elements of German industry can be destroyed or removed as unnecessary for peacetime needs is a matter of [ for? ] expert determination. The balance must be put to work as soon as practicable and subjected to some system of security control. It is a task requiring perseverance, application and intelligence over a long period of time, but I am certain that mere destruction is neither effective as a security measure, nor, in the light of European, including German needs, possible as an economic one. The need of all Europe includes the prompt stimulation of production within Germany, of food, coal, clothing, and housing. Production of these items is not capable of independent development. It must be based on other items and services, in short, general industry and trade. Without freedom of internal trade and communication, no one of these items can be produced on the scale which will be required. It follows that we cannot afford to operate Germany as if she were four separate water tight compartments. recommendations Accordingly, as a first step, I would urge the adoption by the Great Powers at the Conference of a policy which would treat Germany as an economic unit so as to permit her to contribute to her own and to general European rehabilitation. To this end I would urge that the three Powers instruct their representatives in the Control Council to adopt a uniform policy in respect to such matters of nation-wide importance as transportation and communication, rationing and control of critical prices. I would urge that the Control Council also be instructed to adopt a uniform currency and a uniform fiscal and taxation system. They should also be instructed to decree a free exchange of commodities and persons, (subject to feeding and housing limitations) between the zones, and the full recognition of the principle that the cost of any imports shall be a first charge against any exports. And at the same time, in order to accomplish the future security, I would urge that the Control Council be instructed to: ( a ) Institute a system of control over imports and exports which will eliminate the importation of any article not clearly needed for peacetime necessities and commerce. ( b ) Decentralize the political authority of the Germans, giving encouragement to the local administrative units, and by the popular selection of local administrators through free but Nazi-purged elections. For the time being there should be no central political government of Germany other than the Control Council itself acting through such German administrators as it cares to select. ( c ) Completely abolish the German General Staff and submit a plan whereby the world may be assured that neither it, nor anything like it, will again become a factor in the government of Germany. ( d ) Determine and report the extent to which German industrial activity may safely be resumed, considering (1) rehabilitation needs, and (2) the necessity of reducing Germany’s overdeveloped war making powers. The above are not all-inclusive, but I believe they are essential and would constitute a good common start toward achieving the economic and strategic objectives which we seek. I assume of course, that the process of punishment of war criminals will, in coordination with the Control Council[,] be prosecuted vigorously. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Henry L Stimson 1 Document No. 1236 . 2 See documents Nos. 732 , 1212 , 1236 , and 1274 . 3 The following extracts from Stimson’s diary refer to the genesis and use of this memorandum: “[July 16:] I spent the morning with McCloy and Bundy in drafting the papers in re Manchuria [see document No. 1212 ], the problem of Germany, and third, the answer to the proposition of the State Department on the Ruhr, viz: protectorate by France, Belgium, and Holland, and a total excision of the Ruhr from Germany. … “[July 17:] I went to the ‘White House’ for a conference with Byrnes early in the morning. … I then discussed with him the papers on Germany which had been united into one paper. I very briefly outlined our position taken in the paper, but emphasized the danger of trouble which would come from the territorial excision and the denationalization of the German population of the Ruhr, pointing out that it was entirely against the historical tendency of the evolution towards nationalism which had taken place for the past one hundred and fifty years in Europe, and I contrasted this with the wiser territorial results reached in the Treaty of Versailles. Later I heard through the grapevine and McCloy that the State Department proposition had been practically abandoned. …” The “State Department proposition” referred to was presumably document No. 1021 . While the position advanced in that paper was certainly discussed among the Department of State officials who were members of the Delegation, such a position never became the official Department of State position, as the extracts quoted above might seem to imply. 4 i. e., the Subcommittee on War Mobilization Problems of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs (79th Congress, 1st Session). The hearings referred to are printed under the caption, Elimination of German Resources for War (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1945–1946). Cf. A Program for German Economic and Industrial Disarmament: A Study Submitted by the Foreign Economic Administration ( Enemy Branch ) to the Subcommittee on War Mobilization of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, April 1946 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946; Senate Subcommittee monograph No. 6, 79th Congress, 2d Session). 5 For the concluding section of this memorandum, see document No. 1022 . No. 850 The Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council, Germany (Heath) to the Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) Frankfurt USPolAd Files—800 Germany No. 850 The Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council, Germany ( Heath ) to the Political Adviser in Germany ( Murphy ) [ Babelsberg ?], July 17, 1945. Memorandum Attached is the memorandum which you directed the Division 1 to prepare on “Problems with which we are or may be confronted in the US Zone and in Germany as a whole”. I don’t think the paper is in the Division’s best vein. Some of the problems mentioned are small or are on their way to solution and some of the policy guidance asked for in the memorandum will be supplied as a result of the Conference, at least if the American thesis is accepted. I have tried my hand at a new document, a rough draft of which is attached for your consideration. Don [ ald R. Heath ] [Enclosure 1 2 ] [ Political Problems ] There follows a list of the principal problems with which we are or may shortly be confronted in the U. S. Zone or in Germany as a whole for the solution of which high level decisions or policy guidance is needed. 1. The problem of the large numbers of Nazis who have been or shortly will be removed from public office and important positions in private enterprise . Should they be interned, put in labor camps, or be allowed to remain at large? 2. The problem of political decentralization . As the Political Division sees it the problem of decentralization of the German governmental structure is that of re-establishing a federal government utilizing as federal units the historical Länder and provinces. The problem is not great in the American Zone. Bavaria is a natural unit of a German federation and lies entirely within the American Zone. Württemberg is another historic unit, the difficulty in this case being that a large part of the Land of Württemberg is in the French Zone. It is to be noted that it will later be possible to recast the zones to bring Württemberg entirely within one zone. The same is true of the state of Baden, the northern part of which located in the American Zone should be reunited with the southern part and the whole Land placed within the French Zone, possibly in return for restoration of the southern part of Württemberg to our zone. On the other hand Hessen, Hessen-Nassau, and the newly created province of Kur-Hessen might well be combined into one Land. The problem is more acute and complex in the British Zone where there are several small political divisions which are too small to serve as proper units in a refederalized Germany. In the Russian Zone there is the problem of dividing Prussia and restoring some of the old states which Prussia absorbed in its long history of aggression. The problem of federalization or refederalization of Germany is a complex one which cannot be solved without further experience in military government and very considerable study. The question arises whether we should not at an early meeting of the Control Council if not at the present Conference seek a declaration in favor of eventual reconstitution of Germany as a federalized state. When J. C. S. 1067 3 was submitted to the EAC we put forward our position as favoring decentralization. Decentralization is a rather vague term. “Federation” and “federalization” are much more precise. Why cannot we strive at this conference to obtain clear agreement on a federalized Germany with Prussia dismembered into appropriate political units? 3. The problem of the organization of relations between the Control Council governing Germany and allied and neutral states . Should a declaration be issued by the Control Council announcing that it is de facto the Government of Germany? Should the Control Council notify neutral states of this announcement and request the return to Germany of the German diplomatic and consular personnel? Should Allied and neutral states be invited to accredit small missions (military or civilian or both) to the Control Council? Should the Control Council confine its relations to [ with? ] other governments to such missions as may be accredited to it or should it, in certain cases, be permitted to communicate with other governments through one or all of the diplomatic missions of the four powers in other countries? 4. The problem of uniformity in the information services of the zones . We are at present in our zone proceeding from the phase of operation and control by American authority to operation by licensed Germans under American control. The essential problem now is one of consultation and agreement with the British, Soviets and French on a uniform information and operation policy for all of Germany. How shall official news originating inside Germany be distributed outside Germany? Will a new German press service be established? It is understood that an attempt will be made at this Conference to reach uniform policy regarding the movement and activities of accredited correspondents in and between their respective zones. 5. The problem of the resettlement of stateless persons and nonrepatriables in Germany . The German laws which deprived many Germans of their German citizenship have been revoked. Must these persons undertake some positive action on their own part to re-establish their claim to German citizenship? If not, by what process is their citizenship to be restored? What provision is to be made for those persons who do not wish to re-assume German citizenship? 6. The problem of the protection of American property interests . Estimates place the total value of pre-war American investments in industry and other property in Germany at some $1,200,000,000. The present custodianship of American and other foreign property in the American Zone is vested in the Property Control Branch of the Reparations, Deliveries and Restitution Division. As its authority is restricted to the American Zone, the Property Control Branch will be required to establish cooperative relations with corresponding agencies of the other three Occupying Powers for the control of American Property in their respective Zones. Effective steps towards this end, however, can be taken only after the Control Council has started normal operations. Because of the large scope and complexity of the subject, a certain amount of time will be required for developing definitive policies in all their details and organizing necessary administrative machinery for the effective protection of American property interests. A considerable portion—figures not available at this writing—of American investments in Germany are located in the Russian Zone. The question arises whether at this Conference we should not intimate very clearly to the Russians that we expect protection of American investments in the Russian Zone. A preliminary list of principal direct investments in the Russian Zone could be prepared in a short time. Economic Problems 7. Trade and Travel . It is understood that the problem of the movement of goods and persons between the four zones and the problem of German exports, particularly in relation to reparation policy will be studied and discussed during the Conference. 8. The problem of coal and food . The problem of coal and food during the next twelve months is probably the leading economic problem facing the Military Government in the separate zones, and in Germany as a whole. It is less acute in the Russian Zone and, as regards food, most acute in the British Zone. There is full realization of the gravity of the problem of providing food and fuel and adequate attention is being given to the problem in the British and American Zones at least. 9. The problem of inflation . Intimately related to the problem of maximum production of food in Germany to prevent hunger and dangerous political disorder is that of inflation. At this Conference and at [an] early meeting of the Control Council effective agreement should be reached as to the establishment of a functioning central banking machinery and monetary system. 10. The problem of quadripartite action to vest or freeze Germany’s external assets . Will a special agency be established within ACC to handle developments? [Enclosure 2] secret [ Babelsberg ?], July 16, 1945. Memorandum 4 Subject: Problems with which we are or may be confronted in the US zone and in Germany as a whole. I. Economic Problems See the attached statement prepared by Mr. Tuthill of the Economics Branch of the Political Division. II. General Political Problems 1. How soon and to what extent shall political party organizations be permitted ( a ) locally, and ( b ) on a provincial, zonal or national basis? How far shall we accept those political parties already permitted by the Soviets to exist in our sector of Berlin, or those formed in the Soviet zone on a “national” basis? It would seem that the problem of policy toward political activities must be worked out by the Control Council at the national level, as otherwise there may be such divergencies of attitude as to create a serious divisive factor. 2. To what extent should exiled German political and trade union figures be brought back into Germany with our support and assistance? This question applies equally to cases in which we might bring such persons back to serve in appointive positions and to cases in which they might wish to come back “on their own” to engage in political activities. 3. What policy should be adopted toward the large numbers of Nazis removed from office and those who will be removed from office and private enterprise in the future? Should they be interned, put in labor camps, or be allowed to remain at large? 4. The original directives called for the removal of all Nazis from public office and leading positions. These have now been modified so that only active Nazis or Nazi sympathizers are to be removed. These two policies are being applied in various parts of the American Zone, and in other zones, with varying degrees of thoroughness. To what extent, if any, should the policy be reviewed, with the object of allowing somewhat greater discretion in areas where it seems almost impossible to find qualified persons for public or private positions who were not members of the Nazi Party? 5. To what extent should former provinces or Lander be combined into larger areas (with specific reference to the recent proposal to form one Land out of the Western Military District of the US Zone 5 )? 6. How are the relations between the Control Council and Allied and neutral states to be organized. Should a declaration be issued by the Control Council announcing that it is de facto the Government of Germany? Should the Control Council notify neutral states of this announcement and request the return to Germany of the German diplomatic and consular personnel? Should Allied and neutral states be invited to accredit missions (military or civilian or both) to the Control Council? Should the Control Council confine its relations to [ with? ] other governments to such missions as may be accredited to it or should it, in certain cases, be permitted to communicate with other governments through one or all of the diplomatic missions of the four powers in other countries? 7. Should the British and American elements of former SHAEF missions be dissolved? Could not the American Military Governor make use of American military attaches in our established diplomatic missions, in place of the American element of the former SHAEF special missions? In such case could the Military Governor issue instructions directly to such diplomatic missions (military attaches) or would he have to transmit instructions via the War and State Departments? This question applies likewise to cases in which the Control Council might wish to issue instructions to the diplomatic missions of the four powers in any given capital. 8. As the situation has developed, does the policy of non-fraternization, in its present limited status, serve any useful purpose politically? III. Archives and Interrogations 1. Arrangements must be made for us to have access to documents held in the British Zone. The British are already operating jointly with us on documents held in the American Zone. 2. To what extent and under what reciprocal conditions are the Soviets and French to have access to the American-British document centers in the US Zone? Specifically, when and how shall Foreign Office archives at Marburg be made available to the Soviet authorities? 3. Will the State Department make available adequate, properly briefed and experienced special personnel to carry out a program of interrogations of persons detained at Ashcan , Dustbin , Ministerial Control Center (Kassel), the Seventh Army Interrogation Center (Augsburg) and elsewhere? IV. Information Services 1. We are at present in our zone proceeding from the phase of operation and control by American authority to operation by licensed Germans under American control. The essential problem now is one of consultation and agreement with the British, Soviets and French on a uniform information and operation policy for all of Germany. 2. In the field of press relations, the principal problem is to reach agreement with the other three powers on a uniform policy regarding the movement and activities of accredited correspondents in and between the respective zones. 3. How shall official news originating inside Germany be distributed outside Germany? Will a new German press service be established? 4. Should we persist in our present policy of “austerity” in our radio broadcasts, or should our programs include more music and other features, making them of much the same kind and quality as programs in the US? V. Displaced Persons 1. What plans have been formulated or policies adopted looking toward the resettlement of stateless persons and non-repatriables in Germany? 2. The German laws which deprived many Germans of their German citizenship have been revoked. Must these persons undertake some positive action on their own part to re-establish their claim to German citizenship? If not, by what process is their citizenship to be restored? What provision is to be made for those persons who do not wish to re-assume German citizenship? VI. Protection of American Property Interests See attached statement prepared by Mr. Redecker, 6 which furnishes certain information on this subject. VII. War Crimes, German Prisoners of War and United Nations Prisoners of War See attached three statements 7 prepared by Mr. Buhrman which furnish certain background material on these subjects. [Subenclosure 1] [ Babelsberg ?], July 14, 1945. Some Economic Problems of Immediate Interest to the Economics Branch of the Political Division Note : This is not an attempt to list all German economic policy matters that will require attention. For example, it is assumed that the following general problems will be discussed: 1. The movement of goods and persons between the four zones. 2. The question whether SHAEF and Russian laws and directives will be compared and coordinated with the objective of issuing Control Council laws covering all of Germany. 3. The role of various agencies and committees, such as ( a ) the London Group—ECO, EECE, etc., ( b ) the Reparations Committee (Moscow) and ( c ) those in Western Germany such as CRAB. (The Control Council will have to be given clearer authority and implementing powers if major economic policies and decisions are to rest with it.) Other matters that should be discussed are: A. Trade and Reparations 1. Assuming that exports will be used to obtain sufficient foreign exchange to pay for essential imports, what machinery will be established to handle the transfer problem involved? 2. Is it possible to obtain a statement on reparations policy that will indicate the time schedule ( a ) of removing heavy machinery and ( b ) supplying raw materials, finished goods and labor? 3. Can Russia be induced to make Austrian, Hungarian, or Rumanian oil available to our zones in Austria and Germany? B. Labor 1. Assuming that Allied demands for reparations labor will be supplied by active Nazis and ardent Nazi sympathizers, how soon can this policy be made effective? 2. Is formal international judgment that the NSDAP, SS, SA, etc., are criminal in purpose to be a prerequisite for the removal of their members from Germany for reparations labor? 3. What is the current agreed policy on trade union activities involving organized meetings, collection of dues, publications, and posters? Should the Works Council Law of 1920 be restored? C. Finance 1. What form will quadripartite action take regarding vesting or freezing German external assets? Will a special agency be established, within ACC, to handle developments? 2. What is the position regarding German debts to neutrals and how is this related to Question 1? 3. What banking and accounting procedure will be established on a quadripartite basis to allow effective operation of one currency for all of Germany? 4. Can, at least, a functional central banking machinery be established? If so, what are the agreed objectives of inflation controls, servicing of public debt and possible currency conversion? D. Industry 1. What quadripartite action is possible in order to take over management of combines ( Farben ) and aimed ultimately at dissolving cartels and dispersing combines? 2. Assuming quadripartite agreement on denazification policy, can an agreed public statement be prepared emphasizing unanimous determination to use anti-Nazi workers and businessmen to help root out Nazis in industry? 3. Can Combined Resources Allocation Board be broadened or abandoned in order to obtain Russian participation? 4. Coal a. Will Russia participate in ECO? b. How can the Russians be induced to make the hard coal from German and Polish Silesia and the brown coal fields of Central Germany available for minimum essential needs for all of Germany, as well as for export subject to ACC policies? J[ ohn ] W[ ills ] T[ uthill ] [Subenclosure 4] The Status of German Prisoners of War or Disarmed Enemy Forces as Related to the Political Division of US Group CC The handling of German prisoners of war or disarmed enemy personnel is the responsibility of the Demobilization Branch of Army Ground Division, US Group CC. Our relation to the problem entails keeping the State Department informed and acting in an advisory capacity as to our treaty relations. According to the report of this division as of June 16, 1945 the total number of prisoners of war or disarmed enemy personnel originally held by the United States, Britain and France was 7,500,000. Of this number approximately 1,200,000 had been discharged by the United States as of June 18, 1945. No figures are available as to other discharges. The principal problem in relation to this body of disarmed enemy personnel is to effect their discharge and distribution to meet not only the labor requirements in Germany itself but those of allied countries which have specific claims for German reparation labor. According to these demands the United Kingdom requires 250,000 men, France a maximum of 2,000,000, Belgium 45,000, Norway 25,000. The labor demands of Russia and other United Nations countries are not yet known. Disarmed persons still in United Nations Western European hands who will be discharged and returned to what is now known as the Russian Zone of Occupation number 2,520,000, while those who were originally domiciled at [ in ] East Prussia are estimated at 360,000. P[ arker ] W B[ uhrman ] 1 i. e., the Political Division, United States Group, Control Council (Germany). 2 This memorandum is in rough form. Manuscript corrections and revisions have been made as indicated on the original. 3 J. C. S. 1067 was the first in a series of drafts and papers produced during the development of the directive to the Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany, regarding the military government of Germany (text in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 143 ). The directive was finally issued in May 1945 (see Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 596). 4 By Perry Laukhuff. Printed from an unsigned copy. 5 See vol. i , document No. 340 . 6 Not printed. 7 Two of these statements are not printed. No. 851 Memorandum by Major Harold Zink, of the Political Division, United States Group, Control Council, Germany 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2645 No. 851 Memorandum by Major Harold Zink, of the Political Division, United States Group, Control Council, Germany 1 secret [Undated.] German Governmental Structure section i. general policy 1. It is highly desirable that the process of reestablishing a German governmental structure be undertaken with great care and after adequate planning. The experience of American Military Government in Germany following 1918 as officially set forth in the Hunt Report 2 clearly indicates the great peril of proceeding on the basis of expediency and inadequate knowledge. Colonel Hunt concluded that the lack of a policy founded on a thorough analysis of the complicated factors involved resulted in many weaknesses which seriously and permanently vitiated the effectiveness of American Military Government in Germany and led to the playing of American, British, and French occupation forces against each other by the Germans. 2. During tactical operations military expediency must necessarily receive high priority in military government; during the post-hostility period long range objectives should determine action except in special emergencies. In setting up a German governmental structure it would be short-sighted to follow the line of least resistance or to be guided by such considerations as a slight economy of military government personnel or the convenience of dealing with a minimum number of German officials. The main objective is to prevent a recurrence of such international menaces as German militarism and National Socialism. The setting up of an adequate German governmental structure has an important bearing on the above objective. 3. Steps taken to set up a German governmental system should be directed to the maximum extent toward the establishment of a structure which will be democratic in character and lasting in effect. Unless Military Government can create a German governmental system which embodies democratic principles and is so well founded that it will be retained by the Germans after the occupation has ended it will have failed in its fundamental mission. 4. Though the setting up of a satisfactory German governmental structure requires the elimination of Nazi agencies and ideology, it is not necessary to ignore the system which has developed in Germany over several centuries. The scrapping of all established machinery and units would in all probability lead to a chaos which would not only enormously complicate the problems of military government but defeat its primary objective. Insofar as possible and unless there are compelling reasons otherwise the general governmental system based on the Gemeinde–Kreis–Regierungsbezirk–Land/Provinz and the existing boundaries of the various units should be retained. In any country it is dangerous to ignore the experience of the past; in Germany where even the Nazis found it impossible to eradicate traditional governmental units such as the Lander , blind disregard of established governmental units would lead to endless difficulties and serve no useful purpose. 5. In those instances in which a change in boundaries of German governmental units is contemplated, careful regard must be given to the cultural, language, religious, geographical, economic, transportation, and related factors involved. Disregard of these factors would lead to the setting up of artificial units with little chance of permanent success. The subsequent failure of such units might cause serious problems in the future, thus jeopardizing the primary objective of Military Government. 6. Many of the objectionable features of German government in the past have been largely due to extreme centralization. The Nazis carried an already highly centralized governmental system to a point where they controlled virtually every aspect of human activity. The JCS 1067 series 3 directs that the German governmental system be decentralized and that local responsibility be developed. “Autonomy in regional, local and municipal agencies of German administrative” [ administration ] is to be encouraged. The primary objective of Military Government depends in no small measure on the carrying of this mandate into effect. The promotion of democratic principles requires the restoration and even the strengthening of the old self-government authority of the Landkreise, Stadtkreise , and Gemeinde . Vitality must be reinfused into the Lander . At the same time decentralization must not be interpreted so literally that it renders impossible reasonably effective provisions for public health, public safety, public welfare, housing, collection of statistics, etc. 7. Though there are fundamental differences distinguishing the Germans of Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg, for example, from their fellow-countrymen in Westphalia, Hanover, Oldenburg, and Hamburg the overriding factors make for a single German state rather than for separatism. Small groups on the Czechoslovak, French, Dutch, and other borders favor separation from Germany and union with the nearby countries. Other small groups desire to restore dynasties to ruling authority. Certain individuals have placed themselves on record as supporting the setting up of an independent Bavaria, Rhine Republic, Saar State, etc. However, there is slight evidence at present of any widespread support among the German population for the dividing up of the Reich into a number of independent countries. Nor is there any very compelling argument for separatism from the long range Military Government viewpoint, though a case can be made on the basis of possible expediency. In general, it does not appear to be realistic to expect a separatist movement of large proportions among the Germans. A separatism imposed by Military Government would bring in its wake the lack of popular support, the probable impermanence, and the many other difficulties usually attendant upon such artificial creations. 8. With decentralization mandatory and separatism unlikely to have wide support, a federal type of German governmental structure seems to offer the greatest promise of achieving the primary Military Government objective. Under such a system functions such as food supply, railroad administration, PTT, issuance of currency and eventually the conduct of foreign relations would be handled by a Reich government while the major part of governmental authority would be exercised at the Land/Provinz level. The Länder/Provinzen would in turn provide a maximum of autonomy at the Kreis-Gemeinde levels in accordance with JCS 1067. 9. In any federal system likely to prove effective certain basic modifications in the Lander must be undertaken. While it is not essential or indeed desirable that all Länder be uniform in area and population, it is of the highest importance that Prussia be broken up into a number of smaller units. A single Land (Prussia) which contains more than half of the area (321,787 sq. km.) and population (45,328, 118 in 1939) of the entire German Reich cannot be fitted into any vital federal system of government. On the other hand but distinctly less important is the problem presented by very small Lander , such as Schaumburg–Lippe with 53, 159 inhabitants in 1939, Lippe with a population of 187,220, and Anhalt with 431,422 people, which are too tiny to exercise in any very satisfactory manner the functions of really effective Lander . Though JCS 1067 directs decentralization and it is undesirable otherwise to engage in any considerable general fusion of Länder , there are strong arguments for considering the possibility of eliminating the separate identity of Lander with fewer than one million inhabitants. section ii. governmental levels 10. Reich . Under the Nazi Regime virtually all governmental functions were centralized at the Reich level. The early military government planning was based on the assumption that the machinery at this level would be in operation at least to some extent when the Allies took over. Consequently plans were drawn for the continued operation of agencies other than those to be scrapped as Nazi creations. The fact that no central government agencies were functioning when Germany capitulated makes it necessary to reconstitute those ministries which it is desired to reestablish. While it is desirable to set up a fragmentary Reich government at an early date because of the pressing problems of food, coal, transportation, and possibly a few other items, there seems no good reason to proceed immediately to the establishment of an elaborate general system of Reich government. Executive and legislative branches clearly must be delayed until the early period of Military Government has passed. The setting up of administrative departments should depend upon the needs as revealed by developments. The principle of establishing ministries only after it has been decided that there are necessary functions to be performed in the immediate future might well be followed. In setting up ministries the same principle of functional necessity might wisely be followed in the case of subdivisions. Any other course would not only provide unnecessary machinery but complicate and even jeopardize the process of substituting a federal system of government for the old highly centralized machinery. 11. Länder . Under a federal system substantial authority will be vested in the Lander , though this should not go so far as to transfer to the Lander the entire body of power formerly exercised by the Reich. Under the Nazis the Länder [became primarily administrative units of the Reich and their former machinery of government 4 ] was deprived of any considerable responsibility. It is of first-rate importance that the Länder be restored to a position of vitality and influence. On the other hand it is not desirable to give too far reaching authority to them, since such a system, though easier to supervise and of great appeal to those who are primarily impressed by immediate effectiveness, would prevent the autonomy specified in JCS 1067 and make impossible the local responsibility so necessary for educating the German people in democratic techniques. 12. Provinzen . With Prussia broken up both because of the zone lines and the necessity of ending its predominance, some provision must be made for the Provinzen . Most of them can be transformed into Länder with little difficulty. Others can be joined together into Lander . Hessen–Nassau, the only Prussian area involved in the American Zone[,] has already been given the status of a Land. 13. Regierungsbezirke . There has been some desire to abolish these units of government which have recently functioned only in Prussia and Bavaria. However, the experience of Military Government in Bavaria as well as in certain Provinzen indicates that Regierungsbezirke occupy a very necessary place in the governmental system in those Länder where the population and area are large. In Bavaria with approximately 150 Landkreise and more than 20 Stadtkreise some intermediate unit is essential between the Land government and the local governments. In those Länder with populations not exceeding two million inhabitants, such a unit is probably not necessary inasmuch as such Länder are themselves about the [same] size as Regierungsbezirke in Bavaria and Prussia. The Regierungsbezirke require the necessary authority to carry out those services which cannot be handled at the local level, but care should be taken that they do not assume complete control over the Kreise and Gemeinden , thus eliminating the very important self-government functions of the latter. 14. Local Governments . The Landkreise, Stadtkreise and Gemeinden have the closest contacts with the people of Germany. Under the Stein Reform 5 they were to be given a large measure of control over so-called “self-government functions” and in many instances developed standards which were admired even outside of Germany. Though a start was made in the direction of placing German local government on a democratic basis the process was not permitted to continue far. Under the Nazis the remaining vestiges of local freedom disappeared and local government became very largely the creature of the Reich. The Landkreise, Stadtkreise , and Gemeinden during recent years have been little more than administrative units, though in theory the sphere of “self government” authority has been maintained. A major objective of Military Government calls for the reconstituting of German local government on the basis of as much local autonomy as is consonant with a reasonably effective handling of problems. The most promising method of training the Germans in democracy is to give them a large measure of responsibility in conducting their own local affairs. It is important that the emphasis should not be solely on the most efficient system of controls, the greatest economy of funds or personnel, the easiest way for MG officers to supervise (though these are of course not to be disregarded), for these are immediate matters. Relative inefficiency is tolerable, indeed desirable, if democratic experience can be provided. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to believe that full local autonomy is feasible in this age of complicated problems. Moreover, the helplessness engendered by extreme centralization exhibited by many local officials makes some measure of higher supervision essential, especially during the immediate future. Food rationing, coal supply, public health, and other related problems cannot possibly be left to the local units. However, local public works, public safety, recreation, welfare, housing and education are fields in which every effort should be made to promote local responsibility and interest. Considerable leeway should be feasible in administering local finances. 15. Special Districts . The Nazis gave great impetus to a movement already underway in Germany which provided special districts for the handling of various functions. Finance, labor, food rationing and production, economic matters, PTT, transportation, and a number of other governmental functions were removed from the traditional government units and administered on the basis of special districts which were by no means unified in boundaries. The result was an enormously complicated system which few citizens could be expected to keep in mind. Decentralization and the accompanying emphasis on the promotion of democracy require the fusion of most of those special districts with the regular units of government. Such a step will strengthen the Länder and local units of government, make it easier for the people to know their governmental system, and obviate some of the duplication and waste which naturally accompany such an elaborate structure. PTT and railroad districts may be exceptions to the rule since they depend upon transportation facilities which may have little relation to Länder boundaries. A case can obviously be made for the maintenance of all of these special districts, but overall considerations of simplification and democratization call for fusing them into the Land/Regierungsbezirk/Kreis system. [ section ] iii. miscellaneous 16. Executive Agency . Executives subject to strict MG control have in general been installed by Military Government up to and including the Land level. Until the reconstituting process has been carefully observed and found satisfactory in operation, including the establishment of such Reich ministerial machinery as is necessary, it is not intended that a Reich executive agency shall be set up. The Control Council will act as an executive at the Reich level. In the past German executives have been appointed, except in a few instances such as Bürgermeister in Württemberg for a brief period. This system is in general probably better adapted to Germany than an elective one, but a provision under which Bürgermeister in Gemeinden, Oberbürgermeister in Stadtkreise , and Landräte in Landkreise would be popularly elected after elections are permitted might contribute to the building up of local responsibility for government. In any case the selection of anti-Fascists with adequate professional qualifications, strong personal characteristics, and not too advanced in years is of the greatest importance. 17. Legislative Bodies . Legislative bodies either ceased to exist entirely or became powerless under the Nazi system. During the early period of Military Government no elected legislative bodies can be permitted, but advisory bodies should be established at least on the local level. When elections are authorized, legislative bodies should be first organized in the Kreise and Gemeinden . Then the provision should be extended to the Regierungsbezirke and Lander . Only after it has been decided that a general Reich government is desirable should a provision be made for a national legislative body. In setting up legislative bodies every attempt should be made to endow them with definite authority which will permit a large measure of freedom in matters relating to their respective units of government. 18. Courts . Military Government plans call for the reestablishment of German courts beginning with the Amtsgerichte as soon as conditions permit and satisfactory personnel are available. Numerous Amtsgerichte have already been reopened as well as a small number of Landgerichte . Higher courts should be provided as rapidly as conditions warrant. Lower administrative courts should be reconstituted as soon as the necessary personnel can be screened. The numerous special courts which under the Nazis made the German judicial system excessively complicated should be eliminated in large measure from the court system. 19. Civil Service . The German Civil Service is probably the oldest and one of the largest, if not the largest, in the world. During the years 1933–1945 severe pressure led the majority of the civil servants to become at least nominal members of the NSDAP. Civil servants with Nazi allegiance will be removed and disqualified insofar as they hold executive or policy-determining positions. While wide attention has been given to the denazification of the Civil Service, comparatively little has been heard of an equally serious problem involving the bureaucratic and anti-democratic traditions of civil servants, especially in the higher and middle classes. There is substantial evidence that the attitude of the civil servants was an important contributing factor in the scuttling of the Weimar Republic. Military government may have to make immediate use of those civil servants who pass the Nazi vetting test irrespective of their lack of sympathy with democratic traditions, but it would be a very short-sighted policy to continue these civil servants in position indefinitely on the basis of their technical qualifications, at least insofar as they are employed in those departments having political character, where the opportunities to sabotage the democratic achievements of Allied Military Government at a critical moment are unsurpassed. Vigorous effort should be made in the direction of setting up training programs for new civil servants which will be free from the pernicious emphasis of bureaucracy. Special titles and perquisites which set the civil servant apart and serve as foundations of the bureaucratic system should be eliminated. The civil service system which had been completely nationalized, even to local government employees, should be reconstituted on a Land basis, giving reasonable leeway to the local units in handling their own personnel problems. 20. Military Government Control . Allied Military Government must assume responsibility for the supervision of German government indefinitely. As and when this control is ended, it should follow the procedure of giving full responsibility to the Germans on the Kreise and Gemeinden levels first. If that proves satisfactory, controls may be removed at the Regierungsbezirk level. Military Government control at both the Land and Reich levels must be continued throughout the occupation. In exercising control Military Government should work primarily through a single German official, i. e. Minister President of a Land, Regierungsprdsident of a Regierungsbezirk, Landrat of a Landkreis, Oberbürgermeister of a Stadtkreis , or Bürgermeister of a Gemeinde , holding this official strictly responsible for the entire performance of the government unit concerned. This does not mean that no contact can be had with other German officials, but if control responsibility is subdivided it will inevitably lead to evasion of final accountability by the Germans and thus cause confusion and unsatisfactory performance. Military Government officials cannot expect to exercise adequate control unless they spend much of their time in the field, observing at first hand the operations of the German governments they supervise. 21. Elections . Elections are not contemplated during the initial period of Military Government. However, as soon as Military Government experience at the Gemeinde and Kreis levels indicates that German government has reached a point where elective councils can function to advantage local elections should be authorized. Appointive advisory councils should in the meantime precede such a step. As developments at the local level demonstrate that the German people can properly be entrusted with responsibility, the election process should be extended to Regierungsbezirk councils and then to the Landtage . National elections must be postponed until such a time as it is decided to establish a full Reich government with executive and legislative powers. 22. Political Parties . The JCS 1067 series provides that “no political activities of any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized by” the Commanding General of the U. S. Forces. This has properly been construed to ban political parties during the initial period of occupation. There is fairly extensive evidence of a desire on the part of a limited number of former Social Democrats, Democrats, Centrists and other Middle and slightly Rightist groups to become active as political parties. Communists are more insistent on their resumption of political activity. Anti-fascist groups tending to be dominated by Communists though including in their numbers representatives of middle and left center ideologies are to be encountered in many urban sections. A limited amount of freedom should be given to political parties, especially on the local level, as soon as the German governmental system has developed sufficient stability. If this arrangement works out greater leeway should be given and activities should be permitted on a Land level. Authorization of national political organizations would depend upon the decision to authorize a Reich legislative body. It is highly desirable that the number of political parties be reduced sharply below that which characterized the Weimar Republic, inasmuch as a multiplicity of parties contributed in no small way to the weakness of that government and would in all probability have a similar effect in the future. It would not be feasible for Military Government to set an arbitrary limit on the number of political parties in Germany, for any such provision would not only be difficult to enforce but lead to an undesirable artificiality. However, encouragement insofar as may be possible should be given by Military Government to a system under which there would be two or three major political parties. 1 Printed from the final text as transmitted to the Secretary of State by Murphy as an enclosure to despatch No. 699, dated July 26. This text has only minor variations from a draft forwarded by Murphy on July 17 to James W. Riddleberger, Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs, then at Babelsberg, for use in connection with the discussions taking place at the Berlin Conference, except that the draft given to Riddleberger (file No. 862.00/7–1745) did not contain paragraphs 21 and 22, 2 American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943). 3 “The JCS 1067 series” refers to a draft directive to the Commander in Chief, United States Forces of Occupation in Germany, regarding the military government of Germany circulated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as J. C. S. 1067 (text in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 143 ), and to subsequent drafts and papers on this subject produced during the development of the directive as finally issued in May 1945 (see Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 596). 4 The passage in brackets has been supplied from the draft forwarded to Biddleberger by Murphy. 5 For details concerning the “Stein Reform”, see J. R. Seeley, Life and Times of Stein, or Germany and Prussia in the Napoleonic Age (Cambridge, 1878), and Guy Stanton Ford, Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia, 1807–1815 (Princeton, 1922). No. 852 Proposal by the United States Delegation Truman Papers No. 852 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg , July 17, 1945.] Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period Authority of the Control Council 1. The authority of the Control Council to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions on the chief military, political, economic and other questions affecting Germany as a whole shall be paramount in Germany, and those plans and decisions shall be carried out in each zone of occupation by the national Commander-in-Chief concerned. In matters exclusively affecting his own zone, each national Commander-in-Chief shall exercise supreme authority in accordance with directives received from his own government. 2 Political Principles 2. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:— (i) The complete disarmament of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:— ( a ) The German armed forces, including the General Staff and all para-military organizations, shall be demobilized as soon as practicable and disbanded in such manner as permanently to prevent their revival or reorganization; and ( b ) all arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be seized or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented. (ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable. (iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militaristic activity or propaganda. (iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. 3. Nazi laws which proved [ provided ] the basis of the Hitler regime or which establish discriminations or [ on ] grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated. 3 4. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders and influential Nazi supporters and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned. 5. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Those Germans who are permitted to remain in, or are appointed to, official posts (e. g. in the police or the administration) should understand that they hold office only during good behaviour. 4 6. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the development of democratic ideas. 7. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end: (i) Local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany through elective councils. 5 (ii) Non-Nazi political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany. (iii) Representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state ( Land ) administration as rapidly as results of local self-government seem to warrant. (iv) For the time being no Central German Political 6 Government shall be established. 8. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, 7 and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted. Economic Principles 9. The German economy shall be decentralized, except that to the extent required for carrying out the purposes set forth herein, the Control Council shall permit or secure the establishment of central controls. 10. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls, German authorities shall to the fullest extent practicable be ordered to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in those controls will rest with themselves and their own authorities. Any German controls which run counter to the objectives of occupation will be abolished. 11. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only as may be necessary:— ( a ) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparations, of relief for liberated areas and of other supplies as may be notified; ( b ) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to prevent starvation, disease or civil unrest; ( c ) to ensure the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones; ( d ) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein. For the same purpose no extension of credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign person or Government shall be permitted, except in special emergencies on notice to the Control Council which shall have power to prohibit such transactions. 12. The principles governing the exaction of reparations from Germany are set forth in Annex I 8 to this agreement. 13. During the period of occupation, Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end:— (i) No barriers should be erected to the movement of goods and services which are required for ( a ) the maintenance of occupying forces and displaced persons, and ( b )the maintenance of a subsistence standard of living in Germany, and ( c ) subject to the requirements of ( a ) and ( b ) above, the discharge of Germany’s reparation obligations. (ii) To the fullest extent possible there shall be uniform ration scales throughout Germany. (iii) To the fullest extent possible there shall be uniform policies for industry and agriculture throughout Germany. (iv) There shall be programs for imports 9 and exports for Germany as a whole. (v) There shall be agreed programs on German coal production and allocation. (vi) There shall be centralized organization of transport. (vii) There shall be established a centralized control of currency. 14. This agreement does not apply to Austria. 1 Attachment 2 to the minutes of the First Plenary Meeting, July 17. See ante , p. 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . This document bears the following typed notation: “Handed in by President at first Plenary Meeting of Heads of State, July 17 but not read.” 2 Dunn’s copy of document No. 214 (see vol. i ) has the following marginal note in his handwriting opposite this paragraph: “go back to original language in CC machinery”. See ante , p. 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . 3 Byrnes made the following shorthand entry in the margin of his copy of document No. 214 opposite this paragraph: “In addition to the measures already adopted, all Fascist laws as well as all Fascist decrees, orders [instruments should be] abolished as [directed] against democratic liberties, civil rights and the interest of the German people.” See ante , p. 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . 4 In Byrnes’ and Dunn’s copies of document No. 214 the final sentence of this paragraph has been stricken. See ante , p. 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . 5 In Dunn’s copy of document No. 214 , the words “at the discretion of CC” have been added in his handwriting to this subparagraph, and the following manuscript notation by Dunn has been made in the margin: “unless it interferes with other zones”. See ante , pp. 74–75 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . 6 In Byrnes’ and Dunn’s copies of document No. 214 , the word “Political” has been stricken. See ante , pp. 74–75 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . 7 In Dunn’s copy of document No. 214 , the following marginal entry in his handwriting is indicated for insertion at this point: “and any existing restrictions will be progressively relaxed”. See ante , p. 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . 8 Printed as document No. 894 . 9 In a variant copy of this paper, endorsed “‘Boat’ draft less ‘restitution’ the parenthetical phrase “(See Annex n)” has been stricken from the draft at this point. For the text of the annex referred to, see vol. i , document No. 348 . No. 853 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 853 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 18, 1945. Memorandum to Ambassador Pauley In accordance with your instructions, your staff has reviewed the “Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period” 2 and respectfully submits the following comments and suggestions: Appendix A: 3 (I) Insert the following at the beginning of the first sentence: “Subject to the policies and provisions of any Agreements entered into between the Governments of the USSR, UK, and USA, …” 4 (11) ( b ) The terms “starvation, disease and civil unrest” are noted. Under this, the area commander may in his own discretion maintain any plants that he may desire. This is broad power. ( d ) The only financing that should be permitted should be incident to exports which are required for approved imports. Otherwise, our policy that exports should be a first charge against imports, would be undermined. (13) Sentence should be amended by insertion of clause as indicated by underscoring: 5 “During the period of occupation, the German Reich as its boundaries existed on December 31, 1987 , shall be treated as a single economic unit.” 1 Prepared by Pauley’s staff at Babelsberg. 2 Document No. 852 . 3 Document No. 852 was originally appendix A to part 3 of document No. 214 (see vol. i ) . 4 Ellipsis in the original. 5 Here represented by italics. No. 854 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Secretary of State 800.515/7–545 No. 854 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) and the Secretary of State [ Babelsberg , July 18, 1945.] War Department Responsibility for German Interim Financing 1. On July 5 the Secretary transmitted a memorandum 1 to the President, a copy of which is attached, outlining policy agreed in Washington for U. S. participation in German interim financing. The short annex 2 included in the German political and economic policy directive put forward yesterday by the President 3 follows this line exactly. 2. It is essential that responsibility be clearly fixed upon one U. S. Agency for all U. S. financing with respect to all imports into Germany for which the Government of the United States assumes responsibility. The memorandum of July 5 recommends that the responsibility be placed upon the War Department. 3. No reply has been received from the President. Since problems relating to responsibility for financing certain types of imports into the U. S. Zone have already arisen, and the necessity for handling the United States’ share of any combined financing should soon arise if the President’s proposals are adopted, it is important that an early decision be sought. E[ milio ] G C[ ollado ] 4 1 document No. 346, printed in vol. i . 2 document No. 348, printed in vol. i . 3 The reference is to document No. 852 , which Truman introduced at the First Plenary Meeting, July 17. See ante , p. 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . Collado’s memorandum is the only indication found that the United States Delegation paper entitled “German Import Program” (see vol. i , document No. 348 ) was annexed to the proposal put forward by Truman at that meeting. 4 On the original Collado’s initials appear at the head of the memorandum. No. 855 Memorandum by the Central Secretariat 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1745 No. 855 Memorandum by the Central Secretariat 1 top secret SC–145 b [ Washington ,] July 18, 1945. Proposed Communication to the Secretary at the Berlin Meeting on the Objective of the United States Government in the Occupation of Germany There is attached a redraft of the proposed communication to the Secretary on the objective of the United States Government in the occupation of Germany. This redraft has been prepared by Mr. MacLeish in the light of comments in the meetings of the Staff Committee on July 16 and July 17. 2 [Annex] 3 Subject: Objective of the United States Government in the Occupation of Germany (1) The Allied purpose with respect to the future of Germany was stated in the communiqué issued at the close of the Crimea Conference as being “to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world”. 4 (2) This objective was to be achieved by the unconditional surrender of Germany and its occupation by the Allied armies which would apply certain measures of control, political, economic, and social. The achievement of the objective by the destruction of the German people was never considered as a possibility. Even the partition of Germany was rejected. Reliance was put upon the occupation as the means of attaining the end in view. (3) Programs of occupation have been developed by the Allied governments, but their relation to the overall purpose “to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world” has not been defined. It is essential to the successful administration of any program or programs of occupation ultimately approved that their relation to the end purpose should be clearly understood by those responsible for their direction. (4) It is sometimes assumed that the occupation of Germany will remove the German threat to the peace of the world solely by destroying the German war potential. It is undoubtedly true that certain measures contemplated will deprive Germany not only of existing arms but of the materials and machines necessary to the waging of modern war. It is highly improbable, however, that the occupation will deprive Germany permanently of the material means of waging war, since it is highly doubtful that the occupation itself will be permanent. (5) An illustrative parallel can be drawn between the treatment of Germany and the treatment of individual criminals in modern penal institutions. It is well-known to penologists that, although numerous criminals are condemned to prison for life, and even for terms beyond life expectancy, few such criminals ever die in prison. The violence of the public demand for severe punishment declines rapidly as time passes, and life-term convicts are commonly released, at first under parole and then completely, after fifteen to eighteen years. There are already signs that the violence of the demand for German punishment is subsiding, and it is highly improbable that Allied occupation of Germany—at least American occupation—can be continued beyond the period of a few years. (6) Furthermore, the principal war potential of Germany is not German industry or German raw materials. The principal war potential of Germany is the German people whose industrial and scientific aptitude and whose docility in accepting military and social discipline have been demonstrated over a considerable period of time. Since the destruction of the German people is not thinkable, and since it is unlikely, not to say inconceivable, that the German people will be kept under permanent control and surveillance from without, it would follow that the Allies cannot put their sole or even their principal reliance, for the achievement of their over-all purpose, on the destruction of the material means of making war. (7) Over and above their reliance upon the destruction of the material means of waging war, the Allies will be obliged to attempt to bring about a change in the attitude toward war of the German people. If we are not prepared to destroy the German people, and if we are not prepared to police the German people permanently, we must attempt to change the German people in such a way that the German nation, when finally freed of occupation and surveillance, will be a nation which will not be a threat to the peace of the world. (8) A relevant consideration is the fact that weapons developed, or in the course of development, during the present war indicate not only that future wars will be increasingly destructive but that they will be waged with weapons which a scientifically and industrially minded people can produce under conditions which will make surveillance difficult. (9) If this analysis is substantially correct, then the purpose of the German occupation is to remove the German threat to peace by changing the German attitude toward peace. We are occupying Germany, in other words, with a view to changing the social and political character of the nation to such an extent that Germany can be trusted at some future time with independent existence as a nation in a world in which weapons will be more destructive and more difficult to control than they have ever been before. (10) It should be noted that this objective conforms to the objectives of the United Nations Organization and to the situation which the establishment of that Organization will create. A peaceful and peace-loving Germany could be introduced at some appropriate time into the United Nations where the measures of the Organization for security and for peace could be brought to play affirmatively rather than negatively. (11) The explicit recognition that the occupation of Germany is intended to produce a change in the German people would enable us to plan the various measures of occupation more intelligently and to administer them more effectively. At the present time, there is a tendency to make a distinction between political, economic, and military measures for Germany, on the one hand, and measures for what is called the “reeducation” of the German people on the other. Actually, if the present analysis is correct, all aspects of the occupation, whether military, or economic, or political, or social, have one end objective, which is largely psychological: to create a Germany which can be trusted to exist without continuing occupation and surveillance—a Germany which can be re-admitted to the society of peaceful nations. The success of all measures taken in the occupation should therefore be judged not by their immediate consequences alone but by their ultimate effect upon the social and political structure of Germany. (12) There will, of course, be conflicts from time to time between the short-term objectives and the long-range purpose of the occupation. For example, the use of German output for the relief of liberated areas may create economic distress in Germany which will make the labor of the conversion of Germany to our views and our outlook more difficult. However, the explicit recognition of the true long-range objective of the occupation, whether or not in conflict with certain short-term purposes, is essential to the success of the undertaking. (13) Something more is required, however, than the explicit declaration of this purpose. The purpose must also be warmly approved and not shamefacedly admitted. It is our intention to employ every means at our disposition, economic and political means as well as the more direct means of education and information, to produce the change in German thinking and German beliefs and German psychology which we desire. (14) Furthermore, we must be clear in our own minds, not only as to the Germany we wish to change but as to the Germany we wish to put in its place. The soul of man abhors a vacuum quite as much as nature abhors one. You cannot replace something with nothing in the mind of an individual or the mind of a nation. We must assume, although we have no explicit knowledge, that the Russians are clear as to their intentions on this point. Presumably they propose to substitute for Nazi Germany a Germany at least sympathetic to Communism. We presumably believe that a Germany converted to respect for the worth and dignity of human beings and a belief in the basic principles of justice and in the right of men to govern themselves would be a Germany which we could trust. If this, however, is our purpose, we must recognize it and pursue it consciously. We must play again the role we played at the beginning of our history. We must be ready and willing to propagate ideas of liberty and justice and human dignity. (15) The important point, however, is to ascertain at the earliest possible moment what the other occupying powers have in mind with reference to the kind of Germany to be set up and the means by which it is to be established. It has been pointed out in a paper delivered to the Secretary on the subject of German reeducation 5 that it is highly desirable that the occupying powers should reach an understanding as to the common denominators of a policy for reeducation in order that Germany may not be turned, under the occupation, into an ideological cockpit. If the analysis of the present paper is correct, the same considerations would lead to the same conclusion as to the entire program of occupation. It is therefore recommended that conversations be undertaken in the early future to determine, if possible, a common Allied position as to the question of the kind of Germany we wish to see established and the means by which we propose to bring it about. 1 Circulated to the Secretary’s Staff Committee. Cf. document No. 349, printed in vol. i . 2 The Secretary’s Staff Committee decided at its 141st Meeting on July 17 that this paper should be forwarded to Byrnes at the Conference. 3 Printed from the unsigned hectographed copy circulated to the Secretary’s Staff Committee. 4 See document No. 1417 . section ii. 5 Enclosure to document No. 343, printed in vol. i . No. 856 Report by the Subcommittee on German Political Questions Truman Papers No. 856 Report by the Subcommittee on German Political Questions 1 [ Babelsberg , July 19, 1945.] Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic 2 Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period Political Principles 1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, 3 supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council. 2. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are: (i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:— ( a ) All German land, naval and air forces, the S. S., S.A., S.D. and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism; ( b ) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented; (ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable. (iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militaristic activity or propaganda. (iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. 3. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated. 4 4. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned. 5. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany. 6. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas. 7. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion. 5 8. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end: (i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation; (ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany; (iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state ( Land ) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government; (iv) for the time being no central German government shall be established. 6 9. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted. 1 Although not attached to the minutes of the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 19 ( ante , p. 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] ), this paper is clearly the text submitted to that meeting. The source copy bears the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Agreed”. 2 Despite this word in the heading, only political principles are dealt with in the document. 3 i. e., the agreement signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by an agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 124 . 4 There is the following information on this paragraph in a personal letter from James W. Riddleberger, Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs, to Henry P. Leverich and David Harris, Acting Chief and Assistant Chief, respectively, of that Division, dated at Potsdam, July 21, 1945 (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2145): “There was a hot debate on paragraph 3 as Vyshinski wished to abolish all laws passed under Hitler. We were finally able to talk him out of it, so the paragraph remains practically as drafted originally.” 5 In the letter cited in the preceding footnote, Riddleberger wrote as follows concerning this paragraph: “Paragraph 7 is new and was inserted at the request of Vyshinski who felt that some mention should be made of the judicial system.” 6 In the letter cited in footnote 4, ante , Riddleberger wrote as follows concerning this paragraph: “There was a long discussion on paragraph 8, which you will see has been somewhat modified from our original draft [ document No. 852 ]. The British were inclined to drag their feet on the question of elections, and the Russians did not seem to be overly enthusiastic. However, I think we have put this matter in a way which will enable us to go ahead at a local level and will commit the other two governments in principle at least to the same idea.” No. 857 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 857 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 19, 1945. Probable Soviet Amendments to German Paper 1. The last part Article 9: 2 “The Control Council shall permit to remain under the administration of central institutions or shall transfer to administration by such institutions.” (sentence incomplete in Russian.) 2. Article 10, first sentence: “In the establishment and maintenance of administration in the economic sphere the German authorities shall to the fullest extent practical be ordered to carry out such administration.” 3. Article 11: “With respect to the German economy Allied control will be carried out but only to such an extent as may be necessary:” 4. Article 13 (1): “which are required for ( a ) the discharge of Germany’s reparation obligations; ( b ) the maintenance of occupying forces or displaced persons; ( c ) the maintenance of the standard of living in Germany.” 1 This paper, apparently a United States Delegation translation of informal or tentative Soviet suggestions, is not referred to in the minutes, and may relate to negotiations in the Economic Subcommittee. A notation in manuscript reads: “official file copy, Russian Proposals”. 2 The articles referred to are the numbered paragraphs of document No. 852 . No. 858 Texts Considered by the Economic Subcommittee Frankfurt USPolAd Files—600 Berlin Conference No. 858 Texts Considered by the Economic Subcommittee 1 [ Babelsberg , July 19, 1945.] 9. The German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present, excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements. Notwithstanding this, however, and for the purpose of achieving the objectives set forth herein, central administration of certain forms of governmental machinery, including in particular Finance, Transportation and Communications, shall be restored or maintained. 2 10. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls authorized by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be established and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which run counter to the objectives of occupation will be abolished. 3 11. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only as may be necessary: ( a ) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports. ( b ) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding U. K. and U. S. S. R.). ( c ) to ensure the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports. ( d ) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein. For the same purpose no grant of credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign persons or Government shall be permitted except with the approval of the Control Council. 4 12. The production of arms, ammunition and implements of war, including all types of aircraft and ocean-going ships, shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals and machinery shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to minimum, peacetime needs. Production of selected key items within these industrial fields shall be wholly eliminated. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed or destroyed. 5 13. The principles and conditions governing the exaction of reparations from Germany are set forth in Annex I 6 to this agreement. 7 14. Measures shall be promptly taken: ( a ) to effect essential repair of transport; ( b ) to enlarge coal production; ( c ) to maximize agricultural output; and ( d ) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities. 8 1 Each paragraph is on a separate page headed “Economic Sub Committee 11 A.M.—July 19, 1945”. 2 This paragraph bears the following typed notation, “Wording tentatively agreed”. Attached to the following paragraph (and bearing the manuscript notation “#10”) is an earlier draft of this paragraph, the first sentence of which reads: “The German economy shall also be directed towards decentralisation.” Manuscript changes made by Murphy on the face of this draft alter the text to that of the “tentatively agreed” paragraph 9 printed above. No changes were made in the second sentence. Murphy marked the draft “Preliminary acceptance”. 3 This paragraph bears the typed notation, “Wording tentatively agreed:” and the following manuscript notation by Murphy: “OK RM”. Murphy, in a memorandum of November 8, 1954, has supplied the information that this notation, and the similar notations noted in the following footnotes, meant “that our representation on the Economic Subcommittee, headed by Will Clayton, was in accord or approved the text under reference.” Attached is the following “Proposed Amendment” (obviously an earlier proposed amendment of paragraph 10 of document No. 852 ): “In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls, German authorities shall administrative machinery shall be established and required to the fullest extent practicable be ordered to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in those controls will rest with themselves and their own authorities . Any German controls which run counter to the objective of occupation will be abolished .” Manuscript changes made by Murphy on the face of this “proposed amendment” alter the text to that of the “tentatively agreed” language printed above, except that the last word of the paragraph, as corrected in Murphy’s hand, is “prohibited” rather than “abolished”. 4 This paragraph bears the typed notation, “Wording tentatively agreed:” and the following manuscript notation by Murphy: “OK RM”. Cf. footnote 3, supra. 5 This paragraph bears the typed notation, “To be considered further:” and the following manuscript notation: “OK as amended”. 6 See document No. 894 . 7 This paragraph, renumbered “14” by hand, bears the typed notation, “Wording tentatively agreed:” and the following manuscript notation by Murphy: “OK RM”. Cf. footnote 3, ante. 8 This paragraph, renumbered “16” by hand, bears the typed notation, “To be considered further:” and the following manuscript notation by Murphy: “OK RM”. Cf. footnote 3, ante. No. 859 Draft of Report by the Economic Subcommittee Pauley Files No. 859 Draft of Report by the Economic Subcommittee 1 [Undated.] Draft Report of the Economic Sub - Committee We have considered the proposals in a memorandum by the United States Delegation on the Economic Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period, 2 together with the Annex dealing with reparations. 3 We have unanimously agreed to recommend the adoption of the Economic Principles set out in Appendix A, subject to the reservation in paragraphs A and B below. We have also agreed on the contents of the Annex on reparations, subject to the points of disagreement recorded in paragraphs C to [blank] below. The text is given in Appendix B, 4 points in dispute being sidelined. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. 6 There are three matters in addition to those mentioned in paragraph 12 7 on which a common policy is essential in the treatment of Germany as a single economic unit: (1) Uniform method of treatment of the German civilian population. (2) Movement of German population between the zones for the purpose of achieving the objectives laid down in paragraph 13. (3) Subject to normal regulations, free circulation of British, U. S., Soviet and French nationals in all zones by land and air. The Sub-Committee considered that these points, while having economic significance, had a wide political application. They therefore recommend that the Foreign Secretaries should consider them for inclusion in the Political Principles. C. Reparations The U. K. and U. S. representatives consider that it is essential that such necessary imports into Germany as are approved by the Governments controlling Germany shall constitute a first charge against exports from Germany of current production and stocks of goods. The Russian representatives do not accept this principle and express the view that reparation deliveries should have priority and that imports into Germany should, if necessary, be confined to the amount that can be paid for by exports from Germany. [Appendix A (?)] 8 top secret Economic Principles 12 . 9. In order to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war, including all types of aircraft and ocean sea-going ships, shall be prohibited and prevented . Production of metals, chemicals and machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to minimum, postwar peacetime needs. Production of selected key items within these industrial fields shall be wholly eliminated. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed or destroyed. 9 . 10. The German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present, excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements. Notwithstanding this, however, and for the purpose of achieving the objectives set forth herein, central administration of certain forms of governmental machinery , including in particular Finance, Transportation and Communications, shall be maintained or restored. 13 . 11. In organizing the economy of Germany primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and industries producing consumption goods and light products. 15 . 12. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to: ( a ) coal production - and allocation inside Germany , ( b ) ( a ) other industrial production and allocation, particularly coal; ( c ) ( b ) agricultural production, collection and distribution; ( d ) ( c ) wages, prices and rationing; ( e ) ( d ) import and export programmes for Germany as a whole; ( f ) ( e ) currency, central taxation and customs; ( g ) ( f ) reparation and removal of industrial war potential. In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions. 11 . 13. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only as may be necessary: ( a ) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports. ( b ) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding U. K. and U. S. S. R.) ( c ) to ensure in the way determined by the C. C. the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports. ( d ) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein. For the same purpose no grant of credit to Germany of [ or? ] Germans by any foreign persons or Government shall be permitted except with the approval of the Control Council. ( e ) to control all remaining in Germany scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories etc. connected with economic activities irrespective of their ownership ( industrial firms, universities, municipal authorities etc. ) 10 . 14. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be established created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which run counter to the objectives of occupation will be abolished. 13 . 15. The principles and conditions governing the exaction of reparations from Germany are set forth in Annex 1 9 to this agreement. 14 . 16. Measures shall be promptly taken: ( a ) to effect essential repair of transport; ( b ) to enlarge coal production; ( c ) to maximize agricultural output; and ( d ) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities. 1 The text here printed includes a number of minor manuscript revisions. 2 document No. 852 . 3 document No. 894 . 4 No paper identifiable as appendix B has been found. 5 For the paragraph omitted at this point, see document No. 1041 . 6 Immediately before paragraph B the following paragraph has been stricken on the source copy: “B. In submitting their report on the Economic Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period, the Economic Sub-Committee wish to draw attention to the following point.” 7 The numbering of the paragraphs in this draft report corresponds to the revised numbering in the paper tentatively identified as appendix A thereto, infra. 8 On this document, which bears the manuscript notation “Sub-Committee”, manuscript changes (not printed) have been made to bring the text into conformity with the attachment to document No. 863 , and it has been further marked, “As finally approved”, presumably by the Economic Subcommittee. It is obviously an intermediate draft of the Economic Principles, designed to show changes made in an earlier draft (cf. document No. 858 ). From the numbering of the paragraphs it would appear to be appendix A to the Draft Report printed above, but it is not attached to the Draft Report in the Pauley Files (although it is filed in the same folder) and it has not been possible to confirm this tentative identification. 9 No annex was attached to the copy found. See document No. 894 . No. 860 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Piles No. 860 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Proposed Text 17. One of the primary purposes of occupation is to obtain reparation for the damage and injury caused Allied countries by German aggression. To accomplish this purpose some importation of raw materials and other items will be necessary. The Control Council shall formulate as soon as possible a program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole. Such a program shall include provision for equitable inter-zonal distribution of supplies available within Germany, so as to minimize the net deficit for, and imports into, Germany as a whole. Responsibility for the procurement and financing of approved imports for Germany as a whole shall be shared on a basis to be negotiated in the Control Council. 2 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 The following final sentence has been stricken from the draft: “Reimbursement for all net advances made for approved imports into Germany shall be a first charge against the proceeds of any exports from Germany of current production and stocks of goods.” No. 861 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 861 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 20, 1945. 2 Proposed Text 17. A primary purpose of occupation is to obtain reparation for the damage and injury caused Allied countries by German aggression. To accomplish this purpose some importation of raw materials and other items will be necessary. The Control Council shall formulate as soon as possible a program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole. Such a program shall include provision for equitable inter-zonal distribution of supplies available within Germany, so as to minimize the net deficit for, and imports into, Germany as a whole. With full recognition of the principle that the cost of imports must be met from the proceeds of exports 3 from current production or stocks responsibility for the procurement and financing of approved imports for Germany 4 as a whole shall be shared on a basis to be negotiated in the Control Council. Reimbursement for any initial net outlays made in connection with the provision of supplies for Germany shall be a first charge against the German economy. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 This paper bears the following typed notation: “For Economic Sub Committee 10:30 A.M.—July 20, 1945”. 3 There is the following manuscript interpolation at this point: “from goods, capital equipment, and”. 4 An earlier draft bearing the same heading reads at this point: “procurement and financing responsibility with respect to imports for Germany”. This draft has the following manuscript interpolation (apparently intended as a substitution) by Murphy: “for the procurement and financing of approved imports”. The last two sentences of this earlier draft read as follows: “Reimbursement for any initial net outlays made in connection with the provision of supplies for Germany shall be obtained from subsequent German exports from current production or stocks, and reparation from current production or stocks shall be so regulated as always to leave available sufficient exports to pay for approved imports. A program of such exports shall be formulated as soon as practicable.” Attached to the copy of this draft in the Frankfurt USPolAd Files is the following draft paragraph: “Naturally one of the primary purposes of occupation is to obtain reparation for the damage and injury caused Allied countries by German aggression. To accomplish this end, obviously some importation of raw materials and other items may be necessary. The payment for these will be a first charge against the German economy.” This paragraph bears the following manuscript notations by Murphy: (1) “Submitted by RDM July 20” and (2) “Part of this included in paper submitted”. No. 862 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 862 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 20, 1945. 2 Proposed Text 17. One of the primary purposes of occupation is to obtain reparation for the damage and injury caused Allied countries by German aggression. To accomplish this purpose some importation of raw materials and other items will be necessary. The Control Council shall formulate as soon as possible a program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole. Such a program shall include provision for equitable inter-zonal distribution of supplies available within Germany, so as to minimize the net deficit for, and imports into, Germany as a whole. Responsibility for the procurement and financing of approved imports for Germany as a whole shall be shared on a basis to be negotiated in the Control Council. Reimbursement for all net advances made for approved imports into Germany shall be a first charge against the proceeds of any exports from Germany of current production and stocks of goods. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 This paper bears the following typed notation: “For Economic Sub Committee 10:30 A.M.—July 20, 1945”. No. 863 Report by the Economic Subcommittee 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 863 Report by the Economic Subcommittee top secret [ Babelsberg , July 20, 1945. 1 ] Report of the Economic Sub - Committee to the Foreign Secretaries We have considered the proposals in a memorandum by the United States Delegation on the Economic Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period, 2 together with the Annex dealing with reparations. 3 We have unanimously agreed to recommend the adoption of the Economic Principles set out in the attached clauses for incorporation in the proposed Agreement. 4 On one matter, which relates both to the Economic Principles and to Reparations, we have to report that agreement has not been reached. The U. K. and U. S. representatives consider that it is essential that such necessary imports into Germany as are approved by the Governments controlling Germany shall constitute a first charge against exports from Germany whether of capital equipment or current production and stocks of goods. They therefore recommend the adoption of the text attached hereto as Annex II for incorporation in the Agreement on Economic Principles. The Soviet Representatives do not accept this principle and express the view that reparation deliveries should have priority and that imports into Germany, should, if necessary, be confined to the amount that can be paid for by exports from Germany after reparation schedules have been met. The U. K. and U. S. representatives point out that the provisions of paragraph 18 (to the effect that it shall be the general principle, that in the absence of special reasons to the contrary, each of the zones of occupation, including the Greater Berlin area, will draw its supplies, so far as practicable, from the areas in Germany on which it had drawn before the war) apply to the territory of Germany as it existed on December 31, 1937 whether or not any part of such territory is administered by or ceded to another State. The Soviet representatives think that any decision on this point at the present time is premature, pending a decision by the Conference on the future boundaries of Germany. The U. K. and U. S. representatives point out that 5 there are two matters in addition to those mentioned in paragraph 13 on which a common policy is essential in the treatment of Germany as a single economic unit: (1) Uniform method of treatment 6 of the German civilian population; (2) Subject to normal regulations, free circulation of nationals of U. K., U. S., U. S. S. R. and France in all zones by land and air. The Soviet representatives take the position that these two points, while having economic significance, have a wider political application, and that they should therefore not be considered by the Economic Sub-Committee. 7 The Allied Commission on Reparations has agreed on seven basic principles. The Sub-Committee recommend that these principles (Annex 1 8 ) should be accepted. The Allied Commission on Reparations failed to reach agreement 9 on the underscored last clause of an eighth principle: “After payment of reparations, enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany, the necessary means must be provided for payment of imports approved by the Governments concerned before reparation deliveries are made.” 10 As stated above, the Sub-Committee have been unable to reach agreement on this point. 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [Attachment] Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period Text as Submitted to the Foreign Secretaries by Economic Subcommittee Economic Principles 10. In order to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany’s approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 14. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be destroyed, or shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned. 11. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements. Notwithstanding this, however, and for the purpose of achieving the objectives set forth herein, certain forms of central administrative machinery, particularly in the fields of Finance, Transportation and Communications, shall be maintained or restored. 12. In organizing the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. 13. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to: ( a ) mining and industrial production and allocation; ( b ) agriculture, forestry and fishing; ( c ) wages, prices and rationing; ( d ) import and export programs for Germany as a whole; ( e ) currency, central taxation and customs; ( f ) reparation and removal of industrial war potential. 12 In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions. 14. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary: ( a ) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports. ( b ) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding U. K. and U. S. S. R.). ( c ) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports. ( d ) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein. For the same purpose no grant of credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign persons or Governments shall be permitted except with the approval of the Control Council. 13 ( e ) to control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera connected with economic activities. 15. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited. 16. The principles and conditions governing the exaction of reparations from Germany are set forth in Annex I to this agreement. 17. Measures shall be promptly taken: ( a ) to effect essential repair of transport; ( b ) to enlarge coal production; ( c ) to maximize agriculture output; and ( d ) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities. 18. In securing the objective mentioned in paragraph 14 ( c ) it shall be the general principle that, in the absence of special reasons to the contrary, each of the zones of occupation, including the Greater Berlin Area, will draw its supplies so far as practicable from the areas in Germany on which it had drawn before the war. [Annex I] [ Editor’s Note. -—This paper is identical with attachment 1 to document No. 894 .] [Annex II] 19. The Control Council shall formulate as soon as possible a program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole. Such a program shall include provision for equitable inter-zonal distribution of supplies available within Germany, so as to minimize the net deficit for, and imports into, Germany as a whole. Responsibility for the procurement and financing of approved imports for Germany as a whole shall be shared on a basis to be negotiated in the Control Council. Reimbursement for all net advanced [ advances? ] made for approved imports into Germany shall be a first charge against the proceeds of both exports of capital equipment and of current production and stocks of goods from Germany. 1 So dated in an “Index of Attachments to Summary of the Negotiations in the Economic Sub-Committee” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145), but not considered by the Foreign Ministers until July 21 (see ante , p. 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] ). 2 document No. 852 . 3 document No. 894 . 4 In a draft of this report found in the Frankfurt USPolAd Files, this paragraph has the following additional words: “On Economic Principles”. 5 The first ten words of this sentence do not appear in the draft referred to in footnote 4, supra. 6 The draft referred to in footnote 4, ante , reads: “Uniform treatment”. 7 In the draft referred to in footnote 4, ante , this paragraph reads as follows: “The Sub-Committee consider that these points, while having economic significance, have a wider political application. They therefore refer these points for consideration by the Foreign Secretaries.” 8 Annex i is identical with attachment 1 to document No. 894 . 9 See documents Nos. 375 and 376, printed in vol. i , and document No. 894 , post . 10 The passage here printed in italics was underscored in the original. 11 For the paragraphs omitted here, see document No. 902 . 12 The copy of this document in the Pauley Files has the following interpolation at this point: “( g ) finance, transportation, & communications.” This copy also has the following marginal note opposite paragraph 13: “Molotov amendment”. 13 The copy of this document in the Pauley Files has the following marginal note at this point: “If Plan II [is adopted], Rewrite last sentence of 14 d ) to read: ‘Except with the approval of the Control Council or except when determined by the Government concerned to be required for the payment of necessary imports, no grant of credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign persons or governments shall be permitted.’ “The same revision is recommended in a separate paper in the Pauley Files entitled “U. S. Proposal”, dated July 25, and in document No. 864 . No. 864 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 864 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Memorandum With reference to the “Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period, Text as Submitted to the Foreign Secretaries by Economic Sub-Committee”, 2 the following recommendations are made: Economic Principles Paragraph 13: Proposed alternative substitute for first sentence: “During the period of occupation, Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit and the Allied Control Council shall have authority to issue directives to insure the consistent application of this principle in all zones of occupation.” “During the period of occupation, Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit except in those instances as the Allied Control Council shall otherwise determine.” 3 Paragraph 13: There shall be added a further sub-section upon which common policies shall be established in Germany during the period of occupation, as follows: ( g ) finance, transportation, and communications. Paragraph 14 ( d ) 4 on page 3, should either be stricken or amended to read as follows: “Except with the approval of the Control Council or except where determined by the Government concerned to be required for the payments of necessary imports, no grant or credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign persons or Governments shall be permitted.” 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 Attachment to document No. 863 . 3 Another version of this working paper substitutes “may otherwise direct” for the last three words of this paragraph. 4 Another version of this working paper indicates that only the last sentence of paragraph 14 ( d ) is affected by this recommendation. No. 865 The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 800.515/7–2045 No. 865 The Assistant Secretary of War ( McCloy ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) Washington [ Babelsberg ], 20 July 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Clayton Subject: German Interim Financing I have looked at your memorandum from the Secretary to the President 1 on the War Department’s responsibility for German interim financing. I have no difficulty with the paper as far as it goes, but I think it is incomplete. The following points should be clearly understood, and I would think the gist of them should be incorporated in any memorandum to the President: 1. The War Department under present arrangements will be able to finance all food imports into Germany for whatever zone through October loadings. 2. Testimony before Congress indicated that funds made available for the War Department would not be used for maintenance of zones other than the United States, except for a brief turnover period not extending beyond the current calendar year. 3. With respect to any period of time or any zone, the funds which the War Department has received from the Congress for the present fiscal year are restricted to the prevention of disease and starvation. 4. If the President approves Secretary Byrnes’ memorandum, it is necessary that the President send a letter of instructions to the Secretary of War, specifying the extent to which he desires the War Department to finance supplies under the disease and unrest formula outside of the United States zone , and in addition the extent of general economic assistance that he desires the War Department to finance with respect to all zones, including the United States zone. Unless some standard is specified, we would not be able to determine the amount of appropriations we should go to Congress to obtain. In effect, we should have a letter similar to that which President Roosevelt sent to the War Department in November 1943. 2 5. It is suggested that the part of the paper entitled “German Import Program” 3 would be strengthened as a negotiating agent for our representatives in the Control Council, if there were added the following: “Recognizing the principle that proceeds from the sale of exports from Germany as a whole must be used to finance essential imports” at the beginning of the sentence which now starts “Procurement and financing responsibility …” 4 I am returning the memorandum which you gave me. John J McCloy 1 It has not been determined whether McCloy was referring to document No. 346 (see vol. i ) or to an early draft (not found) of document No. 883 . 2 Not printed in this compilation. A substantial portion of the operative part of the text appears, however, in Edwin J. Hayward, “Co-ordination of Military and Civilian Civil Affairs Planning”, printed in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , vol. 267, p. 23. 3 document No. 348, printed in vol. ( i . 4 Ellipsis in the original. No. 866 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Department of State 840.50 unrra /7–2145: Telegram No. 866 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) to the Department of State 1 secret Babelsberg , July 21, 1945. Victory 182. For Thorp, Gilpatric and Reinstein from Clayton and Collado. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . British and we are pressing re German imports for joint financing and first charge principle. At technical level Soviets seem prepared to enter joint financing if any small amount is needed but balk at first charge principle, although they recognize the necessity of paying for any approved imports. Matter referred to Foreign Ministers for decision. 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Byrnes. No. 867 The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2145 No. 867 The Political Adviser in Germany ( Murphy ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 670 Frankfurt [ sic ], July 21, 1945. Subject: Information Concerning Attitude of German People Regarding Nazis. Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith for the Department’s information the following report on the attitude of Germans with respect to Nazis and Nazism, supplied to the Office of Political Affairs by the Intelligence Section, Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF. The questions herein contained were raised by this Division, and the answers supplied by the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF are based on extensive field survey. 1. Do many Germans tend to distinguish between real Nazis and other Nazis, between active and nominal Nazis? It seems clear that to a large number of Germans a Nazi is much the same thing as an “Outsider”. He is a man who is not a native of the place but has been brought by the Party from somewhere else in order to perform certain Party tasks in the district. To a much lesser extent, a Nazi is somebody who made his living by working for the Party. I think the psychological implications of this are fairly obvious. They re-inforce the universal inclination to shift the blame from the individual interrogated to someone else. In this case, it is shifting the blame from the individual’s locality and attributing it to someone from a different part of Germany. 2. Are there other categories into which many German[s] (non-Nazis) tend to put the Nazis? Have they other breakdowns than active and nominal Nazis, ardent and passive Nazis? Compared with this broad distinction, further subdivision into categories of Nazis is comparatively unimportant. It is, however, true that the Germans recognize a category of “ Muss Nazis”[,] i. e. people who were forced into the Party against their real beliefs for fear of losing their jobs. The principal criterion used to distinguish these seems to be the date of joining. It scarcely needs to be pointed out that categories like the SS play a large part in those Germans brought from “outside” to perform Party tasks. 3. What conclusions have been reached thus far by PWD concerning Germans’ acceptance or disavowal of the collective war guilt theme? The question of reactions to charges of war guilt is complex. Preliminary conclusions are that people fall into about four main categories (though so many combinations are possible, either simultaneously or successively for the same individual, that is it [ sic ] very difficult to establish hard and fast definitions.) a .) The indoctrinated Nazis—at highest 10%—automatically repeat the argument that whatever was for the good of Germany was right. For them the question of “guilt” cannot exist. Not unnaturally, the people who explicitly adopt this attitude now are few and far between. b .) “The pots who call the kettle black”, i. e. the people who meet charges of atrocities by reference to stock Nazi propaganda themes such as Katyn, the Boer War, lynchings of negroes, etc. c .) The people who seek to project the blame on to somebody else, i. e. on to the Nazis unless they themselves are indisputably Nazis, in which case they blame some other section of the Nazi Party (usually Himmler and the SS). But non-Nazis in this group tend to say “we admit that, through the Nazis, dire things happened in concentration camps to innocent people. But, also thanks to the Nazis and the way in which they provoked war, the Allies came and bombed Germany and very dire things happened to us too, in spite of the fact that we are also innocent. Therefore, we are in the same class as the victims of the concentration camps and your sympathy should be extended to us equally.” d .) The people who are prepared to admit collective responsibility on the part of the German people for failing to stop Hitler, but who go on to claim that just as much responsibility falls on those Allied Governments who also refused to stop Hitler, e. g. the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Spanish Civil War and Munich. It will be noted that none of the above categories seeks to deny the facts of the atrocities, though a few in categories a . and b . will suggest that they are exaggerated. 4. What punishments do non-Nazis think should be meted out to active and confirmed Nazis? Is their thinking definitive or general and vague on this subject? The usual attitude is that no punishment can be bad enough for confirmed Nazis. This is, of course, a consequence of the scapegoat process. Nominal Nazis should lose their jobs, but there is not much evidence of clear or new thinking on this point. 5. What disposal do Germans interrogated think should be made of the Wehrmacht —retained for internal order and protection against the Russians? Be completely disbanded? Be partially disbanded? Other disposition? There is no evidence of the rank and file of Germans thinking at present about the future of the Wehrmacht . I suspect that if people were directly asked the question, they would start to talk about our need for military help against the Russians. 6. Do Germans interrogated expect that German civilians will be required to do forced labor in the occupied countries? Do they think Germans should be so required? Only some Germans? If [the] latter, what Germans and why? How do they associate this subject with collective war guilt? It is taken for granted that Germans will be required to do forced labor repairing damage done in the occupied countries. There is no evidence at present that this is regarded as a particular injustice but that is not to say that such a feeling might not develop, especially if the scale of demand had serious repercussions on the labor supply in Germany. But at present the complaint is rather that we are not employing Germans when they have accepted the inevitability of having to do restoration work and are anxious to get it over as quickly as possible. This does not prevent them from being afraid of being sent to Siberia. 7. How much blame for the Nazi regime, German militarism and Germany’s defeat do Germans interrogated put upon the shoulders of German industrialists? There is not much evidence at present of blame for the Nazi regime and Germany’s defeat being fixed on the industrialists. The Nazis are acting as the universal scapegoat. 8. What evidence is there of the growth of a Hitler legend? Hitler’s death seems to be generally accepted as a fact. The tendency to exclude Hitler from responsibility for the acts of his followers still crops up here and there. But at the moment, there are no signs of the growth of any legend about him. Respectfully yours, Robert Murphy No. 868 United States Delegation Working Paper Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference No. 868 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Proposed Directive to U.S., U.S.S.R. and U. K. Commanders-in-Chief Concerning Immediate Economic Tasks in the Occupation of Germany In order to secure the fulfillment of the minimum objectives of the occupation of Germany, the U. S., Soviet and U. K. Commanders-in-Chief will advocate in the Control Council the formulation and prompt execution of a uniform program in the following fields: 1). Development of exports for the purpose of a ) Meeting a reparation program as formulated by the Reparations Commission. b ) Meeting urgent external needs for relief and reconstruction. c ) Providing means of payment for Germany’s minimum import. Immediate attention should be given to the export of coal and to removals of railroad rolling stock and live stock. 2). Formulation of a single program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole and determination of basis for sharing procurement and financing responsibility. 3). Establishment of machinery to assure equitable distribution of available supplies within Germany. 4). Establishment of uniform ration scales within Germany. 5). Formulation of immediate steps to secure adequate agricultural and coal output, essential repair of internal transport and emergency repair of housing and utilities. 6). Formulation of initial measures for curtailment of metal, chemical and machinery industries to conform to minimum, peacetime needs. 7). Uniform regulation and control of currency, credit and public finance. 8). Uniform frontier controls and recording of movements of persons and goods. 1 Authorship not indicated. No. 869 The Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany (Clay) to the Secretary of State Department of the Army Files No. 869 The Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany ( Clay ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret Berlin , 21 July 1945. Memorandum for the Secretary of State General Eisenhower , after conference with the President, instructed me to prepare for submission to the President, a proposed directive which is attached hereto 2 and which would be sent to each Zone Commander by his head of government. The proposed delegation of authority in the final paragraph, if accepted by all four governments, would facilitate transaction of business by the Group Council. The specific instructions in paragraphs numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4 are believed to accord fully with decisions reached at this and previous conferences. However, it may be necessary to modify portions of these paragraphs to conform to decisions now in the making. Also, in sending this directive, if approved, the several policy papers accepted at the Berlin conference could be appended to the directive. General Eisenhower feels that this directive would be most helpful to him and to the Group Council. Lucius D. Clay 1 Printed from a certified carbon copy which bears the manuscript notation: “A similar memo went to Adm. Leahy”. 2 The attached draft is the same as document No. 870 except for one variation described in footnote 2 to that document. No. 870 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2145 No. 870 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 21, 1945. Proposed Draft of Directive To Be Issued by Heads of Governments Responsible for the Control of Germany to Their Respective Commanders of Occupation Forces in Germany The Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom have at Yalta and at Berlin agreed to certain policies and principles for the administration of Germany. They have agreed also to accept the provisional government of the French Republic in the quadri-partite administration of Germany. 2 Pursuant to the policies agreed at the Yalta and Berlin Conferences and to the declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany by the governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the provisional government of the French Republic, 3 as Commander-in-Chief of the forces of occupation of the United States of America, and its representative on the Control Council, you are herewith directed to present to and support in that Council measures which will effectuate the agreed policies throughout Germany, 4 to include: 1. The completion of the program to abolish finally and completely all military organizations, semi-military organizations, clubs and associations which serve to keep alive a military tradition in Germany. The completion of the program to remove all active members of the Nazi party from positions of prominence and responsibility in public or private life. The continued search for and arrest of war criminals and the trial of apprehended war criminals as may be agreed by the several governments. The execution of a reparations program designed to destroy Germany’s industrial war potential as recommended by the Reparations Commission and approved by the several governments represented on that commission. 2. The establishment of such German administrative machinery as may be necessary for the administration of Germany as an economic unit to provide for such control as the Control Council may deem necessary over German finance, agriculture, industry, trade and distribution. The interchange of persons, goods and services freely within Germany within the limits of available transportation and facilities to equalize the standards of living within the several zones. The controlled issue of currency, the preparation of the national budget and such servicing of the public debt as may be deemed necessary. The development of an export program which will support those imports found essential to a minimum living economy in Germany. The operation of transportation and communication services throughout Germany. The operation of a postal service throughout Germany. Such other measures as appear to require central control to assure the operation of German economy as a unit. 3. The establishment of procedures and regulations for application in each zone which will insure freedom of the press under policies agreed by the Control Council. The establishment of procedures and regulations which will permit those political parties subscribing to liberal principles to exercise political activity with the right of election of local officials to be discretionary with the Commander-in-Chief in each zone as security conditions may indicate such elections to be warranted. The establishment of procedures and regulations which will provide for the coordination of the information and education programs to be executed in each zone and to be directed to a reorientation of German thought. The establishment of procedures and regulations for the coordination of public health and welfare within the several zones. The establishment of procedures and regulations which will permit the formation of trades unions as rapidly as such unions can be established with security taken into consideration. 4. The decentralization of all functions of government which do not require central supervision for the operation of Germany as an economic unit to the fullest extent possible to lesser political subdivisions to recreate a sense of local responsibility for government within Germany. Within the policies which have been accepted by the governments represented on the Control Council, you are herewith granted full authority to enter into and effect the requisite agreements to all measures presented in that Council which are necessary to the execution of those policies. You may delegate such of this authority as you deem desirable to your representative on the Coordinating Committee to facilitate and expedite the execution of the agreed policies for the administration of Germany. 1 Notice of the submission of this paper was given at the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 22 (see ante , p. 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] ), and the subject was referred to the Foreign Ministers at the Sixth Plenary Meeting, July 22 (see ante , pp. 246–247 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] ). 2 Concerning the decisions of the Yalta Conference referred to, see document No. 1416 , section iv, and document No. 1417 , section ii. 3 Signed at Berlin, June 5, 1945 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649). 4 At this point the draft submitted to Byrnes by Clay (see document No. 869 ) had the following additional words: “exclusive of such areas as may have been ceded by agreement of the four governments to other nations”. No. 871 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President 840.50/7–2445 No. 871 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President 1 secret Memorandum for the President The Rehabilitation of Europe as a Whole I am impressed with the great loss in economic values on the Continent, but even more with the loss in widespread moral values which destruction and war conditions have caused in Europe. We have immediate interests in a return to stable conditions—the elimination of distress conditions to ease our problems of administration and the speed and success of our redeployment. But our long range interests are far greater and much more significant. One hope for the future is the restoration of stable conditions in Europe, for only thus can concepts of individual liberty, free thought and free speech be nurtured. Under famine, disease and distress conditions, no territory or people will be concerned about concepts of free speech, individual liberty, and free political action. All the opposite concepts flourish in such an atmosphere. If democratic interests are not given an opportunity to grow in western and middle Europe, there is little possibility they will ever be planted in Russian minds. I therefore urge that the principles stated in my paper to you on the administration of Germany of 16 July 2 be kept in mind, which recommends that Germany shall be given an opportunity to live and work; that controls be exercised over the German people only in so far as our basic objectives absolutely require, and; that the ethnological and economic groupings of Germany should be disturbed only where considerations make it inescapable. We cannot be misled by the thought that because many plants, at least on our side of the line, exist in relative integrity, that German economy can readily be restored. I am satisfied that it cannot be unless there is a flow of commerce, establishment of transportation systems and stable currency. The Russian policy on booty in eastern Germany, 3 if it is as I have heard it reported, is rather oriental. It is bound to force us to preserve the economy in western Germany in close cooperation with the British, so as to avoid conditions in our areas which, in the last analysis, neither British nor American public opinion would long tolerate. Secondly, I urge that a completely coordinated plan be adopted for the economic rehabilitation of Europe as a whole; that in doing this, all the economic benefits which the United States can bestow, such as war surplus disposal, Export-Import bank credits, etc., be channelled through one man and one agency. Our means must be concentrated in one agency in order to use all our power to achieve our ends. Diverse policy and diverse methods of distribution lead to competition in bestowal of favors and interfere with the carrying out of the only effective and politically supportable program, namely, one of helping Europe to help herself. There are large food, fuel and industrial sources in Europe, and, if all resources are marshalled, much can be done to achieve stability in Europe with the promptitude and in the degree necessary to preserve democratic governments. It does require a period of management in which I am convinced we have to take a part. I would recommend one United States agency as I have indicated, and I would feel that an Economic Council for Europe should be set up. The Chairman should be an American, in whose hands, subject to the authority of the President and pursuant to the directions of the central United States agency just recommended, would be vested the disposition in Europe of all benefits flowing from the United States. Other members of the Council would consist of the representatives of other contributing powers who would be similarly authorized. They should act in close liaison with the Control Council for Germany, and their duties should be, over a limited period, to assist the governments of Europe to help themselves in the restoration of stable conditions. Interest of the War Department —The economic rehabilitation of Europe is not, of course, a matter primarily within the jurisdiction of the War Department. I am presenting this memorandum because the rehabilitation of Europe is so closely related to the immediate problems mentioned above in which the War Department is vitally concerned, and also because I feel that an economically stable Europe, with the impetus it can give to free ideas, is one of the greatest assurances of security and continued peace we can hope to obtain. Berlin , 22 July 1945. 1 Printed from an unsigned copy, described as a “proposed memorandum for the President”, transmitted by Colonel H. A. Gerhardt to Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton on July 24. It is indicated in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947), p. 593, however, that this memorandum was actually submitted to Truman on July 22. 2 Enclosure to document No. 849 . 3 See documents Nos. 896 , 904 , 929 , 940 . No. 872 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference No. 872 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation?] [ Babelsberg , July 23, 1945.] Article 19 of “Economic Principles” 19. After payment of Reparations enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided for payment for imports approved by the Control Council. In case the means are insufficient to pay simultaneously on reparations account and for approved imports all kinds of deliveries (internal consumption, exports, reparations) have to be proportionally reduced. 1 This is apparently the first Soviet draft on this subject presented at the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 23. See ante , p. 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . It bears the following manuscript notation by Murphy: “Submitted by Molotov July 23”. No. 873 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 873 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation?] [ Babelsberg , July 23, 1945.] Soviet Proposal Article 19 of “Economic Principles” 19. After payment of Reparations enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports (in so far as they are approved by the Control Council). 2 The exports to pay [for] such imports will have priority over Reparations and internal consumption. 1 This is apparently the second Soviet draft on this subject presented at the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 23. See ante , p. 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . 2 The parentheses are inserted in pencil on each of two other copies found. Each of these copies has a manuscript interpolation at this point. One reads: “or, in the absence of agreement, by the zone [commander?]”. The other suggests substituting “occupying Government] concerned” for “Control Council”. No. 874 The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 EW/7–2345 No. 874 The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs ( Riddleberger ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 23, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Dunn In connection with Molotov’s proposal 2 that payment for a minimum import program approved by the Control Council would be the first charge on German exports, the following should be borne in mind with reference to the powers of the Control Council: Article 1 of the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany 3 stipulates that supreme authority will be exercised by the four Commanders in Chief, each in his own zone of occupation , and also jointly in matters affecting Germany as a whole in their capacity as members of the Control Council. Article 3 ( c ), however, stipulates that decisions of the Control Council must be unanimous. This means, of course, that any minimum import program would have to be approved by the unanimous decision of the Control Council. In the absence of unanimity in the Council, the authority of the zone commanders would obviously remain supreme. It can therefore be assumed that if there be no agreement in the Control Council on a minimum import program, the American zone commander would not have to make reparation deliveries from the U. S. zone. However, this point should no doubt be made very clear to Molotov if we contemplate accepting his proposal. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. 2 See documents Nos. 872 and 873 . 3 Signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 124 . No. 875 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 875 Proposal by the British Delegation [Undated.] U. K. Proposal Article 19 of “Economic Principles” 19. After payment of Reparations enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Governments concerned. 1 The proceeds of the exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports. 1 Another version of this paper, with the same heading, found in the Pauley Files, ends this sentence with the words “approved by the Control Council”. No. 876 United States Delegation Working Paper [?] Pauley Files No. 876 United States Delegation Working Paper [ ? ] [Undated.] Article 19 Payment of reparations should leave sufficient resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. Payment for imports into Germany approved by the Control Council shall be a first charge against the proceeds of exports out of current production and out of stocks of goods. If the Control Council fails to agree, each zone commander may still import into his own zone such supplies as his Government considers essential, for the payment of which he may assess a first charge on exports of current production and stocks from his own zone. No. 877 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) and the Acting Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs (Reinstein) 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2345: Telegram No. 877 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs ( Thorp ) and the Acting Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs ( Reinstein ) 1 secret Babelsberg , [July 23, 1945.] Victory 215. For Thorp and Reinstein from Collado. Present thought is that four power joint programming of imports, exports and reparations and combined procurement and interim financing of imports will not be feasible. We are consequently drafting on a zonal basis with expectation of combined handling and financing for the three western zones. We are preparing with McCloy and Hilldring a draft directive to War Department on financing responsibility 2 along lines discussed in Washington. 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Byrnes. 2 See document No. 884 . No. 878 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 EW/7–2345 No. 878 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 23, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Clayton German Economic Matters 1. Basic policy for supply and reparations operations as between Soviet and Western Zones of Germany has been laid down in memorandum relating to the Western boundaries of Poland. 2 The following recommendations are based on the assumption that this policy is agreed among the three powers. 2. Reparations and Related Matters— There is attached a draft U. S. proposal 3 which would pave the way for winding up the Reparations Commission and turn the handling of reparations, restitution, etc. to the individual zone commanders subject only to such general agreement as they may wish and be able to reach in the Control Council. The definition on restitution is somewhat broader than Mr. Pauley’s staff would like to see, and Mr. Pauley may raise questions about it. 3. Economic Principles— Assuming agreement on the reparation proposal and the agreement which was tentatively reached on Sunday 4 by the Foreign Ministers on Principles Nos. 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17, 5 there remain only the following points for further action: a . In view of the agreement on supply matters generally involved in the memorandum on the Polish Western Boundary, it would be desirable to accede to the Soviet request that Principle No. 18 be deleted. 6 b . In view of the decision in fact to give up quadrilateral action on reparations operations and on programing, procuring and financing of imports, the last sentence of paragraph 14 ( d ), already tentatively agreed by the Foreign Ministers, should be amended to read as follows: “except where determined by the occupying power concerned to be required for the payment for necessary imports, no grant or credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign persons or governments shall be permitted.” If agreement cannot be reached with the Russians on this amendment, we should insist on the deletion of the entire sentence. c . A minor improvement would be effected in the document by the following two amendments to paragraph 13: “( e ) Currency and banking , central taxation and customs;” ( g ) Transportation and Communications” 4. It will be necessary to determine the manner in which the agreement referred to in 1. is to be formalized. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 document No. 918 . 3 No attachment found. Cf. document No. 916 . 4 See ante , p. 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] . 5 See the attachment to document No. 863 . 6 See ante , p. 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] . No. 879 Proposal by the British Delegation 9.00110 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 879 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 24, 1945. Germany: Political Principles Memorandum by the U. K. Delegation The report of the Economic Sub-Committee to the Foreign Secretaries 2 included the following passage, which was not considered when the report was taken [up] by the Foreign Secretaries: “The U. K. and U. S. representatives point out that there are two matters in addition to those mentioned in paragraph 13 3 on which a common policy is essential in the treatment of Germany as a single economic unit: (1) Uniform method of treatment of the German civilian population; (2) Subject to normal regulations, free circulation of nationals of U. K., U. S., U. S. S. R. and France in all zones by land and air. The Soviet representative takes the position that these two points, while having economic significance, have a wider political application, and that they should therefore not be considered by the Economic Sub-Committee.” The U. K. Delegation attach importance to agreement on these two matters being recorded. They would accordingly propose: ( a ) that a new paragraph be inserted after paragraph 1 of the text on “Political principles” which has been approved by Heads of Governments 4 as follows:— “So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.” 5 ( b ) that a new paragraph be added after paragraph 9 as follows:— “Subject to normal regulations, there shall be free circulation of nationals of the Powers represented on the Control Council in all zones by land and air.” 1 Attachment 8 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . This paper was presumably circulated some days before it came up for discussion. 2 document No. 863 . 3 Of the attachment to document No. 863 . 4 document No. 856 . 5 In a third draft of the Protocol prepared by the British Delegation and annotated “Compared with U. S. Text and agreed 30.7.45.” (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045), there is an indication that this language was to be inserted as paragraph 2 of the section on treatment of Germany, and that the succeeding paragraphs were to be renumbered. No. 880 The Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2345: Telegram No. 880 The Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs ( Thorp ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 25 [1945.] 121. For Clayton from Thorp. Dept and CAD representatives met last Friday with British on German supply problems. At time of receipt of your Victory 215, 2 we were in process of clearing British telegram to London reporting U. S. views expressed at that meeting, which favored zonal approach to procurement and financing. In view of your reference in Victory 215 to “combined handling and financing for the three western zones”, we sought to hold up British telegram pending consultation with you but British are anxious to acquaint London with views expressed here in order that their people at the Conference may be properly briefed on them. We have therefore agreed to telegram going forward with appropriate reservations concerning informal nature of the proposals. CAD supports the proposals and has so advised General Hilldring. The pertinent portion of the British telegram will read approximately as follows: “4. The following principles were put forward by the Americans. ( a ) Zonal estimates to be coordinated in CRAB on basis of agreed interim policies covering consumption standards and levels of industrial activity. Subject to general guidance agreement should be left to zone commanders, who should so far as possible use CRAB as an informal instrument for obtaining such agreement. Object is to avoid any appearance of establishing without consultation with the Russians policies which might be or appear to be permanent. ( b ) Deficiencies in one zone to be met as far as practicable by surpluses from other zones, ( c ) Zonal programmes of requirements for imports to be submitted simultaneously to Combined Boards by the Governments of the occupying powers separately from any other programmes, ( d ) Instructions to be issued to Combined Boards and any other interested Governmental agencies in U. S. A. and U. K. to ensure equal priorities for programmes of all zones, ( e ) Zone Commanders to have the right to agree as to diversion of supplies from one zone to another in case of emergency. 5. Actual procedure which Americans contemplate can best be described under three heads, ( a ) Procedure inside Germany (para 6 below), ( b ) Procedure outside Germany (para 7 below), ( c ) Financial arrangements (Para 8 below). 6. For procedure inside Germany CRAB should be used acting as specified in Mel 891 of 30 June. 3 7. Procedure outside Germany would be as follows. Import programmes for three zones after agreement in CRAB would be submitted through zone commanders to respective Governments (with copies to other zone commanders for transmission to their Governments). Governments would put programmes through their representatives in Washington to combined boards (presumably after exclusion of non- RCL items which would be procured independently by respective Governments). These programmes would be considered simultaneously by Combined Boards subject naturally to necessity for action on other programmes if any programme were unduly delayed. Combined Boards would be directed to give equal priority to all zonal programmes in making allocations. After allocations were made arrangements for procurement and shipment would be responsibility of respective Governments acting through their own agencies. 8. As regards finance Americans are strongly of opinion that only practicable arrangement is that each country should bear initial financing of procurement for its own zone. This would apply to the French as well as ourselves and to American supplies from U. K. as well as to British supplies from U. S. A. There are two main reasons for this view. First the financing by the U. S. A. of supplies from the U. S. A. for the British and French Zones would inevitably necessitate screening by the War Department in Washington of the programme for the British and French Zones. This would stultify or duplicate one of the functions which it is intended CRAB should perform. It would also in American view increase difficulties of development into quadripartite arrangement since it would in effect transfer to Washington the whole function of approval and control of supplies for Germany. Secondly, War Department have no funds beyond a very limited period to finance supplies for British or French zones and after that limited period (which is almost covered by requirements already stated by SHAEF up to November arrivals and in part already approved and allocated by CCAC) neither War Dept. nor any other U. S. Department has funds for this interim financing. Any proceeds of current exports from Germany would in the American view be made available as a pool out of which repayment would be made to the three (ultimately the four) governments in proportion to the interim financing burden assumed by each. Americans agree that the task of repaying out of Germany’s total resources those who have provided the interim finance of imports should be the joint responsibility of the controlling powers. 9. This telegram has been seen by State Dept. and War Dept.” The formulation of these proposals was governed in considerable part by desire to set up interim tripartite machinery which would be readily expansible to a quadripartite basis. Victory 215 appears to diminish the importance of this consideration but does not incline us to revise our conclusions. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 document No. 877 . 3 Not printed. No. 881 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State Pauley Files No. 881 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Secretary of State 1 Berlin , July 28, 1945. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I am in receipt of a copy of a letter sent by Sir David Waley of the British Delegation to Mr. Maisky. The letter to him states that he accepts the American Plan 2 with a slight amendment clarifying “as a first charge” and adding “the needs of occupying forces”. These amendments are satisfactory to our Delegation. Sincerely yours, Edwin W. Pauley [Enclosure] The Under-Secretary in the British Treasury ( Waley ) to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Maisky ) Berlin , 28 July, 1945. Dear Mr. Maisky : We have now had an opportunity to examine the United States proposal on Reparations and related matters which was handed to us the other night. We are ready to agree in these proposals subject to lines 5, 6 and 7 of paragraph b reading as follows:— “Either to pay, as a first charge, for necessary approved imports not otherwise paid for or, if such payment for imports has been effected, for its own reparation account or for the reparation account of any other United Nation entitled to reparation”[.] The insertion of the words “as a first charge” expresses without ambiguity the point to which we have so often drawn attention. The insertion of the word “reparation” is only a drafting amendment. In this connection it seems desirable to define what we mean by “the needs of the occupying forces” and I enclose a memorandum giving our views on this matter. I am sending a copy of this letter to Ambassador Pauley. I am [etc.] S. D. Waley [Subenclosure] Memorandum by the U. K. Delegation The programme of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole should include the supplies which the Armies of Occupation import in the form of food, petrol, oil lubricants and similar supplies and in the form of non-warlike stores, e. g. medical stores, works stores, furniture, etc. On the other hand, the cost of imported warlike stores (including vehicles and signal equipment as well as such obviously warlike items as guns and ammunition and clothing and also pay and allowances drawn by the troops outside Germany) would be at the cost of the Occupying Forces and not included in the programme of imports which have to be covered by German exports. 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 document No. 925 . No. 882 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 882 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period Text as Submitted to the Foreign Secretaries by Economic Sub - Committee Economic Principles [ Editor’s Note. —The opening paragraphs of this text are identical with paragraphs 10 to 16 of the attachment to document No. 863 , except that: ( a ) The final sentence of paragraph 10 has been amended to read: “Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned, or if not removed shall be destroyed.” ( b ) The changes recommended in paragraphs 3 ( b ) and 3 ( c ) of document No. 878 have been made in paragraphs 14 ( d ) and 13 ( e ) and ( g ), respectively.] 17. Removals as restitution shall be governed by the following: ( a ) Upon application by any Allied Government, restitution may be made of the following categories of property, wherever found, if such property is identifiable and was removed from occupied territory by the enemy by whatever means: 2 (i) Heavy industrial and agricultural equipment, and unique machinery; (ii) Rolling stock and other railroad or transportation equipment; (iii) Works of art, religious, historical, educational, or cultural objects, libraries, scientific equipment, and other laboratory or research materials related to organized inquiry into the arts and sciences. ( b ) All questions of restitution shall be dealt with on behalf of the injured property owners by the Allied Nations of which they are citizens, unless such Allied Nation shall make other arrangements with the Allied Nation from whose territories the property was removed. 18. Appropriate steps shall be taken to exercise control and the power of disposition over German owned external assets, in accordance with the Declaration of ——— 3 1945. 19. Ownership by nationals of United Nations or neutral nations shall not impede the carrying out of Paragraph 10. Removals from Germany of properties of nationals of United Nations or neutral nations shall be governed by the following: ( a ) Properties of nationals of United Nations. (i) Governments of the United Nations shall be invited to submit statements to the Control Council covering the nature and extent of property in Germany of their “respective nationals, and Allied representatives shall have facilities and free access [ to ] such properties for the purpose of investigating claim and appraising properties. (ii) Where practicable and desired by the government of the owner, removal shall be effected without transfer of title. (iii) In all other cases, compensation shall be provided by the establishment of Reichsmark deposits to the account of the government of the owners, on the basis of valuations by the Control Council. The country receiving such removed property shall make arrangements, prior to the removals to liquidate such deposit accounts in acceptable foreign exchange in payments spread over a short period of years. ( b ) Properties of nationals of neutral nations. (i) Governments of neutral nations shall be permitted to file with the Control Council statements covering the nature and extent of property in Germany of their respective nationals [.] Reichsmarks in the amount of the valuations made by the Control Council shall be deposited to the account of such governments by way of compensation. 20. Measures shall be promptly taken: ( a ) to effect essential repair of transport; ( b ) to enlarge coal production; ( c ) to maximize agriculture output; and ( d ) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities. 1 The “Index of Attachments to Summary of the Negotiations in the Economic Sub-Committee” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145) lists this paper as follows: “Proposed Redraft of Economic Principles—not used.” 2 In a copy of this document in the Pauley Files, this entire paragraph is underscored (here represented by italics) to indicate new language. The same is true of paragraph 19 below and its subparagraph ( a ). 3 Blank in the original. No. 883 The Secretary of State and the Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President Truman Papers No. 883 The Secretary of State and the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President [Undated. 1 ] Memorandum for the President German Interim Financing 1. On July 5, 1945, the Secretary of State transmitted to you a memorandum on German interim financing 2 which outlined agreement which exists among the Department of State, the Treasury Department, the War Department and the Foreign Economic Administration regarding proposals which should be made to the British, the French, and the Soviets with respect to procurement and interim financing of essential imports. The principles contained in this memorandum are embodied in the position which the American and British representatives are supporting in this present conference. 3 2. The memorandum of July 5 also recommends that the War Department should assume procurement and initial financial responsibility with respect to all imports into Germany for which the Government of the United States assumes responsibility, and to the United States’ share of any combined financing which may be undertaken in concert with the other occupying powers. A copy of this memorandum is attached. 3. The War Department is prepared to accept such responsibility if you so direct. 4. The War Department under present arrangements will be able to finance all food imports into Germany for whatever zone through October loadings. 5. Testimony before Congress indicated that funds made available for the War Department would not be used for maintenance of zones other than the United States, except for a brief turnover period not extending beyond the current calendar year. 6. With respect to any period of time or any zone, the funds which the War Department has received from the Congress for the present fiscal year are restricted to the prevention of disease and starvation. 7. There is attached a proposed letter of instructions 4 from you to the Secretary of War specifying the objectives for the attainment of which the War Department should assume the necessary import procurement and financing responsibility. These objectives are based on the economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany approved in the present conference. Such letter would serve as a basis for requesting appropriations of the Congress in the event that it should be found necessary to obtain additional appropriations for these purposes. James F Byrnes Secretary of State For the Secretary of War[:] John J McCloy Assistant Secretary of War 1 This memorandum was undoubtedly signed between July 25, the date of Stimson’s departure from Babelsberg, and July 29, the date on which Truman acted on the letter of instructions mentioned in paragraph 7 of the memorandum (see document No. 884 ). 2 document No. 346, printed in vol. i . 3 In an earlier draft of this memorandum, dated July 21, prepared for signature by Byrnes and Stimson (file No. 800.515/7–2145), there is the following additional clause at the end of this sentence: “and which have been transmitted by the Economic Sub-Committee to the Foreign Ministers for decision.” 4 Not attached. For the letter as signed, see document No. 884 . No. 884 The President to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Department of the Army Files No. 884 The President to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) 1 Washington [ Babelsberg ], July 29, 1945. My Dear Mr. Secretary : The following objectives to which a program of minimum required imports for Germany should contribute are laid down in principle No. 14 approved by the Foreign Ministers at the present Tripartite Conference: 2 ( a ) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports. ( b ) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding U. K. and U. S. S. R.) ( c ) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports. ( d ) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein. 3 The War Department is directed to assume procurement and initial financing responsibilities with respect to all imports into Germany for which the Government of the United States assumes responsibility in accordance with the above principles, whether or not an agreed program is 4 formulated and carried out by the Control Council. The War Department, moreover, is directed to assume responsibility for the entire share of the United States of any combined financing which may be undertaken in concert with the occupying powers. 5 In accordance with the memorandum of July 5 from the Secretary of State, 6 you will ensure insofar as practicable, that advances for such imports should be a first charge against exports of German current production, facilities, or stocks on hand from your zone or from Germany as a whole. Harry S. Truman 1 Printed from a copy with an authenticated typed signature. 2 An earlier draft of this letter, attached to the draft memorandum referred to in footnote 3 to document No. 883 , opened with the following three paragraphs: “The following principle with respect to the establishment of a program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole, and for the sharing by the occupying powers of responsibility for the procurement and financing of improved [ approved ] imports has been agreed at the present Tripartite Conference: “‘The Control Council shall formulate as soon as possible a program of minimum required imports for Germany as a whole. Such a program shall include provision for equitable inter-zonal distribution of supplies available within Germany, so as to minimize the net deficit for, and imports into, Germany as a whole. Responsibility for the procurement and financing of approved imports for Germany as a whole shall be shared on a basis to be negotiated in the Control Council. Reimbursement for all net advances made for approved imports into Germany shall be a first charge against the proceeds of both exports of capital equipment and of current production and stocks of goods from Germany.’ (Agreement on this principle has not been reached in the Economic Sub-Committee and the matter has been referred to the Foreign Ministers for determination. This draft must be revised in the light of further action at this conference). “The objectives to which such an import program should contribute are laid down in principle No. 14:”. 3 In the draft referred to in the preceding footnote, subparagraph ( d ) contained the following additional sentence: “For the same purpose no grant of credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign persons or Governments shall be permitted except with the approval of the Control Council.” 4 The draft referred to in footnote 2, ante , contains the additional words “in fact” at this point. 5 The draft referred to in footnote 2, ante , ends at this point, and space is indicated for the signature of the Secretary of State rather than the President. 6 document No. 346, printed in vol. i . No. 885 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2945 No. 885 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 29, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Clayton Summary on German Economic and Related Matters General Understanding —There will have to be one or more basic memoranda on boundaries; “zonal” handling of reparations , and supply. Economic Principles —There is already agreement on principles 10–17. 2 Further action: 3 a . Delete Principle No. 18. b . In view of the decision in fact to give up quadrilateral action on reparations operations and on programming, procuring and financing of imports, the last sentence of paragraph 14 ( d ), already tentatively agreed by the Foreign Ministers, should be amended to read as follows: “except where determined by the occupying power concerned to be required for the payment for necessary imports, no grant or credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign persons or governments shall be permitted”. If agreement cannot be reached with the Russians on this amendment, we should insist on the deletion of the entire sentence. c . A minor improvement would be effected in the document by the following two amendments to paragraph 13: “( e ) Currency and banking , central taxation and customs;” “( g ) Transportation and Communications” Reparations —Mr. Pauley’s memo of July 24. 4 Restitution —Our memo of July 23 5 —section d. U. S. Property —Our two mimeographed memos: Germany and satellites. 6 German External Assets— Proposed statement re vesting of such assets, 7 and proposed directive to General Clay re negotiations [ sic ] of a vesting decree. 8 Satellite Assets in Neutral Countries —Memo to Molotov. 9 Art Objects —Proposed directive to General Clay 10 generally approving his proposal. 11 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 Of the attachment to document No. 863 . 3 Cf. document No. 878 and the Editor’s Note to document No. 882 . 4 Presumably document No. 925 . 5 document No. 916 . 6 Documents Nos. 926 and 842 , respectively. 7 See the attachment to document No. 988 . 8 See document No. 998 . 9 document No. 846 . 10 See the enclosure to document No. 964 . 11 Subattachment to document No. 964 . No. 886 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 886 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Political Principles for Germany Soviet Proposal The Soviet Delegation propose that the following addition be made to the Article 8 paragraph IV of the “Political principles for Germany”: 2 “Assistance, however, will be rendered to the establishment of a central German Administration composed of secretaries for respective branches of government, in the first instance—of central administrative institutions for foreign trade, industry, finance, transport and communications. The Central German Administration shall act under the direction of the Control Council [and it will be their task to coordinate the activities of the Provincial Governments in order to ensure the fulfillment of the decisions of the Control Council and the exercise of functions connected with the solving of problems of an All German character.”] 3 1 Attachment 9 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . 2 document No. 856 . 3 The brackets were inserted in pencil on the original Russian text of this document, and the following comment was written in the margin opposite the bracketed passage: “Secretary Byrnes] suggests out”. See ante , p. 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] . No. 887 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 887 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Political Principles for Germany U. S. Revision of Soviet Proposal 2 The Soviet Delegation propose that the following addition be made to Article 8 paragraph IV of the “Political principles for Germany”: 3 “Assistance, however, will be rendered to the establishment of a central German Administration composed of secretaries for respective branches of administration, in the first instance—of central administrative institutions for foreign trade, industry, finance, transport and communications. The Central German Administration shall act under the direction of the Control Council.[”] 1 Attachment 10 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . 2 For the Soviet proposal, see document No. 886 . 3 document No. 856 . No. 888 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 888 Proposal by the British Delegation [ Babelsberg , July 30, 1945. 1 ] The First Charge The following should be included in the Economic Principles:— “Payment for approved imports into Germany shall be a first charge against the proceeds of exports out of current production and out of stocks of goods.” This corresponds with what Mr. Molotov said at the meeting of Foreign Secretaries on the 23rd July. 2 “Approved imports” means imports approved by the Control Council. If the Control Council does not approve imports which any one of the four Governments regards as essential, a new situation arises and will have to be dealt with by the four Governments. Meanwhile, each Zone Commander remains responsible to his own Government for administering his own Zone. 1 Cf. the Rapporteur’s report on the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30, ante , p. 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] . 2 See ante , p. 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . No. 889 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 889 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 31, 1945. Memorandum The British proposal 2 regarding imports as a first charge as [ sic ] against exports could well be incorporated by adding the language they propose as a last sentence to Section 14–( b ) of the Economic Principles. It would then read as follows. (The British language to be added which we agree to with the exception of the word “approved” is underlined). 3 “14. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary: ( a ) … 4 ( b ) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding U. K. and U. S. S. R.). Payment for approved imports into Germany shall be a first charge against the proceeds of exports out of current production and out of stocks of goods” 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 document No. 888 . 3 Words underlined in the original document are here italicized. 4 Ellipsis in the original. No. 890 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 800.515/7–545 No. 890 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 [ Babelsberg ,] August 1, 1945. I have discussed the attached with Admiral Leahy, who tells me he does not know whether the Secretary has talked to the President about the proposed letter from the President to the Secretary of War 2 on German financing, nor whether the President has signed it. He agrees with me, as does Mr. Despres, that in view of the present form of [the] reparations agreement, 3 it would be unwise, although perhaps not absolutely fatal, for the word “facilities” to be included in the first charge sentence of the directive. I have accordingly prepared the attached second sheet 4 in which this word is omitted. The Admiral thought perhaps you might be able to have this page substituted whether or not the President has actually signed the original. 1 Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. 2 See document No. 884 . 3 See documents Nos. 971 and 972 . 4 The only attachment to this document is a substitute page 2 which is identical with the final paragraph of document No. 884 except that the word ‘facilities” and the commas preceding and following that word are omitted. The proposed substitution was not made. No. 891 The United States Representatives on the Economic Subcommittee to the Secretary of State 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 891 The United States Representatives on the Economic Subcommittee to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] August 1 [1945]—1:00 p.m. Report to the Secretary on the Work of the Economic Subcommittee There is attached the Third Report of the Economic Subcommittee to the Foreign Ministers. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . With respect to Article 19, the discussion indicated that the U. S., U. K. and U. S. S. R. representatives were all in fact in agreement on two paragraphs: “Payment of reparations should leave sufficient resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. “Payment for imports into Germany approved by the Control Council shall be a first charge against the proceeds of exports out of current production and out of stocks of goods.” We felt that we could not agree to report favorably these two paragraphs alone without insisting that the following be recorded in the protocol: “The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 ( a ) and 4 ( b ) of the Reparations Agreement.” 3 The British representatives indicated that they would concur. When the Soviet representatives refused to agree to a report that would have included a statement of the position of the U. S. representatives in this matter, it became necessary to fail to agree on any part of the subject. It had been the understanding of the U. K. and U. S. representatives that in the event Article 19 as indicated above had been agreed upon, it would still have been necessary for you and/or the President to indicate that the general Control Council agreement proclaimed June 5 4 would be operative, that is, if the Control Council failed to agree, each zone commander would still be free to import into his own zone such supplies as his government considered essential, for the payment of which he might assess a first charge on exports from his own zone. [Attachment—Extracts 5 ] Third Report of the Economic Subcommittee to the Foreign Ministers 6 The Economic Subcommittee considered the questions of a statement regarding German external assets 7 and an Article 19 8 of the Economic Principles relating to payment for imports into Germany. The Subcommittee also failed to reach agreement in the matter of an Article 19 of the Economic Principles. 1 Printed from an unsigned copy prepared by the United States. 2 For the paragraphs omitted here, see document No. 1002 . 3 See the attachment to document No. 972 . 4 See Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649. 5 For the other sections of this report, see the attachment to document No. 1002 and document No. 1325 . 6 This report was presented at the Eleventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, August 1. See ante , p. 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] . 7 See document No. 1000 . 8 See documents Nos. 872 , 873 , 875 , and 876 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on the principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1481 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . No. 892 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) 862.50/8–1645: Telegram No. 892 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs ( Thorp ) 1 [Extracts 2 ] secret London , August 16, 1945—5 p.m. 8296. For Thorp from Clayton and Collado. The tenor of a number of recent telegrams addressed to us and to Despres by the Department leads us to believe that we should not await our return before giving a few general explanations on the German economic decisions of Potsdam. … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . With respect to import programs and the financing thereof every attempt will have to be made to agree with the Soviets in the Control Council on an approved program. The Soviets have agreed that approved imports shall be a first charge on exports. If as appears quite likely it becomes impossible to agree upon an approved import program in the Control Council the matter will revert to the zone commanders who will assess their own first charges on exports. At this level it will undoubtedly be desirable to arrange tripartite programs and we would agree with General Clay and General Hilldring that there would be some bargaining advantage on the supply side especially in connection with obtaining coal required from the Ruhr if General Clay had a considerable measure of control over supplies imported from the US and was thus able to do much of the combined programming at his end. With respect to finance the President as you undoubtedly know did sign the directive 3 a copy of which was sent to Phelps and consequently the War Department must assume full US financial responsibility whether we operate on a zonal or a combined basis. General Hilldring who is in London recognizes that of course the reparation agreement decisions with respect to capital equipment supersede any mention of facilities in the last paragraph and that in practice it will not be practicable to assess a first charge against exports of capital equipment to other claimants either. In the first instance the results of joint programming of imports into [ in? ] the Control Council will determine whether there is any use attempting to discuss quadripartite financing. If this becomes impossible we would recommend a tripartite sharing of financial responsibility pending eventual assessment of a first charge on German exports which may take two or three years to work itself oat. In this connection we discussed at Potsdam and have solidified our views in London with respect to the financing of displaced persons in Germany. These are embodied in the following paragraph in our proposal on displaced persons: 4 “The administration 5 is authorized to make agreements with the governments or occupying authorities in control of areas of Germany for the care or transportation of displaced persons provided that the basis [ basic? ] supplies equipment and transportation whether indigenous or imported necessary for the care and transportation of displaced persons within Germany shall not be a charge on the resources of the administration.” We do not wish to put the additional financial burden on UNRRA whose funds will at best be severely limited in relation to demands put upon it; we should point out that the military will have to make most of the supply arrangements in any event; and we do not believe UNRRA is in a position to advance a revolving fund against a first charge on Germany which can be implemented only by the military and after UNRRA ceases to exist. It is possible that the British may resist this proposal and General Hilldring has indicated objection to UNRRA operations unless UNRRA does the financing. We strongly believe that such objections should be overruled. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State over the signature of Winant. 2 For the portions of this message omitted here, see document No. 979 . 3 document No. 884 . 4 For presentation at the UNRRA Council meeting at London in August 1945. 5 i. e., UNRRA. Reparations, restitution, and war booty Reparations, restitution, and war booty [[Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [893] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 16, 1945. 740.0011 E. W./7–1645 [894] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg, July 17, 1945.] Truman Papers [895] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 17 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [896] The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State Frankfurt [sic], July 17, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1745 [897] The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Washington,] July 17, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–1745: Telegram [898] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Acting Head of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Sprout) Babelsberg, July 17, 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [899] The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Moscow, 18 July 1945. Pauley Files: Telegram [900] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 18, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [901] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] Pauley Files [902] Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Babelsberg, July 20, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [903] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Acting Secretary of State Babelsberg, July 21, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–2145: Telegram [904] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [905] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [906] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg, July 21, 1945.] 740.00119 EW/7–2145 [907] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg, July 22, 1945.] 740.00119 EW/7–2245 [908] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg, July 22, 1945.] 740.00119 EW/7–2245 [909] The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Babelsberg,] July 22, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [910] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 22, 1945. Pauley Files [911] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] Pauley Files [912] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations [Babelsberg,] July 22 [21?], 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [913] The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Moscow, 23 July 1945. Pauley Files: Telegram [914] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Washington Liaison Officer for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Kindleberger) Babelsberg, July 23, 1945. 862.65/7–2345: Telegram [915] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 23, 1945. Pauley Files [916] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 23, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 [917] Proposal by the British Delegation [ Babelsberg ,] 23rd July, 1945. Pauley Files [918] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg, July 23, 1945.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 [919] The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Moscow, 24 July 1945. Pauley Files: Telegram [920] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [921] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/6–1945 [922] Draft of Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Undated.] Pauley Files [923] Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Babelsberg, July 24, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [924] The Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) Potsdam, July 24, 1945. Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference [925] Proposal by the United States Delegation July 24 [25?], 1945 740.00119 Potsdam/8–245 [926] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–2545 [927] The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) [Babelsberg, July 25, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2545 [928] The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Moscow, 25 July 1945. Pauley Files: Telegram [929] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. Pauley Files [930] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. 740.00119 E. W./7–2545 [931] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] Pauley Files [932] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] 740.00119 EW/7–2545 [933] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [934] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [935] United States Delegation Working Paper Babelsberg, July 26, 1946. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [936] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] Pauley Files [937] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] Pauley Files [938] The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) [Washington,] July 26 [1945.] 740.00119 E.W./7–2645: Telegram [939] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg, July 27, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [940] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 27, 1945. Pauley Files [941] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 28, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–2845 [942] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 28, 1945. Pauley Files [943] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg, July 28, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [944] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) [Babelsberg,] July 28, 1945. Pauley Files [945] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) Berlin, July 29, 1945. Pauley Files [946] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State Berlin, July 29, 1945. Pauley Files [947] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2945 [948] The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) [Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2945 [949] The Adviser on Administration and Political Science on the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Gulick) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) [Undated.] Pauley Files [950] The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany (Zhukov) to Generalissimo Stalin [Undated.] 740.00119 E. W./7–3045 [951] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President Berlin, July 29, 1945. Truman Papers [952] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2945 [953] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg, July 29, 1945.] Pauley Files [954] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. Pauley Files [955] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. Pauley Files [956] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State Berlin, July 30, 1945. Pauley Files [957] Memorandum by the General Counsel of the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Marshall) [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. Pauley Files [958] The President to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater (Eisenhower) Berlin, July 30, 1945. Department of the Army Files [959] Mr. Josiah E. DuBois, Jr., of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations, to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) [Undated.] Pauley Files [960] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [961] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [962] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [963] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [?] [Undated.] Pauley Files [964] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [965] The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] 31 July 1945. Department of the Army Files [966] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 31, 1945. Pauley Files [967] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg, July 31, 1945.] Pauley Files [968] The General Counsel of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Marshall) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) [Babelsberg,] July 31, 1945. Pauley Files [969] Memorandum by the General Counsel of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Marshall) [Babelsberg,] July 31, 1945. Pauley Files [970] Draft of Report by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany [Undated.] Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference [971] Text Considered by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany [Undated.] Pauley Files [972] Report by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany [Babelsberg, August 1, 1945.] Truman Papers [973] The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) [Babelsberg,] August 1, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [974] Draft Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) Babelsberg, August 1, 1945. Pauley Files [975] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) and the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany (Clay) Babelsberg, August 1, 1945. 740.00119 EW/9–2045 [976] The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) [Babelsberg,] August 1, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–645 [[Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [977] The Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) to the Secretary of State Berlin, August 2, 1945. 740.00119 EW/8–245 [978] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Secretary of State London, August 14, 1945—8 p.m. 862.515/8–1445: Telegram [979] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) London, August 16, 1945—5 p.m. 862.50/8–1645: Telegram [980] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) and the Associate Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Lubin) to the President [Washington, September 20, 1945.] 740.00119 EW/9–2045 Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Papers relating to general statements of principle on the exaction of reparations from Germany and on the relative priority to be given reparations and imports as a charge against the proceeds of German exports are printed ante , page 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 848 ] , under the heading: Germany—Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period. Papers on special aspects of the reparations question are printed under the following headings: ( a ) Germany—External Assets, post , page 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] ; and ( b ) Germany— The Rhineland and the Ruhr, post , page 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 1021 ] . No. 893 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 E. W./7–1645 No. 893 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Secretary of State [ Babelsberg ,] July 16, 1945. My Dear Mr. Secretary : Because reparations must include all transfers of property within the whole of the German Reich as its boundaries existed at the end of the year 1937, the relationship between reparations and ceded German territory has been given considerable study by our delegation. Upon this subject, I attach a memorandum embodying four provisions which I strongly recommend be included as a part of any agreement entered into by the United States confirming the ceding of any portion of Germany to other nations. Respectfully, Edwin W. Pauley [Attachment] Memorandum by the United States Section, Allied Commission on Reparations 1 Re: Relationship between Reparations and ceded German territory As a part of any agreement confirming the ceding of any portion of Germany as its boundaries existed at the end of 1937, it shall be provided that: 1. Any property or current production available for removal from any ceded territory shall be first utilized within Germany to whatever extent occupation authorities require to avoid the necessity of imports into Germany; 2. Thereafter, the value or proceeds of any property or current production from any ceded territory available for delivery outside of Germany shall be first used to pay for approved imports into Germany; 3. If sufficient funds are available to pay for all such approved imports, the proceeds or value of any assets delivered from any ceded territory shall be treated as a reparations deliveries [ delivery ] to such nation or nations and in such amounts as may be designated by the Allied Commission on Reparations, or a permanent Reparations Agency to be created; 4. The value of all property remaining within the boundaries of any territory ceded to any other nation shall be counted as reparations. To the extent that the current production of any such property is required to be delivered for reparations, or, to defray the cost of approved imports into Germany, an appropriate adjustment in the value of such property shall be made. 1 Authorship not indicated. This paper was used in the Pauley-Monckton meeting of July 15. See vol. i , document No. 380 . No. 894 Proposal by the United States Delegation Truman Papers No. 894 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg , July 17, 1945.] German Reparations Agreed Principles. The Allied Commission on Reparations has agreed on seven basic principles (text attached). Principle for Decision. The Commission has failed to reach agreement on the underscored last clause of an eighth principle: “After payment of reparations, enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany, the necessary means must be provided for payment of imports approved by the governments concerned before reparation deliveries are made from current production or from stocks of goods.” 2 The United States Government fully concurs in these principles and must insist that such necessary imports as are approved by our governments shall constitute a first charge against exports from Germany of current production and stocks of goods. To do otherwise, will lead either to a repetition of our mistakes at the end of the last war, or leave us unable to bring about the desired industrial disarmament of Germany. Definitions and Allocation of Reparations. The United States proposes immediate agreement on definitions of restitution, war booty, and reparations (text attached). The Commission has agreed on a formula for allocation of reparations between the U. S. S. R., U. K. and U. S. and a procedure for settling the division of reparations among other countries (texts attached). The United States Government feels that the definitions of restitution, war booty, and reparations are so interrelated with the formulae for allocation of reparations that agreement must be reached on all of these matters simultaneously. [Attachment 1] Agreed Principles of Reparations I. Removals of property for reparations shall be primarily such as to assist in bringing to an end the war-making power of Germany by eliminating that part of Germany’s industrial capacity which constitutes war potential. II. Reparations shall be such as will speed recovery and reconstruction in countries devastated at German hands. III. For the purposes of making a reparations plan, Germany will be treated as a single economic unit. IV. Any plan of reparations shall be avoided which necessitates external financial assistance either to enable reparations deliveries to be made or to facilitate economic reconstruction required for reparation purposes, or which might, in the opinion of the Governments concerned, prejudice the successful execution of the task entrusted to the Armies of Occupation. V. To a maximum extent reparations shall be taken from existing national wealth of Germany. While for convenience claims may be stated in money, it is necessary to bear in mind that in contrast to reparations after World War I which were assessed and exacted in money, this time reparations will be assessed and exacted in kind in the form of things, such as plants, machines, equipment, stocks, foreign investments, etc. VI. In order to avoid building up German industrial capacity and disturbing the long term stability of the economies of the United Nations, long run payment of reparations in the form of manufactured products shall be restricted to a minimum. VII. In justice to those countries occupied by the enemy, reparations shall be calculated upon the basis that the average living standards in Germany during the reparation period shall not exceed the average of the standards of living of European countries. European countries means all European countries excluding U.K. and U.S.S.R. [Attachment 2] Proposed Definitions The United States proposes that: 1.) Restitution shall be confined to identifiable artistic, religious and cultural objects existing at the date of the invasion of the territories from which such objects have been removed, insofar as such objects can be recovered and irrespective of the form of dispossession by which they came into enemy hands. While any nation entitled to reparation may be allowed a prior claim for the return of certain other particular types of identifiable property removed by the enemy, the value of such property, if returned, shall be entered on the reparation account of such nation. 2.) War booty shall be limited to finished equipment and supplies produced for and belonging to the German armed forces exclusive of any facilities used to produce such equipment or supplies. 3.) Except for property transferred as restitution, war booty or exports to pay for approved imports, all property in the territory within the boundaries of the German Reich as it existed on December 31, 1937 shall be subject to reparations. [Attachment 3] Agreed in the Allied Commission on Reparations 3 In accordance with the principles established at the Crimean Conference, namely, that the countries entitled to the greatest share of reparations are those which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy, 4 the Allied Commission on Reparations agrees that the total sum of reparations (including both what is received on account of removals from the national wealth of Germany and what is received from annual deliveries after capitulation) will be distributed as follows: Of the total U.S.S.R 56% U. K. 22% U. S. A. 22% Total 100% To meet the validated claims for reparations on the part of the other nations, as determined by mutual agreement of the three powers, each of the three powers will give up from their share in the ratio that each share bears to the total. [Attachment 4] Agreed in the Allied Commission on Reparations 3 Procedure for Settling the Division of Reparations Between Countries Other Than the U. K., U. S. A., and U. S. S. R. 1. The Allied Commission on Reparations will send a communication as soon as possible through the Governments of the U. K., U. S. A., and U. S. S. R. inviting all the United Nations that have taken a direct part in the war with Germany to submit within one month to the Allied Commission on Reparations through their Diplomatic Representatives in Moscow, or otherwise, statements showing data for establishing their reparations claims against Germany and the value of German pre-war assets in their territory. The nature of the data to be submitted will be determined subsequently. 2. On receipt of the data the Allied Commission on Reparations will decide as a basis of discussion on a provisional list of countries entitled to receive reparations and also on the percentage to be allotted to each of them. 3. The Allied Commission on Reparations will in such form as is found to be convenient enter into negotiations with the United Nations whose claims to reparations are considered to be well founded with the object of securing their agreement to the percentage of reparations which has been provisionally suggested by the Allied Commission on Reparations. 4. If the said negotiations with the United Nations whose claims to reparations have been recognized are successful the Allied Commission on Reparations through the member Governments will send to these nations a further communication inviting them to take part in a special conference for the conclusion of a general agreement on reparations between the interested nations. If however the preliminary negotiations prove not sufficiently successful to make it possible to call a conference of this kind the Allied Commission on Reparations will consider afresh in the light of the factual material in its possession the question of the further steps required. 5. A Communication will be sent to the United Nations whose claims to reparations have not been approved informing them of the decision of the Allied Commission on Reparations with an indication of the reasons for that decision. 1 Annex i to document No. 852 , circulated at the First Plenary Meeting, July 17. See ante , p. 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . Although this paper is marked annex i , there is no other annex. Concerning the origin of this document, see document No. 980 . 2 Words in italics were underscored in the original. Cf. vol. i , documents Nos. 375 and 376 . 3 See vol. i , document No. 376 . 4 See document No. 1416 , section v . 3 See vol. i , document No. 376 . No. 895 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 895 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1 secret C. C. S. 706/14 ( Terminal ) [ Babelsberg ,] 17 July 1945. Disposal of Enemy War Materiel in Germany and Austria Reference: CCS 706/11 2 The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve Appendices “A” and “B” to C. C. S. 706/11 as amended herein. [Appendix A—Paraphrase] secret Draft Message * Message to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force , 3 and to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, 4 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff; to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater, 3 from the United States Chiefs of Staff; and to the Commander in Chief, British Forces of Occupation in Germany, 5 from the British Chiefs of Staff . The London Munitions Assignments Board is being authorized to assign surrendered or captured enemy materiel ( unless it is of non-German origin ) in the hands of Britishor American-commanded forces in Austria and Germany to the forces of those countries employed in furtherance of the agreed strategy in the war against Japan. After the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, unless agreement has been reached in the Control Council , the respective Chiefs of Staff will issue further instructions to the commanding officers of the British and United States zones of occupation with respect to treatment of enemy materiel which is in excess of the requirements of the military commanders and in excess of the materiel needed to fill the requirements of the London Munitions Assignments Board. Pending the receipt of such instructions, no such materiel should be destroyed except in so far as such destruction is required for military and public security . The above message is in reply to Scaf 447, 6 which is being repeated to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, today. [Appendix B—Paraphrase] secret Draft Message to the London Munitions Assignments Board Until the countries which are members of the European Advisory Commission have agreed upon a disposal policy, and until such an agreed policy is implemented, the London Munitions Assignments Board is authorized to assign surrendered or captured enemy materiel ( unless it is of non-German origin ) † in the hands of British- or American-commanded forces in Austria and Germany to the forces of those countries which will use such materiel in furtherance of the agreed strategy in the war against Japan. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 197th Meeting, July 20. See ante , p. 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] . 2 document No. 361, printed in vol. i . * Words underscored are proposed additions. Words italicized are proposed deletions. [Footnote in the source copy.] 3 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. 4 Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander. 3 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. 5 Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery. 6 See vol. i , document No. 361 , appendix D. † Words underscored are proposed additions. [Footnote in the source copy.] No. 896 The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1745 No. 896 The Political Adviser in Germany ( Murphy ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 661 Frankfurt [ sic ], July 17, 1945. Subject: Transfer of Scientific and Military Research Institutions From Germany to Russia Sir : I have the honor to enclose a memorandum regarding the transfer to Russia of the personnel and equipment of certain scientific institutions in Berlin. This memorandum was received from a German lawyer who is known by officers of my staff who resided in Berlin before the war and who vouch for his reliability. Respectfully yours, Robert Murphy [Enclosure—Translation] secret Berlin , 14 July 1945. Transfer of Military Research and Scientific Institutions to Soviet Russia The dismantling and shipping out of laboratories and industries essential in the production of secret weapons may be described by two examples. Thus, for instance, was the case with the institutes and inventors of the V–l and V–2, situated in Lichterfelde and Lankwitz, which were transported to Russia, together with their apparatus, laboratories and drawings, assistants and technical workers, and existing and new, as yet unknown, patents. It was significant that these military institutes and research plants were immediately and arbitrarily taken apart and shipped complete, with the greatest speed, to the East in Russian military transport vehicles. Following is a report on the liquidation of the most important and largest scientific research plant, the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft in Berlin. i . Due to its measures for decentralizing to West and South Germany—1943/44—only a part of the scientific stock—material and personnel—of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft was taken over by the Russian occupation. The institutions of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft situated in Berlin, Mark Brandenburg, and the territory between the Elbe and the Oder, were all discovered by the Russians and their stock was liquidated. ii. the dahlem kreis of the Kaiser-wilhelm-gesellschaft 1. The Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry ( Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für physikalische Chemie und Elektrochemie ) had stayed behind in Berlin in full working strength. After the capitulation of Berlin, deputies appeared from Moscow (trophy skeleton staffs under technical officers), who began at once the work of dismantling. These measures were undertaken precipitately, only partially in a more reasonable manner, according to the probability of the approach of the American or Western Allied forces. During this dismantling work the head of the institute—Professor Thiessen—was told that he could have his institute back in Russia. Professor Thiessen is going to Russia with some of his scientific coworkers. However, his change-over, at first to the Russian zone in Berlin, took place only after the arrival of the American troops in Dahlem. Three younger scientific co-workers escaped being taken by means of disappearing (under threat of force). Except for a small amount of stock, the institute has been cleared out. 2. The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics ( Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Physik ) was headed until the outbreak of war in 1939 by Professor Debye, the well known physicist of Netherlands nationality, who went to the United States during the war and is probably still there. The management of the institute was taken over by Professor Heisenberg, who moved himself and the greater part of the institute to Hechingen. The low-temperature physics ( Kaltephysik ) section remained in Berlin under the management of Dr. Bewilogua, and has been moved to Moscow. In this connection, the whole institute, together with apparatus from other sections, for instance high tension and Rontgen plants, was moved out. This move embraced the most primitive furnishings, such as water faucets, washbowls, doorknobs, etc.; even the name Max-Planck-Institut was taken along. In this institute there were the general administration archives of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, which had been saved from the demolished Berliner Schloss. In spite of urgent representations, the safe with all foundation and tradition documents, senate decisions and all other important deeds was carried off to the East. Dr. Bewilogua has already left for Moscow, and together with him the Nobel-prizewinner Hertz, the physicist von Ardenne (V–l and, V–2), as well as other inventors and outstanding technical scientistfs]. 3. Furthermore, of the Dahlemer subsidiary institutes (main institute moved to southwestern Germany), the following have been affected by the dismantling program: Institute for Biology ( Institut für Biologie ) Institute for Biochemistry ( Institut für Biochemie ) Institute for Chemistry ( Institut für Chemie ) Institute for Anthropology ( Institut für Anihropologie ) Silicate Research Institute ( Institut für Silikaiforschung ). iii . kaiser wilhelm institutes between the elbe and the oder 1. Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Seed Cultivation Research ( Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Züchiungsforschung ) in Müncheberg (Mark Brandenburg). The buildings have been preserved as a whole; at present a Russian staff is in the institute. The plants, particularly the extensive greenhouses and laboratories, are in Russian hands. 2. Institute for Cell-Physiology ( Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Zellphysiologie ), Director Professor Warburg. Professor Warburg had moved his institute to Schloss Liebenberg bei Lowenberg i[n] d[er] Mark. In Dahlem the Russians promised that Professor Warburg’s institute (Rockefeller Foundation, relationship of Professor Warburg with the banking house New York, Hamburg) was to be safe from evacuation measures. Nevertheless, the stock of the institute was removed from Liebenberg. This stock is supposed to be still in Spandau. 3. There is as yet no reliable news regarding the Institute for Raw Fibre Research ( Institut für Bastfaserforschung ) in Sorau. No. 897 The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 740.00119 EW/7–1745: Telegram No. 897 The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 secret us urgent [ Washington ,] July 17, 1945. 40. (For Clayton.) British note of July 9 2 refers to Pauley’s communication on June 27 to Monckton of paraphrase of his instructions 3 to his representative at Frankfurt 4 and raises whole question of arrangements for interim exports from Germany pending assumption by ACC of responsibility in this field. Note communicates draft of British views on such exports, excluding movement for purposes of restitution, on which position is reserved, which has been sent to Monckton for discussion with Pauley. British hope to get Pauley to modify his instructions to his representative, to reach agreement on instructions for British and US zones, then to approach Maisky jointly. British interpretation of Pauley’s instructions to his representative differs from that held by Department, ETOUSA and Judge Rosenman. Difficulty arises over ambiguity in paragraph 2 of Pauley’s instructions (2298 from Moscow to Department, June 27 5 ), which states that approval shall be given by Pauley representative to exports from US zone for purposes of reconstruction provided receipts are signed leaving open questions of restitution, reparation, etc. Context of telegram, including introductory remarks and first sentence of paragraph under reference, made clear this approval was required only for property asked for by way of restitution. Department proposes to reply to British note first on question of Pauley’s involvement in questions of interim exports. Reply will state that his approval is required only on goods asked for by way of restitution, although he has an interest, pending the conclusion of agreements by the Reparation Commission on interim exports and their adoption by governments, in holding open the question of whether exports not asked for by way of restitution are exported on reparation, restitution or commercial account for which payment will later be required in acceptable currency. This interest is protected by receipts to be given by importing country. Meanwhile General Eisenhower has responsibility for availabilities, collection of information on requirements of Allied countries, and allocations. Judge Rosenman has agreed to this interpretation of the power of control sought and obtained by Pauley from President. He is anxious, however, to clear this matter with Pauley before replying to British Government either on jurisdiction or substance. Will you ascertain whether Pauley agrees with this position? Copy of letter to Pauley, British note and draft preliminary reply 6 will be sent you in Thursday pouch. Telegram sent against possibility Pauley will return to Moscow before letter arrives. [ Grew ] 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg. 2 document No. 372, printed in vol. i . 3 See vol. i , document No. 360 . 4 Francis W. H. Adams. 5 See vol. i , document No. 360, footnote 1 . 6 None printed. No. 898 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Acting Head of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Sprout) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 898 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Acting Head of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Sprout ) secret priority Babelsberg , July 17, 1945. Victory 52. Please have Abramovitz cable at once the following (1) what percentage of German prewar capital assets (From Pauley for Sproul for Abramovitz) were located in zone allocated to USSR (2) estimate of value of German movable capital assets in 1938 east of Oder Neisse line (3) approximate estimate of value of industrial and mining output of this area for the year 1938. Confrep 2. No. 899 The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Pauley Files: Telegram No. 899 The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) 1 secret priority Moscow , 18 July 1945. To US Headquarters Berlin District Visitors Bureau for Ambassador from Sproul, Abramovitz and Bergson signed Deane M 25043. ( Confmess 5) 1. Approximately 40 per cent of both movable and fixed capital assets before the war were located in Russian Zone. This includes Berlin. 2. Movable capital assets east of Oder–Neisse line were worth about 6 Billion Reichsmarks in 1938. This was about 12 per cent of total Germany. This does not include value of land, mineral reserves, fixed plant, housing, commercial establishments or commercial and manufacturing inventories. Values are net after depreciation. Present value probably not less than in 1938. 3. Based on value added, industrial and mining output. Area east of Oder Neisse was about 28 Billion Reichsmarks in 1938. This was about 7 per cent of total Germany. 4. It should be noted that because of dislocations involved, loss of territory may affect Germany’s capacity to pay in somewhat greater degree than percentage figures above would suggest. 1 Sent by the United States Military Mission, Moscow, via Army channels. No. 900 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 900 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 18, 1945. My Dear Mr. Secretary : The attached memorandum on the relationship between reparations and ceded German territory embodies what we believe to be certain improvements over a similar memorandum submitted to you in my letter of July 16th. 2 The purpose of this proposal is quite simple. It aims to distribute reparation burdens as well as benefits among those receiving ceded German territory. The first three points provide that any exportable surpluses of commodities from any ceded territory shall be subject to the following priorities: First, Shipment into Germany to such extent as these commodities are needed to sustain minimum subsistence. Second, To pay for imports into Germany where needed to sustain minimum subsistence. Third, For payment into the general reparation fund to be allocated among claimant nations. The fourth and last point provides that the value of capital equipment and natural resources located in any ceded territory shall be accounted for as reparations delivered to the receiving nation. Since I understand that the subject of the eastern boundaries of Germany will be considered at today’s meeting of the beads of the Governments, I urge that you give this subject your immediate personal consideration. Respectfully, Edwin W. Pauley [Attachment] Memorandum by the United States Section, Allied Commission on Reparations Re: Relationship between Reparations and ceded German territory. As a part of any treaty recognizing the ceding of any portion of Germany as its boundaries existed at the end of 1937, it shall be provided that: One . Any property or current production available for removal from any ceded territory shall be first utilized within Germany to whatever extent occupation authorities require to avoid the necessity of imports into Germany. Two . Thereafter, the value or proceeds of any property or current production from any ceded territory available for delivery outside of Germany shall be first used to pay for approved imports into Germany. Three . If sufficient funds are available to pay for all such approved imports, the proceeds or value of any assets delivered from any ceded territory shall be treated as a reparations delivery to such nation or nations and in such amounts as may be designated by the Allied Commission on Reparations, or a permanent Reparations Agency to be created. Four . The value of capital equipment and natural resources within the boundaries of any territory ceded from Germany to any other nation shall be accounted for as reparations. To the extent that the production of such equipment or resources is pledged for reparations or to pay for approved imports into Germany, the reparation value of such equipment and resources shall be correspondingly decreased. (Practically, the foregoing obligations may well have to be funded both in the form of agreements to deliver certain fixed quantities of coal, zinc, coke, iron, steel, cement, calcinated soda, etc., for a definite period of years, and by reducing the amount of reparations which will be delivered to the nation receiving ceded territory or delivered to another nation for whose security territory may be ceded.[)] 1 Printed from a copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 document No. 893 . No. 901 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 901 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Gold 1. The U. S. may be committed by various international declarations 2 to restore any identifiable gold to the banks in liberated nations from which it was taken by the Germans. 2. Most of the gold (some $250,000,000.) in our possession will prove identifiable. 3. Although it can be argued that all gold when captured is “war booty”, it may be advisable not to insist upon such a claim. ( a ) It might be construed as breaking our commitments referred to above; ( b ) It might tend further to undermine the “gold standard”—certainly contrary to our own interests in view of our already large gold stocks. 4. But whether or not we should yield our claim to gold as “war booty” may be regarded as a bargaining point which will turn upon how far other Nations yield to our views on reasonable definitions of both “restitution”, “war booty” and an accounting therefor. It also provides a lever to use in connection with the French who probably will assert the largest claim for “restitution” of gold in our possession. 1 Authorship not indicated. This paper bears the following manuscript notation: “Note used for discussion with President at Potsdam, about July 18.” 2 Viz., the United Nations declaration on looted property, January 5, 1943, Department of State Bulletin , vol. viii , p. 21; the United Nations declaration on looted gold, February 22, 1944, 9 Federal Register 2096; and resolution vi , entitled “Enemy Assets and Looted Property”, included in the Final Act of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, July 22, 1944, Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948; Department of State publication No. 2866), vol. i , p. 939. No. 902 Report by the Economic Subcommittee 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 902 Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Extract 1 ] top secret [ Babelsberg , July 20, 1945. 2 ] Report of the Economic Sub-Committee to the Foreign Secretaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Allied Commission on Reparations has agreed on seven basic principles. The Sub-Committee recommend that these principles (Annex 1 3 ) should be accepted. The Allied Commission on Reparations failed to reach agreement on the underscored last clause of an eighth principle: “After payment of reparations, enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany, the necessary means must be provided for payment of imports approved by the Governments concerned before reparation deliveries are made .” 4 As stated above, the Sub-Committee have been unable to reach agreement on this point. The Sub-Committee, at the request of the Soviet representative, have postponed discussion of definitions of reparations, restitution and war booty. 5 The Sub-Committee were informed that the Allied Commission on Reparations had agreed on a formula for allocation of reparations between the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. and a procedure for settling the division of reparations among other countries, the texts of which are attached as Annexes III and IV. 6 The United States representatives feel 7 that the definition of restitution, war booty and reparations are [ sic ] so interrelated with the formulae for allocation of reparations that agreement must be reached on all of these matters simultaneously. The Sub-Committee therefore make no recommendations on these matters at the present time. 1 For the other sections of this report, see document No. 863 . 2 So dated in an “Index of Attachments to Summary of the Negotiations in the Economic Sub-Committee” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145), but not considered by the Foreign Ministers until July 21. See ante , p. 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] . 3 Annex i is identical with attachment 1 to document No. 894 . 4 The passage here printed in italics was underscored in the original. 5 This paragraph does not appear in a draft of this report found in Frankfurt USPolAd Files. Instead, there is the following additional sentence at the beginning of the next paragraph: “The Sub-Committee have not up to the present been able to reach agreement on definitions of restitution and war booty.” 6 Annexes in and iv are identical, respectively, with attachments 3 and 4 to document No. 894 . 7 The draft referred to in footnote 5, ante , reads: “The United States Government feels”. No. 903 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 EW/7–2145: Telegram No. 903 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Babelsberg , July 21, 1945. Victory 149. Acting Secretary of State Washington from Clayton. While Pauley concurs in Department’s interpretation of his instructions to Adams, (reurtel No. 40 of July 18 [ 17 ], 1945 1 ) in view of Soviet efforts to subordinate payment for necessary imports into Germany to delivery for reparations of even current production of [ sic ] stocks of goods in Germany, he emphasizes his interest, as suggested in your wire, in securing payment or an enforceable obligation for payment of all interim exports of current production and stocks of goods. The whole question of approved imports into Germany as constituting a first charge on all exports of current production and stocks of goods from Germany has been submitted to the heads of government here and it may be advisable to delay reply to British note 2 until this issue is resolved. 1 document No. 897 . 2 document No. 372, printed in vol. i . No. 904 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 904 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation?] secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 21, 1945. Soviet Draft Under the “war trophies” is understood: 1). All military supplies and equipment of Germany, including all supplies and military equipment, which belong, [were] 2 being used or have to be used by the military and para military units of the enemy or by the members of these units; 2). All supplies and equipment used by the enemy to satisfy his military needs and captured by the Allies before the end of the war on territories where military operations were conducted. 1 A variant copy in the Pauley Files of this proposal and of that in document No. 905 is headed, “Following Definitions Submitted by the Soviet Government to the Economic Sub-Committee July 21, 1945”. A copy in Frankfurt USPolAd Files has the following notation by Murphy: “Maisky insists that the Soviet Union has the right to take and remove anything & everything from its zone of occupation. ‘Maybe we won’t exercise it.’” 2 Manuscript interpolation in a copy of this document in the Pauley Files. This copy is marked: “As presented by Maiski”. Another copy in these files is marked: “Note: Mr. Maisky says Equipment means, plants, machinery, coal mines, etc.—You have a right to take them, but of course you may yield your right here and there.” No. 905 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 905 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation?] secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 21, 1945. Soviet Proposal 1. Restitution is limited to property which can be identified as having existed at the moment of enemy occupation of the territory from which this property was removed, as well as property which came into existence on the said territory during the period of enemy occupation, if this can be established and irrespective of the manner in which it fell into the hands of the enemy. 2. As regards property which was destroyed by the enemy or utilized or lost value as a result of enemy action, the right is retained to replace it by similar or comparable property only in the case of objects of unique character such as works of art, historical objects, libraries, unique installations, etc. 3. The injured country retains the right to make claims within the limits defined in paragraphs 1 and 2 to restitution in respect of property removed by the enemy which is found in any third country. 4. It is moreover agreed that all questions of restitution will be dealt with on behalf of the injured property owners by the State of which they are citizens. 1 A variant copy in the Pauley Files of this proposal and of that in document No. 904 is headed, “Following Definitions Submitted by the Soviet Government to the Economic Sub-Committee July 21, 1945”. A copy in Frankfurt USPolAd Files bears the following manuscript notation by Murphy: “Submitted by Maisky”. No. 906 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 EW/7–2145 No. 906 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg , July 21, 1945.] Restitution and Replacement In the view of the U. K. Delegation Restitution should be confined to the restoration of identifiable property existing at the date of the invasion of the territories from which the property had been removed , in so far as it can be recovered and irrespective of the form of dispossession by which it had come into enemy hands. As regards replacement in kind, i. e. replacement of property, which cannot be traced or has been destroyed, by similar or comparable enemy property, this should only be permitted in the case of works of art; and only then provided such replacement did not take a form which would be contrary to the general interests of learning ( e. g. the removal of a work of art from a place with which it was traditionally associated and where it was well presented, to some obscure and unsuitable surroundings ). Other claims to replacement of unidentifiable and irrecoverable looted property should not receive any special priority but should be aggregated with all other claims for reparations. 1 The file copy bears the following manuscript notation by Mosely: “UK paper July 21, 1945.” A copy in Frankfurt USPolAd Files bears the following manuscript notation by Murphy: “Submitted by Sir Walter Monckton” (presumably in the Economic Subcommittee). In Murphy’s copy only the last fourteen words in the first paragraph are underscored. No. 907 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 EW/7–2245 No. 907 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg , July 22, 1945.] Restitution 1. Restitution shall be limited to the following categories as identifiable property, wherever found, if such property was removed from occupied territory by the enemy by whatever means: a ) Heavy industrial and agricultural equipment. b ) Machine tools and unique machinery. c ) Rolling stock and other railroad or transportation equipment. d ) Works of art, religious or cultural objects, libraries, scientific equipment, and other laboratory or research materials related to organized inquiry into the arts and sciences. Provided, that with respect to this category of property, lost or destroyed objects may be replaced by similar or comparable enemy property. In passing upon any claim for such replacement, the deciding authorities shall take into account whether the transfer would conflict with the general interest of science and the arts. 2. All questions of restitution shall be dealt with on behalf of the injured property owners by the State of which they are citizens, unless such State shall make other arrangements with the State from whose territories the property was removed. 1 The file copy bears the following manuscript notation by Mosely: “Collado July 22, 1945, Potsdam”. No. 908 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 EW/7–2245 No. 908 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg , July 22, 1945.] Suggested Position on Economic Questions Relating to Germany, Poland, and Reparations 1. The Allied Commission on Reparations in Moscow has made important progress, agreeing on a number of principles and providing the basis on which other major issues can be settled at this conference. With such decisions, the task of “reparations” becomes largely an operating problem. The Commission has therefore completed its work, and future operations fall within the competence of the Control Council and the Zone Commanders. There shall be established a committee of representatives of United Nations which participated directly in the war to advise the Control Council on allocation among claimants. 2. The agreed material on economic treatment of Germany and reparations contained in the report of the Economic Sub-Committee 2 shall be approved. 3. A definition of restitution shall be adopted and representatives of the Allied Nations shall be permitted to move freely about the four zones and shall be given appropriate facilities to identify their property falling within this definition. 4. No attempt shall be made to distinguish between “war booty” and “reparaturns” as regards capital equipment within the 1937 German borders. The Control Council shall establish detailed policies with respect to industrial disarmament and the kinds and quantities of capital equipment which must be destroyed or removed (Economic Principles #10 and 14 a ). 3 Within the framework of such policies, the Zone Commanders shall administer the removals of capital equipment from their respective zones. 5. In practice Soviet and Polish claims will be met from the eastern zone. 6. There is agreement in the Economic Sub-Committee that sufficient exports from Germany must be set aside to pay for necessary imports as well as to provide immediate means for reimbursement for all net advances made by the occupying powers for financing necessary imports into Germany. Goods available from current production and stocks in hand for reparation deliveries shall be administered as set forth in 1, 4 and 5. 7. Arrangements shall be made for the exchange between areas occupied and administered by Poland and the rest of Germany of foodstuffs, coal, and other necessary products customarily provided from the eastern area for products of the other regions of Germany, in order that there may be achieved the objectives of Economic Principle #14, especially paragraphs ( b ) and ( c ). 1 The file copy bears the following manuscript notation by Mosely: “Collado July 22, 1945 Potsdam”. 2 Documents Nos. 863 and 902 . 3 See the attachment to document No. 863 . No. 909 The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 909 The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 22, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Clayton Subject: Present Stage of Reparation Negotiations. 1. Need for a comprehensive program in the present stage of reparation negotiations. We are now engaged in arguing abstract definitions and principles with the Soviet representatives. There is no prospect that the Soviet Government will accept our set of definitions 2 and we cannot accept theirs. 3 To argue indefinitely abstract principles and to argue each principle in isolation from the practical effects of its application will get nowhere. The only way out seems to be to discuss the concrete applications of the principles. At this level of discussion it may be found that the respective approaches are not so far apart as they are at the theoretical or academic level. 2. Factors of disagreement. If war booty can be defined in terms of quantity and a time-limit, the booty factor may be fitted into a general reparation settlement. For example, an agreed time-limit could be set, beyond which German property not yet removed or ticketed for removal would cease to be classified as war booty and would revert to the German economy. If a time-limit is placed on its application, the abstract definition would not loom as large in practical importance as it does now. A second step would be to agree on a global estimate of war booty removed by each of the occupying armies. This estimate would have to be bargained over but could eventually be arrived at. A third step would be to determine the relation of war booty to once-and-for-all removals of capital goods on reparation account. The definition of restitution presents fewer obstacles. The United States proposal is soundly based on considerations of equity and administrative convenience. The Soviet and British approaches, which are shared by the lesser Allies, have strong legal, psychological and political arguments in their favor. The Governments of the devastated countries cannot tell their own peoples that they have renounced the right to restitution. Agreement can be reached on restitution through broadening the American conception somewhat and limiting the British definition. 4 While considerations of equity would be well served by deducting from the reparation total of the separate countries the amount of restitution received, the United States Government can agree to a separate accounting for restitution if the countries directly concerned prefer to see restitution handled in this way. The extent of reparation derived from once-and-for-all deliveries of available goods and equipment will be greatly narrowed if removal of war booty can in practice be considered a charge against such removals. One difficulty in arriving at an agreement on reparation out of current production lies in the form in which we have pressed the “first charge” principle in advance of discussing the total of reparation. It would be easier to arrive at an agreement that both commercial exports and deliveries on reparation should be based on an agreed plan covering exports and imports of all kinds. Soviet public opinion would receive with hostility a statement of reparation policy which in its form gave exports a primacy over reparations. 3. Economic Adjustments in Regard to the Polish-German Frontier. If a definite sum can be stated as equivalent to the loss which will be imposed upon Germany’s reparation-paying capacity by transfer of territory to Poland, the Russians would bargain hard but would probably end by accepting such a settlement. They would be suspicious of a percentage formula defining this loss as long as the total of reparation has not been agreed. They would probably approve a special commercial treaty between Poland and Germany by which certain supplies would flow to Germany from the ceded areas in return for industrial commodities which those areas and, to a large extent, Poland itself formerly received from Germany. Here again a definite and quantitative approach in terms of balanced exchanges would be more readily negotiable than to seek agreement on an abstract principle. 4. A New Approach. It is not feasible to make progress in the reparation negotiations by arguing each part of the problem in isolation and in abstract terms. The Russians have their own set of principles, based on intense popular feeling and fresh experience. They define war booty widely because their own country has only recently been plundered almost to the last nail and thread and they interpret American and British reluctance to see the same treatment meted out to Germany as evidence of greater sympathy for the German people than for the Soviet people. It is not wise to justify failure to agree on reparation mainly on grounds of Soviet rejection of our definition of war booty. If we fail to agree on the relation of war booty to reparation, it is better to be able to report that failure came over the practical applications of the principle. In order to negotiate a comprehensive reparation settlement it is necessary to negotiate simultaneously on all factors involved rather than to proceed by a step-by-step approach. Neither we nor the Russians can agree on abstract statements of principle until we have seen where the practical applications of the principles will lead us. Among the factors which need to be reviewed simultaneously are the following: What is the time-limit beyond which unclaimed war booty reverts to German economy? What evaluation should be placed on war booty removed from Germany, apart from commodities used by the armies in Germany? What is the relation between war booty removals and once-and-for-all removals of German equipment in the first phase of the reparations plan? What categories of looted property are particularly important in applying the concept of restitution? What forms of current reparations should be encouraged? What share of Germany’s reparation capacity will be lost through cession of territory to Poland? What should be the agreed total of reparations, and what deductions should be made from it in order to take into account ( a ) war booty removals; ( b ) detachment of reparation capacity through cession of territory; and ( c ) removals on account of restitution? P[ hilip ] E. M[ osely ] 1 Printed from a copy on which there are uncertified typed initials. 2 See document No. 894 , attachment 2. 3 See documents Nos. 904 and 905 . 4 See document No. 906 . No. 910 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 910 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 22, 1945. Memorandum The representatives of the U. S. S. R. have submitted the following definition of war booty or “war trophies”. 2 “Under the ‘war trophies’ is understood: 1) All military supplies and equipment of Germany, including all supplies and military equipment, which belong, being used or have to be used by the military and para military units of the enemy or by the members of these units; 2) All supplies and equipment used by the enemy to satisfy his military needs and captured by the Allies before the end of the war on territories where military operations were conducted.” The foregoing definition is accepted by the United States. Under this Soviet definition of war booty, little or nothing will remain for exaction as reparations from the U. S. Zone of Occupation. Therefore, for the present at least, the United States will proceed with operations in its Zone without regard to reparations as such. 1 This paper is apparently an alternative to document No. 911 . Authorship not indicated. 2 See document No. 904 . No. 911 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 911 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Memorandum The U. S. S. R. has after considerable negotiations on a program of “reparations”, presented the following definition of war booty or, as designated by the U. S. S. R. “war trophies”: 2 “Under the ‘war trophies’ is understood: 1) All military supplies and equipment of Germany, including all supplies and military equipment, which belong, being used or have to be used by the military and para military units of the enemy or by the members of these units; 2) All supplies and equipment used by the enemy to satisfy his military needs and captured by the Allies before the end of the war on territories where military operations were conducted.” Since it is clear that under this conception of war booty by the U. S. S. R., any occupying Power can remove at its will practically everything in its own Zone as war booty, any attempt to deal with “reparations” on an overall basis for Germany becomes meaningless. Under the circumstances, the United States accepts this position and will proceed, for the time being at least, to remove from its own Zone, for its own account or for the account of such other countries as it may determine upon, such plants, equipment and material as it desires to remove. It is assumed that the other occupying powers will do likewise. 1 This paper is apparently an alternative to document No. 910 . Authorship not indicated. 2 See document No. 904 . No. 912 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 912 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations top secret urgent [ Babelsberg ,] July 22 [ 21? ], 1945. Victory 190. Reference your cable of July 18. 1 (To Sproul from Deane from Pauley for Abramovitz and Bergson) Please send at once the following additional information one approximate estimate of value of industrial and mining output in Russian zone in 1938 two approximate estimated value of agricultural production in the same zone three approximate percentage that each of the above constitute of total pre-war German production four approximate percentage of total German industrial and mining production that came from area east of Oder Neisse river[s] in 1939. Above information needed urgently. 1 document No. 899 . No. 913 The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Pauley Files: Telegram No. 913 The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) 1 top secret priority Moscow , 23 July 1945. M 25084. Confmess 12 to Deane’s party Berlin for Pauley from Sproul, Abramovitz, Bergson and Rosenson TopSec. Replying your July 21 cable: 2 1. Based on value added, the industrial and mining production in Russian zone was approximately 12 billion RM in 1938 or about 31 percent of total for old Reich. 2. Based on gross value produced, the agricultural production in Russian zone in 1938 is estimated roughly at 6.5 billion RM, or about 48 percent of total for old Reich. 3. Based on value added, the industrial and mining production in the area east of Oder Neisse River[s] in 1939 was about 7 percent of total for old Reich. Figures for industrial and agricultural production in Russian zone do not include output in Russian sector of Berlin. In terms of value added, the production in Berlin as a whole was about 6 percent of total mining and manufacturing production in the old Reich before the war. 1 Sent by the United States Military Mission, Moscow, via Army channels. 2 document No. 912 . No. 914 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Washington Liaison Officer for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Kindleberger) 862.65/7–2345: Telegram No. 914 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Washington Liaison Officer for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Kindleberger ) 1 secret Babelsberg , July 23, 1945. Victory 235. To [Acting] Secretary of State for Kindleberger, Washington, from Pauley. Please cable the following information in so far as it is available at once: 1. Estimate of approximate value of manufacturing and agricultural resources in ( a ) East Prussia and ( b ) that portion of East Prussia north of an east-west line passing through Goldap and Braunsberg, which line is approximately 33 kilometers south of Koenigsberg. 2. Estimated annual value of industrial output for each of these areas. 3. Estimated annual value of agricultural output for each of these areas. 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State. The same message was sent as Confrep 8 to the United States Military Mission, Moscow, marked “For Sproul for Bergson and Abramovitz from Pauley”. No. 915 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 915 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 23, 1945. Memorandum on Reparations It was agreed by the Three Governments at the Crimea Conference 2 that Germany, when defeated, would be forced to make reparation and restitution for the burdens and losses imposed, particularly to the Allied Nations which have suffered most and have contributed most to the organization of victory. In as much as the damage caused by Germany, and the suffering imposed by the ruthless German methods far exceed anything Germany can ever repay, it was agreed from the first that the exactions from Germany should be such as to take from Germany not only all industries and tools relating directly to war, but also all capital goods and current production down to that which is essential for maintaining in Germany a standard of living no higher than that of the neighboring Allied countries. Under this hard but fair policy the German people would be made to pay in goods, work and reduction of living standards, all that they can, over a limited period, even though this be far less than they owe the world. In the course of the actual military operations, which required prolonged and vicious mechanized fighting, airbombing and artillery shelling throughout all of Germany, much was destroyed and, with full occupation by large military forces, not a little property was needed and taken by the armed forces directly for sustenance and as war booty. These developments have changed the practical situation in a number of ways. Destruction has lessened what is left to take in reparations; similarly what has been taken as booty, or to support the armies of occupation, cannot be taken again as reparations. Under the formula of “maximum possible removals from Germany”, whatever is destroyed, or used, or removed as booty, or in any other way, reduces pro tanto what is left to be taken as reparations. For this reason the definition of “war trophies” presented on July 21 by the U. S. S. R. 3 as a statement of fact as well as a statement of future policy, calls for corresponding adjustments in the plans for reparations. If most removable capital goods and production are to be taken as “war trophies”, clearly little remains as reparations. However the end result from the standpoint of exaction will be the same. Under these circumstances it is clearly unnecessary to distinguish closely between what is taken as “war trophies” and what is taken as reparations. In the end they add up together to all that can be removed within the standards we have set. Since the military commanders of the armies of occupation will in any case take charge of the extraction of war booty, the simple solution for the removal of reparations would seem to be to entrust this task also to the Zone Commanders, and to consolidate the two as “removals” rather than to attempt the meaningless task of segregation, separate administration and separate accounting. The adoption of this simple and practical policy, apparently envisioned in the Soviet definition of “war trophies”, appears also to conform to the requirements of rough justice, because the assets and productive capacity of the Zones into which Germany has been divided for purposes of military occupation and civil government during the occupation coincide roughly with the agreed division of reparations as between the chief Powers. For example, the U. S. S. R., which it was agreed by the Allied Commission on Reparations 4 should receive 56% of the total, less an amount to be given up pro rata to help meet the accepted claims of other nations, now occupies a Zone which will make possible the exaction of booty and other removals combined approximately equal to its expected receipts under the percentage formula. The Government of the United States, though it would have preferred a more limited definition of “war booty”, a correspondingly broader content of “reparations”, and a more unified administration of removals of both from all of Germany, accepts the Soviet definition of “war trophies” for Germany, and the administration of removals for the present by Zones of occupation which is implicit in that definition. In doing so it is understood that the claims of other nations will be dealt with as follows: Poland’s share will be paid through the transfer of assets included within territories to be annexed to Poland, together with any further payments which the U. S. S. R. may desire to allot from its removals from the Soviet Zone of occupation. Recognizing that this will use up any excess credits from that Zone, all other claimants will look for reparations to the other three zones, namely those of the U. S., the U. K. and France. The United States is prepared to do its share in meeting the reparations claims of other nations and it is believed that the U. K. and France may be similarly depended upon. In accordance with these considerations, the Government of the United States presents with this statement a revision of the plans already submitted to the Three Governments by the Allied Commission on Reparations, in the belief that this new draft 5 which rests upon the “principles” 6 and the “formula” 7 agreed by the Commission, and the prior decisions of the Crimea Conference, will meet the requirements of the situation in a practical way and commend itself to the Governments of the USSR and the U. K. The plan as here presented disposes, for the time being at least, not only of the problem of “war trophies” and “reparations” but also of “interim reparations” and “restitution.” 1 This paper bears the manuscript notation “Gulick”. 2 See document No. 1416 , section v . 3 document No. 904 . 4 See attachment 3 to document No. 894 . 5 Presumably document No. 916 . 6 Attachment 1 to document No. 894 . 7 Attachment 3 to document No. 894 . No. 916 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 No. 916 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 23, 1945. U. S. Proposal on Reparations and Related Matters 2 In accordance with the recommendations of the Allied Commission on Reparations, the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed on the following program for the exaction from Germany of reparations and other Allied levies: 3 a . Available reparations shall be divided among claimant nations to the extent that they have borne the burden of the war, have suffered losses, and organized victory over the enemy. b . Except as otherwise directed by the Allied Control Council each of the four Powers occupying Germany—the United Kingdom, the United States, the U. S. S. R. and France—may remove or permit to be removed from its zone of occupation capital equipment, current production, and stocks of goods either for its own account or for the account of any other United Nation. 4 c . In exacting removals for reparation and other Allied levies, 5 the occupying Powers shall be governed by the following principles: 1. Removals of property shall be primarily such as to assist in bringing to an end the war-making power of Germany by eliminating that part of Germany’s industrial capacity which constitutes war potential. 2. Removals shall be such as will speed recovery and reconstruction in countries devastated at German hands. 3. Any program of removals shall be avoided which necessitates external financial assistance or which might, in the opinion of the Government concerned, prejudice the successful execution of the task entrusted to the Armies of Occupation. 4. To a maximum extent removals shall be taken from the existing national wealth of Germany. 5. In order to avoid building up German industrial capacity and disturbing the long term stability of the economies of the United Nations, recurrent removals in the form of manufactured products shall be restricted to a minimum. 6. In justice to the countries occupied by the enemy the amount of removals shall be calculated on the basis that the average living standards in Germany, during the reparations period, shall not exceed the average of the standards of living of all European countries with the exception of the U. K. and U. S. S. R. 7. After removals are effected enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. The necessary means must be set aside for payment for imports approved by the Government concerned before removals of current production and stocks of goods are made. 6 8. Removals of any capital equipment existing on May 10, 1945 shall cease on May 10, 1947. 9. Removal of stocks of goods and current production shall cease on May 10, 1951. 7 d . 8 Removals as restitution shall be governed by the following: 1. Upon application by any Allied Government, restitution may be made of the following categories of property, wherever found, if such property is identifiable and was removed from occupied territory by the enemy by whatever means: ( a ) Heavy industrial and agricultural equipment. ( b ) Machine tools and unique machinery. ( c ) Rolling stock and other railroad or transportation equipment. ( d ) Works of art, religious, historical, educational, or cultural objects, libraries, scientific equipment, and other laboratory or research materials related to organized inquiry into the arts and sciences. (2) All questions of restitution shall be dealt with on behalf of the injured property owners by the Allied Nations of which they are citizens, unless such Allied Nation shall make other arrangements with the Allied Nation from whose territories the property was removed. e . Appropriate steps shall be taken to exercise control and the power of disposition 9 over German owned external assets. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 An earlier draft of this working paper in the Pauley Files, dated July 22, is headed “Proposal on Reparations of the Government of the United States”. The July 22 draft has the following opening paragraph: “The Government of the United States proposes that the following agreement be announced concluding the negotiations of the Allied Commission on Reparations:”. 3 In the draft referred to in the preceding footnote, this paragraph ends as follows: “exaction of reparations from Germany:”. 4 The draft referred to in footnote 2, ante , has the following additional words at the end of this paragraph: “entitled to reparations”. 5 In the draft referred to in footnote 2, ante , this paragraph begins as follows: “In effecting removals for reparation and otherwise”. 6 Parten has changed one copy in the Pauley Files so that the last clause of this sentence reads: “before any removals are made.” A retyped version, also in the Pauley Files and dated July 23, marked “Office Copy Revised”, reads: “before any removals.” In the draft referred to in footnote 2, ante , the last sentence reads: “The necessary means must be provided for payment for imports approved by the Government concerned before removals are made.” 7 The draft referred to in footnote 2, ante , reads “1952”. 8 Parten has stricken section d from his copy, and it is omitted in the “Office Copy Revised” mentioned in footnote 6, ante , as well as in the draft referred to in footnote 2, ante . 9 In the draft referred to in footnote 2, ante , this passage reads: “taken to obtain the power of disposition”. No. 917 Proposal by the British Delegation Pauley Files No. 917 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 A Tentative Suggestion for Amendments to the Proposals on Reparations of the Government of the United States 1. To be added after paragraph b :— “Removals should be within the framework of a general programme approved by the Control Council. They shall not be such as would be incompatible with the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the Occupying Forces and to maintain in Germany the approved standards of living, including such exports as are required to pay for approved imports for the Occupying Forces and the population of Germany. Further removals should not be such as would be inconsistent with the treatment of Germany as a single economic unit.” 2. Amend the last words of paragraph b to read:— “either to pay for necessary approved imports not otherwise paid for or after such payment for imports has been effected for its own account or for the reparation account of any other United Nation entitled to reparations” 3. In paragraph d , after “scientific value of importance” add “monetary gold, valuables and securities”. 4. After paragraph e , add:— “In cases where this power is not already exercised by any one of the United Nations”. The paragraph is obviously not meant to refer to German property in the U. S. A., U. K., etc. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It might be settled in principle that at the same time as the Reparation Plan is settled, an agreement will be reached for the removal of a specific list of capital goods from the Western Zones to Russia and a specific list of goods currently produced and stocks of such goods from the Russian Zone to the Western Zones. S. D. Waley [ Babelsberg ,] 23rd July, 1945. 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. The amendments suggested in this paper appear to refer to a variant draft (not found) of document No. 916 . 2 For the paragraph omitted here, see document No. 1045 . No. 918 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 No. 918 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg , July 23, 1945.] Memorandum The question of the western boundaries of Poland has both political and economic aspects. By agreement at Yalta, 2 the western boundaries of Poland can only finally be fixed in the peace settlement. Meanwhile, the Poles, under the aegis of the Soviet Armies, have moved their western boundary to the Oder–Neisse line. 3 The President has several times pointed out that this unilateral action introduces into Germany a fifth occupying nation, contrary to agreement. 4 While continuing to maintain this position, we should attempt to reach agreement with the Soviets on the economic aspects of this matter. Supply —Trade arrangements should be made for the exchange of substantial amounts of foodstuffs, coal, and other necessary products customarily provided by the Soviet Zone, including the area occupied by Poland, for products customarily supplied by the rest of Germany. While such production and interchange have been temporarily disrupted by war, much can now be speedily resumed. Reparation, etc. —The Soviet Zone, including the area occupied by Poland, contains between 45 and 50 percent of the area and wealth of Germany. Soviet and Polish claims for reparation amount to about the same percentage of total claims. Soviet and Polish claims for reparation by removals of capital equipment (including “war booty or trophies”), current production, or stocks of goods should be met solely from the Soviet Zone. The claims of other nations should be met from the other zones. A definition of restitution should be adopted and representatives of the Allied Nations should be permitted freely to move about the four zones and should be given appropriate facilities to identify their property falling within this definition. 1 The source copy bears the following manuscript notation by Mosely: “Collado, note for Sec’y talk with Molotov July 23.” See ante , p. 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] ] . 2 See document No. 1417 , section vi . 3 See the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , post . 4 See ante , pp. 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . No. 919 The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Pauley Files: Telegram No. 919 The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) 1 secret urgent Moscow , 24 July 1945. Deane’s party Berlin for Ambassador Pauley from Sproul, Bergson and Abramovitz signed Deane M 25095 ( Confmess 14). Reurtel Confrep number 8, 23 July. 2 Under each head below, A refers to East Prussia; B refers to area north of Goldap–Braunsberg line. Memel and Sudauen are excluded throughout. All value figures are Reichsmarks and refer to 1938. 1. Total assets in manufacturing and mining, excluding land, mineral deposits and inventories: A equals 260,000,000, B equals 160,000,000. 2. Physically movable assets in manufacturing and mining: A equals 170,000,000, B equals 100,000,000. 3. Based on value added the output of manufacturing and mining: A equals 380,000,000 or about 1% of total for old Reich, B equals 230,000,000. 4. Value of livestock and agricultural equipment: A equals about 1,000,000,000, B equals 350,000,000. 5. Based on gross value of production, output of agriculture in A equals about 1,000,000,000 or 7% of total for old Reich; B equals 350,000,000. 1 Sent by the United States Military Mission, Moscow, via Army channels. Cf. document No. 928 . 2 See document No. 914, footnote 1 . No. 920 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 920 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Translation?] top secret [Undated. 1 ] Plan of Reparations From Germany 1. The total sum of Reparations 20 billion dollars which is accepted for consideration has to be covered approximately 50% by the way of once for all removals from the national wealth of Germany within two years after the capitulation and approximately 50% by the way of the annual deliveries in kind within 10 years after the capitulation. 2. The once for all removals from the national wealth of Germany are to be exacted from the following branches of her economic life: Billion dollars 1. War and chemical industries (aircraft production, tank production, naval shipbuilding, arms and ammunition production, production of powder and explosives, synthetic rubber and fuel, artificial fibre, cellulose, Koke-Chemie ) 2, 0– 2, 2 2. Iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, engineering (including electrical industry), coal, power stations 2, 3– 2, 7 3. Building industry, textiles, food industry, printing, transport (including water transport), communications (radio, telephone, telegraph), equipment of ports, warehouses, etc. 1, 8– 2, 0 4. Foreign investments and claims of Germany 1, 1– 1, 4 5. Shares of German enterprises (railways, ports, canals, etc.), foreign currency, precious metals 1, 9– 2, 3 6. Miscellaneous 0, 9– 1, 2 10, 0– 11, 8 For the purpose of removals German property situated on the territory of Germany in 1937 frontiers as well as German property abroad. 3. To fix the following approximate list of goods with which the postwar Germany has to pay her annual deliveries in kind: Coal, brickets Sugar Chemicals (drugs, dyes, potassium etc.) Cattle, agricultural products Ceramics Machinery, tools Medical instruments Cement, building materials Optical apparatus Timber, paper River shipbuilding 4. To fix the total sum of annual deliveries in kind [at] 1 billion dollars per annum or 10 billion dollars in 10 years. To ask Allied Commission on Reparations to make more detailed calculations concerning these deliveries. 5. The basis of calculations are prices of 1938 plus 15% on equipment and 10% on raw materials and finished goods. 6. The rate of exchange: 1 dollar equals 3.5 marks. 1 Although another copy of this proposal (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–245) is headed, “Soviet Plan of Reparations From Germany—July 24, 1945”, this is apparently the paper circulated at the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 23. See ante , p. 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . No. 921 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/6–1945 No. 921 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Translation?] secret [Undated. 1 ] On Advance Deliveries From Germany 1. Pending the establishment of a permanent allied reparation agency, advance deliveries (removals) should be based upon the urgency of need of suffered Nations [ nations which have suffered? ] for rehabilitation purposes and should be made as advance deliveries with subsequent accounting of these deliveries as reparations or restitution, or for purchase account of the recipient nations. 2. With respect to advance deliveries of capital goods to all United Nations, the following procedure should be adopted: a . Immediate establishment of a sub-commission of the Allied Commission on Reparations to be situated in Berlin, and to be composed of representatives of the nations participating in the Allied Commission on Reparations. This sub-commission should keep in constant consultation with the Control Council and should keep the Control Council informed of all its activities. b . The Allied Commission on Reparations will transmit to its sub-commission a list of industries from which advance deliveries of equipment will be allowed. c . Advance deliveries (removals) of capital equipment from those industries up to an agreed percentage of the movable assets, expressed in physical terms, may be made upon the approval or recommendation of the sub-commission. Shipping documents covering such advance deliveries (removals) shall include notification to the receiving country that in the final accounting such deliveries (removals) may be deemed by the Allied Commission on Reparations to be on account of reparations or restitution. d . Each of the occupying powers may remove or permit to be removed from its zone of occupation plant and equipment from any industries in such list, subject to the following conditions: (1) With respect to any removal by an occupying power for its own account, the respective zone commander shall notify the sub-commission of the contemplated removal, giving the sub-commission 2 an opportunity to enter such removal in the plan of advance deliveries. (2) With respect to any removal from the zone of one occupying power for the account of another United Nation (whether or not such United Nation be an occupying power) such removal shall only be permitted upon the approval or recommendation of the sub-commission. 3. With respect to advance deliveries to all United Nations of raw materials out of current production or inventories, such deliveries may be made upon the approval or recommendation of the sub-commission on the basis of the need of the claimants after due regard to the supplies available and the requirements of the occupation forces. Shipping documents covering such advance deliveries shall include notification to the receiving country that in the final accounting such deliveries may be deemed by the Allied Commission on Reparations to be on (1) export account to be paid for in acceptable currencies, (2) reparation, or (3) restitution. 4. Adequate and uniform accounting controls shall be instituted with respect to all deliveries effected under the above proposed plan. 5. Claimant nations should be notified of the establishment of the foregoing procedures for effecting urgently needed advance deliveries. 6. It shall be mutually agreed that each of the occupying powers shall submit, within six months of the date hereof, a statement of all property removed from Germany after the termination of war with Germany. 1 Although another copy of this proposal (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–245) is headed, “Soviet Proposal on Advance Deliveries From Germany—July 24, 1945”, this is apparently the paper circulated at the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 23. See ante , p. 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . 2 There is the following manuscript interpolation at this point on one copy found: “no veto”. No. 922 Draft of Report by the Economic Subcommittee Pauley Files No. 922 Draft of Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Undated.] Report of the Economic Sub-Committee Having failed to reach an agreement on certain basic principles of a reparations plan, the Economic Sub-Committee reports to the Council of Ministers that there seems to be no possibility of Agreement upon these basic issues heretofore reported to the Council. Of course, the Economic Sub-Committee will continue its discussions if such be the desire of the Council of Ministers. No. 923 Report by the Economic Subcommittee 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 923 Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Extract 1 ] top secret [ Babelsberg , July 24, 1945. 2 ] Second Report of the Economic Sub-Committee to the Foreign Ministers 1. The Economic Sub-Committee regrets to have to report that after extensive discussions of the problems of German, Austrian, and Italian reparations, it has failed to come to agreement and consequently must refer these matters back to the Foreign Ministers for decision. 2. The Sub-Committee has recognized the liability of Germany, Austria, and Italy to exactions on account of reparation. 3. With respect to Germany, the Sub-Committee is in agreement that substantial reparations should be made. The Sub-Committee has been unable, however, to agree on the method for carrying out a program of such reparations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 For the other sections of this report, see documents Nos. 766 and 1322 . 2 So dated in the “Index of Attachments to Summary of the Negotiations in the Economic Sub-Committee” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145). No. 924 The Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference No. 924 The Adviser on German Economic Affairs ( Despres ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 Potsdam , July 24, 1945. Memorandum to Mr. Clayton Subject: Reparations. In the event that an agreement is reached with the Russians whereby, in addition to having a free hand to carry out removals in their zone, they will be granted the right to remove a specified amount of capital equipment from the Ruhr or the Western Zones generally, there are certain safeguards regarding Allied property in the Eastern Zone upon which we should insist. 1. Restitution . Identifiable property removed by the Germans from occupied countries should be returned to the governments of the owners. Facilities should be granted to the representatives of Allied Governments to permit the locating and identification of such property. 2. Allied-owned property and investments in Germany . Allied property in Germany should not be removed without the consent of the owners’ government, and suitable provisions should be made for fair compensation. E[ mile ] D[ espres ] 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there are uncertified typed initials. No. 925 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/8–245 No. 925 Proposal by the United States Delegation July 24 [25?], 1945 top secret U. S. Position on Reparations—Final Pauley Version—Submitted to Economic Sub-Committee of [ on? ] July 24 [ 25? ], 1945 united states position on reparations 1 The United States submits the attached plan for the execution [ exaction? ] of reparations from Germany, in the belief that it will meet the requirements of the situation in a practical way and commend itself to the governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. This program for “removals” would be administered by the established machinery for the government of Germany, and would be carried out in accordance with the applicable political and economic policies which we are adopting. This plan amounts in effect to an interim program and does not preclude a coordinated administration of Germany. It permits immediate removals, and at the same time is not inconsistent with such overall economic policies as the Zone Commanders, working through the Allied Control Council, may determine. It is proposed that this program be recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and adopted by our Governments. 2 Implementing this program, industrial equipment, with emphasis on steel capacity, would be made available to the Soviet Union from the Ruhr area at the same time that agricultural products and raw materials, including liquid and solid fuels, timber and potash are made available for western Europe (including the western zones of Germany) from Eastern Europe (including the Eastern zone of pre-war Germany). The basis for such an exchange will be worked out between the governments concerned. u. s. proposal on reparations and related matters 3 In accordance with the recommendations of the Allied Commission on Reparations, the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed on the following program for the exaction from Germany of reparations and other Allied levies: a . Available reparations shall be divided among claimant nations to the extent that they have borne the burden of the war, have suffered losses, and organized victory over the enemy. b . Except as otherwise directed by the Allied Control Council each of the Four Powers occupying Germany—the United Kingdom, the United States, the U. S. S. R. and France—may remove or permit to be removed from its zone of occupation capital equipment, current production, and stocks of goods either to pay for necessary approved imports not otherwise paid for or after such payment for imports has been effected for its own account or for the reparation account of any other United Nation entitled to reparations. Removals shall not be such as would be incompatible with the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and to maintain in Germany the approved standards of living, including such exports as are required to pay for approved imports for the occupying forces and the population of Germany. Removals should not be such as would be inconsistent with the treatment of Germany as a single economic unit. c . In exacting removals for reparation and other Allied levies, the occupying Powers shall be governed by the following principles: 1. Removals of property shall be primarily such as to assist in bringing to an end the war-making power of Germany by eliminating that part of Germany’s industrial capacity which constitutes war potential. 2. Removals shall be such as will speed recovery and reconstruction in countries devastated at German hands. 3. Any program of removals shall be avoided which necessitates external financial assistance or which might, in the opinion of the Government concerned, prejudice the successful execution of the task entrusted to the Armies of Occupation. 4. To a maximum extent removals shall be taken from the existing national wealth of Germany. 5. In order to avoid building up German industrial capacity and disturbing the long term stability of the economies of the United Nations, recurrent removals in the form of manufactured products shall be restricted to a minimum. 6. In justice to the countries occupied by the enemy the amount of removals shall be calculated on the basis that the average living standards in Germany, during the reparations period, shall not exceed the average of the standards of living of all European countries with the exception of the U. K. and U. S. S. R. 7. After removals are effected enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. The necessary means must be set aside for payment for imports approved by the Government concerned before any removals. 8. Removals of any capital equipment existing on May 10, 1945 shall cease on May 10, 1947. 9. Removal of stocks of goods and current production shall cease on May 10, 1951. 1 Another copy of the first section of this paper is dated July 23. Still another (which has the word “exaction” in the first sentence) is dated July 25 and bears the following manuscript notation by Clayton: “Pauley memo, from which he read at meeting of subcommittee 7/25”. See post , p. 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 980 ] . 2 A variant of the first section of this paper, dated July 25, found in the Pauley Files, is identical with the proposal here printed down to this point. It concludes, however, as follows: “Thereupon a special commission would be set up in Germany to work out, in consultation with the Control Council, the practical problems which will arise in the implementation of its program. In particular, this special commission would determine the extent to which industrial equipment in the Ruhr, the industrial heart of the western zones of Germany, can be made available to the Soviet Union at the same time that agricultural products and raw materials, including liquid and solid fuels, timber and potash, are made available for western Europe (including the western zones of Germany) from Eastern Europe (including the Eastern zone of pre-war Germany). “This special commission will take in its initial studies as a basis for discussions the suggestion that 25% of the equipment which is removed from the metallurgical, chemical, and electrical industries in the Ruhr be made available to the Soviet Union in exchange for agricultural and other products for Western Europe.” 3 Copy in the Pauley Files of the second section of this paper is dated July 26. No. 926 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 EW/7–2545 No. 926 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Removals Prom Germany of Properties of United Nations or Neutral Nationals Memorandum of United States Delegation It is proposed that: 1) Ownership by United Nations or neutral nationals should not impede a program of removals. 2) United Nations nationals should be invited to submit statements covering the nature and extent of their property in Germany to the ACC. The ACC should have facilities and free access to such properties for the purpose of investigating claims and appraising properties. 3) Removals of United Nations properties should be made on condition that the United Nations nationals retain their ownership interests in the moved properties, except that, where retention of ownership is not practicable, Reichsmark accounts should be set up, on the basis of ACC valuations, to cover the value of the properties. Arrangements should then be made, prior to removal, to have the receiving country liquidate these accounts in acceptable foreign exchange in payments amortized over a short period of years. 4) Neutral nationals or their governments should be permitted to file with the ACC statements covering the nature and extent of the properties in Germany of neutral nationals. Reichsmarks to the extent of valuations made by the ACC should be deposited to the account of such neutral owners by way of compensation. 1 Although this proposal was circulated to the British and Soviet Delegations, it was apparently never discussed and was withdrawn by Byrnes on August 1. See ante , p. 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . No. 927 The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2545 No. 927 The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Rubin ) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Oliver ) 1 [Extract] top secret [ Babelsberg , July 25, 1945.] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Next, as to reparations: The discussions in Moscow did not advance the cause a great deal. There was agreement on certain basic principles—that Germany was to be treated as an economic unit, that removals should be primarily for the purpose of destroying German war capacity, that reparation should be used to build up Europe, that reparation should to a maximum extent be taken from existing capital wealth of Germany, that in order to avoid building up Germany long-run manufactured goods reparations should be kept to a minimum, that the German standard of living should not exceed that of Europe as an average, excluding USSR and UK, and (on this the Russians I think did not agree) that essential imports into Germany should be a first charge on German exports. 2 However, there was no discussion—the Russians holding back—of definitions of war booty or restitution. When the boys arrived here, they got reparation put on the agenda—where it had not been—and they got the economic subcommittee to adopt their reparation principles—the Russians still excepting on the ground noted above. Then, however, the Russians threw in a definition of war booty—or war trophies as they call it 3 —which included everything.… The outcome of that was a general scrapping of what had gone before, and the drafting of a memo proposing that Russia compensate itself and Poland out of the Russian zone, leaving the rest of us to compensate the rest of the reparation claimants out of our zones. 4 This was supposed to figure out approximately to the percentages which had been agreed to in Moscow—56% for USSR, 22% each for the UK and US, each to cut its share in proportion as other countries were cut in. It was argued that the Russian zone contained about 50% of the reparation material in Germany, and that this sort of deal would about work out equitably. Also, it was argued that maybe this sort of thing was best after all—given a situation in which it was doubtful whether we could actually pull together in governing Germany and dividing up reparation items in each other’s zones. It was pointed out that the Russians had refused to agree that Allied representatives could freely circulate in their zone, and that the other type of overall plan made for friction in the future. Could be. The plan outlined above was presented, orally, to the Russians yesterday. 5 At the same time, I understand that we stated we wouldn’t consider their 20 billion plan 6 (now presented for the first time, though promised for weeks) on the ground that their war-booty definition outmoded it. It was then indicated that maybe the USSR would discuss our plan, if, in addition, they could get 2 billion dollars worth out of the Ruhr. They said that their zone had mostly light industries and agriculture, and that what they needed was heavy industry. We, I understand, said that we’d be glad to give them things from the Ruhr; but that we’d do it in exchange for other things—mostly food, potash and lumber—from their area. A compromise proposal was that we give them part of the 2 billion as reparation and that the rest should be traded; but I think that Pauley has said that he wants to work out the trade deal first. On the other hand, as of this afternoon, the Russians had said that we couldn’t get anywhere on that sort of basis—that we had to agree first on reparation and give them at least a percentage figure on what they’d get from the Ruhr before we could come to the trade questions. (I forgot to say that Clayton tossed out, for tentative consideration and not as a fixed formula or plan, the suggestion that 50% of Ruhr 1938 capacity should remain there, the rest (believed to be more than 50% of 1938 capacity because of construction in excess of bomb damage) should be available as reparation removals, and that half of this might go to Russia—but without saying whether on trade or straight reparation). Result so far—disagreement. But another meeting is going on now—it now being slightly past midnight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Printed from a carbon copy of an extract. 2 See vol. i , documents Nos. 367 and 375 . 3 See document No. 904 . 4 See document No. 916 and later drafts thereof. 5 See document No. 925 . 6 document No. 920 . No. 928 The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Pauley Files: Telegram No. 928 The Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) 1 secret urgent Moscow , 25 July 1945. To Deane’s party Berlin for Ambassador Pauley from Sproul, Abramovitz and Bergson signed Deane M 25102. Following correction of paragraphs (4) and (5) of Confmess 14 of 24 July. 2 (4) Value of livestock and agricultural equipment: A equals 1,250 million, B equals 435 million. (5) Based on gross value of production, output of agriculture in A equals 1,200 million, or about 9 per cent of total for old Reich; B equals 425 million. New subject. Confmess 14 re Alexander should be 15. 3 This Confmess 16. 1 Sent by the United States Military Mission, Moscow, via Army channels. 2 document No. 919 . 3 Not printed. No. 929 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President Pauley Files No. 929 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the President 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. My Dear Mr. President : The other day I gave you very briefly a verbal statement concerning several observations by my staff of machine tool shipments from the Berlin area. I am sending herewith a copy of the report turned in to me by Dr. Luther Gulick, and J. Howard Marshall, the General Counsel of our Delegation. Respectfully, Edwin W. Pauley [Enclosure 2 ] top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Russian Machinery Removals From Berlin Area Covered On July 22 and 23, Howard Marshall and Luther Gulick went by Command Car over the following area: July 22 [ : ] Babelsberg — Schöneberg — Tempelhof — Kreuzberg — Horst Wessel — Prenzlauer Berg — Berlin Center — Charlottenburg — Spandau — Potsdam — Babelsberg. July 23 [ : ] Same route, except that we went NE as far as Hönow and omitted Potsdam returning. Chief Points of Interest The purpose of the first trip was to observe rail and canal marshalling yards. Those observed included the Steglitz-Schoneberg yards, Gorlitzer Station, the Spree Docks, the Slaughter Houses and yards of the Schlesischer Station. The second trip included industrial plants in Siemensstadt such as the “AEG” (General Electric), various smaller paint, petroleum, printing, machine tool, and accumulator and two large power plants. Observations The railroad yards communicating south and SE are virtually bare. They have one or two lines in operation. The warehouses are not restored. In contrast the railroads communicating toward the East are extensively restored, and 4 to 8 lines are in operation, except where there are but 4 lines, in which case all are in use. Warehouses on these lines have been patched up, and loading platforms are well filled with boxes, crates, sacks, bales, drums, boilers, partially covered machine tools and large pieces of machinery most of which have been partially protected against the elements. Swarms of workmen, mostly men in Russian Army uniforms are at work moving, stacking and loading this material on flat cars, though the supply seems pretty well back [ backed? ] up. A few short trainloads were moving out of the City. The great warehouses and loading docks on the North side of the Spree, in Horst Wessel, are teeming with activity. The available space, which is 1.4 mile long by 400 to 800 feet in width, including the buildings which may occupy ¼ of the area, is completely filled with machine tools, electrical equipment, stamping mills, wood-working machinery, printing presses, pressure vessels, and other industrial and chemical equipment. A notable feature of the machinery accumulation here was the section devoted to wood-working equipment. This included band and circular saws, lathes and other turning equipment equipped with sawdust blowers, molding machines, etc. Much of the machinery is the unit electrical drive type. The motors and bright parts are wrapped in oil paper and tarpaulins. There are some large piles of rough lumber which is being used for crating. There was notable progress in crating in the 24 hours which elapsed between our first and second visits. The larger pieces of machinery are being housed on the freight cars. The Spree docks are equipped with about six cranes of 25 ton capacity (25,000 kilos) and two of 100 ton capacity. We were not certain that all were in operation, though they did not seem to be damaged. The Spree dock warehouses were perhaps 50% destroyed. They seem to be in use for the storage of small boxes and bales. Trucks of merchandise were coming and going. Wherever the surrounding wall permitted a view of what was going on, wistful and quiet Germans were peering into the busy, guarded, dock area. Some German civilians were at work inside, but most of the labor was being performed by Russian soldiers. At the slaughterhouse area, covering some 300 acres, about half the buildings, which are mostly one and two story structures, have been given patched emergency roofs. Wherever one can see in, these buildings are filled with boxes, bales, rolls of paper, crates, etc. We found a former overhead enclosed foot-way of cement, steel and glass which apparently cut over the slaughterhouse and marshalling yards for the convenience of pedestrians. It ran for some 500 to 600 feet over the roofs of the warehouses at which point it was bombed out, giving us an excellent view of what was going on. Trucks were bring[ing] in boxes and bales for storage. In one area-way there were about 500 identical individual drive vertical drills, each carefully wrapped as to motor and [d]rill head with oil paper. These were specially guarded, though the entire enclosure was also under guard. Near by two 6 ton trucks were being loaded with bales of clothing or rags from one of the warehouses. These appeared to be old uniforms, though it was difficult to be certain at the distance. The Russian guards ordered us to keep moving. At the first sign from the guard, a rather lethargic middle aged German who we found on the foot-way, ducked spryly behind the concrete ballustrade! We found great activity also at the freight loading platforms of the Schlesischer Railroad Station. On one platform we saw 200 to 300 machine tools, new-looking as to paint, and partly wrapped, awaiting loading. There were but four flat cars standing by. Loading was being done laboriously by hand. The trip toward Hönow took us past many big and little plants. The first was the great city power plant, which was in operation and seemed very little damaged. Coal for the plant was coming in by barge. A second, and smaller power plant further out was not in operation. The great AEG electrical plant at Siemensstadt, which is less than 10% damaged, has been stripped of all machinery on the first and second floor, except for a few very large, semi-built-in pieces. We could not see what the situation is on the three upper floors. The street along which the siding comes into the plant is blocked off for some two blocks and guarded. It is full of small lathes, winding equipment and other machinery all of which is being wrapped in oil paper or crated. A loaded train of flat cars was standing in the street. This was filled with very large pieces of electrical and forging or pressing equipment. We recognized the core of a dynamo, a 12´ fly wheel in two parts, a dis-assembled turbine, and other similar equipment. Across the street at the “Accumulator Fabrik”, newly crated machinery was being loaded into trucks with a medium sized industrial crane and a swarm of workers. While we passed “AEG” a wagon load of good-looking office furniture was driven out of the main gateway from the administration building. We looked over the fence into the plant of a manufacturer advertised as “printing machinery”. The first floor was bare, though the building was in fair condition. Half way down the block was a large automatic roller press lying where it had apparently fallen from some truck. Paint and shiny parts were in good condition. A “machine tool plant” which had lost most of its windows which we passed on the road back to the City was similarly bare, though we could see overhead pulleys and shafting still in place. There were no tools on the first floor. The neighboring varnish and paint works was 80% burned out. Nothing had been removed as far as we could see, though the property was fenced off. We made no systematic effort to talk to Germans about the streets. Those whom we did address replied very respectfully. They said “everything is being taken”, “we don’t know where it is going.” Tentative Conclusions 1. All types of plants are being regarded as “war booty” and the moveable equipment in them, including built-in boilers and pressure and other vessels are being dis-assembled and taken out. 2. Wood-working, printing, and other non-war-potential machinery is being taken. 3. Some care is being taken to protect the machinery from the elements, though there was no evidence that the running parts were being greased or oiled. The wrapping and crating is not adequate to protect the equipment for any period of time outdoors. It is very temporary protection. 4. When machinery is removed, everything in the plant is taken with it. The process is wholesale, not retail. 5. Very great progress has been made in the removal of machinery in the Berlin area. The work is highly organized and is proceeding with despatch. 6. Shipment out of Berlin is going forward both by rail and by barge. However, large amounts of wrapped or crated machinery is backed up at points of shipment awaiting loading. 7. The Russians at work taking, crating, moving, and guarding the equipment seem to enjoy their work. Lucien [ Luther ] Gulick 3 J. Howard Marshall 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 Printed from the ribbon copy in the Truman Papers. 3 The original bears only typed signatures. No. 930 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 740.00119 E. W./7–2545 No. 930 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Dear Mr. Clayton : Attached are estimates of both ourselves and the Soviet Union on the comparative percentage of wealth in the Soviet occupied zone. In view of our present discussions I am sure they will be of interest to you. Very truly yours, Edwin W. Pauley [Attachment 1] [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Estimated Wealth in U. S. S. R. Zone of Occupation 1937 Boundaries U.S.Estimate U.S.S.R.Estimate Percent Percent Industry & Mining 39.3 35.3 Agriculture 48.0 48.0 87.3 83.3 Increase in industry due to removals into Eastern areas during war 5.0 3.0 92.3 86.3 * Average 46.1 40.9 Add 3 percent as value of land ceded to USSR 3.0 0.0 49.1 40.9 [Attachment 2] Volume of Production in Soviet Zone and Berlin as Percentage of Total Germany —1936 Per Cent All Manufacturing 40.0 Non-ferrous metals 40.7 Machinery 42.1 Electrical engineering 61.5 Precision and optical instruments 50.9 Non-ferrous metals products 44.5 Ceramics and glass 49.5 Saw mills 42.0 Wood processing 46.6 Paper and wood pulp 52.3 Printing 50.8 Textiles 44.4 Apparel 61.3 Liquor 50.7 Utilities 44.2 Building and miscellaneous 46.4 Mining 29.8 All Industrial Production (Manufacturing and mining) 39.3 Source: “ Die Deutsche Industrie ”, Reichsamt fur Wirtschaftliche Planung, Berlin 1939. Note : The only administrative units which overlap zone boundaries are Brunswick, Bremen, Anhalt and Schaumburg–Lippe. Detailed statistics for industrial employment showed that 78 percent of the industrial employment in these areas was in territory now in the Soviet-occupied zone. Accordingly, 78 per cent of the industrial production of these areas was assumed to fall in this zone. 1 Printed from the ribbon copy, which bears only a typed signature. * U.S.weights agriculture and industry as equal in importance.U.S.S.R. weights industry as three times as important as agriculture.[Footnote in the original.] No. 931 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 931 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Assets 1936 excl [ uding ] ocean shipping East (excl.Berlin) E[ast] of O/N 2 Bill RM 3 % of Reich Bill of RM 3 % of Reich Total (other than land & resources) Manufacturing 5.3 28.9 1.1 6 Mining .5 .2 Railroads 6.2 Motor Vehicles .6 Inland Shipping .2 Electric Power .3 Livestock 4.5 Agricultural Machinery 2.3 Miscellaneous Manuf[acturing] & Construction .5 Movable Manuf[acturing] 3.6 29.6 .7 5.5 Mining .3 .1 Railroads 1.4 Motor Vehicles .6 Inland Shipping .1 Electric Power .1 Livestock 4.5 Agricultural Machinery 2.3 Miscellaneous Mfg. & Constr .4 Eastern Zone (excl. Berlin) Absolute % of Alt Reich Population (17 May 1939) mill[ions] 24.6 35.4 “(1938) mill [blank] Value Added Mining & Manuf 30.6 Value Added in Mining and Manufacturing mill. RM. (1) East of O/N. 1936 2382 (1936 prices) (2) Total Reich 1936 34185 (1936 “) % (1) of (2) 7% % change in total 1936 and 1938 +26% E of O/N 1938 2800 (1938 prices) % E. 4 VA. (Prov. Total ) 5 V. A. E of O/N Pommern 75 392 294 Brandenburg 33 1175 398 Nieder Schlesien 90 987 890 Oberschlesien 100 450 450 Ostpreussen 100 350 350 2382 3,074,000,000 Total Assets (1936) East (Excl.Berlin.) of O/N Manufacturing 5.3 1.1 Mining .5 .2 Electric Power — .3 Misc.Manuf. .5 .2 Other 13.8 5.3 20.1 7.1 Growth 1937, 1928 [ 1938 ] 2.6 Total 1938 9.7 Movable . Manuf. 3.6 .7 Mining .3 .1 Elec.Power — .1 Misc.Manuf. .4 .1 Other 8.9 3.3 13.2 4.3 Growth 1.6 Total 1938 5.9 [Here follow in the original two manuscript pages of further figures without column headings or identification of any kind.] Value of Industrial Output East of O/N Value Added Mining & Mfg (1928 RM) 45.2 (1938 RM) 33.9 Population East of O/N 8,924,702 (1933) 12.2 Russian Zone 23,469,137 (1933) 32.2 1 An undated manuscript working paper. Authorship not indicated. 2 i.e., the Oder–Neisse Line.Whether the Eastern or Western Neisse is not specified. 3 Billions of Reichsmarks. 3 Billions of Reichsmarks. 4 Presumably percent east of the Oder-Neisse Line. 5 Presumably Value Added (Province Total). No. 932 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 EW/7–2545 No. 932 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Leading Food and Raw Material Surpluses of Soviet Zone (excluding Berlin)—1936 (Excess of rail-borne and water-borne shipments from over receipts into Soviet Zone in thousands of metric tons.) Wheat 883 Rye 476 Barley 303 Oats 146 Flour 354 Potatoes 1,113 Sugar 450 Milk and cream 217 Brown coal 3,492 Potash fertilizer 1,182 Pit props 448 Clay products (building materials) 1,256 1 Authorship not indicated. No. 933 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 933 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Memorandum Russians want of total reparations 50% (Although, on formula which has been agreed to, they realize that the demands of countries other than the occupying powers, may cut this down a little.) Since the Russian Zone now contains of the wealth of Germany 45% it follows that the Russians should get from the other 3 zones the remaining 5% (Although in the area to be ceded to Russia in East Prussia they get fee ownership to all property there, worth at least one billion dollars more than the simple right to take reparation from the same area.) It is estimated that the Ruhr contains 50% of the removables in the U. K., U. S. & French Zones. Probably 40% of these removables can be taken as reparations and still leave sufficient to meet the minimum German requirements, as agreed upon. This is equivalent to 20% of the removables of the whole U. S., U. K., French Zones. It is proposed to offer the Russians one half of this 20% equivalent to 10% of the whole. Half of this would be free, to balance the above-mentioned 5% deficit. The other half (5% of the whole) would be traded to the Russians for food, coal and other necessary supplies from their zone. (Reparations to Poland would be more than balanced by the fact that they are acquiring fee ownership to very valuable property in the area which they expect to have ceded to them in the peace settlement.) 1 Another copy of this paper (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–245) is headed: “Statistical Proposal—Prepared by Clayton, not fully used”. No. 934 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 934 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Memorandum The value of the industrial and agricultural resources (factory equipment, agricultural equipment and timber) in East Prussia in 1941, was estimated at approximately four billion RM. The value of real estate was estimated to be 1,282,000,000 RM., making a total of 5,282,000,000 RM. The area north of the Goldap–Braunsberg line comprises forty percent (40%) of the population. It has a large hog and dairy industry. Its three largest cities have machine, leather, textile, food processing and shipbuilding plants. It is estimated that two-thirds of the industrial and agricultural resources of the province, valued at approximately 2,600,000,000 RM lie in this section. Converted into Dollars at the 1938 legal rate of exchange (2.5 RM to the Dollar), the value of the industrial, forestry, and agricultural resources, omitting real estate, in the area to be ceded to the U. S. S. R. approximates slightly more than One Billion Dollars. At the rate proposed by the U. S. S. R. in its “Plan” of July 23rd, 2 that is, 3.5 RM to the Dollar, the value of these resources would be approximately $750,000,000. 1 Another copy of this paper (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–245) is headed: “Statistics by Lubin”. 2 See document No. 920 . No. 935 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 935 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 Babelsberg , July 26, 1946. Memorandum Forty per cent of all industrial production (manufacturing and mining) is to be found in the Russian zone, although for the most part the industry is of a type which consists of relatively small units, does not involve substantial amounts of fixed capital and should remain in peacetime Germany (textiles, apparel, paper and wood pulp, printing, ceramics and glass, saw mills, etc.). For once-for-all removals the Russian Zone cannot therefore be said to contain over 30% of industrial equipment suitable for reparations and of the kind which the Russians particularly wish. Hence, let us say that the Russian zone has a once-for-all repatriation [ reparation ] potential of 30% It is estimated that [the] Ruhr has 60% of the remaining 70% 42% Leaving in remainder of U. S., U. K. and French zones 28% 100% Assuming Russians entitled to receive of all once-for-all reparations 50% And have available in their zone 30% It remains that they should get elsewhere of the whole once-for-all removals 20% As the Ruhr has 42% of the once-for-all removals in Germany, if we give one-half of such removals to Russia as a final settlement of all her claims, this equals 21% But the Russians would argue they got no current production from the U. S., U. K. and French zones and that this reduces 10½% As against the above; what I have proposed is: Assign Russians one-half Ruhr removals, but only 50% of such assignment for reparations and remaining 50% for exchange for goods from their zone— Thus the amount they get in reparations is reduced by one-half from the above figure and becomes 5¼% 1 This paper is listed in the “Index of Attachments to Summary of the Negotiations in the Economic Sub-Committee” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145) as “Additional Statistical Information by Clayton—July 26, 1945.” No. 936 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 936 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Physically Movable Capital Equipment in Manufacturing Industries at Beginning of 1945 Value in millions of marks (pre-war prices) Per Cent in Eastern Zone plus Berlin Germany (1937 frontiers) Eastern zone plus Berlin (1937 frontiers) Group I Iron and steel, other metals, metal products, machinery, vehicles, electrical equipment, chemicals 6608 1794 27 Group II Textiles, leather, apparel, food processing, paper and pulp, printing, lumber and wood products, rubber, optical & precision instruments, liquid fuels 5686 3107 55 Total manufacturing 12294 14901 40 1 This manuscript working paper was attached to one copy of document No. 935 . Authorship not indicated. No. 937 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 937 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Valuation of Removables From the Ruhr Area There has been a great deal of discussion as to the “value” of remova[ble] equipment in the Ruhr, and in particular as to the “value” of equipment which might be allocated to the Soviet Union from the Ruhr. As is well known, there are various methods by which industries can be valued, depending upon the particular purpose for which the valuation is sought. These methods include cost less depreciation; replacement value; and the value of the industry as a going concern. Depending upon the method used, the valuations may differ substantially. In addition to this difference in the methods of valuation, any attempt to place a value on industries in a country such as Germany becomes subject to even greater divergences of opinion if an effort is made to value such industries in terms of dollars . Assuming a reasonable valuation can be arrived at in marks for the particular purpose involved, at what rate should such marks be converted into dollars for that purpose? It is submitted that for the purpose with which we are concerned, any attempt to place a valuation, whether in marks or dollars, on the equipment to be removed is meaningless and can only lead to needless debate in arriving at a decision on that basis. Even assuming a decision could be arrived at, such a decision would necessarily be subject to varying interpretations in its implementation. What we are trying to determine is how much of the removable industrial equipment in the Ruhr should be allocated to the Soviet Union? The only realistic approach to this problem, and the only approach which can have any definitive meaning to the parties concerned, is to arrive at a percentage of the removable industrial equipment in the Ruhr to be so allocated. To illustrate. Assume that it were decided that X percentage of the removable equipment in a certain industry in the Ruhr was to be allocated to the Soviet Union. Assume that under some method of valuation, and conversion into dollars, used by the United States the value of this equipment were placed at $100,000; and that under some other method used by the Soviet Union the value were placed at $500,000. It must be obvious that the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union place widely divergent values on such equipment is immaterial for our purpose. 1 Authorship not indicated. No. 938 The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) 740.00119 E.W./7–2645: Telegram No. 938 The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 26 [1945.] 131. (For Pauley.) For your information British Embassy handed this Government a memorandum 2 suggesting the possibility of constituent republics of the Soviet Union entering separate reparation claims and seeking separate representation on an Inter-Allied Reparation Commission. The British Government expresses the view that if these issues are raised by the Soviet Government ( a ) separate claims on behalf of Soviet Republics other than White Russia and the Ukraine should be resisted; ( b ) separate claims on behalf of White Russia and the Ukraine should be entertained on ground of the San Francisco precedent, 3 if otherwise agreement with Soviet Union might be delayed indefinitely. Separate allocations to these republics should not be additional to the amount otherwise agreed at Moscow for the Soviet Union as a whole, ( c ) Separate claims on behalf of the Baltic States should not be entertained. This Government’s reply 2 states that it would be premature to attempt now to meet these contingencies since there is at present no indication of whether and in what form these questions may be raised and that this Government will state its policy on these matters when and if the Soviet Government introduces them into the discussions at Moscow. [ Grew ] 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg. 2 Not printed. 3 i. e., the invitation to the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics to attend the United Nations Conference on International Organization. 2 Not printed. No. 939 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 939 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation?] top secret [ Babelsberg , July 27, 1945.] Second Definition—War Trophies Under the “war trophies” is understood: 1). All military property of Germany, including all military property, which belong, is being used or was intended to be used by the military and para military units of the enemy or by the members of these units. 2). Property which was used by the enemy for military purposes and which in the course of the war was removed from Germany to serve the military needs of the Allies. 1 A post–Conference letter from Parten to Brigadier General W. H. Draper, Jr., states: “The second [definition] was presented by Mr. Molotov on July 27. While both these definitions, and particularly the one presented by Mr. Maisky [ document No. 904 ], were a subject of discussion, no formal action was taken on them.” (Pauley Files.) No. 940 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State Pauley Files No. 940 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 27, 1945. Dear Mr. Secretary : Yesterday I visited five plants in the American area of Berlin located in Zehlendorf and Tempelhof. These plants manufactured artificial wool and artificial silk from wood fibre, electrical instruments, radios, telephones, etc. Will Clayton accompanied me in looking over two of the plants. These plants are strictly peace-time concerns. We made the following observations: 1. Very little damage was done to the plants as a result of bombing and shellfire. 2. Subsequent to the armistice, virtually all machinery was removed by the Russians. The machinery was numbered and removed out of our zone some of it just across the line. The work was tremendously rushed toward the end. A few pieces of machinery were left behind. The technical information in the plants, process records and specifications were also taken. 3. In every case, a few foremen and supervisors were “persuaded” by the Russians to accompany the machinery to Russia. 4. Two of the plants visited belonged to the International Telephone and Telegraph and were 94% and 100% American owned. They have been completely stripped of machinery down to even small tools. It would appear that all these removals were in complete violation of all efforts to maintain “non-war potential” industries in Germany. The effect of the removals will be the complete destruction of employment opportunities in the area. What we saw amounts to organized vandalism directed not alone against Germany, but against the U. S. forces of occupation. Incidentally, under the techniques used, Russia will withdraw two to three times as much from any area as would be withdrawn by the U. S. or U. K. under similar circumstances. In the area which we captured and turned over to the Russians we made no removals except for a few samples of unique equipment. You may draw your own conclusions. Respectfully yours, Edwin W. Pauley [Attachment] [ Babelsberg ,] July 27, 1945. Factory Equipment Removals From the American Zone of Berlin 2 Area Covered On July 26 the Reparations Mission Staff, headed by Edwin W. Pauley and Isador Lubin, accompanied during part of the trip by Will Clayton and others, visited five industrial plants in the American sector of Berlin under the guidance of Major Gentle of the U. S. Military Government. The plants were in Zehlendorf and Tempelhof, in the U. S. sector of Berlin. Specific Plant Observations The three plants most carefully inspected were the artificial fibre plant of the Spinnstofffabrik Zehlendorf A. G., the Zeiss Ikon lens and adding machine plant, and the glass works of the Sendlinger Optische Glaswerke. These were selected because they are among the largest plants of the area and are peace-time industries rather than war plants, though their products were used by the military during the war. The following paragraphs will give a brief view of the facts: 1. Spinnstofffabrik Zehlendorf A. G. Normal products: Artificial wool and silk, from wood pulp. War products: Same Plant: About 770,000 sq. feet, mostly one story. About one half built during the war and equipped with new machinery. War damage at end was 20% to buildings and to machinery practically none. Employees: At end about 2,000 of whom 300 were foreign “slave labor” and were reported by the superintendent to be “just as good as the Germans”. Removals: 80% of all machinery removed, including all modern equipment; conveyor systems; 2 modern steam turbines, 12,000 KWH; pumping equipment from 7 deep wells (leaving 2); all specifications and process records; 4 technicians. 2. Zeiss Ikon A. G. Goertzwerke Normal products: Cameras, adding-machines War products: Optical devices Plant: 270,000 sq. feet, modern 5 story concrete reinforced. War damage, buildings 50%, machinery 5% Employees: 2,300 including about 300 “slave labor” Equipment removed: 95% of machine tools, some 1800; all locomotive and rolling stock; all technical reports, drawings and specifications; several technicians went to Russia with the machinery. 3. Sendlinger Optische Glaswerke GmbH. Normal products: Raw glassware for illumination, Röntgen glass, lenses, magnifying glasses, condensers, raw glass for optics. War products: Same, with emphasis on raw glass and lenses for optical instruments. Plant: 117,700 square feet, modern 5 story main plant; war damage to buildings 25%, to machinery none. Employees: 420, about 25% “slave labor” Removals: All machinery except 14 old machines removed since Armistice, kilns and furnaces remain. Some plumbing, electrical fixtures are missing. All measuring machines taken. In addition two International Telephone and Telegraph plants were visited. They manufactured telephones, pneumatic conveyors, radios and other electric equipment. General Observations 1. These were not “war potential” plants. 2. These plants were in full operation up to May 1945. Several of the plants had been damaged during the war mostly by fire, but were repaired and brought to 100% production or more in 30 to 90 days. Some I. T. & T. machinery had been moved out into plants in Czechoslovakia, otherwise there was no evidence of “dispersal.” 3. Managers or superintendents reported that all plants were operated as parts of various cartels, though they could not give all details. 4. “Slave labor” made up around 20% of the labor force, somewhat less than we found in heavy industry. Foreign labor was highly regarded by the superintendents we talked with. 5. Superintendents said that the bulk of their former labor force is still available in the neighborhood, though their living accommodations are very crowded. Present employment is 7% to 10% of normal, and is engaged in repair and clean-up work. 6. Raw materials and semi-finished materials on hand in the plants are very limited or non-existent, in contrast to the stock-piles in the steel plants. This may be an indication of the breakdown in transport toward the end of the war. 7. Virtually all useful machinery, including some boilers, turbines, generators and pumps were removed as well as plumbing and electrical fixtures. 8. Removals were executed by Russian military personnel under some technical supervision. Some 100 men were employed in removals, which may be compared with the 2000 normal employees of the plant. Removals continued up to the time we took over physically. Some machinery, taken from place, was left behind for lack of transport. 9. The removed machinery was carefully numbered and addressed and apparently sent to places selected in advance, to be set up on the former pattern. 10. Superintendents reported that the high precision and measuring machinery was not properly protected and was allowed to stand outdoors and along the streets and roads after removal. 11. German technicians were taken with the machinery to assist in its installation and operation. These technicians went voluntarily, according to the superintendents, though they implied that various “strong inducements” were offered. The Russians wanted many more, but could not persuade them to go. 12. Two of the plants belonged 94% and 100% to the I. T. & T. Co. They were completely “looted”. They had been more seriously damaged than the other plants we visited, but most of their machinery was in good condition at the end of fighting. Conclusions 1. The USSR considers all industrial equipment as war booty, including the equipment of plants engaged in making textiles, cameras, optical instruments, radios, telephones, switchboards and pneumatic tubes and conveyors. 2. Removals are systematic and in some cases supervised by technical personnel. Machinery is numbered and addressed to places selected in advance. (This conflicts with some evidence seen at the freight marshalling yards. Practices may differ for general purpose machinery). Technical personnel is persuaded but not forced to accompany the machinery. 3. Special effort was made to strip the Zone turned over to us in Berlin before we came in. The I. T. & T. in our Zone was stripped before July 4, while the AEG (General Electric) plant in the Russian Zone is only now being stripped. 4. There will be serious industrial unemployment no matter what we do in our Berlin Zone, because the tools of the former peace-time industries are gone. 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 This paper bears the following typed notation: “Field notes and report by Luther Gulick July 27, 1945”. No. 941 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 EW/7–2845 No. 941 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 28, 1945. Dear Mr. Secretary : Our original calculations of maximum reparations, exclusive of current production, available from Germany, within its 1937 borders, amounted to something between $5–$6 billions. This estimate, however, included not only industrial and mining capacity but also among other things foreign investments, livestock and agricultural machinery. If we place the reparations figure at $5 billions and assume that 50% is in the Russian zone of occupancy there remains in the Western Zones, occupied by the U. S., U. K., and France $2.5 billions of removable “once-for-all” reparations. Twelve and one-half percent of this figure would be $312 millions. Under a zonal system of reparations, and particularly in view of the tremendous shortages of food and fuel not only in the Western Zones of Germany, but also in all of Western Europe, it appears to be unwise to remove anything except direct war potentials for reparations purposes. We estimate the value of removable direct war potential in the Western Zones to amount to $1,710,000,000 of which 12½ percent would amount to $214,000,000. This sum differs so widely from the figure which the Russians have in mind that I believe that the mere mention of this figure at this time would preclude any agreement being made at all. Accordingly I suggest that in your discussions with the Russians you talk only of total removables from the Western Zones and simply mention that they would receive 12½ percent of all equipment which the U. S., U. K., and France remove from these Zones. Respectfully yours, Edwin W. Pauley 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. No. 942 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State Pauley Files No. 942 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 28, 1945. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have prepared for transmittal to Mr. Maisky, together with copy of my letter to the President on this same subject. I shall appreciate your reviewing this proposed communication to Mr. Maisky. If you think it advisable, I would be happy to have the letter prepared for your signature and addressed to Mr. Molotov. Respectfully submitted, Edwin W. Pauley [Enclosure 1] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the President 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 28, 1945. My Dear Mr. President : I have prepared a letter to Mr. Maisky which, taken with my letter to him of July 3rd, 2 gives a brief history to date of our negotiations and our present attitude toward the problems of reparations. I have naturally refrained from sending this letter until I have secured the approval of yourself and the Secretary of State. Inasmuch as the subject of reparations will undoubtedly be a matter of public interest and discussion in the United States, and inasmuch as verbal statements by representatives of nations can be so easily misquoted or misunderstood, I think it wise that the official record as regards reparations should be well documented. I am therefore presenting this proposed letter to you and to the Secretary of State for whatever comment you wish to make concerning it. I am also enclosing for your reference a copy of my previous letter to Mr. Maisky dated July 3rd, 1945. Respectfully submitted, Edwin W. Pauley [Enclosure 2] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Chairman of the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Maisky ) 3 [ Babelsberg ,] July 27, 1945. My Dear Mr. Maisky : In my letter to you of July 3rd, I called your attention to the fact that although we had been in Moscow some twenty-two days, we had received from the Soviet Government neither a presentation of the Soviet “plan” of reparations nor any figures in support of the amount of reparations which was agreed at the Crimea Conference 4 should be the subject of discussion at our meeting in Moscow. In the foregoing letter, I pointed particularly to this meeting of the Big Three, and recalled our understanding, reached the day after the arrival of the British delegation in Moscow, that it was our joint responsibility to present a definitive reparation program at this meeting of the heads of Government. In addition to reaching an agreement on the fundamental principles of a reparations plan, I urged that we define “reparations”, “restitution”, and “war booty”, in order to make definite and certain the subject matter upon which a reparations program could be predicated. This latter problem of definition appeared to me then, and even more so now, to be an elementary and obvious first step. As you know, we discussed and agreed on seven of eight general principles which the United States Delegation proposed should guide the formation and administration of a reparations plan for Germany as a whole. It was understood, of course, throughout all our discussions that for the purpose of reparations Germany included all of the territory lying within the boundary of the old German Reich. Both we and the British submitted proposed definitions of “restitution”. You agreed at a meeting of the Steering Committee that you would present a definition of “war booty” or “war trophies”. After countless delays and postponements, no Soviet definition of “war booty” or “war trophies” was forthcoming. When we arrived here at the Big Three Conference, we had received from the Soviets neither an explanation of their proposed “plan” of reparations nor any figures supporting their proposed amount of reparations, nor a definition of “war booty” without which it will be impossible to ascertain what should be available for reparations, or how fairly to divide among claimant nations what is removed. Upon our arrival in Berlin, the United States Delegation sought to facilitate the necessary definition of the subject matter of reparations by submitting to the Soviet and British Delegations, proposed definitions, not only of “war booty”, but of “restitution” and “reparations” as well. These proposed definitions were as follows: [Here follow the definitions contained in attachment 2 to document No. 894 .] Here in Berlin, it has been impossible not to observe that extensive removals of capital equipment of all kinds have been made by the Soviet Government both from the American zone of occupation prior to our occupation, and from the Soviet zone. The removals from the Soviet zone are continuing on a comparable scale and include equipment from many peace-time industries essential both for the maintenance of a minimum subsistence in Germany and to provide for necessary imports and recurrent reparations. Even American owned equipment of this character has been removed. Since all of these removals are taking place before any reparations agreement has been reached, we can only conclude that the equipment removed is either being taken as “war trophies” or that the Soviet Government has concluded that the reparations program can best be conducted on a zonal basis, rather than by treating Germany as a single economic unit as was discussed in Moscow. As you know, we have consistently maintained that the economy of Germany, in which reparations necessarily plays an important part, could be more satisfactorily administered by treating Germany as an economic unit. This principle was set forth in one of the seven principles to which the Soviet Government agreed in Moscow. 5 It has now been made clear both to the Big Three and the Foreign Ministers that with the acquiescence of the Soviet Union, Poland has been permitted to occupy and take over all of German Silesia lying east of the Oder–Neisse River[s] together with a substantial part of East Prussia. Representatives of the Soviet Union have stated that no Germans remain in these areas and take the position that this area belongs exclusively to the Poles. This means that the large potential surpluses of agricultural products and important minerals and other raw materials produced in these areas of pre-war Germany will no longer be available to balance the German economy. This renders it impossible for zones other than the one occupied by the Soviet Government to balance their economy even on a bare subsistence level without large imports of foods, and other raw materials. In the circumstances, both the British and U. S. Governments have been and will be compelled to import into Germany these large quantities of food, and other supplies. The Soviet Government both in our meetings at Moscow and here at this conference has consistently refused to accept that part of the final proposed principle of a reparations plan underlined 6 below: “After payment of reparations, enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany, the necessary means must be provided for payment of imports approved by the Government concerned before reparation deliveries are made .” The Soviet representatives have maintained that reparation deliveries shall have priority over payment for even approved and necessary imports made into Germany by the Allied Governments. This simply means that those Allied Governments which are compelled to ship food and other necessary supplies into Germany without compensation will in effect be advancing funds to provide for deliveries of reparations from Germany. To this neither the United States, nor, as we understand it, the United Kingdom can subscribe. The Soviet position would prevent our receiving compensation for the vast supplies now necessary to maintain our respective zones. Thus we would repeat one of the worst mistakes made after the first World War. The United States has therefore been placed in the position where it must deal with reparations along the same lines as have, in fact, been initiated by the Soviet Government. It was for this reason that we have submitted (two days ago) a further proposal which formally recognizes that removals will be conducted on a zonal basis. 7 This we regard as regrettable, but inescapable, in view of the unilateral actions taken by the Soviet Government. Our proposal need not interfere with the efforts of the Control Council to work out other economic and political problems for Germany as a unit. Likewise, it need not interfere with your securing heavy equipment from western Germany as reparations in return for deliveries of needed equipment and supplies from eastern Germany both on reparations account and to lighten the import burdens which have been placed upon those powers occupying western Germany. I trust that you will understand the spirit in which this letter is written. I am sure that we both realize that removals of necessary peacetime equipment from Germany render it most difficult to deal with reparations and the payment for necessary imports. Let me assure you again that we share your views as to the necessity for removing German war potential. Sincerely yours, Edwin W. Pauley 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 document No. 364, printed in vol. i . 3 Pauley has provided the information, in an interview with Department of State historians on November 23, 1953, that this letter was approved by Clayton, Byrnes, and Truman; that it was handed on or after July 28 to Vyshinsky (who had replaced Maisky as the Soviet negotiator with respect to reparations on the Economic Subcommittee) in the course of a meeting of that Subcommittee after Pauley had stated its substance orally; and that no written reply to this letter was made by the Soviet authorities. 4 See document No. 1416 , section v . 5 See attachment 1 to document No, 894. 6 Here represented by italics. 7 document No. 925 . No. 943 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 943 United States Delegation Working Paper [ Babelsberg , July 28, 1945. 1 ] Preliminary Estimates of Capital Removals Required To Reduce German War Potential in the Reich and by Zones (In Millions of Prewar Reichsmarks) Total Reich Eastern Zone Including Berlin Balance of Germany 1. Manufacturing including armaments 3,500 1,400 2,100 2. Railway transport; motor vehicles, inland shipping 2,250 1,125 1,125 3. Electric power,gas 900 400 500 4. Total 6,650 2,925 3,725 Value in dollars, converted to 1938 prices plus 15 percent a ) At 2.5 RM—$1 3,060 (100%) 1,350 (44%) 1,710 (56%) b ) At 3.5 RM—$1 2,215 (100%) 975 (44%) 1,240 (51%) 2 Basis of Calculation: The calculations are based on a program to reduce German war potential in general and to eliminate it in strategic war-important industries. 1 So dated in the “Index of Attachments to Summary of the Negotiations in the Economic Sub-Committee” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145), which describes this paper as “Statistics by Pauley Group”. 2 Sic . No. 944 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Pauley Files No. 944 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) [ Babelsberg ,] July 28, 1945. Memorandum for Ambassador Pauley The attached memorandum for U. S. Group CC 1 raises certain questions regarding restitution of art objects. I believe that we might concur in recommendations 1 and 2, and I should like your comments on recommendation 3. It too would seem acceptable, subject to your views on “replacement” as against straight restitution of art objects. It would be desirable if we could get off a joint memorandum on this subject to General Clay. W L C[ layton ] 1 Not printed. For the recommendations referred to in the following paragraph, see the subenclosure to document No. 964 . No. 945 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) Pauley Files No. 945 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 Berlin , July 29, 1945. My Dear Mr. Clayton : I have your memorandum of July 28 2 suggesting that we might concur in the recommendation concerning certain questions regarding restitution of art objects, as recommended by the Headquarters, U. S. Group Control Council. At your suggestion I have prepared a joint memorandum 3 and have indicated my approval of it by my signature thereon. If it meets with your approval I presume you will transmit the same to General Clay for appropriate action. Sincerely yours, Edwin W. Pauley 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 document No. 944 . 3 Enclosure to document No. 964 . No. 946 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State Pauley Files No. 946 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Secretary of State 1 Berlin , July 29, 1945. Dear Mr. Secretary : There is no real difference in the US and UK figures. There was an apparent difference because the British (and the Soviets) have been using 1938 replacement value plus 15%, while we have been using 1938 depreciated value plus 15%. We did this as a protection against a later argument over the value of machinery when removed. However, we are willing to use “new cost” basis for second-hand machinery, provided it is agreed that the same basis will be accepted at the time of removal of the property . This is very important especially if the promise to deliver reparations is made in dollar value. Annex I 2 shows our figures on both bases of evaluation. When we use the British method of evaluation we have substantially the same results as they do. The Ruhr contains about 45 percent of the total reparations which we find should be taken from the Western Zones under the reparations policies of the U. S. Government, i. e., demilitarization without destruction of the German people. The additional reparations which may be given to Russia could be taken exclusively from the Ruhr, if, after consideration, you and the President think this wise. However, I think it would be better and safer to draw from the entire Western area, including all three zones. I suggest this because there are disarmament targets in the western zones, which are not in the Ruhr; the Ruhr industries are often integrated with industries just outside the Ruhr; and finally because it is not easy to define “the Ruhr” nor to build up statistics for a unit which exists more in conversation than as a defined political and census area. 3 A summary of the possible reparations removals from the Ruhr is given in Annex II for your information. For your information I attach Annex III and IV which show industry by industry what we find must be taken in reparations from Germany as a whole and from the western zones to fulfill US policy. You will note that while the tables are compiled in Reichsmarks, the totals are converted to dollars on varying bases in Annex I. I trust that this letter and the information given will fully serve your purpose. If not I shall be glad to supplement this material. Sincerely yours, Edwin W. Pauley 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 Annexes not found. 3 Cf. the map facing p. 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] , post . No. 947 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2945 No. 947 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to the Secretary of State [ Babelsberg ,] July 29, 1945. Memorandum This memorandum is in confirmation of my statement to you this morning on reparations and is written merely for the purpose of placing my views on record and not for the purpose of prolonging the discussion. 1. I think enough has been said at Yalta and at Moscow to justify the Russians in feeling that they have a right to 50% of whatever reparations in kind can be got out of Germany. 2. The only practicable method of apportionment between the different claimant countries is on a zonal basis so far as Russia is concerned. 3. If the Russian zone contained 50% of the movable industrial capital equipment of Germany of the kind which the Russians seek, the problem would be simple. 4. The most reliable information we have is that the Russian Zone contains only 40% of the movable industrial capital equipment of Germany and that this equipment consists predominantly of the light industries (textiles, printing, apparel, saw mills, etc.) and contains relatively little of the heavy industrial type which the Russians want. 60% of the movable industrial capital equipment of Germany is in the Western Zone, about half of it in the Ruhr. This equipment, particularly in the Ruhr, is predominantly of the heavy type (iron and steel, chemicals, etc.) which the Russians want. 5. I suggest, therefore, that we should be prepared to trade with the Russians on the following basis: ( a ) Reparations claims of Russia and Poland to be satisfied from the Russian Zone plus 25% of such industrial capital equipment as we decide should be removed from the Ruhr (estimated roughly at ½ of such equipment) on condition that an additional like amount of such equipment would be exchanged for an equivalent value in food, coal, zinc, potash, timber and oil to be made available to us by the Russians from their zone. ( b ) All other claimants for reparations (U. S., U. K., France, et al. ) to be satisfied out of the Western Zone. 6. German merchant fleet not considered in the above but to be covered by a separate arrangement. 7. United Nations property in Germany and satellite countries, if taken for reparations, to be safeguarded or compensated for in accordance with memoranda of the U. S. Delegation of July 25. 1 Since the Russians must bow to the U. K. and U. S. decision regarding their right to receive reparations from the Western Zone, I feel that any decision to exclude them from any participation in the distribution of the heavy equipment in the Ruhr as reparation, would be considered by the Russians as a reversal of the Yalta and Moscow position, since no Allied understanding would be necessary to enable them to get reparations from their own zone. Furthermore, we are committed to the substantial de-industrialization of the Ruhr, and it is doubtful if other claimant nations for reparations will be able to use all the equipment which will be removed from that area. In other words, to give a reasonable percentage of such equipment to the Russians will cost nothing. W L C[ layton ] 1 Documents Nos. 842 and 926 . No. 948 The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2945 No. 948 The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Rubin ) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Oliver ) 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 29, 1945. Dear Covey : I have seen the Department’s telegram 131, July 26, 2 for Pauley, stating that the British have handed us a memorandum stating the possibility that the different Soviet Republics might enter separate reparation claims. So far, this has not happened, and I think that the U. S. S. R. intends to treat its claims as a whole. In any case, the zonal plan of reparation which seems to be evolving contemplates that all of the U. S. S. R. and Poland will be compensated by what they choose to take from the Eastern Zone, plus perhaps an additional agreed amount from the Western Zones. This makes immaterial separate claims on behalf of the Republics or of the Baltic States. Sincerely, Seymour J. Rubin 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 document No. 938 . No. 949 The Adviser on Administration and Political Science on the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Gulick) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Pauley Files No. 949 The Adviser on Administration and Political Science on the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Gulick ) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) [Undated.] Memorandum Subject: Additional evidence on German [ Soviet? ] removals from Berlin. (1) We have three new reports on removals from Berlin. These are as follows: ( a ) Report on industrial removals from the Russian sector observed on July 28 by Sproul, Mahler, Trone and Johnson. ( b ) Report on Art removals by USSR from US sector by John Nicholas Brown for the US Group, Control Council, RD & R Div. as of July 29. ( c ) Report on removals of property belonging to US citizens and Neutrals from US sector , as of July 29, by Capt. Arthur D. Reed for G–5, Berlin District. (2) New material in these reports is as follows: ( a ) Removal of raw materials, scrap and cable machinery, including wire twisters and insulation weaving machines, is reported from the Russian sector, also domestic sewing machines. ( b ) Most of the public Art collections of Berlin were apparently stored for protection in the Flakturm at the Zoo, and in four buildings in the US–UK Sectors of Berlin. The distinctive and valuable material has been removed by the Russians, including especially the sculptures, paintings, antiquities, art libraries, and German Volk arts. The removals were selective, much material of second rate importance remains. ( c ) The Reed report lists 20 American owned plants and installations which have been removed 20% to 100%. These are: Percent of Machinery Usable Removed Since Armistice Anaconda Copper Co. (51% US Owned) 100 International Business Machines (80% US Owned) 40 Combustion Engineering Co. 100 Gillette Safety Razor Co. (Three plants) 100 International Tel and Tel: C. Lorenz Plant 80 Mix and Genest Plant 95 Ferdinand Schuchhardt Shops 100 American Radiator Co. 100 Metals Coating Company 20 Ford Motor Company Shops 100 Intertype Corporation 100 National Cash Register 100 Underwood–Elliott Fisher 100 Horst von Hemming (33% US owned) (medical accessories) 100 General Electric Co. (Two plants in US Zone) 100 Paramount Pictures 100 (projectors and films) Valentin 100 Stocks F. W. Woolworth & Company 100 Stocks L[ uther ] G[ ulick ] 1 1 On the original Gulick’s initials appear at the head of the memorandum. No. 950 The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany (Zhukov) to Generalissimo Stalin 740.00119 E. W./7–3045 No. 950 The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany ( Zhukov ) to Generalissimo Stalin 1 [Translation?] [Undated.] Report of Marshal Zhukov on the Removal by the Allies of Rolling Stock From the Soviet Zone of Occupation I report that while withdrawing their troops from our zone temporarily occupied by them Americans and British have removed without our agreement the following rolling stock— Americans 1. Erfurt Railroad Board Loaded goods cars— 9722 Passenger cars— 278 Locomotives of all types 87 2. Magdeburg Railroad Section Loaded goods cars— 655 Empty goods cars— 939 Passenger cars— 322 British 1. Schwerin Railroad Board Loaded goods cars— 36 Empty goods cars— 1200 Locomotives of all types 15 total removed By Americans By British Total Loaded goods cars 10377 36 10413 Empty goods cars 939 1200 2139 Passenger cars 600 — 600 Locomotives of all types 15 102 Please bring up before the Allies the question of returning to our zone of occupation the abovementioned rolling stock as we in our zone experience acute shortage of rolling stock. Zhukov 1 The subject matter of this report was discussed by Stalin in the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, July 31. See ante , p. 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . No. 951 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President Truman Papers No. 951 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the President Berlin , July 29, 1945. My Dear Mr. President : Marshal Zhukov presented what purports to be an exposé of U. S. and U. K. removals of industrial equipment in Germany. 1 It is clear that this report is designed as a smoke screen for the unilateral U. S. S. R. action in shipping to Russia, before the approval of any reparations plan, whole plants, including factories with no war-potential. Some areas, such as our sector of Berlin, have, as you know, been stripped of virtually all peace-time industrial employment possibilities, in violation of principles agreed to with us and the British in Moscow. I asked Committee I of my staff to analyze the Zhukov Report. The Committee includes well known American industrialists, machine tool experts, and industrial economists, most of whom visited plants in Eastern Germany just before the release of this territory to the Russians by our Armies. Robert G. Sproul, President of the University of California, is Chairman. I attach their report as you should see it. I think it summarizes the situation accurately, and from my own observations, I concur in the statements made. The Zhukov report will surely be heard from again in the international scene, certainly next winter when the ghastly and costly results of the Russian policy become evident and known. I am sure you will want to be prepared for this development. A careful report by the U. S. and U. K. Military Authorities should also be in your hands. 2 Respectfully submitted, Edwin W. Pauley [Attachment 1] secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 29, 1945. Memorandum Subject: Report of Marshal Zhukov on Removals by Allies from Russian Zone After analyzing the report of Marshal Zhukov on the removal by American and British armies of equipment and other properties from the factories and other institutions in the Soviet zone of occupation, we have the following comments: 1. The report is probably largely correct, but compared to the removals of industrial equipment reported and observed in the Berlin District and elsewhere, the removals reported by Marshal Zhukov are trivial. 2. Most of the removals listed, of equipment, documents and personnel, have to do with recent German technical advances, for immediate use in war or war production, and are clearly war booty. 3. The removals of gold and artistic or cultural objects have been made public and are subject to action by the Reparations Commission. 4. Much of the damage to instruments and equipment, in the light of our observations, was caused by looting and destruction by foreign slave labor; souvenir hunters, as in all armies, also played their part. 5. Personnel removed were those suspected of being war criminals or of contributing to German war potential. 6. The removals of equipment described in Marshal Zhukov’s document are not those required for Germany’s peacetime economy, but rather for war purposes, whereas the Russian removals observed, such as agricultural equipment, sewing machines and textile machines, are certainly not war potentials. [Attachment 2—Translation] The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces of Occupation in Germany ( Zhukov ) to Generalissimo Stalin Marshal Zhukov’s Report on Removal by the Allies of Equipment and Other Property From the Factories in the Soviet Zone of Occupation Hereby I report that the Americans and British when withdrawing from the Soviet zone of occupation, i. e., from the territory of Saxony, Thüringen, and province of Saxony and province of Mecklenburg removed the following equipment, property and technical experts: Morsleben near the town of Helmstedt, Province of Saxony from the aviation equipment plant of the Company “Ascania Werke” in the salt mines were removed to Braunschweig: 200 universal metal-cutting machine-tools; All technical documentation; All optical instruments from the laboratory. Town of Hadmersleben near town of Oschersleben (Saxony); the Junkers underground plant in the salt mines: All the optical instruments were damaged, the microscope and micro-photocamera’s lenses were removed. Unseburg near town of Stassfurt; From the underground plant of the B. M. W. Company in the salt mines were removed: ( a ) All technical documentation for new motors and the turbine 0018; ( b ) Chief designer of the new reactive turbine 0018 and a group of technical experts with their families were taken away. Town of Schönebeck: from the Junkers’ plant producing HE–162 aircraft were removed: ( a ) 50 turbines of the firm B. M. W. were dismantled from the finished HE–162 aircraft; ( b ) Chief engineer of the plant and a group of technical experts with their families. Beendorf near town of Helmstedt; from the Siemens plant situated in the salt mines, the pit “Maria”, for the production of the aviation equipment and autopilots for the V–1 and V–2 aircraft were removed: All technical documentation; all optical instruments and the laboratory; Chief engineer of the plant and a group of technical experts with their families. Tarthun near the town of Schönebeck; from the underground Junkers aviation plant were removed: Technical documentation and draughts; Chief engineer and a group of designers and technologists with their families. Town of Stassfurt: from the Berlepsch salt mine were removed: 10 precise geodesic instruments and devices. From the pits “Ludwig–1” and “Ludwig–2” of the “Ludwig” mine from the underground commissary stores of the German War Office were removed: More than 100 railway cars of ammunition and fabrics inclusive of the fabrics produced by the Russian Morozov Factory. Town of Kleinwanzleben westward of the city of Magdeburg; from the institute of beet-sugar production (a research institute of worldwide importance) were removed in April: All the main laboratory equipment and the scientific and research works; Two doctors of biological sciences with their families. Town of Merseburg: from the “Leuna” plant producing synthetic gasoline, carbon and ammoniac were removed: A suitcase full of platinum (that was in the store in the plant); 28 engineers; The American [commander?] gave permission to Krupp to remove the plant. The commander of the Soviet 129 Rifle Corps stopped the removal of the equipment but all the principal technical staff has been taken away. Town of Halle: 24 scientists including the outstanding physiologist, the Nobel prize winner, Professor Doctor Emil Abderhalden, were taken away from the institute of Physics and Chemistry; The laboratory of the Institute was removed. From the Siebel plant were removed: The draught-designs of new speed aircraft; Chief designer of the plant. Town of Schkopau: 1400 tons of finished rubber products and 40 klg of platinum were removed from the Buna plant. Simultaneously 26 leading chemical engineers including inventors, research-workers with their families and personal belongings were taken away; many engineers raised a protest against this, but they were made to leave by force. Village of Berka (Saxony): Up to 100 tons of gold were removed from the store of medical supplies. Town of Niedersachswerfen (Saxony): A plant producing V–1 and V–2 weapon was partially removed. Town of Ilfeld (Saxony): The equipment of plant producing Faust cartridges was partially removed. Town of Langensalza (Saxony): The workers of Krupp and Junkers plants were taken away; The machine tools of the aviation school-factory producing aircraft JU–88 were partially removed. City of Jena: from the Zeiss plant were removed: The central optical control laboratory; The reproduction laboratory; The physics laboratory; The electro-technical laboratory; The range-finder laboratory; The crystallographic laboratory; The metallographic laboratory; The microscopic laboratory; The medical laboratory; The geodesic laboratory; 20 million R. M. worth of finished optical mechanical devices; All the original draughts of all kinds of optical mechanical production; 77 leading experts, including the chief engineer of the plant, 3 professors and 35 doctors of technical sciences. From the “Schott” optical plant were removed: The optical control laboratory; The physics laboratory; The range-finder laboratory; The crystallographic laboratory; The microscopic laboratory; The geodesic laboratory; 3 million R. M. worth of the finished production; 50 key-experts including the chief engineer of the plant Doctor of technical sciences Berger. Town of Weida: from the Berlin Physical and Technical Institute were removed: All the supplies of radium and polonium; 2 complexes of quars clocks [ sic ]; A series of etaloons [ sic ] and measuring instruments (magnitons, vacuum pumps, electromagnets, etc.); Modern technical literature; The draughts of apparatus of new constructions; The records of physical observations; 13 experts of the high frequency laboratory, including Doctor Scheibe, the head of the laboratory and Doctor Meller, President of the Institute. Town of Eisenach: from the Bavarian motor-building plant were removed: 302.000 R. M. worth of equipment; Engineers and designers of the plant. Town of Gera: from the Siemens–Halske electro-technical enterprise were removed: The most valuable equipment and finished production, for example the newest signal-speaking system for railroads; All technical key-personnel including Keyser, the manager, and Paetz, the chief engineer; From the “Califon-Fabric” were removed: All chemical experts and the manager of the factory. City of Egeln: From the aircraft factory “Junkers” was removed the chief engineer with drawings. City of Bad Blankenburg: A part of the laboratory of the firm “Telefunken” was removed. 20 experts in military wireless technique were removed. City of Leipzig: from the factory of the firm “Leis Schoper” were removed: Drawings of non contact combined fuses; 3 experts; Drawings and two experts were removed from the factory where gyroscopic compasses for U–boats of the firm “Schitzsche” were manufactured. City of Zwickau: from the “Horch” factory of the “Autounion” concern were removed: Electrical torpedo drawings; The chief designers of torpedoes. City of Werdau: ( a ) Three experts and drawings were removed from the “Schwarzkopf” factory where principal engines and governing instruments for torpedoes were manufactured. ( b ) Three experts and drawings were removed from the “Siemens” naval instruments factory. City of Bitterfeld: from the “IG Farben Industrie” were removed: 25 experts; Recipes, reports on research work, drawings, patents for production of chlorine, calcium, chloride, hydrogen, chloride-benzole, chlorineiron and etc. City of Bernburg: from the “Deutsche Solne [ Solvay? ] Werke” were removed: 10 experts; Recipes; Reports on research work; Drawings; Patents on production of calcinated soda; sodium hydroxide, bicarbonate, calcium chloride and cement. City of Plauen: from the works of the firm “Horn” were removed: All technical documentation; Specimens and manufactured goods of automatical control of the plane and flying bombs; Chief constructor—Doctor Edhard Horn and his 2 assistants; Many documents, drawings were blown up and burned. City of Kahla (Thüringen): from the works of the firm “Gustloff Werke Reimag” were removed: Original drawings of Me–262, the reaction engines and turbines; All copies documents and experimental specimens are burned. Village Molsdorf (Thüringen): Research laboratory of the firm “Siemens Schukert” for the application of high frequency currents and ultraviolet rays for gluing of wood, its drying, increasing of vitamins in food stuffs, catalytic agent for chemical process, change of atom structure of some of solutions on other. All reports on finished works and researches as well as research personnel of 4 men and staff technical personnel with most valuable apparatus were removed. City of Suhl: from artillery-rifle works of “Gustloff”, where there has been a central engineering bureau for rifle and small-calibre artillery production and the largest laboratory were removed: All designers to the last; All engineers which worked directly in shops; Technical experts with drawings and technical data. Village of Merkers (near city of Gotha): Some time ago from Berlin to the mines of Kaiserode and Grossgerzen were removed: gold and other valuables of German State Bank, paintings and other objects of art of state museums of Berlin, acts and apparatuses of Koenigsberg canals. According to the Manager of the Kaiserode joint stock company and the chief mining engineer from this mine were removed all these valuables including: Gold of German bank—over 100 tons; Paper currency approximately 4 railroad cars load [ carloads? ]; All paintings and other valuables from Berlin museums; Acts and instruments of the Koenigsberg canal board. Village of Wertenrode [ Wernrode? ] (Harz): It is reported that in the potassium mine in Wertenrode were hidden 250 extremely valuable paintings, 4 sculptures, 48 Gobelins and 3 boxes containing the so-called royal treasures from the Prussian Royal Palace (crowns, swords, sceptres and etc.). Enquiries made of local inhabitants revealed that cultural valuables hidden in Wertenrode were removed by the American[s] round about April 8, 1945. According to incomplete information received from a commission investigating synthetic oil plants in the area of Magdeburg, Chemnitz, Leuna (“Troglitz”, “Schwartzheide” and “Ruhland” factories) managers, chemical experts, mechanics and technical documents were removed. In all up to 80% of all military doctors, all gold, silver deposited in banks were removed from the province of Thüringen. In addition the British City of Beuzenberg [ Boizenburg? ]: Partly removed the equipment from Dornier aircraft factory. Removed ready-made output from the motorboat and self-propelled barges. Experts with families—6 persons. Part of turbine drawings. City of Halberstadt (province of Saxony): from the works “Malakhite” for production of engines “B. M. W.” were removed: Model of reaction turbine 004; Its drawings; Experts-engineers and technologists—6 persons. City of Wernigerode: from the works of “Rautenbach” for aircraft engine castings were removed: X–ray apparatus for inspection of castings—7; Precision machine tools (including 1 SIP)—2; All drawings of production objects; Equipment of metallography and mechanic laboratories. From the branch works of the firm “Junkers” were removed: All drawings for turbine 004 and motor. Village of Königshütte (near [town?] of Elbingerode): a number of parts and equipment of Kiev Movie Studio were removed: Movie apparatus—3. Parts of movie projectors. City of Osterwieck: From the clothing factory of brothers “Asmole–Galle” all the equipment of factory was removed. City of Salbelel [ Salzwedel? ]: 200.000 tons of gasoline and workshop equipment were removed from the airfield. City of Oschersleben: Removed: A part of the equipment, drawings of all sort of production, leading and technical personnel of the “Junkers” aircraft factory that produced turbine fighter planes. The investigation into the removal of equipment and valuables is continuing. 1 Attachment 2, infra . 2 Following this paragraph is the following manuscript notation: “7/30/45[.] Memo sent to Eisenhower requesting investigation & report[.] H[arry] S T[ruman]”. See document No. 958 . No. 952 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2945 No. 952 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Draft—Case 1 ( Agreement ) The Conference reviewed the work of the Allied Commission on Reparation and found itself in agreement on the principal aspects of the policy to be pursued in exacting reparation from Germany. It agreed that as far as possible reparation should take the form of immediate deliveries of existing capital equipment. Such deliveries will be carried out primarily for the purpose of eliminating Germany’s war potential. In particular, they will serve to reduce the productive capacity of the metals, machinery and chemical industries, which have been expanded far beyond peacetime needs. Such removals will also promote the economic reconstruction of Allied countries which have been devastated by German aggression. The Conference recognized that the need of the Soviet Union for equipment to rebuild its heavy industries could not be adequately met from the resources of Eastern Germany. Accordingly, the three governments agreed that, in addition to transfers from the Soviet zone and Greater Berlin, the Soviet Union will receive substantial deliveries of equipment from the Ruhr–Westphalia industrial area. The Soviet Union will make available from its zone considerable quantities of food and raw materials in order both to reduce as far as possible the necessity for imports into Western Germany and to assist in meeting the needs of other Allied Nations. These deliveries will permit more effective use of European supplies and will help to relieve the strain on overseas supplies and shipping. The Control Council for Germany was charged by the Conference with working out detailed arrangements for giving effect to these agreed principles. The three governments will consult other Allied nations regarding the allocation of reparation to be exacted from Germany. Draft—Case 2 ( no agreement ) The Conference reviewed the work of the Allied Commission on Reparation but was unable to reach a decision at this time on a definitive program of reparation. The three governments therefore agreed that each of the occupying powers may exact reparation on an interim basis from its own zone in Germany. Each occupying power will also be entitled to make interim deliveries from its zone to other Allied countries which have been devastated by German aggression. The Conference agreed that reparation deliveries will be carried out primarily for the purpose of eliminating Germany’s war potential. In particular, they will serve to reduce the productive capacity of the metals, machinery and chemical industries, which have been expanded far beyond peacetime needs. Such removals will also promote the economic reconstruction of Allied countries. 1 Authorship not indicated. No. 953 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Pauley Files No. 953 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg , July 29, 1945.] Proposal of [ on? ] Reparations From Germany 1. Exactions of once-for-all removals from the national wealth of Germany in payment for reparations (plants, shops, equipment, materials, etc.) will be made by each government in its zone of occupation within two years after capitulation. 2. Removals must be made with a view to the quickest restoration of the economy of those countries which have suffered from German occupation. The necessity of an over-all reduction of the war potential of Germany must also be taken into account. 3. Because of the enormous losses of the Soviet heavy industry and also because of the small quantity of German enterprises of this kind in the Soviet zone of occupation and because of the insufficiency of the total resources of this zone, the USSR must receive in addition to the removals made in her zone, also from 5½ to 6 million tons on a special list of equipment in complete and workable condition on the reparations account from the Western Zones and predominantly from the Ruhr District. This equipment will be used for the restoration of the various branches of Soviet industry which have suffered from the enemy, and in the first instance for the metallurgical, chemical, and machine building industries. These removals must begin immediately upon the acceptance of this decision and will terminate not later than May 10, 1947. For this purpose a special agency will be created by the Allied Commission on Reparations. 4. The USSR will also receive corporation shares valued at $500,000,000 of industrial and transport companies which have remained in the Western Zones and which have the greatest significance from the point of view of an over-all reduction of the military potential of Germany. 5. Exactions of annual deliveries of goods from the current production will not be made on a zone basis but on an over-all German basis. The Allied Commission on Reparations will arrange a general plan for receiving and allocating these deliveries among the nations which have the right to them. The total sum of these deliveries will amount to 8 billion dollars and will be for a period of 10 years. The USSR share in these deliveries will amount to 50% of the total sum. 6. The following goods will be accepted in the form of possible deliveries; coal, brown coal, metals, metal products, cement, building materials, scrap metal[,] timber, potash, paper, sugar, chemical and glass products, machines, river boats, medical instruments, agricultural products, cattle, etc. As a basis for computation, the 1938 price—valued in dollars—will be accepted with an increase of 10%. 7. The Allied Commission on Reparations will arrange the plan of allocating the external assets and claims of Germany among the nations which have a right to receive reparations. 8. In regards to that part of reparations which must be covered by once-for-all removals, the U. S. S. R. will take upon herself, and for her own account, the settlement of the reparations claims of Poland. The United States of America and Great Britain will do the same in regards to France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and Norway. 1 This paper is not dated, but it has been tentatively identified as the proposal which Molotov handed to Byrnes on the afternoon of July 30 (see ante , p. 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] ). It is apparently the paper referred to in documents Nos. 954 and 955 as the Soviet proposal of July 29. No. 954 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 954 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Comments on Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of USSR “Proposal for Reparations From Germany” Dated July 29, 1945 2 1. The Russian proposal to express capital removals in tons is not practicable and is unacceptable for the following reasons: a . Because of their great variety [and] 3 the differences in values of industrial machinery and equipment, a tonnage measurement does not and cannot represent either the value or the industrial or military importance of capital assets. Industrial machinery and equipment generally can be measured meaningfully only in terms of productive capacity rather than in terms of weight. b . To express reparation obligations in terms of tons alone would lead to proposals for indiscriminate removals of machinery and equipment from plants which operate as industrial units. This would lead either to constant disputes or to purposeless destruction of industrial capacity with the consequent danger that Germany would be unable to meet the requirements of her civilian population or annual reparation deliveries. c . To express reparations obligations in tons would be completely unsatisfactory to most receiving countries as a basis for fixing their reparations claims. 2. The determination of recurring reparations [is impossible?] 3 unless there is prior agreement on the amount of capacity to be removed from specified industries. 3. The only sound basis for the determination of capital removals is agreement on the productive capacity which is to be subject for removal from industries constituting war potentials. 4. The proposal in Paragraph 6 of the Soviet memorandum is acceptable as a basis for discussion. However, it may be found impossible to make annual deliveries in certain of the products listed. 1 Authorship not indicated. Cf. document No. 955 . 2 See document No. 953 . 3 These words appear in the corresponding paragraph of document No. 955 . 3 These words appear in the corresponding paragraph of document No. 955 . No. 955 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 955 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Comments on Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of USSR “Proposal for Reparations From Germany” Dated July 29, 1945 2 1. With respect to Paragraph 3, the Russian proposal to express capital removals in tons is impracticable and is unacceptable for the following reasons: a . Because of their great variety and the differences in values of industrial machinery and equipment, a tonnage measurement does not and cannot represent either the value or the industrial or military importance of capital assets. The only sound basis for the determination of capital removals is agreement on the productive capacity which is to be subject for removal from industries constituting war potentials. b . To express reparation obligations in terms of tons alone would lead to proposals for indiscriminate removals of machinery and equipment from plants which operate as industrial units. This would lead either to constant disputes or to purposeless destruction of industrial capacity with the consequent danger that Germany would be unable to meet the requirements of her civilian population or annual reparation deliveries. c . To express reparations obligations in tons would be completely unsatisfactory to most receiving countries as a basis for fixing their reparations claims. 2. With respect to Paragraph 5, the determination of recurring reparations is impossible unless there is prior agreement on the amount of capacity to be removed from specified industries. 3. The proposal in Paragraph 6 of the Soviet memorandum is acceptable as a basis for discussion. However, it may be found impossible to make annual deliveries in certain of the products listed. 1 Authorship not indicated. Cf. document No. 954 . 2 See document No. 953 . No. 956 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State Pauley Files No. 956 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Secretary of State 1 Berlin , July 30, 1945. My Dear Mr. Secretary : Mr. Clayton has given me an opportunity to review his memorandum to you of July 29 2 relative to reparations. I note that Mr. Clayton estimates that the USSR zone contains 40% of the movable industrial capital equipment in Germany. The estimate I presented to you yesterday morning 3 is approximately 45%. In other words my percentage includes about 200,000,000 Reichsmarks more of industrial equipment removables than the percentage used by Mr. Clayton. The difference between the two estimates could arise from the following: ( a ) My figures covered not only industrial equipment but also transportation and utilities. ( b ) Mr. Clayton’s figures relate to total removables of capital equipment in the USSR zone while mine relate to equipment which it is believed should be removed if Germany is to be deindustrialized of its war potential. ( c ) Mr. Clayton may not have included the entire areas considered in my figures. ( d ) The data used in my estimate make some small allowances for the relatively greater amount of damage and destruction to industrial equipment in the west as compared to the east. ( e ) Neither the Clayton figures nor my own make full allowances for the increase in industry in the eastern zone versus the western zone. ( f ) Neither figure takes into consideration the increased value of the fee ownership of land acquired by Russia versus the value of this same area for reparations. ( g ) Neither Mr. Clayton’s figures nor mine make provisions for any allowances that the USSR will remove more from their zone of occupancy than [will the?] U. S., U. K., or France. Any dispute between Mr. Clayton and myself as to [figures?] seems to me irrelevant at the moment. The fact remains that the USSR have for all practical purposes approximately 50% of all things that are subject matters of reparations in their zone, and at least we are close enough to strike a bargain if one is to be made. Sincerely yours, Edwin W. Pauley 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 document No. 947 . 3 Presumably in one of the annexes (not found) to document No. 946 . No. 957 Memorandum by the General Counsel of the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Marshall) Pauley Files No. 957 Memorandum by the General Counsel of the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Marshall ) 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Memorandum Out of Germany (including that part occupied by Russia and Poland) the U. S. should want two important things: (1) Technical knowledge, information, and “know how” relative to the scientific developments, plants, and processes which contributed to both the war and peace-time industrial strength of Germany. (2) Relief from the enormous burden of imports to support Western Europe. Knowledge, information, sample equipment, and data we can largely get for ourselves from the Western Zones. But imports for the West, unless they are to be paid for by U. S. taxpayers, can only come from the East. These necessary imports are food, fuels, and fertilizers (potash). Russia wants capital equipment from Western Germany. We want current production from Eastern Germany. We can call those deliveries of current production (food, fuel and fertilizers) from East to West anything we like—for example: (1) “Reparations” (2) “Deliveries to relieve import burdens” (3) “Deliveries in recognition of the principle that imports shall be paid for before reparations are removed”. Whatever we call them, the fact remains that unless we get them: (1) The American taxpayer will have to provide them and U. S. rationing will be the more stringent, and, (2) Our imports are what permit Russia to get reparations out of Germany—which is another way of saying we are paying for reparations. The Russians have maneuvered us into throwing aside the principle that imports are afirst charge against the entire economy of pre-war Germany. The foregoing results can be avoided practically regardless of what the figures show as to the relative proportions of capital removables between West and East, by refusing to deliver any capital equipment from the West, which is what the Russians desire, until they agree to deliver food, fuel, and fertilizer from the East, which is what we desire. J H[ oward ] Marshall 1 This paper bears the following manuscript notation by Marshall: “Drafted for Committee #1 at Potsdam.” No. 958 The President to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater (Eisenhower) Department of the Army Files No. 958 The President to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater ( Eisenhower ) 1 Berlin , July 30, 1945. Memorandum to General Eisenhower Re: Removal of Property from the Russian Occupied Zone by the American Armies. I am enclosing you an informal translation from Russian of a report by Marshal Zhukov to Generalissimo Stalin. 2 I would appreciate it very much if you would investigate these charges and report to me. 3 Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 1 Printed from a copy subsequently typed in the Department of the Army. This memorandum was referred to by Truman in the course of the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, July 31. See ante , p. 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 2 Attachment 2 to document No. 951 . 3 No reply was received from Eisenhower during the Conference. Cf. document No. 951 . No. 959 Mr. Josiah E. DuBois, Jr., of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations, to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Pauley Files No. 959 Mr. Josiah E. DuBois, Jr., of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations, to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) [Undated.] Memorandum for Ambassador Pauley Subject: Treatment of gold as War Booty. The question has been raised as to whether the gold in our possession at Frankfurt may be treated as war booty, irrespective of whether or not its source can be identified. In a public statement issued by the United States government on January 5, 1943 [ February 22, 1944 ] 1 (similar statements were issued by the British and Russian governments) it was stated: “In view of the foregoing facts and considerations, the United States government formally declares that it does not and will not recognize the transference of title to the looted gold which the axis at any time holds or has disposed of in world markets.” By this statement the three governments served notice that they would not recognize the title of the German state to looted gold. Article LIII of the Hague Regulations 2 (by which we’re not necessarily bound in dealing with Germany) provides: “An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State which may be used for military operations.” Although the right to appropriate booty has been said to be limited to the property of the state, if material is actually in use by the enemy forces or is helping its operations , it is considered to be a part of the military equipment of the enemy and, as such, liable to confiscation. (Latifi, Effects of War on Property (1909), 30.) Similarly, Hyde suggests that the public character of property is to be ascertained by reference to two considerations: (1) its ownership by the enemy state, or (2) its actual use in behalf of the state. (3 Hyde, International Law (2nd ed. 1945), 1896.) The gold in question, whether or not we recognize that title was in the German state, was clearly being used in behalf of the German state. Accordingly, from a strictly legal point of view, apart from the policy considerations involved, the gold may be treated as war booty. Josiah E. DuBois, Jr. 1 Text in 9 Federal Register 2096. 2 Text in Foreign Relations , 1907, pt. 2, p. 1216 . No. 960 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 960 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. The Soviet Union Share of Reparation British Proposal As part of a settlement covering this and other matters, H. M. Government are ready to agree that Russia, in addition to obtaining reparation removals and deliveries from the Russian Zone of Occupation, shall also be entitled to receive from the Western Zones, and particularly from the Ruhr, 10% of such equipment, particularly from the heavy metal industries as it is decided to remove under an agreed Reparation Plan, which will have to provide on the one hand for eliminating German war potential to an adequate degree and which will have, on the other hand, to leave to Germany a sufficient industrial equipment to enable her to maintain approved living standards. It is the policy of H. M. Government that, in order to eliminate German war potential, there must be very considerable removals from these heavy metal industries, but they cannot express an opinion about the precise amount until a comprehensive Plan has been worked out. The Reparation Plan will have to be such as to enable the Powers (other than the Soviet Union and Poland) entitled to reparation to obtain from the Russian Zone adequate amounts of annual deliveries of timber and potash. It will be for the Allied Commission on Reparations to work out the details. 1 Attachment 2 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . No. 961 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 961 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. German Reparations The United States Proposal Reparations claims of Russia and Poland to be satisfied from the Russian zone plus ( a ) 25% of such industrial capital equipment as we determine is not necessary for a peace economy and should be removed from the Ruhr on condition that there would be exchanged an equivalent value in food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products and oil products, to be made available to us by the Soviets. ( b ) An additional 15% of such industrial capital equipment as is determined unnecessary for a peace economy should be transferred from the Ruhr to the Soviet government without payment or exchange of any kind in return. 1 Attachment 1 a to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . Byrnes had given Molotov a copy of this proposal at a private meeting immediately preceding the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. See ante , p. 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] . No. 962 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 962 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Addition to U. S. Proposal on German Reparations The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for a peace economy and therefore available for reparation would be made by the Reparation Commission with France added working in consultation with the Control Council subject to the final approval of the zone commander in the zone from which the equipment is to be removed. 1 Attachment 4 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . An undated copy in the Pauley Files of the body of this addition bears the following manuscript notation by J. H. Marshall: “Potsdam Draft by Byrnes”. Cf. document No. 961 . No. 963 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [?] Pauley Files No. 963 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [ ? ] 1 [Translation?] [Undated.] (1) Reparation claims of USSR shall be made by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the USSR. (2) The USSR undertakes to settle the reparations claims of Poland from its own share of reparations. (3) The reparations claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be made from the western zones. (4) In addition to the reparations to be taken by the USSR from its own zone of occupation, the USSR shall receive additionally from the western zones: ( a ) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries unnecessary for a peace economy, and should be removed from the western zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum and petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon. ( b ) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for a peace economy, and should be removed from the western zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. (5) Removals of industrial capital equipment shall be completed within two years of the date hereof in exchange for products to be delivered by the USSR in agreed instalments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for a peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the zone commander in the zone from which the equipment is to be removed. (6) The amount of equipment to be removed from the western zones on account of reparations must be fixed within six months from now at the latest. 2 1 This paper, undated and without title, was found in the Pauley Files in a folder marked “Russian Proposals”. It is apparently a revision of document No. 1425 prepared following the discussion at the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, July 31. Cf. the attachment to document No. 972 . 2 There is the following penciled addendum partly in Pauley’s handwriting (cf. ante , p. 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , and post , document No. 1425 ): “ To be included in the Protocol. “in consideration of higher percentages in paragraphs 4 ( a ) and ( b ), the U. S. S. R. withdrew the claim previously advanced to receive on account of reparations: “ a . Shares of industrial and transport enterprises in the Western zones to the total amount of $500 million; “ b . 30% of all German foreign assets; “ c . 30% of German gold which came into the hands of the Allies.” No. 964 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 964 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Memorandum I enclose a memorandum signed by Mr. Pauley and me with reference to the disposition of works of art now held by General Clay. If you agree, I suggest that you indicate your approval on this memorandum. However, before delivering the memorandum to General Clay, I suggest also you may wish to inform the U. K. and U. S. S. R. Delegations of the action contemplated. 2 [Enclosure] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) and the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany ( Clay ) 3 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Memorandum for General Clay With respect to the attached memorandum regarding art objects in the United States zone, prepared in the U. S. Group Control Council, the following represents our views: (1) We concur in the recommendations contained in paragraphs 5 a and 5 b , regarding works of art in Class “A” and Class “B”. It was because of your concern for the preservation of these objects that an interim procedure for their return was provided in Pauley’s wire to Eisenhower of June 27. 4 Negotiations have now progressed to the point where it seems clear that the return of objects classified in your 5 a will be deemed restitution. (2) With respect to works of art in Class “C” we are agreeable to arrangements being effected so that such works of art may be sent to the United States to be inventoried, identified and cared for by museums. We feel, however, that no definite statement should be made at this time as to the future disposition of works of art in Class “C”, and that if removed to the United States it should be announced that they are being taken there only for care and safekeeping and that their eventual disposition will be subject to future Allied decisions. Edwin W. Pauley William L. Clayton [Subenclosure] Excerpts From US Group Control Council Memorandum on Art Objects 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Classification: For the purpose of handling these works of art, they may be divided into three classes, to wit: Class “A”, consisting of works of art taken from the countries overrun by Germany readily identifiable as publicly owned, and works of art taken from private owners in the overrun countries by seizure and without compensation. Class “B”, consisting of works of art taken from private collectors in the overrun countries for which some compensation is alleged to have been made to the owners. Class “C”, consisting of works of art placed in the US zone by Germany for safekeeping which are bona fide property of the German nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Recommendations: a . That all works of art in Class “A” be returned to the country of origin as rapidly as arrangements can be effected, without conditions. b . It is recommended that works of art in Class “B” be returned to the countries of origin and that receipts be taken for the amount of compensation alleged to have been paid by the Germans, with these values possibly to be considered as reparations payments to the several countries to which these works of art are returned. c . It is recommended that the works of art in Class “C” be removed to the US as rapidly as arrangements can be effected and distributed among the museums in the US properly equipped to handle these works of art. It is suggested that they be placed on exhibit in the US, but that an announcement be made to the public, to include the German people, that these works of art will be held in trusteeship for return to the German nation when it has re-earned its right to be considered as a nation. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. 2 See document No. 973 . A memorandum of August 9 by DuBois in the Pauley Files states that the enclosure had been delivered to Clay. 3 Printed from a copy included as an appendix to the Pauley–Lubin Report (see document No. 980 ). 4 document No. 360, printed in vol. i . 5 These excerpts comprise the subenclosure in toto. No. 965 The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Secretary of State Department of the Army Files No. 965 The Assistant Secretary of War ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 31 July 1945. Dear Mr. Secretary : I am going off to Frankfurt, and from there to Munich to go through our zone, looking particularly at our Military Government installations on the way from Frankfurt to Munich. From there I intend to go on to Italy for a short visit with the people in northern Italy, finally to spend a day with McNarney and perhaps Alexander in Rome. I shall be home in about five days. I have had talks with Pauley and Clayton about the status of the reparations discussions. I have also had several talks with Clay, and will probably have more in Frankfurt before leaving there. The War Department interest in reparations lies, of course, in the vital effect the solution of the reparations problem has on the day to day administration of Germany. I believe the Army can administer under any of the Plans I gather from Clayton you have in mind as possible solutions of the reparations issue, but I would like to leave with you the following brief thoughts in the hope you will be able to give them consideration in any plan you conclude at Babelsberg: First: In agreeing to a formula for sharing reparations out of the Ruhr area, I hope the wording will insure that whether the amount be stated in percentage or amount, it shall only relate to that portion of the Ruhr surplus which we find is not needed for the maintenance of a reasonable measure of self-supporting economy in Germany . We know that there will be substantial amounts available, but since we have to satisfy France, Belgium, etc., as well as maintain some economy in Germany, we shall be taking the great risk of having to finance that economy if the amount of reparations to be delivered to the Russians from the Ruhr are absolutely fixed now. We have to know more of what has been destroyed and what conditions generally are, in my judgment, before a fixed sum can be set without risk. I know that this is General Clay’s strong recommendation. Second: I hope very much that you will be able to induce all governments to agree that their representative on the Control Council will have delegated to him the authority to deal with all questions within the framework of the policies agreed upon at Babelsberg without reference back to his government for further decision. From what I hear Zhukov is disposed to act and if he is permitted to we shall have a real chance of making the thing work. The language of such a delegation was contained in a paper submitted to you earlier in the Conference by General Clay. 2 For your convenience I enclose herewith the language to which I refer. 3 I shall be in Frankfurt until Wednesday night. Sincerely, [No signature] 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. No signed original of this letter has been found in Department of State files and it has not been possible to verify that the letter was signed and transmitted. 2 document No. 869 . 3 Attached is a copy of the final two sentences of document No. 870 . No. 966 Proposal by the United States Delegation Pauley Files No. 966 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 31, 1945. Restatement of United States Proposal on German Reparations 1. Reparations claims of Russia and Poland to be satisfied from the Russian zone plus ( a ) 25% of such industrial capital equipment as is determined is not necessary for a peace economy and should be removed from the Ruhr on condition that there would be exchanged an equivalent value in food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products and oil products, to be made available to us by the Soviets. ( b ) An additional 15% of such industrial capital equipment as is determined unnecessary for a peace economy should be transferred from the Ruhr to the Soviet government without payment or exchange of any kind in return. 2. Removals of capital equipment in accordance with Paragraph 1. above shall be completed by May 10, 1947. Commodities shipped in exchange under ( a ) above shall be completed not later than May 10, 1951. 3. For purposes of the above agreement the Ruhr is defined in accordance with the attached map. 2 4. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for a peace economy and therefore available for reparation would be made by the Allied Commission on Reparations with France added working in consultation with the Control Council subject to the final approval of the zone commander in the zone from which the equipment is to be removed. Further details shall be determined by the Allied Commission on Reparations with France added. 1 This may have been the paper before the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, July 31. See ante , p. 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . For a subsequent modification of this paper, see document No. 980 . 2 Facing p. 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] . No. 967 Proposal by the British Delegation Pauley Files No. 967 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg , July 31, 1945.] German Reparation (Still under discussion by Drafting Committee, 11 p.m. 31st July, 1945) 1. Reparation claims of U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the Zone of Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R. 2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations. 3. The reparations claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones * and from German external assets * . 4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones: ( a ) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum and petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon. ( b ) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for a peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. Removals of equipment as provided in ( a ) and ( b ) above shall be made simultaneously. 5. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall be completed within two years of the date hereof. The delivery of products covered by 4 ( a ) above shall be made by the U. S. S. R. in agreed instalments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for a peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed. 6. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be fixed within six months from now at the latest. 1 This paper bears the following manuscript notations: (1) “by the U. K.” and (2) “British Proposals”. * Reserved by Soviet Delegate. [Footnote in the original.] * Reserved by Soviet Delegate. [Footnote in the original.] No. 968 The General Counsel of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Marshall) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Pauley Files No. 968 The General Counsel of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Marshall ) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) [ Babelsberg ,] July 31, 1945. Memorandum to Ambassador Pauley Mr. Collado and Mr. Despres, of the State Department, are firm in their belief that the following subjects should be included in the final agreement between the Big Three: 1. Restitution; 2. Property of United Nations nationals located in Germany; 3. German external assets. Mr. Collado and Mr. Despres, however, have undertaken to cover these subjects by way of additions to the Economic Principles which the State Department will submit. We do not, however, feel that this relieves you of the necessity of urging both a declaration by the Big Three on German assets abroad, and the issuance of an appropriate vesting decree by the Control Council (copies attached). 1 You will also, of course, want to check over carefully any proposed definition of restitution although it would no longer seem to be a major factor in the reparations plan under the new proposal. So far as the Economic Principles are concerned we have checked these over carefully and other than the proposed amendment conforming these principles to the British proposal on “first charge” no further amendments are necessary other than the deletion of the last sentence of 14–( d ) and the entire paragraph 18, both of which the State Department have agreed to handle. 2 Paragraph 18 deals with supplies for the Greater Berlin area and this is no longer necessary in view of the supply arrangements for food, etc., now incorporated in the reparations plan. J H[ oward ] Marshall 1 No attachments found. Cf. documents Nos. 1000 and 1003 . 2 See documents Nos. 878 and 885 . No. 969 Memorandum by the General Counsel of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Marshall) Pauley Files No. 969 Memorandum by the General Counsel of the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Marshall ) [ Babelsberg ,] July 31, 1945. Memorandum The most satisfactory way of incorporating the proposed reparations plan in an agreement or protocol to be adopted is simply to attach the plan to the Economic Principles as Annex I, referred to in Section 16. 1 J H[ oward ] M[ arshall ] 1 See the attachment to document No. 863 . No. 970 Draft of Report by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany Frankfurt USPolAd Files—500 Potsdam Conference No. 970 Draft of Report by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany [Undated.] Report of Drafting Committee on Protocol of German Reparation Owing to a difference of view regarding the inclusion of German external assets in paragraph 3, full agreement was not reached on paragraphs 1 to 6 of the attached draft. 1 The U. S. and U. K. representatives considered that in return for the percentages of capital equipment to be received by the U. S. S. R. under the terms of paragraph 4, the Soviet Government had agreed to refrain from exercising a claim to German external assets, gold captured in Germany or securities of German corporations in the Western zones. The Soviet representative was of the view that this decision had not yet been taken, and that the matter should be referred to the heads of government. The U. S. and U. K. representatives did not accept paragraph 7, which was proposed by the U. S. S. R. representative. 1 The draft attached is identical to the attachment to document No. 972 , except that it has the earlier version of paragraph 7 quoted in footnote 2 on p. 933 [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] . No. 971 Text Considered by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany Pauley Files No. 971 Text Considered by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany [Undated.] German Reparation (Agreed with reserves noted by Drafting Committee) 1. Reparation claims of U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the Zone of Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R. 2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations. 3. The reparations claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones * and from German external assets * . 4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones: ( a ) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum or petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon. ( b ) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for a peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. Removals of equipment as provided in ( a ) and ( b ) above shall be made simultaneously. 5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest. 6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the date of the determination specified in paragraph 5. † Until the determination of the general volume of equipment to be removed, deliveries will be carried out as advance deliveries in regard to such equipment as the Allied Commission on Reparations and the Control Council shall decide to be available. The delivery of products covered by 4( a ) above shall be made by the U. S. S. R. in agreed instalments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed. ‡ 7. The Soviet Government will make no claim to securities of Corporations in Western Zones, to German external assets, nor to German gold. * Reserved by Soviet Delegate. [Footnote in the original.] * Reserved by Soviet Delegate. [Footnote in the original.] † Reserved by the U. K. Delegation. [Footnote in the original. ‡ Reserved by Soviet Government. U. S. and U. K. Delegations would accept an oral assurance instead of this clause. [Footnote in the original.] No. 972 Report by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany Truman Papers No. 972 Report by the Drafting Committee on Reparations From Germany 1 [ Babelsberg , August 1, 1945.] Report of Drafting Committee on Protocol of German Reparation No agreement was reached by the Committee on a protocol on German reparations. The U. S. and U. K. representatives considered that, in return for the percentages of capital equipment allocated to the Soviet Union under the terms of paragraph 4 of the attached draft, the U. S. S. R. had agreed to refrain from asserting a claim to German external assets, gold captured in Germany or securities of German corporations in the Western Zones. Therefore, the U. S. and U. K. representatives maintained that German external assets should be included in paragraph 3, as a source of reparation to countries other than the U. S. S. R. Lacking this, the percentages in paragraph 4 would be unacceptable to the U. S. and U. K. representatives. The Soviet representative considered that no agreed decision had yet been taken regarding relinquishment by the U. S. S. R. of a claim to external assets, gold and securities. Therefore the Soviet representatives did not accept the addition of German external assets in paragraph 3 and recommended that the matter should be referred to the Heads of Government. The attached draft would be acceptable to the U. S. and U. K. representatives upon condition that the Soviet representatives confirm the above understanding regarding external assets, gold and securities. The Soviet representative stated that he could not agree with the way this question had been raised. [Attachment] German Reparation 1. Reparation claims of U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R. 2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations. 3. The reparations claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones * and from German external assets [.] * 4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones: ( a ) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon. ( b ) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. Removals of equipment as provided in ( a ) and ( b ) above shall be made simultaneously. 5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest. 6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 ( a ) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U. S. S. R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed. 7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6. 2 1 This report was presented at the Twelfth Plenary Meeting, August 1. See ante , p. 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] . * Reserved by Soviet Representative. [Footnote in the original.] * Reserved by Soviet Representative. [Footnote in the original.] 2 In an earlier draft apparently considered by the Drafting Committee paragraph 7 reads as follows: “7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries will be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery by the Allied Reparations Commission with the confirmation of the Control Council.” A footnote to the entire paragraph reads as follows: “Proposed by U. S. S. R. representative. Not accepted by U. S. and U. K. representatives.” Cf. document No. 970 . No. 973 The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 973 The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar ( Molotov ) 1 [ Babelsberg ,] August 1, 1945. My Dear Mr. Molotov : The United States Zone Commander has informed me that he now holds in the United States zone large amounts of art objects which may be considered in three classes: a . Works of art taken from the countries overrun by Germany and readily identifiable as publicly owned, and works of art taken from private owners in the overrun countries by seizure and without compensation. b . Works of art taken from private collectors in the overrun countries for which some compensation is alleged to have been made to the owners. c . Works of art which were bona fide property of German citizens or institutions. Instructions have been issued to the Zone Commander to return the works of art of the first two categories to the governments of the countries of origin as rapidly as arrangements can be effected. With respect to the second category, receipts will be taken indicating the amount of compensation alleged to have been paid by the Germans. It is contemplated that the third category of works of art will be shipped as rapidly as arrangements can be effected to the United States for care and safekeeping, for which adequate facilities do not exist in Germany. Their eventual disposition will be subject to future decisions. Very sincerely yours, [ James F. Byrnes ] 1 An identical letter was sent on the same date to Bevin. No. 974 Draft Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) Pauley Files No. 974 Draft Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 Babelsberg , August 1, 1945. Memorandum for General Clay We request that you urge the Control Council to adopt the attached proposed principle on restitution to supplement the economic principles and the reparation agreement approved by the heads of Government. W. L. Clayton 2 [Attachment] Proposed Principle on Restitution Removals as restitution shall be governed by the following: ( a ) Upon application by any Allied Government, restitution may be made of the following categories of property, wherever found, if such property is identifiable and was removed from occupied territory by the enemy by whatever means: (i) Heavy industrial and agricultural equipment, and unique machinery; (ii) Rolling stock and other railroad or transportation equipment; (iii) Works of art, religious, historical, educational, or cultural objects, libraries, scientific equipment, and other laboratory or research materials related to organized inquiry into the arts and sciences. ( b ) All questions of restitution shall be dealt with on behalf of the injured property owners by the Allied Nations of which they are citizens, unless such Allied Nation shall make other arrangements with the Allied Nation from whose territories the property was removed. 1 Pauley reported to Byrnes on August 10 that this memorandum “was not officially given to General Clay but [was] discussed with him and we mutually decided that in its presently proposed form it was incomplete and in view of the circumstances concerning the reparations agreement we should before taking definite action on a proposed definition on policy concerning restitution get the advice of other countries concerned in both restitution and reparation.” (File No. 740.00119 E. W./8–1045) 2 Space was provided for Pauley’s signature also, but Pauley did not sign the draft memorandum. See footnote 1, supra. No. 975 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) and the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany (Clay) 740.00119 EW/9–2045 No. 975 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) and the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany ( Clay ) 1 secret Babelsberg , August 1, 1945. Memorandum for General Clay We request that you urge the Control Council to adopt the attached proposed principle on Allied and neutral property in Germany to supplement the economic principles and the reparation agreement approved by the heads of Government. Edwin W. Pauley W. L. Clayton [Attachment] Proposed Principle on Allied and Neutral Property in Germany Ownership by nationals of United Nations or neutral nations shall not impede the carrying out of Paragraph 11 2 of the Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period. 3 Removals from Germany of properties of nationals of United Nations or neutral nations shall be governed by the following: ( a ) Properties of nationals of United Nations. (i) Governments of the United Nations shall be invited to submit statements to the Control Council covering the nature and extent of property in Germany of their respective nationals, and Allied representatives shall have facilities and free access to such properties for the purpose of investigating claims and appraising properties. (ii) Where practicable and desired by the government of the owner, removals shall be effected without transfer of title. (iii) In all other cases, compensation shall be provided by the establishment of Reichsmark deposits to the account of the government of the owners, on the basis of valuations by the Control Council. The country receiving such removed property shall make arrangements, prior to the removals to liquidate such deposit accounts in acceptable foreign exchange in payments spread over a short period of years. ( b ) Properties of nationals of neutral nations (i) Governments of neutral nations shall be permitted to file with the Control Council statements covering the nature and extent of property in Germany of their respective nationals. Reichsmarks in the amount of the valuations made by the Control Council shall be deposited to the account of such governments by way of compensation. 1 Printed from a copy included in the Pauley–Lubin Report (see document No. 980 ). 2 An earlier version of this paper, obviously prepared before the renumbering of the paragraphs containing the economic principles in the Protocol, ends this sentence here with the words “Paragraph 10”. With respect to the renumbering referred to, see document No. 1383, footnote 22 . 3 Document No. 1383, section ii . No. 976 The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) 740.00119 Potsdam/8–645 No. 976 The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar ( Molotov ) [ Babelsberg ,] August 1, 1945. My Dear Mr. Molotov : Now that a definite agreement has been reached between the U. S. S. R., the U. K. and the U. S. on a general tripartite plan of reparations 1 as required by the Crimea Protocol, 2 there remain only the problems of implementing the agreement reached here in Potsdam. The most important task of determining what shall be removed from the Western zones as reparations and arranging for deliveries of necessary products by the Soviets should go forward as quickly as possible. Since these responsibilities can only be discharged in collaboration with the Allied Control Council, it is obvious that the Allied Commission on Reparations should assemble immediately in Berlin. I am sure, in view of your desire for the speedy fulfillment of the agreements arrived at, that you will join with me in the decision that the Allied Commission on Reparations should convene in Berlin at once, and I trust you will instruct the Soviet representative on that Commission accordingly. Very sincerely yours, [ James F.] Byrnes 1 See document No. 1383, section iii . 2 See document No. 1416, section v . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on reparations from Germany, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1485 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1505 [ Pg. 1505 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . No. 977 The Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 EW/8–245 No. 977 The Soviet Foreign Commissar ( Molotov ) to the Secretary of State [Translation] Berlin , August 2, 1945. Esteemed Mr. Byrnes , I fully agree with you that the agreement regarding German reparations concluded at the Berlin Conference should be carried out as soon as possible. I also agree that the Inter-Allied Reparation Commission should work in close collaboration with the Allied Control Council in Berlin. With this in view it is incumbent upon it to establish its organization in Berlin. However the permanent seat of the Commission itself should naturally remain Moscow, as was decided at the Crimea Conference. 1 So much the more, that, of all the Allied countries, the Inter-Allied Reparation Commission in all its activities will be most closely connected with the Soviet Union on the strength of the important decisions made at the Berlin Conference. Sincerely yours V. Molotov 1 See document No. 1416, section v . No. 978 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Secretary of State 862.515/8–1445: Telegram No. 978 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to the Secretary of State 1 London , August 14, 1945—8 p.m. 8243. From Clayton. At Potsdam the Soviets renounced claim to gold captured by Allied troops in Germany. 2 Although in practice it may be difficult to enforce this against any gold captured by Soviet forces certainly the term “Allied” includes the Soviet forces and Germany includes the Soviet Zone. There was no discussion or reason to indicate that only SHAEF Command was involved. None of the Big Three powers have implicitly or explicitly renounced a voice in the disposition of the gold. The statement means merely what it says that the Soviet have renounced a claim to the gold. (Reurtel 6784 3 ) We strongly believe in the Gold Pot theory 4 and engaged in informal discussions of this at Potsdam with the British and Pauley. Although the question of first lien on account of US claims was mentioned by Pauley the very tentative view expressed by Sir David Waley was opposed to this. I believe that the Dept is correct in stating that this is impracticable and inadvisable. I would recommend that the problem of disposition of gold under the Gold Pot doctrine be handled simultaneously with the general problem of restitution in the first instance perhaps by Pauley in the Reparations Commission and then if full agreement is not reached there by Generals Eisenhower and Clay in the Control Council. In this view the French although a claimant would, of course, participate in the discussion. As in all questions eventually requiring action by the Control Council if the Council fails to agree the zone commander will then have to make the decisions. Sent to Dept as 8243, repeated to USPolAd Berlin for Pauley and Despres as 75 from Winant. 1 Sent over the signature of Winant. 2 See document No. 1383, section iii , paragraph 10. 3 Not printed. 4 The “gold pot” principle is explained as follows in a report dated February 18, 1946, submitted to the Secretary of State by James W. Angell, United States Delegate to the Paris Conference on Reparation held in November–December 1945 (file No. 740.00119 EW/2–1846): “This principle recognizes that the countries whose gold was wrongfully taken by Germany are entitled to its restitution. For administrative convenience (since a great deal of the gold is either unidentifiable or bears questionable markings) as well as for reasons of economic policy regarding gold, it was desirable to avoid the restitution of identifiable gold to particular countries. An analogy to explain this seeming departure from the principles of property which normally govern restitution was found in the rule of the Law Maritime regarding losses in a common disaster.… Briefly stated, the principle is that if A and B both ship cargo on a particular vessel and during a storm or fire A’s cargo is jettisoned to save the ship, B’s cargo, when it arrives safely in port, must bear a proportionate share of the loss suffered by A. The analogy has proved quite convenient in the presentation of the ‘gold pot’ principle.” No. 979 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) 862.50/8–1645: Telegram No. 979 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs ( Thorp ) 1 secret London , August 16, 1945—5 p.m. 8296. For Thorp from Clayton and Collado. The tenor of a number of recent telegrams addressed to us and to Despres by the Department leads us to believe that we should not await our return before giving a few general explanations on the German economic decisions of Potsdam. There appears to be an unfortunate tendency to interpret the reparations operating agreement 2 as an indication of complete abandonment of four power treatment of Germany. This is not stated in the texts and should not be accepted as a necessary conclusion even though there may be many among the military forces in Germany who believe that a zonal treatment or a tripartite treatment of the western zones will be the only practicable method of operation. (Sent to Department as No. 8296; repeated to USPolAd Berlin for Despres as No. 80.) The economic principles 3 specifically provide that the Control Council should attempt to formulate “common policies” covering a variety of important economic questions including the scale of deindustrialization, the scale of reparation deliveries, import and export programs, the standard of living and inter-area distribution of foodstuffs and other supplies. In addition finance communications and transport are recognized to require centralized handling. The reparations agreement does not contradict any of these general principles; it rather provides certain detailed operating decisions and provides for a method of operation within common principles that it is believed will result in less administrative friction and difficulty. It is still necessary to reach common decisions if possible with respect to deindustrialization[;] with respect to the vesting of external assets and their distribution among claimant nations beyond the decisions specifically embodied in the Potsdam Agreement; with respect to restitution; to the treatment of Allied property in Germany; to the treatment of gold regarding which we have sent a separate telegram. 4 Even within the reparations operating agreement itself it is necessary for the Reparations Commission and the Control Council to reach decisions regarding the scale of demilitarization in the western zones and the schedules of deliveries involved in paragraphs 4 ( a ) and ( b ). Procedures for handling this work are now being discussed in Berlin. We recognized that in practice it may be difficult to arrive at common decisions in the Control Council and in the Reparations Commission on all of the points on which it is hoped common policy will be determined. Moreover we recognized that in practical operation within such policies the zonal treatment will undoubtedly provide less friction. We even recognize that the Soviets may undertake deindustrialization removals in the eastern zone on a scale not parallel to that which will be determined for the western zones. General Clay has however indicated a considerable degree of confidence in his ability to work out at least some common policies in the Control Council and such efforts should obviously not be abandoned prematurely. We believe it desirable to outline in a little more detail our views as to the handling of sections 4 ( a ) and ( b ) of the reparations agreement. The 10% of removals is of course clear reparation for the Soviets and Poles. The 15% of capital goods and the raw materials to be exchanged for them are also to be considered reparations goods. Thus items received by the US and UK from the Soviets in this category are available in the first instance as reparations to the western occupying powers or through them to other reparations claimants. If it is necessary and desirable to utilize the products within the western zones such amounts of the products shall be considered as new imports from the western reparations claimants and as such subject in [ to? ] the usual first charge on exports. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Sent to the Secretary of State over the signature of Winant. 2 Document No. 1383, p. 1485 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 1383 ] . 3 Document No. 1383, p. 1483 [ Pg. 1483 is part of Doc. 1383 ] . 4 Document No. 978 . 5 For the paragraphs omitted here, see document No. 892 . No. 980 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) and the Associate Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Lubin) to the President 740.00119 EW/9–2045 No. 980 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) and the Associate Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Lubin ) to the President 1 [Extract] secret [ Washington , September 20, 1945.] Report on German Reparations to the President of the United States, February to September 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . part v. tripartite conference at berlin (july 16 to august 2, 1945) The decision to submit the question of a reparations plan and reparation policies to the Berlin Conference was clearly forecast in the letter of the US Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations of July 3, 1945 addressed to the Soviet Representative. 2 (See Appendix 17 3 ) Ambassador Pauley left Moscow for Berlin on July 14. He was accompanied by Minister Isador Lubin, J. R. Parten, Chief of Staff, J. Howard Marshall, the General Counsel, and Dr. Luther Gulick, Advisor on Governmental Organization. Upon arrival in Berlin a series of meetings were commenced with Assistant Secretary of State Clayton and his advisors, Mr. Emile Despres and Mr. Emilio G. Collado, as to the best means of submitting to the Big Three the reparations problem—both that part of the reparations program which had been agreed upon and those parts of the program upon which agreement had not been reached. It was concluded that definitive United States proposals on reparations should be included as part of the United States Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period . 4 Accordingly, there was attached to the proposed agreement Annex I on German Reparations 5 which included the seven principles upon which the Allied Commission on Reparations had agreed together with the eighth proposed principle containing the prior charge of imports on exports with an argument in support of such principle; the agreed upon division of shares between the USSR, UK and US; and the agreed upon procedure for divisions of reparation shares among countries other than the UK, US, and USSR. In addition there was included proposed definitions of restitution, war booty and reparations , as follows: [Here follows the text of attachment 2 to document No. 894 .] On these latter points of definition, of course no agreements had been reached in the Allied Commission on Reparations and in connection therewith it was stated in Annex I “the United States Government feels that the definition of restitution, war booty, and reparations are so interrelated with the formulae for allocation of reparations that agreement must be reached on all of these matters simultaneously.” The following should particularly be noted in the Annex above referred to: “The Commission has failed to reach agreement on the underscored last clause of an eighth principle: ‘After payment of reparations, enough resources must be left to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany, the necessary means must be provided for payment of imports approved by the governments concerned before reparation deliveries are made from current production or from stocks of goods.’ 6 “The United States Government fully concurs in these principles and must insist that such necessary imports as are approved by our governments shall constitute a first charge against exports from Germany of current production and stocks of goods. To do otherwise will lead either to a repetition of our mistakes at the end of the last war, or leave us unable to bring about the desired industrial disarmament of Germany.” 7 Thus Annex I on reparations became a part of the US proposal for Germany at the first meeting of the Big Three. 8 The so-called economic principles of the US proposal including the annex dealing with reparations, were referred by the Big Three to the Committee of Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Ministers in their turn referred these matters to an economic sub-committee. 9 This subcommittee was headed, insofar as the US Delegation was concerned, by Assistant Secretary of State Clayton. Included also was Ambassador Pauley sitting in a dual capacity both as the American Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations and as a personal advisor to the President on economic matters. Minister Isador Lubin likewise attended the meetings of this Economic Sub-Committee as the Associate of Ambassador Pauley on Reparations and certain members of the US Delegation on Reparations, usually Mr. Parten and Mr. Marshall, attended. Sir Walter Monckton, Sir David Waley, and Mr. Mark Turner attended the meetings of the Economic Sub-Committee and spoke for the British. These three had been in Moscow as part of the British Delegation on the Allied Commission on Reparations. Mr. Maisky and Mr. Sabourov together with the various other advisors attended the meetings of the Economic Sub-Committee and spoke for the Soviet Union. These representatives likewise had represented the USSR on the Allied Commission on Reparations in Moscow. The Economic Sub-Committee of the Council of Foreign Ministers tried in vain to resolve the question of approved imports as a “first charge” on exports. The question was referred to the Committee of Foreign Ministers where, likewise, no agreement was reached. On numerous occasions during the course of the reparation discussions in this Economic Sub-Committee the Soviet representatives were asked for their definition of “war booty” which they undertook to submit during the latter part of the discussions which had occurred in Moscow. Finally Mr. Maisky submitted late on the evening of July 21 a proposed Soviet definition of war booty which he styled “War Trophies” as follows: “1. All military supplies and equipment of Germany, including all supplies and military equipment, which belong, being used or have to be used by the military and para military units of the enemy or by the members of these units; “2. All supplies and equipment used by the enemy to satisfy his military needs and captured by the Allies before the end of the war on territories where military operations were conducted.” 10 Obviously section 2 of the foregoing definition was exceedingly broad. In response to specific questions both by Sir Walter Monckton and Ambassador Pauley, Mr. Maisky indicated that the Soviet regarded such equipment as textile mills, shoe factories, and coal mines to constitute war trophies if at any time they were used to supply any of the military needs of the German Armed Forces. Mr. Maisky admitted that this definition would leave little for “reparations” if strictly applied throughout Germany. He suggested, however, that merely because a nation had a right to claim war booty on the foregoing broad basis, it did not mean that the right could not be “waived” which would leave more in the way of capital goods for reparations. Both Sir Walter Monckton and Ambassador Pauley indicated, as the meeting adjourned, that this hardly seemed a satisfactory method of approaching the problem. Following the presentation of the Soviet’s proposed definition of war trophies the US Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations came to the conclusion that an “overall percentage” allocation of shares as between the Big Three was no longer feasible. The division of reparations as applied to Germany as a whole would have to be abandoned for some less controversial method of dividing what would be removed as reparations among the nations entitled to reparations. The US Representative came to this conclusion because: 1. Already there had occurred a “ fait accompli ” by which the Poles, with the consent of the Soviets, had occupied a substantial part of Germany lying east of the Oder–Neisse line from which area a substantial amount of reparations had been expected when the 56–22–22 percentage formula had been tentatively agreed upon. 11 2. The USSR definition of “war booty” or “war trophies” was so broad that if accepted it would tend toward endless controversies between the Soviet Representatives and the representatives of the Western Powers holding very different views as to what might properly be classified as war booty. 3. Detailed first-hand surveys in the American and British zones of occupation in Berlin as well as in the Russian areas of the city, particularly by Gulick and Marshall, showed conclusively that Soviet removals of plants of both heavy and light industry alike had already taken place or were in the process in Berlin with the result that, if practiced uniformly, little if anything would be left to move from east to west as reparations or to support an agreed German economy. 12 In the course of the next week the plan was gradually evolved for the division of reparation shares as between claimant nations to be made upon a zonal basis. Throughout the discussion that follows one should bear in mind that the zone plan as evolved and finally adopted did not contemplate separate reparation plans to be applied to a dismembered Germany. Rather it is simply an alternative method of dividing the total amount of reparations among the various nations as a more practical means of division than the agreed percentage formula arrived at in Moscow which was contemplated to apply to the whole of Germany as of 1937 boundaries. The nature of the plan submitted was based on data submitted by the US Representative. These data were directed to ascertain the percentages of industrial and agricultural resources estimated to exist in the Eastern Zone of occupation (including that part of the Alt Reich lying east of the Oder–Neisse line) and the Western Zones. 13 The final percentage of so-called “free” deliveries allowed the Soviets from the Western Zones was predicated in a large measure upon these estimates. It was sufficient to allow the USSR approximately 50% of the total removals as reparations to which approximate percentage ever since the Crimea Conference neither the US nor UK ever raised serious objection. The US proposal for a zonal division of reparation shares was first formally submitted to the Economic Sub-Committee of the Foreign Ministers on July 25th. It had been informally discussed both in this Sub-Committee and between Secretary Byrnes and Mr. Molotov prior thereto. 14 The first draft of the US proposal, to which the British had informally subscribed, was as follows: [Here follows the second section of document No. 925 .] Subsequently, after considerable discussion and trading back and forth the U. S. proposal was amended by the addition of the following which introduced the idea of USSR and Poland securing additional capital equipment from the Ruhr industrial area in Germany partly in exchange for raw materials to be provided by the Soviet and partly without any obligation to deliver commodities in exchange for capital removals: [Here follows the text of document No. 966 .] Negotiation between Ambassador Pauley, Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov brought the matter to the point where the Soviet expressed a preference for the right to secure removals both as reparations and in exchange for raw material deliveries not just from the Ruhr but from all of the western zones of occupation. In accordance at the end with the informal agreement of the British it was suggested to modify the US proposal further by adding the following: “ d . 15 Implementing the foregoing programs, the reparations claims of the USSR and Poland shall be satisfied by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the USSR, plus “( a ) 12% percent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for a peace economy, and should be removed from the zones of Germany occupied by the US and UK in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum and petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon, to be made available to the US and UK by the Soviets. “( b ) 7½ percent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for a peace economy, and should be removed from the US and UK zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government without payment or exchange of any kind in return. “Removals of industrial capital equipment shall be completed within two years of the date hereof in exchange for products to be delivered within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for a peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Allied Commission on Reparations with France added working in consultation with the Control Council subject to the final approval of the zone commander in the zone from which the equipment is to be removed.” As the discussions proceeded at the Foreign Ministers level with respect to the proposal for the division of reparation shares on the basis of the additional 12½ and 7½ percent for the Soviet and Poland, the USSR raised various questions as to the division of German external assets, gold captured by the Allied Armies in Germany and their claim for a share interest in corporate assets of German enterprises like railroads which would necessarily be left in Germany. In consideration of an agreement on the part of the USSR to renounce any interest by way of reparations in the foregoing three types of property the 12½ and 7½ percentages were raised to 15 and 10 percent respectively. At the very last moment a question arose between Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Gromyko on the one hand and Mr. Clayton and Mr. Pauley on the other when the Soviet draftsman insisted that the USSR had only renounced its claim to German external assets lying west of their zone of occupation. This argument was finally compromised by deciding certain specific countries in which the western powers renounce any claim to German external assets and provided [ and by providing? ] that the USSR renounce its claim to German external assets in all other countries. As put forward by Secretary Byrnes the US proposal on the actual percentages of reparations to be delivered to USSR and Poland from the western zones after agreement had been reached in principle, [and?] the USSR [had?] renounced its claim to external assets and gold, follows: [Here follows the text of document No. 961 .] And Secretary Byrnes also submitted the following as a first draft method of determining the amount and character of industrial capital equipment which should be removed from Germany as reparations: “The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital unnecessary for a peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Allied Commission on Reparations with France added working in consultation with the Control Council subject to the final approval of the zone commander in the zone from which the equipment is to be removed.” 16 There are certain significant variations between the foregoing first drafts of the proposed language of the reparations plan [and the plan] as it finally appeared in the Berlin Protocol. 17 1. The determination of the amount and character of removals originally proposed to be vested in the Allied Commission on Reparations was changed to provide that this function should be vested in the Control Council. 2. There were omitted the general policies to govern reparation removals, originally included in the plan submitted to the Economic Sub-Committee which were derived from the principles adopted by the Allied Commission on Reparations (with the exception of the first charge) in Moscow. These policies were stricken at the request of USSR on the ground that such policies were already embodied in the economic principles and the Soviet Delegation at the last moment had accepted the principle of imports as a first charge on exports. 3. Although as originally proposed by the USSR the matter of interim or “advanced” deliveries was to be determined by the Allied Commission on Reparations, this was modified in the final discussions with Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Gromyko in the evening before the Protocol was adopted to provide that the eligibility of capital equipment for advanced deliveries would be determined by the Control Council. One further important matter should be noted with respect to those provisions of the Berlin Protocol which relate to the fifteen percent of certain capital equipment to be delivered by the USSR, “in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.” Although the Protocol does not specify the source of the foregoing commodities in so many words, it should be noted that the obligation to deliver was placed upon the Soviet Union—not upon the Eastern Zone of Germany. The clause in question should be read in the light of the background of discussion at the Potsdam Conference, which preceded its inclusion in the Berlin Protocol. That discussion revolved about ways and means whereby compensation could be provided for the deficit in the German economy resulting from splitting off, on motion of the Soviets, that part of Germany lying east of the Oder–Neisse line. At one time in the course of negotiations the words “petroleum and petroleum products” were included in the commodities to be delivered by the USSR. These commodities were not included in the Soviet-Polish Trade Treaty. 18 They were originally included in a proposed draft of the Berlin Protocol by Ambassador Pauley as a continuation of his efforts in the Economic Sub-Committee to obtain fifty thousand barrels of crude oil per day from Austria, Hungary and Rumania in order indirectly to increase the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to the US and UK for waging war in the Pacific. Originally it was proposed that this crude oil be supplied by the Soviet Union either on reverse lend lease or for purchase but to this USSR was not ready to agree. 19 The injection of petroleum and petroleum products into the draft of the Berlin Protocol as commodities to be supplied in exchange for capital removals was thought by Ambassador Pauley to be one way of meeting the problem. On the evening before the Protocol was finally adopted Mr. Clayton consented at the request of Mr. Vyshinski to a phrasing which read “petroleum or petroleum products” and later it was agreed to strike the first word “petroleum”, thus leaving “petroleum products.” The US Representative also pressed for the adoption of paragraph 18 of the Economic Principles, 20 which provides: “Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.” After this provision was agreed upon, the US Representative submitted to the President for his signature a memorandum requesting General Clay to press immediately for the adoption of a decree by the Control Council, vesting German external assets. A suggested form of decree was forwarded with the memorandum. The text of the memorandum and proposed decree is contained in Appendix 24. 21 Articles III and IV respectively of the Berlin Agreement 22 contain The Political and Economic Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period and Reparations From Germany. This portion of the Berlin Agreement is set forth in Appendix 3 hereof. 23 Paragraph 6 of Article IV in part reads: “The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparations shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed.” Paragraph 7, Article IV, reads as follows: “Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect of such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.” These quoted provisions, together with the other provisions of Article IV and the provisions of Article III, furnish the basis of the agreed plan of reparations. This plan is to remove all industrial equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy, as determined in accordance with the principles set forth. Many of the “policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations” are contained in the Berlin Agreement. Naturally other policies will be required of the “Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France”, which logically should be undertaken when and as the occasion arises by meetings of the Allied Commission on Reparations in Berlin. This is desirable, though it will require the removal of the seat of this Commission from Moscow, because the closest contact will be required between [ with? ] the administration of the Allied Control Council in order that the physical facts which it develops will be available to the Commission. This circumstance was the basis for the US recommendation that the Allied Commission on Reparations move its seat to Germany and preferably to Berlin. 24 At the request of the Zone Commander the US Representative drafted an interpretive memorandum styled Memorandum on the Provisions of the Berlin Protocol Relating to Reparations, 25 and before his departure from Berlin on August 20, 1945, filed a copy of same with the Zone Commander, with a covering letter 25 stating that after this draft was gone over with the affected agencies in Washington, a final draft would be drawn and officially transmitted to him. This memorandum has been completed and contains a comprehensive analysis of the reparation plan, together with historical background of the discussions and considerations that led to the several provisions, and is attached hereto as Appendix 30. 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 This report, drafted and compiled in large part by Gulick and DuBois, dealt with negotiations on the German reparations question from February to September 1945. The only section here printed is part v , which is a summary of the reparations negotiations at the Berlin Conference. 2 Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky. 3 Document No. 364, printed in vol. i . 4 Document No. 852 . 5 Document No. 894 . 6 The passage here represented by italics was underscored in the source copy. 7 Cf. document No. 894 . 8 See ante , p. 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . 9 See ante , pp. 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] . 10 Cf. document No. 904 . 11 See documents Nos. 894 (attachment 3), 915 , 918 , and 931 . 12 See documents Nos. 929 and 940 . 13 See documents Nos. 930 – 936 . 14 See ante , p. 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] . 15 See the second section of document No. 925 for paragraphs a–c to which this paragraph d is related. 16 Cf. document No. 962 . The chronology of the Pauley–Lubin Report with respect to the last four proposals quoted is at variance with the minutes and the documents circulated at the Conference. 17 Document No. 1383, section iii . 18 See ante , p. 406, footnote 3 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] . 19 See documents Nos. 1316 – 1326 . 20 See document No. 1383, section ii , paragraph 18. 21 See document No. 1003 ; cf. document No. 998 . Only the attachment to document No. 1003 is reproduced in appendix 24 to the Pauley–Lubin Report. 22 i. e., the Communiqué ( document No. 1384 ). 23 Not printed as such. See document No. 1384 . 24 See document No. 976 . 25 Not printed. 25 Not printed. 26 Not printed. External assets External assets [981] The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) Babelsberg, July 16, 1945. 800.515/7–1645: Telegram [982] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) Washington, July 17, 1945—7 p.m. 800.515/7–1745: Telegram [983] The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) [Washington,] July 17, 1945. 800.515/7–1645: Telegram [984] The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Washington,] July 18, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–1845: Telegram [985] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State Moscow, July 19, 1945—8 p.m. 800.515/7–1945: Telegram [986] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) and the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Acting Secretary of State Babelsberg, July 21, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–2145: Telegram [987] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] Pauley Files [988] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg, July 22, 1945.] Pauley Files [989] The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Washington,] July 24, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845: Telegram [990] The Military Attaché in Sweden (Kessler) to the War Department Stockholm, 24 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [991] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, July 24, 1945—6 p.m. 800.515/6–1545: Telegram [992] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. Pauley Files [993] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) Babelsberg, July 25, 1945. 800.515/7–2545: Telegram [994] The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) [Washington,] July 25 [1945.] 800.515/7–2545: Telegram [995] The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) to the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) [Washington,] July 27 [1945.] 800.515/7–2745: Telegram [996] The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) and the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) [Washington,] July 27 [1945.] 800.515/7–2745: Telegram [997] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State Moscow, July 27, 1945. 800.515/8–745: Airgram [998] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 28, 1945. Pauley Files [999] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) Babelsberg, July 30, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–3045: Telegram [1000] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg, July 30, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [1001] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 31 [1945.] 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–3045: Telegram [1002] The United States Representatives on the Economic Subcommittee to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] August 1 [1945]—1:00 p.m. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [1003] The President to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany (Clay) Babelsberg, August 1, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–645 [1004] The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) Babelsberg, August 2, 1945. 800.515/8–245: Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 981 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) 800.515/7–1645: Telegram No. 981 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Oliver ) secret Babelsberg , July 16, 1945. Victory 23. For Oliver ES from Collado. Please bring us up to date on progress in controlling German external assets especially in Spain since Department’s 5499 of July 6th to London 1 and your memorandum of July 7. 2 1 Document No. 383, printed in vol. i . 2 Document No. 384, printed in vol. i . No. 982 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) 800.515/7–1745: Telegram No. 982 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) secret u. s. urgent Washington , July 17, 1945—7 p.m. 1629. British have now agreed to proposal outlined Deptstel 1316 June 15. 1 Spanish situation urgent. Reurtel 2570 July 14 2 inform Soviet we assume their concurrence in view of reports from Ankara and Stockholm that Soviet has so warned Turks and Swedes. Make point 5 of Depstel 1534 July 6 3 if can conveniently do so. For your information Dept proposes to continue stressing coordinated action and maintenance of trusteeship principle. This would preclude particular occupying power from disposing of German external assets to its own advantage. American expressions to Soviet regarding German Legation property Stockholm and German shares Rumanian oil companies will probably make these points. Sent to Moscow, repeated to SecState Berlin for Collado and Despres. Grew C[ovey] T. O[liver] 1 See vol. i , document No. 382, footnote 1 . 2 Document No. 326, printed in vol. i . 3 See vol. i , document No. 383, footnote 1 . No. 983 The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) 800.515/7–1645: Telegram No. 983 The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Oliver ) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 17, 1945. 44. For Collado from Oliver. Chief development is that British have agreed to join in warnings to neutrals. Madrid reports that Spanish have instructed Ambassador here 2 to take up with Department question of German subsidiaries in Spain which Franco, through Instituto Nacional de Industria, a government development corporation, wishes to acquire. (Reurtel 23 July 16 3 ) Department has asked urgently for French concurrence to Department’s original proposal. Regarding Russians, Moscow has been instructed to inform Russians we assume tacit approval from Russian unilateral action in Turkey and Sweden. 4 Department will probably recommend to SecState that German external assets in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria be included within four-power trusteeship principle. Department will also object to Russian attempt to acquire German Legation buildings at Stockholm on reparation account, pointing out to Russians that regarding German properties in western European neutrals British and ourselves have scrupulously adhered to principle that particularized advantage should not be obtained by any one of occupying powers. ES is now discussing a preamble to vesting decree such as was suggested by telegram 5 sent to you by courier July 13. Discussions with Swiss Chargé 6 indicated utility of deletion 7 as bargaining point re neutral recognition control German external assets. Swiss wished deletion Scintilla A. G., in which there is majority German interest. Swiss were told deletion impossible until our control over German interest established. Chargé indicated Swiss would perhaps help us establish such control. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 Juan Francisco de Cárdenas. 3 Document No. 981 . 4 See document No. 982 . 5 Not identified. 6 Max Grässli. 7 From the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals. Concerning the Proclaimed List, see Hackworth, Digest of International Law , vol. vii , pp. 654–656. No. 984 The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 740.00119 EW/7–1845: Telegram No. 984 The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 18, 1945. 56. (For Assistant Secretary Clayton.) Bucharest has seen a letter from Russians to Rumanian Prime Minister 2 informing latter that German-held shares in Rumanian oil corporations “pass into the patrimony of the Soviet Union as partial compensation for damages caused to USSR by Germany.” 3 Objectionable features of this are obvious. It (1) asserts Soviet desire for share interests as reparation or otherwise; (2) manifests USSR intention to obtain exclusionary control Rumanian oil industry; (3) bypasses current Four Power discussions regarding treatment of German assets in ex-enemy and neutral countries from economic security and reparations points of view; and (4) raises serious question regarding looted property. Accordingly, it is suggested that positive steps be taken at Potsdam Conference to forestall this action. In addition to basing our objections to proposed Russian action upon as many of the foregoing grounds as can be mentioned to Russians, following arguments could be advanced: (1) No shares can be subjected to control or disposition as German by Soviet for its individual advantage unless it is established that they were not acquired by the Germans in looting transactions outlawed by United Nations’ declaration of January 5, 1943. 4 It might be added that US would have to be satisfied that particular shares were not United Nations’ property which had been looted by Germans; (2) shares which have met above burden of proof (i. e. shown conclusively to have been German owned through legitimate transactions) should be governed by general principles to be established by Four Powers regarding treatment of German assets in ex-enemy or neutral countries. It should be emphatically denied that such assets in Rumania pass into patrimony of USSR alone as compensation by Germany for war damage. US cannot admit competence of USSR to assert unilaterally ownership rights to German assets in ex-enemy or neutral countries. Without exception US has treated such assets coming within its control in these countries as subject to trusteeship on behalf of all four occupying powers. Similar standard of conduct expected of Soviet Union and must be strongly insisted upon. It should be obvious to Soviet Government that in three neutral Western European countries, German external assets will be principally under control of British and ourselves. (3) Article 8 of Rumanian Armistice 5 pledges the Rumanian Government not to allow the expropriation of any form of German property without the permission of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. While we recognize that protests can hardly be based on actual wording of this article, this Government maintains control should be exercised on behalf of and with respect to interests of other United Nations, particularly since Article 18 provides that Allied (Soviet) High Command, in controlling execution of Armistice, acts on behalf of the Allied Powers. Please inform Harriman and Pauley. Inform whether this message should be repeated to Moscow and Bucharest for information. [ Grew ] 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg. 2 Petru Groza. 3 See vol. i , document No. 385 . 4 Text in Department of State Bulletin , vol. viii , p. 21. 5 Signed at Moscow, September 12, 1944 (Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712). No. 985 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State 800.515/7–1945: Telegram No. 985 The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Moscow , July 19, 1945—8 p.m. 2628. 1. Embassy has prepared in collaboration with Rubin and transmitted note to Foreign Office in accordance with instructions given Depts 1629, July 17. 2 Substance of note refers to previous communication addressed to Soviets on June 18 3 and to lack of answer thereto, and states that in view of reported action of Soviets in Ankara and Stockholm, as reported in Depts reference telegram, and in view of general urgency of matter US Govt has had to assume that Soviets have no objection to action described in letter of June 18. Note repeats statement of necessity for action to prevent dissipation and concealment of German assets, states that similar steps have already been taken with respect to German official properties in Spain, and states US Govt in collaboration with British will shortly present démarche to Spanish. Sent Dept 2628; rptd London 371, Paris 243, Frankfort for Pauley, Harriman and Clayton 23. 2. Rubin and DuBois have been instructed by Pauley to proceed to Berlin and plan to depart July 20 and to take with them copy of Embassy’s note. Immediately following airgram 4 contains text of note. 3. Would be helpful to Embassy if Dept would indicate exact nature of representations made by Soviets in Stockholm and Ankara as well as whether it is planned immediately to make démarche to Spanish whether French will participate and other details. 4. British here appear to have received no instructions. Kennan 1 The same message was sent directly to the Office of the Political Adviser at Frankfurt for transmittal to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg. 2 Document No. 982 . 3 See vol. i , document No. 382, footnote 1 . 4 Document No. 997 . No. 986 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) and the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 EW/7–2145: Telegram No. 986 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) and the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Babelsberg , July 21, 1945. Victory –184. From Pauley and Clayton. In view of note presented by AmEmbassy Moscow to Soviet [Government] 2 based on your July 18 [ 17 ] telegraphed instructions re Spanish situation, 3 believe it highly desirable to repeat to Moscow your telegram 56, July 18, re Rumanian oil shares. 4 Also believe desirable to repeat to Moscow details of Soviet negotiations re German property in Stockholm, both in case of Soviet questions on note presented by Embassy. See no reason not to repeat telegram re Rumanian oil shares to Bucharest. American delegation is presenting to conference its view that a declaration should be issued by US, UK, USSR, and if possible France, declaring German external assets subject to jurisdiction of powers occupying Germany and of ACC, and naming diplomatic representatives of occupying powers as agents for both. 5 Rubin and Dubois here working on text of proposed vesting decree with view to presenting decree to US Group CC for presentation to ACC. 6 ES comments being considered. 1 Sent over the signature of Byrnes. 2 See documents Nos. 985 and 997 . 3 Document No. 982 . 4 Document No. 984 . 5 For the text of the proposal presented by the United States Delegation on July 30, see document No. 1000 . 6 See the attachment to document No. 1003 . No. 987 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 987 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Memorandum on German External Assets The United States believes it important that immediate action be taken to obtain control and the power of disposition over German external assets, particularly in neutral countries. This is necessary not only from the standpoint of security but also to preserve such assets for Allied objectives. It is therefore urged that an appropriate declaration be issued by the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union, and if possible France, assuming jurisdiction over such assets. It is recommended that this matter be referred to the Economic Subcommittee for immediate attention. 1 Authorship not indicated. No. 988 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 988 United States Delegation Working Paper [ Babelsberg , July 22, 1945. 1 ] Memorandum by US Delegation It is the view of the United States that a declaration should be issued by the Conferring Powers and by France to the effect that German external assets are subject to the jurisdiction of the Powers occupying Germany, 2 and of the ACC, acting through the diplomatic representatives of the occupying Powers. Such a declaration would be of invaluable assistance in obtaining control over German external assets, especially those located in neutral countries and such countries as Turkey and Argentina. The declaration should be in such form that it may readily be adhered to by France and it should be presented to France with a view to joint issuance by the four occupying Powers. 3 Should France demur, the declaration should be issued by the Conferring Powers alone, as an outgrowth of the Potsdam Conference. [Attachment] [ Babelsberg , July 22, 1945. Text of Proposed Declaration The Chiefs of State of the U. S., U. K., and U. S. S. R. having met at Potsdam [and having concerted with the Government of France], 4 the following declaration is issued: The Governments of the U. S., U. K., U. S. S. R. [and France] declare that German external assets, not already under the control of United Nations which have taken a direct part in the war with Germany, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Powers occupying Germany and of the Allied Control Council. All countries in which such assets are located are hereby called upon to place such assets at the disposition of the occupying Powers and of the Allied Control Council. The diplomatic representatives of the Powers signatory to this Declaration will act as their representatives and as the representatives of the Allied Control Council in obtaining control and the power of disposition over such assets, for such use as is determined to be in the interests of security and other Allied objectives. The Allied Control Council and such representatives shall take such action as may be appropriate to carry out the purposes of this declaration. 1 So dated in a manuscript notation which also contains Rubin’s initials. 2 Another version of this memorandum in the Pauley Files, dated July 21, reads: “of the occupying Powers of Germany”. 3 The version referred to in the preceding footnote reads: “by France and the U. S., U. K, and U. S. S. R.” 4 These brackets and those in the following paragraph have been inserted in pencil on the source copy. No. 989 The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845: Telegram No. 989 The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 24, 1945. 115. (For Clayton.) For your information and with reference Department’s 56 of July 18, 2 Bucharest reports Soviets now demand German bank stocks in Rumania. [ Grew ] 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg. 2 Document No. 984 . No. 990 The Military Attaché in Sweden (Kessler) to the War Department Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 990 The Military Attaché in Sweden ( Kessler ) to the War Department 1 secret priority Stockholm , 24 July 1945. 667. For ComGenAir MilID Washington D. C. Russian Delegation here conducted survey of interned German aircraft presumably those coining here from German Soviet front. Russians propose to fly these out shortly as war booty. Their plans have been publicized in newspapers. See my 591 of 26 June and your 28542 of 7 July. 2 Newspapers also carried item that neither UK or US have made request concerning remainder. Kessler 1 Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 25 as a retransmission from the War Department. 2 Neither printed. No. 991 The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 800.515/6–1545: Telegram No. 991 The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) 1 restricted u. s. urgent Washington , July 24, 1945—6 p.m. 2381. Formally notify FO that powers occupying Germany claim title to or control of German owned or German controlled assets (repeated to London as 462 and Paris as 409) and request that Govt to which you are accredited take no action which would conflict with this control which must be recognized as having come into existence. ReDeptel 2042 to you of June 15 (1137 to Stockholm, 988 to Lisbon, 618 to Ankara, 4828 to London, 2768 to Paris, 1316 to Moscow). 2 Brit have agreed to foregoing specifically for neutrals and French have indicated will instruct their Missions to join US–UK in warnings of this nature. Russians have been informed we assume their consent from Russian actions at Ankara and Stockholm. Inform your colleagues representing occupying powers of your proposed action and ask them to take identical steps. Madrid has already acted. Ankara to await parallel Brit instructions. Sent to Bern, Stockholm, Lisbon and Ankara for action. Repeated to London, Paris[,] Buenos Aires and Moscow for info. Grew C[ovey] T. O[liver] 1 The same message was sent at the same hour to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) as telegram No. 1416; to the Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) as telegram No. 1218; and to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) as telegram No. 759. 2 See vol. i , document No. 382, footnote 1 . No. 992 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 992 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. U. S. Proposals That the declaration on reparations and related matters be amended with reference to German owned external assets as follows: Appropriate steps shall be taken to exercise control and the power of disposition over German owned external assets, in cases where this power is not already exercised by any one of the United Nations, which has directly participated in the war. 2 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 Another copy of this paragraph in the Pauley Files is dated July 27. No. 993 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) 800.515/7–2545: Telegram No. 993 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) 1 confidential Babelsberg , July 25, 1945. Victory 286. From Ambassador E. W. Pauley Tripartite Conference Victory 286 to American Legation Stockholm: information to AmLegations [ sic ] Paris, London, Lisbon, Madrid, Bern, AGWar for SecState. There is presently under consideration at Berlin Conference proposal for declaration of power over German external assets, whose issuance in near future however seems doubtful. Reurtel giving reaction Rubin’s telegram July 19. 2 Draft decree vesting in agency operating within framework of ACC all right, title and interest in German external assets also under consideration. 3 As decree now stands it would automatically vest such interest, and would be exercise of its power to vest by ACC. Text of proposed decree being sent Legation by pouch. Proposed to turn decree over to US Group CC for consideration and presentation to other ACC members. Necessity for some formal action establishing right of Allied governments to supervise and control important German external properties, especially in countries like Spain, Portugal and Switzerland, makes exercise of vesting power desirable. This telegram cleared with Clayton. 1 Printed from the text received in the Department of State. 2 Not printed. 3 See the attachment to document No. 1003 . No. 994 The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) 800.515/7–2545: Telegram No. 994 The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Oliver ) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 25 [1945.] 122. For Collado from Oliver. Our Embassy Madrid jumped gun and joined with Brit in formally notifying Spaniards that powers occupying Germany “claim title to or control of German owned or German controlled assets and requesting that Spanish Govt take no action which would conflict with this control which must be recognized as having come into existence.” This is limit of Brit agreement at this time. Brit do not wish to mention ACC or any other body as source of authority. Fortunately French had grudgingly consented to joint warnings before Madrid acted. Dept has now instructed Missions in Stockholm, Bern, Lisbon and Ankara to take similar steps. 2 Would have preferred slight variation in Madrid’s wording, but Brit here said changes would have to be referred again to London. Action at Ankara must await British concurrence. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 See document No. 991 . No. 995 The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) to the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) 800.515/7–2745: Telegram No. 995 The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Oliver ) to the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Rubin ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 27 [1945.] 147. For Rubin from Oliver. AmLegation Bern believes that démarche on Swiss reported Deptel Victory [ sic ] 122 July 25 2 would tend to discourage Swiss cooperation in tracing and disclosing German assets. Bern adds that unlike Spain there is little prospect of dissipation in Switzerland. A similar reaction it is predicted will be received from Stockholm. Would appreciate your reactions based on Bern visit. ES considers Swiss already aware of our general position. Recently Swiss Chargé urged deletion 3 of Scintilla, majority stock in which is German [ sic ]. Oliver told him control under Swiss freezing decree not sufficient for deletion and intimated occupying powers would have to consider their rights to German shares. Chargé intimated Switzerland would help if deletion could be expected. At this stage consider telegrams from various sources apt to confuse missions. Suggest your reply be sent only to Department. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 Document No. 994 . 3 From the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals. No. 996 The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) and the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) 800.515/7–2745: Telegram No. 996 The Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Oliver ) to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) and the Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Rubin ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 27 [1945.] 148. For Collado and Rubin from Oliver. There follow as promised Fletcher’s revised estimates on total German assets in neutrals. Figures in parentheses represent April 30 estimates of overall report. All figures in millions dollars. Switzerland 600 (300); this figure represents direct investments only. Portugal 35 (27). Sweden 51 (57.7). Turkey 51.2 (33). Spanish estimates not yet reconciled. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. No. 997 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State 800.515/8–745: Airgram No. 997 The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Acting Secretary of State Moscow , July 27, 1945. A 183. Safehaven . Reference to my July 19, No. 2628 to Department, repeated to London as 371, Paris as 243, and Frankfort for Pauley, Harriman, and Clayton as 23, 1 the following is a [ the ] text of the note referred to therein: “You will recall that on June 18, 1945, Ambassador Harriman informed you of a proposal that the United States and British Governments, on behalf of the Powers occupying Germany, make a joint démarche to the Spanish Government with respect to the control of all German assets in Spain. 2 In view of the reported action of your Government in issuing similar warnings to the Governments of Sweden and Turkey, my Government has been obliged to assume that the Soviet Government has no objection to the action described in Mr. Harriman’s letter. In the light of this situation, and of the general urgency of the matter, my Government feels it necessary to proceed to completion of the steps which Mr. Harriman has outlined. “The Powers occupying Germany are, as has many times in the past been indicated, strongly interested in preventing the dissipation and concealment of German property and in making possible restitution of property looted by the Germans and held in neutral territory. In order to achieve these objectives, and acting in a capacity as trustee on behalf of the Powers occupying Germany, my Government will shortly, and in collaboration with the British Government, present its démarche to the Spanish Government proposing that the United States and British Missions in Madrid immediately assume control and active management of German property in Spain, including all corporations and other entities owned or controlled by the former German state. Similar steps have already been taken with respect to German official properties in Spain.” Copies of this Airgram have been transmitted to London, Paris and Potsdam for Pauley, Harriman and Clayton. Kennan 1 Document No. 985 2 See vol. i , document No. 382, footnote 1 . No. 998 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 998 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 28, 1945. Memorandum for General Clay It is requested that you attempt to get the Control Council to issue the attached decree, 2 vesting German external assets, as soon as possible. We regard it as most urgent that steps be taken immediately to exercise the power of disposition over these assets. In your discussion in the Control Council with respect to paragraph ( b ) of Article I of the decree, you may point out that the U. S. and the U. K. governments have been dealing extensively with the problems involved in connection with German external assets for several years and that their representatives are best qualified to deal with the matter of actually getting hold of such assets. The Board would of course be subject to the directions of the Commission, which in turn would be under the Control Council. 3 1 This paper bears the following manuscript notation: “Not sent”. 2 No attachment found. Cf. the attachment to notation No. 1003. 3 At the end of this draft memorandum, spaces were provided for the signatures of Pauley, Clayton, and McCloy. Another draft memorandum for Clay, prepared for signature by Truman and dated August 1, consists in toto of the first paragraph of this paper. It is marked “Not used”. For the memorandum actually sent, see document No. 1003 . No. 999 The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–3045: Telegram No. 999 The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) 1 secret Babelsberg , July 30, 1945. Victory 419. Sent to Moscow repeated Department for information. Re note delivered to Soviets on German assets in Spain, 2 we have received word from US Military Attaché, Stockholm, 3 that Russian Delegation has conducted a survey in Sweden of interned German planes (presumably including only those coming to Sweden from Soviet-German front), which are proposed to be flown out as war booty. 4 Newspapers have publicized Russian plans, together with statement that no request concerning remainder has been made by US or UK. Byrnes 1 Printed from the text received in the Department of State. 2 See document No. 997 . 3 Brigadier General Alfred A. Kessler, Jr. 4 See document No. 990 . No. 1000 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1000 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg , July 30, 1945.] German External Assets The United States believes it important that immediate action be taken to exercise control and the power of disposition over German external assets, particularly in neutral countries. This is necessary not only from the standpoint of security but also to preserve such assets for Allied objectives. It is therefore urged that an appropriate declaration be issued by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and if possible France, assuming jurisdiction over such assets. There are attached alternative forms of a declaration, one which would be issued by the Big Three, and the other which would be issued by the Big Three and France. Following the issuance of such a declaration it is recommended that the Control Council issue a decree vesting German external assets. [Attachment 1] Text of Proposed Declaration by the Big Three The Chiefs of State of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union having met at Potsdam, the following Declaration is issued: The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union declare that German external assets, not already under the control of United Nations which have taken a part in the war with Germany, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Powers occupying Germany and of the Allied Control Council. All countries in which such assets are located are hereby called upon to place such assets at the disposition of the occupying powers and of the Allied Control Council. The diplomatic representatives of the Powers signatory to this Declaration will act as their representatives in exercising control and the power of disposition over such assets. [Attachment 2 2 ] Text of Proposed Declaration by the Big Three and France The Chiefs of State of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union having met at Potsdam and having concerted with the Government of France, the following declaration is issued: The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France declare that German external assets, not already under the control of United Nations which have taken a part in the war with Germany, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Powers occupying Germany and of the Allied Control Council. All countries in which such assets are located are hereby called upon to place such assets at the disposition of the occupying powers and of the Allied Control Council, The diplomatic representatives of the Powers signatory to this Declaration will act as their representatives in exercising control and the power of disposition over such assets. 1 Attachment 5 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . 2 Not attached to the source copy of document No. 1000 . The text of attachment 2 here printed constitutes the only attachment to another copy of document No. 1000 (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145). No. 1001 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–3045: Telegram No. 1001 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] July 31 [1945.] 164. Following telegram (re Victory 419, July 30 1 ) was sent to Stockholm on July 26: 2 “Dept learns (your military attaché’s 677 [ 667 ] to War Dept July 24 3 ) Sov Govt will ask Swedish Govt to deliver interned German airplanes to Sov Govt as war booty. Should report be correct it is desirable that you, preferably supported by your British and French colleagues, 4 should inform Swedish Govt that we cannot acknowledge such a war booty theory and that Swedish Govt should not therefore permit disposition of German property or equipment as war booty. In our opinion, all German assets and interests are now under the joint jurisdiction of the four occupying powers and should not be removed or disposed of without consent of Allied Control Commission.” [ Grew ] 1 Document No. 999 . 2 As telegram No. 1439. 3 Document No. 990 . 4 Cecil Bertram Jerram and Christian Carra de Vaux de Saint-Cyr, respectively. No. 1002 The United States Representatives on the Economic Subcommittee to the Secretary of State 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 1002 The United States Representatives on the Economic Subcommittee to the Secretary of State 1 [Extract 2 ] [ Babelsberg ,] August 1 [1945]—1:00 p.m. Report to the Secretary on the Work of the Economic Subcommittee There is attached the Third Report of the Economic Subcommittee to the Foreign Ministers. With respect to the question of German external assets, the U. S. and U. K. recommended the inclusion in the Economic Principles 3 of the following: “18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.” We also recommended that appropriate reference to this matter be made in the communiqué. The Soviet representatives, while stating that they had very little interest in the matter, reserved their position pending a study of the entire problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [Attachment—Extract 4 ] Third Report of the Economic Subcommittee to the Foreign Ministers 5 The Economic Subcommittee considered the questions of a statement regarding German external assets 6 and an Article 19 7 of the Economic Principles relating to payment for imports into Germany. With respect to the question of German external assets, no decision was reached. The Soviet representatives, after a general explanation of the problem had been made, requested fuller information and reserved their position pending the furnishing of such information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Printed from an unsigned copy prepared by the United States Delegation at Babelsberg. 2 For the other sections of this report, see document No. 891 . 3 Attachment to document No. 863 . 4 For the other sections of this report, see the attachment to document No. 891 , and document No. 1325 . 5 This report was presented at the Eleventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, August 1. See ante , p. 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] . 6 See document No. 1000 . 7 See documents Nos. 872 , 873 , 875 , and 876 . No. 1003 The President to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany (Clay) 740.00119 Potsdam/8–645 No. 1003 The President to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany ( Clay ) Babelsberg , August 1, 1945. Memorandum for General Clay The heads of government today agreed to the following: “Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.” 1 In order to carry out this agreement, you are directed to urge the Control Council to issue the attached draft decree, which would vest German external assets. I regard it as most urgent that steps be taken immediately to exercise control and the power of disposition over these assets. Harry S. Truman [Attachment 2 ] Law No. — Vesting and Marshalling of German External Property 3 preamble In modern warfare and under conditions of totalitarian rule the instrumentalities of war include privately owned enterprises and funds, as well as official properties of the warring state. Germany’s war of aggression was sustained, not only by controlling her domestic economy, but also by mobilizing her industrial and financial interests in foreign countries. In order to promote and maintain international peace and collective security in the post-war world, it is necessary to eliminate Germany’s potential for war. To do this it is essential to assume control of all German assets, wherever located, and to divest German ownership. Therefore , by virtue of the Supreme Authority with respect to Germany arising from the Act of Surrender, May 7, 1945, 4 and in accordance with Article XIII of the Statement by the Governments of the USA, the USSR, the UK and the provisional Government of the French Republic, adopted at Berlin by the Supreme Commanders on June 5, 1945, 5 it is hereby Decreed : article i Establishment of German External Property Commission. There is hereby established a German External Property Commission composed of representatives of the Powers occupying Germany, hereinafter referred to as the “Commission.” This Commission is created as a governmental agency with all the attributes, powers and immunities of the sovereign government for the purpose of carrying out the policies and provisions of this law both within and outside Germany. article ii Vesting of External Property of Persons within Germany. All the right, title and interest, legal and equitable, in or with respect to all property outside Germany, of all persons within Germany, is hereby vested in the Commission, Provided that this Article shall not affect the property of any individual within Germany.[:] ( a ) who is a citizen or subject of a foreign sovereign state other than Japan; or ( b ) who is part of the armed forces or civilian personnel of any Allied government. article iii Vesting of External Property of Persons outside Germany. All the right, title and interest, legal and equitable, in or with respect to any property outside Germany, of any German citizen outside Germany and the branch of a corporation or other legal entity organized under the laws of Germany or having its principal place of business in Germany, and any legal entity which is owned or controlled from Germany, is hereby vested in the Commission. As used in this Article the term “German citizen” means individuals who ( a ) have had full rights of German citizenship under Reich law, at any time since January 1, 1942, and have been within any territory while such territory was under the control of the Reich Government, at any time since January 1, 1942; or ( b ) have been designated by the Commission to be German citizens for the purpose of this decree. article iv Compensation. All persons whose right, title or interest in any property has been vested in accordance with this law shall be entitled to fair compensation in an amount and in a manner to be determined. article v Disposition of Property Vested under this Law. The right, title and interest to all property, title to which has been vested in the Commission, under this law, or the proceeds of such property, shall be held by the Commission and disposed of pursuant to such further directives as the Allied Control Council or other appropriate authority may issue from time to time in order to accomplish the objectives set out in the Preamble. article vi Additional Specific Powers of the Commission. In order to effectuate the policies and provisions of this law and in addition to its general powers under Article I, the Commission’s specific powers shall include the power, acting through any agency that it may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise, ( a ) to do all acts which it deems necessary or appropriate to obtain possession or control over all property, the right, title or interest in which is vested in the Commission under this law; ( b ) to operate, control and otherwise exercise complete dominion over all such property, including the sale, liquidation or other disposal thereof; ( c ) to subpoena witnesses and to require the keeping of full records, the furnishing of full information, and the production or seizure of any books of account, records, contracts, letters, memoranda, or other papers, relating to any property affected by this law. article vii Exemptions. This decree shall not apply to assets subject to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, France or any United Nation determined to be entitled to retain assets subject to its jurisdiction as a form of reparations or otherwise. article viii Definitions . For the purpose of this law: ( a ) The term “person” shall include any natural person or collective persons and any juridical person or entity under public or private law having legal capacity to acquire, use, control or dispose of property or interests therein; and any government, including all political subdivisions, public corporations, agencies and instrumentalities thereof. Any juridical person or entity which is organized under the laws of, or has its principal place of business in Germany, shall be deemed to be a person within Germany within the meaning of Article II hereof. ( b ) The term “property” shall include all movable and immovable property and all legal, equitable, or economic rights and interests in or claims to such property, whether matured or not, and shall include, but shall not be limited to lands and buildings, goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, coin, bullion, currency, deposits, accounts or debts, claims, bills of lading, warehouse receipts, all kinds of financial instruments whether expressed in Reichsmarks or in any foreign currency, evidences of indebtedness or ownership of property, contracts, judgments, rights in or with respect to patents, copyrights, trademarks, etc., and in general, property of any nature whatsoever. ( c ) The term “Germany” shall mean the area constituting “ Das Deutsch [ e ] Reich ” as it existed on December 31, 1937. article ix Penalties. Any person who violates any provision of this law or any regulations, instructions or directives issued hereunder or any person any of whose property is affected by this law who acts or attempts to act in derogation of the title or interest of the Commission under Articles II and III and any person who assists or conspires with any other person to commit such an act or violation shall, upon conviction, be liable to any lawful punishment as determined by the court. In addition to any penalty imposed by this Article, any person who is convicted hereunder shall forfeit his right to compensation under Article IV. article x Conflicting Laws Annulled. All provisions of foregoing laws or decrees or parts thereof which are contradictory to any one of the provisions of this law or of any law or decree issued under the provisions of this law are herewith declared null and void. 1 Document No. 1383, section ii , paragraph 18. 2 Not attached to the source copy of document No. 1003 , but clearly identified as the draft referred to (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145). 3 For the text of the law actually adopted (Allied Control Council Law No. 5, October 30, 1945), see United States Economic Policy Toward Germany (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946; Department of State publication No. 2630), p. 88. 4 Executive Agreement Series No. 502; 59 Stat. (2) 1857. 5 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649. No. 1004 The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Rubin) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) 800.515/8–245: Telegram No. 1004 The Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Rubin ) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Oliver ) 1 secret Babelsberg , August 2, 1945. Victory 480. For Oliver from Rubin. President has sent to General Clay memo 2 stating agreement of Big Three to issuance of decree vesting German foreign assets, and directing that ACC (Allied Control Commission) be urged to adopt decree. Memo states that President regards it as urgent that control and power of disposition over German external assets be obtained. Draft of decree already sent to you 3 has been amended by striking portion which previously set up a special board (with US and UK represented) to direct the vesting body. 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Byrnes. 2 Document No. 1003 . 3 Not printed. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1485 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 1383 ] and 1505 [ Pg. 1505 is part of Doc. 1384 ] (paragraph 18), and pages 1485–1487 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 1383 ] and 1505–1506 [ Pg. 1505 is part of Doc. 1384 ] (paragraphs 1, 3, 8, and 9). Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine [[Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)]] Editor’s Note [1005] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Washington [Babelsberg], 17 July 1945. Truman Papers [1006] The Navy Department to the Commander, United States Naval Forces in Europe (Stark) Washington, 18 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1007] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 19, 1945 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1945 [1008] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President [Babelsberg,] July 19, 1945. Truman Papers [1009] The War Shipping Administrator (Land) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Babelsberg,] 25 July 1945. Truman Papers [1010] The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations (King) to the Navy Department Babelsberg, 26 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1011] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg, July 29, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [1012] The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Brown) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–2945 [1013] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [1014] Proposal by the British Delegation Potsdam , 30th July, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [1015] Report by the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine [Babelsberg, August 1, 1945.] 740.00119 Potsdam/8–145 [[Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] Editor’s Note —Papers relating to the allocation of shipping, including the employment of captured German vessels, are printed post , page 1191 [ Pg. 1191 includes portions of Doc. 1189 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)] , and Doc. 1190 ] , under the heading: United Kingdom—Allocation of Shipping. No. 1005 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Truman Papers No. 1005 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President top secret Washington [ Babelsberg ], 17 July 1945. Memorandum for the President The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following statement of policy in regard to the disposition and distribution of captured German merchant shipping. a . In view of the urgent requirement for personnel shipping in the further prosecution of the war, captured or surrendered enemy vessels capable of being used to transport troops should be made available as quickly as possible for the U. S. military use. b . All captured or surrendered German vessels should be divided among the Allied Nations, first as to immediate use and later as to final disposition, except for such coastwise and inland water craft as are determined to be essential for the minimum German economy. No ocean-going vessels (i. e., ships over 4,000 deadweight tons) designed for foreign trade should be left in the hands of the Germans. c . All captured and surrendered German and other enemy ships should be placed in a common pool. In this connection, every effort should be made to persuade the Russians to enter the United Maritime Authority agreement covering the handling of the Allied Nations pool of ships. 1 d . In the final disposition all ex-German personnel shipping should be divided among the Allied Nations. Further details in regard to the U. S. needs for personnel shipping were given in a memorandum to you from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 7 July 1945. 2 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: William D Leahy Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy , Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy . 1 See Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1722; 61 Stat. (4) 3784. 2 Document No. 549, printed in vol. i . No. 1006 The Navy Department to the Commander, United States Naval Forces in Europe (Stark) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1006 The Navy Department to the Commander, United States Naval Forces in Europe ( Stark ) secret routine Washington , 18 July 1945. This is serial No. 33. CominCh and CNO addressed ComNavEu for action and ComNavForGer for info and directed info to be forwarded CominCh and CNO. 1 Admiralty … [messages of July 7 and 11] 2 indicate no US representation on Capcraft Commission or provision for protecting US interest in disposing of captured enemy small craft including tugs for immediate use in Pacific. There is an immediate and urgent need for seagoing tugs in carrying out approved primary operations in the Pacific. Request you investigate and if desirable arrange equal representation on Capcraft Commission or set up counter commission for US account in order to secure all possible immediate assistance for Pacific seagoing tug requirements. Suggest substitution of captured German tugs for US tugs now operating ETO. WSA and War Washington have been advised of Admiralty dispatches and feel their interest identical with ours and that you and local War and WSA representatives should handle to satisfactory conclusion. 1 Received by the United States Delegation to the Berlin Conference on July 19 as a retransmission from the War Department. 2 Neither printed. No. 1007 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1945 No. 1007 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 19, 1945 [Translation] The German Navy and Merchant Marine Soviet Proposal Presented to Foreign Ministers July 19, 1945 1 1. One third of the total German navy including the ships which at the beginning of unconditional surrender of Germany were under construction or in repair shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. 2. One third of reserve armaments, ammunition and supplies of the German navy in accordance with the classes of ships shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. 3. One third of the German merchant marine shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. 4. The transfer and receipt of the ships of the German navy and merchant marine shall begin August 1 and shall be completed by November 1, 1945. 5. There shall be established an expert commission the strength of which shall be determined by the Naval Commands of the three Allied countries to transfer and take the ships of the German navy and merchant marine located in the ports and bases of the Allied Commands as well as in the ports and bases in Germany and other countries. 1 See ante , p. 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] . This subheading appears as a manuscript notation by Yost on the Department of State file copy. No. 1008 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President Truman Papers No. 1008 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the President [ Babelsberg ,] July 19, 1945. My Dear Mr. President : The question of the disposition of the German Naval and Merchant fleets has been raised by Generalissimo Stalin. As I understand it, he suggests that one-third of the tonnage of these fleets be allocated to each of the three powers. 1 Most of the German Naval and Merchant tonnage is in the possession of the U. K., with some little in the hands of the U. S., and a small although unknown amount is held by the Russians in areas which they occupied. Clearly under our proposed definition of “war booty”, the Naval ships would be excluded from reparations. But the Merchant vessels not belonging to the German armed forces would be deemed reparations. I quote our definition of war booty: “ War Booty shall be limited to finished equipment and supplies produced for and belonging to the German armed forces exclusive of any facilities used to produce such equipment or supplies.” 2 Under any definition of war booty heretofore laid down, the German Naval fleet would be so classified and therefore excluded from reparations. If we award one-third of the German Naval tonnage to Russia, we would be making an outright gift to the Soviet Union. While I do not object to making this gift, I believe that it should be subject to certain specific conditions. These conditions are that: One, Agreement be reached on proper definitions of war booty, restitution, and reparations, including particularly the boundaries of Germany from which reparations will be exacted. Two, Whatever allocation of ships is made to the U. S. S. R. shall not be delivered until the Japanese War is terminated. Three, The U. S. S. R. agree to provide approximately 50,000 barrels per day of petroleum or petroleum products from Hungary and Rumania to relieve the present burden on the U. S. and U. K. of providing tankers, needed for the Pacific war, for hauling petroleum supplies to Europe and the Mediterranean area. In general, it would appear that the U. S. would be better off to view the German Merchant tonnage as reparations rather than as war booty,—particularly since most of this Merchant tonnage is in the possession of the U. K. Under the Soviet proposal, by yielding our claim to some of the Naval vessels as war booty, we would acquire a full one-third interest in the Merchant tonnage as reparations. These Merchant vessels could be reassigned by ourselves to countries like Norway as reparations to help replace her great war shipping losses. It would certainly seem that the power to allocate Merchant ships as reparations will prove useful to the U. S. in trading for such other assets as we may ourselves desire to acquire as reparations. Of course, the Merchant tonnage should not be turned over to the U. S. S. R. for immediate operation. That country is not a member of the shipping pool. Moreover, it could not man the ships with experienced personnel for the most efficient use in the prosecution of the Japanese War. In the circumstances, it is my recommendation that this whole matter of ships be referred to the Allied Commission on Reparations for immediate consideration and for report. All of the members of this commission are presently here. Respectfully, Edwin W. Pauley 1 See ante , pp. 118–122 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 2 Cf. attachment 2 to document No. 894 . No. 1009 The War Shipping Administrator (Land) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) Truman Papers No. 1009 The War Shipping Administrator ( Land ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 secret [ Babelsberg ,] 25 July 1945. Memorandum to Honorable William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State Assumption: The Tripartite Conference will agree that U. S. S. R. (Russia) will be given as reparations one-third (⅓) of the captured and/or surrendered German merchant tonnage. (This will exclude ( a ) Fishing vessels; ( b ) Harbor and Inland Water Craft; ( c ) Coastal shipping required for German use.) If the above assumption is correct, the Protocol should definitely cover the following points: ( a ) In this one-third distribution full consideration should be given to any enemy merchant tonnage captured or surrendered now in possession of U. S. S. R. ( b ) Ships may be tentatively “earmarked” for delivery to U. S. S. R. at the end of the war with Japan. ( c ) The implementation should not take place until after the fall of Japan, preferably six months after VJ–Day which, by limitation, is the period of the United Maritime Authority. ( d ) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships now fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority. These ships are now engaged in providing shipping service for military and other tasks necessary for, and arising out of, the completion of the war in Europe and the Far East and for the supplying of all the liberated areas as well as the United Nations generally and the territories under their authority. They are being handled and integrated accordingly. ( Note : Any change in the present military and civilian approved instructions covering these vessels will interfere with the successful prosecution of the war with Japan.) E S Land [Attachment] secret Notes To Accompany Attached Memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Clayton 1. Russia is not, at present, a signatory to the “Agreement on Principles having reference to the continuance of coordinated control of merchant shipping,” which was done in London on the 5th day of August, 1944 2 (United Maritime Authority). 2. To date Russia has evinced no interest in joining the United Maritime Authority. 3. Our records indicate that Russia endeavored to dissuade both Norway and Sweden from joining the United Maritime Authority but they were not successful. This attitude on the part of Russia indicates either a misunderstanding or a fear, or both, as to the intent and purposes of the United Maritime Authority. 4. The shipping allocations to Russia by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board have been satisfactorily handled by the United States and the United Kingdom throughout the war and if Russia does not choose to accede to the United Maritime Authority, there is no reason why she should not henceforth apply to it for her shipping requirements. This leads to the conclusion that Russia’s accession to U. M. A. is not vital provided that the Protocol definitely states that the delivery of ships to Russia will not take place until the limit of the U. M. A. period, namely within six months after VJ–Day. Land 1 The presence of the signed original of this memorandum in the Truman Papers suggests the probability that it was passed on to Truman. Cf. ante , p. 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] . 2 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1722; 61 Stat. (4) 3784. No. 1010 The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations (King) to the Navy Department Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1010 The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations ( King ) to the Navy Department 1 confidential routine Babelsberg , 26 July 1945. Victory 358. CominCh sends serial 25 to CominCh and CNO Admin for action. Action ad[dress]ee pass for info to ComNavEu and ComNavForGermany. In consultation with Commodore Moran select officer qualified to sit on Capcraft Commission to select tugs suitable for United States purposes. Have selected officer report to ComNavEu for temporary duty on Capcraft Commission. 1 This message resulted from an agreement reached in Anglo-American conversations at Babelsberg. See ante , p. 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] . No. 1011 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 1011 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg , July 29, 1945.] Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine German Fleet It is agreed that the German fleet shall at once be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S. A large proportion of the German submarines shall be destroyed, a small number being retained for experimental and training purposes. The destruction of the submarines shall be supervised by a mixed commission which shall also determine which will be retained. It is further agreed that naval officers of the three powers will be accorded facilities to inspect German naval vessels and installations wherever held. German Merchant Marine . It is agreed that the German merchant marine wherever or however captured or held shall be ultimately divided equally among the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S., subject to further distribution by them to other Allied nations. Although particular vessels may be earmarked now for particular nations, all German merchant vessels shall be used in the prosecution of the Japanese war as long as that war continues. The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese war period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority. The ultimate distribution of the German merchant fleet shall take place six months after the fall of Japan. It is further agreed that appropriate officers of the three powers will be accorded facilities to inspect German merchant vessels wherever held. 1 In the “Index of Attachments to Summary of the Negotiations in the Economic Sub-Committee” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145), this paper is identified as a “draft agreement by Collado, July 29, 1945.” No. 1012 The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Brown) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 EW/7–2945 No. 1012 The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State ( Brown ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 29, 1945. Memorandum for the Secretary Tonight at 11:35 Pavlov called and asked that the following message be transmitted to you: “Generalissimo Stalin has appointed the following to serve on the committee for disposition of the German fleet: “The Admiral of the Fleet Kusnecov [“]Mr. Sobonev.” Walter Brown 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. No. 1013 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1013 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. German Navy and Merchant Marine Soviet Proposal 1. One third of the total strength of the German surface navy including ships which at the beginning of Germany’s surrender were under construction or in repair shall be transferred to the Soviet Union. 2. A larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. A part of the submarine fleet viz. submarines presenting the greatest interest from the technical standpoint shall be preserved and divided between the USSR, Great Britain and the USA. 3. One third of all stocks of armaments, ammunition and supplies of the German navy shall according to the classes of vessels be transferred to the Soviet Union. 4. One third of the German merchant marine shall be transferred to the Soviet Union. 5. The transfer of vessels and ships of the German navy and merchant marine shall begin on August 1st and their receipt shall be completed by November 1st, 1945. 6. A Maritime Technical Commission will be set up to hand and take over vessels of the German navy and merchant marine located in the ports and bases in allied countries as well as in Germany and other countries. 1 Attachment 7 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . No. 1014 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1014 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 secret Disposal of the German Fleet and Merchant Ships Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation When this question was discussed at the Third Plenary Meeting on the 19th July, 2 on the basis of the Soviet Delegation’s Memorandum of that date, 3 certain conclusions were reached and it was agreed to leave the matter until the last stage of the Conference. 2. The British Delegation have given further consideration to the questions raised in the Soviet Memorandum, in the light of the discussion on the 19th July, and submit the following suggestions as a basis for the decisions of the Conference on the subject. These suggestions relate to the numbered paragraphs of the Soviet Memorandum:— (1) ( a ) It was agreed on the 19th July that the German surface ships should be shared equally between the Three Powers. The British Delegation suggest that consideration should now be given to allotting a share to France which is an equal party to the terms of surrender for Germany and is a full member of the Control Council for Germany. The allocation of specific vessels is, it is suggested, a matter upon which an expert commission should submit recommendations to the Three Governments, after it had drawn up a list of all available surface ships, including those under construction or already launched, and those under repair which can be quickly completed. Any ships requiring more than three months for completion should be removed from Germany by the country to whom they are allocated. Remaining ships under construction will be destroyed. ( b ) At the same time it was agreed in principle that the German U–boats should be dealt with separately, the greater part being destroyed. A token number would be retained for equal division among the Three Powers for purposes of research. The question of a French share of the retained U–boats should also be considered. Here again, it is suggested that the expert commission should be instructed to make concrete proposals after full investigation of the numbers of U–boats—seaworthy, damaged and under construction or repair—which are in the hands of the Allied authorities. Each of the Three Powers would be responsible for arranging the destruction of U–boats in its control, apart from the token number which it may be agreed to retain. In deciding the allocation of German warships, the British Delegation consider that account should be taken of the Rumanian and Bulgarian warships available to the Soviet Union. (2) The Soviet request for a proportional share of the German Navy’s reserve of armaments, ammunition and supplies was not discussed at the Plenary Meeting on the 19th July. The Soviet request is acceptable in principle to the British Delegation, who must point out, however, that these stores have been dispersed by the Germans and that the first step must be the preparation of an inventory which should be one of the tasks assigned to the proposed expert commission. (3) It was agreed in principle that there should be a division of the surrendered German merchant shipping, but no final conclusion was reached as to the proportions to be allotted to the different Allied States. Mr. Churchill expressed the view that account should be taken of merchant shipping which had passed under the control of the Soviet Government as the result of the armistices with Finland and Rumania. President Truman emphasized the need for German shipping in the war against Japan and for bringing supplies for the rehabilitation of Europe. The meeting agreed in principle that without prejudice to the preparation of a scheme for the division of surrendered German merchant ships, all such ships should be available for use in support of the Allied war effort against Japan. The British Delegation maintain their point of view that in the division of the surrendered German merchant shipping account should be taken of the shipping taken as reparation by the Soviet Union from the Satellite States. Account should also be taken of the need for providing ships for local German purposes, in accordance with any recommendations which may be made by the Allied Control Council for Germany. Subject to these conditions, the British Delegation renew the suggestion made by Mr. Churchill on the 19th July that a fourth part be made available for division between the other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered substantial losses at the hands of Germany. The share of the Soviet Union would in that case be one quarter of the total available. The shares of the various Allied States would be counted as reparation receipts. (4) The British Delegation cannot agree to the timetable proposed by the Soviet Delegation, since, as pointed out above, there is much essential preliminary investigation and listing to be done before the transfer of ships can begin. The British Delegation suggest that the following timetable should be approved in principle by the Conference:— ( a ) Warships . Transfers will be carried out as soon as possible after Governments have approved the recommendations of the proposed expert commission. ( b ) Merchant Ships . Proposals for the allocation of specific German merchant ships, in accordance with such decision on allocation as may be agreed by the Conference, should be agreed as soon as possible between the three Governments, in the light of recommendations made by the experts, and particular ships would then be earmarked. The transfer of these ships would take place as soon as they became available after the end of the Japanese War. 5. The Plenary Meeting on the 19th July agreed in principle upon the formation of a Three Power Naval Commission, with reciprocal rights for each party to make the investigations required for their work in any territory under the control of the other parties. As mentioned above, the British Delegation propose that there shall be established an expert commission to deal with German warships. Its composition and duties are suggested in paragraphs (1) and (2) above. As regards merchant ships the British Delegation suggest that detailed recommendations to give effect to the proposals in paragraphs (3) and (4) ( b ) should be worked out between suitable expert representatives nominated by the Three Governments to deal with merchant ships, in consultation with representatives of other interested Governments. 3. There is the possibility that any public announcement that German warships are to be divided amongst the Allies may result in the German crews scuttling ships which might be ordered to sail to Allied ports. It is therefore desirable that no announcement of the division of the German Navy be made, at any rate until the expert commission has completed its investigations, which should include the detailed arrangements for carrying out the transfer of ships. A similar delay is necessary before making any definite announcement about the division of the surrendered German merchant ships. Potsdam , 30th July, 1945. 1 Attachment 6 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . 2 See ante , pp. 118–122 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 3 Document No. 1007 . No. 1015 Report by the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine 740.00119 Potsdam/8–145 No. 1015 Report by the Technical Subcommittee on Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine [ Babelsberg , August 1, 1945. 1 ] Report of the Special Committee Designated To Prepare Recommendations for the Disposal of the German Navy and German Merchant Marine Enclosure[s]: (A) Decisions of the Tripartite Conference on Distribution of the German Navy. (B) Decisions of the Tripartite Conference on Distribution of the German Merchant Marine. 1. The Committee met at 1030, 31 July, 1945, in consideration of above subject. The Committee’s recommendations, Enclosures [ sic ] (A) and Enclosure (B), are based upon tentative decisions reached during plenary sessions of the Tripartite Conference beginning 17 July, 1945. These enclosures are drafted in the form of decisions in order to facilitate final action in the plenary session of the Tripartite Conference. [For?] Those parts of the enclosures in which agreed recommendations could not be made the divergent views are set forth in each of the specific paragraphs involved. 2. The Committee feel bound to draw the attention of the Conference [to] the possibility that any public announcement that German warships are to be divided amongst the Allies may result in the German crews scuttling ships which might be ordered to sail to Allied ports. It is therefore desirable that no announcement of the division of the German Navy be made, at any rate until the expert commission has completed its investigations, which should include the detailed arrangements for carrying out the transfer of ships. A similar delay is necessary before making any definite announcement about the division of the surrendered German merchant ships. The Committee accordingly recommend that the Conference might confine publicity to the following announcement:— “The Conference agreed in principle upon arrangements for the use and disposal of the surrendered German Fleet and merchant ships. It was decided that the Three Governments would appoint experts to work out together detailed plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint statement will be published simultaneously by the Three Governments in due course.” Kyэheцob 2 Admiral of the Fleet , C M Cooke Jr. Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy . E D B McCarthy . Rear Admiral, Royal Navy . [Enclosure A] Decisions of the Tripartite Conference on Distribution of the German Navy 3 1. The Tripartite Conference agree upon the following principles for the distribution of the German Navy:— ( a ) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. (1) (The British representatives expressed the view that a portion of the German Navy should be allotted to France and that, therefore, full agreement with the above principles must be subject to final decision of the Plenary Conference.) ( b ) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German shipbuilding or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peace-time standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government. ( c ) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. The Committee are not able to make a recommendation as regards the number of submarines to be preserved for experimental and technical purposes. (1) It is the opinion of the British and American members that not more than 30 submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U. S. S. R., U. K. and U. S. for experimental and technical purposes. Paragraph 1 ( a ) (1) also applies to submarines. (2) It is the view of the Russian members that this number is too small for their requirements and that U. S. S. R. should receive about 30 submarines for its own experimental and technical purposes. ( d ) All stocks of armaments, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to subparagraphs ( a ) and ( c ) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships. ( e ) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than August 15th., 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located. ( f ) The Three Governments agree that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than February 15th., 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission. [Enclosure B] Decisions of the Tripartite Conference on Distribution of the German Merchant Marine 1. The Tripartite Conference agree upon the following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine:— ( a ) (1) It is proposed by the Soviet and American representatives: The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. This distribution shall not preclude any of the Parties from making such [ sic ] further allocation of part of its share to other Allied Nations. (2) The British representatives considered it essential to allot a share of not less than one quarter to the lesser maritime Allied States whose merchant marines have lost so heavily in support of the common cause against Germany. Accordingly, the British Delegation proposed the following alternative draft of subparagraph ( a ) (1):— “One quarter of the German merchant marine surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located shall be allotted to the Soviet Union and the remainder shall be divided between the U. K. and the U. S. who will provide an appropriate share to the Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered substantial losses in support of the common cause against Germany. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan.” ( b ) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority. ( c ) While actual transfer of the ships will be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with subparagraph ( a ) (as approved). ( d ) The British and American representatives propose the following sub-paragraph:— “German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers.” The Soviet representatives do not agree to this inclusion. ( e ) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st., 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located. ( f ) The British representatives suggested the need to add the following provision:— “The shares of the various Allied States will be counted as reparation receipts.” The Soviet Delegation considered that this was unnecessary in view of the new policy agreed by the Conference on reparations. The American representatives took no position in this matter. 1 So dated in a manuscript notation by Yost. This report was discussed at the Eleventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers and at the Twelfth Plenary Meeting, August 1. See ante , pp. 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] . 2 Kuznetsov. 3 The file copies of this enclosure and the succeeding one were apparently used as working drafts in working out the language finally agreed upon (see document No. 1383, section iv ). The texts here printed are those of the typed report before any manuscript changes had been made in it. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1487 [ Pg. 1487 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1507 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . War criminals War criminals [1016] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg, July 30, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [1017] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg, July 30, 1945.] 740.00116 EW/7–3045 [1018] Proposal by the British Delegation Potsdam , 30th July, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [1019] The President’s Special Counsel (Rosenman) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] August 1, 1945. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 1016 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1016 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg , July 30, 1945.] Trial of Principal War Criminals 1. The Conference has recognized as necessary for the trial of the principal war criminals whose crimes, as is stated in the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, 2 were not connected with a definite geographical place, to establish an International Tribunal in the near future. 2. The Conference has decided in the first instance that judgment should be passed on the following leaders of the Hitlerite clique: Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop, Ley, Keitel, Doenitz, Kaltenbrunner, Frick, Streicher, Krupp. 3. The leaders of the three Allied governments declare that according to the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943 they will take all measures at their disposal to provide for the surrender into the hands of justice war criminals who have taken refuge in neutral countries. In the case of the refusal of any such country to surrender war criminals who have taken refuge on their territory, the three Allied Governments will consult between each other concerning the measures which should be taken in order to provide for the effecting of their inflexible decision. 1 Handed to Byrnes at the Byrnes–Molotov meeting, July 30. See ante , p. 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] . This paper bears the following typed notation: “Translation of document handed to the American and British Delegations by Mr. Molotov”. Although this paper is attachment 14 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30 (see ante , p. 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] ), it appears that document No. 1017 was the paper submitted at that meeting. 2 Text in Department of State Bulletin , vol. ix , p. 310. No. 1017 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00116 EW/7–3045 No. 1017 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation 2 ] [ Babelsberg , July 30, 1945.] Concerning the Trial of the Important War Criminals 1. The Conference has found it necessary to organize in the very near future an International Tribunal for the trial of the important war criminals whose crimes are not connected with a definite geographical location and who, in accordance with the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, are not to be sent to the countries in which their crimes were committed, to be tried according to the laws of these countries. 2. The Conference has decided that the International Tribunal, first of all, must try the following leaders of the predatory Hitlerite band: Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop, Papen, Ley, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frick, Hans Frank, Streicher, Krupp and Schacht. 3 3. The leaders of the three Allied Governments declare that, in accordance with the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1944 [ 1943 ], they will take all measures at their disposal in order to ensure the surrender into the hands of justice of the war criminals who are hiding in neutral countries. In case of a refusal by any of those countries to surrender war criminals who hide on its territory, the three Allied Governments will consult among themselves concerning the measures which should be taken in order to ensure the carrying out of their inflexible decision. 1 This document is undated, but is apparently the paper submitted by Molotov at the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30 (see ante , p. 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] ). Byrnes commented at that meeting that the list of war criminals named in the document differed from the list in a paper which Molotov had handed him earlier the same day. Cf. document No. 1016 . 2 Prepared after the Conference by the Division of Language Services, Department of State. 3 The Russian original has at this point the following manuscript interpolation in English: “& Doenitz”. This name and those of Papen, Frank, and Schacht (i. e., the names not included in document No. 1016 ) are underscored in pencil. No. 1018 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1018 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 secret War Crimes Memorandum by the British Delegation Dated 13 th [ sic ] July , 1945 The British Delegation placed this matter on the Agenda of the Conference. 2 They consider it most desirable, in view of the great public interest throughout the world in the major war criminals being brought to just and speedy punishment, that an agreement should be reached between the Three Governments to insert a paragraph on the lines suggested below in the Protocol and Communiqué. “The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London 3 between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 have no particular geographical localisation. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date.” 4 Potsdam , 30th July, 1945. 1 Attachment 13 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . 2 See vol. i , document No. 176 . 3 For the London discussions referred to, for the text of the Agreement of August 8, 1945, signed at the conclusion of those discussions, and for the text of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to that Agreement, see Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945 . 4 One copy of this paper bears the following manuscript notation: “Agreed”. No. 1019 The President’s Special Counsel (Rosenman) to the Secretary of State Truman Papers No. 1019 The President’s Special Counsel ( Rosenman ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] August 1, 1945. Memorandum for the Secretary of State Bob Jackson tried to reach you, and when he couldn’t, asked for me, and he discussed with me the present situation on war criminals. The meeting 2 scheduled for this morning did not take place, because of the opening of Parliament and the necessity of the Lord Chancellor 3 being present at the opening. The meeting has been postponed for tomorrow. I told Bob that anything that was to be done had to be done at today’s meeting. 4 His views are: 1. That we should refuse emphatically to name any of the war criminals. 2. That we should not commit ourselves here to an international tribunal for purposes of trial. As to the second point, Bob has come to feel very strongly that it would be better not to have a joint tribunal because of the difficulty of working with the Russians in a trial. He feels that if the Russians, however, in London accept the various propositions which we have made, that he is committed to favor a joint tribunal, and does not feel that he can back out of it merely on the ground that it would be difficult to get along. If, however, they do not accede to our suggestions as to definition of a war crime and certain other matters, he will then take the course of having each nation try the criminals in its respective jurisdiction. He was even of the thought that the British, French and Americans might agree to a joint trial, leaving the Russians out. I expressed to him my personal opinion that that would be quite a slap at the Russians, leading to recriminations, whereas it would not be quite so bad if it was decided that each nation would try its own war criminal prisoners. At any rate, nothing will be done before tomorrow, and I said I would phone him from some place in England and find out what has happened. S[ amuel ] I R[ osenman ] 1 The presence of the original of this memorandum in the Truman Papers suggests the probability that Byrnes passed it on to Truman. 2 The reference here is apparently to a meeting in London. 3 Sir William Jowitt. 4 The reference here is apparently to a plenary meeting of the Berlin Conference. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1489 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1507 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . Soviet annexation of Königsberg and northern East Prussia Soviet annexation of Königsberg and northern East Prussia [1020] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [ Babelsberg ,] 7/22/45. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 1020 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Truman Papers No. 1020 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation?] Soviet Proposal on Koenigsberg On shaping the decision of the three Heads of Governments regarding the transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg area. The Conference approved the proposal of the Soviet Union that pending the final settlement of territorial questions at the Peace Congress, the part of the western border of the U. S. S. R. adjoining the Baltic Sea should follow the line from the point on the western shore of the Danzig Bay indicated on the map annexed hereto, 2 eastward—north of Braunsberg–Goldap to the junction of the frontiers of the Lithuanian S. S. R., the Polish Republic and former East Prussia. 3 [ Babelsberg ,] 7/22/45. 1 Apparently circulated between the Sixth Plenary Meeting, July 22, and the Seventh Plenary Meeting, July 23. See ante , pp. 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 2 Not found. 3 For the draft entries on this subject submitted by the British and Soviet Delegations for inclusion in the Protocol, see documents Nos. 1429 – 1431 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1489 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1507 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . The Rhineland and the Ruhr The Rhineland and the Ruhr [1021] United States Delegation Working Paper [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1545 [1022] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President [Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1745 [1023] Draft Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) [Babelsberg,] July 16, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1645 [1024] The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Assistant Secretaries of State (Dunn and Clayton) [Babelsberg,] July 17, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1745 [1025] The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2145 [1026] Memorandum by the Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council, Germany (Heath) [Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2145 [1027] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1021 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1545 No. 1021 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Undated.] Separation of the Ruhr and Rhineland From Germany A primary objective of our three Governments is to prevent Germany from ever again embarking on a War of Aggression. All present and intended measures of military and industrial disarmament do not of themselves constitute a certain guarantee to this end. Even a truncated Germany 2 will retain her war making potential if the Ruhr 3 and Rhineland are permitted to remain under German authority. Without this area, Germany is incapable of waging a major war. I therefore propose that we here determine:— 1. That the Ruhr and Rhineland be permanently detached from the remainder of Germany. 2. That prior to conclusion of the period of military occupation a separate international protectorate comprising this area be created. 3. That this international protectorate be placed under the authority of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. 4. That we recommend that the Security Council designate Belgium, France and the Netherlands to administer this international protectorate on its behalf and in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the Security Council. 5. That we recommend [to] the Security Council that in [ sic ] the administration of this international protectorate shall be carried out in such a manner as to: ( a ) make available the economic resources and production of the protectorate for the benefit of European economy as a whole without discrimination against European or non-European countries. ( b ) to afford to the inhabitants of the protectorate so far as consistent with the basic purposes of the protectorate the maximum degree of local self-government. 1 Authorship not indicated. The copy of this paper in the Truman Papers bears the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Not presented but discussed[.] Decided that they should remain in Germany[.]” 2 In a later version of this paper (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1545), this passage reads: “Even a Germany reduced in size”. 3 For a map of the Ruhr, see the map facing p. 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] , ante . No. 1022 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1745 No. 1022 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President 1 [Extract 2 ] top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 16 July 1945. Memorandum for the President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . dismemberment of germany In speaking of Germany, I refer of course, to that part of the country which it is intended will eventually return to her sovereignty. I would be disposed to grant to Poland some areas on her western boundaries which would tend to compensate her for the territory to be ceded to Russia. I feel however, that the burden is upon Russia to show that suitable provisions will be made to care for the millions of Germans now in those areas. We must make it clear that they cannot be shunted to American responsibility. I would not be disposed to grant sovereignty to France over all the left bank of the Rhine, although certain provisions respecting fortifications and military installations in this area in favor of France would be desirable. No final conclusions on this subject will, I imagine, be reached without consultation with the French. I would not go further in the dismemberment of Germany, as I believe in modern times it will require the full resources of the remaining area to make possible any reasonable recovery. As a part of the demilitarization of Germany I would suggest that a thorough study be made by the experts of the three Powers, and submitted to the three governments, of the practicability of a plan for the international ownership and control of the products and resources of the Ruhr and the Saar. I would not approve either a wholesale destruction of these resources or a territorial annexation of the area by either another country or a condominium of countries. I have just heard the proposal that the Ruhr and the Rhineland should be severed from Germany, and placed as a protectorate under the management of France, Belgium, and Holland. 3 I understand that the proposed severance from Germany is to be complete, except for a customs Verein . The reasons why I fear any such attempted remedy of the problems which we are facing in the Ruhr, are as follows: 1. It at once takes out of the heart of Germany many millions of people of complete German race, and severs them from all political ties with the remainder of Germany. The proposed severance is the most drastic kind of dismemberment, far worse than any severance involving territory where there are mixed nationalities. 4 It is likely to cause the most violent political reactions and the political revolutionary attitude and activity known as irredentism. The history of Europe during the past one hundred and fifty years proved the correctness of the theory of racial self-determination put forward by the Allied Powers at the close of the last World War. During that period we have constantly seen the evolution of homogeneous racial groups and the dissolution of heterogeneous groups. The development of Italy from 1859 to 1870 was an example of the first kind of trend toward racial amalgamation; the dissolution of Austria–Hungary was a prominent example of the severance of badly combined national groups. The mistake after the last war was not the emphasis on self-determination, but the failure to deal properly with economic realities. 2. The proposed severance of the Ruhr would, I believe, be a mistake not only in ethnic and political matters but also in the economic field. The cutting of the political and economic ties between Germany and the severed provinces will impair the capacity of both the areas to sustain a reasonable peacetime economy. A protectorate of a foreign race and nationality, will not lead to an effective operation. In the light of the great need for production throughout the European area this let down would be a serious blow to any prompt rehabilitation of Europe. Moreover, by reason of the inability of the remaining portion of Germany to obtain the economic benefit of the Ruhr and Rhineland, great impairment of the economy of the remaining portion will result. Europe as a whole will inevitably suffer. 3. I believe that the severing of the Ruhr from the main portion of Germany will tend to drive the industries which formerly were dependent upon the Ruhr and the Rhineland to look to eastern Germany and Poland. I think there would be a strong tendency to drive Germany toward the east in her economic affiliations and outlook. I do not think that is in the interests of either western Europe or the United States. The objections I have stated to the proposed severance of the Ruhr would not inhere in even the most drastic kind of international control to prevent the production of war munitions. The study I have proposed would disclose the advantages and disadvantages of the international control which I have suggested. It is this road rather than the road of political severance I believe we should follow. Henry L Stimson 1 Submitted to Byrnes for transmittal to Truman (see document No. 849 ). For Stimson’s oral comments to Byrnes on this subject, see document No. 849, footnote 3 . 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see the enclosure to document No. 849 . 3 See document No. 1021 . 4 The last four words are in manuscript, replacing “only a part of the population is severed from its homeland.” No. 1023 Draft Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1645 No. 1023 Draft Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 16, 1945. Memorandum for the Secretary Creation of a Separate Rhineland–Ruhr There are several proposals for special treatment of the Rhineland–Ruhr. They have in common the assumption that control by the Western powers of the economic resources of this area, whether by political or economic means or by a combination of them, will provide a means of assuring our security interests in the European settlement. All these proposals raise a number of complicated questions, which are bound to be advanced by the other Governments. Before approaching our Allies with this proposal, we need to consider what answers we will give to those questions. 1. If the pattern of use of the Ruhr iron, steel, coal, and chemicals remains unchanged and these resources undergo final fabrication in many other parts of Germany, what especial benefit will be derived from “controlling” the raw material and crude manufacturing resources of the Ruhr? 2. If the Rhine–Ruhr is to be drawn away from the rest of the German economy and oriented toward the West, what adjustments would the Western countries, including ourselves, have to make in the pattern of their manufacturing and trade in order to accommodate this important area, even on a reduced scale of production, within the western orbit? In controlling this area the Western powers would be drawn between two conflicting objectives: 1, the desire to prevent or restrict a competition of this powerful area against relatively high cost areas in France and Britain, and 2, the need to provide sufficient export markets in Western Europe and overseas to make the Rhine–Ruhr an economically workable area. 3. If Germany east of the Oder or Oder–Neisse is cut off, if the Rhine–Ruhr is given a special status and if ten or twelve million Germans are dumped into the rump Germany which would be left in the middle, what economic adjustments would be necessary in that middle area? The middle area is a highly industrial area specializing in machinery and electrical equipment and fabricated consumer goods. To maintain even a minimum subsistence this area would have to become dependent on whatever countries would accept these products in exchange for foodstuffs and raw materials. The most likely market would be found in Eastern Europe because Western European countries and America have highly developed and competitive industries of the same type. 4. If as the result of creating a separate Rhine–Ruhr state, Germany falls apart, will a Western German state of some sixteen million be able to withstand the pull exerted by a differently organized German state of some fifty million? Both economic and patriotic forces would tend to pull the smaller Western Germany, over the long run, to rejoin the much greater Eastern German state. 5. If a Rhine–Ruhr state is created, what powers will control it? It is more than doubtful that France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, even in combination, are competent to control this area and to work out the adjustments necessary to make it a workable unit. Britain would suffer many disadvantages if she accepted the creation of a continental bloc of this nature outside her own control. If Britain joins in underwriting and controlling this bloc she will be taking a long step toward establishing a west-European bloc which will inevitably come into rivalry with Russia. For this and other reasons the Soviet Union will either oppose the creation of such a bloc outside her control or will insist on a strong voice in controlling and directing it. If, in order to overcome British and Russian opposition, they are brought into the controlling body, the control over the area would basically be in the hands of the same four powers which are already committed to controlling and policing Germany jointly. The British and Russians would then ask: why introduce the great complication of a separate political unit when they have already agreed to control Germany on a four-power basis? 6. If this plan is proposed to our Allies, they will ask whether the United States is prepared to underwrite it and, if so, for what period of years and with what commitment of military force and financial contribution. Will such a plan reduce or increase our commitments in Europe and will it present those commitments in a form palatable to the American public and compatible with the purposes with which it entered the war? Will it be able to obtain from Congress the large appropriations which will be necessary to enable the population to subsist during the long period which must elapse before an economically workable adjustment has been made. We must assume that neither France or Britain is able to undertake such an economic commitment on their own resources. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. It seems probable that this was a draft memorandum intended for signature by Dunn or Clayton. No. 1024 The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Assistant Secretaries of State (Dunn and Clayton) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1745 No. 1024 The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) to the Assistant Secretaries of State ( Dunn and Clayton ) 1 secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 17, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Dunn and Mr. Clayton Subject: Creation of a Rhineland–Ruhr State. A. The Proposal . While there are several proposals under consideration for separating the Rhineland–Ruhr area from the remainder of Germany, most of the proposals provide for this area to be set up as a permanently separate unit, economically and politically independent of the rest of Germany. One of the proposals 2 provides that it shall be controlled by France, Belgium and the Netherlands under the supervision of the Security Council. Obviously, a merely temporary separation would, by the very assumption that the area would at some foreseeable time be returned to Germany, have political and psychological effects different from those of a separation designed to be lasting. Similarly, the economic effects of separation would be very different if this area were to be left in customs union with the rest of Germany. B. Advantages of Separation . 1. The advantage of separation most often cited would be that even when political self-rule was returned to the Germans in the rest of Germany the basic resources of the Rhineland–Ruhr area would not return to the control of the German state or the German economy, thus eliminating Germany’s ability to use these resources to rearm. This argument assumes that when direct Allied occupation of Germany comes to an end, the four Powers might be unable or unwilling to prevent the rest of Germany from rearming and that the separation of the Rhineland–Ruhr is therefore a necessary safeguard against the revival of Germany as a military power. 2. A second advantage is that the separation of this area would make the rest of Germany much weaker as a power factor and hence much less attractive to any outside power which might be tempted to court it as an ally, and that Germany would thus be more likely to remain a political vacuum. If political forces could be shaped or confined by drawing lines on a map, this argument would carry decisive weight. There are other political factors, such as numbers, technical and organizing skills and political drives of a people, which can be deflected but not destroyed by lines drawn on a map. 3. It is also argued that existence in partite states could be made so attractive to Germans over the long run that it would be accepted by them and would thus form a lasting contribution to a more peaceful Europe. In the history of Europe in the last 200 years nothing suggests that the bulk of Germans either in the Rhineland–Ruhr or in the rest of Germany will eventually accept such a solution sincerely and work to maintain it. Failing such acceptance, this solution, to endure, would require permanent unity of will among the four great powers. An imposed partition of Germany is, over any considerable period, more likely to divide the four major powers than it is to contribute to their continued unity of purpose and action. C. Disadvantages . 1. Would the economic potential of Germany be reduced by drawing a boundary line around the Rhineland–Ruhr? As a by-product of separation, the exploitation of the Rhineland–Ruhr would probably have to be maintained on a fairly high level in order, through developing its capacity to export in highly competitive markets, to support its present population. Numerous industries now carried on in the rest of Germany would, as a normal consequence of separation, be developed in the Rhineland–Ruhr area, and thus, if at some later date the boundary between the Rhineland–Ruhr and the rest of Germany were removed, Germany’s total economic potential might well be no smaller than it had been before partition. 2. The separation of the Rhineland–Ruhr would contribute to the stability of Europe if it were accepted sincerely by the bulk of Germans in both parts of Germany and if the four major powers were equally determined to maintain partition. However, the issue of partition could easily become the focus for all the discontents among Germans in both areas. The grievance of partition would unify all Germans in a way difficult to combat and dangerous to the longer-range aims of the Allies. Any great power which wished to disturb the peace of Europe would have at hand an issue which would win the support of the entire German people and would trouble the conscience and divide the political will of the Allied nations. The inability of the great powers to unite between 1918 and 1938 in maintaining the independence of Austria, which had never been politically a part of the modern German state, gives some inkling of the political risk involved in basing a long-range policy on the assumption that all major powers will share an equal interest in maintaining the partition of Germany. 3. While control of the Rhineland–Ruhr by France, Belgium and Holland would give a western-European bloc the power to cut off the flow of coal, iron and steel from the Rhineland–Ruhr to the rest of Germany, other potential power-factors would not be under their control. It is doubtful that they could eradicate the will of the Germans to reunite. This factor, even though Germany by itself were incapable of an active political role, would have its influence on all calculations and decisions as long as the separation lasted, since the German people, even disarmed, could be counted on to throw the weight of their manpower and economic potential to the side of any power which seemed likely to support their efforts at reunion. 4. Any decision as to what powers will dominate a separate Rhineland–Ruhr state or protectorate will give rise to both immediate and continuing rivalries. Neither Great Britain nor Russia can afford to have an area of sixteen million Germans, possessing a great industrial potential, drawn into a combination which would be outside its own control. If the four major powers agree to separate the Rhineland–Ruhr, that will be on a basis of equal participation in its control. As long as the four powers are willing to maintain their joint control over all of Germany, it is hard to see what advantages would be gained by setting up a separate four-power regime for the Rhineland–Ruhr apart from the four-power control over Germany as a whole, and it is easy to foresee the great administrative, economic and political complications to which it would give rise. 5. If the Rhineland–Ruhr is placed under the control of France, Belgium and Holland, these three countries will have to combine to form a cohesive Western European bloc, in order to control effectively a West German state of sixteen millions. The formation of such a bloc would be regarded with suspicion by Russia and has not previously been encouraged by the United States, which has so far opposed the division of Europe into water-tight regional power-blocs. Weak in itself, a West European bloc would need generous and sustained support by both Britain and the United States. 6. For Britain and the United States to underwrite permanently a spearhead bloc in Western Europe implies a major decision on their part. It assumes that they cannot work out satisfactory joint solutions with Russia and that they must now form a strong and cohesive bloc of their own. If that assumption is the only one on which Britain and the United States can safely act, they should not limit their power-bloc to Western Europe but should strive to make the area of their leadership as broad, inclusive and cohesive as possible. They cannot feel adequately reinforced by having on their side a disparate bloc consisting of France, Belgium, Holland and a reluctant Rhineland. 7. A principal argument for creating a separate Rhineland–Ruhr state is that this will furnish a reliable safeguard against Germany’s rearming after American and British forces have withdrawn from the Continent. However, a separate Rhineland–Ruhr state could be maintained only by military forces, available in substantial numbers on the ground and always available in unstinted numbers on immediate call at a distance. It is conceivable that the forces needed to maintain a separate Rhineland against the will of the German people and the potential opposition of other major powers would be as great or greater than those needed to garrison all of Germany after Germany has been disarmed and reorganized internally. Even if American and British forces are withdrawn from Germany at an early date, Germany could still be garrisoned indefinitely by contingents furnished by the Continental European allies. These allies, which have obligatory military service and are in close proximity to Germany, could easily provide, on a rotating basis, a garrison of 200,000. The creation of a separate Rhineland state would not obviate the necessity for maintaining a long-term system of inspection as a safeguard against German efforts to rearm. Through licensing industrial establishments, through direct and frequent inspection by a corps of Allied personnel, through licensing and regulating the use of critical alloys, through eliminating the production of aircraft and synthetic oil and rubber, and through preventing all forms of military training and warlike indoctrination, the victorious powers can, if they so will, prevent Germany from restoring her military strength or potential. Continuity in enforcing such controls under the authority of the Security Council will be attained more easily than continuity of joint and unremitting action to enforce the separation of the Rhineland–Ruhr from the rest of Germany. 8. It should be the aim of the victorious powers to keep Germany weak and disunited politically. An imposed partition will lead nearly all Germans to subordinate their natural internal differences to the one burning desire, namely, to overcome a division of their country and people which runs counter to their deep national feeling, and to their economic interests. Finally, it will be easier to maintain unity of policy between the four major powers if they agree to keep Germany politically weak and economically open to the influence of all the major powers instead of breaking Germany up into exclusive spheres of influence. Philip E. Mosely 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 Cf. document No. 1021 . No. 1025 The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2145 No. 1025 The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 21, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Clayton Subject: Maisky Proposal for Internationalizing the Ruhr 1. During May and June Mr. Churchill urged strongly that the Allied forces should stand on the May 7 line of demarcation between them and the Soviet forces, in order to use the withdrawal as a bargaining counter during the current conference. 1 The President insisted, and rightly so, on the fulfillment of the Agreement on Zones of Occupation 2 and declined to press Russia to accept a smaller zone in Germany. The U. S. forces were withdrawn into the assigned zone in accordance with our pledged word and without seeking political advantages for ourselves from the fulfillment of an undertaking already given. 2. Maisky’s proposal of July 20 3 for immediate internationalization of the Ruhr amounts to a proposal for revising the Agreement on Zones, this time at the expense of the U. K. Zone. It would remove from that zone the larger part of its resources. While we may promise to study sympathetically any concrete proposals which the Soviet Government may wish to put forward, we should be careful not to box the British in by agreeing “in principle” or in any other way to this proposal, as we would then be in the position of approving a Soviet proposal to cut down the British Zone immediately after having blocked a British proposal to raise the question of a revision of the Soviet Zone. 3. Our best position would be to press the Russians for immediate implementation of the Agreement on Control Machinery, 4 just as we have carried out the Agreement on Zones. We could point out that the four-power control machinery has not yet been put into operation; that Allied objectives in Germany cannot be achieved unless the Control Machinery works well and rapidly; that the moment when the agreed machinery is about to begin operation is no time to change it drastically and suddenly by creating new four-power machinery in one part of Germany, particularly in one which cannot be disconnected from the surrounding areas without requiring a large number of adjustments both within the Ruhr and the rest of Germany; that experience in working the control machinery in Germany during occupation will provide a better basis for planning and operating a permanent four-power control of the Ruhr. P[ hilip ] E. M[ osely ] 1 See Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , pp. 601–609. 2 Signed at London, September 12, 1944. For text, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2078; Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 118 . 3 See notes on the meeting of the Economic Subcommittee, July 20, ante , p. 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] . 4 Signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 124 . No. 1026 Memorandum by the Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council, Germany (Heath) 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2145 No. 1026 Memorandum by the Director of Political Affairs, United States Group, Control Council, Germany ( Heath ) 1 secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 21, 1945. Memorandum Subject: Creation of Ruhr–Rhineland State. The American Delegation has discussed and the Russian Delegation has tentatively put forward orally (through Maisky at Economic Subcommittee meeting 2 ) a proposal to create a separate Ruhr–Rhineland state including possibly the remainder of Westphalia. As I understand it, our study 3 contemplated that this state would be under the immediate supervision of the French, Belgian, and Dutch Governments and the general supervision of the council of the world security organization. International government of this territory would begin coincidentally with the cessation of quadripartite military occupation of Germany which it was assumed would terminate within a few years. While initially there would be direct international government of the Ruhr–Rhineland state, a local government would be fostered and international control eventually limited to indirect measures backed up by an international garrison. The Russian tentative proposal contemplates the immediate creation of a state to be supervised by the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and France. While it is believed possible that some form of international control might later be applied to the Ruhr area, which contains Germany’s basic war-making potential, the following considerations to my mind make it undesirable at this time to enter into any commitments for either special international control of the Ruhr area or for the establishment of a separate state including that area: 1. The basic thesis that we have been advocating before and at this Conference is that Germany should be treated as an economic unit. It would be hard to reconcile either of the two proposals concerning the Ruhr with our previously maintained position. 2. To propose a plan which would exclude Russia from direct participation in the government of the new state except through her membership in the world security organization council would have the effect of justifying and even encouraging Russian attempts to assume control over Eastern Germany. 3. If the Russian proposal were accepted, the net result would be to leave the Russians in effective control of the Upper Silesian industrial area and, in addition, to give them a direct participation in the government of the Ruhr area which they do not at present have. In other words something for nothing. 4. The American position up to the present has been to stand upon the agreed zones for the government of Germany. We have recently refused a British suggestion for certain changes in the Russian zonal boundaries. It would appear unjustifiable if we were now to accept a Soviet proposal, especially one which would remove the most valuable part of the British zone from British control. 5. Any imposed partition of Germany is bound to evoke a spirit of irredentist nationalism which will thwart our program of German re-education and, in the end, overthrow the partition arrangement itself. 6. Forcible partition in the proposed instance would react against the embryonic tendencies toward separatism which although weak do exist in Bavaria and other regions and which under other circumstances might conceivably develop. 7. Insufficient study has as yet been given to the economic and political problems incident to the formation of the proposed state nor have we as yet had sufficient experience in military government or quadripartite cooperation to reach final conclusions on the suggested plans. 8. We cannot as yet judge the stability and strength of France which, under our plan, would be the most important element in the international rule of the area. 9. Furthermore, Russia might interpret such a proposal as an effort of the Western Allies to increase their war potential as against her own. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. 2 Ante , p. 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] . 3 No “study” along the lines described has been found. Cf. document No. 1021 . No. 1027 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1027 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. On Ruhr Industrial District Soviet Proposal Considering the Ruhr Industrial District as a part of Germany and having in view the necessity of all kind curtailment of Germany’s war potential the Conference has deemed expedient: (1) To determine that the Ruhr Industrial District shall be in respect of administration under the joint control of U. S. A., U. K., U. S. S. R. and France. (2) The administration of the Ruhr Industrial District shall be exercised by the Allied Council composed of representatives of U. K., U. S. A., U. S. S. R. and France. (3) The Industry of the Ruhr District will be utilized for reparation purposes in conformity with the common reparation plan. (4) To establish immediately, in view of prompt accomplishment of this decision, provisional Allied Council composed of representatives of U. S. A., U. K., U. S. S. R. and France, which in a months term will carry out necessary preparatory work and will assume the provisional Administration of the Ruhr District. 1 Attachment 16 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . Molotov had given Byrnes a copy of this proposal at a private meeting immediately preceding the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. See ante , p. 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] . Another copy of this proposal bears the following manuscript notation: “Sov. to present to Council For. Min? but not included in protocol”. Cf. ante , p. 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . The French zone of occupation and the French sector in Berlin The French zone of occupation and the French sector in Berlin [1028] The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Washington [Babelsberg], 17 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745 [1029] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Babelsberg, July 18, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845: Telegram [1030] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) London, 18 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845: Telegram [1031] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, 24 July 1945. 740.00119 EAC/7–2445: Telegram [1032] Report by the European Advisory Commission Lancaster House, London, S. W. 1. 26th July, 1945. L/T Files [1033] The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 27, 1945. Byrnes Papers [1034] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Babelsberg, July 29, 1945. 740.00119 EAC/7–2945: Telegram No. 1028 The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745 No. 1028 The Assistant Secretary of War ( McCloy ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) confidential Washington [ Babelsberg ], 17 July 1945. Memorandum for Mr. James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State General Clay advises me today that he has tentatively worked out with General Weeks, Deputy Military Governor of the British Zone, an agreement that a French Area of Occupation in the City of Berlin will be formed from the existing areas allocated to the United Kingdom and the United States Forces of Occupation. It would seem appropriate now to inform Ambassador Winant that agreement with the British and French on this point seems likely and to request that he agree in the European Advisory Commission with the British, the Russians and the French that the matter may be referred to the Control Council for Germany for settlement, with the understanding that the French Zone will be created out of the areas presently assigned to the United States and United Kingdom Forces. General Clay expects to confer with General Weeks and General Koeltz on this matter on Thursday 1 and to work out a definitive scheme, subject to final ratification by the Joint Chiefs of Staff if that turns out to be necessary. John J McCloy 1 July 19. No. 1029 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845: Telegram No. 1029 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) 1 top secret Babelsberg , July 18, 1945. Victory 68. For Ambassador Winant, London, repeated to State Department, Washington from Secretary of State, Berlin. U. S. and U. K. military authorities in Germany agree that French Berlin area of occupation will be formed from existing U. K. and U. S. areas. As soon as U. K. representative EAC 2 have [ has ] received similar instructions, you are authorized accept Soviet July 12th [ 11th ] proposal 3 for final sentence report accompanying agreement on French Zone in Germany and conclude agreement. Byrnes 1 Printed from the text received in the Department of State. 2 Sir Ronald I. Campbell. 3 See vol. i , document No. 411 . No. 1030 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845: Telegram No. 1030 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) 1 secret urgent London , 18 July 1945. Tripartite Conference Babelsberg for Mosely from Winant serial number 4307. … No word to date received at Soviet Embassy here from Moscow permitting clearance and signature of … agreement amending agreement on zones Germany. 1 For the full text of this message, see document No. 1035 . No. 1031 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 EAC/7–2445: Telegram No. 1031 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State [Extract 1 ] top secret urgent London , 24 July 1945. For Tripartite Conference, Babelsberg, top secret from Winant serial number 44360. Sent the Secretary Babelsberg top secret from Winant and to Dept as 7434, July 24, Comea 340. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EAC met last night to complete two outstanding documents. British informed U. S. they did not have full authority to accept Soviet draft final paragraph for covering report to EAC agreement amending agreement on zones occupation Germany. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 For the other portions of this message, see document No. 1037 . 2 For Byrnes’ reply to this message, following a conversation at the Berlin Conference between Mosely and Strang, see ante , p. 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] . No. 1032 Report by the European Advisory Commission L/T Files No. 1032 Report by the European Advisory Commission Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic . In consequence of a decision of the Crimea Conference announced on the 12th February, 1945, 1 whereby the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom stated their intention to invite the Provisional Government of the French Republic to participate in the occupation of Germany, the European Advisory Commission has examined the question of delimiting the zone of French occupation in Germany. The Commission now transmits to the four Governments for their consideration and approval the text of an Agreement 2 amending the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, 3 on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of “Greater Berlin”. The Commission calls to the attention of the four Governments the fact that Articles 4 and 5 of the present Agreement supersede Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement of 14th November, 1944, 4 between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom regarding Amendments to the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of “Greater Berlin”. In view of the physical conditions prevailing in the area of “Greater Berlin”, the Commission in the drafting of Article 7 of the present Agreement did not attempt to delimit the area in “Greater Berlin” to be occupied by the armed forces of the French Republic. The Commission recommends that the question of the delimitation of the French area in “Greater Berlin”, which will have to be allotted from the American and British areas of “Greater Berlin” as a consequence of the greater destruction in the Soviet area of the City, should be referred to the Control Council in Berlin for consideration. Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission: John G. Winant Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission: T. Caкcиh 5 Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission: Ronald I. Campbell Representative of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on the European Advisory Commission: R. Massigli Lancaster House, London , S. W. 1. 26th July, 1945. 1 See document No. 1417, section ii . 2 For the text of the agreement transmitted with this report, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2093. 3 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2079; Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 118 . 4 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2087; Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 121 . 5 G. Saksin. No. 1033 The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State Byrnes Papers No. 1033 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 27, 1945. Memorandum for the Secretary On July 26 the European Advisory Commission signed the Agreement amending the protocol of September 12, 1944 on zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of greater Berlin. This Agreement makes provision for a French zone of occupation in Germany, as agreed at the Yalta Conference. The Agreement, the covering report, and the accompanying exchanges of letters 2 were negotiated in the EAC in full conformity with the detailed instructions agreed between the Department and the JCS. I suggest that the President may now wish to give his approval to this Agreement and inform Ambassador Winant accordingly. The Agreement comes into force when approved by the four Governments. Its provisions are already being carried out directly by the military authorities concerned. James Clement Dunn Approved : ________________ 3 Secretary of State Approved : Harry S. Truman , July 28, 1945. 4 The President 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 For the text of the agreement of July 26, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2087. For the covering report, see document No. 1032 . The exchanges of letters referred to comprised the following (copies transmitted to the Department of State under cover of Winant’s despatch No. 24517 of July 27, file No. 740.00119 EAC/7–2745): ( a ) A letter from Winant to Massigli, informing the latter that the United States Government “will be prepared, at a later stage in the Allied occupation of Germany, to review with the Provisional Government of the French Republic the assignment of areas of occupation between the French and U. S. zones, in the light of the then prevailing conditions of occupation and the requirements of the respective forces of occupation.” ( b ) A parallel letter from Campbell to Massigli, giving similar assurances with respect to a review of the assignment of areas of occupation between the French and British zones. ( c ) A letter from Winant to Massigli, informing the latter “that the U. S. military authorities in Germany will be prepared to make available to the French military authorities in Germany the records and archives located at Karlsruhe and relating to the area of French occupation in Baden.” ( d ) A letter from Massigli to Winant containing the following assurances: “… the French Government will assure to the United States forces of occupation the right of free passage across the French zone of occupation as well as the right of free overflight above that zone. It is likewise understood that the United States forces will exercise in that zone exclusive control over the bridges across the Rhine constructed by the United States, as well as over communications lines and installations constructed in Germany under the same conditions. The French forces will have free use of the said bridges, lines, and installations located in or leading into the French zone. The detailed arrangements regarding these matters will be worked out by mutual agreement between the United States and French commanders-in-chief in Germany.” ( e ) Acknowledgments of the above letters. 3 There is no indication of Byrnes’ approval. 4 The source copy bears a holograph signature by Truman. It appears that this copy was signed by Truman as a souvenir rather than as an official record of Presidential approval. There is no doubt, however, that Truman approved Dunn’s memorandum officially, presumably after it had been approved by Byrnes. See document No. 1034 . No. 1034 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 740.00119 EAC/7–2945: Telegram No. 1034 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) 1 top secret Babelsberg , July 29, 1945. Victory 406. To American Embassy London repeated for information to State Department, Washington. Victory 406. TopSec. Re London’s 65460, July 26th repeated to Department as 7546 Comea 343. 2 The President has approved the EAC agreement of July 26th amending protocol of September 12th 1944 on zones occupation Germany and administration greater Berlin, together with covering report and accompanying exchanges of letters. Please inform EAC colleagues that United States Government has approved EAC agreement. 3 Byrnes 1 Printed from the text received in the Department of State. 2 Not printed. This message informed Byrnes that the additional requirements agreement (see document No. 1038 ) had been signed on July 25, and that the agreement on zones of occupation in Germany would be signed on July 26. 3 Winant executed this instruction on July 29. Notification of approval was given by the other signatories as follows: the United Kingdom on August 2, the Provisional Government of the French Republic on August 7, and the Soviet Union on August 13. The “additional requirements” agreement The “additional requirements” agreement [1035] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) London, 18 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845: Telegram [1036] The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Babelsberg, July 20, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2045: Telegram [1037] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, 24 July 1945. 740.00119 EAC/7–2445: Telegram [1038] Report by the European Advisory Commission Lancaster House, London, S. W. 1. 25th July, 1945. L/T Files No. 1035 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845: Telegram No. 1035 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) secret urgent London , 18 July 1945. Tripartite Conference Babelsberg for Mosely from Winant serial number 4307. Please read Dept’s 5766 July 14 to London repeated to Hoechst as 112. 1 No word to date received at Soviet Embassy here from Moscow permitting clearance and signature of additional requirements agreement 2 and agreement amending agreement on zones Germany. 3 1 Document No. 416, printed in vol. i . 2 See document No. 1038 . 3 See document No. 1032 and footnote 2 thereto. No. 1036 The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2045: Telegram No. 1036 The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission ( Mosely ) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) 1 secret Babelsberg , July 20, 1945. Victory 115. From Mosely at Babelsberg to London for Winant and State Department at Washington for Grew. Vyshinsky informed Mosely today 2 Soviet Government has approved agreement on additional requirements except new title and new first paragraph; he expects latter will be cleared shortly. Ambassador Murphy and Mosely have discussed with McCloy and Colonel Cutter contents of Department’s 5766, July 14, to London (repeated 112 to Murphy) 3 and furnished following explanations: (1) Term “Allied representatives” means four commanders both as member Control Council and commanders of zones. Neither June 5 declaration 4 nor agreement additional requirements defines separate spheres for activity of Control Council and of zonal commanders. Both documents contain Allied agreements to impose requirements on Germans and to that extent contain agreed policy. Draft agreement in no way affects control machinery agreement 5 or jurisdiction of zone commander under it. (2) Certain sections of agreement notably naval clauses have been largely executed already. Most sections have a continuing value. Even those sections already executed have some value as they contain first Four-Power agreement for lines of action we have already followed without such agreement. (3) Agreement does not assume existence of central German Government. It uses term “German authorities” in same sense as June 5 declaration. There are no German “authorities” at any level except as recognized by military commanders. (4) Colonel Cutter raised question whether Article 14 ( a ) of agreement conflicts with authority of U. S. Alien Property Custodian over German property in U. S. When this question arose during negotiation, it was clearly understood that Control Council would be unable act re German property located in country of any controlling power against opposition of that power because decisions of Control Council must be unanimous. Mr. McCloy expressed satisfaction these explanations and foresaw no obstacle to early clearance agreement on part War Department. Ambassador Murphy receiving this message. 1 Printed from the text received in the Department of State. 2 i. e., July 19. 3 Document No. 416, printed in vol. i . 4 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649. 5 Signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 124 . No. 1037 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 EAC/7–2445: Telegram No. 1037 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State top secret urgent London , 24 July 1945. For Tripartite Conference, Babelsberg, top secret from Winant serial number 44360. Sent the Secretary Babelsberg top secret from Winant and to Dept as 7434, July 24, Comea 340. Your Victory 241 July 23 1 received. EAC met last night to complete two outstanding documents. … 2 Saksin stated his Government approved additional requirements agreement with last part of title reading in translation “certain additional requirements to Germany”. Original English title read “certain additional requirements to be imposed on Germany”. Saksin insisted title he [was] authorized to accept could not be translated as in English version and he would have to obtain new instructions in order to accept that wording. Apparently discrepancy arose at time Soviet delegation originally telegraphed proposed title to Soviet Government. Saksin claimed his delgation was not aware at that time that English and French versions contained phrase “to be imposed”. He stated he would telegraph for new instructions. Perhaps Mosely could see Gousev and expedite necessary instructions to Saksin. 3 1 See ante , p. 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] . 2 For the passage omitted here, see document No. 1031 . 3 For Byrnes’ reply to this message, following a conversation at the Berlin Conference between Mosely and Gusev, see ante , p. 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] . No. 1038 Report by the European Advisory Commission L/T Files No. 1038 Report by the European Advisory Commission secret Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic . 1. Pursuant to the Declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with respect to Germany, signed at Berlin on 5th June, 1945, 1 wherein it is stated, in Article 13 ( b ), that the Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements, the European Advisory Commission has, in accordance with its terms of reference, considered certain of the more urgent of these additional requirements. Accordingly, it submits herewith, for consideration and approval by the four Governments, an Agreement regarding certain Additional Requirements to be imposed upon Germany. 2. It will be recalled that the Commission agreed in March 1944, when discussing the terms of surrender of Germany, that certain broad political and economic requirements should be imposed upon Germany at the time of, or shortly after, the surrender, in addition to the mainly military requirements to be contained in the Instrument or Declaration of Surrender. The most important military requirements were announced in the Declaration of 5th June, 1945. The Commission believes that the enclosed Agreement on Additional Requirements, representing the agreed views of the four Governments, will furnish guidance to the Allied Representatives regarding additional measures to be imposed on Germany. The Commission accordingly recommends that the Agreement on Additional Requirements, as soon as it is approved by the four Governments, be transmitted to the Allied Representatives in Berlin. The Commission recommends that the four Governments authorize the Allied Representatives to decide whether publication of this document shall be in whole or in part. 3. The Commission has several comments to make with regard to certain specific provisions in the Agreement on Additional Requirements. a ) The Commission recommends that in exercising control over German research relating to war or the production of war material, as set forth in sub-paragraph 13 ( b ), the Allied Representatives should, when they consider conditions in Germany appropriate, supplement this provision by issuing the following order to the German people: All research, experimentation, development or other study relative to war or the production of war material, whether in public or private establishments, factories, technological institutions, laboratories or elsewhere, is hereby abolished and forbidden in future. b ) The Commission recommends that in giving effect to the provisions of sub-paragraph 15 ( b ) the Allied Representatives should also require the German authorities to hand over, for delivery to the Allied Government concerned, any drawings, plates and other special technical equipment utilized directly for the production of monetary tokens for issue by Germany in territories formerly occupied by her or elsewhere. c ) In connection with the provisions of sub-paragraph 16 ( b ) the Commission recommends that all property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to any country, other than Germany and the countries referred to in sub-paragraph 16 ( a ), which has at any time since 1st September, 1939, been at war with any of the United Nations, be taken under the provisional control of the Allied Representatives and preserved, pending subsequent transfer to the countries of ownership under arrangements to be worked out with the appropriate Allied Control Commissions or organs in those countries. d ) In connection with the execution of the provisions of subparagraph 26 ( a ), the Commission recommends to the four Governments approval of the following understanding: Vessels of the United Nations surrendered to the Allied Representatives in accordance with sub-paragraph 26 ( a ) will be returned by the Allied Representatives to the respective Allied States which own or owned, or whose nationals own or owned, such vessels. Nothing in this provision shall alter in any manner any existing agreements and procedures among any of the United Nations with respect to the pooling of the vessels surrendered by Germany under the provisions of sub-paragraph 26 ( a ). e ) In connection with the execution of the provisions of paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 19, the Commission invites the attention of the four Governments to the great importance of effecting as full and as prompt restitution as possible of the property which has been looted by the Germans from occupied Allied countries. It points out the urgency of providing the Allied Representatives in Germany with guidance concerning the principles and procedures which should govern the restitution of looted Allied property, in accordance with the Declaration made at London on 5th January, 1943 on Enemy Acts of Dispossession. 2 4. During the consultations which the European Advisory Commission has carried on, under instructions of the four Governments, with representatives of the European Allied Governments concerning the Declaration of 5th June, 1945, these Governments have expressed, both in writing and orally, their great interest in the additional requirements which are to be imposed upon Germany. In view of this concern, the Commission recommends that the four Governments instruct it to communicate the Agreement on Additional Requirements, upon its approval by the four Governments, to the interested Allied Governments. In so doing the Commission would point out to the representatives of those Governments that these additional requirements do not purport to be complete and will be supplemented by specific orders and instructions to be issued by the Allied Representatives. Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission: John G. Winant Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission: T. Caкcиh 3 Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission: Ronald I. Campbell Representative of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on the European Advisory Commission: R. Massigli Lancaster House, London , S. W. 1. 25th July, 1945. [Accompaniment] secret Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on Certain Additional Requirements To Be Imposed on Germany . 4 The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic have reached the following agreement regarding instructions to be issued by the Allied Representatives in Germany: “We, the Allied Representatives, Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of occupation of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, pursuant to the Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany, signed at Berlin on 5th June, 1945, hereby announce certain additional requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply, as follows:— section i . 1. All German land, naval and air forces, the S. S., S. A., S. D. and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in accordance with methods and procedures to be laid down by the Allied Representatives. 2. All forms of military training, military propaganda and military activities of whatever nature, on the part of the German people, are prohibited, as well as the formation of any organization initiated to further any aspect of military training and the formation of war veterans’ organizations or other groups which might develop military characteristics or which are designed to carry on the German military tradition, whether such organizations or groups purport to be political, educational, religious, social, athletic or recreational or of any other nature. section ii . 3. ( a ) German authorities and officials in all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on 31st December, 1937, and in any areas within those frontiers indicated at any time by the Allied Representatives, will comply with such instructions as to withdrawing therefrom as they may receive from the Allied Representatives. ( b ) The German authorities will issue the necessary instructions and will make the necessary arrangements for the reception and maintenance in Germany of all German civilian inhabitants of the territories or areas concerned, whose evacuation may be ordered by the Allied Representatives. ( c ) Withdrawals and evacuations under sub-paragraphs ( a ) and ( b ) above will take place at such times and under such conditions as the Allied Representatives may direct. 4. In the territories and areas referred to in paragraph 3 above, there shall immediately be, on the part of all forces under German command and of German authorities and civilians, a complete cessation of all measures of coercion or forced labour and of all measures involving injury to life or limb. There shall similarly cease all measures of requisitioning, seizure, removal, concealment or destruction of property. In particular, the withdrawals and evacuations mentioned in paragraph 3 above will be carried out without damage to or removal of persons or property not affected by the orders of the Allied Representatives. The Allied Representatives will determine what personal property and effects may be taken by persons evacuated under paragraph 3 above. section iii . 5. The Allied Representatives will regulate all matters affecting Germany’s relations with other countries. No foreign obligations, undertakings or commitments of any kind will be assumed or entered into by or on behalf of German authorities or nationals without the sanction of the Allied Representatives. 6. The Allied Representatives will give directions concerning the abrogation, bringing into force, revival or application of any treaty, convention or other international agreement, or any part or provision thereof, to which Germany is or has been a party. 7. ( a ) In virtue of the unconditional surrender of Germany, and as of the date of such surrender, the diplomatic, consular, commercial and other relations of the German State with other States have ceased to exist. ( b ) Diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of service missions in Germany of countries at war with any of the four Powers will be dealt with as the Allied Representatives may prescribe. The Allied Representatives may require the withdrawal from Germany of neutral diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of neutral service missions. ( c ) All German diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of German service missions abroad are hereby recalled. The control and disposal of the buildings, property and archives of all German diplomatic and other agencies abroad will be prescribed by the Allied Representatives. 8. ( a ) German nationals will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving German territory except as authorised or directed by the Allied Representatives. ( b ) German authorities and nationals will comply with any directions issued by the Allied Representatives for the recall of German nationals resident abroad, and for the reception in Germany of any persons whom the Allied Representatives may designate. 9. The German authorities and people will take all appropriate steps to ensure the safety, maintenance and welfare of persons not of German nationality and of their property and the property of foreign States. section iv . 10. The German authorities will place at the disposal of the Allied Representatives the whole of the German inter-communication system (including all military and civilian postal and telecommunication systems and facilities and connected matters), and will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for placing such inter-communication systems under the complete control of the Allied Representatives. The German authorities will comply with any instructions give[n] by the Allied Representatives with a view to the establishment by the Allied Representatives of such censorship and control of postal and telecommunication [ sic ] and of documents and other articles carried by persons or otherwise conveyed and of all other forms of inter-communication as the Allied Representatives may think fit. 11. The German authorities will comply with all directions which the Allied Representatives may give regarding the use, control and censorship of all media for influencing expression and opinion, including broadcasting, press and publications, advertising, films and public performances, entertainments and exhibitions of all kinds. section v . 12. The Allied Representatives will exercise such control as they deem necessary over all or any part or aspect of German finance, agriculture (including forestry), production and mining, public utilities, industry, trade, distribution and economy generally, internal and external, and over all related or ancillary matters, including the direction or prohibition of the manufacture, production, construction, treatment, use and disposal of any buildings, establishments, installations, public or private works, plant, equipment, products, materials, stocks or resources. Detailed statements of the subjects to which the present provision applies, together with the requirements of the Allied Representatives in regard thereto, will from time to time be communicated to the German authorities. 13. ( a ) The manufacture, production and construction, and the acquisition from outside Germany, of war material and of such other products used in connection with such manufacture, production or construction, as the Allied Representatives may specify, and the import, export and transit thereof, are prohibited, except as directed by the Allied Representatives. ( b ) The German authorities will immediately place at the disposal of the Allied Representatives all research, experiment, development and design directly or indirectly relating to war or the production of war material, whether in government or private establishments, factories, technological institutions or elsewhere. 14. ( a ) The property, assets, rights, titles and interests (whether situated inside or outside Germany) of the German State, its political subdivisions, the German Central Bank, State or semi-State, provincial, municipal or local authorities or Nazi organisations, and those situated outside Germany of any person resident or carrying on business in Germany, will not be disposed of in any way whatever without the sanction of the Allied Representatives. The property, assets, rights, titles and interests (whether situated inside or outside Germany), of such private companies, corporations, trusts, cartels, firms, partnerships and associations as may be designated by the Allied Representatives will not be disposed of in any way whatever without the sanction of the Allied Representatives. ( b ) The German authorities will furnish full information about the property, assets, rights, titles and interests referred to in sub-paragraph ( a ) above, and will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may give as to their transfer and disposal. Without prejudice to any further demands which may be made in this connection, the German authorities will hold at the disposal of the Allied Representatives for delivery to them at such times and places as they may direct all securities, certificates, deeds or other documents of title held by any of the institutions or bodies mentioned in subparagraph ( a ) above or by any person subject to German law, and relating to property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated in the territories of the United Nations, including any shares, stocks, debentures or other obligations of any company incorporated in accordance with the laws of any of the United Nations. ( c ) Property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated inside Germany will not be removed outside Germany or be transferred or disposed of to any person resident or carrying on business outside Germany without the sanction of the Allied Representatives. ( d ) Nothing in sub-paragraphs ( a ) and ( b ) above shall, as regards property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated inside Germany, be deemed to prevent sales or transfers to persons resident in Germany for the purpose of maintaining or carrying on the day-to-day national life, economy and administration, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph 19 ( b ) and ( c ) below and to the provisions of the Declaration or of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder. 15. ( a ) The German authorities and all persons in Germany will hand over to the Allied Representatives all gold and silver, in coin or bullion form, and all platinum in bullion form, situated in Germany, and all such coin and bullion situated outside Germany as is possessed by or held on behalf of any of the institutions or bodies mentioned in sub-paragraph 14 ( a ) above or any person resident or carrying on business in Germany. ( b ) The German authorities and all persons in Germany will hand over in full to the Allied Representatives all foreign notes and coins in the possession of any German authority, or of any corporation, association or individual resident or carrying on business in Germany, and all monetary tokens issued or prepared for issue by Germany in the territories formerly occupied by her or elsewhere. 16. ( a ) All property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to any country against which any of the United Nations is carrying on hostilities, or held for or belonging to the nationals of any such country, or of any persons resident or carrying on business therein, will be taken under control and will be preserved pending further instructions. ( b ) All property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to private individuals, private enterprises and companies of those countries, other than Germany and the countries referred to in sub-paragraph ( a ) above, which have at any time since 1st September, 1939, been at war with any of the United Nations, will be taken under control and will be preserved pending further instructions. ( c ) The German authorities will take all necessary steps to ensure the execution of the provisions of sub-paragraph ( a ) and ( b ) above, will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for that purpose, and will afford all necessary information and facilities in connection therewith. 17. ( a ) There shall, on the part of the German authorities and people, be no concealment, destruction, scuttling or dismantling of, removal or transfer of, nor damage to, ships, transport, ports or harbours, nor to any form of building, establishment, installation, device, means of production, supply, distribution or communication, plant, equipment, currency, stocks or resources, or, in general, public or private works, utilities or facilities of any kind, wherever situated. ( b ) There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, suppression or alteration of any documents, records, patents, drawings, specifications, plans or information, of any nature, affected by the provisions of this document. They shall be kept intact in their present locations until further directions are given. The German authorities will afford all information and facilities as required by the Allied Representatives in connection therewith. ( c ) Any measures already ordered, undertaken or began [ sic ] contrary to the provisions of sub-paragraphs ( a ) and ( b ) above will be immediately countermanded or discontinued. All stocks, equipment, plant, records, patents, documents, drawings, specifications, plans or other material already concealed within or outside Germany will forthwith be declared, and will be dealt with as the Allied Representatives may direct. ( d ) Subject to the provisions of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, the German authorities and people will be responsible for the preservation, safeguarding and upkeep of all forms of property and materials affected by any of the said provisions. ( e ) All transport material, stores, equipment, plant, establishments, installations, devices and property generally, which are liable to be surrendered or delivered under the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, will be handed over intact and in good condition, or subject only to ordinary wear and tear and to any damage caused during the continuance of hostilities which it has proved impossible to make good. 18. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with, or dealings with or for the benefit of, countries at war with any of the United Nations, or territories occupied by such countries, or with any other country or person specified by the Allied Representatives. section vi . 19. ( a ) The German authorities will carry out, for the benefit of the United Nations, such measures of restitution, reinstatement, restoration, reparation, reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation as the Allied Representatives may prescribe. For these purposes the German authorities will effect or procure the surrender or transfer of such property, assets, rights, titles and interests, effect such deliveries and carry out such repair, building and construction work, whether in Germany or elsewhere, and will provide such transport, plant, equipment and materials of all kinds, labour, personnel, and specialist and other services, for use in Germany or elsewhere, as the Allied Representatives may direct. ( b ) The German authorities will also comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give relating to property, assets, rights, titles and interests located in Germany belonging to any one of the United Nations or its nationals or having so belonged at, or at any time since, the outbreak of war between Germany and that Nation, or since the occupation of any part of its territories by Germany. The German authorities will be responsible for safeguarding, maintaining, and preventing the dissipation of, all such property, assets, rights, titles and interests, and for handing them over intact at the demand of the Allied Representatives. For these purposes the German authorities will afford all information and facilities required for tracing any property, assets, rights, titles or interests. ( c ) All persons in Germany in whose possession such property, assets, rights, titles and interests may be shall be personally responsible for reporting them and safeguarding them until they are handed over in such manner as may be prescribed. 20. The German authorities will supply free of cost such German currency as the Allied Representatives may require, and will withdraw and redeem in German currency, within such time limits and on such terms as the Allied Representatives may specify, all holdings in German territory of currencies issued by the Allied Representatives during military operations or occupation, and will hand over the currencies so withdrawn free of cost to the Allied Representatives. 21. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as may be issued by the Allied Representatives for defraying the costs of the provisioning, maintenance, pay, accomodation [ sic ] and transport of the forces and agencies stationed in Germany by authority of the Allied Representatives, the costs of executing the requirements of unconditional surrender, and payment for any relief in whatever form it may be provided by the United Nations. 22. The Allied Representatives will take and make unrestricted use (whether inside or outside Germany) of any articles referred to in paragraph 12 above which the Allied Representatives may require in connection with the conduct of hostilities against any country with which any of their respective Governments is at war. section vii . 23. ( a ) No merchant ship, including fishing or other craft, shall put to sea from any German port except as may be sanctioned or directed by the Allied Representatives. German ships in ports outside Germany shall remain in port and those at sea shall proceed to the nearest German or United Nations port and there remain, pending instructions from the Allied Representatives. ( b ) All German merchant shipping, including tonnage under construction or repair, will be made available to the Allied Representatives for such use and on such terms as they may prescribe. ( c ) Foreign merchant shipping in German service or under German control will likewise be made available to the Allied Representatives for such use and on such terms as they may prescribe. In the case of such foreign merchant vessels which are of neutral registration, the German authorities will take all such steps as may be required by the Allied Representatives to transfer or cause to be transferred to the Allied Representatives all rights relative thereto. ( d ) All transfer to any other flag, service or control, or the vessels covered by sub-paragraphs ( b ) and ( c ) above, is prohibited, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives. 24. Any existing options to repurchase or reacquire or to resume control of vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered by Germany during the war will be exercised as directed by the Allied Representatives. Such vessels will be made available for use by the Allied Representatives in the same manner as the vessels covered by subparagraphs 23 ( b ) and ( c ) above. 25. ( a ) The crews of all German merchant vessels or merchant vessels in German service or under German control will remain on board and will be maintained by the German authorities pending further instructions from the Allied Representatives regarding their future employment. ( b ) Cargoes on board any such vessels will be disposed of in accordance with instructions given to the German authorities by the Allied Representatives. 26. ( a ) Merchant ships, including fishing and other craft of the United Nations (or of any country which has broken off diplomatic relations with Germany) which are in German hands, wherever such ships may be, will be surrendered to the Allied Representatives, regardless of whether title has been transferred as the result of prize court proceedings or otherwise. All such ships will be surrendered in good repair and in seaworthy condition in ports and at times to be specified by the Allied Representatives, for disposal as directed by them. ( b ) The German authorities will take all such steps as may be directed by the Allied Representatives to effect or complete transfers of title to such ships regardless of whether the title has been transferred as the result of prize court proceedings or otherwise. They will secure the discontinuance of any arrests of or proceedings against such ships in neutral ports. 27. The German authorities will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for the destruction, dispersal, salvaging, reclamation or raising of wrecked, stranded, derelict or sunken vessels, wherever they may be situated. Such vessels salvaged, reclaimed or raised shall be dealt with as the Allied Representatives direct. 28. The German authorities will place at the unrestricted disposal of the Allied Representatives the entire German shipping, shipbuilding and ship repair industries, and all matter and facilities directly or indirectly relative or ancillary thereto, and will provide the requisite labour and specialist services. The requirements of the Allied Representatives will be specified in instructions which will from time to time be communicated to the German authorities. section viii . 29. The German authorities will place at the unrestricted disposal of the Allied Representatives the whole of the German inland transport system (road, rail, air and waterways) and all connected material, plant and equipment, and all repair, construction, labour, servicing and running facilities, in accordance with the instructions issued by the Allied Representatives. 30. The production in Germany and the possession, maintenance or operation by Germans of any aircraft of any kind, or any parts thereof, are prohibited. 31. All German rights in international transport bodies or organisations, and in relation to the use of transport and the movement of traffic in other countries and the use in Germany of the transport of other countries, will be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Allied Representatives. 32. All facilities for the generation, transmission and distribution of power, including establishments for the manufacture and repair of such facilities, will be placed under the complete control of the Allied Representatives, to be used for such purposes as they may designate. section ix . 33. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give for the regulation of movements of population and for controlling travel or removal on the part of persons in Germany. 34. No person may leave or enter Germany without a permit issued by the Allied Representatives or on their authority. 35. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give for the repatriation of persons not of German nationality in or passing through Germany, their property and effects, and for facilitating the movements of refugees and displaced persons. section x . 36. The German authorities will furnish any information and documents, and will secure the attendance of any witnesses, required by the Allied Representatives for the trial of ( a ) the principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied Representatives and all persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous offences; ( b ) any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed an offence against his national law and who may at any time be named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representative [ sic ]; and will give all aid and assistance for these purposes. 37. The German authorities will comply with any directions given by the Allied Representatives in regard to the property of any person referred to in sub-paragraphs 36 ( a ) and ( b ) above, such as its seizure, custody or surrender. 38. Any person referred to in sub-paragraph 36 ( b ) above who may be apprehended or surrendered to the Allied Representatives will be handed over immediately, on demand, to the Government of the United Nation concerned. section xi . 39. The National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) is completely and finally abolished and declared to be illegal. 40. The German authorities will comply promptly with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the abolition of the National Socialist Party and of its subordinate organizations, affiliated associations and supervised organizations, and of all Nazi public institutions created as instruments of Nazi domination, and of such other organizations as may be regarded as a threat to the security of the Allied forces or to international peace, and for prohibiting their revival in any form; for the dismissal and internment of Nazi personnel; for the control or seizure of Nazi property and funds; and for the suppression of Nazi ideology and teaching. 41. The German authorities and German nationals will not allow the existence of any secret organizations. 42. The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the repeal of Nazi legislation and for the reform of German law and of the German legal, judicial, administrative, police and educational systems, including the replacement of their personnel. 43. ( a ) The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the rescinding of German legislation involving discrimination on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions, and for the cancellation of all legal or other disabilities resulting therefrom. ( b ) The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue regarding the property, assets, rights, titles and interests of persons affected by legislation involving discrimination on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions. 44. No person shall be prosecuted or molested by the German authorities or by German nationals on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions, or on account of any dealings or sympathies with the United Nations, including the performance of any action calculated to facilitate the execution of the Declaration or of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder. 45. In any proceedings before any German Court or authority judicial notice shall be taken of the provisions of the Declaration and of all proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions issued thereunder, which shall override any provisions of German law inconsistent therewith. section xii . 46. Without prejudice to any specific obligations contained in the provisions of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, the German authorities and any other person in a position to do so will furnish or cause to be furnished all such information and documents of every kind, public and private, as the Allied Representatives may require. 47. The German authorities will likewise produce for interrogation and employment by the Allied Representatives upon demand any and all persons whose knowledge and experience would be useful to the Allied Representatives. 48. The Allied Representatives will have access at all times to any building, installation, establishment, property or area, and any of the contents thereof, for the purposes of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, and in particular for the purposes of safeguarding, inspecting, copying or obtaining any of the desired documents and information. The German authorities will give all necessary facilities and assistance for this purpose, including the service of all specialist staff, including archivists. section xiii . 49. In the event of any doubt as to the meaning or interpretation of any term or expression in the Declaration and in any proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions issued thereunder, the decision of the Allied Representatives shall be final.” The above text of the Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on certain Additional Requirements to be imposed on Germany has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 25th July, 1945. Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission: John G. Winant Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission: T. Caкcиh 5 Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission: Ronald I. Campbell Representative of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on the European Advisory Commission: R. Massigli Lancaster House, London , S. W. 1. 25th July, 1945. 1 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649. 2 Text in Department of State Bulletin , vol. viii , p. 21. 3 G. Saksin. 4 Signed ad referendum on July 25, 1945, at a meeting of the European Advisory Commission at London. Notification of approval by three of the signatories was given by their representatives on the Commission on the following dates: the United Kingdom, August 2; the Soviet Union, September 4; and France, September 10, 1945. On September 8 Winant notified Campbell, Gusev, and Massigli “that the United States Government has approved the Agreement of July 25th on Certain Additional Requirements to be Imposed on Germany except for Article [ paragraph ] 38, which my Government believes is not appropriate for inclusion in a document directed to the Germans. In view of the fact that this subject relates exclusively to arrangements between the occupying Powers and the fact that the European Advisory Commission is no longer active, my Government considers that the Control Council in Berlin is now the proper place for negotiating the subject treated in Article 38.” Paragraph 38 was accordingly omitted from the text of the additional requirements approved by the Allied Control Council at Berlin on September 20, which text was issued as the Council’s proclamation No. 2 (reprinted in Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 515). 5 G. Saksin. Coal and food Coal and food [1039] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) Babelsberg, July 18, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1845: Telegram [1040] The Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres) [Washington,] July 18 [1945.] 840.6362/7–1845: Telegram [1041] Draft of Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Undated.] Pauley Files [1042] The Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom (Blaisdell) to the Deputy Solid Fuels Administrator for War (Potter) London, July 21, 1945—11 p.m. 103.9163: Telegram [1043] The Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration (Bissell) to Mr. M. F. Millikan, of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration Babelsberg, 22 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1044] The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Secretary of State Berlin, 23rd July 1945. Byrnes Papers [1045] Proposal by the British Delegation [ Babelsberg ,] 23rd July, 1945. Pauley Files [1046] President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin Washington [Babelsberg], 27 July 1945. Truman Papers [1047] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State Berlin, July 28, 1945. Pauley Files [1048] Generalissimo Stalin to President Truman Berlin, July 29, 1945. Truman Papers [1049] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom (Blaisdell) [Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1050] The Third Secretary of the British Embassy (Miles) to the Assistant Adviser on German Economic Affairs (deWilde) Washington, July 30, 1945. 862.6362/7–3045 [1051] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [1052] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg, August 1, 1945.] 740.00119 Potsdam/8–145 [[Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 1039 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1845: Telegram No. 1039 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) and the Adviser on German Economic Affairs ( Despres ) to the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs ( Thorp ) 1 secret Babelsberg , July 18, 1945. Victory 56. For Thorp from Clayton and Despres. Please advise us whether Soviet [Union] has been informed of U. S. proposal for directive on German coal production and exports. 2 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Byrnes. 2 See vol. i , document No. 420 . No. 1040 The Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Adviser on German Economic Affairs (Despres) 840.6362/7–1845: Telegram No. 1040 The Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs ( Thorp ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) and the Adviser on German Economic Affairs ( Despres ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 18 [1945.] 52. For Clayton and Despres from Thorp. Proposed coal directive, as revised in Aide-Mémoire to the British dated July 10 [ 11 ], 2 copy of which you have with you, has not been submitted to Russians, nor has any comment been received from British, and therefore program is not yet in effect. Blaisdell and Winant suggested from London that directive, and proposal to use ECO as allocating body for surplus coal available in Germany for Western Europe should be referred to Russians in connection with Potsdam Meeting agenda. 3 This suggestion came after you left, and it was felt that presentation to Russians here would not reach Moscow in time for any action. We also considered asking Moscow Embassy to present both directive and ECO proposal to Russians but decided that since Harriman and members of his staff would be coming to Berlin, the matter could more appropriately be raised there. Therefore no communication on coal has been given to Russians. Please advise if you wish action taken. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 Document No. 432, printed in vol. i . 3 See vol. i , document No. 200 . No. 1041 Draft of Report by the Economic Subcommittee Pauley Files No. 1041 Draft of Report by the Economic Subcommittee 1 [Extract 2 ] [Undated.] Draft Report of the Economic Sub-Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. Economic Principles The U. S. and U. K. representatives have agreed to paragraph 13 ( c ) 3 of the Economic Principles only on the assumption that “Germany” is Germany as it existed on the 31st December, 1937. On this assumption they maintain that the principle should be accepted that, in the absence of special reasons to the contrary, the food and fuel requirements of the Greater Berlin area should be drawn from those areas in Germany from which they were derived before the war. On the other hand, if any part of Germany as it existed on the 31st December, 1937 is to be administered by, or transferred to, Poland, suitable arrangements should be made for the rest of Germany, including the Greater Berlin area, to have a prior claim to the surplus food and coal produced in such transferred territory to meet deficiencies in local supplies. This arrangement should last at least for so long as the extreme shortage of coal and foodstuffs continues. The Soviet representatives do not accept this principle and maintain that, whatever the frontiers of Germany may be, equitable distribution of essential commodities between zones should take place. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The text here printed includes a number of minor manuscript revisions. 2 For the other sections of this draft report, see document No. 859 . 3 See appendix A to document No. 859 . No. 1042 The Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom (Blaisdell) to the Deputy Solid Fuels Administrator for War (Potter) 103.9163: Telegram No. 1042 The Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom ( Blaisdell ) to the Deputy Solid Fuels Administrator for War ( Potter ) 1 secret us urgent London , July 21, 1945—11 p.m. 7382. To Batt from Blaisdell for Potter. Sumoc 290. 1. Have been advised most confidentially (repeat most confidentially) regarding findings and recommendations resulting from survey of UK large coal position by official working party. (Ref last pgh our Sumoc 285, July 18 2 ). 2. War Cabinet now considering this report. Will probably act affirmatively on recommendations which we summarize in pgh 3 below for your confidential information. We consider this important as indicating position which British will take at Potsdam. 3. The recommendations may be summarized as follows. ( a ) The UK large coal position is such that it is impossible to even contemplate export of large coal after Aug. All exports of loco and gas coal to N W Europe should therefore cease at the end of Aug. ( b ) The UK general coal position is such that it is impossible to export any coal which is at all usable in the UK after Sept exports of 110,000 tons to N W Europe and 40,000 tons to the Mediterranean[.] ( c ) The US should be urged to continue the bunker arrangements after Aug to enable the UK to bunker the recently mobilized Scandinavian and German prize ships. This will require about 100,000 tons a month until arrangements can be made to reduce the UK burden by bunkering these ships from Polish and Silesian sources. ( d ) In Sept and thereafter the UK should make available 50/100,000 tons extremely low grade fuel which are not usable in UK. 4. We recognize that you were already made aware of above eventualities during your stay in London and by our Sumoc 285. We consider you should know this is now highest level UK position. 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Winant. 2 Not printed. No. 1043 The Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration (Bissell) to Mr. M. F. Millikan, of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1043 The Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration ( Bissell ) to Mr. M. F. Millikan, of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration confidential priority Babelsberg , 22 July 1945. Victory 204. To Conway for Millikan WSA Washington from Bissell. 1. In preliminary discussion of coal problems Leathers has stated that U. K. cannot export any coal whatever to any destination after August shipments for September arrival excepting anthracite duffs for briquetting and special grades required North Africa. 2. He is most anxious to continue to obtain not less than 90,000 tons per month of bunker coal from U. S. especially in view of assumption by U. K. of responsibility for bunkers for captured and released shipping to extent of about 70,000 tons per month. 3. Have advised Leathers that MWT might have to make cash purchases. He will discuss financial arrangements with Clayton and Collado here. 1 4. Request you discuss with Potter and advise urgently his views on availability of coal from U. S. and reasonableness of British refusal to continue exports. 5. Bissell plans to go to London 23rd or 24th therefore reply should be to London. 1 No documentation on the substance of such a discussion has been found. For an indication that Clayton did discuss the coal question with members of the British Delegation, see document No. 1049 . No. 1044 The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Secretary of State Byrnes Papers No. 1044 The British Foreign Secretary ( Eden ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , 23rd July 1945. Dear Secretary of State [:] You will remember that our two Departments have discussed certain amendments to the Directive on coal production which the President suggested should be issued to our Zone Commanders in Germany. 1 We have now considered the revised draft directive which was handed to members of the British Embassy in Washington on July 11th, 2 and I am glad to say that we find ourselves in agreement with it. We are therefore arranging to have a Directive in the same terms issued forthwith as an interim instruction to the British Zone Commander. 3 2. I understand that it was the intention of the President to discuss this Directive with Marshal Stalin here, but I do not know whether he intends to raise it at a Plenary Session or find some other opportunity. I should be glad to have your views on this. 3. Coal remains one of the most dangerous world shortages and in our view it is important that we should obtain Russian support for the European Coal Organisation. If we can get this, it will be easier to bring the Poles in as well. Perhaps therefore, if this question is to be raised at a Plenary Session, it might best come up under the heading of “co-operation in solving European economic problems” which you have put on your agenda. 4 Yours sincerely Anthony Eden 1 See vol. i , document No. 420 . 2 See vol. i , document No. 432 . 3 Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery. 4 See document No. 1161 . No. 1045 Proposal by the British Delegation Pauley Files No. 1045 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 [Extract 2 ] A Tentative Suggestion for Amendments to the Proposals on Reparations of the Government of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Note : The Soviet Government might be asked to enter into an undertaking as regards valuable foodstuffs and coal in the Russian Zone of Germany as it existed in 1937 being made available to the rest of Germany in accordance with detailed terms to be drawn up by the Control Council after full enquiry into the effects. This agreement might run for 12 months and be subject to reconsideration thereafter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S. D. Waley [ Babelsberg ,] 23rd July, 1945. 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 For the other sections of this proposal, see document No. 917 . No. 1046 President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin Truman Papers No. 1046 President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin Washington [ Babelsberg ], 27 July 1945. Memorandum for Generalissimo Stalin An acute coal famine threatens Europe this winter unless German coal in substantial quantities can be made available for export. Despite our own shortages of coal, internal transportation and ocean shipping, we are now shipping coal to Europe as an emergency measure in order to provide some relief in the present crisis. It is obvious, however, that with our large commitment of industrial and military resources in the war against Japan, the quantities of coal which we can make available to Europe will be inadequate to cover pressing European needs. To meet these needs all possible measures should immediately be taken to increase coal production in Germany and to make the maximum quantities available for export. In order to avoid delay, I have directed the United States Commander-in-Chief 1 to take the necessary measures in his zone of occupation. I understand that the British and French Governments have issued similar directives to their respective commanders in Germany. 2 A copy of the directive to General Eisenhower is attached. I am most anxious that a common policy in respect to coal should be followed by the four occupying powers, and I have therefore instructed General Eisenhower to discuss the policy set forth in the above directive at the Allied Control Council at the earliest possible date. I trust that the Soviet Government will see their way to joining with us in this policy. It is my hope that they will be prepared to instruct their Commander-in-Chief 3 to take similar action in the portions of Germany occupied by Soviet forces, and to proceed with the formulation in the Control Council of a coal production and export program for Germany as a whole. Harry S. Truman [Attachment] Directive to Commander of U. S. Forces in Germany 4 Unless large quantities of coal are made available to liberated Europe in forthcoming months, there is grave danger of such political and economic chaos as to prejudice the re-deployment of Allied troops and to jeopardize the achievement of the restoration of economic stability which is the necessary basis for a firm and just peace. Adequate quantities of coal for the greater part of Europe cannot, as a practical matter, be obtained from any source other than Germany. It is a matter of great urgency that Germany be made to produce for export to other European nations the coal which they must have to support economic life on at least a minimum basis. You are therefore directed in your capacity of Commanding General of United States Forces in Germany and as United States member of the Allied Control Council, to take all steps necessary to achieve the following objectives: 1. To make available for export out of the production of the coal mines in Western Germany a minimum of 10 million tons of coal during 1945, and a further 15 million tons by the end of April, 1946. 2. To the extent necessary to accomplish the export of 25 million tons of coal at the rate directed, to assign the highest priority to all matters pertaining to maximizing the production and transportation of German coal, in particular the provisioning of mining supplies, transportation facilities, and food supplies adequate to maintain mining labor at the requisite level of efficiency. This requirement should be subordinate only to the civil and military requirements necessary to insure the safety, security, health, maintenance, and operation of the occupying forces and to insure the speedy redeployment of allied forces from Germany. 3. To recommend to the Control Council ( a ) an assignment to the production and export of coal from Eastern Germany of an urgency as great as that implied in the required export of 25 million tons of coal from Western Germany by the end of April, 1946, and ( b ) the formulation of a coordinated program for Germany as a whole covering the production, distribution, and export of coal. 4. To assist in every reasonable way, efforts to maximize the production of coal in other zones of occupation than your own. 5. To recommend to the Control Council, and to follow in your zone of occupation, the principle that in allocating coal within Germany, the export of coal is to take precedence over the use of coal for industrial production and civilian purposes within Germany to the extent necessary to accomplish the export of 25 million tons of coal from Western Germany at the rate suggested and to comply with paragraph 3, above, subject only to the requirements set out in paragraph 2, above. It is recognized that the following of this policy during the period of critical coal shortage will delay the resumption of industrial activity in Germany. It is also recognized that the carrying out of the above policies with respect to German coal may cause unemployment, unrest, and dissatisfaction among Germans of a magnitude which may necessitate firm and rigorous action. Any action required to control the situation will be fully supported. 6. To make available to the European Coal Organization full and complete details of coal production and coal allocations within Germany, in order that the member nations of the European Coal Organization may know the relationship that prevails between the level of coal consumption in Germany and the level of coal consumption in liberated Europe. 7. To assign a high priority to the production and export of brown coal briquettes and of additional quantities of other coal in excess of the 25 million tons specified in paragraph 1. 8. A similar directive is being issued to the United Kingdom and French zonal commanders by their respective governments. 1 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower. 2 Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery and General Joseph-Pierre Koenig. 3 Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. 4 This directive was issued to Eisenhower by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 26 (telegram No. Victory 338). No. 1047 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State Pauley Files No. 1047 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Secretary of State 1 Berlin , July 28, 1945. My Dear Mr. Secretary : In calculating the food supplies from the official statistical records we find that taking all kinds of food together there was a total deficiency (grain, meats, fats, etc.) in 1936 for Germany, as constituted in 1937 of 5,700,000 tons. However, in the zone now occupied by the USSR there was a surplus of 2,650,000 tons. This meant a net deficiency in the western zones occupied by the US, UK and France (including Berlin) of 8,350,000 tons. The present situation differs from that before the war in three major respects: ( a ) The efficiency of collections from the farms will probably be greatly reduced. We estimate a drop of 25% below prewar normal for the next year or two. ( b ) The food consumption standard of urban consumers will be reduced. We estimate that average consumption should be about 2,300 calories per day which was the average urban civilian diet in Germany in 1943–44. ( c ) In view of world shortages of meats, fats and oils and other quality foods, the bulk of German caloric deficiencies will have to be made good by grain imports. We estimate that the amount of grain which Germany as a whole will have to import annually during the next year or two to offset her deficit of all foods will be about 4,400,000 tons, worth 565,000,000 Reichsmarks. In contrast, the Russian zone should probably show a food surplus of 1,200,000 tons in grain equivalent; valued at 150,000,000 Reichsmarks. The zones occupied by the US, UK and France (including Berlin), on the other hand, will have to import about 5,600,000 tons of grain to meet their total food deficiencies. The value of this grain would be about 715,000,000 Reichsmarks. In addition to the surplus of grains in the USSR zone noted above, past experience shows there is good reason to believe that there will be a surplus of other types of commodities. The following figures show net shipments out of the USSR zone in metric tons for 1936: Brown coal 3,492,000 Potash fertilizer 1,182,000 Pit props 448,000 Clay products 1,258,000 In discussing this problem with Mr. Molotov may I suggest that you call to his attention the following important argument, namely: It is proposed that 12½% (10% British proposal—12½% compromise) of all equipment removed from the western zones should go to the USSR. 2 This is a net and free delivery to Russia from Germany. On the other hand the food which Russia would send into our zone, or to the Control Council from eastern Germany, under our proposal would be paid for in Reichsmarks. In other words this food would be of no direct cost or expense to the Russian Government if produced in Germany. The 12½% of removables that would thus be turned over to USSR in return for food and other goods would, in final analysis, cost the Russians nothing. Sincerely yours, Edwin W. Pauley 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 See ante , pp. 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] . No. 1048 Generalissimo Stalin to President Truman Truman Papers No. 1048 Generalissimo Stalin to President Truman [Translation] Berlin , July 29, 1945. Dear Mr. President : I have received your memorandum of July 27 1 concerning German coal and a copy of your directive to General Eisenhower. The important question set forth in your memorandum concerning the use of German coal to satisfy European needs will be subject to appropriate study. The Government of the United States will be informed of the point of view of the Soviet Government on this question. I must however state that we should avoid a situation arising whereby the taking of measures on the export of German coal would lead to any disturbances in Germany, concerning which mention is made in your directive to General Eisenhower,—and this seems to me fully possible and necessary from the point of view of the interests of the Allied Governments. I. Stalin 1 Document No. 1046 . No. 1049 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom (Blaisdell) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1049 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to the Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom ( Blaisdell ) 1 secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 29, 1945. Victory 416. For Blaisdell from Clayton. I am informed that War Cabinet adopted substantially the recommendations outlined in your 7382, July 21 to Washington. 2 Believe we should strongly urge the British to revise this decision and to maintain export to Europe of usable grades of U. K. coal at former rates. Our allocation of six million tons for Europe will in any event arouse some criticism, owing to prospective shortage for domestic heating and to our strained shipping and inland transport position. If at same time exports from U. K. are discontinued criticism will be accentuated. Despite tightness of British coal position, it should be possible to maintain quarter of a million tons monthly for European relief instead of transferring whole supply burden to U. S. 1 Sent over the signature of Byrnes. 2 Document No. 1042 . No. 1050 The Third Secretary of the British Embassy (Miles) to the Assistant Adviser on German Economic Affairs (deWilde) 862.6362/7–3045 No. 1050 The Third Secretary of the British Embassy ( Miles ) to the Assistant Adviser on German Economic Affairs ( deWilde ) Ref. G269/–/45 Washington , July 30, 1945. My Dear deWilde , I enclose an Aide-Mémoire relating to the draft directive on coal production in Germany. Presumably you will be hearing from Potsdam yourself about the discussions that have taken place there. I do not know whether you consider any further coordination is necessary over the timing of the two directives. Yours sincerely, Richard Miles [Enclosure] Aide-Mémoire His Majesty’s Government have given consideration to the revised directive to the American Commander-in-Chief in Europe, 1 which was handed to this Embassy with the State Department’s Aide-Mémoire of July 11th, 2 concerning coal production in Germany. The question has been discussed in the British Delegation at the Berlin Conference and the Foreign Secretary has now informed Mr. Byrnes 3 that His Majesty’s Government are in agreement with the terms of the revised directive and will arrange for a directive in the same terms to be issued to Field Marshal Montgomery as interim instructions. Washington , July 30, 1945. 1 Attachment to document No. 1046 . 2 Document No. 432, printed in vol. i . 3 See document No. 1044 . No. 1051 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1051 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Source of Supply for the Zones of Occupation, Including the Greater Berlin Area British Proposal ( a ) As a general principle in the absence of special reasons for the contrary, each of the Zones of Occupation, including the Greater Berlin Area, will draw its supplies as far as practicable from the areas of Germany on which it had drawn before the war. ( b ) Food —During the period until the 1946 harvest is available for consumption, it is recognized that the Zone of Occupation for which the Soviet Government are responsible may have little or no surplus foodstuffs to supply to the Western Zones. But during this period the Zone of Occupation for which the Soviet Government are responsible should supply enough food to ensure that this Zone and the whole of the Greater Berlin Area will be self-supporting and will maintain a nutritional standard up to the minimum level established by the Control Council for Germany as a whole without foodstuffs having to be imported from the Western Zones. From the 1946 harvest onwards, the Zone of Occupation for which the Soviet Government are responsible should provide for supplies to the Greater Berlin Area and also to the Western Zone to approximately such extent as was customary in the past. This follows as a result of the general principle of treating Germany as a single economic unit. ( c ) Coal —That part of German territory within the 1937 frontiers which is administered at present by Poland should supply 5 million tons of hard coal a year to the Western Zones and to the Greater Berlin Area for a period of 3 years. ( d ) Alternatively, an agreement covering specific quantities of food and coal and other fuel should be worked out by the Control Council, and when such an agreement has been concluded, this agreement and the agreement that the Soviet Government should obtain industrial plant from the Western Zones and, particularly, from the Ruhr, 2 will come into operation simultaneously. 1 Attachment 3 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . 2 Cf. document No. 960 . No. 1052 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/8–145 No. 1052 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg , August 1, 1945.] Note It was agreed 2 that the British and American Commanders would provide 40,000 tons of food a month and 2,400 tons of coal a day for the British and American Zones in Berlin for thirty days running from July 15th. Pending the establishment of an agreement for the instalments of commodities to be made available by the Soviet Government under paragraph 4 ( a ) of the Reparations Agreement, 3 the Control Council should be instructed to draw up immediately a programme of the food, coal and fuel which will need to be imported during the next six months into the Greater Berlin area to bring the standard of the whole of the population of that area up to an agreed level. These amounts will be furnished by the Soviet Government to the Greater Berlin area as an advance delivery under paragraph 4 ( a ) of the Reparations Agreement. 1 This paper bears the following manuscript notation by Yost: “Br[itish] Proposal presented to Conference Aug[ust] 1. Stalin asked for time to study”. See ante , pp. 570–571 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] . 2 See vol. i , document No. 433 . 3 See document No. 1383, section iii . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the language on these subjects included in the Protocol, see post , page 1485 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , paragraph 17, and pages 1485–1486 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , paragraph 4 ( a ). For the corresponding passages in the Communiqué, see post , pages 1505 [ Pg. 1505 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1506 [ Pg. 1506 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . Transfers of population Transfers of population [1053] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President [Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1745 [1054] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador to Poland (Lane) Babelsberg, July 31, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–3145: Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 1053 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–1745 No. 1053 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President 1 [Extract 2 ] top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 16 July 1945. Memorandum for the President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … I would be disposed to grant to Poland some areas on her western boundaries which would tend to compensate her for the territory to be ceded to Russia. I feel however, that the burden is upon Russia to show that suitable provisions will be made to care for the millions of Germans now in those areas. We must make it clear that they cannot be shunted to American responsibility.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Henry L Stimson 1 Submitted to Byrnes for transmittal to Truman (see document No. 849 ). 2 For the other portions of this memorandum, see the enclosure to document No. 849 and document No. 1022 . No. 1054 The Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador to Poland (Lane) 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–3145: Telegram No. 1054 The Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador to Poland ( Lane ) 1 top secret us urgent Babelsberg , July 31, 1945. Victory 454, 455, 456. The three Governments participating in the Berlin Conference have reached the following agreement regarding the transfer of German populations to Germany: “July 31, 1945. [Here follows the text of document No. 1383, section XIII (XII) .]” Please concert with your Soviet and British colleagues for communicating the foregoing to the Provisional Government of Poland. You should ask that the communication be treated as strictly secret until an official statement is issued by the conference. Sent to Warsaw, Prague and Budapest. Byrnes 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, and relayed to Warsaw. The same message was relayed to the Representative at Budapest (Schoenfeld) and the Chargé at Prague (Klieforth), with appropriate modifications in the penultimate paragraph. It appears from Byrnes’ telegram No. 6842 to the American Embassy at London, dated August 13, 1945 (file No. 840.50 UNRRA/8–1345), that on August 1, at the Berlin Conference, Byrnes gave or sent to Molotov a memorandum (not found) dealing with ( a ) aid through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to displaced persons in enemy and ex-enemy territory and ( b ) assistance to displaced persons who did not wish to be repatriated. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1495 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1511 [ Pg. 1511 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . Alleged anti-Soviet activities Alleged anti-Soviet activities [1055] The Soviet Delegation to the United States Delegation [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2545 No. 1055 The Soviet Delegation to the United States Delegation 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–2545 No. 1055 The Soviet Delegation to the United States Delegation [Translation—Extract 1 ] Aide-Mémoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Information has also been received concerning similar activities of white-immigrants in Germany in the zone of the First French Army. Here this activity is carried on under the active support on the part of the French military authorities from the “ Sécurité Militaire ”. In the British and American zones of occupation the leadership of the hostile activities vis-à-vis the U. S. S. R. is carried on by the so-called Committee led by the white-immigrants, General Skoropadski, Kostyushchenko, Mironenko and Shmega. According to information received by the Soviet military authorities this Committee in June 1945 created the so-called “Ukrainian Committees” in a number of German cities, including Weissenburg, Kassel and Nuremberg. Each member of such committee is supplied with certificates prepared in a print shop of the “Central Committee”. On each certificate there is the seal and signature of the “President of the Free Ukraine”. Persons supplied with these certificates are free to move about in the Allied zones of occupation in Germany and carry on without hinder [ hindrance? ] hostile activities vis-à-vis the U. S. S. R. in camps for Soviet citizens located in the British, American and French zones. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and of the British Government the above-mentioned facts. [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. 1 For the paragraphs of this aide-mémoire relating to Austria and for the covering letter from Novikov to Dunn, see document No. 790 . For Dunn’s reply, see document No. 792 . German forces in Norway German forces in Norway [1056] The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Berlin, July 25, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–2545 [1057] The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) Berlin, July 27, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–2545 [1058] The British Foreign Secretary (Bevin) to the Secretary of State Berlin, 31st July, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–3145 No. 1056 The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 EW/7–2545 No. 1056 The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation ( Novikov ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) [Translation] Berlin , July 25, 1945. Dear Mr. Dunn : Under instructions of Peoples’ Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, I enclose herewith an aide-mémoire on the question of the non-application of the unconditional surrender regime toward German troops in Norway. I would appreciate it if you would acknowledge receipt of this letter. Sincerely yours, K Novikov [Enclosure—Translation] Aide-Mémoire The Soviet Government has received information that with relation to German troops on Norwegian territory, the unconditional surrender regime provided for in the military capitulation of Germany, signed in Berlin on May 8, 1945 1 is not being applied in full. It is stated that the German troops located in the region between the cities of Mo and Trondheim, amounting to 260,000 men, and in the region of Tromsö, 140,000 men, are holding on to their arms and military “technique” (this probably means light military equipment). 2 The personnel of these troops have not been interned and they have full freedom of movement. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and the British Government this information, since the Supreme Allied Control with respect to the surrendered troops on Norwegian territory is effected by the Allied Command. [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. 1 Executive Agreement Series No. 502; 59 Stat. (2) 1857. 2 The words in parentheses are apparently a note by the translator. No. 1057 The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) 740.00119 EW/7–2545 No. 1057 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation ( Novikov ) Berlin , July 27, 1945. Dear Mr. Novikov : I refer to your note of July 25, 1945 1 with which you enclosed an aide-mémoire regarding the non-application of the unconditional surrender formula toward German troops in Norway. Since this is an area of primary British military responsibility I assume that the necessary information will be submitted to you by the British Government. Sincerely yours, James Clement Dunn 1 Document No. 1056 . No. 1058 The British Foreign Secretary (Bevin) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7–3145 No. 1058 The British Foreign Secretary ( Bevin ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , 31st July, 1945. My Dear Secretary of State [:] With reference to discussion at the Foreign Secretaries’ meeting yesterday afternoon, 1 I send you herewith copy of a letter which I have written to Monsieur Molotov, together with a copy of the Soviet aide-mémoire 2 to which reference is made in it, on the subject of the disarming of the German troops in Norway. Yours very sincerely Ernest Bevin [Enclosure 1] The British Foreign Secretary ( Bevin ) to the Soviet Foreign Commissar ( Molotov ) Berlin , 30th July, 1945. Dear M. Molotov , At the Plenary Meeting on July 25th last 3 Generalissimo Stalin said that the Soviet Government had received information to the effect that German troops in Norway were not being properly disarmed. Mr. Churchill undertook to have enquiries made and to submit a report on the facts. M. Novikov subsequently communicated to Sir W. Strang an aide-mémoire setting out the information in the hands of the Soviet Government. I have now received the following report from the competent authorities in London, and I am happy to be able to tell you that the allegations contained in the Soviet aide-mémoire of July 25th are without foundation. The true situation is as follows: At the conclusion of hostilities with Germany there were in all 365,000 Germans in Norway. These were all collected into reservations, up to ten miles square in area, in which they were confined to within one kilometre of the camps where they lived and the roads joining such camps. A small number of Germans connected with communications, supply and technical services are “exempt” from confinement in these reservations and work in depots and similar installations. After collection into the reservations, the Germans in Norway were all disarmed except for the officers and two per cent of the other ranks. These were allowed to retain pistols and rifles respectively, with a very small quantity of ammunition, to maintain order and discipline amongst themselves. There are in all about 7,300 Germans thus allowed to bear arms. No German is allowed to bear arms outside his reservation, depot or similar installation. The Soviet aide-mémoire of July 25th referred to reports that German troops stationed in the area between the towns of Mo and Trondhjem, numbering about 260,000 men and those in the region of Tromsö numbering about 140,000 men were in possession of their arms and war equipment. The true facts are as follows: In the Mo–Trondhjem area there are 49,688 Germans, of whom 1,400 have been allowed to retain arms and 7,500 are “exempt” from confinement in reservations. In the Bodö–Tromsö area, out of a total of 120,000 men, 2,750 are armed and 13,300 exempt from confinement. It will be seen therefore that the reports referred to in the Soviet aide-mémoire are incorrect and devoid of foundation. I should like to take this opportunity of raising a point connected with the evacuation of the German troops from Norway. 108,000 of the Germans in Norway originated from the Russian Zone of Occupation in Germany. The British military authorities are at present responsible for the disposal of 54,000 of these Germans, the United States military authorities having offered to take responsibility for the remaining 54,000. It would much facilitate the work of evacuation if the Soviet authorities would accept direct from Norway those 54,000 Germans originating from the Russian Zone in Germany who are now the responsibility of the British military authorities. If the Soviet Government agree in principle to this proposal, I would suggest that arrangements for transporting these Germans direct from Norway to the Russian Zone in Germany might be worked out by the appropriate British[,] Soviet and possibly Swedish authorities. E. Bevin 1 See ante , p. 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] . 2 This enclosure is not printed. It is a variant translation of the aide-mémoire presented to the United States Delegation (enclosure to document No. 1056 ). 3 See ante , p. 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] . Government and elections Government and elections [[Unnumbered document following Document 1058 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1059] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 17 [1945.] 868.00/7–1745: Telegram [1060] The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Berlin Conference, July 18, 1945. 868.00/7–1745 [1061] The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) [Babelsberg,] July 19, 1945. 868.00/7–1745 [1062] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery) [Babelsberg, July 20, 1945.] Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1063] The Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) to the Secretary of State Berlin Conference, July 20, 1945. 868.00/7–1745 [1064] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 20, 1945 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 [1065] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the United States Delegation Paris, July 21, 1945—4 p.m. 868.00/7–2145: Telegram [1066] Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill Potsdam , 22nd July, 1945. 868.00/7–2245 [1067] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State Moscow, July 24, 1945—4 p.m. 868.00/7–2445: Telegram [1068] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Acting Secretary of State Athens, July 24, 1945—8 p.m. 868.00/7–2445: Telegram [1069] The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 [1070] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State Paris, July 31, 1945—8 p.m. 868.00/7–3145: Telegram Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1058 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Papers dealing with the question of Greek elections in a broader context are printed ante , page 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 744 (#1)] and Doc. 745 ] , under the heading: Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe; Freedom of the Press in Eastern Europe. No. 1059 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 868.00/7–1745: Telegram No. 1059 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret us urgent [ Washington ,] July 17 [1945.] 38. Brit FonOff telegram July 14 1 suggests draft “invitation to be issued simultaneously to Soviet Govt at Terminal and to French Govt in Paris re joint supervision Greek elections. We are in essential agreement but prefer not use words “invite” or “invitation”. Consider phraseology excellent in notes presented to Greek Govt quoted in telegram no. 22 to SecState July 14. 2 Suggest draft proposal along following lines: “In view of Allied obligations to Greece and the undertakings at Yalta, 3 the US Govt feels that Allied responsibility to the Greek people makes advisable joint Allied assistance in supervising approaching Greek national elections. It is therefore proposed that the responsibilities in the supervision of the Greek elections be shared by the Brit, the Soviet, the French, and the US Govts. The Greek Govt, which it may be recalled is a signatory to the Varkiza Agreement, 4 Article 9 of which provides for Allied supervision of elections, has expressed its agreement that the approaching national elections be held under the supervision of the four Allies named. 5 The US Govt earnestly hopes that the Soviet Govt (Govt of France) will agree to participate in the joint supervision of Greek national elections.” Sent to SeeState as no. 38 July 17. Repeated to Paris and Athens. You may wish to concert with Brit at Terminal on this question and instruct Caffery direct regarding timing and phraseology of approach to French FonOff in collaboration with Brit colleague in Paris. 6 [ Grew ] 1 See vol. i , document No. 453 . 2 Document No. 452, printed in vol. i . 3 Under the terms of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. For the text of this declaration, see document No. 1417, section v . 4 Of February 12, 1945, between the Greek Government and the National Liberation Front. Text in Woodhouse, Apple of Discord , p. 308. 5 See vol. i , document No. 451, footnote 2 . 6 Alfred Duff Cooper. No. 1060 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 868.00/7–1745 No. 1060 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) Memorandum Subject: Greek Elections. The attached telegram No. 38, July 17, from the Department, 1 makes our proposed telegram 2 on Greek elections unnecessary. The Department agrees with the British suggestion in substance but objects to the British text of a joint “invitation” to the Russians. The Department prefers that we and the British propose that the four powers supervise the elections rather than that the United States and the United Kingdom “invite” the Russians and French to participate. I think the Department’s point well taken and believe I can work out a suitable agreement with the appropriate member of the British delegation, if you would like me to try. The Department also apparently wishes to limit the proposal to supervision of the Greek parliamentary elections and not to include the subsequent plebiscite regarding the King. The Department doubtless thinks that only one bridge should be crossed at a time. I agree. G[ eorge ] V A[ llen ] Berlin Conference, July 18, 1945. 1 Document No. 1059 . 2 Not printed. No. 1061 The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) 868.00/7–1745 No. 1061 The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar ( Molotov ) 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 19, 1945. 2 My Dear Mr. Molotov , The Government of the United States is of the view that Allied obligations to Greece and the undertakings at Yalta make joint Allied assistance in supervising the approaching Greek national elections advisable, in keeping with Allied responsibility to the Greek people. It is accordingly proposed that responsibility for supervising the Greek elections be shared by the Governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and the United States. The Greek Government has agreed that the elections be held under the supervision of the four Allies named, in accordance with Article 9 of the Varkiza Agreement, which provides for Allied supervision of these elections. The Government of the United States earnestly hopes that the Soviet Government will agree to the joint supervision as proposed. Very sincerely yours, [ James F. Byrnes ] 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. 2 The file copy is so dated, but the original was apparently not sent to Molotov until July 20. See ante , pp. 151–152 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . No. 1062 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1062 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) top secret priority [ Babelsberg , July 20, 1945.] Victory 116. For the Ambassador from the Secretary of State. I have today 1 addressed a letter to Molotov proposing Soviet participation in supervising Greek elections along the lines of the text proposed in the Department’s telegram of July 17, 2 which was repeated to you. I would appreciate your making a similar proposal to the French Government immediately. The British Delegation suggests, and I concur, that no publicity whatever be given to this proposal until replies are received from the French and Soviet Governments and the Greek Government can be appropriately informed. Sent to Paris. Repeated to Washington and Athens. 1 i. e., July 19, the date the message was drafted. 2 Document No. 1059 . No. 1063 The Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) to the Secretary of State 868.00/7–1745 No. 1063 The Soviet Foreign Commissar ( Molotov ) to the Secretary of State [Translation] Berlin Conference , July 20, 1945. Dear Mr. Byrnes : In connection with your letter of July 19, 1 containing a proposal regarding the establishment of Allied Control in connection with the national elections in Greece, I wish to state that on July 20 at the meeting of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, I put forward the point of view of the Soviet Government regarding the situation in Greece. 2 Consequently you are now advised of the negative attitude of the Soviet Government toward the practice of control by foreign governments over national elections, and also (you are advised) that the Soviet Government has its proposals in relation to the state of affairs in Greece which, I hope, will be further examined by us. Sincerely yours, V. Molotov 1 Document No. 1061 . 2 See ante , pp. 151–154 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . No. 1064 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 No. 1064 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 20, 1945 [Translation—Extracts 1 ] The Yalta Declaration “On Liberated Europe” Russian Proposal Presented to Foreign Ministers, July 20, 1945 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . But there is one country—Greece—in which no due order still exists, where law is not respected, where terrorism rages directed against democratic elements which have borne the principal burden of the fight against German invaders for the liberation of Greece. Moreover, the present Greek Government is breaking the peace with their neighbors and threatening Albania and Bulgaria with military action. All these circumstances create the necessity of taking urgent measures to eliminate such a situation in Greece. In accordance with the aforesaid the Soviet Government consider necessary: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) to recommend to the Regent of Greece 3 to take immediate measures towards the establishment of a democratic government in the spirit of the agreement reached at Varkiza, February 12, 1945, between the representatives of the then existing government of Greece and the representatives of Greek democracy. The Soviet Government express their assurance that the above-mentioned measures will find the support of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America and will be carried out. 1 For the other paragraphs of this proposal, see document No. 804 . For another Soviet proposal on this subject, see document No. 1423 . 2 See ante , p. 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . 3 Damaskinos, Archbishop of Greece. No. 1065 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the United States Delegation 868.00/7–2145: Telegram No. 1065 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the United States Delegation 1 top secret Paris , July 21, 1945—4 p.m. [46.] Bidault accepted at once on behalf of the French Govt the proposal regarding Greek elections as set out in your Victory 116 telegram. 2 Sent Frankfurt for Berlin as 46, repeated Washington 4395 and Athens 9. Caffery 1 Printed from the text received in the Department of State. 2 Document No. 1062 . No. 1066 Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill 868.00/7–2245 No. 1066 Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill 1 secret P. ( Terminal ) 25 Greece Memorandum by Mr. Churchill In view of the reference to Greece in the Soviet Memorandum, 2 I circulate the following two papers to the Conference. The first * is the report of Field Marshal Alexander. The second † is the report on the visit of the British Trades Union Delegation to Greece, which was headed by Sir Walter Citrine and composed of leading Trades Unionists. This I believe gives a true picture of the rights and wrongs of the Greek position. I am puzzled at the reference on paragraph 4, Sub-section 2 of the Soviet Memorandum to “the representatives of Greek democracy”. According to the information I have, the EAM–ELAS elements in Greece in no way represent Greek democracy or the vast majority of Greeks. Their conduct in Athens during their attempt to seize and dominate the city have made a gulf between them and the Greek people which will last for many years. The report of the Trades Union Delegation should be read in this connection. W[ inston ] S. C[ hurchill ] Potsdam , 22nd July, 1945. 1 Printed from the mimeographed text circulated at the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 23. See ante , p. 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . 2 Document No. 1064 . * Annex i . [Footnote in the original. For the text of annex i , see annex i to document No. 1076 .] † Annex ii . [Footnote in the original. This annex is not reproduced here. For its text, see What We Saw in Greece: Report of the T. U. C. Delegation (London, Trades Union Congress, 1945).] No. 1067 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State 868.00/7–2445: Telegram No. 1067 The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 confidential Moscow , July 24, 1945—4 p.m. 2667. Vice Commissar FonOff Dekanozov addressed letter dated July 13 to British Chargé 2 in reply to British Ambassador’s 3 protest to Molotov (Embassy’s 2472, July 7 4 ) re Soviet press and radio campaign against Greek Govt and British in Greece (To Dept 2667 repeated London 378 Athens 37). Dekanozov stated Soviet Govt does not see any grounds for Clark Kerr charges re New Times article as journal not an official organ of Soviet Govt. Furthermore Soviet Govt finds it necessary to call British Govt’s attention to Athens July 8 Fascist meeting where sharply hostile speeches to USSR were made and slogans of “let[’]s get at Sofia, Belgrade, Moscow” etc[.] were uttered. Such speeches becoming more frequent and in increasingly inadmissible forms Dekanozov claimed. He pointed out Soviet Govt regarded such situation wholly incorrect in country where there are troops of USSR’s British Ally. Kennan 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 126 of July 25 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2545). 2 Frank Roberts. 3 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. 4 Document No. 446, printed in vol. i . No. 1068 The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Acting Secretary of State 868.00/7–2445: Telegram No. 1068 The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 confidential Athens , July 24, 1945—8 p.m. 746. Greek FonMin 2 returned Sunday July 22 and resigned next day, yesterday. According to PriMin, 3 whom I saw last evening, Sofianopoulos said he is convinced after talking with Molotov that only hope of achieving desired relations Russia would be set up here political govt representative of all parties (this coincides new demands communist-controlled EAM, see my despatch 1336, July 16 4 ). He suggested a cabinet apportioned in thirds to left, center, right, respectively. PriMin replied unconvinced such govt would prove viable existing circumstances. Pointed out already tried unsuccessfully by Papandreou. Added repeated conferences so far indicate party leaders unable get together. Subsequently, British Chargé 5 told me after consulting Regent that latter stated question change of govt “does not arise”. This morning Sofianopoulos issued statement press and called on me confirming attitude as above. Appeared very cocky and on my remarking that one of royalist leaders had just told me a political govt is “impossible”, replied “that depends on who would be its chief”, apparently meaning himself. Has little numerical following at present but would constitute a useful acquisition to such a group as EAM, hitherto lacking outstanding personalities. Fact resignation Russian-inspired and coincides with Potsdam discussions and yesterday’s threatening Yugoslav note (my telegram 742, July 23 6 ) suggests possibility Russia intending base refusal join supervise elections on alleged inability nonrepresentative govt control “chaotic” situation and prepare tests fairly. MacVeagh 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 126 of July 25 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2545). 2 Ioannis Sophianopoulos. 3 Admiral Petros Voulgaris. 4 Not printed. 5 Harold Caccia. 6 See document No. 1077, footnote 4 . No. 1069 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 No. 1069 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 [Extracts 2 ] [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Dunn Subject: Matters relating to the Near Eastern and African Area for inclusion in the Final Protocol There is outlined below my understanding of the final decisions reached with regard to the five items on the agenda which relate to the Near Eastern and African Area: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As regards Greece the Soviet Delegation declined the invitation of the United States and Great Britain to participate in the forthcoming elections in Greece on the grounds that such supervision would constitute interference in the internal affairs of Greece. 3 George V. Allen 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see documents Nos. 736 , 1332 , 1342 , 1358 , and 1374 . 3 See documents Nos. 1061 and 1063 . No. 1070 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State 868.00/7–3145: Telegram No. 1070 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Acting Secretary of State top secret Paris , July 31, 1945—8 p.m. 4640. Re this Embassy’s memo July 21 1 pertaining to control by Allies to be exercised in Greece during forthcoming elections, memo has been received from Foreign Office dated July 20 [ 30 ]. 2 Confirming my 4395 July 21 3 this memo informs Embassy that French Government accepts readily to participate in Four Power control of these elections. French Foreign Office furthermore shares views of American Government re necessity of keeping these consultations secret until answers of four interested Governments are received and Greek Government informed officially. Caffery 1 To the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Not printed. Cf. documents Nos. 1062 and 1065 . 2 Not printed. 3 Document No. 1065 . Relations with Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia Relations with Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia [1071] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, July 17, 1945. 868.00/7–1745 [1072] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Acting Secretary of State Athens, July 19, 1945—8 p.m. 868.00/7–1945: Telegram [1073] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 20, 1945 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 [1074] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Caserta, July 20, 1945—1 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/7–2045: Telegram [1075] The Chief of Mission in Albania (Jacobs) to the Acting Secretary of State Tirana, July 21, 1945—4 p.m. 868.00/7–2145: Telegram [1076] Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill Potsdam , 22nd July, 1945. 868.00/7–2245 [1077] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 24 [1945.] 760h.68/7–2445: Telegram [1078] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Caserta, July 24, 1945—midnight. 760h.68/7–2645: Telegram [1079] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, July 24, 1945. 760h.68/7–2445 [1080] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) [Washington,] July 25, 1945. 760h.68/7–2345 [1081] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Babelsberg, July 28, 1945. 760h.68/7–2845: Telegram [1082] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) Washington, July 28, 1945—10 p.m. 740.0011 EW/7–2045: Telegram [1083] Proposal by the British Delegation Potsdam , 30th July, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [1084] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) Washington, July 31, 1945—7 p.m. 868.00/7–3145: Telegram [1085] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 31 [1945.] 760h.68/7–2845: Telegram [1086] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Acting Secretary of State Athens, August 1, 1945—6 p.m. 760h.68/8–145: Telegram [1087] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 8, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 No. 1071 The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/7–1745 No. 1071 The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 1331 Athens , July 17, 1945. Subject: Political and Economic Conditions in Northern Greece. Sir : I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1213 of June 23, 1945, 1 and to transmit herewith a survey of politico-economic conditions in Northern Greece prepared by Third Secretary Leonard J. Cromie, together with a copy of a report on the British Army in Greece and its relationship to Greek armed forces prepared by Captain William H. McNeill, Assistant Military Attaché, who accompanied Mr. Cromie on his recent tour (June 12–24) of Macedonia and Western Thrace. These reports may perhaps be usefully read in conjunction with my despatch No. 1282 of July 4 on Developments in the North of Greece: Frontier Incidents and Anglo-Russian Relations 2 and my telegrams No. 695 of July 10 3 and No. 708 of July 14, 4 referring to Marshal Tito’s speech of July 8. Mr. Cromie’s report, based on first-hand observation and numerous, on-the-spot conversations with representative persons of all factions and classes as well as other reliable intelligence data available to the Embassy, fails to support in any substantial degree the allegations of Marshal Tito and the Moscow and Balkan Soviet press regarding anarchy and wholesale terror in Northern Greece. The overall picture of conditions in that area resembles that of the rest of the country, with the possible difference, characteristic of the “New Greece” acquired after the Balkan and first World Wars, of more pronounced republicanism in the cities and a more kaleidoscopic pattern of political sentiment in the countryside owing to the presence of some minority groups and of large numbers of Greek refugees from Asia Minor. Figures cited by Mr. Cromie on the prison population of various small towns in Northern Greece and the high ratio of arrests to convictions do bear witness to the deficiencies of present Greek regional administrative and judicial procedure and the disregard of local officials of royalist persuasion for the civil liberties of leftists and Slavophones. Certain of the latter who have identified themselves with the “Free Macedonian” movement or who have relatives among the ELASites now in Yugoslavia have doubtless found it expedient, as Marshal Tito stated, to seek a more congenial political clime across the border. A New York Times Correspondent, Mr. Sam Brewer, told me today that he interviewed last week in Monastir a score of such persons who had recently come from Greece. They gave such reasons for their move as “because we were suspected of being Tito’s spies” or “because we love Stalin”. Brewer was told by Yugoslav authorities, who invited him to inspect frontier registers, that about 1,000 refugees of this type have already crossed the border at the Monastir Gap and 3,000 in the Lake Dojran region. Granted the existence of some injustice, the bitter legacy of Slavophone collaborationism during the war and of post-liberation civil strife, it must also be borne in mind, as pointed out in the attached reports, that a determined effort is being made by the British to restore order and safeguard civil liberties with the sincere support of many enlightened Greek officials acting in accordance with the directives of their well-intentioned if still weak central Government. An objective understanding of the true situation in Northern Greece is essential if the threat to this strategic and rich territory implied in the current war of nerves directed against Greece is to be averted. Captain McNeill’s report shows that local British and Greek forces could scarcely block a Soviet-sponsored military promenade to the Aegean disguised as a “Free Macedonian” uprising. Firm diplomacy, therefore, backed by informed public opinion in the Western Democracies, will be needed to make it clear that, while the legitimate desire of the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians for port and transit facilities may be satisfied, the perpetration of a major crime against a loyal member of the United Nations on the pretext of correcting transient and relatively insignificant abuses cannot be tolerated. Respectfully yours, Lincoln MacVeagh [Enclosure 1—Extracts] secret [Undated.] Northern Greece A Regional Survey of Present Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . summary The spotlight of world attention is once again swinging back to Macedonia and Western Thrace, granary of Greece and outpost of British influence in the Balkans, in which the struggle for rehabilitation is being carried on in an atmosphere dangerously troubled by ideologic and ethnic conflict and the clash of rival territorial ambitions, the Greek claim to a more strategic northern boundary and the quest of the Slavs and Bulgars for footholds on the Aegean. UNRRA food shipments and the indestructible fertility of the soil have laid the specter of actual starvation in Northern Greece despite a fifty percent failure of this year’s grain crop. But a serious lack of transport is impeding the distribution of foodstuffs and the launching of the rehabilitation program that is needed to dissipate internal discontent which breeds disorder and on which international rivalries batten. Internal conflicts in Northern Greece find their origin not only in economic distress but also in the different backgrounds of the various Greek and non-Hellenic population groups. Rightist leanings prevail among native Greeks in both rural and urban districts, while Greek refugees from the Turkish cities and Transcaucasia and the Slavo-Macedonian minority have mainly gravitated toward the left. The result is a kaleidoscopic pattern of political sentiment throughout the area. Political passions and ethnic differences, exacerbated by the war and civil strife, inevitably breed a certain amount of injustice and violence. Scant respect is shown for the civil liberties of leftists, and members of the Slavophone minority, as a consequence of their alleged pro-Bulgar attitude, are deprived of cultural rights and subjected to petty persecution by their Greek neighbors and local police authorities. The British, with one division and some armored units in the area, stand as arbiters in the midst of turmoil under a group of able and impartial officers, but their task is complicated by the disorganized state of Greek judicial and administrative machinery and the complacency of royalist officials. It should not be assumed, however, that a state of anarchy exists in Northern Greece, where the average citizen, thanks to the presence of the British and the moderate policy of the Athens Government, probably enjoys a greater measure of personal security and freedom than in any other country of the Balkans. Tito’s flight of “thousands and thousands of refugees from the terror of Greek reactionaries” 5 is largely a flight of fancy. Difficulties which do exist would solve themselves in the absence of outside pressure. In particular, it is most likely that the few Slavic remnants left in Northern Greece would become painlessly Hellenized within one or two generations were it not for the possibility of the Soviet Balkan bloc’s using the “Free Macedonia” movement as a key to conquest. In this connection, the exact import of the present war of nerves and of the armies now poised at the strategic gateways to Greece, to which no effective, immediate resistance could be offered, warrants most careful consideration by the Western Powers. For loss of her Northern Provinces would not only be a mortal blow to Greece and a shocking violation of the principles of the United Nations, but an event of major geopolitical importance in the Mediterranean. i—introduction Northern Greece is the breadbasket and the powder keg of the Hellenic Nation. Before the war, the Provinces of Macedonia and Western Thrace, with about one quarter of the population of Greece, accounted for forty to fifty percent of Greek agricultural production. In Greece’s present straitened circumstances, the economic resources of the area should be invaluable. They would also be useful to covetous neighbors. The traditional political importance of the region, deriving from its wealth, its strategic location and the mottled ethnic composition of its population, is enhanced today by its position on a key frontier between the zones of Russian and British influence in Europe, a frontier which the Greeks would like to push northward and which the Soviet Balkan bloc, according to many indications, would like to push into the sea. The picture of Northern Greece today is a study in contrasts. On the one hand, the litter of war: twisted rails and hundreds upon hundreds of wrecked cars and locomotives in the railroad yards of Salonika; the Port of Salonika a shambles of sunken ships and broken cranes; the burned village of Lekhovon, one among many, stark but still picturesque on the mountainside; destroyed bridges and railroad spans, testimonials to the ruthless efficiency of German sappers. On the other hand, scenes of normality and peace: the Germans spread destruction no farther east than the Strymon River. Beyond, the Bulgars were careful to leave undamaged “their” Provinces of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace to which they hope to return. Bridges are intact, highways have actually been improved, reforestation projects dot the southern slopes of the Rhodope Mountains, and the housing problem is relieved in some areas by hundreds of neat, concrete village bungalows erected for Bulgarian settlers. The railroads from Serres to Alexandroupolis and from the latter Port to Adrianople are running, although on a reduced schedule owing to lack of rolling stock. In the whole of Northern Greece, the peasants are busy at their usual seasonal pursuits, but their attitude is by no means uniform. Whereas broad smiles and the brave thumbs-up gesture universally greet the jeep traveller in the Greek villages and districts, the Slavophone peasants, particularly in the northwest frontier regions, are morose and sullen. In Salonika and the large towns, life appears quite normal on the surface with no suggestion of a “reign of terror”, but the building next to the Prefecture in Fiorina has been converted into a detention barracks and the barred windows are crowded with political prisoners. Such are the highlights of the general picture of Northern Greece in June 1945. Because the spotlight of world attention may shortly be focused on this area, it may be of interest to fill in some of the details. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii—the political imbroglio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rival Territorial Ambitions The economic and political problems of the 1,700,000 inhabitants of Northern Greece would be of scant interest to the outside world were it not for international factors which not only complicate the solution of local problems but threaten to compromise the political future of the region as an integral part of Greece and consequently the present balance of power in the Mediterranean and around the Dardanelles. These factors have already been mentioned and are well known: on the one hand, agitation in Greece for territorial expansion northward; on the other hand, the old Russian drive for a window on the Aegean, currently masquerading as a “Free Macedonia Movement”. With regard to Greek expansionism, it need only be said that the naturally receptive state of mind of the public is being exploited and stimulated to the utmost by public leaders and editors as a tactic of internal politics. In this, the situation resembles the pattern of the whole country. The particular claim to Turkish Thrace recently featured by the Communists arouses little interest. The usual response to questions on this matter was: “It would be very nice, of course, to have Eastern Thrace, but we do not want to complicate our relations with Turkey.” * In view of the present unequal balance of forces in southeastern Europe, Greek expansionism is of immediate interest only insofar as it might conceivably provide a pretext for “precautionary” troop concentrations on the opposite side of the frontier or even for positive “preventive action” by Greece’s neighbors backed by the Soviet Union. Minorities—Turks, Kutzo-Vlachs and Armenians It is much more likely, however, that minority grievances would be invoked as justification for Soviet intervention in Northern Greece, and it will therefore be of interest to follow closely the post-war development of Greek policy towards the minorities, the attitudes and problems of the different minorities, and their susceptibility to foreign propaganda and influence. Of the four principal minorities in Northern Greece, Turks, Kutzo-Vlachs, Armenians and Slavo-Macedonians, now as before the war, the most contented and best treated are certainly the Turks. The Greeks generally credit the Turks in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace with having observed a correctly non-cooperative attitude towards the Bulgarian forces of occupation and have accordingly permitted them to reopen their schools, practise their religion, and enjoy a large measure of cultural freedom. Their lot is not quite perfect, according to the Turkish Consul at Komotiní. Like minorities everywhere, they suffer some persecution from neighbors of the dominant ethnic group, and local officials are not over-zealous in protecting their rights and interests. It is this situation, the Consul said, which led to the emigration of considerable numbers of Turks from Western to Eastern Thrace earlier this year (despatch No. 965 of May 1, 1945, 6 page 17). Some difficulty, too, was caused by recent action of the Greek authorities in ordering the summary expulsion of some 2,000 Pommacks (Bulgarian subjects of Turkish descent) from Western Thrace. Upon the refusal of the Bulgars and Turks to permit these people to cross the border, the British intervened to have the order suspended and there the matter now rests. Apart from these observations, the Consul formulated no general grievances against Greek Government policy. The Kutzo-Vlachs are a lesser minority, partially Hellenized, mostly scattered in small villages in Western Macedonia. Moreover, the Rumanian motherland is conveniently remote. Though occasionally troublesome, this minority does not appear to arouse serious Greek animosity or apprehensions. The Inspector General of Rumanian Schools at Salonika (an official of the former Rumanian Government whose present status is dubious) stated that some of the Rumanian elementary schools have already been reopened. The secondary schools have not. † As for the Armenians, their trading instinct apparently got the better of their neo-Hellenism during the Bulgarian occupation, with the result that they find themselves in a very difficult situation today. Andreas Kondoianopoulos, Prefect of the Nome of Rhodope, spoke very bitterly of their collaborationist activities during the war, and a family of five Armenians was brutally murdered at Xánthi in early June for their alleged pro-Bulgar attitude. The Slavo-Macedonians Most troublesome and largest minority in Northern Greece are, of course, the Slavo-Macedonians. It was they, for example, who undoubtedly inspired the Yugoslav Minister of State’s 7 ominous reference in Politika (Belgrade) of June 21 to “current outrages in Aegean Macedonia”, which “is Yugoslav just like all the other Yugoslav federal units”. ‡ (According to this same statement, the minority numbers 260,000 persons, which would be about fifteen percent of the total population of Northern Greece. Greek sources usually give a total of 80,000 Macedonians, 70,000 in Western Macedonia and 10,000 in Western Thrace. They also tend to play down the distinct ethnic character of the minority, pointing out that virtually all the Slavophones know how to speak Greek and asserting that fifty percent are Greek in sentiment anyhow. The present situation of the Slavophones is the outgrowth of Greek policy towards them in the past and their own behavior during the recent years of Bulgarian and German occupation. It may be recalled that Venizelos attempted to woo with kindness and preferential treatment the Slav remnants left in Greece after the population exchange of 1924. Metaxas abruptly reversed this policy and even forbade the use of the Macedonian language. As a consequence, the Slavophones generally welcomed the Germans and Bulgars as liberators and collaborated with them whole-heartedly. In return, Slavic villages were usually untouched by the conquerors while many Greek villages were razed, and the Slavic peasants were allowed to enrich themselves at the expense of their unhappy Greek neighbors. Later, with the changing tide of war, Macedonian autonomist leaders such as Gotsi § began to see the wisdom of collaborating with EAM/ELAS with a view to the realization of their objectives through the medium of Soviet federalism. Their cooperation was welcomed at first by the Greek Andartes, but the Macedonian guerilla chiefs soon demonstrated by their attitude and indiscipline that they were more interested in promoting Macedonian autonomy than in fighting against the Germans or for a socialist Greece. The opportunism of the Slavophones and their autonomist activities have embarrassed their traditional friends, the Greek left, and aroused the active animosity of Greek nationalists. EAM leaders, whatever their Marxist convictions regarding the insignificance of national frontiers, are good enough political realists to be unwilling to offend the patriotic sentiments of the Greek electorate, including rank-and-file leftists, in order to win the support of a minority or even to please the comrades abroad. Accordingly, present EAM policy would allow the Slavophones their own schools and church services in Macedonian, but would insist that higher studies be pursued in Greek at Greek universities. On the other hand, a typical Greek nationalist such as the Bishop of Fiorina 8 favors the Metaxist policy of forbidding entirely the use of the Macedonian tongue. In this, as in connection with policy towards Greek leftists, the Greek Government authorities seem to be following a middle-of-the-road course and sinning more by omission than by commission. There is no positive reign of terror directed against the Slavophones as such, and they are secure in their lives and in the essential right of land tenure. Those who have fled to Yugoslavia have apparently done so because they feared arrest as political leftists or autonomist agitators. A promise of improved conditions may be seen in the visit to Fiorina on June 27 and 28 of Governor General Merenditis of Northern Greece, whose fair attitude has already been demonstrated by his refusal to permit discrimination in the distribution of UNRRA foodstuffs as between Greek and Slavophone villages. ║ According to an OSS source, ¶ Governor General Merenditis hopes to reenforce security by bringing a National Guard battalion to Fiorina for border patrol duties and 1,200 Gendarmes to Fiorina, Kastoria and Kozani. He has, moreover, ordered that arbitrary arrests must cease, that all cases involving charges of autonomist activities must be cleared up within two months, and that the Slavo-Macedonians are to be assured their full rights as Greek citizens including the right to speak their own language. The future of the Slavophones of Northern Greece will be determined by the further evolution of relations between the Balkan Soviet bloc and Greece and the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. Left to themselves, they would, in all probability, become painlessly Hellenized within one or two generations—a normal solution for the problem of a minority which is too small and too scattered geographically to warrant indefinite, special protection and perpetuation as a distinct ethnic unit. Attitude of the Balkan Soviet Bloc It appears, unfortunately, that the Slavophone minority is too convenient a peg on which to hang Balkan-Soviet territorial ambitions to be allowed to die a natural and peaceful death, for a mounting weight of evidence indicates that this bloc intends to make such capital as it can out of the Macedonian imbroglio. Acquisition of all or a substantial part of Northern Greece would give the Russians one outlet on the Aegean and result in the strategic investment of the coveted Dardanelles. Moreover, this oblique movement would appear to have the advantage over a frontal attack on Turkey in that it could be carried out by non-Russian forces against a relatively undefended territory under the guise of assisting a “spontaneous uprising of oppressed peoples”. British commanding officers in Northern Greece are inclined to discount, on political grounds, the likelihood of an immediate attack from the north, but they are fully alive to the strategic implications of the potentially hostile forces now massed near each of the gateways to Greece, the Monastir Gap, the Strymon Valley, and the Roupel Pass. Defense of the area in the event of attack being out of the question in view of the relative weakness of the British (one division and units of an armored brigade), these are now engaged in maneuvers and a study of troop dispositions for a covering action to permit orderly withdrawal from Salonika in a few days’ time. British diplomacy is presumably equally aware of the possible implications behind the present war of nerves directed against Greece, but it can scarcely afford to adopt a similar policy of retreat. Appeasement on the issue of Northern Greece would involve the surrender of an important bastion of security in the Mediterranean, the betrayal of a loyal ally and the overwhelmingly Greek population of the affected area, and abandonment of the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, 9 tantamount to hoisting the white flag over that newly-erected citadel of peace. [Enclosure 2] secret No. R 121–45 [Undated.] Revised British Plans: 1. Contingent upon what the Government’s policy will be following the elections in Great Britain, it has been recently decided to keep the two British divisions which now garrison Greece in the Country through the coming winter. At the same time, top priority for supply to the Greek Forces has been assigned to the Gendarmerie , in the hope that the gendarmes will be sufficiently well organized and able (1) to enforce law and order in Greece during the coming year; and (2) to supervise the elections and/or the plebiscite which the British hope to see held in November. (The elections are for members to the Chamber of Deputies; the plebiscite will decide upon the return of the King, or the formation of a Republic.) To achieve this, the National Guard battalions have been seriously weakened by the withdrawal of volunteers for the Gendarmerie; and the effort to rebuild the Greek Army has come to a standstill after the formation of a single division. Background: 2. The British troops which were originally despatched to Greece included a small force designed to harass the retreating Germans, and a larger number of service troops who were expected to administer the civilian relief program. After ELAS attempted to carry through a revolution in December 1944, three additional British divisions were sent to Greece. This force succeeded in driving ELAS from Athens, and later superintended the disarmament and disbandment of ELAS, and then occupied all the principal centers of Greece. One division was withdrawn in April, leaving the present garrison behind. 3. During March and April 1945, the British planned to create a Greek National Army of three divisions by November; and, as soon as these divisions were ready, to withdraw the British force. Meanwhile, as a stop gap, National Guard battalions were organized to perform police work in the areas taken over from the control of ELAS. In fact, however, supplies have not been delivered in sufficient quantity to equip three Greek divisions; and the National Guard has made a rather bad name for itself by sporadic illegality and violence directed against persons known or suspected of being Leftists. It is in view of these conditions that British authorities in London have tentatively decided to retain British troops in Greece over the winter, and to endeavor to establsh a Gendarmerie that may perform its police duties more impartially and with less violence than does the National Guard. Role of British Troops in Greece: 4. It is a general policy of the British army to leave as much of the policing of Greece to Greeks as is possible. In Southern Greece, where there are relatively few supporters of EAM/ELAS, British troops are concentrated in battalion or larger units, and very seldom intervene either to support or to restrain the Greek authorities. In Central and Northern Greece, however, where a large percentage of popular sentiment is antagonistic to the present government of Greece and opposes the Gendarmerie and National Guard, British troops are dispersed in company and platoon detachments; and normally, whenever something unusual is in the wind, mixed Greek and British patrols are organized to investigate. In general, British efforts are directed more toward restraining the illegal and violent methods favored by some members of the National Guard, than toward supporting the National Guard against bandits or other opponents. 5. When winter comes, with its attendant difficulties of transportation (the roads of Western Macedonia are snowbound for about three months), British troops will perforce be concentrated in the principal communications centers of Northern Greece, and policing of the smaller towns and villages will be left exclusively in the hands of Greek forces. General Boucher plans to station his troops in battalion camps for the winter, located in the following towns: Komotiní, Kavalla, Drama; Serres, Salonika, Kilkís; Verroia, Edessa, Kozáni. It is not even sure whether the road to Kozáni can be kept open through the winter, since snow plow equipment will be necessary, and is not yet on hand. Future of the National Guard: 6. As soon as the Gendarmerie is up to strength, and no longer needs National Guard assistance to police the country, the British expect to convert the National Guard battalions into a Frontier Force, totalling 9–12 battalions. Surplus personnel will be transferred to the regular army, or else demobilized. According to present hopes and plans, the transfer of all police responsibility from the National Guard will be completed before November. 7. For the present, the National Guard is being starved of equipment and milked of men for the benefit of the Gendarmerie . Plans for raising new National Guard battalions have been dropped, with the result that some districts of Greece are policed by locally recruited National Guardsmen, while others are under the “Athens battalions” which were originally raised during December to fight against ELAS in Athens and Piraeus. The nominal strength of a National Guard battalion is 530, all ranks; but actually many battalions in Northern Greece can muster no more than 200 men at the present time, owing largely to transfers to the Gendarmerie. The Gendarmerie: 8. The Gendarmerie is expected to control Greece with half the number of men used by the National Guard (30,000 as against 60,000). It is a volunteer, career service; and at the present time, its ranks are being recruited largely from among former Gendarmes and present day National Guardsmen. British officers believe that the Gendarmerie will establish a better reputation for itself than has the National Guard; that it will meet with less hostility among the population; and that, consequently, it will be able to establish smaller detachments, and man smaller, more numerous posts. The British apparently rely on an election to clear the political air in Greece, hoping that it will stabilize the government, and thus facilitate the task of the Gendarmerie. 9. Up to the present, only a more or less skeleton Gendarme organization has been established throughout Greece. Actual day to day policing has been taken over by the Gendarmes in all the principal provincial towns, and in a few of the villages small detachments have been set up. As more men come from Athens, more and more of these village detachments will be sent to their stations, until there will be one Gendarme post for every three or four villages in Greece. The National Army: 10. Since it has been decided to keep British troops in Greece for an additional six months or more, the urgency of the need for a Greek National Army has lessened; and, due to an acute shortage of almost every sort of military equipment, plans for the establishment of two more divisions (in Salonika and Thessaly) have been indefinitely postponed. Comment: 11. This revision of British plans is made inevitable by their failure to deliver supplies sufficient to equip the proposed Greek army. It is made advisable by the fact that it is quite improbable that any Greek force would be able to maintain peace and order inside the country were it not supported (and restrained) by foreign troops; and a turbulent Greece might easily inflame world relations by entangling Russian with British interests. 12. At the same time, it appears doubtful whether the Gendarmerie will prove much less partisan than the National Guard in its administration of the law. Its members are all recruited from the Right; and many of them have served as Gendarmes under both Metaxas and the Germans. Furthermore, given the volatile Greek temperament, it is a question whether an early election will not rather exacerbate than calm political passions in this country. William H. McNeill , Captain, C. A. C., Asst. Military Attaché . Approved and forwarded: Sterling L. Larrabee , Lt. Colonel, G. S. C., Military Attaché . 1 Document No. 454, printed in vol. i . 2 Document No. 458, printed in vol. i . 3 Document No. 461, printed in vol. i . 4 Document No. 463, printed in vol. i 5 See vol. i , document No. 461, footnote 2 . * When asked whether the Turks were alarmed by this claim, Mr. Muzaffer Gorduysus, Turkish Consul at Komotiní with jurisdiction over the border area, smiled and shrugged his shoulders: “Not at all,” he said, “I have pointed out to my Greek friends that their Army would not get beyond our customs posts much less our frontier defenses.” [Footnote in the original.] 6 Not printed. † Despatch No. 1152 of June 6, 1945: [“] The Kutzo-Vlachs as a Disturbing Factor in Balkan Affairs ”. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.] 7 Mane Cuckov. ‡ Shantz’s press telegram No. 6 of June 21, 1945. [Footnote in the original; telegram not printed.] § The history of the Gosti movements is discussed in detail in … [a report from Athens dated] May 7, 1945. [Footnote in the orginal; report not printed.] 8 Vassilios. ║ A policy favored by Major General Boucher on the grounds of the collaborationist activities of the Slavophones and their lesser need. [Footnote in the original.] ¶ [A footnote which appears in the original at this point is not printed.] 9 Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031. No. 1072 The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Acting Secretary of State 868.00/7–1945: Telegram No. 1072 The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret urgent Athens , July 19, 1945—8 p.m. 730. There is obviously no comparison between situation Greece and Soviet “puppet regimes” (Department’s circular telegram June 18 2 ) and Moscow picture of Greece as country in throes anarchy and the monarchy-Fascist “terror” whose insatiable territorial ambitions menace “peaceful” neighbors is fantastic distortion. Following observations and recent figures this connection possibly of interest: (1). Despite admitted excesses by misguided Rightist groups and officials, which Government only gradually getting under control after last winter’s Leftist uprising, average citizen Greece enjoys far greater personal security, liberty than anywhere else Balkans. Leaders, including Communists, of bloody December uprising are at liberty and politically active and vocal. Press, all opinions including Communist, may be purchased any newsstand Athens. Answering EAM charges, Government states present prison population out of over seven million is 17,351. Of these 13,000 are held for common law crimes committed under EAM auspices and not amnestied Varkiza agreements; 3 2,000 are pro-German collaborators; rest are common criminals. (2). Granted Greek claims untimely and sometimes exaggerated for purposes internal politics, Greece is in no position use force and has furthermore denied categorically aggressive intentions impossible to carry out. Greek forces northern border Adriatic to Maritsa total only 7,000 National Guardsmen. Entire National Guard only 40,000. Greek regular army consists one newly raised, unequipped division Athens area. (British have one armored brigade and two under-strength divisions in Greece, one in north. According best reports Athens, these forces face 30,000 Albanians; 30,000 Yugoslavs and 24,000 Bulgars on Greek border plus quarter million Russians Bulgaria. On June 23 Greek Undersecretary Zakynthinos characterized KKE allegation Greek Government intended use force occupy north Epirus as “gross anti-national faction [ fiction? ], neither the Government nor the Army has considered disturbing Balkan peace by a coup”. Same spokesman said July 7: “Greece will on no account and under no circumstances have recourse to force”. MacVeagh 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 90 of July 21 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2145). 2 Not printed. 3 Of February 12, 1945, between the Greek Government and the National Liberation Front. Text in Woodhouse, Apple of Discord , p. 308. No. 1073 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 No. 1073 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 20, 1945 [Translation—Extract 1 ] The Yalta Declaration “On Liberated Europe” Russian Proposal Presented to Foreign Ministers, July 20, 1945 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … Moreover, the present Greek Government is breaking the peace with their neighbors and threatening Albania and Bulgaria with military action. All those circumstances create the necessity of taking urgent measures to eliminate such a situation in Greece. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 For the other portions of this proposal, see documents Nos. 804 and 1064 . 2 See ante , p. 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . No. 1074 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Bulgaria)/7–2045: Telegram No. 1074 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Caserta , July 20, 1945—1 p.m. 3002. General Oxley, head of British Delegation ACC, Bulgari[a,] reports that when he saw General Biryusov yesterday he asked him whether there was any basis for rumor that Russia[n] Army of Occupation in Bulgaria had been increased. General Oxley said that he himself had seen troops passing through Sofia and had also seen them moving through the country on his tour. (See our 2821, June 30. 2 ) Oxley said he preferred to ask Biryusov direct rather than give credence to rumors often exaggerated through malice. Therefore he asked Biryusov whether he would like to answer two definite questions: (1) Had Russian Army been increased and (2) if so, what was significance? He answered that Russian armies in southeast Europe were being regrouped due to withdrawal northeast from southern part of area made move through Bulgaria necessary. Biryusov then paused and Oxley asked whether they were going through Bulgaria to Russia. Biryusov paused again and then made reply which Oxley said astonished him somewhat. Biryusov said there were other countries beyond Bulgaria and that he did not know plans of General Staff in this connection. Biryusov then started questioning Oxley and said he understood British garrison in Greece had been increased largely. He added that Greek press was putting out highly inflammatory statements of which one was to effect that they proposed to march through Bulgaria to Moscow. He said he thought they could be thought of as a flea on an elephant’s back who feels that much stronger. Oxley observed that it was gratifying that British rate as an elephant. Oxley tried to allay his fears by pointing out that there had been no increase of British troops in Greece and Biryusov said he accepted tha[t] statement. Oxley then explained that Greeks were similar to Europeans and other Mediterranean races. As an excitabl[e] people sufferings they had undergone had only intensified that trait and that undue attention should not be given to irresponsible faction of press. Oxley assured Biryusov that if anything were worrying him at any time he had only to ask and Oxley would make every effort to give reliable information. Kirk 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 106 of July 23 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2345). 2 Not printed. No. 1075 The Chief of Mission in Albania (Jacobs) to the Acting Secretary of State 868.00/7–2145: Telegram No. 1075 The Chief of Mission in Albania ( Jacobs ) to the Acting Secretary of State top secret Tirana , July 21, 1945—4 p.m. 91. There was secret meeting of military command here last night to consider Greek situation. Understand that authorities fear Greeks with tacit approval of present high British military authorities? 1 ] in Greece will provoke border incidents and then ask British troops to occupy southern Albania to preserve “order and status quo ”. From remarks of British military officers here I believe some British military authorities at least desire opportunity for British troops to occupy southern Albania and group here seems unduly anxious that something will happen to prevent recognition provisional or otherwise, or [ of? ] present regime. Brig Hodgson and Col Palmer have left for southern Albania. Authorities here report that on July 9 band of armed Greeks crossed frontier near Konispol on coast south of Sarande and attempted to place two boundary pyramids on Albanian soil. Shots were fired and band retreated. Sent Dept as 91: reptd Caserta as 108; repeated Athens. On July 12 and 13 Greek soldiers attempted same thing at Bilisht east of Korçë and were driven away by gunfire. See first item enclosure my despatch 50, July 12 2 for fifteen other alleged incidents extending back to April. Yugoslavs now sending to Albania quantities of ammunition and some artillery which according to our sources being concentrated at Korçë and Gjinokastër where Albanian troops have gone. While I cannot say positively which side is stirring up these border incidents it seems certain now that they are taking place and my opinion is colored by Albanian point of view because it was the Greeks who started propaganda campaign on frontier problems and persecution. Jacobs 1 Words in brackets supplied to fill an apparent omission in the original. 2 Not printed. No. 1076 Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill 868.00/7–2245 No. 1076 Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill 1 [Extract 2 ] secret P. ( Terminal ) 25 Greece Memorandum by Mr. Churchill In view of the reference to Greece in the Soviet Memorandum, 3 I circulate the following two papers to the Conference. The first * is the report of Field Marshal Alexander.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W[ inston ] S. C[ hurchill ] Potsdam , 22nd July, 1945. [Annex I] Report by Field Marshal Alexander With reference to the Soviet Memorandum on Greece, the following points are submitted for the Prime Minister:— 1. The general feeling of the great mass of the Greek people is one of relief from terror, due to the presence of British troops. 2. We have in Greece a Headquarters under General Scobie, and two British Empire Divisions, i. e., the 4th British and 4th Indian, spread about throughout the country for the purpose of keeping law and order, and, as is well-known, British troops do their duty. 3. UNRRA is now functioning in Greece, which they were unable to do during the ELAS–EAM terror. 4. As regards the alleged Greek threat to Albania and Bulgaria, I must point out that the Greeks have so far only one Division, and this Division does not finish its training until October: while the 2nd and 3rd Divisions are only in cadre form and have not yet been formed. They will be ready in March, 1946. The National Guard are in process of being disbanded, and are gradually being replaced by a gendarmerie . Against this, the Yugoslavs have 52 Divisions, of which some 8 are in the area of Skoplje and the Greek frontier. The Bulgarians have an Army of some 18 Divisions, and the Albanians have 7 Divisions, of which 2 appear to be in Yugoslav Macedonia in close proximity to the Greek frontier. With regard to the relative forces facing each other, any suggestion of a Greek threat is unfounded. 5. The situation however is aggravated by a strong propaganda campaign by Press and radio emanating from Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. H. R. Alexander , F. M. [ Babelsberg ,] 21st July, 1945. 1 Printed from the mimeographed text circulated at the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 23. See ante , p. 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] . 2 For the full text of this memorandum, see document No. 1066 . 3 See document No. 1073 . * Annex i . [Footnote in the original.] No. 1077 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 760h.68/7–2445: Telegram No. 1077 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] July 24 [1945.] 117. The Embassy at Belgrade has received notes from the Yugoslav Foreign Office dated July 18 and 19 1 in substance as follows: Yugoslav Government deems it necessary to advise the United States Government of numerous violations by the Greek Government of principles of international law laid down in the Atlantic Charter, 2 the Declaration of [ by ] United Nations 3 and in the Charter of the United Nations to the detriment of Yugoslav co-national inhabitants of Aegean Macedonia (the Greek portion of Macedonia). These violations consist in the Greek Government not only failing to stop terrorism by unofficial organized gangs of Fascists, but also in its supporting such gangs and in persecutions committed by Greek regular forces. Statements of refugees and testimony of 20,000 Macedonian peasants forced to flee from Aegean Macedonia permit no doubt insofar as the Yugoslav Government is concerned that an organized systematic terrorism of Fascist pattern is being carried on in Macedonia against Yugoslav co-nationals for the purpose of compelling them to emigrate from Aegean Macedonia or to exterminate them. In addition to these persecutions and to publicity in the Greek press manifestly directed against Yugoslavia, Greek forces have also committed excesses by firing over Yugoslav southern frontier, which accumulation of developments leads the Yugoslav Government to believe that there are elements in Greece who desire Yugoslav-Greek relations to be other than correct and neighborly. Notes of similar content are being transmitted to the British and Soviet Embassies and instructions have been given to the Yugoslav representative at Athens to draw the attention of Greek Government to “necessity of eliminating this situation which is not in accordance with principles of international law.” Notes also contain details concerning alleged instances of looting, torture and murder of Macedonians by Greek soldiers and “other terrorists” and list six alleged incidents involving Greek shooting at the frontier. Although the notes do not specifically so state, they give the definite impression that the Yugoslav Government regards as within its province the protection of Greek-Macedonians, that is, Greek citizens of Slavic origin in Macedonia. From the foregoing and Athens’ no. 742 of July 23 repeated to Potsdam quoting the text of a note delivered by the Yugoslav Legation in Athens to the Greek Government, 4 it seems clear that this situation is developing to point where concerted international action is required. Such action might be agreed upon in the course of your present conversations or, if you prefer, the Department could approach the Soviet and British Governments through the Embassies in London and Moscow. You may also wish to consider whether the French Government should be asked to join these representations. In either case, if you approve, Department proposes to instruct Chargé Belgrade 5 to reply to Yugoslav notes in following sense and to advise Ambassador at Athens to inform Greek Government of substance thereof: Please inform Foreign Office, with reference to its communications of July 18 and 19, that the United States Government has given most urgent consideration to the views of the Yugoslav Government in regard to the situation described in those communications and welcomes the implication contained in the communication from the Yugoslav Government of July 18 that the matter should be resolved on an amicable basis in accordance with the principles of international law. The United States Government would be prepared to concert with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the USSR to offer its good offices to the Yugoslav and Greek Governments with a view to investigating Yugoslav charges of violations by the Greek Government in Greek-Macedonia of the principles of international law laid down in the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of United Nations and the Charter of the United Nations and to submitting recommendations for acceptance by the two Governments concerned. The Government of the United States is consequently inquiring of the British and Soviet Governments whether they would be disposed to join with the United States in making an offer in this sense and will communicate further with the Yugoslav Government in the premises in due course. Meanwhile, the United States Government expects that neither the Yugoslav Government nor the Greek Government, which is being similarly informed, will take any unilateral action which might further complicate the situation. [ Grew ] 1 Neither printed. 2 Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603. 3 Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1600. 4 At the request of the Greek Prime Minister, Admiral Petros Voulgaris, MacVeagh, in the telegram cited (file No. 760h.68/7–2345—not printed), had transmitted to the Department of State and directly to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg a translation of a note of July 23 from the Yugoslav Legation at Athens to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the gist of which is recorded in the second paragraph of document No. 1080 . MacVeagh had also reported to Washington and Babelsberg the Greek Prime Minister’s comments that the Yugoslav allegations of Greek persecutions in Macedonia were unfounded, that the Macedonians mentioned were “not Yugoslav ‘compatriots’ but Greek citizens”, that the Atlantic Charter was inapplicable to this situation “unless to Greek national rights now threatened”, that he felt that the Yugoslav note was intended to lay the basis for an invasion by the “Yugoslav Army or possibly irregular bands”, and that he placed his hopes in the Big Three to prevent this. 5 Harold Shantz. No. 1078 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 760h.68/7–2645: Telegram No. 1078 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 [Extract] secret Caserta , July 24, 1945—midnight. 3047. When we were in Belgrade on July 18 British Ambassador 2 at dinner with Shantz informed us that he had been instructed by ForOff to make strong representations to Yugo Govt with regard to propaganda of Belgrade radio, Yugo press and “inflammatory statements of responsible Yugo statesmen” on questions of Greek Yugo frontier and Venezia Giulia. Stevenson stated he had been instructed to seek an audience with Marshal Tito on Axis [ this ] subject. We have just seen two telegrams from British Ambassador Belgrade to FonOff reporting Stevenson’s conversations with Tito on this subject. After having heard Stevenson’s complaints, Tito replied that insofar as his personal declarations were concerned he felt that he was obliged to keep Yugo people informed as to developments in international position of Yugo. He added that Yugo propaganda in regard to Greek Yugo frontier was in retaliation to inflammatory attacks of Greek radio and press against Yugo. Tito went on to say that insofar as Yugo propaganda campaign re Venezia Giulia was involved British press was largely to blame and cited specifically articles in “ Nineteenth Century ” [and] “ Time and Tide ”. British Ambassador stated he could not accept this argument and suggested that it would be most desirable if Yugo Govt should settle any difficulties with Greek Govt by direct negotiation. Tito agreed to this suggestion and said he was ready to proceed at once with conversations to this end. British Ambassador’s message on this subject concluded with statement that he was not optimistic that Yugo press would change its present line. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kirk 1 A report on the British representations described in this message was included in telegram No. 113 of July 24 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2445). 2 R. C. Skrine Stevenson. No. 1079 The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 760h.68/7–2445 No. 1079 The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 1346 Athens , July 24, 1945. Subject: Violations of the Greco-Yugoslav Border. Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a report prepared for the War Department by Captain William H. McNeill, Assistant Military Attaché, concerning recent incidents on the Greco-Yugoslav border, which is of particular interest in relation to the Department’s information telegram No. 693 of July 16 1 mentioning the likelihood of exploratory raids across this frontier. The Department will observe that the incidents related are of a more serious character than those reported in my despatch No. 1282 of July 4 2 both by their nature and since they are apparently directed from a base established in or near Monastir for the express purpose of organizing forays into Greece with the object of stirring up trouble and disseminating Communist propaganda. Already on Greek soil one British soldier has been killed, one wounded, and a third taken prisoner by one of these bands. The Yugoslavs have also adopted an attitude of studied rudeness towards senior British officers desiring to parley about these incidents. While all reports reaching this Embassy from the Department and other Missions seem to agree that the present Soviet war of nerves is directed more against Turkey than Greece, these violations of the Greek border and the persistent press campaign against Greece would appear to indicate a desire to keep the pot boiling in this area as well. If the Russians decide to risk military action against Turkey, the possibility, discussed in my despatch No. 1331 of July 17, 3 of a preliminary or simultaneous drive by Yugoslav, Bulgar, and even ELASite puppet forces across the relatively undefended plains of Northern Greece to the Aegean should perhaps not be excluded. Respectfully yours, Lincoln MacVeagh [Enclosure] secret No. R 132–45 [Undated.] Greco-Yugoslav Border Incidents: 1. During the first two weeks of July 1945, the Yugoslavs have seemingly tried to foment trouble in Greek Macedonia and along the frontier. Several small bands of armed men have crossed the border into Greece, where they have spread Communist propaganda among the villagers, killed a small number of civilians and one British soldier, and exchanged occasional rifle shots with Greek and British patrols. Furthermore, on 12 July, a Yugoslav frontier guard detachment trespassed onto Greek soil, attacked the Greek frontier post opposite them, and took a National Guardsman prisoner. These events would appear to indicate that Yugoslav policy is in accord with Tito’s unfriendly references to the Greek Government in his speech of 8 July. 4 2. Approximately thirty separate reports of the presence of armed bands have been received by British HQ in Salonika. Reports are thickest from the mountain areas immediately around Fiorina, with a secondary center in the mountains north of Edessa. It is certain that these bands are in communication with Yugoslavia, for couriers have been intercepted bringing propaganda leaflets from across the border to them. They are probably operating loosely under the control of a central headquarters in or near Bitolj (Monastir). According to a Yugoslav political commissar in Bitolj, a special “raiding force”, organized into two brigades, each 2,500 strong, has been set up for operations in Greek Macedonia; but British authorities suspect that this story is a plant, and believe that the bands actually operating in the area are far weaker than the Commissar said, totalling perhaps not more than 500 men. Sweeping operations in the mountains by both British and Greek troops have resulted in only a few brushes with small groups of men, during which no prisoners were taken and no casualties occurred. 3. A frontier incident, involving the Yugoslav and Greek guard detachments on the road just south of Zhivojna (about 15 miles WNW of Fiorina), reflects a similarly aggressive attitude on the part of the Yugoslavs. The sequence of events is as follows: On 11 July a soldier from the Yugoslav frontier guard detachment deserted to the Greeks. Next day, the Yugoslavs accused the Greeks of having kidnapped the deserter and demanded his return. The demand was refused, and that night the Yugoslavs surrounded the Greek frontier post, and a brisk exchange of fire began. The Yugoslavs captured one of the Greek soldiers, and then withdrew to their own side of the frontier. 4. The next day, 13 July, Brigadier Saunders-Jacobs, commander of 5 Brigade, 4 Indian Division, came with the Yugoslav Consul from Salonika to investigate the incident, and, if possible, to effect an exchange of the prisoners. The Yugoslav Consul verified the Greek report that the Yugoslav soldier was a deserter and had not been kidnapped; but the brigadier could not find any Yugoslav officer with enough authority to order the prisoners exchanged. The officer who commanded the Yugoslav frontier detachment apparently behaved with calculated rudeness, spitting on the ground by Brigadier Saunders-Jacobs’ feet, and cracking a whip in the interpreter’s face. 5. The affair was further complicated by the fact that on the night 13–14 July a Greek soldier deserted from the frontier detachment, thus giving the Yugoslavs two bodies for one. A second meeting between British and Yugoslav officers, arranged for 15 July, failed to take place when the Yugoslavs did not show up at the appointed time. Thereupon the British decided to take no further initiative, and so the matter rests as of 18 July. Attempts to Propagandize: 6. Apparently the principal activity of these bands has been dissemination of propaganda. They have circulated in both Greek and Slavophone villages, saying that the Communists will soon be back, with the Russians behind them. In addition, about a dozen civilians have been murdered, though the motives for the killing are not always discernible. Near Fiorina, a number of KKE pamphlets were captured on 15 July, which proclaimed the initiation of a more active, aggressive policy, including the hold-up of British trucks and the arrangement of jail-breaks. The following day, a British truck was ambushed on the road between Edessa and Fiorina, and one British soldier was killed, one wounded, and a third taken prisoner. (The prisoner was released, stark naked, a few hours later.) Another British truck encountered an undefended block across the same road on the night 15–16 July. 7. The relation of these bands to the “Autonomous Macedonia Movement” is not clear. The personnel of the bands seems to be Greek rather than Slavo-Macedonian, comprising former ELASites who fled across the Yugoslav border in the early part of this year. So far as is known, autonomy for Macedonia has not figured in their propaganda. Comment: 8. It seems likely that the Yugoslav Government is deliberately seeking to create disorder in Greece for ends of its own. If the Slav minority in Greek Macedonia can be made into a world problem, the Yugoslav Government will thus acquire one more claim with which to bargain when it comes to the readjustment of frontiers at the Peace Conference. Furthermore, until the question of world relations between Russia and England has been amicably settled, the possibility of Yugoslav invasion of Greek Macedonia cannot be totally discounted. In such an eventuality, it would salve world opinion if there were “oppressed Slav brethren” to rescue from “reactionary terrorism”; and the best way to provoke such terrorism, is, of course, to send former ELAS bands across the border. William H. McNeill , Asst. Military Attaché , Captain, C. A. C. Approved and forwarded: Sterling L. Larrabee , Lt Colonel, G. S. C., Military Attaché . 1 Not printed. 2 Document No. 458, printed in vol. i . 3 Document No. 1071 . 4 See vol. i , document No. 461, footnote 2 . No. 1080 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) 760h.68/7–2345 No. 1080 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Kohler ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 25, 1945. Memorandum of Conversation Subject: Reaction to Tito’s Charges of Terrorism. Participants: Greek Ambassador 2 Mr. Henderson Mr. Kohler The Greek Ambassador called at his request to read us a telegram from his Government which may be summarized as follows: The telegram quoted the text of a note, dated July 23, received by the Greek Foreign Office from the Yugoslav Legation at Athens demanding that the Greek Government forthwith “bring to an end the terror and persecution directed against the population of Yugoslav origin in Aegean Macedonia and respect the rights of our minority” therein, that these persons have their property restituted and be paid reparations. (For full text see Athens’ no. 742, July 23, midnight, copy of which is attached 3 ). The Foreign Ministry considered this as undoubtedly a premeditated action against the security of the Greek State and particularly of Greek Macedonia. It did not want to consider this action as the forerunner of an attack but felt it could not rule out the possibility, particularly in view of the persistent circulation of rumors that such attack was planned for July 26. The Foreign Office considered the note unacceptable as direct intervention in Greek internal affairs. Greece had never recognized the existence of a Yugoslav minority and did not intend to do so. There were some Slavic-speaking people in northern Greece who had never been recognized or considered to be Yugoslav or Bulgarian nationals. Even if they had, Yugoslav interference could not be admitted. The Foreign Office therefore felt that it must avoid answering this note, as otherwise Greece would be unable to maintain her prestige as an independent state. The Greek Government had done everything possible to reestablish public order in northern Greece. Any Slavic-speaking refugees in Yugoslavia were certainly Greek collaborationists who had followed the Germans out of Greece in order to avoid the just action of Greek courts or else fugitive members of the ELAS some of whom had fled to Yugoslavia, taking hostages. In fact Yugoslav and Bulgarian bands had been making raids into Greek territory and had thus delayed the restoration of public order in northern Greece. In this connection the Foreign Office cited an attack on a British lorry near Fiorina. The Foreign Office believed that the Allies must consider this matter in connection with the evolution of Russo-Turkish relations, believing it possible that action was contemplated against Turkey simultaneously with an attack by Tito and Hoxha on Greece. The Foreign Office commented that the present Yugoslav démarche showed that no consideration had been given by Tito to the recent British and American representations on this matter. The Ambassador was instructed to see the Acting Secretary and to express the Greek Government’s hope that the British and American Governments would not fail to take the necessary steps and measures to terminate Tito’s aggressive tactics. For its part the Greek Government intended to take no action in this connection until it had received the views of the United States and British Governments. The Ambassador expressed alarm and grave apprehension at the state of relations between Greece and Yugoslavia. In commenting on the Yugoslav note, he drew particular attention to the phrase “Aegean Macedonian” [ Macedonia ] used therein instead of the usual terms “Greek Macedonia” or “Northern Greece”. The Ambassador requested and was assured that he would receive Mr. Henderson’s assistance in arranging for him to see the Acting Secretary. 4 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. The gist of this memorandum of conversation was included in telegram No. 150 of July 28 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2845). 2 Cimon P. Diamantopoulos. 3 Not printed See document No. 1077, footnote 4 . 4 Diamantopoulos called on Grew on July 27 and repeated the major points recorded in this memorandum. No. 1081 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 760h.68/7–2845: Telegram No. 1081 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Babelsberg , July 28, 1945. Victory 392. To Acting Secretary of State, Washington. Reference your 117, July 24 1 regarding notes of protest received by the Embassy at Belgrade from the Yugoslav Foreign Office concerning disturbances along the Greek-Yugoslav frontier. I concur in your belief that this situation can best be solved by an on the spot investigation of the Yugoslav charges. I do not believe that it is desirable to send a special mission into this area. Therefore your proposed reply should be amended to indicate that we are prepared to recommend the appointment of a commission composed of military and political representatives drawn from the present staffs of the American, British and Soviet missions in Belgrade and the American and British missions in Athens. It would be necessary for the Soviet Government to appoint a special group to collaborate with the Athens group. With this clarification I agree that you should proceed to take immediate action on this matter. Byrnes 1 Document No. 1077 . No. 1082 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) 740.0011 EW/7–2045: Telegram No. 1082 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Yugoslavia ( Shantz ) secret Washington , July 28, 1945—10 p.m. 220. Please inform Foreign Office, with reference to its communications of July 18 and 19, (Your teles 295 and 300, July 20 and 21 1 ) that the United States Government has given most urgent consideration to the views of the Yugoslav Government in regard to the situation described in those communications and welcomes the implication contained in the communication from the Yugoslav Government of July 18 that the matter should be resolved on an amicable basis in accordance with the principles of international law. The United States Government is prepared to recommend the appointment of a commission composed of military and political representatives drawn from the present staffs of the American, British and Soviet missions in Belgrade and the American and British missions in Athens to investigate charges of violations by the Greek Government in Greek Macedonia of the principles of international law laid down in the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration by United Nations and the Charter of the United Nations and to submit recommendations for acceptance by the two governments concerned. It would be necessary for the Soviet Government to appoint a special group to collaborate with the group drawn from the American and British missions in Athens. The Government of the United States is consequently inquiring of the British and Soviet Governments whether they would be disposed to join with the United States in this manner and will communicate further with the Yugoslav Government in the premises in due course. (Sent to Belgrade and repeated to Athens 2 ). Meanwhile, the United States Government expects that neither the Yugoslav Government nor the Greek Government, which is being similarly informed, will take any unilateral action which might further complicate the situation. Grew J[ohn] D H[ickerson] by W[alworth] B[arbour] 1 Neither printed. See document No. 1077 . 2 MacVeagh, in telegram No. 754 of July 28 (file No. 760h.68/7–2345) was instructed to inform the Greek Government of this communication to the Yugoslav Foreign Office. No. 1083 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1083 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 secret South-East Europe Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation The United Kingdom Delegation suggest that it might be desirable for the Conference to issue at its conclusion a statement on the following lines:— The three Heads of Government noted with regret that charges of aggressive action were being made by Governments in South-East Europe against their neighbours, and that fears were entertained of attempts to anticipate the peace settlement by violent and unilateral action. The three Heads of Government would be strongly opposed to any such attempts, which would be contrary to the principles for which the war has been fought and which are embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. They are confident that the Governments of the countries concerned, which have so recently suffered in common the trials of war and of Fascist occupation, will find peaceful means of solving their differences, and that their people will now be enabled to enter a period of prosperous and democratic development, on the lines laid down in such documents as the Varkiza Agreement 2 and the Tito-Ŝubašić Agreement. 3 Potsdam , 30th July, 1945. 1 Attachment 11 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . This proposal was apparently withdrawn by Bevin at the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, July 31. See ante , pp. 525 (footnote 46) [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . 2 Text in Woodhouse, Apple of Discord , p. 308. 3 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251 – 254 . No. 1084 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) 868.00/7–3145: Telegram No. 1084 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) 1 restricted Washington , July 31, 1945—7 p.m. 1710. Please inform FonOff in response to notes dated July 18 and 19 2 addressed by Yugo FonOff to US Embassy Belgrade charging Greek Govt with violations in Greek Macedonia of principles of international law laid down in Atlantic Charter, Declaration by United Nations and Charter of United Nations, that Embassy at Belgrade has been instructed to reply to Yugo FonOff that US Govt is prepared to recommend appointment of commission composed of military and political representatives drawn from present staffs of US, Brit and Soviet missions in Belgrade and US and Brit missions in Athens to determine whether or not Greek Govt has been or is violating in Greek Macedonia principles enunciated in documents referred to above and to submit recommendations for acceptance by two Govts concerned. US Govt will accordingly appreciate indication by Govt to which you are accredited as to whether that Govt is prepared to collaborate with US Govt in conducting such investigation and making such recommendations to Yugo and Greek Govts. It would, of course, be necessary for Soviet Govt to appoint special group to collaborate with group drawn from US and Brit missions in Athens. (Sent London and Moscow; repeated Belgrade and Athens.) For your info this matter was submitted to SecState at Potsdam and he concurs in this course of action. Also Greek Govt has been apprised of communication by US Embassy Belgrade to the Yugoslav Govt referred to above. Grew S[amuel] R[eber] 1 An identical instruction was sent to Winant at the same time as telegram No. 6375. 2 Neither printed. See document No. 1077 . No. 1085 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 760h.68/7–2845: Telegram No. 1085 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] July 31 [1945.] 167. Department is instructing Embassies Moscow and London to inform FonOffs of our recommendation of appointment of tripartite commission in accordance with urtel Victory 392, July 28, 1 and to solicit indication by FonOffs of agreement of Soviet and British Governments to collaborate in this matter. [ Grew ] 1 Document No. 1081 . No. 1086 The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Acting Secretary of State 760h.68/8–145: Telegram No. 1086 The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Athens , August 1, 1945—6 p.m. 781. I communicated to Prime Minister yesterday Dept’s reply Yugoslav Govt (your telegram 754, July 28 1 ). He made no comment pending possible direct reply my telegram 742, July 23. 2 Meanwhile, according Caccia British Chargé d’Affaires, no reply that connection received yet from London. However Caccia reports conversation with Tsamados Greek Under Minister Foreign Office according to which Greek Govt anxious not raise “Macedonian question” and believes Yugoslav Athens note probably due instructions following Tito–Stevenson conversation (Belgrade’s telegram 305, July 21 3 ) and “unorthodox style” possible result inexperience Yugo Secretary now Acting Chief Mission here. If these beliefs correct Tsamados said would be inclined suggest Greek Yugo Govts settle matter between selves possibly after arrival here new Yugo Minister who should be briefed with full details allegations his Govt desires make. However, while ready investigate alleged border incidents and discuss disposal Greek nationals who may have fled Yugo, Greek Govt would wish make clear in advance impossible agree any foreign Govt has right intervene concerning Greek nationals. Above appears indicate may be unnecessary place present question high international level at least so far as concerns Greece. Regarding alleged border incidents British investigating and British Acting Consul Gen Salonika 4 reports only three of six places mentioned Yugo’s note July 21 [ 19? ] 5 addressed Allied Missions Belgrade can be identified and seriousness can be judged by “the fact that no tank can approach within five miles junction Bulgar Yugo Greek frontiers and that only Greek detachment near Djevdjelija is station at Évzonoi (Matsíkovon) and not issued with mortars”. Regarding accusations persecution Slavophobes [ Slavophones ] in Greek Macedonia and exodus refugees Yugo, Caccia states “facts as known to us are that the numbers do not exceed about 5,000 including elements ELAS. Owing absence strict Greek frontier control due shortage Greek troops and Gendarmerie there has been no check individual movements into Yugo and difficult arrive correct figures. On other hand there is evidence armed bands crossing into Greece from Yugo and the two main bands so far identified are reported about 100 strong”. Recommend Dept refer enclosure my despatch 1346, July 24 6 made by American officer on spot. This officer now again Greek Macedonia with instructions continue reporting this subject. MacVeagh 1 Not printed. See document No. 1082, footnote 2 . 2 Not printed. See document No. 1077, footnote 4 . 3 Not printed. See document No. 1078 . 4 Alfred Hazell King. 5 Not printed. 6 Document No. 1079 . No. 1087 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 No. 1087 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 [Extract 2 ] top secret [ Washington ,] August 8, 1945. Berlin Conference Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Differences between Yugoslavia and Greece were discussed at various times during the Conference, the Soviets accusing the Greeks of aggressive designs against Yugoslavia and the British maintaining that the Belgrade and Moscow radios were circulating fantastic and unfounded stories to this effect. The British presented a proposal for a joint injunction to the Yugoslav and Greek Governments to avoid hostile action pending an impartial investigation 3 but, when the Soviets responded by introducing two proposals directed against Greece, 4 all three were withdrawn and no action was taken. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. For the minutes of the discussions summarized in this memorandum, see ante , pp. 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 152–154 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 2 For the other paragraph of this memorandum, see document No. 1205 . 3 The British proposal referred to is apparently document No. 1083 , although that paper did not refer to an impartial investigation of Yugoslav-Greek differences. During the course of the Conference, however, the United States proposed through normal diplomatic channels the appointment of an investigating commission (see document No. 1084 ). 4 The two Soviet proposals referred to are apparently documents Nos. 1211 and 1423 . See ante , pp. 525 (footnote 46) [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . General policy, revision of surrender terms, and conclusion of a peace treaty General policy, revision of surrender terms, and conclusion of a peace treaty [[Unnumbered document following Document 1087 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1088] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , July 16th, 1945. 740.00119 P. W./7–1645 [1089] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg, July 17, 1945.] Truman Papers [1090] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State Washington, July 18, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845 [1091] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg, July 20, 1945.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 [1092] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2145 [[Unnumbered document following Document 1092 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1093] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 9, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–945 Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1087 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Related papers are printed under the following headings: ( a ) Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers and Dissolution of the European Advisory Commission, ante , page 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 711 ] ; ( b ) United Nations—Admission of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, and Spain, ante , page 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 722 ] ; and ( c ) Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, ante , page 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 744 (#1)] and Doc. 745 ] . No. 1088 The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.00119 P. W./7–1645 No. 1088 The British Embassy to the Department of State [Extract 1 ] Aide-Mémoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. On the other hand, His Majesty’s Government were as anxious as [the] United States Government to proceed to the conclusion of the Italian peace treaty as soon as possible. They were also disposed to think that a public statement by the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments at Terminal that they were in favour of the early conclusion of a Peace Treaty would be desirable and have a useful effect in Italy and intended to recommend this course to the other interested Allied Powers. His Majesty’s Government had, therefore, already suggested that in any tripartite discussions on Italy at Terminal , the United Kingdom Delegation should propose that some such statement should be issued at the end of the Conference. We felt, however, that it was highly important that any such statement about the desirability of the early conclusion of an Italian peace treaty should be made in the names of all three Governments and that any unilateral statement by one of the Governments—and a fortiori any unilateral statement on the lines suggested by the State Department 2 —would be most unfortunate. 7. His Majesty’s Government hoped, therefore, that the State Department would agree to take no further action in the matter 3 until the question had been discussed at Terminal and until it had been decided whether any statement would be issued there on the subject of the conclusion of the peace treaty. The Foreign Office would inform the United Kingdom Delegation at Terminal of the position and hoped that the United States Delegation might be similarly informed by the State Department. Washington , July 16th, 1945. 1 For the first five paragraphs of this aide-mémoire , see document No. 722 . 2 See document No. 242, printed in vol. i , and document No. 723 , ante. 3 Of issuing a statement on the admission of Italy to the United Nations. No. 1089 Proposal by the United States Delegation Truman Papers No. 1089 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 top secret [ Babelsberg , July 17, 1945.] Policy Toward Italy The objectives of the three governments with regard to Italy are directed towards her early political independence and economic recovery, and the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government. Italy’s present status as co-belligerent and unconditionally surrendered enemy is anomalous, and hampers every effort both by the Allies and by Italy herself, to improve Italy’s economic and political situation. This anomaly can be finally solved only through the negotiation of a definitive peace treaty which would at best require some months. The preparation of such a treaty should be one of the first tasks of the suggested council of foreign ministers. 2 Meanwhile, however, improvement in the Italian internal situation would be greatly facilitated by some immediate interim arrangement whereby the Italian Government would have some tangible recognition of Italy’s contribution toward the defeat of Germany. It is therefore recommended that the short terms of surrender 3 and the numerous obsolete clauses of the long terms of surrender 4 be terminated, and replaced by certain undertakings on the part of the Italian Government to meet the requirements of the existing situation. These undertakings should provide: 1. That the Italian Government will refrain from any hostile action against any of the United Nations pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace. 2. That the Italian Government will maintain no military, naval or air forces or equipment, except as authorized by the Allies, and will comply with all instructions on the subject of such forces and equipment. Under this interim arrangement, control of Italy should be retained only so far as is necessary: a . To cover Allied military requirements, so long as Allied forces remain in Italy or operate therefrom. b . To safeguard the equitable settlement of territorial disputes. 1 Attachment 4 to the minutes of the First Plenary Meeting, July 17. See ante , p. 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . Cf. document No. 214, printed in vol. i . Dunn’s copy of document No. 214 bears the following notation in his handwriting: “Mr. Churchill speaks of difficulties of war for 2 years & losses of ships &c[.] Not in disagreement but wishes to study.” 2 See document No. 711 . 3 i. e., the Conditions of an Armistice, signed at Fairfield Camp, Sicily, September 3, 1943 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740). 4 i. e., the Instrument of Surrender of Italy, signed at Malta, September 20, 1943 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2742). No. 1090 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845 No. 1090 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret Washington , July 18, 1945. Memorandum for the Secretary of State The Italian Ambassador 1 called on me this morning and left with me the appended papers which he asked be sent to you for the President’s and your consideration during the present meeting at Potsdam. The Ambassador said that his Government is seriously worried about indications that a peace treaty for Italy might be drawn and that the British and Soviet Governments are inclined to make the terms as harsh as possible. He said that if this were done it would destroy Italian morale and make it impossible for Italy to recover its position in the world, which he believed was not in the best interests of the European nations. The Ambassador feared that the general lines for such a treaty would be laid down at the present meeting and would be accepted. He asks on behalf of his Government that the United States Government take a position at Potsdam which would avoid laying down harsh terms for Italy. Joseph C. Grew [Enclosure 1 2 ] The Italian Ambassador ( Tarchiani ) to the Acting Secretary of State N. 5760 Washington , July 18, 1945. My Dear Mr. Grew : I have just received from Rome instructions to officially thank the Department of State in the name of the Italian Government for the so encouraging assurances recently given to me and indicating the intention of the United States not to proceed to the signature of a treaty deemed inequitable or oppressive for Italy and to do their utmost, from the Potsdam Conference on, to avoid that such a tendency should prevail. My Government have also deeply appreciated the verbal communication according to which it was the expectation of the United States Government, that before any Italian peace treaty be put in final form, a full opportunity be offered to the Italian Government to discuss it and present their views. In consideration of the friendly spirit of such assurances, I want to convey to you personally the heartfelt and profound gratitude of my Government who have highly appreciated this new evidence of the purposes of equity and generous comprehension inspiring the United States toward the Italian nation, in the difficult international situation confronting it at the present time. Please accept [etc.] Tarchiani [Enclosure 2] The Italian Ambassador ( Tarchiani ) to the Acting Secretary of State N. 5759 Washington , July 18, 1945. My Dear Mr. Grew : My Minister of Foreign Affairs 3 has directed me to convey to the Department of State our deepest gratitude for the action taken with regard to our declaration of war against Japan and for the very valuable advice given us. 4 Mr. De Gasperi has instructed me to tell the Department of State that the Italian Government is placing its highest hopes in the action that the President of the United States of America may deem it fitting to take at Potsdam for the purpose of alleviating the terms of a peace treaty for Italy. The Foreign Minister has also asked me to inform you of the following views the Italian Government has on the matter. It is certain that, should particularly harsh peace terms be imposed upon Italy, even though not in the form of a veritable “ Diktat ”, thereby humiliating and thwarting the Italian nation, the orderly development of a working democracy in Italy would be seriously endangered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The basic necessity for Italy—as the Department of State fully realizes—is, at the present time, to be released from the Armistice terms, and to be internationally rehabilitated, so as to allow her to take part in the negotiations for the peace treaty in which she is concerned. If, therefore, the action of the President of the United States and of the American Delegation at the Potsdam Conference should encounter obstacles and difficulties …, the Italian Government would deem it more preferable if provisional solutions could be adopted which, although settling the fundamental problem of the moral and juridical status of Italy, would leave open the more controversial questions, such as those of Venezia Giulia, of the final settlement of the Italian colonies, and of the fleet (the latter being bound to constitute, in the firm intention of the Italian Government, an important part of the Italian contribution to the war against Japan). The Italian Government shall be extremely grateful to the United States if, were such a necessity to arise, they would consider it possible to withhold final decisions which would allow Italy to make some headway against opposing international currents, after having, of course, succeeded in attaining on a general basis her international rehabilitation. This would leave to time and to the evolution of the European events in general and of the Balkan situation in particular the possibility of working out with more chances of equitable solutions, a far-reaching and constructive European settlement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In bringing to your knowledge, according to instructions received, the above-mentioned viewpoints of the Italian Government, I shall be very grateful to you, Mr. Grew, if you will kindly communicate the foregoing to the President of the United States or to the American Delegation at Potsdam. I avail myself [etc.] Tarchiani 1 Alberto Tarchiani. 2 The enclosures are printed from the signed originals in the files of the Department of State (file No. 740.00119 EW/7–1845). 3 Alcide De Gasperi. 4 See vol. i , documents Nos. 236 (footnote 4) and 237 . No. 1091 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 No. 1091 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg , July 20, 1945.] Policy Toward Italy The objectives of the Three Governments with regard to Italy are directed toward her early political independence and economic recovery, and the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government. Italy’s present status as co-belligerent and unconditionally surrendered enemy is anomalous, and hampers every effort both by the Allies and by Italy herself, to improve Italy’s economic and political situation. This anomaly can be finally solved only through the negotiation of a definitive Peace Treaty which would at best require some months. The preparation of such a Treaty should be one of the first tasks of the suggested Council of Foreign Ministers, which should be invited to press on with the matter with the utmost expedition. Meanwhile the Three Governments should agree to certain steps which would afford some further acknowledgement of Italy’s contribution toward the defeat of Germany. As a first step in this direction the Three Governments should publicly announce their intentions as to the early conclusion of a Peace Treaty; coupled with an undertaking to provide Italy with such economic assistance as is practicable and reiterating the desirability of early elections in Italy. As a second step, the Allied Commission in Italy should be invited to accelerate the steps already taken to transfer increasing responsibilities to the Italian Government. Moreover, the Three Governments should agree to suspend those clauses of the terms of surrender which may now be considered as obsolete, retaining as active obligations on the part of Italy those provisions which would constitute undertakings on the part of Italy to assure: a . Compliance with Allied military requirements, so long as Allied forces remain in Italy or operate therefrom. b . Safeguards for the equitable settlement of questions regarding disposition of military or naval armament, reparations, territorial settlements, or other matters requiring detailed and technical study in the negotiation of the final peace treaty. c . The maintenance by the Italian Government of only the military, naval or air forces or equipment, as authorized by the Allies, and compliance with all instructions on the subject of such forces and equipment. To accomplish these purposes the Three Governments should agree to authorize their respective Ambassadors in Italy, 2 in consultation with the Supreme Allied Commander, 3 together to place before their respective Governments a report stipulating those provisions of the terms of surrender to be henceforth considered as inoperative, approval of the Three Governments then to be sought through diplomatic channels. 1 Authorship not indicated. This paper constitutes the enclosure to document No. 726 . 2 Alexander Kirk, American Ambassador: Sir Noel Charles, Bart., British High Commissioner; and Mikhail Alexeyevich Kostyiev, Soviet Ambassador. 3 Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander. No. 1092 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2145 No. 1092 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 21, 1945. Policy Toward Italy The objectives of the Three Governments with regard to Italy are directed toward her early political independence and economic recovery, and the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government. The Three Governments agree to certain steps which would afford some further acknowledgement of Italian contribution toward the defeat of Germany. 1. The Three Governments will publicly announce their intention to conclude a peace treaty with Italy at an early date coupled with an undertaking to provide Italy with such economic assistance as is practicable and reiterating the desirability of early elections in Italy. 2. The Allied Commission in Italy will accelerate the steps already taken to transfer increasing responsibilities to the Italian Government. 3. The Three Governments agree to instruct their respective Ambassadors in Italy, in consultation with the Supreme Allied Commander, together to place before their respective governments before September 1, 1945 a report stipulating those provisions of the terms of surrender to be henceforth considered as inoperative, for approval of the Three Governments. 1 Submitted to the Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 21, See ante , p. 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1092 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . No. 1093 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–945 No. 1093 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] August 9, 1945. Berlin Conference Italy Soviet Policy Stalin stated that he had no objection in principle to the United States proposal presented at the opening of the Conference providing for a considerable easing in the terms of surrender for Italy. 2 Pie motivated his support for this proposal by the same line of policy which he had advanced in connection with Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, i. e., the desire to detach these countries permanently from Germany and align them in interest and sentiment with the Allies. He was, however, totally unwilling to accept any action in regard to Italy which the United States and Britain were not willing to apply in equal measure to Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. This attitude on his part prevented any measures by the Conference on Italy other than those set forth in that section of the communiqué on “Conclusion of Peace Treaties and Admission to the United Nations Organization”. 3 The Soviets complained on several occasions that their representatives in Italy had not been accorded equal status on the Allied Control Commission and had not been consulted in advance in regard to many of the important measures of Allied policy taken in regard to Italy. The Soviets did not, however, press this issue but used it largely in an attempt to justify the procedures they had followed in the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. . . . . . . . British Policy Churchill delivered a strong indictment on the behavior of Italy before and during the war. He stated that he was willing to go along with some easing of the surrender terms but he was not willing to go as far as the United States proposal on this subject. He was also in agreement that the Council of Foreign Ministers should start the work of preparing a peace treaty for Italy but he did not believe it advisable for the Council to come to a conclusion until there had been free elections in Italy and until the Italian Government which consists now simply of politicians rests on a democratic foundation. He did not think the undertakings contained in the American proposal in substitution for the surrender terms went far enough since they did not cover the future of the Italian fleet, the Italian colonies, reparations, and other important points.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . There was no very clear indication of the attitude toward Italy by the new Labor Ministers except that they supported those portions of the communiqué having to do with the conclusion of the peace treaty with Italy and its admission to the United Nations.… 1 Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. For the other sections of this memorandum, see documents Nos. 738 and 1107. For the minutes of the discussions summarized in this memorandum, see ante , pp. 168–175 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 229–232 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 326–328 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 358–362 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 462–464 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 589–590 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 2 Document No. 1089 . 3 See document No. 1384, section x . Reparations Reparations [1094] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Acting Secretary of State Babelsberg, July 17, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745: Telegram [1095] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President [Babelsberg,] July 18, 1945. Truman Papers [1096] The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs (Reinstein) and the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) Babelsberg, July 18, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–1845: Telegram [1097] British Text of a Draft Report by the Economic Subcommittee [ Babelsberg ,] 21st July, 1945. Pauley Files [1098] The Washington Liaison Officer for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Kindleberger) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) [Washington,] July 21 [1945.] 740.00119 EW/7–2145: Telegram [1099] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg, July 24, 1945.] Truman Papers [1100] Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Babelsberg, July 24, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [1101] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945. Pauley Files [1102] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. Pauley Files [1103] United States Delegation Working Paper [Babelsberg,] July 25 [1945.] Pauley Files [1104] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [1105] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [1106] United States Delegation Memorandum [Babelsberg,] July 31, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [1107] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 9, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–945 No. 1094 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745: Telegram No. 1094 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Babelsberg , July 17, 1945. Victory –51. To Kindleberger and Wolf, White House, Washington for [Acting] Secretary of State from Pauley. Understand that Reinstein has been preparing materials on possible Italian reparations and restitutions. Urgently require outstanding features of this report. Cable summary to me at Tripartite Conference Headquarters Masterwork Berlin with particular emphasis upon what might be available for reparations and possible value of same. Send also estimates made by State and FEA as to value of imports required by Italy in order to maintain her economy over the coming year. (Repeat message for Sproul, c/o American Delegation, Allied Commission on Reparations, American Embassy, Moscow, for his information numbering the repeat message as follows Confrep 3.) No. 1095 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President Truman Papers No. 1095 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the President [ Babelsberg ,] July 18, 1945. Memorandum to the President It is important that we get a definite picture of what Generalissimo Stalin had in his mind yesterday when he raised the question of securing reparations from Italy. 1 As you know, Italy is going to be dependent on the United States for its sheer existence during the coming winter. The economic situation there verges on a state of almost complete economic disorganization. I understand that our Army representatives on the scene have estimated that the United States would have to ship approximately 750 million dollars worth of food and other materials into Italy in order to tide the country over until next spring. Investigations made by FEA place the figure at over a billion dollars, while the State Department estimates it to be no less than 500 million. Under these circumstances, it is quite evident that we can look for very little in the form of reparations from Italy. Indeed, in the final analysis, any reparations coining from there would in fact be a contribution from the taxpayers of the United States. We certainly cannot permit materials and equipment to be taken out as reparations when at the same time we are pouring in hundreds of millions of dollars to keep the Italian people alive. In order to clarify this issue fully, I am taking the liberty of suggesting that you ask the Generalissimo just what he has in mind when he talks about “reparations from Italy”. You might wish to ask him to be specific as to what he expects to take out and how large a sum he has in mind. Respectfully Edwin W Pauley 1 See ante , p. 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . No. 1096 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs (Reinstein) and the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls (Oliver) 740.00119 EW/7–1845: Telegram No. 1096 The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs ( Reinstein ) and the Acting Chief of the Division of Economic Security Controls ( Oliver ) 1 secret Babelsberg , July 18, 1945. Victory 77. To Acting SecState Washington for Reinstein and Oliver from Collado. The Soviets have touched on subject of Italian reparations (ref Lubin’s telegram to Kindleberger 2 ). My tentative view is no reparation claim against Germany 3 and no current or productive capital goods payments by Italy. We should allow restitution from Germany limited to works of art, et cetera, and should require restitution by Italy of such articles. Perhaps we should allow some token deliveries to Greece and Ethiopia. Presumably Latin American and other nations will satisfy claims for ship sinkings, et cetera, by holding on to Italian external assets. What are your views on U. S. position on this point, and your comments on entire Italian reparations and restitution problem? Send immediately background information on Italy’s relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction needs, her overseas assets, her shipping position, et cetera. Also background material on our attitude and actions with respect to Finnish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian reparations, none of which was included in my papers. 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Byrnes. 2 See document No. 1094 . 3 i. e., by Italy. No. 1097 British Text of a Draft Report by the Economic Subcommittee Pauley Files No. 1097 British Text of a Draft Report by the Economic Subcommittee 1 [Extract 2 ] Draft Report of the Economic Sub-Committee of the Foreign Secretaries on the Subject of the Liability to Reparations of Italy and Austria The Sub-Committee have regarded it as outside their competence to discuss the question whether reparations should or should not be exacted from Italy and Austria on political grounds. From the economic point of view, the Committee make the following report. A. Italy Italy is at present indebted to the United States Government and the U. K. Government for relief supplies for the civilian population and for supplies to the Italian Forces. The debt at present stands at about $500 million and the debt will be further increased before the existing arrangements can be terminated. The discharge of this debt would, in the view of the Sub-Committee exceed the capacity of Italy to make external payments for many years to come. Neither the United States Government nor the U. K. Government are prepared to grant financial facilities to Italy for the purpose of enabling her to pay reparations. It is also certain that UNRRA will not be prepared to send supplies to Italy free of cost in order to enable Italy to pay reparations. 2. The Committee suggest that further consideration should be given to the question of Italy making compensation in other ways to the Allied countries chiefly concerned, including Greece and Yugoslavia. Italy might, for example, be required to contribute, free of charge, anything needed by UNRRA for these Allied countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S. D. W[ aley ] [ Babelsberg ,] 21st July, 1945. 1 Printed from the ribbon copy, which bears only uncertified typed initials. 2 For the section of this draft dealing with Austria, see document No. 765 . No. 1098 The Washington Liaison Officer for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Kindleberger) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) 740.00119 EW/7–2145: Telegram No. 1098 The Washington Liaison Officer for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Kindleberger ) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 21 [1945.] 87. (For Pauley from Kindleberger. Repeat to Collado from Reinstein.) Reference Victory –51, July 17. 2 1. Italian reparations. Following is summary of proposals on Italian reparations and restitution being prepared by Reinstein. Proposals have not been fully discussed and do not have Department approval. a . From American policy viewpoint, highly undesirable that Italy be compelled to pay reparations. Economic security considerations not present which would call for plant removals, although some minor possibilities in armament and related fields might exist. Italy will require large external financial assistance for some time, most of which will have to come directly or indirectly from U. S. In view of Italian economic situation, any current reparations program would be paid largely by U. S. b . It may not be practical from political viewpoint to insist on complete exclusion of reparations. Greece, Yugoslavia and Ethiopia have suffered from Italian aggression and will press claims strongly probably with backing by USSR of Yugo claim and by British of Greeks. UK, France, and probably USSR all will also press claims. c . It will probably be necessary to consider token reparations to Greece, Yugo and possibly Ethiopia. US should seek to hold these to a minimum. Any reparations made by Italy should assume form which will involve no direct foreign exchange outlay, and lowest possible indirect exchange costs. Labor services and processing of imported raw materials furnished by reparations recipients offer some limited possibilities. If labor services used, some form of international supervision essential. Removal of plant for armament or related purposes such as aircraft manufacturing depends on decisions regarding Italian disarmament on which US position undetermined. Italian merchant shipping should not be taken for reparation purposes as it is important source foreign exchange earnings. d . US should resist strongly anything beyond foregoing and particularly payments to larger powers, except to extent payment can be made from Italian assets in claimant countries. e . US war claims not available but claims are principally for shipping losses. Some are for US government account, others for insurance companies which covered by premiums. These claims should not be pressed. Claims for war damage to American owned companies in Italy should be paid in lire, companies to be provided with foreign exchange cover for import needs within limits Italian reconstruction program. Settlement for minor claims, such as personal property losses, ship losses not covered by insurance, can be made directly between Italy and US possibly within limits of some agreed sum. f . Italian prewar debts to US more important than war claims. Consist principally of dollar bonds, which Italian Government already informally indicated desire to refund and service after period of grace, with Italian Government assuming obligations of private debtors and municipalities. Solution of debt problem along these lines highly desirable. US should not object to full settlement of pre-war debts to other countries but should press for period of grace, possibly three to five years, during which payments would not be made out of current earnings in foreign exchange. This necessary to prevent immediate siphoning off of external financial aid and would also discourage full use of Italian assets to meet war claims. Similar arrangements should be made with neutrals on pre-war debt. Swiss and other neutral credits extended during Italian belligerency against us should be wiped out. g . Treatment of Italian assets abroad. Allied countries would be allowed to seize and liquidate Italian assets in their territories to pay claims and debts. Possible exception of right of seizure should be made of $140 million in gold held by British as collateral for World War I debts, to be subject separate negotiation whenever these debts settled. Assets in US $75 million of which $15 million vested by Alien Property Custodian. Further vesting, already suspended, not desirable. Italian assets not vested should be left under direct control of Italian Government, subject to freezing control of US Treasury. Mobilization of private cash and portfolio security holdings should be required, but liquidation small Italian real estate for example should not be forced. If satisfactory settlement of financial questions along lines of foregoing is worked out, Italian assets in US should be released from Treasury control and assets vested by Alien Property Custodian (except patents) should be returned to owners. Patents require further consideration. Italian assets in neutral countries should not be used to pay reparations. h . Restitution. Only known restitution claim against Italy of significance is for $10 million gold of Yugoslav National Bank. This is presumably with gold carried away by Germans and reported captured by American forces in North Italy. Subject to review of facts, recommend restoration of this gold to Italy with requirement full reimbursement to Yugoslavia. Gold claims by Albania may also exist and should, if proved, be satisfied. Restitution of art works should also be required. Restitution of plant equipment, rolling stock, etc. where identifiable recommended if no reparations policy agreed to. May be desirable if reparations can be held to genuine token amounts. 2. Italian claims against Germany. Italy should be given no share in German reparations unless admitted to the United Nations prior to determination of shares. If this should occur, further consideration necessary. Italy should be allowed restitution of art works. Whether admitted as restitutions claimant for other property depends on ( a ) political decisions on Italy’s status, ( b ) general restitutions policy. No specific recommendation made, but suggest consideration restoration on limited basis of property removed by Germans after recognition of Italian co-belligerency, particularly rolling stock. German holdings in Italy should be liquidated. Italy should be allowed to retain German assets in Italy except gold and foreign currency. (On this point there has been disagreement in discussions within the Department.) 3. Italian import requirements. In view lack of detailed information on conditions in Northern Italy, satisfactory estimate Italian requirements coming year not available. Best estimate present information is $700 to $800 million, which would provide basic food, raw materials and modest amount reconstruction. Estimate deficit in Italian balance of payments next twelve months which must be covered by foreign financial assistance $500 million. Substantial amount required next twelve months with continuing aid at reduced level for several years at least. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 Document No. 1094 . No. 1099 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Truman Papers No. 1099 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg , July 24, 1945. 2 ] Regarding Reparations From Italy (1) To establish the total sums of reparations from Italy at $600,000,000. (2) Italy must bear the expense of the established reparations over a period of six years with deliveries of products of Italian industry and agriculture. (3) Reparations from Italy must serve as compensation of losses caused by the participation of Italy in the war to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States of America, Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania. 1 Enclosure 2 to the Rapporteur’s report of the Ninth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 27. See ante , pp. 446–447 [ Pgs. 446–447 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] . This proposal was submitted, however, at the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 24. See ante , p. 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . 2 A translation in the Pauley Files is so dated. Cf. footnote 1, supra. No. 1100 Report by the Economic Subcommittee 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 1100 Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Extracts 1 ] top secret [ Babelsberg , July 24, 1945. 2 ] Second Report of the Economic Sub-Committee to the Foreign Ministers 1. The Economic Sub-Committee regrets to have to report that after extensive discussions of the problems of German, Austrian, and Italian reparations, it has failed to come to agreement and consequently must refer these matters back to the Foreign Ministers for decision. 2. The Sub-Committee has recognized the liability of Germany, Austria, and Italy to exactions on account of reparation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. The Soviet representatives believe Austria capable of delivering the equivalent of $250,000,000 in kind over six years, and Italy the equivalent of $600,000,000, particularly as Italy and Austria will no longer have their former military expenditures. 3 The British and American representatives, on the other hand, point out that both Austria and Italy will require aid from abroad for some time to come, that the U. K., U. S. and Canada have already supplied more than $500,000,000 of goods to Italy to prevent disease and unrest, and that any reparations deliveries from these countries would in fact be financed by the nations supplying such goods. They are thus unable to agree to the imposition of any reparation levies on the current production of Austria and Italy. They would be prepared to consider the possibility of certain once-for-all removals of machinery and equipment from direct war industries having no peace-time utility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 For the other sections of this report, see documents Nos. 923 and 1322 . 2 So dated in the “Index of Attachments to Summary of the Negotiations in the Economic Sub-Committee” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145). 3 A variant version of this document (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145), identical with this paper in other respects, has the following final clause in this sentence: “particularly as in the case of Italy she will no longer have her former military expenditures.” No. 1101 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 1101 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 24, 1945. United States Position on Reparations From Italy 1. Greece, Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia, shall file a statement of the nature and amount of their claims for reparations from Italy with the Allied Commission for Italy prior to November 1, 1945. 2. The Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States will consider such claims, in consultation with other governments concerned, for the purpose of determining the extent to which and the manner in which Italy shall be required to make compensation for the losses suffered by these countries. 1 Authorship not indicated. No. 1102 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 1102 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. United States Position on Compensation for War Losses From Italy 1. Greece, Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia, shall file with the Allied Commission for Italy prior to November 1, 1945, a statement of the nature and amount of the damage suffered by them as a result of Italian military action. 2. The Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States will consider such claims, in consultation with the other governments concerned, for the purpose of determining the extent to which Italy shall be required to make compensation by deliveries which will not in any way place any burden for supporting the Italian peacetime economy on any other country. 1 This document is apparently an alternative to document No. 1103 . It bears the manuscript notation “JD” [Josiah DuBois?]. No. 1103 United States Delegation Working Paper Pauley Files No. 1103 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 25 [1945.] Reparations From Italy 1. Greece, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and any other United Nation which claims to be entitled to reparations from Italy shall file a statement of the nature and amount of such claim with the Allied Commission for Italy prior to November 1, 1945. 2. The Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States will consider such claims, in consultation with the other governments concerned, for the purpose of determining the extent to which and the manner in which Italy shall be required to make compensation for the losses suffered by other countries as a result of Italy’s participation with Germany in the war. 1 This document is apparently an alternative to document No. 1102 . It bears the drafting initials “JD” [Josiah DuBois?]. No. 1104 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1104 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Regarding Reparations From Italy and Austria Soviet Proposal 1. Italy and Austria must pay reparations in compensation of those losses which they caused the United Nations by their participation in the war on the side of Germany. 2. Reparations shall be paid in the form of immediate removals of equipment from those branches of their economy which are the most important elements of their military potential. Such removals should be concluded during a period of one year. 3. The total sum of reparations from Italy shall be established at three hundred million dollars. The Allied Reparations Commission shall define the amount of reparations from Austria. 4. Italy shall pay reparations to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania; and Austria to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 1 Attachment 15 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . Molotov had given Byrnes a copy of this proposal at a private meeting immediately preceding the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. See ante , p. 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] . No. 1105 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1105 Proposal by the British Delegation [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Italian Reparations British Proposal Italy shall be liable to make reparation to those of the United Nations against which she went to war. It is recognized, however, that such reparation must not be at the expense of those States which are furnishing or may continue to furnish Italy with minimum essential supplies or at the expense of the maintenance of Italy’s economic stability. It is recommended that the Council of Foreign Ministers should deal with the problem on this basis when considering the Italian peace treaty. No. 1106 United States Delegation Memorandum 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 1106 United States Delegation Memorandum 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 31, 1945. U. S. Statement Italian Reparations The United States Delegation, in accordance with the statement made by its representatives on the Economic Subcommittee, is unable to agree to the imposition of any reparations levies on the current production of Italy. The United States Delegation would be prepared to consider the possibility of certain once-for-all removals of designated machinery and equipment from direct war industries in Italy having no peacetime utility. 1 It has not been determined whether this statement was actually made or circulated at the Conference. No. 1107 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–945 No. 1107 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 [Extracts 2 ] top secret [ Washington ,] August 9, 1945. Berlin Conference Italy Soviet Policy . . . . . . . . On two occasions the Soviets presented proposals in regard to the imposition of reparations on Italy. 3 The United States and Britain refused to agree except in the case of delivery of capital equipment from war industries having no peacetime utility. No decision was taken on this matter. British Policy … On reparations he 4 said that the British did not wish them for themselves but were thinking of Greece. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … They 5 also strongly supported the United States position on Italian reparations. 1 Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. For the minutes of the discussions summarized in this memorandum, see ante , pp. 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 174–175 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 464–465 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] . 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see documents Nos. 738 and 1093 . 3 Documents Nos. 1099 and 1104 . 4 i. e., Churchill. 5 i. e., Attlee and Bevin. Retention of Allied forces and of a combined command in Italy Retention of Allied forces and of a combined command in Italy [1108] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Washington [Babelsberg], 17 July 1945. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–1745 [[Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1109] The Assistant to the President’s Personal Representative at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Acting Secretary of State Vatican City, July 30, 1945—3 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–3045: Telegram No. 1108 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–1745 No. 1108 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President top secret Washington [ Babelsberg ], 17 July 1945. Memorandum for the President The Joint Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to the memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President dated 4 July 1945 on the subject of “Retention of Allied Forces in Italy.” 1 In his memorandum the Secretary of State proposed that five Allied divisions, in addition to the two in Venezia Giulia, be retained in Italy until major problems are settled. This will require the retention in Italy of one U. S. division in addition to the present estimate of one for the Venezia Giulia commitment. Under present redeployment plans there will be excess U. S. forces in Italy until December, 1945 and in Europe until April, 1946. It is thus not necessary at this time to accept a commitment to retain additional forces in Italy, and it is militarily undesirable to make a commitment for their retention until the situation requiring the presence of those forces becomes more apparent. Sufficient air forces remain in Europe even after redeployment to provide any necessary show of air forces in Italy. In view of the above it is suggested that the question of the desirability of retaining additional United States forces in Italy be reexamined late in 1945, in the light of the situation as it will have developed. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken the position with the Combined Chiefs of Staff that a review of the situation in Italy should be made about 1 September 1945, with a view to early dissolution of the Allied Command, Mediterranean. 2 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: William D Leahy Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. 1 Document No. 473, printed in vol. i . 2 See vol. i , document No. 479 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the action taken at the Conference on this subject by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see volume I, document No. 479, footnote 3 . No. 1109 The Assistant to the President’s Personal Representative at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–3045: Telegram No. 1109 The Assistant to the President’s Personal Representative at Vatican City ( Tittmann ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Vatican City , July 30, 1945—3 p.m. 180. My 155, June 26. 2 Brigadier General Hume[,] Sr Civil Affairs officer Allied Military Govt, after audience with Pope July 28, reports burden of Pope’s conversation was his concern lest Allied troops be withdrawn from Italy before conditions become normal again. Gen Hume said other highly placed ecclesiastics of his acquaintance in Rome including two Cardinals took occasion of his presence here now to speak emphatically to him in similar vein. Tittmann 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 169 of July 31 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–3145). 2 Not printed. Admission to the United Maritime Authority Admission to the United Maritime Authority [1110] The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Washington,] July 18 [1945.] 800.85/7–1845: Telegram No. 1110 The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 800.85/7–1845: Telegram No. 1110 The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 18 [1945.] 57. For Clayton. Following is for your information in event Admiral Land’s attendance at conference leads to discussion of question of inviting Italy to join United Maritime Authority. Italy has intimated its desire to be invited to join UMA and British Foreign Office has inquired as to Department’s views. Foreign Office suggests awaiting conclusion peace treaty with Italy. We have been discussing subject informally with WSA. Opinion within Department leans toward extending invitation now, in line with broad general policy of promoting resumption of responsible Italian participation in international affairs and strengthening Italian political and economic status. WSA considers invitation inopportune at this time for fear of jeopardizing smooth operations UMA. Its opposition is based on (1) apprehension of French, Greek and Yugoslav resentment, (2) belief that Italian political status first be clarified as by admission Italy to United Nations and (3) doubts as to competence Italian authorities and shipping operators to function in accordance with UMA requirements. We are not fully in concurrence these objections insofar as they touch on political relations and contemplate requesting more detail as to question of competence, particularly as to steps Italy would have to take to remove this objection. However at WSA request we intend to leave issue in statu quo until Admiral Land’s return particularly as WSA state they are taking steps meanwhile to improve Italian position by substituting specific charter arrangements in place of Admiral Cunningham Agreement 2 as basis for control of Italian ships, by considering possibility of including provisions in charters to compensate Italy for shipping services, and by formulating with Ministry of War Transport arrangements for greater Italian participation in UMA operations in Zone III Mediterranean area. 3 [ Grew ] 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg. 2 i. e., the Memorandum of Agreement on the Employment and Disposition of the Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine of September 23, 1943. Text in United States and Italy, 1936–1946: Documentary Record (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946; Department of State publication No. 2669), p. 53. 3 Concerning the discussion of this subject at the Berlin Conference, see ante , pp. 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] . Proposed appointment of James H. Douglas, Jr., as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission Proposed appointment of James H. Douglas, Jr., as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission [1111] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Rome, July 17, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–1745: Telegram [1112] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) Washington, July 19, 1945—4 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–1745: Telegram [1113] The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the War Department Babelsberg, 19 July [19]45. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1114] The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs (Reber) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews) [Washington,] July 20 [1945.] 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2045: Telegram [1115] The Director of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs (Reber) Babelsberg, July 27, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2745: Telegram [1116] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) Washington, July 27, 1945—8 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2645: Telegram No. 1111 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–1745: Telegram No. 1111 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State plain Rome , July 17, 1945. 2010. Most Rome papers this morning carry United Press item stating that Colonel James Henderson Douglas will arrive in Italy probably on July 24 to assume post of Chief Commissioner of Allied Commission replacing Admiral Stone (see my 1877, July 7th 1 ). Kirk 1 Not printed. No. 1112 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–1745: Telegram No. 1112 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) secret Washington , July 19, 1945—4 p.m. 1205. Dept has not yet received British concurrence (urtel 2010, July 17 1 ) in appointment of Douglas as Chief Commissioner of AC. Grew S[amuel] R[eber] 1 Document No. 1111 . No. 1113 The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the War Department Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1113 The Assistant Secretary of War ( McCloy ) to the War Department secret urgent Babelsberg , 19 July [19]45. Victory 98. To AG War for Chanler, Civil Affairs Division for Colonel James H. Douglas from McCloy. Prospective appointment of Col James H. Douglas is subject. Have discussed Douglas’ appointment with Alexander. 1 We have agreed with him that the announcement quoted below will be made simultaneously from London and Washington at a time to be set as soon as Douglas cables me that the announcement is agreeable to him. Announcement follows: “It was announced that Colonel James H. Douglas, former Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury[,] would leave shortly to study economic conditions in Italy, preparatory to his eventual assumption of the position of Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission in Italy when steps are taken to alter the military character of the commission. “Colonel Douglas will resign his commission which he now holds in the Army before assuming such a position and in the meantime will be given an opportunity to make himself familiar with conditions in Italy. The present Chief Commissioner of the council is Rear Admiral Ellery Stone who has occupied the position during the military phase and has performed most valuable services during the critical stages of the Italian recovery during and following the conduct of the military campaign in Italy. Admiral Stone will continue as the Chief Commissioner until the completion of the military phase.” 2 Alexander would propose that Douglas proceed shortly (probably not until close of Terminal conference so that Alexander will be there to receive him) to Italy as his guest but without taking office as Chief Commissioner at this time to become familiar with the situation on the spot and then to return to Washington and make report. About 1st September or thereabouts Douglas would then return to Italy and take office relieving Admiral Stone at that time. I believe that this arrangement is desirable and hope Douglas will approve of it promptly. Alexander is much pleased by Douglas’ appointment but anxious to make this arrangement in order to conform to his plans for placing commission on civilian status. Every precaution should be taken to avoid any further announcements until authorized from here. 1 See ante , p. 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] . Douglas’ appointment was also discussed at the 196th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, July 19. See ante , p. 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] . 2 This announcement was never issued, as Douglas declined the proposed appointment. No. 1114 The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs (Reber) to the Director of European Affairs (Matthews) 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2045: Telegram No. 1114 The Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs ( Reber ) to the Director of European Affairs ( Matthews ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 20 [1945.] 76. For Matthews from Reber. Please see Douglas’ telegram to McCloy of today’s date. 2 He expresses personal regret to you and Clayton. I can not but share his views and consider the situation would have to be completely reviewed in the light of what appears to have been the decision to make no change until after the military phase has terminated. We feel that it is important that some decision regarding the future of the Commission after that date be made if possible during your present conversations. As you know UNRRA’s assumption of responsibility for supply to Italy, although still undetermined, is nevertheless hoped for at an early date. We recognize this may preclude any decision now. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 Not printed. Douglas declined the prospective appointment. No. 1115 The Director of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs (Reber) 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2745: Telegram No. 1115 The Director of European Affairs ( Matthews ) to the Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs ( Reber ) 1 secret Babelsberg , July 27, 1945. Victory 380. To the State Department for Reber from Matthews. I have been in close touch with McCloy, who sent another personal telegram 2 to Douglas yesterday. I hope you will do your best to persuade Douglas to reconsider and convince him of the State Department’s real interest in having him take the job. Regardless of the unfortunate handling of this question in the past, I know that Marshal Alexander is sincerely anxious for Douglas to take the post of Chief Commissioner. No decision has been made with regard to any date for terminating the Allied Commission’s activities and even when that does take place, it is our thought that Douglas would continue on as Chief Economic Adviser in any machinery set up for helping Italy solve her problems. There is a vitally important job to be done, and I know Douglas is the best man to do it. 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State. 2 Not printed. No. 1116 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2645: Telegram No. 1116 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) secret Washington , July 27, 1945—8 p.m. 1256. Appointment of Douglas as Chief Commissioner (urtel 2108, July 26 1 and previous) depends upon outcome of Potsdam discussions. Douglas does not desire to proceed to Italy for consultation prior to definite appointment about September 1, as suggested by SACMed, and has requested that his nomination be withdrawn. McCloy is now discussing situation further with British officials, and you will be informed as soon as final decision is reached. 2 Grew J[ohn] D H[ickerson] 1 Not printed. Cf. document No. 1111 . 2 Douglas’ decision not to accept the proposed appointment was final, but no message to Kirk informing him of this fact has been found. Government and elections; liquidation of the affairs of the Government-in-Exile Government and elections; liquidation of the affairs of the Government-in-Exile [1117] The Acting Secretary of State to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg [Washington,] July 17, 1945. 860c.01/7–945 [1118] The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Secretary of State Berlin, [July 17, 1945.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745 [1119] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Caserta, July 18, 1945—10 a.m. 860c.00/7–1845: Telegram [1120] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 18, 1945 Truman Papers [1121] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg, July 19, 1945.] 023.1/9–1454 [1122] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State London, July 19, 1945—5 p.m. 860c.00/7–1945: Telegram [1123] The Deputy Political Adviser at Allied Force Headquarters (Offie) to the Secretary of State Allied Force Headquarters, July 20, 1945. 860c.20/7–2045 [1124] The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Washington,] July 20 [1945.] 860c.85/7–2045: Telegram [1125] The Acting War Shipping Administrator (Conway) to the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator (Morse) [Washington,] July 20 [1945.] 860c.85/7–2045: Telegram [1126] The War Shipping Administrator (Land) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator (Morse) to the Acting War Shipping Administrator (Conway) Babelsberg, 21 July [19]45. 862.85/7–2145: Telegram [1127] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Acting Secretary of State Babelsberg, July 21, 1945. 860c.85/7–2145: Telegram [1128] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, July 21, 1945—1 p.m. 860c.01/7–945: Telegram [1129] Report by the Subcommittee on Poland [Babelsberg,] 21st July, 1945. 023.1/9–1454 [1130] Text Considered by the Heads of Government Berlin, July 21, 1945. Truman Papers [1131] Text Approved by the Heads of Government [Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945. 860c.01/7–2145 [1132] The Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board (Carnwath) and the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration (Monroe) to the War Shipping Administrator (Land) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator (Morse) [London,] 21 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1133] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the United States Delegation Moscow, 22 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1134] The War Shipping Administrator (Land) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator (Morse) to the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration (Monroe) and the Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board (Carnwath) Babelsberg, 23 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1135] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State London, July 23, 1945—8 p.m. 860c.01/7–2345: Telegram [1136] Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) [Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945. 860c.01/8–945 [1137] Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) [Undated.] 860c.01/8–1445 [1138] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State London, July 24, 1945—7 p.m. 860c.00/7–2445: Telegram [1139] The Appointed Ambassador to Poland (Lane) to the Acting Secretary of State Paris, July 24, 1945—11 p.m. 124.60c/7–2445: Telegram [1140] The Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Modzelewski) to the Secretary of State Potsdam, July 30, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [1141] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State London, August 1, 1945—6 p.m. 860c.01/8–145 Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 1141 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1142] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 8, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 No. 1117 The Acting Secretary of State to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg 860c.01/7–945 No. 1117 The Acting Secretary of State to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg [ Washington ,] July 17, 1945. 1 My Dear Senator Vandenberg : I have received your letter of July 9, 1945 2 in which you raise several questions concerning the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, recently established in Warsaw, and the United States Government’s policy toward that Government. For greater convenience to you, I have considered individually, in the order of their appearance in your letter, your several statements and questions: 1. “There still seems to be no clear assurance that the Polish people will themselves have the final opportunity of untrammeled self-determination under this new Provisional Government which is imposed upon them by Britain, Russia and the United States, within Polish boundaries similarly dictated by these external powers.” Since the rival Polish groups in Poland and in London were unable to settle their differences, it was decided at Yalta to set up a Commission, composed of Mr. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R., Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to the U. S. S. R., and Mr. W. Averell Harriman, American Ambassador to the U. S. S. R., which would be empowered to bring these groups together in order that members of the Polish provisional government then functioning in Warsaw and other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad could consult with a view to the reorganization of the provisional government on a broader democratic basis, and the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity with which the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union could establish, diplomatic relations. 3 Arrangements were finally made to bring the three groups of Poles together and they met in Moscow between June 17 and June 21 to discuss the composition of the new government. On June 21 the leaders informed the Commission established by the Crimea Conference that complete accord had been reached by them regarding the formation of a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. After studying the report submitted by the Polish leaders, the three Commissioners concluded that the Polish groups represented had set up a government in conformity with the Crimea decisions. The Commission’s decision was accepted by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. 4 Thus, since this Government was set up by the Poles themselves, the new Government was not imposed upon the Polish people by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. 2. “I wish to inquire whether our responsibility, under the Yalta Agreement, is presumed to have been discharged by the creation of this new Provisional Government or whether the three-power obligation continues until the promised ‘free elections’ have actually occurred?” The formation of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity constituted a positive step in the fulfillment of the Crimea decisions. The decisions will be further implemented when the new Government carries out its pledge to hold free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot. In this connection the Crimea decisions also provide that the Ambassadors in Poland of the three powers shall keep their respective Governments informed about the situation in Poland. It is clear, therefore, that the creation of the new Government does not alone discharge us from the responsibilities we assumed at Yalta. 3. “When the new Provisional Government begins to operate, will the United States be permitted to send full diplomatic and consular representatives into Poland?” Mr. Osóbka-Morawski, Prime Minister of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in his message to President Truman requesting the establishment of diplomatic relations with his Government stated: “I have the honor in the name of the Provisional Government of National Unity to approach the Government of the United States of America with a request for the establishment of diplomatic relations between our nations and for the exchange of representatives with the rank of Ambassador.” 5 On the basis of the assurances given by the United States at the Crimea Conference, President Truman established diplomatic relations with the new Government and informed the Prime Minister that he had chosen as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Poland the Honorable Arthur Bliss Lane. Ambassador Lane and initial members of his staff are making arrangements to proceed to Warsaw as soon as possible and, thus in accordance with the Crimea decisions, the Ambassador will be in a position to keep this Government “informed about the situation in Poland”. 4. “Will the American Press be permitted to send its uncensored correspondents into Poland?” In the discussions relative to the recognition of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, the United States Government made it clear that it expected American correspondents to be permitted to enter Poland in order that the American public may be informed of the situation in that area. 6 You may be assured that the United States Government will use its full influence to attain this desired end. In addition to these conversations regarding the entry of American correspondents into Poland, the Department of State has for some time been pressing the Soviet authorities for authorization for American correspondents to enter eastern and southeastern Europe in order to be in a position to report accurately to the American public on developments there. 7 The Department will continue its efforts to obtain permission for American correspondents to operate freely in all areas. 5. “Will the United States participate, on an equality with the other powers, under their Yalta obligation, in a general supervision of these ‘free elections’ to make certain they are ‘free’ in fact as well as name?” President Truman in his message to the Polish Prime Minister stated that “I am pleased to note that Your Excellency’s Government has recognized in their entirety the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question thereby confirming the intention of Your Excellency’s Government to proceed with the holding of elections in Poland in conformity with the provisions of the Crimea decisions.” 8 This undertaking with regard to the holding of free and unfettered elections was one of the vital points considered in connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations between this Government and the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. As indicated above, the American Ambassador and his staff will make reports on the situation in Poland and on the basis of these reports this Government will give consideration to the question of whether supervision of elections would be advisable. If it is decided to supervise the elections, the United States Government will, of course, insist upon its right to participate on an equal basis with the other powers. In conclusion, I wish to point out that American policy with regard to Poland continues to be based on the decisions of the Crimea Conference. Both President Roosevelt and President Truman have gone on record that the United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state. I welcome this opportunity to exchange views with you, since I believe it is of vital importance that the members of the Congress be afforded a clear understanding of questions relating to our foreign relations and policy. Under such conditions the State Department can best carry out the foreign policy of the United States as determined by the President and the Congress. Sincerely yours, Joseph C. Grew 1 The file copy also bears the date of July 24, but other papers in the file indicate that the signed original of the letter was actually dated July 17 , 1745 [ sic ]. 2 The questions raised by Vandenberg are quoted verbatim in the document here printed. For the text of Vandenberg’s letter, see Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 109. 3 See document No. 1417, section vi . 4 Concerning the establishment of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and United States recognition thereof, see vol. i , documents Nos. 483 – 501 . 5 For the full text of Osóbka-Morawski’s message, see Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 47. 6 See vol. i , document No. 490 . 7 See vol. i , document No. 257 . 8 For the full text of Truman’s message, see Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 48. No. 1118 The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745 No. 1118 The British Foreign Secretary ( Eden ) to the Secretary of State Berlin , [July 17, 1945. 1 ] My Dear Secretary of State , On the 5th July, at the time of our recognition of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, His Majesty’s Ambassador at Washington 2 informed the United States Government 3 that His Majesty’s Government had sought from the Polish Provisional Government certain explanations and assurances as to their attitude in regard to the participation of “all democratic and anti-Nazi parties” in free elections in Poland in accordance with the Crimea decisions. 4 In seeking such assurances, His Majesty’s Government had had in mind that, of the four main parties which throughout the war had supported the Polish Government in London and their resistance movement in Poland, only two are represented in the present Provisional Government. The settlement of the Polish question which has now been reached would be criticised in the United Kingdom if it were found that only the parties now included in the Provisional Government were to take part in the elections as a Government bloc without any effective opposition. In reply to our enquiries, Sir A. Clark Kerr obtained from the Polish Ambassador in Moscow 5 assurances in writing that the Government coalition “leaves freedom of choice to the former elements of the Democrat or Christian Labour Parties which are democratic and anti-Nazi to take part in the elections or in any other way”. The Polish Ambassador’s communication stated, however, that the National Democratic Party no longer existed in its pre-war form. In an oral communication to Sir A. Clark Kerr, the Polish Ambassador stated that the Democratic and Christian Labour Parties would “have complete freedom of action in regard to the elections and in all other respects”. The Polish Ambassador also indicated that political leaders who wished to start or revive other democratic parties would be free to do so and that such parties would participate in the elections either independently or in blocs as they saw fit. M. Popiel, the leader of the Christian Labour Party, recently left London for Warsaw to discuss co-operation with the new Government at their invitation; but the Government have made, so far as we know, no move toward any National Democrats. In the circumstances we felt bound to inform the United States and Soviet Governments that we were not satisfied with the assurances which we had so far received on this question and reserved the right to raise it at the present Conference as affecting the implication of the Crimea decisions. The Polish Provisional Government were informed that we had made this communication to the United States and Soviet Governments. I do not now think that it would in fact be desirable to discuss this matter in detail at the present Conference. It would be arguable that the question is one which should properly be pursued in direct discussion with the Polish Provisional Government, and it is perhaps unlikely that we should find common ground with the Russians such as would enable effective international action to be taken at the time of the elections. I therefore consider that we should aim rather at securing the insertion in the Communiqué to be issued at the end of this Conference of a reference to the Polish question. This might take the form of a statement on the following lines: “The Three Powers have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the establishment in accordance with the Crimea decisions of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognised by the Three Powers and pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. It is the confident hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be so organised as to enable all sections of Polish opinion to express their views freely and thus play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life. The Three Powers will further expect that representatives of the Allied Press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections. Finally, they are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the orderly return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go; the Polish Provisional Government could itself greatly assist in this task by giving specific undertakings that those Poles who return will do so with full assurance of their personal security, freedom and livelihood.” A statement on these lines seems to us desirable. It would help His Majesty’s Government in securing the full support of Parliament in the Polish statement and also in dealing with the very difficult practical problems arising out of the presence of some 250,000 Poles on British soil and in the armed forces under British command. If you agree that some statement of this sort would be useful I would propose to take an appropriate opportunity of raising it at a meeting of Foreign Ministers and I would hope that I might then count on your support. Yours sincerely Anthony Eden 1 So dated in a manuscript notation by Dunn. 2 The Earl of Halifax. 3 See vol. i , document No. 504 . 4 See document No. 1417, section vi . 5 Zygrmunt Modzelewski. No. 1119 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 860c.00/7–1845: Telegram No. 1119 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Caserta , July 18, 1945—10 a.m. 2979. War Office informed AFHQ that Daily Telegraph reported extracts from an apparently inflammatory speech on July 11 by General Anders and the Observer of July 15 reported rebuke issued to Anders by SAC. 1 AFHQ was requested to report as War Office “most anxious” to know details. AFHQ replied that it has no knowledge of any such speech and cited cordial visit Anders to SAC on July 13. 2 No rebuke at this or any other time. Anders issued order of the day on July 6 which not considered inflammatory. Message emphasizes “admirable” attitude Anders has taken under new circumstances. He is now touring Italy addressing all available men stating position in Poland as he knows it, but offers every facility to return with personal guarantee of no victimisation of those who choose to go. War Office further informed that at Anders’ request AFHQ arranging for segregation and return of those who desire to go to Poland. Kirk 1 Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander. 2 See document No. 1123 . No. 1120 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Truman Papers No. 1120 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 July 18, 1945 [Translation] Draft Submitted by the Soviet Delegation July 18 The Statement of the Heads of the Three Governments on the Polish Question In view of the setting up on the basis of the decisions of the Crimea Conference of the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity and in view of the establishment by the United States of America and by Great Britain of diplomatic relations with Poland, which previously already existed between Poland and the Soviet Union, we agreed that the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America as well as the Governments of other United Nations shall sever all relations with the government of Arciszewski. We deem it imperative to render to the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity the necessary assistance in the immediate transmission to it of all stock, assets and all other property belonging to Poland, which still is at the disposal of the government of Arciszewski and of its organs, in whatever form this property may be and no matter where or at whose disposal this property may prove to be at the present moment. The transfer of this property to any institution of any kind or to private persons is forbidden. We also found it necessary that the Polish armed forces, including the navy and the merchant marine, now subordinated to the government of Arciszewski, should be subordinated to the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity, which [will?] determine the further measures to be taken in respect of these armed forces, men of war and merchant ships. 1 Attachment 2 to the minutes of the Second Plenary Meeting, July 18. See ante , p. 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] . At the end of this document is the following typed notation: “Translated from Russian by (S. Golunsky)”. No. 1121 Proposal by the British Delegation 023.1/9–1454 No. 1121 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg , July 19, 1945.] [ Draft of a Statement on Poland ] (1) We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognised by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists. (2) The British and United States Governments express their willingness to discuss with properly accredited representatives of the Polish Provisional Government the orderly transfer to it of Polish State property, including the Polish Embassies in London and Washington, in regard to which measures of conservation have been taken by the two Governments. They assume that such discussions would embrace also the questions of the acknowledgement by the Polish Provisional Government of liability for the credits advanced to the late Polish Government and other outstanding debts, and the relation of such advances to any assets of the Polish State available abroad. (3) The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and Merchant Marine. It is their desire that as many of these Poles as possible should return home, and they consider that the Polish Provisional Government could itself greatly assist in this regard by giving specific undertakings that those Poles who return will do so with full assurance of their personal security, freedom and livelihood. (4) The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government is pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. It is the confident hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be so organised as to enable all sections of Polish opinion to express their views freely, and thus play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life. The Three Powers will further expect that representatives of the Allied Press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections. 1 Submitted at the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 19. See ante , p. 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] . An amended text submitted later by the British Delegation (see ante , pp. 187–188 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] ) has not been found. For Soviet proposals on this subject submitted to the Subcommittee on Poland, see documents Nos. 1421 and 1422 , post . No. 1122 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State 860c.00/7–1945: Telegram No. 1122 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret London , July 19, 1945—5 p.m. 7269. Sargent tells us that Hankey reported from Warsaw that he has had conversations with Bierut and Mikołajczyk. Bierut in the course of a short conversation stressed desire of Polish Govt to establish close political and economic relations with the West. Mikołajczyk, Hankey found to be in an optimistic frame of mind. Sent Dept as 7269; rptd Moscow as 258; rptd Paris for Lane as 462. Mikołajczyk told Hankey that he has been able to get around freely, re-establishing contact with former Peasant Party associates. His visit to Cracow was particularly encouraging. After some further talks with Peasant Party leaders the party’s program would be formulated. No difficulty in making it public was anticipated by Mikołajczyk. Popiel, according to Mikołajczyk, has also been able to move about and get in touch with Christian Labor Party people. That party’s program would also be drafted soon and it was planned to make it public too. All political parties and groups, Mikołajczyk thinks, will be permitted to participate in elections with the exception, of course, of the pro-German party formerly active chiefly in Silesia and a small underground group which had cooperated with the Germans during the German occupation. In the same message reporting his talks with Bierut and Mikołajczyk, Hankey emphasized the extent to which Warsaw had been destroyed, the heaps of rubble still very much in evidence and the shortage of food and goods generally. With reference to this, Sargent said that Foreign Office was making plans to have a plane go from here twice weekly to Warsaw. This would be used for transporting essential food and other supplies for the Embassy staff and it was hoped for transporting English journalists to Warsaw. Foreign Office was very anxious, Sargent continued, to get some English journalists to Warsaw as quickly as possible. Arrangements for a British plane on a regular service to land in Poland could, Sargent thought, be made without difficulty. The British Air Ministry, however, was slow in releasing a plane for this purpose, claiming that every available plane was needed for the Far East. Winant 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 80 of July 20 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2045). No. 1123 The Deputy Political Adviser at Allied Force Headquarters (Offie) to the Secretary of State 860c.20/7–2045 No. 1123 The Deputy Political Adviser at Allied Force Headquarters ( Offie ) to the Secretary of State top secret No. 1247 Allied Force Headquarters , July 20, 1945. Subject: Transmitting Minutes of the Meeting between Field Marshal Alexander and Lieutenant General Anders. Sir : With reference to my telegram No. 2979, July 18, 10 a.m., 1 I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the minutes of a meeting between Field Marshal Alexander and Lieutenant General Anders, Commander of the Second Polish Corps, Italy, held at Caserta on July 13, 1945. The Department will note that General Anders stated that he would do everything possible to expedite the repatriation to Poland of those members of his army who desired to be repatriated. It should also be observed that General Anders reassured to the Supreme Allied Commander that he would maintain the morale and discipline of Polish troops in Italy. Respectfully yours, C. Offie [Enclosure—Extracts] top secret Minutes of the Conversation Between SAC and Lt-Gen. Anders, Commander 2 Polish Corps , 13 July 1945, in the Office of the Supreme Allied Commander Present: Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, SAC Lt-Gen. W. Anders, Commander 2 Polish Corps Lt-Gen. W. D. Morgan, Chief of Staff Brig. E. H. C. Frith, Comd, 26 BLU. Col. J. L. Tappin, Chief, Liaison Section Lt-Col. J. T. Rankin, Liaison Section Capt. Łomnicky, Interpreter to General Anders The following Minutes were prepared by Brigadier E. H. C. Frith, Comd, 26 BLU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. General Anders raised the question of those Poles who wished to return to Poland, and outlined his policy of freedom of choice, his views on the handling of them once he had demobilized them, and pointed out that once he had passed them to British or Allied repatriation camps, he did not wish to interfere with them and could not be responsible for their further fortunes. It was pointed out that this whole question is a subject of staff study at AFHQ. S. A. C. agreed with Gen Anders’ policy, and said that he wished it to be carefully gone into—especially the route by which they would be sent to Poland. Gen. Anders pointed out that he wished to avoid giving the Soviet or the Warsaw Govt any handle whereby they could allege that he was using force or in any way interfering with their freedom of choice, and hence his earnest desire that repatriation camps should be British run. He further said that, for this reason as well as to give evidence of good faith, he hoped that arrangements would be made early so that he could evacuate to British camps in parties as they came forward those Poles wishing to return to Poland. The S. A. C. asked what the total numbers were likely to be as it was a matter of importance in planning that this should be known. Gen Anders said that he could give no figures now but he would, he considered, be able to give this information in, at the most two weeks. He also pointed out that, even after that, there might be further applicants. The S. A. C. asked, in this connection, what the strength of the Polish Corps was, and Gen Anders replied that in Italy the strength was approx 110,000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Document No. 1119 . No. 1124 The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 860c.85/7–2045: Telegram No. 1124 The Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 20 [1945.] 73. For attention Clayton. WSA have brought to our attention problem arising out of Polish seamen’s strike regarding which they are communicating to Admiral Land at Potsdam. 2 Crews of merchant vessels controlled by London Polish authorities and chartered or allocated to British Ministry of War Transport struck last week in protest against recognition of Warsaw-Polish Government. Ships affected include five small American-owned coasting steamers transferred to Polish flag by regular procedure under Lend-Lease and operating in British coasting service. So far as known strike has not extended to the single Liberty ship similarly transferred to Polish operation and now loading on West Coast South America. WSA state idleness of five Lend-Lease vessels on which crews have struck can not be justified for such a cause and only practical method to deal with the situation is to withdraw the ships under charter option requiring thirty days notice or more promptly on some other basis. However, they wish to avoid any action which might prove prejudicial in present Polish situation or which might prejudice atmosphere or otherwise prove embarrassing in connection with Potsdam conference. Our view is that political character of strike voids essential purpose of allocation these ships to Polish operation, which was to provide crews for them. This seamen’s strike, however justified from viewpoint of the seamen themselves, constitutes interference with shipping and foreign policy operations of this Government and therefore cannot be tolerated; moreover, strike indicates prospect of continuing trouble with these seamen if existing arrangements continue. Therefore we believe ships should be withdrawn from Polish allocation by promptest legitimate procedure unless such action at this time would in any way embarrass proceedings of Potsdam conference. It is believed British would provide substitute crews if the vessels are allocated to them in view of importance to them of coasting services. If new Polish Government subsequently wishes to take over and operate American-owned ships under similar charter arrangements, this question can be discussed on the basis of then existing circumstances. Of course transfer of these ships to British or other allocation would likely make it more difficult to find other ships for later allocation to new Polish Government. Possibility has been suggested that withdrawal of these ships from Polish operation might provide new Polish authorities with excuse for withdrawing from UMA and that Polish withdrawal might be followed by others. Since however withdrawal of these ships would reduce tonnage under Polish flag and in no way improve Polish ability to provide shipping space for Polish import requirements, disadvantage to Poland of withdrawal from UMA would not be lessened by transferring these struck ships to other operation. In light of information available to us therefore we do not believe possible repercussions UMA should be considered a significant factor as against greater objection to any course of catering to seamen who have struck for political reasons. We understand strike also affects about twenty Polish-owned ships chartered to British Ministry of War Transport but that presents problem for British to solve independently of action taken toward our ships allocated to Polish operation. We presume this question will be subject of direct discussion with Admiral Land Potsdam, but would appreciate your instructions or comment. [ Grew ] 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg. 2 See document No. 1125 . No. 1125 The Acting War Shipping Administrator (Conway) to the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator (Morse) 860c.85/7–2045: Telegram No. 1125 The Acting War Shipping Administrator ( Conway ) to the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator ( Morse ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 20 [1945.] 74. To Admiral Land for Morse from Conway. SD 4486. In view of the Polish crew strike, Helmbold and I believe we should immediately withdraw N3’s and re-allocate. State Department also of this opinion but believe with us that no action should be taken pending clearance from you since it may embarrass your current negotiations or U. M. A. questions. Liberty crew so far has not joined strike. At meeting in Shipping Division Office State Department Polish desk advised it would be an advantage to take action now on vessels as this would be a propitious time to take a necessary if unpleasant step. However Saugstad fully advising Clayton on situation. 2 I have signed the following letter and dispatched it to the State Department today: “The State Department has been informed of the arrangements under which the War Shipping Administration has allocated six U. S. owned ships to the Polish Government on a ‘Bareboat out, time charter back’ basis. Since the date on which the ships were delivered there has been a change in the recognized Polish Government. Although we understand that the Polish Government now recognized is apparently the legal successor to the prior government, it has occurred to us that there may be reasons why it would not be desirable to continue the ‘Bareboat out, time charter back’ arrangements with the new government. A strike on the part of the crews of five of the six ships involved has brought this point to an immediate head which will require action on our part. We are informed by a cable from London today 3 that the crews have struck in protest against the recognition of the Warsaw-Polish Government. From an operating point of view, we cannot justify the idleness of these ships for such a cause; and the only practical method by which we could deal with the present situation is to withdraw the ships from their present allocation either by taking advantage of our charter option to cancel the present arrangements on thirty days notice or otherwise. Since this might be interpreted as an uncordial act towards a newly formed friendly government we would appreciate your advices before taking any further action. In the event that the ship delay problem is settled before we have been able to take any action along the above lines, it would appear to us, from an operating point of view, that the present arrangements could be continued and the ships thus kept moving without interruption until such time as a definite policy be established. We believe this possible even though, because of the many uncertainties involved, we have felt it necessary for the present to stop payment of charter hire to protect our interest. The present arrangement was concluded with the then duly authorized Polish authorities, and we have worked with their duly appointed agency, the Gdynia–America Line, which is ninety eight per cent owned by the Polish Government. Pending official word from Warsaw, we feel there is some basis for continuance of the present arrangements. Because of the many factors involved and because of the maturing obligation to pay charter hire, we would also like your advice on this point. In view of the operating problem involved, your immediate advice is urgently requested.” We have received following cable from Devlin: “ Wsa 3714–W 2084 reference our Wsa 3590–W 2038 3 on five Polish coasters. Situation unchanged as regards Kowel [,] Kolno and Kielce. Kutno crew remains with exception of master and vessel continues in Liverpool–Belfast trade. Krosno anchored Southend with crew and cargo on board[;] crew will leave when vessel ties up at berth. London berthing situation tight account labour and British hesitate to berth vessel as she will be immobilized immediately she ties up. Prospects of settlement extremely uncertain. Unless otherwise advised by you we will take no action as problem apparently one of high level foreign relations.” To which we have replied as follows: “Your present method for handling situation approved. Settlement of dispute not desirable until we are prepared to act under necessary diplomatic clearances. Necessary that we be kept fully advised of any possibility that situation may be changed. We are handling with State Department here and with Morse in Potsdam.” 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 See document No. 1124 . 3 Not printed. 3 Not printed. No. 1126 The War Shipping Administrator (Land) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator (Morse) to the Acting War Shipping Administrator (Conway) 862.85/7–2145: Telegram No. 1126 The War Shipping Administrator ( Land ) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator ( Morse ) to the Acting War Shipping Administrator ( Conway ) confidential priority Babelsberg , 21 July [19]45. Victory 170. From Admiral Land and Morse, Babelsberg, Germany to Conway, War Shipping Administration. Reference your number 74 of July 20. 1 We have dispatched the following message to Monroe, London: “Suggest you confer with Keenlyside regarding arrangements made by Ministry [of War Transport] whereby three Polish Troopers were placed on bare boat charter basis and same striking Polish crew signed on under British articles. Then you ascertain if Polish crews on 5 N 3’s would be willing to sign on under U. S. articles on similar basis. This might require some waiver of U S. laws which in view of emergency requirements for vessels should be obtained in Washington. Such an arrangement would be temporary pending clarification of Polish situation when vessels could go back under old charter. Please advise us here also Conway. We are repeating this message to Conway.” Upon receipt of favorable advices from Monroe please arrange necessary waivers and also write an explanatory letter to head of Gdynia–American Line, New York, advising action being taken because of emergency requirements for vessels and telling them that this is a temporary arrangement pending clarification of situation when vessels will go back under old charter. Advise State Department of contemplated action. Have discussed matter with Mr. Clayton who concurs. Advise State Department. 1 Document No. 1125 . No. 1127 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Acting Secretary of State 860c.85/7–2145: Telegram No. 1127 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Babelsberg , July 21, 1945. Victory –185. From Clayton. Admiral Land, Mr. Dunn, and I have discussed Polish seamen’s strike 2 (reurtels Nos. 73 and 74 3 ) and decided that WSA should take action parallel to British; that is, haul down Polish flag, run up United States flag, offer to sign on same seamen, and indicate that the action is temporary for the emergency situation. 1 Sent over the signature of Byrnes. 2 See ante , p. 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] . 3 Documents Nos. 1124 and 1125 , respectively. No. 1128 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 860c.01/7–945: Telegram No. 1128 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) secret Washington , July 21, 1945—1 p.m. 6019. Department desires more information re agreement concluded between British Treasury and former Polish Government at London assigning to former control of latter’s assets, (urtel 6900 July 9 1 ). Department is particularly interested in assets covered including any assets outside Britain. Please request FonOff permission to reexamine document and annex. For your information, Treasury Department has replaced licenses previously granted Polish official agencies in United States permitting expenditures without individual review with licenses which require advance notification to Treasury of proposed transactions of these agencies. Payments to meet expenses incurred by Polish official agencies in United States will for time being be approved only after appropriate review. Grew J[acques] J R[einstein] 1 Document No. 507, printed in vol. i . No. 1129 Report by the Subcommittee on Poland 023.1/9–1454 No. 1129 Report by the Subcommittee on Poland P. ( Terminal ) 17. [ Babelsberg ,] 21st July, 1945. Draft Statement on the Polish Question, as Submitted by Drafting Committee to Meeting of Foreign Ministers on 21 st July 1 Note :—The Soviet Members of the drafting Committee would omit passages in italics. The United Kingdom members would omit passages in square brackets. 1. We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognised by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists. 2. The British and United States Governments have already taken measures to prevent the alienation to third parties of property [including merchant vessels] 2 belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They are ready to take immediate measures to arrange for the transfer in accordance with the requirements of the law of such property to the Polish Provisional Government. To this end they are prepared to discuss with properly accredited representatives of the Polish Provisional Government the manner and time of such transfer and the question of the liability of the Polish Provisional Government for the credits advanced to the late Polish Government and other outstanding debts and the relation of such advances to any assets of the Polish State available abroad . All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated. 3. The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces and merchant marine. It is their desire that as many of these Poles as possible should return home and they consider that the Polish Provisional Government could itself greatly assist in this regard by giving suitable assurances . [They expect] that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens. 4. [The British Government will at the same time take measures in order to prevent on British territory and on territories controlled by British authorities arrests of Poles who wish to return to Poland]. 5. The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government is pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. It is the confident hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be conducted in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all [democratic and anti-Nazi] sections of Polish opinion have been able to express their views freely, and thus to play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life. The Three Powers will further expect that representatives of the Allied Press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections . 1 See ante , p. 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] . 2 Brackets throughout this document appear in the source copy. No. 1130 Text Considered by the Heads of Government Truman Papers No. 1130 Text Considered by the Heads of Government 1 Berlin , July 21, 1945. Statement on the Polish Question We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists. [The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property.] 2 The British and United States Governments have already taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of property belonging to the Polish state located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They are ready to take immediate measures to arrange for the transfer, in accordance with the requirements of the law, of such property to the Polish Provisional Government. To this end they are prepared to discuss with properly accredited representatives of the Polish Provisional Government the manner and time of such transfer (and the question of the liability of the Polish Provisional Government for the credits advanced to the late Polish Government and other outstanding debts and the relationship of such advances to any assets of the Polish state available abroad). All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish state which may have been wrongfully alienated. The three powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. British version: (It is their desire that as many of these Poles as possible should return home and they expect that the Polish Provisional Government will give suitable assurances that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights and rights on property on the same basis as all Polish citizens). Soviet version: (They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights and rights on property on the same basis as all Polish citizens). The three powers note that the Polish Provisional Government is pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. (It is the confident hope of the three powers that the elections will be conducted in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all democratic and anti-Nazi sections of Polish opinion have been able to express their views freely and thus to play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life). (The three powers will further expect that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon the developments in Poland before and during the elections). 1 Annex 2 to the minutes of the Fifth Plenary Meeting, July 21. See ante , p. 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . 2 Brackets appear in the original. No. 1131 Text Approved by the Heads of Government 860c.01/7–2145 No. 1131 Text Approved by the Heads of Government 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 21, 1945. Statement on the Polish Question We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists. The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated. The three powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights and rights on property on the same basis as all Polish citizens. The three powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in conformity with the Crimea decision has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied powers [ press ] shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon the developments in Poland before and during the elections. 1 This text came out of the discussion at the Fifth Plenary Meeting, July 21 See ante , pp. 204–207 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . The July 21 status report ( ante , p. 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] ) indicates that this paper had received final approval, but a few changes were made in it later in the course of the Conference. Cf. document No. 1383, section ix ( viii ) A. No. 1132 The Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board (Carnwath) and the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration (Monroe) to the War Shipping Administrator (Land) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator (Morse) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1132 The Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board ( Carnwath ) and the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration ( Monroe ) to the War Shipping Administrator ( Land ) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator ( Morse ) 1 restricted [ London ,] 21 July 1945. To Potsdam for Admiral Land and Mr. Morse WSA from Carnwath and Monroe WSA signed Eisenhower ref nr UK 46112. Wsa 3844–PO2. 1. There follows in para 2 text of note addressed by Brunk to Burch. Please advise me through Army WSA position. I assume you will discuss this matter with Weston. 2. “As our two governments have now withdrawn recognition of the former Polish Government in London and have recognized the Warsaw Government, I have given instructions, with which I hope you will concur, that UMA papers and minutes should cease to be sent to the officials of the former Polish Government in London. I have also asked the chairmen of committees not to invite them to meetings nor to communicate with them further on UMA matters. We do not yet know what arrangements the new Polish Government will make for representation on UMEB. “I am quite uncertain which Polish Government is recognized by any of the other contracting governments. Strictly perhaps our attitude should be agreed with them, but I should be inclined not to raise this point. [“]We should be glad to know if WSA agree with what we have done and are taking similar action in Washington.” 1 Sent by the United Kingdom Base Section of Eisenhower’s command via Army channels. No. 1133 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the United States Delegation Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1133 The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the United States Delegation 1 unclassified priority Moscow , 22 July 1945. From Kennan. Have just reed from Polish Chargé 2 note in English dated July 21st reading as follows: “I am instructed to ask you to be as kind as to transmit to the Govt of the USA the text of my Govt’s note of July 20, 1945, which simultaneously is forwarded to the Govt of the USSR, U. K. and the French Republic.” Text of note of July 20 also written in English as enclosed in Chargé’s letter reads as follows: “The Polish Provisional Govt of Natl Unity, desiring to enable millions of Poles in Germany to return home as soon as possible and justly attempting to regain Polish assets which during the occupation period were illegally removed from Poland by the Germans, have the honour to reiterate the suggestion expressed by the Provisional Govt in their declaration of this June 15th. 3 The Polish Provisional Govt of Natl Unity suggest to set up a Polish Military Mission on the Control Council, which is exercising supreme authority in the territory of Germany. Article 5 [ 8 ] of the agreement on the control apparatus in Germany signed by the Govts of the USA, the USSR and the UK as well as by the Provisional Govt of the French Republic 4 provides for accrediting such a mission on the Control Council. Simultaneously the Polish Provisional Govt of Natl Unity feel it necessary to reiterate their suggestion regarding Poland’s participation in the activities of the Reparations Commission, which appears to be the more necessary when Poland’s damages are taken into consideration as well as the fact that she is a country, which comparatively suffered most as result of the German invasion and occupation. While approaching the four Allied Powers with these suggestions the Polish Govt of Natl Unity express their deep conviction that the settlement of the above mentioned questions will be welcomed with deep satisfaction by the Polish public opinion and will strengthen ties of friendship and collaboration between Poland and her great allies.” 5 1 Sent by the United States Military Mission, Moscow, via Army channels. Number garbled. 2 Władysław Matwin. 3 The following summary of this declaration was sent to the American Embassy, Moscow, by the Department of State in telegram No. 1346 of June 19, 1945 (file No. 860c.01/6–1945): “Since the Control Council for Germany has been established, it is now possible to settle problems such as repatriation of Polish citizens now in areas occupied by the Allies and the identification of Polish property unlawfully taken by Germans. For this, it is necessary that representatives of the Polish Provisional Government be present. These should enjoy complete freedom of movement, be enabled to deal with technical aspects, and should be engaged in finding out scattered Polish property. Procedure suggested is to send Military Mission of Polish Provisional Government to the Control Council as anticipated in Article 5 of the agreement on Control Machinery for Germany. Problem of Poland’s participation in Reparations Committee also brought forward as vital and burning one for the Polish nation and directly bound with problem of reconstruction. It is also difficult to imagine effective working of Inter-Allied Commission for investigation of German crimes without participation of representatives of Government of Poland on territory of which Nazis committed most of their crimes. In putting forth these problems Polish Provisional Government is firmly convinced that a positive solution will be important contribution to work of reconstruction of countries experiencing German aggression and will assist in effecting permanent and friendly collaboration of Allied nations.” 4 i. e., the agreement on control machinery in Germany, signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. Text of the agreement of November 14, 1944, also in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 124 . 5 No reply was made to this communication until after the close of the Berlin Conference. No. 1134 The War Shipping Administrator (Land) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator (Morse) to the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration (Monroe) and the Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board (Carnwath) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1134 The War Shipping Administrator ( Land ) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator ( Morse ) to the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration ( Monroe ) and the Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board ( Carnwath ) confidential priority Babelsberg , 23 July 1945. Victory 221. To Monroe and Carnwath, War Shipping Administration, London, England. Repeat to Conway, WSA, Washington, D. C. from Vice Admiral Land and Morse. Reference your Wsa 3844 July 21. 1 Have discussed matter with State Department here and Weston. UMA papers should not be sent to officials of former Polish Government and they should not be invited to attend meetings or communicated with further on UMA matters. 1 Document No. 1132 . No. 1135 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State 860c.01/7–2345: Telegram No. 1135 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret London , July 23, 1945—8 p.m. 7421. We were given following information at FonOff (Foreign Office) today by official directly concerned Polish affairs. 1. Agreement between British Treasury and former Polish Govt covers only leases on UK property. We were shown annex today which enumerates approximately 50 leases. (Re Department’s telegram 6019, July 21 2 ) 2. We were also shown draft of circular instruction which FonOff is sending out to British missions abroad re liquidation Polish diplomatic and consular establishments. These establishments will be assimilated into British missions as sections charged with administering relief and other social benefits such as disbursing funds for maintenance refugee camps and children’s hostels. Former Polish Govt submitted to FonOff list of diplomatic and consular offices broken down into three categories depending on character of work transacted. As re category A offices former Polish Govt recommended that all personnel be retained since they perform relief work almost exclusively. (Repeated to Moscow as 261) For category B offices former Polish Govt recommended reduction 50% in staffs. Category C comprises for most part diplomatic missions and former Polish Govt recommended retention of from 1 to 3 persons per office to serve as caretakers. FonOff circular asks for comment from British missions on proposed liquidation scheme for Polish Foreign Service and warns British missions not to permit Polish Foreign Service establishments after absorption to act in diplomatic or consular capacities. Circular also warns British missions not to allow officials Polish Govt Warsaw to assume control of or participate in affairs of diplomatic or consular establishments or [ of? ] former London Polish Govt until FonOff has negotiated with Warsaw Govt agreement covering final disposition or liquidation of such establishments. 3. The list of Polish diplomatic and consular offices given to FonOff did not cover such offices in US, Latin America or France. Diplomatic and consular offices former London Polish Govt in US and Latin America according to FonOff official appear to be maintained by dollar remittances and French offices by French subsidies. Official stated in this connection that FonOff would like to have any information available re finances of Polish diplomatic and consular offices in US and Latin America. 4. British Embassy Warsaw has reported to FonOff that Communists are pressing for early elections in Poland but that Mikołajczyk is resisting in hope of achieving postponement until Oct or later when Red Army will presumably have withdrawn from Poland. 5. There have been some encouraging indications that larger numbers of Poles than was previously thought likely may return to Poland. British Govt does not wish to have direct question on return put to Polish military now serving abroad since it feels that replies at moment might be largely in negative and might prejudice future positions of many individuals. Emissaries from Polish Govt Warsaw have been propagandizing civilian and military officials in western Europe quite effectively however and a number have thus far voluntarily indicated desire to return Poland. British military authorities are trying to segregate Polish troops which indicate willingness to return. No estimates are available thus far as to numbers involved. Winant 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 126 of July 25 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2545). 2 Document No. 1128 . No. 1136 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) 860c.01/8–945 No. 1136 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) 1 [Translation] secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 24, 1945. Poland is to be strong, free, independent and sovereign. Poland is to live in alliance with Soviet Russia, with Great Britain and France, and in friendship with the United States and the Slav countries. This is possible on the following conditions: (1) The Soviet forces and the NKVD should quit the territories accorded to, and delimited for, the Polish State. (2) The Polish Army is to become a national army. (3) The so-called Security should cease to terrorize the community. (4) The émigrés and Polish troops should return swiftly, and elections should be held, before which the western frontiers should be settled. (5) There should be freedom of the Press and freedom of concourse and the genuine organization of the five Parties in Poland. The P. P. R. (translators note—the Polish Labor Party or really, the Communist Party) does enjoy these freedoms, the P. P. S. (Polish Socialist Party) only enjoys them in part, whilst the Democratic party is at this moment more or less an extension of the P. P. R. The Peasant’s Party, thanks to which the Provisional Government of National Unity has been formed and the Polish Government recognised, does not have freedom of action, nor does the Labor Party. (6) Personal freedom and the right of property should be safeguarded within the framework of the law. (7) The elections should take place at the latest in December or February on the basis of the electoral laws resulting from the 1921 constitution. There must be found a method of ensuring the fairness of the elections. Fair elections are impossible as long as Soviet troops and the NKVD remain in Poland. Elections on the basis of the 1921 constitution are rendered impossible by interpretations relating to the electoral system. These follow the conception of the PKWN (translator’s note: Polish Committee of National Liberation), which was based on the 1921 constitution, and they introduce artificial majorities by the appointment—beside the political parties—of various professional and social organizations which are adjuncts of a party already possessing its own representatives in Parliament ( Sejm ). 1 Handed to Harriman at a meeting attended also by Dunn and Matthews. See ante , p. 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] . No. 1137 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) 860c.01/8–1445 No. 1137 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) 1 [Translation] [Undated.] (?) As to [ To add to ( ? )] 2 the preceding note from which it follows that at this stage of the dispute one should not limit himself by the relatively small territory which anyway with the support of Russia may by the force of facts appear to be included in Poland. At this moment the struggle is about the independence and sovereignty of Poland, and the dispute about borders unless it is predetermined is another problem. To save the independence of Poland the territory should be determined (established?) and the elections should take place as soon as possible. At the recognition of territory the conditions could be put forward, And so: 1. Elections—freedom for parties and for press, eventually the international control of elections. 2. Removal of the Soviet troops and NKVD. 3. Return and help for return of Polish army from the West in a whole and all émigrés in general. 4. Help in repatriation of Poles from the East. 5. Immediate stop of dismembering (taking to pieces) of factories and disjoining the railroad tracks on the territory given to Poland and full control by Poland of political, economic and communications administration. The Soviet transport through Polish territory on the basis of a plan presented by Polish authorities. Poland is to take part in the assistance to Europe by its industrial production and later by agricultural products. Therefore Poland must be completely freed and can not be hampered from inside by senseless dismembering of industrial objects, railroad tracks and by depriving it of agricultural machinery and livestock. 1 Handed to Harriman on or about July 25. 2 The question mark at the beginning of the paragraph and the phrase in italics are in the source copy. No. 1138 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State 860c.00/7–2445: Telegram No. 1138 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret London , July 24, 1945—7 p.m. 7445. Sir Orme Sargent has shown us two most recent messages received from Hankey from Warsaw. The picture of prevailing conditions is not as favorable as reported in Hankey’s first message (Embassy’s 7269, July 19, 5 p.m.). 2 Mikołajczyk, furthermore, is no longer optimistic about participation of all major parties in elections. Hankey found Mik[ołajczyk] very disturbed over decision of Polish Govt not to allow Popiel to organize a rally of Christian Labor Party and over words [ sic ] sent to Popiel that Christian Labor Party would not be permitted to take part in election. Mik feels that if at this early date it is decided that Christian Labor Party is not to participate in elections during coming weeks same decision may well be reached effecting [ affecting ] other parties. Hankey has had a talk with Grabski. Grabski maintains that practically no civic liberties are enjoyed by people of Poland. Behind every local govt there is a Soviet official who has final word. A secret service under Soviet direction is active everywhere and many arrests continue to be made. When showing us these messages from Hankey, Sargent told us that he had just received a message “privately” from Mik in which Mik said that he was alarmed at the tendency of the Lublin group on the Praesidium to transform the Praesidium on which Grabski is outnumbered five to one into the real governing body of Poland. Sent Dept as 7445; repeated Moscow as 263. Winant 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 126 of July 25 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2545). 2 Document No. 1122 . No. 1139 The Appointed Ambassador to Poland (Lane) to the Acting Secretary of State 124.60c/7–2445: Telegram No. 1139 The Appointed Ambassador to Poland ( Lane ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret niact Paris , July 24, 1945—11 p.m. 4463. From Lane. In view delay obtaining for our Embassy to Poland Soviet clearance across Soviet occupied zone in Germany en route Warsaw, it is pertinent to summarize steps taken: July 6 I inquired of Ambassador Murphy Frankfort whether Marshal Zhukov would clear passage of group provided information furnished re route to be traveled, names persons in party and numbers of passports. Arrangements with US military for three airplanes having been made July 18 Frankfort was requested that date to obtain Soviet clearance over Soviet controlled territory. Altho we understood Zhukov’s HQs had on July 21 given Murphy’s office reason to anticipate receipt that same day of a note granting permission such permission was not rec’d. It was therefore necessary to cancel at 9 a.m. July 22 plans for departure on 23rd as US military authorities Berlin require 24 hours notice of flight Paris Berlin. Permission was then requested to cross Soviet controlled territory on July 26 which should have given sufficient additional time for action by Soviet authorities and would also have enabled advance notice to be given to Polish Govt for our reception in Warsaw and to US military to have our planes in readiness. Permission still not having been rec’d we have been obliged again to postpone departure for Warsaw and to set July 30 as tentative departure date. Obstructionist Soviet tactics recall similar measures towards our missions in Rumania and Bulgaria and especially refusal for months to permit Embassy to Zecho to proceed thru Rumania on ground of military security. Even this fictional argument does not obtain in case of Embassy to Poland in view end European war. Furthermore, Soviet Govt has direct obligation thru Yalta decision to permit American Embassy to report on conditions in Poland. Fact that British Chargé already arrived Warsaw great interest in US re conditions Poland and specifically re holding elections will undoubtedly create unfavorable public reaction unless immediate steps taken to grant our request. It will be recalled that Mr. Hopkins, in his conversations with Stalin last May, 2 emphasized deterioration of public opinion in US towards Soviet Union as result of Polish question and had explained that this was principal reason for Mr. Hopkins going to Moscow and that this was principal cause of anxiety at that time. (Sent Dept; rptd Frankfort for Berlin as 53 for attention Secretary State and Moscow 207.) I therefore recommend that the Secretary consider desirability of taking up this matter in Berlin on highest level. 1 Sent over the signature of Caffery. The same message was sent directly to the Office of the Political Adviser at Frankfurt for transmittal to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg. 2 See vol. i , p. 27 . No. 1140 The Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Modzelewski) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 No. 1140 The Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Modzelewski ) to the Secretary of State Potsdam , July 30, 1945. Excellency , Upon the instruction of my Government I have the honour to inform you, Excellency, that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity feel very much disturbed by the news that have reached them from the Polish Second Army Corps, now in Italy under the command of General Anders. Upon the information received it is obvious that the way the problems of repatriating Polish officers and men are dealt with by the Polish command, is against the interests and desires of the Polish Government and the Polish People who are anxiously waiting for their countrymen to come back home in the shortest possible time. It also seems that action taken in these matters by General Anders is contrary to the policy of the Allied Powers who assured the Polish Government that in executing the repatriation no pressure will be brought to bear upon men and officers concerned. Here are a few items of information that have lately reached the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity: On the 16th inst. in all units of the Polish Army Corps in Italy an order of General Anders was read according to which all those who wished to go home were to report individually to their commanding officers. On the same day in the 10th Batallion of Military Engineers, stationed at Capua, six men reported their desire to be sent back to Poland. On the next day they all were arrested and sent away to unknown destination. At the same time there were arrested seventeen other men who expressed their desire to return to their home country. Similar incidents happened also in the 13th Regiment of Heavy Artillery and in many other units of the Corps. For fear of being arrested, many soldiers desert their units. The prevailing opinion among the soldiers is that the majority of them wish to be repatriated, and that the break down and winding up of the Corps is to be expected any day. Meanwhile the command are busy making mass arrests among the men. Lest the situation within the 2nd Army Corps in Italy should become more acute, and in order to prepare an orderly repatriation undisturbed by irresponsible elements, the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity venture to request the United States Government: (i) that steps be taken by the Allied Powers to prevent the recurrence of such incidents, and (ii) that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity be enabled to take control of Polish forces at present under Allied Command and thus to terminate the present duality of command over Polish Armies in foreign territory, such duality being incompatible with the existence of a National Government enjoying international recognition. 1 I avail myself [etc.] Z Modzelewski 1 No indication has been found that this note was answered at the Conference. No. 1141 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State 860c.01/8–145 Telegram No. 1141 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret us urgent London , August 1, 1945—6 p.m. 7752. Foreign Office official directly concerned with Polish affairs told us this afternoon that British officials had first formal meeting this morning with Drożniak and Kołodziejski. Embtel 6900, July 9. 1 He said discussion had been amiable although Poles were critical of continued employment by interim Treasury committee of officials of former London Polish Govt. They were particularly critical of continued use of Count Raczynski who they felt is trying to retain some political status for former London Polish Government. Poles were assured that Count Raczynski is no longer regarded as Ambassador and is consulted solely in private capacity, but they were not completely satisfied on this point nor on employment of other Polish personalities. In end they were told that British Government had already consolidated the twelve former London Polish Ministries into one agency and had reduced the number of their employees from twelve hundred to approximately four hundred. They were also told that Poles employed by interim Treasury committee were selected for their peculiar knowledge of operations of former ministries and were in fact usually non political personalities such as executive officers. Finally Pole representatives were told that interim Treasury committee was dispensing British funds and was perfectly entitled to do so in its own way. On constructive side conversations brought an agreement by British to furnish Polish representatives with a complete account of funds advanced to former Polish Government and a detailed statement of present commitments of interim Treasury committee. Official who gave us foregoing information told us that it seemed likely an agreement would ultimately be reached with Polish representatives whereby Poland would assume liability for funds advanced to former Polish Government and for at least certain categories of present continuing obligations. He said United Kingdom had considerable bargaining power in that it controlled Polish gold reserve, Polish merchant shipping and Polish Army. We were handed a copy of circular telegram regarding assimilation of certain diplomatic and consular missions of former Polish Government into British diplomatic posts referred to our telegram 7421, July 23. 2 A copy is being forwarded by airgram. 3 In connection with this circular we were asked again if we had any information about manner in which missions and consulates of former Polish Government in Latin America and the United States are being maintained financially. Will Dept please repeat to Ambassador Lane. Winant 1 Document No. 507, printed in vol. i . 2 Document No. 1135 . 3 Not printed. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1141 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on these subjects, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . No. 1142 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 No. 1142 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 [Extract 2 ] top secret [ Washington ,] August 8, 1945. Berlin Conference Poland Soviet Policy The principal interests of the Soviets at the Berlin Conference in connection with Poland were (1) the liquidation of the London Government and (2) establishment of the Polish Western frontier. In regard to the first the aim of the Soviets was clearly to see to it that all the assets of the London Government were transferred immediately to the Warsaw Government and that the former was thereby estopped from continuing any of its activities, particularly those in the field of propaganda. They were not willing to state that the Polish Provisional Government would assume the liabilities of the London Government. The Soviets also appeared to be ready to further the return to Poland of as many as possible of the Poles abroad. They were not willing that the Polish Government should be asked to give returning Poles specific “assurances” in regard to freedom of their person and property but were willing to state, as recorded in the communiqué, 3 that returning Poles should be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens. As to the holding of elections in Poland, the Soviets were unwilling to go beyond the Yalta Declaration on this matter 4 and the communiqué therefore merely repeats the language of that Declaration. The Soviets did agree after considerable discussion to the inclusion in the communiqué of a reference to the right of Allied press representatives to report to the world upon developments in Poland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. For the minutes of the discussions summarized in this memorandum, see ante , pp. 91–94 [ Pgs. 91–94 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 187–194 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 204–207 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] . 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see document No. 1154 . 3 See document No. 1384, section ix . 4 See document No. 1417, section vi . Frontiers and areas of administration Frontiers and areas of administration [[Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1143] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President [Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945. 740.00119 Control (Germany) /7–1745 [1144] Memorandum by the British Delegation Foreign Office, 18th July, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845 [1145] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 20, 1945 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 [1146] President Bierut and Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski to President Truman Warsaw , July 20, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 [1147] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Polish Chargé in the Soviet Union (Matwin) Moscow, July 23, 1945. Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference [1148] President Bierut to President Truman Warsaw , July 23d, 1945. Truman Papers: Telegram (?) [1149] Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) [Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945. 860c.01/8–945 [1150] Memorandum by the Polish Delegation Potsdam , July 28, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2845 [1151] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg, July 29, 1945.] Truman Papers [1152] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [1153] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) [Potsdam, July 31, 1945.] Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1154] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 8, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Related papers are printed under the following headings: ( a ) Germany—Reparations, Restitution, and War Booty, ante , page 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] ] , and ( b ) Germany—Coal and Food, ante , page 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] . No. 1143 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President 740.00119 Control (Germany) /7–1745 No. 1143 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President 1 [Extract 2 ] top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 16 July 1945. Memorandum for the President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . dismemberment of germany In speaking of Germany, I refer of course, to that part of the country which it is intended will eventually return to her sovereignty. I would be disposed to grant to Poland some areas on her western boundaries which would tend to compensate her for the territory to be ceded to Russia. I feel however, that the burden is upon Russia to show that suitable provisions will be made to care for the millions of Germans now in those areas. We must make it clear that they cannot be shunted to American responsibility. … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Henry L Stimson 1 Submitted to Byrnes for transmittal to Truman (see document No. 849 ). 2 For the other portions of this memorandum, see the enclosure to document No. 849 , and document No. 1022 . No. 1144 Memorandum by the British Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845 No. 1144 Memorandum by the British Delegation The Eastern Frontier of Germany as It Affects the Principles Governing the Treatment of Germany and the Authority of the Control Council For background information please see attached paper. 1 At the plenary session on the 18th July 2 it was unanimously agreed that as a preliminary working assumption Germany should be regarded as comprising all territories contained within her 1937 frontiers. It is suggested that at this afternoon’s meeting Marshal Stalin should be asked how, in the light of this understanding, the Soviet Government regard the Polish claim to a frontier on the Oder and the Neisse (including Stettin) in its effect upon the joint occupation and control of Germany. Do these territories come under the authority of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Germany? Are the Polish authorities in this area acting as the agents of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and responsible to him? Are the resources of the area available for supplying the rest of Germany? If these questions do not provoke a direct answer we might go on to say that we understand that Marshal Zhukov at recent meetings in Berlin, has maintained that the territory to the east of the Oder and the Neisse was outside his zone and that he could not therefore draw upon it for food and fuel supplies for his zone. 3 We should then develop our grievance on the following lines:— (1) Under the agreements concluded in the European Advisory Commission on the occupation and control of Germany, 4 the controlling Powers agreed that the zones of occupation should be created out of Germany within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, including East Prussia, and that the members of the Control Council should jointly exercise authority in matters affecting Germany as a whole (i. e. 1937 Germany). His Majesty’s Government do not regard these agreements as having been modified by the Crimea decisions on Poland. 5 His Majesty’s Government consider that the Soviet Government are not entitled to release from their authority any of the territory of 1937 Germany without prior consultation and agreement with the other controlling Powers. (2) If these German territories are withdrawn from the authority of the Control Council and of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, the whole basis of our combined plans for the treatment of Germany is altered. The balance between the zones is upset. The Soviet zone, reduced in area but obliged to support a larger population owing to the influx of Germans expelled from the territories further east, becomes in Marshal Zhukov’s view a deficit area. The British and American Commanders-in-Chief, instead of being able to draw upon the normal surpluses of Eastern Germany, are expected to help to supply Berlin. This radical readjustment threatens to cause very serious consequences for us in our zones. Moreover the total stock of reparation supplies available for the common pool is gravely reduced. (3) His Majesty’s Government, while fully supporting Poland’s right to accessions of territory, regard the present claim to the Oder–Neisse line, 6 including Stettin, as excessive. On the short term view it is doubtful whether the Poles will be able to maintain full production in the whole of this area during the critical next winter, while continued expulsion of Germans from the area will cause grave problems for the controlling Powers in Germany. On the long term view Poland’s capacity to populate and absorb the whole of these territories is uncertain, while the permanent amputation of one-fifth of the area of Germany would be a cause of weakness to Poland and of instability in Europe as a whole. Marshal Stalin should then be asked to have the Soviet view reconsidered in the light of our attitude and to let us know the result. Foreign Office , 18th July, 1945. 1 No attachment found. Cf. the attachment to document No. 518, printed in vol. i . 2 See ante , p. 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] . 3 See document No. 429, printed in vol. i . 4 i. e., ( a ) the protocol regarding the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin, signed at London, September 12, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, November 14, 1944 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2078), and ( b ) the agreement on control machinery in Germany, signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062). Texts of the agreements of September 12 and November 14, 1944, also in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 118 , 121 , 124 . 5 See document No. 1417, section vi . 6 See the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , post . No. 1145 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2045 No. 1145 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 20, 1945 [Translation?] top secret On the Question of Western Frontier of Poland Russian Proposal Presented to Foreign Ministers July 20, 1945 1 We have considered the question of western frontier of Poland and have, taking in consideration ethnographical and historic conditions recognized it necessary and equitable, pending the final settlement of territorial questions at the Peace Congress, the western frontier of Poland to fix along the line marked on the attached map 2 viz: west of Swinemünde to the river Oder leaving Stettin on the Polish side, further up the river Oder to the estuary of the river West Neisse to the Czechoslovakian frontier. 1 See ante , p. 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] . 2 Not found. Cf. the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , post . No. 1146 President Bierut and Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski to President Truman 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 No. 1146 President Bierut and Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski to President Truman 1 His Excellency President Truman [:] On behalf of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity we address ourselves to Your Excellency desiring to call the attention of Your Excellency to the problem of [the] Western frontier of the Polish Republic, a problem that is of a vital importance to the Polish Nation. Expressing the unanimous and inflexible will of the whole Nation, the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity are convinced that only the boundary line that follows, beginning in the south, the former frontier between Czechoslovakia and Germany, then the Lausitzer Neisse river, then runs along the left bank of the Oder, and leaving Stettin for Poland reaches the sea west of the town of Swinemünde, can be considered a just frontier that guarantees successful development to the Polish Nation, security to Europe, and a lasting peace to the world. The Polish Nation, which suffered such enormous losses in the war against the Germans, would consider any other solution of the problem of their Western boundary as harmful and injurious, and endangering the future of the Polish Nation and State. Simultaneously we transmit identical note to Generalissimo Stalin, Chairman of the Council of the Peoples Commissars of the USSR, and to Mr. Winston Churchill, Prime-Minister of His Majesty’s Government, and we are convinced that the problem of Poland’s Western frontier will find a positive solution during the present debates that are of such a far reaching momentum. We avail ourselves [etc.] Bolesław Biertjt 2 Edward Osóbka-Morawski Warsaw , July 20, 1945. 1 This communication was mentioned in the course of the Fifth and Sixth Plenary Meetings, July 21 and 22. See ante , pp. 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 2 The signatures are typed on the source copy. No. 1147 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Polish Chargé in the Soviet Union (Matwin) Moscow Embassy Files—500 Berlin Conference No. 1147 The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Polish Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Matwin ) Moscow , July 23, 1945. Dear Mr. Matwin : I have just been asked by my Government to effect delivery through you of the following urgent and secret message from the President of the United States to the President of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity: “I have the honor, on behalf of the three heads of Government now in conference at Potsdam, 1 to invite the Polish Government to send two or three representatives, if possible by July 24, to state to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and the Secretary of State of the United States of America their views on the question of the western frontier of Poland. (Signed) Harry S. Truman.” I would be grateful if you would be good enough to arrange for the immediate transmission of this message to President Bierut and would advise me as soon as he is known to have received it. 2 Very sincerely yours, [ George F. Kennan ] 1 As agreed at the Sixth Plenary Meeting, July 22. See ante , p. 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 2 Kennan informed Truman later on July 23 that the Polish Embassy at Moscow had confirmed the delivery of this message to Bierut. No. 1148 President Bierut to President Truman Truman Papers: Telegram (?) No. 1148 President Bierut to President Truman 1 Accepting with thanks your invitation 2 conveyed in the name of the Heads of the Three Governments I have the honor to inform that the Polish Government send the following representatives: Edward Osóbka-Morawski, Prime-Minister of the Provisional Government of National Unity, S. Mikołajczyk, Vice-Premier, W. Rzymowski, Foreign Minister. The question under discussion being of exceptional importance for Poland, I shall also come to Potsdam as my presence might prove to be expedient. I take this occasion [etc.] Boleslaw Bierut Warsaw , July 23d, 1945. 1 This message probably was transmitted through Soviet channels. It is apparently a translation from the Russian, since the names of the Polish officials are given in the source text as Eduard Osubka-Moravski, S. Mikolaichik, V. Zhimovski, and Boleslav Berut. 2 See document No. 1147 . No. 1149 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) 860c.01/8–945 No. 1149 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) 1 [Translation] secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 24, 1945. Poland, in order to safeguard her existence, development, and independence, must—after the loss of territories in the East, (to which loss the population cannot psychically reconcile itself) acquire in the west, the frontier of the Neisse, Stettin and the Delta. This frontier should be determined immediately for the following main reasons: ( a ) The population east of the Curzon Line, 2 if it is not to perish for ever, must be boldly encouraged to return and transfer to Western Poland. ( b ) The population of the west must be repatriated with utmost speed, and the Western Territories must absorb it; the date of the elections is contingent on their swift return. ( c ) If these questions had to be dependent on a tardier fixing of the frontiers, then there would be no possibility either of transfer of population from the east or the west, or of holding elections there. Soviet Armies would stand as hosts in those territories and Poland would lose the chance of directing her own national economy within the area of the entire state. The partial holding of elections, after the losses east of the Curzon Line and without the delimitation of the western frontiers would only cover a small portion of the country’s territory. ( d ) This state of affairs would not only overthrow the State system of economy, but it would render impossible any normalisation of conditions in the country, which might prejudice the question of the State’s independence or of its system. ( e ) The lack of opportunities for transfer to the west of population from the overcrowded central districts of Poland, leads to the parcellation of peasant farm holdings and estates inside Poland, however healthy the agricultural structure of the country, and it will not be possible to effect a recovery. ( f ) If Poland does not take over these territories soon, then there will be no point in a later occupation of these derelict areas. 1 Handed to Harriman at a meeting attended also by Dunn and Matthews. See ante , p. 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] . 2 See the map facing p. 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 846 ] in vol. i . For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , pp. 793 – 794 . No. 1150 Memorandum by the Polish Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2845 No. 1150 Memorandum by the Polish Delegation Following what was declared by Mr. Byrnes, 1 Chairman of the Conference of the three Foreign Ministers, that regardless of oral declarations it was permissible to send in documentary materials in writing, the Polish Delegation have the honour to transmit enclosed some papers referring to the problem of Poland’s Western frontier, together with an opinion of Professor Stanislaw Grabski, Deputy Chairman of Polish National Council. Potsdam , July 28, 1945. [Enclosure] Papers Relating to the Polish Claim of Poland’s Western Frontier 2 [Annex 1] Only a Poland that is economically strong will contribute to a lasting peace. On the contrary a Poland economically weak, and that necessarily implies her military and political weakness, would only tempt the Germans to a new acquisitive aggression. I believe it was just the recognition of this very truth that made the three leaders of the Allied Nations declare in Yalta 3 they desired to see, as a result of this war, an independent, sovereign, and powerful Poland. Poland, however, comes out of this war with a considerably diminished territory and a diminished number of population. This is due to the fact of her having ceded to the Soviet Union an area of 180.000 square kilometres and the entire Ukrainian and White Ruthenian population that lived there before 1939. Should Poland in the way of compensation acquire that portion of Eastern Prussia that lies south and west of Konigsberg, and trace her Western frontier-line on the Western Nisa [ Neisse ] and the Oder (including Stettin into Poland), her area would be smaller by 80.000 kilometres and her population by 7 million people. In order that Poland might not become but a troublesome client to the Soviet Union, entirely dependent on her for defence, but that she might be a valuable ally to the Union, as well as to the great Western Democracies, in the common cause of safeguarding mankind against Germany’s aggressiveness, she must be given conditions that would enable her to progress economically much faster than she was able to do till now. As a result of this progress she must be able, within twenty years at the most, to reach such a level, at which her social income per head of population should be equal to that of Germany. Poland’s social income equal with that of Germany will be one of the most powerful safeguards of peace on the European Continent. But to do that it is necessary to increase the Polish social income almost thrice. This, however, cannot be achieved unless the Polish nation undergoes a speedy change from a nation exclusively continental and chiefly agricultural into a nation simultaneously continental as well as maritime, and agricultural as well as industrial, approximately of the type of SwEden and Denmark. For this purpose, in turn, it is necessary that Poland, within the shortest possible time, should enter into the international exchange of goods contributing to it the largest possible amount of import and export. Poland, for the reconstruction of her industry destroyed by the war, and the more in order to speed up her industrial development, will have to import implements of production and raw materials for a long period of time. But in the long run it is impossible to import on credit only. If we do not wish to have a new world crisis, international liabilities must be paid and a world equilibrium of export and import must be preserved. Poland, not only in her own interest, but also in the interest of a natural after the war economical collaboration among the nations, ought to be able, in the shortest possible time, to square her import by her export. At the present moment, however, she has lost the main sources of her pre-war export, viz: the most fertile agricultural territories of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, as well as the forests of Polesie and the Eastern Carpathians. These losses will be compensated, not without a surplus, I admit, by granting to Poland all Silesia up to the Western Nisa—by the surplus, however, not only Poland will benefit, but also the cause of world’s peace. Just the contrary to what it was in Germany, Polish economic science and writers before the war did not show any liking whatsoever toward economic self-sufficiency. The Polish economic thought always tried to find the way of economic progress within the framework of economic world collaboration. So much the more does she desire this collaboration today. The mines and factories of Silesia which, under the German domination, were, alike with those of the Ruhr Basin, a forge for their war industry, will in the hands of Poland become a strong unifying factor in the field of economic collaboration between the Polish Nation and the great Western Anglo-Saxon Democracies. The collaboration of Western capital with the Polish people, with the Polish engineers and miners, in the further development of Silesian industry and mining, will be of a great importance for furthering the movement for peace in Central Europe. The Polish people as a whole are desirous to establish such a collaboration. But that is also the reason why all the Polish parties and all layers of the Polish community, without any exception whatsoever, expect the Great Powers to grant to Poland territorial compensation for what she was deprived in the East, for this compensation only will make it possible for her to take a due part in the economic progress of mankind, resting upon the foundations of an honest international collaboration. When the allied Poland has, following the decisions of the Crimean Conference, withdrawn her Eastern frontier to a line on which she stood at the end of the XIVth century, no injustice, it seems, can be found in Germany, the foe, withdrawing her Eastern frontier, being at the same time Poland’s Western boundary, to a line where she stood at the end of the same century. And this line was the Oder with Stettin, and the Lausitz Nisa. Stanislaw Grabski Professor of Economic Deputy President of Polish National Council Potsdam , July 28, 1945. [Annex 2] Why the Territory on the Oder and the Western Nisa Has Been Taken Over by Poland? On the basis of the Crimean Declaration, issued at Yalta by the Great Allies, Poland took it for granted that her territory in the North and West would be substantially increased. Following the shifting of the Eastern frontier of Poland it was necessary to conclude an agreement with the USSR, the result of which was that Poland had to face a re-settlement of a part of her population in a very brief period of time. Therefore new homes for the Polish population from across the Curzon line had to be found. For that purpose the area, stretching away between the former Polish frontier and the river Oder and Western Nisa, proved to be most suitable. It had been recently freed by the Red and the Polish Armies and was almost completely abandoned by Germans. In making use of it Poland relied upon the Crimean Declaration. In the old Poland, within the limits of 1939, it was impossible to accommodate those 4,200.000 home coming people, the overpopulation and war damages in that area being too great. On the other hand the land on the Oder and the Western Nisa proved to be deserted owing to a mass flight of Germans before military activities. Had that area been let to remain empty of people, crops and livestock would have been lost and industrial equipment ruined. In all that a very positive part was played by the Polish Army which, together with the Red Army, had fought on this territory and succeeded in freeing it from the German occupant; it was only natural it had to stay there for the sake of preserving peace and security, and by doing so to protect this part of Europe against disorder and banditry. Polish troops contributed a good deal to the restoration of economic life in those parts, in particular assisted in spring sowing and in harvesting crops. So the arable land in that area was not left unused and there is no doubt that this made the danger of starvation in Europe much smaller. At the present moment the Polish settler in that area, assisted by the Polish Army, is busy at harvesting crops and is getting ready for autumn sowing. Thus he contributes to re-introducing this land into the economic life of Europe and to making the economic and political conditions more stable. Moreover, in the area on the Oder and the Western Nisa there lived about 2 million people of Polish descent and speaking Polish language; they looked forward to the Polish state for assistance and protection. Apart of them in Germany worked about 2 million Polish workers [ sic ] deported there by force and about 1 million of prisoners in P. O. W. and concentration camps. A great part of those was to be found in the spoken about area. Those people, too, asked to be helped and protected by the Polish authorities. These are the reasons why Poland has introduced her administration in the territory east of the Oder and the Western Nisa. The results of this action were positive. The Polish administration and the Polish Army have restored order and made it possible for the economic life, interrupted by the activities of war, to thrive again. [Annex 3] Economic Value of the Territory Ceded to the USSR and the Western Area East of the Oder and the Western Nisa (A Few Comparative Data) With the cession of the territory in the East to the USSR the following most important economic items were lost for Poland: a. mineral raw materials 1. Oil (Eastern Carpathians) yearly production of Poland in 1937 501.000 tons loss in production 380.000 tons loss in percentage 76% 2. Ozocerite (Eastern Carpathians) entire production lost 100% 3. Natural gas (Eastern Carpathians) loss 72% 4. Potassium salts (Eastern Carpathians) entire prod. lost 100% Production in 1938: 567.000 tons 5. Building stones (for roads and buildings, Volhynia and Polesie) loss 70% Production in 1938: 3,000.000 tons 6. Gypsum (Southern area) losses: alabaster—total production 100% plaster gypsum 40% 7. Ceramic materials (china clay, quartz, feldspar) total production lost 100% As to oil, ozocerite, natural gas, potassium salts, and alabaster, Poland has nothing to gain by the incorporation of the said territory in the West, since those raw materials are not to be found there. As far as construction stones, gypsum, and ceramic materials are concerned, Poland shall obtain in the new area an equivalent for the losses in the East. On the other hand Poland will come into possession of 18 bituminous coal mines (the district of Oppeln in Silesia) with the annual production of about 30 million tons, and a few coal mines in the Lower Silesia with the yearly production of about 5 million tons, which means a total increase of Polish production capacity in this respect by 50 per cent. Moreover, Poland will obtain in the vicinity of Bytom (district of Oppeln, Silesia) a part of Upper-Silesian deposits of zinc-and-lead ores. That will [increase?] her resources of these ores up to 33 million tons (an increase by about 55 per cent). Having in view, however, a high degree of development of the home smelting industry, even these resources must be considered as being, relatively speaking, rather small, since they can feed zinc and ore smelting furnaces in Poland no longer than 50 years. b. agriculture (Computation based upon approximate pre-war data) In the Eastern territory ceded to the Soviet Union, to be exact in the middle and Southern part of it, we have lost about 50 per cent of what we possessed in loess and “czernoziom” soil, owing to which Poland is to suffer some losses in her agricultural production. Even if the territories east of the Western Nisa and the Oder were incorporated, our agricultural production will diminish by: Tons Percent Wheat by 300.000 i.e. by 14 Barley 44.800 3 Flax seed 30.000 44 Hemp seed 13.000 68 Buckwheat 115.000 66 Millet 54.500 55 Maize 98.500 94 Hops 1.400 71 Tobacco 5.200 48 In return certain gains would be achieved in other sectors of agricultural production, viz: Tons Percent Rye 160.000 i.e. by 2 Oats 147.000 6 Potatoes 1,365.000 4 Clover 1,178.000 4 Sugar beets 2,601.900 90 Sihquous plants 8.900 23 Flax fibre 27.000 73 Hemp fibre 1.500 13 As one may see by comparing the two lists owing to the changes in our frontiers the centre of gravitation of agricultural production in Poland will shift, i. e. there will be an increase in the crop of wheat [ beets? ] and potatoes and at the same time a substantial decrease in the production of wheat, buckwheat and maize. c. forests As a result of Poland having given up to the Soviet Union some large forested areas and in spite of her acquiring woods in the territory east of the Western Nisa and the Oder, she would lose on the whole 1,384.000 hectares. This loss, as well as the damages caused to our forests by the Germans has decreased the Polish resources of timber to such an extent, that Poland has to import timber for the purpose of reconstructing the country. d. livestock breeding In consequence of the fact that the Polish territory will be smaller by 20%, some decrease in the area of meadows, and pastures as well as in the crop of feed-plants, necessary for livestock breeding, is to be expected. As one can easily see looking at these comparative figures, Poland, by ceding her territory east of the Curzon line, suffered important economic loss in some main raw materials. It is impossible for her to obtain compensation in all particular items. Generally speaking, however, these losses can be counter-balanced only by her coming into possession of the area east of the Oder and the Western (Lausitzer) Nisa. This will bring about a shift in the type of Polish productivity: from a country producing mainly food and timber Poland will change into an agricultural and industrial one, which will raise the level of living and consumption capacity of her population, and, in consequence, increase her share in the international exchange of goods. [Annex 4] Demographic Needs of Poland There are about 26,000.000 Poles at the present moment. Considering that in 1931 (last Polish census of population) the average density of population was 83 people per sq. km., Poland ought to have at least 314.000 sq. km. of her territory. The area she lost in the East amounted to 184.000 sq. km. What was left for her was 204.000 sq. km., i. e. not more than 65% of the area required. So her territory ought to be increased by ⅓, otherwise she will not be able to live an independent life. The incorporation of the Eastern part of Germany up to the Oder and the Western Nisa will bring to Poland 105.000 sq. km., and so even in that event she will obtain less than she really needs. In consequence of these changes the territory of Poland will be smaller by 74.000 sq. km., in other words, by 20 per cent, whereas Germany’s territorial loss will be no greater than 18 per cent of her area. Poland’s maximum claims lead in effect to a smaller loss for defeated Germany than to allied and victorious Poland. Poland will have to master an area of 105.000 sq. km. inhabited by about 8 million people. Among that population, however, those who are of Polish descent and speak Polish amount to 2 million men and women. They will regain their national liberty at last. Actually, then, we have to take care of those industrial portions (farm, factories, artisan workshops and others), that were left behind by about 6 million people of German nationality. From the East about 4,200.000 Poles are to be transferred: they must find the opportunity to earn their living in the new Poland. From abroad (France, Belgium, USSR, etc.) about half a million Poles will come back home. Before the war Poland was a country that was extremely over-populated, particularly in the rural districts. There, without any land of their own to cultivate and without any chance of getting employment, lived 3 to 5 million people, 70 per cent of whom were Poles. Those rural “superfluous people” could not be absorbed into the industry and urban centres owing to the low level of old Poland’s industrial development. In the new Poland, however, those people must also be given satisfactory conditions for a decent existence. As it was shown by the publications of the League of Nations, the overpopulation of the rural districts in Europe had reached the maximum intensity in Poland. That was the reason why more than 2 million people emigrated from this country in the years 1919–1939. The rural overpopulation in Poland made also people to look for a seasonal emigration to neighbouring countries; between 1927 and 1938 534.000 men and women left Poland. Out of this number 431.000 went to Germany to cultivate, as migratory farm, workers, the land that had been abandoned by German inhabitants. This shows that the German element was not able to hold his own in agriculture in those parts. This fact is being confirmed, too, by a constant German emigration that has been going on without a stop from about 1850. Even in the last years, in spite of the strenuous efforts of Hitler’s government to the contrary, 448.000 people left that land, going westward, in the years 1933–39. The Polish farm labourer considered this state of affairs as injurious, for he saw himself induced to cultivate the soil robbed from his ancestors by Germany, and in this way to collaborate at making the power of his enemies still greater. Poland cannot but defend her citizens, she can comply no longer with them working for Germany under such conditions. On the other hand she is willing to send Germany the surplus of her agricultural products in exchange for a suitable equivalent. In this way justice will be done to both those who work and those who are in need. The demographic pressure of the Polish population is, indeed, very great. It shows itself in the natural annual increase of the population that on the average is more than 250.000 people. In conclusion one may say (i) that Poland with no difficulty can master the territory east of the Oder and the Western Nisa; (ii) that this area is necessary for her as a condition of her existence as independent power; (iii) that only by possessing that land she will be able to organize her agricultural and, generally speaking, her whole professional system on a more reasonable and sound basis; furthermore, to avoid that her sons and daughters should emigrate or slave for Germany. The Polish claims in reference to her Western frontiers upon the Oder and the Western Nisa are, then, much more modest than it would be justified by her actual demographic needs. 1 See ante , p. 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . 2 This caption appears on a separate page preceding the annexes. 3 For the text of the Yalta Declaration on Poland, see document No 1417, section vi . No. 1151 Proposal by the United States Delegation Truman Papers No. 1151 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg , July 29, 1945.] In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimean Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, to west of Stettin to the Oder and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the eastern Neisse River 2 and along the eastern Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. 1 Handed to Molotov July 29. See ante , p. 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] . 2 i. e., the Glatzer Neisse or Nysa Kłodzka. See the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , post . No. 1152 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1152 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Western Frontier of Poland U. S. Proposal In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimean Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River 2 and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. 1 Attachment 1 b to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . Byrnes had given Molotov a copy of this proposal at a private meeting immediately preceding the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers. See ante , p. 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] . 2 i. e., the Lausitzer Neisse or Nysa Łużycka. See the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , post . No. 1153 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Truman Papers No. 1153 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 [ Potsdam , July 31, 1945.] Would it 2 be appropriate for the Polish Government officials to be jointly notified of the decision on the Polish boundary. You might have one representative of each of the three to do it here. J[ ames ] C[ lement ] D[ unn ] 1 This paper is a manuscript note in pencil which Dunn apparently passed to Byrnes in the course of the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, July 31 (see ante , p. 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] ), and which Byrnes, with the change described in footnote 2, infra , apparently passed on to Truman with the manuscript notation, “from Dunn”. 2 Byrnes amended the first sentence by hand to read: “Would it not”. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Protocol and Communiqué, see post , pages 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] . No. 1154 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 No. 1154 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] August 8, 1945. Berlin Conference Poland Soviet Policy The principal interests of the Soviets at the Berlin Conference in connection with Poland were (1) the liquidation of the London Government and (2) establishment of the Polish Western frontier. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As to the Western frontier of Poland, the Soviets from the beginning supported the Polish claim to the Oder–Neisse Line including Stettin and Swinemünde in Poland. Their argument was based almost entirely on the allegation that practically all of the Germans had already fled from these regions, that the Poles had moved in and that the Red Army had had no recourse but to turn the administration of a Polish-inhabited area over to the Poles. In answer to the argument that an important food and coal-producing area was being removed from the jurisdiction of the Allied Control Commission for Germany, they replied that, the Germans having fled and being unwilling to return, only the Poles could produce the food and mine the coal and that they could not be expected to do so for the benefit of the Germans. Though the Poles themselves in appearing before the Foreign Ministers presented numerous other arguments in favor of the Oder–Neisse Line, 3 Stalin limited himself almost exclusively to the claim that we are confronted by a practical situation which admits of no other solution than to recognize the fait accompli . British Policy The British opposed the Polish claim on two grounds. First they maintained that the area in question was inhabited by eight to ten million Germans, far too large a number to be turned over to Poland. If on the other hand these vast numbers were driven westward out of this area, they would impose an enormous burden on the occupying powers in the remainder of Germany. Secondly the British laid the greatest stress on the difficulties which would be caused the occupying authorities if these important coal and food-producing areas were no longer available to supply the rest of Germany, particularly Berlin and the industrial areas in the west. They maintained that the result would be that the United States and Britain would have to import food to feed the Germans in their zones. It was only with the very greatest reluctance that the British finally consented to the Oder–Neisse Line and it is by no means certain that, but for the change in the British Government in the midst of the Conference, they would have done so. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. For the minutes of the discussions summarized in this memorandum, see ante , pp. 208–215 [ Pgs. 208–215 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 247–252 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 518–520 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 2 For the paragraphs omitted here, see document No. 1142 . 3 See ante , pp. 332–336 [ Pgs. 332–336 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , and post , pp. 1518–1523 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 1385 ] . Economic assistance from the United States Economic assistance from the United States [1155] The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Army–Navy Liquidation Commissioner (McCabe) Babelsberg, July 26, 1945. 860c.24/7–2645: Telegram [1156] The Chief of the Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property Affairs (Fetter) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) [Washington,] July 28 [1945.] 860c.24/7–2645: Telegram No. 1155 The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Army–Navy Liquidation Commissioner (McCabe) 860c.24/7–2645: Telegram No. 1155 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to the Army–Navy Liquidation Commissioner ( McCabe ) 1 [Extract] secret Babelsberg , July 26, 1945. Victory 349. To [Acting] Secretary of State Washington for McCabe from Clayton[;] for Fetter from Collado. Please inform us urgently of status of 1,000 trucks for Poland. … 2 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Byrnes. 2 Cf. ante , p. 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] . No. 1156 The Chief of the Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property Affairs (Fetter) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) 860c.24/7–2645: Telegram No. 1156 The Chief of the Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property Affairs ( Fetter ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) and the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) 1 [Extracts] secret [ Washington ,] July 28 [1945.] 154. For Clayton and Collado from Fetter. On July 18 OANLC instructed Field Commissioner Paris (Your Victory 349 July 26 2 ) to make all necessary arrangements for delivery of 1,000 trucks to Polish Govt. Ambassador Lane has discussed question with Field Commissioner and reports that approximately 750 trucks for Poland are available in U. K. for early delivery and that remaining 250 could be obtained on Continent. We do not know what official of Polish Govt should execute necessary documents and accept delivery. Dept has instructed Lane to request Polish Govt to name representative to close transaction. Lane, now in Paris, reports that he will do this on his arrival in Warsaw about July 30. Nothing more can be done until Lane and Polish Govt supply further information. Dept and OANLC feel that no public announcement of truck deal should be made until all arrangements are completed and Lane has been instructed not to release public statement without first submitting it to Washington. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . This reply has been shown to OANLC and they concur in respect to any actions by them. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 Document No. 1155 . General policy; sharing of information on atomic energy General policy; sharing of information on atomic energy [1157] Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) [Babelsberg, July 19, 1945.] Department of the Army Files No. 1157 Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) Department of the Army Files No. 1157 Memorandum by the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) 1 top secret [ Babelsberg , July 19, 1945.] Reflections on the Basic Problems Which Confront Us 1. With each International Conference that passes and, in fact, with each month that passes between conferences, it becomes clearer that the great basic problem of the future is the stability of the relations of the Western democracies with Russia. 2. With each such time that passes it also becomes clear that that problem arises out of the fundamental differences between a nation of free thought, free speech, free elections, in fact, a really free people with a nation which is not basically free but which is systematically controlled from above by Secret Police and in which free speech is not permitted. 3. It also becomes clear that no permanently safe international relations can be established between two such fundamentally different national systems. With the best of efforts we cannot understand each other. Furthermore, in an autocratically controlled system, policy cannot be permanent. It is tied up with the life of one man. Even if a measure of mental accord is established with one head the resulting agreement is liable to be succeeded by an entirely different policy coming from a different successor. 4. Daily we find our best efforts for coordination and sympathetic understanding with Russia thwarted by the suspicion which basically and necessarily must exist in any controlled organization of men. 5. Thus every effort we make at permanent organization of such a world composed of two such radically different systems is subject to frustration by misunderstandings arising out of mutual suspicion. 6. The great problem ahead is how to deal with this basic difference which exists as a flaw in our desired accord. I believe we must not accept the present situation as permanent for the result will then almost inevitably be a new war and the destruction of our civilization. I believe we should direct our thoughts constantly to the time and method of attacking the basic difficulty and the means we may have in hand to produce results. That something can be accomplished is not an idle dream. Stalin has shown an indication of his appreciation of our system of freedom by his proposal of a free constitution to be established among the Soviets. 2 To read this Constitution would lead one to believe that Russia had in mind the establishing of free speech, free assembly, free press and the other essential elements of our Bill of Rights and would not have forever resting upon every citizen the stifling hand of autocracy. He has thus given us an opening. The questions are: a . When can we take any steps without doing more harm than good? b . By what means can we proceed? 1. By private diplomatic discussion of the reasons for our distrust. 2. By encouraging open public discussions. 3. By setting conditions for any concessions which Russia may ask in respect to— ( a ) Territorial concessions ( b ) Loans ( c ) Bases ( d ) Any other concessions. How far these conditions can extend is a serious problem. At the start it may be possible to effect only some amelioration of the local results of Russia’s Secret Police State. 7. The foregoing has a vital bearing upon the control of the vast and revolutionary discovery of X 3 which is now confronting us. Upon the successful control of that energy depends the future successful development or destruction of the modern civilized world. The Committee appointed by the War Department which has been considering that control has pointed this out in no uncertain terms and has called for an international organization for that purpose. 4 After careful reflection I am of the belief that no world organization containing as one of its dominant members a nation whose people are not possessed of free speech but whose governmental action is controlled by the autocratic machinery of a secret political police, cannot [ can ] give effective control of this new agency with its devastating possibilities. I therefore believe that before we share our new discovery with Russia we should consider carefully whether we can do so safely under any system of control until Russia puts into effective action the proposed constitution which I have mentioned. If this is a necessary condition, we must go slowly in any disclosures or agreeing to any Russian participation whatsoever and constantly explore the question how our head-start in X and the Russian desire to participate can be used to bring us nearer to the removal of the basic difficulties which I have emphasized. 5 1 Given to Truman by Stimson on July 21 with the explanation that it “was in no sense an official paper”. For Stimson’s later reflections on this paper, see Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947), pp. 638–641. The following extracts from Stimson’s diary show the genesis of this memorandum and the circumstances of its presentation to Truman: “[July 19:] … Later in the afternoon at a quarter to five McCloy, Bundy, and I had a long and interesting discussion on our relations with Russia; what the cause of the constant differences between the countries are, and how to avoid them. As a result, I dictated a memorandum on the subject to serve as a sort of analysis and possible basis for action. It boiled down to the possibility of getting the Russians to see that the real basis of the evil was the absence of freedom of speech in their regime, and the iron-bound rule of the OGPU. I have been very much impressed on this visit with the atmosphere of repression that exists everywhere, and which is felt by all who come in contact with the Russian rule in Germany. While the Russian soldiers and American soldiers seem to like each other individually when they meet, the people who have to deal with the Russian officials feel very differently, and it greatly impairs the cooperation between our two countries. Churchill is very rampant about it, and most of our people who have seen the Russians most intimately think we have been too easy and that they have taken advantage of it. “It is a very difficult problem because they are crusaders for their own system and suspicious of everybody outside trying to interfere with it. At the same time it is becoming more and more evident to me that a nation whose system rests upon free speech and all the elements of freedom, as does ours, cannot be sure of getting on permanently with a nation where speech is strictly controlled and where the Government uses the iron hand of the secret police. The question is very important just now, and the development of S–l is bringing it to a focus. … “[July 20:] … We then returned to the house and Ambassador Harriman soon came in on my invitation to talk over the subject of our relations with Russia which McCloy, Bundy and I were discussing last evening. I showed him the paper which I had dictated on the importance of getting freedom of speech in Russia. It wound up as a suggestion as to the importance of beginning to get the Russians accustomed to the thought of coming to that one of the Bill of Rights which in my opinion is the most important of all. Harriman read the paper and said that the analysis of the reasons for the difference were in his opinion exactly correct but he was pessimistic as to the chances of getting Russia to change her system in any way. He has been in Russia now for nearly four years and has grown evidently depressed and troubled by the situation. I talked with him for a long time regarding the matter and, in view of his intelligence and capacity, such a despairing view from him troubled me a great deal. … “[July 22:] Called on President Truman at nine-twenty. The foregoing day I had left with him my paper on reflections as to our relations with Russia, copy of which is hereto attached. I had told him that this paper was in no sense an official paper—that it did not even contain my matured opinions, but that it represented an analysis which I thought was correct and a program of what I hoped might sometime be done. With that understanding he asked me to see it and I left it with him and this morning I picked it up. He gave it to me and stated that he had read it and agreed with it. …” 2 See Constitution ( Fundamental Law ) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Adopted at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., December 5, 1936 (Moscow, 1937). 3 i. e., atomic energy. 4 See the sources cited in vol. i , document No. 619, footnote 3 . 5 Concerning the extent of Truman’s disclosure to Stalin at the Berlin Conference of the existence of a new atomic weapon, see ante , pp. 378–379 [ Pgs. 378–379 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] ] . Participation in European economic organizations Participation in European economic organizations [1158] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State London, July 18, 1945—1 p.m. 840.70/7–1845: Telegram [1159] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State London, July 19, 1945—noon. 840.70/7–1945: Telegram [1160] The Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy (Taft) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) [Washington,] July 19, 1945. 840.70/7–1945: Telegram [1161] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg, July 22, 1945.] 740.00119 Potsdam/8–245 [1162] Report by the Subcommittee on Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. 840.50/7–2545 [[Unnumbered document following Document 1162 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1163] The British Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State (Ronald) to the Minister in the United Kingdom (Hawkins) [London,] August 3, 1945. London Embassy Files—870 EITO No. 1158 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State 840.70/7–1845: Telegram No. 1158 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret us urgent London , July 18, 1945—1 p.m. 7236. With regard to suggested procedure for reconvening EIT conference given in Department’s 5808, July 14 1 Ronald has now suggested that matter could be more advantageously taken up in Berlin. FonOff has telegraphed its delegation at Berlin Conference to consult with US delegation and if agreed discuss with Russians problem of reconvening EIT conference as part of larger discussion of Russian cooperation in European economic organizations. Ronald stated Weston is in Berlin and would be able to give both delegations technical background information if necessary. Winant 1 Not printed. For the text of the “suggested procedure” referred to, see document No. 1160 . No. 1159 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State 840.70/7–1945: Telegram No. 1159 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret London , July 19, 1945—noon. 7259. 1. Ronald informs us that Cadogan has been instructed to arrange for Clark Kerr to discuss with Harriman and Clayton at Berlin the question of what steps should be taken, in view of agreement on Polish Provisional Govt, to try to extend membership of EECE, provisional ECITO, and ECO. 2. First question is whether single approach should be made to Soviet at Berlin with respect to all these temporary economic bodies or whether provisional ECITO should be taken up separately. (My telegram 7236, July 18 1 ). Second question is what subsequent procedure to follow if Soviet are not willing to join. FonOff thinks it would in effect be incompatible with insistence on independent character of Polish Provisional Govt if in such a case no opportunity to join were given to Poland. 3. As regards provisional ECITO Ronald suggested that if Soviet would not join reconvened conference to get up ECITO the provisional character of ECITO might be retained to facilitate their adherence later but invitations be sent to Poland and Czechoslovakia and perhaps others to join the provisional organization. Winant 1 Document No. 1158 . No. 1160 The Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy (Taft) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) 840.70/7–1945: Telegram No. 1160 The Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy ( Taft ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) 1 secret us urgent [ Washington ,] July 19, 1945. 61. Attention Clayton from Taft. Dept has received from BritEmb an aide-mémoire 2 proposing that European Inland Transport Conference be reconvened. BritGovt further proposed that they inform SovGovt of the desire to resume the Conference and that they are disposed to invite Provisional Polish Govt to appoint a delegation but before doing so BritGovt would welcome assurance that SovDeleg would participate in work of Conference. BritGovt also suggested that Danish and Turkish Govts be invited to reconvened Conference and requested US views on this question. Dept answered Brit aide-mémoire as follows: 3 “The Department of State agrees with the proposals of His Majesty’s Government as contained in the British Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of July 11, 1945 that the Soviet Government be informed of the desire of our Governments to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference as soon as possible. Such communication to the Soviet Government would go on to say that our two Governments are disposed at once to invite the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to appoint a delegation to the Conference but that before doing so we would welcome assurance that the Soviet Government would participate in the work of the reconvened Conference. The Department of State suggests that since the original invitations to the Conference were issued jointly by our two Governments the proposal to the Soviet Government and the invitations reconvening the Conference likewise be joint communications. The Department of State does not believe that the Danish and Turkish Governments should be invited to send delegates to the reconvened Conference as this might entail further delay or raise additional questions concerning the participation of other governments. This question should be left for consideration either by the Conference after it is reconvened or by the Council of the Organization after the final agreement has been signed. This Government agrees that the Provisional Organization for European Inland Transport should continue its activities until the European Central Inland Transport Organization proper comes into being.” Embassy London now advises 4 that FonOff suggests matter could be more advantageously taken up in Berlin and that FonOff has requested its delegation Berlin to consult with you and if agreeable to discuss with Soviets question of reconvening Conference as part of larger discussion of Russian cooperation in European economic organizations. Weston of Ministry of War Transport is Brit official most familiar with entire EIT matter. He is in Berlin and would be able to give both delegations technical background information if necessary. Department perceives no objection to latest FonOff proposal and will therefore assume that matter will be considered in Berlin unless informed by you to the contrary. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 Document No. 267, printed in vol. i . 3 On July 14. 4 See document No. 1158 . No. 1161 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/8–245 No. 1161 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 top secret [ Babelsberg , July 22, 1945.] Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems The urgent tasks of European relief and reconstruction can be most effectively carried out only if supported by the combined efforts of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. It is, therefore, recommended that the three governments agree to participate fully in the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe (EECE), European Coal Organization (ECO) and the European Central Inland Transport Authority (ECITO). It should be the aim of the three Governments to assist in making these organizations effective agencies for handling the problems of relief and reconstruction by day-to-day cooperation in their activities. 1 Notice of the submission of this paper was given at the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 22 (see ante , p. 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] ), and the subject was referred to the Foreign Ministers at the Sixth Plenary Meeting, July 22 (see ante , pp. 246–247 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] ). No. 1162 Report by the Subcommittee on Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems 840.50/7–2545 No. 1162 Report by the Subcommittee on Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Report of the Conclusions Reached by the Sub Committee Created To Consider the United States Proposal on “Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems ” 1. After a discussion of the functions and purposes of the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe and the European Coal Organization, the Soviet representatives agreed to review the documents concerning these organizations in order to decide the Soviet position regarding participation in them. The U. K. and U. S. Governments are already members of these organizations. 2. The U. K. and U. S. representatives informed the Soviet representatives of their desire to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference 2 and stated that they would welcome assurance that the Soviet Government would participate in the work of the reconvened Conference. The Soviet representative subsequently informed the U. K. and U. S. representatives that the Soviet Government would participate in this conference. 1 Submitted to the Ninth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 27. See ante , p. 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] . An English translation of the Russian text of this paper, which contains variations of language and word order from the document here printed, is attached as enclosure 3 to the Rapporteur’s report of that meeting. See ante , p. 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] . 2 See Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, July 1, 1941–June 30, 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947; Department of State publication No. 2665), p. 138. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1162 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference text on this subject, as included in the Protocol, see post , page 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] . No. 1163 The British Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State (Ronald) to the Minister in the United Kingdom (Hawkins) London Embassy Files—870 EITO No. 1163 The British Acting Assistant Under-Secretary of State ( Ronald ) to the Minister in the United Kingdom ( Hawkins ) [Extracts] W 10212/22/13 [ London ,] August 3, 1945. Dear Hawkins , After you left me yesterday I … addressed a telegram to our Chargé d’Affaires in Warsaw 1 in the terms of the enclosed. … 2 You will notice that I adopted your suggestion that we should mention an actual date in our communication. I was all the more inclined to do this when I heard from Weston that the Soviet Delegation at Terminal had definitely favoured quick progress in this field. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yours sincerely, Nigel Ronald [Enclosure—Extract] As a result of discussions between United Kingdom, United States and Soviet delegations at Terminal Soviet Government have agreed to resume participation in European Inland Transport Conference in London as soon as Polish Provisional Government have accepted invitation to send a delegation to the Conference and have indicated when that delegation could reach London. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Hon. Robert M. A. Hankey. 2 Instructing the Chargé to invite the Polish Provisional Government to send a delegation to the European Inland Transport Conference. Repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals Repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals [1164] The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Berlin, July 23, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2345 [1165] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Caserta, July 25, 1945—midnight. 740.62114/7–2545: Telegram [1166] The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) Berlin, July 27, 1945. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2345 [1167] Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 [1168] The Soviet Delegation to the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] “—” [sic] July 1945. 740.62114/8–145 No. 1164 The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2345 No. 1164 The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation ( Novikov ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) [Translation] Berlin , July 23, 1945. Dear Mr. Dunn : In connection with the question concerning the British camp for Soviet citizens in the region of Cesenatico (Italy), regarding which the statement was made by the Soviet Delegation at the meeting of the Heads of the Three Governments on July 22, 1 I am sending you herewith, under instructions of the People’s Commissar, an aide-mémoire . I would appreciate it if you would acknowledge the receipt of the attached aide-mémoire. Sincerely yours, K Novikov [Attachment—Translation] Aide-Mémoire The Soviet Reparation [ Repatriation ] Authorities have received the following information from their representatives in Italy. On July 10, 1945 Lieutenant Colonel Levels informed the Soviet representative, Colonel Yakovlev, that there were 150 Soviet citizens in the British camp in the region of the city of Cesenatico. On July 16 the Soviet representative, Colonel Podobed, together with the English Brigadier Denny—the commanding officer of the zone of POW camps—had occasion to visit the camp in the Cesenatico area. It was thereupon revealed that 150 persons were not held in this camp but 10,000 who were in general Ukrainians. One division of approximately 10,000 men had been formed from these Ukrainians. The division consisted of twelve regiments, including a communications regiment and an engineer regiment. The Officer Corps of this division was chosen from persons who occupied command positions in corresponding units of the German army. It also appeared that the persons who expressed the desire to return to their homeland had been badly treated and were even beaten up. 2 [ Babelsberg ,] July 23, 1945. 1 See ante , p. 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 2 For the draft entry on this subject submitted by the Soviet Delegation for inclusion in the Protocol, see document No. 1432 . No. 1165 The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.62114/7–2545: Telegram No. 1165 The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Caserta , July 25, 1945—midnight. 3062. We have read telegram in Broad’s office from British Delegate Potsdam stating that at close July 23 [ 22 ] session Big Three meeting, Molotov complained to Eden about British POW camp Italy at Cesenatico near Ravenna where British had informed Russian representatives there were only 150 Soviet citizens held as POWs. Soviet ForMin added that when Russian officials arrived visit camp they discovered there were 10,000 Ukrainian citizens there who were being interviewed by Polish consular officials in Italy while Soviet officers were kept out. These Ukrainians were men who had been organized into division of 12 regiments under officers who had served German Army. 665 of them indicated to Russian officers they wished return Soviet Union. Understood that both Eden and Churchill expressed doubt these were facts of case but promised Molotov they would have report made immediately and inform him soon as complete information received. 1 General Morgan cabled Potsdam in following sense: Approximately 10,000 personnel in this camp present in process being screened by USSR Mission Rome who have full access to camp. People involved mostly non-Soviet Ukrainians and include numbers Poles who, so far as can be ascertained, were not domiciled east 1939 USSR frontier. He added negotiations already under way return to Russia 665 persons referred to and be ready hand over to Russians any more who will go without use force. Morgan reminded British Delegate Potsdam he has sought urgently required ruling by British War Office as to what to be done with those people for whom use force would be necessary. He also explained that British had retained original regimental troops under their own generals for administrative reasons only. 2 Kirk 1 See ante , p. 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . 2 Churchill made a statement along these lines at the Eighth Plenary Meeting, July 24. See ante , p. 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . No. 1166 The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation (Novikov) 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2345 No. 1166 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation ( Novikov ) Berlin , July 27, 1945. Dear Mr. Novikov : I refer to your note of July 23, 1945 1 with which you enclosed an aide-mémoire in regard to the British camp for Soviet citizens in the region of Cesenatico (Italy). Since this is entirely a British matter I assume that you will approach the British separately and that your aide-mémoire was transmitted for information purposes only. Sincerely yours, James Clement Dunn 1 Document No. 1164 . No. 1167 Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1167 Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. Soviet Citizens in Allied Territories Soviet Proposal According to the information of the Repatriation Soviet Authorities General Thorne, Commander of English troops in Norway, having quoted the British Government’s order refused to deliver to these authorities citizens of the Soviet Baltic Republics, who are at present time in Norway, as well as Soviet citizens-emigrants from the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, several thousand persons altogether. Similar situation exists in Great Britain from which country 287 Soviet citizens-emigrants from the Soviet Baltic Republics and from the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia were not permitted to leave for their native country by the British authorities. Drawing attention of the Government of Great Britain to these facts the Soviet Government expects that the British Military Authorities will immediately issue instructions about delivering to the Repatriation Soviet Military Authorities of [ sic ] all Soviet citizens-emigrants from the Baltic Republics and the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. 1 Attachment 17 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . No. 1168 The Soviet Delegation to the United States Delegation 740.62114/8–145 No. 1168 The Soviet Delegation to the United States Delegation 1 [Translation] Aide-Mémoire According to reports received by the Soviet Repatriation Representatives a considerable number of Soviet citizens are being held in English and American camps for German war prisoners. The Soviet Government has information at its disposal that in Norway at the beginning of July 1945 about 1,000 Soviet citizens were being held with German prisoners of war. In various American camps for German war prisoners situated in Great Britain and the United States there are also a considerable number of Soviet citizens. Provided with data on the presence of Soviet citizens in American and English camps for German prisoners of war, the Soviet Repatriation Representatives immediately requested the American and English authorities for permission to enter the German war prisoner camps in order to establish the identity of these persons (these Soviet citizens). They were refused permission to do so. The Soviet Government in bringing the above to the attention of the British and American Governments anticipates that instructions will be given to the appropriate American and English authorities to permit the entry of Soviet Repatriation Representatives into the German war prisoner camps in order to establish (the identity) of the Soviet citizens. [ Babelsberg ,] “—” [ sic ] July 1945. 1 The translation bears the following typed notation: “Handed to the American and British Representatives by Mr. Molotov on August 1, 1945.” This aide-mémoire was submitted at the Eleventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, August 1. See ante , p. 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . The Russian text, however, is signed in pencil: “К Новиков [K. Novikov] 31.7.45.” Air traffic between the United States and the Soviet Union Air traffic between the United States and the Soviet Union [1169] The Commanding General, Army Air Forces (Arnold) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) [Babelsberg,] July 20, 1945. 811.79661/1–1746 [1170] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Washington [Babelsberg], 20 July 1945. Truman Papers [1171] President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin [Babelsberg,] 20 July 1945. Truman Papers [1172] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Ambassador in France (Caffery) Moscow, July 28, 1945—5 p.m. 811.79661/7–2845: Telegram [1173] Generalissimo Stalin to President Truman Berlin, July 29, 1945. Truman Papers [1174] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State Moscow, August 1, 1945—8 p.m. 861.79600/8–145: Telegram No. 1169 The Commanding General, Army Air Forces (Arnold) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) 811.79661/1–1746 No. 1169 The Commanding General, Army Air Forces ( Arnold ) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 20, 1945. Dear Averell : The Joint Chiefs of Staff this morning agreed to submit the attached memorandum to the President 2 inclosing a draft memorandum to Marshal Stalin concerning service to Moscow from the United States being routed through Berlin instead of through Teheran. The United States Chiefs agreed that the continuance of the present situation is intolerable, that there is no justification for the current Soviet attitude, and that it would be desirable for the President to take a most firm position in presenting this matter to Marshal Stalin. Admiral Leahy indicated that he would pass on to the President these views. Sincerely, H. H. Arnold 1 Printed from a copy subsequently typed in the American Embassy at Moscow. 2 See document No. 1170 . No. 1170 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Truman Papers No. 1170 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President top secret Washington [ Babelsberg ], 20 July 1945. Memorandum for the President In the past we have experienced considerable delay in travel of individuals and important official mail between the United States and Moscow. This situation is now susceptible to considerable improvement if the air connection point were shifted from Tehran to Berlin. Experience has shown that the Russians are extremely hesitant in coming to any agreements with foreign countries regarding air travel for fear of establishing precEdents that might carry over into the postwar period. Efforts to obtain Soviet agreement to a Berlin connecting point have been made without success by both our military and diplomatic representatives. There is a good likelihood that Marshal Stalin would accede to a personal request made by you, and it is recommended that you either send the attached letter 1 to Mr. Stalin or discuss the matter with him along the lines indicated. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: William D Leahy Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. 1 Document No. 1171 . This paper bears the following manuscript notation by Leahy: “Letter delivered to Stalin 20 July W. D. L.” No. 1171 President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin Truman Papers No. 1171 President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 20 July 1945. My Dear Generalissimo : At the present time American air traffic between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. is accomplished via Teheran. From the United States point of view this is an extremely wasteful use of critically needed air transport, in addition to the time lost in travel. The U. S. has now established a military transport service into Berlin for handling official U. S. traffic which could be made available for official Soviet traffic as well. I therefore seek your approval to diverting American and Soviet traffic now carried through Teheran to a route through Berlin. Harry S. Truman No. 1172 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Ambassador in France (Caffery) 811.79661/7–2845: Telegram No. 1172 The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) 1 secret Moscow , July 28, 1945—5 p.m. [259.] Question raised in your 214 July 26 2 of possible courier route to and from Moscow via Berlin and Paris is one which has preoccupied this mission for some time, since Tehran service is definitely unsatisfactory and no other regular air facilities are yet available. (Sent Paris 259 rptd Frankfurt for Harriman 37, rptd Dept 2702) On June 29 Ambassador Harriman discussed with Vyshinski project of regular facilities for our passengers and mail via Berlin whereby Soviet and American airlines would connect at Berlin. Vyshinski seemed to think that this would be possible and that administrative and technical details could be promptly worked out. 3 On July 7 Ambassador wrote Vyshinski specifically requesting his cooperation in speedy conclusion of arrangements for this service. 4 On July 11 Vyshinski replied by referring to a previous conversation of June 15 in which, he stated, he had drawn attention to fact that while considerable improvement had been made in air facilities on that route and while he recognized importance of matter question could not be considered sufficiently advanced for detailed consideration. He stated that he would communicate further as soon as further instructions were received from the Soviet Govt. 5 Ambassador Harriman left soon afterward for Berlin, and I have not heard anything further from Russians in his absence. I have no information as to whether subject has been discussed with Russians at Berlin. Meanwhile, Russians continue to take individual American passengers from here over this route when it pleases them to do so and to refuse to take them in other cases. It would, of course, be helpful if American aircraft could travel as far as Warsaw. I believe, however, that any proposal for regular entry of American aircraft to Poland may encounter strong opposition in certain Russian quarters. Kennan 1 Printed from the text received by the Department of State as telegram No. 2702. The same message was sent directly to the Office of the Political Adviser at Frankfurt for transmittal to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg. 2 Not printed. The Embassy at Paris, apparently unaware that the subject had already been raised with Stalin at the Conference, had suggested that it be raised with the Soviet Foreign Office at Moscow. 3 See vol. i , document No. 531 . 4 See vol. i , document No. 533 . 5 See vol. i , document No. 534 . No. 1173 Generalissimo Stalin to President Truman Truman Papers No. 1173 Generalissimo Stalin to President Truman [Translation] Berlin , July 29, 1945. Dear Mr. President : I have received your message of July 20 1 concerning the change in the routing of American and Soviet shipments from Tehran to Berlin. The Soviet Government agrees with your proposal. Instructions have been issued to the appropriate Soviet authorities to study with American representatives the technical questions connected with this proposal. I. Stalin 1 Document No. 1171 . No. 1174 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Acting Secretary of State 861.79600/8–145: Telegram No. 1174 The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Acting Secretary of State restricted Moscow , August 1, 1945—8 p.m. 2732. High-level Russian assent in principle to opening of regular air passenger facilities between Moscow and west via Berlin has I understand been obtained at Potsdam and military mission here is now making preparations to undertake with Russians technical discussions looking to inauguration of regular Russian services connecting with ours at Berlin. To Dept 2732; rptd to Paris as 263; Stockholm as 51; Tehran as 111; Cairo as 78. Meanwhile Russians are already moving occasional individual American passengers to and from Berlin on special request when they are so inclined; all Brit courier mails are already moving over that route under cover of an informal arrangement whereby Russians undertook to move mails and personnel for British Reparations Delegation during period of reparations talks here. Thomas has just returned from trial trip to Stockholm by rail and steamer. Trip took four to five days in each direction. It presents no great technical difficulties. In view of above I wish to recommend following: (1) That despatch of mails via Tehran be terminated at this time subject to resumption in case other routes should fail to work out. (2) That air courier mails for this mission be sent henceforth to Paris for transmission. (3) That list of couriers for Paris–Moscow route be communicated at once to this mission for transmission to Soviet Govt and that application be made forthwith for visa for first courier to make trip from Paris and return. (It may take some time to obtain this visa. By that time mail will presumably have accumulated in Paris). (4) That efforts be made to route second class pouches by sea to SwEden for movement to Moscow by courier. If there is not sufficient frequency of maritime service to SwEden (I think once in six weeks would be minimum) then these pouches would also have to be handled from Paris by air as is now being done via Tehran. If Stockholm route is used, professional courier should in my opinion be available there. I am planning to send Thomas out to Paris as courier if possible next week. He will therefore be available for consultation in Paris with respect to above matters. Thereafter, I see no necessity his return to Moscow at this time. Kennan Spain: General policy Spain: General policy [1175] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Armour) Washington, July 16, 1945—11 a.m. 881.00/2–945: Telegram [1176] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State London, July 18, 1945—5 p.m. 852.00/7–1845: Telegram [1177] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 19, 1945 Truman Papers [1178] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 31 [1945.] 711.52/7–3145: Telegram [1179] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 8, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 No. 1175 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Armour) 881.00/2–945: Telegram No. 1175 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain ( Armour ) 1 [Extract 2 ] secret us urgent Washington , July 16, 1945—11 a.m. 1200.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. We cannot escape the conviction that the Spanish people do not as yet appreciate the weakness of their Government’s international position. It seems clear that the implications of the San Francisco resolution 3 are not adequately appreciated in Spain. We believe that it is going to be increasingly difficult for the interests of Spain and the Spanish people to be adequately represented and recognized in international affairs because of the regime which is governing Spain. All of this is, of course, directly in line with the purport of President Roosevelt’s letter 4 to you in regard to the nature of the relations which must necessarily exist between the United States and Spain so long as the present regime continues in power. Repeated London as 5815; Paris 3312; Tangier 156. Grew 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 48 of July 18 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–1845). 2 For the first part of this message, see document No. 1349 . 3 See vol. i , document No. 239, footnote 1 . 4 The reference is to the following letter of March 10, 1945, from Roosevelt to Armour (here reprinted from Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 466): “In connection with your new assignment as Ambassador to Madrid I want you to have a frank statement of my views with regard to our relations with Spain. “Having been helped to power by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, and having patterned itself along totalitarian lines the present regime in Spain is naturally the subject of distrust by a great many American citizens who find it difficult to see the justification for this country to continue to maintain relations with such a regime. Most certainly we do not forget Spain’s official position with and assistance to our Axis enemies at a time when the fortunes of war were less favorable to us, nor can we disregard the activities, aims, organizations, and public utterances of the Falange, both past and present. These memories cannot be wiped out by actions more favorable to us now that we are about to achieve our goal of complete victory over those enemies of ours with whom the present Spanish regime identified itself in the past spiritually and by its public expressions and acts. “The fact that our Government maintains formal diplomatic relations with the present Spanish regime should not be interpreted by anyone to imply approval of that regime and its sole party, the Falange, which has been openly hostile to the United States and which has tried to spread its fascist party ideas in the Western Hemisphere. Our victory over Germany will carry with it the extermination of Nazi and similar ideologies. “As you know, it is not our practice in normal circumstances to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries unless there exists a threat to international peace. The form of government in Spain and the policies pursued by that Government are quite properly the concern of the Spanish people. I should be lacking in candor, however, if I did not tell you that I can see no place in the community of nations for governments founded on fascist principles. “We all have the most friendly feelings for the Spanish people and we are anxious to see a development of cordial relations with them. There are many things which we could and normally would be glad to do in economic and other fields to demonstrate that friendship. The initiation of such measures is out of the question at this time, however, when American sentiment is so profoundly opposed to the present regime in power in Spain. “Therefore, we earnestly hope that the time may soon come when Spain may assume the role and the responsibility which we feel it should assume in the field of international cooperation and understanding.” No. 1176 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State 852.00/7–1845: Telegram No. 1176 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret London , July 18, 1945—5 p.m. 7241. Ambassador Mallet, proceeding Madrid Monday, expressed himself this morning as in much doubt how to handle Franco. Franco’s latest moves considered by FonOff unsatisfactory, unencouraging and it seems to be feared Franco by holding on will play Spain into Soviet hands. Garran of FonOff expects interesting developments Spanish scene in view of Soviet interest in Tangier coupled with renewed radio campaign against Franco which now features, Garran said, instructions for sabotage. Sent Dept as 7241; repeated Madrid 189. Winant 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 65 of July 19 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–1945). No. 1177 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Truman Papers No. 1177 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation July 19, 1945 [Translation] Spain Soviet Proposal Presented to Foreign Ministers July 19, 1945 1 The Soviet Government present for consideration by the Conference the following suggestion. In view of the fact: 1. that the regime of Franco originated not as a result of the development of the internal forces in Spain but as a result of the intervention by the principal axis-countries—Hitler Germany and fascist Italy which imposed upon the Spanish people the fascist regime of Franco; 2. that the regime of Franco constitutes a grave danger to the freedom-loving nations in Europe and South America; 3. that in the face of brutal terror instituted by Franco the Spanish people have repeatedly expressed themselves against the regime of Franco and in favour of the restoration of democratic government in Spain, The Conference deems it necessary to recommend to the United Nations: 1. to break off all relations with the Government of Franco; 2. to render support to the democratic forces in Spain and to enable the Spanish people to establish such a regime as will respond to their will. 1 Attachment 2 to the minutes of the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 19. See ante , p. 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] . No. 1178 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 711.52/7–3145: Telegram No. 1178 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State top secret [ Washington ,] July 31 [1945.] 168. Mr. Hull called us on the telephone this morning and discussed at some length the Spanish situation. He is a little apprehensive lest the new government in the United Kingdom may suddenly announce a new policy in regard to Spain in such a way that it may indicate that the Labor Government is setting out on a course sharply divergent from that followed by the Churchill Government and by the United States Government. Mr. Hull pointed out that while the policy followed by the two countries in regard to Spain during the war was a joint one, it had usually been the British Government which had argued for more liberal treatment of Spain than the American Government would have been disposed to accord. He added that the British had in most cases, it was true, been able to buttress their case with sound military arguments. In particular he referred to the period in 1942 when all of us were afraid that Spain might enter the war on the side of the Axis and with German and Italian help attack Gibraltar. Mr. Hull said that what he was really afraid of was that the new British Government might take sudden action which would place our Government in a false position vis-à-vis public opinion. We told him about President Roosevelt’s letter of last March to Ambassador Armour 1 and referred to the active support which the United States gave to the Mexican resolution at San Francisco aimed at preventing Spain’s joining the United Nations Organization. 2 Mr. Hull inquired whether it might not be desirable for us to look into the question of “tightening up” on Spain by unilateral action before the British Government undertakes some action, possibly unilateral, in regard to Spain. We told him that we understood that Spain had been discussed at your present meeting but that we had no details in regard to the discussion or any decision that might have been reached. Mr. Hull suggested that I send you this telegram giving you the substance of our talk with him for your consideration in the light of any discussions that may have taken place at Potsdam. He says that it may very well be that there is no action which the United States Government should take at this time but that he is keenly desirous of avoiding a situation in which we might be placed in a false position. We have given some consideration here to the possible publication of President Roosevelt’s letter to Ambassador Armour, but we had decided not to raise this question with you until after your return. I shall be glad to have the benefit of your views and any instructions you may wish to give me on the points raised by Mr. Hull. [ Grew ] 1 See document No. 1175, footnote 4 . 2 See vol. i , document No. 239, footnote 1 . No. 1179 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 No. 1179 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] August 8, 1945. Berlin Conference Spain Soviet Policy The Soviets proposed that all the United Nations be asked to break all diplomatic relations with the Franco Government and to support the democratic forces in Spain. 2 They took the position that the regime of Franco was gaining strength, that it was feeding semi-Fascist regimes in other countries and that it was a menace to democratic governments both in Europe and in Latin America. They expressed the view that action short of force to oust the Franco regime would not be intervention in the internal affairs of Spain since Franco had been installed by external intervention on the part of Hitler and Mussolini. Stalin stated that it was not the fact that the Franco regime was a dictatorship to which he objected but the fact that it owed its origin to Fascist intervention. When they found the British and the United States unyielding on the question of breaking diplomatic relations with Franco, they urged that the Conference issue a statement setting forth the view of the three governments on the Franco regime. They finally accepted without much discussion the brief statement on Spain in that section of the communiqué dealing with “Conclusion of Peace Treaties and Admission to the United Nations Organization”. 3 British Policy Churchill said that his Government had a strong distaste for Franco and that he, Churchill, had been misrepresented as having been friendly to this gentleman. He opposed, however, breaking diplomatic relations with the Franco Government on the grounds that it might, in view of the Spanish character, rally the Spaniards behind Franco. Furthermore, we should be injuring our own interests if we withdrew our ambassadors. His principal point, however, was that he did not wish to interfere in the domestic affairs of any state, except those for which we had assumed a certain responsibility because of the presence of Allied troops as a result of the war. He was in addition most anxious not to take any step which might lead to a renewal of Spanish civil war. He pointed out the provision in the United Nations Charter 4 against interference in domestic affairs. He stressed the importance of British trade with Spain. He said that he would personally favor a constitutional monarchy in Spain but thought that the matter should be left to the Spanish people. There was no discussion of the Spanish question after the change in the British Government and therefore no opportunity was afforded to obtain the views of the Labor Ministers on this question. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. For the minutes of the discussions summarized in this memorandum, see ante , pp. 122–127 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 2 See document No. 1177 . 3 See document No. 1384, section x . 4 The reference is to article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945 (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031). Lend-lease; need for Anglo-American financial discussions Lend-lease; need for Anglo-American financial discussions [1180] The Secretary of State to the President [Undated.] 841.24/5–2945 [1181] President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill [Babelsberg, July 17, 1945.] 841.24/5–2945 [1182] Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman [Babelsberg,] 24th July, 1945. 800.24/8–745 [1183] President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill Babelsberg, July 25, 1945. Truman Papers [1184] Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman Whitehall [Babelsberg], July 25, 1945. 740.00119 PW/7–2545 [1185] President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee Babelsberg, July 29, 1945. Truman Papers [1186] Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Berlin, July 31, 1945. Truman Papers No. 1180 The Secretary of State to the President 841.24/5–2945 No. 1180 The Secretary of State to the President 1 secret [Undated.] Memorandum for the President 1. I have had prepared a new draft reply 2 from you to the Prime Minister’s telegram of May 28 3 regarding Lend-Lease during the Japanese War. It would assure the Prime Minister that it is your intention that deliveries should be made for the prosecution of the war against Japan in accordance with schedules and other terms prepared by Army, Navy, and F. E. A. supply officers in consultation with British representatives last November 4 as modified in the light of changing strategic plans as well as of supply, procurement, and allocation considerations. It would remind the Prime Minister that the British dollar position remains at a reasonable level which should permit some relaxation of the exceedingly tight policy of the British with respect to dollar payments. 2. The schedules prepared last November and modified continuously in the light of changing circumstances are based solely on the efficient prosecution of the war against Japan and have been so presented to the Congress on three occasions: (1) Last November on the conclusion of the Phase II discussions 5 and prior to the release of a statement by Secretary Morgenthau and Messrs. Stettinius and Crowley in the United States 6 and of an address by the Prime Minister before the House of Commons; 7 (2) Last March and April in hearings on the extension of the Lend-Lease Act; 8 and (3) Three weeks ago in hearings on the Lend-Lease appropriation. 9 3. The munitions schedules are in three parts: ground forces, air, and naval. The ground forces schedules and conditions were originally signed on October 23, 1944, by Under Secretary Patterson and Generals Somervell and Clay. The air and fleet air arm schedules and conditions were originally signed on October 31, 1944 by Under Secretary Patterson, Assistant Secretaries Lovett and Gates, General Arnold and Vice-Admiral Fitch. The naval schedules and conditions were originally signed on November 10, 1944, by Vice-Admiral Home. As indicated above, these schedules are constantly subject to strategic and supply decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 10 4. The non-munitions schedules 11 were worked out by Mr. Crowley with representatives of appropriate civilian and military agencies and are also subject to changing strategic and supply considerations. They include only items for the support of the British civilian population in the effective prosecution of the war against Japan, and in no case items relating to rehabilitation and reconstruction of Britain, nor items for export or export manufacture. The principal items are: (1) food; (2) raw materials (cotton, pulp and paper, timber, and synthetic rubber which is matched by reverse lend-lease of crude rubber); (3) petroleum; and (4) shipping services. 5. Mr. Crowley in the Jane hearings on the Lend-Lease appropriation spelled out in some detail the non-munitions or FEA schedules, and the Congress appropriated the funds as requested. 6. I believe that these schedules have been prepared and are being handled in accord with the letter of the Lend-Lease Act and with the intent of the Congress and of yourself that Lend-Lease shall be used only in the prosecution of the war against Japan. The Congress has recently had an opportunity to examine the matter in connection with the appropriation bill and has signified its concurrence by making the funds available. 7. I therefore recommend that Lend-Lease deliveries to the British Commonwealth proceed in accordance with the above, and that you reply to the Prime Minister as suggested in the attached draft memorandum. 1 Printed from an unsigned and undated carbon copy typed subsequently. Collado, in an interview with a Department of State historian on April 5, 1954, supplied the information that this memorandum was submitted to Truman by Byrnes at Babelsberg. 2 The attached paper is identical with document No. 1181 . 3 See vol. i , document No. 537, footnote 5 . 4 See vol. i , document No. 537, footnote 3 . 5 “Phase II” as applied to lend-lease signifies the period between the defeat of Germany and the surrender of Japan. 6 Text in Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1944–june 1945 (Princeton, 1947), p. 140. 7 On November 30, 1944. See Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report , 5th series, vol. 406, cols. 69–74. 8 i. e., the hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 79th Congress, 1st Session, February 7–March 6, 1945, printed under the caption, Extension of Lend-Lease Act (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1945), and those before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 28 and April 4, 1945, printed under the caption, Lend-Lease (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1945). For the text of the Lend-Lease Act, approved March 11, 1941, see 55 Stat. 31; for the extension referred to, approved April 16, 1945, see 59 Stat. 52. 9 i. e., the hearings before the Subcommittee on Deficiency Appropriations of the House Committee on Appropriations, June 13–15, 1945, printed under the caption, Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1945), and those before the Subcommittee on Deficiency Appropriations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, June 28, 1945, also printed under the caption. Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1945). 10 The schedules referred to are not printed. 11 Not printed. No. 1181 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill 841.24/5–2945 No. 1181 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill secret [ Babelsberg , July 17, 1945.] Memorandum for the Prime Minister I have gone into the question that you raise in your telegram of May 28 1 in regard to Lend-Lease during the Japanese War. We intend to furnish Lend-Lease to the British Commonwealth for the prosecution of the war against Japan generally in accord with the schedules of requirements for the first year following the defeat of Germany and other terms worked out between British and American supply representatives in October and November 1944. You, of course, realize that the policy I have indicated does not necessarily mean that either the munitions or the non-munitions program for the present year will be equal in total or individual items to the Lend-Lease requirements as estimated in the meetings of last fall. Those estimates were subject to changing strategic demands as well as to supply, procurement, and allocation considerations, and to the provision of the necessary funds by the Congress. Individual requisitions are of course handled by the usual administrative and allocation channels, with full discussion between our supply representatives. In connection with the foregoing, it has come to my attention that the British gold and foreign exchange holdings are now considerably higher than was anticipated at the time of the Phase II discussions. I do not wish to propose reopening the Phase II discussions on this account. However, I would like to request that your Government relax its position with respect to permitting dollar payments on certain items, particularly those where the unwillingness of your Government to make payments leads to political criticism in the United States. For example, it would be of considerable assistance if your Government relaxed its restrictions on dollar payments for the proceeds of property sales in the Middle East and elsewhere; if the United Kingdom continued to take its share of the burden of the military relief and UNRRA programs in Europe; and if dollar payments were allowed on other items which arise from time to time in our relationships. I urge that you provide this flexibility in the long-term interests of both your country and mine. [ Harry S. Truman ] 1 See vol. i , document No, 537, footnote 5 . No. 1182 Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman 800.24/8–745 No. 1182 Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 24th July, 1945. My Dear Mr. President , I thank you for your memorandum of 17th July. 2 I am pleased that you say the Agreement made in Washington last autumn stands. We have never, of course, regarded the munitions schedules as absolutely rigid. Indeed I am told that our munitions requirements have already been scaled down from the 2.8 billion dollars agreed last autumn for the first year of Stage II to 1.8 billion, and that all these items are within the terms then arranged. Unfortunately the Departments in Washington have recently been insisting that nothing can be delivered save what is needed for direct use against Japan, and interpreting this in the narrowest possible sense; this has reduced munitions supplies almost to [the] vanishing point, and has put us in a very difficult position. Much as I dislike troubling you with technical questions of this kind at the present time, it is urgently necessary for us to find a solution. I attach a note on the position by the Chiefs of Staff, and very much hope that you will find it possible to let me know whether their reading of your intentions, as expressed in paragraph 1 of the note, is correct. If so, I earnestly hope you will be able to see your way to issue the necessary directive to your agencies. The important financial questions mentioned in your last paragraph are, of course, of a somewhat technical character, and I should hesitate to enter into them deeply at this stage. But I am told that our present gold and dollar balances (1.8 billion dollars) do not exceed what was agreed as reasonable last autumn in Washington by the United States Administration; on the other hand our external liabilities, owing to the prolongation of the war, have increased to 13 billion dollars. The Chancellor [of the Exchequer] 3 asks me to add that, both in the matter of sales of surplus in the Middle East and elsewhere and in the matter of relief to Europe, he has, in an earnest endeavor to meet your wishes, already authorised proposals to the State Department which go a long way beyond what he could have justified on any other ground. In particular we have told the State Department that we are willing to continue relief during the military period in Italy until UNRRA takes over relief there in the early autumn, and to make a further contribution to the general work of UNRRA for the next year. Both of these proposals are at present under discussion with the State Department, though the Chancellor has not yet any Parliamentary authority for this further relief expenditure. All these questions, of course, are linked up closely with the general post-war economic arrangements which will have to be worked out before the War ends. For this purpose, I should be very glad if you would agree to our sending a special delegation to Washington as soon as convenient—say in September. It will, I am sure, be in our common interest to achieve as soon as possible agreement on these vital post-war issues, so that we can view the economic picture as a whole. Yours very sincerely, Winston S. Churchill [Attachment] The British Chiefs of Staff to Prime Minister Churchill top secret Lend-Lease Memorandum to the Prime Minister by British Chiefs of Staff 1. The Chiefs of Staff have seen President Truman’s minute of 17th July about Lend-Lease. We note that the President intends to furnish us with Lend-Lease for the prosecution of the war against Japan. We earnestly hope that it is also his intention: ( a ) That troops of occupation and other British forces carrying out essential tasks, who now hold American equipment, will continue to receive such equipment and maintenance as they require:[.] ( b ) That American components needed for equipment manufactured in the U. K. and Canada will continue to be made available. ( c ) That these U. S. items on which, under the agreement reached at Quebec last autumn, 4 we are counting to supplement our own manufacturing programme of the same articles, will be supplied to us. 2. For ( a ) above our case is as follows: By agreement between the two Governments, British forces throughout the world are equipped with certain items of American equipment for which there is no British counterpart, and no possibility of maintenance from British sources. Consequently in the absence of American spares and replacements, such equipment is a wasting asset with the resultant loss of efficiency. Take for example the Jeep. There is no British counterpart, and therefore we maintain our Jeeps in Europe and the Middle East, but also to recondition those which are required to be sent from Europe to South-East Asia Command to take part in the war against Japan [ sic ]. At present, numbers of these are held up here because spare parts to refit them cannot be shipped from America owing to the freezing of Lend-Lease equipment. As regards the Royal Air Force, the Dakota is a good example. We ourselves do not produce any transport aircraft comparable to this machine; and therefore 15 squadrons, in Europe and the Mediterranean, which are, or are planned to be, equipped with this type of aircraft would be grad-dually demobilized or, alternatively, forced to use obsolescent Halifaxes. It is only by the use of transport aircraft that we can to some extent make good the acute shortage of our manpower in relation to our world-wide military commitments. After the war with Japan, we will be perfectly prepared to return to the Americans any U. S. type transport aircraft which it could be established by agreement were surplus to our military needs as one of the Occupying Powers. The Navy are not greatly affected since so much of the Fleet is, or will be, operating against Japan. But here again, the lack of maintenance stores for ships and equipment of U. S. type, which are now being used for minesweeping and other duties around Europe, would hit us hard. 3. The case for ( b ) is perhaps best illustrated by the Royal Air Force. For example the Sunderland IV is equipped with American turrets. The necessity for the continuance of the supply of these and similar components require no emphasis. 4. We now turn to ( c ). In accordance with the agreement reached at Quebec last Autumn, our plans have been based on the assumption that we could count on the supply from America of certain articles of equipment, such as clothing, telephone cables, etc., etc. to supplement the flow of similar articles manufactured by ourselves. Unless the Quebec Agreement, as we read it, is implemented in this respect, we are informed that all the above plans will have to be entirely recast. 5. We beg of you to take up these matters with the President as a matter of urgency. The mere fact that some American equipment has been or is being issued to us, should not limit our ordinary freedom in regard to the use and disposal of British equipment in order to give us more latitude in the disposal of British equipment. A.F. Brooke C. Portal Andrew Cunningham 1 Printed from a copy typed subsequently in the Department of State. 2 Document No. 1181 . 3 Sir John Anderson. 4 The records of the Second Quebec Conference are scheduled for subsequent publication in a volume in this series. See H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London, 1955), p. 443. No. 1183 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill Truman Papers No. 1183 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill Babelsberg , July 25, 1945. My Dear Mr. Prime Minister : In reply to your letter of the 24th, 1 the Secretary of State is preparing a copy of the memorandum directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the issuance of Lend Lease material. 2 It is my intention to abide strictly by the law as passed by the United States Congress on Lend Lease, 3 as I explained to you yesterday, although a liberal construction will be given to the distribution of those items referred to in your memorandum from your Chiefs of Staff. I am making every effort to get a construction of the new Lend Lease renewal act 4 so as to cause the least difficulty and embarrassment to our Allies. As soon as the memorandum to our Chiefs of Staff is finally prepared, I shall send you a copy. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Very sincerely yours, [ Harry S. Truman ] 1 Document No. 1182 . 2 See the enclosure to document No. 1185 . 3 For the text of the basic Lend-Lease Act, approved March 11, 1941, see 55 Stat. 31. 4 Approved April 16, 1945 (59 Stat. 52). 5 For the paragraph omitted here, see document No. 1248 . No. 1184 Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman 740.00119 PW/7–2545 No. 1184 Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman [Extract 1 ] most secret Whitehall [ Babelsberg ], July 25, 1945. My Dear Mr. President , I thank you for your letter of July 25, 2 and I await the Memorandum on Lend-Lease which you are kindly having prepared. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yours very sincerely, Winston S. Churchill 1 For the main body of this letter, see document No. 1249 . 2 Document No. 1183 . No. 1185 President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee Truman Papers No. 1185 President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee Babelsberg , July 29, 1945. My Dear Mr. Prime Minister : In accordance with my letter of July 25, 1 I enclose a copy of a memorandum directive on the issuance of Lend-Lease munitions, which I have today sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This directive eliminates the delivery of Lend-Lease material for the occupation of Axis countries. In other respects I believe it adequately covers your expressed desires. I have noted the suggestion in the letter of July 24, 2 that postwar economic arrangements be discussed in Washington, say in September. Mr. W. L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State, will be in London shortly for the U. N. R. R. A. Council meeting, and I have instructed him to engage in informal conversations with your people about these matters. When he has reported to me in Washington, we shall be able to decide upon arrangements for further discussions with your representatives. Very sincerely yours, [ Harry S. Truman ] [Enclosure] The President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 3 top secret Memorandum Directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Referring to my memorandum of 5 July, 1945, 4 quoted herewith following: “Approval of the issue to Allied Governments of Lend Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment will be limited to that which is to be used in the war against Japan, and it will not be used for any other purpose.” It may be given the following interpretation: 1. Issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to all Allied Governments, including Latin American countries is authorized when in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it is to be used in direct support of redeployment of American troops, or Allied troops in connection with their redeployment in support of the war against Japan. 2. Supply of Allied service units that are directly serving United States forces in any area with subsistence, supply, and equipment (except arms and ammunition) is authorized. 3. Until the receipt of further instructions issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to the U. S. S. R. is authorized in accordance with my directive of 11 May, 1945, 5 when in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it can be considered as for use in the war against Japan. 4. Until the receipt of further instructions issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to the British Empire is authorized for the direct support of redeployment of American troops, and of British troops in connection with their redeployment in support of the war against Japan, taking into account commitments for approved combined operations against Japan. In accordance with my memorandum of 17 July, 1945 6 to the Prime Minister, and subject to the elimination of the requirements for occupational forces in Axis countries, such issue should be generally in accord with schedules of requirements and other terms arrived at by British and American supply representatives in October–November 1944, subject to changing strategic demands as well as to usual supply, procurement, and allocation considerations and procedures. 5. Replacement and maintenance on a military Lend-Lease basis of French units which have already been equipped by the U. S. under the North African Rearmament Program, Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and Air Forces Program is authorized for subsistence until August 31, 1945, and for other items of equipment and supply until September 30, 1945. 6. Supply of maintenance items for U. S. equipment now in the possession of Allied armies may be issued for purposes other than those specifically approved in this memorandum against payment under such terms and conditions as may be determined by the State Department and Foreign Economic Administration in accordance with established procedure. Harry S. Truman [ Babelsberg ,] July 29, 1945. 1 Document No. 1183 . 2 Document No. 1182 . 3 Printed from the Department of State file copy (file No. 851.24/7–545), which has been compared with the signed original in J. C. S. Files. Referring to this directive, Collado, in an informal letter (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–845) dated at London, August 8, to Dudley M. Phelps, Acting Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy, stated that it “was really a unilateral affair although Sir Robert Sinclair and General Macready had several long conversations with Jack McCloy and myself”. No record of these conversations has been found. 4 See vol. i , document No. 542 . 5 Not printed. 6 Document No. 1181 . No. 1186 Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Truman Papers No. 1186 Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Berlin , July 31, 1945. My Dear Mr. President , Thank you for your letter of July 29 1 on the subject of Munitions Supplies on Lend Lease in Stage II. While I will not disguise my disappointment that it has not been found possible to accept in its entirety our understanding as set out in the memorandum which was attached to Mr. Churchill’s letter of July 24, 2 1 sincerely appreciate your desire, as stated in your letter of July 25, 3 to get a construction of the new Lend Lease Renewal Act so as to cause the least difficulty and embarrassment to us in the prosecution of the war against Japan. In accepting your decision I earnestly trust you will agree:— ( a ) That detailed instructions applying this decision to the British and defining the portion of our Stage II requirements as now revised which under this decision can qualify for Lend Lease can be agreed as soon as possible with our representatives in Washington and ( b ) That meantime the shipment of supplies destined for the Far Eastern operational theatre or for bases or lines of communication serving that theatre may go forward without delay. There are, I am told, supplies of that category which are currently available in Washington and are urgently required by us in connection with forthcoming operations. With reference to the application of this decision to the British referred to in ( a ) above, I enclose a draft which, from the informal discussions which have taken place here, would seem to provide a basis for agreement in Washington consistently [ sic ] with your letter; and I would venture to express] the hope that; those who are charged with the day to day executive action under this arrangement may be given to understand your desire to place a liberal construction upon the document as finally agreed. In particular I trust that your decision which eliminates our requirements for occupational forces will not be taken to imply that the efficient maintenance of these forces is of small importance, and that they can be stripped of equipment. The effective control of Germany and Austria is a vital matter for us, and its importance is specifically recognised in paragraph 4 of the C. C. S. final report 4 which you and my predecessor recently approved. I have noted what you say about post-war economic arrangements and I shall look forward to hearing from you after Mr. Clayton has reported to you in Washington. May I conclude by assuring you of my personal appreciation of the most helpful attitude you have adopted in dealing with this matter which is of such great importance to us. Yours very sincerely, C. R. Attlee [Enclosure] 1. Requirements accepted under the terms of the President’s letter of 29th July are to include the following:— (i) Items included in the schedules of British requirements which are to be shipped directly to the Far East or to units outside that area but designated for that area. (ii) Items required for bases which serve the Far Eastern operational theatre even although the bases themselves are outside of the area. (iii) Items required for the lines of communication to the Far Eastern Operational theatre provided they are to be used in connection with the prosecution of the war against Japan. (iv) Items required for essential military purposes in other areas and needed solely to replace similar items which, owing to the time factor, have had to be transferred to the Far Eastern operational theatre. (v) Such proportion of the components required for the manufacture of military stores outside the United States as may be held to be required for the prosecution of the war against Japan. Note . The first four classifications cover main items and spares, and all five classifications shall qualify for Lend-Lease irrespective of whether the items are made solely in the United States or not. 2. The requirements as defined above shall be accepted for procurement to the extent that production facilities exist and as far as possible they shall be produced in addition to the United States own needs. 3. Assignments shall be made to the British (within the total quantity accepted for procurement) where the items are in easy supply. Where, however, the items are in short supply the share of available supplies allocated to the British must continue to be conditioned by the consideration of operational priorities. 1 Document No. 1185 . 2 Attachment to document No. 1182 . 3 Document No. 1183 . 4 Post , p. 1462 [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 1381 ] . Civil aviation policy Civil aviation policy [1187] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State London, July 17, 1945—10 a.m. 800.796/7–1745: Telegram [1188] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , July 26, 1945. 800.796/7–2645 [1189] The Secretary of State to the Chief of the Aviation Division (Morgan) Washington, August 21, 1945—6 p.m. 811.79641/8–2145: Telegram No. 1187 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State 800.796/7–1745: Telegram No. 1187 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret London , July 17, 1945—10 a.m. 7182. With reference to the Embassy’s telegrams 2 reporting various efforts on the part of the British to have steps taken which would lead to a fairly early agreement on the commercial aspects of air transport with the United States, Sir William Hildred informed the Civil Air Attaché 3 that he hoped and expected to be able to go to the United States between now and August 2 (when the Civil Aviation Radio Conference opens) partly in connection with setting up of the Interim Council 4 but primarily to discuss the Fifth Freedom 5 with Pogue and Warner. The Department will observe that Sir William made this statement a day or two after the closing of the Empire Aviation conference and that the suggestion is now not that Pogue come to England but that Hildred go to the United States. He said frankly that he believed he would be more successful in obtaining Swinton’s approval for the trip, which he had been unable to do before, in view of the “progress in thinking” which the Empire Aviation Conference developed. He said he thought that the British Government would agree to an arrangement with the United States and with other countries which set forth the principle that (1) the more international air transportation the better for mankind[,] (2) all economic and other burdensome restrictions on civil aviation should be removed and (3) the principle of the Fifth Freedom in general was necessary to the successful development of air transportation. He felt that where it could be demonstrated that the unrestricted exercise of short-range pickup traffic by strong nations destroyed or seriously upset some regional airlines, the Interim Council should be able to rectify such obvious injustices. He thought that the major international airlines would recognize sufficiently the value to them of prosperous feeder line services along their routes so that they would be careful not to put them out of business. Sir William stressed the necessity of keeping the foregoing strictly confidential. Winant 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 65 of July 19 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–1945). 2 Not printed. 3 Livingston Satterthwaite. 4 Of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization. 5 See vol. i , document No. 547 . No. 1188 The British Embassy to the Department of State 800.796/7–2645 No. 1188 The British Embassy to the Department of State Ref: 21/334/45 Aide-Mémoire In the Embassy’s note No. 312 of June 21 1 it was stated that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom had no intention of opposing the United States Government or any other Government in the acquisition of landing rights for civil aircraft in any country. It has become evident, however, that some misunderstanding exists over the interpretation of the phrase “landing rights” and the Foreign Office think it desirable that a comprehensive statement of the present British position in regard to international civil aviation should be given to the Department. 2. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom adhere to the proposals which they put forward “at the Chicago Conference. 2 There they readily accepted the proposal that Freedoms 1 and 2 3 should be freely given and received and they will be ready to extend those Freedoms, under the Transit Agreement, to every country which is, or becomes, a party to it. 3. His Majesty’s Government hoped that Freedoms 3 and 4 might be included in an international convention. While they believed that Freedom 5 would more properly be the subject of bilateral or collateral agreements negotiated between the countries concerned, they were prepared to deal with this privilege also in a multilateral convention, provided that agreement could be reached on the governing conditions. 4. Those matters on which it proved impossible to reach agreement at Chicago stand referred for further consideration and report by the Council of the Interim Civil Aviation Organization about to be set up at Montreal. It is the earnest desire of His Majesty’s Government that a solution satisfactory to the United States Government, His Majesty’s Government and the other interested Governments may be found. 5. In the meantime, the only alternative course in the view of His Majesty’s Government is to proceed by way of bilateral agreements for the exchange on equitable terms of the privileges in question. In entering into any such agreements His Majesty’s Government propose to provide for the following matters, which they hope to see incorporated in a multilateral convention: ( a ) In order to avoid uneconomic competition and reduce, and ultimately eliminate, subsidies, capacity should be settled and varied by agreement, so as to provide a reasonable equilibrium between the aggregate of services and the amount of traffic offering on a particular route and that capacity should be fairly divided between the countries concerned. His Majesty’s Government also consider that any agreement should contain convenient machinery for the fixing of rates: and should provide for reference of matters in dispute to the arbitration of a well-qualified independent body. ( b ) His Majesty’s Government in any agreement would, where appropriate, propose the insertion of a provision on the line of the “United Nations Clause” which the United States Delegation in common with other Delegations accepted in principle at the Chicago Conference. ( c ) His Majesty’s Government would also, in any agreement, propose to deal with Freedom 5, in so far as it is relevant. In dealing with this Freedom they still consider that the criteria which they proposed in the final British plan at Chicago (Conference Document 429 4 ) are the most practical and flexible that have yet been suggested. These criteria were substantially as follows:— (1) The capacity to which a through airline operator would be entitled in order to carry traffic embarked in or for his own country; (2) The air transport needs of the area through which he passes judged in relation to public convenience and necessity; (3) The position of regional and local air transport development; (4) Economy of through airline operation. 6. His Majesty’s Government propose to be guided by the above considerations when concluding agreements with other Governments and to give advice in accordance with these considerations when their advice is sought by other Governments. 7. In this connection it may be appropriate to draw attention to the second paragraph of the Embassy’s note under reference which sets out the views of His Majesty’s Government on the provision of airports for international services. Since these views are based on the Chicago Agreements it is assumed that they are held equally by the United States Government. Washington , July 26, 1945. 5 1 Document No. 548, printed in vol. i . 2 i. e., the International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago from November 1 to December 7, 1944. 3 For a description of the “Five Freedoms”, see vol. i , document No. 547 . 4 Text in Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago Illinois, November 1–December 7, 1944 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948–1949; Department of State publication No. 2820), vol. i , p. 519. 5 This aide-mémoire bears the following manuscript notation: “Delivered to TRC Charles P. Taft by Geoffrey [ Roger? ] Makins 7/27/45 10:30 A.M.” No. 1189 The Secretary of State to the Chief of the Aviation Division (Morgan) 811.79641/8–2145: Telegram No. 1189 The Secretary of State to the Chief of the Aviation Division ( Morgan ) 1 [Extract] secret Washington , August 21, 1945—6 p.m. 7101. For Stokeley Morgan. Potsdam meeting did not go into aviation questions except for statement from Secretary to Cadogan that discussion of problem was desired.… 2 Byrnes J[ohn] B[ell] 1 Sent to the American Embassy, London. 2 No other papers relating to this Byrnes–Cadogan conversation have been found. Concerning a Truman–Churchill conversation on this subject, however, see ante , p. 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] . Allocation of shipping Allocation of shipping [[Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1190] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1191] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 19 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1192] Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 21 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1193] The Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board (Carnwath) and the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration (Monroe) to the War Shipping Administrator (Land) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator (Morse) London, 21 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1194] The Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration (Bissell) to the War Shipping Administration Babelsberg, 22 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1195] Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 22 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1196] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 23 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [[Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Related papers are printed under the following headings: ( a ) Germany—Disposition of the German Navy and Merchant Marine, ante , page 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , and Doc. 1005 ] , and ( b ) Japan—Basic Military Objectives, Strategy, and Policies in the War Against Japan, post , page 1299 [ Pg. 1299 includes portions of Doc. 1262 and Doc. 1263 ] . No. 1190 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1190 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 679/6 [ Babelsberg ,] 18 July 1945. Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships 1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have indicated in papers of the C. C. S. 679 series 2 an urgent need for 39,000 troop spaces in captured enemy shipping to supplement the trooplift available for carrying out redeployment plans. 2. Since the publication of C. C. S. 679/1, 2 U. S. requirements for trooplift in the Pacific have materially increased. Deficits now are serious. 3. Drastic action has been taken to augment United States resources by conversion of cargo ships, increasing air-lift, and curtailing withdrawals of U. S. troops from Europe. In spite of every possible adjustment in United States resources, the trooplift situation in the Pacific will remain serious during the last half of this year. 4. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board (CSAB) has had the matter of distribution of captured German shipping under discussion for several weeks. Certain agreements as to manning and operation have been reached, but the United States view that the seven vessels under consideration should be allocated for the carriage of U. S. troops during the current emergency period has been opposed on the British side of the CSAB pending decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 5. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that in order to meet emergency requirements for the movement of U. S. troops necessary for forthcoming operations, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree to the allocation for United States purposes, so long as an emergency exists, of the following seven vessels: Europa, Caribia, Vulcania, Patria, Potsdam, Pretoria and Milwaukee. 6. Arrangements as to manning, operation, repair and conversion can be determined by the CSAB, and it is understood that the agreement proposed in paragraph 5 above in no way prejudices ultimate disposition of these vessels. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 199th Meeting, July 23. See ante , p. 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] . 2 Not printed. 2 Not printed. No. 1191 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1191 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 679/7 [ Babelsberg ,] 19 July 1945. British Troopship Employment in U. S. Trans-Atlantic Programs, First Half of 1946 1. In C. C. S. 679/1 2 the following offer of trans-Atlantic lift was made:— “For the six months following VE–Day the Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth and the Aquitania will be retained on service in the North Atlantic, and this westbound capacity will be placed at the disposal of the United States authorities. This offer is subject to a proviso that fifty (50) berths should be reserved in each sailing if required by the British authorities.” This assistance has been estimated at equivalent to 50,000 spaces per month. 2. Subsequent to the publication of C. C. S. 679/1, the United States has taken the following steps in an attempt to expedite redeployment to meet accelerated target dates for the main operations against Japan and for repatriation:— a . Increased the monthly target of the Air Transport Command for trans-Atlantic lift from 15,000 to 50,000. b . Authorized the conversion of 100 Victory ships to carry 1,500 personnel each, c . Authorized the modification of 206 cargo vessels, formerly fitted for 350 personnel each, to an increased capacity of 550 personnel each. d . Authorized the overloading of Victory and Liberty ships by 30 percent of capacity in the Atlantic. 3. Although the measures listed in paragraph 2 above have greatly improved our ability to meet revised redeployment build-up of strategic reserve and repatriation schedules, a serious deficit in personnel shipping does exist. The United States Chiefs of Staff have recommended modification of 74 of the 100 Victory ships mentioned in paragraph 2 so that they will be suitable for trans-Pacific operation and for direct redeployment from Europe to the Pacific. It is contemplated that all captured enemy troopships, with the exception of the Europa , that can be placed in service, will be diverted to the Pacific. Even these expedients will not enable the United States to meet Pacific troop movement requirements and there will exist by the end of 1945 a backlog of between 250,000 and 300,000 for Pacific movements. The removal of the 74 Victorys from trans-Atlantic service will retard the withdrawal of U. S. forces from Europe and will reduce the availability of cargo shipping in the Atlantic by about 25 sailings per month. 4. At Argonaut it was considered desirable that the United States and British convert 200 cargo ships to troop carriers on a combined basis. 3 Up to the present time there has been no indication of British action with respect to converting a share of the cargo vessels. 5. In C. C. S. 679/1 British requirements for the movement of troops from Europe to Canada were shown to be 195,600 during the first six months after VE–Day. Space was provided for 133,800, leaving a deficit of approximately 62,000 over a six-month period. The total British requirement for repatriation of Canadians is not known to the United States Chiefs of Staff; however, it is noted that five weeks’ lift of the three British vessels allocated for United States trans-Atlantic troop movements would overcome the first six months’ deficit. 6. The three large British passenger liners are vastly more efficient from a trooplift point of view in the North Atlantic service than in any other service. Their continued employment in this service for the repatriation of Canadian and U. S. forces will cause the greatest benefit to accrue to combined troop moving needs. 7. In order to avoid the possibility of still further invasion of United States cargo shipping resources to the detriment of combined trans-Atlantic cargo programs, it is recommended that the British trooplift represented by the two Queens and the Aquitania should be retained in the trans-Atlantic service during an additional six months for the build-up of strategic reserves in the United States and the repatriation on a combined basis of Canadian and U. S. forces. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 199th Meeting, July 23. See ante , p. 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] . 2 Not printed. 3 The reference is to a recommendation contained in C. C. S. 746/11, which was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Yalta on February 8, 1945. See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 750 . No. 1192 Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1192 Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 1 confidential C. C. S. 897 [ Babelsberg ,] 21 July 1945. Provision of Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of Allied Governments the problem 1. To ensure the efficient coordination of the demands for personnel shipping submitted by Allied governments, other than British and American military movements, and to provide a machinery for dealing with essential personnel movements other than those already approved. facts bearing on the problem 2. See Enclosure “B.” discussion 3. See Enclosure “C.” conclusions 4. It is concluded that: The following procedure will ensure the efficient coordination of all those Allied demands:— a . The current procedure for handling the United States and United Kingdom personnel shipping for military requirements will be continued. This procedure will permit on an operational basis the opportune use of such shipping on return voyages, or legs of such voyages, to move passengers of any of the Allied governments. b . All requirements of the Allied governments for the movement of passengers, whether military or civilian, involving definite additional commitments of shipping, whether on a short- or long-term basis, should be submitted to the United Maritime Authority (UMA) in terms of the shipping space required. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board should confer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to practicability of meeting such requirements. On military requests of the other Allied governments the decision will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. c . As regards the movement of civilians for which provision is not made under a . and b . above, the matter may be referred to the appropriate agencies of the United Kingdom and United States to decide whether passenger vessels should be withdrawn at the expense of the military effort. Ships, if so allocated, would operate under the control of the United Maritime Authority on the basis of the “Agreement on Principles” 2 but would be retained in the common pool and assigned for particular voyage employment as might be decided from time to time. recommendations 5. a . That the foregoing conclusions be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. b . That the letter in Enclosure “A” be forwarded to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. [Enclosure A] confidential Draft Memorandum for the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board 1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been studying the problem of providing passenger carrying shipping to meet the urgent demands for the essential military operations in the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for the provision of such shipping of this type to meet other requirements as can be made available without adversely affecting military operations. 2. The available passenger space is insufficient to meet all the urgent requirements of the United Nations, and coordination of demands is, therefore, essential in order to determine priority and to secure shipping efficiency as well as to ensure the fullest consideration being given to all claimants. 3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, agreed that in accordance with the “Agreement on Principles,” dated 5 August 1944, contained in the UMA report, October, 1944, the following procedure in respect of the submission of demands should be adopted by all the Allied nations:— 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Vital demands for shipping should therefore be submitted to the United Maritime Authority for consideration. 5. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board is requested to transmit the foregoing statement of policy to the United Maritime Executive Board in Washington and London. [Enclosure B] confidential Facts Bearing on the Problem 1. The tonnage of the Allied Nations under the control of the United Maritime Authority (UMA) is administered in accordance with the “Agreement of [ on ] Principles,” dated 5 August 1944. As regards cargo, this agreement and the procedures of the UMA provide fully for the requirements of the contracting governments to be taken into account in the disposition of available tonnage. This report deals only with the sea transport of personnel. 2. The “Agreement on Principles” contains the following provision in Article 7 ( c ):— “… In order to meet the special case of military requirements those ships which have been taken up under agreements made by United States Government and/or United Kingdom Government with the other governments having authority for those ships for use as troopships, hospital ships, and for other purposes in the service of the armed forces, shall remain on charter as at present to the War Shipping Administration (WSA) and/or the Ministry of War Transport (MWT), as the case may be, under arrangements to be agreed between the governments severally concerned. (Any further ships required for such purposes shall be dealt with in a like manner.) “The fact that these ships are assigned to military requirements shall not prejudice the right of the governments concerned to discuss with the central authority the measures to be taken to provide … 4 shipping for their essential requirements within the scope of paragraph 1 of the Agreement.” 3. As regards personnel ships suitable for long sea voyage employment, estimates of military needs indicate the necessity for every suitable vessel being under the direct control (by time charter) of the WSA or the MWT. The estimates of available trooplift as submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff are based on the assumption that all the Allied passenger ships at present in service, or recovered as a result of liberation or capture, will be under the direct control of the Combined (Anglo-American) shipping authorities. On the other hand, it has always been recognized that there might be requests for the movement of military and civilian personnel sponsored by other Allied governments. The last paragraph of Article 7 ( c ) as above, expressly reserves “the right of the governments concerned to discuss with the central authority the measures to be taken to provide shipping for their essential requirements,” and was inserted at the request of the other Allies to provide for this expectation. These requirements might include:— a . Movement of military personnel of the forces under the control of these governments, or repatriation of prisoners of war, or b . Movement of civilian passengers of high priority (including essential civilian personnel in colonial territories), displaced persons, etc. [Enclosure C] confidential Discussion 1. The procedure of the UMA for the allocation of shipping to contracting governments depends upon the assumption that there are appropriate authorities to approve and sponsor the requirements of those governments for shipping space. As regards cargo, this is provided for by arrangements already in force. As regards other Allied personnel movements, however, there is at present no authority responsible for guiding the UMA on questions of priority, and in this class of shipping, owing to the acute shortage, it is clear that some guidance will be necessary. 2. The available personnel lift is not adequate to meet all the urgent requirements of the United Nations. Coordination of demands is, therefore, indispensable in order to determine priority and to secure shipping efficiency. In any case, it is presumed that the appropriate chiefs of staff or theater commander would be concerned with any substantial movement of personnel. Once it is determined that a particular government has personnel movements of an approved character to carry out, it would be in accordance with the procedure of the UMA to allocate ships or space to that government for the approved movements. It should be noted that under existing conditions the combined shipping authorities are bound to advise that such arrangements can not be made on any substantial scale at present without affecting existing plans for military moves. 1 Submitted on the Committee’s initiative, in consultation with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. Considered at the 201st Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 23 (see ante , p. 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] ) and at the 199th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, July 23 (see ante , p. 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] ). 2 Signed at London, August 5, 1944 (Treaties and Other International Agreements Series No. 1722; 61 Stat. (4) 3784). 3 Here follow subparagraphs a, b , and c , which are identical with paragraphs 4 a, b , and c in the body of the Committee’s report printed above, except that the parenthetical “(UMA)” in subparagraph b is omitted. 4 Ellipses in this quotation are in the source copy. No. 1193 The Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board (Carnwath) and the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration (Monroe) to the War Shipping Administrator (Land) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator (Morse) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1193 The Representative on the London Branch of the United Maritime Executive Board ( Carnwath ) and the Regional Director for the Combined United Kingdom and Continental Areas, War Shipping Administration ( Monroe ) to the War Shipping Administrator ( Land ) and the Assistant to the War Shipping Administrator ( Morse ) 1 restricted London , 21 July 1945. Wsa 3843–PO 1. To Potsdam for Admiral Land and Mr. Morse WSA from Carnwath and Monroe WSA signed Eisenhower ref nbr UK 46111. WSA and MWT on basis of joint recommendation of their technical representatives, have now agreed that Milwaukee should be temporarily repaired in Germany and proceed to USA for fitting. It is hoped that vessel will be ready to leave Germany by August 10 unless unforeseen damage is discovered in dry dock. While we have agreed with MWT as to manner in which vessel is to be sailed to USA, it would be helpful if you could agree with Leathers as to whether WSA or MWT should man and operate this vessel. You will recall that this decision was deferred. If this question is decided now we will be able to determine whether U. S. or British Navy should effect seizure of vessel in prise (British Navy has not taken any action in this respect). Furthermore, it would be practical for the country who is going to be responsible for manning and operating the vessel to handle the manning and operation for the voyage from Germany to USA. If you find time to do so, therefore, it is suggested that an effort be made to arrive at an agreement as to this matter with Leathers. MWT have sent similar message to Leathers. 1 Sent by the United Kingdom Base Section of Eisenhower’s command via Army channels. No. 1194 The Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration (Bissell) to the War Shipping Administration Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1194 The Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration ( Bissell ) to the War Shipping Administration confidential priority Babelsberg , 22 July 1945. Victory 205. To Conway Millikan Winterbottom WSA from Bissell. 1. Leathers has definitely agreed to use of T–2 tankers for grain in U. K. import program and has cabled instructions to MWT London. 2. We have agreed that tankers should be withdrawn from grain trade if combined dry cargo shipping position eases to such an extent that use of tankers would cause dry cargo ships to be laid up. 3. Believe British could if necessary accept in U. K. all thirteen tankers available for August loading but have told them we would use some of the tankers in national programs to Continent if feasible. 4. British believe London pool position will continue to be easy in September and October and that they will be able to help meet Wash pool deficits in those months. 5. Repeated to Monroe London. No. 1195 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1195 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 679/8 [ Babelsberg ,] 22 July 1945. Employment of Captured Enemy Ocean-Going Passenger Shipping and British Troopship Employment in U. S. Trans-Atlantic Programs in the First Half of 1946 1. The British Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 679/6 and 679/7, 2 and consider that these proposals, the arguments in support of them and the possible effect on combined requirements for movement of personnel are so closely linked that they should be taken together. 2. The British Chiefs of Staff have taken note of the steps taken by the United States to meet revised schedules for redeployment, build-up of strategic reserve and repatriation, and of the net effect of these on Pacific movements, viz., a backlog of between 250,000 and 300,000 at the end of 1945. 3. The British Chiefs of Staff will, of course, do everything possible to assist in the movement of United States forces, particularly those destined for the Pacific, but they wish to make it clear that the personnel shipping resources allotted to them in C. C. S. 679/1 3 fell far short of meeting British requirements for redeployment and repatriation, which had to be severely cut. 4. Further, they wish to point out that a preliminary examination of the estimated British requirements for the first half of 1946 indicates that the total British trooplift will suffice to lift only about two men out of every three, even if the current programme is achieved without a backlog at the end of the year. 5. In view of the serious position of United States movement to the Pacific, the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to agree that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should allocate the total lift of the seven ships listed in C. C. S. 679/6 for United States employment up to 31st December 1945. In return, they ask that the United States Chiefs of Staff allocate to them a lift of 16,000 during the rest of 1945 for movement of the Canadians, many of whom have been absent from their homes for a very long time. The Canadian Government are pressing us very strongly in this matter. 6. The British Chiefs of Staff further suggest that a combined study on the lines of C. C. S. 679/1 of the combined requirements and combined resources (including captured enemy trooplift) for the first half of 1946 should be completed by mid-September if possible. The study would cover the recommendation in C. C. S. 679/7 and also the employment during the first half of 1946 of the seven ships to which reference is made in C. C. S. 679/6. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 199th Meeting, July 23. See ante , p. 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] . 2 Documents Nos. 1190 and 1191 , respectively. 3 Not printed. No. 1196 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1196 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 679/9 [ Babelsberg ,] 23 July 1945. Employment of Captured Enemy Ocean-Going Passenger Shipping and British Troopship Employment in U. S. Trans-Atlantic Programs in the First Half of 1946 The United States Chiefs of Staff agree with the provisions of C. C. S. 679/8 2 except for the date of 31 December 1945 given in paragraph 5 as terminating the use by the United States of the six of the seven captured German ships destined for the Pacific. After moving these ships great distances to the Pacific we shall be fortunate to obtain one trip from them before the 31 December date. By then our deployment will not have ended and the main operation will yet have to be undertaken. It would be uneconomical to remove this shipping from the Pacific after just one run. When ships may be withdrawn from the Pacific, less adaptable shipping such as the converted Victory ships should be first transferred back to the Atlantic. The lift of these ships of course will be included in the proposed review of personnel shipping to be completed by mid-September. Accordingly, the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that paragraphs 5 and 6 of C. C. S. 679/8 be modified as indicated in the Enclosure. [Enclosure * ] top secret 5. In view of the serious position of United States movement to the Pacific, the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to agree that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should allocate the total lift of the seven ships listed in C. C. S. 679/6 3 for to the United States employment up to 31st December 1945 for employment as follows: the Europa until 31 December 1945; and the Caribia, Patria, Vulcania, Potsdam, Pretoria and Milwaukee until 30 June 1946. In return, they ask that the United States Chiefs of Staff allocate to them a lift of 16,000 during the rest of 1945 for movement of the Canadians, many of whom have been absent from their homes for a very long time. The Canadian Government are pressing us very strongly in this matter. 6. The British Chiefs of Staff further suggest that a combined study on the lines of C. C. S. 679/1 4 of the combined requirements and combined resources (including captured enemy trooplift) for the first half of 1946 should be completed by mid-September if possible. The study would cover the recommendation in C. C. S. 679/7 5 and also the employment during the first half of 1946 of the seven ships to which reference is made in C. C. S. 679/6. subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 above . 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 199th Meeting, July 23, See ante , p. 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] . 2 Document No. 1195 . * Words underlined are proposed additions. Words italicized are proposed deletions. [Footnote in the original. 3 Document No. 1190 . 4 Not printed. 5 Document No. 1191 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister, see post , pages 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1472 [ Pg. 1472 is part of Doc. 1381 ] . Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery [1197] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 19 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1198] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Washington [Babelsberg], 21 July 1945. Truman Papers [1199] President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill [Babelsberg,] 23 July 1945. Truman Papers [1200] Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman undated Truman Papers No. 1197 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1197 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 891/1 [ Babelsberg ,] 19 July 1945. Combined Chiefs of Staff Machinery After the War With Japan With reference to C. C. S. 891, 2 the political relationship of the United States with other nations in the period following this war is not yet sufficiently defined to permit the United States Chiefs of Staff to discuss at this date the post-war relationships between the respective military staffs. The United States Chiefs of Staff will bring up for consideration the problem of the most effective military machinery to be used from now forward and prior to the end of the Japanese war. 3 1 Noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See ante , p. 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] . Cf. ante , p. 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] . 2 Document No. 550, printed in vol. i . 3 This paragraph refers to item 5, paragraph e , of the minutes of the 195th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, July 18. See ante , pp. 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] . No. 1198 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Truman Papers No. 1198 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President top secret Washington [ Babelsberg ], 21 July 1945. Memorandum for the President In 1942 the munitions resources of the United States and the United Kingdom were insufficient to meet the requirements of the United Nations forces. Therefore, President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister agreed to pool munitions resources and to create Munitions Assignments Boards in London and Washington 1 to assign finished war material to the several United Nations in accordance with strategic needs. From the military point of view, the present combined munitions assignment procedures are no longer necessary or desirable. Combined munitions resources are now generally more than sufficient to insure the success of combined strategy. The British, who are converting many of their own munitions facilities to civilian production, are in a position, through their membership on the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, to object to the assignment of U. S. munitions to other nations—a matter of primary United States concern. In the absence of the Munitions Assignments Board decisions on transfers or retransfers of munitions and on the assignment of captured equipment could be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or appropriate British agencies. Either nation would still retain the right of appeal to higher authority. It is recommended that you seek the agreement of the Prime Minister to abolish the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington. A suggested form of a memorandum for the Prime Minister is attached. 2 Consultation with the Prime Minister is believed appropriate in view of the agreement between him and President Roosevelt. It is further recommended, however, that if the Prime Minister will not concur you should nevertheless issue an appropriate Executive Order abolishing the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, and transferring its functions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the British Government should desire to abolish the London Munitions Assignments Board, its existing function of assigning enemy equipment captured in Europe should be retained until new machinery now contemplated to perform this function has been established and is operative. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: William D. Leahy Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. 1 With respect to the creation of the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, see Federal Records of World War II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950–1951), vol. ii , p. 4. 2 The attached draft was dispatched without change on July 23. See document No. 1199 . No. 1199 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill Truman Papers No. 1199 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 23 July 1945. 1 Memorandum for the Prime Minister In 1942 when the munitions resources of the United States and the United Kingdom were insufficient to meet the requirements of the United Nations forces you and President Roosevelt agreed to pool our munitions resources and to create Munitions Assignments Boards in London and Washington to assign finished war material to the several United Nations in accordance with strategic need. Since the munitions resources of the United States and the United Kingdom are now generally more than sufficient to insure the success of combined strategy, I consider that the Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, no longer serves a useful purpose. I therefore propose to abolish this Board and would appreciate your concurrence in this action. Harry S. Truman 1 The date appears as a manuscript addition, in brackets, on the source copy. No. 1200 Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Truman Papers No. 1200 Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman 1 undated Memorandum From the Prime Minister to the President Dated About 31 st July , 1945 I have received your memorandum of 23rd July, 1945, 2 in which you propose to abolish the Munitions Assignment[s] Board, Washington. 2. As you say, the Munitions Assignment[s] Boards in Washington and London were established to operate the common pool of production for war purposes of the United States and Great Britain. Their duty was to study the combined resources and to assign the output under directives from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with strategic needs. It was the wholehearted pooling of resources which governed the production programmes of the two countries and led to the concentration of production of certain items in one country or the other. Under the Boards was established a considerable machine for the collection and presentation of information, and for carrying out the detailed work of assignment. 3. I am in full agreement that the end of the German war and the consequent reduction in the scope of combined business in the munitions assignment field requires a scaling down of the machinery. 1 am not sure whether your proposal is merely to abolish the Boards while leaving the subordinate committee structure more or less intact, or whether you had in mind the abolition of the whole of the combined munitions assignment machinery. There are a number of considerations which require to be taken into account before any drastic reduction is decided upon. The following are some of these considerations:— ( a ) While it is true that in general the combined munitions resources of the United States and the United Kingdom are sufficient, there is still a number of items which are in overall short supply. ( b ) This being so, it would appear that some machinery is necessary to apply operational priorities to the distribution of the items which are in short supply. This machinery must give effect to the strategic decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. There must be provision for reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff when there is disagreement. ( c ) It would seem desirable that arrangements for the interchange of information about the availability and disposal of munitions should be maintained. ( d ) There is a good deal of work to be done in ascertaining the status of Lend-Lease and British surpluses and on the disposal of these surpluses. This is at present being carried out through the medium of the Sub-Committees of the Boards. ( e ) The Boards have a responsibility in connection with the disposal of captured war material which is still a considerable problem. ( f ) The relation to the Boards of the Allies and Dominions requires study. 4. The above considerations prompt me to suggest that before any decision is taken it would be desirable to know in more detail the exact scope of your proposal, and how you would propose that the remaining functions of the assignment machinery should be carried out. Perhaps the best plan would be for the American and British representatives in Washington to be given this interchange of memoranda and to be instructed to work out, in consultation with any other interested parties, concrete proposals for the future of the Assignment Boards and their subordinate structure, which could then be presented for our approval. A similar examination could be carried out in London and the scope of the London machinery could be adjusted to conform to what is eventually decided about the machinery in Washington. 1 Printed from a mimeographed copy of a text supplied by the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington in September 1945. The index to the folder in which the source copy was found contains the following entry: “5. About 31 July 1945 . Text of a memorandum prepared by Attlee regarding Munitions Assignment[s] Board, in answer to the President’s memorandum to Churchill of 23 July. The President states that he received no memorandum from Attlee on this subject but he discussed it with him. The text as herein given was furnished by the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington in September, 1945.” 2 Document No. 1199 . Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia [1201] The Secretary General of the British Delegation (Hayter) to the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) Berlin, July 17th, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745 [1202] Proposal by the British Delegation July 19, 1945 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1945 [1203] The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State Belgrade, July 27, 1945—7 p.m. 860h.00/7–2745: Telegram [1204] The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State Belgrade, July 29, 1945—2 p.m. 860h.00/7–2945: Telegram [1205] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 8, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 No. 1201 The Secretary General of the British Delegation (Hayter) to the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1745 No. 1201 The Secretary General of the British Delegation ( Hayter ) to the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal ( Cannon ) F. O. 11 (1) Berlin , July 17th, 1945. Dear Cannon , It is very good news that you are here as the expert on South-east Europe. I am supposed to be the same for our delegation, and we must get together soon. Meanwhile I enclose a copy of a telegram from our Ambassador at Belgrade, 1 which you may find interesting. The reference in the last paragraph is to the proposal, which your Embassy has I think also reported, 2 that this meeting should issue a reminder that the Three Powers expect the Tito-Šubašić agreement 3 to be fully carried out in the near future. I know that Mr. Eden is very anxious to get this through, and perhaps we could meet and discuss it. Could you give me a ring? Yours very sincerely, W G Hayter [Enclosure] Telegram From His Majesty’s Ambassador at Belgrade , 11 th July It was recently reported in Belgrade press that it was intended to hold in the near future a congress of national liberation fronts of various states in Yugoslav Federation. The aim of the congress would be to weld these national liberation fronts into a national front for the whole of Yugoslavia. 2. I heard this morning that Dr. Šubašić had been invited to become a member of Steering Committee of this congress and I took an opportunity to question him about it in the course of private conversation this afternoon. 3. He confirmed to me that he had received such an invitation. He had, however, not yet returned a reply. He intended to discuss the matter with M. Kardelj and to take the line that if he were being invited as an individual he could not accept. This would mean that he was merely being used as a figurehead. If however he were permitted first to call a meeting of the executive of Croat Peasant Party and secure a mandate to represent the party he would then be in a position to take a constructive part in the congress. A possible alternative might be that he should meet Dr. Maček, ascertain his views and seek a mandate of some kind from him. 4. The idea at the back of Dr. Šubašić’s mind in this is that a national front which would be a coalition of the parties each having a separate existence, would probably be the best solution of the country’s political problems; even though a dominant position in such a coalition was held by the Communist party. 5. As he sees the position the present régime have all physical power in their hands. A national front is therefore inevitable. The only alternative to it would be civil war. This would only be possible with foreign armed assistance which is out of the question. It is equally inevitable that a transitory role in political life of this country will be played for some time at any rate by the Communist party. The problem therefore is to prevent the national front from becoming a thinly disguised one-party régime. This could be done by creating it as a true coalition of the parties even though Communist party’s influence in the coalition was preponderant. 6. It will be interesting to see whether Dr. Šubašić terms for his participation in the congress are accepted by Marshal Tito. If so it may be that some kind of a coalition will emerge from proposed congress. Kardelj assured him that after the congress complete freedom of the press and of political activity would be granted. The present idea is that the congress should precede meeting of broadened AVNOJ. 7. It is Dr. Šubašić’s impression that at the moment leaders of this regime are manoeuvring and waiting for the results of the Big Three meeting. He is therefore doubly anxious that some kind of a reminder about Tito–Šubašić agreement should issue from it. 1 R. C. Skrine Stevenson. 2 See vol. i , document No. 553 . 3 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251 – 254 . No. 1202 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1945 No. 1202 Proposal by the British Delegation July 19, 1945 Yugoslavia British Proposal Presented to Heads of Governments July 19, 1945 1 At the Crimea Conference on February 10th the Heads of the three Governments discussed the Yugoslav question 2 and agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Šubašić that the agreement between them be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement. 3 2. The three Governments have thus endorsed the Tito-Šubašić Agreement, with its guarantees of the basic principles of democratic liberties, in particular personal freedom, freedom from fear, freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of speech, press meetings and associations, and the right of property and private initiative, and with the promise of a democratic election within three months of the Yugoslav liberation. 3. Doubtless owing to war conditions, the principles set out in the Tito-Šubašić Agreement have not been fully carried out. In view of the declaration issued at Yalta, it is desirable that, at the close of the present meeting, the three Heads of Governments should issue a statement recalling the fact that they had given recognition to the Yugoslav Government on the basis of the Yalta Agreement and the Tito-Šubašić Agreement, which they expect to be fully carried out in the near future. 1 On the file copy this is a manuscript heading by Yost. See ante , pp. 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 2 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 900 – 901 . 3 See document No. 1417, section vii . No. 1203 The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State 860h.00/7–2745: Telegram No. 1203 The Chargé in Yugoslavia ( Shantz ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret us urgent Belgrade , July 27, 1945—7 p.m. 319. After week of rumors that Šubašić, Grol and Šutej would resign, Cabinet meeting was called Wednesday 2 and Ministers were presented with four new laws for their approval. One concerns enlargement of AVNOJ, another Constituent Assembly, third elections and fourth voting procedure. Šubašić countered by proposing a committee to study the laws and make recommendations to Cabinet. After initial opposition Tito accepted proposal and immediate Cabinet crisis was averted. Members of Committee are Kardelj Chairman and Grol, Kosanović, Šutej, Qnol [ sic ] Hebrang and Prodanović. Šutej told Fraleigh today that Committee has worked until after midnight for two days on first problem[,] enlargement of AVNOJ. Problems posed by new law are to find 125 new members and apportion them among political parties of National Liberation Front. Enlargement program cannot be carried out from Belgrade alone and Šutej proposes to go to Zagreb tomorrow to look for candidates. Meanwhile, he says Communists want lion’s share and will agree to nothing which will reduce their power, the crux of the matter in final analysis. Committee’s activities will probably force postponement of AVNOJ meeting another ten days. Upon rumors of resignations of minor Cabinet members like himself Šutej said key to opposition is Šubašić who signed the basic agreement with Tito. Šubašić told British Ambassador regarding rumors he would resign that eve no [ of? ] political battle is not time for resignations. Šutej says Šubašić is not strong enough to bring about any important changes unless western powers back him in demanding fulfillment of Yalta Agreement and granting of peoples freedoms. For moment activities of new committee leave political situation open. Crisis will probably recur in about ten days. Meanwhile, Šutej says everyone expects an announcement from Potsdam for they are sure Yugo is on conference agenda. Result of British elections has increased confusion in ranks of non-Communists. Shantz 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 157 of July 30 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–3045). 2 July 25. No. 1204 The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State 860h.00/7–2945: Telegram No. 1204 The Chargé in Yugoslavia ( Shantz ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret us urgent Belgrade , July 29, 1945—2 p.m. 323. Talks with Vice Premier Grol yesterday evening following those with Šutej (remytel 319 of July 27 2 ) throw more light on Wednesday’s cabinet meeting and present critical situation. At what was first full cabinet meeting in nearly three months Grol led attacks on new laws and reiterated what (sent Dept, rptd Caserta and Moscow) he had told Tito month ago (remytel 255 of July 10 3 ), that his participation in government and support of his party would depend on govt’s action on enlargement of AVNOJ in spirit of Yalta, free elections and freedoms of press and speech. He pronounced new laws unsatisfactory and requiring study by the Ministers], so many of whom had been kept uninformed during past three months. Šubašić, “showing more fight than usual,” then came to Grol’s support and proposed committee to study laws. Meeting lasted five stormy hours. Part of Communists was taken by Tito and Kardelj, others having apparently been instructed by Tito to avoid a pitched battle. Some of main points taken up by Grol were: 1. One hundred twenty members of AVNOJ, of whom forty from 1938 Parliament, rest divided among parties, is considered insufficient number; 2. New electoral law permits exclusion of approximately half of electorate on ten possible grounds ranging from alleged opposition to National Liberation Front to alleged support of Mihailović; 3. Nomination of candidates by local NL committees is not nomination by people … 4 but nomination by Communists who control so-called People’s Committees …; 4 4. New electoral law based on King Alexander’s 1931 law makes Opposition’s activities virtually impossible by requiring all parties in election to be represented in all electoral districts of country (it[‘]s impossible for instance for Serbian Radical Party be represented in Slovenian district, Slovenian Clerical Party in Macedonian districts); 5. Parties cannot find candidates without freedoms of travel, campaign and press; 6. Govt’s proposal of paper ballot unfair to large ignorant section of electorate, rubber ball system preferred (re my despatch 70 of June 26 5 ); 7. Front cannot call itself representative so long as it excludes most of Serbian Radicals and Maček’s Party. (Next day Tito sent his car to Knjaževac near Nish to bring Aca Stanojević, aged 94[,] nominal head of Radicals to Belgrade. Politika July 27 carried photograph and story on page one of meeting, but Grol is informed nothing of importance was discussed. Meeting was apparently staged to give impression that Radicals support Front. A few individuals do, but party, largest in Serbia, does not. This was confirmed to me by Lazar Marković, a Radical leader). Since cabinet meeting Grol has worked with Committee studying laws until late every night. He has found Hebrang reasonable, but Kardelj and other Communists make it clear that no compromise is intended which will effect [ affect ] their iron control. Therefore, committee offers no hope. Grol says there are now only two possibilities for success: 1. Pressure on Tito from outside, i. e. from America and England with or without Russian approval; 2. Resignation or threat of resignation of both Grol and Šubašić with others probably joining them. Like Sutej, Grol thinks decisive results depend on action of Šubašić and he hopes America and England will take this opportunity to remind Subasic, who is wavering, that he is responsible and must be firm. Grol is certain he and Šubašić together could bring severe blow to Tito’s regime and perhaps force an end of terror and bring about some relief for people. Without Šubašić Grol knows his actions will have only minor results but he is prepared to act anyway and take consequences. It seems to this Embassy that there is now a brief and perhaps a last opportunity for the great powers, especially ourselves and British, to manifest our support for the principles for which Grol and a few others in govt are still fighting. If Grol resigns and Šubašić drifts along with Tito on critical laws now pending it will be more difficult than ever for us to relieve a situation which is becoming daily more oppressive and in which we would seem to have a responsibility to the people. Dept may wish repeat to Berlin for info of American representatives at Potsdam. Shantz 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No, 157 of July 30 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–3045). 2 Document No. 1203 . 3 Document No. 554, printed in vol. i . 4 There is a garble at this point in the text as received. 4 There is a garble at this point in the text as received. 5 Not printed. No. 1205 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–845 No. 1205 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 [Extract 2 ] top secret [ Washington ,] August 8, 1945. Berlin Conference Yugoslavia There was comparatively little discussion of Yugoslavia at the Conference. The British presented a proposal 3 having in view the implementation of the Yalta Declaration in regard to Yugoslavia. In commenting on this proposal Stalin said that according to his information the Yalta Agreement was being carried out. He furthermore refused to discuss the matter unless Yugoslav representatives were called before the Conference in order to state their point of view. When the President refused to agree to calling in the Yugoslavs, the British withdrew their paper, though not before Churchill had remarked that the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia had been drafted largely by the Americans and he would have thought that they would have wished to insure that it was carried out. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. For the minutes of the discussions summarized in this memorandum, see ante , pp. 127–129 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] . 2 For the other paragraph of this memorandum, see document No. 1087 . 3 Document No. 1202 . Attitude on civil administration in Venezia Giulia Attitude on civil administration in Venezia Giulia [1206] The War Department to the United States Delegation Washington, 25 July 1945. J. C. S. Files: Telegram [1207] Prime Minister Tito and the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs (Šubašić) to President Truman Belgrade, July the 25th 1945. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–3145 [1208] The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the War Department Babelsberg, 26 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1209] The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State Belgrade, July 27, 1945—6 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2745: Telegram [1210] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 29 [1945.] 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2945: Telegram [1211] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3045 No. 1206 The War Department to the United States Delegation J. C. S. Files: Telegram No. 1206 The War Department to the United States Delegation secret priority Washington , 25 July 1945. War 38253. CCAC is considering answer to request 1 from SACMed 2 which refers to Belgrade Agreement of 9 June 3 regarding Venezia Giulia. Paragraph 3 of agreement provided that use will be made by AMG of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and which SACMed thinks is working satisfactorily. SACMed has taken the position that this does not require him to make use of committees and subcommittees of liberation set up by Yugoslavs in various administrative fields which have been exercising executive power. He asks approval of this position, which Yugoslavs oppose. US side of CCAC has previously cleared a proposed answer approving this position. British, saying that affirmative instructions should be given, now propose to add additional paragraph reading as follows: “You should as far as possible administer the area, on following lines:—Yugoslav system of national committees should be eradicated in whole area, and Italian system reinstalled. In predominantly Yugoslav towns and villages, token Yugoslav administration might be retained and national committee used in advisory capacity. In predominantly Italian towns, particularly Trieste, firmness should be used to sweep away Yugoslav system.” State Department working level has approved British suggestion, but War and Navy representatives are reluctant to concur, though they recognize primary State Department interest. Mr. Lovett requests your views be obtained. He feels additional paragraph should be eliminated or at least word “eradicated” should be changed to “discontinued” and last sentence should be eliminated. 1 Document No. 572, printed in vol. i . 2 Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander. 3 For the text of the agreement referred to, an Anglo-American-Yugoslav agreement “respecting the provisional administration of Venezia Giulia” signed at Belgrade, June 9, 1945, see Executive Agreement Series No. 501; 59 Stat. (2) 1855. For the text of article 3, see vol. i , document No. 558, footnote 4 . No. 1207 Prime Minister Tito and the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs (Šubašić) to President Truman 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–3145 No. 1207 Prime Minister Tito and the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Šubašić ) to President Truman 1 Excellency [:] We take the liberty of addressing ourselves to you in a matter which presses heavily upon our peoples, with the conviction that it will draw your attention. On the 17th of July of this year, the government of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia through their Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a verbal note no. 1938 to the Embassies of Great Britain and the United States of America in Belgrade. The content of this note concerns the Civil Administration of that part of Julian Venice which is now under Allied Military Administration. In the enclosed note we particularly stressed that the Agreement of the 9th of June, 1945, which was signed in Belgrade by the Ambassadors of the United States of America and Great Britain 2 and by the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, contains in its 3rd article the following clause: “Use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and which in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander is working satisfactorily”. This clause of the said Agreement rests upon the fact that the territory which is now under Allied Military Administration, is liberated territory, inhabited mostly by a population which has given proof of its limitless devotion to the Allied cause, and which is not merely occupied territory. The elevated principles proclaimed by the great Allies during the course of the war not only command the respect of democratic institutions in the liberated regions but also the active help of the Allies in order to create and, where they already exist, to develop these institutions. During the sanguinary four years struggle against Fascism in which, in addition to the Slovene inhabitants, Italians from Julian Venice participated in great numbers, democratic institutions arose and developed and attained their highest degree only when Fascism was crushed and the people had full opportunity of building up their democratic administration. With various measures undertaken by the Allied Military Authority, the democratic development of Julian Venice was brought to a stand-still. In abolishing some democratic institutions, reinstating the legal order based on laws which were in force up to the 8th of September, 1943, the decrees issued by the Allied Military Authorities resulted in the substitution of an administration based upon democratic principles, by a regime in which fascist laws, fascist institutions and fascist administrators prevail. The Allied Military Authority in Julian Venice, inasmuch as it was not satisfied with the work of particular organs of the democratic institutions and democratic procedures of changing those organs and, with the approval of the people, of appointing to corresponding posts such persons as would most closely collaborate with the Allied Military Administration. Therefore, we propose that democratic elections be carried out in this part of Julian Venice which is under Allied Administration, whereby the organs of a civil administration would be chosen in accordance with the democratic aspirations of the people. It is with the greatest confidence that we await the Peace Conference, which is to bring the final decision on the question of Julian Venice. But, in the meantime, interpreting the wishes of the people concerned—Slovenes as well as Italians—we should desire that to this afflicted, heroic people be returned those liberties which they won through their own sacrifices, so that they may, pending the final decision of the Peace Conference, live under a national administration of their own choosing and creation, in close collaboration with the Allied Military Administration. We beg your Excellency to take this matter into consideration and bring such a solution as will be satisfactory to the people of Julian Venice. 3 Please accept [etc.] J B Tito Dr Ivan Šubašić Belgrade , July the 25th 1945. [Enclosure] No. 1938 Note Verbale The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia present their compliments to the United States Embassy, and have the honour to communicate, on behalf of the Yugoslav Government as follows: As known to the United States Government, at a Conference held in Devin (Duino), 4 following the Beograd [ Belgrade ] Agreement of June 9, 1945, no agreement was reached regarding the Civil administration in the territory of Julian March which came under Allied Military Government, and so the matter was left to be decided upon through diplomatic channels. According to Art. 3 of the Beograd Agreement of June 9, 1945, Allied Military Government will in the territory of the Slovenian Littoral and Trst [ Trieste ] make use of any Yugoslav Civil administration which is already set up, and which in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander is working satisfactorily. The Yugoslav Government are confident that this disposition of the said Agreement can be interpreted only to the effect that Allied Military Government will make use of the Civil authorities and ascertain from the practice during the work, whether same fulfill their administrative duty satisfactorily to the people who elected them. If the Military Government get the opinion that certain organs of the people’s Authority were not satisfactory in carrying out their duties, they will be able to request the replacement through democratic proceedings. This interpretation was communicated orally by the Yugoslav Government to the U. S. and British Ambassadors during the Conference and before signing the Agreement of June 9, 1945; same view of the Yugoslav Government in the premises was pointed out also by Lieut. General A. Jovanović, Representative of the General Staff at the Devin (Duino) Conference. This seems to be the only logical interpretation in view of the following two facts: ( a ) That the status of a liberated territory was recognised to the area in question; ( b ) That the Allied Countries the forces of which occupied this territory are democratic States. Allied Military Government do not comply with dispositions of the Agreement signed in Beograd on June 9, 1945, which will be seen from the following: ( a ) They expressively [ expressly ] stated in their first Proclamation 5 that all laws which had been in vigour until September 8, 1943 would again be effective. Since the organisation of Authorities too, is a matter laid down by laws, through this Proclamation there were reinstated all Authorities organised to Mussolini’s laws, and which were effective up to September 8, 1943 in that territory. At the same time that means a formal abolition of those Civil authorities which were not organised on the grounds of Mussolini’s laws, but which were built up by the population of that territory during its democratic fight side by side with United Nations, in opposition to Fascist laws and in opposition to the form and contents of Fascist Authorities. If there had been an intention of compliance with the Beograd Agreement, it should have been expressively emphasised in the Proclamation that all laws concerning the organisation of Civil Authorities and their functioning were considered void since Civil Administration had been taken over by National Committees recognised by Allied Authorities. ( b ) Allied Military Government deprived People’s Courts of their authority of judging and passing of sentences immediately after assuming control over the area. Owing to their character Military Authorities seem not [to] be adequate to enquire into personal qualities of judges having the confidence of an overwhelming majority of the population over which they exercise judicial Authority. ( c ) With a number of practical dispositions Allied Military Government completely paralysed in their work the Departmental National Liberation Committees ( Pokrajinski Narodno-oslobodilački odbor ), and all its dependent organs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia have the honour to draw the attention of the United States Government to the fact that the reinstatement of hated laws which were effective until September 8, 1943, caused a dissatisfaction and incitement among the people. These same people which rose into fight with the parole [ sic ] of destroying Fascist laws and Decrees which are nothing but an instrument by means of which Fascism is oppressing people and keeping them in chains; which suffered heavy sacrifices in blood and torments in their fight for democratic liberties; these people had now to witness how Allied military Authorities are reintroducing laws which they had overthrown through their fight. At the beginning of exercising their authority Allied Military Government abolished and dissolved the National Militia, the executive branch of the existing Civil Administration’s Section of Internal Affairs. With such a decision Allied Military Government acted in contravention of the Beograd Agreement of June 9, 1945 since they had had no time, in fact they had not even tried to see whether or not the work of the National Militia was satisfactory: on the other part they completely unabled [ sic ] the people’s Authorities to work successfully since without their executive branch they could not carry out their duty intrusted to them by the people. We beg leave to point out that therewith the portion of Julian March under the jurisdiction of Allied Military Government has been placed in a position which is worse than that one of occupied enemy areas where Police Units of existing Civil Authorities are effective for the purpose of maintaining public order and are also allowed to wear light arms while on duty. The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs [wishes?] to emphasise as follows; (1) The Yugoslav Government are very much interested in the life and destiny of people living in the territory of Julian March owing to the fact that a great majority of the population in that territory are of Yugoslav nationality, i. e. conationals not of an occupied country, but of Jugoslavia, an allied country, while the majority of the remaining part of the population consider the new Yugoslavia as the country towards which they tend economically and culturally. This has been proved also by the fact that the population of this territory took a most active part in the fighting against the Italian and German Fascism under the Command of Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, suffered in that fight great sacrifices for the victory of freedom loving people, and built up in the same fight the National Liberation Committees as the only organs of a democratic Civil Authority possessing the full support of the population. (2) Through the denial of a Civil authority having the full confidence of the people it is just this population who had [suffered?] for the Allied aims which is now being placed in a position even worse than that one of the population of occupied enemy countries: therewith a dissatisfaction has been caused among the people of the Julian March and also among the people of Yugoslavia, which could only hinder good allied relations between our two countries, while it is the greatest desire and endeavour of the Yugoslav Government to deepen and to fasten our allied relations. The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs are confident that the United States Embassy will communicate the view of the Yugoslav Government to their Government, and that the United States Government will give necessary [instructions?] to their military authorities that the Agreement of Beograd signed on June 9, 1945 be interpreted in this spirit, and that it be particularly borne in mind that in question is an area of a special character to which the status of a liberated territory has been recognised in a Memorandum of Allied Force Headquarters Representatives of June 16, 1945, 6 which was also the tendency of the Signers of the Beograd Agreement of June 9, 1945. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia avail themselves [etc.] Beograd , July 17th, 1945. 1 Enclosed in despatch No. 86 from the Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State. This message was also summarized in a telegram from Shantz to the Acting Secretary of State. See document No. 1209 . 2 Richard C. Patterson, Jr., and R. C. Skrine Stevenson, respectively. 3 No reply was made to this communication until after the close of the Berlin Conference. 4 i. e., the conference which negotiated the Duino agreement of June 20, 1945. See vol. i , document No. 561 and footnote 2 to document No. 560 . 5 For the text of proclamation No. 1, see The Allied Military Government Gazette (published in Trieste by Allied Military Government, 13 Corps, Venezia Giulia), No. 1, September 15, 1945, p. 3, and Department of State Bulletin , vol xvi , p. 1265. 6 Not printed. No. 1208 The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the War Department Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1208 The Assistant Secretary of War ( McCloy ) to the War Department secret priority Babelsberg , 26 July 1945. Victory 341. To AG War for Sommers Office Assistant Secretary of War and CAD signed McCloy. Reference War 38253 1 Matthews and I approve the addition of a paragraph reading as follows along the lines suggested by British. “You should as far as possible administer the area, on following lines:—Yugoslav system of national committees should in general be discontinued in whole area, and Italian system reinstalled. In predominantly Yugoslav towns and villages, token Yugoslav administration might be retained and national committee used in advisory capacity.” This is substantially Lovett’s suggestion as reported by you. 1 Document No. 1206 . No. 1209 The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2745: Telegram No. 1209 The Chargé in Yugoslavia ( Shantz ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret us urgent Belgrade , July 27, 1945—6 p.m. 318. Foreign Office delivered letter last night addressed to President Truman and signed by Marshal Tito and Dr. Šubašić concerning “a matter which presses heavily upon our peoples”. A similar letter was delivered at about same time to British Ambassador for Mr. Churchill. Letter refers to Foreign Office note of July 17, contents of which were summarized in my telegram No. 296 of July 20, 2 on the civil administration of the area of Venezia Giulia under AMG (Allied Military Government) and quotes the following clause in Article 3 of the Agreement signed in Belgrade on June 9: “Use will be made of any Yugo Civil Administration which is already set up and which in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander is working satisfactorily.” Letter then says this clause rests upon fact that area is liberated territory inhabited mostly by a population which has proved its devotion to Allied cause and is not merely occupied territory. But with coming of Allied military authorities democratic development of Venezia Giulia was brought to standstill] Some democratic institutions were abolished and legal order based on laws in force up to September 8, 1943, was reinstated along with Fascist laws, Fascist institutions and Fascist administrators. Allied military authorities were not satisfied to use the democratic institutions and democratic procedures available. Therefore, it is proposed that democratic elections be carried out in the part of Venezia Giulia under Allied Administration “whereby the organs of civil administration would be chosen in accordance with the democratic aspirations of the people”. Note concludes that settlement at peace conference of question of Venezia Giulia is awaited with greatest confidence but in meantime, interpreting the wishes of both Slovenes and Italians, it is desired that these afflicted heroic peoples be returned liberties they won through their sacrifices so that until final decision of peace conference they may live under a national administration of their own choosing in close collaboration with AMG. Please note Yugo claim that territory administered by AMG is liberated territory and that no mention is made of the region of Friuli. Reaction of British Ambassador is that holding of an election in Venezia Giulia would add enormously to burden of AMG and that to accept Yugo thesis that the area is liberated territory would in effect prejudge the final question of sovereignty. We agree in this opinion. Text of letter follows by airgram. 3 Shantz 1 Text repeated in extenso in telegram No. 155 of July 29 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–645). 2 Not printed. For the full text of the note referred to, see the enclosure to document No. 1207 . 3 Airgram not printed. For the full text of the Tito-Šubašić communication, see document No. 1207 . No. 1210 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Italy)/7–2945: Telegram No. 1210 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Extract] secret [ Washington ,] July 29 [1945.] 155.… 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department has discussed Yugo note (Belgrade’s 296) 2 with British and is now awaiting receipt their views before instructing Embassy Belgrade re reply. We expect that local elections will be held in Venezia Giulia as in other AMG territory at approximately same time such elections are held in other parts of Italy and AMG has already initiated certain preparations to that end. Department however agrees with view set forth in final paragraph Belgrade’s 318 3 that to accept Yugo thesis that area is liberated territory (i. e. Yugo liberated territory) would in effect prejudge final question of sovereignty. [ Grew ] 1 Here follows a summary of document No. 1207 and its enclosure. 2 The Embassy’s telegram is not printed. For the text of the Yugoslav note referred to, see the enclosure to document No. 1207 . 3 Document No. 1209 . No. 1211 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 ( Potsdam )/7–3045 No. 1211 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg ,] July 30, 1945. On Conditions in Trieste–Istria District Soviet Proposal The Soviet Government have taken knowledge of the message of Mr. I. Šubašić, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, and Marshal I. Broz-Tito, Prime-Minister of Yugoslavia, to the Heads of the Three Governments concerning conditions in Trieste–Istria District, 2 It is said in that message that Italian fascist laws which had been in action until September 8, 1943, were restored on the territory of Trieste–Istria in consequence of Allied military authorities activity. Former Italian institutions are being restored; persons who had occupied executive posts in the period of German occupation are permitted to participate in the civil administration. At the same time obstacles are being made to the activities of democratic institutions of the local Yugoslavian administration which had been created during the period of struggle against occupants, in a number of cases these institutions are ignored by the representatives of the Allied military authorities. The Government of Yugoslavia request that the laws which had been in action until September 8, 1943, on Trieste–Istria territory be revoked, that the possibility of normal activities should be given to the democratic institutions of the local administration represented by the people’s committees having the support and confidence of the population and that in such cases when those institutions do not correspond to the proper requirements their replacement should be effected by the way of free democratic elections. The Soviet Government consider desirable that the proposals of the Government of Yugoslavia expressed in the message of Mr. I. Šubašić, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Marshal I. Broz-Tito, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, should be met by the Conference of the Heads of the Three Governments. 1 Attachment 12 to the summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 30. See ante , pp. 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] . This proposal was apparently withdrawn by Stalin at the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, July 31. See ante , pp. 525 (footnote 46) [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . 2 Document No. 1207 . Far Eastern Questions Far Eastern Questions Contents Peace feelers through the Soviet Union (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)]) Issuance of a proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan (Documents 1236-1261) Basic military objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan (Documents 1262-[Unnumbered document following Document 1266 (#1)]) Control and command in the war against Japan (Documents 1267-1273) Relationship of the Soviet Union to the war against Japan (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)]-1282) British Commonwealth participation in the war against Japan (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)]-[Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)]) French and Netherland participation in the war against Japan (Documents 1288-[Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)]) Portuguese participation in the war against Japan (Documents 1295-1302) Use of atomic weapons in the war against Japan (Documents 1303-1315) Release of tankers for the war against Japan through altered distribution of European oil supplies (Documents 1316-1326) Iran: Withdrawal of Allied forces (Documents 1327-[Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)]) China: Negotiations with the Soviet Union China: Negotiations with the Soviet Union [1212] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President [Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945. 740.0011 P. W./7–1645 [1213] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State and the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) [Chungking,] 19 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1214] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President and the Secretary of State [Chungking,] 20 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1215] The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Russell) to the Secretary of State Washington [Babelsberg], July 20, 1945. 761.93/7–2045 [1216] The President to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) [Babelsberg,] 23 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1217] The Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Berlin Conference, July 23, 1945. 761.93/7–2345 [1218] The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 28, 1945. 761.93/7–2845 [1219] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) [Babelsberg,] July 28, 1945. 761.93/7–2845: Telegram [1220] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State Chungking, 29 July 1945. 761.93/7–2945: Telegram [1221] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State [Chungking,] 29 July 1945. 761.93/7–2945: Telegram [1222] The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State Berlin Conference, July 31, 1945. 761.93/7–3145 No. 1212 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President 740.0011 P. W./7–1645 No. 1212 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President 1 [Extract 2 ] top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 16 July 1945. Memorandum for the President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the yalta agreements As for the Russian participation [in the war against Japan] and the so-called Yalta Agreements, 3 1 believe that these agreements, so long as they are interpreted consistently with our traditional policy toward China, should not cause us any concern from a security point of view, assuming always we keep clear our control over the Pacific islands. By our traditional policy toward China I refer, of course, to the Open Door and the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. manchuria We can afford to permit Russia to have access to ports in Manchuria, and I interpret the Yalta Agreements as giving her full commercial access to Dairen, with the necessary facilities. Likewise I understand the late President Roosevelt’s willingness to permit the Russians to have what in effect is the lease of a naval base at Port Arthur on the peninsula for a limited time. However no concessions should be made which would permit Russia to control or prohibit trade through Dairen or any other commercial port in Manchuria . In other words I would insist that Manchuria be treated precisely as China proper in this regard, except that Russia be permitted to acquire the facilities necessary to develop and support her trade from and to Russia through the port by her joint control with China of the railway and the normal acquisition of the necessary port facilities. The operation of the railway must be conducted on the usual public carrier basis without discrimination against the trade in Manchuria of any power. I understand Dr. Soong to take this view and I would not hesitate to support China on this, as any other course could constitute an abandonment of one of our longest established and most highly respected American policies. It would also be antagonistic to our clear and growing interests in the orient. 4 Except for the lease of a naval base at Port Arthur, which in itself is a trend in the wrong direction, no further military rights or control should be granted in the Dairen peninsula or elsewhere in Manchuria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Henry L Stimson 1 Submitted to Byrnes for transmittal to Truman (see document No. 1236 ). 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see the enclosure to document No. 1236 , and documents Nos. 732 and 1274 . 3 i. e., the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan signed by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill on February 11, 1945. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984 . 4 The following extracts from Stimson’s diary are relevant to this paragraph: “[Undated entry inserted before July 14:] … In addition to that I had talks with him [Truman] and I gave him a memorandum on the conflict between the supposed plans of Russia as to Dairen in Manchuria and our Open Door Policy, and went over them with him carefully, again and again warning him to be absolutely sure that the Russians did not block off our trade by their control over the Chinese Eastern Railway. I pointed out that an open port would be useless if our trade could be smothered by railroad control behind that, and that was what it looked as if the Russians were planning to do. “[July 15:] … Averell Harriman and Ambassador Murphy came in to see us in the late afternoon. Harriman was much worked up over his fears of the Russian plans for Manchuria and wanted help. I helped him out by pointing out that any plan such as he feared the Russians had in mind to monopolize trade in Manchuria would be in direct violation with our historic Open Door policy and the Nine Power Treaty, and I afterwards took this up with the President.… “[July 17:] I went to the ‘White House’ for a conference with Byrnes early in the morning.… I impressed on him the importance of the Open Door policy in connection with Stalin’s new pressure for commercial rights in Manchuria, and advised that any claim for exclusive rights should be firmly opposed. I described to him the development of the Open Door and the Nine Power Treaty. Byrnes evidently accepted that advice, . . . . “[July 18:] … The President again repeated [to Stimson] that he was confident of sustaining the Open Door policy, and I took the occasion to emphasize to him the importance of going over the matter detail by detail so as to be sure that there would be no misunderstanding over the meaning of the general expressions.…“Cf. ante , p. 43, footnote 3 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] . No. 1213 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State and the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1213 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the Secretary of State and the Ambassador to the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) 1 top secret priority [ Chungking ,] 19 July 1945. ComNavGroup China sends. Top secret and urgent for the eyes alone of the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, Potsdam, Germany. For Ambassador Harriman from Hurley (the following message is from Dr. T. V. Soong for Ambassador Harriman). “After having had the opportunity of discussing the details of the negotiations 2 with Generalissimo 3 and other leading members of my Government, I am convinced that we have gone as far as we possibly could in meeting Soviet demands. I tell you this in all candor, and you know how completely frank I have been with you. T. V. Soong”. Hurley 1 Sent by the Commander, Naval Group, China, via Navy channels. 2 i. e., Soong’s negotiations with Stalin at Moscow, which had been interrupted by Stalin’s departure for the Berlin Conference. See vol. i , p. 857 . 3 Chiang Kai-shek. No. 1214 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President and the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1214 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the President and the Secretary of State 1 top secret priority [ Chungking ,] 20 July 1945. From ComNavGroup China. (The following message is top secret and urgent for the eyes alone of the Secretary of State James S [ F .] Byrnes, Potsdam, Germany. For the President from Hurley.) The following message is from the Generalissimo, President Chiang Kai-shek, for President Truman, “I saw Soviet Ambassador 2 today and requested him to send following message to Generalissimo Stalin: ‘I wish to thank you most warmly for your cordial reception to Dr T V Soong and the frank and forthright conference you had with him. On the question of Outer Mongolia we had expected that you would be satisfied with our not pressing the question although both in 1924 and in 1936 3 your Government had given categorical assurances recognizing that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of China, preservation of the status quo could only mean that while the de facto position is to be preserved the legal title of China in Outer Mongolia is likewise to be undisturbed. Your insistence that China should recognize independence of Outer Mongolia comes as complete surprise. It will be against the traditional convictions of our people and it will prove most unwelcome to many members of my Government. Nevertheless provided all other problems are satisfactorily settled I shall not shrink from this greatest sacrifice in order to remove what you consider as the outstanding stumbling block to lasting friendly relations between our two countries. The problems I refer to are (1) in order that administrative and military unity in China be achieved, Soviet Russia should not extend any moral or material aid to Chinese Communists, any assistance given China should be confined to the National Government; (2) all possible assistance to China in the pacification of the rebels in Sinkiang; and (3) the territorial and administrative integrity of China in Manchuria be completely respected. As regards first two problems, I am grateful to Marshal Stalin for his categorical assurances to Dr Soong. As regards the third problem, it relates to the question of the trunk line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and South Manchurian Railways and Dairen and Port Arthur. Knowing that you were leaving for Berlin, I instructed Dr Soong to convey every possible concession to satisfy the Soviet Government, specifically I told him to present them with utmost frankness, laying as it were all cards on the table, without any attempt at bargaining. The President of the two railways should be naturally Chinese in accordance with respect for the sovereignty and integrity of China. I am ready to agree that a Soviet citizen should be manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway section, while on the South Manchurian Railway section the manager should be Chinese. As regards Dairen we shall declare it a free port so that through traffic with Soviet Russia will not be taxed. In accordance with the principle of administrative integrity of China, Dairen, being the principal port of Manchuria, must be run by a Chinese administration, however, we are ready to employ some Russian technical experts so as to render effective cooperation in meeting Dairen needs. In addition, we are ready to give a long term commercial lease of certain warehouses so that Soviet transit could be facilitated. As regards Port Arthur I am ready to entrust the defense of the area to the Soviet Government, with a joint Chinese Soviet Military Commission to work out the joint use of the port. However, in order to give due recognition to the administrative integrity of China in Manchuria the civilian administration should be Chinese [and I cannot] 4 agree that appointment of Chinese civilian administrators will be made by consultation with Soviet Military Command. Finally the area of Port Arthur should be delimited by a line south of Dairen and the railway leading to Dairen, because the conception of a free port or internationalization of that port is impossible if it is situated within a military area controlled by Soviet Russia. I am ready, however, to have another zone between that line and the bottleneck leading to Dairen, where defense problem could be worked out by the Joint Military Commission, but Dairen and the railways from Changchun to Dairen must be outside the military zone. I trust that Generalissimo Stalin would recognize that China has made the utmost efforts to meet Soviet needs. I hope that he would realize that after suffering from eight years of war, and at the moment when the tide is definitely turning against Japan, I cannot go entirely beyond what my people are ready to accept. In other words, I have frankly put forward all I could do to meet Soviet needs. Since the Yalta proposals were put forward through the American Government, and since Mr Harriman on behalf of the President has asked that the American Government be kept fully informed, I shall inform President Truman of this message to you.’ The above is the substance of my message to Generalissimo Stalin. Although China was not represented at the Yalta Conference, you Mr President, will realize that we have gone the limit to fulfill the Yalta formula. We have even gone beyond it in the case of Outer Mongolia, we have gone as far as the public opinion of China will stand. We may even have already gone beyond the limit that the Chinese people will support. I trust in your conversations with Generalissimo Stalin you would impress him on [ sic ] the eminently reasonable stand we have taken, so that he will not insist on the impossible. Hoping for your prompt action and support and awaiting your reply, Sincerely yours, Chiang Kai-shek” Please acknowledge receipt. Hurley 1 Sent by the Commander, Naval Group, China, via Navy channels. 2 Appolon Alexandrovich Petrov. 3 See Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929 (Washington, 1929), p. 133; Stephen Heald and John W. Wheeler-Bennett, eds., Documents on International Affairs, 1936 (London, 1937), p. 472. 4 The words in brackets are supplied from a corrected copy. No. 1215 The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Russell) to the Secretary of State 761.93/7–2045 No. 1215 The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State ( Russell ) to the Secretary of State Washington [ Babelsberg ], July 20, 1945. Memorandum for Secretary Byrnes I attach herewith two memoranda, one prepared by Mr. Vincent of the Chinese Division and the other by Mr. Harriman. Both memoranda deal with certain Chinese questions that both Mr. Vincent and Mr. Harriman feel Stalin will present for consideration at this Conference. The concessions already made by us to the Russians at Yalta represent, to some extent at least, a compromise of the traditional American policy with reference to China. It was in the maintenance of that policy that our country became embroiled in the Japanese war. Any compromise beyond the Yalta agreement would seriously weaken the prestige of the President in the international field at the very beginning of his term. If Russia does not bring the Chinese negotiations up, we should do so and emphasize our firm position. So far as possible, we should avoid any developments in China such as have occurred in Poland. Accordingly, we should, in advance of any entrance by Russia into the Japanese war, make clear what our position is and shall be with reference to the territorial integrity of China and the maintenance of our traditional “open-door” policy there, without special privileges to any nation. You will note that these memoranda do not deal with Korea. You will find in Mr. Stimson’s memorandum 1 [an] excellent discussion of the Korean situation. Ambassador Harriman would like to discuss this matter with you at your earliest convenience. D[ onald ] R[ ussell ] [Attachment 1] The Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dooman ) and the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 2 top secret Memorandum Subject: Proposed Chinese-Soviet Agreements. There are attached factual memoranda 3 on the above subject together with comments thereon. The memoranda express the following views: (1) the proposed agreements concern directly and may affect adversely our policies and objectives in regard to China; (2) those policies are based firmly on our national interest; (3) we are at war with Japan in defense of the principles underlying those policies; (4) avowals of respect for the sovereignty of China and for the interests of third parties notwithstanding, the Chinese-Soviet agreements as discussed prejudice Chinese sovereignty and give the Soviet Union a special position in Manchuria which can be inimical to our national interest; (5) the Yalta commitments regarding Manchuria and the Chinese-Soviet agreements that may follow therefrom should be regarded as expedients ; (6) nevertheless, our undertaking at Yalta should be respected having in mind the objectives thereof; but (7) concessions beyond the Yalta commitments should not be made by China. It is believed that the terms offered by Premier T. V. Soong in his conversations in Moscow fully meet the Yalta commitments. With that thought in mind, it is recommended specifically: (1) that no objection be raised to a grant by China of independence to Outer Mongolia; (2) that Russian and Chinese direction of the joint company set up to operate the specified railways in Manchuria be on a basis of equality; (3) that Dairen be a free port under Chinese administration with, if necessary, an international supervisory commission to deal with specific free port problems; (4) that the territorial bounds of the Port Arthur lease be clearly limited to the peninsula southwest of and excluding Dairen; and (5) that a strong effort be made to reduce the time limit of the agreement from 30 to 15 years (reference Russian-Chinese treaty of 1924). 4 It is believed urgent that an early opportunity be sought for discussions with Stalin and Molotov. Furthermore, if they are agreeable, Soong might be invited to come here (3 days flying time) toward the conclusion of the Conference to join in the discussions. J[ ohn ] C[ arter ] V[ incent ] Berlin Conference , July 19, 1945. [Subattachment 1] top secret Memorandum Subject: Proposed Chinese-Soviet Agreements. The character and scope of Premier T. V. Soong’s recent conversations in Moscow are of vital and immediate concern to us. They concern directly and may affect adversely our traditional and present policies and objectives with regard to China; e. g., observance of the “open door” and equality of opportunity; respect for the territorial and administrative integrity of China; and opposition to the growth of political and economic spheres of influence. These policies are derived from and based firmly upon our national interest, more clearly now than at any time in the past. We are at war with Japan in defense of the principles underlying these policies. We have, through our numerous missionary, social and cultural organizations, formed ties with China which are broad and deep. In the years just prior to the depression of 1929 Americans contributed about 60 million dollars annually to the support of missionary work in China. The attitude of these Americans, which is strongly “pro-Chinese”, must be accorded consideration in our thinking and planning with regard to China. When we first established treaty relations with China over one hundred years ago, we assumed the lead in obtaining “most favored nation” treatment with a view to protecting our merchants from discrimination. Since then, we have insisted upon equality of commercial opportunity for American nationals, with success except in areas of special interest (Russia and Japan in Manchuria). Just prior to Sino-Japanese hostilities (1937) we held first place in China’s foreign trade. Throughout this hundred year period, but more especially subsequent to the Spanish-American War, we have been aware that China under foreign domination or divided into spheres of foreign influence would threaten not only our commercial interests but also our security in the Pacific. The underlying cause of our involvement in war with Japan was our refusal to accept Japanese domination in China. There is inherent in the settlements discussed by Soong in Moscow a threat to our national interests in China and also to international cooperation to secure peace in the Pacific. This threat comes not from the actual language of the suggested settlements but from the potentialities of those settlements for future misapplication and friction. Let us face the issue squarely with ourselves and with the Russians. The suggested settlements are in the main retrogressive. They are an expedient. They are not essential to general security in the Far East or to Russian security and they are not of a character to promote general participation in the economic development in China, including Manchuria. On the contrary they would lay the foundation for a sphere of political and economic interest. Irrespective of what disavowals may be made, they would constitute an infringement upon Chinese sovereignty and as such would be contrary to our policies and interests. Let us face these facts. A bargain is being made on the basis of a bargain made at Yalta. We should live up to our commitments at Yalta. But we should stand firm and counsel China to stand firm against any concessions which go beyond the Yalta commitments. It is recommended that we seek an opportunity toward the end of the Conference to discuss with Stalin his conversations with Soong and, if Stalin is agreeable, that Soong be invited to proceed here by plane (3 days) to participate in the discussions. There are attached factual statements and specific comments with regard to Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang—the areas of China that have been the subject of special discussion by Soong at Moscow. Berlin Conference , July 17, 1945. [Subattachment 2] top secret Memorandum Subject: Manchuria. Soong’s conversations in Moscow in regard to Manchuria dealt with three separate but closely related matters: trunk railways, the commercial port of Dairen, and Port Arthur as a naval base. The railways discussed were those built by Russia as a result of agreements with China in 1896 and 1898. 5 They extend across North Manchuria through Harbin to connect with Vladivostok, and southward from Harbin to Dairen and nearby Port Arthur. The agreements provided that these railways could be purchased by China at the end of 36 years and would be handed over to China without charge at the end of 80 years. Russia obtained policing rights in the “railway zone” with provision for stationing troops therein. As a result of Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese war (1904–5), Japan took over the southern portion of the railway from Changchun (central Manchuria) to Dairen and Port Arthur under the same terms as granted to Russia by China. The northern portion of the system continued under Russian control as the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Japanese portion, together with a connecting line constructed by Japan from Mukden to Antung on the Korean border, was called the South Manchuria Railway. (Inasmuch as Stalin has limited his interest to the main lines, it is improbable that he has in mind the Mukden–Antung branch of the S. M. R., but it would be well to obtain clarification on this point.[)] On May 31, 1924, China and the Soviet Union signed an agreement for the provisional management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. 6 This agreement established the principle of joint operation (Chinese-Russian). A more specific agreement was entered upon by the Soviet Union and the Autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces of China (Manchuria) on September 20, 1924. 7 By this treaty the two parties agreed inter alia: (1) that the railway “is a purely commercial enterprise”; (2) that the Board of Directors should be composed of 5 Chinese and 5 Russians with a Chinese Director General and a Russian Assistant Director General; (3) that there should be a Board of Auditors, 2 Chinese and 3 Russians; (4) that the railway should have a Russian manager and 2 assistant managers, one Chinese and one Russian; (5) that China might redeem the railway (presumably at any time) with Chinese capital at a fair cost to be fixed; (6) “ that the concession period of 80 years shall be reduced to 60 years upon the expiration of which the railway shall pass free of charge to the Chinese Government .” In 1929 the Chinese seized the Chinese Eastern Railway and arrested the Russian director and Russian personnel. After a show of force by the Russians the Chinese entered into a preliminary agreement in December 1929 restoring the status quo ante . 8 In 1935 the Soviet Union sold the railway to “Manehukuo” for 140,000,000 yen. The Japanese Government guaranteed payment. The final payment was made in 1940. The Chinese Government protested the sale of the railway. The Soviet Government is reported to have replied that when China recovered Manchuria the railway would be included and the Soviet Union would not retain a share in it. (We have no documentary evidence of this reply). Russia obtained a 25-year lease from China in 1898 9 to the Liaotung peninsula in which are located the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. Russia was granted full jurisdiction in the leased area. Dairen was made a free port under Russian administration and Port Arthur a Russian naval base. By the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) 10 concluding the Russo-Japanese war Japan fell heir to all Russian rights in the leased territory. In 1915 Japan obtained from China an extension of the period of the lease to 99 years 11 (this was one of the “21 Demands” the validity of which we have never recognized). At Moscow Soong was asked to agree to operation of the railway by a “joint company” with a majority of Russians on the board of directors. He was also asked to agree to the “internationalization” of Dairen as a free port under a joint Chinese-Soviet administration in which the Russians would predominate, and to the lease of a Soviet naval base at Port Arthur. Additionally, Stalin desired to have a Soviet military zone to include not only Port Arthur but also Dairen in an area of which there would be located another or subsidiary naval base or station. Agreements regarding railways and ports were to run for 30 years. The Yalta commitments provide for a “joint company” to operate the railway, for the internationalization of Dairen as a free port, and for a Russian naval base at Port Arthur. The objectives of these commitments seem to have been to provide the Soviet Union with an ice-free port, rail connections therewith through Manchuria, and protection thereof by a naval base at Port Arthur. The first two objectives could be reached satisfactorily by making Dairen a free port under Chinese administration and by according Russians international transit rights on the railways. It is debatable whether Soviet interests or international security require a Soviet naval base at Port Arthur. Three main points of difference regarding the Manchurian settlements now require solution. They concern: (1) the composition of the board of directors of the railway; (2) the composition and character of the administration of Dairen as an international port; and (3) the territorial extent of the lease on Port Arthur as a naval base. On point one, it is recommended that we stand firmly for Soong’s suggestion of a directorship composed of Russians and Chinese in equal number, which is in accord with the Yalta commitments, and against the Soviet suggestion of a seven man board composed of 3 Chinese and 4 Russians. The 1924 treaty provides for equal representation. Differences not susceptible of settlement by the railway board should be referred to the two governments for agreement or by the two governments to a board of arbitration. On point two, it is also felt that Soong’s offer to establish a free port under Chinese administration is in accord with the Yalta commitments. If concession is necessary to satisfy the Russians, an international administration composed of a Chinese, Russian, Englishman and an American might be established. On point three, the area of the Port Arthur lease should be restricted to that essential to the operation and administration of the naval base. Soong is understood to be agreeable to an area up to but not including Dairen. The Yalta commitment should not be construed as warranting a larger area. Under no circumstance should the lease include territory in or surrounding Dairen. Integration of the Port Arthur lease into an international security arrangement would be advantageous, if possible. With regard to the period of the agreements (30 years accepted tentatively by Soong), a reduction would be desirable. According to the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1924 (cited above), the original 80 year period, at the end of which China was to receive the railways without charge, was reduced to 60 years. This means that China should be given the railways sometime between 1960 and 1964, depending on the date on which the various lines were completed. There are no apparent grounds for denying the validity of this treaty provision. If operation of the settlement regarding the railway could be shortened to 15 or 20 years, it is probable that the life of the port settlements might be similarly reduced. The foregoing comments and suggestions are prompted by a grave concern that, with the best of intentions and good faith, the reentry of the Soviet Union into Manchuria as envisaged has in it the seeds of future international friction. The Russians are asking for a special position in Manchuria to the detriment of Chinese sovereignty and political unity, avowals to the contrary notwithstanding. We are committed, with good reason, to the respect of Chinese sovereignty and to the promotion of Chinese political unity. A foreign power established in China, or in portions of China, on a preferential military and economic basis, is inimical to our interests and security. We should adhere to the Yalta commitments regarding Manchuria. We should not go beyond them. In frankness, and for the sake of mutual understanding and respect, we should make it clear to the Russians that we consider the Yalta commitments and the Chinese-Soviet agreements growing therefrom as expedients , having no basis in principle or permanency, to be liquidated as soon as possible in the interests of a sovereign and united China and of Soviet-American cooperation for international peace. Berlin Conference , July 19, 1945. 12 [Subattachment 3] top secret Memorandum Subject: Outer Mongolia. During the Manchu dynasty (1644–1911) Mongolia was under Chinese (Manchu) Government control. Early in this century that portion of Mongolia lying farthest from China and least subject to Chinese control came to be known as Outer Mongolia, and the area adjacent to China was spoken of as Inner Mongolia. In 1911 the Mongolians at Urga (Ulan Bator) in Outer Mongolia set up an autonomous regime and in 1912 obtained a pledge of support from Russia. In 1915, China, Russia, and Outer Mongolia signed a tri-partite agreement, 13 confirming an earlier Russo-Chinese agreement (1913), 14 whereby China recognized Outer Mongolian autonomy and Russia recognized Chinese sovereignty over the area. During the period of the Russian revolution, China endeavored to reassert control over Outer Mongolia but in 1921 the Chinese were again ejected from the area and the Soviet Union entered into an agreement establishing relations with the Mongolian Peoples’ Government. 15 In 1924 the Soviet Union signed a treaty with China, reiterating its recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia. 16 In 1936 the Soviet Union signed a protocol of Mutual Assistance with the Mongolian Peoples’ Republic. 17 China protested and received assurances that the protocol was not viewed by the Soviet Union as a violation of Chinese sovereignty. In 1941 the Soviet and Japanese Governments issued a declaration whereby the Soviet Union pledged itself “to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo” and Japan made an identical pledge with respect to the Mongolian Peoples’ Republic. 18 At Moscow Soong was informed that the Soviet Union desired Chinese recognition of Outer Mongolian independence after the war and Soong is understood to have assented. There are virtually no Chinese in Outer Mongolia. Any attempt by China to assert control over the area would be strongly resisted by the Mongolians irrespective of Russian support. The Mongolian Government, although under Russian influence, is of itself a “going concern” which has the support of the Mongolian people and governs in their interest. The United States Government considers Outer Mongolia an integral part of China. We have never accorded recognition to the Soviet Union’s special relations with the area. However, the area has no direct significance to us, commercial or otherwise. Therefore, should the Chinese Government decide to grant independence to Outer Mongolia, we should interpose no objection. Although a preponderance of Soviet influence in the area is to be expected for some time to come, it would be well to obtain an agreement on the part of the Soviet Union to respect the independence of Outer Mongolia and to place no obstacle in the way of other nations establishing political and commercial relations with the area. In order to avoid future border difficulties, a clear delineation of the presently ill-defined boundary between Outer Mongolia and China (Manchuria, Inner Mongolia now divided into several provinces, and Sinkiang, in all of which there are sizeable Mongolian minorities) should accompany a recognition of Outer Mongolian independence. Berlin Conference , July 17, 1945. [Subattachment 4] top secret Memorandum Subject: Sinkiang. Sinkiang is China’s northwestern-most province, bounded on the north by Outer Mongolia and on the west by Soviet central Asia. Chinese comprise less than ten per cent of the estimated population of 3,700,000. The area is peopled by Uighurs (largest group), Kazaks, Mongolians, Tungans, etc. The majority of the people are Mohammedans of central Asian origin who speak a Turki dialect. In 1871 Russia occupied the westernmost area of Sinkiang (Kuldja or Ili) during a period of civil war in China but withdrew in 1881. In 1931 the Soviet Union entered into an agreement with the provincial government of Sinkiang which, although largely commercial in character, gave the Russians a position of considerable political influence with the local authorities. In 1942, the Russians closed most of their commercial establishments in the province and withdrew Soviet troops which had been invited into the province by the Chinese Governor. A strengthening of Sinkiang’s political ties with the Chinese Nationalist Government resulted. In early 1944 fighting between Chinese and Mongolian troops occurred along the ill-defined Sinkiang–Outer Mongolian border. The causes remain obscure. The Chinese accused the Russians of aiding the Mongolians. The Soviet Union without admitting the Chinese charge, cited its Mutual Assistance Pact of 1936 19 with Outer Mongolia as a warning to China. The border disturbances subsided soon thereafter. Later in 1944, Sinkiang natives revolted against the Chinese rule in western Sinkiang and soon established control of the Kuldja or Ili area where they have maintained themselves to the present. Minor conflicts are still occurring in the area. Chinese maladministration is cited as the cause of the insurrection but local Chinese authorities are openly suspicious that assistance is coming to the native Kazaks from the adjoining Soviet Republic of Kazakistan. There are probably elements of truth in both accusations. The commerce of Sinkiang has for over a generation been almost entirely with Soviet central Asia. There is no commercial outlet toward China comparable to the nearby Turk-Sib railway in central Asia and none is in prospect. Commercial ties with the Soviets are natural and will continue. Kinship of the natives to the peoples of bordering Soviet republics will exercise a strong influence. Soviet non-interference in the internal affairs of the province, as promised Soong at Moscow, would be an important negative factor favoring Chinese control but not the determining factor. Whether China will be able to continue to exercise a tenuous sovereignty over Sinkiang, or whether the area will gradually go the way of Outer Mongolia depends almost wholly on the intelligence with which China organizes an administration for and in cooperation with the native population. Berlin Conference , July 17, 1945. [Attachment 2 20 ] top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 18, 1945. Yalta Agreement Affecting China The recent conferences in Moscow between Dr. T. V. Soong and Generalissimo Stalin have resulted in agreement on the following points: I. China raises no objection and accepts the return to Russia of the southern part of the Sakhalin Island and the accession of the Kurile Islands. II. Chiang Kai Shek agrees that “the status quo for Outer Mongolia shall be preserved” and, in addition, that the Chinese National Government will, after the war is terminated with Japan, recognize the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic, assuming that a plebiscite will be held which re-affirms the desire of the people of Outer Mongolia for independence. (It should be noted that this latter goes beyond the strict interpretation of the Yalta agreement. On the other band, it is not considered that the interests of the United States are adversely affected by this concession to the demands of the Soviet Government). III. The Soviet Government has offered to the Chinese National Government a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Post-war Cooperation as agreed to at Yalta. The terms of this agreement are satisfactory to the Chinese and in general follow similar treaties concluded by the Soviet Government with European countries. In this connection, Stalin has indicated the Soviet Government’s desire for a strong and unified China and has agreed to support Chiang Kai Shek’s government in the unification of China under his government and to withhold moral and material support from the Chinese Communist Party and the insurgents in Sinkiang. In this connection, the Soviet Government also agreed to conclude a civil affairs agreement (along the lines of the Czech agreement 21 ) which provides for political representatives of the Chinese National Government accompanying the Red Army, when it enters Chinese territory, in order to organize Chinese administration liberated by the Red Army therein. Stalin agreed that if the Chinese Government so requests, the Soviet Government will withdraw Soviet troops from Chinese territory within three months after the termination of hostilities against Japan. Agreement was not fully reached between Soong and Stalin on the question of the ports and railroads referred to in the Yalta agreement . 1. Railroads: It has been agreed that the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad shall be equally owned by a joint Soviet-Chinese company. Neither government shall have the right to transfer its share of ownership to a third party. Joint ownership shall be for a period of thirty years at the termination of which all interests shall revert to the Chinese Government. The arrangements relate only to the main lines from Dairen to Harbin and from Harbin to Manchuli and Pogranichnaya. The Soviet Government has agreed that it should not have the privilege of stationing troops in Manchuria or to have Soviet guards on the railroads or to move troops through Manchuria except in time of war or in the event of a threat of war. The Soviet Government has demanded that there be seven directors of the railroad companies; four Russian and three Chinese, and that the managers of each of the railroads be Russian and the assistant managers Chinese. On the other hand, Dr. Soong has proposed that there should be eight directors, four Chinese and four Russian; that the chairman of the board (a titular position without administrative authority) as a courtesy should be Chinese; the manager of the Chinese Eastern to be Russian and the assistant manager Chinese; the manager of the South Manchurian Railroad Chinese and the assistant manager Russian. Dr. Soong is prepared to agree that the interests of the Soviet Government in its transit traffic shall be fully provided for. 2. Ports: ( a ) Port Arthur: Agreement has been reached regarding the use of Port Arthur by the Soviet Government as a naval base for a period of thirty years; the port and the adjacent area to be under Soviet military control. As a matter of form, the Chinese will also have the right to use the port. ( b ) Dairen: The Soviet Government has demanded that the military zone under Soviet control shall extend to and include not only the area of Port Arthur but also the entire area of the original Russian lease of the Kwangtung Peninsula which includes Dairen; that one of the bays of Dairen shall be set aside as an additional naval base for Soviet use; that the management of the port be under a mixed Russian-Chinese commission, that the manager be Russian, and that although the Chinese are permitted to deal with civilian matters, the civil government be under the orders of the Soviet military authorities, including the secret police. On the other hand, Dr. Soong for the Chinese Government has offered the establishment of Dairen as a free port under Chinese administration, giving the Soviet Government a commercial lease on certain docks and storage yards within the port for exclusive Soviet use. The military zone under Soviet control should not include the port of Dairen or the connecting railway and Dairen should not be used as a Soviet naval base. Dr. Soong has requested that I lay before the President the points of difference regarding the arrangements for the port of Dairen and the railroads. He further requests that the President inform Chiang Kai Shek of his interpretation of the Yalta agreement in these respects. He hopes that the President can during the present conference reach an agreement with Generalissimo Stalin along the lines of his (Soong’s) proposals. If this is done, Soong is prepared to return to Moscow immediately after this conference in order to conclude the agreements covering all questions discussed. He would prefer, however, to have the opportunity to discuss these matters personally with the President and Generalissimo Stalin in Berlin during the last days of the conference. discussion and recommendations I believe that Dr. Soong’s final proposals as described above adequately fulfill the Yalta agreement. In the discussion leading up to the Yalta agreement, Stalin first asked the President’s support for a lease of the railroads and the ports to the Soviet Government. President Roosevelt resisted this demand and proposed that the operation of the railroads and ports be placed under an international trusteeship. He finally agreed, however, to Stalin’s counter proposal that the operation of the railroads should be by a “joint Soviet-Chinese Company.” 22 It should be pointed out that although the Yalta agreement regarding the railroads states that “the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded” it mentions that “the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad which provide an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated.” I feel sure that President Roosevelt had in mind that the “preeminent interests” of the Soviet Government related to transit traffic and not to any general Soviet interests in Manchuria. There appears, therefore, no reason why Russia should have complete domination of the railroads in which the interests of the Chinese and other nations are also involved. As to the disagreement over the port of Dairen, it is inconceivable that there can be any real free port in a Soviet controlled military zone. We have ample experience that Soviet military security considerations would make free commercial operations impossible under such controls. The language of the Yalta agreement states that “the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded …” 23 Soviet military control of the port would run completely counter to the whole spirit of what President Roosevelt had in mind. I believe President Roosevelt looked upon the lease of Port Arthur for a naval base as an arrangement similar to privileges which the United States has negotiated with other countries for the mutual security of two friendly nations. It should be noted that when Stalin requested a lease for the port of Dairen President Roosevelt refused to agree to it, 24 indicating that it was against American Chinese policy. There is no reason, from the discussions leading up to the Yalta agreement, to presume that the safeguarding of the “preeminent interests of the Soviet Union” should go beyond Soviet interests in the free transit of exports and imports to and from the Soviet Union. Dr. Soong’s offer of a commercial lease to the Soviet Government of an area of the port for its exclusive use would appear adequately to safeguard this interest. Stalin, in his talks with President Roosevelt, at no time asked for the right to use Dairen as a naval base. Stalin was fully familiar with President Roosevelt’s attitude toward foreign concessions in China and I am quite satisfied that President Roosevelt never intended or never would have agreed to special privileges to the Soviet Union which would adversely affect our long standing policy towards China. President Roosevelt did, however, feel that the Soviet Union was entitled to free access to a warm water port for its exports and imports. If there is to be a compromise as to the management of the port, it might be proposed that the American Government participate therein with the Soviet and Chinese Governments. This would appear to come within the meaning of “internationalization.” Dr. Soong told me that he would welcome such participation as a compromise if the United States Government wished to propose it. Our experience with the control which the Soviet Government exercises over all matters under its direction, convinces me that there would be interference with the development of commerce and trade of the United States and other nations in Manchuria_if_the port of Dairen and the railroads are under Soviet domination. An agreement at this time to grant to the Soviet Government such control would violate the established policy and principles which the United States has held for a long period of time. Stalin has agreed on a number of occasions to support America’s open door policy for China and to respect the sovereignty of China in Manchuria. I, therefore, recommend that we stand firm on the interpretation of the Yalta agreement as indicated above. [W. A. Harriman ] 1 Document No. 732 . 2 The heading of this memorandum indicates that it was from Dooman and Vincent jointly, but the ribbon copy bears only Vincent’s initials. 3 Drafted by Vincent. 4 Text in Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929 , p. 133. 5 For the texts of the agreements referred to, see John V. A. MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894–1919 (New York, 1921), vol. i , pp. 81, 119. 6 Text in Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929 , p. 133. 7 Text printed ibid ., p. 148. 8 Text in John W. Wheeler-Bennett, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1929 (London, 1930), p. 280. 9 Text in MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements , vol. i , p. 119. 10 Signed September 5, 1905. Text in Foreign Relations , 1905. p. 824 . 11 Text in MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements , vol. ii , p. 1220. 12 So dated, although referred to in the memorandum above of July 17. 13 Text in MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements , vol. ii , p. 1243. 14 Text printed ibid ., p. 1066. 15 Text in Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929 , p. 53. 16 Text printed ibid ., p. 133. 17 Text in Heald and Wheeler-Bennett, eds., Documents on International Affairs, 1936 , p. 472. 18 Text in S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1940–June 1941 (Boston, 1941), p. 292, and in British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxliv , p. 840. 19 Text in Heald and Wheeler-Bennett, eds., Documents on International Affairs, 1936 , p. 472. 20 Not attached. Printed from an unsigned ribbon copy (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1845) which has been identified as the attachment in question by comparison with a copy supplied by Harriman. 21 Signed at London, May 8, 1944. Text in Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1948–June 1944 (Boston, 1945), p. 644. 22 See Foreign Relations . The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 768 – 770 , 894 – 897 . 23 Ellipsis in the original. 24 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 768 – 769 , 894 – 896 . No. 1216 The President to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1216 The President to the Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 23 July 1945. Number 310, personal and top secret, from the President for Ambassador Hurley. Please deliver the following message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek: “I refer to your message of 19 [ 20 ] July 2 quoting your telegram to Generalissimo Stalin. I asked that you carry out the Yalta agreement but I had not asked that you make any concession in excess of that agreement. If you and Generalissimo Stalin differ as to the correct interpretation of the Yalta agreement, I hope you will arrange for Soong to return to Moscow and continue your efforts to reach complete understanding. Truman.” Truman 1 Sent to the Commander, Naval Group, China, via Navy channels. 2 Document No. 1214 . No. 1217 The Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Vincent) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 761.93/7–2345 No. 1217 The Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 top secret Memorandum Subject: Suggested Protocol Pertaining to the Chinese-Soviet Agreements under Negotiation. There is attached the draft of a suggested understanding between our Government and the Soviet Government in regard to the Chinese-Soviet agreements concerning Manchuria now under negotiation. The suggested understanding has been phrased to have general application but its purpose is to reserve our historic American position in the face of potential encroachment. A reservation of the American position would have considerable political value in the likely event that the agreements under negotiation, if consummated, are made the occasion for public and press criticism of the administration. Our commitments at Yalta regarding Manchuria and our undertaking to obtain Chinese acceptance of those commitments place us squarely in a position of responsibility which we cannot transfer to the Chinese on the theory that the negotiations are bilateral and that the Chinese should get as good terms as they can from the Russians. The Chinese are in no position to bargain. Our interpretation of the Yalta commitments is for them controlling. It might be argued that, should the Chinese supported by us take a firm stand against concessions beyond the Yalta commitments, and as a result agreements not be consummated, in the final settlements regarding Manchuria we would be in as strong a position to safeguard American interests as we are now—conceivably, with the backing of public opinion, in a stronger position than we are now. It might also be argued that the expedient of a resumption of a special Russian position in Manchuria having been conceded at Yalta, the present differences between the Russians and the Chinese in regard to the agreements are of minor importance. But the situation is not likely to be so regarded by the American public, a large section of which is profoundly interested in China and in safeguarding the American position in China. They will be critical of the Yalta commitments; they will be highly critical of any concessions beyond the Yalta commitments; and they will expect reservations safeguarding American interests in the face of those commitments. It is with this thought in mind that the attached protocol has been prepared. Berlin Conference , July 23, 1945. [Attachment] Draft Protocol The Governments of the Republic of China and of the U. S. S. R. are entering upon agreements respecting the operation of specified railways in Manchuria and the administration of an international free port at Dairen. These agreements under negotiation have their origin in recognition of the Soviet Union’s interest in the maintenance of transit rail traffic between Siberia across Manchuria to Vladivostok and to the ice-free port of Dairen as a means of facilitating the commerce of Siberia with the outside world. Their sole objective is to give to the commerce of the Soviet Union unimpeded access to the sea through Manchuria on a basis free from treatment which would be either discriminatory or preferential. Full recognition is given by the Soviet Union to the sovereignty of the Government of China in Manchuria. Full recognition is accorded by the two Governments negotiating the agreements to the principle of equality of opportunity which underlies the historic “open door” policy. Thus, the specified railways and the free port of Dairen shall be administered and operated in a manner to accord complete equality of opportunity to the nationals and commerce of all nations maintaining relations with China. There shall be equality of treatment in all matters such as rates, allocation of space, handling and dispatch of goods on the railways, and to such regulations, charges, etc., as may be applicable to ships calling at Dairen and to the handling of incoming and outgoing freight at the port. Furthermore, implementation of the agreements for operation of the railways and administration of the free port of Dairen shall be in accord with the rights acquired by nationals of nations having commercial treaty relations with China in respect to residence, the pursuit of commercial, investment and cultural enterprises, and other matters covered by treaty. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. No. 1218 The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 761.93/7–2845 No. 1218 The Ambassador to the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 28, 1945. Memorandum for the Secretary Subject: China In connection with Dr. Soong’s discussions with Stalin it seems clear that Soong has carried the negotiations as far as the Chinese Government is able to do so. It comes now to a question of the interpretation of the Yalta Agreement in connection with the points remaining at difference. China is not in a strong position to resist unaided the present exaggerated Soviet demands. Since the United States is involved by the Yalta Agreement in the contemplated settlement between China and the Soviet Union, I believe it is in our interest that the President give his interpretation of the Yalta Agreement specifically in connection with the differences over the arrangements for the port of Dairen and the operation of the railroads. I am fearful that unless this is done Soong will be forced to make concessions which are at variance with our fundamental policies towards China and adverse to our national interests. The United States Government has taken the initiative in inducing the Chinese Government to discuss with the Soviet Government the subject of the Manchurian railroads and ports. If the resulting arrangements between the Chinese and Soviet Governments would have the effect of giving the Soviet Government special advantages over American and other foreign commerce with Manchuria or even shutting out foreign trade, the United States Government could not escape the responsibility of not having the “open door” policy in that area. The President’s views can be put before Stalin here or else I can be instructed to inform Stalin at some stage of the further conversations which will be held when Soong returns to Moscow. Although it may not be desirable for us at this time to show any concern over the question of Russia’s entry into the war against Japan, it would seem that there are substantial advantages in the reestablishment of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and China, particularly the agreement that the Soviet Government will support the Chinese National Government as the unifying force in China. If agreement is reached between the Chinese Government and the Soviet Government I believe that it is important for us to obtain from the Soviet Government reaffirmation in writing of the verbal assurances of Stalin to support our “open door” policy and specifically in its application to Manchuria. In the event the Soviet Government uses the privileges granted to it in Manchuria against our interests, such an agreement would be of value in giving us the opportunity to deal with the Soviet Government directly. I am attaching a draft 1 of a possible memorandum to be agreed to between the Soviet and United States Governments with this objective in view. Such an agreement could be negotiated with Stalin in Moscow at the time of the forthcoming discussions with Soong. W. A. H[ arriman ] 1 The attached draft is identical with the attachment to document No. 1217 . No. 1219 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) 761.93/7–2845: Telegram No. 1219 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 28, 1945. Please deliver as soon as possible the following message to Doctor Soong: I understand you were to communicate with Marshal Stalin by 30th or 31st July. I think it important that before that date you communicate with him here through Moscow requesting opportunity to return to Moscow and continue discussions in hope of reaching agreement. No. 1220 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State 761.93/7–2945: Telegram No. 1220 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the Secretary of State top secret Chungking , 29 July 1945. Cfb 2087. Reference to your message of 28 July for Doctor T. V. Soong 1 the following is Soong’s reply to you: “When I left Moscow I had distinct understanding with M. Molotov that he will keep me informed of Marshal Stalin’s movements so that I could reach Moscow soon after he returns.” Hurley 1 Document No. 1219 . No. 1221 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State 761.93/7–2945: Telegram No. 1221 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the Secretary of State top secret eyes only [ Chungking ,] 29 July 1945. 282. This is a sidelight for your information. At 1335 hours 1 Chungking time July 29 I sent you both Army and Navy a reply 2 from Soong to your message of July 28. 3 He states that he has an understanding with Molotov to return to Moscow to reach there soon after Stalin’s return. This was not a message direct to Stalin as you requested. It was the best we could get. We hope it fulfills the purpose. Soong will return to Moscow to resume negotiations. After his return from Moscow Soong told me that he doubted the advisability of returning to Moscow himself. At that time he suggested the advisability of having Dr. Wang Shih Chieh appointed Foreign Minister and sending him to Moscow. I told Soong frankly that I thought his plan not feasible and that he should personally conclude the negotiations. This morning in our conference with Soong and Chiang Kai Shek, Soong suggested in my presence the advisability of making Dr. Wang Minister of Foreign Relations and sending him to Moscow to conclude negotiations with Stalin. I opposed this on the grounds that Soong as Prime Minister is the only man in China other than the Generalissimo with proper hand to negotiate with Stalin. If Soong declines to go sending a new Foreign Minister might have a damaging or perhaps a destructive effect on the negotiations. It was finally agreed that Soong would return to Moscow but it was suggested that Dr. Wang be appointed Foreign Minister and accompany him. This would be satisfactory. Soong is distressed about his political future. He fears the proposed agreement with the Soviet will be damaging to him personally. The first time I saw Soong after his return from Moscow he threw up his hands and said, “I am a broken man. I am personally ill from overstrain and overwork.” Later he said, “this proposed agreement with Soviet will be destructive politically to the man responsible for it.” There is every indication that the Generalissimo is anxious for a just friendly and early agreement with Soviet. The Soviet Ambassador here 4 states Soong agreed in Moscow that China will join Soviet in recognizing independence of Peoples Republic of Outer Mongolia. As I heretofore advised you Chiang Kai Shek directed (possible garble) 5 Soong to take this action. At the same time he directed Soong to obtain from Soviet modification of terms on railroads and ports in return for recognition of independence of Outer Mongolia. Perhaps it is this point that is distressing Soong. It appears that Soong has not yet obtained any modification in regard to railroads and ports. Hurley 1 i. e., 1:35 p.m. 2 Document No. 1220 . 3 Document No. 1219 . 4 Appolon Alexandrovich Petrov. 5 This parenthetical phrase is in the source text. No. 1222 The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 761.93/7–3145 No. 1222 The Ambassador to the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State top secret Berlin Conference , July 31, 1945. Memorandum to the Secretary of State Subject: Yalta Agreement Affecting China When Dr. Soong arrives in Moscow Stalin will expect Soong to have instructions from Chiang Kai Shek to sign promptly an agreemerit along the lines of Stalin’s proposals presented early in July. Unless the Chinese give in or unless the United States takes a firm position on the interpretation of the Yalta agreement the negotiations will break down and Chinese-Soviet relations will be severely strained. It would be contrary to the interests of the United States for Soong to go beyond his counter proposals previously submitted and since Soong cannot remain in Moscow after disagreement has arisen, I recommend that I be instructed to inform Stalin at that time: 1. that at Yalta President Roosevelt declined to agree to Stalin’s original proposal for a Soviet lease of the port of Dairen and insisted upon its internationalization as a commercial free port (as set forth in my memorandum dated July 18 1 ); 2. that we cannot agree to the inclusion of the port in the Soviet military zone or its use as a Soviet naval base, and 3. that if Stalin does not agree to Soong’s proposal for a free port under Chinese administration with a commercial lease of a certain section of the port for Soviet transit traffic we propose the creation of an international commission consisting of representatives of the Chinese, Soviet, United States and possibly British Governments to supervise the operation of Dairen as a free port. The differences regarding the operation of the railroads are not as fundamental. I am hopeful that Soong and Stalin will be able to compose the points at issue. In connection with these proposed arrangements between the Soviet and Chinese governments 2 1 recommend that I be instructed to propose to Stalin a protocol, along the lines of the draft 3 attached to my memorandum of July 28, 4 reaffirming in writing Stalin’s verbal assurances to observe the “open door” policy in Manchuria. 5 W A H[ arriman ] 1 Attachment 2 to document No. 1215 . 2 For translations of the Sino-Soviet treaty concluded on August 14, 1945, and of related notes and agreements, see Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiv , p. 201; United States Relations With China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949; Department of State publication No. 3573), p. 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] . 3 See the attachment to document No. 1217 . 4 Document No. 1218 . 5 Byrnes took no action on this recommendation during the Berlin Conference. Peace feelers through the Soviet Union Peace feelers through the Soviet Union [[Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1223] The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) [Tokyo,] July 17, 1945—4:20 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1224] The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) [Tokyo,] July 17, 1945—5 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1225] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 18, 1945—11:28 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1226] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 19, 1945—2:30 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1227] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 19, 1945—4:42 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1228] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 20, 1945—6:30 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1229] The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) [Tokyo,] July 21, 1945—9:30 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1230] The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) [Tokyo,] July 21, 1945—9:30 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1231] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 21, 1945—5 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1232] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 24, 1945—5:56 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1233] The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) [Tokyo,] July 25, 1945—7 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1234] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 25, 1945—11:23 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1235] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 25, 1945—11:53 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] Editor’s Note —See volume I, page 873 , for a note concerning ( a ) the extent to which the contents of the papers in this section were known to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg and ( b ) the translations here printed. No. 1223 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1223 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) [Translation] secret urgent [ Tokyo ,] July 17, 1945—4:20 p.m. 910. The Domei news dispatches from your area on the 14th reported on your meetings with Lozovsky and Molotov respectively on the 10th and the 11th. With respect to the present important negotiations which are taking place, those concerned include only the members comprising the Supreme War Council: The Prime Minister, 1 this minister, the Minister of the Navy, 2 the Minister of the Army, 3 and the two Chiefs of Staff. 4 In handling this matter, if this should ever leak out, the results would be most dire, I fear. Therefore, on your side also this matter is limited to you, Mr. Ambassador, and I would like to ask you to observe particularly strict security measures in dispatching and receiving telegrams and the like so that we may have nothing to regret. 1 Admiral Baron Suzuki Kantaro. 2 Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa. 3 General Anami Korehita. 4 General Umezu Yoshijiro and Admiral Toyoda Soemu. No. 1224 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1224 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) [Translation] secret urgent [ Tokyo ,] July 17, 1945—5 p.m. 913. Re your telegram No. 1392. 1 1. In the present situation, strengthening friendly relations with the Soviet Union and, moreover, effectively utilizing the Soviets to terminate the war is difficult. This was clear from the outset but in view of the demands of the times it is essential to accomplish this boldly. Furthermore, for our side it is even difficult merely to prevent the Soviets from taking part in hostilities against Japan, and we must realize that to have them act to our advantage is a prospect hard to achieve. This is as I indicated in my telegram No. 890, 2 and the negotiations for strengthening friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union constitute the basis on which to invite sincere Soviet mediation for terminating the war. Moreover, it is also considered essential in order to strengthen our stand in negotiations against the United States and Great Britain. Besides, we should not limit ourselves to sounding out the attitude of the Soviets concerning the termination of the war but should also endeavor to induce them to mediate in good faith. 2. Not only our High Command but also our Government firmly believes that even now our war potential is still sufficient to deal the enemy a severe blow, but against an enemy who can make repeated attacks we cannot always be completely free from anxiety. In such times, we continue to maintain our war strength; if only the United States and Great Britain would recognize Japan’s honor and existence we would terminate the war and would like to save mankind from the ravages of war, but if the enemy insists on unconditional surrender to the very end, then our country and His Majesty would unanimously resolve to fight a war of resistance to the bitter end. Therefore, inviting the Soviet Union to mediate fairly does not include unconditional surrender; please understand this point in particular. 3. The Soviet reply concerning the dispatch of the special envoy should be obtained as soon as possible. It is extremely important to get Soviet approval quickly and I would like you to exert extreme efforts towards this end through Lozovsky. 1 Document No. 588, printed in vol. i . 2 Document No. 580, printed in vol. i . No. 1225 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1225 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) [Translation] very secret very urgent Moscow , July 18, 1945—11:28 p.m. 1416. Re your telegram No. 913–2. 1 The so-called unconditional surrender or peace obtained by some-thing close to unconditional surrender referred to in my telegram No. 1392 2 and others which I sent from time to time, omits the problem of protecting the fundamental character of our nation. It goes without saying that even in conducting negotiations with the Soviets on the subject of your telegram, the absolute desire on the part of 70 million citizens as regards our form of government should be forcefully stressed. Therefore I have already added a statement in the latter portion of my telegram No. 1143, 3 believing that there should be no fear of a misunderstanding arising therefrom on this matter; I mention this only in order to make sure. If the matter of the preservation of our form of government were already taken care of, whether you call it unconditional surrender or whether you call it something close to this condition, in the final analysis it is a matter of degree. As for us I think it should not be made an absolute condition. Concerning the early portion of the telegram, I would like to express my humble opinion at another time after giving the matter full consideration. 1 i. e., paragraph 2 of document No. 1224 . 2 Document No. 588, printed in vol. i . 3 Not printed herein. See Shusen shiroku (Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1952), p. 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] . No. 1226 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1226 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) [Translation] very secret urgent Moscow , July 19, 1945—2:30 p.m. 1417. Re my telegram No. 1385. 1 On the evening of the 18th I received a confidential note from Lozovsky which reads as follows: “Moscow, July 18, 1945 “His Excellency Naotake Sato, Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the Soviet Union “Excellency: “I have the honor to confirm that I am in receipt of your note dated July 13, and the message from His Majesty the Emperor of Japan. 2 “By order of the Government of the USSR, I have the honor to call your attention to the fact that the Imperial views stated in the message of the Emperor of Japan are general in form and contain no concrete proposal. The mission of Prince Konoye, special envoy, is also not clear to the Government of the USSR. “The Government of the USSR, accordingly, is unable to give any definite reply either as to the message of the Emperor of Japan or to the dispatch of Prince Konoye as special envoy mentioned in your note of July 13. “I avail myself of this opportunity to express to you my highest esteem. S. A. Lozovsky”[.] 1 Document No. 586, printed in vol. i . 2 See vol. i , documents Nos. 582 and 586 . No. 1227 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1227 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) [Translation] very secret urgent Moscow , July 19, 1945—4:42 p.m. 1418. Re my telegram No. 1417. 1 Concerning the matter of the dispatch of the special envoy, the Soviet Government has declined to accept such an envoy for the time being on the grounds that the mission is not specific. The above is indeed regrettable but just as I said in my humble opinion in my telegrams Nos. 1386 and 1392, 2 and as again demonstrated this time, there is no way other than to present a concrete proposal when dealing with this government. Although your opinion expressed in your telegram No. 913–2 [ 913–1 ] 3 has its point from the Japanese side, it does not at all conform to the atmosphere here. That you cannot achieve your objective of having them act in accordance with your hopes can almost be inferred from their attitude in rejecting the special envoy at this time. 1 Document No. 1226 . 2 Documents Nos. 587 and 588, printed in vol. i . 3 This correction was reported in Sato’s telegram No. 1429 of July 20. The reference is to paragraph 1 of document No. 1224 . No. 1228 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1228 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) [Translation] very secret urgent Moscow , July 20, 1945—6:30 p.m. 1427. Re your telegram No. 913. 1 After considering this matter most carefully, I wish to express my unreserved opinion in the following manner: 1. Since July 14 an American task force has been operating in the waters off the northern section of Honshu Island; they have come close to the shore in the areas of Kamaishi, Muroran, and Mito and have shelled them in a naval bombardment; we have heard that their carrier-based planes have been menacing traffic between the mainland and Hokkaido and have sunk a great number of ships. Our defensive measures, according to enemy broadcasts, have been next to nothing, even with our Navy and Air Force. This is most regrettable, but it may also be taken as the truth in the matter of how weak our war potential has become. If this trend continues, with every passing day the enemy fleet should be more able to move at will, as though it were unopposed. Actually, the names of the ships comprising the task force and even the name of the task force commander have already been ostentatiously broadcast, hurling an open challenge to the Japanese Navy. 2. On the other hand, the enemy air forces based in areas such as the Marianas, Okinawa and Iwo, attack various parts of Japan almost continuously. Large metropolitan areas have already been destroyed and the bombings have even reached out to the small and intermediate-sized cities, quite aside from arms-production facilities and oil-storage dumps. The successive destruction and conflagration of our cities continue. Moreover, just as our anti-aircraft defenses have manifestly decreased in their effectiveness in comparison with the days when the B–29’s first started their attacks, so have we also had the command of the skies wrested from our grasp. We cannot assess this any other way. 3. Once the command of the skies has been taken from us by the enemy, our fighting strength will decline at an accelerated rate. This is quite clear if you look at Germany’s example. Furthermore, once you have relinquished the mastery of the skies to the enemy it is well nigh impossible to regain it without outside assistance. For the Empire there is no hope other than that of mass production of aircraft in Manchuria. This development is quite recent and it is not only difficult to be sure just how much to expect from Manchurian production but also Manchuria itself is about to become a victim of mass bombing from nearby Okinawa. 4. Although I cannot know with certainty whether there is going to be an enemy landing on the mainland, I do not have sufficient faith to declare such a thing impossible, and I believe that we should be prepared for a landing, considering the thorough manner of the landing tactics in the enemy’s Leyte operations, although there may be some differences because of geographic conditions. Furthermore, assuming that a date for the landings has been set, it is equally clear that this would be after our fighting strength has been completely destroyed. In order to knock out our fighting strength, the enemy will pay special attention to depriving the people of their means of livelihood, besides directly destroying military installations and industrial plants and bombing the cities. The enemy must know about our food shortage. They must also have a thorough knowledge of how great an influence the present autumn harvest will have on our fighting strength; and so plans on their part to destroy our crops should not be considered impossible with the coming of harvest time. For instance, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the enemy will ascertain the period when the paddies are dry and the rice-plants are ripe throughout the nation and devise methods of burning these up at one stroke. As far as they are concerned, it is a weakness of ours which they should only naturally exploit. If we lose our autumn harvest, our situation will be absolutely critical and we will be in no position to continue the war. Our Empire, which has already lost command of the skies, can do nothing to combat the above circumstances; we are at the mercy of the enemy and committed to whatever the enemy should will. 5. As I have already urged in my telegram No. 1143, 2 continuing the war after our fighting strength has been destroyed should be considered impossible. It goes without saying that the Imperial Army and the populace as a whole will not surrender to the enemy as long as there is no Imperial command to do so; they will literally not throw away their spears until the last man. But even if the officers and men and the entire citizenry, who already have been deprived of their fighting ability by the absolute superiority of the enemy’s bombing and gunfire, were to fight to the death, the state would not be saved. Do you think that the Emperor’s safety can be secured by the sacrifice of seventy million citizens? With the above thought in mind, I have come to the conclusion that the individual’s position, the honor of the military, and the pride of the people cannot take the place of the state, and that there is no other way for us than to hurry and make up our minds to advocate peace. 6. I had been thinking that the peace proposal through the special envoy mentioned in your telegram No. 893, 3 which was to be put forward in Moscow, was most right and proper. The dispatch of the special envoy, however, unfortunately met with disapproval from the Soviet side (my telegram No. 1417 4 ), making it necessary to contrive some other way. Once peace has been decided upon, although it may be difficult to avoid some harsh conditions which the Japanese citizens must endure as a result, we should be prepared for such an eventuality and have our military representatives and theirs conclude an agreement to terminate hostilities within the shortest possible time; we should put a stop to further sacrifices. One of the conditions for peace that will require reservation and emphasis on our part is the matter of protecting our national polity. This will have to be for us an absolute requirement, and the fact that it will require us to make a strong impression on our opponents to this effect has already been stated in my telegram No. 1416. 5 Regarding this matter of protecting the national polity, one way is to consider the matter one of a domestic nature and therefore excluded from the terms of a peace treaty. In this case, however, even though it may be but a formality, it will be necessary to hold something like a constitutional convention to hear the people’s voice for the sake of appearances. And it cannot be expected that there will be no open opposition to the maintenance of the national polity from some extreme leftists at such a convention. Again, convening a constitutional convention may itself run counter to our Constitution; and if we are to cope with emergency circumstances, it will be necessary to find appropriate solutions regarding such criticisms of unconstitutionality. On the other hand, we may be able to solve the problem of our fundamental form of government with this formality and it may even be relatively easy to get the enemy’s agreement, but I find this difficult to judge. In fact, if we resolve to have the Imperial Household above us under the general will of the people, our national polity might, indeed, carry a great deal of weight throughout the world. 7. What I mean to say as a peace proposal is to approve most of the enemy’s conditions with the exception of the protection of the fundamental character of our form of government. As long as the fundamental character of our government is preserved, it would mean that our country’s honor and existence will be guaranteed in the minimum degree, and I trust this will not run counter to the purport of your telegram No. 913–2 6 (please refer to my telegram No. 1416). 8. Our country is literally standing at the crossroads of destiny. If we were to continue the war under the present circumstances the citizens would die with the satisfaction of having truly served their country loyally and patriotically, but the country itself would be on the verge of ruin. Although it is possible to remain loyal to the great and just aims of the Greater East Asia War to the very end, it is meaningless to insist on them to the extent of destroying the state. We should protect the survival of our country even by enduring every kind of sacrifice. Since the Manchurian incident Japan has pursued a policy of authoritarian rule. In the Greater East Asia War she finally plunged into a war beyond her means. As a result, we are confronted with the danger of having even our mainland trampled upon. Since there is no longer any real chance of success, I believe that it is the duty of the statesmen to save the nation by coming quickly to a decision to lay down our arms. If we seek peace, of course, we know roughly what the terms will be by observing the example of Germany. It is inevitable that the people will have to endure the heavy pressure of the enemy for a long period of time, but the nation will live on and we may be able to recover our former prosperity again after several decades. The government should certainly select this path. I ceaselessly implore that we put His Majesty’s mind at ease without any delay whatever. In the postwar dawn we must strive to carry out thoroughgoing reforms throughout the country, to democratize politics in general, and to do away with the domineering and selfrighteous attitude of the bureaucrats in order to realize a truly harmonious relation between the Emperor and the people. The scorn for diplomacy and the indifference to international relations, even before the Manchurian incident, were the cause which brought about our present misfortune. In view of the fact that we shall encounter problems in finding a way out of our difficulties while being buffeted about by the storm of international relations in the postwar period, we recognize the urgency of adopting the best political system which will attach importance to future foreign relations. Since entering into the anti-Comintern pact 7 our foreign policy has been completely bankrupt. The whole thing had its inception in our splitting the world into an Axis force and an anti-Axis force by joining forces with Nazism. For the future, we must clearly recognize our past mistakes and fundamentally reconstruct our foreign policy. 9. In obedience to the Imperial proclamation of war, it was the bounden duty of all the people to devote every effort to the achievement of the war objectives. Therefore I also endeavored to contribute my humble efforts to this cause. In view of the present situation, however, I consider it necessary to recognize frankly that the prospects in the present war have become desperate. The theory that we should counterattack with all our strength, if the United States and England should land on our mainland, and thus make them tire of the invasion should be carefully evaluated. I might have had some faith in the firm belief of the military and the government that our war potential can still inflict quite a blow on the enemy (your telegram No. 913–2) and I might have placed some hope in this if we had not yet lost control of the skies and of the sea. Today, however, we find ourselves in a situation in which we cannot repel the daily attacks of the enemy naval and air forces and in which our production facilities are continuously being destroyed. Moreover, we must consider that this situation will become rapidly even worse as time passes. The resulting imbalance of the opposing forces cannot be rectified no matter how heroically our soldiers and people fight. It also goes without saying that groups such as organized guerrillas cannot accomplish much in the face of modern weapons. Thus, after an enemy landing on our mainland, there would be a struggle for every inch of land and repeated valiant fighting until we became exhausted and finally laid down our arms. By that time, as can be seen in the case of Germany, the entire country would already have been trampled by the enemy and the national sovereignty would have been transferred to an occupying power. I only pray that we may quickly terminate the present situation, in which we can no longer hope to achieve our future objectives and in which we continue to resist simply from past inertia, and that we may save hundreds of thousands of lives which would be uselessly sacrificed and thereby stop short of the destruction of the nation, save our 70,000,000 people from misery, and endeavor to maintain the survival of our race. I realize that it is a great crime to dare to make such statements, knowing that they are contrary to the views of the government. The reason for doing so, however, is that I believe that the only policy for national salvation must coincide with these ideas. Therefore, even though I am criticized as being a defeatist and am asked to take the responsibility of submitting to this criticism, I assert that I must willingly accept the responsibility. Thus I was able to express my views freely, and I need not repeat them further. I beg that you understand that the motive which prompts me to say these things is my sincere concern for the country. I cannot cease praying that my words, because of too much concern, may not result in unfounded and distorted views. 1 Document No. 1224 . 2 Not printed herein. See Shusen shiroku , p. 466. 3 Document No. 582, printed in vol. i . 4 Document No. 1226 . 5 Document No. 1225 . 6 i. e., paragraph 2 of document No. 1224 . 7 i. e., the German-Japanese agreement signed at Berlin, November 25, 1936, Text in Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. i , p. 400 . Cf. Foreign Relations , Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii , p. 153 . No. 1229 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1229 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) [Translation] urgent [ Tokyo ,] July 21, 1945—9:30 p.m. 931. Re your telegrams No. 1417 and No. 1418. 1 The mission of special envoy Konoye is to ask the Government of the USSR for its assistance in terminating the war and to explain our concrete intentions concerning the matter in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor; it is also to negotiate on matters of establishing cooperative relations between Japan and the USSR, which should become basic in our diplomacy during and after the war. Please propose the above to the Soviets and endeavor to obtain the agreement of the Government of the USSR relative to the dispatch of the special envoy. Also, please understand fully my telegram No. 932 2 in particular. 1 Documents Nos. 1226 and 1227 , respectively. 2 Document No. 1230 . No. 1230 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1230 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) [Translation] secret urgent [ Tokyo ,] July 21, 1945—9:30 p.m. 932. Re my telegram No. 931. 1 1. We cannot accept unconditional surrender (understood fully your telegram No. 1416 2 ) in any situation. Although it is apparent that there will be more casualties on both sides in case the war is prolonged, we will stand united as one nation against the enemy if the enemy forcibly demands our unconditional surrender. It is, however, our intention to achieve, with Soviet assistance, a peace which is not of unconditional nature, in order to avoid such a situation as mentioned above in accordance with His Majesty’s desire. It will be necessary for us to exert our utmost efforts to have the United States and Great Britain understand thoroughly this intention. Thus, it is impossible at this time to ask the Soviet Union unconditionally for assistance in obtaining peace; at the same time, it is also impossible and to our disadvantage to indicate the concrete conditions immediately at this time on account of internal and external relations. Under such delicate circumstances, we hope to have Prince Konoye transmit to the Soviet Union our concrete intentions based on the Emperor’s wishes and following a conference to have the Soviets deal with the United States and Great Britain, while considering the Soviet demands in Asia. 2. Taking into consideration the fact that this matter is a negotiation of the utmost importance which may determine the fate of our country, I request that you take full measures to grasp the true intentions of the Soviet Union by seeking sufficient explanations, for instance, even with respect to the Soviet reply transmitted in your telegram No. 1417. 3 3. It is a matter of course that the special envoy has the responsibility of advising the Government; but please explain to the Soviets, if necessary, that the envoy is to be dispatched as a special envoy in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor, whose chief aim is benevolence. Please take care to fully impress the other party with the facts regarding His Majesty’s trust in Prince Konoye and the prominent position held by the Prince in the political circles in our country. 4. If the proposal at the beginning of my telegram No. 931 is not absolutely necessary, please avoid making a written proposal. 5. Furthermore, I understood your opinion transmitted in telegram No. 1427, 4 but wish to request your further endeavors since the decision regarding the matter at the beginning of my telegram was that of the Cabinet. 1 Document No. 1229 . 2 Document No. 1225 . 3 Document No. 1226 . 4 Document No. 1228 . No. 1231 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1231 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) [Translation] very urgent Moscow , July 21, 1945—5 p.m. 1433. Re my telegram No. 1418. 1 It is presumed that there is no connection between the rumored peace proposals in your telegram No. 919 2 and my telegram No. 1422 2 and the question of sending a special envoy. However, the Big Three Conference had already started on the 17th. Therefore, it may be presumed that the reply from the Soviet Union on the evening of the 18th mentioned in my previous telegram No. 1417 3 may have stemmed from the Big Three Conference. If not, it must be taken into consideration that we had proposed sending a special envoy prior to the Big Three Conference and that this matter may have been divulged to the Anglo-American group. Very little information on that conference is available from radio or other sources. In spite of the paucity of information thereon, it appears that the conference atmosphere is very friendly and that the three leaders are having frequent private meetings. Therefore, relations between Japan and the Soviet Union may take an unforeseeable turn. I am convinced of the necessity for extreme caution. 1 Document No. 1227 . 2 Not printed. 2 Not printed. 3 Document No. 1226 . No. 1232 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1232 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) [Translation] urgent Moscow , July 24, 1945—5:56 p.m. 1441. Re your telegram No. 932. 1 We received this telegram on the 22d, but your telegram No. 931 2 did not arrive until today, the 24th. After considering the manner of presenting our proposal, we intend to suggest a meeting with Lozovsky. 1 Document No. 1230 . 2 Document No. 1229 . No. 1233 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1233 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) [Translation] secret urgent [ Tokyo ,] July 25, 1945—7 p.m. 944. Re my telegram No. 932. 1 1. It goes without saying that the outcome of the Big Three Conference will be very closely connected with this subject. However, Churchill and Attlee are expected to return to England temporarily on the 26th and the conference will be recessed for a while. Thus, you should take advantage of this opportunity and, if necessary, go to a place selected as suitable by the other party, meet Molotov, and explain fully the intention of the Imperial Government of Japan. Even though Molotov may find it difficult to arrange a meeting, we believe that the request for a meeting with you would have a good effect in that it would impress them with the sincerity of our desire. 2. On the occasion of the meeting, as repeatedly mentioned in my previous telegrams, it should be pointed out that the Imperial Government has, first of all, requested the good offices of the Soviet Union and that the sending of the special envoy to the Soviet Union would enable Stalin to acquire the position of advocate of world peace. Also make it clear that we are fully prepared to recognize the wishes of the Soviet Union in the Far East (see my telegram No. 932, last paragraph). Let it be known also that should the Soviet Government react coldly to our request we have no choice but to select other ways and means. Thus, you must work hard to induce the Soviet side to recognize these points and have the Soviet Union take positive action immediately. 3. Also, at the present time, as you are probably well aware, there are various arguments as to the substance of the demand for the unconditional surrender of Japan in Great Britain and the United States, particularly in the United States. A United States spokesman stated that: “As a rule, for the sake of formality, the Allies will hold fast to unconditional surrender until the end. However, should the Imperial Japanese Government surrender immediately, the Allies are actually prepared to modify the terms.” 2 For instance, on the 19th [ 21st ] Captain Zacharias—although a member of the United States Office of War Information he broadcasts to Japan as spokesman for the United States Government—disclosed the substance of surrender terms, saying that Japan had two choices to make. 3 One was to submit to a dictated peace after the complete destruction of Japan; the other, to accept unconditional surrender and receive benefits under the Atlantic Charter. 4 This is considered simple propaganda strategy. Although it is not definitely stated, this is to a certain degree understood to be a means of encouraging us to surrender. Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to the fact that at this time the United States referred to the Atlantic Charter. As for Japan, it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter. The difficult point is the attitude of the enemy, who continues to insist on the formality of unconditional surrender. Should the United States and Great Britain remain insistent on formality, there is no solution to this situation other than for us to hold out until complete collapse because of this one point alone. On the other hand, since it is possible that the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States may exercise caution and suspect that our dispatch of a special envoy may be a peace plot, we have repeatedly advised that what is described above is not a mere “peace feeler” but is in obedience to the Imperial command. Also, it is necessary to have them understand that we are trying to end hostilities by asking for very reasonable terms in order to secure and maintain our nation’s existence and honor. Should things advance to the stage where we send a special envoy to the Soviet Union, undoubtedly these problems will have to be discussed frankly. Because of the beginning of the Three-Power Conference and also in consideration of the development of the recent delicate situation in the United States, you should keep the above circumstances in mind and lose no opportunity to explain all this carefully to Molotov—if under unavoidable circumstances this is not possible, it will be well to consult Solomon A. Lozovsky, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs—and inform us immediately by telegram regarding their attitude. 1 Document No. 1230 . 2 The spokesman and the statement referred to have not been identified. 3 See Ellis M. Zacharias, Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer (New York, 1946), p. 421. 4 Executive Agreement Series No. 236: 55 Stat. (2) 1603. No. 1234 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1234 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) 1 [Translation] urgent Moscow , July 25, 1945—11:23 p.m. 1450. Re my telegram No. 1449. 2 At the time of my conference with Lozovsky on the 25th, I stated orally as follows (as indicated at the beginning of my telegram, 3 the above was to be sent later to L. in written form): 1. At the meeting with you, the Acting People’s Commissar, last July 13th, I delivered the message from the Emperor and also particularly mentioned His Majesty’s desire to dispatch Prince Konoye. 4 Concerning the above, I received a reply from you in writing on the night of the 18th to the effect that the Government of the USSR could not give a specific answer because there was nothing concrete either in the message of the Emperor or in the Prince’s mission to Moscow. 5 2. Concerning these matters, I once again made my proposal to you today to make the circumstances clear in the following manner: The mission of special envoy Konoye, entrusted with the Emperor’s request, is to ask the Government of the USSR to assist in the termination of the war and to explain our concrete intentions on this matter; his mission is at the same time to negotiate on matters which will solidify and improve relations between Japan and the USSR, which should become the basis of our diplomacy for the period during and after the war. 3. In addition to stating the foregoing on instructions from our Government to the Government of the USSR, I repeated that the Emperor especially ordered the Government to dispatch the envoy as the result of His Majesty’s wishes to put an end to the tragedy of additional bloodshed from the continued exchange of fire. The special envoy will explain to the Government of the USSR the concrete intentions of the Japanese relative to the above, and will request its consideration of this matter. Therefore, I hope that the Government of the USSR will give sufficient and favorable consideration to this matter of the envoy and agree to the dispatch of the envoy very soon. Furthermore, since the Government of the USSR is well aware that ex-Premier Prince Konoye enjoys high trust in the Imperial Court and is prominent in Japanese political circles, I believe it will not be necessary to add my own explanation here. 1 The statement quoted in this message is presumably the communication read by the Soviet interpreter at the Tenth Plenary Meeting, July 28. See ante , p. 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] . 2 Document No. 1235 . 3 i. e., in telegram No. 1449. 4 See vol. i , document No. 586. 5 See document No. 1226 . No. 1235 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1235 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) [Translation] urgent Moscow , July 25, 1945—11:53 p.m. 1449. Re my telegram No. 1441. 1 On the 25th I met Lozovsky in order to make the proposal contained in my telegram No. 1450, 2 and we continued our conversation as follows: Sato : As you have already understood from my proposal, the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in a friendly manner relative to the termination of the war, and at the same time will have Prince Konoye explain directly to you the concrete intentions of our Government. L.: Could you give me the text of the proposal which you have just made? Its content is really important. If you could prepare a written text for me, I should be able to understand it more correctly. It is difficult to expect real accuracy from an oral presentation. It would also be convenient for me to make a report to my Government if I have a written text. I should like to ask one or two questions: (1) I understand that the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in order to terminate the war, and (2) concerning the above problem Prince Konoye is going to bring us some concrete proposals. Now, are these concrete proposals for the termination of the war or for strengthening Russo-Japanese relations? As this point was not made clear, I should like to have you explain it to me so that I can make a report to my Government. Sato : As to your latter question, the concrete intentions which Prince Konoye is going to explain to the Soviet Government are, as I understand it, concerned with both of the problems you have just mentioned. In other words, I understand that they are concerned, first, with the request to the Soviet Government for mediation and, second, with the problem of strengthening Russo-Japanese relations. As to your first request, it is outside the instructions which I have received to prepare a written text of the proposal which I made today. However, I shall prepare such a text for your reference on my own initiative and present it to you later, since the problem itself is significant, as you have suggested, and also in due consideration of the fact that the leaders of the Soviet Government are now in Berlin. Needless to say, however, I have to ask you to treat this text as top secret, because of its extremely secret nature. I should also like to mention that Prince Konoye, whose mission I have just explained to you, has our Emperor’s greatest confidence and occupies an eminent position in our Government. Therefore, in my opinion, his mission will cover a vast area: he will ask the Soviet Government for mediation; at the same time he will exchange views concerning problems common to both of our countries. Moreover, he may go into the problem of future relations between the two nations. I believe you will not be wrong in understanding the matter as I have indicated above. L.: I understand well the secret nature of this problem; I also understand well that what you have conveyed to me, Mr. Ambassador, is very confidential. I will make a report to my Government as soon as I receive your written text. Moreover, I will let you know immediately concerning any instructions I receive from my Government. Sato : Thank you for your kind help. I personally would also wish to hear from you as soon as possible. Before leaving, I added the following: The intention of the Japanese Government, regarding Prince Konoye’s mission, is to ask the Soviet Government’s assistance in terminating the war. I am sure that the intention is good. Therefore, it is my hope that you will be able to make arrangements so that the Soviet Government will have an opportunity to hear directly from the Prince on this matter. This would have ended today’s meeting. However, I repeated my own explanation of the mission of the special envoy, which appeared to impress L. a great deal. Particularly the fact that our Government has asked the Soviet Government to mediate seemed to arrest his attention. L. listened to our proposal with an earnest and attentive attitude throughout, and promised me an answer from his Government. 1 Document No. 1232 . 2 Document No. 1234 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Five further messages on this subject are printed post , under the heading: “Issuance of a Proclamation Calling for the Surrender of Japan”. See documents Nos. 1256 , 1257 , 1259 , 1260 , and 1261 . Issuance of a proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan Issuance of a proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan [1236] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State Potsdam , 1y [16] July 1945. 740.0011 P. W./7–1645 [1237] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 16, 1945. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1645: Telegram [1238] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] July 17, 1945. 740.00119 PW/7–1745 [1239] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Washington [Babelsberg], 18 July 1945. 740.00119 PW/7–1845 [1240] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 19, 1945. 740.00119 PW/7–1945 Telegram [1241] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President [Babelsberg,] 20 July 1945. Department of the Army Files [1242] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Babelsberg, July 21, 1945. 740.00119 PW/7–2145: Telegram [1243] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 22 [1945.] 740.00119 PW/7–2245: Telegram [1244] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Undated.] Byrnes Papers [1245] Proposal by the British Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2245 [1246] The President to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) [Babelsberg,] 24 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1247] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President and the Secretary of State [Chungking,] 25 July 1945. Nanking Embassy Files: Telegram [1248] President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill Babelsberg, July 25, 1945. Truman Papers [1249] Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman Whitehall [Babelsberg], July 25, 1945. 740.00119 PW/7–2545 [1250] The White House Map Room to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) [Babelsberg?], 25 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545: Telegram [1251] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President and the Secretary of State [Chungking,] 26 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1252] The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President and the Secretary of State [Chungking,] 26 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 1252 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1253] The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) [Babelsberg, July 26, 1945.] 790.00/1–2050 [1254] Department of State Memorandum [Undated.] Staff Committee Files [1255] The White House Information Officer (Ayers) to the President’s Secretary (Ross) [Washington,] 27 July 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2745: Telegram [1256] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 27, 1945—4:30 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1257] The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) [Tokyo,] July 28, 1945—10:45 a.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1258] Press Conference Statement by Prime Minister Suzuki [Tokyo, July 28, 1945.] [1259] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 28, 1945—3:25 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1260] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 30, 1945—8 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram [1261] The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) Moscow, July 30, 1945—10:31 p.m. 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1236 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 P. W./7–1645 No. 1236 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the Secretary of State top secret Dear Mr. Secretary [:] I am enclosing herewith the original and a copy for your files of a memorandum to the President relating to the conduct of the war with Japan. It relates to a subject which I think is of supreme importance at the moment, and I would very much like to see the President with you about it at your earliest convenience. On another matter in which the War Department is greatly interested, namely the administration of Germany, I also have some thoughts which I should like to submit to you and the President. They will be in written form the first thing in the morning. 1 Faithfully yours, Henry L Stimson Potsdam , 1y [ 16 ] July 1945. [Enclosure—Extract] 2 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 16 July 1945. Memorandum for the President the conduct of the war with japan With the great needs of rehabilitation both domestically and abroad facing us, we still find ourselves engaged in war with a major Pacific power. The length and limitation upon our lines of communications to the Pacific combat areas aggravate the strains upon our resources which the wastes of war always impose. The Japanese soldier has proved himself capable of a suicidal, last ditch defense; and will no doubt continue to display such a defense on his homeland. Yet we have enormous factors in our favor and any step which can be taken to translate those advantages into a prompt and successful conclusion of the war should be taken. I have already indicated in my memorandum to you of 2 July 1945, 3 the reasons which impel me to urge that warnings be delivered to Japan, designed to bring about her capitulation as quickly as possible. While that war is going on, it will be most difficult politically and economically to make substantial contributions to the reestablishment of stable conditions abroad. The longer that war progresses, the smaller will our surpluses become, and the more our over-all resources will be strained. warning to japan It seems to me that we are at the psychological moment to commence our warnings to Japan. The great marshalling of our new air and land forces in the combat area in the midst of the ever greater blows she is receiving from the naval and already established Army forces, is bound to provoke thought even among their military leaders. Added to this is the effect induced by this Conference and the impending threat of Russia’s participation, which it accentuates. Moreover, the recent news of attempted approaches on the part of Japan to Russia, 4 impels me to urge prompt delivery of our warning. I would therefore urge that we formulate a warning to Japan to be delivered during the course of this Conference, and rather earlier than later, along the lines of the draft prepared by the War Department and now approved, I understand, by both the State and Navy Departments. 5 In the meantime our tactical plans should continue to operate without let up, and if the Japanese persist, the full force of our newer weapons should be brought to bear in the course of which a renewed and even heavier warning, backed by the power of the new forces and possibly the actual entrance of the Russians in the war, should be delivered. 6 Whether the Russians are to be notified of our intentions in advance in this regard, would depend upon whether an agreement satisfactory to us had been reached with the Russians on the terms of their entry into the Japanese war. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Henry L Stimson 1 See document No. 849 . 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see documents Nos. 732 , 1212 , and 1274 . 3 Document No. 592, printed in vol. i . 4 Cf. the following entry in Stimson’s diary for July 16: “… I also received important paper in re Japanese maneuvering for peace.…” The paper referred to has not been identified. Concerning Japanese approaches to the Soviet Union prior to this date, see documents Nos. 582 and 586, printed in vol. i ; cf. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries , pp. 74–76. 5 See vol. i , document No. 594 . 6 Stimson’s diary contains the following entries on the relationship between the warning to Japan and the successful test of the atomic bomb: “[July 17:] I went to the ‘White House’ for a conference with Byrnes early in the morning. We first discussed methods of handling Harrison’s paper [document No. 1303]. Byrnes was opposed to a prompt and early warning to Japan which I had first suggested. He outlined a timetable on the subject warning which apparently had been agreed to by the President, so I pressed it no further.…” “[July 23:] At ten o’clock Secretary Byrnes called me up asking me as to the timing of the S–1 program. I told him the effect of the two cables [see particularly document No. 1309 ] and that I would try to get further definite news. I dictated a cable to Harrison [ document No. 1310 ] asking him to let us know immediately when the time was fixed.… “At eleven o’clock I went down to the ‘Little White House’ to try to see the President or Byrnes.… When I got there I found Byrnes out, and I asked for the President who saw me at once.… [I] told him that I had sent for further more definite information as to the time of operation from Harrison. He told me that he had the warning message which we prepared on his desk, and had accepted our most recent change in it [see document No. 1241 ], and that he proposed to shoot it out as soon as he heard the definite day of the operation.… “[July 24:] At nine-twenty I went to ‘The Little White House’ and was at once shown into the President’s room where he was alone with his work, … “I then showed him the telegram which had come last evening from Harrison giving the dates of the operations [document No. 1312]. He said that was just what he wanted, that he was highly delighted and that it gave him his cue for his warning. He said he had just sent his warning to Chiang Kai-shek to see if he would join in it, and as soon as that was cleared by Chiang he, Truman, would release the warning and that would fit right in time with the program we had received from Harrison.” No. 1237 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1645: Telegram No. 1237 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State top secret [ Washington ,] July 16, 1945. 31. Mr. Hull asks me to send you the following comments on the draft statement 1 calling on Japan to surrender: 2 “To James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State—Confidential. “I refer to entire document, and especially to paragraph 12. Its support by the heads of War and Navy and by the Under Secretary of State calls for the most serious consideration. The central point calculated to create serious difference is in paragraph 12 and relates to a proposed declaration by the allies now that the Emperor and his monarchy will be preserved in event of allied victory. I am stating this rather broadly but as the general public will doubtless construe it. The proponents believe that this step might shorten the war and save allied lives. The theory is that somehow the influences and persons who listen to the Emperor and his religion would fight and resist less hard and so save allied lives and shorten the war, et cetera, et cetera. Undoubtedly, if this undertaking should prove successful it would be still more appealing. The other side is that no person knows how the proposal would work out. The militarists would try hard to interfere. Also should it fail the Japs would be encouraged while terrible political repercussions would follow in the U. S. Would it be well first to await the climax of allied bombing and Russia’s entry into the war? Hull.” [ Grew ] 1 See vol. i , document No. 594 . 2 Byrnes, before leaving Washington for the Berlin Conference, had communicated the terms of the draft proclamation to Hull. Concerning Hull’s oral comments on the draft made at that time, see The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), vol. ii , pp. 1593–1594. No. 1238 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/7–1745 No. 1238 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State top secret [ Washington ,] July 17, 1945. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Subject: Draft proclamation by heads of state Participants: Mr. Cordell Hull; Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew I telephoned Mr. Hull this morning to tell him that a reply had been received from Mr. Byrnes to the message from Mr. Hull which I had cabled to the Secretary yesterday 1 with respect to the proposed proclamation by the heads of state setting forth what unconditional surrender would mean to Japan. I read the text of Mr. Byrnes’ reply to Mr. Hull as follows: “I agree that the issuance of statement should be delayed and, when made, should not contain commitment to which you refer.” Mr. Hull said he was not sure what Mr. Byrnes meant by “commitment”. I replied that I would not have interpreted it as a commitment, but I thought what he had in mind was paragraph 12 of the proposed statement. Mr. Hull stated that he had thought that point over carefully—the political side—and he appreciated the other side as well. He thought, however, that we would have a very difficult time there, and that was the reason he suggested that we wait for other developments, to see if something wouldn’t happen. I replied that I understood his feeling in this matter and agreed that the issuance of the statement should be delayed. Mr. Hull inquired whether I would send him a copy of the telegram I had sent to Mr. Byrnes transmitting Mr. Hull’s message, as well as a copy of Mr. Byrnes’ reply. I said that I would be glad to get copies of those messages off to him at once. J[ oseph ] C. G[ rew ] 1 Document No. 1237 . No. 1239 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President 740.00119 PW/7–1845 No. 1239 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President top secret Washington [ Babelsberg ], 18 July 1945. Memorandum for the President The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposed proclamation by the Heads of State dealing with the unconditional surrender formula for Japan as prepared by the State, War and Navy Departments and forwarded to you. 1 From the military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the proclamation is generally satisfactory. They believe, however, that the wording of the last sentence in the next to the last paragraph might well be clarified. To some of the extreme devotees of the Emperor, the phrase, “This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty,” may be misconstrued as a commitment by the United Nations to depose or execute the present Emperor and install some other member of the Imperial family. To the radical elements in Japan, this phrase may be construed as a commitment to continue the institution of the Emperor and Emperor worship. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that the next to the last paragraph of the proclamation be changed to read as follows: * “The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as our objectives are accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the world that such a government will never again aspire to aggression . Subject to suitable guarantees against further acts of aggression, the Japanese people will be free to choose their own form of government .” Such a statement would involve no commitment by the United Nations to support of any particular form of Japanese government, would enable the United Nations to prevent the establishment of any unacceptable government and would be more likely to appeal to all elements of the Japanese populace. From a strictly military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it inadvisable to make any statement or take any action at the present time that would make it difficult or impossible to utilize the authority of the Emperor to direct a surrender of the Japanese forces in the outlying areas as well as in Japan proper. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: William D. Leahy Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy . 1 See vol. i , document No. 592 , enclosure 2. * Deletions are lined out and additions underlined. [Footnote in the original. Words underlined in the original are here printed in italics.] No. 1240 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/7–1945 Telegram No. 1240 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State top secret [ Washington ,] July 19, 1945. 69. Rumors are increasingly current in the press and on the air that we propose to issue a statement elucidating unconditional surrender for Japan. Most prevalent rumor is that formulation of our position was taken by President to Berlin for discussion with Stalin and Churchill and that statement will issue as result of meeting. Another rumor has it that our “terms” to Japan will include agreement not to invade. Question submitted to the Department today by the Associated Press and the International News Services reads as follows: “Is it true that plans for the handling of Japan’s unconditional surrender have been fully formulated and that President Truman has taken them to the Potsdam Conference?” A second question asks whether the United States has “any unilateral definition of unconditional surrender for Japan”. Seems to us desirable, for reasons affecting domestic situation as well as situation in Japan, to quiet these rumors in so far as possible. Would you approve a reply to the questions in following terms: “The policy of this Government on unconditional surrender by Japan has been repeatedly stated. Elucidations of this policy were issued by the President on May 8 and on June l. 1 Papers on this subject as well as on a number of other matters of present importance have been supplied to the President, but no plan altering the policy already announced has been formulated by this Government. The implementation of the announced policy will depend, of course, on the situation as it develops. The treatment to be accorded the Japanese under the unconditional surrender terms as defined by the President will depend upon the circumstances under which the surrender occurs. If the Japanese surrender now, before we invade their main islands on our inevitable march to Tokyo, it is logical that the situation thus created should call for treatment which would be different in character and degree from the treatment that would be required if the Japanese delay surrender or if they fail to surrender. The longer the period of the fighting, and the greater the loss of American lives and of the lives of the fighting men of other United Nations, the more severe must be the treatment accorded the Japanese under the announced terms. The reason for this is clear: the longer Japan resists the more certainly shall we know that the military war lords are still in firm control and the more drastic will be the measures required to rout them out and to insure their complete permanent downfall and elimination. We have declared our firm purpose to eliminate the forces in Japan which have made it a threat to the peace of the world, and that purpose we mean to carry out. In order to carry it out, we shall unquestionably be obliged to occupy Japan and to occupy it by an effective, not by mere token force. In the light of the sacrifices already made by the United Nations, it is unthinkable that we should pause or be deflected from the full attainment of our objectives”. In reply to the second question whether the United States has any unilateral definitions of unconditional surrender for Japan, I would say this. “The United States has never considered the possibility of unilateral action against Japan in fighting the war. Neither has it considered, nor will it consider, unilateral action in deciding upon the future of Japan following the war. It will continue in the future, as in the past, to act jointly with other nations concerned.” It will be necessary to reply in the near future to these questions posed by the Associated Press and the International News Services. Failing satisfactory answers I fear that the steadily mounting public clamor for a statement of our proposed terms for Japan will be harmful to the Administration and will create in Japan the impression that we are weakening in our determination to see the war through to unconditional surrender and final victory. This can only retard any movement in Japan to force the leaders to accept unconditional surrender before our invasion. Hope for your instructions as soon as possible. [ Grew ] 1 For the texts of the statements referred to, see Department of State Bulletin , vol. xii , pp. 886, 999. No. 1241 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President Department of the Army Files No. 1241 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 20 July 1945. Memorandum for the President Subject: Proposed Proclamation to Japan and [ by? ] Heads of State (JCS 1275/5 and 1275/6 1 ) Paragraph (2) of the proposed warning to Japan reads as follows: “(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west [have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union and] 2 are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until her unconditional capitulation.” I am troubled by the words “until her unconditional capitulation” in the last sentence of the paragraph. I suggest that these words be changed to read “until she ceases to resist”. Such a change has two advantages: (1) It avoids repeating in other words the term “unconditional surrender” where it is not necessary to do so, and where failure to do so makes it easier for the Japanese publicly to recognize and Act upon the futility of further war; (2) It avoids a perplexing contradiction in terms. A capitulation is defined in the only dictionary I have at hand as “a conditional surrender; a treaty”. To call in substance, for an unconditional conditional surrender would be highly confusing and, as translated, possibly badly, into Japanese, the expression might well defeat our ends. The words I suggest avoid this difficulty. I concur in the revised form of paragraph (12) suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum to you of 18 July 1945. 3 Henry L. Stimson 1 Not printed as such. For the text of the draft proclamation studied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and for the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs based thereon, see document No. 592 (enclosure 2), printed in vol. i , and document No. 1239 , ante . 2 Brackets in the original. 3 Document No. 1239 . Stimson’s diary entry for July 24 gives the following additional information on this subject: “… I then spoke [to Truman] of the importance which I attributed to the reassurance of the Japanese on the continuance of their dynasty, and I had felt that the insertion of that in the formal warning was important and might be just the thing that would make or mar their acceptance, but that I had heard from Byrnes that they preferred not to put it in, and that now such a change was made impossible by the sending of the message to Chiang [document No. 1246], I hoped that the President would watch carefully so that the Japanese might be reassured verbally through diplomatic channels if it was found that they were hanging fire on that one point. He said that he had that in mind, and that he would take care of it.… No. 1242 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/7–2145: Telegram No. 1242 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State top secret Babelsberg , July 21, 1945. Victory –188. Top secret to Acting Secretary of State from the Secretary of State. Referring to your No. 69 of July 19, 1945 1 on the subject of questions asked by the press in connection with unconditional surrender for Japan: I would approve of your making reply to the questions you mention in the following terms: “The policy of this Government on unconditional surrender by Japan has been repeatedly stated. Elucidations of this policy were issued by the President on May 8 and on June 1.” Byrnes 1 Document No. 1240 . No. 1243 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/7–2245: Telegram No. 1243 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State top secret [ Washington ,] July 22 [1945.] 99. From Grew for Byrnes. OWI released to the press last night English text of broadcast to Japan in Japanese by Captain E. M. Zacharias, USN. 1 The OWI release commenced with the phrase “An official spokesman for the United States Government today warned Japan etc”. Zacharias in actual broadcast did not identify himself as such. Captain Zacharias began by reviewing points made in previous broadcasts. Japan, he stated, faced inevitable defeat. This situation resulted from bad leadership. Leaders continue to mislead people in stating that alternatives are victory or extermination. President Truman has made clear that this is not fact. Salvation of Japan lies in accepting unconditional surrender peace formula. The unconditional surrender formula is “humanitarian gesture of great constructive value”. Broadcast then continues to state that time has arrived when Japanese leaders should face fact realistically and without shallow emotion. Surrender is a time honored formula provided for in Hague Convention. 2 Moreover American policy is derived from Atlantic Charter 3 and Cairo Declaration 4 and “both begin with the categorical statement that we seek no territorial aggrandizement in our war against Japan”. The leaders of the Japanese face two alternatives. “One is the virtual destruction of Japan followed by a dictated peace. The other is unconditional surrender with its attendant benefits as laid down by the Atlantic Charter”. Japan’s opportunity to think of these facts “is rapidly passing. As soon as our redeployment is completed, this opportunity will be lost to Japan: and as you know, it will be lost forever”. Broadcast states that “at present there are still some influential people in the United States who would not like to see the destruction of Japan. But our patience, too, has its limits and it is rapidly running out”. Zacharias speech was prominently featured with banner headlines in the entire metropolitan press: Washington Star —“U. S. Warns Japs to Surrender Immediately as Only Salvation; Enemy Looks for Easier Terms”. Post —“U. S. Warns Japan to Quit Now, Escape Virtual Destruction”. Baltimore Sun —“U. S. Again Calls for Japs’ Unconditional Surrender”. Herald Tribune —“Japan Told to Surrender Unconditionally or Face Inevitable Destruction: Official Broadcast Bids Enemy Leaders Yield Under Atlantic Charter”. New York Times —“Japan is Warned to Give Up Soon: U. S. Broadcast Says Speed Will Bring Peace Based on the Atlantic Charter”. OWI spokesman last night told the press that there was no significance in making this translation available; that it was just one of a series. Press speculating widely on this matter along lines that this broadcast made available for domestic use in order to tell U. S. public just what our terms of unconditional Surrender are. Particular importance is attached by U. S. press to statement in release that Captain Zacharias broadcast as “an official spokesman of the U. S. Government” and to the fact that the Atlantic Charter commits the signatory governments to permit peoples to select their own form of Government. This was interpreted as indicating formulation of American policy with reference to Emperor. Associated Press states that reports were circulating to effect that a statement clarifying Allied policy toward Japan would be issued within next few days by President and Churchill and possibly Stalin. Department has been asked by press if broadcast was cleared with Department. Our answer has been that all major propaganda themes are discussed by the Department and other interested Government Agencies and the broad policy under which the OWI would conduct the campaign has been laid down. In no case, however, has the Department cleared any individual propaganda broadcast and was not informed that this broadcast was to be given to the American press. Elmer Davis made following statement to press this morning: “Captain E. M. Zacharias has for some time been delivering series of broadcasts in the Japanese language for OWI to the Japanese leaders and people. These are all within the framework of U. S. policy as previously announced. No significance attaches to the fact that the twelfth of these broadcasts was issued to the press in response to requests. The text of all broadcasts has been available if desired and a number of earlier ones have been proposed [ sic ] in whole or in part.” In view of the prominence given this broadcast by the American press, I believe it will not be necessary for me to answer the two press questions by the statement which you authorized me to make 5 and I shall make no statement in the absence of specific instructions from you. [ Grew ] 1 For the English text of this broadcast, see Zacharias, Secret Missions , p. 420. Cf. ibid ., pp. 373–375. 2 Under article 35 of convention ii , signed July 29, 1899, and under the same article of convention iv , signed October 18, 1907. See James Brown Scott, ed., The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (New York, 1915), p. 120. 3 Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603. 4 Of December 1, 1943. Text in Department of State Bulletin , vol. ix , p. 393. 5 See document No. 1242 . No. 1244 Proposal by the United States Delegation Byrnes Papers No. 1244 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [Undated.] Draft Proclamation by the Heads of Governments United States … United Kingdom … U. S. S. R. … China 2 (1) We,—The President of the United States, 3 the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, and the President of the Republic of China, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that the Japanese people shall be given an opportunity to end this war. (2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union, and are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until her capitulation. 4 (3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will 5 mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland. (4) The time has come for the Japanese people to decide whether they will continue blindly to follow the leadership of those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether they will follow the path of reason. (5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay. (6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world. (7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, Japanese territory shall be occupied to the extent necessary to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth. (8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine. (9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives. (10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. Democratic tendencies among the Japanese people shall be supported and strengthened. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established. (11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted. (12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government. (13) We call upon the Japanese people and those in authority in Japan, to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction. 1 This document bears the following manuscript notation: “Handed to P. M. by U. S. Sec. of State.” This draft was not communicated to the Soviet Delegation. Truman ( Year of Decisions , p. 387) states: “I waited until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reached an agreement on our military strategy before I gave him [Churchill] a copy of the draft [proclamation] on July 24.” This document was returned to the United States Delegation, presumably when the British amendments were submitted (see document No. 1245 ), and was marked as follows in shorthand by Cassie Connor, Byrnes’ Personal Assistant: “Adopt all British suggestions”. The changes noted in footnotes 3 and 4, post , were apparently made after the return of the draft to Byrnes. At that time handwritten brackets were also introduced in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 7, 10, and 13, but the changes contemplated were not written in. 2 Punctuation as in the original. 3 At this point the word “and” has been interpolated in Byrnes’ handwriting. Later in the paragraph the words “the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, and the President of the Republic of China,” have been stricken from the draft. 4 The last two words of this sentence have been stricken from the draft, and Byrnes has made the following manuscript substitution: “she ceases to resist”. Cf. document No. 1241 . 5 See document No. 1382, footnote 3 . No. 1245 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2245 No. 1245 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 [Undated.] American Text Suggested Amendments Paragraph 1 . Paragraph 1 . … Japanese people … … Japan … Paragraph 4 . Paragraph 4 . The time has come for the Japanese people to decide whether they will continue blindly to follow the leadership of those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether they will follow the path of reason. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason. Paragraph 7 . Paragraph 7 . Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, Japanese territory shall be occupied to the extent necessary to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth. Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth. Paragraph 10: second sentence . Paragraph 10: second sentence . Democratic tendencies among the Japanese people shall be supported and strengthened. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Paragraph 13 . Paragraph 13 . We call upon the Japanese people and those in authority in Japan … We call upon the Government of Japan … 1 Sent to the Commander, Naval Group, China, via Navy channels. No. 1246 The President to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1246 The President to the Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) 1 top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 24 July 1945. Personal and Top Secret for Ambassador Hurley from the President. Number 311. Please inform Chiang Kai-Shek that we propose to issue in the near future the following message to Japan in regard to surrender and request the Generalissimo to inform us without delay of his concurrence. “Proclamation by the Heads of Governments, United States, United Kingdom and China. (1) We,—the President of the United States, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war. [Then follow paragraphs 2 to 13 inclusive of the attachment to document No. 1249 .]” Please acknowledge receipt of this. Harry S. Truman 1 Cf. document No. 1244 . Ellipses throughout this document appear in the original. Presumably this paper was not communicated to the Soviet Delegation. No. 1247 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President and the Secretary of State Nanking Embassy Files: Telegram No. 1247 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the President and the Secretary of State 1 top secret urgent [ Chungking ,] 25 July 1945. (The following message is top secret and urgent for the eyes alone of the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, Potsdam, Germany, for the President from Ambassador Hurley.) Your message White House Number 311 2 delivered to Prime Minister Soong at his residence at 2130 hours, 3 Chungking time, July 25th. Generalissimo out of Chungking across Yangtze River in mountains. We intend to complete translation and deliver message to him tonight. 1 The source copy does not indicate whether this message was sent via Army or Navy channels. 2 Document No. 1246 . 3 i. e., 9:30 p.m. No. 1248 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill Truman Papers No. 1248 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill [Extract 1 ] Babelsberg , July 25, 1945. My Dear Mr. Prime Minister : … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . We sent you last night a copy of our telegram to Chiang Kai-shek. 2 I am hoping that we will receive a concurrence from him, and that we may be in a position to issue the Proclamation at the earliest possible moment. I shall inform you, as soon as I hear from him, and we will issue the Proclamation jointly from here, if that is satisfactory to you. Very sincerely yours, [ Harry S. Truman ] 1 For the other paragraphs of this letter, see document No. 1183 . 2 See document No. 1246 . No. 1249 Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman 740.00119 PW/7–2545 No. 1249 Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman most secret Whitehall [ Babelsberg ], July 25, 1945. My Dear Mr. President , I thank you for your letter of July 25, 1 … I return the copy of the Proclamation to Japan by the Heads of Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China, which I received from you yesterday. I am willing to sign it on behalf of His Majesty’s Government in its present form, and I hope you will issue it as you propose whenever you choose and as soon as possible. On a minor point, I suggest that the word “industries” might be added where shown in paragraph 11, otherwise the word “those” would seem at first sight to apply to Separations. 2 Yours very sincerely, Winston S. Churchill [Attachment] (1) We,—The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the President of the Republic of China, 4 representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war. (2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist. (3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will 5 mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland. (4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason. (5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay. (6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world. (7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth. (8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine. (9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives. (10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established. (11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those 6 which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted. (12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government. (13) We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction. 1 Document No. 1248 . For the passage omitted here, see document No. 1184 . 2 This letter bears the following manuscript notation in the top margin: “Accept”. 4 In a variant draft in the Truman Papers, otherwise identical with this draft, paragraph 1 begins: “We—The President of the United States, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing”. This variant draft bears the following manuscript query by Truman: “Should China be asked?” Truman has also added “& China” to the heading, which had previously been changed to read: “Draft Proclamation by the Heads of Governments[,] United States … United Kingdom”. The text sent to Chiang for concurrence named the three countries in the heading but omitted the Head of Government of China in paragraph 1. See documents Nos. 1246 and 1251 . 5 See document No. 1382, footnote 3 . 6 At this point Churchill has interpolated the word “industries”. No. 1250 The White House Map Room to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545: Telegram No. 1250 The White House Map Room to the Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) top secret [ Babelsberg? ], 25 July 1945. 313. The President requests an immediate answer to White House message #311 (241035Z). 1 If an answer is not received within twenty-four hours, the proclamation will be released by the President and the Prime Minister. Please advise time of receipt of this message. 1 Document No. 1246 . No. 1251 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President and the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1251 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the President and the Secretary of State 1 top secret urgent [ Chungking ,] 26 July 1945. (The following message is top secret and urgent for the eyes alone of the Secretary of State James F Byrnes Potsdam, Germany for the President from Ambassador Hurley.) The following message is from the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai Shek, for President Truman. “I concur in the proposed proclamation to Japan, with the single alteration that paragraph (1) should be revised to read ‘We, the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen etc, etc, etc’ since the proclamation is to be by the heads of the three governments concerned, Chiang Kai Shek”. Concurrence given to me by Chiang Kai Shek at Yellow Mountain, 0930 hours 2 Chungking time July 26th. Delay in transmission due to fact I had to return to Chungking by ferry Yangtze River because lack of communications. Foregoing message handed both Army and Navy for transmission at 1105 hours 3 Chungking time July 26th. 1 Sent by the Commander, Naval Group, China, via Navy channels. An identical message, numbered Cfb 1713, was sent by the Commanding General, United States Forces, China. 2 i. e., 9:30 a.m. 3 i. e., 11:05 a.m. No. 1252 The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President and the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1252 The Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) to the President and the Secretary of State 1 top secret urgent [ Chungking ,] 26 July 1945. (The following message is top secret and urgent for the eyes alone of the Secretary of State James F Byrnes Potsdam, Germany for the President from Ambassador Hurley.) The following are sidelights that may be helpful to you. The translation was not finished until after midnight. We then had difficulty in procuring a ferry to cross the Yangtze. The Prime Minister 2 declined to go out to Yellow Mountain with me in the night. This morning, K C Wu, Assistant Minister of Foreign Relations, accompanied me to the Generalissimo’s residence at Yellow Mountain. The Generalissimo read the translation carefully, then K C Wu interpreted my explanation of the necessity for immediate concurrence. The Generalissimo was kindly and courteous throughout. After he had told me that he concurred in the proclamation Dr Wang Shih Chieh, Minister of Information, arrived at the conference. It became necessary to explain the whole situation again to Wang. Incidentally Wang is to succeed the Prime Minister as Minister of Foreign Relations. When Chiang Kai Shek had approved the message of concurrence we found the telephone out of order. It was necessary for me to return to Chungking to contact facilities for transmission to you. The message was sent through both Army and Navy systems. Two points which the Generalissimo wished to state in his message were omitted on my suggestion. I am stating them here for your information. (1) The Generalissimo wished to explain that it would be helpful to his position in China if the words “President of the National Government of the Republic of China” should follow “President of the United States”. He considers both you and himself as the supreme heads of nations while the Prime Minister 3 is a secondary official. (2) He desired me to stress in the message an expression of his desire for China to be invited to be present at all future United Nations conferences on Asia. He said he realized the difficulties of the past which prevented his attendance and was very tolerant in his attitude toward those conditions. He stated however that decisions pertaining to Asia made in conferences without China being represented puts him in an undesirable position with the people of China. Especially is this true when he is asked to concur in decisions made in the absence of China’s representatives without giving him an opportunity to procure the opinions of his advisors. His concurrence and his whole attitude were constructive and without rancor. He expressed appreciation of your friendship for China. 1 Sent by the Commander, Naval Group, China, via Navy channels. 2 T. V. Soong. 3 i. e., Churchill. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1252 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final text of the proclamation of July 26 calling for the surrender of Japan, see post , page 1474 [ Pg. 1474 is part of Doc. 1382 ] . No. 1253 The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) 790.00/1–2050 No. 1253 The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar ( Molotov ) 1 [ Babelsberg , July 26, 1945.] I am transmitting herewith for your information copy of a declaration which is being issued by the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, on the aims and purposes of the war against Japan. 2 This declaration has been given to the press for release and publication tomorrow morning. 3 1 Printed from a copy of the body of the communication subsequently typed in the Department of State. 2 Document No. 1382 . 3 Concerning Molotov’s reaction to this message, see ante , pp. 449–450 [ Pgs. 449–450 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] . Concerning Soviet adherence to the proclamation of July 26, see document No. 1382, footnote 1 . Concerning French “consent” to the proclamation, see document No. 1412 . No. 1254 Department of State Memorandum Staff Committee Files No. 1254 Department of State Memorandum 1 [Undated.] Comparison of the Proclamation of July 26, 1945 With the Policy of the Department of State I. Question —To what extent is the proclamation of July 26, 1945 2 consistent with the policy of the Department of State? II. Discussion — 1. The proclamation is a statement of terms addressed to Japan (par. 1) and to the Japanese government (par. 13) which if accepted would constitute an international agreement subject to interpretation by the usual canons of international law. Under international law ambiguous terms in an international agreement have been interpreted favorably to the state which accepted them. The state which proposed them should express its intention clearly. (See Harvard Research, Draft Convention on Treaties, American Journal of International Law , Supp., 1935, vol. 29, p. 941, citing several arbitral awards.) The Department’s policy has interpreted unconditional surrender as contemplating a unilateral surrender with no contractual elements whatever. 2. The contractual character of the surrender contemplated by the proclamation together with the allusion to “good faith” in paragraph 13, suggests that to some extent the execution of the terms is to be left to the good faith of the Japanese Government. The Department’s policy has assumed that all requirements would during the first stage be carried out by allied forces without any reliance upon the good faith of any Japanese authorities. 3. The proclamation interprets unconditional surrender as applying only to “all Japanese armed forces”. The Department’s policy has interpreted unconditional surrender as applying to Japan, thus covering not only the armed forces, but also the emperor, the government and the people. All are to acquiesce in any acts which the allies consider appropriate in carrying out their policy. 4. The considerations referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above as well as the reference to “the Japanese government” in paragraphs 10 and 13 of the proclamation suggest that continuance of the Japanese government which accepts the terms is contemplated so long as that government observes the terms in good faith. This interpretation is, however, not certain because of the suggestion that the “Self-willed militaristic advisers” (par. 4) and the “irresponsible militarism” of Japan (par. 5 [ 6 ]) are to be eliminated. These terms may refer to the existing government of Japan. Furthermore paragraph 13 of the proclamation requires that occupation of certain points in Japan shall continue until “there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.” This statement could be interpreted to mean that the government which accepts the terms shall immediately retire and leave the occupying forces to govern Japan until the objectives stated have been achieved and a “peacefully inclined and responsible government” has been established by an election. That statement might also mean that the emperor will accept the terms proposed in the proclamation and will continue to function, but will at once dismiss all his militaristic advisers, democratize the constitution of Japan, arrange an election, appoint a government in accordance with its results, and direct that government to carry out the terms of the proclamation. The Department’s policy has assumed that the allied governments would have full powers of government in Japan until their objectives were carried out. 5. The limitation of unconditional surrender to Japanese armed forces (par. 13) and the apparent assumption that a Japanese government will continue and will be responsible for carrying out the terms (pars. 10 and 13) suggests that the occupation of points in Japanese territory to be designated by the allies, (par. 7) is for the purpose of bringing pressure upon the Japanese government and does not contemplate military government of any large part of Japan. This interpretation, however, is not certain. The proclamation as noted in paragraph 4 above may mean a temporary elimination of the Japanese government until a new and reliable government can be established. No limits are stated in the number of points which may be occupied. If sufficiently numerous such occupations could effectively control the whole of Japan and, therefore, permit military government of the whole of Japan. Furthermore, many of the terms stated in the proclamation, such as the complete disarmament of Japanese military forces (par. 9), the apprehension of war criminals (par. 10), the strengthening of democratic tendencies and government (pars. 10 and 12) the establishment of freedom of speech, religion and thought, and of respect for human rights (par. 10) the exaction of just reparations in kind (par. 11) the industrial disarmament of Japan (par. 11), and the prevention of Japanese control of raw materials (par. 11) are of a character which could hardly be achieved without direct control in all parts of Japan by the allied military authorities. The Department’s policy has contemplated such direct control, not mere influencing of a Japanese government. 6. The terms referred to in paragraph 5 above suggest that the military occupation contemplated by the proclamation whether of a limited number of points or of the whole of Japan, would be an occupation in the sense of the law of war. This interpretation, however, is not certain. Such an occupation can only have the limited objectives of maintaining order, assuring security of the occupying forces, and influencing the political action of the enemy government within the framework of the existing laws of the territory occupied. The objectives of the proclamation, stated in paragraph 5 above, go much beyond this. Consequently one has to assume either that the occupation is intended to bring pressure upon a Japanese government which will carry out the objectives, or that the occupation itself will have far more authority than an ordinary military occupation. The Department’s policy has assumed that unconditional surrender would mean a temporary exercise by the allies of all the powers of the Japanese government, thus permitting the occupying authorities to exercise much more authority than a military occupant under the law of war. 7. The proclamation states that Japan’s sovereignty shall be limited to the four main islands of Japan “and such minor islands as we determine.” (par. 8). This statement does not indicate an intention to eliminate Japan’s sovereignty over the Liu Chiu [ Ryukyu ] and Kurile islands as they are “minor islands.” There is more grounds for supposing that it intends to eliminate Japan’s sovereignty over Southern Sakhalin which is hardly a “minor island.” The Department’s policy has not favored the elimination of Japan’s sovereignty in any of these three areas. 8. The proclamation declares that “stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners”. The illustration suggests a limitation of “war criminals” to violators of the laws of war, but this suggestion is hardly supportable in view of the common use at the present time of the word “war criminals” in a wider sense and the use of the word “all”. Furthermore, the illustration is not introduced by a word suggesting that it is intended to indicate the kind of war criminals meant but by a word suggesting that it is intended to assure the American public that a class of war criminals in which they have manifested a particular interest will be included. The Department’s policy has assumed a broad definition of war criminals to include those responsible for the initiation of aggression. 9. The provisions of the proclamation seem consistent with the Department’s policy concerning demilitarization, reeducation, reparations, and economic policy. These policies can be adhered to, whether they are to be initiated and carried out in Japan by allied forces or by the Japanese government, though minor changes would doubtless be necessary. III. Conclusion — 1. The proclamation offers terms which, if accepted by Japan, would require a modification of several of the Department’s policies, particularly those concerning the interpretation and application of unconditional surrender. 2. Several of the terms are not clearly stated and, if accepted by Japan, may give rise to future controversy. [Attachment] Comparison Proclamation to Japan, July 26, 1945 and Department Policy Proclamation Department Policy 1. Unconditional Surrender “Unconditional Surrender of all Japanese armed forces”. Unconditional Surrender of Japan—Government and armed forces. 2. Terms Japan is given an opportunity to end this war on the basis of stated terms. Japan must obey all directives which may be given by the Allied powers. The powers, however, should announce in advance their basic policies in regard to Japan. 3. Legal Powers of Allies in Japan Designated points in Japan to be occupied. Authority outside of these points is left uncertain. The Allies to take over the government of Japan and to possess supreme authority. 4. The Japanese Government The status of the Japanese Government is left uncertain. It apparently is to continue and to exercise certain functions. (Article 10). All authority of the Japanese Government is transferred to the Allies. Administrative machinery and most agencies to function under direction of Allies. 5. The Emperor No mention. Since his removal is not stipulated, it may be assumed that he may remain. The Emperor is to sign and announce the unconditional surrender of Japan. His powers pass to the Allies. He is to be held in protective custody. 6. Objectives Irresponsible militarism and Japan’s war-making power to be destroyed. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, and respect for fundamental rights. Establishment of a peacefully inclined and responsible government. No important differences. 7. Enforcement of Objectives Not clear. The Japanese Government has the responsibility of carrying out some and possibly all the demands of the Allies. Some of the “terms” would seem to necessitate direct action by Allied authorities. The Allies’ Government in Japan will, itself, enforce its demands. 8. Economic Provisions Japan to maintain industries necessary to sustain her economy and pay reparations. Industries to be demilitarized. No important differences. 9. Loss of Territories Cairo Declaration. Japanese sovereignty to be limited to four main islands “and such minor islands as we determine”. No Department Policy beyond the Cairo Declaration. 10. Withdrawal of Occupation Forces As soon as stated objectives of Allies have been accomplished and a peacefully inclined and responsible government is established. No definite provisions. 1 This memorandum, prepared in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, was considered at the 152d Meeting of the Secretary’s Staff Committee, July 30. It is attached to the minutes of the 151st Meeting of that Committee. 2 Document No. 1382 . No. 1255 The White House Information Officer (Ayers) to the President’s Secretary (Ross) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2745: Telegram No. 1255 The White House Information Officer ( Ayers ) to the President’s Secretary ( Ross ) secret [ Washington ,] 27 July 1945. 256. OWI domestic and overseas directors, Neil Dalton and Thurman Barnard, request the following be sent you by message: “Proclamation on Japan handled as follows (All times EWT): Text received at 3:10 p.m. At 3:32 p.m. given to press through OWI Press Room, White House and State Department simultaneously. At 4:00 p.m. (5 a.m. Tokyo time) our west coast shortwave transmitters began broadcasting text in English. Highlights broadcast in Japanese at 4:05 p.m. Full text in Japanese not broadcast until translation made by OWFs San Francisco office had been checked by telephone with State Dept language experts in Washington. First broadcast from San Francisco at 6:00 p.m. (7 a.m. Tokyo time). Thereafter, Japanese text broadcast repeatedly on our eleven west coast shortwave transmitters, shortwave transmitter at Honolulu and on our medium wave Saipan transmitter. Carried in twenty languages from west coast. All regular programs were cancelled to permit full and repeated broadcasts of the proclamation. 1 Text transmitted in telegraphic Japanese to Pacific and China outposts so one official Japanese version would be used on outpost radio programs and in leaflets. Urgent telegrams ordered psychological warfare outposts In Honolulu, Manila, Chungking, and Kunming to use full text without comment or speculation until further notice. Our New York office made Proclamation highlights and text lead story for programs in 24 languages broadcast over 26 transmitters. Current instructions to all offices and outposts are no editorial comment or other reaction to be used. This will not be modified without consultation with State. Fullest play will be continued on all Pacific transmitters through Friday. For several days thereafter the Proclamation will be repeated at regular intervals.” Ayers 1 No evidence has been found in Department of State files to indicate that the text of the proclamation was transmitted to the Japanese Government through neutral diplomatic channels. No. 1256 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1256 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) 1 [Translation] secret urgent Moscow , July 27, 1945—4:30 p.m. 1458. Re my telegram No. 1449. 2 Although it is difficult to predict what the Soviet reply will be to our recent request, 3 it is possible that the repeated request by the Japanese Government is regarded as merely seeking the good offices of the Government of the Soviet Union, since we failed to indicate on what basis such a request was made. Since the request does not even indicate an outline, the Soviet Union may find it impossible to decide its attitude so simply on such an important matter, and it is conceivable that the request may be turned down again. If, by chance, it does result in a Soviet refusal, I am deeply concerned lest this may force us into a very awkward position. It may also implicate the Imperial Household, since we have been ordered by the Emperor to end further bloodshed and are strongly urged to send a special envoy. In presenting the request, as directed in your telegram No. 931 4 regarding the mission of Prince Konoye, I have taken the precaution not to give the impression that the mission is to set forth the Japanese Government’s “concrete aim”, and not to present a concrete “proposal”. Lozovsky, however, stated that he understood … 5 is to bring a “concrete proposal” and, as he hinted that he was expecting some form of concrete proposition, I believe we must pay special attention to this point. In presenting a proposal to end such a tremendous undertaking as the present large-scale war, we do not, in the final analysis, have a definite proposition but are only explaining our intention in an indirect way. It is absolutely impossible to cause the Soviet Government to make a move with such a noncommittal attitude on our part. In this connection I do not have the slightest doubt that the straightforward attitude of the Soviet Union is designed to compel Japan to come out with a concrete proposal. The definitive joint declaration against Japan made by the leaders of the three nations—the United States, Great Britain, and China—at Potsdam on the 26th 6 appears to be a big scare-bomb directed against us. It became very doubtful whether the Soviet Union would offer its good offices under this offensive started by the three countries. Then there is no doubt that the aforesaid tripartite declaration is a counteroffensive, with our trial venture to terminate the war as its target. According to a broadcast of the B. B. C. on the 26th, Lord [Louis] Mountbatten visited Potsdam on his return trip to England and is said to have reported to and consulted with the Big Three leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union on the progress of the war in the Far East. 7 We must take note of the remark that Stalin has for the first time participated in a discussion of the war in the Far East. For your information I make this reference, since this is also a matter which I fear may have some effect on the attitude of the Soviet Union in relation to our request for the Soviets’ good offices. 1 See vol. i , p. 873 , for a note concerning ( a ) the extent to which the contents of the papers of Japanese origin printed in this section were known to the United States Delegation at Babelsberg and ( b ) the translations here printed. 2 Document No. 1235 . 3 See documents Nos. 1234 and 1235 . 4 Document No. 1229 . 5 At this point there is a garble in the original. 6 Document No. 1382 . 7 See ante , pp. 375–378 [ Pgs. 375–378 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] . No. 1257 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1257 The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) [Translation] secret urgent [ Tokyo ,] July 28, 1945—10:45 a.m. 952. Re my telegram No. 944. 1 1. The position taken by the Soviet Union in connection with the Potsdam joint declaration made by Great Britain, the United States, and Chungking 2 will henceforth have a bearing on our planning and will be a very important problem. When we consider that details of every conference (Quebec, Cairo, etc.) held by the above three countries have been supplied to the Soviet Union, it is not difficult to imagine that the Soviet Union will have detailed knowledge of the recent joint declaration. 2. However, we have been awaiting the Soviet reply regarding the dispatch of the special envoy and we cannot help but have doubts that there may be some connection between the new joint declaration and our request. Is there no connection at all between the new joint declaration and the above-mentioned request? Also, did or did not the Soviet Government inform England and the United States of our above-mentioned request? And what steps will the Soviet side take against the Japanese Empire from now on? These questions will all remain of interest to our side. 3. For the time being, countermeasures against the joint declaration will be decided after we receive and study the Soviet reply to our request. Thus, Mr. Ambassador, keeping this in mind, meet with Molotov without delay, and at the beginning make our aims clearly understood as described in our outgoing telegrams. Also, on that occasion, endeavor to find out the Soviet Union’s attitude regarding the joint declaration. 1 Document No. 1233 . 2 Document No. 1382 . No. 1258 Press Conference Statement by Prime Minister Suzuki No. 1258 Press Conference Statement by Prime Minister Suzuki 1 [Translation—Extracts] [ Tokyo , July 28, 1945.] Premier Suzuki, at his press conference held at his Official Residence at 3 p.m. July 28, which lasted about an hour, answered questions on various government policies taken at this decisive stage of the war and expressed strong conviction of sure Japanese victory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Question): “What is the Premier’s view regarding the Joint Proclamation by the three countries?” (Answer): “I believe the Joint Proclamation by the three countries is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the Government, it does not find any important value in it, and there is no other recourse but to ignore it entirely 2 and resolutely fight for the successful conclusion of this war.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Printed from “Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Monday, July 30, 1945” (Washington, Federal Communications Commission, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, mimeographed, 1945), pp. BC 1–2. The extracts here printed are a translation of portions of a Domei transmission in romaji carried by Radio Tokyo’s Greater East Asia service at 3 a.m., Eastern War Time, July 29, as monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. This statement is apparently the Japanese rejection of the Potsdam Proclamation to which Truman referred in his statement of August 6 ( document No. 1315 ). Cf. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly , p. 263; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War , p. 625. The passage cited in Stimson and Bundy suggests that Stimson had seen a somewhat different English version of Suzuki’s statement, containing the phrase “unworthy of public notice”. 2 The Japanese word used here was mokusatsu . For discussions as to whether Suzuki intended to reject the Proclamation by the use of this word, see William J. Coughlin, “The Great Mokusatsu Mistake: Was This the Deadliest Error of Our Time?” in Harper’s Magazine , March 1953, p. 31, and Robert J. C. Butow, Japan’s Decision To Surrender (Stanford, 1954), pp. 145–147. No. 1259 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1259 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) [Translation] secret urgent Moscow , July 28, 1945—3:25 p.m. 1476. Re your telegram No. 944. 1 1. Your above telegram (repeat telegram 2 received on the 28th and decoding completed) and my telegrams numbered 1449, 1450, and 1458 3 crossed each other on the way. In the meantime Attlee, the newly appointed Prime Minister, returned to Potsdam on the same day and is reported to have joined the conference immediately. Thus, item No. 1 of your telegram is now out of the question. Even if we did make a request, there is no possibility that the Soviet side would agree to my visit, which would only result in exposing our uneasy emotion and would be of no benefit to us. 2. Item No. 2 of your telegram stated that a request will first be made to the Soviet Union for its good offices, and, should the Soviet Government react coldly, that there is no other choice but to consider some other course or method. Praising or criticizing the Soviet Union will be regarded by them as being done to suit our convenience, and in view of the various circumstances the attitude mentioned above appears to lack applicability. 3. According to item No. 3 of your telegram, a United States spokesman has hinted that unconditional surrender still stands; however, should Japan accept surrender immediately, in reality the terms may be mollified. What the spokesman said is only natural and after considering these circumstances I presented my opinion in telegram No. 1427. 4 I have no way of knowing the extent of the authority given to Captain Zacharias in his broadcast. His word, however, that Japan shall receive the benefit of the Atlantic Charter is in contradiction to the attitude taken by England and the United States when they rejected German participation under the said Charter prior to her surrender. Also, I find no reason why such attitude will be relaxed for present-day Japan when the same was not done at that time. Also, according to your opinion, you are not opposed to the restoration of peace based on the said Charter, Can this be interpreted to mean that the Imperial Government has already accepted demilitarization? Then, if this is the case, the question is, why did Japan not notify the Soviet Government of acceptance of demilitarization when Japan first asked to send the special envoy? In the same way, the question will arise regarding prior recognition of independence for Korea. 4. Although the B. B. C. announced that the Prime Minister made a statement 5 to the effect that the Japanese Government will “ignore” the July 26 tripartite declaration against Japan, 6 we have not received any official telegram to this effect. Also, regardless of whether it is intended to ignore the above declaration, it was not reported through general information media. The tripartite declaration is an official expression of their will and not only does it supersede the above-mentioned statement of Captain Zacharias but in reality there is some difference on important points. (According to this declaration, it is interpreted that Japan’s territory shall be limited to Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Hokkaido, and the United States will reserve the right to occupy Okinawa even though the declaration did not substantiate this.) 5. Your telegram No. 893 7 mentioned sending the special envoy only. Telegram No. 931 8 clearly indicates seeking the good offices of the Soviet Government. Also, in your telegram No. 944, you have asked me to make it clear that the dispatch of the special envoy to the Soviet Union is to enable Stalin to acquire the position of advocate of world peace. This, to our sorrow, gives the impression that we are giving out our aims piecemeal. With regard to your comment that you have considered the possibility that the Soviet side might react coldly toward our request and that Japan may have to consider other ways and means, I feel embarrassed, since I am unable to understand what was meant by “other ways and means”. 6. All things considered, as mentioned in my telegram No. 1450, I am awaiting a reply from the Soviet side. If there is no reply all day on the 30th (Monday), I am inclined to press for a reply immediately. 7. Shortly after this telegram was drafted your telegram No. 952 9 arrived. With reference to the third item, please understand that the meeting with Molotov will [not?] take place as mentioned in the first item of this telegram unless a special, concrete, and definite proposal for termination of the war is presented by the Imperial Government of Japan. 1 Document No. 1233 . 2 i. e., a repetition of telegram No. 944 requested because of delay or garbles in the original transmission. 3 Documents Nos. 1235 , 1234 , and 1256 , respectively. 4 Document No. 1228 . 5 See document No. 1258 . 6 Document No. 1382 . 7 Document No. 582, printed in vol. i . 8 Document No. 1229 . 9 Document No. 1257 . No. 1260 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1260 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) [Translation] secret urgent Moscow , July 30, 1945—8 p.m. 1480. Re your telegram No. 952. 1 1. There is no reason to believe that Stalin was not informed beforehand on the Potsdam joint declaration 2 and this must be considered only natural, judging from the present relationship among the three countries—the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Also, for the most part, we can surmise that the above-mentioned joint declaration had some connection with our plan to send the special envoy, i. e., our first request to the Soviet Union on the 13th regarding the dispatch of a special envoy. 3 It can be suspected that the subject was casually mentioned to the leaders of the United States and Great Britain at Potsdam. 4 I believe we can conclude that the recent joint declaration was based on this information and that the three countries—the United States, Great Britain, and China—made a proclamation in an effort to make their stand clear and definite. As to whether or not the declaration of the 26th was made after the leaders of the United States and Great Britain were informed 5 of the first request which I made to Lozovsky on the 25th and also regarding the second request 6 (my telegram No. 1449 7 ) on sending the special envoy, all this is not actually too important. Also, in reality, we believe that a discussion was held with Chiang Kai-shek prior to our presentation of the request on the 25th. Nevertheless, it is possible that they have already ferreted out signs of our overtures to conclude a negotiated peace at that time. The only ones who knew the circumstances of that period are Stalin and Molotov, and it is a difficult task to find out the truth. As for our side, I believe there is nothing we can do but to reason as indicated above. 2. In connection with the above problems, one important point is that by issuing the joint declaration, the United States and Great Britain made persistent demands on Japan to surrender unconditionally immediately, and another important point which they made clear is that they have no intention of relaxing the terms as stated in he declaration. If Stalin sees that it is impossible to shake the will of the United States and Great Britain regarding the above points, it would mean that our request to send the special envoy cannot be accepted and will be futile, regardless of how we explain that our desire to terminate the miserable war is in accordance with the will of our gracious Emperor and that Stalin will be called the advocate of world peace, etc. As for the United States and Great Britain, their contention will be that the only way for Japan to avoid the bloodshed of war is to surrender immediately. Stalin will also exert sufficient heavy pressure on the United States, Great Britain, and China regarding Manchuria, China, Korea, etc., in the event that Japan surrenders. He is also believed to have made up his mind to push through his claim and actually holds the power to do so. Therefore I believe that Stalin feels there is absolutely no necessity for making a voluntary agreement with Japan. On this point I see a serious discrepancy between your view and the actual state of affairs. Also, attention should be paid to Australian Foreign Minister Evatt’s announcement, as reported by the B. B. C. on the 30th, that he was opposed to the attitude of the joint declaration against Japan since it tends to be more lenient toward Japan than the stand taken by the Allied nations against Germany in the past. 8 I request that you read through my telegram No. 1476 9 together with this telegram. 1 Document No. 1257 . 2 Document No. 1382 . 3 See vol. i , document No. 586 . 4 See ante , pp. 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] and 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , and post , p. 1587 [ Pg. 1587 includes portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] . 5 See ante , p. 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] . 6 See documents Nos. 1234 and 1235 . 7 Document No. 1235 . 8 See New York Times , July 30, 1945, p. 4. 9 Document No. 1259 . No. 1261 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) 761.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1261 The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Sato ) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Togo ) [Translation] secret urgent Moscow , July 30, 1945—10:31 p.m. 1484. Re my telegram No. 1476, 1 item 6. Worried by the delay in the reply from the Soviet side, I met with Lozovsky on the 30th at 5 p.m. and again conveyed our wishes. The following conversation took place: Sato : I have come to receive your reply concerning our request for assistance by the Government of the Soviet Union to end the war which was presented to your Government on the 25th. 2 Although it was arranged that we should be notified as soon as the reply was ready, since it is now Monday I have come to inquire about your reply. Lozovsky : Since both Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, and Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, are now in Berlin, the reply will necessarily take several days to arrive. I regret to say that the reply cannot be delivered yet. 3 Sato : I fully understand the circumstances. However, the three countries—Great Britain, the United States, and China—issued a joint declaration against Japan on the 26th, 4 pressing unconditional surrender on Japan. Unconditional surrender is, after all, out of the question for the Japanese Government. Our view remains the same as was stated on the 13th, at our meeting before the last. 5 If it is possible to avoid such a formula, however, Japan desires to end the war, with an extremely conciliatory attitude, so long as Japan is guaranteed the nation’s honor and existence. For this purpose we asked the Soviet Government for assistance. I hope that Marshal Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, will give special consideration to this point. Although it has not been possible to receive your reply, I shall be happy if you will notify Commissar Molotov that I have come to see the Acting People’s Commissar in order to receive the reply. Lozovsky : I shall do my best to convey Your Excellency’s request to Molotov today by all means. Sato : I shall be much obliged if you will kindly do so. The Japanese Government has decided to send the Emperor’s most trusted Prince Konoye as special envoy to Moscow. As I explained at previous meetings, the envoy will discuss a wide range of subjects as to how the Japanese Government should work to re-establish peace in the Far East and will seek your Government’s assistance. I shall also appreciate it if you will inform Mr. Molotov that my understanding is that Prince Konoye will be empowered to discuss a wide range of subjects with the Soviet Government. Also, the Japanese Government understands that various reservations and stipulations will be made by the Soviet Union in connection with the Japanese Government’s request for assistance. Lozovsky : I shall arrange as you request immediately. Sato : The point which I am concerned about is the possibility that the tripartite joint declaration may obstruct the assistance from the Soviet Government which is desired by the Japanese Government. However, since the top leaders of the Soviet Government are now in Berlin, I hope that they will give appropriate consideration to the removal of such obstruction. Lozovsky : I promise again to convey your request. 1 Document No. 1259 . 2 See documents Nos. 1234 and 1235 . 3 Sato, having received no reply during the course of the Berlin Conference, requested an interview with Molotov upon the latter’s return to Moscow. At this interview, which took place on August 8, Molotov notified him of the Soviet declaration of war on Japan. See document No. 1382, footnote 1 . 4 Document No. 1382 . 5 See vol. i , document No. 586 . Basic military objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan Basic military objectives, strategy, and policies in the war against Japan [1262] The Commanding General, Army Service Forces (Somervell) to the British Minister of War Transport (Leathers) Potsdam, 20 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1263] Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 20 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1264] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 21 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1265] The Commanding General, Army Service Forces (Somervell) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 23 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1266] Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg, July 23, 1945.] J. C. S. Files [[Unnumbered document following Document 1266 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 1262 The Commanding General, Army Service Forces (Somervell) to the British Minister of War Transport (Leathers) J. C. S. Files No. 1262 The Commanding General, Army Service Forces ( Somervell ) to the British Minister of War Transport ( Leathers ) 1 secret Potsdam , 20 July 1945. Dear Fred : In accord with your request, the U. S. Chiefs were shown a copy of the amendments to basic undertakings informally submitted by you and the substitute dictated during our conversation. 2 They state they cannot accept your proposal. 3 Though also unwilling to accept the substitute as a part of basic undertakings, their reaction now is to view in a favorable light, its inclusion in the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister with the words “Isles” for “Commonwealth of Nations,” and “civil requirements” in lieu of British “rehabilitation and reconstruction plans.” Cordially, Brehon Somervell 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 Cf. document No. 1265 . 3 See ante , p. 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] . No. 1263 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1263 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff top secret C. C. S. 877/4 [ Babelsberg ,] 20 July 1945. Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies 1. We have considered the latest proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 877/2. 1 In the attached schedule we have set out in one column the document as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, together with the amendments which we should like to see introduced. In the right-hand column we set out our comments. 2. The document, as far as paragraph 6, covers presently known military requirements. Against the possibility that additional military requirements may emerge which might conflict with presently accepted civil shipping programmes, it is considered desirable to add a further paragraph in the terms set out in paragraph 7. 3. We recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff adopt the basic objectives, strategy, and policies as amended in the attached, and incorporate them in the final report of the Terminal Conference. [Enclosure] top secret Memorandum by United States Chiefs of Staff With Proposed Amendments by British Chiefs of Staff Comments by British Chiefs of Staff i. over-all objective 1. In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan. ii. over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war 2. In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria. 3. In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese occupied territory if required. We fully agree that the first priority should be given to the main operations against the Japanese Islands. We trust, however, that other operations in the Outer Zone, which will achieve the secondary object of evicting the Japanese from all occupied territories, will receive the fullest possible consideration. iii. basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war 4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:— * a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth. b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the British Isles in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of this war. a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept. b . c . Support the war-making capacity of our forces, in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or destined for combat areas. c . d . Maintain vital overseas lines of communication. The wording of paragraph 4 b . as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff does not allow for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of such countries as Canada, India or Australia, all of which are making an important contribution towards the prosecution of the war. War-making capacity cannot be confined solely to that required for the defeat of Japan since it is also necessary to meet the requirements for military control of Germany and Austria as stated in the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war. If first priority is given only to the support of the war-making capacity of forces in the combat areas, this might lead to the withholding of priority from the forces destined to relieve or support them. For example, the forces in India are required for maintaining the forces in active operations and providing reinforcements. As is known many installations supporting the operations in Southeast Asia Command are outside those areas which can strictly be termed combat areas. Unless these requirements are recognized, the war-making capacity of forces in combat areas will be jeopardised. 5. In order to attain the overall objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war. The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations. 6. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept: a . Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith. b . Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan. c . Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war. or are required to maintain world order in the interests of the war effort. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the present war. d . In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas. 7. Cargo Shipping Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere, for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, and for supplies to liberated areas. Should further military demands arise for maintaining the maximum war effort which would bring about a substantial conflict with British rehabilitation and reconstruction plans, and supplies to liberated areas, the shipping situation will be examined by the two Governments at time in the light of changed conditions. The present wording would appear to limit this assistance strictly to those forces which can take part in the war against Japan. We feel, however, that the necessity for the maintenance of world order, particularly in Europe, must be recognised. Having brought about the liberation of Europe, it would be illogical to allow unrest to occur owing to lack of forces in the liberated areas to keep order. The last sentence of paragraph 6 c . is unnecessary as it is now dealt with in paragraph 7 below. 1 Document No. 601, printed in vol. i . * Words underscored are proposed additions. Words italicized are proposed deletions. [Footnote in the source copy.] No. 1264 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1264 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff top secret C. C. S. 877/5 [ Babelsberg ,] 21 July 1945. Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies Reference: CCS 877/4 1 1. The United States Chiefs of Staff having considered the proposals concerning the “Basic Objectives, Strategy and Policies” made by the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 877/4, wish to make their position clear. They consider that the basic undertakings should be confined to broad statements concerning the military conduct of the war. As a result of the changed circumstances arising from the defeat of Germany and the practical capability of the British Commonwealth to support its own forces in the field, they are operating on the basis that approval of the issue to allied governments of lend-lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment will be limited to that which is to be used in the war against Japan and which will not be used for any other purpose. They do not propose to subscribe to any statements which deviate from this principle. They consider that occupation forces are not a subject for combined military commitments. Matters relating to post-war armies are also not susceptible to combined military commitments. Any arrangements which the British wish to make on these subjects are beyond the purview of the United States Chiefs of Staff and should be taken up on the governmental level. 2. Considering in detail the proposed changes, the United States Chiefs of Staff have understood that throughout the entire period of the two-front war the combined commitment limited to supporting the war-making capacity of the British Isles has been satisfactory to the British Chiefs of Staff. In light of the limited information available to the United States Chiefs of Staff, it appears that the war effort of the British Commonwealth in the future is going to be less than that generated over the period when the commitment as previously worded was satisfactory; also certain portions of this war-making capacity will be devoted to other than the war effort against Japan. Since it is realized that certain parts of the British Commonwealth will make a contribution to the war against Japan there is no objection to a statement which confines the combined military commitment to matters clearly connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan. Therefore the United States Chiefs of Staff propose to substitute in their paragraph III 4 b . the words “British Commonwealth” for “British Isles” and substitute “the war against Japan” for “this war.” 3. The change proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 c . to include forces “destined for combat areas” is acceptable if rephrased to indicate clearly that it applies only to forces specifically designated for employment in combat areas against Japan. The United States Chiefs of Staff propose that the subparagraph 4 c . read in part “… 2 those forces in or designated for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan.” The proposal contained in paragraph III 6 c . that the United States make a military commitment to support forces engaged in other than the prosecution of the war against Japan is unacceptable for reasons indicated in the first paragraph of this memorandum. 4. The proposal to strike out the last sentence of paragraph III 6 c . is acceptable. However, the United States Chiefs of Staff are willing to retain it in view of the fact they do not accept the inclusion in the basic undertakings of paragraph 7 proposed by the British. 5. The proposed paragraph 7 is beyond the purview of the United States Chiefs of Staff. They are not in a position to make military commitments on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom or on the matter of supplies for liberated Allies. Furthermore, the inclusion of terms concerning a specific resource such as cargo shipping in the basic undertakings is unacceptable. The purpose of the basic undertakings includes provision of a guide to the operating agencies for the allocation and the determination of priorities concerning all resources, not only cargo shipping, but forces and munitions of war. The United States Chiefs of Staff, however, will accept the inclusion in the final report to the President and Prime Minister, but not in the basic undertakings[,] of a statement concerning cargo shipping which is limited to matters within their purview. The statement proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff changed as indicated below is acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff:— Cargo Shipping “Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere, insofar as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, and for supplies to liberated areas civilian requirements. Should further military demands arise for maintaining the maximum war effort which would bring about a substantial conflict arise with British rehabilitation and reconstruction plans, and supplies to liberated areas , the shipping situation will be examined a matter for examination by the two Governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions.” * 6. For purposes of ready reference the statement of policy concerning strategy and basic undertakings is included in the Enclosure using the redraft of the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 877/4 and with the changes indicated above shown by italicizing and underlining. 7. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the statement in the Enclosure. [Enclosure] top secret [ Redrafted Text on Basic Objectives, Strategy, and Policies ] i. over-all objective 1. In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan. ii. over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war 2. In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria. 3. In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required. iii. basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war 4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:— † a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth. b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the British Commonwealth in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan. a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept. c. b . Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or designated destined for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan. d. c . Maintain vital overseas lines of communication. 5. In order to attain the over-all objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theatre to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war. The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations. 6. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:— a . Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith. b . Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan. c . Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war or are required to maintain world order in the interests of the war effort . Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the war against Japan. d . In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas. 7. Cargo Shipping The proposal by the British Chiefs of Staff is not acceptable. 1 Document No. 1263 . 2 Ellipsis in the source copy. * Words underscored are proposed additions. Words italicized are proposed deletions. [Footnote in the source copy.] † Words underscored are proposed additions. Words italicized are proposed deletions. [Footnote in the source copy.] No. 1265 The Commanding General, Army Service Forces (Somervell) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1265 The Commanding General, Army Service Forces ( Somervell ) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff secret [ Babelsberg ,] 23 July 1945. Memorandum for the U. S. Chiefs of Staff Subject: Cargo Shipping. Lord Leathers has just called me on the ’phone, stating that after lunching with the Prime Minister and General [ Field Marshal ] Brooke, that he had stated that he would seek an agreement on the wording of his paragraph, leaving for the conference tomorrow, a discussion only on the place of the paragraph in the report. The wording which Lord Leathers now submits is as follows: “Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere, insofar as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan and for an additional amount for [for] the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom and for supplies to liberated areas and for essential civil programs of the Western Hemisphere civilian requirements . Should a substantial conflict arise the shipping situation will be a matter for examination by the two Governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions.” The underlining 1 represents the re-insertion of his original phraseology of the first sentence 2 plus the phrase “and for essential civil programs of the Western Hemisphere” and the elimination of the all inclusive term “civilian requirements” as used in the U. S. paper. 3 The U. S. phraseology is broader than the British but is much shorter. The latest proposal of Lord Leathers seems to be entirely acceptable to me and I recommend that I be authorized to so notify him. 4 Somervell 1 Represented here by italics. 2 Cf. document No. 1262 . 3 Document No. 1264 . 4 This paper bears the following manuscript endorsement by Leahy: “OK WDL”. No. 1266 Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1266 Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret [ Babelsberg , July 23, 1945.] III. Basic Undertakings and Policies for the Prosecution of the War U. S. Proposals British Proposals 4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:— a . Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth. b . Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the British Commonwealth in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan. c . Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or designated for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan. d . Maintain vital overseas lines of communication. Delete a . and b . and substitute:— a . Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept. Delete c . and substitute the following as b: — b . Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or destined for combat areas. 5. In order to attain the overall objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war. The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations. 6. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:— a . Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith. b . Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan. c . Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the war against Japan. d . In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas. Add at the end of the first sentence: “or are required to maintain world order in the interests of the war effort.” Delete the last sentence of 6 c . because this is dealt with in paragraph 7 below. 7. The inclusion under Basic Undertakings of terms concerning a specific resource such as cargo shipping is undesirable. It is agreeable, however, to include in the text of the report the following paragraph:— cargo shipping Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere, in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for an additional amount for civilian requirements. Should a substantial conflict arise, the shipping situation will be a matter for examination by the two governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions. 7. Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, for supplies to liberated areas and for essential programmes of the Western Hemisphere. Should substantial conflict arise, the shipping situation will be a matter for examination by the two governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions. 1 Circulated as appendix A to the draft report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister, which draft report constituted the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2. This appendix gave a comparison of United States and British proposals which were being referred to Truman and Churchill for decision. For the discussion of these proposals by Truman and Churchill on July 24, see ante , pp. 340–343 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1266 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister, see post , pages 1463–1464 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 1381 ] . Control and command in the war against Japan Control and command in the war against Japan [1267] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 17 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1268] Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1269] Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 20 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1270] The Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Pacific (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manila, 21 July 1945. J. C. S. Files: Telegram [1271] Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 22 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1272] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 23 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [[Unnumbered document following Document 1272 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1273] The President to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) Berlin, 1 Aug[ust 1945.] Nanking Embassy Files: Telegram No. 1267 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1267 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff top secret C. C. S. 890/1 [ Babelsberg ,] 17 July 1945. Control and Command in the War Against Japan With reference to the proposed boundaries for the extension of command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, 1 suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, 2 the United States Chiefs of Staff have no objection from the military viewpoint to the inclusion of Indo-China south of latitude 15 degrees N. in the new area. This, however, is a matter primarily for decision by the Generalissimo 3 and a shift does not appear practicable until such time as his agreement is obtained. Until that time it appears operations can go forward on the present basis. As to the boundaries of the Australian command, this is a matter on which the solution worked out between the British and Australian Chiefs of Staff should be acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff. On the matter of the northern boundary of the area, the United States Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the necessity for retaining control by the United States of the Admiralty Islands for the reasons set forth in paragraph 3 of C. C. S. 852/1. 4 The proposal to extend the British sphere of responsibility east of the present boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area does not appear necessary or desirable until United States activities are cleared from the area, at which time the transfer should be effected. Aside from United States military resources in the area which must continue to be rolled up under United States military control, there are no military objectives or problems in the area except Ocean and Nauru Islands. At such time as British forces are prepared to recapture these islands, the United States will offer no objection. The objective of the United States Chiefs of Staff in proposing the transfer has been to release United States resources and commanders from the responsibility for containing and mopping up the Japanese forces in the area in order that they might concentrate on the main effort. Hence they have proposed 15 August as the date of turnover. Their objective would not be achieved by delaying the turnover until such time as Admiral Mountbatten is in position to advance through the Malacca Straits. Furthermore, it does not appear that retention of the area under United States responsibility until the end of the year will result in any activity additional to that which would occur if the area passed to Admiral Mountbatten on 15 August. The forces employed in the area are already primarily Australian. It is possible that if the British Chiefs of Staff do not desire to take over the area shortly, the Australian Chiefs of Staff might be able to do so with subsequent adjustment with Admiral Mountbatten within the British Empire. In summary, with regard to the matter of the Southeast Asia Command and the Southwest Pacific Area, the United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the immediate action should be to pass to the British Chiefs of Staff as of 15 August or very shortly thereafter the area with boundaries as outlined in C. C. S. 852/1. 5 Concerning the matter of higher strategic control in the war against Japan, the thought of the United States Chiefs of Staff is that the role of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the European war cannot appropriately be applied to the Pacific war. In the Pacific war there exist two clearly delineated areas that, commanded by Admiral Mountbatten with the extensions proposed in the foregoing paragraphs, constitute an area of British Empire responsibility associated with the Portuguese, the Dutch, and perhaps eventually the French. The initial operational interest of the United States in this area has now greatly decreased. The Pacific area is devoted to the main effort, is organized under a command and control set-up peculiar to the United States, and has forces and resources overwhelmingly United States unless the Chinese, and possibly Russian, contribution is considered. Any change in the present control system which would involve added complications and more cumbersome procedures is unacceptable. It appears that the interest of the United States in Admiral Mount-batten’s expanded theater now includes little more than sufficient review of operations to determine their impact on Allied operations and from the standpoint of lend-lease requirements, that they are adjusted to the main effort, and that they do not have an unduly adverse effect on the supply line to China through India and Burma. In line with this thought the British Chiefs of Staff may wish to consider some readjustment of the status of the Southeast Asia Command under the Combined Chiefs of Staff, perhaps along the line of the present status of the Pacific Theater. In summary, the United States Chiefs of Staff believe that increased participation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the Pacific Theater is impracticable. 1 Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. 2 See vol. i , document No. 604 . 3 i. e., Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 4 “3. It is considered necessary that the United States retain control of the Admiralty Islands due to the extensive naval facilities that have been assembled at Manus and its continued use as a primary base west of Hawaii for support of U. S. Naval forces.” 5 Not printed. No. 1268 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1268 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 890/2 [ Babelsberg ,] 18 July 1945. Control and Command in the War Against Japan 1. The British Chiefs of Staff have considered the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 890/1) 2 on Control and Command in the War against Japan. They have the following comments to make. 2. They fully understand that it will ultimately be necessary to obtain the agreement of the Generalissimo to the inclusion of Indo-China in Southeast Asia Command. They are anxious, however, that the United States Chiefs of Staff should support them in recommending to the President and the Prime Minister that they should press the Generalissimo to agree to this transfer. They suggest, therefore, that a recommendation to this effect should be included in the final report of the Terminal Conference. 3. The British Chiefs of Staff note that the United States Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary to retain control of the Admiralty Islands. They, therefore, withdraw their proposal for the inclusion of these islands in the Australian command. They also agree not to press for the eastward extension of the present boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area until United States activities are cleared from the area. They note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would offer no objection to British operations against Ocean and Nauru Islands. 4. The British Chiefs of Staff realize the advantages of an early transfer of the Southwest Pacific Area but are up against two difficulties. The first is the fact that Admiral Mountbatten is now fully engaged on planning further operations. The assumption of further responsibilities at this particular stage must inevitably embarrass him. Secondly, we have no idea what degree of assistance the United States Chiefs of Staff are at present providing to the Borneo operations nor when those operations are due to be completed. On present information, therefore, we cannot assess the commitment we should be undertaking if we agree to the transfer on any particular date. We should like, therefore, to discuss this further with the United States Chiefs of Staff. 5. On the question of the higher strategic control of the war against Japan, the British Chiefs of Staff wish to reiterate and amplify their view that they should now be given a larger share of control of strategy on the lines suggested in C. C. S. 890. 3 They desire to bring to the notice of the United States Chiefs of Staff the following particular considerations:— a . The United States and Great Britain are the two major powers allied against Japan, and thus jointly responsible for the prosecution of the war. It is most desirable that they should consult freely on all matters of major strategic importance relating to the conduct of the war. b . The British Chiefs of Staff have an inescapable responsibility to advise His Majesty’s Government on the use to which British forces are put in all theatres of war. c . Although the United States are of course providing the major share, the war against Japan, like that against Germany, is being fought with pooled United States and British resources, particularly shipping. It is right, therefore, that the British should have full understanding and knowledge of the proposed methods of applying these resources. 6. The British Chiefs of Staff wish to make it clear that the full extent of what they are asking is that they should be consulted on major strategic policy. They have no intention of suggesting interference with the operational control now accorded to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz in whom they have the utmost confidence. The British Chiefs of Staff ask, therefore, that the United States Chiefs of Staff should reconsider their attitude on this question. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 195th Meeting, July 18. See ante , p. 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] . 2 Document No. 1267 . 3 Document No. 604, printed in vol. i . No. 1269 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1269 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 892/1 ( Terminal ) [ Babelsberg ,] 20 July 1945. Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia We submit for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the attached draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia. [Enclosing—Extract] 2 top secret Draft Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Boundaries of Command 3 2. The Eastern Boundary of your command will be extended to include Borneo, Java and the Celebes. Full details of this extension are contained in the Appendix. 3. Further information will be sent to you regarding Indo-China. 4. It is desirable that you assume command of the additional areas as soon as convenient 4 after the 15th August, 1945. You will report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the date on which you expect to be in a position to undertake this additional responsibility. 5. From that date, such Dominion and Dutch forces as may be operating in your new area will come under your command. They will, however, continue to be based on Australia. 6. The area to the east of your new Boundary will be an Australian command under the British Chiefs of Staff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [Appendix] top secret Eastern Boundary of Command 5 Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 15°N; thence through the Balabac Strait along the 1939 Boundary Line between the Philippines and Borneo to latitude 05°N; thence eastward to 05°N. 128°E; thence southwestward to 02°S. 123°E; thence southeastward to 08°S. 125°E; thence southwestward to 18°S. 110°E. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 197th Meeting, July 20. See ante , p. 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] . 2 For the other paragraphs of this draft directive, see the enclosure to document No. 1285 . 3 Except for the amendment noted in footnote 5, post , the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved these paragraphs without change. The approved text of the directive was circulated as C. C. S. 892/2, July 20. 4 The word “convenient” was amended to read “practicable” in the text approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 5 This appendix was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and was reproduced without change as the appendix to the enclosure to C. C. S. 892/2, July 20. On August 7, however, a corrigendum was circulated by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, substituting for this text of the appendix the definition of the boundary contained in the annex to appendix B to document No. 1381 . No. 1270 The Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Pacific (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files: Telegram No. 1270 The Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Pacific ( MacArthur ) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Extracts] top secret urgent Manila , 21 July 1945. From CinCAFPac to WarCOS for Joint Chiefs of Staff top secret. C 27265. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is suggested that the boundary between the New SEA–Australian Command and SWPA be delineated to conform to the Philippine International Boundary specifically as follows: Beginning on the coast of Indo China at 15° north; Thence to intersect at 7°40′ north latitude, 116° east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; Thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05° north, longitude 127° east; Thence east to 05° north, 130° east; Thence south to the equator; Thence east to 140° east; Thence generally southeast to 02°20′ south, 146° east; Thence east to 02°20′ south, 159° east; Thence south. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No. 1271 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1271 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 890/3 [ Babelsberg ,] 22 July 1945. Command in Indo-China 1. We agree that as a first step in reorganising command in Indo-China, there is advantage in dividing the country into two, leaving the northern portion in China Theatre and allotting the southern portion to Southeast Asia Command. This organisation of command should be subject to review in the light of the development of operations in that area. 2. We have examined the run of communications in Indo-China and suggest that the most satisfactory dividing line would be latitude 16° N. 3. We, therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should include in their final report to the Prime Minister and President, a statement on the following lines:— “We consider it important that there shall be unity of control of major operations in the Indo-China–Siam area when they develop and of previous subversive and para-military operations. As the first step in securing this unity of control, we are agreed that the best arrangement would be to include that portion of Indo-China lying south of latitude 16° North in Southeast Asia Command. This arrangement would continue General Wedemeyer’s control of that part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected Chinese operations in China, and would enable Admiral Mountbatten to prepare the ground in the southern half of Indo-China where any initial operations by him would develop. “We recommend that the President and the Prime Minister should approach the Generalissimo to secure his agreement to this arrangement.” 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 199th Meeting, July 23. See ante , p. 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] . Cf. document No. 1381 , paragraph 14. No. 1272 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1272 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff top secret C. C. S. 900/1 ( Terminal ) [ Babelsberg ,] 23 July 1945. Report to the President and Prime Minister Reference: C. C. S. 900 1 In order to more accurately describe the boundary between the British and U. S. areas of command in the Southwest Pacific, the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the attached Appendix “C” be substituted in lieu of Appendix “C” to C. C. S. 900. 2 [Attachment] top secret Appendix “C” Boundary Between the British and U. S. Areas of Command in the Southwest Pacific 3 (See paragraph 14 of the Report) The following will be the boundary between the British and U. S. areas of command in the Southwest Pacific: “Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16° north; thence to intersect at 7 degrees 40 minutes north latitude 116° east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence through Balabac Strait along the 1939 boundary line between of the Philippines and-Borneo to latitude 05 ° north longitude 127° east; thence east to 05° north 130° east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140° east; thence generally southeast to 02°20′ south 146° east; thence east to 02°20′ south 159° east; thence south.” 1 Not printed. 2 Not printed as such. Text of appendix C to C. C. S. 900 is the same as the amended appendix C, infra , with the omission of all words in italics. 3 Additions indicated by italics; deletions, by canceled type. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1272 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister, see post , pages 1464 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1465 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1469–1471 [ Pg. 1469 is part of Doc. 1381 ] . No. 1273 The President to the Ambassador in China (Hurley) Nanking Embassy Files: Telegram No. 1273 The President to the Ambassador in China ( Hurley ) 1 top secret operational priority Berlin , 1 Aug[ust 1945.] Top secret from the President to Ambassador Hurley. Please deliver the following message from me to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. “1. At the Potsdam Conference the Prime Minister of Great Britain and I, in consultation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, have had under consideration future military operations in South-East Asia. 2. On the advice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff we have reached the conclusion that for operational purposes it is desirable to include that portion of French Indo-China lying south of 16° north latitude in the Southeast Asia Command. This arrangement would leave in the China Theater that part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected Chinese operations in China and would at the same time enable Admiral Mountbatten to develop operations in the southern half of Indo-China. 3. I greatly hope that the above conclusions will recommend themselves to Your Excellency and that, for the purpose of facilitating operations against the common enemy, Your Excellency will feel able to concur in the proposed arrangements. 2 4. I understand that the Prime Minister of Great Britain is addressing a communication to Your Excellency in a similar sense. Signed Harry S. Truman.” 1 There is in the Truman Papers a typed draft of a telegram from Attlee to Chiang on which manuscript changes have been made to convert it into a message from Truman to Hurley which is substantially identical with the message here printed as received in Chungking. 2 Chiang’s reply was not received until after the conclusion of the Berlin Conference. Relationship of the Soviet Union to the war against Japan Relationship of the Soviet Union to the war against Japan [[Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1274] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President [Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945. 740.0011 P. W./7–1645 [1275] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Washington [Babelsberg], 16 July 1945. Truman Papers [1276] Text Proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg, July 21, 1945.] J. C. S. Files [1277] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Washington [Babelsberg], 21 July 1945. Truman Papers [1278] President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin [Babelsberg,] 21 July 1945. Truman Papers [[Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1279] The United States Chiefs of Staff to the Soviet Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg, July 24, 1945.] J. C. S. Files [1280] Memorandum by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union (Deane) [Undated.] J. C. S. Files [1281] The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations (King) to the Navy Department [Babelsberg,] 26 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1282] President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin [Babelsberg,] July 31, 1945. Truman Papers Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Related papers are printed under the following headings: ( a ) United Nations—Possible Trusteeship for Italian Colonial Territories and Korea, ante , page 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 732 ] ; ( b ) China—Negotiations With the Soviet Union, ante , page 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 1212 ] ; and ( c ) Japan—Peace Feelers Through the Soviet Union, ante , page 1248 [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] and Doc. 1223 ] . No. 1274 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President 740.0011 P. W./7–1645 No. 1274 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President 1 [Extracts 2 ] top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 16 July 1945. Memorandum for the President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Whether the Russians are to be notified of our intentions in advance in this regard, 3 would depend upon whether an agreement satisfactory to us had been reached with the Russians on the terms of their entry into the Japanese war. the yalta agreements As for the Russian participation and the so-called Yalta Agreements, 4 I believe that these agreements, so long as they are interpreted consistently with our traditional policy toward China, should not cause us any concern from a security point of view, assuming always we keep clear our control over the Pacific islands. By our traditional policy toward China I refer, of course, to the Open Door and the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . allied occupation of the main japanese islands I would hope that our occupation of the Japanese islands would not involve the government of the country as a whole in any such manner as we are committed in Germany. I am afraid we would make a hash of it if we tried. The Japanese are an oriental people with an oriental mind and religion. Our occupation should be limited to that necessary to ( a ) impress the Japanese, and the orient as a whole, with the fact of Japanese defeat, ( b ) demilitarize the country, and ( c ) punish war criminals, including those responsible for the perfidy of Pearl Harbor. If the Russians seek joint occupation after a creditable participation in the conquest of Japan, I do not see how we could refuse at least a token occupation. I feel, however, that no prolonged occupation by the Soviet should be approved and, indeed, any occupation by any major ally which exceeds our own, either in the strength of forces employed or in duration. I would approve their occupation of the Kuriles or indeed their cession to Russia, but I do not relish Russian occupation further south. If there is to be occupation of the main islands, the conditions and terms must certainly be determined by us. If the Kuriles are to be ceded to Russia, we should retain permanent landing rights therein, as the islands are located in a great circle route to Japan from the United States, and would substantially shorten our mileage on air voyages following this route. Henry L Stimson 1 Submitted to Byrnes for transmittal to Truman (see document No. 1236 ). 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see the enclosure to document No. 1236 , and documents Nos. 732 and 1212 . 3 i. e., with regard to issuing a warning to Japan. See the enclosure to document No. 1236 . 4 i. e., the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan signed by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill on February 11, 1945. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984 . No. 1275 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Truman Papers No. 1275 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President 1 top secret Washington [ Babelsberg ], 16 July 1945. Memorandum for the President The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the Russian Chiefs of Staff should have the opportunity of holding conversations with the United States Chiefs of Staff as early in the Terminal Conference as they may desire. It would be desirable that this opportunity be offered them by the President in the course of his first conversations with Marshal Stalin. The United States Chiefs of Staff have presented no agenda to the Russians. We have advised them that we would be pleased to discuss with them the exchange of liaison parties and intelligence on the Japanese situation, and that we are ready to discuss any other problems which the Russians may wish to present. 2 In view of this fact, the suggestion of a meeting should properly originate with Marshal Stalin. Failing such suggestion from Marshal Stalin, however, it would be in keeping with our proposed procedure insofar as the Russians are concerned if the President should suggest to Marshal Stalin that his Chiefs of Staff are here and are prepared to discuss these and any other matters which the Russian Chiefs of Staff may wish to present. 3 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: William D. Leahy , 4 Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy . 1 Attached to this memorandum is the following manuscript memorandum by Leahy: “President ask Marshal Stalin[:] When will Soviet Staff officers meet with the American Staff.” For Truman’s endorsement, see ante , p. 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] . 2 See vol. i , documents Nos. 171 and 185 . 3 Stimson’s diary contains the following passages relating to arrangements for a Soviet-American military meeting and to broader aspects of the Soviet relationship to the war against Japan: “[July 23:] After lunch and a short rest I received Generals Marshall and Arnold, and had in McCloy and Bundy at the conference. The President had told me at a meeting in the morning that he was very anxious to know whether Marshall felt that we needed the Russians in the war or whether we could get along without them, and that was one of the subjects we talked over. Of course Marshall could not answer directly or explicitly. We had desired the Russians to come into the war originally for the sake of holding up in Manchuria the Japanese Manchurian Army. That now was being accomplished as the Russians have amassed their forces on that border, Marshall said, and were poised, and the Japanese were moving up positions in their Army. But he pointed out that even if we went ahead in the war without the Russians, and compelled the Japanese to surrender to our terms, that would not prevent the Russians from marching into Manchuria anyhow and striking, thus permitting them to get virtually what they wanted in the surrender terms. Marshall told us during our conference that he thought thus far in the military conference they had handled only the British problems and that these are practically all settled now and probably would be tied up and finished tomorrow. He suggested that it might be a good thing, something which would call the Russians to a decision one way or the other, if the President would say to Stalin tomorrow that ‘inasmuch as the British have finished and are going home, I suppose I might as well let the American Chiefs of Staff go away also’ that might bring the Russians to make known what their position was and what they were going to do, and of course that indicated that Marshall felt as I felt sure he would that now with our new weapon we would not need the assistance of the Russians to conquer Japan. … “[July 24:] At nine-twenty I went to ‘The Little White House’ and was at once shown into the President’s room where he was alone with his work, and he told me about the events of yesterday’s meeting with which he seemed to be very well satisfied. I then told him of my conference with Marshall and the implication that could be inferred as to his feeling that the Russians were not needed. I also told the President of the question which Marshall had suggested might be put to Stalin as to the Americans going home, and he said that he would do that this afternoon at the end of the hearing [i. e., the plenary meeting], but he told me that there had been a meeting called by Leahy of the Military Staffs to meet either this afternoon or I think tomorrow morning. ...” For subsequent accounts of Truman’s own attitude, at the time of the Berlin Conference, with respect to Soviet entry into the war against Japan and the opinions of his other principal advisers at Berlin on this subject, see Truman, Year of Decisions , pp. 314–315, 322–323, 387, 411; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly , p. 208; Byrnes, All in One Lifetime , pp. 297–298; Leahy, I Was There , p. 422; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, 1948), pp. 441–442. 4 The original bears only a typed signature. No. 1276 Text Proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1276 Text Proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Extract 1 ] top secret Enclosure to C. C. S. 877/5 [ Babelsberg , July 21, 1945.] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:— a . Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 For the full text of this document, see the enclosure to document No. 1264 . The same language had appeared in drafts of June 14 (see vol. i , document No. 600, footnote 1 ) and July 20 (see the enclosure to document No. 1263 ). No. 1277 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President Truman Papers No. 1277 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President top secret Washington [ Babelsberg ], 21 July 1945. Memorandum for the President It is requested that the appended memorandum, 1 which is self-explanatory, be presented to Generalissimo Stalin. At the Yalta conference a proposal was made to provide additional weather stations in the Siberian area with special U. S. equipment for upper air soundings and both the equipment and U. S. personnel to operate it were offered. The Russians approved the establishment of the stations and the use of the U. S. equipment but stated that they did not want the U. S. personnel. 2 Most of this equipment has been shipped. The Soviets have in the past been most reluctant to allow U. S. personnel to operate within their boundaries. It is believed that your personal intercession is necessary to obtain this permission. In view of the vital importance of accurate weather forecasts to the success of forthcoming operations, which forecasts can best be produced by U. S. personnel, the acceptance by Generalissimo Stalin of our proposal to establish and man the two weather controls indicated in attached memorandum should be strongly urged. If, however, Stalin persists in his refusal to admit U. S. personnel to Siberia for this purpose and offers to man these facilities with Russian personnel, agreement to his counter proposal, though far from satisfactory, will be better than nothing. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: William D Leahy Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. 1 See document No. 1278 . 2 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 393 , 399 , 733 – 734 , 758 , 760 , 764 , 836 – 837 , 840 . No. 1278 President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin Truman Papers No. 1278 President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin top secret [ Babelsberg ,] 21 July 1945. 1 My Dear Generalissimo : It has become highly desirable because of increasing operations of naval and air forces adjacent to Japan and Siberia to augment the facilities for the collection and dissemination of weather information in Eastern Siberia. The increased services should be equally beneficial to the Soviet Union. Weather in the Japan and Japan Sea Area is affected not only by weather movement from West to East over Eastern Siberia but also by the movement associated with typhoons which pass from the Western Pacific northward over Japan. It is considered that the above urgent needs can best be met through expansion of the United States communications net by providing equipment and liaison personnel for establishment of radio stations and weather controls at Khabarovsk and Petropavlovsk. United States personnel would consist of approximately 60 officers and men at Khabarovsk and 33 officers and men at Petropavlovsk. Details of this proposal have been previously communicated to the Soviet General Staff. Because of the important bearing of weather on current and future operations, early accomplishment of these proposed improvements is most important. I, therefore, urge your approval and the issuance of the necessary instructions for the early completion of the detailed arrangements by our respective staffs. Harry S. Truman 1 The copy in the Truman Papers is so dated, but the letter was apparently not delivered until July 23. See ante , p. 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , and post , p. 1327 [ Pg. 1327 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] and Doc. 1279 ] . An oral answer was received on July 26. See ante , p. 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister, see post , page 1463 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , paragraph 7 a , and page 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , paragraph 18. No. 1279 The United States Chiefs of Staff to the Soviet Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1279 The United States Chiefs of Staff to the Soviet Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret [ Babelsberg , July 24, 1945.] First Question —Has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish United States weather liaison groups in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk as presented to Generalissimo Stalin by President Truman on 23 July 1945? 2 Second Question —United States naval surface forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. United States submarine forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan, south and east of a line established by connecting the following points: Coast of Korea at latitude 38° north, thence to latitude 40° north longitude 135° east, thence to latitude 45°45′ north longitude 140° east, thence along the parallel of latitude 45°45′ north. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. United States submarine operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of naval operations? Third Question —United States air forces will operate without restriction south and east of the following line: Cape Lopatka, west to point at latitude 51°10′ north longitude 147° east, thence to point at latitude 45°45′ north longitude 144°20′ east, thence to point at latitude 45°4′ north longitude 139°30′ east, thence to point at latitude 41°20′ north longitude 133°20′ east, thence westward to Seishin [ Chongjin ], Korea, thence north to railroad at Korean border, thence westward along railroad to Yungki and Changchun, thence along the river to Liaoyuan, Kailu and Chihfeng, thence along the railroad through Tolun, Paochang, Wanchuan [ Kalgan ], Tatung, Fengchen, Tsining [ Chining ] to Kweisui, thence northwest to the border of Outer Mongolia. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. United States air operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air operations? Fourth Question —Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal for the immediate establishment of operational coordination and liaison as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission, 3 to General Antonov on 5 July 1945? 4 Fifth Question —It is assumed that, after D–day, Soviet or United States air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet or United States ports or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing, medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat. Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly facility would be sought, it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas where maximum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Government designate such ports, airfields or areas furnishing information necessary for proper location, identification and approach together with information on recognition signals, corridors of approach and exit for general use in any emergency, landing or coastal approach? The United States is prepared to take corresponding action in the case of Soviet aircraft. 1 Annex to the minutes of the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and the Soviet Union, July 26. See ante , p. 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] . These questions were handed to Antonov on July 24. See ante , p. 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , A copy was communicated to the British Chiefs of Staff on July 25. 2 See document No.1278. 3 Major General John R. Deane. 4 Document No. 185, printed in vol. i . No. 1280 Memorandum by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union (Deane) J. C. S. Files No. 1280 Memorandum by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union ( Deane ) 1 top secret [Undated.] Agenda and Procedure for U. S.–U. S. S. R. Chiefs of Staff Conference at “Terminal” 1. It is recommended that, immediately after the meeting opens, the Soviet Chiefs of Staff be asked whether they are prepared to answer the questions handed them on Tuesday. 2 If not, or if the answers are not satisfactory, Admiral Leahy might then inform them that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to comment briefly on the questions. (Comments following each question are intended as suggestions for use by the United States Chiefs of Staff.) First Question —Has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish U. S. weather liaison groups in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk as presented to Generalissimus Stalin by President Truman on 23 July 1945? 3 Comment —It is suggested that at this point, Admiral King hand to the Russian General Staff a memorandum covering the details of this proposal, and, at the same time, make such comment as he considers desirable. Second Question —U. S. naval surface forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. U. S. submarine forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan, south and east of a line established by connecting the following points: Coast of Korea at Lat. 38° N, thence to Lat. 40° N Long. 135° E, thence to Lat. 45°–45′ N Long. 140° E, thence along the parallel of Latitude 45°–45′ N. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. U. S. submarine operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of naval operations? Comment —We feel that unrestricted operations of U. S. naval surface forces can be accomplished with very little danger of conflict and will contribute most to the speedy defeat of Japan. We consider that a line delineating the areas of submarine operations is necessary and that the line selected will provide areas suitable for submarine warfare in support of our respective strategic and tactical aims. This line can be modified and operations across the line facilitated through Soviet liaison between commanders in the field. Third Question —U. S. air forces will operate without restriction south and east of the following line: Cape Lopatka, west to point at Lat. 51° 10′ N Long. 147° E, thence to point at Lat. 45° 45′ N Long. 144° 20′ E, thence to point at Lat. 45° 45′ N Long. 139° 30′ E, thence to point at Lat. 41° 20′ N Long. 133° 20′ E, thence westward to Seishin [ Chongjin ], Korea, thence north to railroad at Korean border, thence westward along railroad to Yungki and Changchun, thence along the river to Liaoyuan, Kailu and Chihfeng, thence along the railroad through Tolun, Paochang, Wanchuan [ Kalgan ], Tatung, Fengchen, Tsining [ Chining ] to Kweisui, thence northwest to the border of Outer Mongolia. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. U. S. air operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air operations? Comment —We consider that a limiting line for unrestricted operations of U. S. Air Forces is necessary until effective operational liaison is established and that the line selected will give U. S. air operations maximum effectiveness in the defeat of Japan. Variations or adjustments of this line can best be made as the developing military situation requires, and operations across the line most satisfactorily coordinated, through direct liaison between commanders in the field. Fourth Question —Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal for the immediate establishment of operational coordination and liaison as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission, to General Antonov on 5 July 1945 (J. C. S. 1420)? 4 Comment —The following reasons for this question should be brought out in discussion: a . Rapid communication between field commanders concerning Japanese naval and air forces, the activities of our own sea and air forces, and the safety of supply ships at sea will be of great importance on and after D–Day. b . Direct operational liaison is essential for arranging quickly and efficiently changes in the boundaries stated in questions two and three, and operations across the boundary line. c . The present communications system, which requires the processing of information around the world through Washington and Moscow, is too slow for operational liaison between our respective field commanders. d . This operational liaison machinery would not concern itself with matters of policy which would continue to be decided in Washington and Moscow. Fifth Question —It is assumed that, after D–Day, Soviet or U. S. air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet or U. S. ports or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing, medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat. Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly facility would be sought, it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas where maximum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Government designate such ports, airfields or areas furnishing information necessary for proper location, identification and approach together with information on recognition signals, corridors of approach and exit for general use in any emergency landing or coastal approach? The United States is prepared to take corresponding action in the case of Soviet aircraft. 2. It is recommended that the following lines of action be taken with the Soviet General Staff only in the event they raise the subjects: a. Pacific Convoys after D–Day . The following questions should be asked the Russians, indicating that our views cannot be given until the answers are received: (1) What will be the Soviet status of supply in the Far East at the outbreak of hostilities? (2) What supplies necessary to the operations in the Far East and still to be delivered could be sent via the Atlantic and Trans-Sib[erian] Railroad after the outbreak of hostilities? (3) What plans have the Soviets for the vessels en route to Siberia or loading in U. S. West Coast ports at the outbreak of war? (4) What are Soviet views with regard to composition, assembly, escort, timing, routing and control of convoys from U. S. West Coast to Siberia? (5) What assistance will the Soviets require from the U. S. for escort and cover for these convoys? (6) If U. S. assistance is required, what are Soviet views as to methods of liaison and communications between U. S. and Soviet forces? b. Diversion of the Pacific Supply Program to the Atlantic after D–Day . The United States Chiefs of Staff should inform the Soviet Chiefs of Staff that as a general policy we shall not ship via the Atlantic any items which are now on hand in Western Russia, either from Soviet production or from stockpiles of U. S. goods previously delivered. Subject to that policy, once the Pacific supply route is closed, and provided Trans-Siberian rail capacity is available, we will ship those items to Russia via the Atlantic which remain undelivered under Annex III of the Fourth Protocol. 5 Likewise with regard to the request for supplies and equipment submitted by the Soviet Government on 28 May, 6 we shall ship via the Atlantic rolling stock previously planned for shipment via the Pacific, petroleum products, medical supplies and certain categories of food. Comment —In connection with the above policy it is recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff advise the Soviet Chiefs of Staff that planning for a revised shipping program after D–Day should be initiated at once, and that any Soviet requests should be submitted without delay. It should be emphasized that we cannot deliver supplies on the spur of the moment regardless of the degree of urgency. c. Provision of U. S. Heavy Bombers to Russia . (1) As it would be at least five months before heavy bombers supplied to Russia could be operational in any significant number and as the contribution therefrom to U. S. effort would be negligible, it is recommended that any request for heavy bombers be refused. Comment —Since previous U. S. offers of heavy bombers were not accepted, U. S. production has been readjusted to provide only for the support of the U. S. Pacific air operations. (2) Should it become necessary, for any reason, to accede to a request for heavy bombers, it is recommended that the Soviet Chiefs of Staff be informed as follows: There are available a number of used B–24’s which are serviceable. However, the U. S. cannot commit itself to the support and maintenance of a Russian heavy bomber force by provision of additional replacement aircraft, engines, spare parts, tools, armament, radio equipment, ground accessory equipment and special airdrome equipment and is not prepared to participate in a training program. d. Milepost . . (Including list of 28 May) If the Soviets bring up the subject of delivery of specific supplies it is recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff listen to what they have to say and agree to furnish answers to any questions later through the Military Mission. 1 Printed from a mimeographed copy circulated on July 24 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This memorandum was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by informal action on July 26. 2 See document No. 1279 . 3 See document No. 1278 . 4 Document No. 185, printed in vol. i . 5 Text in Wartime International Agreements: Soviet Supply Protocols (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947; Department of State publication No. 2759), p. 89. 6 Not printed. No. 1281 The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations (King) to the Navy Department Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1281 The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations ( King ) to the Navy Department top secret priority [ Babelsberg ,] 26 July 1945. Victory 352. This is Lockup . CominCh sends No. 24 to CominCh and CNO Administrative Office for action MilMis Moscow for info. Soviets have agreed 1 to establishment of facilities outlined your 122012 and 171951. 2 Detailed arrangements as to entry of personnel still to be made. Soviets will receive communication and aerological material now. Request tonnage cube place and date of assembly of this material for each station. Advise schedule of Soviet west coast sailings and Hula transfers by which material could be shipped to Petropavlovsk and/or Vladivostok. Possibility of use of east coast sailings for transportation overland via Europe should also be reported. In addition desire detail your plans for transportation via United States aircraft thru Alaska in event Soviet authorize this method of delivery. Send reply MilMis Moscow for action. 1 See ante , pp. 409–410 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] . 2 Neither printed. These messages dealt with the establishment of United States weather liaison groups in Siberia. No. 1282 President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin Truman Papers No. 1282 President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin [ Babelsberg ,] July 31, 1945. Memorandum for Generalissimo Stalin In response to your suggestion 1 that I write you a letter as to the Far Eastern situation, I am attaching a form of letter which I propose to send you at your convenience after you notify me you have reached an agreement with the Government of China. 2 If this is satisfactory to you, you can let me know immediately when you have reached such agreement and I will wire you the letter, to be used as you see fit. I will also send you by fastest courier the official letter, signed by me. If you decide to use it it will be all right. However, if you decide to issue a statement basing your action on other grounds or for any other reason prefer not to use this letter it will be satisfactory to me. I leave it to your good judgment. 3 Harry S. Truman [Attachment] [ Draft of Letter From President Truman to Generalissimo Stalin ] 4 Washington , July 31, 1945. Dear Generalissimo Stalin : Paragraph 5 of the Declaration signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943 5 by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China, provides: “5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.” Article 106 of the proposed Charter of the United Nations 6 provides: “Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.” Article 103 of the Charter provides: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” Though the Charter has not been formally ratified, at San Francisco it was agreed to by the Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet government will be one of the permanent members of the Security Council. It seems to me that under the terms of the Moscow Declaration and the provisions of the Charter, above referred to, it would be proper for the Soviet Union to indicate its willingness to consult and cooperate with other great powers now at war with Japan with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations to maintain peace and security. Sincerely yours, [No signature] 1 See ante , p. 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] . 2 Stalin had told Truman on July 17 that the Soviet Union would need to complete its pending negotiations with China before entering the war against Japan. See pod , p. 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 1418 ] . Cf. ante , p. 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] . 3 The Department of State was notified on November 17, 1950, by George M. Elsey, Administrative Assistant to the President, that Truman’s files in the White House had been searched and that there was no record whatsoever of any subsequent exchange with Stalin relating to this memorandum. Cf. the Soviet declaration of war on Japan quoted in footnote 1 to document No. 1382 . 4 For information on the preparation of this draft letter, see Byrnes, Speaking Frankly , pp. 208–209; Byrnes, All in One Lifetime , p. 298. Leahy ( I Was There , p. 424) states that Truman handed it to Stalin at the Plenary Meeting on July 31. 5 Full text in Department of State Bulletin , vol. ix , p. 308. 6 Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031. British Commonwealth participation in the war against Japan British Commonwealth participation in the war against Japan [[Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1283] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 17 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1284] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1285] Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 20 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1286] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 21 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1287] The War Shipping Administrator (Land) and the Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration (Bissell) to the Acting War Shipping Administrator (Conway) Babelsberg, 23 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)]] Editor’s Note Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Related papers are printed under the following headings: ( a ) Japan—Basic Military Objectives, Strategy, and Policies in the War Against Japan, ante , page 1299 [ Pg. 1299 includes portions of Doc. 1262 and Doc. 1263 ] , and ( b ) Japan—Control and Command in the War Against Japan, ante , page 1313 [ Pg. 1313 is part of Doc. 1267 ] . No. 1283 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1283 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 889/1 [ Babelsberg ,] 17 July 1945. British Participation in the War Against Japan 1. The United States Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their previous agreement to the proposals in subparagraphs 3 a . and b . of C. C. S. 889. 2 In connection with the latter proposal it should be noted that there is little prospect that airfield space for more than ten squadrons of a British very long range (VLR) bomber force will become available at least before 1 December 1945. 2. As to paragraph 3 c , the United States Chiefs of Staff agree in principle to the participation in the final phase of the war against Japan of a British Commonwealth land force, subject to satisfactory resolution of operational problems by Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific, 3 and Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 4 and to the clarification of certain factors which the United States Chiefs of Staff believe will be controlling. Their views on some of these factors follow:— a . It is essential that a firm commitment be received as to dates of availability and composition of forces in order to plan for their participation in the final effort and to effect adjustments of the United States redeployment program. It is not practicable to plan on using forces whose availability is contingent upon their release following the conclusion of a separate major operation. Hence it appears these forces cannot at present be planned for use earlier than the build-up phase of Coronet. b . The difficulties incident to the employment of Indian troops (language complications and the necessity for prior acclimatization) make it doubtful that the Indian division can be effectively employed. c . Arrangements have already been made with the Canadian Government to organize and equip along United States lines one Canadian division, to operate as a part of a United States corps. d . It is noted that agreement of the Dominions concerned has not yet been obtained. e . A solution must be found to the complicated logistical problems involved. f . The forces should be concentrated in the Pacific or in the United States well in advance of the date scheduled for their participation in the campaign. g . The question of the provision of assault lift requires clarification. h . It is considered impracticable to superimpose upon the already adequate U. S. tactical air forces a small British tactical air force, since this would overload prospective airfields and introduce complications resulting from additional aircraft types. i . The effect of the proposals upon continued operations in the Southeast Asia Command requires further examination. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 194th Meeting, July 17 See ante , p. 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] . 2 Document No. 615, printed in vol. i . 3 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. 4 Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. No. 1284 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1284 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff top secret C. C. S. 889/2 [ Babelsberg ,] 18 July 1945. British Participation in the War Against Japan The following extracts of a message from General MacArthur to the War Department under date of 9 July 1945 concerning British participation in the war against Japan are furnished for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff:— The scope of the British proposal for participation in Coronet presents problems not heretofore encountered when the Canadian and French contingents were considered. These problems must be viewed in their proper perspective as they relate to the specific operation in contemplation unless complexity, particularly as applies to logistics, and lack of homogeneity of forces destroy combat effectiveness or require a delay in target date. This operation, as at present visualized, is confined to narrow limits. There will be no opportunity to assign separate sectors of responsibility along national lines. The assault is to be made into heavily defended areas and calls for the closest coordination of air, naval, and ground forces, and within the ground forces themselves. Acceptance of the British in the assault with the differences in organization, composition, equipment, training procedures, and doctrines will complicate command, operations, and logistic support. Redeployment geared to the support of homogeneous forces and now well advanced, would have to undergo a large-scale readjustment, particularly taking into consideration a parallel line of British logistic channels, including separate bases, storage, issuance and maintenance facilities, and personnel therefor. British forces participating in operations against Singapore in November could not be prepared for the assault phase in Coronet . It is considered doubtful that these forces could participate even in the follow-up. Certainly, to utilize considerable numbers of troops without adequate opportunity on the part of higher commanders of this area to exercise command functions prior to their use would be a most dangerous expedient. Moreover, it would be entirely unsatisfactory to have the availability of troops scheduled for Coronet dependent in any way upon their release from another campaign. Availability of these troops as well as all others committed must be certain for a fixed date. The following general plan is suggested as being one which will obviate the full impact of the objectionable features indicated above. This plan takes into consideration previous communications relating to the use of Australian forces as well as Canadian forces. a . Limit British Empire participation to one corps of three divisions; one British, one Canadian, and one Australian. b . Re-equip British division and corps troops and Australian division with American equipment, logistic support to be provided by the United States on the same scale as provided for our troops. c . The Australian division to be either the 7th or 9th Division, now concentrated in the Borneo–Morotai area. d . British division and corps troops to be concentrated by 1st December in the Borneo-Morotai area or, as an alternate, in the United States, if these units can be equipped there. e . Amphibiously train one British division and one Canadian division prior to arrival in concentration area. The Australian division is already amphibiously trained. f . Lift this corps on assault shipping to be provided by the British to arrive in the objective area about Y plus 10. 1 It will there be used as the AFPac assault reserve afloat. Canadian division to be lifted directly from the United States, Australian division from the Borneo–Morotai area, and British division and corps troops from either area depending on where it is concentrated. g . Fight this corps as an integral corps within a United States Army. Utilize divisions separately within American corps if the exigencies of the situation so demand. I doubt the advisability of employing troops of native origin in this complex operation where homogeneity of language within the corps is required. Likewise, there is a question of the advisability of utilizing troops of tropical origin in a temperate zone without an extended period of acclimatization. Hence, the acceptance of Indian troops is not concurred in. The British division should be Anglo-Saxon. The foregoing comments are equally applicable to Allied air components, aggravated by the difficulties of integrating relatively small air forces in tactical operations under the restrictions imposed by a comparatively limited air deployment potential. There are ample American air forces in or projected for this area to support all troops in Coronet operation. 1 i. e., ten days after the target date for Coronet. No. 1285 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1285 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 892/1 ( Terminal ) [ Babelsberg ,] 20 July 1945. Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia We submit for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the attached draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia. 2 [Enclosure] top secret Draft Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia 3 1. Your primary task is the opening of the Straits of Malacca at the earliest possible moment. It is also intended that British Commonwealth land forces should take part in the main operations against Japan which have been agreed as the supreme operations in the war; and that operations should continue in the Outer Zone to the extent that forces and resources permit. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . British Participation in Main Operations against Japan. 7. It has been agreed in principle that a British Commonwealth land force of from three to five divisions and [, if possible, 5 ] a small tactical air force should take part in the main operations against Japan in the Spring of 1946. [Units of the East Indies Fleet may also take part. 6 ] Certain important factors relating to this are still under examination. 8. You will be required to provide a proportion of this force together with the long range portion of two assault forces. 7 Units of the East Indies Fleet may also take part. 8 The exact composition of this force and its role and the mounting and supporting arrangements will be discussed between [Admiral Nimitz, 9 ] General MacArthur and the British Force Commanders, and will receive final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 9. The requirements for the force taking part in the main operations against Japan must have priority over all the other tasks indicated below. Operations in the Outer Zone. 10. Subject to the fulfillment of the higher priority commitments given above, you will, within the limits of available resources, carry out operations designed to: a . Complete the liberation of Malaya. b . Maintain pressure on the Japanese across the Burma–Siam frontier. c . Capture the key areas of Siam. d . Establish bridgeheads in Java and/or Sumatra to enable the subsequent clearance of these areas to be undertaken in due course. 11. You will submit a programme of operations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as you are in a position to do so. Development of Bases. 12. You will develop Singapore and such other bases as you may require to the extent necessary for operations against the Japanese. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 197th Meeting, July 20. See ante , p. 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] . 2 Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. 3 After making a number of amendments in the text of this draft directive, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the text, as amended, and it was circulated as the enclosure to C. C. S. 892/2, July 20. The amendments are indicated in the succeeding footnotes. 4 For paragraphs 2–6, omitted here, see the enclosure to document No. 1269 . 5 The words in brackets were added in C. C. S. 892/2. 6 The sentence in brackets was added at this point in C. C. S. 892/2. 7 In C. C. S. 892/2 the words “assault lift for two divisions” were substituted for the last seven words of this sentence. 8 In C. C. S. 892/2 this sentence was dropped from this paragraph and inserted in paragraph 7 (see footnote 6, ante ). 9 The words in brackets were added in C. C. S. 892/2. No. 1286 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1286 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff top secret C. C. S. 889/3 [ Babelsberg ,] 21 July 1945. British Participation in the War Against Japan General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz welcome the visit of a British corps commander and accompanying officers. General MacArthur suggests that they should arrive at an early date, and if practicable by 1 August. It is suggested that further matters connected with this visit be handled on an operational basis between the British Joint Staff Mission and the operating agencies concerned of the War and Navy Departments No. 1287 The War Shipping Administrator (Land) and the Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration (Bissell) to the Acting War Shipping Administrator (Conway) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1287 The War Shipping Administrator ( Land ) and the Director of the Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration ( Bissell ) to the Acting War Shipping Administrator ( Conway ) secret priority Babelsberg , 23 July 1945. Victory 233. To Conway from Land and Bissell reference your War 34607 of 19 July. 1 1. Have discussed with British use of their ships in the Pacific. They are assuming substantial commitments there in connection with developments in military plans and will also assist with redeployment sailings. Following arrangements agreed. 2. In connection with separation of Australia, New Guinea, and N. E. I. from MacArthur’s Theater and placing of these areas under British military command 2 M. W. T. have agreed to assume responsibility for retentions in British area as well as maintenance from U. S. and U. K. Estimate this will involve about 30 M. W. T. retentions and corresponding relief to MacArthur. 3. 3 to 5 British divisions expected to take part in Pacific operations under MacArthur’s command replacing equivalent number of U. S. divisions. 3 M. W. T. have agreed to provide all shipping required for organizational equipment and maintenance these forces. If U. S. Army undertakes supply responsibility, M. W. T. will put number of vessels required for support of British divisions into W. S. A. Pacific pool. British Army estimates total shipping required to support 5 divisions including retentions and long voyages would be 80 to 100 vessels employed for 3 months smaller number permanently employed thereafter. 4. In addition to commitments paras 2 and 3 M. W. T. is providing 100 military retentions in S. E. A. C. 5. M. W. T. has agreed to provide minimum of 25 sailings for ammo cargoes from E. T. O. to Pacific. Up to 20 can be provided in August thereby covering most or all of August requirements. Total of 25 may be increased sufficiently to cover most of September requirement as well. 6. We have agreed that provision British shipping for military purposes in Pacific as described above is more important than blowup of 18 Sam ships to carry troops and we expect to drop request for conversions. 7. If you have any comments or recommendations please cable soonest to Bissell London. Otherwise will assume you authorize Monroe to arrange for use of M. W. T. vessels on above basis for August loadings in U. K. 1 Not printed. 2 See document No. 1381 , paragraph]13. 3 See document No. 1284 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister, see post , pages 1464 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 1381 ] ff. French and Netherland participation in the war against Japan French and Netherland participation in the war against Japan [1288] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1289] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1290] Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1291] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 19 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1292] The Ambassador to the Netherlands (Hornbeck) to the Acting Secretary of State London, July 21, 1945—5 p.m. 740.0011 PW/7–2145: Telegram [1293] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Netherlands (Hornbeck) Washington, July 23, 1945—6 p.m. 740.0011 PW/7–2145: Telegram [1294] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] July 23, 1945. 861.00/7–2345 [[Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 1288 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1288 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 895 [ Babelsberg ,] 16 July 1945. Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in Far Eastern Operations There are attached (Enclosure “A”) a memorandum in which the French propose to place a French corps of two infantry divisions under American command in the Pacific war and (Enclosure “B”) a reply proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff. Since the British Chiefs of Staff may have views as to the areas in which these French troops should be employed, though perhaps not under United States command, their comment or concurrence is requested. General MacArthur proposes, if the French corps is assigned to him, to use it in the main effort against Japan in late spring of 1946. [Enclosure A] The Chief of the French Military Mission in the United States ( Brossin de Saint Didier ) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army ( Marshall ) top secret No. 432/EM Washington , May 29, 1945. Memorandum for General George C. Marshall Subject: French participation in Far Eastern operations During conversations between President Truman and Mr. Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Provisional Government, 2 on the one hand, and President Truman, General Marshall and General Juin on the other, the principle of a French participation in the war against Japan was viewed favorably. Following these conversations, the French Government puts at the entire disposal of the American command, for operations in the Far East, an army corps comprising two divisions, besides corps-supporting and service units. This army corps should include:— 1) The 9th Colonial Infantry Division, already well trained, having taken a brilliant part in the French and German campaigns. In order to be able to operate in the Pacific war zone, this division would only require certain transfers of personnel (replacement by volunteers of men unfit for overseas duty). The above will be ready to be shipped by the end of June. It seems advisable that the 9th Division receive its equipment in the theater of operations. 2) The 1st Colonial Infantry Division of the Far East, planned several months ago. This division, whose colored troops will be replaced by trained European volunteers, from the French 1st Army, will be ready by the end of July, provided it receives its equipment on time. It is to be expected that the latter unit, in view of the previous training of its personnel, will be ready for combat duty a month after receipt of its equipment. To save time, immediate delivery of its equipment is therefore suggested. In case the above is delivered only in the theater of operations, a corresponding delay would be needed by the 1st Division, from the time of receipt of its equipment, to participate in actual combat. 3) Supporting units and services of the army corps would also be ready by the end of July. Details of its equipping will have to be worked out in accord with the American command. This army corps being put at the entire disposal of the American command, it seems logical to the French General Staff to give its units an organization similar to that of corresponding American units in the Far East. It is therefore requested, in regard to divisions as well as to supporting army corps units and services, that the types of units to be organized, be exactly defined. It is finally suggested, in order to facilitate further negotiations, that Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, be authorized to deal directly with the French command in what concerns details of the matters herewith referred to. A. M. Brossin de Saint Didier [Enclosure B] top secret Draft Memorandum for the Chief of the French Military Mission to the United States 1. With reference to your memorandum of 29 May 1945 3 addressed to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, the United States Chiefs of Staff accept in principle that portion of your proposal whereby the French Government puts at the entire disposal of the American command a French army corps of two infantry divisions, with corps-supporting and service units on the U. S. scale, for operations in the war against Japan. This acceptance in principle is with the understanding that the agreement on this matter with the French Government will include the following provisions:— a . This French corps will be, both during the period of hostilities and in the post-hostilities readjustment period until released by the United States, subject to the complete command and control of the United States command in the same manner as a U. S. army corps. b . Movement of the corps from France will be contingent upon the French corps having, in the opinion of the United States command, a combat efficiency based on United States standards. c . Assurance that adequate trained replacements will be provided by the French Government as necessary. d . Maximum use will be made of equipment provided under the North African and Metropolitan Rearmament Programs. e . The implementation of this agreement including matters such as accompanying supporting and service units, provisions for equipment, and the planning and timing for the movement and employment of the corps will be in accordance with plans and arrangements to be determined by the United States military authorities who will deal directly with the French military authorities. 2. Pressing requirements for operations in the Pacific during the coming months make certain that it will not be possible to move this corps from France for at least several months after the dates you suggest, and it appears unlikely that this corps will be committed to operations prior to the spring of 1946. 3. The United States Chiefs of Staff will advise you further in this matter subsequent to the conclusion of a governmental agreement. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See ante , p. 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] . 2 See Department of State Bulletin , vol. xii , p. 927. 3 Enclosure A, supra. No. 1289 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1289 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 842/2 [ Babelsberg ,] 18 July 1945. French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff forward the enclosed memorandum to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in lieu of the memorandum in the Enclosure to C. C. S. 842/1. 2 [Enclosure] top secret Draft Memorandum to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff 3 The Combined Chiefs of Staff have given consideration to the question of French/Netherlands participation in the war against Japan and wish to inform you of their views which are as follows:— a . While it is at present impracticable due chiefly to logistical difficulties for French or Netherlands armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance which may be synchronized with operations will be taken into account by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The use of such forces will depend solely on military considerations. French or Netherlands forces so accepted must operate under the complete control of the commander in chief concerned. b . In implementing this policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff undertake to give the French/Netherlands representatives timely information of their intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 195th Meeting, July 18. See ante , p. 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] . 2 Document No. 617, printed in vol. i . 3 Separate memoranda based on this text were dispatched to the French and Netherland Representatives by the Combined Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington on July 19. No. 1290 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1290 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 895/1 [ Babelsberg ,] 18 July 1945. Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in Far Eastern Operations 1. We have examined the proposals by the United States Chiefs of Staff for the employment of two French colonial infantry divisions in Far Eastern operations, as set out in C. C. S. 895. 2 2. In the light of the discussion at C. C. S. 194th Meeting held on 17 July 1945, 3 we suggest it would be preferable for the two French divisions to be employed in due course in French Indo-China. 3. The question of under whose command this force would operate would, we suggest, be decided in the light of the situation at the time. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See ante , p. 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] . 2 Document No. 1288 . 3 See ante , pp. 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] . No. 1291 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1291 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 895/2 [ Babelsberg ,] 19 July 1945. Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in Far Eastern Operations The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the comments of the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 895/1 2 as to the employment of the two French divisions and recommend that the enclosed memorandum be forwarded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Chief of the French Military Mission to the United States in lieu of Enclosure “B” to C. C. S. 895. 3 [Enclosure] top secret Draft Memorandum for the Chief of the French Military Mission in the United States 4 The Combined Chiefs of Staff accept in principle your offer of a French corps of two infantry divisions to serve in the Pacific war on the understanding that: — a . Whether the corps will serve under U. S. or British command and the area in which it will operate will be determined later. b . Final acceptance of the corps will involve an agreement with the government concerned on basic matters including command, combat efficiency, replacements, and logistical support. c . Maximum use will be made of equipment provided under the North African and Metropolitan Rearmament Program. d . The time of movement will be in accordance with the priority of the operations in which it is to be used. Pressing shipping and other requirements for operations in the Pacific make certain that the corps cannot be moved from France for at least several months. Whether used in the main effort or in the South China Sea area, it will not be possible to commit it to operations prior to the spring of 1946. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See ante , p. 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] . 2 Document No. 1290 . 3 Document No. 1288 . 4 This text was communicated to the Chief of the French Military Mission in a memorandum dispatched by the Combined Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington on July 19. No. 1292 The Ambassador to the Netherlands (Hornbeck) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.0011 PW/7–2145: Telegram No. 1292 The Ambassador to the Netherlands ( Hornbeck ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret us urgent London , July 21, 1945—5 p.m. Neter 187. From Hornbeck. Minister Van Royen approached me in the Hague last evening and stated on behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs 2 that Prime Minister Schermerhorn and ex-Prime Minister Gerbrandy desire to proceed to Berlin to lay before the President and Prime Minister Churchill a project for sending to Australia for special training there some 27,000 Netherlanders of whom 22,000 would be for “security forces” and 5,000 for “civil administration” purposes in connection with and preparatory to the liberation of the Netherlands East Indies. Van Royen stated that this matter was simultaneously being taken up with the British in London. Upon arrival in London this afternoon I conferred with the British Ambassador to the Netherlands, Sir Nevile Bland, and he informs me that the matter was brought to his attention here by the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs at the same time it was being brought to mine in the Hague last evening. Sir Nevile states that he immediately drafted and took to the Foreign Office a telegram in communication of the Netherland Govt’s request and that he believes that it went forward during the night to Mr. Eden in Berlin. I have also checked with the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs. Both he and Van Royen emphasize that the Netherland Govt attaches the utmost importance to this matter, especially to the objectives, both military and humanitarian, which the interview which is thus sought would be intended to serve. It is believed that it would be helpful could it be arranged that the replies of the President and the Prime Minister respectively or jointly could be communicated to the Netherland Govt as soon as possible in identical terms, and at the same or approximately the same time. For US purposes receipt by this Embassy of a reply directly from Berlin would be helpful. 1 Sent over the signature of Winant. The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 106 of July 23 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2345). 2 Eelco N. van Kleffens. No. 1293 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Netherlands (Hornbeck) 740.0011 PW/7–2145: Telegram No. 1293 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Netherlands ( Hornbeck ) 1 secret us urgent Washington , July 23, 1945—6 p.m. Neter 77. Neth Ambassador 2 has informed us under instructions re your 187, July 21, 3 that July 18 the Neth Govt expressed through SHAEF Mission Neth as well as through General [ Field Marshal ] Montgomery’s headquarters desire of Schermerhorn and Gerbrandy to lay before President Truman and PriMin Churchill (1) request for additional shipping to carry Dutch military forces to the Far East and (2) urgency from Dutch standpoint of early direct military action looking to liberation of the Indies. Reply given Dutch Govt through the same channels was to effect that the projects should be taken up with Brit and American Govts through regular channels. For your info: Various aspects of project mentioned in your reference telegram have been presented to American and Brit Govts in piecemeal fashion through military channels and are receiving urgent attention by all interested agencies. You will be informed when decisions have been arrived at. The tendency of the Dutch in this as well as in other matters to present questions simultaneously through several different channels has complicated speedy consideration. Grew J[ ohn ] D H[ ickerson ] 1 Sent to the American Embassy, London. 2 Alexander Loudon. 3 Document No. 1292 . No. 1294 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State 861.00/7–2345 No. 1294 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State [Extracts] [ Washington ,] July 23, 1945. Memorandum of Conversation Subject: … French desire to participate in war against Japan; … Participants: French Ambassador, Mr. Henri Bonnet; Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew The French Ambassador called on me this afternoon accompanied by Mr. Lacoste and took up with me the following matters: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) The Ambassador referred again to the talks which Mr. Bidault had had with the President and myself 1 concerning the desire of France to participate in the war against Japan. He said that on Friday of last week (July 20) the French Military Mission in Washington had received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff a paper 2 which explained with complete clarity the conditions under which such French participation could take place. The Ambassador merely noted the fact that the Combined Chiefs had stated that such participation would not be possible before the spring of 1946, and he raised the point that the war with Japan might possibly be finished before that time and the French Government would be very much disappointed not to be able actively to participate in the Pacific war. I said that as the Combined Chiefs had communicated this information through the French Military Mission, it was clear that the whole matter was now in military channels. The Ambassador assented but observed that there were political and psychological aspects to the matter which he hoped would have our interest. He did not however press the matter or make any concrete requests or suggestions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J[ oseph ] C. G[ rew ] 1 In May 1945. See Department of State Bulletin , vol. vii , p. 927. 2 See document No. 1289, footnote 3 , and document No. 1291, footnote 4 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference texts on this subject, as included in the Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister, see post , pages 1465–1466 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 1381 ] . Portuguese participation in the war against Japan Portuguese participation in the war against Japan [1295] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Washington [Babelsberg], 16 July 1945. SWNCC Files [1296] Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 16 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1297] Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff [Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945. J. C. S. Files [1298] The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Department of State and the British Foreign Office Washington [Babelsberg], 18 July 1945. SWNCC Files [1299] The Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) to the Acting Secretary of State Lisbon, July 21, 1945—2 p.m. 753.94/7–2145: Telegram [1300] The Military Attaché in Portugal (Solborg) to the War Department Lisbon, 22 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1301] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] July 24, 1945. 853.014/7–2445 [1302] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) Washington, August 1, 1945—1 p.m. 853.014/8–145: Telegram No. 1295 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee SWNCC Files No. 1295 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 1 top secret SM–2607 Washington [ Babelsberg ], 16 July 1945. Memorandum for the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 2 Subject: Portuguese Participation in Liberation of Timor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of State be advised as follows: “In reply to the State Department memorandum of 11 June 1945 * requesting information regarding the details of the plan for Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff regret that no definite information can be given at this time. A draft letter on this subject, C. C. S. 462/19, 3 for transmission to the Department of State and Foreign Office was submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their approval on 3 January 1945. A copy of the paper was sent to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, which advised on 13 January 1945 (J. C. S. 953/9) 3 that the draft letter was considered satisfactory by the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy. “The British Chiefs of Staff have deferred action on C. C. S. 462/19 pending the receipt of information from Australia on its ability to accommodate the Portuguese force for training. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to revise the letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office in C. C. S. 462/19 along broader lines which they hope the British Chiefs of Staff will be able to approve without further delay. The British Chiefs of Staff are being urged to take prompt action on this revised paper and it is hoped that the desired information will be forthcoming shortly.” For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A. J. McFarland , Brigadier General, U. S. A., Secretary. [Appendix] The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Culbertson ) to Colonel John S. Wise, of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff top secret [ Washington ,] June 11, 1945. Memorandum An urgent telegram 4 has been received from our Ambassador at Lisbon 5 stating that Dr. Salazar believed that we should submit very soon the details of the plan for Portuguese participation “in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor” to use the language in our Note to him of November 28, 1944. 6 You will recall that the British furnished similar assurances at the same time 7 and that these assurances constituted practically the only consideration given by us in exchange for the facilities at Santa Maria. These facilities have been said by a high military authority to be “of incalculable importance”. A review of the history of the Santa Maria negotiations suggests that the principal reason for the delay in obtaining the Portuguese assent to the use of Santa Maria was our delay in giving the assurances as to Timor, which were desired by Dr. Salazar. This is mentioned in order to emphasize the vital interest of the Portuguese in this matter. The Department understand] that active discussions are being held by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the complexity of the shipping, supply and training questions involved is fully appreciated. However, the Department believes that it is highly important to furnish promptly evidence of our good faith in carrying out the plan to which we are committed. This is particularly important, in view of impending negotiations for long term post-war military rights in the Azores. The Department does not feel that it can start such negotiations until the Portuguese are fully satisfied on the question of Timor. Therefore, the Department hopes that it will be possible to communicate to the Portuguese in the very near future the details of our plans as they now stand for Portuguese participation in any Timor expedition. If for any reason, it is not possible within the next few days to give information of this nature, the Department hopes that it will be given information on which to base an explanation to Dr. Salazar of the present state of the matter and the reasons for the delay in communicating to him the final plans. Paul T. Culbertson 1 Circulated as SWNCC 163 on July 20. A draft memorandum from the Chairman of SWNCC to the Secretary of State transmitting the contents of this document was circulated informally on July 18 to the SWNCC panel at Babelsberg and was approved by McCloy and Gardner on July 18 and by Dunn on July 19. In view, however, of the approval in the meantime of document No. 1298 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Dunn (as Chairman of SWNCC) determined that the delivery to the Secretary of State of a memorandum from SWNCC on the subject was unnecessary. 2 This memorandum and its appendix are printed from mimeographed texts circulated by the SWNCC Secretariat. * See Appendix hereto. [Footnote in the original.] 3 Not printed. 3 Not printed. 4 Not printed. 5 Herman B. Baruch. 6 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2338; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 2124. 7 See British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxlvi , p. 452. No. 1296 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1296 Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 462/25 [ Babelsberg ,] 16 July 1945. Staff Conversations With Portugal Reference: CCS 462 Series 1. The report by the Combined Administrative Committee in consultation with the Combined Staff Planners in C. C. S. 462/19 2 on the report of the Anglo-American Military Mission (C. C. S. 462/15 3 ) relative to proposals for Portuguese participation in Allied operations for the recapture of Timor was submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 3 January 1945. This report recommended that a letter be dispatched to the Department of State and Foreign Office setting forth the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the staff conversations with the Portuguese. Action on C. C. S. 462/19 has been deferred at the request of the British Chiefs of Staff. As a result the Department of State and Foreign Office have not as yet been advised of the conclusions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the staff conferences held with the Portuguese although these conversations were held some nine months ago. The Department of State is pressing the United States Chiefs of Staff for information regarding the details of the plan for Portuguese participation in any operations directed toward liberation of Timor. 2. The United States Chiefs of Staff understand that the British Chiefs of Staff’s delay in acting on C. C. S. 462/19 is due to lack of information from Australia on that country’s ability to provide accommodations for the Portuguese contingent. The end of the war in Europe makes out of date the draft letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office contained in Appendix “A” of C. C. S. 462/19 in two particulars. The United States Chiefs of Staff have therefore revised the letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office contained in Appendix “A” to C. C. S. 462/19 along broader lines. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the enclosed letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office. 4 In view of the urgency of the matter, the United States Chiefs of Staff would appreciate prompt consideration of this paper by the British Chiefs of Staff. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 195th Meeting, July 18. See ante , p. 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] . 2 Not printed. 3 Not printed. The mission referred to concluded an agreement embodied in an exchange of notes dated November 28, 1944. See Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2338; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 2124. 4 The text of the enclosure is identical with document No. 1298 except as noted in footnote 2 to that document and except that a change was made in the final sentence (not printed). No. 1297 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff J. C. S. Files No. 1297 Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff 1 top secret C. C. S. 462/26 [ Babelsberg ,] 18 July 1945. Staff Conversations With Portugal 1. We have considered the memorandum (C. C. S. 462/25) 2 by the United States Chiefs of Staff and are in general agreement with the draft letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office attached as the Enclosure thereto. 2. We propose, however, two minor amendments as follows:— a . In subparagraph b . of the proposed letter, it is stated that “the larger force is acceptable and can be trained in the theater.” The situation in this respect is that the Australian authorities have informed us that they cannot accept any Portuguese force. An inquiry has now been addressed to the Commander in Chief, Ceylon, asking him whether he can accept the Portuguese and, if so, the size of force he can accommodate, pointing out that we prefer the larger force. No reply has yet been received. We cannot, therefore, be certain which of the two forces we can accept or where the training area will be. We, therefore, propose that subparagraph b . of the draft letter should read as follows:— “As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops), the larger force is likely to be the more acceptable. Steps are being taken to allocate a suitable training area.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Subject to the above amendments, we recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the despatch of the letter to the Department of State and the Foreign Office as proposed in C. C. S. 462/25. 1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 195th Meeting, July 18. See ante , p. 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] . 2 Document No. 1296 . No. 1298 The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Department of State and the British Foreign Office SWNCC Files No. 1298 The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Department of State and the British Foreign Office 1 top secret Washington [ Babelsberg ], 18 July 1945. Memorandum for the Department of State : Foreign Office : The Combined Chiefs of Staff on 2 September 1944 appointed an Anglo-American Military Mission to enter into conversations with Portuguese military authorities to discuss Portuguese proposals for participation in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have arrived at the following conclusions on the report of this mission: a . The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement with the Portuguese military authorities as to the direct use of Portuguese forces, they have recognized the possibility of such use and agreed that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in staff conversations in Lisbon. b . As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops), the larger force is likely to be the more acceptable. Steps are being taken to allocate a suitable training area. 2 c . The air component offered by Portugal should under no circumstances be included in the acceptance of the Portuguese offer in view of the small number of planes available and the state of the training of the pilots, mechanics and radio specialists. d . There is no objection from the military viewpoint to Portugal receiving munitions when they can be spared but negotiation as to the basis for transfer is an action to be taken on a governmental level. e . The Combined Chiefs of Staff in accepting Portuguese participation do not intend to enter into a commitment for the retaking of Portuguese Timor. Neither is acceptance to be construed as a commitment to use Portuguese troops in any other area. f . Military operations against Portuguese Timor must for the present await the completion of operations against higher priority Japanese-held objectives. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will notify the Portuguese military authorities of impending operations against Portuguese Timor in time for them to prepare their troops for participation therein. Details as to the assembly, shipment, training and equipping of the Portuguese force will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the appropriate time. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the disclosure of any of the above information to the Portuguese if the Department of State or Foreign Office deem it necessary in diplomatic conversations. … For the Combined Chiefs of Staff: A. T. Cornwall–Jones , Brigadier A. J. McFarland , Brigadier General, U. S. A. Combined Secretariat . 1 A copy of this letter was circulated as SWNCC 163/1 on July 24 to members of SWNCC, with the notation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had approved the letter on July 20 and that the approved letter had been delivered to the Secretary of State and the Foreign Office. 2 The final sentence of this paragraph did not appear in the enclosure to document No. 1296 , and in that paper the preceding sentence ended: “the larger force is acceptable and can be trained in the theater.” No. 1299 The Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) to the Acting Secretary of State 753.94/7–2145: Telegram No. 1299 The Ambassador in Portugal ( Baruch ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 top secret priority Lisbon , July 21, 1945—2 p.m. 1568. Military Attaché 2 was received yesterday by Dr. Salazar at Salazar’s request in farewell visit in anticipation of Solborg’s impending departure. During course of conversation which lasted forty minutes Salazar brought up question of Timor and Solborg received impression strengthening and confirming views expressed in my telegram 1246, June 9, noon, 3 that Salazar continues to entertain primary concern over Portuguese participation reoccupation of Timor. During the past several months, Dr. Salazar has conveyed his views on this question through Bianchi, through the British Ambassador here 4 and through this mission, and time continues to pass with no response on the part of the CCS to these repeated intimations that plan agreed to for movement of Portuguese troops to Far East be submitted. Impression is growing upon us that we may expect to encounter delays, lack of sympathetic consideration and possibly even obstructionist tactics in matters of importance to us which are now and may be in the future under discussion between our two govts. We have in mind of course especially the pending civil air agreement upon which no visible progress has been made in nearly three months. Even putting aside these practical considerations based upon the attainment of immediate objectives we feel that further delay in action responsive to Salazar’s wishes in the Timor matter may well raise question of good faith. It is pertinent to recall that we obtained rights to Santa Maria only as a result of a bargain; Salazar’s price was (1) agreement in principle by US to participation of Portuguese troops in recovery of Timor and (2) undertaking by US to submit a plan implementing such principle, this plan to be presented by CCS as a result of and based upon information derived from staff talks with Portuguese conducted by General Chaney last November. Granted that no time limit was imposed upon period within which such plans should be submitted; nevertheless Salazar has made it abundantly clear that in his opinion that time has now arrived. We accordingly express the view for the Depts consideration that it is in the national interest that we should make good our part of the bargain without further delay (see Military Attaché’s telegram to War Dept No. 272. 5 [)] Baruch 1 The text of this message, in extenso , was received by Byrnes at Babelsberg as telegram No. Victory–in –445. 2 Colonel Robert A. Solborg. 3 Not printed. 4 Sir Ronald H. Campbell. 5 Document No. 1300 . No. 1300 The Military Attaché in Portugal (Solborg) to the War Department Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1300 The Military Attaché in Portugal ( Solborg ) to the War Department top secret priority Lisbon , 22 July 1945. Top secret 272 to MilID Washington D. C. Salazar having learned of my impending transfer expressed thru military channels desire to receive me, Colonel Carvalhaes called on Ambassador to ascertain if he concurred. With Ambassador’s permission I called on Prime Minister yesterday and had 40 minute cordial interview. After opening generalities and complimentary remarks concerning my work in Portugal Salazar evidenced interest on certain post-war aspects in Germany and Russia and praised Stalin’s astute statesmanship but questioned advisability of U. S. and Britain making further concessions to Soviets now that European war is ended. He expressed firm belief that Russia will enter closing phase of war against Japan and ventured opinion that this is not in best interests of U. S. and if unavoidable should be considered as favor to Russia rather than aid sought after by Allies. Salazar views European events also great concern and believes that Soviet influence if allowed to spread westward will result in isolating Europe from rest of world following general pattern of Soviet procedure in countries within their political or military orbit. Prime Minister then asked me if I recalled Timor Staff talks of last autumn and wondered why CCS have not yet implemented their part of agreement in offering critique of Port Plan and or countering with one of their own. He referred to last conversation with WPG 1 of State Dept on. this matter at which time he states he was given to understand that it might be advisable to wait for action until hostilities in Europe were terminated. He states that events in Pacific are proceeding fast and emphasized that Port token occupation of Timor is essential to preserve PortugalHs prestige and empire entity. I told Prime Minister that matter is under consideration by competent authorities. Comment, I have gained clear impression that Timor is uppermost in Salazar[’]s mind and that he considers us morally and factually obligated to supply him with CCS plan for Port Task Force to be moved to Pacific Theater there to take part in occupation of Timor. Ambassador saw this message and sent cable 1568 to State 2 NA [ for necessary action? ]. Solborg 1 Presumably W. Perry George. 2 Document No. 1299 . No. 1301 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State 853.014/7–2445 No. 1301 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] July 24, 1945. Memorandum of Conversation Subject: Expulsion of Japanese from Portuguese Timor Participants: Portuguese Ambassador, Dr. João Antonio de Bianchi; Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew The Portuguese Ambassador called on me this afternoon and left with me the appended note with regard to the desire of the Portuguese Government to send an expeditionary force to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor following the tripartite agreement of November 28, 1944. The Ambassador talked at length regarding the importance of this step to the Portuguese Government, which found it very difficult to explain to the Portuguese people why their soldiers continued to be held at Lourenço Marques when no progress whatever appears to have been made in arranging for the expedition and why the repeated inquiries from the Portuguese Government had resulted in no constructive replies. The Ambassador added that the soldiers themselves were becoming decidedly restive. He said that the war with Japan might come to an end in the not distant future and Portugal would still find itself on the sidelines so far as the reoccupation of this Portuguese colony is concerned. I said to the Ambassador that I was fully familiar with this problem and he need not for a moment think that it had been pigeonholed in the Department of State. On the contrary, we had the matter steadily before us and we had recently received from our Embassy at Lisbon a report of the conversation which Mr. Salazar had had with the retiring Military Attaché, Colonel Solborg, on this subject. 1 I said that as the Ambassador knew, the problem had been given full consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that the whole question is one of timing and logistics. Our armed forces are now concentrating all their efforts on bringing the war with Japan to a victorious close at the earliest moment, and it is very difficult to persuade our military and naval authorities to deflect in any degree their efforts and the needed shipping from this essential purpose. I said, however, that in the light of Mr. Salazar’s talk with Colonel Solborg and the Ambassador’s talk today with me, I should be glad to make further efforts to follow the matter up and see what could be done in giving effect to the desires of the Portuguese Government. I suggested that it would be unwise to approach the matter at this moment until the return of the American group from the meeting at Potsdam and while the President, the Secretary of State and our highest military and naval officers are absent from the country. The Ambassador once again urged that steps be taken and he furthermore said that he had long ago urged his Government to send two Portuguese warships to an Australian port so that the Japanese might know that the Portuguese flag was flying in those areas. He hoped that arrangements could be made with Australia to bring this about. J[ oseph ] C. G[ rew ] [Attachment] The Portuguese Ambassador ( Bianchi ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Proc. 79 No.–170 Washington , July 24, 1945. Sir :—Following conversations in Lisbon, in the autumn of last year, a tripartite agreement—Portuguese, American and British—was arrived at and concluded in the form of an exchange of notes, which took place on November 28, accepting and agreeing to the participation of Portugal in such operations as might be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor in order that that territory might be restored to full Portuguese sovereignty. This was to be effected in two forms: direct participation by the use of Portuguese forces, and indirect, by the concession to the government of the United States of facilities for the construction, use and control of an air base on the Island of Santa Maria, Azores. To the latter, in which the United States Government had shown very special interest, was given immediate care and close cooperation by the Portuguese authorities concerned and a major transoceanic airfield is now in full and satisfactory operation. As regards the former, the Portuguese expedition, staff talks were held in Lisbon at the time, between Portuguese, American and British officers including Australians, and a tentative plan was drawn up to be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a basis for future discussion and final arrangements. My Government have repeatedly asked for information regarding the action that may have been taken in considering the plan and requested that it be progressed with. So far no constructive reply has been received. In the meantime, in preparation for the said direct participation they have trained, equipped and transferred several thousand troops to Lourenço Marques, the port of embarkation for the expedition. Since the war in Europe has ended, the operations in the Far East having been intensified and their theatre being in process of expansion, The Portuguese Government have become all the more anxious to be advised and prepared in sufficient time for the campaign that may develop for the reoccupation of Timor, in order to ensure Portuguese armed participation in accordance with the agreements above referred to. Unless and until such arrangements have reached a more advanced stage, it is not easy to explain to the Portuguese people what measures have or are being taken to redress a situation which has been and is disturbing the national mind. I am, therefore, instructed to request Your Excellency’s good offices in endeavoring to obtain, from the military authorities concerned, the reply we have been expecting. Similar steps are being taken in London. My Government further ask me to convey to the proper quarters their willingness to send here a small mission, including some of the officers who took part in the staff talks in Lisbon, should that be found necessary or helpful. Thanking Your Excellency in anticipation for your kind and early attention in this matter, I avail myself [etc.] J Bianchi 1 See document No. 1299 . No. 1302 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Baruch) 853.014/8–145: Telegram No. 1302 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal ( Baruch ) secret Washington , August 1, 1945—1 p.m. 1270. Portuguese Ambassador called on me July 24 and outlined in detail Portuguese interest in early communication to them of plans for implementing provisions of British and American Timor notes. 1 He feared that the war with Japan might end with no provision having been made for Portuguese troops to assist in liberation or occupation of Timor. Bianchi was assured that problem had received continuing attention of Dept. as well as of JCS and CCS. I emphasized that our armed forces were concentrating all efforts on bringing war with Japan to victorious end at earliest possible moment and pointed out that military and naval authorities would not want to deflect their efforts in any degree from this essential purpose. For your information present difficulty is location of acclimatization and training area. It is hoped that this will be resolved shortly. British Embassy here is communicating with London and shortly after return to Washington of JCS officers now at Potsdam Dept hopes to be able to prepare joint statement with British giving Salazar present status of planning. 2 Grew J[ohn] D H[ickerson] 1 See document No. 1301 . 2 No communication was actually given to the Portuguese Government on this subject until after the conclusion of the Berlin Conference. Use of atomic weapons in the war against Japan Use of atomic weapons in the war against Japan [1303] The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, 16 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1304] The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, 17 July [19]45. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1305] The Commanding General, Manhattan District Project (Groves) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, 18 July 1945; Department of the Army Files [1306] Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Berlin, 18.7.45. S/AE Files [1307] The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, 21 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1308] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) [Babelsberg,] 21 July, 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1309] The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, 21 July [19]45. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1310] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) [Babelsberg,] 23 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1311] The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, 23 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1312] The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, 23 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1313] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President Washington, 30 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1314] Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Berlin, August 1, 1945. Truman Papers [1315] White House Press Release August 6, 1945 White House Files No. 1303 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1303 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee 1 ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) top secret urgent Washington , 16 July 1945. War 32887. For Colonel Kyle’s Eyes Only from Harrison for Mr. Stimson. Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations. Local press release necessary as interest extends great distance. Dr. Groves pleased. He returns tomorrow. I will keep you posted. 2 1 Concerning the establishment and membership of this Committee, of which Stimson was Chairman, see Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War , p. 616. 2 Stimson’s diary entry for July 16 concludes: “… At 7:30 PM Harrison’s first message concerning the test of the S–1 bomb arrived and I took it at once to the President’s house and showed it to Truman and Byrnes who of course were greatly interested, although the information was still in very general terms.” Concerning a further discussion of the message between Stimson and Byrnes, see document No. 1236, footnote 6 . No. 1304 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1304 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) top secret priority Washington , 17 July [19]45. War –33556. TopSec Secretary of War from Harrison. Doctor has just returned most enthusiastic and confident that the Little Boy is as husky as his big brother. 1 The light in his 1 eyes discernible from here to Highhold 1a and I could have heard his screams from here to my farm. 2 1 i. e., Fat Man . 1 i. e., Fat Man . 1a Stimson’s home on Long Island. 2 At Upperville, Virginia. Stimson’s diary entry for July 18 includes the following: “Harrison’s second message came, giving a few of the far reaching details of the test. I at once took it to the President who was highly delighted. … The President was evidently very greatly reenforced over the message from Harrison and said he was very glad I had come to the meeting. …” No. 1305 The Commanding General, Manhattan District Project (Groves) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Department of the Army Files No. 1305 The Commanding General, Manhattan District Project ( Groves ) to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) 1 top secret Washington , 18 July 1945; Memorandum for the Secretary of War Subject: The Test. 1. This is not a concise, formal military report but an attempt to recite what I would have told you if you had been here on my return from New Mexico. 2. At 0530, 2 16 July 1945, in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico, the first full scale test was made of the implosion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in history there was a nuclear explosion. And what an explosion! … The bomb was not dropped from an airplane but was exploded on a platform on top of a 100–foot high steel tower. 3. The test was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone. Based on the data which it has been possible to work up to date, I estimate the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT; and this is a conservative estimate. Data based on measurements which we have not yet been able to reconcile would make the energy release several times the conservative figure. There were tremendous blast effects. For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over ten thousand feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard to the same distance in a few instances but generally to about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken although one was some 125 miles away. A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the sub-stratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet above the ground, in about five minutes, breaking without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which most of the scientists thought would stop it. Two supplementary explosions occurred in the cloud shortly after the main explosion. The cloud contained several thousand tons of dust picked up from the ground and a considerable amount of iron in the gaseous form. Our present thought is that this iron ignited when it mixed with the oxygen in the air to cause these supplementary explosions. Huge concentrations of highly radioactive materials resulted from the fission and were contained in this cloud. 4. A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1200 feet and a slight slope toward the center, was formed. In the center was a shallow bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth. The material within the crater was deeply pulverized dirt. The material within the outer circle is greenish and can be distinctly seen from as much as 5 miles away. The steel from the tower was evaporated. 1500 feet away there was a four-inch iron pipe 16 feet high set in concrete and strongly guyed. It disappeared completely. 5. One-half mile from the explosion there was a massive steel test cylinder weighing 220 tons. The base of the cylinder was solidly encased in concrete. Surrounding the cylinder was a strong steel tower 70 feet high, firmly anchored to concrete foundations. This tower is comparable to a steel building bay that would be found in typical 15 or 20 story skyscraper or in warehouse construction. Forty tons of steel were used to fabricate the tower which was 70 feet high, the height of a six story building. The cross bracing was much stronger than that normally used in ordinary steel construction. The absence of the solid walls of a building gave the blast a much less effective surface to push against. The blast tore the tower from its foundations, twisted it, ripped it apart and left it flat on the ground. The effects on the tower indicate that, at that distance, unshielded permanent steel and masonry buildings would have been destroyed. I no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb. Enclosed are a sketch showing the tower before the explosion and a telephotograph showing what it looked like afterwards. 3 None of us had expected it to be damaged. 6. The cloud traveled to a great height first in the form of a ball, then mushroomed, then changed into a long trailing chimney-shaped column and finally was sent in several directions by the variable winds at the different elevations. It deposited its dust and radioactive materials over a wide area. It was followed and monitored by medical doctors and scientists with instruments to check its radioactive effects. While here and there the activity on the ground was fairly high, at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the population. Radioactive material in small quantities was located as much as 120 miles away. The measurements are being continued in order to have adequate data with which to protect the Government’s interests in case of future claims. For a few hours I was none too comfortable about the situation. 7. For distances as much as 200 miles away, observers were stationed to check on blast effects, property damage, radioactivity and reactions of the population. While complete reports have not yet been received, I now know that no persons were injured nor was there any real property damage outside our Government area. As soon as all the voluminous data can be checked and correlated, full technical studies will be possible. 8. Our long range weather predictions had indicated that we could expect weather favorable for our tests beginning on the morning of the 17th and continuing for four days. This was almost a certainty if we were to believe our long range forecasters. The prediction for the morning of the 16th was not so certain but there was about an 80% chance of the conditions being suitable. During the night there were thunder storms with lightning flashes all over the area. The test had been originally set for 0400 hours and all the night through, because of the bad weather, there were urgings from many of the scientists to postpone the test. Such a delay might well have had crippling results due to mechanical difficulties in our complicated test set-up. Fortunately, we disregarded the urgings. We held firm and waited the night through hoping for suitable weather. We had to delay an hour and a half, to 0530, before we could fire. This was 30 minutes before sunrise. 9. Because of bad weather, our two B–29 observation airplanes were unable to take off as scheduled from Kirtland Field at Albuquerque and when they finally did get off, they found it impossible to get over the target because of the heavy clouds and the thunder storms. Certain desired observations could not be made and while the people in the airplanes saw the explosion from a distance, they were not as close as they will be in action. We still have no reason to anticipate the loss of our plane in an actual operation although we cannot guarantee safety. 10. Just before 1100 the news stories from all over the state started to flow into the Albuquerque Associated Press. I then directed the issuance by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base of a news release as shown on the inclosure. With the assistance of the Office of Censorship we were able to limit the news stories to the approved release supplemented in the local papers by brief stories from the many eyewitnesses not connected with our project. One of these was a blind woman who saw the light. 11. Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell was at the control shelter located 10,000 yards south of the point of explosion. His impressions are given below: “The scene inside the shelter was dramatic beyond words. In and around the shelter were some twenty-odd people concerned with last minute arrangements prior to firing the shot. Included were: Dr. Oppenheimer, the Director who had borne the great scientific burden of developing the weapon from the raw materials made in Tennessee and Washington and a dozen of his key assistants—Dr. Kistiakowsky, who developed the highly special explosives; Dr. Bainbridge, who supervised all the detailed arrangements for the test; Dr. Hubbard, the weather expert, and several others. Besides these, there were a handful of soldiers, two or three Army officers and one Naval officer. The shelter was cluttered with a great variety of instruments and radios. “For some hectic two hours preceding the blast, General Groves stayed with the Director, walking with him and steadying his tense excitement. Every time the Director would be about to explode because of some untoward happening, General Groves would take him off and walk with him in the rain, counselling with him and reassuring him that everything would be all right. At twenty minutes before zero hour, General Groves left for his station at the base camp, first because it provided a better observation point and second, because of our rule that he and I must not be together in situations where there is an element of danger, which existed at both points. “Just after General Groves left, announcements began to be broadcast of the interval remaining before the blast. They were sent by radio to the other groups participating in and observing the test. As the time interval grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The scientists felt that their figuring must be right and that the bomb had to go off but there was in everyone’s mind a strong measure of doubt. The feeling of many could be expressed by ‘Lord, I believe; help Thou mine unbelief.’ We were reaching into the unknown and we did not know what might come of it. It can be safely said that most of those present—Christian, Jew and Atheist—were praying and praying harder than they had ever prayed before. If the shot were successful, it was a justification of the several years of intensive effort of tens of thousands of people—statesmen, scientists, engineers, manufacturers, soldiers, and many others in every walk of life. “In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition. Dr. Oppenheimer, on whom had rested a very heavy burden, grew tenser as the last seconds ticked off. He scarcely breathed. He held on to a post to steady himself. For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and then when the announcer shouted ‘Now!’ and there came this tremendous burst of light followed shortly thereafter by the deep growling roar of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief. Several of the observers standing back of the shelter to watch the lighting effects were knocked flat by the blast. “The tension in the room let up and all started congratulating each other. Everyone sensed ‘This is it!’ No matter what might happen now all knew that the impossible scientific job had been done. Atomic fission would no longer be hidden in the cloisters of the theoretical physicists’ dreams. It was almost full grown at birth. It was a great new force to be used for good or for evil. There was a feeling in that shelter that those concerned with its nativity should dedicate their lives to the mission that it would always be used for good and never for evil. “Dr. Kistiakowsky, the impulsive Russian, 4 threw his arms around Dr. Oppenheimer and embraced him with shouts of glee. Others were equally enthusiastic. All the pent-up emotions were released in those few minutes and all seemed to sense immediately that the explosion had far exceeded the most optimistic expectations and wildest hopes of the scientists. All seemed to feel that they had been present at the birth of a new age—The Age of Atomic Energy—and felt their profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history. “As to the present war, there was a feeling that no matter what else might happen, we now had the means to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives. As to the future, there had been brought into being something big and something new that would prove to be immeasurably more important than the discovery of electricity or any of the other great discoveries which have so affected our existence. “The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explosion came first, the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty. Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized.” 12. My impressions of the night’s high points follow: After about an hour’s sleep I got up at 0100 and from that time on until about five I was with Dr. Oppenheimer constantly. Naturally he was nervous, although his mind was working at its usual extraordinary efficiency. I devoted my entire attention to shielding him from the excited and generally faulty advice of his assistants who were more than disturbed by their excitement and the uncertain weather conditions. By 0330 we decided that we could probably fire at 0530. By 0400 the rain had stopped but the sky was heavily overcast. Our decision became firmer as time went on. During most of these hours the two of us journeyed from the control house out into the darkness to look at the stars and to assure each other that the one or two visible stars were becoming brighter. At 0510 I left Dr. Oppenheimer and returned to the main observation point which was 17,000 yards from the point of explosion. In accordance with our orders I found all personnel not otherwise occupied massed on a bit of high ground. At about two minutes of the scheduled firing time all persons lay face down with their feet pointing towards the explosion. As the remaining time was called from the loud speaker from the 10,000 yard control station there was complete silence. Dr. Conant said he had never imagined seconds could be so long. Most of the individuals in accordance with orders shielded their eyes in one way or another. There was then this burst of light of a brilliance beyond any comparison. We all rolled over and looked through dark glasses at the ball of fire. About forty seconds later came the shock wave followed by the sound, neither of which seemed startling after our complete astonishment at the extraordinary lighting intensity. Dr. Conant reached over and we shook hands in mutual congratulations. Dr. Bush, who was on the other side of me, did likewise. The feeling of the entire assembly was similar to that described by General Farrell, with even the uninitiated feeling profound awe. Drs. Conant and Bush and myself were struck by an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niagara Falls on his tight rope, only to me this tight rope had lasted for almost three years and of my repeated confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we would do it. 13. A large group of observers were stationed at a point about 27 miles north of the point of explosion. Attached is a memorandum written shortly after the explosion by Dr. E. O. Lawrence which may be of interest. 14. While General Farrell was waiting about midnight for a commercial airplane to Washington at Albuquerque—120 miles away from the site—he overheard several airport employees discussing their reaction to the blast. One said that he was out on the parking apron; it was quite dark; then the whole southern sky was lighted as though by a bright sun; the light lasted several seconds. Another remarked that if a few exploding bombs could have such an effect, it must be terrible to have them drop on a city. 15. My liaison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, 60 miles away, made the following report: “There was a blinding flash of light that lighted the entire northwestern sky. In the center of the flash, there appeared to be a huge billow of smoke. The original flash lasted approximately 10 to 15 seconds. As the first flash died down, there arose in the approximate center of where the original flash had occurred an enormous ball of what appeared to be fire and closely resembled a rising sun that was three-fourths above a mountain. The ball of fire lasted approximately 15 seconds, then died down and the sky resumed an almost normal appearance. “Almost immediately, a third, but much smaller, flash and billow of smoke of a whitish-orange color appeared in the sky, again lighting the sky for approximately 4 seconds. At the time of the original flash, the field was lighted well enough so that a newspaper could easily have been read. The second and third flashes were of much lesser intensity. “We were in a glass-enclosed control tower some 70 feet above the ground and felt no concussion or air compression. There was no noticeable earth tremor although reports overheard at the Field during the following 24 hours indicated that some believed that they had both heard the explosion and felt some earth tremor.” 16. I have not written a separate report for General Marshall as I feel you will want to show this to him. I have informed the necessary people here of our results. Lord Halifax after discussion with Mr. Harrison and myself stated that he was not sending a full report to his government at this time. I informed him that I was sending this to you and that you might wish to show it to the proper British representatives. 17. We are all fully conscious that our real goal is still before us. The battle test is what counts in the war with Japan. 18. May I express my deep personal appreciation for your congratulatory cable to us 5 and for the support and confidence which I have received from you ever since I have had this work under my charge. 19. I know that Colonel Kyle will guard these papers with his customary extraordinary care. L R Groves [Enclosure 3] Bulletin 6 Alamogordo, N. M., July 16—William O. Eareckson, commanding officer of the Alamogordo Army Air Base, made the following statement today: “Several inquiries have been received concerning a heavy explosion which occurred on the Alamogordo Air Base reservation this morning. “A remotely located ammunition magazine containing a considerable amount of high explosive and pyrotechnics exploded. “There was no loss of life or injury to anyone, and the property damage outside of the explosives magazine itself was negligible. “Weather conditions affecting the content of gas shells exploded by the blast may make it desirable for the Army to evacuate temporarily a few civilians from their homes.” [Enclosure 4] top secret [ Near Alamogordo Air Base ?], July 16, 1945. Thoughts by E. O. Lawrence 7 Our group assembled at a point 27 miles from the bomb site about two in the morning. We were on a plain extending all the way to the bomb and although I did not notice carefully the mountains seemed to be some miles away. We could see in the distance lights defining the position of the bomb and at about four a.m. our radio picked up conversations between the B–29s and the ground organization. We soon learned that zero hour was 5:30 a.m. which was just break of dawn. Naturally our tenseness grew as zero hour approached. We were warned of the probable brilliance of the explosion—so bright it would blind one looking directly at it for sometime and there was even danger of sunburn! I decided the best place to view the flame would be through the window of the car I was sitting in, which would take out ultraviolet, but at the last minute decided to get out of the car (evidence indeed I was excited!) and just as I put my foot on the ground I was enveloped with a warm brilliant yellow white light—from darkness to brilliant sunshine in an instant and as I remember I momentarily was stunned by the surprise. It took me a second thought to tell myself, “this is indeed it!!” and then through my dark sun glasses there was a gigantic ball of fire rising rapidly from the earth—at first as brilliant as the sun, growing less brilliant as it grew boiling and swirling into the heavens. Ten or fifteen thousand feet above the ground it was orange in color and I judge a mile in diameter. At higher levels it became purple and this purple afterglow persisted for what seemed a long time (possibly it was only for a minute or two) at an elevation of 20–25,000 feet. This purple glow was due to the enormous radioactivity of the gases. (The light is in large part due to nitrogen of the air and in the laboratory we occasionally produce it in miniature with the cyclotron.) In the earlier stages of rise of the flame the clouds above were illuminated and as the flame rose it was a grand spectacle also to see the great clouds immediately above melt away before our eyes. The final phases was the column of hot gases smoke and dust funneling from the earth into the heavens to 40,000 feet. The column was to me surprisingly narrow until high elevations were reached when it foamed out considerably. The great funnel was visible a long time. We could still make it out as we drove away a half hour later. But to retrace, a little over two minutes after the beginning of the flash the shock wave hit us. It was a sharp loud crack and then for about a minute thereafter there were resounding echoes from the surrounding mountains. The pressure of the shock wave was not great enough to be disturbing but the noise was very loud and sharp, indeed. The noise of the shock wave was a sharp crack like that of a giant firecracker set off a few yards away—or perhaps like the report of 37 mm artillery at a distance of about one hundred yards. A number of observers near me were looking right at the explosion through welders goggles (or the same dark glass) and they told me the light through these glasses was so bright as to blind them for an instant. As I was not actively concerned with the problems of Y, I had on occasions asked my colleagues there what the event would be like and their predicted picture of the event was borne out completely. I am amazed that the whole business went off so exactly as their calculations had predicted. The grand, indeed almost cataclysmic proportion of the explosion produced a kind of solemnity in everyone[’]s behavior immediately afterwards. There was restrained applause, but more a hushed murmuring bordering on reverence in manner as the event was commented upon[.] Dr. Charles Thomas (Monsanto) spoke to me of this being the greatest single event in the history of mankind, etc. etc. As far as all of us are concerned although we knew the fundamentals were sound and that the explosion could be produced, we share a feeling that we have this day crossed a great milestone in human progress. Ernest O. Lawrence 1 Stimson’s diary entry for July 21 contains the following information relating, to this document: “… At eleven thirty-five General Groves’ special report was received by special courier. It was an immensely powerful document, clearly and well written and with supporting documents of the highest importance. It gave a pretty full and eloquent report of the tremendous success of the test and revealed far greater destructive power than we expected in S–1. … “At three o’clock I found that Marshall had returned from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to save time I hurried to his house and had him read Groves’ report and conferred with him about it. “I then went to the ‘Little White House’ and saw President Truman. I asked him to call in Secretary Byrnes and then I read the report in its entirety and we then discussed it. They were immensely pleased. The President was tremendously pepped up by it and spoke to me of it again and again when I saw him. He said it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence and he thanked me for having come to the Conference and being present to help him in this way.” Stimson showed Groves’ report to Arnold on July 22 (see document No. 1310, footnote 3 ). Concerning the discussion of the report with Churchill, see ante , pp. 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] . Truman later stated that, following receipt of news that the Alamogordo test had been successful, he had called together Byrnes, Stimson, Leahy, Marshall, Arnold, Eisenhower, and King and had asked them for their opinions as to whether the bomb should be used, and the consensus had been that it should. See Hillman, Mr. President , p. 248. Truman apparently also received at this meeting an oral estimate of the casualties to be expected in the assault on Japan if the new weapon were not used. See ibid. , and Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago, 1948–1958), vol. v , facsimile following p. 712 of a letter from Truman to Cate dated January 12, 1953. 2 i. e., 5:30 a.m. All times in this memorandum are expressed in military style, i. e., from 0001 hours (12:01 a.m.) to 2400 hours (midnight). 3 Neither reproduced. 4 At this point is the following manuscript interpolation by Groves: “an American and Harvard professor for many years”. 5 Not printed. 6 Identified in the source copy as a clipping from The Albuquerque Tribune for July 16, 1945. 7 This memorandum, which bears an uncertified typed signature, has the following typed notation at the end: “This was written in an airplane and not corrected by the author.” No. 1306 Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of War (Stimson) S/AE Files No. 1306 Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) top secret and personal Mr. Secretary Stimson [:] I enclose a photostat record of the Hyde Park Agreement on T. A., for which you asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 1 This photograph was taken by a special photographic section of the Air Ministry, and flown out here in the charge of a trusted officer. W[ inston ] S C[ hurchill ] Berlin , 18.7.45. [Enclosure] top secret Tube Alloys 2 Aide-Mémoire of Conversation Between the President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park, September 18, 1944 3 1. The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding Tube Alloys , with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use, is not accepted. The matter should continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but when a “bomb” is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender. 2. Full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing Tube Alloys for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F[ ranklin ] D R[ oosevelt ] W[ inston ] S C[ hurchill ] 1 Sir John Anderson. Following the death of President Roosevelt, an authenticated text of the enclosed aide-mémoire was not available to responsible American officials. Before the Berlin Conference, Stimson had asked the British Government to supply a photocopy of the aide-mémoire . 2 The following manuscript notation appears in the top margin: “A copy of this aide-mémoire was left with Pres. Roosevelt. Another copy was given to Adl. Leahy to hand to Lord Cherwell. J[ohn] M[iller] M[artin.]” The copy of the aide-mémoire in the Roosevelt Papers deposited in the Franklin D. Rooseveit Library at Hyde Park does not, of course, bear this notation nor that quoted in footnote 3, infra , but it does have a handwritten date, “18. 9”,i. e.,September 18, under Churchill’s initials. 3 At this point there is the following marginal manuscript notation: “actually 19th J[ohn] M[iller] M[artin.]” No. 1307 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1307 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) top secret urgent Washington , 21 July 1945. War 35987. Secretary of War Eyes Only TopSec from Harrison. All your local military advisors engaged in preparation definitely favor your pet city 1 and would like to feel free to use it as first choice if those on the ride select it out of four possible spots in the light of local conditions at the time. 1 The reference is to the selection of Kyoto as a possible target for atomic attack. See Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War , p. 625. No. 1308 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1308 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee ( Harrison ) top secret urgent [ Babelsberg ,] 21 July, 1945. Victory 189. Reference War 35987 1 from Stimson to Pasco for Harrison’s Eyes Only . Message begins: Aware of no factors to change my decision. On the contrary new factors here tend to confirm it. End. 1 Document No. 1307 . No. 1309 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1309 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) top secret urgent Washington , 21 July [19]45. War –35988. Secretary of War Eyes Only top secret from Harrison. Patient progressing rapidly and will be ready for final operation first good break in August. Complicated preparations for use are proceeding so fast we should know not later than July 25 if any change in plans. No. 1310 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1310 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee ( Harrison ) top secret urgent [ Babelsberg ,] 23 July 1945. Victory 218. To AGWar from Stimson to Pasco for Harrison[’]s Eyes Only . Reference your number War 35988. 1 We are greatly pleased with apparent improvement in timing of patient[’]s progress. We assume operation may be any time after the first of August. Whenever it is possible to give us a more definite date please immediately advise us here where information is greatly needed. Also give name of place or alternate places, always excluding the particular place against which I have decided. 2 My decision has been confirmed by highest authority. 3 1 Document No. 1309 . 2 Kyoto. See Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War , p. 625. 3 i. e., Truman. Stimson’s diary contains the following entries on this subject: “[July 22:] Called on President Truman at nine-twenty. … “I also discussed with him Harrison’s two messages [presumably documents Nos. 1307 and 1309 ]. He was intensely pleased by the accelerated timetable. As to the matter of the special target which I had refused to permit, he strongly confirmed my view and said he felt the same way. … “At twelve-fifteen I called General Arnold over, showed him Harrison’s two cables, showed him my answer to them and showed him Groves’ report [document No. 1305], which he read in its entirety. He told me that he agreed with me about the target which I had struck off the program. He said that it would take considerable hard work to organize the operations now that it was to move forward. … [For Arnold’s account of his various conversations on this subject with Stimson at Babelsberg, see H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), pp. 584–585, 588–591.] “[July 24:] … We [Stimson and Truman] had a few words more about the S–1 program, and I again gave him my reasons for eliminating one of the proposed targets. He again reiterated with the utmost emphasis his own concurring belief on that subject, and he was particularly emphatic in agreeing with my suggestion that if elimination was not done, the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act might make it impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. It might thus, I pointed out, be the means of preventing what our policy demanded, namely a sympathetic Japan to the United States in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Manchuria.” No. 1311 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1311 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) top secret urgent Washington , 23 July 1945. War 36791. Top secret Secretary of War Eyes Only from Harrison. Reference my War 35987 1 and your Victory 218 2 Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata in [ is? ] order of choice here. 1 Document No. 1307 . 2 Document No. 1310 . No. 1312 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1312 The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) top secret operational priority Washington , 23 July 1945. War 36792. Secretary of War Eyes Only top secret from Harrison. Operation may be possible any time from August 1 depending on state of preparation of patient and condition of atmosphere. From point of view of patient only, some chance August 1 to 3, good chance August 4 to 5 and barring unexpected relapse almost certain before August 10. No. 1313 The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1313 The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the President top secret urgent Washington , 30 July 1945. 1 War 41011. To the President from the Secretary of War. The time schedule on Groves’ project is progressing so rapidly that it is now essential that statement for release by you be available not later than Wednesday, 1 August. I have revised draft of statement, which I previously presented to you, 2 in light of ( a ) Your recent ultimatum, 3 ( b ) Dramatic results of test and ( c ) Certain minor suggestions made by British 4 of which Byrnes is aware. While I am planning to start a copy by special courier tomorrow in the hope you can be reached, nevertheless in the event he does not reach you in time, I will appreciate having your authority to have White House release revised statement as soon as necessary. 5 Sorry circumstances seem to require this emergency action. 1 Stimson had left Babelsberg on July 25 and had returned to Washington. 2 The draft referred to has not been found. 3 Document No. 1382 . 4 Not printed. 5 For the text of the statement as issued by the White House in Washington on August 6, see document No. 1315 . Concerning the military orders issued from the Conference for the atomic attack on Japan, see Craven and Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II vol. v , facsimile facing p. 697 and chapter 23. No. 1314 Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Truman Papers No. 1314 Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Berlin , August 1, 1945. Dear Mr President [:] Thank you so much for your letter of to-day 1 about the new weapon to be used on Japan. If it is quite convenient to you, I will come to see you for a few minutes after the Plenary Session this afternoon. 2 I am deeply touched by the very kind words you use about me and I, too, have been greatly encouraged by the unity which exists between our two countries on policies for world peace. I shall work with all my strength to maintain this unity unimpaired during the difficult years which lie before us. May I also thank you warmly for the great personal consideration and kindness which you have shown to me and which has been such a help, especially during these last few days. Yours sincerely C R Attlee 1 The index to the folder in which Attlee’s letter was found contains the following entry: “6. 1 August 1945 . Letter from the President to Attlee regarding the Atomic Bomb. The President wrote in longhand and no copy is available.” It appears that Attlee received his first news of the successful test of the atomic bomb from Truman during the Berlin Conference. See Lord Attlee, “The Hiroshima Choice”, in The Observer , September 6, 1959, p. 16. 2 The Log records no private meeting between Truman and Attlee on August 1. No. 1315 White House Press Release White House Files No. 1315 White House Press Release 1 August 6, 1945 Statement by the President of the United States Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T. N. T. It had more than two thousand times the blast power of the British “Grand Slam” which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare. The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid many fold. And the end is not yet. With this bomb we have now added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction to supplement the growing power of our armed forces. In their present form these bombs are now in production and even more powerful forms are in development. It is an atomic bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power of the universe. The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East. Before 1939, it was the accepted belief of scientists that it was theoretically possible to release atomic energy. But no one knew any practical method of doing it. By 1942, however, we knew that the Germans were working feverishly to find a way to add atomic energy to the other engines of war with which they hoped to enslave the world. But they failed. We may be grateful to Providence that the Germans got the V–l’s and the V–2’s late and in limited quantities and even more grateful that they did not get the atomic bomb at all. The battle of the laboratories held fateful risks for us as well as the battles of the air, land and sea, and we have now won the battle of the laboratories as we have won the other battles. Beginning in 1940, before Pearl Harbor, scientific knowledge useful in war was pooled between the United States and Great Britain, and many priceless helps to our victories have come from that arrangement. Under that general policy the research on the atomic bomb was begun. With American and British scientists working together we entered the race of discovery against the Germans. The United States had available the large number of scientists of distinction in the many needed areas of knowledge. It had the tremendous industrial and financial resources necessary for the project and they could be devoted to it without undue impairment of other vital war work. In the United States the laboratory work and the production plants, on which a substantial start had already been made, would be out of reach of enemy bombing, while at that time Britain was exposed to constant air attack and was still threatened with the possibility of invasion. For these reasons Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed that it was wise to carry on the project here. We now have two great plants and many lesser works devoted to the production of atomic power. Employment during peak construction numbered 125,000 and over 65,000 individuals are even now engaged in operating the plants. Many have worked there for two and a half years. Few know what they have been producing. They see great quantities of material going in and they see nothing coming out of these plants, for the physical size of the explosive charge is exceedingly small. We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history—and won. But the greatest marvel is not the size of the enterprise, its secrecy, nor its cost, but the achievement of scientific brains in putting together infinitely complex pieces of knowledge held by many men in different fields of science into a workable plan. And hardly less marvellous has been the capacity of industry to design, and of labor to operate, the machines and methods to do things never done before so that the brain child of many minds came forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to do. Both science and industry worked under the direction of the United States Army, which achieved a unique success in managing so diverse a problem in the advancement of knowledge in an amazingly short time. It is doubtful if such another combination could be got together in the world. What has been done is the greatest achievement of organized science in history. It was done under high pressure and without failure. We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories, and their communications. Let there be no mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan’s power to make war. It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 2 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. 3 If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea and land forces in such numbers and power as they have not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are already well aware. The Secretary of War, who has kept in personal touch with all phases of the project, will immediately make public a statement giving further details. 4 His statement will give facts concerning the sites at Oak Ridge near Knoxville, Tennessee, and at Richland near Pasco, Washington, and an installation near Santa Fe, New Mexico. Although the workers at the sites have been making materials to be used in producing the greatest destructive force in history they have not themselves been in danger beyond that of many other occupations, for the utmost care has been taken of their safety. The fact that we can release atomic energy ushers in a new era in man’s understanding of nature’s forces. Atomic energy may in the future supplement the power that now comes from coal, oil, and falling water, but at present it cannot be produced on a basis to compete with them commercially. Before that comes there must be a long period of intensive research. It has never been the habit of the scientists of this country or the policy of this Government to withhold from the world scientific knowledge. Normally, therefore, everything about the work with atomic energy would be made public. But under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the technical processes of production or all the military applications, pending further examination of possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction. I shall recommend that the Congress of the United States consider promptly the establishment of an appropriate commission to control the production and use of atomic power within the United States. I shall give further consideration and make further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace. 1 Released August 6, 1945. A draft of this statement had been discussed with the British (see document No. 1313 ). 2 Document No. 1382 . 3 See document No. 1258 . 4 For the text of Stimson’s statement of August 6, 1945, see Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1, 1945–December 31,1946 (Princeton, 1948), p. 413. Release of tankers for the war against Japan through altered distribution of European oil supplies Release of tankers for the war against Japan through altered distribution of European oil supplies [1316] The Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) [Washington,] July 16, 1945. 740.00119 EW/7–1645: Telegram [1317] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President [Babelsberg,] July 19, 1945. Truman Papers [1318] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President [Babelsberg,] July 19, 1945. Pauley Files [1319] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 20, 1945. Pauley Files [1320] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 20, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 [1321] The Chief of Staff of the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Parten) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) [Babelsberg,] July 21, 1945. Pauley Files [1322] Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Babelsberg, July 24, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [1323] The Petroleum Administrator for War (Ickes) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) [Washington,] July 25 [1945.] 840.6362/7–2545: Telegram [1324] Proposal by the United States Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. Pauley Files [1325] Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Babelsberg, August 1, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [1326] The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany (Clay) Berlin, August 4, 1945. Pauley Files No. 1316 The Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) 740.00119 EW/7–1645: Telegram No. 1316 The Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy ( Collado ) 1 secret us urgent [ Washington ,] July 16, 1945. 33. (For Collado.) In telegram 2250 of June 24, 2 Pauley suggested that certain (unspecified) commodities received by Soviet Union on reparation account from satellite countries might be made available to American occupation forces through reverse-lend-lease arrangements. Dept drafted reply to effect that US waived none of its claim to reparations from satellites (though expecting none), that prospects of obtaining commodities from Soviet Union for US forces were so small as to preclude an approach to Soviet Union, and that US interest in exportable surpluses of the satellite countries centered on deliveries to UNRRA beneficiaries for relief of UNRRA and in turn US. This draft was taken by the Secretary. 3 When reply was drafted, Dept was thinking in terms of agricultural products, including food. It is apparent from later telegrams that Pauley is deeply interested in obtaining oil from Rumania, Hungary and Austria and has corresponded with PAW and SHAEF on this subject. His latest telegram to PAW 4 asks for information on tanker requirements for Anglo-American oil for western and Mediterranean oil requirements from Anglo-American sources, and tanker savings possible if Austrian, Hungarian and Rumanian sources could be used. Suggest you consider asking the Secretary to enlarge the draft reply to 2250 of June 24 to indicate the interest of the US in obtaining oil from this area, and in paying dollars for such oil (if necessary) to Rumania and Hungary rather than USSR with understanding that these dollars be used primarily to satisfy US claims on these countries. You may recall that Dept has already asked Embassy in Moscow for information on prospects of obtaining oil from Russian sources, or from Rumanian and Hungarian fields dominated by the Soviet Union. A long reply was received from Harriman to the effect that the Soviet Union position in oil continued to show a deficit. 5 This exchange took place before Pauley’s arrival in Moscow. [ Grew ] 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg. 2 Document No. 620, printed in vol. i . 3 The text of the draft referred to, which was repeated to Byrnes at the Conference as telegram No. 54 of July 18, is as follows (file No. 740.00119 EW/7–1745): “While claims by this country on account of war damage would not be substantial (Embtel 2250, June 24) and Dept realizes that the prospects of this country’s securing general reparations payments from the satellite countries are negligible in any case, US has not waived any of rights respecting presentation of reparations claims which are reserved to it in armistice agreements signed with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. With respect to Austria, this Govt is opposed to exaction of reparations. The transfer of existing capital equipment clearly in excess of healthy, peacetime requirements of Austrian economy, such as machinery in armaments plants erected since 1938, need not necessarily conflict with this policy. “With regard to your suggestion that certain commodities received by the Soviet Union on reparations account from satellite countries might be made available to American occupation forces through reverse lend-lease arrangements, Dept believes that the prospects of inducing Soviet Union to turn over to American forces such commodities are so small as to preclude any approach to the Soviet Govt on this question. “Our interest in the exportable surplus of the satellite countries has been centered on deliveries to UNRRA beneficiaries and thus reducing the burden falling upon UNRRA and ultimately upon our production and shipping availabilities. Some of these matters may be discussed at the forthcoming Big Three meeting.” 4 See vol. i , document No. 625 . 5 Not printed. No. 1317 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President Truman Papers No. 1317 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the President [Extracts 1 ] [ Babelsberg ,] July 19, 1945. My Dear Mr. President : The question of the disposition of the German Naval and Merchant fleets has been raised by Generalissimo Stalin. As I understand it, he suggests that one-third of the tonnage of these fleets be allocated to each of the three powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . … If we award one-third of the German Naval tonnage to Russia, we would be making an outright gift to the Soviet Union. While I do not object to making this gift, I believe that it should be subject to certain specific conditions. These conditions are that: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Three, The U. S. S. R. agree to provide approximately 50,000 barrels per day of petroleum or petroleum products from Hungary and Rumania to relieve the present burden on the U. S. and U. K. of providing tankers, needed for the Pacific war, for hauling petroleum supplies to Europe and the Mediterranean area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully, Edwin W Pauley 1 For the full text of this letter, see document No. 1008 . No. 1318 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the President Pauley Files No. 1318 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the President 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 19, 1945. Memorandum to the President Subject: Request for oil from Austria, Rumania, or Hungary Discussion: Discussion in Washington by Colonel Fogelson with General Pyron, of the Army–Navy Petroleum Board, and Mr. Davies, Deputy Petroleum Administrator for War, discloses that there will be a shortage of 207,000 barrels of crude oil per day in 1946 for prosecuting the Japanese War. A portion of this shortage can be offset with crude oil from the middle east and Venezuela by utilizing the refining capacity of southern France and England; but there still remains a critical shortage of 50,000 barrels per day (approximately 7,000 tons) needed for the occupation forces and for western European economy. It is necessary that this 50,000 barrel daily shortage be supplied from the oil fields of Rumania, Hungary, or Austria. It can be refined either in Germany’s crude oil refineries or refineries in the Balkans. If Russia agrees to furnish this oil, it will displace a part of the oil we are now shipping into Europe, and help to ease the critical oil shortage. In addition, it will help relieve the tanker situation by making more tankers available for the Pacific Theater. Recommendation: That Russia agree to furnish from Rumania, Hungary, or Austria, 50,000 barrels (approximately 7,000 tons) of crude oil or refined oil products per day for western Europe beginning as of September 1, 1945. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. No. 1319 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State Pauley Files No. 1319 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 20, 1945. My Dear Mr. Secretary : General Pyron of the Army–Navy Petroleum Board and R. K. Davies, Deputy Petroleum Administrator for War, have indicated the urgent need of additional oil for prosecuting the Japanese War. Unless European supplies are provided, approximately 300,000 barrels per day of refined oil products must continue to be imported by ocean-going tankers into Western Europe and the Mediterranean. Approximately 200 such tankers must be constantly used to move this volume of oil. Insufficient oil supplies and tankers to move such supplies may well prove to be a limiting factor in the military might which can be thrown against Japan. To augment the petroleum available for the Japanese War and to release tankers for the Pacific, at least 50,000 barrels per day of crude oil or refined oil products are immediately required from Rumania, Hungary, or Austria, to meet a part of the foregoing 300,000 barrels per day of Western European and Mediterranean requirements. It is recommended that the matter of securing at least 50,000 barrels of crude oil or refined oil products per day from Southern and Eastern Europe for shipment into Western Europe beginning September 1, 1945, be submitted to the heads of Government for immediate action at this conference. Respectfully, Edwin W. Pauley 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. No. 1320 Proposal by the United States Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2345 No. 1320 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 20, 1945. Memorandum There exists an urgent need of additional supplies of oil for prosecuting the war against Japan. Unless European supplies are provided, approximately 300,000 barrels per day of refined oil products must continue to be imported by ocean-going tankers into Western Europe and the Mediterranean. Approximately 200 such tankers must be constantly used to move this volume of oil. Insufficient oil supplies and tankers to move such supplies may well prove to be a limiting factor in the military might which can be thrown against Japan. To augment the petroleum available for the Japanese War and to release tankers for the Pacific, at least 50,000 barrels per day of crude oil or refined oil products are immediately required from Rumania, Hungary, or Austria, to meet a part of the foregoing 300,000 barrels per day of Western European and Mediterranean requirements. It is recommended that the Three Governments agree that at least 50,000 barrels of crude oil or refined oil products per day be provided from Southern and Eastern Europe for shipment into Western Europe beginning September 1, 1945. 1 Submitted at the Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 21. See ante , p. 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] . No. 1321 The Chief of Staff of the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Parten) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) Pauley Files No. 1321 The Chief of Staff of the United States Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Parten ) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 21, 1945. Statistical Summary on Petroleum Supply and Demand in Continental Europe for the Last Half of the Year 1945, and for the Year 1946 Memorandum for Ambassador Pauley One: From the best available information, there is in Europe and USSR an indigenous supply of 773,000 barrels per day against estimated requirements of 703,000 barrels per day. This indicates a surplus of 70,000 barrels per day. Two: It also appears that the surplus balance of Rumania, Hungary, and Austria is 70,000 barrels per day, which would indicate that the Soviet Union is in balance from a standpoint of oil supply versus requirements. This surplus is distributed as follows: Austria 19,000 barrels per day Hungary 19,000 “ “ “ Rumania 32,000 “ “ “ Total 70,000 “ “ “ Three: Oil from these countries is accessible to Constanta on the Black Sea and Danube River ports farther west by connecting pipelines. These oils, if made available, can therefore be transported to Western Europe by way of the Danube River or to Mediterranean Europe by sea. Four: We have estimated at least 50,000 barrels of this oil can be made available for Western and Mediterranean Europe, which, in turn, would lessen the necessary shipments from Anglo-American sources to this area by this amount and will result in a substantial saving in tank ship carrying capacity so vitally needed in prosecuting the Japanese War. This would result specifically in a saving depending upon the point of origin by quantity of from 30 to 40 Type B tank ships of 12,000 dead weight tons. Five: This surplus oil could be delivered with advantage either as crude oil or refined products because there is presently a surplus refining capacity in this area. (Refer to Annex I). Six: The tentative request of USSR for oil product supplies of 16,700 barrels per day over the last half of 1945 should be used to enlist Soviet support of our request for supplies from Eastern Europe. (See Annex I). [Annex I] top secret ( a ) Approximate Producing Capacity, Rumania, Austria, Hungary Rumania Austria Hungary Total Production Capacity Barrels per day 87,000 21,000 20,000 128,000 Refining Capacity Barrels per day 195,000 * 10,000 16,000 221,000 ( b ) Tentative Request for Oil Supplies from U. S. to Russia Last Six Months, 1945 . Alkylate 7,900 B/D 100 Octane Av. Gas. 3,500 “ Motor Gasoline 1,300 “ Navy Special Fuel Oil 3,300 “ Lube Oils 700 “ Total 16,700 B/D [ Washington ?], July 13, 1945. 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. * Prewar Capacity: Now operable capacity estimated well above 100,000 barrels per day. [Footnote in the original.] No. 1322 Report by the Economic Subcommittee 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 1322 Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Extract 1 ] top secret [ Babelsberg , July 24, 1945. 2 ] Second Report of the Economic Sub-Committee to the Foreign Ministers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. The Sub-Committee is not yet prepared to make a definitive report regarding the proposal of the United States 3 that at least 50,000 barrels a day of oil be shipped from Southeastern European producing areas to Western Europe or the Mediterranean for the purpose of easing the stringent oil and tanker situation in the supply of the Pacific War. The Soviet representatives indicate that they have not yet received full information as to such possibility, although their preliminary data suggest the absence of any substantial surplus in the producing areas. They indicate that they will explore the matter further and report at a later date. 1 For the other sections of this report, see documents Nos. 766 and 923 . 2 So dated in the “Index of Attachments to Summary of the Negotiations in the Economic Sub-Committee” (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145). 3 Document No. 1320 . No. 1323 The Petroleum Administrator for War (Ickes) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) 840.6362/7–2545: Telegram No. 1323 The Petroleum Administrator for War ( Ickes ) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 25 [1945.] 119. For Pauley from Ickes. Reurmemo June 16 2 following summarizes reply mailed you at Potsdam and Moscow: Realize serious coal shortage facing Europe. Current petroleum program covering more than twelve months provides for supplying European requirements from various sources on shorthaul basis. Western Hemisphere major source of supply, primarily delivering products. Program includes supplying crude for those European refineries that can be effectively utilized. Middle East has adequate potentialities as petroleum supply source for Europe. I have taken steps looking toward orderly development of that area. Increased crude production used primarily in Persian Gulf refineries, leaving little crude available for export. Recently arranged supply Southern French refineries, when reopened, from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Working on crude for other Western European refineries expected reopen within few months. Approval given construction of pipeline permitting movement Kuwait crude to Persian Gulf by first next year. This crude then available European refineries at time when all Saudi Arabian crude will be used in Persian Gulf refineries. Everything possible being done to make Middle East oil available for export accessible to Europe. Tremendously increased military requirements make any sizable increases unlikely in near future. Products from Middle East refineries continue to go to military in Pacific on shorthaul basis. Therefore crude or product supply from Middle East available for Europe not large quantity compared to European needs. Therefore assistance to liberated European countries in coming months must come primarily from other sources, one appearing to be Eastern European countries believed to have excess petroleum production over requirements. Early agreement with Russians on this oil would help greatly in relieving critical situation in Western European countries. 1 Sent to the Secretary of State at Babelsberg over the signature of Grew. 2 Not printed. No. 1324 Proposal by the United States Delegation Pauley Files No. 1324 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. U. S. Proposal on Oil for Western Europe In order to alleviate as far as possible the present critical situation in oil supply and shipping requirements for Western and Mediterranean Europe, it is agreed as follows: 1. That such quantity, not exceeding 50,000 barrels per day, of crude or refined oils as may be found to be available in Hungary, Austria and Rumania shall be designated for movement westward for the use of the Allies of Western Europe upon a purchase basis to be negotiated. 2. To that end representatives of the U. S., U. K., and U. S. S. R. shall be designated to meet as early as possible with the purpose to survey availability of, to negotiate arrangements for, and to determine the maximum availability of overland and water transportation for the appropriate movement and distribution of said crude or refined oils. The U. S. points out again that present shipping of approximately 300,000 barrels per day of oil to supply Western and Mediterranean Europe is an extremely heavy burden to the Anglo-American sources of supply. As well it represents a heavy draft on available tank-ship carrying capacity, requiring approximately 200 Type B tankers. Obviously, any assistance which might be obtained to diminish these supply and shipping requirements, however small, will be extremely helpful in the world picture, and particularly in the successful prosecution of the Japanese war. Oil supplied from the above named sources would greatly help my Government in the circumstances. Moreover it would help the U. S. to meet requested deliveries by our Allies now pending. 1 Another copy of this proposal is identified as the “U. S. proposal submitted to the subcommittee.” No. 1325 Report by the Economic Subcommittee 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 1325 Report by the Economic Subcommittee [Extract 1 ] [ Babelsberg , August 1, 1945.] Third Report of the Economic Subcommittee to the Foreign Ministers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Soviet representatives reported that they were not yet in a position further to discuss the matter of oil supplies from the East. 2 1 For the other sections of this report, see the attachments to documents Nos. 891 and 1002 . 2 See document No. 1320 . No. 1326 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany (Clay) Pauley Files No. 1326 The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations ( Pauley ) to the Deputy Military Governor, United States Zone in Germany ( Clay ) 1 [Extract] Berlin , August 4, 1945. Memorandum for General Clay At a meeting of The Big Three Conference the United States introduced a proposal 2 in which the Soviet Government was asked to deliver from Rumania, Hungary and Austria 50,000 barrels of crude oil or refined oil products per day into the Western Zone of Occupation beginning September 1, 1945. This introduction was made at the request of the Army and the Petroleum Administration for War and referred to the Economic Subcommittee of which I was a member. Although we pushed this to the greatest extent we received no affirmative answer from the Soviet Government. The Soviet representatives in their last report to The Big Three made the following official report: 3 “The Soviet representatives indicate that they have not yet received full information as to such possibility, although their preliminary data suggest the absence of any substantial surplus in the producing areas. They indicate that they will explore the matter further and report at a later date.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. 2 Document No. 1320 . 3 Cf. document No. 1322 . Near Eastern and African Questions Near Eastern and African Questions Contents Iran: Withdrawal of Allied forces (Documents 1327-[Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)]) Iran: Withdrawal of Allied forces Iran: Withdrawal of Allied forces [1327] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 17 [1945.] 761.91/7–1745: Telegram [1328] The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State Tehran, July 20, 1945—1 p.m. 891.00/7–2045: Telegram [1329] The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State Tehran, July 20, 1945—7 p.m. 891.00/7–2045: Telegram [1330] Proposal by the British Delegation Berlin , 21st July, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1445 [1331] The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 23, 1945. Truman Papers [1332] The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 [1333] The President to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) [Babelsberg, July 27, 1945.] Department of the Army Files [1334] The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State Tehran, July 27, 1945—5 p.m. 800.24591/7–2745: Telegram [1335] The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State Tehran, July 28, 1945—10 a.m. 811.24591/7–2845: Telegram [1336] The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff (Hull) to the Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army (Handy) Babelsberg, 28 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1337] The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State Tehran, July 30, 1945—1 p.m. 811.24591/7–3045: Telegram [[Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 1327 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 761.91/7–1745: Telegram No. 1327 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] July 17 [1945.] 39. During personal conversation between Ambassador Murray and Shah of Iran July 13, Shah expressed frankly his growing concern-over Iran’s future, emphasizing his fear as to Soviet intentions towards Iran. He stated he is greatly disturbed over entire question of Russian policy towards Iran, and feels incapable of appointing strong premier because of inevitable Soviet opposition. Iran accordingly is forced to submit to rapid succession of weak and ineffective governments. British Ambassador to Iran, 1 according to Murray, telegraphed Foreign Office July 11, expressing opinion that Russians are apparently making determined effort to obtain dominant position in Iran prior to withdrawal of forces. Ambassador Murray states it is impossible not to be alarmed at present situation and ruthlessness of Russian tactics. He compares present Soviet official and press attitude towards Sadr Government to Soviet policy towards Saed Government last autumn, and believes Soviet is determined to have favorable cabinet in office during course of forthcoming elections. These statements indicate progressive deterioration of Iranian internal affairs, which is being hastened by intense Soviet-British rivalry in Iran. This rivalry is producing critical internal schism in which exercise of effective Iranian administrative control and rehabilitation of economy are impossible. Since continuation or development of this situation is prejudicial to Iranian sovereignty, Allied solidarity, and international security, you may wish to discuss entire Iranian problem fully and frankly at Conference. (See four background memoranda on Iran prepared by Department for Conference 2 and in particular memorandum entitled “Anglo-Soviet Rivalry in Iran.”) [ Grew ] 1 Sir Reader Bullard. 2 See vol. i , documents Nos. 628 and 629 . The other two memoranda, entitled “Anglo-Soviet Censorship in Iran” and “Russian Access to the Persian Gulf”, are not printed. No. 1328 The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State 891.00/7–2045: Telegram No. 1328 The Ambassador in Iran ( Murray ) to the Acting Secretary of State restricted Tehran , July 20, 1945—1 p.m. 511. Speaking in Majlis yesterday Deputy Ardalan urged early withdrawal British and Soviet troops in accordance Article 5 Tripartite Treaty. 1 Prime Minister Sadr replied that govt agreed and was studying problem. Murray 1 i. e., the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of January 29, 1942. Text in Department of State Bulletin , vol. vi , p. 249. No. 1329 The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State 891.00/7–2045: Telegram No. 1329 The Ambassador in Iran ( Murray ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Tehran , July 20, 1945—7 p.m. 516. Prime and Foreign Ministers 2 last night renewed to me urgent appeal for American action at Potsdam to bring about elimination Anglo-Soviet intervention in Iran and specifically withdrawal Russian and British troops. Both expressed gravest fears for future of Iran and even for world peace unless immediate steps taken to improve situation. Essence of their argument was as follows: (Sent to Dept as 516, repeated to Moscow 164 and London 37) History of Anglo-Russian rivalries in Iran clearly shows danger continued presence here of their forces. Like Serbia in First World War and Poland in Second, Iran may well be spark to let [ set? ] off third war. It is therefore in interest of whole world, not merely Iran, that something must be done quickly to relieve tension. Tehran declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943 3 provides statement of principles which can and should be put into practice. Sepahbodi emphasized importance of fact this declaration was signed by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill personally and should therefore carry special weight (first and most important step would be at least partial withdrawal foreign forces, which should be begun at once.) They said even token withdrawal would help. Sadr believes neither Britain nor Russia will take initiative both being interested parties and each distrustful of other. U. S. is party to Tehran declaration and, being disinterested could and should use its great moral force to cause other two powers to act. Foregoing was put to me eloquently and urgently[.] Prime Minister stressed Iran is caught in Anglo-Soviet vise and cannot extricate herself by her own efforts. He spoke more emphatically of Russian interference in internal affairs but also indicated fear and resentment of British activities. There was no indication any approach of this sort had been made to British or Russians. Murray 1 Text repeated in extenso in telegram No. 103 of Julv 23 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–645). 2 Mohsen Sadr and Anoshiravan Sepahbodi, respectively. 3 Text in Department of State Bulletin , vol. ix , p. 409. No. 1330 Proposal by the British Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1445 No. 1330 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 secret P. ( Terminal ) 16 Persia Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation His Majesty’s Government and the Soviet Government are maintaining their troops in Persia by virtue of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of the 29th June [ January ], 1942, under Article 5 of which these forces are to be withdrawn from Persia “ not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her Satellites had been suspended”. His Majesty’s Government have suggested to the Soviet Government that the Allied forces should be withdrawn from Persia pari passu and in stages before the final treaty date is reached. The Soviet Government have not, however, replied. 2. In His Majesty’s Government’s view the time has now come for the complete joint withdrawal of Allied forces from Persia and they propose that this should take place in three stages as follows:— (1) British and Soviet forces would be withdrawn completely from Tehran at once; (2) After the completion of the first stage, British and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the whole of Persia except that British troops would remain in Abadan and the southern oilfields area and Soviet troops would remain in a zone in either north-east or northwest Persia; (3) On the completion of the second stage, British troops would be withdrawn from Abadan and the oilfields area in south Persia and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the last area in which their troops were stationed in either north-east or north-west Persia. 3. If this proposal is accepted the demarcation of the withdrawal zones can be worked out afterwards. Berlin , 21st July, 1945. 1 Eden gave notice at the Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 21, that he was circulating this paper, but it was apparently not actually circulated until after the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 22. See ante , pp. 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] . No. 1331 The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State Truman Papers No. 1331 The Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of State 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 23, 1945. Iran 2 Memorandum for the Secretary I have communicated with General Hull of the War Department through Colonel Wise on the subject of the withdrawal of our troops from Iran. General Hull said that unless we want to abandon the U. S. supplies which are now in the American Service Theater in Iran from Tehran to the Gulf, we will not be able to withdraw our Service troops in 30 days nor probably 60 days. As you know, we are negotiating with the Persians and the Russians for the disposal of most of these supplies as surplus. Any forced withdrawal on our part would force our hand in this bargaining process and would probably amount to our just giving them away to either the Persians or the Soviet authorities. The alternative to continuing these negotiations to their end would be to load up our stuff on ships and take the greater part out of Persia and practically abandon what we cannot move. Another point is that about 1,500 of the U. S. Service Forces are Army [Air] Transport Command forces and, of course, in connection with the communications to the Far East and Russia, it would be advisable, if possible, to maintain this transport Service Airfield in Persia at least until the end of the war in the Pacific. These ATC forces are both at the Airfield on the Gulf and the Airfield at Tehran. That means that if we agree to withdraw all of our forces, we would have to realize that such withdrawal would affect the matter of the surplus property in Persia and the ATC communications. J[ ames ] C[ lement ] D[ unn ] 1 The presence of the original of this memorandum in the Truman Papers suggests the probability that Byrnes passed it on to the President. 2 This heading is a manuscript addition. No. 1332 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 No. 1332 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 [Extracts 2 ] [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Dunn Subject: Matters relating to the Near Eastern and African Area for inclusion in the Final Protocol There is outlined below my understanding of the final decisions reached with regard to the five items on the agenda which relate to the Near Eastern and African Area: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Iran . The three delegations agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn from the City of Tehran immediately and that consideration would be given later to withdrawal from additional areas of Iran. The British Delegation made known its view that agreement should be reached now on successive withdrawals in the future. The American Delegation announced the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces from Iran in the near future, regardless of the action taken by the other powers. 3 [The Soviet Delegation gave assurances that no action would be taken against Iran. 4 ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . George V. Allen [P. S.] As regards two of the foregoing items, I hope very much that some additional clarification or expansion of the agreements reached in principle can be included in the Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Iran . While the agreement was to withdraw troops merely from the “City of Tehran” I hope this can be extended to included [ sic ] Tehran and its vicinity. A withdrawal merely from the city limits, with considerable bodies of troops remaining on the outskirts, would do little to help the internal situation in Iran. It would be helpful if a specific reference could be made to a distance of 25 or even 50 miles from the city. 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see documents Nos. 736 , 1069 , 1342 , 1358 , and 1374 . 3 See ante , pp. 309–310 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 4 Handwritten brackets have been inserted around this sentence, with the following manuscript notation in the margin: “omit.” No. 1333 The President to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) Department of the Army Files No. 1333 The President to the Chief of Staff, United States Army ( Marshall ) 1 top secret [ Babelsberg , July 27, 1945.] Replying to your request for information in regard to the tripartite agreement that “troops of the three powers should be withdrawn from Teheran at once”, you are informed that it is my desire that United States troops be withdrawn from Teheran within 60 days if it is practicable to do so. It is not intended that the Ridley and Schwarzkopf missions and that A. T. C. personnel and facilities in Iran be withdrawn at the present time. 1 Printed from the text relayed by Hull to the War Department in telegram No. Victory 370 of July 27, where it is described as a “memorandum for General Marshall signed by the President under date July 27”. No. 1334 The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State 800.24591/7–2745: Telegram No. 1334 The Ambassador in Iran ( Murray ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret priority Tehran , July 27, 1945—5 p.m. 550. British Ambassador told me last night he had received official word that agreement on immediate evacuation of Tehran by all Allied troops had been reached at Potsdam. He said he had advised Soviet Ambassador, 1 who had heard nothing on subject. Later in evening I learned General Booth had just received telegram 2 from General Marshall at Potsdam saying evacuation of Tehran had been proposed and asking his view. Booth has replied evacuation of PGC (Persian Gulf Command) from Iran is already proceeding as fast as practicable in view of allocation of ships, etc. Main American military establishment this vicinity is Camp Amirabad, HQ (headquarters) for whole command, which is located two miles out and in his opinion should not be considered part of city. Although HQ could be moved to Khorramshahr, he does not recommend this. In any case, he states caretaking detachments must be left to protect American property, consisting of Amirabad and Camp Atterbury (in Tehran proper). In his telegram Booth adds that announcement last month of termination PGC Mission and beginning withdrawal American troops had very favorable effect locally. He refers to fact he has been informed by Embassy that Iranian authorities have stated they hope American troops will not leave before British and Russians go. Adds that anticipated announcement of incorporation of PGC within AMET (African Middle East Theater) should give clear indication we have no intention of staying on here longer than necessary, since it will show declining importance of our forces in Iran. Murray 1 Mikhail Maximov. 2 Not printed. No. 1335 The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State 811.24591/7–2845: Telegram No. 1335 The Ambassador in Iran ( Murray ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret us urgent Tehran , July 28, 1945—10 a.m. 554. Telegram from War to PGC (Persian Gulf Command) 1 received this morning states agreement on evacuation of American troops from Iran has been reached and instructs Booth to withdraw all personnel and supplies within 60 days if practicable. Only specific exceptions mentioned are essential ATC personnel and Schwarzkopf and Ridley missions. PGC believes this schedule can be met under certain conditions one of which is that it not be required to ship out railway rolling stock still here. While I can appreciate the overriding political considerations which may have dictated this decision, I must point out that it apparently contemplates abandonment of American fixed installations in Iran whose construction costs approximated 37 million dollars and may also involve transfer to Iranians without advance payment of moveable equipment such as trucks and railway rolling stock whose current value may be as high as 10 million dollars. Past history of negotiations with Iranians gives no hope negotiations for sale and payment these properties could be completed within time available. If possible under agreement which has been reached, I would recommend caretaking detachments be left to look after American property even after all other PGC personnel has gone. Total required for this purpose throughout Iran estimated at 2700. If delivered to Iranian custody even though title retained by US, I fear both moveable and fixed assets would deteriorate so rapidly as to suffer heavy if not total loss. In any case I think Colonel Stetson and OANLC (Office of Army Navy Liquidating [ Liquidation ] Commissioner) staff should remain here so long as we retain title to property of any importance in Iran. Dept may wish to determine whether evacuation order was intended to include Stetson’s office. Murray 1 Not printed. No. 1336 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff (Hull) to the Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army (Handy) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1336 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff ( Hull ) to the Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army ( Handy ) top secret urgent Babelsberg , 28 July 1945. Victory 391. To Handy from Hull. Look at paragraph 6 BG376 from PGC dated 26 July 1 and my Victory out 370 to Handy of 27 July. 2 The President has approved retention of liquidation commission 3 together with minimum of security and maintenance personnel at Teheran. Reference Craig’s 39585 of 27 July to Hull and Victory 331 of 25 July 4 it is contemplated that US will withdraw from all of Iran except for ATC, Schwarzkopf and Ridley missions, liquidation commission, etc. However, no time limit has been set by the President except for 60 day deadline on Teheran as given in Victory 370. The summary given in paragraph 7 of Booth’s BG376 of 26 July appeared to me to meet the evacuation requirement insofar as Iran exclusive of Teheran is concerned. I have shown to Admiral Leahy the instructions issued by War Department in War 39586 of 27 July. 5 Admiral Leahy informed me that the President understands the necessity of guarding our property in Iran and has no intention of directing a precipitous withdrawal. However, the President does desire that our troops be withdrawn from Persia without unnecessary delay. 1 Not printed. Cf. document No. 1334 . 2 See document No. 1333, footnote 1 . 3 Assigned to dispose of surplus American property in Iran. 4 Neither printed. 5 Not printed. Cf. document No. 1335 . No. 1337 The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State 811.24591/7–3045: Telegram No. 1337 The Ambassador in Iran ( Murray ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret priority Tehran , July 30, 1945—1 p.m. 560. Booth has received further telegram 1 from Potsdam canceling War telegram reported mytel 554 July 28 2 and authorizing more gradual withdrawal troops from Iran. He is now instructed transfer HQ (headquarters) from Amirabad to Khorramshahr by October 1 but to leave custodial detachment at Amirabad. Orders state OANLC (Office Army Navy Liquidation Commissioner]) staff will remain here. Murray 1 Not printed. 2 Document No. 1335 . Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference text on this subject, as included in the Protocol, see post , page 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] . Lebanon and Syria: The crisis in Franco-Levantine relations Lebanon and Syria: The crisis in Franco-Levantine relations [1338] The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) Babelsberg, July 18, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845: Telegram [1339] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 19 [1945.] 890d.01/7–1945: Telegram [1340] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State Paris, July 21, 1945—4 p.m. 890d.01/7–2145: Telegram [1341] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Berlin, July 23, 1945. Truman Papers [1342] The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 [1343] Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg, July 29, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2945 No. 1338 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–1845: Telegram No. 1338 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) to the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Henderson ) 1 secret Babelsberg , July 18, 1945. Victory 82. To Acting Secretary of State for Loy Henderson from George Allen. Sent to Department. Repeated to Paris and Tangier for Villard and Ailing. Russians have proposed addition of Tangier and the Levant states to the agenda for the conference. 2 There is, as yet, no indication of Russian attitude regarding either question. 1 Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Byrnes. 2 See ante , pp. 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] . No. 1339 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 890d.01/7–1945: Telegram No. 1339 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] July 19 [1945.] 63. Reurtel Victory 82, July 18. 1 We see no harm in an exchange of views at Terminal on Syria and Lebanon but feel it would be preferable that no decisions on future relations between these two countries and France be taken at a conference in which they are not participants. Detailed implementation of French decision to turn over Troupes Spéciales to local Governments is now being worked out locally between Levant Governments and French and British authorities. There are indications that British and French may agree on simultaneous withdrawal of their armed forces from Levant territory. These steps will meet immediate demands of Syria and Lebanon and may enable direct negotiation to start between them and France for conclusion of agreements regulating their future relations. Our view that such agreements should afford reasonable protection to French interests on a non-discriminatory basis is well known to all parties. We believe opportunity should be given for situation to develop on these lines. In case it should become clear that no progress is possible some kind of international consultation may become necessary. Repeated to Paris. [ Grew ] 1 Document No. 1338 . No. 1340 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State 890d.01/7–2145: Telegram No. 1340 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Paris , July 21, 1945—4 p.m. 4396. Bidault insisted again this morning that he can get no satisfaction whatever or any answer at all from the British in regard to the Levant situation. They simply do not reply. He said that their “numerous concessions” have meant nothing at all[;] the British continue in their endeavors to eliminate them from every phase of activity in Levant. He said that de Gaulle is getting increasingly restive under this. He was very much upset by the British endeavors to have US send American citizens to take part in Mira? He said that he understands very well that the British would like to get us involved with them but that he very much hopes that we will not swallow the bait. France would interpret this as our aiding British efforts to kick them out of that part of the world. … Sent Department, repeated London as 535 and Beirut 45. Caffery 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 106 of July 23 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2345). No. 1341 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation Truman Papers No. 1341 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] Berlin , July 23, 1945. Syria and Lebanon Owing to the international importance of the question of the situation in Syria and Lebanon the Conference expresses itself in favour of this question being considered by representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, the USSR and France and deems necessary that consent of the Government of France should be first obtained to this proposal. 1 An agency in Syria concerned with the collection and distribution of wheat. No. 1342 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 No. 1342 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 [Extracts 2 ] [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Dunn Subject: Matters relating to the Near Eastern and African Area for inclusion in the Final Protocol There is outlined below my understanding of the final decisions reached with regard to the five items on the agenda which relate to the Near Eastern and African Area: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Syria and Lebanon . The Soviet Delegation, which placed this item on the agenda, took notice of an explanation by the British Delegation of recent events in Syria and Lebanon and a declaration of a lack of any desire by the British Government to seek advantage or privilege for itself in the area. The Soviet Government withdrew its proposal that the situation in Syria and Lebanon be considered by representatives of the U. S. A., U. K., U. S. S. R. and France. The British Delegation expressed itself as favorable to the retention of a privileged position for France in the area, provided the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were willing to agree to such privileges. The American Delegation gave notice that it favored equality of treatment for all nations in the area and privileges for none. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . George V. Allen 1 Annex 2 to the minutes of the Seventh Plenary Meeting, July 23. See ante , p. 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . This proposal was withdrawn by Stalin during the course of that meeting. See ante , p. 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 2 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 3 For the other sections of this memorandum, see documents Nos. 736 , 1069 , 1332 , 1358 , and 1374 . No. 1343 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2945 No. 1343 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg , July 29, 1945.] On Syria and Lebanon On the Soviet Government suggestion at the Conference [there] took place the exchange of opinions on the situation in Syria and Lebanon. 1 See ante , pp. 306–308 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 317–319 [ Pgs. 317–319 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] . Palestine: Jewish immigration; suggestion for Anglo-American discussions Palestine: Jewish immigration; suggestion for Anglo-American discussions [1344] President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill [Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945. Truman Papers [1345] The Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] July 30, 1945. 867n.01/7–3045 [1346] Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Berlin , 31st July, 1945. Truman Papers [1347] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) Washington, August 18, 1945—5 p.m. 867n.01/8–1845: Telegram No. 1344 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill Truman Papers No. 1344 President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 24, 1945. Memorandum Subject: Palestine There is great interest in America in the Palestine problem. The drastic restrictions imposed on Jewish immigration by the British White Paper of May, 1939, 2 continue to provoke passionate protest from Americans most interested in Palestine and in the Jewish problem. They fervently urge the lifting of these restrictions which deny to Jews, who have been so cruelly uprooted by ruthless Nazi persecutions, entrance into the land which represents for so many of them their only hope of survival. Knowing your deep and sympathetic interest in Jewish settlement in Palestine, I venture to express to you the hope that the British government may find it possible without delay to take steps to lift the restrictions of the White Paper on Jewish immigration into Palestine. While I realize the difficulties of reaching a definite and satisfactory settlement of the Palestine problem, and that we cannot expect to discuss these difficulties at any length at our present meeting, I have some doubt whether these difficulties will be lessened by prolonged delay. I hope, therefore, that you can arrange at your early convenience to let me have your ideas on the settlement of the Palestine problem, so that we can at a later but not too distant date discuss the problem in concrete terms. 1 Submitted to the Protocol Subcommittee. On the Russian original is the following typed notation in Russian: “Approved by Comrade Molotov 29. vii . 45.” and the following manuscript notation in English: “Syria & Lebanon for Protocol.” The following translation of this text, headed “Syria and the Lebanon”, was included in a third draft of the Protocol prepared by the British Delegation and annotated “Compared with U.S. Text and agreed 30.7.45.” (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045): “At the suggestion of the Soviet Government, there was an exchange of views at the Conference on the situation in Syria and the Lebanon.” No section on this subject, however, was included in the Protocol ( document No. 1383 , post ). 2 A copy of Grew’s telegram No. 7 of July 9 to Byrnes (see vol. i , document No. 648, footnote 1 ) is attached to the source copy of this memorandum in the Truman Papers. No. 1345 The Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State 867n.01/7–3045 No. 1345 The Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Henderson ) to the Acting Secretary of State [ Washington ,] July 30, 1945. Office Memorandum If time permits I believe you will wish to note the attached memorandum prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs relative to the probable attitude of the new Labor Government in England toward the Palestine question. You will note that in 1939 many Labor members of Parliament, including several influential members of the present Cabinet, were strongly opposed to the White Paper on Palestine setting forth the Chamberlain Government’s policy on Palestine, which is still in force but which will presumably require some modification in the near future. You will also note that while the Labor Party is definitely committed to a pro-Zionist policy, there is some question as to the extent to which it will find it feasible to put this policy into operation. L[ oy ] W. H[ enderson ] [Attachment] Memorandum Subject: The Probable Attitude of the Labor Government of Great Britain With Respect to Palestine The leaders of the Labor Party, the rank and file of Labor Party members of the House of Commons, and the powerful labor unions among which are found a considerable number of the members of the Labor Party have consistently given their support to the Balfour Declaration. 1 In 1939 the Labor Members of the House of Commons voted overwhelmingly against the White Paper of 1939. In the debate on the White Paper 2 Laborite members argued that with its restrictions on immigration and land transfers the White Paper was contrary to the terms of the Mandate 3 and a repudiation by the Government of its promises to the Jews. Of the 179 members who voted against the White Paper of 1939, 137 were members of the Labor Party. Among the outstanding Laborites who voted against the White Paper were the following: Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee Age 62; Deputy Prime Minister in Coalition Cabinet; Prime Minister , July, 1945. Mr. H. Dalton President of Board of Trade since 1942; Minister of Economic Warfare 1940–42; Chancellor of the Exchequer , July, 1945. Rt. Hon. A. Greenwood Deputy Leader and Acting Chairman, Labor Party since 1942; Lord Privy Seal , July, 1945. Mr. J. Maxton Chairman of the Independent Labor Party, 1926–31, 1934–39. Rt. Hon. H. Morrison Minister of Supplies, 1940; Lord President of the Council and Leader in Commons , July, 1945. Mr. P. J. Noel-Baker Joint Parliamentary Secretary to Ministry of War Transport since 1942. Rt. Hon. F. W. Pethick-Lawrence. Vice-Chairman of the Labor Party, 1944. Mr. E. Shinwell Member of National Executive of the Labor Party. Mr. G. Tomlinson Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Labor, 1941. In the debate on the White Paper of 1939, significant remarks were made by three leading members of the present Labor Cabinet. Mr. Attlee , now Prime Minister, raised the question as to whether the British Government has the right to do as it wishes with respect to Palestine irrespective of the League of Nations. Sir Stafford Cripps , now President of the Board of Trade, stressed the inconsistent and conflicting nature of the promises made to the Arabs and the Jews. After describing the Palestine problem as essentially an economic one and mentioning the obligation on the British Government to make a very large economic contribution to the people of Palestine, particularly to the Arabs, in order to raise the standard of living of the Arab peasants, he referred to the obligation of the British Government to protect the Jewish population of Palestine. He proposed that a Jewish enclave be set up, temporarily, in which Jewish self-government be allowed to operate, while at the same time leaving Arab self-government to be developed in the rest of Palestine during the temporary “period of partition”. Cripps was of the opinion that through economic development Arabs and Jews would learn to cooperate. He stated that “… 4 with a view to an independent Palestine, we must partition the country temporarily in order to safeguard the interests of the Jewish people”. Mr. Herbert Morrison , now Lord President of the Council and Leader in Commons, declared that the White Paper was not in words or in spirit in harmony with the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. He maintained that the British Government had no right to deliberately create a Jewish minority and that the Government should not be committed to a policy “as to which grave doubt exists as to its consistency with the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate”. Mr. Morrison asserted that the Labor Party was friendly to the Arabs and regarded it as a duty of the Labor movement and of the British Government to raise “the economic, social and political status of the Arab masses in Palestine, Trans-Jordan and the other Arabian countries without in any way prejudicing the development of the Jewish National Home”. Mr. Morrison said in part: “… 4 I think it ought to be known by the House that, this breach of faith, which we regret, this breach of British honour, with its policy, with which we have no sympathy, is such that the least that can be said is that the Government must not expect that this is going to be automatically binding upon their successors”. Labor Party Resolution In December, 1944 the Labor Party at its 43d annual conference adopted the following resolution with respect to Palestine: “Here we have halted half way, irresolute between conflicting policies. But there is surely neither hope nor meaning in a ‘Jewish National Home’, unless we are prepared to let Jews, if they wish, enter this tiny land in such numbers as to become a majority. There was a strong case for this before the War. There is an irresistible case now, after the unspeakable atrocities of the cold and calculated German Nazi plan to kill all Jews in Europe. Here, too, in Palestine surely is a case, on human grounds and to promote a stable settlement, for transfer of population. Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out, as the Jews move in. Let them be compensated handsomely for their land and let their settlement elsewhere be carefully organised and generously financed. The Arabs have many wide territories of their own; they must not claim to exclude the Jews from this small area of Palestine, less than the size of Wales. Indeed, we should reexamine also the possibility of extending the present Palestinian boundaries, by agreement with Egypt, Syria, or Trans-Jordan. Moreover, we should seek to win the full sympathy and support both of the American and Russian Governments for the execution of this Palestinian policy.” The Probable Attitude of the Labor Government In the near future the Labor Government will be faced with important decisions with regard to Palestine. The remaining quota of Jewish immigrants will be exhausted within a few weeks. A situation will then arise which will probably oblige the Labor Government to reconsider the terms of the White Paper of 1939 with respect to immigration. Likewise, the Labor Government will be obliged to formulate its general policy towards the future status of Palestine under the United Nations Charter 5 within a few months time. With the assumption of responsibility for the British Empire, it does not seem likely that the Labor Government will attempt to implement the resolution passed at the 43d Annual Conference of the Labor Party of December, 1944. It does, however, appear likely that the Labor Government will modify or repeal the White Paper policy of 1939, especially with respect to Jewish immigration. The Labor Government may be expected to consult the governments of the Soviet Union and the United States before putting into execution a new policy with respect to the future status of Palestine. W[ illiam ] Y[ ale ] [ Washington ,] 7/30/45. 1 Palestine: Statement of Policy (London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1939; Cmd. 6019). 2 Of November 2, 1917. Text in Foreign Relations , 1917, supp. 2, vol. i , p. 317, footnote 1 . 3 See Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report , 5th series, vol. 347, cols. 1937–2056, 2129–2190. 4 For the text of the mandate of July 24, 1922, see Treaty Series No. 728; 44 Stat. (3) 2184; Foreign Relations , 1924, vol. ii , p. 213 . 4 Ellipsis in the original. 5 Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945 (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031). No. 1346 Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Truman Papers No. 1346 Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman Memorandum to the President From the Prime Minister I have read your memorandum of July 24 about Palestine. 1 You will I am sure understand that I cannot give you any statement on policy until we have had time to consider the matter, and this is simply to inform you that we will give early and careful consideration to your memorandum. C R Attlee Berlin , 31st July, 1945. 1 Document No. 1344 . No. 1347 The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) 867n.01/8–1845: Telegram No. 1347 The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem ( Pinkerton ) confidential Washington , August 18, 1945—5 p.m. 163. Following for background info is substance of remarks on Palestine made by President at Aug 16 press conference: In reply to inquiry whether Jewish national state had been discussed at Potsdam President said it had been discussed with Churchill and Attlee and was still being discussed. Asked whether he had discussed it with Stalin President replied in negative adding there was nothing Stalin could do about it. In reply to subsequent question as to the American view on Palestine that was put forward at Potsdam, President said that we want to let as many Jews into Palestine as is possible and he added that the matter would have to be worked out diplomatically with the Brit and the Arabs and it would have to be on a peaceful basis as he had no desire to send half a million American soldiers to keep the peace in Palestine. End summary[.] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sent Jerusalem repeated Cairo Baghdad Jidda Beirut Damascus. Byrnes Tangier: Future of the international zone; Soviet participation in the Paris conversations on Tangier Tangier: Future of the international zone; Soviet participation in the Paris conversations on Tangier [1348] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, July 16, 1945—11 a.m. 881.00/7–1145: Telegram [1349] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Armour) Washington, July 16, 1945—11 a.m. 881.00/2–945: Telegram [1350] The Representative in the Conversations Concerning Tangier (Childs) to the Acting Secretary of State Paris, July 18, 1945—1 p.m. 881.00/7–1845: Telegram [1351] The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Acting Secretary of State Madrid, July 18, 1945—1 p.m. 881.00/7–1845: Telegram [1352] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State London, July 18, 1945—5 p.m. 881.00/7–1845: Telegram [1353] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 19 [1945.] 881.00/7–1945: Telegram [1354] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State London, July 20, 1945—noon. 881.00/7–2045: Telegram [1355] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, July 21, 1945. 881.00/7–2145 [1356] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg,] July 22, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2245 [1357] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State [Babelsberg,] July 23, 1945. 881.00/7–2345: Telegram [1358] The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 [1359] The Representative in the Conversations Concerning Tangier (Childs) to the Acting Secretary of State Paris, July 26, 1945—1 p.m. 881.00/7–2645: Telegram [1360] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State London, July 26, 1945—5 p.m. 881.00/7–2645: Telegram [1361] The Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard) to the Acting Secretary of State Tangier, July 27, 1945—7 p.m. 881.00/7–2745: Telegram [1362] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , July 28th, 1945. 881.00/7–2845 [[Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)]] Editor’s Note No. 1348 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 881.00/7–1145: Telegram No. 1348 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) secret Washington , July 16, 1945—11 a.m. 5814. It is not clear from your 6984, July 11, 1 whether British have definitely decided to raise Tangier question at Big Three meeting or whether Hoyer Millar was merely sounding us out on the idea. (Sent London 5814, rptd to Paris 3311, Tangier 155, and Moscow 1615) Our own feeling is that this should not be done in view of the fact that France will not be represented at the meeting. If the British so desire however we would see no objection to their endeavoring through normal diplomatic channels to ascertain what views the Russians may have for the solution of the Tangier problem. Grew 1 Document No. 673, printed in vol. i . No. 1349 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Armour) 881.00/2–945: Telegram No. 1349 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain ( Armour ) [Extract 1 ] secret us urgent Washington , July 16, 1945—11 a.m. 1200. 1. We have given careful study to the various points raised in your 1475 of July 9, 7 p.m. 2 and fully realize that the course which we may be compelled to follow in solving the Tangier problem may result in a deterioration of our relations with Spain and that such deterioration may render more difficult our efforts to use Spain as a source of supply and a base for A. T. C. operations. 2. We agree that Spain has interests in Tangier which should not be ignored. Nevertheless, we are convinced that if the United States is to discharge its world responsibilities it must take a more, rather than a less, active interest in areas which are a potential source of trouble. If we do not insist just now in appropriate participation in the administration of Tangier, an impression may well be created that we shall not insist upon being consulted in matters of international importance relating to North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Near East. We feel that we must continue actively to interest ourselves in these areas with the primary purpose of preventing developments from taking place in them which might lead to international conflicts involving ourselves. Since clashes of interests originating in the Western Mediterranean might result in conflicts involving the Soviet Union and since as far back as Algeciras 3 Russia was admitted to have a legitimate interest in Tangier, we do not believe that the Soviet Union can be kept out of Tangier without giving it the impression that the Western powers are discriminating against it. We believe that the Soviet Union would continue to insist upon participation in discussions relating to Tangier even though the United States would withdraw from such conversations. 3. It is possible that Soviet representatives participating in conversations or in conventions relating to Tangier may insist that the present Spanish Government be barred. If they do so we shall make every effort to find a formula which would admit both the Soviet Union and Spain. If that is not possible, we shall be prepared to consult with the British and French Governments with a view to dealing with this situation when we are confronted with it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grew 1 For the other part of this message, see document No. 1175 2 Document No. 671, printed in vol. i . 3 i. e., the Algeciras Conference of 1906. For the text of the Act of Algeciras, signed April 7, 1906, see Treaty Series No. 456; 34 Stat. (3) 2905; Foreign Relations , 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495 . No. 1350 The Representative in the Conversations Concerning Tangier (Childs) to the Acting Secretary of State 881.00/7–1845: Telegram No. 1350 The Representative in the Conversations Concerning Tangier ( Childs ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Paris , July 18, 1945—1 p.m. 4310. From Childs. Meyrier informed British Counselor Holman and me today that he had made an unofficial communication to Soviet Representatives of Embassy [ sic ] yesterday concerning Soviet participation in Tangier conference and had mentioned August 3 as a tentative date for official opening (my 4262, July 16 2 ). At Meyrier’s request Holman agreed to endeavor to obtain acquiescence of British Govt in date proposed as soon as possible. Meyrier stated he wished to open entirely informal conversations with US and British on July 30 to which no publicity of any kind would be given, such informal talks to continue to August 1, inclusive. (Sent Dept 4310; repeated Madrid 272; London 525; Tangier 22.) It appears to me that USSR might legitimately take exception to participation of American Representatives in such informal talks to which Russian Representatives were not also invited. Accordingly, I believe it might be preferable for such informal discussions in advance of conference to be confined to British and French Representatives whose invitations to US and to Soviet Union are based on their original sponsorship of 1923 statute. 3 Absence of American Representative from preliminary discussions would not preclude our being kept currently informed of developments of those conversations. 1 Sent over the signature of Caffery. The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 65 of July 19 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Sum-maries/7–1945). 2 Not printed. 3 i. e., the regime established for Tangier by the convention signed at Paris, December 18, 1923. For text, see British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxvii , p. 499. No. 1351 The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Acting Secretary of State 881.00/7–1845: Telegram No. 1351 The Ambassador in Spain ( Armour ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 confidential Madrid , July 18, 1945—1 p.m. 1548. British Chargé 2 has been advised by Castillo that Alba was last week instructed to inform British FonOff that Spanish Govt considers that Russia by refusing to associate itself with statutory regime in Tangier forfeited its rights under act of Algeciras and that present Soviet claim to participation is consequently without juridical basis, for which reason Spain cannot consent to such participation. (My 1452 July 5 repeated London 433 Paris 366 Tangier 79 3 ) Castillo admitted however Spain could in fact do nothing to prevent Russian participation but stated that should USSR be admitted to Tangier only course open to Spain, in view of large Spanish colony and extensive Spanish interests in that zone (repeated to London as 456 Paris as 398 Tangier as 82), would be to renounce statute 4 and revert to capitulatory regime. Armour 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 65 of July 19 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–1945). 2 Reginald James Bowker. 3 Document No. 668, printed in vol. i . 4 i. e., the regime established for Tangier by the convention signed at Paris, December 18, 1923. No. 1352 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State 881.00/7–1845: Telegram No. 1352 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret London , July 18, 1945—5 p.m. 7242. The British do not intend to raise Tangier question at big three meeting except in so far as determining whether Russia will participate is concerned, according to Harvey and Garran of FonOff. Embassy was told today that while Russian request presumably will be granted British hope to use their concurrence as bargaining point with Russia. It was stated British are dissatisfied with tardy and sometimes unsatisfactory Soviet action on British requests. Garran said Spanish Under Secretary Castillo has told Bowker if Russians brought in Spain will revert to status quo ante 1923. FonOff evidently believes Soviet Govt out to embarrass Franco to fullest and has noted anti-Franco Soviet broadcasts recently stepped up considerably. Sent Dept as 7242; repeated Paris 461; Madrid 190; Tangier 44; Moscow 255. Winant 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 65 of July 19 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–1945). No. 1353 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State 881.00/7–1945: Telegram No. 1353 The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] July 19 [1945.] 64. 1. The conversations on the Tangier problem have been postponed on the insistence of the Brit until sometime in Aug. We have been given to understand that the Brit wish to use their consent to Soviet participation in the talks as a “deal by which Brit would obtain something in exchange for Russian admission to conversations”. (Urtel Victory 82, July 18.) 1 2. On July 16 we took the position in a telegram to London 2 that the Tangier question should not be raised at the Big Three meeting in view of the fact that France was not to be represented at the meeting. We added, however, that if the Brit so desired we would see no objection to their endeavoring through normal diplomatic channels to ascertain what views the Russians might have for the solution of the Tangier problem. The Brit have assured us that they would limit any discussions on this subject in Berlin to the question of the participation of the Soviet Govt in the talks. Any info the Soviet representatives might volunteer to give as to their ideas with regard to the future of Tangier would of course be helpful to us. 3. We have unearthed an old Riga despatch 3 reporting that the Izvestiya of Sept 10, 1926 contained an article to the effect that Soviet Govt had notified Sweden, Great Britain, Italy and France that Russia’s participation in Algeciras conference gave it same rights as other participants to take part in any revision of Tangier Statute, and that Soviet Govt declared that it reserved right not to recognize any decisions that might be reached without its participation. 4. Villard is in Tangier; Childs and Dempster in Paris. They can proceed to Berlin if desired. [ Grew ] 1 Document No. 1338 . 2 Document No. 1348 . 3 Not printed. No. 1354 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State 881.00/7–2045: Telegram No. 1354 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret London , July 20, 1945—noon. 7304. Embassy understands Foreign Office position unchanged by French proposals (re Paris 525, July 18 to London 1 ) British still unwilling proceed prior conclusion Big Three Meeting. Should meeting end in time, and result in concurrence Soviet request as is expected, British will make counter-proposal Tangier Conference to open August 6 instead August 3. Sent Dept as 7304; repeated Paris 467, Madrid 192, Tangier 45. Winant 1 Document No. 1350 . No. 1355 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 881.00/7–2145 No. 1355 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 2536 Paris , July 21, 1945. Subject: Transmitting Comments on Spanish Threat to Withdraw from the Tangier Statute in the Event of Soviet Participation The American Ambassador refers to telegram no. 1548, July 18, 1945 addressed by the American Ambassador in Madrid to the Department 1 referring to a Spanish threat to withdraw from the Tangier Administration in the event of Soviet participation, and has the honor to transmit, as of possible interest to the Department, a memorandum prepared by Mr. Ernest J. Dempster in consultation with Mr. J. Rives Childs commenting on the disabilities of Spain to carry out its threatened intentions. J R[ ives ] C[ hilds ] [Enclosure] Memorandum Madrid Embassy’s Telegram No . 398 1 in Reference to Action Spain Proposes to Adopt If Russia Joins in the Tangier Administration The Spanish Government admits that it can do nothing to prevent Russian participation in the Tangier administration but bases its objection to such Russian intervention upon a legal argument shown to be untenable by reference to paragraph 1 of Article 56 of the 1923 Convention concerning Tangier. The paragraph in question reads as follows: “The present Convention shall be communicated to the Powers signatories of the Act of Algeciras and the three contracting Governments (France, Great Britain and Spain) undertake to lend each other mutual support in obtaining the accession of those Powers.” It is clear from this provision that the signatories of the Act of Algeciras were admittedly free to accept or to reject association in the statutory administration of the Tangier Zone after consideration of the joint persuasive pressure of the elaborators of the 1923 Convention. No signatory of the Act of Algeciras could possibly be deemed to forfeit its rights under that Act as a result of its declining adherence to another and extraneous instrument such as the 1923 Tangier Statute. Furthermore there is nothing in the terms of the 1923 Convention to preclude any signatory of the Act of Algeciras from subsequently reconsidering its refusal and intimating its desire to adhere to the Statute subject to eventual agreement with the contracting powers on the conditions of its entry into the Tangier administration. Such a contingency is apparently admitted by the Spanish without demur in the case of the United States, and there are no grounds upon which that position may be contested in regard to Russia whose position in the premises is substantially identical with that of America. In the event of Russia’s admission, or on other grounds, the Spanish may claim a right to denounce the Statute. However, the carrying into effect of their threatened reversion to the capitulatory regime as and when they may think fit, appears to be restrained by Article 56 above cited of the 1923 Convention paragraphs 3 and 4 of which read as follows: “It (the Convention) is concluded for a period of twelve years dating from its ratification. “It shall be renewed automatically for one or more equal periods if at least six months before its expiry none of the contracting powers has demanded its revision. In such case it shall remain in force while the revision by common agreement is being effected.” The Spanish position in the premises in reference to the above provisions appears to be governed by the following facts: 1. The Tangier Statute is in its second twelve year period which terminates in 1948. (The legality of its continued operation has not been affected by the farce of the Spanish occupation, which in effect may be set down as an unconventional method for the presentation of Spain’s statutory demand for a revision of, or even for Spanish withdrawal from the Statute.) 2. The other two contracting powers, France and Great Britain[,] are likewise now demanding a revision for the purpose, entirely compatible with the terms of the 1923 Statute[,] of arranging for the inclusion in the administration of the United States and Russia as, similarly in 1928, a revision 2 was made to include Italy. 3. During such revisions (and as happened in 1928), the Statute remains in force and, in accordance with the terms of its Article 48, paragraph 3, the capitulatory rights of Spain remain in abeyance. 4. An attempt by Spain to set up its consular court jurisdiction in Tangier during the period of revision, and presumably in any event until the year 1948 when the second twelve year period of the Statute terminates, would be illegal as contrary to Spain’s contractual engagements under the Tangier Convention. 5. The authorities which would continue administering the Zone in conformity with the provisions, including those of Article 56, of the 1923 Statute would appear to be justified in ignoring a reestablishment of the Spanish consular courts and properly require Spanish ressortissants to submit to the jurisdiction of the International Mixed Court provided for by Article 48 of the 1923 Convention. While the foregoing is believed to represent the legal position in the premises, the Spanish view and contemplated intentions are susceptible obviously of increasing the delicacy and difficulties of the problem of order and security in the Tangier Zone during the interim administration. E[ rnest ] J D[ empster 1 Document No. 1351 . 1 Document No. 1351 . 2 Signed at Paris, July 25, 1928. Text in British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxxviii , p. 449. No. 1356 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2245 No. 1356 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation?] top secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 22, 1945. International Zone of Tangier Soviet Proposal Having considered the question of the zone of Tangier we have agreed that this zone which includes the city of Tangier and the area adjacent to it shall, owing to its specific strategic importance, remain international. Representatives of the states chiefly concerned viz. Great Britain, the United States of America, the U. S. S. R. and France which will be invited to join this declaration will work out an appropriate status of this international zone responding [ corresponding? ] to the new conditions that resulted from the victory over Hitler Germany. Spain will be invited to adhere to the new status after the re-establishment of democratic regime in the country. 1 This question was raised by Molotov at the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 22. See ante , p. 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] . This subject was referred to the Foreign Ministers at the Sixth Plenary Meeting, July 22. See ante , pp. 246–247 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . No. 1357 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 881.00/7–2345: Telegram No. 1357 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State secret [ Babelsberg ,] July 23, 1945. Victory 230. To Acting Secretary of State, Washington. Information American Embassy, Paris, to American Legation, Tangier. British are telegraphing to London today suggesting that the French and British Embassies in Moscow invite the Soviet Government to send representatives to Paris for the discussions regarding Tangier. 1 They hope that the discussions may begin by August 6. We are in accord with this action. 1 See Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , pp. 380, 613. No. 1358 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 No. 1358 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 [Extract 2 ] [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Dunn Subject: Matters relating to the Near Eastern and African Area for inclusion in the Final Protocol There is outlined below my understanding of the final decisions reached with regard to the five items on the agenda which relate to the Near Eastern and African Area: 1. Tangier . It was agreed that the Zone of Tangier, which includes the City of Tangier and adjacent area, should remain international. It was further agreed that the U. S., U. K., U. S. S. R. and France should send representatives to Paris in the near future to work out an appropriate status of this international zone. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . George V. Allen 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see documents Nos. 736 , 1069 , 1332 , 1342 , and 1374 . 3 See ante , p. 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . No. 1359 The Representative in the Conversations Concerning Tangier (Childs) to the Acting Secretary of State 881.00/7–2645: Telegram No. 1359 The Representative in the Conversations Concerning Tangier ( Childs ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Paris , July 26, 1945—1 p.m. 4505. From Childs. Meyrier informed us today that British and French were concerting together on the form of invitation to the USSR to participate in the Tangier conversations to open in Paris on August 6 and that it was hoped to arrive at a definite text which would (sent Dept as 4505; repeated Tangier as 24; Madrid as 281 and London as 541) be communicated to the French and British Embassies in Moscow tomorrow. 1 Sent over the signature of Caffery. No. 1360 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State 881.00/7–2645: Telegram No. 1360 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret London , July 26, 1945—5 p.m. 7529. FonOff now states French Govt will be informed immediately British concurrence in Soviet participation Tangier discussions and that French and British Govts will communicate with Moscow upon concerting their action. (Sent Dept as 7529; repeated Paris as 484; repeated Tangier as 47; repeated Madrid as 200). Winant No. 1361 The Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard) to the Acting Secretary of State 881.00/7–2745: Telegram No. 1361 The Chief of the Division of African Affairs ( Villard ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Tangier , July 27, 1945—7 p.m. 215. From Villard. During a call which I made on the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuán this morning, General Varela spoke for an hour and a half on Spain’s interest in Tangier. He asserted that his govt had occupied the international zone in 1940 only because of a German threat, that unless Spain did so German forces would be moved in. The Spanish action had thus preserved Tangier for the Allies. When I pointed out the effect had actually been to create a base for Nazi espionage Varela claimed that the presence of a few individual enemy agents was inevitable in wartime and that he could personally vouch for the fact that no Spanish official in the Ministry of War was ever guilty of complicity in such events. Moreover, Spain’s control of Tangier, said General Varela[,] had insured a regime of tranquility and was respecte[d] by the Moors, in contrast with the French handling of affairs in the Levant. He spoke sharply of France’s efforts to enhance her position in Tangier, a city whose inhabitants were predominately Spanish, and complained that the Sultan was being constantly built up by the French merely to increase their own prestige. The High Commissioner expressed great fear that Russia’s principal intention in Tangier was to establish a foothold for the dissemination of Communist propaganda among the Arabs. He urged that serious consideration be given to the results in Morocco. By admitting Russia to the administration of Tangier the Anglo-Saxon powers would bear the responsibility for the repercussions which would certainly follow throughout the Arab world. General Varela said that Spain relied on Great Britain and the US to bear in mind her natural rights and interests in the forthcoming discussions at Paris wherein Spain was to have no voice. He said that of paramount importance to Spain in Tangier was the police force, which for the sake of order and security should remain in Spanish hands. Sent Dept as 215, repeated Paris 20, Madrid 89 and London 23. 1 Sent over the signature of Paul H, Ailing, Diplomatic Agent at Tangier. No. 1362 The British Embassy to the Department of State 881.00/7–2845 No. 1362 The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire His Majesty’s Ambassador at Paris 1 has been instructed to inform the French Government that His Majesty’s Government are now able to agree to the participation of the Soviet Government at the Paris talks about Tangier and to suggest that the French and British Ambassadors in Moscow 2 should be instructed to make a joint formal communication to the Soviet Government, in reply to their representations in Paris and London of July 2nd, 3 inviting them to attend talks in Paris early in August. Mr. Duff Cooper is further to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs 4 that, in line with the previous assurance of His Majesty’s Government, the general question of Tangier has not been discussed at Potsdam and that no reference will be made to Tangier in the communiqué to be issued at the end of the Conference. G. H. M[ iddleton ] Washington , July 28th, 1945. 1 Alfred Duff Cooper. 2 General of the Army Georges Catroux and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, respectively. 3 See vol. i , documents Nos. 662 and 663 . 4 Georges Bidault. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference text on this subject, as included in the Protocol, see post , page 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] . Turkey: The Straits question; relations with the Soviet Union Turkey: The Straits question; relations with the Soviet Union [1363] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Washington [Babelsberg], 17 July 1945. SWNCC Files [1364] The State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to Members of the Committee Panel at Babelsberg Berlin, 18 July 1945. SWNCC Files [1365] The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Chairman of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (Dunn) Washington [Babelsberg], 19 July 1945. Truman Papers [1366] The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Berlin Conference, July 19, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1945 [1367] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State Ankara, July 19, 1945—8 p.m. 761.67/7–1945: Telegram [1368] The Under Secretary of the Navy (Gates) to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (Gardner) [Washington,] 21 July 1945. Department of the Army Files: Telegram [1369] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Babelsberg], 7/22/45. 767.68119/7–545 [1370] The Chairman of the President’s War Relief Control Board (Dairies) to the President 3 Kaiserstrasse, 22 July 1945. Truman Papers [1371] Memorandum by the President’s Chief of Staff (Leahy) [Potsdam, July 24 (?), 1945.] Truman Papers [1372] United States Delegation Working Paper Berlin Conference, July 25, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2545 [1373] Proposal by the United States Delegation Berlin Conference, July 25, 1945. 840.811/7–2545 [1374] The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 [1375] Proposal by the British Delegation [Babelsberg, July 27, 1945.] 840.811/7–2545 [1376] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State Ankara, July 27, 1945—2 p.m. 767.68119/7–2745: Telegram [1377] The Additional Secretary to the British Cabinet (Brook) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) Berlin Conference, 28th July, 1945. 767.68119/7–2845 [[Unnumbered document following Document 1377 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1378] Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) [Washington,] August 9, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–945 No. 1363 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee SWNCC Files No. 1363 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee top secret SM–2610 Washington [ Babelsberg ], 17 July 1945. Memorandum for the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Subject: United States Policy Concerning Dardanelles and Kiel Canal It is assumed that the request of the State Department 1 for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the future of the Dardanelles is based upon the fact that we have agreed to discuss the Montreux Convention 2 at Terminal . A similar request 1 concerning the future of the Kiel Canal indicates that that subject may also be brought up for discussion. The problem presented is two fold. First, whether or not the United States should agree to decide these matters at this time, and second, if they are to be decided what should be the position of our government. In approaching this problem it is essential that we first establish in clear perspective, the place of these questions in relation to the overall problem of the general peace settlement which alone can establish and stabilize the boundaries, rights and responsibilities of nations in the immediate post-war era, and thus provide a sound basis for solving the military problems of national and international security. The problems of the Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal are basically merely two of a score of similar problems which in the aggregate constitute the over-all problem of the peace settlement. Among these problems are agreement on numerous boundaries and bases in Europe, disposition of Italian colonial areas, areas detached from Japan, strategic islands in the Pacific, restitution of territory to China, and the establishment of the trusteeship system, which will of necessity be directly involved in many problems of the general settlement. While there has been no formal agreement to that effect, the principle has been generally accepted that most of these problems should await the end of the war, or, at least until they can be decided, not separately, but as an integrated whole. The single but important exception in the application of this principle has been Russia. By agreement or at least by acceptance on the part of her allies, Russia has already established her claims to eastern Poland, 3 to the Baltic States, to parts of Finland and to Bessarabia and Ruthenia There is reason to believe she has also obtained agreement as to her claims in the Far East. 4 Whatever the justification of these agreements, the fact remains that, while the other great powers await the peace settlement to negotiate their proposals and establish their rights and responsibilities, Russia has received preferred treatment, both as regards intrinsic values and as regards priority of settlement. Russia’s reaction to this favored treatment has been to demand further special consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that at present Russia is pressing the question of the Dardanelles, including the right to bases in that area, has demanded certain Turkish areas in northeast Turkey, 5 is agitating the question of access to the Persian Gulf, has occupied the Island of Bornholm and has made proposals to Norway looking to establishing Russian bases in Bear Island and Spitsbergen. Russia has so far succeeded in obtaining her demands because she has had the might, if not always the right, on her side and has convinced the other powers that in the cases of Poland, the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Ruthenia, she would seize by force what was not granted her by agreement. The current demands and proposals of Russia, however, are not in exactly the same category. While it is true that the United States and Great Britain could not successfully oppose a determined Russian effort to seize these desired areas by force, it is also true that as Russian demands progress farther afield, her power to seize her objectives progressively declines, and there is a diminishing ratio of return to risk and effort. Furthermore, in estimating Russian intentions, we should give full weight to the fact that she is war-weary, over-extended by her great efforts and in need of years to reestablish her economy, consolidate her gains and recoup her losses, a process in which she requires the substantial support and assistance of the United States. We should also question whether she would be willing to break with the World Organization, 6 before it is established, or with the United States in particular, on the issue that her current demands be accepted now , rather than being decided later as a part of the general peace settlement. In view of the considerations outlined above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that from the long range and over-all security point of view the United States, in so far as consistent with commitments already made, should limit and postpone discussion of the Dardanelles and Kiel Canal questions and in any case, should insist that final decisions on these matters should be delayed until they can be made as part of the general peace settlement. 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . If, notwithstanding the considerations previously stated, it is necessary, due to previous commitments or other compelling reasons to discuss and possibly reach a decision concerning the Dardanelles, then it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that from the long range and over-all security point of view, the position of the United States should be: a . The United States would agree to a revision of the Montreux Convention substantially along the lines suggested by the State Department in its recent memorandum on this subject. 8 b . We should support the demilitarization of the Straits, and failing that should oppose any proposals granting a nation, other than Turkey, bases or other rights for direct or indirect military control of the Straits. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A J McFarland Brigadier General, U. S. A., Secretary . 1 Not printed. 2 Signed July 20, 1936. The substantive provisions of this convention regarding the regime of the Turkish Straits are printed in Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits , p. 25. For full text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 213. 1 Not printed. 3 See document No. 1417 , section vi . 4 See the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan signed by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill on February 11, 1945, at Yalta. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984 . 5 See vol. i , documents Nos. 683 – 686 . 6 i. e., the United Nations. 7 For the paragraphs omitted here, see document No. 751 . 8 The reference is presumably to document No. 681, printed in vol. i . No. 1364 The State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to Members of the Committee Panel at Babelsberg SWNCC Files No. 1364 The State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to Members of the Committee Panel at Babelsberg 1 top secret Berlin , 18 July 1945. Memorandum for : Mr. Dunn Mr. McCloy Admiral Gardner Subject: United States Policy Regarding Dardanelles and Kiel Canal References: JCS 1418 Series 2 The attached memorandum to the Secretary of State, 3 embodying a report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on recommended U. S. policy concerning the Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal, 4 is circulated for informal consideration. It is requested that you indicate your concurrence or comments. For the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee[:] H A Gerhardt Colonel, G. S. C. Acting Secretary S. W. N. C . [ C .] 1 Gardner indicated his approval of the attachment to this memorandum on July 18. Dunn signed his copy, giving his approval, but did not indicate the date. For McCloy’s comment, see document No. 1365 . 2 Not printed. Cf. document No. 1363 . 3 See the attachment to document No. 1365 . 4 Documents Nos. 751 and 1363 . No. 1365 The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Chairman of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (Dunn) Truman Papers No. 1365 The Assistant Secretary of War ( McCloy ) to the Chairman of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee ( Dunn ) 1 top secret Washington [ Babelsberg ], 19 July 1945. Memorandum for the Chairman, State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee Subject: United States Policy Regarding Dardanelles and Kiel Canal. I approve the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State embodying a report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a recommended United States policy concerning the Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal. I think, however, that the United States should support such a policy only if it is satisfactory to Great Britain, particularly those points which appear in subparagraphs 4 and 5 under the heading: “United States Attitude Toward Possible Changes In The Montreux Convention” of the State Department memorandum regarding the Montreux Convention. 2 If the British are not agreeable to the policy as set forth in the State Department’s memorandum, then, since this is a matter in which the British have a vital interest, the United States policy should be reviewed in the light of the British position. John J McCloy 3 [Attachment] The Chairman of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of State top secret [Undated. 4 ] Memorandum for the Secretary of State Subject: United States Policy Concerning Dardanelles and Kiel Canal The following views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subject have been approved by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (Berlin) and are forwarded herewith, in compliance with the request of the State Department: [Here follows verbatim the body of memorandum No. SM–2610 of July 17 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See documents Nos. 751 and 1363 .] James Clement Dunn 1 The copy of this paper in the SWNCC Files bears the following manuscript notation: “Original sent to Secretary of State with Memo from SWNCC” [i. e., the attachment to document No. 1365 ]. The presence in the Truman Papers of the signed originals of this memorandum and of its attachment suggests the probability that Byrnes passed them on to Truman. 2 Document No. 681, printed in vol. i . 3 In a letter to Colonel C. W. McCarthy, Secretary of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, dated July 23, Gerhardt says: “Mr. McCloy discussed the memorandum [i. e., the attachment to document No. 1365 ] with the Secretary of War, and in accordance with Mr. Stimson’s thoughts, added a comment to his memorandum approving the paper.” 4 Circulated by the Secretariat of the Committee as SWNCC 169 on July 30. No. 1366 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–1945 No. 1366 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 Subject: Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 2 on the Dardanelles. The paper recommends in brief that the U. S. Delegation should try to “limit and postpone discussion of the Dardanelles”, and in any case should insist that final decision be delayed until it can be made a part of the general peace settlement. The paper points out the many instances in which Russia is gaining control over various areas while the other Allies follow the agreed policy of waiting for the peace settlement to present their claims. The Joint Chiefs think we should insist that Russia follow our practice in this instance. If we are compelled to reach an agreement now on the Dardanelles, the Joint Chiefs think that, from the security point of view, the U. S. should: ( a ) agree to revision of the Montreux Convention along the lines suggested by the State Department paper. 3 (I attach a copy of our paper, as revised, for convenient reference). ( b ) support the demilitarization of the Straits. Failing this, we “should oppose any proposals granting a nation, other than Turkey, bases or other rights for direct or indirect military control of the Straits”. Comment: The Joint Chiefs agree with the first five points of the State Department paper (which deal with the revision of the Montreux Convention), but do not agree with our sixth point. You will recall that following your discussion with Loy Henderson, we revised our sixth point to say that we would not object to Russian bases on the Straits provided they were established with the free consent of Turkey. 4 The Joint Chiefs feel that we should oppose either bases or direct or indirect control of the Straits by any power other than Turkey. This, as you know, is also the strong British view, and the view the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs has long held. I myself fully agree with the Joint Chiefs’ position. As regards the Joint Chiefs’ suggestion of demilitarization, this would return the Straits’ status to that of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, 5 which Turkey never liked and which she was finally able to change in the Montreux Convention of 1936, when Turkey was given the right to refortify the Straits. Neutralization would be in American strategic interests if the Turkish Government should some day come tinder the influence of a power hostile to the United States—in which case we would welcome the Straits being unfortified. However, as long as Turkey is friendly to us, Turkish fortifications along the Dardanelles are in our interests and are a very considerable protection to British interests in the Aegean and Mediterranean. Perhaps the Joint Chiefs feel that Turkey must inevitably come under hostile influence sooner or later. They consider that neutralization is the best for us in the long run and may be a compromise acceptable to Russia while avoiding Russian bases. Turkey would undoubtedly resist neutralization bitterly and I do not see how it can be forced on her without violating the principles of the United Nations. In brief, I concur fully in the Joint Chiefs’ paper with the possible exception of the suggestion that the Straits be neutralized. I think we should insist in this regard, as in regard to bases, that neutralization, if agreed upon, must be established with the free consent of Turkey. G[ eorge ] V. A[ llen ] Berlin Conference , July 19, 1945. 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there are uncertified typed initials. 2 Document No. 1363 . 3 Not attached. See vol. i , document No. 681 . 4 See vol. i , document No. 681, footnote 5 . 5 Substantive provisions in Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits , p. 21. For full text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxviii , p. 115. No. 1367 The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State 761.67/7–1945: Telegram No. 1367 The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wilson ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret Ankara , July 19, 1945—8 p.m. 990. Acting Foreign Minister 2 tells me Turkish government is “thoroughly satisfied” with talks which Foreign Minister Saka had with Eden at London. 3 He said British “encouraged” Turks to maintain their position regarding Soviet desiderata. British said they were “greatly surprised” that Soviet Government should have raised Montreux revision directly with Turkey without first having presented Soviet views thereon to British and United States as Stalin had promised to do. 4 (Sent to Dept as 990 rptd London as 71 and Moscow as 64). Also British considered that territorial questions and bases should be treated “in a very different manner” from matter of revision Straits Convention. Wilson 1 The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 90 of July 21 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7–2145). 2 Nurullah Esat Sumer. 3 See vol. i , document No. 706 . 4 At Yalta. See document No. 1416 , section xiv . No. 1368 The Under Secretary of the Navy (Gates) to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (Gardner) Department of the Army Files: Telegram No. 1368 The Under Secretary of the Navy ( Gates ) to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet ( Gardner ) secret priority [ Washington ,] 21 July 1945. ComNavEu passes action UnderSecNavs 212100 to CominCh and CNO for Rear Admiral Matthias B. Gardner. Please see Joint Chiefs memorandum to State War Navy Coordinating Committee 17 July 1945 1 original of which was delivered to Colonel Harrison Gerhardt at Terminal on 17 July 1945. It is strongly felt by Secretary 2 and me that at present meeting no attempt should be made to deal with Dardanelles question.… 3 1 Document No. 1363 . 2 i. e., Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. 3 For the last sentence of this message, see document No. 753 . No. 1369 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 767.68119/7–545 No. 1369 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation?] top secret The Black Sea Straits ( Soviet Proposal ) With regard to the regime of the Black Sea Straits, the Conference found necessary that: 1. The International Straits Convention signed in Montreux shall be abrogated in the proper regular procedure as it no longer corresponds to the present time conditions. 2. The determination of the regime of the Straits—the only sea passage from and to the Black Sea—shall fall within the province of Turkey and the Soviet Union as the states chiefly concerned and capable of ensuring the freedom of commercial navigation and the security in the Black Sea Straits. 3. In addition to other measures the new Straits regime should also provide for the following: In the interests of their own security and maintenance of peace in the area of [the] Black Sea[,] Turkey and the Soviet Union shall prevent by their common facilities in the Straits the use of the Straits by the other countries for the purposes inimical to the Black Sea powers (in addition to Turkish military bases the establishment of Soviet military bases in the Straits). [ Babelsberg ], 7/22/45. 1 This question was raised at the Sixth Plenary Meeting, July 22. See ante , p. 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] . For the draft entry on this subject submitted by the Soviet Delegation for inclusion in the Protocol, see document No. 1433 . No. 1370 The Chairman of the President’s War Relief Control Board (Dairies) to the President Truman Papers No. 1370 The Chairman of the President’s War Relief Control Board ( Dairies ) to the President 3 Kaiserstrasse , 22 July 1945. My Dear Mr. President : Here is the memorandum on the Straits problem which is on the Agenda for tomorrow. The resume and conclusion give you the picture and the last three pages 1 give the various dates. I think you will find it interesting reading; it illumines the constant conflict of interest between the British and the Russians and other European powers for control of the Dardanelles. Britain and Russia have been on both sides of the question at different times. The facts herein are amply sustained by authority. With great respect [etc.] Joseph E Davies [Enclosure] [ The Straits Question ] résumé of the straits The degree of control or access to the Straits which Russia had, varied from time to time, according to the fortunes of war. The same is true with reference to Russia’s control over the Danubian provinces (the Balkans). Apparently the period of greatest Russian influence was in the years 1833 to 1840. During that period Russia had complete access in and out of the Straits and the right to pass its war ships through the Straits, denied to other European powers. It also had the right to land troops there if necessary for Russian protection. In 1840 Russia relinquished these rights in order to cooperate with Britain. After the Crimean War in 1856 Russia was compelled to relinquish all rights over the Danubian Provinces and, while the Black Sea was open to commerce of all, ships of war were excluded except for a few small Turkish and Russian vessels. Fifteen years later Russia repudiated these restrictions in part. With the exception, however, that the Straits could not be used by war ships. Thirteen years later Russia secured an agreement with Germany which would prevent Britain from using its warships, with a secret provision that Russia might occupy the Straits if necessary. This lasted only for six years. In 1890, the Germans refused to re-execute this treaty. Four years later (1894) England served notice that any attempt to change the status of the Straits settlement to enable Russia to pass her warships would be regarded as a casus belli . However, in 1898, Austria and Russia entered into an agreement whereby the Straits and Bulgaria were the Russian sphere of influence. Bulgaria secured its independence, for which Russia paid Turkey for recognizing this independence 20 million pounds by cancelation of Turkey’s debt to Russia. In the World War Britain agreed in 1915 that the Straits were to be open to Russian war ships. Necessity drove. It was a complete reversal of the classic British policy. The irony of the situation was that in 1923, 8 years later, that which was desired by Russia was opposed now by the Bolsheviks in fear of the outside aid of the Allies to the White Russians and Kolshak who were fighting the Bolshevik Government. Despite the objections of the Bolsheviks to open up the Straits to war ships, the Straits Settlement at the Lausanne Conference legislated this right but did not permit Turkey to fortify the Straits. Thirteen years later at the Montreux Conference this was amended to permit Turkey to fortify the Straits, but left the Straits Convention otherwise unchanged. In the spring of 1945, the USSR served notice upon Turkey that it required a revision of its relations with Turkey because of changed conditions which recognition of the facts required. Greece occupies a strategic position in the protection of the Suez Canal (completed in 1869) which, being in the British sphere of influence, would probably be available for protection against Soviet warships. The British probably would offer no serious objection to giving the Russians free access to the “exit gate” of the Straits. The press has contained some suggestions that the Russians are seeking access across the Danubian provinces to a port on the Mediterranean. Obviously the USSR is protecting itself against any possible attack through the Dardanelles and also is making secure its outlet to the warm water of the Mediterranean. Turkey is probably more concerned with the fear that Russia will require territorial concessions than she is concerned over free passage through the Straits. Lausanne Straits Settlement In 1923 the Straits Settlement, guaranteed by the Big Three and Japan, was based on freedom of the air and of the sea as to the Straits. As to merchant ships , all had free passage except when Turkey was at war. Under such conditions Turkey had the right to attack enemy merchant ships and exert the right of contraband on neutral merchant vessels. As to war ships , each party to the agreement, the Big Powers, could send up to three ships up to 10,000 tons each into the Black Sea. Also, other neutrals, when Turkey was not at war, had the same right. An exception, however, as to the Russian status was provided . All belligerent ships could pass freely into the Black Sea except when Turkey herself was at war. Both shores of the Straits were demilitarized. Turkey, however, had the right to maintain a garrison of 12,000 men and a naval base in Constantinople. The Montreux Conference In 1936 the Straits Settlement was revised. International control was ended. When threatened with war, Turkey was granted the right to close the Straits to warships. Black Sea powers could send war ships through the Straits, but in single file. Outside powers were limited in the amount of tonnage which they could ship into the Black Sea. Nonriparian war ships’ stay in the Black Sea was limited to twenty-one days. conclusion From the foregoing it is apparent that Russia has been continuously concerned for the past 150 years with the Dardanelles and the Straits, both as affording an outlet to the warm water of the Mediterranean, and also as an inlet passage for attack by warships upon its back door through the Black Sea. From the time of Napoleon’s attempt to attack England, through a threat to India, by way of Egypt, Russia has been on one side or the other, involved in the protection of its interest in the Straits. Vital, therefore, have been the so-called Danubian Provinces (the Balkans). At different times she has been compelled to be allied with the British against the French, with France against England, for herself as against both France and England, with Germany against Britain, with Britain against the Germans. For her protection, Russia, at different times, has had to advocate that the Straits be opened to warships including her own and at times that the Straits be closed to all warships including her own. Britain’s policy has similarly changed according to her necessities and needs. At one time Britain asserted that a change in the Straits settlement would mean war. At another time it enforced the exact opposite against Russia’s demands. All manner and kinds of reasons have been assigned for wars which were fought around the Straits: the aspirations of Greece for independence, and the protection of Christians in Turkey, the Holy Alliance, the British route to India, etc. So far as Russia is concerned, it appears clear that two dominant purposes have controlled: first, the desire for access out to warm water, and second the desire to prevent naval attack from the outside by stopping access into the Black Sea through the Straits. She has constantly sought to maintain her control over her vital interests in the Balkans connected with the Danubian Provinces (Rumania and Bulgaria). It is apparent that Britain’s purposes have been two fold. One, to protect her life-line to India; the other, to maintain the balance of power in Europe. The interests involved on both sides in the present day cannot be assessed except with full consideration for these basic and existing realities. memorandum as to the dardanelles and the straits 1768–1791 Beginning of Russian Interest Russia obtained access to the Black Sea by the conquest of the Crimea and territory adjacent to the Black Sea and Rumania by defeating the Turkish armies . 1798–1802 Russian Control of the Danubian Provinces ( The Balkans ) The Straits, the Dardanelles, and Turkey were menaced by Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt in the French attack against the British directed against India. Russia and Turkey joined up with the British and Nelson destroyed the French fleet at the Battle of Aboukir; Russia and Turkey took the Ionian Islands. In 1802 the control of the Straits resided in Turkey and Russia. The latter was granted control over the Danubian Provinces which, on the European side, were vital to the use of the Straits. 1802–1812 Napoleonic Wars Needled by the French, the Turkish position on the Straits threatened British interests and the British fleet forced the Dardanelles, demanding the expulsion of the French Ambassador. 2 The British fleet was forced to retire. Russia in the meantime, also concerned, claimed that the agreements as to the Danubian Provinces were being violated by the Turks. Turkey declared war on Russia which was composed by the Treaty of Bucharest (1812). 3 Napoleon aided Russia to procure concessions from Turkey which opened the Straits to Russian ships. 1812–1826 Period of the Congress of Vienna and Holy Alliance This was the period of the “Sick Man of Europe” and of the war for Greek Independence with constant trouble in the Danubian Provinces. Russia served an ultimatum on Turkey demanding its old control over the Danubian Provinces and rights in the Straits. This time, on the advice of Austria and France, Turkey yielded. By the Convention of Ackermann in 1826 4 the Black Sea was open to Russian ships and control by Russia over the Danubian Provinces was reaffirmed. (Territory now Rumania). 1829 In connection with the war for Greek independence, Russia, France, and Turkey [ Great Britain ], defeated the Turkish [Fleet] at the naval Battle of Navarino. The Russian status as to the Straits was not disturbed . 1833 Turkey was attacked by Egypt and asked for Russian aid. This resulted in an agreement whereby Russian ships of war were granted the right to pass through the Straits and Russia was also granted the right to land troops there if necessary. All other war ships were excluded from the Straits . 5 For the period of the next 7 years Russia had the exclusive right of war ship access to the Straits and the greatest influence in this region. 1840 Due to Russia’s desire to split the alliance between England and France Russia agreed with Britain at the Conference of London to relinquish these rights and consented to the closing of the Black Sea and the Straits to all warships including Russian warships . 6 1853 Russia attacked the Danubian Provinces upon religious pretext and Turkey declared war on Russia. France and England joined Turkey and the Crimean War ensued. British and French warships passed through the Straits and attacked Sevastopol. 1856 The Treaty of Paris 7 provided that Russia should relinquish all rights over the Danubian Provinces and the Black Sea was opened to the commerce of all countries and closed to all ships of war except a few small Turkish and Russian war vessels. 1871 Taking advantage of the Franco-Prussian war Russia repudiated the restrictions of the Treaty of Paris which forbade the construction of Naval Arsenals in the Black Sea. London recognized this repudiation with the exception that the Straits could not be used for warships. 8 1884 [ 1887 ] A treaty 9 was entered into between Russia and Germany (Bismarck) which insured Russia against the use of the Straits by British warships, and by a secret protocol provided Russia the right to occupy the Straits if necessary. 1890 Russia tried to renew this treaty with Germany. The latter, then courting Britain, refused. 1894 England served notice that any attempt to change the Straits settlement which would permit the passing of war ships would be a casus belli . 1908 Austria and Russia agreed upon a partition of Turkey. The Straits were to be in the Russian zone and Bulgaria to be in the sphere of Russian influence. Austria annexed Hercegovina. Bulgaria declared its independence for which Russia released Turkey of a debt of 20 million pounds. 1915 World War . Britain agreed to open the Straits to Russian war ships, a reversal of the classic British policy. 10 1923 Despite Bolshevik objection this was done by the Straits Convention drawn up at the Lausanne Conference 11 and Turkey was not permitted to fortify the Straits. 1936 The Montreux Conference 12 permitted Turkey to fortify the Straits and international control was ended. When threatened with war, Turkey was granted the right to close the Straits to warships. 13 1 Beginning with the heading, “Memorandum as to the Dardanelles and the Straits”, post , p. 1431 [ Pg. 1431 is part of Doc. 1370 ] . 2 General of Division Horace-François-Bastien Sébastiani. 3 Text in British and Foreign State Papers , vol. xiii , p. 908. 4 Text printed ibid. , p. 899. 5 Under the Treaty of Unkiar Eskelessi. Text of the pertinent provisions in Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits , p. 16. 6 Under the Convention of London, signed July 15, 1840; text of the pertinent provisions printed ibid. , p. 16. Cf. the pertinent provisions of the Convention pf London of July 13, 1841, printed ibid. , p. 17. 7 Text of the provisions concerning the Black Sea and the Straits in Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits , pp. 17, 18. 8 See ibid. , p. 18. 9 The so-called Reinsurance Treaty, signed at Berlin, June 18, 1887. Text in Heinrich Triepel, ed., Nouveau recueil général de traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international , 3d series (Leipzig and Greifswald, 1908–1944), vol. x , p. 37. 10 See Foreign Relations , 1917, supp. 2, vol. i , pp. 494 – 497 . Cf. E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939 (London, 1946– ), 1st series, vol. iv , pp. 635–638; J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record (Princeton, 1956), vol. ii , pp. 7–11. 11 Text of the substantive provisions in Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits , p. 21; full text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxviii , p. 115. 12 Text of the substantive provisions of the Montreux Convention in Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits , p. 25; full text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 213. 13 For a more detailed memorandum by Davies on the same subject, see vol. i , document No. 697 . No. 1371 Memorandum by the President’s Chief of Staff (Leahy) Truman Papers No. 1371 Memorandum by the President’s Chief of Staff ( Leahy ) 1 [ Potsdam , July 24 (?), 1945.] Our attitude is 2 free passage of ships of all nations through the Straits on equal terms and there should be no fortifications on the shores of the Straits[.] 1 From the fragmentary nature of this manuscript memorandum and its location in the Truman Papers, it seems probable that Leahy wrote it and passed it to Truman during the course of the discussion of the Straits at the Eighth Plenary Meeting, July 24. See ante , p. 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . 2 Leahy originally wrote “should be”, but changed this wording to “is”. No. 1372 United States Delegation Working Paper 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–2545 No. 1372 United States Delegation Working Paper 1 [Extract 2 ] Berlin Conference , July 25, 1945. Subject: Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways. ....... With respect to the Straits, the three States here represented are in accord that passage through these waterways should be free and unrestricted at all times, in war and in peace, to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations. In order to assure this complete freedom of transit, the three States are of the view that there should be no fortifications of any kind along the Straits, and freedom of transit should be guaranteed by the United Nations Organization. The Three States will support the foregoing policy in any revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936, and will recommend its adoption by Turkey and the other States properly concerned. 1 Authorship not indicated. 2 For the other paragraphs of this working paper, see document No. 757 . No. 1373 Proposal by the United States Delegation 840.811/7–2545 No. 1373 Proposal by the United States Delegation 1 [Extract 2 ] Berlin Conference , July 25, 1945. Draft Proposal by American Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The three states will support the policy of free and unrestricted navigation in any revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936. 1 Submitted at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways, July 27. See ante , p. 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] . 2 For the other paragraphs of this proposal, see document No. 758 . No. 1374 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 No. 1374 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 [Extracts 2 ] [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945 Memorandum for Mr. Dunn Subject: Matters relating to the Near Eastern and African Area for inclusion in the Final Protocol There is outlined below my understanding of the final decisions reached with regard to the five items on the agenda which relate to the Near Eastern and African Area: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Turkey . It was agreed by the three delegations that the Montreux Convention should be revised to [accord to the vessels of Black Sea powers entire freedom of movement through the Straits. 3 ] The Soviet Delegation made known its view that this freedom of transit should be guaranteed by Turkey and Russia jointly. The British Delegation was of the view that the freedom of transit should be guaranteed by an international organization. The American Delegation concurred, with the addition that the Straits should be neutralized, thereby removing the necessity for any military establishment to guarantee the freedom of transit. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . George V. Allen [P. S.] As regards two of the foregoing items, I hope very much that some additional clarification or expansion of the agreements reached in principle can be included in the Protocol. 1. Turkey . While the agreement concerned only the revision of the Montreux Convention in favor of Russian ships, I feel strongly that this should be expanded to include vessels of all Black Sea Powers. This means the addition of Bulgaria and Rumania. If the agreement is extended only to U. S. S. R., it will appear to the smaller nations of the world that the agreement has resulted from Big Power politics and not from the just needs of Black Sea Riparian States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature 2 For the other sections of this memorandum, see documents Nos. 736 , 1069 , 1332 , 1342 , and 1358 . 3 The words in brackets have been stricken from the draft and the following manuscript marginal notation has been indicated as a substitution: “make it more in accord with modern conditions”. 4 See ante , pp. 256–258 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 303–304 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 365–367 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . No. 1375 Proposal by the British Delegation 840.811/7–2545 No. 1375 Proposal by the British Delegation 1 [Extract 2 ] [ Babelsberg , July 27, 1945.] Draft Proposal by the British Delegation International Inland Waterways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It was also agreed that the principle of free and unrestricted navigation should be applied to the whole of the Straits between the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea, and that in furtherance of this principle the Montreux Convention of 1936 should be abrogated by the proper regular procedure and replaced by a new international agreement. This agreement would affirm the principle of free and unrestricted navigation of the Straits by warships and merchant ships, in peace and war, and would be guaranteed, for their part, by the Three Powers. 1 Submitted at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Inland Waterways, July 27. See ante , p. 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] . 2 For the other paragraphs of this proposal, see document No. 759 . No. 1376 The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State 767.68119/7–2745: Telegram No. 1376 The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wilson ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret priority Ankara , July 27, 1945—2 p.m. 1018. British Ambassador 2 came to see me today and gave me copy of memorandum concerning Potsdam discussion on Turkey which he said he had left yesterday with Turkish Prime Minister. 3 Paraphrase of memorandum is as follows: Discussions regarding Turkey reached inconclusive end July 24. On that day discussion mainly concerned with proposal President Truman that freedom of Straits be under approval and guarantee of an international authority which would include US, Britain and USSR. Stalin did not agree that this could be regarded as substitute for Soviet bases in Straits. He said finally he thought question not ripe and that interrupted talks between USSR and Turkey would be resumed. While discussion on July 24 did not mention Kars and Ardahan, Stalin had indicated previous day that Turkey could not expect alliance with USSR unless there were territorial concessions. 4 British memorandum went on to say that possibly Soviets might now increase pressure on Turkey. Advice from British to Turks is to keep their heads and in reply to Russian approaches maintain firmly that question must be settled on international basis. President Truman at end of session undertook to endeavor to make Turkish Government see advantage of international control. British hope very great importance of President’s proposal will be understood by Turks and that they will reflect carefully upon this proposal under which United States itself would join in guarantee of freedom of Straits. I asked Peterson what Prime Minister’s reaction was. He said latter was “perturbed”. He said Saracoğlu remarked that international regime suggested struck him as probably something between Lausanne and Montreux. What definitely troubled him was possibility Turkey might be asked demilitarize Straits. This said Prime Minister would be impossible unless Turkey received satisfactory guarantee from USSR regarding eastern provinces and integrity Turkish territory. Stalin’s attitude as reported in memorandum was not reassuring on this point. Saracoğlu said that apparently next move was up to United States and he supposed he would hear from me before long. 5 Please repeat this message to our delegation Potsdam. Wilson 1 Text repeated in extenso in telegram No. 151 of July 28 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–645). 2 Sir Maurice Drummond Peterson. 3 Sükrü Saracoğlu. 4 See ante , pp. 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 365–367 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] . 5 No evidence has been found that the United States made an approach to Turkey on this matter during the course of the Berlin Conference. No. 1377 The Additional Secretary to the British Cabinet (Brook) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 767.68119/7–2845 No. 1377 The Additional Secretary to the British Cabinet ( Brook ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) Berlin Conference , 28th July, 1945. Dear Mr. Dunn , I am writing to confirm that the amendment which you have proposed to the provisional draft of a paragraph for the Protocol on the Black Sea Straits is quite acceptable to us. I enclose a copy of the revised draft in the form in which I have this morning communicated it to Monsieur Gromyko. Yours sincerely, Norman Brook [Enclosure? 1 ] Turkey U. K. Draft (as amended by U. S. Delegation) In outlining to the Conference, at the request of the United Kingdom Delegation, the recent discussions between the Soviet and Turkish Governments, the Soviet Delegation made special reference to the free use of the Straits between the Black Sea and the Aegean. The U. S. Delegation put forward a proposal that freedom of movement through the Black Sea 2 Straits at all times by the war and merchant vessels of all nations be guaranteed by international agreement of the interested States, which would include the three Powers present at this Conference. This proposal received the support of the United Kingdom Delegation. The Soviet Delegation considered it preferable to settle the question by direct negotiations with the Turkish Government. The Conference did not reach any final decision on this subject. 1 This paper (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2845), although not attached to document No. 1377 , appears to be the enclosure described. The paper actually attached, headed “Turkey”, consists in toto of the second sentence of the paper here printed (presumably the United States amendment). 2 The words “Black Sea” have been deleted. Opposite the deletion is the following manuscript marginal notation by Brook: “Insert first sentence of Russian draft”. Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1377 (#1)] Editor’s Note —For the final Conference text on this subject, as included in the Protocol, see post , page 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] . No. 1378 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat (Yost) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–945 No. 1378 Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat ( Yost ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] August 9, 1945. Berlin Conference Turkey and the Black Sea Straits Soviet Policy The Soviets presented a proposal 2 providing for the revision of the Montreux Convention, for the control of the Straits by the Soviet Union and Turkey alone and for the establishment of Soviet bases on the Straits. Stalin said that they considered the Montreux Convention to be inimical to Russia in that it left Turkey free to block the Straits whenever she thought she was threatened. This meant that a small state had a great state by the throat and was a situation which would not be permitted by the United States in Panama or by Britain in the Suez. It is essential that Soviet shipping be able to pass to and from the Black Sea safely and Turkey was too weak to guarantee such passage in case complications arose. If it was thought that Soviet naval bases in the Straits would be unacceptable to the Turks, then the Soviets should have some other nearby base where the Russian fleet could refuel and where in cooperation with its allies it could protect the Straits. He did not consider a mere international guarantee of the freedom of the Straits to be adequate and was not sure that Turkey would accept such international control. The Soviets pointed out that international control of this kind is not applied to the Suez Canal. This phase of the matter is left undecided, the Protocol merely recording the agreement of all three governments that the Montreux Convention should be revised and stating that each of the three governments would have direct conversations with the Turkish Government on the question. 3 As to other phases of Soviet-Turkish relations, the Soviets maintained that the Turks had taken the initiative in seeking a treaty of alliance since such a treaty would involve a mutual guarantee of frontiers. The Soviets have replied that they could not enter into such an alliance as long as Kars and Ardahan, which had been snatched from the Soviet Union, remained a part of Turkey. They would not have raised this territorial question if the Turks had not asked for a treaty of alliance. They insisted that the Turks had no reason to be alarmed as to Soviet intentions. They maintained that they had only 30,000 troops in Bulgaria which was far less than the Turks had on their European frontier. The one point on which the Soviets seemed to be adamant in connection with Turkey was for some arrangement which would give them effective control of passage through the Straits in time of war or emergency. British Policy The British exhibited grave anxiety in regard to Soviet intentions vis-à-vis Turkey. They first raised the question at the Conference and asked the Soviets for a statement of their intentions. Churchill expressed himself as quite willing to support a revision of the Montreux Convention with the participation of all the parties to that Convention except Japan. He stated that he felt it perfectly proper that there should be free passage of the Straits for Russian as for all other ships in time of war as in time of peace. He attached great importance to the President’s statement that the United States was prepared to join in an international guarantee of the free and unrestricted use of the Straits. He appeared to be strongly opposed to the establishment of Soviet bases on the Straits, though he couched his argument chiefly in terms of his belief that the Turks would never consent to such bases. He made it clear that the British would support the Turks in the protection of their legitimate rights. He urged strongly that the Soviets not take any action which would frighten the Turks, pointing out that the recent conversations in Moscow coupled with the presence of large numbers of Russian troops in Bulgaria had served to frighten the Turks. He seemed willing to support some form of international control of the Straits if that should prove to be a satisfactory means of settling the difficulty. In response to a remark by Molotov that there was no such international control of the Suez Canal, Churchill replied that the Suez was open to all ships of all nations at all times and that protection was maintained in accordance with a treaty freely concluded between Britain and Egypt. There was little discussion of this question after the change in the British Government but from such discussion as there was it appeared that the Labor Ministers supported Churchill’s position. 1 Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. For the minutes of the discussions summarized in this memorandum, see ante , pp. 256–258 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 302–305 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 365–367 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 577–578 [ Pgs. 577–578 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] . 2 Document No. 1369 . 3 See document No. 1383 , section xvii ( xvi ). Preparation of the Conference Communiqué Preparation of the Conference Communiqué [1379] The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) [Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 [1380] The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Brown) to the President and the Secretary of State undated 740.00119 Potsdam/8–145 No. 1379 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2545 No. 1379 The Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Allen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Dunn ) 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 25, 1945. Memorandum for Mr. Dunn Subject: Possible Items Concerning the Near East and Africa Which Might be Included in the Press Communiqué at the End of the Conference The following items from my area might possibly be suitable for inclusion in the press communiqué: 1. Tangier . It was agreed by the representatives of the three states that the Zone of Tangier, which includes the City of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, should, owing to its specific strategic importance, remain international. They further agreed that representatives of the U. S., U. K., U. S. S. R. and France should be sent to Paris in the near future to consider an appropriate status of this international zone. 2. Trusteeship . It was agreed by the representatives of the three states present that the question of the disposal of the former colonies of Italy in Africa and the Mediterranean was a matter for settlement when the peace treaty with Italy is drawn up. 3. Syria and Lebanon . The representatives of the three states present heard a report by the British Delegation of recent events in Syria and Lebanon and a declaration by the British Delegation of a lack of any desire to seek advantages for Great Britain in the area. The American Delegation expressed itself as a supporter of the full independence of Syria and Lebanon and as opposed to special privileges by any power in that area. 4. Iran . The representatives of the three states present agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from the City of Tehran. Comments. I am aware that it is questionable whether some of the items suggested above, particularly those concerning trusteeship and Syria and Lebanon, should be published. I merely include them in case it is desired to publish anything on these subjects. I hope that the agreement to withdraw Allied troops from Tehran may be made somewhat more specific and that the announcement can include agreement to withdraw from “Tehran and its vicinity.” Little would be accomplished, as far as meeting Iranian wishes and improving morale there, if Allied troops merely withdraw from the city limits and remain in force on the outskirts. I would welcome a specific statement that the withdrawal would include an area of 25 or even 50 miles from the capital if the Russian Delegates can be brought to concur. It seems to me that the principle of Marshal Stalin’s suggestions of withdrawal from the capital could be construed to include a real withdrawal and not merely a technical one. George V. Allen 1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an uncertified typed signature. No. 1380 The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Brown) to the President and the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–145 No. 1380 The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State ( Brown ) to the President and the Secretary of State undated [ Editor’s Note .—Stapled on top of document No. 1380 is a sheet of paper bearing the signatures of the three Heads of Government, as follows: Communique 1 Approved: И. Ctajiиh 2 Harry S Truman C. R. Attlee This cover sheet was signed early on August 2, following discussion of the Communiqué at the Thirteenth Plenary Meeting. See ante , page 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . For the text of the Communiqué as actually released at the conclusion of the Conference by the Secretary to the President, see document No. 1384 .] [ Potsdam , August 1, 1945.] Memorandum 3 Subject: Communiqué. Attached is revised draft of communiqué: The Committee 3a is in agreement on this draft with the following exceptions: [1.] Introduction: (I) We and the British prefer the introduction in the attached draft. The Russians have submitted a substitute which is attached. The differences are these: ( a ) The Russian draft breaks the introduction by listing all the names of the delegations, about 30 in all. Many of these ore military names and there is only one line in the communiqué about military talk. Our draft lists the Big Three and Foreign Ministers in the lead and the other names at the end of the communiqué. ( b ) Our communiqué gives more details as to the numbers and times of meetings held by the Big Three. Neither we or the British feel strongly about the matter but thought we would let the Big Three decide. 2. On page 1 of Germany, III, last line of first paragraph the Russians wish to delete words “loudly applauded”. This is a British phrase which we accepted. 3. On orderly transfers of German populations, XIII, Russians wish to delete word “orderly” in title. Dunn and British feel this word should be retained since one of the two principal provisions of the agreement is that the transfers shall be orderly. 4. The British do not want to include Tangier (XVI) and Russians do not want to include Rumanian oil equipment (XIV). We prefer to include both. 5. Military Talks (XV). This chapter caused much discussion. Neither Russians nor British like Leahy text. 4 We agreed to a single sentence stating Chiefs of Staffs of the three Governments conferred “on military matters of common interest.” All agreed on that yesterday. The British agreed to go along with separate joint statement on Japanese War if we desired. Today the Russians wanted to go back to sentence saying meetings were held by joint Chiefs of Staff “on military matters of common interest affecting Europe.” We decided to pass this one up to the Big Three. The following items are in the protocol but no mention is made of them in the communiqué: 1. Ruhr 2. Black Sea Straits 3. International inland waterways 4. European Inland Transport Conference 5. Directive to military commanders in Allied Control Council 6. Allied property in Southeastern Europe. In connection with the discussion this afternoon on the inland waterways proposal, I would also like to call your attention to the fact that in Trusteeships (XI) and in the second part of Iran (XV) direct mention is made of the fact that the matters are being referred to the [Council of] Foreign Ministers. W[ alter ] B[ rown ] 5 [Attachment] [ Draft of the Communiqué ] [ i ] [ introduction—alternative a ] draft proposed by the soviet union of section i of the report on the tripartite conference at berlin A Conference of the leaders of the three Allied Powers, the President of the United States of America, H. S. Truman, the President of the Council of Peoples Commissars, J. V. Stalin, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston S. Churchill, and, from July 28 onwards, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Clement R. Attlee, took place in Berlin from July 17 until August 1, 1945, with the participation of the Foreign Secretaries, military and other advisers. The President of the United States of America was invited by his two colleagues to be the Chairman of the Conference. Besides the heads of the three Governments, the following took part in the Conference: For the Soviet Union: [blank] For the United Kingdom: [blank] For the United States: [blank] During the course of the Conference there were daily meetings of the Foreign Ministers. Committees appointed by the Foreign Ministers for preliminary consideration of the questions before the Conference also met daily. The meetings of the Conference were held at the Cecilien Hof near Potsdam. The Conference ended on August 1, 1945. Important decisions and agreements were reached and they are announced in this report. Views were exchanged on a number of other questions that deeply concern the three Governments and consideration of these matters will be continued by the Council of Foreign Ministers established by the Conference. This Conference strengthened the ties among the three Governments and extended the scope of their collaboration and understanding. President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee leave this Conference with renewed confidence that their governments and peoples, together with the other United Nations, will ensure the creation of a just and enduring peace. i [ introduction–alternative b ] [ draft proposed by the united states and british delegations 6 ] On July 17, 1945, the President of the United States of America, Harry S. Truman, the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Generalissimo J. V. Stalin, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, together with Mr. Clement R. Attlee, met in the Tripartite Conference of Berlin. They were accompanied by the foreign secretaries of the three Governments, Mr. James F. Byrnes, Mr. V. M. Molotov, and Mr. Anthony Eden, the Chiefs of Staff, and other advisers. There were nine meetings between July 17 and July 25. The Conference was then interrupted for two days while the results of the British general election were being declared. On July 28 Mr. Attlee returned to the Conference as Prime Minister, accompanied by the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin. There were four additional meetings. During the course of the Conference there were daily meetings of the Foreign Ministers. Committees appointed by the Foreign Ministers for preliminary consideration of the questions before the Conference also met daily. The meetings of the Conference were held at the Cecilien Hof near Potsdam. The Conference ended on August 1, 1945. Important decisions and agreements were reached and they are announced in this report. Views were exchanged on a number of other questions that deeply concern the three Governments and consideration of these matters will be continued by the Council of Foreign Ministers established by the Conference. This Conference strengthened the ties among the three governments and extended the scope of their collaboration and understanding. President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee leave this Conference with renewed confidence that their governments and peoples, together with the other United Nations, will ensure the creation of a just and enduring peace. i [ introduction—alternative c ] [ redraft by the british delegation 7 ] On July 17, 1945, the President of the United States of America, Harry S. Truman, the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Generalissimo J. V. Stalin, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, together with Mr. Clement R. Attlee, met in the Tripartite Conference of Berlin. They were accompanied by the foreign secretaries of the three Governments, Mr. James F. Byrnes, Mr. V. M. Molotov, and Mr. Anthony Eden, the Chiefs of Staff, and other advisers. There were nine meetings between July 17 and July 25. The Conference was then interrupted for two days while the results of the British general election were being declared. On July 28 Mr. Attlee returned to the Conference as Prime Minister, accompanied by the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin. Four days of further discussion then took place. During the course of the Conference there were regular meetings of the Heads of the Three Governments accompanied by the foreign secretaries, and separate 8 meetings of the Foreign Secretaries alone. Committees appointed by the Foreign Secretaries for preliminary consideration of questions before the Conference also met daily. The meetings of the Conference were held at the Cecilienhof near Potsdam. The Conference ended on August 1, 1945. Important decisions and agreements were reached. Views were exchanged on a number of other questions 9 [that deeply concern the three Governments] 10 and consideration of these matters will be continued by the Council of Foreign Ministers established by the Conference. President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee leave this Conference, which has strengthened the ties between the three governments and extended the scope of their collaboration and understanding, with renewed confidence that their governments and peoples, together with the other United Nations, will ensure the creation of a just and enduring peace. ii establishment of a council of foreign ministers The Conference reached an agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers representing the five principal Powers to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements and to take up other matters which from time to time may be referred to the Council by agreement of the governments participating in the Council. The text of the agreement for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers is as follows: “(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States. “(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advisers. “(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time. “(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilised for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established. “(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion. “(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments. “(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question. “(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State[s] chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.” In accordance with the decision of the Conference the three Governments have each addressed an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. The establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text will be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodic consultation among the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of Germany’s unconditional surrender[,] for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly, it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved. iii germany The Allied armies are in occupation of the whole of Germany and the German people have begun to atone for the terrible crimes committed under the leadership of those whom, in the hour of their success, they (loudly applauded and) blindly obeyed. 11 Agreement has been reached at this Conference on the political and economic principles of a coordinated Allied policy toward defeated Germany during the period of Allied control. The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea declaration on Germany. German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbors or the peace of the world. It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world. The text of the agreement is as follows: The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period . A. Political Principles . 1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised on instructions from the respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council. 2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany. 3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are: (1) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:— ( a ) All German land, naval and air forces, the S. S., S. A., S. D. and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism; ( b ) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented. (ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable. (iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda. (iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. 4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated. 5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned. 6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany. 7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas. 8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion. 9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end: (i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation; (ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany; (iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government; (iv) for the time being no central German government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council. 10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted. B. Economic Principles . 11. In order to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany’s approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 14. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed. 12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements. Notwithstanding this, however, and for the purpose of achieving the objectives set forth herein, certain forms of central administrative machinery, particularly in the fields of Finance, Transportation and Communications, shall be maintained or restored. 12 13. In organizing the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. 14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to: ( a ) mining and industrial production and allocation; ( b ) agriculture, forestry and fishing; ( c ) wages, prices and rationing; ( d ) import and export programs for Germany as a whole; ( e ) currency and banking, central taxation and customs; ( f ) reparation and removal of industrial war potential; ( g ) transportation and communications. In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions. 15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary: ( a ) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports. ( b ) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding U. K. and U. S. S. R.) ( c ) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports. ( d ) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein. ( e ) to control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, cetera, connected with economic activities. 16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited. 17. Measures shall be promptly taken: ( a ) to effect essential repair of transport; ( b ) to enlarge coal production; ( c ) to maximize agriculture output; and ( d ) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities. 18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany. 19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports. The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 ( a ) and 4 ( b ) of the Reparations Agreement. iv reparations from germany In accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility, the following agreement on reparations was reached: 1. Reparation claims of U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R. 2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations. 3. The reparations claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets. 4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones: ( a ) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon. ( b ) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. Removals of equipment as provided in ( a ) and ( b ) above shall be made simultaneously. 5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest. 6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 ( a ) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U. S. S. R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed. 7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6. 8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below. 9. The Governments of the U. K. and U. S. A. renounce their claims to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria. 10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany. v disposition of the german navy and merchant ships The Conference agreed in principle upon arrangements for the use and disposal of the surrendered German Fleet and merchant ships. It was decided that the Three Governments would appoint experts to work out together detailed plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint statement will be published simultaneously by the Three Governments in due course. vi city of koenigsberg and the adjacent area The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg–Goldep [ sic ], to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia. The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier. The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement. vii war criminals The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 have no particular geographical localisation. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring those criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of those major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before September 1. viii austria The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria. The three Governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna. It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria. 13 ix poland The Conference considered questions relating to the Polish Provisional Government and the western boundary of Poland. The following statement on the Polish Provisional Government 14 was approved: 15 We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists. The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated. The three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens. The three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in accordance with the Crimea Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections. The following agreement was reached on the western boundary of Poland: In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea through 16 Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. x conclusion of peace treaties and admission to the united nations . In view of the victorious end of the war in Europe and the necessity of establishing as soon as possible the conditions of lasting peace, the Conference agreed upon the following statement of common policy: The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties, so that as soon as possible thereafter relations between them and the ex-enemy States can, where necessary, be reestablished on a normal footing. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views. For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty with Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations. The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foriegn [ sic ] Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic Governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries. The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declared that: “1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; “2. the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from these [ sic ] states which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above. The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership. xi trusteeship territories The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government concerning trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organization. After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty with Italy and that the question of Italian territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. xii revised allied control commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and hungary The Three Governments have taken note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commission, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased. The Three Governments agree that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries will now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the Three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government’s proposals for Hungary. 17 xiii ( orderly ) transfers of german populations The Conference reached the following agreement on the removal of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary: The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner. Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Allied Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out, having regard to the present situation in Germany. The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above, and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending the examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council. xiv bilateral commissions to investigate the removal of oil equipment from Rumania 18 The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of United Kingdom and Soviet Members, and one to be composed of United States and Soviet members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions arising from the removal of oil equipment from Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days, on the spot. xv iran 19 The Conference has decided that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September 1945. xvi the international zone of tangier 19 A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached. Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Governments have agreed that this Zone, which includes the city of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance shall remain international. The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France. xiv [ xvii ] 20 military talks During the Conference there were meetings between the chiefs of Staff of the three Governments on military matters of common interest (affecting Europe). 21 xiii [ xviii ] list of delegations 22 For the United States The President The Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. N., Chief of Statt [ sic ] to the President Joseph E. Davies, Special Ambassador Edwin Pauley, Special Ambassador W. Averell Harriman[,] Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. General of the Army, George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army Fleet Admiral, Ernest J. King, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet General of the Army, H. H. Arnold, U. S. Army Air Forces Lieutenant General [ sic ] Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator William L. Clayton[,] Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn[,] Assistant Secretary of State Ben Cohen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department Charles E. Bohlen[,] Assistant to the Secretary, (together with political, military and technical advisers). 1 This heading is a manuscript addition by Truman. 2 I. Stalin. 3 Brown’s diary entry for August 1 contains the following information relating to this memorandum: “About 6:00 p.m. recess [of the Twelfth Plenary Meeting] was taken. I was asked if we were ready to report on communiqué. Had new draft. When Big Three went back in session, Molotov said they had not had time to study and it was decided to pass over communiqué until 9:00 p.m. session. Other matters were discussed and adjournment was taken until 9:00 p.m. Delayed for one hour and by 9:45 Foote and I were ready with new draft including all sections. “When President and JFB [Byrnes] arrived [at Cecilienhof], I had for them memos showing differences. Explained same to them. Protocol group did likewise.” The attachment to this memorandum was before Truman at the Thirteenth Plenary Meeting, and he made manuscript changes and notations on it during that meeting. In connection with this draft, see the general annotations to document No. 1383 . 3a i. e., the Communiqué Subcommittee. 4 Not found. 5 On the original Brown’s initials appear at the head of the memorandum. 6 The page on which this draft begins is headed “Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin” and bears the typed notations, “Draft August 1, 1945” and “Top Secret”. 7 This paper, which was not a part of the draft originally attached to Brown’s memorandum, was accepted at the Thirteenth Plenary Meeting, August 1, in lieu of the two preceding drafts and was presumably incorporated into this document at that time. See ante , pp. 590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . It bears the heading, “Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin”, the typed notations, “British Revise August 1, 1945” and “Top Secret”, and the following manuscript notation by Truman: “accepted as substitute [section] i ”. 8 Changed by hand by Byrnes to read “regular”. See ante , pp. 594–595 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 9 At this point a repetition of the words “on a number of other questions” has been stricken. 10 Brackets in the original. 11 Changed by hand by Truman to read: “those for whom, in the hour of their success, they openly expressed approval and whom they blindly obeyed.” See ante , p. 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 12 The last sentence has been stricken from the draft. See ante , p. 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 13 This entire section was stricken from the draft. The first two paragraphs were then marked “in” by Truman, and the last paragraph stricken again with the following manuscript notation by Truman: “Last paragraph only taken [out]”. See ante , pp. 591–592 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 14 The following manuscript interpolation was made by Truman at this point: “of National Unity”. 15 Here Truman has written: “they defined their [attitude] in the following statement”. See ante , p. 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 16 The word “through” has been stricken from the draft, and Truman has made the following manuscript interpolation as a substitute: “immediately west of”. See ante , pp. 587–588 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 17 Changed by hand to read: “and accepting as a basis, agreed proposals.” See ante , p. 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 18 This section has been stricken from the draft, with the following manuscript notation by Truman: “out”. See ante , pp. 593–594 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 19 This section has been stricken from the draft, with the following manuscript notation by Truman: “out”. See ante , pp. 593–594 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 19 This section has been stricken from the draft, with the following manuscript notation by Truman: “out”. See ante , pp. 593–594 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 20 Changed by hand to xvii . 21 The two words in parentheses have been stricken from the draft. See ante , p. 594, footnote 35 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 22 No lists of the British and Soviet Delegations are included in this document. Cf. document No. 1384 . Final Documents Final Documents Contents Protocol of Proceedings (Documents [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)]-1383) Communiqué (Documents 1384-1384) Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States and the United Kingdom Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States and the United Kingdom [1381] The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill [Babelsberg, July 24, 1945.] J. C. S. Files No. 1381 The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill J. C. S. Files No. 1381 The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill 1 top secret Enclosure to C. C. S. 900/3 [ Babelsberg , July 24, 1945.] Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the “Terminal” Conference 1. The agreed summary of conclusions reached at the Terminal Conference is submitted herewith. i. over-all objective 2. In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan. ii. over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war 3. In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required. 4. In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria. iii. basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war 2 5. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:— a . Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept. b . Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or designated for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan. c . Maintain vital overseas lines of communication. 6. In order to attain the over-all objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war. The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations. 7. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:— a . Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith. b . Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan. c . Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war in accordance with the over-all strategic concept. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the war against Japan. d . In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas. iv. the war against japan Strategic Direction of the War 8. We have discussed the strategic direction of the war against Japan and have agreed as follows:— a . The control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater will remain in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff. b . The United States Chiefs of Staff will provide the British Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and intentions. c . The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of Staff on matters of general strategy on the understanding that in the event of disagreement the final decision on the action to be taken will lie with the United States Chiefs of Staff. d . In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff as indicated in c . above, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as will permit them to make timely rearrangements. e . In the event the U. S. S. R. enters the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned. Operations in the Pacific 9. We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in Appendix “A.” 10. We have considered the scope and nature of British participation in operations in the Pacific area. Our conclusions are as follows:— a . The British Pacific Fleet will participate as at present planned. b . A British very long range bomber force of 10 squadrons, increasing to 20 squadrons when more airfields become available, will participate. There is little prospect that airfield space for more than 10 squadrons of this force will become available before 1 December 1945 at the earliest. c . We have agreed in principle that a Commonwealth land force and, if possible, a small tactical air force, should take part in the final phase of the war against Japan, subject to the satisfactory resolution of operational and other problems. In addition, some units of the British 3 East Indies Fleet may also take part. 11. In connection with paragraph 10 c . above, we have agreed that the appropriate British commanders and staff should visit Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur and draw up with them a plan for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Operations in Southeast Asia Command 12. We have discussed the instructions that should be issued to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, and have agreed upon the terms of the directive in Appendix “B.” Reallocation of Areas and Command in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia Areas 13. We have agreed in principle that that part of the Southwest Pacific Area lying south of the boundary described in Appendix “C” should pass from United States to British command as soon as possible. The British Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to these proposals and to investigate and report the earliest practicable date on which the transfer can be effected. 14. We consider it desirable that initially Admiral Mountbatten control operations undertaken in southern Indo-China since these are more closely related to those of Southeast Asia Command than to those of the China Theater. We are agreed that the best arrangement would be to include that portion of Indo-China lying south of latitude 16° north in Southeast Asia Command. This arrangement would continue General Wedemeyer’s control of that part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected Chinese operations in China, and would enable Admiral Mountbatten to prepare the ground in the southern half of Indo-China where any initial operations by him would develop. We recommend that an approach to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek 4 be made by our two governments to secure his agreement to this arrangement. At a later date it may prove to be desirable to place all or part of the remainder of Indo-China within the sphere of operations of the Southeast Asia Command. French and Dutch Participation in the War 15. We have considered the arrangements which can be made for French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan and our conclusions are as follows:— a . While it is at present impracticable due chiefly to logistical difficulties for French or Netherlands armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance which may be synchronized with operations will be taken into account. The use of such forces will depend solely on military considerations. French or Netherlands forces so accepted must operate under the complete control of the commander in chief concerned. b . The French/Netherlands representatives will be given timely information of our intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East. 16. We have considered an offer by the French of a French corps of two infantry divisions to serve in the Pacific war and have agreed on the following reply:— “ a . Whether the corps will serve under U. S. or British command and the area in which it will operate will be determined later. “ b . Final acceptance of the corps will involve an agreement with the government concerned on basic matters including command, combat efficiency, replacements, and logistical support. “ c . Maximum use will be made of equipment provided under the North African and Metropolitan Rearmament Programs. “ d . The time of movement will be in accordance with the priority of the operations in which it is to be used. Pressing shipping and other requirements for operations in the Pacific make certain that the corps cannot be moved from France for at least several months. Whether used in the main effort or in the South China Sea area, it will not be possible to commit it to operations prior to the spring of 1946.” Portuguese Participation in the War 17. We have examined a report by an Anglo-American Military Mission which discussed with the Portuguese military authorities Portuguese proposals for participation in such operations as may eventually be conducted to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. We have informed the State Department and the Foreign Office of our views, which are set out in Appendix “D.” Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War 18. We have discussed the policy to be followed by the British and the United States Chiefs of Staff in passing to the Russians information and intelligence concerning the Japanese war and have agreed as follows:— a . The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will pass to the Russians such operational information and intelligence regarding the theaters in which they are respectively responsible as either may wish and without bargaining. b . The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will consult together before passing to the Russians any information and intelligence other than operational. Neither party will pass to the Russians information or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party’s sources without their consent. Planning Date for the End of Organized Resistance by Japan 19. We recommend that for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan be 15 November 1946 and that this date be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war. v. miscellaneous Personnel Shipping 20. We have considered the employment of certain captured enemy ocean-going passenger shipping and have agreed that the total lift of the Europa, Caribia, Vulcania, Patria, Potsdam, Pretoria , and Milwaukee should be allocated for United States employment up to 31 December 1945. We have taken note that the United States Chiefs of Staff will allocate to the United Kingdom a lift of 16,000 during the remainder of 1945 for the movement of Canadians. 21. We have directed the completion by 15 September 1945 of a study of the combined requirements and combined resources, including captured enemy trooplift, for the first half of 1946. Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of Allied Governments 22. We have considered the best means of insuring the efficient coordination of the demands for personnel shipping submitted by Allied governments, other than British and American military movements, and of providing a machinery for dealing with essential personnel movements other than those already approved. We have forwarded to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board the memorandum contained in Appendix “E.” Cargo Shipping 5 23. Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, for supplies to liberated areas, and for essential programs of the Western Hemisphere. Should substantial conflict arise, the shipping situation will be a matter for examination by the two governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions. [Appendix A] top secret Plans and Operations in the Pacific (See paragraph 9 of the Report) 1. In conformity with the over-all objective to bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date, the United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific:— a . From bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Marianas, and the Philippines to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to: b . An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to: c . The decisive invasion of Honshu. 6 2. We have curtailed our projected expansion in the Ryukyus by deferring indefinitely the seizure of Miyako Jima and Kikai Jima. Using the resources originally provided for Miyako and Kikai, we have accelerated the development of Okinawa. By doing this, a greater weight of effort will more promptly be brought to bear against Japan and the risk of becoming involved in operations which might delay the seizure of Kyushu 7 is avoided. 3. In furtherance of the accomplishment of the over-all objectives, we have directed:— a . The invasion of Kyushu. b . The continuation of operations for securing and maintaining control of sea communications to and in the western Pacific as are required for the accomplishment of the over-all objective. c . The defeat of the remaining Japanese in the Philippines by such operations as can be executed without prejudice to the over-all objective. d . The seizure of Balikpapan. (This operation is now approaching successful completion.) e . The continuance of strategic air operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective. 4. Planning and preparation for the campaign in Japan subsequent to the invasion of Kyushu are continuing on the basis of meeting the target date for the invasion of Honshu. This planning is premised on the belief that defeat of the enemy’s armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender, and that such a defeat will establish the optimum prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main Japanese islands. We recognize the possibility also that our success in the main islands may not obviate the necessity of defeating Japanese forces elsewhere; decision as to steps to be taken in this eventuality must await further developments. 5. We are keeping under continuing review the possibility of capitalizing at small cost 8 upon Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals in the China Theater, without delaying the supreme operations. 6. We have directed the preparation of plans for the following:— a . Keeping open a sea route to Russian Pacific ports. b . Operations to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes in order to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances such as a sudden enemy collapse or surrender. [Appendix B] The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia ( Mountbatten ) top secret Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia (See paragraph 12 of the Report) The following directive has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff will obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command set-up in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia. 1. Your primary task is the opening of the Straits of Malacca at the earliest possible moment. It is also intended that British Commonwealth land forces should take part in the main operations against Japan which have been agreed as the supreme operations in the war; and that operations should continue in the Outer Zone to the extent that forces and resources permit. 2. The eastern boundary of your command will be extended to include Borneo, Java, and the Celebes. Full details of this extension are contained in the Annex hereto. 3. Further information will be sent to you regarding Indo-China. 4. It is desirable that you assume command of the additional areas as soon as practicable after 15 August 1945. You will report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the date on which you expect to be in a position to undertake this additional responsibility. 5. Prom that date, such Dominion and Dutch forces as may be operating in your new area will come under your command. They will, however, continue to be based on Australia. 6. The area to the east of your new boundary will be an Australian command under the British Chiefs of Staff. 7. It has been agreed in principle that a British Commonwealth land force of from three to five divisions, and, if possible, a small tactical air force, should take part in the main operations against Japan in the spring of 1946. Units of the British 9 East Indies Fleet may also take part. Certain important factors relating to this are still under examination. 8. You will be required to provide a proportion of this force together with the assault lift for two divisions. The exact composition of this force and its role and the mounting and supporting arrangements will be discussed between Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur, and the British force commanders, and will receive final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 9. The requirements for the force taking part in the main operations against Japan must have priority over all the other tasks indicated below. 10. Subject to the fulfillment of the higher priority commitments given above, you will, within the limits of available resources, carry out operations designed to:— a . Complete the liberation of Malaya. b . Maintain pressure on the Japanese across the Burma–Siam frontier. c . Capture the key areas of Siam. d . Establish bridgeheads in Java and/or Sumatra to enable the subsequent clearance of these areas to be undertaken in due course. 11. You will submit a program of operations to the British Chiefs of Staff as soon as you are in a position to do so. 12. You will develop Singapore and such other bases as you may require to the extent necessary for operations against the Japanese. [Annex] top secret Eastern Boundary of Southeast Asia Command (See paragraph 2 of Appendix “B”) Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16° north; thence to intersect at 7°40´ north latitude 116° east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05° north longitude 127° east; thence southwestward to 02° south 123° east; thence southeastward to 08° south 125° east; thence southwestward to 18° south 110° east. [Appendix C] top secret Boundary Between the British and U. S. Areas of Command in the Southwest Pacific (See paragraph 13 of the Report) Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16° north; thence to intersect at 7°40´ north latitude 116° east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05° north longitude 127° east; thence east to 05° north 130° east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140° east; thence generally southeast to 02°20´ south 146° east; thence east to 02°20´ south 159° east; thence south. [Appendix D] top secret (See paragraph 17 of the Report) The Combined Chiefs of Staff have communicated to the Department of State and the Foreign Office the following views on Portuguese participation in the war against Japan:— a . The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement with the Portuguese military authorities as to the direct use of Portuguese forces, they have recognized the possibility of such use and agreed that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in staff conversations in Lisbon. b . As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops), the larger force is likely to be the more acceptable. Steps are being taken to allocate a suitable training area. c . The air component offered by Portugal should under no circumstances be included in the acceptance of the Portuguese offer in view of the small number of planes available and the state of the training of the pilots, mechanics, and radio specialists. d . There is no objection from the military viewpoint to Portugal receiving munitions when they can be spared but negotiation as to the basis for transfer is an action to be taken on a governmental level. e . The Combined Chiefs of Staff in accepting Portuguese participation do not intend to enter into a commitment for the retaking of Portuguese Timor. Neither is acceptance to be construed as a commitment to use Portuguese troops in any other area. f . Military operations against Portuguese Timor must for the present await the completion of operations against higher priority Japanese-held objectives. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will notify the Portuguese military authorities of impending operations against Portuguese Timor in time for them to prepare their troops for participation therein. Details as to the assembly, shipment, training, and equipping of the Portuguese force will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the appropriate time. They have informed the State Department and the Foreign Office that they have no objection to the disclosure of any of the above information to the Portuguese if the Department of State or Foreign Office deem it necessary in diplomatic conversations.… [Appendix E] The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board confidential Memorandum for the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board (See paragraph 22 of the Report) 1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been studying the problem of providing passenger carrying shipping to meet the urgent demands for the essential military operations in the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for the provision of such shipping of this type to meet other requirements as can be made available without adversely affecting military operations. 2. The available passenger space is insufficient to meet all the urgent requirements of the United Nations, and coordination of demands is, therefore, essential in order to determine priority and to secure shipping efficiency as well as to ensure the fullest consideration being given to all claimants. 3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, agreed that in accordance with the “Agreement on Principles,” dated 5 August 1944, 10 contained in the United Maritime Authority’s report, October, 1944, the following procedure in respect of the submission of demands should be adopted by all the Allied nations:— a . The current procedure for handling the United States and United Kingdom personnel shipping for military requirements will be continued. This procedure will permit on an operational basis the opportune use of such shipping on return voyages, or legs of such voyages, to move passengers of any of the Allied governments. b . All requirements of the Allied governments for the movement of passengers, whether military or civilian, involving definite additional commitments of shipping, whether on a shortor long-term basis, should be submitted to the United Maritime Authority in terms of the shipping space required. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board should confer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to practicability of meeting such requirements. On military requests of the other Allied governments the decision will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. c . When a satisfactory arrangement in regard to the movement of civilians cannot be made under a . and b . above, the matter may be referred to the appropriate authorities of the United Kingdom and United States, to decide whether passenger vessels should be withdrawn at the expense of the military effort. Ships, if so allocated, would operate under the control of the United Maritime Authority on the basis of the “Agreement on Principles” but would be retained in the common pool and assigned for particular voyage employment as might be decided from time to time. 4. Vital demands for shipping should, therefore, be submitted to the United Maritime Authority for consideration. 5. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board is requested to transmit the foregoing policy to the United Maritime Executive Board in Washington and London. 1 Text as approved by Truman and Churchill on July 24. See ante , p. 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] . 2 In the draft report to the President and the Prime Minister circulated on July 23 as the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2, the following language constitutes the complete text under this heading: “(The respective views of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff are set out in parallel columns in Appendix ‘A’.)” For the text of appendix A to C. C. S. 900/2, see document No. 1266 . With the resolution of the differences of view set forth in appendix A to C. C. S. 900/2 (see ante , pp. 340–343 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] ), the subject matter of this appendix was dealt with in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the body of the final report. This necessitated the relettering of the other appendices. Appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2 became appendix A to C. C. S. 900/3, et cetera. 3 The word “British” does not appear at this point in C. C. S. 900/2. 4 C. C. S. 900/2 reads: “an approach to the Generalissimo”. 5 This heading and paragraph 23 do not appear in the body of the enclosure to C. C. S. 900/2, Cf. document No. 1266 . 6 In appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2, subparagraph c reads as follows: “The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain.” 7 Appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2 reads “southern Kyushu”. 8 Appendix B to C. C. S. 900/2 has the phrase “without delaying the supreme operations” at this point rather than at the end of the sentence. 9 The word “British” does not appear at this point in appendix C to C. C. S. 900/2. 10 Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1722; 61 Stat. (4) 3784. Proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom Proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom [1382] Proclamation Potsdam July 26, 1945 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2645 No. 1382 Proclamation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2645 No. 1382 Proclamation 1 Proclamation by the Heads of Governments, United States, China and the United Kingdom 2 (1) We, the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war. (2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist. (3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will 3 mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland. (4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed milita[r]istic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason. (5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay. (6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world. (7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth. (8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration 4 shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine. (9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives. (10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as [a] nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strength[en]ing of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established. (11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those industries which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted. (12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government. (13) We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction. Potsdam July 26, 1945 Harry S Truman Winston Churchill by H. S. T. President of China by wire 5 1 Harriman sent to Byrnes, in telegram No. 2841 of August 10, 1945 (Moscow Embassy Files—711.9 Japanese Surrender), the following English translation of “Molotov’s statement handed to Japanese Ambassador and published in Soviet press August 8th declaring war on Japan”: “After the defeat and surrender of Hitlerite Germany Japan remained the only great power which still held out for continuing the war. “The demand of the three powers—the United States of America, Great Britain, and China [—] of July 26, 1945 concerning the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was refused by Japan. The proposal of the Japanese Government to the Soviet Union concerning mediation in the war in the Far East [cf. ante , pp. 1262–1264 [ Pgs. 1262–1264 include portions of Doc. 1233 , Doc. 1234 , Doc. 1235 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)] ] ] thereby loses all basis. “Taking into consideration the refusal of Japan to surrender, the allies approached the Soviet Government with a proposal [cf. document No. 1282 ] to join the war against Japanese aggression and thereby shorten the length of the war, reduce the number of victims, and assist in the prompt reestablishment of general peace. “Faithful to its obligations to its Allies, the Soviet Government accepted the proposal of the Allies and adhere to the statement of the Allied powers of July 26, 1945. “The Soviet Government considers that its policy is the only means of hastening the coming peace, to deliver the people from further sacrifice and suffering, and enable the Japanese people to avoid those dangers and destructions which Germany suffered after its refusal to surrender unconditionally. “In view of the foregoing, the Soviet Government declares that as of tomorrow, that is, as of 9 August, the Soviet Union will consider it is in a state of war with Japan.” Concerning the French “consent” to the tripartite proclamation of July 26, see document No. 1412 . 2 A copy in the Truman Papers, apparently earlier, has “United States, United Kingdom, and China” in the heading. It also begins: “(1) We, — the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek”. The last name has been deleted and the following substitution made as a manuscript interpolation by Truman: “and the President of the National Government of the Republic of China”. At the end of this copy there is the further manuscript notation by Truman: “Change order in paragraph 1 so as to read Pres. of U. S., Pres. of China and Prime Minister of Great Britain”. See documents Nos. 1251 and 1252 . 3 The words printed in italics throughout this document were originally underscored in document No. 594 (printed in vol. i ) , apparently to call attention to changes from an earlier draft (see vol. i , document No. 592 . enclosure 2). This emphasis was inadvertently carried over into later drafts (see documents Nos. 1244 and 1249 ) and into the final text of the proclamation. 4 Text in Department of State Bulletin , vol. ix , p. 393. 5 The last two “signatures” are in Truman’s handwriting. In the copy referred to in footnote 2, ante , which also bears three “signatures” in Truman’s handwriting, the second appears as “Winston Churchill by authorization H. S. T.” This copy has no place or date. For Churchill’s authorization, see document No. 1249 . For Chiang’s concurrence, see document No. 1251 . Protocol of Proceedings and Communiqué, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom: Protocol of Proceedings and Communiqué, approved by the Heads of Government of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom: Contents Protocol of Proceedings Protocol of Proceedings [[Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1383] Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference Berlin, August 1, 1945. L/T Files Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] Editor’s Note —The text of the Protocol, as released to the public by the Department of State on March 24, 1947, 1 was developed in three distinct stages, as follows: Stage 1 . From the preparation of a draft Protocol by the Protocol Subcommittee of the Conference to the end of the Conference. According to the minutes of the Thirteenth Plenary Meeting, August 1, 1945 ( ante , page 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] ), the three Heads of Government merely signed “top copies” to which the perfected texts of the Protocol were to be attached, and appointed a committee, consisting of a representative of each of the three Delegations, to “compare texts”. 1a The United States original of the Protocol as it left the Conference (i. e., the text as it stood at the end of Stage 1) consists of a one-sentence “top document”, dated August 1, 1945, and signed by Stalin, Truman, and Attlee, to which there is fastened by a wire staple the “Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference”, part of which is typewritten and part of which is in mimeographed form, and on the face of which a number of manuscript changes and corrections had been made. The text printed below is the text as it stood at the end of Stage 1. 1b Stage 2 . After the United States original of the Protocol reached Washington, but before its text was publicly released, it became apparent that certain editorial corrections had not been made and that certain decisions of the Heads of Government with respect to the Protocol and the Communiqué had not been reflected in changes in the Protocol. A number of changes falling within these categories were then made on the United States original of the Protocol. Stage 3 . Immediately before the publication of the Protocol in a Department of State press release, the United States text of the Protocol was checked against a British text of the same document, and further changes were introduced to bring the United States text into harmony with the British text. These changes, however, were not entered on the face of the United States original. The text printed below (the text as it stood at the end of Stage 1) is annotated to show ( a ) manuscript changes made on the signed original during Stage 1 and ( b ) changes introduced in Stages 2 and 3. 1c 1 Department of State press release No. 238 of March 24, 1947, as corrected by a sheet of corrigenda of the same date. 1a Assistant Secretary of State James Clement Dunn represented the United States on the committee to “compare texts”. A copy of the Protocol (without the one-sentence “top document”) bearing manuscript changes and corrections, many of them in Dunn’s handwriting, is in the Department’s files (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–245). Many of the changes and corrections entered on this copy (hereafter referred to as Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol) were not, however, entered at Babelsberg on the United States original of the Protocol, i.e., the copy to which the signed “top document” was stapled, although it was presumably intended that they were to be so entered. 1b In identifying the Stage 1 text the editors used a photostatic copy of the United States original made in the Department of State on November 5, 1946, before the Stage 2 changes had been made on that document. 1c Except that variations in punctuation, spelling, and capitalization which occurred in Stage 3, and minor variations in Stage 3 which were obviously the result of typographical errors, have not been annotated. In the footnotes which follow, an asterisk (*) indicates that the United States text, as changed, is in harmony with the text published by the British Government in 1947. A dagger (†) indicates that the United States text, as changed, is in harmony with the Russian text published by the Soviet Government in 1955. (For full citations to the British and Soviet texts referred to, see ante , pp. xxix [ Pg. XXIX is part of Introduction ] , xxx [ Pg. XXX is part of Introduction ] .) There remain, however, both editorial and substantive differences between the United States, British, and Soviet texts. Attention is called to the principal remaining substantive differences in the footnotes which follow. No. 1383 Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference L/T Files No. 1383 Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference Berlin , August 1, 1945. 1d There is attached hereto the agreed protocol of the Berlin Conference. И. Ctajлиh 2 Harry S Truman 3 C. R. Attlee 4 [Attachment] Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference The Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government of the U. S. S. R., U. S. A., and U. K., which took place from July 17 to August 1, 5 1945, came to the following conclusions: i. establishment of a council of foreign ministers . 6 The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements: “(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States. (2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advi[s]ers. (ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time. (3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established. (ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion. (iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments. (4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question. (ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problem 7 under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State[s] chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.” 8 It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. The text of the approved invitation was as follows: Council of Foreign Ministers . Draft for identical invitation to be sent separately by each of the Three Governments to the Governments of China and France . “The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U. S. S. R. consider it necessary to begin without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, for submission to the United Nations. The Council would also be empowered to propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as member Governments might agree to refer to it. The text adopted by the Three Governments is as follows: (Here insert final agreed text of the Proposal). In agreement with the Governments of the United States and U. S. S. R., His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and U. S. S. R., the United States Government, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government extend a cordial invitation to the Government of China ( France ) to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council. 9 His Majesty’s Government, The United States Government, The Soviet Government attach much importance to the participation of the Chinese Government ( French Government ) in the proposed arrangements and they hope to receive an early and favorable reply to this invitation.” 10 It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference 11 that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom. 12 The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the Agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, 12a for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. 13 It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Commission 14 at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly the Conference agreed to recommend to the Member Governments of the European Advisory Commission that the Commission might now be dissolved. 15 ii. the principles to govern the treatment of germany in the initial control period 15a A. Political Principles . 1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, 16 supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council. 2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany. 3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are: (1) 17 The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:— ( a ) All German land, naval and air forces, the S. S., S. A., S. D. and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and quasi-military 18 organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism; ( b ) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented. (ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable. (iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda. (iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. 4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discrimination 19 on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated. 5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned. 6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany. 7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas. 8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion. 9. The administration of affairs 20 in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. 20a To this end:— (i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation; (ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany; (iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government; (iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council. 10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted. 21 Economic Principles 11. 22 In order to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany’s approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. 23 Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed. 12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements. Notwithstanding this, however, and for the purpose of achieving the objectives set forth herein, certain forms of central administrative machinery, particularly in the fields of Finance, Transportation and Communications, shall be maintained or restored. 24 13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. 14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to: ( a ) mining and industrial production and 25 allocation; ( b ) agriculture, forestry and fishing; ( c ) wages, prices and rationing; ( d ) import and export programs for Germany as a whole; ( e ) currency and banking, central taxation and customs; ( f ) reparation and removal of industrial war potential; ( g ) transportation and communications. In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions. 15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary: ( a ) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and 26 demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports. ( b ) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding U. K. and 27 U. S. S. R.) ( c ) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports. ( d ) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein. ( e ) to control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera, connected with economic activities. 16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited. 17. Measures shall be promptly taken: ( a ) to effect essential repair of transport; ( b ) to enlarge coal production; ( c ) to maximize agricultural 28 output; and ( d ) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities. 18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany. 19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports. The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 ( a ) and 4 ( b ) of the Reparations Agreement. 29 iii. german separation 30 1. Reparation claims of 31 U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R., and from appropriate German external assets. 2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations. 3. The reparations 32 claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets. 4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones: ( a ) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon. ( b ) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. Removals of equipment as provided in ( a ) and ( b ) above shall be made simultaneously. 5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest. 6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 ( a ) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U. S. S. R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. 32a The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, 33 with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed. 7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to 34 such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6. 8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims 35 to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below. 9. The Governments of the U. K. and U. S. A. renounce their claims 36 to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria. 10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany. iv. disposal of the german navy and merchant marine . A. 37 The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed: (1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., U. K., and U. S. 38 (2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided, without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German ship building or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government. (3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U. S. S. R., U. K. and U. S. 38 for experimental and technical purposes. (4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships. (5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than 15th August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each Delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located. (6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15th February, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission. B. 39 The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed:— (1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S. 40 The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland. (2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority. 41 (3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with paragraph (1). (4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers. (5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located. vi 42 city of koenigsberg and the adjacent area The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg–Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia. The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer 42a to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert 43 examination of the actual frontier. The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement. vii 44 war crimes 45 The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London 46 between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 47 have no particular geographical localisation. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1st September. 48 viii . 49 austria The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria. The three Governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna. It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria. ix . 50 poland A. Declaration 50a We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, 51 of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognised by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government 52 has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, 53 which no longer exists. The British and U. S. 54 Governments have taken measures to protect the interests 55 of the Polish Provisional Government, 55a as the recognised Government of the Polish State, in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government 55a for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated. The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government 56 in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces and the merchant marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights 57 and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens. The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government 56 in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates; and that representatives of the Allied Press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections. B. Western Frontier of Poland . In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland 58 and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity 59 have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west [of] 60 Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, 61 including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference 62 and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. x . 63 conclusion of peace treaties and admission to the united nations organisation . The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Roumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. 64 They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views. For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty with 65 Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, who [ to ] 66 whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognised and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations. The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Roumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognised democratic Governments in these States will also enable the Three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The Three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries. 67 The Three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied Press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations 68 declared 69 that: 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who 70 accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; 2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above. The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership. xi . 71 territorial trusteeship The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the question of trusteeship territories envisaging those categories of territories 71a as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference 72 and in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation. After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian 73 territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty with 74 Italy and that the question of Italian 73 territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. xii . 75 revised allied control commission procedure in roumania, Bulgaria and hungary . The Three Governments have taken 76 note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased. The Three Governments agree that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries will now be undertaken, 77 taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the Three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government’s proposals for Hungary as annexed hereto. 78 annex . 79 text of a letter transmitted on july 12 to the representatives of the u. s. and u. k. governments on the allied control commission in hungary . In view of the changed situation in connection with the termination of the war against Germany, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to establish the following order of work for the Allied Control Commission in Hungary. 1. During the period up to the conclusion of peace with Hungary the President (or Vice-President) of the ACC will regularly call conferences with the British and American representatives for the purpose of discussing the most important questions relating to the work of the ACC. The conferences will be called once in 10 days, or more frequently in case of need. Directives of the ACC on questions of principle will be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission after agreement on these directives with the English and American representatives. 2. The British and American representatives in the ACC will take part in general conferences of heads of divisions and delegates of the ACC, convoked by the President of the ACC, which meetings will be regular in nature. The British and American representatives will also participate personally or through their representatives in appropriate instances in mixed commissions created by the President of the ACC for questions connected with the execution by the ACC of its functions. 3. Free movement by the American and British representatives in the country will be permitted provided that the ACC is previously informed of the time and route of the journeys. 4. All questions connected with permission for the entrance and exit of members of the staff of the British and American representatives in Hungary will be decided on the spot by the President of the ACC within a time limit of not more than one week. 5. The bringing in and sending out by plane of mail, cargoes and diplomatic couriers will be carried out by the British and American representatives on the ACC under arrangements and within time limits established by the ACC, or in special cases by previous coordination with the President of the ACC. I consider it necessary to add to the above that in all other points the existing Statutes regarding the ACC in Hungary, which was confirmed on January, 20 [ sic ], 1945, 80 shall remain in force in the future. xiii 81 orderly transfer of german populations 81a The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognise that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner. Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Allied 82 Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem, with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out having regard to the present situation in Germany. The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending an examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council. xiv 83 oil equipment in Rumania The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of United Kingdom and Soviet Members, and one to be composed of United States and Soviet members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions arising from the removal of oil equipment from 84 Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days, on the spot. xv 85 iran It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945. xvi 86 the interna[t]ional zone of tangier A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached. Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Governments have agreed that this Zone, which includes the city of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance shall remain international. The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kin[g]dom and France. 87 xvii 88 the black sea straits The three Governments recognised the need for revision of the Convention on the Straits concluded at Montreux 89 as failing to meet present-day conditions. 90 It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government. xviii 91 international inland waterways . The Conference considered a proposal of the U. S. Delegation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. xix 92 european inland transport conference . The British and U. S. Delegations to the Conference informed the Soviet Delegation of the desire of the British and U. S. Governments to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference and stated that they would welcome assurance that the Soviet Government would participate in the work of the reconvened conference. The Soviet Government agreed that it would participate in this conference. 93 xx 94 directives to military commanders on allied control council for germany . The three Governments agreed that each would send a directive to its representative on the Control Council for Germany informing him of all decisions of the Conference affecting matters within the scope of his duties. 94a xxi 95 use of allied property 96 for satellite reparations or “war trophies” The proposal 97 presented by the U. S. 98 Delegation was accepted in principle by the Conference, but the drafting of an agreement on the matter was left to be worked out through diplomatic channels. 99 1d So dated, although this “top document” was apparently not signed until a few minutes after midnight, i.e., until August 2. See ante , p. 596, footnote 38 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . The texts of the Protocol published by the British and Soviet Governments do not include this “top document”, and they place the signatures and dateline after annex ii at the end of the Protocol. In the British text the dateline reads, “Berlin, 2nd August, 1945.” In the Soviet text it reads, in translation, “Berlin, 1 August 1945.” 2 I. Stalin. Changed in Stage 3 to “Joseph V. Stalin”. 3 Changed in Stage 3 to “Harry Truman”. 4 At this point in the United States original is a second page with the identical text printed above, but without the signatures. 5 Changed in Stage 3 to “August 2”. *† 6 “A.” introduced at the beginning of this paragraph in Stage 2.*† 7 Changed in Stage 3 to “problems”. 8 “B.” introduced at the beginning of this paragraph in Stage 2.*† 9 The words in italics, which were underscored in the original, were obviously intended to supply the form of invitation to be used by each of the three inviting Governments, but there appear to have been inadvertent omissions in the text. The first sentence of this paragraph presumably should read: “In agreement with the Governments of the United States and U. S. S. R., His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom ( United Kingdom and U. S. S. R., the United States Government ) ( United States and United Kingdom, the Soviet Government ) extend[s] a cordial invitation to the Government of China ( France ) to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council.” Cf. document No. 715 and the enclosure to document No. 1395 . 10 “C.” introduced at the beginning of this paragraph in Stage 2.*† 11 See document No. 1417 , section viii . 12 “D.” introduced at the beginning of this paragraph in Stage 2.*† 12a The Soviet text reads, in literal translation, “recommendations concerning the unconditional surrender of Germany”. 13 See vol. i , document No. 233 . 14 “Allied Control Commission” changed in Stage 3 to “Control Council”.*† 15 The final sentence changed in Stage 3 to read: “Accordingly it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.”* The Soviet text reads, in literal translation, “Accordingly, it is recommended that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.” 15a The Soviet text, which contains the words “Political and Economic Principles” in this heading, also contains the following introductory statement following the heading: “The following political and economic principles for the treatment of Germany were adopted:”. 16 Signed at London, November 14, 1944, as amended by a further agreement signed at London, May 1, 1945. For texts, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3070; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, p. 2062. The agreement of November 14, 1944, also printed in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 124 . 17 Corrected in Stage 3 to “(i)”.*† 18 Changed in Stage 3 to “semi-military”.*† 19 Changed in Stage 3 to “discriminations”. 20 The words “of affairs” deleted in Stage 3.*† 20a The Soviet text reads, in literal translation, “the development of a sense of responsibility”. 21 During Stage 1 there was deleted the following heading which appeared in the draft above the heading printed: “Proposed Agreement on the Political and Economic Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period[:] Text as Submitted to the Foreign Secretaries by Economic Sub-Committee”.*† “B.” was introduced before the heading printed in Stage 2.*† See ante , p. 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . The text of section ii B in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol bears only the typed heading, “B. Economic Principles ”. 22 This paragraph number was corrected from “10” in Stage 1.*† The numbers of the eight succeeding paragraphs, i. e., 12 to 19 inclusive, were likewise corrected in Stage 1,*† having been numbered 11 to 18 inclusive in the draft. The renumbering of the later paragraphs of this section was caused by the insertion of a new paragraph 2. See document No. 879, footnote 5 . The text of section ii B in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol is correctly numbered. 23 Corrected from “14” in Stage 1.*† The number is correct in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. 24 The final sentence of this paragraph was deleted in Stage 2.* This deletion was marked in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. Cf. the attachment to document No. 1380 and ante , p. 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . The sentence was not deleted, however, from the Soviet text. 25 The word “its” introduced at this point in Stage 3.*† 26 The word “and” replaced by a comma in Stage 3. Neither the word “and” nor the comma appears in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. 27 The words “U. K. and” replaced by “the United Kingdom and the” in Stage 3*† 28 Changed from “agriculture” in Stage 1.*† 29 i. e., section iii , infra . 30 Changed in Stage 3 to “Reparations From Germany”.*† 31 The word “the” introduced at this point in Stage 3.*† 32 Changed in Stage 3 to “reparation”. 32a The Soviet text reads, in literal translation, “within five years of the said date”. 33 See International Agencies in Which the United States Participates (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946; Department of State publication No. 2699), p. 141. 34 The word “to” changed by hand to “of” in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol.* 35 The words “in respect of reparations” introduced at this point in Stage 3.*† These words appear in Dunn’s handwriting as an interlineation in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. See ante , pp. 586–587 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 36 The words “their claims” replaced by “all claims in respect of reparations” in Stage 3.*† The words “in respect of reparations” appear in Dunn’s handwriting as an interlineation following the words “their claims” in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. See ante , pp. 586–587 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 37 “A.” moved in Stage 3 to the beginning of the following paragraph. 38 Changed in Stage 3 to “U. S. A.” This change was marked in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. 38 Changed in Stage 3 to “U. S. A.” This change was marked in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. 39 “B.” moved in Stage 3 to the beginning of the following paragraph. 40 Changed in Stage 3 to “U. S. A.” This change was marked in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. 41 Concerning these two organizations see, respectively, United States Government Organization Manual, 1953–54 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 542, and International Organizations in Which the United States Participates, 1949 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950; Department of State publication No. 3655), p. 323. 42 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ v ”.*† This correction is marked in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol, where the numbering of all the succeeding sections of the Protocol is likewise corrected. An undated working paper (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045) which contains a numbered list of the proposed sections of the Protocol indicates that at one stage it was expected that section v of the Protocol would deal with the Ruhr. When the Heads of Government decided on August 1 that the Protocol would not contain a section on the Ruhr (see ante , pp. 595–596 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] ), this decision should have precipitated a renumbering of section vi (on the city of Königsberg and the adjacent area) to section v , and an appropriate renumbering of all succeeding sections of the Protocol. As noted above, this renumbering was carried out in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol, but the correct numbering was not entered on the United States original of the Protocol until Stage 2, as defined above (see ante , p. 1477 [ Pg. 1477 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] ] ). 42a The Soviet text reads, in literal translation, “concerning the transfer”. 43 Corrected by hand in Stage 1 from “exper”. 44 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ vi ”.*† 45 Changed in Stage 2 to “War Criminals”. *† 46 For the London discussions referred to, for the text of the Agreement of August 8, 1945, signed at the conclusion of those discussions, and for the text of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to that Agreement, see Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945 . 47 Text in Department of State Bulletin ) vol. ix , p. 310 48 For the list referred to, which was made public on August 29, 1945, see Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 301. 49 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ vii ”.*† 50 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ viii ”.*† 50a In the Soviet text this heading reads, in literal translation, “A. Declaration on the Polish Question”, and the following introductory statement follows the heading: “The Conference has adopted the following declaration on the Polish question:”. 51 See document No. 1417 , section vi . 52 The words “of National Unity” introduced at this point in Stage 3.* 53 Concerning United States recognition of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, see vol. i , document No. 501 . 54 Changed in Stage 3 to “United States”.*† 55 Changed in Stage 3 to “interest”. 55a The words “of National Unity” introduced at this point in Stage 3.*† 55a The words “of National Unity” introduced at this point in Stage 3.*† 56 The words “of National Unity” introduced at this point in Stage 3.*† 57 The word “rights” deleted in Stage 3.*† This change was marked in Dunn’s handwriting in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. 56 The words “of National Unity” introduced at this point in Stage 3.*† 58 Boleslaw Bierut. 59 See ante , p. 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] . 60 The words “immediately west” substituted for “through” in Stage 1.*† The word “of” introduced in Stage 2.*† The words “immediately west of” appear in Dunn’s handwriting as an interlineation in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. See ante , p. 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . 61 See the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , ante . 62 Ante , section vi ( v ). 63 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ ix ”.*† 64 The following passage deleted at this point in Stage 1: “so that as soon as possible thereafter relations between them and the ex-enemy States can, where necessary, be reestablished on a normal footing”.*† See ante , p. 590, footnote 16 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] . This passage is also marked for deletion in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. 65 Changed in Stage 3 from “with” to “for”.*† This change appears in Dunn’s handwriting as an interlineation in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. 66 The correction from “who” to “to” made in Stage 2.*† 67 Concerning United States action to carry out the provisions of the final sentence of this paragraph see: for Finland, Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , pp. 283, 339; for Rumania, ibid. , vol. xiv , pp. 256, 298; for Bulgaria, ibid. , vol. xvii , p. 746; for Hungary, ibid. , vol. xiii , p. 478. 68 Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031. 69 Changed in Stage 3 to “declares”.*† This change is marked in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. 70 Reads “which” in the Charter. The text included in the Protocol also has variations of capitalization and punctuation from the text of the Charter. 71 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ x ”.*† 71a The British text omits the words “envisaging those categories of territories”. The Soviet text likewise contains no Russian translation of these words. 72 See document No. 1416 , section i . 73 The word “colonial” introduced at this point in Stage 3.*† 74 Changed in Stage 3 from “with” to “for”.* This change appears in Dunn’s handwriting as an interlineation in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. 73 The word “colonial” introduced at this point in Stage 3.*† 75 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ xi ”.*† 76 The words “have taken” changed in Stage 3 to “took”.*† This change appears in Dunn’s handwriting as an interlineation in Dunn’s working copy of the Protocol. 77 Dunn has changed the beginning of this paragraph by hand, in his working copy of the Protocol, to read as follows (italics supplied): “The Three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken”.* 78 The words “(Annex i )” introduced at the end of the paragraph in Stage 3.*† 79 Changed in Stage 2 to “Annex i ”.*† In Stage 3 this annex was removed from its position at the end of the section of the Protocol to which it pertains and placed near the end, between section xxi and annex ii ,*† both of which were introduced in Stage 2 ( post , p. 1498 [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 1383 ] ). 80 Not printed. 81 Corrected in Stage 2 to “xii”. *† 81a The Soviet text contains the following introductory statement following this heading: “The Conference has adopted the following decision:”. 82 The word “Allied” deleted in Stage 3.*† 83 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ xiii ”.*† 84 Changed in Stage 3 from “from” to “in”.*† 85 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ xiv ”.*† 86 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ xv ”.*† 87 See Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , pp. 380, 613. 88 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ xvi ”.*† 89 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 213. 90 This paragraph revised in Stage 3 as follows: “The Three Governments recognized that the Convention on the Straits concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions.”† The British text reads: “The three Governments recognised that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions.” 91 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ xvii ”.*† 92 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ xviii ”.*† 93 See Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, July 1, 1941–June 30, 1945 , p. 138. See also Executive Agreement Series No. 494; 59 Stat. (2) 1740. 94 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ xix ”.*† 94a The Soviet text reads, in literal translation, “to its representative on the Control Council concerning questions coming within the scope of his competence”. 95 Corrected in Stage 2 to “ xx ”.*† 96 Changed in Stage 2 to “Properties”; to “Property” once more in Stage 3.*† 97 The words “(Annex ii )” introduced at this point in Stage 2.*† 98 Changed in Stage 3 to “United States”.* 99 The Soviet text of this paragraph reads, in literal translation: “The Conference decided to accept in principle the proposal of the American Delegation (Annex No. 2). The wording of this proposal is to be agreed upon through the diplomatic channel” The Protocol, as it stood at the end of Stage 1, ended with this paragraph. In Stage 2 an additional section xxi was introduced*† and annex ii (pertaining to the final section of the Protocol as it stood at the end of Stage 1) was added.*† In Stage 3 the annex to the section on “Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary” ( ante , p. 1494 [ Pg. 1494 is part of Doc. 1383 ] ) was inserted between the new section xxi and annex ii .*† The texts of the new article and annex introduced in Stage 2 are as follows: xxi military talks During the Conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the three governments on military matters of common interest. [Cf. document No. 1384 , section xiv , and ante , p. 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] .] annex ii [The heading, “Use of Allied Property for Satellite Reparations or ‘War Trophies’” was inserted at this point in Stage 3.† A similar heading above the words “Annex ii ” was deleted in Stage 2.*] 1. The burden of reparation and “war trophies” should not fall on allied nationals. 2. Capital equipment.—We object to the removal of such allied property as reparations, “war trophies”, or under any other guise. Loss would accrue to allied nationals as a result of destruction of plants and the consequent loss of markets and trading connections. Seizure of allied property makes impossible the fulfilment by the satellite of its obligation under the armistice to restore intact the rights and interests of the allied nations and their nationals. The United States looks to the other occupying powers for the return of any equipment already removed and the cessation of removals. Where such equipment will not or cannot be returned, the United States [changed to “U. S.” in Stage 3] will demand of the satellite adequate, effective and prompt compensation to American nationals, and that such compensation have priority equal to that of the reparations payment. These principles apply to all property wholly or substantially owned by allied nationals. In the event of removals of property in which the American as well as the entire allied interest is less than substantial, the United States [changed to “U. S.” in Stage 3] expects adequate, effective, and prompt compensation. 3. Current production.—While the United States [changed to “U. S.” in Stage 31 does not oppose reparation out of current production of allied investments, the satellite must provide immediate and adequate compensation to the allied nationals including sufficient foreign exchange or products so that they can recover reasonable foreign currency expenditures and transfer a reasonable return on their investment. Such compensation must also have equal priority with reparations. We deem it essential that the satellites do [the word “do” deleted in Stage 3] not conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which deny to allied nationals access, on equal terms, to their trade, raw materials, and industry; and appropriately modify any existing arrangements which may have that effect. [Cf. document No. 842 .] No. 1384 Communiqué Truman Papers No. 1384 Communiqué 1 [ Babelsberg ,] August 2, 1945[.] Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin i 2 On July 17, 1945, the President of the United States of America, Harry S. Truman, the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Generalissimo J. V. Stalin, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, together with Mr. Clement R. Attlee, met in the Tripartite Conference of Berlin. They were accompanied by the foreign secretaries of the three Governments, Mr. James F. Byrnes, Mr. V. M. Molotov, and Mr. Anthony Eden, the Chiefs of Staff, and other advisers. There were nine meetings between July 17 and July 25. The Conference was then interrupted for two days while the results of the British general election were being declared. On July 28 Mr. Attlee returned to the Conference as Prime Minister, accompanied by the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin. Four days of further discussion then took place. During the course of the Conference there were regular meetings of the Heads of the Three Governments accompanied by the foreign secretaries, and also of the Foreign Secretaries alone. Committees appointed by the Foreign Secretaries for preliminary consideration of questions before the Conference also met daily. The meetings of the Conference were held at the Cecilienhof near Potsdam. The Conference ended on August 2, 1945. Important decisions and agreements were reached. Views were exchanged on a number of other questions and consideration of these matters will be continued by the Council of Foreign Ministers established by the Conference. President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee leave this Conference, which has strengthened the ties between the three governments and extended the scope of their collaboration and understanding, with renewed confidence that their governments and peoples, together with the other United Nations, will ensure the creation of a just and enduring peace. ii . establishment of a council of foreign ministers The Conference reached an agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers representing the five principal Powers to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements and to take up other matters which from time to time may be referred to the Council by agreement of the governments participating in the Council. The text of the agreement for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers is as follows: (1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States. (2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advisers. (ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time. (3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established. (ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion. (iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments. (4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question. (ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State[s] chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem. In accordance with the decision of the Conference the three Governments have each addressed an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. The establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text will be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodic consultation among the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of Germany’s unconditional surrender, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly, it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved. iii germany The Allied armies are in occupation of the whole of Germany and the German people have begun to atone for the terrible crimes committed under the leadership of those whom, in the hour of their success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed. Agreement has been reached at this Conference on the political and economic principles of a coordinated Allied policy toward defeated Germany during the period of Allied control. The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea declaration on Germany. German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbors or the peace of the world. It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world. The text of the agreement is as follows: The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period . A. Political Principles . 1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council. 2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany. 3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are: (i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:— ( a ) All German land, naval and air forces, the S. S., S. A., S. D. and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and quasi-military organization[s], together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism; ( b ) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented. (ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable. (iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda. (iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. 4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated. 5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned. 6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany. 7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas. 8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion. 9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end: (i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation; (ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany; (iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government; (iv) for the time being no central German government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council. 10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted. B. Economic Principles . 11. In order to eliminate Germany’s war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany’s approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed. 12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements. 13. In organizing the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. 14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to: ( a ) mining and industrial production and allocation; ( b ) agriculture, forestry and fishing; ( c ) wages, prices and rationing; ( d ) import and export programs for Germany as a whole; ( e ) currency and banking, central taxation and customs; ( f ) reparation and removal of industrial war potential; ( g ) transportation and communications. In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions. 15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary: ( a ) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports. ( b ) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.) ( c ) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports. ( d ) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential tial [ sic ] and of achieving the other objectives named herein. ( e ) to control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera, connected with economic activities. 16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited. 17. Measures shall be promptly taken: ( a ) to effect essential repair of transport; ( b ) to enlarge coal production; ( c ) to maximize agricultural output; and ( d ) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities. 18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany. 19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports. The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 ( a ) and 4 ( b ) of the Reparations Agreement. iv reparations from germany In accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility, the following agreement on reparations was reached: 1. Reparation claims of the U. S. S. R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U. S. S. R. and from appropriate German external assets. 2. The U. S. S. R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations. 3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets. 4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U. S. S. R. from its own zone of occupation, the U. S. S. R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones: ( a ) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon. ( b ) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. Removals of equipment as provided in ( a ) and ( b ) above shall be made simultaneously. 5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest. 6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 ( a ) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U. S. S. R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparations shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed. 7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect of such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6. 8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of occupation in 3 Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below. 9. The Governments of the U. K. and the U. S. A. renounce their claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria. 10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany. [ v ] disposal of the german navy and merchant marine The Conference agreed in principle upon arrangements for the use and disposal of the surrendered German fleet and merchant ships. It was decided that the Three Governments would appoint experts to work out together detailed plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint statement will be published simultaneously by the Three Governments in due course. vi . city of koenigsberg and the adjacent area The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg–Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia. The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier. The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement. vii . war criminals The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 have no particular geographical localization. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring those criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of those major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before September 1. viii Austria The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria. The three Governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna. ix 4 Poland The Conference considered questions relating to the Polish Provisional Government and the western boundary of Poland. On the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity they defined their attitude in the following statement: A— 5 We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists. The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated. The three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens. The three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections. B—The following agreement was reached on the western frontier of Poland: In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. x . conclusion of peace treaties and admission to the united nations organization . The Conference agreed upon the following statement of common policy for establishing, as soon as possible, the conditions of lasting peace after victory in Europe: The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views. For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of The United Nations. The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic Governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries. The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that: “1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; “2. the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above. The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership. xi territorial trusteeships 6 The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government concerning trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organization. After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. xii revised allied control commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and hungary The Three Governments took note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commission, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased. The Three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the Three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis the agreed proposals. xiii orderly transfers of german populations The Conference reached the following agreement on the removal of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary: The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner. Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Allied Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out, having regard to the present situation in Germany. The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above, and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending the examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council. xiv military talks During the Conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the three Governments on military matters of common interest. Approved: J. V. Stalin Harry S. Truman C. R. Attlee 7 list of delegations For the United States The President: Harry S. Truman The Secretary of State: James F. Byrnes Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the President Joseph E. Davies, Special Ambassador Edwin Pauley, Special Ambassador 8 W. Averell Harriman[,] Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. General of the Army, George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army Fleet Admiral, Ernest J. King, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet General of the Army, H. H. Arnold, U. S. Army Air Forces Lieutenant General [ sic ] Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator William L. Clayton[,] Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn[,] Assistant Secretary of State Ben Cohen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, Department of State Charles E. Bohlen[,] Assistant to the Secretary, (together with political, military and technical advisers). For the United Kingdom The Prime Minister: Mr. Winston S. Churchill, M. P. Mr. C. R. Attlee, M. P. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Mr. Anthony Eden, M. P. Mr. Ernest Bevin, M. P. Lord Leathers[,] Minister of War Transport Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow Sir Walter Monckton, Head of the U. K. Delegation to Moscow Reparations Commission. Sir William Strang, Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, British Zone in Germany. Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the Cabinet Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord. General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence. Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre. Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington. and other advisers [ For the Soviet Union 9 ] [The Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars: J. V. Stalin People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs: V. M. Molotov Fleet Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, People’s Commissar, the Naval Fleet of the U. S. S. R. A. I. Antonov, Chief of Staff of the Red Army A. Ya Vyshinski, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs S. I. Kavtaradze, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs I. M. Maisky, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Admiral S. G. Kucherov, Chief of Staff of the Naval Fleet F. T. Gusev, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Great Britain A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in the United States of America K. V. Novikov, Member of the Collegium of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Director of the Second European Division S. K. Tsarapkin, Member of the Collegium of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Director of the United States Division S. P. Kozyrev, Director of the First European Division of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs A. A. Lavrishchev, Director of the Division of Balkan Countries, Commissariat for Foreign Affairs A. A. Sobolev, Chief of the Political Section of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany I. [ M .] Z. Saburov, Assistant to the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany A. [ S .] A. Golunsky, Expert consultant of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and also political, military, and technical assistants.] 1 The source copy is filed in a folder in the Truman Papers bearing the following typed notation: “Final typewritten copy as prepared under the direction of the President’s Press Secretary, Mr. Charles Ross, on 2 August 1945 after the President. Attlee and Stalin had made changes in an earlier draft at the last Plenary Session.” This represents the final text in the files of the United States Delegation which was prepared at the Conference site. The text released at Washington on August 2 (the source for the text printed in the Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii . p. 153) was based on a telegraphic transmission and contains minor variations from the text here printed. For the “earlier draft” referred to above, i. e., the Report of the Communiqué Subcommittee, to which a cover sheet bearing the signatures of the three Heads of Government was attached, see document No. 1380 . In connection with the Communiqué see also the general annotations to document No. 1383 . 2 This Roman numeral is a manuscript addition. 3 The words “occupation in” are a manuscript addition. 4 This Roman numeral is a manuscript correction of the numeral “ vii ” in the original typescript. The correction is initialed by George M. Elsey. 5 “A—” is a manuscript addition; 6 This typed caption replaces an earlier caption, “Trusteeship Territories”, which has been crossed out by hand. 7 These typed signatures appear on the source text of the Communiqué. Concerning the document to which the holograph signatures of the Heads of Government were attached, see document No. 1380 . 8 Upon telegraphic instructions from Babelsberg, “Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Zone in Germany” was added at this point to the text released at Washington. 9 This list of the Soviet Delegation was not included in the source copy. Upon telegraphic instructions from Babelsberg, it was added to the text released at Washington. It is here reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin , vol. xiii , p. 161. A. Mikołajczyk notes on a meeting of the Foreign Ministers and on Polish-American and Polish-Soviet conversations at the Berlin Conference A. Mikołajczyk notes on a meeting of the Foreign Ministers and on Polish-American and Polish-Soviet conversations at the Berlin Conference [[Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1385] Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 12:30 p.m. Mikołajczyk Papers [1386] Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Babelsberg, July 25, 1945 Mikołajczyk Papers [1387] Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) July 26, 1945 Mikołajczyk Papers [1388] Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) July 27, 1945 Mikołajczyk Papers [1389] Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) July 28, 1945 Mikołajczyk Papers [1390] Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) [Babelsberg, July 28, 1945.] Mikołajczyk Papers [1391] Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) [Babelsberg, July 29, 1945.] Mikołajczyk Papers [1392] Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) [Babelsberg, July 30, 1945.] Mikołajczyk Papers [1393] Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) [Babelsberg, July 31, 1945.] Mikołajczyk Papers [1394] Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) August 1, 1945 Mikołajczyk Papers Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Stanislaw Mikołajczyk, who (in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity) was a member of the Polish Delegation to the Berlin Conference, has made available to the Department of State the papers now in his possession relating to the Conference. There are included in this appendix translations, prepared by the Department, of ( a ) Mikołajczyk’s minutes of the appearance of the Polish Delegation before the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers on July 24, 1945; ( b ) his formal memoranda on four conversations between members of the United States and Polish Delegations; ( c ) his memorandum on Stalin’s reception for the Polish Delegation on July 27, 1945; and ( d ) four entries from his diary 1 which give information not found elsewhere on two Polish-American and two Polish-Soviet conversations. 1 The diary of the Berlin Conference now in Mikołajczyk’s possession covers only the period July 27–August 1, 1945. No. 1385 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Mikołajczyk Papers No. 1385 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) 2 Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 12:30 p.m. [Translation] Meeting of the Three Foreign Ministers on July 24, 1945, at 12:30 Secretary Byrnes , as Chairman, opens the meeting: We have invited 3 the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to come here so that they would have the opportunity to explain to us their point of view with regard to the Polish western frontier. Who is going to speak on behalf of the Polish Provisional Government in answer to our invitation? I should like to ask President Bierut to name the speaker who will present to us the position of the Polish Government. President Bierut : (Expresses thanks for the invitation to the Conference and begins the report.) In connection with this World War, Poland has been placed in a situation which changes her boundaries. Resolutions of the Crimean Conference 4 determined the eastern boundary of Poland, but the western boundary was not established. We accepted the eastern boundary in accordance with the resolutions of the Crimean Conference and the Moscow Conference. 5 Our government would like to express its opinion with regard to the western boundary of Poland. I should like to point out that the Government of National Unity has unanimously arrived at the following conclusions: we should all like to ask, when our western borders are established, that there be taken into consideration the vital interests of Poland, i. e., the factors without which Poland will not be able to exist. Poland is a state which became the object of German aggression. As a result of this war Poland has suffered the most heavily in population and material of all the states participating in the war. Our country was damaged more than any other country in this war. We realize that in order to establish a lasting peace in all Europe Poland, which suffered great losses in the war for that peace, must also make certain common sacrifices at this time, in the same way as other nations. From the territorial standpoint, Poland had to give up an area of 180,000 square kilometers in establishing her eastern boundary. We consider it proper and just that the eastern boundary was established in accordance with ethnic principles. I believe that the equivalent which Poland should receive in accordance with the decisions of the Big Three should include such a territorial increase as would guarantee to Poland a boundary appropriate from the standpoint of security as well as an area which would be a compact unit from the standpoint of economy and defense of the state. In our plan we drew up precisely such a boundary, based in the north on Swinemünde, which gives Stettin to Poland and runs along the Oder and the Neisse to the Czechoslovak border. 6 It is true that from the territorial standpoint the establishment of such a boundary would return to Poland less than what Poland has lost in the east, but from the economic standpoint it would guarantee better conditions for development. The total area of Poland would be reduced from 380,000 square kilometers to 309,000 square kilometers, i. e., by approximately 70,000 square kilometers. From the demographic standpoint the total population of Poland would decrease from 34 million to 26 million, but the new figure would represent a homogeneous Polish population. Secretary Eden : Are we to assume that all Germans have been expelled from Poland? President Bierut : Most of the Germans have fled from these former German territories; we should assume that the remaining German population does not want to move to areas which are inhabited strictly by Germans. According to our figures about 1 to 1½ million Germans still live there. Secretary Byrnes : How large is the Polish population which came under Russian rule? President Bierut : The areas to the east of the Curzon Line 7 are inhabited predominantly by a Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian population. There were about 4 million Poles in those areas. Most of these 4 million have probably already moved to Polish territory. With regard to the population, the important fact is that the average population density in Poland was 83 per square kilometer. The new boundaries which we propose would slightly increase the population density. If we take the prewar density of 83 persons, we would have to have an area of 314,000 square kilometers. Under the plan we would have only 310,000 square kilometers. Thus the population density would slightly increase, but the areas claimed are richer from the economic standpoint; they would therefore absorb the people and alleviate their lot so that the population would no longer need to emigrate. Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk adds: Either to America or to Germany. President Bierut : I wish to draw the attention of the High Commission 8 to the fact that a large part of the agricultural population has emigrated from that area every year. With regard to the agricultural population, the western territories which we have claimed depended mainly on the production of Polish labor, except that it was the Germans who benefited from it. I consider it unjust that the Polish population should supply the labor and that the Germans should obtain the fruits of this labor. Every year hundreds of thousands of our people migrated to these German areas. In order to present our arguments fully, I should like to ask the Chairman for permission to let my colleagues, Minister Rzymowski and Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk, testify also on this subject. Secretary Byrnes consents. Minister Rzymowski : In the Second World War the Polish state became the first victim of German imperialism. Poland remained under occupation for the longest period of time, and the conduct of the Germans, whose victims we became, shows that the basic purpose of their aggression was to undermine the national and economic existence of Poland. Poland was a country where the German occupation created many death camps so that the Polish population could be destroyed and our territory converted into Lebensraum for German settlement and colonization. When the German authorities came to Kraków, which is the metropolis of Polish learning and culture, they started by sending university professors to death camps on the assumption that the destruction of Polish culture would be the best start toward destroying the nation. Since the destruction of the Polish nation was one of the basic aims of German imperialism, I consider it to be just if the triumph over the Germans manifests itself through the revival of Poland as a strong state capable of further development. It would be an expression of historical justice to give Poland a territory which would represent a guarantee of her strength and development, a strength capable of resisting German aggression. In the interest of friendship with the Soviet Union and of peace in the east we have given up territory inhabited by 4 million Poles. It is necessary to find a place for these Poles in the new Poland. The population which had previously been forced to emigrate to other countries—to France or to Germany—must find room in the territory of postwar democratic Poland. There must be room for the natural increase in Polish population, which amounts to 250,000 people yearly. I consider it to be just that for the territory which Poland has renounced in the east Poland should receive in compensation those areas which for centuries have been the base of German imperialism. If we had to cede lands to the east of the Curzon Line, then I consider it to be fair that the Germans also cede those territories which have been the base for their aggression. This is in the interest of security and peace in Europe. I believe that a territory for Poland which will extend to the Curzon Line in the east and the Oder–Neisse Line in the west will represent a territory on which the Polish nation can satisfy its economic, demographic, and cultural needs and achieve an appropriate foundation for its security. In the interest of the security of Poland, as well as in the interest of the peace of the world, the Germans must be deprived of those territories which they have used as a base for their aggression. The Poland which will arise in the proposed territory will be a country without national minorities; it will be a state of one nationality, which means that it will acquire a most healthy and peaceful basis for its development. I consider our proposed boundaries to be modest and moderate in view of the fact that the territory of the new Poland will be smaller by 80,000 square kilometers, and I also believe that in this smaller territory the population will have all the conditions necessary for prosperous development because its social structure will change. The industry of Silesia, which under German rule worked on the production of weapons to conquer the world, under the government of the Polish state will work to satisfy the peaceful needs of a society which has heretofore been at a very low level of social development. Our right to Silesia is based on the fact that that part of the territory is inhabited by a Polish population. It suffices to remove the cloak of oppression to become convinced that the population there belongs to the Polish motherland. The boundary running along the Oder–Neisse Line is not an accidental boundary which we have drawn arbitrarily. It is an ancient boundary of a state which was the cradle of the Polish nation. In addition, the boundary along the Oder–Neisse Line is the shortest boundary possible between Poland and Germany. It is clear that the shortest boundary is at the same time the most secure one, the most favorable boundary from the standpoint of defense in case of renewed German aggression. The other borders of Poland consist of a seashore, which is a boundary of maximum security, and then of another boundary which is a frontier of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union, and also with Czechoslovakia. Therefore the only boundary which may create doubts as far as security is concerned is the Polish-German border. A boundary which is reduced to the shortest distance is the best guarantee for security against a new war. A long seashore and an industrial base in Silesia will provide the Polish state with a powerful lever for social and economic reconstruction. Before the war Poland was the only country in Europe which had such an unfavorably preponderant majority of rural population over urban population. The rural overpopulation, coupled with little urban development, was one of the basic reasons for the collapse of Poland. The approximately 4 million farm workers residing in rural areas represented a reservoir of unemployment in Poland. Cities could not absorb these farm workers. Therefore we consider the inclusion of Silesia up to the banks of the Neisse to be an economic necessity for Poland, because in that way we shall create an opportunity for the rural population to move into cities. The inclusion of Silesia is most closely connected with our postulate to acquire Stettin, because Stettin serves Silesian industry. Since Stettin serves Silesian industry, it should by the same token be in Polish hands. Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk : My views are the same as those of the previous speakers. In a few words I would like to raise two questions. We know that it is in the interest of all of us to prevent the Germans from causing another war. I see two sources of aggressive German imperialism: armaments, and profits which they derived from the fact that they were intermediaries between several nations. (1) One of the German military bases was precisely the territory which we are claiming for Poland. One of the basic raw materials was zinc. Out of the total production of 160,000 tons of zinc in Germany, 107,000 tons was produced in Silesia. I believe that it would be a good thing if those sources were not in German hands. There is also the question of coal. After the last World War, the Germans increased their exports of coal from 22% to 27% of the entire world export. The German exports increased by 5.1%, while the entire Polish exports amounted to only 6%. The transfer of this core of industry represents a source of world security. (2) Profits derived from acting as an intermediary: It must be taken into consideration that the value of German foreign trade in 1937 amounted to 926 million pounds sterling. If we take those figures, we see that the shipping of goods from Bohemia amounted to 2,300,000 tons; from Hungary, 400,000 tons; from Rumania, 500,000 tons; and from Yugoslavia, 200,000 tons—not to speak of the fact that Poland was also forced to ship its own products through Germany. Well, the shortest route for exports from those countries goes through Stettin. The Germans directed their exports through Hamburg. The exports from Poland would go through Stettin and would be under the control of a nation belonging to the United Nations. Now about the reasons why the Oder and its basin ought to be in Polish hands. Poland must also export on a large scale in order to compensate speedily for those losses which it suffered during the war and to provide employment for its population. One river system—the Vistula—is not sufficient. It would not be right if it could not be arranged for the Oder to be entirely in Polish hands. I recall the case of Danzig and how the blocking of the Vistula affected the Polish economy. Therefore I take the view that Stettin, not controlled by the Germans, ought to be completely under Polish control and in Polish hands. If we look at the problem more closely, we see that the Oder would not be such an easily navigable river if it were not for the supply of water which is concentrated below the Oder. In view of the fact that the supply of water is found between the Oder and the Lausitzer Neisse, if the Oder’s tributaries were controlled by someone else the river would be blocked. For that reason both problems are closely connected with each other. In summing up, we come to the conclusion that: (1) the sources of raw material for armaments should be taken away from the Germans; (2) the Germans should be deprived of the controlling position and the profits resulting from their acting as an intermediary. By transferring these affairs to Polish hands, we perform not only an act of security and justice with regard to Poland and an act of security with regard to all nations, but we also create a new economic system which will make Poland a great transit area both for the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, as well as for all those countries which benefited from it before the war. One more consideration with regard to the territorial basis of Poland: I should like to bring to your attention the fact that in spite of all, Germany, which lost the war, is losing less than Poland, because on a percentage basis Poland will be 20% smaller, while Germany will be only 18% smaller. As to the exchange of populations, I should like to say that it was the Germans who began to expel the population in adjacent areas and turn them into slaves, while we intend to gather Poles who have resided in German territory. I believe that the whole world will agree to such a settlement. Therefore in closing I should like to ask for a speedy and full decision, because it is necessary for us to repatriate our population both from the Soviet Union and from other territories of Europe to which the war has forced them to move. A rapid reconstruction of our state depends on that. Secretary of State Byrnes : According to the decisions of the Crimean Conference, we were to consult the Polish Provisional Government with regard to the problem of the western boundary of Poland. However, the peace conference should decide on the size of the territory which will go to Poland. After it has expressed its views, the Polish Government will have to wait for the final delimitation of the western boundary. The Foreign Ministers were very pleased to hear the opinion of the Polish Government on the subject, and your arguments will be submitted to the Tripartite Conference 9 for consideration. (A brief discussion follows concerning the possibility of having a fourth delegate of the Polish Government make a statement. President Bierut mentions Professor Grabski, and Minister Molotov supports the desire of the Polish Delegation. Secretary Byrnes makes a reservation, saying that according to his understanding only three delegates were supposed to speak, and he adds:) If President Bierut desires to submit additional arguments to support his views, then please formulate them in writing and I assure you that your arguments will be considered most carefully. Minister Molotov : The position of the Soviet Union in this matter is a special one. The Crimean Conference examined the problems of both the Polish eastern boundary and the western boundary. As far as the eastern boundary is concerned, the problem refers to Soviet-Polish relations and it has been settled. As far as the Polish western boundary is concerned, we have heard here the arguments of the Polish Government and we want to give the Polish delegates an opportunity to present fully their arguments. Secretary Byrnes : I have no objection to our meeting again, so that you can have the opportunity to discuss the problem again. Minister Molotov : I believe that the problem of the Polish boundaries is one of historical importance. It has enormous historical significance not only for Poland and its neighbors but also for all Europe. The settlement of the Polish eastern boundary at the Crimean Conference was the result of an agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union as neighbors. Poland transferred to us the western part of the Ukraine and White Russia. For that reason we feel that we have special obligations toward Poland with regard to its western boundary. I do not say here anything that is new either to the representatives of England, the United States, or Poland. I feel obligated to support the Polish demands, because I believe that it is a question of justice. The Soviet Union considers the efforts of Poland to transfer its boundary to the Oder, including Stettin, and to the Neisse to be justified and timely. On the basis of justice Germany should lose the territory in favor of Poland. I consider such a solution to be in the interest of Europe and of the whole world. In international relations it means checking German aggression. It also means a revival of the Polish nation. A revived Poland will be again a pillar of peace in Europe. Germany will be weakened and Poland will become stronger not only in the present but also in the future. All Poles will be grouped together in one state. The Poland—a truly democratic Poland—which will be revived within these boundaries will be a homogeneous state from the economic and social point of view. Therefore the Soviet Delegation hopes that the Polish plan will meet with understanding. ( Minister Molotov stresses again the fact that the position of the Soviet Union is a special one, because it is Poland’s neighbor, and because in addition it has special obligations with regard to Poland.) Secretary Byrnes : The United States is not Poland’s neighbor, to be sure, but the United States of America has always been Poland’s great friend. Secretary Eden : And England entered this war to defend Poland. 2 Cf. ante , pp. 332–336 [ Pgs. 332–336 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] . 3 See document No. 1147 . 4 See document No. 1417 , section vi . 5 See vol. i , document No. 493 . 6 See vol. i , document No. 517 See also the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] in this volume. 7 For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , pp. 793 – 794 . See also the map facing p. 748 in vol. i . 8 i. e., the Foreign Ministers. 9 i. e., the Heads of Government. No. 1386 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Mikołajczyk Papers No. 1386 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) 1 Babelsberg, July 25, 1945 [Translation] Economic Conference With the American Delegation ( Messrs. Clayton, Collado, Murphy, Despres, and Dunn on the American Side; Mikołajczyk, Rzymowski, and Modzelewski on Our Side ) Held on July 25, 1945, at Babelsberg Mr. Clayton informs us that, on the basis of a telegram received from Mr. Harriman, 2 he has made arrangements for 1,000 military-motor vehicles to be sent to us, and that by now they are probably on the way. 3 Mr. Murphy states that in addition we shall get six sedans. In reply to a question asked by Mr. Clayton, the United States Representative to UNRRA, as to whether the UNRRA delegation had already arrived in Poland and whether we had received any UNRRA deliveries, Mr. Gomułka replies and stresses the problem of increased UNRRA deliveries which are necessary for Poland, particularly the problem of fats and oils. We shall need help for some time to come, and Mr. Gomułka points out that livestock has been destroyed, and he gives the approximate figures. Mr. Clayton is particularly interested in the question of how long we shall need help from UNRRA and whether we have enough flour to feed the population. Mr. Gomułka states that with regard to grains we shall not feel any shortages unless the crops do not turn out in the future as expected, and he stresses again the problem of fats and oils. Mr. Clayton answers that the shortage of fats and oils is felt everywhere in the world, even in the United States, where the supply is about 10% short. Then he asks whether we applied for a loan from the United States for needed reconstruction of the country, as was done by Norway and Denmark. The United States expects a large number of such applications in the very near future. The United States Government wants to orient itself with regard to the total world requirements for loans for reconstruction so that it may grant credits in the proper ratio. Therefore he asks whether the Polish Government has prepared any figures on losses and on credit requirements. Mr. Gomułka answers that we do not yet have any exact figures, but that the damages amount roughly to 20 billion in gold. First comes the problem of the reconstruction of ports. Mr. Gomułka asks about the technicalities involved in getting a loan (applications, banks, etc.). Mr. Clayton explains that the loan will be granted by the United States Export–Import Bank. The Bretton Woods International Bank 4 is still being organized and presumably will not begin to function for about a year. Mr. Mikołajczyk brings up the question of designating a representative of the Polish Government to UNRRA. Heretofore the representative has been Mr. Kwapiński, who acted on behalf of the émigré London Government and who has now been recalled. Mr. Dunn asks that a mission be designated to act on behalf of the Government of National Unity and that the names be given at Potsdam or through the American Ambassador at Warsaw. 5 Mr. Mikołajczyk then brings up the problem of livestock in Poland, which was decimated by the occupation forces. This problem is connected with the question of fats and oils. If we do not get a sufficient amount of fats and oils from UNRRA, we shall be forced to reduce still further the already depleted livestock, which will have catastrophic consequences for agriculture. It would be desirable to obtain a certain number of cattle for breeding purposes from the United States. Mr. Clayton explains that at this time there are not many cattle in the United States either, but that they could sell us a small number of breeding cattle. (In Washington beef can be obtained only once a month.) Mr. Gomułka asks under what conditions and in what amount we could get a reconstruction loan from the Export–Import Bank. Mr. Clayton points out that he would have to know what goods we need. Mr. Gomułka mentions material for the reconstruction of ports, and in the first place for the reconstruction of highways and railroads. In answer to a question by Mr. Harriman, as to how many automobiles we have now, Mr. Gomułka states that the number is ridiculously small (10,000, including motorcycles, and even this small number of machines is in a deplorable condition and in constant need of repair). Mr. Clayton asks whether we have sufficient production of steel to rebuild bridges, docks, etc. Mr. Gomułka states that for our present opportunities our production is sufficient, but that our internal production will not cover the needs when the reconstruction of Poland proceeds farther. Mr. Mikołajczyk points out the increasing needs in the future in connection with the reconstruction of Warsaw, and Mr. Modzelewski stresses the shortages of metallurgical establishments, rolling mills, etc. Mr. Harriman is interested in our figures for the production of steel, particularly in the western areas which we have claimed. Mr. Clayton inquires whether we shall need technical assistance for reconstruction, such as technicians, engineers, etc. Mr. Gomułka thinks that we shall be informed as to the situation in this respect only after the return of our émigrés and our technicians from abroad, where we have a large number of them. He estimates in general, however, that we shall need that kind of assistance. Mr. Gomułka states, in answer to a suggestion by Mr. Harriman, that with regard to agricultural machinery we shall need primarily tractors and combines. Mr. Clayton inquires then about the technical condition of our textile production, particularly in Łódź. Mr. Gomułka explains that the textile industry in Poland is not in bad shape and that it works, but that we shall need machinery in the future. In answer to a question by Mr. Harriman about raw material, Mr. Gomułka states that we shall import cotton from the Soviet Union, with which we have suitable agreements, 6 but that obviously possible deliveries of that raw material from the United States can be the subject of a commercial agreement between Poland and the United States. As to the entire textile industry, Mr. Gomułka points out that we have received a large number of German plants, so that our total textile production will exceed the prewar figures. Mr. Clayton asks us to prepare a memorandum in which we would specify what kind of goods we need from the United States. The first part of the memorandum should indicate items which are most urgently needed, i. e., needed in the course of the first year (1946), and the second part should indicate goods necessary for later objectives. Mr. Clayton also advises us to assign to our future Embassy at Washington an experienced specialist in economic affairs who would be well acquainted with the economic and present needs of our country. At the beginning it should be only one person attached to the Embassy and only later on, when the relations between the two countries have developed, should it be a special economic mission. 1 Cf. ante , p. 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] . 2 Document No. 522, printed in vol. i . 3 Cf. document No. 1156 . 4 i. e., the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which had its origin in proposals formulated at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944. 5 Arthur Bliss Lane. 6 See ante , p. 406, footnote 3 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] . No. 1387 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Mikołajczyk Papers No. 1387 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) 1 July 26, 1945 [Translation] Notes of a Discussion With Mr. Harriman on July 26, 1945 Persons present: from the American side—Ambassador Harriman and his secretary; 2 from the Polish side—Professor Grabski, Messrs. Gomułka, Modzelewski, Mikołajcyzk, and interpreter Żebrowski. Mr. Harriman takes the floor and asks for a short time to speak because of a meeting which is to follow, and he asks that his talk be considered confidential. As we know, the Americans now have to feed about 7 million people. At the same time, one of the most terrible wars is being waged 7,000 miles from home in the Pacific. They are aware of the fact that they will have to help Europe. Those 7 million people are mostly Germans in the American occupation zone—prisoners of war and also people of various nationalities who are in their occupation zone. The … American nation does not wish to allow any people in the world to starve in time of peace. In making their territorial claims the Poles broached a controversial issue concerning food and raw materials needed by European nations. The territories occupied by the Soviet Union in Germany and the territories claimed by Poland were a source of food supplies for the rest of the German population. There is a shortage of coal in the world. Russia has a coal shortage as well as a food shortage. France, Belgium, and the Netherlands also experience such shortages. Polish Silesia used to supply coal to Berlin. Italy is short of coal, and in such circumstances the United States has to export 7 million tons of coal annually, although its production is not sufficient for domestic needs. England cannot export coal if it is to maintain its present level of industrial production, but it does export coal at present. At this time of controversy over raw materials and food, the Poles announce their claims with regard to sources of supply for food, coal, zinc, and similar raw materials. They announce their claim to a territory formerly inhabited by 8 to 9 million Germans. The Czechs announced their claim with regard to the expulsion of 2 million Germans, the Hungarians of half a million.… At present Messrs. Harriman, Matthews, and Clayton are having their own private discussions with President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes in order to formulate the position of the American Delegation with regard to the Polish problem. He also knows that similar discussions concerning the Polish problem are going on within the British Delegation. The problem must be settled somehow at the meeting of the Three. One thing has already been settled positively so far, namely, that all of the Three Powers will actively help in the repatriation of the Poles from the west. From the legal point of view, the problem of boundaries must wait until the end of the war.… But the problem of a legal settlement of the situation at a peace conference is one thing, and the problem of establishing a Polish administration in the western territories and of securing the harvest and organizing industrial production is something else. The Russians cannot do it; it has to be done by the Poles. If they are to do it and start production on a large scale, they must repatriate their population from areas behind the Curzon Line and from the west. Yesterday’s conference, 3 however, showed clearly that until the next harvest Poland cannot export food, yet it has to export raw materials such as coal, zinc, etc., to meet the needs of other countries, and obviously for payment.… Mr. Harriman then expresses thanks for the invitation proffered on behalf of the Government to visit the western territories of Poland and promises to make this visit after the Conference, not only as an ambassador but also as a friend of Poland. In closing, I said to Mr. Harriman, half jokingly, that Poland should not take a beating because of a quarrel between the Allies concerning food. With regard to that problem the interests of Poland must be preserved above all. 1 Cf. ante , p. 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] . 2 Not identified. 3 See ante , p. 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , and document No. 1386 . No. 1388 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Mikołajczyk Papers No. 1388 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) July 27, 1945 [Translation] Memorandum on Marshal Stalin’s Reception of July 27, 1945 Present: Generalissimo Stalin, Molotov, Beriya, Vyshinsky, Marshal Rokossovsky, Konev, Chief of Staff Antonov, the Navy Chief, 1 and Zhukov. On the Polish side: Bierut, Osóbka-Morawski, Grabski, Gomułka, Rzymowski, Modzelewski, Mikołajczyk, and [Rola-]Żymierski. Molotov proposed a toast to President Bierut, then to Osóbka-Morawski, and then to Mikołajczyk. In his lengthy speech he repeated and clarified the argumentation contained in his speech before the Committee of Three 2 in Berlin on July 24, 1945. Replies were made in the following order: Bierut toasted Marshal Stalin; Morawski toasted Molotov; Mikołajczyk stated that his speech before the Committee of Three 3 was based on his deep conviction that the Germans must be deprived of the economic base for their armaments industry and of the possibility of making profits on the work of other nations. The industrial complexes of Silesia must no longer be the base for German armaments, and the waterways system of the Oder, which allowed the Germans to reap profits from the transit trade and which is not necessary for the economy of Germany, must remain in the hands of a free, independent, and sovereign Poland. This waterways system must not be blocked either by the German ownership of Stettin or by German control of the navigation system of the Lausitzer Neisse, which regulates the navigability and the water level of the Oder. This waterways system of the Oder in Polish hands will also be used for transportation by other Slavic nations and Soviet Russia, in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence between Poland and Soviet Russia. He then toasted the peaceful collaboration of the two nations, thanking Molotov for his support of the Polish position in the Committee of Three, and then he also toasted Marshal Stalin. Following this, Molotov toasted Grabski in a lengthy speech. Grabski replied and spoke of the Slavic nations, which will cooperate no longer on the basis of the old Czarist pan-Slavism, but as free, independent, and sovereign nations under Stalin’s leadership. Marshal Stalin in his answer used particularly warm words regarding Mikołajczyk and stated that he agreed with Professor Grabski on one point—Slavs cannot accept any leadership from above and therefore their cooperation must be based on full sovereignty and independence. That is why cooperation can be only among equals, and he personally is not qualified to be a leader of the Slavic nations. After more toasts and speeches, Marshal Stalin rose and left the room; a moment later a Chopin mazurka was heard from a record to which Stalin listens very often. After supper, with black coffee, there was more music by two male and two female Soviet artists, again beginning with Chopin melodies. Late at night, before the end of the reception and after a considerable amount of champagne, Marshal Stalin turned to Mikołajczyk and said: “I know that you still have doubts and do not believe that we sincerely want to see the Polish people strong, free, independent, and truly sovereign. You will see, after we have worked longer together; you will become convinced as to our intentions.” “They are sincere,” answered Mikołajczyk , “because doubtless all the Poles are also guided by their feelings but perhaps less so than others, as they depend more on realism and political sense, and therefore they have no doubt that one of the foundations of future peace and the existence of the Polish state must be cooperation between Poland and Soviet Russia. This opinion is one which they will always express regardless of the conditions under which they will be working, whether they be on top or in a position with little influence. This the more so since the situation is made more difficult in many cases by the actions of some Soviet people in subordinate positions. I do not doubt, Mr. Marshal, that you will do everything necessary to eliminate such difficulties.” Then, in the presence of Bierut, Morawski, and Gomułka, he spoke of the necessity of cooperation within the framework of the coalition. Osóbka spoke of the need for closer coordination in cooperation; this was interrupted by The Marshal , who said that the point is to keep up the coalition, but that differences of opinion within the coalition are unavoidable—they will recur and must keep recurring, because each political party will attempt to broaden its influence, which is something which they all are entitled to do.… The election returns in England were also discussed. Mikołajczyk expressed the opinion that the Labor Party did not expect its victory nor did the Conservatives expect their defeat. He is of the opinion that the main lines of foreign policy will not change, although the attitude toward Germany might become somewhat more lenient in accordance with the principle expressed by the Labor Party that the German nation, and in particular German workers, cannot be held responsible for the actions of Hitlerism. Marshal Stalin evaluated the result of the elections as follows: The English people took a clear position for peace. The Japanese war is a burden for them, and, as they did not trust the Conservatives to carry out the social reforms which have been promised, they gave their votes to Labor. In so far as policies are concerned, he agrees that there might be a more lenient attitude toward the Germans under British occupation. Churchill did not trust us and in consequence we could not fully trust him either. The reception ended late at night. 1 The reference is probably to Admiral Kucherov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Navy. 2 See ante , pp. 331–332 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 1524 [ Pg. 1524 is part of Doc. 1385 ] . 3 See ante , pp. 334–335 [ Pgs. 334–335 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] ] , 1522–1523 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 1385 ] . No. 1389 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Mikołajczyk Papers No. 1389 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) 1 July 28, 1945 [Translation] Economic Conference With the American Delegation Held on July 28, 1945 (Present on our side: Messrs. Mikołajczyk, Mine, Modzelewski, Rajchman; on the American side: Clayton, Harriman, Bergson, and two experts. 2 ) Minister Minc proposes to present a brief exposition for orientation purposes about our economy. Agriculture: With regard to grain, we shall manage to make ends meet this year, however difficult it may be. On the other hand, the question of livestock presents very serious difficulties. The number of cattle was reduced to 25% as compared with the prewar period; the number of horses is even below 20% of the prewar figures. As to food, we should expect a certain unsteady balance in the supply of grain. We have a catastrophic deficit in the supply of meat and fats. We shall have a certain small surplus of potatoes and sugar. That is the situation in the entire area which is actually under Polish administrative control. With regard to forests, we have suffered serious losses. It was principally the Germans, and partly also armies in transit, who depleted the forests to such an extent that for 16 years we shall not be able to do any substantial lumbering. Mr. Harriman points out that the armies had to build bridges. Then he asks about the situation in Poland before the war with regard to lumber. Minister Minc explains that Poland exported lumber, and now it will have to import it to cover the requirements of the reconstruction of the country. We shall have considerable difficulties in rural reconstruction; there is a shortage of industrial wood, beams for mining, and cellulose for the manufacture of paper and artificial fibers. This picture represents the prospects for one year. It is to be assumed that there will be a balance in the supply of grains in the following year, but the problem of meat and fats is going to be a protracted affair. Industry : We are reaching 50% of the prewar production within old boundaries. As far as coal is concerned, the daily production amounts to 81,000 tons according to data received in the past two days. That is the production in the entire area, including the western territories, with the exception of the Waldenburg coal basin, where the production amounts to from 7,000 to 8,000 tons daily. The production figures for German Silesia are: February—40,500 tons; March—92,000; April—123,000; May—258,000; June—473,000. The number of workers in that territory was: February—3,900; March—6,900; April—20,000; May—21,000; June—25,500. I point out that all workers employed there are Poles. In December we expect a monthly production of 3,750,000 tons, so that the monthly average for the five-month period up to December will be around 3 million. During those five months we expect a total production of 15 million tons. Mr. Clayton asks whether it will be possible to export any of that amount. Mr. Minc explains: During those five months Poland will need 6,250,000 tons. To cover export contracts to all countries, i. e., to Russia, Sweden, and those countries with which we are negotiating (Denmark, Finland, Rumania, and Norway), we shall need 5,500,000 tons. If we add the domestic requirements to the export obligations, we get the figure of 11,750,000 tons. That figure is incomplete, because it does not include reserves, which amount to 1,500,000 tons. The total coal balance sheet is therefore 16,500,000 less the requirements of 11,750,000. Our coal production is limited by (1) insufficient food supply for the miners and the resulting difficulties in hiring labor; (2) shortage of young people in the coal-mining industry (the average age of coal miners is over 45 years); and (3) transportation, shortage of freight cars and locomotives, shortage of motor vehicles, which is felt even more acutely because of the shortage of horses that were used before the war. Mr. Clayton , in connection with the age of coal miners, asks about the decrease in productivity. Mr. Minc says that, in spite of all, productivity is increasing. In previous months it was 0.4, and in the first ten days of June it was 0.84. These figures do not represent the actual productivity, because the productivity below surface is not very different from the prewar productivity. It is due to the disproportion in individual qualifications between miners working on the surface and those working in the mines. The 4 to 5 million tons which we have available for export can be used only if we get additional transportation. At present the supply must be considered available only at the mines. Mr. Clayton asks what the price of coal would be f. o. b. Gdynia or Danzig in dollars. Mr. Minc : On the basis of Swedish contracts, $8.42 per ton. Mr. Clayton asks whether the decrease in the productivity of the miners affects the quality of the coal. Mr. Minc replies to this that the grading of the coal is very accurate. Mr. Harriman asks whether the widening of railroad tracks makes transportation more difficult. Mr. Minc says that, on the contrary, it makes it easier. The broad-gauge Breslau–Katowice–Kraków railroad line can transport coal to Russia on wide Russian freight cars. On the other hand, railroad lines running to the seashore have normal gauge. The broad-gauge line which was revamped by the Russians has lines of both gauges, and it can be easily shifted to normal gauge. Since we have only a few freight cars of our own, and the wide freight cars can carry more, we find ourselves in the paradoxical situation where we are in no hurry to rebuild the tracks and return to the normal gauge. Mr. Clayton asks whether the present condition of the Polish transportation system warrants a discussion about exporting the surplus of coal. Mr. Minc explains that the railroad lines do warrant it, but that the railroad rolling stock does not. Mr. Clayton expresses his doubts as to whether the situation will permit an increase in coal production. Mr. Minc points out that if we cannot export the surplus coal because of the lack of transportation, then we can use it in Poland in view of the fact that the internal consumption figures were determined rather modestly, and that we can use it especially for industrial purposes. Transportation for internal purposes should be sufficient, since the distances are short and industrial establishments are located within a radius of 150 to 200 kilometers. Mr. Harriman : Are the port installations for loading coal in Gdynia and in Danzig in good condition? Mr. Minc : The loading capacity before the war was 40,000 tons daily. Today it has decreased to 4,000 tons in both ports. We expect, however, that it will increase to from 16,000 to 17,000 tons by the middle of August. At present our cranes are destroyed, and not all power plants are working. The situation would improve considerably if the number of our ports were increased. Stettin is important, especially since the ports of Gleiwitz and Cosel are now active. We have more barges than before the war. There is also the port of Elbing, which can load from 10,000 to 15,000 tons daily provided we make minor investments. But Elbing can be used only for cabotage to Riga, Tallin, possibly to Denmark, to the Soviet Union, and to ports in southern Sweden during certain seasons of the year. The port of Elbing is rather shallow. Mr. Harriman : How many freight cars would Poland need to export the 5 million surplus [tons]? Is it true that Poland is to receive freight cars from Sweden? Mr. Minc : We are to receive 1,600 freight cars of 20-ton capacity. Whether we need freight cars for transportation depends on the destination. Mr. Clayton : To the nearest port. Mr. Minc : Have you considered transporting coal by railroad through western Europe? Mr. Clayton : Unfortunately, nobody in Europe has a sufficient number of freight cars today. Mr. Minc : Given the present condition of the railroads, we would have to figure 7 days to Danzig one way, which means 14 days both ways—in other words, 14,000 to 16,000 freight cars. If we calculated the figures through the whole year, we could reduce them by some 20%, because then we could organize the railroad transportation appropriately. I also point out that with regard to transportation to the west by railroad we are limited only by the number of freight cars, while with regard to ports we have to take into consideration the loading capacity of the ports, not counting the tonnage of the ships. Mr. Harriman : Do you have enough locomotives? Could you get more locomotives and freight cars from Sweden? Mr. Minc : Sweden says that we cannot. Mr. Bergson : Are there freight cars from Germany in the rolling stock used in Poland? Mr. Minc : Only in transit to Russia. We do not have any such freight cars. Mr. Harriman : How many of your freight cars are damaged? Mr. Minc : We have a certain percentage of incapacitated freight cars. The proportion is not much higher than before the war. The trouble is that we do not have the means to make repairs. Mr. Clayton : How much coal could Poland produce in 1946 if it had means of transportation at its disposal? Mr. Minc : The total production would be around 5 million tons a month. Of that total we could export from 2½ to 3 million. Mr. Clayton : That would be 30,000 [ 30 million ] yearly. Mr. Minc : At least. Mr. Clayton : Quite a considerable amount for export. Mr. Minc : We say in Poland that coal is our foreign exchange. Mr. Clayton1 : Is coal perhaps the most important item of Polish export? Mr. Minc : It is the first item, but not the only one. Other important items are zinc and cement. In June we produced 21,000 tons of zinc ore, 3,501 tons of zinc concentrate, and 4,300 tons of zinc. These figures represent 35% of our capacity, and they apply to the Polish territory as of 1939. With regard to the new territories, zinc is found only on the very border, and the quantity is small. From August 1945 through December 1946 we shall have 40,000 tons of refined zinc according to estimates of our export capacity. In addition we have a rare metal—cadmium. In the same period, between August 1945 and December 1946, we shall have at our disposal for export purposes 200 to 300 tons of cadmium, 7 million tons of coke, 350,000 tons of cement, 160,000 tons of steel and iron (the total production of steel and iron within the boundaries of the old Poland amounts to 40,000 tons a month). The production capacity of Upper Silesia before the war was 100,000 tons a month. Mr. Harriman : Is the synthetic rubber industry greatly damaged? Mr. Minc : It is destroyed in Silesia. In Poland it did not exist at all. Mr. Bergson : Has Poland yet sold any steel and iron? Mr. Minc : I am not informed as to how much has been sold. Other export items are: glass panes for windows, ½ million meters; soda, 50,000 tons. Then there are various small items, which together can bring in a large amount of money, but it would take a long time to discuss them. Mr. Harriman : How is your textile industry? Mr. Minc : In December the industry worked at full capacity of the looms. Mr. Clayton : What about the raw material? Mr. Minc : Our supply is secure. The Soviet Union has a large quantity of cotton. On the other hand, we are very short of wool. The output of the looms represents about 60% of the prewar production. The Germans destroyed the textile industry to a great extent. Mr. Clayton1 : I am amazed that you can import cotton from Russia, because Russia itself had to import cotton before the war. Mr. Minc : The Soviet Union imported a certain amount of cotton before the war, but they did not use up the cotton during the war. Mr. Harriman : They received a large amount of ready-made clothing through lend-lease. And how is the problem of footwear in Poland? Mr. Minc : That is the darkest spot in the picture of our industry. We do not have leather and we do not have tannin. Our tanneries are undamaged and we have a labor force, but because of the shortage of raw material we have the largest deficit in this respect. I can see clearly today how to provide clothing for the people in Poland, but I do not know how to get footwear for them. We do not have rubber to use as a substitute. In some cases it affects us very painfully. In industry, where shoes wear out fast—for example, in coal mining and in those industries where acids are used in production—workers go around half barefooted. Mr. Clayton refers to our requirements as regards farm machinery, factory equipment, trucks, etc., as well as raw material. Mr. Minc reads an import program for the period from August 1945 to December 1946, not including UNRRA or long-term investments, and not specifying from which country the material is to be imported: The approximate value of imports will be 380 million dollars (not including long-term investments on credit). The problem is to maintain current production and to satisfy the elementary needs of the economy and reconstruction. Rubber 8,000 tons Transmission belts 60 tons Automobile tires and other tires 5,500 tons Wool 20,000 tons Woolen rags 15,000 tons Cotton 60,000 to 70,000 tons Scrap iron 300,000 tons Copper 30,000 tons Aluminum 2,500 tons Nickel 1,000 tons Gasoline 100,000 tons Foodstuffs: Meat—100,000 tons; fish—50,000 tons; butter—20,000 tons; lard—[blank]; fat back—20,000 tons As for machinery, we must import steam boilers and parts, combustion motors, motorcycle and automobile engines, traction engines, water and steam turbines, pumps and springs, hydraulic presses, ventilators, wood lathes and metal lathes, moulding machines for foundries, textile machinery, sewing machines, road steam-rollers, excavators, and crushing machines, in a total amount of from 30 to 35 million dollars. River boats, dredges, and barges, and tugboats (not including seagoing vessels) in the sum of 10 to 15 million dollars. Potassium salts, 750,000 tons. Agricultural implements in the sum of from 10 to 15 million dollars, including tractors, of which we shall need about 5,000. The imports indicated above represent the most indispensable needs, which should be covered by normal foreign trade, through our exports and credit in goods. Mr. Minc , in answer to Mr. Harriman, explains that we shall have difficulties with regard to lumber for only eight or nine months and that in spite of these difficulties we intend to cover our needs through local production. We have made important experiments in that respect by replacing wood with cement, for example, in the production of railroad ties. Mr. Clayton : Has not a large part of Polish exports been earmarked for the Soviet Union? Mr. Minc : Our agreement with the Soviet Union 3 is effective until January 1, 1946. As to the coal for export, the figure which I gave is free of any obligations. Mr. Clayton : I do not see here capital investments for the construction of plants, railroads, ports, water-supply systems, sewage systems, etc. Mr. Minc : Our foreign relations in the field of economics are divided into three parts: (1) trade; (2) assistance; (3) credit. I speak only about trade and credit. Mr. Bergson : How much of the figure of 380 million dollars is to be covered by exports? Mr. Minc : About 50%, and the rest by credits for about five years. Mr. Clayton : And should the long-term credit cover only investments? Mr. Minc : With regard to the normal trade turnover, we expect that the exports will increase, mainly with regard to coal and textiles. On the other hand, we figure that credit for reconstruction will be considerably higher. Furthermore, we have every reason to expect reparations. Mr. Harriman : I suppose that after these 18 months the imports will decrease and the exports will increase. Mr. Minc : Our imports will not decrease, but they will be covered by our exports in a higher proportion. 1 Cf. ante , p. 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] . 2 Collado and Despres. See ante , p. 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] . 3 See ante , p. 406, footnote 3 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] . No. 1390 Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Mikołajczyk Papers No. 1390 Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) [Translation] [ Babelsberg , July 28, 1945.] … The rest of the group 1 was at a conference with the Soviet authorities. It was decided that all dismantling of industrial enterprises must be stopped, and that the dismantling of 123 enterprises must be ended before August 7 according to the enclosed plan. 2 All other dismantling is to be considered illegal. One hundred fifteen thousand railroad cars are to be set aside from the rolling stock as Polish cars and the property of the Polish Government. This number included around 18,000 disabled cars. Out of 50,000 loaded cars which are blocking traffic, 20,000 are to be unloaded and the rest taken out before September 15. 1 The reference is apparently to the members of the Polish Delegation other than Mikołajczyk. 2 Not found. No. 1391 Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Mikołajczyk Papers No. 1391 Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) [Translation] [ Babelsberg , July 29, 1945.] In the evening Mr. Bierut was invited to see Marshal Stalin, 1 who informed him that the Americans had presented their boundary proposal based on the Lower Neisse 2 and the line of the Oder, including Stettin. 3 Marshal Stalin asked whether, in view of the fact that the Americans had gone farther, the Polish side would not agree to certain concessions, e. g., the line of the Queiss [ Kwisa ] instead of the Lausitzer Neisse. After consultations with experts it was decided that we should possibly agree, not to the Lower Neisse, but only with regard to the watershed line between the Queiss and the Lausitzer Neisse. That would deprive us of some water installations but would not affect the industry of Silesia. 1 Stalin was indisposed and had not been able to attend a plenary meeting of the Berlin Conference on July 29. 2 i. e., the Glatzer Neisse. 3 See document No. 1151 . See also the map facing p. 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , ante . No. 1392 Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Mikołajczyk Papers No. 1392 Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg , July 30, 1945.] A Polish-American conference was held at the headquarters of the Polish Delegation 2 concerning a transaction with regard to 2,500 tons of coal to be delivered to the American occupation sector in Berlin. The transaction was based on a payment in dollars, but the Polish side retained the right to accept oil or gasoline in payment for the supply of coal. The Americans would provide railroad freight cars for the coal and would send them to the place of loading. 1 Cf. ante , p. 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] . 2 At 10 Domgasse, Babelsberg. See Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed , p. 130. No. 1393 Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Mikołajczyk Papers No. 1393 Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) 1 [Translation] [ Babelsberg , July 31, 1945.] Mr. Harriman called in the afternoon. 2 On behalf of President Truman, as chairman of the meeting of the Big Three which began at 4 o’clock, he invited the Polish Delegation to see President Truman the next day, when the latter would communicate the results of the meeting today.… 1 Cf. ante , p. 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)] ] . 2 From the discussion which took place toward the end of the Eleventh Plenary Meeting on July 31, it would appear that Harriman probably paid his call on the Polish Delegation following the adjournment of that meeting at 7:15 p.m. Cf. ante , pp. 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . No. 1394 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) Mikołajczyk Papers No. 1394 Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister ( Mikołajczyk ) 1 August 1, 1945 [Translation] Notes of a Discussion With President Truman on August 1, 1945, in Babelsberg Present on the American side: Truman, Byrnes, Bohlen, and Harriman. On the Polish side: Bierut, Mikołajczyk, Grabski, Modzelewski, and interpreter Żebrowski. President Truman opens the session. He states that on behalf of the three Great Powers he wishes to inform us of the following: The territorial boundaries have been established 2 in accordance with the Polish proposal, 3 and the Polish Government is responsible for the administration within these boundaries. The Russians have agreed to withdraw their armies from these territories, and will retain only two lines of communication for transit across Poland. (In answer to my question, Bohlen stated that one of these lines is the Kraków–Lwów line; the other one is in the north.) We have acknowledged the fact that representative Poles from Poland and from abroad had agreed to the formation of a Provisional Government of National Unity. We had recognized that Government and therefore we were able now to hear its views. After hearing its views, we were able to make a unanimous decision which we are now communicating to you. As a result, the Arciszewski Government has ceased to exist and the two states—Great Britain and the United States—undertake to do everything in their power in order to protect Polish property abroad, to make it impossible to transfer or sell such property, and to help recover it. All of the Three Powers promise every assistance to help Poles and the Polish Army in returning to Poland from abroad. In this connection they express their conviction that all Poles who return will be treated on the same terms as apply to all other Polish citizens. Having heard the statement of the President and of the Government concerning obligations under the resolutions of the Crimean Conference to hold elections as soon as possible, as well as the statement that the foreign press shall have free access to Poland, we were able to make unanimous decisions. Mr. Bierut thanks the President for both the decisions and the assistance. President Truman stresses the fact that he speaks on behalf of the three Great Powers and can accept thanks only in that capacity. In parting I approached Truman and told him that only now was I free to thank him as the President of the United States. President Truman answered, “Thank you; we did it out of friendship toward Poland”, and said that he himself was greatly interested in Poland … and that he hoped that Poland would be free and happy. Then there was a brief conversation with Harriman , who stressed once more the necessity of keeping secret the decision announced by President Truman until the Communiqué 4 had been published. He then pointed out that as a result of the statements made by Mr. Bierut and of discussions between Mr. Mikołajczyk and himself, Dunn, Bohlen, and Matthews, the American Delegation had been able to propose the final text, which had been approved unanimously by the Three Powers, and the decision is now that of the three Great Powers. Since Harriman expressed a desire to see me again, I suggested that he could pay me a farewell visit, which was arranged for 12:30. 5 A typed notation at the end of this memorandum indicates that it was accompanied by two enclosures in English and two in Polish. The two papers which follow the memorandum in the Mikołajczyk Papers are copies, in English, of documents Nos. 1152 and 1131 . (The copy of document No. 1131 in the Mikołajczyk Papers has the correct wording, “Allied press”, in the final sentence.) 1 Cf. ante , p. 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . 2 Mikołajczyk uses the word ustalone at this point. The actual agreement between the three Heads of Government, however, was that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement and that, pending the final determination of that frontier, Stettin and the areas east of the Oder–Neisse Line should be under the administration of the Polish State. For the final text of the tripartite agreement on Poland, see document No. 1383 , section ix ( viii ). Preliminary texts of that agreement (i.e., copies of documents Nos. 1152 and 1131 ) were apparently communicated to the Polish Delegation in writing at this meeting. See footnote 5, post . 3 See ante , pp. 332–336 [ Pgs. 332–336 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] and document No. 1385 . 4 Document No. 1384 . 5 See ante , p. 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] . B. French reaction to decisions of the Berlin Conference B. French reaction to decisions of the Berlin Conference [1395] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) Paris, July 31, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [1396] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) Paris, July 31, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 [1397] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) Paris, August 1, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–145 [1398] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) Paris, August 1, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–145 [1399] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) [Paris, August 1, 1945.] 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–145 [1400] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) Paris, August 1, 1945. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–145 [1401] The French Chargé (Lacoste) to the Acting Secretary of State Washington, August 6, 1945. 740.0011 PW/8–645 [1402] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State Paris, August 6, 1945—4 p.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–645: Telegram [1403] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State Paris, August 6, 1945—6 p.m. 740. 00116 E. W./8–645: Telegram [1404] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State Paris, August 7, 1945—2 p.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1405] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State Paris, August 7, 1945—10 p.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1406] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 7, 1945—midnight. 710.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1407] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 7, 1945—midnight. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1408] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 7, 1945—midnight. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1409] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 7, 1945—midnight. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1410] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 7, 1945—midnight. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1411] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 7, 1945—midnight. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram [1412] The French Ambassador (Bonnet) to the Secretary of State Washington, August 11, 1945. 740.00119 PW/8–1145 [1413] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery) Washington, August 15, 1945—2 p.m. 740.00119 Potsdam/8–1545: Telegram [1414] Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 23, 1945, 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. 740.00111 EW/8–2346 [1415] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Bonbright) [Washington,] September 4, 1945. 862.30/9–445 No. 1395 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 1395 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Bidault ) No. 533 Paris , July 31, 1945. Excellency : Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to transmit an invitation on behalf of my Government to the Government of France to participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers. Your Excellency will note that my Government attaches much importance to the participation of the French Government in the proposed arrangements and hopes to receive an early and favorable reply to this invitation. I avail myself [etc.] Jefferson Caffery [Enclosure] The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U. S. S. R. consider it necessary to begin without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, for submission to the United Nations. The Council would also be empowered to propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as member Governments might agree to refer to it. The text adopted by the Three Governments is as follows: [Here follows the text of the attachment to document No. 714 .] In agreement with the Governments of the United Kingdom and U. S. S. R. the United States Government extends a cordial invitation to the Government of France to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council. The United States Government attaches much importance to the participation of the French Government in the proposed arrangements and it hopes to receive an early and favorable reply to this invitation. The three governments also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal task by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the Inter Allied Control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Commission at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly, the three governments have agreed to recommend to the French government that the Commission might now be dissolved. No. 1396 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/7–3145 No. 1396 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Bidault ) secret No. 669 Paris , July 31, 1945. Excellency : Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to transmit a communication on behalf of my Government to the Government of France relating to political principles which the Government of the United States considers should govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. It is the earnest wish of my Government that the Government of France will be able to associate itself with these principles. Your Excellency will note that my Government will be grateful if the Government of France would treat the present communication as strictly secret until such time as an official statement is issued by the Conference. I avail myself [etc.] Jefferson Caffery [Enclosure] The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed upon the following political principles which they consider should govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period. It is their intention to communicate the text of these principles to the Commanders-in-Chief of their respective forces of occupation in Germany 1 after the conclusion of the present Conference and to instruct them to be guided by these principles in their action in their respective zones of occupation, and to concert with their colleagues on the Control Council in working out the application of these principles in such a way as to ensure the appropriate uniformity of action in zones of occupation. It is the earnest wish of the three Governments that the Provisional Government of the French Republic will be able to associate itself with these principles and to send similar instructions after the conclusion of the Conference to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces of Occupation. 2 The three Governments would be grateful if the French Provisional Government would treat the present communication as strictly secret until such a time as an official statement is issued by the Conference. Agreement on Political Principles To Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period [Here follows, with minor variations, the text of document No. 1383 , section II, paragraphs 1–10.] Paris , July 31, 1945. 1 Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. 2 General Joseph-Pierre Koenig. No. 1397 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–145 No. 1397 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Bidault ) secret No. 671 Paris , August 1, 1945. Excellency : Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to transmit herewith a communication on behalf of my Government to the Government of France relating to the transfer of German populations, or elements thereof, at present in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. I avail myself [etc.] Jefferson Caffery [Enclosure] “The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following agreement regarding the transfer of German populations to Germany: [Here follows, with minor variations, the text of document No. 1383 , section XIII (XII).] It is the earnest wish of the three Governments that the Provisional Government of the French Republic will be able to associate itself with the agreement set out above and to send appropriate instructions, after the conclusion of the conference, to the Commander-in-Chief of the French forces of occupation in Germany, and, if they see fit, to their representatives with the Polish Provisional Government and the Czechoslovak Government. The three Governments will be grateful if the French Provisional Government would treat the present communication as strictly secret until such time as an official statement is issued by the conference.” Paris , August 1, 1945. No. 1398 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–145 No. 1398 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Bidault ) secret No. 675 Paris , August 1, 1945. Excellency : Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to transmit herewith the text of the document “Western Frontier of Poland” approved on July 31, 1945. 1 I avail myself [etc.] Jefferson Caffery 1 The enclosure consists of the text, without date or heading, of document No. 1152 . No. 1399 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–145 No. 1399 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Bidault ) No. 677 [ Paris , August 1, 1945.] Excellency : I have just received telephonic instructions 1 from the Secretary of State who is at Potsdam to convey to Your Excellency an invitation to the Government of France to become a member of the Allied Commission on Reparations. My Government trusts that the Government of France will be willing to accept this invitation and will appoint a representative as soon as possible. I avail myself [etc.] Jefferson Caffery [Enclosure] The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U. S. S. R. have pleasure in inviting the Provisional French Government to take part in the work of the Allied Commission on Reparations. They trust that the Provisional French Government will be willing to accept this invitation and appoint a representative as soon as possible. Paris , August 1, 1945. 1 A copy of the invitation enclosed with this note which is in the Central Files of the Department of State (file No. 740.00119 EW/8–145), in which the names of the three Powers in the opening sentence are all abbreviated, bears the following manuscript notation: “Telephoned to Caffery. Will be delivered at 5 p.m. Aug. 1???” No. 1400 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bidault) 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–145 No. 1400 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Bidault ) secret No. 678 Paris , August 1, 1945. Excellency : I have just received a communication from Potsdam by telephone 1 from the Secretary of State instructing me to communicate to the Government of France a statement which has been adopted by the Three Powers at the Conference concerning the trial of war criminals. You will note that the three Governments will be most grateful if the French Government will treat the present communication as strictly secret until such time as an official statement is issued by the Conference. I avail myself [etc.] Jefferson Caffery [Enclosure] secret [Here is set forth, with minor variations, the text of document No. 1383 , section VII (VI).] It is the earnest wish of the three Governments that the Provisional Government of the French Republic will be able to associate itself with the above statement. The three Governments would be grateful if the French Provisional Government would treat the present communication as strictly secret until such time as an official statement is issued by the Conference. Paris , August 1, 1945. 1 A copy of the instruction to the British Ambassador at Paris to make a similar approach to the French Government bears the following manuscript notation: “Telephoned Caffery Aug 1, 6:00 p.m.” No. 1401 The French Chargé (Lacoste) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.0011 PW/8–645 No. 1401 The French Chargé ( Lacoste ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 [Translation] No. 526 Washington , August 6, 1945. Mr. Secretary of State : I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Provisional Government of the Republic, having acquainted [itself] with the two memoranda addressed under date of July 19, 1945 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the French Military Mission at Washington 2 on the subject of French participation in the war against Japan, desires to take formal note of the acceptance in principle by the Allied Command of the French offers of military participation. In addition it has noted with satisfaction the undertaking of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to inform the French representatives in due time of their intentions in so far as these will directly affect French territory or French forces in the Far East. In view of the efforts made by France toward the establishment of expeditionary forces for the Far East, my Government would nevertheless like to have concluded as soon as possible the special agreement with the interested Commander-in-Chief which will be necessary to render French participation effective. It hopes that the time at which the effective engagement of French units is envisaged will be appreciably shortened and, with the purpose of hastening the common victory against Japan, proposes to instruct its representatives at Washington to present new suggestions to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject. Accept [etc.] Francis Lacoste 1 The French original bears the following manuscript notation: “August 6 left with Mr. Grew by Mr. Lacoste of French Embassy.” 2 See document No. 1289, footnote 3 , and document No. 1291, footnote 4 . No. 1402 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–645: Telegram No. 1402 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Acting Secretary of State top secret Paris , August 6, 1945—4 p.m. 4722. Bidault tells me confidentially that replies to the various notes I handed to him having to do with the Potsdam Conference 1 will be handed to me within the next day or two. He remarked that his government is very much upset over the statements regarding reparations which they read in the Potsdam communiqué. 2 He said that they are also much concerned about the article referring to the possibility of setting up a central government for Germany 3 for they take it to mean that it is the intention of the Soviet Government to Sovietize all Germany as rapidly as they can do so. Caffery 1 Documents Nos. 1395 – 1400 . 2 See document No. 1384 , sections iii and iv . 3 The reference is probably to document No. 1384 , section ii , paragraph (3)(i). No. 1403 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State 740. 00116 E. W./8–645: Telegram No. 1403 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Acting Secretary of State restricted Paris , August 6, 1945—6 p.m. 4728. There follows translation of note just received from Bidault answering mine of August 1 1 which enclosed a statement adopted by the three powers at Potsdam Conference concerning trial of war criminals: “Answering your communication of August second (first?) pertaining to major war criminals whose crimes cannot be exactly limited to a certain area, [I have the honor to inform you that the Provisional Govt of the French Republic,] [stating the desire of the American, British and Soviet Govts to bring about the trial of the guilty parties as soon as possible,] 2 associates itself with the declaration of the three Govts. I would appreciate your being kind enough to so inform your Govt”. Sent Dept as 4728; rptd London as 570 to Moscow as 240. Caffery 1 Document No. 1400 . 2 The two passages here printed in brackets appear to be transposed. No. 1404 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1404 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Paris , August 7, 1945—2 p.m. 4743. While it is still too early accurately to gauge final reaction of the French public to the Potsdam conference the first general reaction—despite some injured feelings at having been excluded—is not unfavorable. In official and other circles there is appreciation of the efforts made to convey to them some of the decisions of the conference before they were published and the invitations to the French Govt to participate in the conferences of the Foreign Ministers at London and to become a member of the Reparations Commission at Moscow are warmly welcomed as evidence that “France’s rightful place of equality among the great nations has at last been recognized”. While the general reaction appears to have been favorable it would be idle to deny that the French have nonetheless some reservations about the results of the Potsdam conference. For example they are not sure exactly how the reparations question is to be handled and there is an underlying fear that France will not receive what she considers her rightful share of reparations exacted from Germany. There is also a belief current in some quarters that although a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the big five has been established the Big Three may continue to make all the important decisions and that the task of the Council of Foreign Ministers will be largely to implement Big Three decisions. Insofar as the provisional settlement of the Polish German boundary is concerned the French are not displeased but a number of observers have remarked that “Germany’s western boundary should have also been rectified to afford France the same security that Poland has been given by the revision of Germany’s eastern frontier” (by this they mean of course the Saar and the Rhineland etc). There is also some speculation as to possible “unpublished” decisions relating to the Far East about which the French are sensitive and there are a few criticisms over the failure of France to have an equal role in the preparation of the peace treaties with the ex-enemy Balkan satellites. The fact that the Potsdam communiqué contained nothing about the Far East Dardanelles implementation of the Yalta agreements in the Balkans (where the French generally believe that the Russians are acting unilaterally without considering Anglo-American wishes) and certain other important questions is interpreted by many observers to indicate that there are still important and potentially dangerous differences of opinion between the Big Three which were not resolved at Potsdam. Despite the foregoing reservations which in part certainly stem from French sensitivity and the well-known inferiority complex I repeat that the general reaction thus far has been favorable. Caffery No. 1405 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1405 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Acting Secretary of State restricted us urgent—niact Paris , August 7, 1945—10 p.m. 4769. Bidault requested Bogomolov, Duff Cooper and myself to call this evening. He delivered to us six identical notes containing the views of the French Govt on the decisions made at Potsdam. The French Govt accepts in each case the decisions but formulates various “reservations”, “regrets” and “observations”. (My 4722, Aug 6, 4 p.m. 1 ) The texts of these six notes are being cabled in my six immediately following telegrams. Caffery 1 Document No. 1402 . No. 1406 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 710.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1406 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State restricted us urgent Paris , August 7, 1945—midnight. 4770. The following is a translation of note dated August 7 handed me by Bidault this evening (my 4769, August 7 1 ). Mr. Ambassador, in reply to your communication of August l 2 concerning the transfers to Germany of German minority populations which are still in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, I have the honor to inform you that the French Government has taken note of the arrangement agreed to on this subject by the American, British and Soviet Governments and of which you have communicated to me the text. The French Government raises no objections against the principle of these transfers. It is evident, on the other hand, that a considerable increase in the population in the different zones can, in the present circumstances, make more difficult the task of the control authorities. Given the complexity of the problem, the French Government which has not yet received detailed information, is not actually in a position to take a definite fixed position on the subject. Caffery 1 Document No. 1405 . 2 Document No. 1397 . No. 1407 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1407 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State restricted us urgent Paris , August 7, 1945—midnight. 4771. The following is translation of note dated August 7 handed me by Bidault this evening (my 4769, August 7 1 ). Mr. Ambassador: By a letter dated August l, 2 you were so kind as to transmit to me, in the name of your Government, the text of an “arrangement relative to the western frontiers of Poland” agreed to ( intervenu ) at Potsdam by the American, British and Soviet Governments. The French Government has no objections of principle to the taking in charge by the Polish administration of territories situated east of the indicated line, nor to the installation of the Soviet administration in a part of east Prussia. It believes, however, that the problem of the frontiers of Germany forms a whole and is not susceptible of solution ( ne saurait recevoir de solution ) until it has been examined jointly by all the interested powers. Caffery 1 Document No. 1405 . 2 Document No. 1389 . No. 1408 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1408 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State restricted us urgent Paris , August 7, 1945—midnight. 4772. The following is translation of note dated August 4 handed to me by Bidault this evening (my 4769, August 7 1 ). “Concerning the communications addressed to it on July 31, August 1 and 2 by the three govts represented at the Potsdam Conference, 2 the French Provisional Govt, desirous of avoiding inconveniences ( inconvénients ) which have occurred in the past, and noting that the communiqué published at the termination of the Potsdam Conference 3 treats of questions about which it has not been advised, would like to know if the information which has been furnished up to the present time covers the whole of the results of the conference, or if other important decisions have been made, notably with regard to the multiple problems with which the Council of Ministers of the five great powers will have to deal”. Caffery 1 Document No. 1405 . 2 For Caffery’s notes to Bidault on the results of the Berlin Conference, see documents Nos. 1395 – 1400 . 3 Document No. 1384 . No. 1409 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1409 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State restricted us urgent Paris , August 7, 1945—midnight. 4773. There follows translation of note dated August 7 handed me by Bidault this evening (my 4769, August 7 1 ) Mr. Ambassador, By your communication of August first, 2 you were kind enough to inform me that the Govt of the united States in accord with the Govts of the United Kingdom and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics invited the provisional Govt of the French Republic to participate in the work of the Allied Reparations Commission. The French Govt accepts with much pleasure the invitation which has been extended to it. It has designated Mr. Robert Coulondre, ex-Ambassador of France to Moscow and to Berlin, to represent it on this Commission as First Delegate, and Mr. Rueff, Inspector General of Finances, as Assistant Delegate. Referring to the communication which was made to it on August second, 3 the French Govt reserves the right to make known at a later date its point of view on the economic principles which should govern the control of Germany, especially insofar as the contemplated basis for a settlement of the reparations problem is concerned. Caffery 1 Document No. 1405 . 2 Document No. 1399 . 3 This apparently refers to a communication from the British Embassy at Paris to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated August 2, with which were enclosed copies of the texts agreed upon at the Conference with respect to economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany and reparations from Germany. Cf. ante , p. 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] . No. 1410 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1410 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State restricted us urgent Paris , August 7, 1945—midnight. 4774. 1. The following is the translation of a note handed me this evening by Bidault (my 4769, Aug 7, 10 p.m. 1 ) 2. Mr. Ambassador: In reply to your communication of July 31, 2 I have the honor to inform you that the French Govt is glad to accept the invitation which the Govt of the United States of America, in agreement with the Govts of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was kind enough to extend to it to participate in a council of ministers for foreign affairs of the five great powers and to join at once in the organization of this council which will meet in London on Sept 1 at the latest. 3. However, as concerns the text relative to the “establishment of a council of ministers for foreign affairs” which appears in your communication, the French Govt wishes to set forth the following important reservations: 4. France is obviously interested in all important questions concerning Europe or any region of Europe. This applies particularly to the settlements concerning Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. Furthermore, the French Govt feels constrained to point out that the dispositions envisaged by the text of the agreement concluded between the Govts of the US of America, the United Kingdom and the USSR and which concern the preparation of the treaties of peace with Rumania, Hungary and Finland do not appear to it to be in harmony with the declaration on liberated Europe made at Yalta by the Govts of the US of America, the UK and the USSR. 3 The procedures provided for in this declaration and with which France was invited to associate itself cover not only countries liberated from Nazi domination but countries formerly satellites of the Axis as well. 5. Moreover, the French Govt could not accept “ a priori ” the reconstitution which is apparently envisaged for an undetermined date, of a central Govt in Germany. Furthermore, such a reconstitution has not up to now occasioned any exchange of views between the French Govt and its Allies. 6. As far as Italy is concerned France does not appear among the signatories of the instrument of capitulation 4 although she was the first objective of aggression of Italian Fascism and although she participated to an important degree in its defeat. The French Govt, therefore, sees no reason why she should be considered now as a signatory of this instrument. It is nonetheless favorably disposed toward the conclusion of a peace treaty with Italy. We [are?] favorably inclined to the entry of a democratic Italy into the United Nations. Caffery 1 Document No. 1405 . 2 Document No. 1395 . 3 See document No. 1417 , section v . 4 See ante , p. 101, footnote 3 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] . No. 1411 The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Potsdam/8–745: Telegram No. 1411 The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State restricted us urgent Paris , August 7, 1945—midnight. 4775. Following is translation of note handed me by Bidault this evening (my 4769, Aug 7. 1 ) Mr. Ambassador, by your letter No. 669, July 31, 2 you were good enough to inform me on behalf of the Govt of |the US and in agreement with the Govts of the UK and the USSR of the text of an “arrangement” agreed upon between these govts on the subject of “political principles which would govern the treatment of Germany during the initial period of control.” In view of the vital importance which the whole of the German problem assumes for France, the French Govt regrets that a text relating to the most important aspects of this problem has been established, without its participation, between three of its principal Allies when the French Govt itself is a party to the agreements elaborated by the European Consultative [ Advisory ] Commission and actually in force with regard to the occupation and control of Germany. 3 Subject to a more thorough examination, it wishes to make a certain number of observations on the communication it has received. It recognizes the necessity for a certain uniformity of treatment for the population of the whole of Germany. It can only approve the essential aims of the occupation such as they are presented: Complete and final disarmament and decentralization of Germany; complete uprooting of militarism; suppression of all armament industry; destruction of the German war potential; elimination of Nazi laws, organizations and institutions; adoption of all measures designed to prevent the rebirth of militarism and Nazism; the rapid punishment of war criminals; control of public education; reorganization of the judiciary machinery; administrative decentralization; the remolding of the administrative machinery beginning with autonomous municipalities, and on the basis of a representative and elective system; the impossibility of reconstituting at present a central German Govt. The French Govt likewise believes it indispensable to consider now the proper means to favor the birth and the development of democratic ideas in Germany with a view to the future return of the German population into the community of peace-loving and democratic peoples. On the other hand, some of the other principles which were presented called for reservations on the part of the French Govt. Some of the measures advocated seem to assume that a given future political evolution of Germany will occur; while it is impossible to foresee at the present time whether such an evolution corresponds to the interests of European peace and to the wishes of the populations involved. In this regard the French Govt has particularly in mind the reconstitution of political parties for the whole of Germany, and the creation of central administrative depts which would be directed by secretaries of state whose jurisdiction would cover, it seems, the whole of the German territory, which is not yet defined. For its part the French Govt believes that it would be preferable before defining such conditions to take into account the experiences which the four occupying powers will not fail to gather during the initial phase of control. On all of these points the French Govt is disposed to proceed to an exchange of views with the powers which share with it the responsibilities of the occupation and the control of Germany. Caffery 1 Document No. 1405 . 2 Document No. 1396 . 3 Treaties and Other International Acts Series Nos. 3070 and 3071; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements , vol. 5, pt. 2, pp. 2062, 2078. See also document No. 1038 . No. 1412 The French Ambassador (Bonnet) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/8–1145 No. 1412 The French Ambassador ( Bonnet ) to the Secretary of State [Translation] No. 558 Washington , August 11, 1945. Mr. Secretary of State : I have the honor to inform you, by order of my Government, that the latter has given its full consent to the ultimatum sent to Japan on July 26 last by the American, British, and Chinese Governments. 1 In fact, France, a riparian power in the Pacific, was one of the first victims of Japanese aggression. It has been officially at war with Japan since December 8, 1941. Certain of its territories in the Pacific are still under Japanese occupation. Its troops are fighting there and its vessels are taking part in the operations directed against Japan by the Inter-Allied Command. Consequently, and by order of my Government, I have the honor to request that it be made a party to the discussions now being held between the Allied Powers regarding Japan’s offer of surrender, and be permitted to participate in the signing of the instrument of surrender. Accept [etc.] H Bonnet 1 Document No. 1382 . No. 1413 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery) 740.00119 Potsdam/8–1545: Telegram No. 1413 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) secret Washington , August 15, 1945—2 p.m. 3860. You may inform Bidault in confidence of the following decisions which were taken at Potsdam 1 and which were not touched on in the public communiqué. 2 (Sent to Paris 3860, repeated to London 6918, Moscow 1837). 1. It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria. 2. It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn from Tehran and that further stages of withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at forthcoming meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers in London. 3. It was agreed that Soviet proposals for revision of Control Council in Hungary should be accepted as basis for similar revisions in Rumania and Bulgaria. 4. In connection with present discussion in Paris it was agreed that zone of Tangier including City of Tangier and area adjacent to it shall remain international in view of its strategic importance. 5. It was recognized that the Montreux Convention on the Straits should be revised to meet present-day conditions and it was agreed that as the next step the three governments should separately institute direct conversations with the Turkish government. 6. It was agreed a proposal of the United States regarding international inland waterways should be referred for consideration at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 7. American proposal regarding use of Allied property for satellite reparations or war trophies was accepted in principle but drafting of agreement was left to be worked out through diplomatic channels. (Copies of American proposals referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 are being forwarded by airmail for transmission to Bidault) Byrnes J[ames] C[lement] D[unn] 1 For texts of the Conference decisions summarized below, see document No. 1383 2 Document No. 1384 . No. 1414 Memorandum of Conversation 740.00111 EW/8–2346 No. 1414 Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 23, 1945, 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. [Translation—Extracts] Conversation Between Mr. Georges Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, and Mr. James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, at the Department of State, Washington, D. C., Thursday, August 23, 1945, 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Mr. Bidault having expressed the desire to discuss German questions first of all, Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the communiqué published on the Potsdam decisions 2 had passed over only one question in silence: that of the German fleet. Russia and the United Kingdom considered this fleet spoils of war and Russia asked for a third of it. This was agreed to 3 but was not made public for fear the crews might be tempted to scuttle the ships. Mr. Byrnes could communicate the exact text of the agreement reached on this point. With respect to reparations, the American Government had prepared a plan in which the German economy was regarded as forming a whole. 4 Germany was to keep enough machines for the strict needs of its economy; the rest were to be distributed as reparations. However, the American delegates found at Potsdam that the Soviet Government’s concept of spoils of war differed greatly from that of the American and British Governments. Without notice, the Russians removed machines which could not be considered spoils of war, machines not used in the manufacture of weapons, furniture, and goods of all kinds. This made any agreement on the definition of spoils of war difficult, if not impossible. It was not possible to determine the value of the property removed by the Russians, which, according to the Americans, should be applied to reparations. The delegates had expected that the Russian Occupation Zone would supply about 42% of the total amount of reparations. The Soviet Government declared—with some justification—that in the Crimea President Roosevelt had agreed to allow it 50% of the reparations. However, if the total of the available assets were thus reduced and if the Russians received 50%, there would remain very little for the others. The Russians thought that only 40% of the reparations, not 42%, could be found in their zone. They also declared that, since the Poles were operating the Silesian mines, the coal extracted from them was Polish and not Russian. The American delegation replied that this coal was in the Russian Zone and should be included in the assets available for reparations. It was certain that the Soviets needed machines. They wanted very much to obtain part of the heavy equipment of the Ruhr. It was certain, in any case, that at Yalta President Roosevelt did not agree explicitly to the percentage of 50% of the reparations for the Russians, or to the lump-sum figure of 20 billion dollars. According to the Protocol, the American delegation had accepted the proposal only as “a basis for discussion.” 5 The Russians sincerely believed that the agreement was concluded, and lengthy explanations were necessary to make them understand the difference. President Truman indicated in a conversation that he would agree to grant the Russians about 50% of the reparations, but he refused to convert this figure into a definite amount in dollars. The American delegation added that the United States would in any case refuse to do again what it had done after the first war, and that it would not advance a single dollar to Germany to permit the latter to pay reparations to other countries. It insisted that German imports be paid for primarily out of exports. Mr. Byrnes stated that it was on these bases that the agreement should be concluded if it was desired to have it extend to all the zones, and he hoped that it would operate without misunderstanding. To be sure, the agreement presented numerous disadvantages. However, after two weeks of discussion, it appeared to be the only one possible. Russian losses in men and property were greater than those of any other country, and out of their 50% the Russians would have to make a settlement with Poland. It must be recognized, it is true, that the latter had already taken over Silesia and its mines. The American delegation had become alarmed at the prospect of a shift of population involving 9½ million people, but it was established that most of them had already left, and that only about one and a half million remained. Mr. Bidault had three observations to make: 1. France had suffered damage twice as serious as in the last war. Yet, immediately after that war she had received 52% of the reparations. This time a settlement had been made without her even being permitted to present any argument. It was a cruel fate, just as detrimental to the harmony between the Allies and the equitable settlement of current questions as to France herself. 2. Paying for German imports out of exports posed a serious problem for France. Coal was for her the chief element of reparations. Not having had an opportunity to present her claims, she was now faced with the prospect of having to pay for German coal in dollars, since it was really only in the United States that Germany would be able to supply her needs. That was a very serious question for the equilibrium of Western Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . With respect to reparations, [Mr. Byrnes said that] it was evident that no government endowed with common sense could expect to obtain full compensation for its war losses. The United States had spent 400 billion dollars on the war, and its public debt had increased from 50 to 300 billion. This meant that for years to come the American people would have to pay off this debt. The American Government was not asking for reparations, but it refused to tax the American people so as to send money to Germany to enable her to pay reparations. As regards imports, the American Government knew that a certain quantity was necessary to maintain the German economy and prevent a bankruptcy which would affect France and Belgium even more than the United States. Now, the only way to pay for imports was to use the proceeds from exports. Mr. Bidault replied that France had conceived a system which would permit Germany to pay for her imports, but that she had not had an opportunity to have it discussed. Mr. Byrnes observed that France, which would be represented on the Allied Control Council and the Reparations Commission, would henceforth have every opportunity to present her point of view. At Yalta the Soviet representatives had suggested the allocation to Russia of a total of 20 billion dollars as reparation, noting that this amount represented but a small part of Russian losses. Mr. Churchill had stated at that time that in his opinion even this limited amount of reparations would never be extracted from Germany, and the Soviet representatives seemed now to have understood him. However, since Crimea the Russian armies had invaded Germany and seized materiel throughout the zone occupied by them. On the other hand, the American and British Air Forces had destroyed everything not carried off by the Russians. With respect to coal, it was certain that if more of it was to be got from Germany the food ration of German miners must be increased. A certain amount of Silesian coal was going to Russia and the situation in Berlin threatened to become very bad. That is why the American Government had tried to send coal there. In its agreement on reparation, it had provided for the shipment to Russia of certain machines in the western occupation zone, which the Russians were anxious to obtain, in exchange for coal and foodstuffs to be shipped to this zone by Russia. Mr. Bidault recognized that reparations never correspond to the losses sustained. What interested France in the matter of reparations was to obtain coal, machinery and labor. If coal was exported instead of being delivered as reparation, it meant that France would actually obtain no reparation except what she might have been able to seize on the spot; that she would in fact be completely excluded from reparation. This was all the more serious for her since the problem of restitution had not yet been settled. This was not the same problem as that of reparation, for restitution should, in her opinion, be given absolute priority. Among the invaded countries France was, so to speak, the only one that had had industrial equipment. But she was now being told that she could not regain possession of the stolen equipment because such equipment was part of the reparation assets. Consequently, if French machines were found in Germany, France could not obtain their return to her, for they would be liable to being shipped elsewhere. The essential points for France were therefore restitution and some assistance which would enable her to dispel the present uncertainty in regard to the three essential elements: coal, machinery, labor. Mr. Byrnes replied that the Reparations Commission was still free to take decisions relating to coal and that the question was still open. Furthermore, it was certain that if French machines were identified in Germany they were to be returned to France. Mr. Bidault noted that even if restitution was not prohibited, it was nevertheless true that it had not yet been regulated. In order to make restitution, one must be able to draw up an inventory. This argument was not challenged, but attention should be called to the urgent and serious character of the problem. Mr. Byrnes stated that the American position in regard to the restitution of identifiable goods was the following: all identifiable gold found in the American Zone would be returned to its lawful owner. Likewise, if a machine was identified by the control authorities as belonging to a given Allied Government, such machine must be returned and would not be included among the assets allocated to reparation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mr. Bidault mentioned that, on the day before, the Secretary of State and President Truman had pointed out that in 1918 Germany remained intact, whereas now she was destroyed. She could nevertheless still constitute a danger. To be sure, it was known that with the atomic bomb fifty kilometers more or less did not greatly change the military situation. The French Government was, however, impressed by one fact: In accordance with the decisions of Potsdam, which were the result of those of Yalta, 6 Germany had been whittled down in the East on a basis officially temporary but probably permanent in actual fact. Nothing like that had been done in the West. Therefore, to the extent to which Germany still constituted an economic and political unit, her center of gravity would be pushed back toward the West and thus nearer to us. When there were Secretaries of State for the whole of Germany, they would have no authority East of the Oder–Neisse Line. Their offices would be in Berlin, and if their authority extended across the British and French Zones as far as the French frontier, it would mean that the Soviet influence being exerted in Berlin would reach to the Western frontiers of Germany. The French did not want that and thought it was not desirable for anyone. The task would be easy for the Russians, who had cleared their zone of its inhabitants and who would exert their influence through propaganda by using the administrative systems of the other zones. If all the zones had been associated the Western Powers could have won over the Germans to their side, but it was now too late. The East Germans had disappeared and the Russians had a free hand to carry on propaganda in our zones. Mr. Byrnes thought that the fears expressed by Mr. Bidault were without foundation. If the Russians carried on propaganda in favor of their form of government in the British, French and American Zones, they would probably fail because in these three Zones the Germans were better treated than in the Russian Zone. This was proved by the fact that all those able to leave the Russian Zone had done so. This had, moreover, brought about a serious food problem since the population of the Western Zones had increased while the supply facilities remained the same. One would have to believe that a German family in the Russian Zone would, from Soviet propaganda, take such an interest in the Russian political philosophy as to find more satisfaction in it than in the presence of husbands or sons who had been sent away. A very unlikely assumption. If it could be established that a part of the population had been sent to Russia, the fact would not be forgotten for a long time. The Secretary of State did not know, moreover, whether this was true, for it was just a rumor. France seemed to fear that, although all machinery capable of producing war materials had been removed from Germany, she could still manufacture planes, weapons, gasoline for military purposes, etc. It was true that twenty years before hostility had been quickly forgotten and the United States had granted loans to Germany for reconstruction, loans in which, furthermore, France and the United Kingdom had participated. That was a mistake which there was no question of our making again. If we were fools enough to do so, we should deserve the fate that would inevitably overtake us. We had now come to understand that when a war of that kind broke out in Europe we could not remain aloof. The people of the United States were therefore determined to do everything to prevent Germany from rearming. When the occupation of Germany by the Allied Forces came to an end, it would be incumbent on the statesmen to adopt the necessary control measures to prevent the recurrence of German aggression. It might be that the United Nations would supply the necessary inspection and control machinery. Otherwise, the possibility of concluding an agreement among the Powers occupying permanent seats on the Security Council would have to be considered, with a view to organizing the inspection and control of Germany. It would be necessary to be always on the alert against the resurgence of the military power of Germany. Mr. Bidault did not think that Germany would become a threatening military power for a long time. However, he himself had been a prisoner of war in Germany for more than a year and, in the village where he was, although many families had had members interned by the Gestapo, they had remained completely Nazi. Furthermore, in occupied countries the enemy was always the one on the spot. It was therefore to be feared that a unified Germany would fall under Soviet influence. The French Government saw no objection to the frontier of Poland being fixed at the Oder–Neisse line. As far as France was concerned, she had no desire to annex any German territory, but she noted that a section had been cut off in the East while nothing comparable had been provided in the West. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . To return to the question of Germany, [Mr. Bidault said that] it would seem that there should be a Secretary of State for Railways and Postal Service, whose jurisdiction would extend as far as Saarbrücken, for instance, under the authority of the four Commanders in Chief, while cities like Königsberg, Breslau, Frankfort-on-the-Oder and Küstrin, essentially German cities, would pass under Russian control. Germany was therefore brought back farther west, which was, historically, a misfortune for France. If this westward shifting of Germany’s center of gravity were to continue, France might find herself obliged, though this seemed impossible after the war of 1914 and this war, to resign herself to other attitudes. Mr. Bidault hoped that things would not reach that point, but it was none the less true that to have Saarbrücken regarded as forming part of Germany and administered by a German, while this was not the case in Königsberg and Danzig, was an impossible situation. Mr. Byrnes could not understand how France could suffer from the fact that Germany’s population had decreased from 65 to 45 million and that there would be a man in Berlin who would administer all the railroads of the shrunken country. France would benefit from having a peaceful Germany producing useful goods. What was needed was, by mutual agreement, to adopt measures to prevent Germany from rearming. Mr. Bidault stated that there was perhaps no immediate danger of war, but nevertheless the reconstitution of a State that had collapsed might seem, at the very least, premature. There was formerly 7 an agreement to keep Germany in a state of subordination, and if France left five years before the end of the stipulated time, it was because her associates were not willing to remain there themselves. She was now prepared to perform the act of faith asked of her, but she must insist that a section of territory be cut off in West Germany similar to that in East Germany. Mr. Byrnes did not see how an amputation of the kind demanded by Mr. Bidault could be more effective than the force of the whole world organized in the United Nations. If fifty nations could not ward off the German peril, it was not worth while to organize the United Nations. It was by relying on the joint action of all the nations that the maximum security would be obtained. The Potsdam Agreement did not contemplate at all the creation of a central German Government. It was only thought that a central administration should be set up for such matters as transportation, currency, etc. 8 As for the actual form of the government of Germany, that was a question that should be reserved for the future. Mr. Bidault considered that the vital interests of France had thus been prejudiced without French participation and he felt obliged to make the most explicit reservations in the matter. … If she 9 was now asking that Germany be moved back from her frontiers, that did not at all mean that she had no faith in collective security, but when she noted that a city like Königsberg had been completely given to Russia, although it had never been Russian, the situation was entirely different, and a precedent had been established. Mr. Byrnes remarked that it was not a question of setting up a central government in Germany, but only three administrative services. The United Nations gave better guarantees than did territorial adjustments. The fate of Konigsberg was, moreover, not definitive and would be finally settled at the Peace Conference. Mr. Bonnet made it clear that Mr. Bidault’s request did not tend to bring France closer to Germany, but, on the contrary, to move Germany farther from France. In this connection two main questions arose: that of the status of the Ruhr Basin and that of the future status of the left bank of the Rhine. Mr. Byrnes remarked that the Russians were desirous of seeing an independent Ruhr under Allied control. Mr. Bonnet replied that France, too, wished to see an international system established in the Ruhr. As for the left bank of the Rhine, she was not asking for a definitive decision at once but only that the present system, that of French occupation, be continued without interference from Berlin. France could not accept the reversion of the left bank of the Rhine to Prussia. For the Ruhr it was certainly possible to organize an international regime assuring the life of that country and giving security guarantees to the western neighbors of Germany. Mr. Byrnes agreed, but he again mentioned the matter of Russian participation, which seemed to him to be contraindicated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Authorship not indicated. Since the original is in French, this memorandum was presumably prepared by Bidault or by one of his assistants. 2 i. e., the sections relating to Germany of document No. 1384 . 3 See document No. 1383 , section iv . 4 See document No. 894 . 5 See document No. 1416 , section v . 6 See Document No. 1383 , sections vi ( v ) and ix ( viii ), and document No. 1417 , section vi . 7 i. e., after World War I. 8 See document No. 1383 , section ii , paragraph 9 (iv). 9 i. e., France. No. 1415 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Bonbright) 862.30/9–445 No. 1415 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs ( Bonbright ) [ Washington ,] September 4, 1945. Memorandum The French Ambassador, M. Henri Bonnet, called on the Under Secretary 1 at 3:30 this afternoon, and left with him the attached note (No. 678, September 4, 1945) relative to the disposition of the German fleet and Merchant Marine. The note states that the French Government “has just been informed” 2 of the creation of a Tripartite Naval Commission in Berlin, consisting of representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, charged with the task of dividing the German naval and merchant ships between the three countries. The note insists strongly that a representative of France be admitted without delay to the Commission in question and that there be no distribution of ships until the question of French participation is settled. In addition to repeating the point made in the note that the setting-up of this Tripartite Commission is contrary to the agreements reached in the European Advisory Commission at London, to the effect that all matters concerning Germany should be settled on a quadripartite basis, the Ambassador spoke at some length in support of the French request. He emphasized the immediate French need for a share of the German shipping in view of the great damage done to the French fleet and the sacrifice which France made by placing her usable merchant ships in the Allied pool. Merchant ships, he added, were urgently needed to carry supplies not only to France but to the colonies. In this connection, he referred specifically to the lack of transport and cargo space between France and North Africa. He indicated that naval vessels were needed for the purpose of patrolling and protecting French supply lines. The Ambassador assumed that similar démarches were being made by his Government in London and Moscow but he hoped particularly to obtain the support of the United States Government. He stated that although, as indicated in the note, the French proposed to raise the question at the forthcoming Conference of Foreign Ministers in London, he would very much appreciate receiving an early reply, even of a preliminary nature. Mr. Acheson indicated to the Ambassador that we would look into the question at once. J[ ames ] C H B[ onbright ] [Attachment—Translation 3 ] The French Ambassador ( Bonnet ) to the Secretary of State No. 678 Washington , September 4, 1945. The Ambassador of France to the United States presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and has the honor to direct his attention to the following question: The French Government has just been informed that pursuant to an agreement arrived at in the conference of Potsdam 4 among the Governments of the United States, of Great Britain, and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a naval commission, in charge of distributing German warships and ships of the merchant marine among the three countries has been created in Berlin. The French Government considers that the constitution of this tripartite commission is contrary to the agreements that had been worked out by the European Advisory Commission and approved by the Governments of Washington, London, Moscow, and Paris. According to these agreements, the regulation of all affairs concerning Germany must be effected on a quadripartite basis. The French Government cannot, consequently, admit the procedure that has been considered at Potsdam. On accepting the invitation which had been addressed to it after this conference to participate in the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the five great powers 5 and on replying to the other communications pertaining to Germany which had been made then, the French Government had already pointed out that it considered itself obliged to reserve its position on the various arrangements which were concluded among the three Powers. 6 The question of the German marine will evidently be raised by the French Government at the Conference of London. But it urgently insists now that a representative be admitted without delay to the naval commission of Berlin and that no distribution of boats be made until French participation has been settled. France, which has emerged from the war with a marine very much weakened, and whose arsenals and navy yards have been devastated or destroyed, has a particularly urgent need of tonnage, in warships as well as in merchant ships. She expects that her Allies, recognizing the importance of her sacrificies, will accede to her request and that the Government of the United States in particular will be good enough to support her legitimate claim. Mr. Henri Bonnet is happy [etc.] H[ enri ] B[ onnet ] 1 Dean Acheson. 2 Cf. document No. 1414 . 3 Printed from the official translation (file No. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–445), rather than from the informal translation actually attached to the original of Bonbright’s memorandum. 4 See document No. 1383 , section iv . 5 See document No. 1410 . 6 See documents Nos. 1403 , 1406 , 1407 , 1409 , and 1411 . C. Protocol of Proceedings and Communiqué of the Yalta Conference C. Protocol of Proceedings and Communiqué of the Yalta Conference [1416] Protocol of the Proceedings of the Yalta Conference March 24, 1947 L/T Files [1417] Communiqué Issued at the End of the Yalta Conference February 11, 1945 740.0011 EW/2–1145 No. 1416 Protocol of the Proceedings of the Yalta Conference L/T Files No. 1416 Protocol of the Proceedings of the Yalta Conference 1 March 24, 1947 Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to 11th came to the following conclusions. i. world organisation It was decided: (1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organisation should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America. (2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be: ( a ) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February, 1945; and ( b ) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term “Associated Nation” was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey). When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e. the Ukraine and White Russia. (3) that the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organisation. (4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows: invitation “The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of _________ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security. “The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI: “‘C. Voting ‘1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote. ‘2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. ‘3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting’. “Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently. “In the event that the Government of ________ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments”. territorial trusteeship It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship. The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to ( a ) existing mandates of the League of Nations; ( b ) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; ( c ) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and ( d ) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations, 2 and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship. ii. declaration on liberated europe The following declaration has been approved: “The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems. “The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations. “To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require ( a ) to establish conditions of internal peace; ( b ) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; ( c ) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and ( d ) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. “The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration. “When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration. “By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind. “In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.” iii. dismemberment of germany It was agreed that Article 12 ( a ) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows: “The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security.” The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative. iv. zone of occupation for the French and control council 3 for germany It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government. It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council 3 for Germany. v. reparation The following protocol has been approved: 4 1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy. 2. Reparation in kind is 5 to be exacted from Germany in three following forms: a ) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. b ) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed. c ) Use of German labour. 3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America. 4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows: “The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points ( a ) and ( b ) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned. The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission. vi. major war criminals The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference. vii. poland The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference: “A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the Western part of Poland. 6 The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. “M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. “When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland. “The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.” viii. Yugoslavia It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic: ( a ) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement 7 should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement. ( b ) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare: (i) that the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and 8 (ii) that legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; 9 and that this statement should be published in the communique of the Conference. ix. italo-yugoslav frontier italo-austria frontier 10 Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later. x. yugoslav-bulgarian relations There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius. xi. south eastern europe The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects: ( a ) the Control Commission in Bulgaria ( b ) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations. ( c ) Oil equipment in Roumania. xii. iran 11 Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and M. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. 11 It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel. xiii. meetings of the three foreign secretaries The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London. xiv. the montreux convention and the straits It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their Governments. 12 The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment. The foregoing Protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference, February 11, 1945. E R Stettinius, Jr B. Молотов 13 Anthony Eden 1 Released to the press by the Department of State March 24, 1947. 2 The final s of “consultations” was added with pen and ink. The change is not initialed in the margin. 3 The word “Council” is a substitution, with pen and ink, for “Commission” as typed. In the margin opposite the change is a small penned question mark The change is not initialed. 3 The word “Council” is a substitution, with pen and ink, for “Commission” as typed. In the margin opposite the change is a small penned question mark The change is not initialed. 4 The word “Council” is a substitution, with pen and ink, for “Commission” as typed. In the margin opposite the change is a small penned question mark The change is not initialed. 5 The word “is” is handwritten, replacing “are” as typed. The change is not initialed in the margin. 6 The phrase “of the Western part of Poland” read “of Western Poland” as typed, but was revised by hand on the original, with no initials in the margin. 7 For the text of this agreement, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251 – 254 . 8 As typed, this subparagraph began “that the National Liberation Committee”. The changes were made in handwriting, with the initials of Bohlen in the margin. 9 As typed, this subparagraph began “that legislative acts passed by the National Liberation Committee”. The changes were made in handwriting, with the initials of Bohlen in the margin. 10 This heading should perhaps read “Austro-Yugoslav Frontier”. See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 981, footnote 10 . 11 Changed by hand from “Persia” as typed in the original. No initials in the margin. 11 Changed by hand from “Persia” as typed in the original. No initials in the margin. 12 In the original as typed the phrase at the end of this sentence read “to the three Governments.” The change was made by hand, with no initials in the margin. 13 V. Molotov. No. 1417 Communiqué Issued at the End of the Yalta Conference 740.0011 EW/2–1145 No. 1417 Communiqué Issued at the End of the Yalta Conference 1 Report of the Crimea Conference For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff and other advisors in the Crimea. In addition to the three Heads of Government, the following took part in the Conference: For the United States of America: Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the President; Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President; Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization; General of the Army George C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet; Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces; Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator Major General L. S. Kuter, U. S. A., Staff of Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces; W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department; Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State; Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisors. For the Soviet Union: V. M. Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Admiral Kuznetsov, People’s Commissar for the Navy Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A. Ya. Vyshinski, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR I. M. Maisky, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Marshal of Aviation Khydyakov F. T. Gousev, Ambassador in Great Britain A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in U. S. A. For the United Kingdom: Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense, together with Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre Field Marshal Wilson, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington together with military and diplomatic advisors. The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean Conference: i the defeat of germany We have considered and determined the military plans of the three allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the Conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest information has been inter-changed. The timing, scope and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the East, West, North and South have been fully agreed and planned in detail. Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this Conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises. Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance. ii the occupation and control of germany We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the Three Powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission. It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and Militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations. iii reparation by germany We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A Commission for the Compensation of Damage will be established. The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied Countries. The Commission will work in Moscow. iv united nations conference We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples. The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty. We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25th, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks. The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public. v declaration on liberated europe We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on liberated Europe. This Declaration provides for concerting the policies of the three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows: The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems. The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to creat[e] democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations. To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require ( a ) to establish conditions of internal peace; ( b ) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; ( c ) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and ( d ) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration. When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration. By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind. In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested. vi poland We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussions we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major powers. The agreement reached is as follows: A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the, U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland. The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference. vii yugoslavia We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the Agreement 2 between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that Agreement. We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed, it should declare that: 3 (i) The Anti-fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and (ii) legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly. 4 There was also a general review of other Balkan question[s]. viii meetings of foreign secretaries Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the Heads of Governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers have also been held daily. These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three Capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on world organization. ix unity for peace as for war Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world. Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, “afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want”. Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace. Winston S. Churchill Franklin D Roosevelt И. Сталин 5 February 11, 1945 1 Released to the press Monday, February 12, 1945. The text here printed is from the original signed document in the files of the Department. 2 For the text of this agreement, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251 – 254 . 3 The portion reading “, it should declare that:” is handwritten on the original and initialed in the margin by Bohlen. 4 The words “Anti-Fascist Assembly of” are handwritten on the original, as is also “(AUNOJ)”, the latter replacing the word “Committee” as typed. These changes are initialed in the margin, as in the case mentioned in the previous footnote. 5 I. Stalin. D. Bohlen post-Conference memoranda on two Truman–Stalin meetings at the Berlin Conference D. Bohlen post-Conference memoranda on two Truman–Stalin meetings at the Berlin Conference [[Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1418] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) Washington, March 28, 1960. 023.1/3–2860 [1419] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) Washington, March 28, 1960. 023.1/3–2860 Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] Editor’s Note —The two memoranda printed in this appendix were prepared by Charles E. Bohlen in March 1960 on the basis of his original longhand notes of two Truman–Stalin meetings at the Berlin Conference and from memory, in view of the fact that the editors were unable to find the memoranda of conversation which Bohlen is certain he transcribed in July 1945. For literal transcripts of the original longhand notes referred to, see ante , pp. 43–46 [ Pgs. 43–46 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] . With respect to these later reconstructions of the Truman-Stalin meetings of July 17 and 18, 1945, Bohlen has made the following explanatory comment: “I made no attempt to reproduce the actual words during these interviews, since the notes are too fragmentary to ensure any accuracy even with the exercise of memory. Rather, I have sought to deal in narrative form with the subjects covered.” No. 1418 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) 023.1/3–2860 No. 1418 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State ( Bohlen ) Washington , March 28, 1960. Memorandum Subject: Meeting of President Truman with Generalissimo Stalin at Babelsberg, 12 noon, July 17, 1945 Present: President Truman, Secretary of State Byrnes, Mr. Bohlen; Generalissimo Stalin, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Mr. Pavlov The opening remarks recorded in my longhand notes on this meeting 1 refer to Stalin’s apology for arriving late at Potsdam. (He arrived one day after the President.) Stalin explained that he had been delayed by the negotiations with the Chinese. 2 (T. V. Soong had been in Moscow for negotiations for a Sino-Soviet treaty subsequently concluded that summer.) He also explained that his doctors had forbidden him to fly because of the condition of his lungs. President Truman expressed understanding of the reason for Stalin’s arriving late and said he had looked forward for a long time to making his acquaintance. Stalin agreed upon the importance of personal relationships and contacts, to which the President replied that he thought they would have no difficulty in reaching agreement on the matters which would be before them at the Potsdam Conference. The President having replied in the negative to Stalin’s inquiry as to whether he had any questions to be added to the agenda, Molotov read a list of questions which the Soviets desired to have included, pointing out that some were already on the agenda. He listed: 1. Division of the German Fleet. 2. Reparations. 3. The Polish question. Under the last heading he included the question of the status of the former Polish Government-in-Exile in London headed by Arciszewski and in particular the disposal of the assets belonging to that former government. He also mentioned the question of the western frontiers of Poland, which apparently was already on the agenda. Stalin pointed out that the Yalta Conference had not decided the frontiers of Poland. 3 Molotov raised the question of the possibility of trusteeships for the U. S. S. R. Stalin explained that there was no question of changing existing trusteeship arrangements, which had been settled at San Francisco, 4 but he thought, although this might appear stupid, that the Soviets were entitled to be considered for trusteeship of the former Italian colonies which had not been assigned. He did not dispute the claims of other countries, but merely felt that in principle the Soviets should be entitled to consideration for the administration of one. Some reference was made by Molotov to the question of relations with the former Axis satellites and also to the problem of the Franco regime in Spain. There seems here to have been a discussion between Secretary Byrnes, Molotov, and Stalin as to how the trusteeship item should be worded on the agenda. There then followed a brief discussion as to the time to be set for the meetings of the Conference, including some joking references by Secretary Byrnes to Stalin’s habit of rising late, to which Stalin replied that he had changed those habits since the war. It appears to have been agreed that the Conference would meet at 5 p.m. for its opening session on July 17 and would meet regularly at 4 p.m. after that. There is a brief but not clear discussion as to the meetings of the military advisers during the Conference, at which time it was indicated that General Marshall would be there for the United States and General Antonov for the Soviets and possibly an Air Marshal for the British. Stalin then returned to the question of the Franco regime in Spain. He explained that this regime had not come about as a result of internal conditions but had been imposed by the Germans and the Italians. He felt its continuance was a danger to the United Nations, since it would be disposed to give shelter to fascist remnants. The Soviet Government thought it would be proper to break off relations with the present regime and give the Spanish people a chance to select a government of their choice. The President said he held no brief for Franco and agreed that the matter should be studied. There seems to have been a brief discussion of the conduct of the business of the Conference during which the President restated his pleasure at meeting Generalissimo Stalin. With what appears to be a jocular reference to Stalin’s nickname, “Uncle Joe”, the President appears to have said that he proposed to deal directly with Stalin as a friend and that, since he was no diplomat, he would not beat around the bush but would operate on a yes or no basis. Stalin expressed appreciation for the President’s remark and said that the Soviet Union would always try to meet the views of the United States. Following the President’s remark that Churchill had called on him also, there appears to have been a brief discussion of the British election, during which Stalin expressed the view that the British people would not throw Churchill out if only because of his great service during the war and their instinct of self-preservation. The President made some mention of the size of the majority that Churchill expected to have. (It seemed to be in the neighborhood of 80 seats.) With reference to Stalin’s observation, the President agreed and spoke of the precedent of the re-election of Roosevelt in 1944. Stalin then appears to have spoken about the different attitude of the British toward the Japanese and European wars. He said that Great Britain seemed to think that the war was virtually over with the victory in Europe, but they had been bombed by the Germans and not by the Japanese. The British therefore had very little interest in the war against Japan, and this might be a complicating factor in relations with the British. The President observed that the United States was not in the same dire straits in regard to the war in the Pacific as England had been in with regard to the war Europe. Stalin reverted to the Yalta agreement concerning Soviet entry into the Pacific war 5 and told the President that the Soviets would be ready for such entry by the middle of August, but said that prior to acting they would need to complete their negotiations and reach agreement with the Chinese. Stalin then gave a brief outline of the status of these negotiations, in which he stated that the question of Outer Mongolia had been agreed after long negotiation, but that the question of railroads in Manchuria and the status of Dairen and Port Arthur were still the subject of differences. He mentioned that Soong was not optimistic about settling these differences by cable, and he had observed that Soong understood the Russian position better than Chungking. The President observed at this point that he had had a long talk with T. V. Soong 6 and that the latter well understood the situation. Stalin continued that Soong was prepared to return to Chungking in an endeavor to persuade his Government, and should return to Moscow by the end of July. He had asked from the Soviets a statement giving a Soviet assurance that Manchuria was a part of China and subject to its sovereignty. The Soviets had given this assurance. Stalin said that Soong had asked assurances that the central government would be the only recognized authority in Manchuria and not any other military nucleus, having in mind the Communist army. He repeated that the Soviet Union would give Soong full assurances on all these points. The President said that he was very happy to hear that these matters were so near settlement. Stalin repeated that assurances had been given that there would be one government and one army, and that this would be clearly stated in the treaty, which was to last for 30 years as against the 20-year term of the Czech treaty. 7 It would also provide for noninterference in Chinese internal affairs and deal with the problem of Sinkiang, where it was recognized that the Chinese authorities had a definite problem with the local population. The Soviets agreed not to give any assistance to the rebels. Special provisions in the treaty dealt with this problem of noninterference. The Soviets had, however, suggested to the Chinese that they make concessions, such as native schools, to satisfy the non-Chinese inhabitants in Sinkiang. According to Stalin, Soong had agreed and realized that a situation of this kind could not be calmed by a stick but required certain concessions and improvements for the local inhabitants. The President remarked that Soong seemed to be a reasonable man. Secretary Byrnes asked what differences still remained. Stalin said the Yalta agreement provided that the railroads should be jointly administered and that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union were to be safeguarded in regard to the railroads and also in Dairen and Port Arthur. The Chinese do not recognize the Soviet preeminent interest and will attempt to get around it. In answer to his own rhetorical question as to what the Soviet preeminent interests were, Stalin pointed out that they were asking no profit from the railroads, the administration of which would be equally divided, although they had been built by Russian money. Furthermore, there would be no guards such as the Japanese had maintained, but the Chinese would protect the railroads themselves. The old treaty concerning the railroads 8 had been for 80 years, after which time they would revert to China. The Soviet suggestion in the present instance was 30 years. He also mentioned that the Russians wished to have a majority of one on the railroad board and a Russian director, but the Chinese wanted a Chinese director with no Russian majority. There was also the question of the Chinese administration of Dairen. At this point there was an exchange between Secretary Byrnes and Stalin relating to the question of joint administration and a Chinese majority. Stalin said that the Soviets had proposed a city council with a joint board in which the Russians would participate. The President then appears to have asked what effect this arrangement would have on the rights of the United States. Stalin answered that it would be a free port open to the commerce of all nations, to which the President observed that it would follow, therefore, the Open Door policy. Stalin remarked that all was not smooth with the Chinese, presumably between Soong and his government, and this was why Soong had gone home. Reverting to the question of Soviet entry into the Far Eastern war, Stalin repeated that the Soviets would be ready in mid-August, as was agreed at Yalta, and said they would keep their word. The President appears to have expressed his confidence that the Soviets would keep their word. Secretary Byrnes reverted to the negotiations with the Chinese and said that, if the arrangements were in strict accordance with the Yalta agreement, this would be all right, but that if at any point they were in excess of that agreement, this would create difficulties. Stalin stated that their desires were more liberal than the Yalta agreement, which had provided for the restoration of Russian rights. This would have entitled them to station troops and to have the railroads run for 80 years exclusively by Russians. He said they would have had that formal right, but they had not insisted on it. The Soviets did not wish to add in any respect to the Yalta agreement or to deceive the Chinese. However, he said that Chungking did not understand horse trading; they were very slow and tried to wangle every little thing. They did not seem to be aware of the big picture. The President and Secretary Byrnes both indicated that the main interest of the United States was in a free port. In reply to the Secretary’s inquiry as to Soong’s movements, Stalin stated that Soong expected to return to Moscow at the end of July to finish the negotiations. In an obvious reference to Outer Mongolia, Stalin stated that for 22 years there had been no ties with the Chinese and no Chinese representation there. The Chinese therefore could not lose what they did not have. C[ harles ] E B[ ohlen ] 1 Ante , pp. 43–46 [ Pgs. 43–46 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] . 2 Concerning the Stalin-Soong conversations referred to, see vol. i , p. 857 . 3 See document No. 1417 , section vi . 4 i. e., at the United Nations Conference on International Organization. See chapters xi–xiii of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945 (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031). 5 Signed February 11, 1945. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984 . 6 See Truman, Year of Decisions , pp. 268-270. 7 The reference is to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Post-War Cooperation, signed at Moscow, December 12, 1943, which was to remain in force for 20 years. For text, see Department of State, Documents and State Papers , vol. i , p. 228. 8 For a description of and citations to the treaties referred to, see ante , p. 1231 [ Pg. 1231 is part of Doc. 1215 ] . No. 1419 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen) 023.1/3–2860 No. 1419 Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State ( Bohlen ) Washington , March 28, 1960. Memorandum Subject: Meeting of President Truman with Generalissimo Stalin at Stalin’s Villa, 3 p.m., July 18, 1945, on the occasion of the President’s courtesy call on Stalin Present: President Truman, Secretary of State Byrnes, Mr. Bohlen; Generalissimo Stalin, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Mr. Pavlov The opening remarks recorded in my longhand notes on this meeting 1 refer to the President’s comment on the scenery from the balcony of Stalin’s villa, which overlooked the lake, with dark trees in the background. Stalin said that the Soviet Union had received a communication from the Japanese, and he handed to the President a copy of a note from Sato, the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow, with a message from the Emperor. 2 Secretary Byrnes then referred to something which Harry Hopkins had told him following Hopkins’ return from Moscow in June 1945. Stalin inquired of the President whether it was worth while answer this communication. The President replied that he had no respect for the good faith of the Japanese. Stalin pointed out that the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan and that it might be desirable to lull the Japanese to sleep, and possibly a general and unspecific answer might be returned, pointing out that the exact character of the proposed Konoye mission was not clear. Alternatives would be that they might ignore it completely and not answer, or send back a definite refusal. The President said that he thought the first course of action would be satisfactory. Molotov pointed out that it would be completely factual, since it was not entirely clear what the Konoye mission would have to offer. 3 Secretary Byrnes observed that it was possible that this Japanese move had been inspired by fear of what the Soviets intended to do. Molotov said that he was sure the Japanese could guess, and Stalin remarked that they had observed Soviet forces and tanks, etc., moving in the Far East. There seems to have been a discussion here of previous Japanese peace feelers not only to the U. S. S. R. but also to the Allied powers, and the President mentioned that the United States had had some indication via Sweden. 4 C[ harles ] E B[ ohle ] 1 Ante , p. 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] . 2 See vol. i , document No. 582 . The paper which Stalin apparently handed to Truman has not been found. 3 Concerning the reply given to Sato at Moscow on July 18, see document No. 1226 . 4 See document No. 1420 . E. Addenda E. Addenda [[Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)]] Editor’s Note [1420] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, July 6, 1945—6 p.m. 740.00119 PW/7–645: Telegram [1421] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 [1422] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 [1423] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 [1424] Text Submitted to the Heads of Government [Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2445 [1425] Proposal by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3145 [1426] Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [1427] Text Submitted by the British Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [1428] Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [1429] Text Submitted by the British Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [1430] Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [1431] Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [1432] Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 [1433] Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation [Undated.] 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 Editor’s Note [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] Editor’s Note —Except for document No. 1420 (which was added to the compilation to clarify a reference by Truman in his private conversation with Stalin on July 18), the papers included in this appendix were discovered, after the rest of the compilation was in page proof, in a file of personal papers to which the editors had not previously had access. Although these documents, the source copies of which have now been deposited in the Department’s indexed Central Files, add comparatively little of substance to the papers already contained in the compilation, it seemed advisable to include them in an appendix because of the light which they shed on drafting changes and for the clarification which they give to certain passages in the minutes of meetings at which these particular texts were discussed. No. 1420 The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/7–645: Telegram No. 1420 The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State 1 Top secret Stockholm , July 6, 1945—6 p.m. 2384. Following is substance of report given Leg by Prince Carl Bernadotte following a conversation with Jap Military Attaché. 2 This conversation took place at a dinner arranged by the Japs for Prince Carl who had previously informed Leg that he would. 3 Major General Onodera, Jap Mil Attaché, stated that Japs know war has been lost and when right time comes they will make direct contact with King of Swed. Onodera said this would be done by him and he emphasized that he and not Jap Minister 4 has authorization from Emperor and Jap Govt to enter into negotiations. King Gustaf would be approached with view to his contacting Allies. Onodera referred to Emperor and pointed out that by reason of Emperor’s position contact will have to be made by Swed King. He further stated that Emperor must be maintained in his position after the capitulation. No other conditions of surrender were specified. Bernadotte was asked not to advise the Americans of conversation at this time Mil Attaché stressing point that time had not yet arrived for contact to be made. Onodera then requested Prince Charles [ Carl ] to arrange meeting for him with his father Prince Carl Senior. Bernadotte replied that his father is now in Oslo and is not well but that he would deliver message and give Onodera Prince Carl Senior’s reply. Prince Carl Senior is brother of King Gustaf and President of Swed Red Cross. Johnson 1 Sent to Washington; relayed to Byrnes, then at sea, in Grew’s telegram No. 4 of July 7 (file No. 740.00119 (Potsdam)/8–645). This is presumably the message which Truman had in mind when he mentioned an “indicate[on] from Sweden” in his discussion with Stalin on July 18 of a Japanese peace feeler. See ante , pp. 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 1419 ] . 2 Major General Onodera Makoto. 3 There is an apparent omission at this point in the original. 4 Okamoto Suemasa. No. 1421 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 No. 1421 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation 2 ] [Undated.] Amendments of the Soviet Delegation to the British Draft Declaration on the Polish Question 3 It Is Suggested : 1. that the text of paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned document be replaced by a new text (see enclosure 1). 2. that the text of the last sentence of paragraph 3 be replaced by a new text (see enclosure 2). 3. that the last two sentences of paragraph 4 be omitted. [Enclosure 1—Translation] Declaration on the Polish Question In place of the text of paragraph 2 of the British draft the following text is proposed: The British and United States Governments have already taken measures to prevent the alienation to third parties of property of all kinds belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be, wherever and at whosoever’s disposal it may be, and without regard to whether it was transferred to someone earlier and exactly when. They are ready to take immediate measures for the transfer of this property, as well as vessels of the Polish Merchant Marine, to the disposal of the Polish Provisional Government as soon as possible. To this end they are prepared to discuss with properly accredited representatives of the Polish Provisional Government the manner and time of such transfer. [Enclosure 2—Translation] Declaration on the Polish Question In place of the text of the last sentence of paragraph 3 the following text is proposed: They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens and in accordance with the existing laws of Poland. At the same time the British Government shall take measures that in the territory of Great Britain, and in territories under British control, Poles wishing to return to Poland shall not be arrested. 1 Submitted to the Subcommittee on Poland. 2 The translations of this proposal and of its two enclosures were prepared for this volume by the Division of Language Services, Department of State. 3 For the text of the British proposal referred to, see document No. 1121 . For the text reported by the Subcommittee, after consideration of the British and Soviet drafts on this subject, see document No. 1129 . No. 1422 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 No. 1422 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation 2 ] [Undated.] The British and United States Governments have already taken measures to prevent the alienation to third parties of property of all kinds belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They are ready to take immediate measures for the transfer of this property, as well as vessels of the Polish Merchant Marine, to the disposal of the Polish Provisional Government as soon as possible. To this end they are prepared to discuss with properly accredited representatives of the Polish Provisional Government the manner and time of such transfer. All facilities will be given to the Polish Government of National Unity for the return to it, in accordance with the laws of the U. S. A. and Great Britain, of any property which may have been wrongfully alienated. 1 Presumably submitted to the Subcommittee on Poland. 2 Prepared for this volume by the Division of Language Services, Department of State. No. 1423 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2045 No. 1423 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation 2 ] [Undated.] Since in Greece today the public order is disturbed and law is not observed, and it is clear that the Varkiza agreement 3 between the Greek Government and democratic elements is not being observed it is proposed that the Government of Great Britain urge the Regent of Greece to change the composition of the Greek Government in spirit of the agreement reached at Varkiza, February 12, 1945, between representatives of the then existing government of Greece and representatives of Greek democracy. 1 This is presumably the paper on Greece circulated by the Soviet Delegation on July 30. See ante , pp. 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] . Cf. document No. 1064 . This prop was apparently withdrawn by Stalin at the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, July 31. See ante , pp. 525 (footnote 46) [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537. 2 Prepared for this volume by the Division of Language Services, Department of State. 3 See vol. i , documents Nos. 442 and 443 . The text of the Varkiza Agreement is printed in Woodhouse, Apple of Discord , p. 308. No. 1424 Text Submitted to the Heads of Government 740.00119 Potsdam/7–2445 No. 1424 Text Submitted to the Heads of Government 1 [ Babelsberg ,] July 24, 1945. Admission to the United Nations The three Governments consider that the time has come terminate the present anomalous position of Italy. Italy was first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions. The three Governments have therefore resolved that it is desirable that very early steps should be taken to conclude a peace treaty with Italy and they trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share their views. They have, therefore, included the preparation of the treaty as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. The conclusion of such a peace treaty will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations Organization. As regards the admission of other States, Article IV of the Charter of the United Nations 2 declares that: 1. membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. 2. the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The three Governments so far as they are concerned will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above. The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded on the support of the Axis powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor states, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership. 1 This paper, a revision of document No. 729 , has been tentatively identified as the paper on this subject attached to the Rapporteur ’s report of the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 24. See ante , pp. 325–326 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] . The discussion of this subject, however, at the Eighth Plenary Meeting, July 24, centered on a draft (not found) which superseded this paper and was in turn superseded by the draft of July 25 referred to in the footnotes to document No. 730 . The missing draft of July 24 presumably incorporated the two suggestions by Byrnes quoted on pp. 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] and 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , ante . 2 Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945 (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031). No. 1425 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3145 No. 1425 Proposal by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation 2 ] [Undated.] Reparations From Germany 1. Reparations shall be taken by each Government in its own zone of occupation. They shall assume two forms: simultaneous removals from the national property of Germany (equipment, matériel), which shall be completed within two years after surrender, and yearly delivery of products out of current production, which shall be completed within ten years after surrender. 2. Reparations shall have the purpose of aiding the quickest possible restoration of the economies of countries which suffered from German occupation, taking into account the necessity of eliminating the war potential of Germany in all ways. 3. In addition to the reparations to be taken from its own zone, the USSR shall receive additionally from the Western Zones: ( a ) 15% of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries, which on determination of the Control Council in Germany on the basis of the report of the Commission on Reparations shall be subject to removal on reparations account from the Western Zones: this equipment shall be transferred to the Soviet Union in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, timber, clay products, and petroleum products over a period of 5 years. ( b ) 10% of the basic industrial capital equipment shall be taken out of the Western Zones on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return. Establishment of the amount of equipment and matériel to be removed from the Western Zones on reparations account must be determined within three months at the latest. 4. In addition to this, the USSR shall receive on reparations account: ( a ) 500 million dollars worth of the shares of industrial and transport enterprises in the Western Zones; ( b ) 30% of the external investments of Germany; ( c ) 30% of the German gold which has come into the hands of the Allies. 5. The USSR itself shall assume the settlement of the reparations claims of Poland from its own share of reparations. The USA and Great Britain shall do the same in regard to France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland, and Norway. 1 Circulated at the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, July 31. See ante , pp. 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] . 2 Prepared for this volume by the Division of Language Services, Department of State. No. 1426 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 No. 1426 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [Undated.] Draft Entry for the Protocol Regarding Trusteeship Territories The Conference examined a proposal of the Soviet Government regarding the settlement of the question concerning trusteeship territories. 2 In this respect the categories of territories as they were defined in the decision of the Crimean Conference 3 and in the Charter of the International Security Organization 4 were envisaged. In the Soviet proposals it was provided that the Council of Foreign Ministers be instructed to prepare proposals with respect to the category of territories which have been taken away from enemy states, taking as the point of departure in this respect the necessity of deciding in the near future the question of the forms of trusteeship over the former colonial possessions of Italy in Africa and the Mediterranean Sea. In the Soviet draft the possibility was foreseen of establishing a trusteeship of separate states or a joint trusteeship of the USSR, USA, and Great Britain over the aforementioned former Italian colonial possessions. The Soviet draft also provided that the Council of Foreign Ministers should work out the practical measures with respect to the concluding of definite agreements concerning territorial trusteeship in accordance with the Statute [ Charter ] of [the] United Nations, including proposals concerning the future fate of the territories, administered on the basis of mandates of the League of Nations. After an exchange of opinions on this question it was decided to take note of the statement of the Soviet Delegation to the effect that the proposal of the Soviet Government on the question of trusteeship territories would be submitted by it to the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs for consideration. 1 Submitted to the Protocol Subcommittee. Cf. ante , pp. 550–551 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . 2 Document No. 733 . 3 See document No. 1416 , section i . 4 i. e., the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945 (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031). No. 1427 Text Submitted by the British Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 No. 1427 Text Submitted by the British Delegation 1 [Undated.] Austria The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria. 2 The three Governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna. The Conference took note of a statement by Generalissimo Stalin that Marshal Koniev would continue to issue rations to the people of Vienna until the British and American authorities were able to undertake the task. 3 1 This draft text constitutes the fifth part of a third draft of the Protocol prepared by the British Delegation, which bears the following notation: “Compared with U. S. Text and agreed 30.7.45.” It was discussed at the Eleventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, August 1. See ante , p. 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . Cf. document No. 1428 . 2 See ante , p. 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . 3 See ante , p. 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] . No. 1428 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 No. 1428 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [Undated.] Draft Entry for the Protocol Regarding the Extension of the Authority of the Provisional Austrian Government to the English and American Zones of Occupation in Austria The Conference has examined a proposal of the Soviet delegation regarding the extension of the authority of the Provisional Austrian Government to the English and American zones of occupation in Austria. 2 The Conference has agreed that such an undertaking is expedient and the English and American Delegations have stated that they are prepared to examine this question after the entry of their forces into the City of Vienna. 1 Cf. document No. 1427 . Cf. also the following text submitted by the Soviet Delegation (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045): “The Conference examined a proposal of the Soviet Delegation concerning the extension of the authority of the Provisional Austrian Government to all of Austria. The Conference agreed on the desirability of such action and the English and American Delegations declare that their Governments are ready to examine this question after the entry of their forces into the City of Vienna.” For the final text on this subject, as included in the Protocol, see document No. 1383 , section viii ( vii ). 2 See ante , p. 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] . No. 1429 Text Submitted by the British Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 No. 1429 Text Submitted by the British Delegation 1 [Undated.] Western Frontier of the Union of the [ sic ] Soviet Socialist Republics The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government 2 that, pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should provisionally 3 pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg–Goldap to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia. The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Königsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above, subject to expert examination of the actual frontier . The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support in principle this proposal at the forthcoming peace settlement. 1 This draft text constitutes the fourth part of a third draft of the Protocol prepared by the British Delegation, which bears the following notation: “Compared with U. S. Text and agreed 30.7.45.” It was discussed at the Eleventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, August 1. See ante , pp. 552–553 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . Cf. documents Nos. 1430 and 1431 . 2 Document No. 1020 . 3 The words here printed in italics are underscored in red pencil on the original, which also bears the following penciled notation: “in Red disagreed”. No. 1430 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 No. 1430 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation 2 ] [Undated.] Draft Entry for the Protocol Partial Change in the Western Frontier of the USSR and the Transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the Adjacent Area The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government 3 to the effect that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the Peace Conference, the section of the western frontier of the USSR which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig, indicated on the attached map, 4 to the east, north of Braunsberg–Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of the Lithuanian SSR, the Polish Republic and former East Prussia. (In accordance with the attached map). The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it. The American and British Governments have declared that they will support the proposal at the forthcoming Peace Conference. 1 Submitted to the Protocol Subcommittee. Cf. documents Nos. 1429 and 1431 . 2 Prepared for this volume by the Division of Language Services, Department of State. 3 Document No. 1020 . 4 Map not found. No. 1431 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 No. 1431 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [Undated.] Soviet Draft Translation Concerning the Transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of koenigsberg and adjacent area The Conference examined the proposal of the Soviet Government 2 that prior to the final decision on territorial questions at the peace settlement that the section of the western frontier of the USSR adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the west bank of the Gulf of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg–Goldap to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic, and East Prussia. The Conference agreed in principle with the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and its adjacent area. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain declare that they will support this proposal at the forthcoming peace conference. 1 Submitted to the Protocol Subcommittee. Cf. documents Nos. 1429 and 1430 . 2 Document No. 1020 . No. 1432 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 No. 1432 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation 2 ] [Undated.] Draft Entry for the Protocol Declaration of the Soviet Government Concerning the Soviet Prisoner-of-War Camp in the Cesenatico District ( Italy ) The Soviet delegation transmitted an aide-mémoire on this question to the delegations of the United States of America and Great Britain 3 (see enclosure No. 4 ). Prime Minister Churchill and Field Marshal Alexander gave a clarification on this matter. 5 The Soviet delegation declared that it considered this question closed. 1 Submitted to the Protocol Subcommittee. No section on this subject, however, was included in the Protocol. 2 Prepared for this volume by the Division of Language Services, Department of State. 3 For the communication on this subject addressed to the United States Delegation, see document No. 1164 . 4 Enclosure number blank in the original. The enclosure is identical to the attachment to document No. 1164 , except that it is dated July 28, 1945. 5 See ante , pp. 367–368 [ Pgs. 367–368 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] . No. 1433 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 740.00119 Potsdam/7–3045 No. 1433 Text Submitted by the Soviet Delegation 1 [Translation] [Undated.] Draft Entry for the Protocol Regarding the Black Sea Straits 1. The three Governments have recognized the necessity of revising the Straits Convention, concluded at Montreux, 2 as not conforming to present conditions. 2. The three Governments will continue conversations with Turkey on this question. 1 Submitted to the Protocol Subcommittee. It was discussed at the Eleventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, August 1. See ante , p. 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] . Cf. document No. 1369 . 2 Signed July 20, 1936. The substantive provisions are printed in Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits , p. 25. For full text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 213. Index Index Editor’s Note .—In indexing persons the intention has been to include references to persons of significance for an understanding of the record. References to persons in the following categories have in general been omitted: historic personages; persons appearing only as recipients or as transmitting agents of documents or information; Secret Service agents; authors, journalists, and composers, unless mentioned in some other capacity; civilian clerical personnel; enlisted personnel of the armed services; and other persons having only a slight substantive connection with the record to whom only passing reference is made in the documents. For identification of persons mentioned in this volume, see the List of Persons Mentioned, ante , pages xlviii–lxxiii [ Pgs. XLVIII–LXXIII include portions of List of Persons: and List of Persons Mentioned ] . Abderhalden, Emil, 907 [ Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 951 ] Abramovitz, Moses, 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 841–842 [ Pgs. 841–842 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] , 862–863 [ Pgs. 862–863 include portions of Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , and Doc. 920 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] Abyssinia. See Ethiopia . Acheson, Dean, 1564 n [ Pg. 1564 includes portions of Doc. 1414 and Doc. 1415 ] , 1565 [ Pg. 1565 is part of Doc. 1415 ] Adams, Francis W. H., 840 n [ Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 897 ] Adjournment of Berlin Conference, 596–597 [ Pgs. 596–597 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Agenda, question of, 31–32 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 46–47 [ Pgs. 46–47 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 54–55 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 60–61 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 1583 [ Pg. 1583 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Air communications: Anglo-American cooperation, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] ; London–Warsaw, 518–520 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 533–534 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] ; United States–Soviet Union, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 1166–1170 [ Pgs. 1166–1170 include portions of Doc. 1168 , Doc. 1169 , Doc. 1170 , Doc. 1171 , Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , and Doc. 1174 ] Alba de Tormes, Duke of, 124 n [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 1350 and Doc. 1351 ] Albania, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 130–131 [ Pgs. 130–131 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] , 1063 [ Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 1075 ] , 1064–1065 [ Pgs. 1064–1065 include portions of Doc. 1076 and Doc. 1077 ] , 1091–1092 [ Pgs. 1091–1092 include portions of Doc. 1098 and Doc. 1099 ] , 1093 [ Pg. 1093 includes portions of Doc. 1099 and Doc. 1100 ] , 1096 [ Pg. 1096 includes portions of Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 111–112 [ Pgs. 111–112 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 175–177 [ Pgs. 175–177 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 181–182 [ Pgs. 181–182 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 310–311 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 316–317 [ Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 367–368 [ Pgs. 367–368 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 623 n [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , 669–670 [ Pgs. 669–670 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , and Doc. 774 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 895 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] , 1064–1065 [ Pgs. 1064–1065 include portions of Doc. 1076 and Doc. 1077 ] , 1100 [ Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , and Doc. 1113 ] , 1101 [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 1113 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 1114 and Doc. 1115 ] , 1103 [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 1115 and Doc. 1116 ] , 1109 n [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 1118 and Doc. 1119 ] , 1113–1114 [ Pgs. 1113–1114 include portions of Doc. 1122 , Doc. 1123 , and Doc. 1124 ] , 1213 n [ Pg. 1213 includes portions of Doc. 1205 and Doc. 1206 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Alexander I, former King of Yugoslavia, 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1204 ] Allen, Denis, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] Allen, George V., 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 238–239 [ Pgs. 238–239 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 317–319 [ Pgs. 317–319 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 635–636 [ Pgs. 635–636 include portions of Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , and Doc. 737 ] , 1042 [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , and Doc. 1061 ] , 1047–1048 [ Pgs. 1047–1048 include portions of Doc. 1068 , Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] , 1393–1394 [ Pgs. 1393–1394 include portions of Doc. 1331 , Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] , 1398 [ Pg. 1398 includes portions of Doc. 1338 and Doc. 1339 ] , 1400 [ Pg. 1400 includes portions of Doc. 1341 and Doc. 1342 ] , 1416 [ Pg. 1416 includes portions of Doc. 1357 and Doc. 1358 ] , 1425–1426 [ Pgs. 1425–1426 include portions of Doc. 1366 and Doc. 1367 ] , 1435–1436 [ Pgs. 1435–1436 include portions of Doc. 1373 , Doc. 1374 , and Doc. 1375 ] , 1441–1442 [ Pgs. 1441–1442 include portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] Allied Commission in Italy. See under Italy . Allied Commission on Reparations. See Germany : Reparations Commission . Allied Control Commissions. See under Bulgaria , Hungary , and Rumania . Allied Control Councils. See under Austria and Germany . Allied declaration on Germany, June 5 , cited, 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 788 and Doc. 789 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] , 1008 [ Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 1037 and Doc. 1038 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 1038 ] American interests and property rights, protection of, 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 835 and Doc. 836 ] , 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , and Doc. 840 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 850 ] American Radiator Co., 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Anaconda Copper Co., 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] Anami, Gen. Korehita, 1248 n [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] and Doc. 1223 ] Anders, Lt. Gen. Wladyslaw, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 1109–1110 [ Pgs. 1109–1110 include portions of Doc. 1118 , Doc. 1119 , and Doc. 1120 ] , 1113–1114 [ Pgs. 1113–1114 include portions of Doc. 1122 , Doc. 1123 , and Doc. 1124 ] , 1132 [ Pg. 1132 includes portions of Doc. 1139 and Doc. 1140 ] Anderson, Sir John, 1180 n [ Pg. 1180 includes portions of Doc. 1181 and Doc. 1182 ] , 1180–1181 [ Pgs. 1180–1181 include portions of Doc. 1181 and Doc. 1182 ] , 1370 n [ Pg. 1370 includes portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] Angell, James W., 938 n [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] Antonov, Army Gen. A. I., 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 344–345 [ Pgs. 344–345 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 350–353 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 408–417 [ Pgs. 408–417 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] , 1584 [ Pg. 1584 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Arabs in Palestine, 1404–1406 [ Pgs. 1404–1406 include portions of Doc. 1345 and Doc. 1346 ] Arciszewski, Tomasz, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 1110 [ Pg. 1110 includes portions of Doc. 1119 and Doc. 1120 ] , 1541 [ Pg. 1541 is part of Doc. 1394 ] , 1583 [ Pg. 1583 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Ardalan, Naser Qoli, 1390 [ Pg. 1390 includes portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , and Doc. 1329 ] Ardenne, Baron Manfred of, 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 896 ] Argentina, 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] Argonaut ( see also Yalta ), 1193 [ Pg. 1193 is part of Doc. 1191 ] Armistice agreements. See under Bulgaria , Hungary , Finland , Italy , and Rumania . Armour, Norman, 1410–1411 [ Pgs. 1410–1411 include portions of Doc. 1350 , Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] , 1413 [ Pg. 1413 is part of Doc. 1355 ] Arnold, Gen. of the Army Henry H., 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139–140 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 197–198 [ Pgs. 197–198 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 349–350 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 413–414 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 1166 [ Pg. 1166 includes portions of Doc. 1168 and Doc. 1169 ] , 1178 [ Pg. 1178 is part of Doc. 1180 ] , 1324 n [ Pg. 1324 is part of Doc. 1275 ] , 1361 n [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] , 1373 n [ Pg. 1373 is part of Doc. 1310 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Arutyunyan (Arutiunian), A. A., 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] Ascania Werke, 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 951 ] Ashcan , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 850 ] Atlantic Charter, cited, 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 1076 and Doc. 1077 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1066 n [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 1082 and Doc. 1083 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] , 1261 [ Pg. 1261 is part of Doc. 1233 ] , 1273 [ Pg. 1273 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1274 [ Pg. 1274 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1294 [ Pg. 1294 is part of Doc. 1259 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1578 [ Pg. 1578 is part of Doc. 1417 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Atomic bomb. See under Japan . Atomic energy, sharing of information with Soviet Union, 1157 [ Pg. 1157 is part of Doc. 1157 ] Attlee, Clement R.: Appointment as Prime Minister, 388 n [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 431 n [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] Exchange of messages with Truman, 1184–1187 [ Pgs. 1184–1187 include portions of Doc. 1185 and Doc. 1186 ] , 1205–1206 [ Pg. 1205 is part of Doc. 1200 ] , 1375 [ Pg. 1375 includes portions of Doc. 1313 and Doc. 1314 ] , 1406 [ Pg. 1406 includes portions of Doc. 1345 and Doc. 1346 ] Meetings with Byrnes, 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] ; with Truman, 458–459 [ Pgs. 458–459 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 476–477 [ Pgs. 476–477 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] Miscellaneous, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 490 n [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 1107 and Doc. 1108 ] , 1260 [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 1232 and Doc. 1233 ] , 1294 [ Pg. 1294 is part of Doc. 1259 ] , 1321 [ Pg. 1321 is part of Doc. 1273 ] , 1403–1404 [ Pg. 1403 is part of Doc. 1345 ] , 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 1347 ] , 1440 [ Pg. 1440 is part of Doc. 1378 ] , 1442 [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] , 1445 [ Pg. 1445 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1446 [ Pg. 1446 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1447 [ Pg. 1447 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Plenary Meetings, participation in, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 167–168 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 459–470 [ Pgs. 459–470 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 510–540 [ Pgs. 510–540 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] , 565–585 [ Pgs. 565–585 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 586–601 [ Pgs. 586–601 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Tripartite dinner meetings, participation in, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] Australia ( see also British Commonwealth ), 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 includes portions of Doc. 1260 and Doc. 1261 ] , 1313 [ Pg. 1313 is part of Doc. 1267 ] , 1315 [ Pg. 1315 includes portions of Doc. 1267 and Doc. 1268 ] , 1340 [ Pg. 1340 is part of Doc. 1287 ] , 1346 [ Pg. 1346 includes portions of Doc. 1291 and Doc. 1292 ] Austria: Allied Control Council, establishment and functions of, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 712 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 656–657 [ Pgs. 656–657 include portions of Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , and Doc. 759 ] , 661–662 [ Pgs. 661–662 include portions of Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 782 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 787 ] , 681–682 [ Pgs. 681–682 include portions of Doc. 788 and Doc. 789 ] , 1455 [ Pg. 1455 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1480 [ Pg. 1480 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1544 [ Pg. 1544 includes portions of Doc. 1395 and Doc. 1396 ] Anti-Soviet activities, alleged. See Fascist activities , infra . Austrian political and economic situation, letter to Truman from Archduke Otto of Austria, 659–661 [ Pgs. 659–661 include portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] Carinthia, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , and Doc. 765 ] Communist Party activities, 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] Control machinery in Austria, European Advisory Commission Agreement on ( July 4 ), approval by the four occupation powers, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 670–671 [ Pgs. 670–671 include portions of Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 677–679 [ Pgs. 677–679 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] Economic and financial matters in connection with reparations ( see also Food , infra ), 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 663–665 [ Pgs. 663–665 include portions of Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] Enemy war matériel, disposal of, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] , 835–837 [ Pgs. 835–837 include portions of Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , and Doc. 896 ] Fascist activities in British and U. S. occupation zones, question of, 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 495–496 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 548–549 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 683–685 [ Pgs. 683–685 include portions of Doc. 789 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)] , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] Food, 310–311 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 316–317 [ Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 673–677 [ Pgs. 673–677 include portions of Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 787 ] , 1596 [ Pg. 1596 includes portions of Doc. 1427 and Doc. 1428 ] Four Power authority in Austria, proposed quadripartite statements relative to, 508 n [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#145)] ] , 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] , 681–683 [ Pgs. 681–683 include portions of Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)] , and Doc. 790 ] German assets in Austria, 567–569 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579–580 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1486–1487 [ Pg. 1486 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1506 [ Pg. 1506 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Moscow Declaration on Austria ( Nov. 1, 1943 ), cited, 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 784 and Doc. 785 ] Occupation: Entry of British and U. S. troops into Western occupation zones and sectors in Vienna, discussions concerning, 175–177 [ Pgs. 175–177 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 181–182 [ Pgs. 181–182 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 310–311 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] ; quadripartite meetings of military commanders, 669–671 [ Pgs. 669–671 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 672–673 [ Pgs. 672–673 include portions of Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , and Doc. 778 ] , 674–675 [ Pgs. 674–675 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 787 ] European Advisory Commission Agreement on occupation zones and administration of Vienna ( July 9 ), approval by the four occupation powers, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 677–679 [ Pgs. 677–679 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] Oil, 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1378–1388 [ Pgs. 1378–1388 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , Doc. 1317 , Doc. 1318 , Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , Doc. 1321 , Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , Doc. 1324 , Doc. 1325 , and Doc. 1326 ] passim Otto, Archduke of Austria, letter to Truman, 659–661 [ Pgs. 659–661 include portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] Protocol and Communiqué sections concerning, 1455 [ Pg. 1455 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1507–1508 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Provisional government under Karl Renner, question of recognition, and extension of authority to all of Austria, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 553–554 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 659–663 [ Pgs. 659–663 include portions of Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , and Doc. 765 ] , 1455 [ Pg. 1455 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1507–1508 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1595 [ Pg. 1595 includes portions of Doc. 1426 and Doc. 1427 ] , 1596 [ Pg. 1596 includes portions of Doc. 1427 and Doc. 1428 ] Reestablishment as an independent democratic state according to Moscow Declaration of Nov. 1, 1943 , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 784 and Doc. 785 ] Relief, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] Renner government. See Provisional government , supra . Reparations: Discussions concerning, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 336–337 [ Pgs. 336–337 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 432–434 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 441–442 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 446–447 [ Pgs. 446–447 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 482–483 [ Pgs. 482–483 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 484–485 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 591–592 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] ; proposals and reports, 663–667 [ Pgs. 663–667 include portions of Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 771 (#1)] ] , 1093–1094 [ Pgs. 1093–1094 include portions of Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , and Doc. 1102 ] , 1095–1096 [ Pgs. 1095–1096 include portions of Doc. 1103 , Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, decision with respect to inclusion in, 591–592 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 1455 n [ Pg. 1455 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Restitution, 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] State of war between United States and Austria, question of, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] Styria, 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 662–663 [ Pgs. 662–663 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , and Doc. 765 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] Vienna: Entry of British and U. S. forces into their occupation sectors, discussions concerning, 175–177 [ Pgs. 175–177 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 181–182 [ Pgs. 181–182 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 310–311 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 669–671 [ Pgs. 669–671 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 672–677 [ Pgs. 672–677 include portions of Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 787 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué sections concerning, 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1507–1508 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 1384 ] ; provisioning of, 310–311 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 316–317 [ Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 669–671 [ Pgs. 669–671 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 675–677 [ Pgs. 675–677 include portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 787 ] , 1596 [ Pg. 1596 includes portions of Doc. 1427 and Doc. 1428 ] War booty, 664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 765 and Doc. 766 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] War matériel, disposal of, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] , 835–837 [ Pgs. 835–837 include portions of Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , and Doc. 896 ] Withdrawal of Soviet troops to own occupation zone, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] Autounion, 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 951 ] Ayers, Eben A., 1290 [ Pg. 1290 is part of Doc. 1255 ] Azores, U. S. facilities at Santa Maria, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 1350 [ Pg. 1350 is part of Doc. 1295 ] , 1355 [ Pg. 1355 is part of Doc. 1299 ] , 1358 [ Pg. 1358 is part of Doc. 1301 ] Badoglio, Marshal Pietro, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] Bainbridge, Kenneth T., 1364 [ Pg. 1364 is part of Doc. 1305 ] Balance of power. See Spheres of influence . Balfour, John, 639–640 [ Pgs. 639–640 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] Balfour Declaration of Nov. 2, 1917 , cited, 1403 [ Pg. 1403 is part of Doc. 1345 ] , 1405 [ Pg. 1405 is part of Doc. 1345 ] Balkans. See individual countries; also under Press, freedom of . Balogh, Rev. István, 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] Baltic Sea, 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 849 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 includes portions of Doc. 1151 and Doc. 1152 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1489 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 1429 ] , 1598 [ Pg. 1598 is part of Doc. 1430 ] , 1599 [ Pg. 1599 is part of Doc. 1431 ] Baltic States, 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 includes portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] , 1165–1166 [ Pgs. 1165–1166 include portions of Doc. 1167 , Doc. 1168 , and Doc. 1169 ] ; question of repatriation of Baltic nationals to Soviet Union, 259–260 [ Pgs. 259–260 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 367–368 [ Pgs. 367–368 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 549–550 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1162–1166 [ Pgs. 1162–1166 include portions of Doc. 1163 , Doc. 1164 , Doc. 1165 , Doc. 1166 , Doc. 1167 , Doc. 1168 , and Doc. 1169 ] , 1600 [ Pg. 1600 includes portions of Doc. 1432 and Doc. 1433 ] Barbour, Walworth, 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 1082 and Doc. 1083 ] Barnard, Thurman L., 1290 [ Pg. 1290 is part of Doc. 1255 ] Barnes, Maynard B., 694–695 [ Pgs. 694–695 include portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] , 708–709 [ Pgs. 708–709 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , and Doc. 812 ] , 716–718 [ Pgs. 716–718 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , and Doc. 818 ] , 722–725 [ Pgs. 722–725 include portions of Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , and Doc. 824 ] , 728–732 [ Pgs. 728–732 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 733–734 [ Pgs. 733–734 include portions of Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 832 (#1)] ] Baruch, Herman B., 956 n [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] , 1350 n [ Pg. 1350 is part of Doc. 1295 ] , 1354–1355 [ Pgs. 1354–1355 include portions of Doc. 1298 and Doc. 1299 ] , 1356 [ Pg. 1356 is part of Doc. 1300 ] Bavaria, 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 includes portions of Doc. 1026 and Doc. 1027 ] Beatty, Morgan, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 710 ] Belgium: Coal shipments to Belgium, 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] ; German ships, Belgian share, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] ; international protectorate in Rhineland and Ruhr, proposed, question of participation, 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 1021 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 1023 and Doc. 1024 ] , 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 1026 ] ; miscellaneous, 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] ; reparations from Germany, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Belgrade Agreement of June 9 (U. S.-British-Yugoslav agreement respecting the provisional administration of Venezia Giulia). See Yugoslavia : Venezia Giulia . Bell, John O., 1191 [ Pg. 1191 includes portions of Doc. 1189 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)] , and Doc. 1190 ] Bellinger, Vice Adm. Patrick N. L., 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 710 ] Belot, Col. Monti L., 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 710 ] Beneš, Edvard, 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] Berger, Edwin, 908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 951 ] Bergson, Abram, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 841–842 [ Pgs. 841–842 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] , 855 n [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] , 862–863 [ Pgs. 862–863 include portions of Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , and Doc. 920 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] , 1532 [ Pg. 1532 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1535–1536 [ Pg. 1535 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] Beriya (Beria), L. P., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] Berlin Physical and Technical Institute, 908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 951 ] Bernadotte, Prince Carl, 1589 [ Pg. 1589 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] and Doc. 1420 ] , 1590 [ Pg. 1590 includes portions of Doc. 1420 and Doc. 1421 ] Betts, Brig. Gen. Edward C., 421–422 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] Bevin, Ernest: Byrnes–Attlee meeting, participation in, 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] Foreign Ministers Meetings, participation in, 483–503 [ Pgs. 483–503 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 543–564 [ Pgs. 543–564 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] ; report as Rapporteur , meeting of July 30 , 500–503 [ Pgs. 500–503 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] Letter to Byrnes, 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 1057 and Doc. 1058 ] ; to Molotov, 1038–1040 [ Pgs. 1038–1040 include portions of Doc. 1057 and Doc. 1058 ] Meetings with Forrestal, 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] ; with Polish Delegation, 490 n [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] Miscellaneous, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 846 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1087 [ Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 1107 and Doc. 1108 ] , 1440 [ Pg. 1440 is part of Doc. 1378 ] , 1446 [ Pg. 1446 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1447 [ Pg. 1447 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1499 [ Pg. 1499 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Plenary Meetings, participation in, 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 463–466 [ Pgs. 463–466 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 469–470 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 510–511 [ Pgs. 510–511 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 515–528 [ Pgs. 515–528 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 531–538 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 565–572 [ Pgs. 565–572 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 575–576 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579–584 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 586–601 [ Pgs. 586–601 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Truman–Attlee meetings, participation in, 458–459 [ Pgs. 458–459 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] Bewilogua, Ludwig, 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 896 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 896 ] Bianchi, João Antonio de, 1355 [ Pg. 1355 is part of Doc. 1299 ] , 1357–1359 [ Pgs. 1357–1359 include portions of Doc. 1301 and Doc. 1302 ] Bidault, Georges, 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] , 1342 [ Pg. 1342 is part of Doc. 1288 ] , 1348 [ Pg. 1348 includes portions of Doc. 1293 and Doc. 1294 ] , 1399 [ Pg. 1399 includes portions of Doc. 1339 , Doc. 1340 , and Doc. 1341 ] , 1419 [ Pg. 1419 includes portions of Doc. 1362 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)] ] , 1548–1549 [ Pgs. 1548–1549 include portions of Doc. 1401 , Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , and Doc. 1404 ] , 1550–1555 [ Pgs. 1550–1555 include portions of Doc. 1404 , Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , Doc. 1409 , Doc. 1410 , Doc. 1411 , and Doc. 1412 ] , 1556 [ Pg. 1556 includes portions of Doc. 1412 and Doc. 1413 ] , 1557 n [ Pg. 1557 includes portions of Doc. 1413 and Doc. 1414 ] , 1557–1564 [ Pgs. 1557–1564 include portions of Doc. 1413 , Doc. 1414 , and Doc. 1415 ] Bierut, Bolesław, 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 490 n [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 506–507 [ Pgs. 506–507 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 1112 [ Pg. 1112 includes portions of Doc. 1121 and Doc. 1122 ] , 1138–1139 [ Pgs. 1138–1139 include portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , Doc. 1146 , and Doc. 1147 ] , 1140 [ Pg. 1140 includes portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 includes portions of Doc. 1151 and Doc. 1152 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1491 n [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1529–1531 [ Pgs. 1529–1531 include portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] ; conversations with Truman, 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 1540–1541 [ Pgs. 1540–1541 include portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] ; participation in Foreign Ministers Meeting of July 24 , 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 332–333 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 1518–1519 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1523 [ Pg. 1523 is part of Doc. 1385 ] Big Five, proposed creation of a Council of Foreign Ministers of. See Council of Foreign Ministers . Birse, Maj. Arthur, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 81 n [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] Biryuzov, Col. Gen. S. S., 708 n [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 827 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 1074 ] Bissell, Richard M., Jr., 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 1043 and Doc. 1044 ] , 1199 [ Pg. 1199 includes portions of Doc. 1194 and Doc. 1195 ] , 1340–1341 [ Pgs. 1340–1341 include portions of Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , and Doc. 1288 ] Black Sea Straits. See Turkey : Straits question . Blair, Lt. Col. James A., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] Blaisdell, Thomas C., Jr., 1024 [ Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 1040 and Doc. 1041 ] , 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 1041 and Doc. 1042 ] Bland, Sir Nevile, 1347 [ Pg. 1347 includes portions of Doc. 1292 and Doc. 1293 ] Blue Division, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] BMW (Bayrische Motoren Werke), 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 951 ] Bobrovi, Col., 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] Bogomolov, A. E., 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 1404 and Doc. 1405 ] Bohlen, Charles E.: Miscellaneous, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 378 n [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1540–1541 [ Pgs. 1540–1541 include portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] , 1572 n [ Pg. 1572 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 includes portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] , 1580 n [ Pg. 1580 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Notes, memoranda, and minutes on— Byrnes–Molotov meetings, 274–275 [ Pgs. 274–275 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 449–452 [ Pgs. 449–452 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 480–483 [ Pgs. 480–483 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] Tripartite dinner meeting, July 23 , 320–321 [ Pgs. 320–321 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] Truman–Molotov meeting, 471–476 [ Pgs. 471–476 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] Truman–Stalin meetings, 43–47 [ Pgs. 43–47 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 86–87 [ Pgs. 86–87 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] ; post-Conference memoranda ( 1960 ), 1582–1588 [ Pgs. 1582–1588 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] , Doc. 1418 , and Doc. 1419 ] Bonbright, James C. H., 1564–1565 [ Pgs. 1564–1565 include portions of Doc. 1414 and Doc. 1415 ] Bonnet, Henri, 1348–1349 [ Pgs. 1348–1349 include portions of Doc. 1293 , Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , and Doc. 1295 ] , 1555–1556 [ Pgs. 1555–1556 include portions of Doc. 1411 , Doc. 1412 , and Doc. 1413 ] , 1563 [ Pg. 1563 is part of Doc. 1414 ] , 1564–1566 [ Pgs. 1564–1566 include portions of Doc. 1414 and Doc. 1415 ] Booth, Brig. Gen. Donald P., 1394–1395 [ Pgs. 1394–1395 include portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , Doc. 1334 , and Doc. 1335 ] , 1396 [ Pg. 1396 includes portions of Doc. 1335 and Doc. 1336 ] , 1397 [ Pg. 1397 includes portions of Doc. 1336 , Doc. 1337 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)] ] Boris III, former King of Bulgaria, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 827 ] Boucher, Maj. Gen, Charles Hamilton, 1056 n [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 1071 ] Bowen, Col. John W., 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] Bowker, Reginald James, 1410 n [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 1350 and Doc. 1351 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] Bradley, Gen. Omar N., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] Brand, T. H., 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] Bratianu, Constantin (Dinu), 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 806 ] Bretton Woods Conference ( 1944 ) 844 n [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 1526 n [ Pg. 1526 is part of Doc. 1386 ] Bridges, Sir Edward, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] , 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] British Broadcasting Corporation, 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] British Commonwealth, participation in war against Japan, 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 1334–1341 [ Pgs. 1334–1341 include portions of Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , Doc. 1283 , Doc. 1284 , Doc. 1285 , Doc. 1286 , Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , and Doc. 1288 ] , 1464–1465 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1469–1470 [ Pg. 1469 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Broad, Philip, 1163 [ Pg. 1163 includes portions of Doc. 1164 and Doc. 1165 ] Brook, Norman, 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] , 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 1438 [ Pg. 1438 includes portions of Doc. 1376 and Doc. 1377 ] Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35–36 [ Pgs. 35–36 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 84–86 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 112–114 [ Pgs. 112–114 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 201–202 [ Pgs. 201–202 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 292–293 [ Pgs. 292–293 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 352–353 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 375–376 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 1181–1182 [ Pg. 1181 is part of Doc. 1182 ] , 1309 [ Pg. 1309 is part of Doc. 1265 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Brossin de Saint-Didier, Maj. Gen. Auguste, 32 n [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 1342–1343 [ Pg. 1342 is part of Doc. 1288 ] Brown, John Nicholas, 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] Brown, Walter J., 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 471 n [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 594 n [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 includes portions of Doc. 1012 and Doc. 1013 ] , 1442–1444 [ Pgs. 1442–1444 include portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] , 1443 n [ Pg. 1443 is part of Doc. 1380 ] Brunk, P. A., 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 1131 and Doc. 1132 ] Buhrman, Parker W., 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 765–766 [ Pgs. 765–766 include portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] Bulgaria: Allied Control Commission, revision of procedure with regard to status of British and U. S. representatives ( see also Peace treaty , infra ): Discussions concerning, 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 228–230 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 524–525 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] , 554–556 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 604–605 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] ; Protocol and Communiqué sections concerning, 1458–1459 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1494–1495 [ Pg. 1494 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1511 [ Pg. 1511 is part of Doc. 1384 ] ; Soviet proposal and policy, 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 829 and Doc. 830 ] , 736–737 [ Pgs. 736–737 include portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] ; U. S. consideration and proposal, 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 719–720 [ Pgs. 719–720 include portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] Armistice agreement ( Oct. 28, 1944 ), cited, 67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 804 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] Bulgarian external assets, 747–749 [ Pgs. 747–749 include portions of Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , and Doc. 847 ] Bulgarian ships available to Soviet Union, 978 [ Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 1014 ] Communist influence and Party activities, discussions and U. S. reports concerning, 326–327 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 694–695 [ Pgs. 694–695 include portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] , 716–718 [ Pgs. 716–718 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , and Doc. 818 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 822 ] , 728–732 [ Pgs. 728–732 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] Danube commission, Bulgarian participation, 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 757 and Doc. 758 ] Diplomatic relations, establishment of ( see also Government and Peace treaty , infra; also United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria , etc.): Bulgarian appeal for, 708–709 [ Pgs. 708–709 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , and Doc. 812 ] , 711–713 [ Pgs. 711–713 include portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] ; discussions concerning, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 326–328 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 370–372 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 529–530 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 589–590 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 598–599 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] ; Soviet proposal, 698–699 [ Pgs. 698–699 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] Elections, supervision of: Bulgarian desire for, 722–725 [ Pgs. 722–725 include portions of Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , and Doc. 824 ] , 728–729 [ Pgs. 728–729 include portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] ; U. S. views on and evaluation of political situation with regard to, 694–695 [ Pgs. 694–695 include portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] , 708–709 [ Pgs. 708–709 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , and Doc. 812 ] , 716–718 [ Pgs. 716–718 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , and Doc. 818 ] , 728–732 [ Pgs. 728–732 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 733–734 [ Pgs. 733–734 include portions of Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] Discussions concerning, 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 165–166 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 228–232 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 604–605 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] Soviet position, 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] German assets in Bulgaria, 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1486–1487 [ Pg. 1486 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1506 [ Pg. 1506 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Government: Fatherland Front, 694–695 [ Pgs. 694–695 include portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] , 708–709 [ Pgs. 708–709 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , and Doc. 812 ] , 716–717 [ Pgs. 716–717 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 730–732 [ Pgs. 730–732 include portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 829 and Doc. 830 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 832 (#1)] ] National Agrarian Union, 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] Position of democratic elements, U. S. reports regarding, 694–695 [ Pgs. 694–695 include portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] , 708–709 [ Pgs. 708–709 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , and Doc. 812 ] , 722–723 [ Pgs. 722–723 include portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] , 728–732 [ Pgs. 728–732 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] Reorganization of minority government prior to establishment of diplomatic relations and conclusion of peace treaty: Discussions concerning, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 326–327 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 370–372 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 394–395 [ Pgs. 394–395 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] ; U. S. and British policy, 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , and Doc. 748 ] Zveno, 728–729 [ Pgs. 728–729 include portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 730–731 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 827 ] Greek-Bulgarian frontier incident, 116–117 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] Peace treaty ( see also United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria, etc. ; and under Council of Foreign Ministers : Functions, etc. ), Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1457–1458 [ Pg. 1457 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509–1510 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Press. See Press : Balkans . Relations with Greece and Yugoslavia, 116–117 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 130–131 [ Pgs. 130–131 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 1048–1057 [ Pgs. 1048–1057 include portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] , 1060–1061 [ Pgs. 1060–1061 include portions of Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , and Doc. 1073 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 1074 ] , 1065–1071 [ Pgs. 1065–1071 include portions of Doc. 1076 , Doc. 1077 , Doc. 1078 , Doc. 1079 , and Doc. 1080 ] , 1073–1078 [ Pgs. 1073–1078 include portions of Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , Doc. 1084 , Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , and Doc. 1087 ] , 1573 [ Pg. 1573 is part of Doc. 1416 ] Restrictions on U. S. and British officials, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 362–363 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] Soviet troops in Bulgaria, 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 1074 ] United Nations, admission to. See United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria, etc. Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. See Declaration under Yalta . Bullard, Sir Reader, 1389 n [ Pg. 1389 is part of Doc. 1327 ] , 1394 [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] Bundy, Harvey H., 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 754 n [ Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 849 ] , 1155 n [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] , 1324 n [ Pg. 1324 is part of Doc. 1275 ] Burma. See Japan : Operations in Pacific and Southeast Asia . Bush, Vannevar, 1367 [ Pg. 1367 is part of Doc. 1305 ] Byrnes, James F.: Conversations with Attlee, 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] ; with Bidault, 1557–1564 [ Pgs. 1557–1564 include portions of Doc. 1413 , Doc. 1414 , and Doc. 1415 ] ; with Churchill, 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] ; with Eden, 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] ; with Eden and Molotov, 354–356 [ Pgs. 354–356 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] ; with Gromyko, 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 734 ] ; with members of Polish Delegation, 379–380 [ Pgs. 379–380 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] ; with Molotov, 274–275 [ Pgs. 274–275 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 449–452 [ Pgs. 449–452 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 480–483 [ Pgs. 480–483 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] ; with U. S. officials, 421–424 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] Exchange of messages with Molotov, 747–748 [ Pgs. 747–748 include portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 933–934 [ Pgs. 933–934 include portions of Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , and Doc. 974 ] , 936–937 [ Pgs. 936–937 include portions of Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] , 1042–1043 [ Pgs. 1042–1043 include portions of Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , and Doc. 1063 ] , 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , and Doc. 1064 ] , 1284 [ Pg. 1284 includes portions of Doc. 1253 and Doc. 1254 ] Foreign Ministers Meetings, participation in, 66–79 [ Pgs. 66–79 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 101–109 [ Pgs. 101–109 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 143–160 [ Pgs. 143–160 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)] ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 185–197 [ Pgs. 185–197 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 226–243 [ Pgs. 226–243 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 276–292 [ Pgs. 276–292 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 295–298 [ Pgs. 295–298 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 322–338 [ Pgs. 322–338 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 397–401 [ Pgs. 397–401 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 425–447 [ Pgs. 425–447 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 483–503 [ Pgs. 483–503 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 543–564 [ Pgs. 543–564 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 1517–1524 [ Pgs. 1517–1524 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)] and Doc. 1385 ] ; reports as Rapporteur , 77–79 [ Pgs. 77–79 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 195–197 [ Pgs. 195–197 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 336–338 [ Pgs. 336–338 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 562–564 [ Pgs. 562–564 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] Letters from Bevin, 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 1057 and Doc. 1058 ] ; from Eden, 1026–1027 [ Pgs. 1026–1027 include portions of Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , and Doc. 1045 ] , 1107–1109 [ Pgs. 1107–1109 include portions of Doc. 1117 , Doc. 1118 , and Doc. 1119 ] ; from Modzelewski, 1132–1133 [ Pgs. 1132–1133 include portions of Doc. 1139 , Doc. 1140 , and Doc. 1141 ] Memorandum to Truman, 1177–1179 [ Pgs. 1177–1179 include portions of Doc. 1180 and Doc. 1181 ] Miscellaneous, 4–25 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] passim , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 388–389 [ Pgs. 388–389 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 610 n [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 711 ] , 616–697 [ Pgs. 616–697 include portions of Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 721 (#1)] , Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , Doc. 741 , Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 744 (#1)] , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)] , Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)] , Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 771 (#1)] , Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)] , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 792 (#1)] , Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , and Doc. 803 ] passim , 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 734–735 [ Pgs. 734–735 include portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 832 (#1)] ] , 753–757 [ Pgs. 753–757 include portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 776 n [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 852 ] , 777 n [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 852 ] , 779–784 [ Pgs. 779–784 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] , 802–804 [ Pgs. 802–804 include portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 817–846 [ Pgs. 817–846 include portions of Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] , Doc. 892 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] passim , 870 n [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 888–897 [ Pgs. 888–897 include portions of Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] , 899–901 [ Pgs. 899–901 include portions of Doc. 946 , Doc. 947 , and Doc. 948 ] , 917–993 [ Pgs. 917–993 include portions of Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , Doc. 989 , Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , Doc. 1009 , Doc. 1010 , Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)] , Doc. 1016 , Doc. 1017 , Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] , Doc. 1021 , Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , and Doc. 1024 ] passim , 1002–1083 [ Pgs. 1002–1083 include portions of Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , Doc. 1042 , Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , Doc. 1045 , Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)] , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , Doc. 1058 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1058 (#1)] , Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , Doc. 1068 , Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , Doc. 1073 , Doc. 1074 , Doc. 1075 , Doc. 1076 , Doc. 1077 , Doc. 1078 , Doc. 1079 , Doc. 1080 , Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , Doc. 1084 , Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , Doc. 1087 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1087 (#1)] , Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , and Doc. 1090 ] passim , 1113–1114 [ Pgs. 1113–1114 include portions of Doc. 1122 , Doc. 1123 , and Doc. 1124 ] , 1151 n [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1173–1174 [ Pgs. 1173–1174 include portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] , 1191 [ Pg. 1191 includes portions of Doc. 1189 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)] , and Doc. 1190 ] , 1220–1283 [ Pgs. 1220–1283 include portions of Doc. 1209 , Doc. 1210 , Doc. 1211 , Doc. 1212 , Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , Doc. 1217 , Doc. 1218 , Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , Doc. 1222 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] , Doc. 1223 , Doc. 1224 , Doc. 1225 , Doc. 1226 , Doc. 1227 , Doc. 1228 , Doc. 1229 , Doc. 1230 , Doc. 1231 , Doc. 1232 , Doc. 1233 , Doc. 1234 , Doc. 1235 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)] , Doc. 1236 , Doc. 1237 , Doc. 1238 , Doc. 1239 , Doc. 1240 , Doc. 1241 , Doc. 1242 , Doc. 1243 , Doc. 1244 , Doc. 1245 , Doc. 1246 , Doc. 1247 , Doc. 1248 , Doc. 1249 , Doc. 1250 , Doc. 1251 , Doc. 1252 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1252 (#1)] ] passim , 1349 n [ Pg. 1349 includes portions of Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , and Doc. 1295 ] , 1360 n [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] , 1361 n [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] , 1379 n [ Pg. 1379 is part of Doc. 1316 ] , 1389–1424 [ Pgs. 1389–1424 include portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , Doc. 1329 , Doc. 1330 , Doc. 1331 , Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , Doc. 1334 , Doc. 1335 , Doc. 1336 , Doc. 1337 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)] , Doc. 1338 , Doc. 1339 , Doc. 1340 , Doc. 1341 , Doc. 1342 , Doc. 1343 , Doc. 1344 , Doc. 1345 , Doc. 1346 , Doc. 1347 , Doc. 1348 , Doc. 1349 , Doc. 1350 , Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , Doc. 1353 , Doc. 1354 , Doc. 1355 , Doc. 1356 , Doc. 1357 , Doc. 1358 , Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , Doc. 1361 , Doc. 1362 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)] , Doc. 1363 , Doc. 1364 , and Doc. 1365 ] passim , 1442–1461 [ Pgs. 1442–1461 include portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] , 1474 n [ Pg. 1474 is part of Doc. 1382 ] , 1551–1557 [ Pgs. 1551–1557 include portions of Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , Doc. 1409 , Doc. 1410 , Doc. 1411 , Doc. 1412 , Doc. 1413 , and Doc. 1414 ] , 1565–1566 [ Pg. 1565 is part of Doc. 1415 ] Participation in Truman meetings with Attlee, 458–459 [ Pgs. 458–459 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 476–477 [ Pgs. 476–477 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] ; with Bierut, 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] ; with Churchill, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] ; with Mikołajczyk, 1540–1541 [ Pgs. 1540–1541 include portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] ; with Molotov, 471–476 [ Pgs. 471–476 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] ; with Stalin, 43–46 [ Pgs. 43–46 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 86–87 [ Pgs. 86–87 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 1582–1583 [ Pgs. 1582–1583 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] and Doc. 1418 ] , 1586–1588 [ Pgs. 1586–1588 include portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] Plenary Meetings, participation in, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 88–91 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 95–97 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 203–207 [ Pgs. 203–207 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 215–216 [ Pgs. 215–216 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 357–358 [ Pgs. 357–358 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 368–372 [ Pgs. 368–372 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 461–462 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 510–538 [ Pgs. 510–538 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 565–585 [ Pgs. 565–585 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 586–601 [ Pgs. 586–601 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Tripartite dinner meetings, participation in, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] Cabell, Brig. Gen. Charles P., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Caccia, Harold, 1047 n [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 1068 and Doc. 1069 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 1085 and Doc. 1086 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 1086 and Doc. 1087 ] Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 397–401 [ Pgs. 397–401 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 425–447 [ Pgs. 425–447 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 458–459 [ Pgs. 458–459 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] , 483–485 [ Pgs. 483–485 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 1191 n [ Pg. 1191 includes portions of Doc. 1189 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)] , and Doc. 1190 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Caffery, Jefferson, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] , 1048 [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] , 1399 [ Pg. 1399 includes portions of Doc. 1339 , Doc. 1340 , and Doc. 1341 ] , 1413 [ Pg. 1413 is part of Doc. 1355 ] , 1543–1555 [ Pgs. 1543–1555 include portions of Doc. 1395 , Doc. 1396 , Doc. 1397 , Doc. 1398 , Doc. 1399 , Doc. 1400 , Doc. 1401 , Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , Doc. 1404 , Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , Doc. 1409 , Doc. 1410 , Doc. 1411 , and Doc. 1412 ] Cairo Declaration ( 1943 ), cited, 1273 [ Pg. 1273 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1276 [ Pg. 1276 is part of Doc. 1244 ] , 1281 [ Pg. 1281 includes portions of Doc. 1249 and Doc. 1250 ] , 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 1257 and Doc. 1258 ] Caldwell, CWO Horace K., 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] Campbell, Capt. Sir Harold, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 710 ] Campbell, Sir Ronald H., 1355 n [ Pg. 1355 is part of Doc. 1299 ] Campbell, Sir Ronald I., 668 n [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 772 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 1002 n [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 1029 and Doc. 1030 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 1032 and Doc. 1033 ] , 1005 n [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 1033 ] , 1011 [ Pg. 1011 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] Canada ( see also British Commonwealth ): Miscellaneous, 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] ; repatriation of Canadians from Europe, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 1193–1194 [ Pgs. 1193–1194 include portions of Doc. 1191 and Doc. 1192 ] , 1200 [ Pg. 1200 is part of Doc. 1195 ] , 1201–1202 [ Pgs. 1201–1202 include portions of Doc. 1196 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)] , and Doc. 1197 ] Cannon, Cavendish W., 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 268–270 [ Pgs. 268–270 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 380 n [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 417–418 [ Pgs. 417–418 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , and Doc. 748 ] , 719–720 [ Pgs. 719–720 include portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 725–726 [ Pgs. 725–726 include portions of Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , and Doc. 825 ] , 727–728 [ Pgs. 727–728 include portions of Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , and Doc. 827 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 970 and Doc. 971 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 972 ] , 933 n [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] Capcraft , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 1005 and Doc. 1006 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1010 and Doc. 1011 ] Cardenas, Juan Francisco de, 950 n [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] Carnwath, Joseph W., 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 1131 and Doc. 1132 ] , 1198 [ Pg. 1198 includes portions of Doc. 1192 and Doc. 1193 ] Carra de Vaux de Saint-Cyr, Christian, 963 n [ Pg. 963 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] Carvalhaes, Col. Augusto de, 1356 [ Pg. 1356 is part of Doc. 1300 ] Cary, Col. John B., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Castillo y Campos, Cristobal del, 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 1350 and Doc. 1351 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] Catroux, Gen. of the Army Georges, 1418 n [ Pg. 1418 includes portions of Doc. 1361 and Doc. 1362 ] Cattegat, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] Chamberlain, Neville, 1403 [ Pg. 1403 is part of Doc. 1345 ] Chaney, Maj. Gen. James E., 1355 [ Pg. 1355 is part of Doc. 1299 ] Charles, Archduke of Austria, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 761 ] Charles, Sir Noel, 36 n [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] Chase, Lt. Joseph, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] Cherrière, Brig. Gen. Paul-Raymond-Philippe, 669 n [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 787 ] Cherwell, Lord, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] , 1371 n [ Pg. 1371 is part of Doc. 1306 ] Cheshmedzhev (Cheshmedjieff), Grigor, 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 822 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 827 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo: Exchange of messages with Truman, 1225–1227 [ Pgs. 1225–1227 include portions of Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , and Doc. 1215 ] , 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , and Doc. 1217 ] , 1278 [ Pg. 1278 includes portions of Doc. 1246 and Doc. 1247 ] , 1282 [ Pg. 1282 includes portions of Doc. 1251 and Doc. 1252 ] , 1321 [ Pg. 1321 is part of Doc. 1273 ] Message to Stalin, 1225–1227 [ Pgs. 1225–1227 include portions of Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , and Doc. 1215 ] Miscellaneous, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 449–450 [ Pgs. 449–450 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , and Doc. 718 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] , 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1246 [ Pg. 1246 includes portions of Doc. 1221 and Doc. 1222 ] , 1267 n [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] , 1272 n [ Pg. 1272 includes portions of Doc. 1241 and Doc. 1242 ] , 1283 [ Pg. 1283 includes portions of Doc. 1252 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1252 (#1)] ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 is part of Doc. 1260 ] , 1313 [ Pg. 1313 is part of Doc. 1267 ] , 1315 [ Pg. 1315 includes portions of Doc. 1267 and Doc. 1268 ] , 1321 n [ Pg. 1321 is part of Doc. 1273 ] , 1465 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1474–1476 [ Pg. 1474 is part of Doc. 1382 ] Proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan. See Japan : Proclamation . Childs, J. Rives, 1409–1410 [ Pgs. 1409–1410 include portions of Doc. 1349 , Doc. 1350 , and Doc. 1351 ] , 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 1353 and Doc. 1354 ] , 1413 [ Pg. 1413 is part of Doc. 1355 ] , 1417 [ Pg. 1417 includes portions of Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , and Doc. 1361 ] China: Chiang Kai-shek. See Chiang Kaishek, Generalissimo . Chinese Eastern Railway, 1224 n [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 1212 and Doc. 1213 ] , 1226 [ Pg. 1226 is part of Doc. 1214 ] , 1231–1232 [ Pg. 1231 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1238 [ Pg. 1238 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Dairen and Port Arthur. See Manchuria , infra . Manchuria ( see also Japan : Operations in and near China and Korea ), ports and railways, 45–46 [ Pgs. 45–46 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 1223–1224 [ Pgs. 1223–1224 include portions of Doc. 1212 and Doc. 1213 ] , 1226 [ Pg. 1226 is part of Doc. 1214 ] , 1228–1229 [ Pg. 1228 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1230–1234 [ Pg. 1230 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1238–1241 [ Pgs. 1238–1241 include portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , and Doc. 1217 ] , 1241–1244 [ Pgs. 1241–1244 include portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , Doc. 1217 , and Doc. 1218 ] , 1247 [ Pg. 1247 is part of Doc. 1222 ] Negotiations with Soviet Union for pact of friendship and alliance (in accordance with Yalta agreements): Berlin Conference discussion of Sino-Soviet negotiations, 45–46 [ Pgs. 45–46 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] , 1582 [ Pg. 1582 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] and Doc. 1418 ] , 1585–1587 [ Pgs. 1585–1587 include portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] Chinese position: Opinion of T. V. Soong on status of negotiations, 1224–1225 [ Pgs. 1224–1225 include portions of Doc. 1212 , Doc. 1213 , and Doc. 1214 ] ; views of Chiang and request for U. S. support, 1225–1227 [ Pgs. 1225–1227 include portions of Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , and Doc. 1215 ] Stalin’s résumé of status of negotiations, 1585–1587 [ Pgs. 1585–1587 include portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] U. S. position based on traditional China policy: General résumé, 1227–1230 [ Pgs. 1227–1230 include portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] Statements and comments relative to Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang, 1230–1237 [ Pg. 1230 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Yalta agreement affecting China: Dissussions and recommendations concerning, 1237–1241 [ Pgs. 1237–1241 include portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , and Doc. 1217 ] ; message of Truman to Chiang, 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , and Doc. 1217 ] ; proposed U. S.-Soviet understanding relative to Sino-Soviet agreements under negotiation, 1241–1244 [ Pgs. 1241–1244 include portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , Doc. 1217 , and Doc. 1218 ] , 1247 [ Pg. 1247 is part of Doc. 1222 ] ; Soong’s resumption of negotiations in Moscow, U. S. position and recommendations concerning, 1245–1247 [ Pgs. 1245–1247 include portions of Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , and Doc. 1222 ] Open-door policy, 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 1212 ] , 1224 n [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 1212 and Doc. 1213 ] , 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] , 1229 [ Pg. 1229 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1243 [ Pg. 1243 includes portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] , 1244 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 1218 ] , 1322 [ Pg. 1322 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)] and Doc. 1274 ] , 1586 [ Pg. 1586 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Outer Mongolia, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 1225 [ Pg. 1225 includes portions of Doc. 1213 and Doc. 1214 ] , 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] , 1234–1235 [ Pg. 1234 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1236 [ Pg. 1236 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1246 [ Pg. 1246 includes portions of Doc. 1221 and Doc. 1222 ] , 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 1418 ] , 1587 [ Pg. 1587 includes portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] Participation in Council of Foreign Ministers, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 56–58 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 61–63 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 616–620 [ Pgs. 616–620 include portions of Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 721 (#1)] ] , 1478 [ Pg. 1478 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] and Doc. 1383 ] , 1479–1480 [ Pg. 1479 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Port Arthur. See Manchuria , supra . Sinkiang, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 1235–1237 [ Pg. 1235 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1585–1586 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Soong. See Soong, T. V. South Manchuria Railway, 1226 [ Pg. 1226 is part of Doc. 1214 ] , 1238 [ Pg. 1238 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Treaties and agreements: Sino-Japanese agreement ( 1915 ), 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Sino-Russian agreements of 1896 and 1898 , cited, 1231 [ Pg. 1231 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Sino-Soviet Agreement on General Principles ( 1924 ), cited, 1229 [ Pg. 1229 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1231 [ Pg. 1231 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Sino-Soviet agreement ( 1929 ), 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Sino-Soviet treaty of Aug. 14: Cited, 1247 n [ Pg. 1247 is part of Doc. 1222 ] Negotiations. See Negotiations with Soviet Union , supra . Soviet-Manchurian agreemen ( 1924 ), 1231 [ Pg. 1231 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Treaties, etc., affecting Outer Mongolia ( 1913, 1915, 1921, 1924, 1936 , and 1941 ), cited, 1225 [ Pg. 1225 includes portions of Doc. 1213 and Doc. 1214 ] , 1234–1235 [ Pg. 1234 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1236 [ Pg. 1236 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Yalta agreements and decisions. See Negotiations , supra . Chinese Eastern Railway, 1224 n [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 1212 and Doc. 1213 ] , 1226 [ Pg. 1226 is part of Doc. 1214 ] , 1230–1234 [ Pg. 1230 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1238–1241 [ Pgs. 1238–1241 include portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , and Doc. 1217 ] , 1585–1587 [ Pgs. 1585–1587 include portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] Churchill, Jr. Comdr. Mary, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] Churchill, Winston S.: Atomic bomb, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 81–82 [ Pgs. 81–82 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 1370–1371 [ Pgs. 1370–1371 include portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] Combined Chiefs of Staff: Participation in meeting of, 339–344 [ Pgs. 339–344 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] ; report ( July 24 ), approved by Truman and Churchill, 1462–1473 [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Conversations with Byrnes, 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] ; with Leahy, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] ; with Roosevelt, aide-mémoire ( 1944 ), 1371 [ Pg. 1371 is part of Doc. 1306 ] ; with Stimson, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] ; with Truman, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 79–82 [ Pgs. 79–82 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] Exchange of messages with Truman, 1179–1183 [ Pgs. 1179–1183 include portions of Doc. 1180 , Doc. 1181 , Doc. 1182 , Doc. 1183 , and Doc. 1184 ] , 1204 [ Pg. 1204 includes portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] , 1279–1281 [ Pgs. 1279–1281 include portions of Doc. 1248 , Doc. 1249 , and Doc. 1250 ] , 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 1344 ] Miscellaneous, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 420–427 [ Pgs. 420–427 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 552–553 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 621 n [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 722 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , and Doc. 737 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 738 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 771 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 771 (#1)] ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 1014 ] , 997 [ Pg. 997 includes portions of Doc. 1024 and Doc. 1025 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 is part of Doc. 1058 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] , 1080 n [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] , 1086–1087 [ Pgs. 1086–1087 include portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] , 1155 n [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] , 1164 [ Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 1165 and Doc. 1166 ] , 1164 n [ Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 1165 and Doc. 1166 ] , 1175–1176 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 1179 ] , 1177 [ Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 1180 ] , 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 1198 ] , 1213 [ Pg. 1213 includes portions of Doc. 1205 and Doc. 1206 ] , 1223 n [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 1212 ] , 1260 [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 1232 and Doc. 1233 ] , 1270–1283 [ Pgs. 1270–1283 include portions of Doc. 1240 , Doc. 1241 , Doc. 1242 , Doc. 1243 , Doc. 1244 , Doc. 1245 , Doc. 1246 , Doc. 1247 , Doc. 1248 , Doc. 1249 , Doc. 1250 , Doc. 1251 , Doc. 1252 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1252 (#1)] ] passim , 1309 [ Pg. 1309 is part of Doc. 1265 ] , 1310 n [ Pg. 1310 is part of Doc. 1266 ] , 1323 n [ Pg. 1323 includes portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] , 1346 [ Pg. 1346 includes portions of Doc. 1291 and Doc. 1292 ] , 1347 [ Pg. 1347 includes portions of Doc. 1292 and Doc. 1293 ] , 1377 [ Pg. 1377 is part of Doc. 1315 ] , 1390–1391 [ Pgs. 1390–1391 include portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , Doc. 1329 , and Doc. 1330 ] , 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 1347 ] , 1421 n [ Pg. 1421 is part of Doc. 1363 ] , 1440 [ Pg. 1440 is part of Doc. 1378 ] , 1462 n [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1559 [ Pg. 1559 is part of Doc. 1414 ] , 1567–1581 [ Pgs. 1567–1581 include portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Plenary Meetings, participation in, 52–63 [ Pgs. 52–63 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 88–98 [ Pgs. 88–98 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 116–137 [ Pgs. 116–137 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 164–182 [ Pgs. 164–182 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 203–221 [ Pgs. 203–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 244–268 [ Pgs. 244–268 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 299–319 [ Pgs. 299–319 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 357–374 [ Pgs. 357–374 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 381–391 [ Pgs. 381–391 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] Proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan. See Japan : Proclamation . Tripartite dinner meetings, participation in, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 319–321 [ Pgs. 319–321 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] Citrine, Sir Walter, 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] Civil Aviation Radio Conference, 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 1187 ] Clark, Gen. Mark W., 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 851 ] Clark Kerr, Sir Archibald, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 650 n [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 738 n [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] , 738–739 [ Pgs. 738–739 include portions of Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , and Doc. 836 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 1104–1105 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 1117 ] , 1108 [ Pg. 1108 is part of Doc. 1118 ] , 1158 [ Pg. 1158 includes portions of Doc. 1158 and Doc. 1159 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1571 [ Pg. 1571 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] , 1579 [ Pg. 1579 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Clay, Lt. Gen. Lucius D., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 806 n [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 892 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] , 924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 964 and Doc. 965 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] , 934–936 [ Pgs. 934–936 include portions of Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , and Doc. 976 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] , 939–940 [ Pgs. 939–940 include portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 960–961 [ Pgs. 960–961 include portions of Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] , 964–968 [ Pgs. 964–968 include portions of Doc. 1002 , Doc. 1003 , and Doc. 1004 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 1027 and Doc. 1028 ] Clayton, William L., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] ] , 141–142 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 183–184 [ Pgs. 183–184 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 403–406 [ Pgs. 403–406 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 750 n [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 788 n [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 827–830 [ Pgs. 827–830 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] , Doc. 892 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] , 867 n [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] , 882 n [ Pg. 882 includes portions of Doc. 932 and Doc. 933 ] , 884 n [ Pg. 884 includes portions of Doc. 934 and Doc. 935 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 940 ] , 894 n [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 900–901 [ Pgs. 900–901 include portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 956 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] , 924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 964 and Doc. 965 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 973 and Doc. 974 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] , 937–940 [ Pgs. 937–940 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , and Doc. 980 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , and Doc. 995 ] , 963–964 [ Pgs. 963–964 include portions of Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , and Doc. 1003 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 1049 and Doc. 1050 ] , 1118 [ Pg. 1118 is part of Doc. 1126 ] , 1119 [ Pg. 1119 includes portions of Doc. 1127 and Doc. 1128 ] , 1153 [ Pg. 1153 includes portions of Doc. 1154 , Doc. 1155 , and Doc. 1156 ] , 1158 [ Pg. 1158 includes portions of Doc. 1158 and Doc. 1159 ] , 1184 [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1185 ] , 1187 [ Pg. 1187 is part of Doc. 1186 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1525–1527 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 1386 ] , 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 1387 ] , 1532–1538 [ Pgs. 1532–1538 include portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] Coal. See under Germany and Poland . Cochrane, Adm. Edward L., 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] Cohen, Benjamin V., 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 143–144 [ Pgs. 143–144 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] ; notes on Foreign Ministers Meeting of July 27 , 436–443 [ Pgs. 436–443 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] ; notes on Plenary Meetings, 59–63 [ Pgs. 59–63 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 94–98 [ Pgs. 94–98 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 130–137 [ Pgs. 130–137 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 177–182 [ Pgs. 177–182 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 215–221 [ Pgs. 215–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 260–268 [ Pgs. 260–268 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 312–317 [ Pgs. 312–317 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 368–374 [ Pgs. 368–374 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 388–391 [ Pgs. 388–391 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 466–470 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 528–538 [ Pgs. 528–538 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 578–585 [ Pgs. 578–585 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 597–601 [ Pgs. 597–601 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Coleman, Maj. Lawrence A., 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] Collado, Emilio G., 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 741 n [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 838 and Doc. 839 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 750 n [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 779–780 [ Pgs. 779–780 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , and Doc. 855 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 826–827 [ Pgs. 826–827 include portions of Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , and Doc. 891 ] , 829–830 [ Pgs. 829–830 include portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] ] , 848 n [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] , 849 n [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] , 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] , 938–940 [ Pgs. 938–940 include portions of Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , and Doc. 980 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 975 n [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1010 and Doc. 1011 ] , 1088–1089 [ Pgs. 1088–1089 include portions of Doc. 1095 , Doc. 1096 , and Doc. 1097 ] , 1153 [ Pg. 1153 includes portions of Doc. 1154 , Doc. 1155 , and Doc. 1156 ] , 1177 n [ Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 1180 ] , 1184 n [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1185 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 1386 ] , 1532 n [ Pg. 1532 is part of Doc. 1389 ] Combined Chiefs of Staff ( see also Joint Chiefs of Staff ; Tripartite military meeting ; and United Kingdom : British Chiefs of Staff ): Allied Commission in Italy, question of appointment of a civilian chief, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] Chairmanship of meetings, question of, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] Combined Intelligence Committee, 36 n –37 n [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] Combined Military Transportation Committee, 163 n [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 1194–1198 [ Pgs. 1194–1198 include portions of Doc. 1191 , Doc. 1192 , and Doc. 1193 ] Enemy war matériel in Germany and Austria, question of disposal, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] Final report approved by Truman and Churchill: Discussions, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 339–344 [ Pgs. 339–344 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] ; text, 1462–1473 [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Japan, war against, discussions and recommendations in connection with: British and British Commonwealth participation in war, 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] Control and command, 85–86 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] French and Netherlands participation in war, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] Military objectives, strategy, and policies, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 1310–1312 [ Pgs. 1310–1312 include portions of Doc. 1266 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1266 (#1)] ] Operations in Pacific and Southeast Asia, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 375–378 [ Pgs. 375–378 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] Planning date for end of organized resistance by Japan, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] Portuguese participation in war, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 1353–1354 [ Pgs. 1353–1354 include portions of Doc. 1297 , Doc. 1298 , and Doc. 1299 ] Postwar staff machinery, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 1202–1206 [ Pgs. 1202–1206 include portions of Doc. 1196 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)] , Doc. 1197 , Doc. 1198 , Doc. 1199 , and Doc. 1200 ] Release of information to Soviet Union, 113–115 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] Shipping, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 293–294 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 1194–1198 [ Pgs. 1194–1198 include portions of Doc. 1191 , Doc. 1192 , and Doc. 1193 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 includes portions of Doc. 1266 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1266 (#1)] ] Unconditional surrender, 36–37 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] Meetings, July 16–21 and July 23–24 , minutes, 35–38 [ Pgs. 35–38 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 82–86 [ Pgs. 82–86 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 112–115 [ Pgs. 112–115 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161–162 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 201–202 [ Pgs. 201–202 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 292–294 [ Pgs. 292–294 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 339–344 [ Pgs. 339–344 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 375–378 [ Pgs. 375–378 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] Military talks, sections in Protocol and Communiqué, 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 594 n [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 1443–1444 [ Pg. 1443 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1460 [ Pg. 1460 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1498 n [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Postwar staff machinery, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 1202–1206 [ Pgs. 1202–1206 include portions of Doc. 1196 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)] , Doc. 1197 , Doc. 1198 , Doc. 1199 , and Doc. 1200 ] Report, July 24. See Final report , supra . Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1213 [ Pg. 1213 includes portions of Doc. 1205 and Doc. 1206 ] Combined Intelligence Committee, 36 n –37 n [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] Combined Military Transportation Committee, 163 n [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 1194–1198 [ Pgs. 1194–1198 include portions of Doc. 1191 , Doc. 1192 , and Doc. 1193 ] Combined Resources Allocation Board (CRAB), 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 880 ] Combined Shipping Adjustment Board (CSAB), 119 n [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 is part of Doc. 1009 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 1009 and Doc. 1010 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1010 and Doc. 1011 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 1015 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)] ] , 1192 [ Pg. 1192 includes portions of Doc. 1190 and Doc. 1191 ] , 1195–1196 [ Pg. 1195 is part of Doc. 1192 ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1472–1473 [ Pg. 1472 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Combustion Engineering Co., 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] Communiqué: Discussions concerning preparation and release of, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 400–401 [ Pgs. 400–401 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] , 584–585 [ Pgs. 584–585 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 590–595 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 599–601 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 1441–1444 [ Pgs. 1441–1444 include portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] ; draft text, 1444–1461 [ Pg. 1444 is part of Doc. 1380 ] ; final text, 1499–1514 [ Pg. 1499 is part of Doc. 1384 ] ; meetings of Communiqué Subcommittee, 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] Communist activities in Austria, 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] ; Bulgaria, 326–327 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 694–695 [ Pgs. 694–695 include portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] , 716–718 [ Pgs. 716–718 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , and Doc. 818 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 822 ] , 728–732 [ Pgs. 728–732 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] ; Greece, 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] , 1069 [ Pg. 1069 is part of Doc. 1079 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 1079 ] ; Hungary, 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 799 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] ; Poland, 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1128 [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1129 [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 1136 and Doc. 1137 ] , 1130–1132 [ Pgs. 1130–1132 include portions of Doc. 1137 , Doc. 1138 , Doc. 1139 , and Doc. 1140 ] ; Rumania, 326–327 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 647–648 [ Pgs. 647–648 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , and Doc. 803 ] , 699–701 [ Pgs. 699–701 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 814 and Doc. 815 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] ; Yugoslavia, 1208 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 1203 and Doc. 1204 ] , 1211–1212 [ Pgs. 1211–1212 include portions of Doc. 1204 and Doc. 1205 ] Conant, James B., 1366 [ Pg. 1366 is part of Doc. 1305 ] , 1367 [ Pg. 1367 is part of Doc. 1305 ] Connor, Cassie, 1275 n [ Pg. 1275 is part of Doc. 1244 ] Control Commissions (Allied). See Allied Control Commission under Bulgaria , Hungary , and Rumania . Control Councils (Allied). See Allied Control Council under Austria and Germany . Control machinery. See under Austria and Germany . Conway, Capt. Granville, 1116–1117 [ Pgs. 1116–1117 include portions of Doc. 1124 and Doc. 1125 ] Cooke, Vice Adm. Charles M., Jr., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 199–201 [ Pgs. 199–201 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] ] , 509 n [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 980–981 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1015 ] Cooper, Alfred Duff, 1042 n [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , and Doc. 1061 ] , 1418 n [ Pg. 1418 includes portions of Doc. 1361 and Doc. 1362 ] , 1419 [ Pg. 1419 includes portions of Doc. 1362 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)] ] , 1547 n [ Pg. 1547 includes portions of Doc. 1399 and Doc. 1400 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 1404 and Doc. 1405 ] Cornwall-Jones, Brig. Arthur Thomas, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 1354 [ Pg. 1354 includes portions of Doc. 1298 and Doc. 1299 ] Coronet , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 1336 [ Pg. 1336 is part of Doc. 1284 ] , 1337 [ Pg. 1337 is part of Doc. 1284 ] Coulondre, Robert, 1553 [ Pg. 1553 includes portions of Doc. 1409 and Doc. 1410 ] Coulson, J. E., 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 970 and Doc. 971 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 972 ] , 933 n [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] Council of Foreign Ministers: Establishment of, U.S. proposal concerning: Discussions and approval in principle, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 56–58 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 61–63 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 66–70 [ Pgs. 66–70 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 77–78 [ Pgs. 77–78 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 101–102 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 143–145 [ Pgs. 143–145 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 148–149 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 167–168 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 354–355 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 419–420 [ Pgs. 419–420 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] ; draft of proposal, redrafts, and final text, 609–615 [ Pgs. 609–615 include portions of Doc. 711 , Doc. 712 , Doc. 713 , and Doc. 714 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué sections concerning, 1447–1449 [ Pg. 1447 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1478–1481 [ Pgs. 1478–1481 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] and Doc. 1383 ] , 1500–1501 [ Pg. 1500 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Functions of Council in connection with— International inland waterways, 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] , 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1556 [ Pg. 1556 includes portions of Doc. 1412 and Doc. 1413 ] Iran, withdrawal of Allied troops from Tehran, 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1556 [ Pg. 1556 includes portions of Doc. 1412 and Doc. 1413 ] Peace conference to be held in the future, preparation of, 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 62–63 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] , 1447 [ Pg. 1447 is part of Doc. 1380 ] Peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania, and peace settlement with Germany, preparation of, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 174–175 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 281–283 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] ] , 290–291 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 300–301 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] , 363–364 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 712 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 626–627 [ Pgs. 626–627 include portions of Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , and Doc. 730 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 730 and Doc. 731 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)] ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1080 [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] , 1084 [ Pg. 1084 is part of Doc. 1091 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 1093 ] , 1096 [ Pg. 1096 includes portions of Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] , 1448 [ Pg. 1448 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1457 [ Pg. 1457 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1479 [ Pg. 1479 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1500 [ Pg. 1500 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1509–1510 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1592–1593 [ Pgs. 1592–1593 include portions of Doc. 1423 , Doc. 1424 , and Doc. 1425 ] Poland, Western frontier question, 248–251 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Ruhr area, question of, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 595–596 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 602–603 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] Territorial settlements. See Poland and Ruhr , supra; Trusteeship , infra . Trusteeship for Italian colonial territories and Korea, 254–255 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 281–283 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] ] , 290–291 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 300–301 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 550–551 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 734 ] , 635–638 [ Pgs. 635–638 include portions of Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 1458 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1594–1595 [ Pgs. 1594–1595 include portions of Doc. 1425 , Doc. 1426 , and Doc. 1427 ] Participation of China and France: Discussions concerning, and invitation by the three powers, 52–53 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 56–58 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 61–63 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 67–70 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 186–187 [ Pgs. 186–187 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 286–287 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 419–420 [ Pgs. 419–420 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 616–620 [ Pgs. 616–620 include portions of Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 721 (#1)] ] , 1448 [ Pg. 1448 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1478 [ Pg. 1478 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] and Doc. 1383 ] , 1479–1481 [ Pg. 1479 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1543–1544 [ Pgs. 1543–1544 include portions of Doc. 1395 and Doc. 1396 ] , 1549 [ Pg. 1549 includes portions of Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , and Doc. 1404 ] ; reaction of China and France to invitations, 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 619–620 [ Pgs. 619–620 include portions of Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 721 (#1)] ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 1404 and Doc. 1405 ] , 1552 [ Pg. 1552 includes portions of Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , and Doc. 1409 ] , 1553–1554 [ Pgs. 1553–1554 include portions of Doc. 1409 , Doc. 1410 , and Doc. 1411 ] Time and place of Council meetings (permanent joint Secretariat at London), 167–168 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 186–187 [ Pgs. 186–187 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 354–355 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 1447–1448 [ Pg. 1447 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1479 [ Pg. 1479 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1500 [ Pg. 1500 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Craig, Maj. Gen. Howard A., 1396 [ Pg. 1396 includes portions of Doc. 1335 and Doc. 1336 ] Crane, Maj. Gen. John A., 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 716 n [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] Crimea Conference. See Yalta . Cripps, Sir Stafford, 1404–1405 [ Pg. 1404 is part of Doc. 1345 ] Cromie, Leonard J., 1048–1057 [ Pgs. 1048–1057 include portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] Crowley, Leo T., 1177 [ Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 1180 ] , 1178 [ Pg. 1178 is part of Doc. 1180 ] Ćuckov, Mane, 1054 n [ Pg. 1054 is part of Doc. 1071 ] Culbertson, Paul T., 1350–1351 [ Pgs. 1350–1351 include portions of Doc. 1295 and Doc. 1296 ] Cunningham, Adm. of the Fleet Sir Andrew, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 82–83 [ Pgs. 82–83 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 375–376 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 1110 ] , 1181–1182 [ Pg. 1181 is part of Doc. 1182 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Curzon Line, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 1141 [ Pg. 1141 includes portions of Doc. 1149 and Doc. 1150 ] , 1144 [ Pg. 1144 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1519 [ Pg. 1519 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1520 [ Pg. 1520 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1572 [ Pg. 1572 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1580 [ Pg. 1580 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Cutler, Brig. Gen. Stuart, 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] Cutter, Col. R. Ammi, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] Cyrenaica, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] Czechoslovakia ( see also Germany : Transfers of German populations ): Danube commission, Czechoslovak participation, 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 757 and Doc. 758 ] ; German assets in Czechoslovakia, 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] ; possible invitation to attend Berlin Conference, 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] ; reparations from Germany, 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] ; treaties with Soviet Union ( 1943 and 1944 ), 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1585 n [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Dairen. See China : Manchuria . Dalton, Hugh, 1404 [ Pg. 1404 is part of Doc. 1345 ] Dalton, Neil, 1290 [ Pg. 1290 is part of Doc. 1255 ] Damaskinos, Archbishop of Greece, 1044 n [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 1063 and Doc. 1064 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 1068 and Doc. 1069 ] Danube, question of internationalization and free use of, 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 651–654 [ Pgs. 651–654 include portions of Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , and Doc. 755 ] , 655–656 [ Pgs. 655–656 include portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 657–658 [ Pgs. 657–658 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)] ] Danzig, 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 includes portions of Doc. 1151 and Doc. 1152 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1489 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1522 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1533 [ Pg. 1533 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1534 [ Pg. 1534 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1535 [ Pg. 1535 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1562 [ Pg. 1562 is part of Doc. 1414 ] Dardanelles, fee Turkey: Straits question. Davies, Joseph E., 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 1428–1434 [ Pgs. 1428–1434 include portions of Doc. 1369 , Doc. 1370 , Doc. 1371 , and Doc. 1372 ] , 1434 n [ Pg. 1434 includes portions of Doc. 1370 , Doc. 1371 , and Doc. 1372 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Davies, Ralph K., 1381 [ Pg. 1381 is part of Doc. 1318 ] , 1382 [ Pg. 1382 includes portions of Doc. 1319 and Doc. 1320 ] Davis, Elmer, 1274 [ Pg. 1274 is part of Doc. 1243 ] Dean, Col. Fred M., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Dean, Patrick, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] , 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] Deane, Maj. Gen. John R., 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99–100 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 911 and Doc. 912 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] , 1328 n [ Pg. 1328 includes portions of Doc. 1279 and Doc. 1280 ] , 1328–1332 [ Pgs. 1328–1332 include portions of Doc. 1279 , Doc. 1280 , and Doc. 1281 ] Debye, Peter Joseph William, 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 896 ] De Gasperi, Alcide, 1082 [ Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 1090 ] de Gaulle, Gen. Charles, 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 306–307 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 314–315 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 317–318 [ Pgs. 317–318 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 1399 [ Pg. 1399 includes portions of Doc. 1339 , Doc. 1340 , and Doc. 1341 ] Dekanozov, V. G., 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] Delegations, list of, 1512–1514 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Democracy, Stalin1’s views on, 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] Dempster, Ernest J., 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 1353 and Doc. 1354 ] , 1413–1415 [ Pgs. 1413–1415 include portions of Doc. 1355 and Doc. 1356 ] Denmark, 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 1159 [ Pg. 1159 includes portions of Doc. 1159 and Doc. 1160 ] Denny, Brig., 1163 [ Pg. 1163 includes portions of Doc. 1164 and Doc. 1165 ] Derzhanski. See Durzhansky, Angel . Despres, Emile, 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 478–479 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 480 n [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 750 n [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 1386 ] , 1532 n [ Pg. 1532 is part of Doc. 1389 ] Devlin, Capt. Jones F., Jr., 1117 [ Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 1125 ] Dhimakis, Ilias. See Gotsi . Diamantopoulos, Cimon P., 1071 n [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] , 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] Diplomatic relations, establishment of. See under Bulgaria , Finland , Hungary , Italy , and Rumania . Displaced persons. See Germany : Displaced persons in Germany and Transfers of German populations ; Hungary : Transfers of populations ; Poland : Repatriation and Transfers of German populations ; Soviet Union : Repatriation . Dönitz (Doenitz), Grand Admiral Karl, 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 985 n [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Donnelly, Col. Charles H., 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Dooman, Eugene H., 1228–1229 [ Pg. 1228 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Douglas, Elsie L., 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] Douglas, Col. James H., Jr., 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 1100–1103 [ Pgs. 1100–1103 include portions of Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , Doc. 1113 , Doc. 1114 , Doc. 1115 , and Doc. 1116 ] Dragoicheva, Tsola, 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 829 and Doc. 830 ] Drożniak, Edward, 1133 [ Pg. 1133 includes portions of Doc. 1140 and Doc. 1141 ] DuBois, Josiah E., Jr., 665 n [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] , 919–920 [ Pgs. 919–920 include portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , and Doc. 960 ] , 923 n [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] , 940 n [ Pg. 940 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 1094 n [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , and Doc. 1102 ] , 1095 n [ Pg. 1095 includes portions of Doc. 1103 and Doc. 1104 ] Duff Cooper, Alfred, 1042 n [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , and Doc. 1061 ] , 1418 n [ Pg. 1418 includes portions of Doc. 1361 and Doc. 1362 ] , 1419 [ Pg. 1419 includes portions of Doc. 1362 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)] ] , 1547 n [ Pg. 1547 includes portions of Doc. 1399 and Doc. 1400 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 1404 and Doc. 1405 ] Dumbarton Oaks, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 1568 [ Pg. 1568 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1577 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Dunn, James Clement, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 143–144 [ Pgs. 143–144 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 668 n [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 772 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 788 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 792 ] , 707–708 [ Pgs. 707–708 include portions of Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , and Doc. 810 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 776 n [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 852 ] , 777 n [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 852 ] , 1004–1005 [ Pgs. 1004–1005 include portions of Doc. 1032 and Doc. 1033 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 1057 and Doc. 1058 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 1068 and Doc. 1069 ] , 1080 n [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] , 1119 [ Pg. 1119 includes portions of Doc. 1127 and Doc. 1128 ] , 1128 n [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1140 n [ Pg. 1140 includes portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1151 n [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1164 [ Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 1165 and Doc. 1166 ] , 1349 n [ Pg. 1349 includes portions of Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , and Doc. 1295 ] , 1392–1393 [ Pgs. 1392–1393 include portions of Doc. 1330 , Doc. 1331 , and Doc. 1332 ] , 1423 n [ Pg. 1423 includes portions of Doc. 1364 and Doc. 1365 ] , 1424 [ Pg. 1424 is part of Doc. 1365 ] , 1443 [ Pg. 1443 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1477 n [ Pg. 1477 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1525–1526 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 1386 ] , 1541 [ Pg. 1541 is part of Doc. 1394 ] , 1557 [ Pg. 1557 includes portions of Doc. 1413 and Doc. 1414 ] Durbrow, Elbridge, 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 835 and Doc. 836 ] Durzhansky, Angel, 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] Dustbin , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 850 ] Eareckson, Col. William O., 1364 [ Pg. 1364 is part of Doc. 1305 ] , 1368 [ Pg. 1368 is part of Doc. 1305 ] East Prussia, 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 855–856 [ Pgs. 855–856 include portions of Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , and Doc. 915 ] , 862–863 [ Pgs. 862–863 include portions of Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , and Doc. 920 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 933 and Doc. 934 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] , 1142 [ Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1489 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 1429 ] , 1598 [ Pg. 1598 is part of Doc. 1430 ] , 1599 [ Pg. 1599 is part of Doc. 1431 ] Echols, Maj. Gen. Oliver P., 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 480 n [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] Economic matters. See European questions : Cooperation, etc. ; and under Austria , Bulgaria , Germany , Hungary , Italy , Poland , Rumania , and Soviet Union . Economic Subcommittee: Meetings, 110–111 [ Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 141–142 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 183–184 [ Pgs. 183–184 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] ; reports and recommendations, 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 787–792 [ Pgs. 787–792 include portions of Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , and Doc. 859 ] , 795–799 [ Pgs. 795–799 include portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] , 818–820 [ Pgs. 818–820 include portions of Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , and Doc. 883 ] , 827–828 [ Pgs. 827–828 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] ] , 845–846 [ Pgs. 845–846 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 922 and Doc. 923 ] , 931–933 [ Pgs. 931–933 include portions of Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , and Doc. 973 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 includes portions of Doc. 1002 and Doc. 1003 ] , 1385 [ Pg. 1385 includes portions of Doc. 1322 and Doc. 1323 ] , 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 1324 and Doc. 1325 ] Edelstein, Lt. Julius C., 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] Eden, Anthony: Foreign Ministers Meetings: Participation in, 66–79 [ Pgs. 66–79 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 101–109 [ Pgs. 101–109 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 143–160 [ Pgs. 143–160 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)] ] , 185–197 [ Pgs. 185–197 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 226–243 [ Pgs. 226–243 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 276–292 [ Pgs. 276–292 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 295–298 [ Pgs. 295–298 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 322–338 [ Pgs. 322–338 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 1517–1524 [ Pgs. 1517–1524 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)] and Doc. 1385 ] ; reports as Rapporteur , 108–109 [ Pgs. 108–109 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 240–243 [ Pgs. 240–243 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 244–246 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] Letters to Byrnes, 1026–1027 [ Pgs. 1026–1027 include portions of Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , and Doc. 1045 ] , 1107–1109 [ Pgs. 1107–1109 include portions of Doc. 1117 , Doc. 1118 , and Doc. 1119 ] Meetings with Byrnes, 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] ; with Byrnes and Molotov, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] Miscellaneous, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 165–166 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 800 ] , 743–744 [ Pgs. 743–744 include portions of Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , and Doc. 842 ] , 1033 [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 1050 and Doc. 1051 ] , 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1426 [ Pg. 1426 includes portions of Doc. 1366 and Doc. 1367 ] Plenary Meetings, participation in, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 116–118 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 244–246 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260–261 [ Pgs. 260–261 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 357–358 [ Pgs. 357–358 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] Tripartite dinner meetings, participation in, 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] Edgcumbe, Maj. Gen. Oliver Pearce, 228 n [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] Egypt ( see also Suez Canal ), 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] Eisenhower, Gen. of the Army Dwight D., 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 652 n [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 653–654 [ Pgs. 653–654 include portions of Doc. 754 and Doc. 755 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 895 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 897 ] , 933 [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1028 n [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 1046 ] , 1028–1030 [ Pgs. 1028–1030 include portions of Doc. 1046 and Doc. 1047 ] , 1361 n [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] , 1545 n [ Pg. 1545 includes portions of Doc. 1396 and Doc. 1397 ] Elbrick, C. Burke, 506 n [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] Elections. See under Bulgaria , Finland , Greece, Hungary , Italy , Poland , Rumania , United Kingdom , and Yugoslavia . Elsey, Lt. George M., 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document preceding Document 710 (#1)] ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 1333 n [ Pg. 1333 is part of Doc. 1282 ] , 1508 n [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Emergency Economic Committee, Europe (EECE), 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 1158 [ Pg. 1158 includes portions of Doc. 1158 and Doc. 1159 ] , 1160 [ Pg. 1160 includes portions of Doc. 1160 and Doc. 1161 ] , 1161 [ Pg. 1161 includes portions of Doc. 1162 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1162 (#1)] ] Empire Aviation Conference, 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 1187 ] Erhardt, John G., 670–671 [ Pgs. 670–671 include portions of Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 674–675 [ Pgs. 674–675 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 787 ] Esposito, Brig. Gen. Vincent J., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Ethiopia, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 1088–1089 [ Pgs. 1088–1089 include portions of Doc. 1095 , Doc. 1096 , and Doc. 1097 ] , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 1097 and Doc. 1098 ] , 1094–1095 [ Pgs. 1094–1095 include portions of Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , and Doc. 1104 ] European Advisory Commission: Agreements on— “Additional Requirements” to be imposed on Germany, July 25 , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)] ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 1006–1023 [ Pgs. 1006–1023 include portions of Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] ; text, 1011–1023 [ Pgs. 1011–1023 include portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] Control machinery in Austria, July 4 , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 670–671 [ Pgs. 670–671 include portions of Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 677–679 [ Pgs. 677–679 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] Control machinery in Germany, Nov. 14, 1944 , amended by a further agreement May 1, 1945 , cited, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 72 n [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 998 [ Pg. 998 is part of Doc. 1025 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] , 1481 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1502 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Zones of occupation in— Austria ( July 9 ), 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 677–679 [ Pgs. 677–679 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] Germany ( July 26 ), 1001–1006 [ Pgs. 1001–1006 include portions of Doc. 1027 , Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , and Doc. 1035 ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] Termination of, and transfer of functions to Allied Control Councils for Austria and Germany, 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 712 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 1544 [ Pg. 1544 includes portions of Doc. 1395 and Doc. 1396 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué sections concerning, 1448–1449 [ Pg. 1448 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1480–1481 [ Pg. 1480 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 1384 ] War criminals, EAC paper on United Nations renegades and Quislings, 422 n –423 n [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] European Central Inland Transport Organization (ECITO), 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)] , and Doc. 751 ] , 1158–1159 [ Pgs. 1158–1159 include portions of Doc. 1158 , Doc. 1159 , and Doc. 1160 ] , 1160 [ Pg. 1160 includes portions of Doc. 1160 and Doc. 1161 ] European Coal Organization (ECO), 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 1024 [ Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 1040 and Doc. 1041 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 1044 and Doc. 1045 ] , 1029 [ Pg. 1029 is part of Doc. 1046 ] , 1158 [ Pg. 1158 includes portions of Doc. 1158 and Doc. 1159 ] , 1160 [ Pg. 1160 includes portions of Doc. 1160 and Doc. 1161 ] , 1161 [ Pg. 1161 includes portions of Doc. 1162 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1162 (#1)] ] European Inland Transport Conference, 1159–1160 [ Pgs. 1159–1160 include portions of Doc. 1159 , Doc. 1160 , and Doc. 1161 ] , 1161 [ Pg. 1161 includes portions of Doc. 1162 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1162 (#1)] ] , 1162 [ Pg. 1162 includes portions of Doc. 1163 and Doc. 1164 ] , 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] European questions, general: Cooperation in solving European economic problems, discussions of U. S. proposal, 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1158–1161 [ Pgs. 1158–1161 include portions of Doc. 1158 , Doc. 1159 , Doc. 1160 , Doc. 1161 , Doc. 1162 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1162 (#1)] ] , 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] European economic organizations, Soviet participation in, 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1158–1162 [ Pgs. 1158–1162 include portions of Doc. 1158 , Doc. 1159 , Doc. 1160 , Doc. 1161 , Doc. 1162 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1162 (#1)] , Doc. 1163 , and Doc. 1164 ] , 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Freedom of the press in Eastern Europe. See Press . Inland waterways: Discussions concerning, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 256–258 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 303–305 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 313–314 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 397–398 [ Pgs. 397–398 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 453–454 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] , 577–578 [ Pgs. 577–578 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1556 [ Pg. 1556 includes portions of Doc. 1412 and Doc. 1413 ] ; meeting of Subcommittee on Inland Waterways, 453–454 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] ; Protocol, section concerning, 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] ; U. S. and British proposals, 649–658 [ Pgs. 649–658 include portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)] , Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)] ] Territorial settlements. See United Nations Organization : Trusteeship, etc. Trade, 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] , 755–756 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 849 ] Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, implementation of. See Yalta agreements : Declaration on Liberated Europe . Evatt, Herbert, 1297 [ Pg. 1297 includes portions of Doc. 1260 and Doc. 1261 ] Evsekov, Maj. N. V., 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] Export–Import Bank, 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 871 ] , 1526 [ Pg. 1526 is part of Doc. 1386 ] External assets, control of. See under Bulgaria , Finland , Germany , Hungary , and Rumania . Fahy, Charles, 421–424 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] Falaleyev (Fallalev), Marshal of Aviation F. Ya., 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 411–414 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] Far East. See individual countries . Farrell, Brig. Gen. Thomas F., 1364 [ Pg. 1364 is part of Doc. 1305 ] , 1367 [ Pg. 1367 is part of Doc. 1305 ] Fascist activities. See under Austria and Germany . Fat Man , 1360 n [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] Felix, Archduke of Austria, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 761 ] Fetter, Frank W., 1153–1154 [ Pgs. 1153–1154 include portions of Doc. 1154 , Doc. 1155 , and Doc. 1156 ] Finland: Armistice agreement ( Sept. 19, 1944 ), cited, 67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] Coal shipments to Finland, 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] Diplomatic relations, establishment of ( see also Peace Treaty , infra; also United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria, etc. ): Discussions concerning, 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 326–328 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 370–372 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 529–530 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 589–590 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 598–599 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] ; Soviet proposal, 698–699 [ Pgs. 698–699 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] Elections, 230–231 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] Finnish external assets, 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 846 ] Finnish ships, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 1014 ] German assets in Finland, 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1486–1487 [ Pg. 1486 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1506 [ Pg. 1506 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Government, position of the three powers regarding recognition of, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 394–395 [ Pgs. 394–395 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] Peace treaty, discussions concerning conclusion of ( see also under Council of Foreign Ministers : Functions, etc. ), 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 178–181 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] ; U. S. proposal, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] Press, admission of foreign correspondents and radio representatives, 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 731 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1458 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1492–1493 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Reparations from Finland, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] United Nations, admission to. See United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria, etc. Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. See Declaration under Yalta Fitch, Vice Adm. Aubrey W., 1178 [ Pg. 1178 is part of Doc. 1180 ] Fite, Katherine B., 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] Five Freedoms (civil aviation), 1188–1190 [ Pgs. 1188–1190 include portions of Doc. 1187 and Doc. 1188 ] Flanigan, Rear Adm. Howard A., 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] Fleener, Ens. Cecil M., 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] Fletcher, Otto F., 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] Fogelson, Col. Elijah E., 1381 [ Pg. 1381 is part of Doc. 1318 ] Food. See Poland : Coal and food ; and under Austria and Germany . Foote, Wilder, 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] , 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] Ford Motor Co., 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), 1087 [ Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] , 1088 [ Pg. 1088 includes portions of Doc. 1095 and Doc. 1096 ] , 1177 [ Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 1180 ] , 1178 [ Pg. 1178 is part of Doc. 1180 ] , 1185 [ Pg. 1185 is part of Doc. 1185 ] Foreign Ministers, Council of. See Council of Foreign Ministers . Foreign Ministers meetings as provided at Yalta Conference (periodic meetings of U. S., British, and Soviet Foreign Ministers), 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 62–63 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 69–70 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 712 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 1448 [ Pg. 1448 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1480 [ Pg. 1480 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1573 [ Pg. 1573 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1580–1581 [ Pg. 1580 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Foreign Ministers Meetings at Berlin Conference, July 18–25, 27, 30 , and Aug. 1: Records of proceedings, 66–79 [ Pgs. 66–79 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 101–109 [ Pgs. 101–109 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 143–160 [ Pgs. 143–160 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)] ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 185–197 [ Pgs. 185–197 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 226–243 [ Pgs. 226–243 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 276–292 [ Pgs. 276–292 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 295–298 [ Pgs. 295–298 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 322–338 [ Pgs. 322–338 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 397–403 [ Pgs. 397–403 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 425–447 [ Pgs. 425–447 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 483–503 [ Pgs. 483–503 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 543–564 [ Pgs. 543–564 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] ; rotating chairmanship for, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] Forrestal, James, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] , 651 n [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] , 1350 [ Pg. 1350 is part of Doc. 1295 ] , 1427 n [ Pg. 1427 includes portions of Doc. 1368 and Doc. 1369 ] Foskett, Capt. James H., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 710 ] Four Freedoms, 1155 n [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] , 1155–1157 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] , 1209 [ Pg. 1209 includes portions of Doc. 1202 and Doc. 1203 ] , 1281 [ Pg. 1281 includes portions of Doc. 1249 and Doc. 1250 ] , 1286 [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 1254 ] Fraleigh, William N., 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 1203 and Doc. 1204 ] France ( see also Syria and Lebanon ; Tangier : U. S.-British-French conversations ): Berlin Conference: Attitude of French public and officials toward Conference, 1549–1551 [ Pgs. 1549–1551 include portions of Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , Doc. 1404 , Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , and Doc. 1407 ] , 1552 [ Pg. 1552 includes portions of Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , and Doc. 1409 ] ; reaction of French Provisional Government to decisions reached at Conference, 1543–1566 [ Pgs. 1543–1566 include portions of Doc. 1395 , Doc. 1396 , Doc. 1397 , Doc. 1398 , Doc. 1399 , Doc. 1400 , Doc. 1401 , Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , Doc. 1404 , Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , Doc. 1409 , Doc. 1410 , Doc. 1411 , Doc. 1412 , Doc. 1413 , Doc. 1414 , and Doc. 1415 ] Coal shipments to France, 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] Council of Foreign Ministers, question of participation. See Council of Foreign Ministers : Participation of China and France . Danube and Rhine commissions, French participation, 654–657 [ Pgs. 654–657 include portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , and Doc. 759 ] Franc, exchange value of, 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] Germany: French zone of occupation and French sector in Berlin, 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 1001–1006 [ Pgs. 1001–1006 include portions of Doc. 1027 , Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , and Doc. 1035 ] German external assets, French attitude, 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 includes portions of Doc. 987 and Doc. 988 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] , 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , and Doc. 995 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] , 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 1000 ] German Fleet and merchant ships, question of allotment of a share to France, 118–122 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 977–978 [ Pgs. 977–978 include portions of Doc. 1013 and Doc. 1014 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 1015 ] International protectorate in Rhineland and Ruhr, proposed, question of French participation, 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 1021 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 1023 and Doc. 1024 ] , 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 1026 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 includes portions of Doc. 1026 and Doc. 1027 ] Miscellaneous, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 284–285 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] Principles governing treatment of Germany in initial control period, French reaction to Conference decisions, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 1544–1545 [ Pgs. 1544–1545 include portions of Doc. 1395 , Doc. 1396 , and Doc. 1397 ] , 1554–1555 [ Pgs. 1554–1555 include portions of Doc. 1410 , Doc. 1411 , and Doc. 1412 ] Reparations. See under Germany : Reparations . Transfers of German populations, French reaction to Conference decisions, 1545–1546 [ Pgs. 1545–1546 include portions of Doc. 1396 , Doc. 1397 , Doc. 1398 , and Doc. 1399 ] , 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , and Doc. 1407 ] Tripartite Naval Commission in Berlin, French desire to be represented on, 1564–1566 [ Pgs. 1564–1566 include portions of Doc. 1414 and Doc. 1415 ] War criminals, French reaction to Conference decisions concerning, 1547 [ Pg. 1547 includes portions of Doc. 1399 and Doc. 1400 ] , 1549 [ Pg. 1549 includes portions of Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , and Doc. 1404 ] Greek elections, question of French participation in supervision of, 151–155 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] passim , 1041–1045 [ Pgs. 1041–1045 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1058 (#1)] , Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , and Doc. 1066 ] , 1047–1048 [ Pgs. 1047–1048 include portions of Doc. 1068 , Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] Inability of Berlin Conference to discuss certain questions in the absence of France, 285–286 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 496–497 [ Pgs. 496–497 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] Japan, war against: French consent to proclamation calling for surrender of Japan, 1555–1556 [ Pgs. 1555–1556 include portions of Doc. 1411 , Doc. 1412 , and Doc. 1413 ] ; French participation, question of, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 1341–1349 [ Pgs. 1341–1349 include portions of Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , Doc. 1288 , Doc. 1289 , Doc. 1290 , Doc. 1291 , Doc. 1292 , Doc. 1293 , Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , and Doc. 1295 ] , 1465–1466 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Lend-Lease. See Lend-Lease : U. S. policy concerning. Peace settlements for Italy and other countries, question of French participation, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 101–102 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 712 and Doc. 713 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 1448 [ Pg. 1448 is part of Doc. 1380 ] Poland, western frontier question, French reaction to Conference decisions, 1546 [ Pg. 1546 includes portions of Doc. 1397 , Doc. 1398 , and Doc. 1399 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 1404 and Doc. 1405 ] , 1551–1552 [ Pgs. 1551–1552 include portions of Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , and Doc. 1409 ] , 1561–1562 [ Pg. 1561 is part of Doc. 1414 ] Shipping losses in World War II, 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Vienna, French participation in occupation of, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] Franco y Bahamonde, Generalissimo Francisco, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 46–47 [ Pgs. 46–47 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 122–126 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 133–135 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 1172 [ Pg. 1172 includes portions of Doc. 1175 and Doc. 1176 ] , 1173 [ Pg. 1173 includes portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] , 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 1179 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] , 1583 [ Pg. 1583 is part of Doc. 1418 ] , 1584 [ Pg. 1584 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Frank, Hans, 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Freedom of the press. See Press . Freeman, Comdr. Charles L., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] Frick, Wilhelm, 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Frith, Brig. E. H. C., 1113–1114 [ Pgs. 1113–1114 include portions of Doc. 1122 , Doc. 1123 , and Doc. 1124 ] Galounsky (Galunski). See Golunsky, S. A. Ganev, Venelin Yordanov, 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 822 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] Gardner, Rear Adm. Matthias B., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197–198 [ Pgs. 197–198 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1349 n [ Pg. 1349 includes portions of Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , and Doc. 1295 ] , 1423 n [ Pg. 1423 includes portions of Doc. 1364 and Doc. 1365 ] Garran, Isham Peter, 1172 [ Pg. 1172 includes portions of Doc. 1175 and Doc. 1176 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] Gates, Artemus L., 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] , 1178 [ Pg. 1178 is part of Doc. 1180 ] , 1427 [ Pg. 1427 includes portions of Doc. 1368 and Doc. 1369 ] Gdynia, 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 1533 [ Pg. 1533 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1534 [ Pg. 1534 is part of Doc. 1389 ] General Electric Co., 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Gentle, Maj. James C., 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 940 ] George, W. Perry, 1356 n [ Pg. 1356 is part of Doc. 1300 ] George, Walter F., 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] George VI, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 710 ] Georgiev, Kimon, 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 723 n [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 822 ] , 728–730 [ Pgs. 728–730 include portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 829 and Doc. 830 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 832 (#1)] ] Gerashchenko, V. S., 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] Gerbrandy, Pieter Sjoerd, 1346 [ Pg. 1346 includes portions of Doc. 1291 and Doc. 1292 ] , 1347 [ Pg. 1347 includes portions of Doc. 1292 and Doc. 1293 ] Gerhardt, Col. Harrison A., 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 823 and Doc. 824 ] , 808 n [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 871 ] , 1423 [ Pg. 1423 includes portions of Doc. 1364 and Doc. 1365 ] , 1424 n [ Pg. 1424 is part of Doc. 1365 ] Gerig, O. Benjamin, 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] Germany: Acts of military surrender, May 7 and May 8 , cited, 67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] “Additional Requirements” Agreement, July 25: Discussions, 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)] ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 1006–1008 [ Pgs. 1006–1008 include portions of Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , and Doc. 1038 ] ; EAC report, 1008–1011 [ Pgs. 1008–1011 include portions of Doc. 1037 and Doc. 1038 ] ; omission of par. 38 from text as issued by Control Council, 101 n [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] ; text, 1011–1023 [ Pgs. 1011–1023 include portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] Administration of Germany. See Government , infra; also under Treatment of Germany in the initial control period , infra . Allied Commanders in Chief, proposed directive for, 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] , 283–285 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 804–807 [ Pgs. 804–807 include portions of Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] Allied Commission on Reparations. See Reparations Commission , infra . Allied Control Council: Authority in economic and political matters, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 141–142 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 750–753 [ Pgs. 750–753 include portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 777–778 [ Pgs. 777–778 include portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 896 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 includes portions of Doc. 1002 and Doc. 1003 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 1003 and Doc. 1004 ] , 1480 [ Pg. 1480 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1481 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1484–1485 [ Pg. 1484 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1502 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1504–1505 [ Pg. 1504 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Establishment and policy of ( see also Authority , supra ), 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 59–60 [ Pgs. 59–60 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] European Advisory Commission, transfer of functions to Control Council, 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 712 ] Functions of, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 278–281 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 398–399 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] , 422–424 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 481–482 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 492–493 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)] ] , 750–1040 [ Pgs. 750–1040 include portions of Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , Doc. 862 , Doc. 863 , Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] , Doc. 892 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , Doc. 921 , Doc. 922 , Doc. 923 , Doc. 924 , Doc. 925 , Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , Doc. 929 , Doc. 930 , Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , Doc. 933 , Doc. 934 , Doc. 935 , Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , Doc. 943 , Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , Doc. 946 , Doc. 947 , Doc. 948 , Doc. 949 , Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , Doc. 989 , Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , Doc. 1009 , Doc. 1010 , Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)] , Doc. 1016 , Doc. 1017 , Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] , Doc. 1021 , Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , Doc. 1025 , Doc. 1026 , Doc. 1027 , Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , Doc. 1042 , Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , Doc. 1045 , Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)] , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , and Doc. 1058 ] passim Military Commanders in Chief of occupying powers, supreme authority in Germany as members of, 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 1481 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1544–1545 [ Pgs. 1544–1545 include portions of Doc. 1395 , Doc. 1396 , and Doc. 1397 ] Polish representation in, question of, 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 1125–1126 [ Pgs. 1125–1126 include portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] , 1125 n [ Pg. 1125 is part of Doc. 1133 ] Relations with Allied and neutral states and former SHAEF and Soviet missions, 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 850 ] Reparations, role in connection with, 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 975 and Doc. 976 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 979 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 980 ] Allied declaration on Germany ( June 5 ), cited, 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 788 and Doc. 789 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] , 1008 [ Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 1037 and Doc. 1038 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 1038 ] American property interests, protection of, 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 850 ] Anti-Soviet activities, Soviet allegations regarding, 548–549 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 683–684 [ Pgs. 683–684 include portions of Doc. 789 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)] , Doc. 790 , and Doc. 791 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 1054 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)] , and Doc. 1055 ] Bavaria, 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 includes portions of Doc. 1026 and Doc. 1027 ] Berlin: Coal and food supply for, 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 570–571 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] , 1024–1025 [ Pgs. 1024–1025 include portions of Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , and Doc. 1042 ] , 1033–1034 [ Pgs. 1033–1034 include portions of Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] ] ; French sector of occupation, 407 n [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 1001–1006 [ Pgs. 1001–1006 include portions of Doc. 1027 , Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , and Doc. 1035 ] , 1576 [ Pg. 1576 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Coal and food ( see also Coal production , infra ), 183–184 [ Pgs. 183–184 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 210–215 [ Pgs. 210–215 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 217–221 [ Pgs. 217–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 248–252 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 262–263 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 278–281 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 296–298 [ Pgs. 296–298 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 385–386 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 389–390 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 570–571 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 683–684 [ Pgs. 683–684 include portions of Doc. 789 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)] , Doc. 790 , and Doc. 791 ] , 756–757 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 849 ] , 760–761 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 800–801 [ Pgs. 800–801 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , and Doc. 866 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 918 and Doc. 919 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 includes portions of Doc. 932 and Doc. 933 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 918 [ Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 957 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] , 1024–1025 [ Pgs. 1024–1025 include portions of Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , and Doc. 1042 ] , 1033–1034 [ Pgs. 1033–1034 include portions of Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] ] , 1485–1486 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1506 [ Pg. 1506 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Coal production for interzonal and European consumption: British position and proposals, 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 1041 and Doc. 1042 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 1043 and Doc. 1044 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 1044 and Doc. 1045 ] , 1032–1034 [ Pgs. 1032–1034 include portions of Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] ] Political aspects of coal problem, 212–213 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 850 ] Relationship to reparations, 212–215 [ Pgs. 212–215 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 217–221 [ Pgs. 217–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 279–281 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] Soviet position, 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 1041 and Doc. 1042 ] , 1031 [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 1047 and Doc. 1048 ] Territory east of the Oder–Neisse Line, relation to, 212–215 [ Pgs. 212–215 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 217–221 [ Pgs. 217–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 250–251 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 1033–1034 [ Pgs. 1033–1034 include portions of Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] ] U. S. proposed coal directive to Military Zone Commanders, information concerning, 1023–1024 [ Pgs. 1023–1024 include portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , and Doc. 1041 ] ; British position and amendments, 1026–1027 [ Pgs. 1026–1027 include portions of Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , and Doc. 1045 ] , 1032–1034 [ Pgs. 1032–1034 include portions of Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] ] ; Truman–Stalin exchange of messages concerning, 1028–1030 [ Pgs. 1028–1030 include portions of Doc. 1046 and Doc. 1047 ] , 1031 [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 1047 and Doc. 1048 ] Commodities, interzonal exchange of ( see also Coal and food and Coal production , supra ), statistical data, 1030–1031 [ Pgs. 1030–1031 include portions of Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , and Doc. 1048 ] Control Council. See Allied Control Council , supra . Control machinery in Germany: European Advisory Commission Agreement ( Sept. 12, 1944 , as amended), cited, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 998 [ Pg. 998 is part of Doc. 1025 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] , 1481 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1502 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Treatment of Germany in the initial control period. See Treatment, etc. , infra . Danube, see Danube . Denazification, 73–74 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 761–762 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 852 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 852 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1502–1503 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1576–1577 [ Pg. 1576 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 775–776 [ Pgs. 775–776 include portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 780–781 [ Pgs. 780–781 include portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 784–785 [ Pgs. 784–785 include portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 796–797 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1481 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1502 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Dismemberment of. See Territorial settlements , infra; and Poland : Frontiers, etc. Displaced persons in Germany ( see also Transfers of German populations , infra ), 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] ] , 1020 [ Pg. 1020 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1035 n [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 1053 and Doc. 1054 ] East Prussia (see also Königsberg , infra ), 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 855–856 [ Pgs. 855–856 include portions of Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , and Doc. 915 ] , 862–863 [ Pgs. 862–863 include portions of Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , and Doc. 920 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 933 and Doc. 934 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] , 1142 [ Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1489 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 1429 ] , 1598 [ Pg. 1598 is part of Doc. 1430 ] , 1599 [ Pg. 1599 is part of Doc. 1431 ] Economic and financial matters ( see also Agreement and Import program under Treatment of Germany in the initial control period , infra ): Discussions, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 110–111 [ Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] ; Economic Council for Europe, proposed, 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 871 ] ; summary memorandum on German economic and related matters, 823–824 [ Pgs. 823–824 include portions of Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , and Doc. 886 ] ; treatment of Germany as an economic unit, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 274–275 [ Pgs. 274–275 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 849 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 791–792 [ Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 870–871 [ Pgs. 870–871 include portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 1452 [ Pg. 1452 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1484 [ Pg. 1484 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Economic principles for initial control period. See Treatment of Germany in the initial control period , infra . Education, 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 852 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1503 [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 1384 ] ; reeducation of the German people, 782–784 [ Pgs. 782–784 include portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] Enemy war matériel, disposal of, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 835–837 [ Pgs. 835–837 include portions of Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , and Doc. 896 ] External assets, control of ( see also Reparations : German external assets , infra ): Estimates of total German assets in neutral countries, 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] German assets in Austria, 567–569 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579–580 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1486–1487 [ Pg. 1486 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1506 [ Pg. 1506 is part of Doc. 1384 ] ; in Balkans and Finland, 567–568 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 812 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 951–952 [ Pgs. 951–952 include portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] ; in Spain, 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 952–953 [ Pgs. 952–953 include portions of Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , and Doc. 986 ] , 959–960 [ Pgs. 959–960 include portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , and Doc. 998 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] ; in Turkey, 949–960 [ Pgs. 949–960 include portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , Doc. 989 , Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , and Doc. 998 ] passim ; in United States and Latin America, 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 531–532 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 567–568 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] ; in western and northern Europe, 567–568 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 956–959 [ Pgs. 956–959 include portions of Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] Protocol and Communiqué sections concerning, 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1485–1487 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1506 [ Pg. 1506 is part of Doc. 1384 ] U. S.-British démarche to neutral countries concerning, 949–950 [ Pgs. 949–950 include portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , and Doc. 983 ] , 952–953 [ Pgs. 952–953 include portions of Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , and Doc. 986 ] , 956–957 [ Pgs. 956–957 include portions of Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , and Doc. 993 ] , 958–959 [ Pgs. 958–959 include portions of Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] ; French concurrence in, 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , and Doc. 995 ] ; Soviet actions and U. S. note to Soviet Union, 949–953 [ Pgs. 949–953 include portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , and Doc. 986 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] , 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] , 959–960 [ Pgs. 959–960 include portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , and Doc. 998 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] U. S. proposed declaration and vesting decree: Discussions and Economic Subcommittee report, 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 515–516 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)] ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 963–964 [ Pgs. 963–964 include portions of Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , and Doc. 1003 ] ; French participation, question of, 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 includes portions of Doc. 987 and Doc. 988 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] , 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 1000 ] ; position and proposals of United States, 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 953–955 [ Pgs. 953–955 include portions of Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , and Doc. 989 ] , 957–958 [ Pgs. 957–958 include portions of Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , and Doc. 995 ] , 960–961 [ Pgs. 960–961 include portions of Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] , 961–962 [ Pgs. 961–962 include portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] , 964–965 [ Pgs. 964–965 include portions of Doc. 1002 and Doc. 1003 ] , 968–969 [ Pgs. 968–969 include portions of Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , and Doc. 1005 ] ; texts of declaration and decree (drafts), 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 1000 ] , 965–968 [ Pgs. 965–968 include portions of Doc. 1003 and Doc. 1004 ] Fascist activities in ( see also Anti-Soviet activities , supra ), 495–496 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] Food, discussions concerning interzonal supply of ( see also Coal and food , supra ), 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 296–297 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 389–390 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 918 and Doc. 919 ] Freedom of speech, press, and religion, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1483 [ Pg. 1483 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1504 [ Pg. 1504 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Frontier with Poland. See Poland : Frontiers . General Staff, 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 849 ] , 775–776 [ Pgs. 775–776 include portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 1038 ] German Fleet, question of disposal of. See German Navy, etc. , infra . German forces in Norway, 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 387–388 [ Pgs. 387–388 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1037–1040 [ Pgs. 1037–1040 include portions of Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , and Doc. 1058 ] German frontiers of 1937 as basis for discussions and territorial settlements, 89–90 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 1024–1025 [ Pgs. 1024–1025 include portions of Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , and Doc. 1042 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 1044 and Doc. 1045 ] , 1033–1034 [ Pgs. 1033–1034 include portions of Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] ] , 1136–1137 [ Pgs. 1136–1137 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)] , Doc. 1143 , and Doc. 1144 ] German minority groups, discussions concerning repatriation of. See Transfers of German populations , infra . German Navy and Merchant Marine, disposal and distribution of: Discussions concerning, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 70–71 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 105–106 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] ] , 118–122 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 131–133 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 382–383 [ Pgs. 382–383 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 392–393 [ Pgs. 392–393 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 474–475 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 544–545 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 558–562 [ Pgs. 558–562 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 576–577 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1380 [ Pg. 1380 includes portions of Doc. 1316 and Doc. 1317 ] , 1557 [ Pg. 1557 includes portions of Doc. 1413 and Doc. 1414 ] ; report of Technical Subcommittee, 980–983 [ Pgs. 980–983 include portions of Doc. 1015 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)] ] Position and proposals of the three powers: Soviet Union, 971 [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 1007 and Doc. 1008 ] , 976–977 [ Pgs. 976–977 include portions of Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , and Doc. 1014 ] ; United Kingdom, 977–979 [ Pgs. 977–979 include portions of Doc. 1013 and Doc. 1014 ] ; United States, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 969–970 [ Pgs. 969–970 include portions of Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , Doc. 1005 , and Doc. 1006 ] , 971–975 [ Pgs. 971–975 include portions of Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , Doc. 1009 , Doc. 1010 , and Doc. 1011 ] Protocol and Communiqué sections concerning, 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1487–1488 [ Pg. 1487 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1507 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Subcommittee on, meeting and report, 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] ] , 980–983 [ Pgs. 980–983 include portions of Doc. 1015 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)] ] Tripartite Naval Commission, formation of, 979 [ Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 1014 ] , 982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 1015 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 1015 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)] ] ; French démarche regarding participation in, 1564–1566 [ Pgs. 1564–1566 include portions of Doc. 1414 and Doc. 1415 ] Use of Merchant Fleet in connection with the war against Japan and the rehabilitation of Europe, 119–121 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 474–475 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 969–970 [ Pgs. 969–970 include portions of Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , Doc. 1005 , and Doc. 1006 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 is part of Doc. 1009 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1010 and Doc. 1011 ] Gestapo, 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1481 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1562 [ Pg. 1562 is part of Doc. 1414 ] Government: Decentralization of political structure and restoration of local self-government ( see also Governmental structure , infra ), 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 758–759 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 776–777 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 852 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1482–1483 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1503 [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Governmental structure and related matters, 766–775 [ Pgs. 766–775 include portions of Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , and Doc. 852 ] Military Government control, 773–774 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 851 ] I. G. Farben Industrie, 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 951 ] Information services, 759–760 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 850 ] Judicial system, reorganization of, 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1503 [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Kiel Canal, question of internationalization of, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 313–314 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] , 649–650 [ Pgs. 649–650 include portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)] , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] , 655–656 [ Pgs. 655–656 include portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)] ] , 1420 [ Pg. 1420 is part of Doc. 1363 ] , 1423–1424 [ Pgs. 1423–1424 include portions of Doc. 1364 and Doc. 1365 ] Königsberg, question of Soviet annexation, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 305–306 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 551–552 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 909 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] , 1142 [ Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1454–1455 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1489 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1507 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1562 [ Pg. 1562 is part of Doc. 1414 ] , 1563 [ Pg. 1563 is part of Doc. 1414 ] , 1597–1599 [ Pgs. 1597–1599 include portions of Doc. 1429 , Doc. 1430 , and Doc. 1431 ] ; Soviet proposal, 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] Labor services, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 764–766 [ Pgs. 764–766 include portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] Nazis and Nazi Party, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 761–762 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 852 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 785–786 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 802–804 [ Pgs. 802–804 include portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 1021 [ Pg. 1021 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1450 [ Pg. 1450 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1502–1503 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1576–1577 [ Pg. 1576 is part of Doc. 1417 ] ; attitude of German people toward Nazis, 802–804 [ Pgs. 802–804 include portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] Occupation: Directive to Allied Commanders in Chief, 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] , 283–285 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 804–807 [ Pgs. 804–807 include portions of Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] Document centers in zones of occupation, 762–763 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 850 ] EAC Agreement regarding zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin, July 26, 1945 , amending Protocol of Sept. 12, 1944 , 1001–1006 [ Pgs. 1001–1006 include portions of Doc. 1027 , Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , and Doc. 1035 ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] French zone of occupation and French sector in Berlin, 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 1001–1006 [ Pgs. 1001–1006 include portions of Doc. 1027 , Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , and Doc. 1035 ] U. S. objective in occupation of Germany, 780–784 [ Pgs. 780–784 include portions of Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] Oder–Neisse Line. See under Poland . Political parties and activities in Germany ( see also Anti-Soviet activities, etc. , supra ), 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 774–775 [ Pgs. 774–775 include portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] Political principles for initial control period. See Treatment of Germany in the initial control period : Agreement, etc. , infra . Press, question of freedom of, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1483 [ Pg. 1483 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1504 [ Pg. 1504 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Prisoners of war, 765–766 [ Pgs. 765–766 include portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1449–1455 [ Pg. 1449 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1481–1490 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1501–1507 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Prussia, 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 851 ] Reeducation of German people, 782–784 [ Pgs. 782–784 include portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] Rehabilitation, 753–757 [ Pgs. 753–757 include portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 808–809 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 871 ] Reparations ( see also Reparations Commission, Restitution , and War booty , infra ): Allied Control Council, role in connection with, 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 975 and Doc. 976 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 979 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 980 ] Allied- or neutral-owned property in Germany, 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 882 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] , 935–936 [ Pgs. 935–936 include portions of Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , and Doc. 976 ] , 1497–1498 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Allocation, 834 [ Pg. 834 is part of Doc. 894 ] , 845–846 [ Pgs. 845–846 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] , 868 n [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 871–872 [ Pgs. 871–872 include portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] , 882–883 [ Pgs. 882–883 include portions of Doc. 932 , Doc. 933 , and Doc. 934 ] , 884–885 [ Pgs. 884–885 include portions of Doc. 934 , Doc. 935 , and Doc. 936 ] , 886–887 [ Pgs. 886–887 include portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] , 896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 947 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 953 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 956 ] , 920–923 [ Pgs. 920–923 include portions of Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , and Doc. 964 ] , 925–928 [ Pgs. 925–928 include portions of Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , and Doc. 968 ] , 930–931 [ Pgs. 930–931 include portions of Doc. 970 , Doc. 971 , and Doc. 972 ] , 932–933 [ Pgs. 932–933 include portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 943–944 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 945–947 [ Pg. 945 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1557–1558 [ Pgs. 1557–1558 include portions of Doc. 1413 and Doc. 1414 ] , 1593–1594 [ Pgs. 1593–1594 include portions of Doc. 1424 , Doc. 1425 , and Doc. 1426 ] Definitions, 832 [ Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 894 ] , 833–834 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 894 ] , 846–849 [ Pgs. 846–849 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 is part of Doc. 927 ] , 894–895 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 942–943 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] Discussions and minutes concerning, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 118–119 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 212–215 [ Pgs. 212–215 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 217–221 [ Pgs. 217–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 277–281 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 289–290 [ Pgs. 289–290 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 295–298 [ Pgs. 295–298 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 428–432 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 438–441 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] ] , 450–452 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 473–476 [ Pgs. 473–476 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] , 481–482 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 484–492 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 500–501 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 514–518 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 530–533 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 535–536 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 566–570 [ Pgs. 566–570 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 578–581 [ Pgs. 578–581 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 586–587 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] Distribution. See Allocation , supra . Estimates of German assets, 841–842 [ Pgs. 841–842 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 854–856 [ Pgs. 854–856 include portions of Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , and Doc. 915 ] , 862–863 [ Pgs. 862–863 include portions of Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , and Doc. 920 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] , 877–882 [ Pgs. 877–882 include portions of Doc. 930 , Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , and Doc. 933 ] , 883–884 [ Pgs. 883–884 include portions of Doc. 933 , Doc. 934 , and Doc. 935 ] , 885–886 [ Pgs. 885–886 include portions of Doc. 935 , Doc. 936 , and Doc. 937 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] , 899 [ Pg. 899 is part of Doc. 946 ] External assets. See External assets , supra . France: Invitation to French Provisional Government to participate in Reparations Commission, and French acceptance, 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 569–570 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1546–1547 [ Pgs. 1546–1547 include portions of Doc. 1397 , Doc. 1398 , Doc. 1399 , and Doc. 1400 ] , 1549 [ Pg. 1549 includes portions of Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , and Doc. 1404 ] , 1552–1553 [ Pgs. 1552–1553 include portions of Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , Doc. 1409 , and Doc. 1410 ] ; notification to French Provisional Government of decisions reached on reparations, and French reaction, 1548 [ Pg. 1548 includes portions of Doc. 1401 and Doc. 1402 ] , 1557–1560 [ Pgs. 1557–1560 include portions of Doc. 1413 and Doc. 1414 ] German external assets, 566–569 [ Pgs. 566–569 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 966 and Doc. 967 ] , 928–929 [ Pgs. 928–929 include portions of Doc. 967 , Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 970 and Doc. 971 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 972 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 980 ] Gold, 515–516 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 531–532 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 919–920 [ Pgs. 919–920 include portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , and Doc. 960 ] , 923 n [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] , 931–932 [ Pgs. 931–932 include portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 937–938 [ Pgs. 937–938 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , and Doc. 979 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1487 [ Pg. 1487 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Imports as a first charge against proceeds of German exports, 279–281 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] ] , 490–491 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] , 810–812 [ Pgs. 810–812 include portions of Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 825–828 [ Pgs. 825–828 include portions of Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 892 ] , 840–841 [ Pgs. 840–841 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 is part of Doc. 909 ] , 896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 918 [ Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 957 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] Labor services, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 764–766 [ Pgs. 764–766 include portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] Polish claims and question of settlement, 472–473 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 489–490 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 491–492 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 849–850 [ Pgs. 849–850 include portions of Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] , 851–852 [ Pg. 851 is part of Doc. 909 ] , 857 [ Pg. 857 is part of Doc. 915 ] , 861–862 [ Pgs. 861–862 include portions of Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , and Doc. 919 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 933 and Doc. 934 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 953 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] , 926–927 [ Pgs. 926–927 include portions of Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1453–1454 [ Pg. 1453 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1485–1487 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1505–1506 [ Pg. 1505 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Relation to ceded German territory, 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 842–843 [ Pgs. 842–843 include portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] Removals of equipment and property from Germany: Information and observations on removals by Soviet Union, 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 873–876 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 929 ] , 888–892 [ Pgs. 888–892 include portions of Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , and Doc. 941 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 902–903 [ Pgs. 902–903 include portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 944–945 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 980 ] ; by United States and United Kingdom, 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 516–517 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 903–912 [ Pgs. 903–912 include portions of Doc. 949 , Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , and Doc. 952 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 includes portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] Principles governing, 859 [ Pg. 859 is part of Doc. 916 ] , 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 916 and Doc. 917 ] , 869 [ Pg. 869 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 942 and Doc. 943 ] , 912–916 [ Pgs. 912–916 include portions of Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , and Doc. 955 ] , 918–919 [ Pgs. 918–919 include portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 is part of Doc. 980 ] Reparation Plan, U. S. development of, and subsequent negotiations and agreement: Economic Subcommittee reports, 845–846 [ Pgs. 845–846 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 922 and Doc. 923 ] Principles and formulae agreed upon by Reparations Commission, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 832–835 [ Pgs. 832–835 include portions of Doc. 894 and Doc. 895 ] , 845–846 [ Pgs. 845–846 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] Proposals of the three powers: Soviet Union, 863–865 [ Pgs. 863–865 include portions of Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , and Doc. 921 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] , 913–914 [ Pgs. 913–914 include portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] , 922–923 [ Pgs. 922–923 include portions of Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , and Doc. 964 ] ; United Kingdom, 860–861 [ Pgs. 860–861 include portions of Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , and Doc. 918 ] , 920–921 [ Pgs. 920–921 include portions of Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , and Doc. 961 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 966 and Doc. 967 ] ; United States, 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] ] , 832–835 [ Pgs. 832–835 include portions of Doc. 894 and Doc. 895 ] , 849–850 [ Pgs. 849–850 include portions of Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] , 856–860 [ Pgs. 856–860 include portions of Doc. 914 , Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , and Doc. 917 ] , 861–862 [ Pgs. 861–862 include portions of Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , and Doc. 919 ] , 867–870 [ Pgs. 867–870 include portions of Doc. 924 , Doc. 925 , Doc. 926 , and Doc. 927 ] , 915–916 [ Pgs. 915–916 include portions of Doc. 954 and Doc. 955 ] , 921–922 [ Pgs. 921–922 include portions of Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , and Doc. 963 ] , 926–927 [ Pgs. 926–927 include portions of Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections incorporating Plan: Drafting of, 929–933 [ Pgs. 929–933 include portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , and Doc. 973 ] ; implementation of, 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 975 and Doc. 976 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] ; résumé relative to, 939–940 [ Pgs. 939–940 include portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] ; texts, 1485–1487 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1505–1506 [ Pg. 1505 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Recapitulation of negotiations, 850–852 [ Pgs. 850–852 include portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] , 870–872 [ Pgs. 870–872 include portions of Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , and Doc. 928 ] , 893–897 [ Pgs. 893–897 include portions of Doc. 942 and Doc. 943 ] , 940–949 [ Pgs. 940–949 include portions of Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] Scientific and military research institutions, transfer from Germany to Soviet Union, 837–839 [ Pgs. 837–839 include portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] Yalta discussions and decisions regarding, 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 438–440 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 475–476 [ Pgs. 475–476 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 914 and Doc. 915 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] Reparations Commission (Allied): Functions and activities, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 878 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 834–835 [ Pgs. 834–835 include portions of Doc. 894 and Doc. 895 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 975 and Doc. 976 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1560 [ Pg. 1560 is part of Doc. 1414 ] Invitation to French Provisional Government to participate in Commission, and French acceptance, 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 569–570 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1546–1547 [ Pgs. 1546–1547 include portions of Doc. 1397 , Doc. 1398 , Doc. 1399 , and Doc. 1400 ] , 1549 [ Pg. 1549 includes portions of Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , and Doc. 1404 ] , 1552–1553 [ Pgs. 1552–1553 include portions of Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , Doc. 1409 , and Doc. 1410 ] Restitution, definitions and proposals of the three powers, 818–819 [ Pgs. 818–819 include portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] , 833–834 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 894 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 897 ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 847–849 [ Pgs. 847–849 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 is part of Doc. 909 ] , 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 916 and Doc. 917 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] , 894–895 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 923–925 [ Pgs. 923–925 include portions of Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , and Doc. 965 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] , 934–935 [ Pgs. 934–935 include portions of Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , and Doc. 975 ] ; art objects, 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] , 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 916 and Doc. 917 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 923–925 [ Pgs. 923–925 include portions of Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , and Doc. 965 ] , 933–934 [ Pgs. 933–934 include portions of Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , and Doc. 974 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1560 [ Pg. 1560 is part of Doc. 1414 ] Rhineland and Ruhr, question of separation from Germany ( see also Ruhr , infra ): Discussions, 183–184 [ Pgs. 183–184 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 496–497 [ Pgs. 496–497 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 521–522 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 535–536 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 1023 and Doc. 1024 ] , 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 1026 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 includes portions of Doc. 1026 and Doc. 1027 ] Proposals and position of Soviet Union, 998 [ Pg. 998 is part of Doc. 1025 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 1026 ] , 1000–1001 [ Pgs. 1000–1001 include portions of Doc. 1026 , Doc. 1027 , and Doc. 1028 ] ; of United States, 998–1000 [ Pgs. 998–1000 include portions of Doc. 1025 , Doc. 1026 , and Doc. 1027 ] Ruhr ( see also Coal and Rhineland and Ruhr , supra ): Administration of industrial area, discussions and résumés, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] ] , 595–596 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 602–603 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] Food for, 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] Production of coal, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 250–251 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] ] Reparations, 297–298 [ Pgs. 297–298 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 450–452 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 481–482 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 512–513 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 514–515 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 871–872 [ Pgs. 871–872 include portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 933 and Doc. 934 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 includes portions of Doc. 934 and Doc. 935 ] , 885 [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 935 and Doc. 936 ] , 886–887 [ Pgs. 886–887 include portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] , 899 [ Pg. 899 is part of Doc. 946 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 947 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 951 and Doc. 952 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 953 ] , 920–921 [ Pgs. 920–921 include portions of Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , and Doc. 961 ] , 926–927 [ Pgs. 926–927 include portions of Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 1027 and Doc. 1028 ] , 1558 [ Pg. 1558 is part of Doc. 1414 ] Shipping ( see also German Navy and Merchant Marine , supra ), disposition of captured German passenger ships, 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 1191–1192 [ Pgs. 1191–1192 include portions of Doc. 1189 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)] , Doc. 1190 , and Doc. 1191 ] , 1199–1202 [ Pgs. 1199–1202 include portions of Doc. 1194 , Doc. 1195 , Doc. 1196 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)] , and Doc. 1197 ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1472–1473 [ Pg. 1472 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Silesia. See under Poland . Territorial settlements ( see also East Prussia , Kiel Canal , Königsberg , and Rhineland and Ruhr , supra ) : Cession of German territory to Poland, discussions concerning, 208–215 [ Pgs. 208–215 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 217–221 [ Pgs. 217–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 247–252 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 261–264 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] ] , 296–297 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 332–336 [ Pgs. 332–336 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 369–370 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 942 ] German frontiers of 1937 as basis for, 89–90 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] ] , 208–211 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 1024–1025 [ Pgs. 1024–1025 include portions of Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , and Doc. 1042 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 1044 and Doc. 1045 ] , 1033–1034 [ Pgs. 1033–1034 include portions of Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] ] , 1136–1137 [ Pgs. 1136–1137 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)] , Doc. 1143 , and Doc. 1144 ] Transfers of German populations, 210–215 [ Pgs. 210–215 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 217–221 [ Pgs. 217–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 383–391 [ Pgs. 383–391 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 398–399 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 523–524 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 536–537 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1012–1013 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)] , and Doc. 1055 ] ; notification to French Provisional Government regarding agreement concerning, and French reply, 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 1545–1546 [ Pgs. 1545–1546 include portions of Doc. 1396 , Doc. 1397 , Doc. 1398 , and Doc. 1399 ] , 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , and Doc. 1407 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1459 [ Pg. 1459 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1495–1496 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1511 [ Pg. 1511 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Treatment of Germany in the initial control period, principles to govern: Administration of Germany: Directive to Allied Commanders in Chief, 807 [ Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 870 ] ; governmental structure, 766–775 [ Pgs. 766–775 include portions of Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , and Doc. 852 ] ; political and economic problems involved, 758–766 [ Pgs. 758–766 include portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] ; provisions in draft agreement under consideration by the powers, 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 776–777 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 852 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 787–788 [ Pgs. 787–788 include portions of Doc. 857 and Doc. 858 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 863 ] Agreement on political and economic principles to govern: Discussion and minutes, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 72–76 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 90–91 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 108–109 [ Pgs. 108–109 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 232–234 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 241–242 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 278–281 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 283–285 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 492–493 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 520–522 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 571–572 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] Drafts, negotiations and revisions of, 750–753 [ Pgs. 750–753 include portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 775–779 [ Pgs. 775–779 include portions of Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , Doc. 853 , and Doc. 854 ] , 787–800 [ Pgs. 787–800 include portions of Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , Doc. 862 , Doc. 863 , Doc. 864 , and Doc. 865 ] , 810–812 [ Pgs. 810–812 include portions of Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 813–815 [ Pgs. 813–815 include portions of Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , and Doc. 880 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] Economic principles, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 751–753 [ Pgs. 751–753 include portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 777–778 [ Pgs. 777–778 include portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] , 787–794 [ Pgs. 787–794 include portions of Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] , 796–799 [ Pgs. 796–799 include portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] , 799–800 [ Pgs. 799–800 include portions of Doc. 863 , Doc. 864 , and Doc. 865 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] , 811–812 [ Pgs. 811–812 include portions of Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 813–814 [ Pgs. 813–814 include portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 818–820 [ Pgs. 818–820 include portions of Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , and Doc. 883 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 887 and Doc. 888 ] , 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] ] Economic Subcommittee, consideration of drafts and submittal of texts, 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 787–792 [ Pgs. 787–792 include portions of Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , and Doc. 859 ] , 795–799 [ Pgs. 795–799 include portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] , 818–820 [ Pgs. 818–820 include portions of Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , and Doc. 883 ] , 827–828 [ Pgs. 827–828 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] ] Political principles, 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 750–751 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 775–777 [ Pgs. 775–777 include portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 784–785 [ Pgs. 784–785 include portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 814–815 [ Pgs. 814–815 include portions of Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , and Doc. 880 ] , 824–825 [ Pgs. 824–825 include portions of Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , and Doc. 888 ] Protocol and Communiqué, text of agreement included in, 1481–1485 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1502–1505 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Subcommittee on German Political Questions, report, 784–786 [ Pgs. 784–786 include portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] ; Soviet and U. S. proposals concerning, 824–825 [ Pgs. 824–825 include portions of Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , and Doc. 888 ] U. S. proposals. See Drafts , supra . Discussions and minutes. See under Agreement, etc. , supra . Import program: Formation of, 778 [ Pg. 778 includes portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] , 779 n [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 793–794 [ Pgs. 793–794 include portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] Priority of imports as a first charge against proceeds of German exports, U. S. and British desire for, and Soviet opposition to, 279–281 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 includes portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] , 810–812 [ Pgs. 810–812 include portions of Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 825–828 [ Pgs. 825–828 include portions of Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 892 ] Procurement and interim financing of essential imports, 779–780 [ Pgs. 779–780 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , and Doc. 855 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 800–801 [ Pgs. 800–801 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , and Doc. 866 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 878 ] , 815–817 [ Pgs. 815–817 include portions of Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , and Doc. 881 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 includes portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] , 820–823 [ Pgs. 820–823 include portions of Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , and Doc. 885 ] , 826–827 [ Pgs. 826–827 include portions of Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , and Doc. 891 ] , 829–830 [ Pgs. 829–830 include portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] ] Notification to French Provisional Government of decisions reached, and French reaction, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 1544–1545 [ Pgs. 1544–1545 include portions of Doc. 1395 , Doc. 1396 , and Doc. 1397 ] , 1554–1555 [ Pgs. 1554–1555 include portions of Doc. 1410 , Doc. 1411 , and Doc. 1412 ] Occupation: Directive to Allied Commanders in Chief relative to execution of responsibilities, 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] , 283–285 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 804–807 [ Pgs. 804–807 include portions of Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] ; objective of U. S. Government in occupation of Germany, 780–784 [ Pgs. 780–784 include portions of Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1449–1453 [ Pg. 1449 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1481–1485 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1501–1505 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Rehabilitation, 753–757 [ Pgs. 753–757 include portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 808–809 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 871 ] Summary memorandum on German economic and related matters, 823–824 [ Pgs. 823–824 include portions of Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , and Doc. 886 ] Tripartite Naval Commission in Berlin, 979 [ Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 1014 ] , 982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 1015 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 1015 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)] ] , 1564–1566 [ Pgs. 1564–1566 include portions of Doc. 1414 and Doc. 1415 ] War booty (war trophies): Definitions and proposals of the three powers, 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 834 [ Pg. 834 is part of Doc. 894 ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 846–847 [ Pgs. 846–847 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , and Doc. 905 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] , 850–851 [ Pgs. 850–851 include portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] , 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 909 ] , 853–854 [ Pgs. 853–854 include portions of Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , and Doc. 912 ] , 856–857 [ Pgs. 856–857 include portions of Doc. 914 and Doc. 915 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 is part of Doc. 927 ] , 876 [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 929 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] , 894–895 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 919–920 [ Pgs. 919–920 include portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , and Doc. 960 ] , 942–943 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] Discussions, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 808–809 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 871 ] Enemy war materiel in Germany, disposal of, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 835–837 [ Pgs. 835–837 include portions of Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , and Doc. 896 ] Gold. See under Reparations , supra . Protocol, section concerning, 1497–1498 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] War criminals, treatment of: Discussions concerning, 421–424 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 494–495 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498–499 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 525–527 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537–538 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)] ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 572–573 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] Position and proposals of Soviet Union, 984–985 [ Pgs. 984–985 include portions of Doc. 1016 and Doc. 1017 ] ; of Subcommittee on German Political Questions, 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] ; of United Kingdom, 986 [ Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 1018 ] ; of United States, 421–424 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] , 750–751 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 852 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 987–988 [ Pgs. 987–988 include portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1455 [ Pg. 1455 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1489–1490 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1503 [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1507 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Transmittal to French Provisional Government of decisions regarding, and French reaction, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 1547 [ Pg. 1547 includes portions of Doc. 1399 and Doc. 1400 ] , 1549 [ Pg. 1549 includes portions of Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , and Doc. 1404 ] War matériel, disposal of, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 835–837 [ Pgs. 835–837 include portions of Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , and Doc. 896 ] War trophies. See War booty , supra . Wehrmacht, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 867 ] Westphalia, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 1026 ] Yalta discussions and decisions. See under Reparations , supra . Gestapo, 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1481 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1562 [ Pg. 1562 is part of Doc. 1414 ] Gill, Col. Robert J., 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] Gillette Safety Razor Co., 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] Goberidge, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] Goebbels, Joseph, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] Gold, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 515–516 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 531–532 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 919–920 [ Pgs. 919–920 include portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , and Doc. 960 ] , 923 n [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 963 and Doc. 964 ] , 931–932 [ Pgs. 931–932 include portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 937–938 [ Pgs. 937–938 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , and Doc. 979 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1091 [ Pg. 1091 is part of Doc. 1098 ] , 1134 [ Pg. 1134 includes portions of Doc. 1141 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1141 (#1)] ] , 1487 [ Pg. 1487 is part of Doc. 1383 ] “Gold Pot” doctrine, 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] Golikov, Col. Gen. F. I., 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] Golunsky (Golunski), S. A., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 417–418 [ Pgs. 417–418 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 1110 n [ Pg. 1110 includes portions of Doc. 1119 and Doc. 1120 ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Gomułka, Władysław, 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 1525–1531 [ Pgs. 1525–1531 include portions of Doc. 1386 , Doc. 1387 , and Doc. 1388 ] Gorduysus, Muzaffer Kamil, 1053 n [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1053–1054 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 1071 ] Göring (Goering), Reich Marshal Hermann, 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Gorlinsky, Maj. Gen. N. D., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] Goroshenko. See Gerashchenko, V. S. Gotsi ( nom de guerre of Ilias Dhimakis), 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 1071 ] Gousev. See Gusev, F. T. Grabski, Stanisław, 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1130 [ Pg. 1130 includes portions of Doc. 1137 and Doc. 1138 ] , 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 1138 and Doc. 1139 ] , 1141–1144 [ Pgs. 1141–1144 include portions of Doc. 1149 and Doc. 1150 ] , 1523 [ Pg. 1523 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1528–1530 [ Pgs. 1528–1530 include portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1540 [ Pg. 1540 includes portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] Graham, Capt. Frank H., 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 710 ] Graham, Lt. Col. Wallace H., 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] “Grand Slam,” 1376 [ Pg. 1376 is part of Doc. 1315 ] Grassli, Max, 950 n [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] Greater East Asia, 1255 [ Pg. 1255 is part of Doc. 1228 ] Greaves, Brig. D. G. B., 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] Greece: British troops in Greece and relationship to Greek forces (see also Frontier incidents, etc. , infra ), 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] , 1056–1060 [ Pgs. 1056–1060 include portions of Doc. 1071 and Doc. 1072 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 1074 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 1076 ] , 1069 [ Pg. 1069 is part of Doc. 1079 ] Communist Party (KKE) activities, 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] , 1069 [ Pg. 1069 is part of Doc. 1079 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 1079 ] EAM (National Liberation Front), 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 1068 and Doc. 1069 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 1076 ] ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army), 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] , 1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1057–1059 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 1076 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 1079 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 1079 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 1080 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 1086 and Doc. 1087 ] Elections, Allied supervision of, in accordance with Varkiza Agreement of Feb. 12 and Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe: Discussions and proposals, 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 158–159 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 165–166 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 747 and Doc. 748 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] U. S.-British proposal to Soviet Union and France to participate in supervision of elections, 1041–1043 [ Pgs. 1041–1043 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1058 (#1)] , Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , and Doc. 1063 ] ; Soviet negative attitude and French acceptance, 151–155 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] passim , 1043–1045 [ Pgs. 1043–1045 include portions of Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , and Doc. 1066 ] , 1047–1048 [ Pgs. 1047–1048 include portions of Doc. 1068 , Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] “Free Macedonia” movement, 1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 1079 ] Frontier incidents. See Relations with Albania and Relations with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia , infra . German assets in Greece, 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] German ships, Greek share, 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Government, composition of ( see also Elections , supra ), Soviet position and reactions to, 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 1063 and Doc. 1064 ] , 1045–1047 [ Pgs. 1045–1047 include portions of Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , Doc. 1068 , and Doc. 1069 ] , 1592 [ Pg. 1592 includes portions of Doc. 1423 and Doc. 1424 ] KKE (Communist Party), 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] , 1069 [ Pg. 1069 is part of Doc. 1079 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 1079 ] Minorities, 1053–1056 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 1071 ] National Guard, Gendarmerie , and National Army, 1059–1060 [ Pgs. 1059–1060 include portions of Doc. 1071 and Doc. 1072 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] National Liberation Front (EAM), 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 1068 and Doc. 1069 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 1076 ] National popular Liberation Army (ELAS), 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] , 1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1057–1059 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 1076 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 1079 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 1079 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 1080 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 1086 and Doc. 1087 ] Political and economic conditions in northern Greece, survey by U. S. Ambassador, 1048–1061 [ Pgs. 1048–1061 include portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , and Doc. 1073 ] Press: Freedom of, 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] passim; Soviet press and radio campaign against Greek Government and British forces in Greece, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 1079 ] Relations with Albania, frontier problems, 130–131 [ Pgs. 130–131 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1063 [ Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 1075 ] , 1064–1065 [ Pgs. 1064–1065 include portions of Doc. 1076 and Doc. 1077 ] Relations with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia: General situation and frontier incidents, 116–117 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 130–131 [ Pgs. 130–131 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 1048–1057 [ Pgs. 1048–1057 include portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] , 1060–1061 [ Pgs. 1060–1061 include portions of Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , and Doc. 1073 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 1074 ] , 1065–1066 [ Pgs. 1065–1066 include portions of Doc. 1076 and Doc. 1077 ] , 1068–1071 [ Pgs. 1068–1071 include portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] ; U. S. and British recommendations and position, 1065–1067 [ Pgs. 1065–1067 include portions of Doc. 1076 , Doc. 1077 , and Doc. 1078 ] , 1073–1078 [ Pgs. 1073–1078 include portions of Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , Doc. 1084 , Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , and Doc. 1087 ] Relations with Turkey, 1053–1054 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 1071 ] Reparations, question of payment by Germany, 517 n [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] ; by Italy, 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 433–434 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 1088 [ Pg. 1088 includes portions of Doc. 1095 and Doc. 1096 ] , 1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 1096 and Doc. 1097 ] , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 1097 and Doc. 1098 ] , 1093 [ Pg. 1093 includes portions of Doc. 1099 and Doc. 1100 ] , 1094–1095 [ Pgs. 1094–1095 include portions of Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , and Doc. 1104 ] , 1096 [ Pg. 1096 includes portions of Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 1107 and Doc. 1108 ] Varkiza Agreement ( Feb. 12 ) between Greek Government and National Liberation Front (EAM), cited, 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1058 (#1)] and Doc. 1059 ] , 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , and Doc. 1063 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 1063 and Doc. 1064 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] , 1592 [ Pg. 1592 includes portions of Doc. 1423 and Doc. 1424 ] Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, implementation of. See Elections , supra . Greenwood, Arthur, 1404 [ Pg. 1404 is part of Doc. 1345 ] Greer, Maj. DeWitt, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] Gregoryev, Col. B., 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] Grew, Joseph C., 622–623 [ Pgs. 622–623 include portions of Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , and Doc. 724 ] , 635 n [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 647–648 [ Pgs. 647–648 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 661–662 [ Pgs. 661–662 include portions of Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 802 and Doc. 803 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 726–727 [ Pgs. 726–727 include portions of Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , and Doc. 826 ] , 734–735 [ Pgs. 734–735 include portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 832 (#1)] ] , 737–738 [ Pgs. 737–738 include portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , and Doc. 835 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)] ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 840–841 [ Pgs. 840–841 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 includes portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 951–952 [ Pgs. 951–952 include portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] , 956–957 [ Pgs. 956–957 include portions of Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , and Doc. 993 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] , 1041–1042 [ Pgs. 1041–1042 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1058 (#1)] , Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , and Doc. 1061 ] , 1065–1067 [ Pgs. 1065–1067 include portions of Doc. 1076 , Doc. 1077 , and Doc. 1078 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 1080 ] , 1073–1074 [ Pgs. 1073–1074 include portions of Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , and Doc. 1083 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 1085 and Doc. 1086 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 1089 and Doc. 1090 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 1110 ] , 1100 [ Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , and Doc. 1113 ] , 1103 [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 1115 and Doc. 1116 ] , 1104–1107 [ Pgs. 1104–1107 include portions of Doc. 1117 and Doc. 1118 ] , 1114–1116 [ Pgs. 1114–1116 include portions of Doc. 1123 , Doc. 1124 , and Doc. 1125 ] , 1119 [ Pg. 1119 includes portions of Doc. 1127 and Doc. 1128 ] , 1171–1172 [ Pgs. 1171–1172 include portions of Doc. 1175 and Doc. 1176 ] , 1173–1174 [ Pgs. 1173–1174 include portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] , 1220–1221 [ Pgs. 1220–1221 include portions of Doc. 1209 , Doc. 1210 , and Doc. 1211 ] , 1267 [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] , 1268 [ Pg. 1268 includes portions of Doc. 1238 and Doc. 1239 ] , 1270–1271 [ Pgs. 1270–1271 include portions of Doc. 1240 and Doc. 1241 ] , 1273–1274 [ Pg. 1273 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1347 [ Pg. 1347 includes portions of Doc. 1292 and Doc. 1293 ] , 1349 [ Pg. 1349 includes portions of Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , and Doc. 1295 ] , 1357–1358 [ Pg. 1357 is part of Doc. 1301 ] , 1359–1360 [ Pgs. 1359–1360 include portions of Doc. 1301 , Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] , 1378–1380 [ Pgs. 1378–1380 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , and Doc. 1317 ] , 1389–1390 [ Pgs. 1389–1390 include portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , and Doc. 1329 ] , 1398–1399 [ Pgs. 1398–1399 include portions of Doc. 1338 , Doc. 1339 , Doc. 1340 , and Doc. 1341 ] , 1402 n [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 1344 ] , 1408–1409 [ Pgs. 1408–1409 include portions of Doc. 1348 , Doc. 1349 , and Doc. 1350 ] , 1411–1412 [ Pgs. 1411–1412 include portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , Doc. 1353 , and Doc. 1354 ] Gribanov, M. G., 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] Grol, Milan, 1209–1212 [ Pgs. 1209–1212 include portions of Doc. 1202 , Doc. 1203 , Doc. 1204 , and Doc. 1205 ] Gromyko, A. A., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52–63 [ Pgs. 52–63 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 324 n [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 417–418 [ Pgs. 417–418 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 734 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Gross, Maj. Gen. Charles P., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Groves, Maj. Gen. Leslie R., 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 378–379 [ Pgs. 378–379 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] ] , 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] , 1373 n [ Pg. 1373 is part of Doc. 1310 ] , 1374 [ Pg. 1374 includes portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , and Doc. 1313 ] ; report on test of atomic bomb, 1361–1368 [ Pgs. 1361–1368 include portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] Groza, Petru, 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 814 ] , 951 n [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 984 ] Gruenther, Maj. Gen. Alfred M., 669 n [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 787 ] Gryzlov, Lt. Gen. A. A., 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Gulick, Luther H., 856 n [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 914 and Doc. 915 ] , 873–876 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 929 ] , 889 n [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 940 ] , 902–903 [ Pgs. 902–903 include portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 940 n [ Pg. 940 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 980 ] Gusev, F. T., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#145)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 681 n [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 788 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 789 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)] , and Doc. 790 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 970 and Doc. 971 ] , 930 n [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 970 and Doc. 971 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 972 ] , 932 n [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 972 ] , 933 n [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 1008 n [ Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 1037 and Doc. 1038 ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1570 [ Pg. 1570 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Gustaf V, King of Sweden, 1589 [ Pg. 1589 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] and Doc. 1420 ] Haddon, Lt. Col. Thomas, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] Halifax, Earl of, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 1107 n [ Pg. 1107 includes portions of Doc. 1117 and Doc. 1118 ] , 1368 [ Pg. 1368 is part of Doc. 1305 ] Halsey, Adm. William F., 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] Hankey, Robert M. A., 647 n [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1112 [ Pg. 1112 includes portions of Doc. 1121 and Doc. 1122 ] , 1130 [ Pg. 1130 includes portions of Doc. 1137 and Doc. 1138 ] , 1132 [ Pg. 1132 includes portions of Doc. 1139 and Doc. 1140 ] , 1162 n [ Pg. 1162 includes portions of Doc. 1163 and Doc. 1164 ] Harriman, W. Averell: Foreign Ministers Meetings, participation in, 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ; letter from General Arnold, 1166 [ Pg. 1166 includes portions of Doc. 1168 and Doc. 1169 ] ; memoranda, 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 1237–1241 [ Pgs. 1237–1241 include portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , and Doc. 1217 ] , 1243–1244 [ Pgs. 1243–1244 include portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] , 1246–1247 [ Pgs. 1246–1247 include portions of Doc. 1221 and Doc. 1222 ] ; miscellaneous, 8–24 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] passim , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 710 n [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 812 ] , 743 n [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 959–960 [ Pgs. 959–960 include portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , and Doc. 998 ] , 1024 [ Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 1040 and Doc. 1041 ] , 1104–1105 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 1117 ] , 1129 n [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 1136 and Doc. 1137 ] , 1140 n [ Pg. 1140 includes portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] , 1155 n –1156 n [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] c, 1168 [ Pg. 1168 includes portions of Doc. 1171 and Doc. 1172 ] , 1224 n [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 1212 and Doc. 1213 ] , 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] , 1228 [ Pg. 1228 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1380 [ Pg. 1380 includes portions of Doc. 1316 and Doc. 1317 ] , 1447 n [ Pg. 1447 is part of Doc. 1380 ] ; participation in conversations with Polish Delegation, 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 403–406 [ Pgs. 403–406 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 1128 n [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1525–1529 [ Pgs. 1525–1529 include portions of Doc. 1386 , Doc. 1387 , and Doc. 1388 ] , 1532–1538 [ Pgs. 1532–1538 include portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] , 1540–1541 [ Pgs. 1540–1541 include portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] ; Plenary Meetings, participation in, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] ; tripartite dinner meetings, participation in, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] Harrison, Geoffrey Wedgwood, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] Harrison, George L., 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 1266 n –1267 n [ Pgs. 1266–1267 include portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] , 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] , 1360–1361 [ Pgs. 1360–1361 include portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , Doc. 1304 , and Doc. 1305 ] , 1372 [ Pg. 1372 includes portions of Doc. 1307 , Doc. 1308 , and Doc. 1309 ] , 1373 n [ Pg. 1373 is part of Doc. 1310 ] , 1374 [ Pg. 1374 includes portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , and Doc. 1313 ] Harvey, Oliver, 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] Hayes, Maj. Jesse, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] Hayter, William, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 268 n [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 380 n [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 417–418 [ Pgs. 417–418 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] , 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1201 ] Heath, Donald R., 758–761 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 999–1000 [ Pgs. 999–1000 include portions of Doc. 1026 and Doc. 1027 ] Hebrang, Andrija, 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 1203 and Doc. 1204 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1204 ] Heisenberg, Werner, 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 896 ] Helmbold, Gerald H., 1116 [ Pg. 1116 includes portions of Doc. 1124 and Doc. 1125 ] Henderson, Loy W., 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] , 1403 [ Pg. 1403 is part of Doc. 1345 ] , 1425 [ Pg. 1425 is part of Doc. 1366 ] Hertz, Gustav, 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 896 ] Hess, Rudolf, 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Hickerson, John D., 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 1082 and Doc. 1083 ] , 1103 [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 1115 and Doc. 1116 ] , 1348 [ Pg. 1348 includes portions of Doc. 1293 and Doc. 1294 ] , 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] Hildred, Sir William, 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 1187 ] Hilldring, Maj. Gen. John H., 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 892 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] ] Hirohito, Emperor of Japan, 36–37 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] , 1249 [ Pg. 1249 is part of Doc. 1224 ] , 1251 [ Pg. 1251 includes portions of Doc. 1226 and Doc. 1227 ] , 1255 [ Pg. 1255 is part of Doc. 1228 ] , 1257 [ Pg. 1257 includes portions of Doc. 1228 and Doc. 1229 ] , 1258 [ Pg. 1258 is part of Doc. 1230 ] , 1259 [ Pg. 1259 includes portions of Doc. 1230 and Doc. 1231 ] , 1262 [ Pg. 1262 includes portions of Doc. 1233 and Doc. 1234 ] , 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 1235 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)] ] , 1267 [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] , 1269 [ Pg. 1269 is part of Doc. 1239 ] , 1274 [ Pg. 1274 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1288 [ Pg. 1288 is part of Doc. 1254 ] , 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 1256 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 includes portions of Doc. 1260 and Doc. 1261 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 1261 ] , 1587 [ Pg. 1587 includes portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] , 1589 [ Pg. 1589 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] and Doc. 1420 ] Hiroshima, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 1374 [ Pg. 1374 includes portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , and Doc. 1313 ] , 1376 [ Pg. 1376 is part of Doc. 1315 ] Hiss, Alger, 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 639 n [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 includes portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Hitler, Adolf, 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 867 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 1149 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 1179 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1503 [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Hoag, Brig. Gen. Earl S., 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] Hodgson, Brig. D. E. P., 1063 [ Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 1075 ] Hollis, Maj. Gen. Leslie, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] Holman, Adrian, 1409–1410 [ Pgs. 1409–1410 include portions of Doc. 1349 , Doc. 1350 , and Doc. 1351 ] Holmes, Maj. Gen. Noel Galway, 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] Hong Kong, 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] Hood, Viscount, 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] Hopkins, Harry L., 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 1132 [ Pg. 1132 includes portions of Doc. 1139 and Doc. 1140 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 includes portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] , 1587 [ Pg. 1587 includes portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] Horch, 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 951 ] Horn, Edhard, 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 951 ] Hornbeck, Stanley K., 1346–1347 [ Pgs. 1346–1347 include portions of Doc. 1291 , Doc. 1292 , and Doc. 1293 ] Horne, Vice Adm. Frederick J., 1178 [ Pg. 1178 is part of Doc. 1180 ] Horst von Hemming, 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Houstoun-Boswall, W. E., 695 n [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 800 ] , 735 n [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 832 (#1)] ] Hoxha, Col. Gen. Enver, 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 1080 ] Hoyer Millar, Frederick, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 1408 [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 1348 and Doc. 1349 ] Hubbard, Charles J., 1364 [ Pg. 1364 is part of Doc. 1305 ] Hula , 1332 [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 1280 and Doc. 1281 ] Hull, Cordell, 1173–1174 [ Pgs. 1173–1174 include portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] , 1267 [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] , 1268 [ Pg. 1268 includes portions of Doc. 1238 and Doc. 1239 ] Hull, Lt. Gen. John E., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 99–100 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 377–378 [ Pgs. 377–378 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] , 1392 [ Pg. 1392 includes portions of Doc. 1330 and Doc. 1331 ] , 1396–1397 [ Pgs. 1396–1397 include portions of Doc. 1335 , Doc. 1336 , Doc. 1337 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)] ] Hume, Maj. Gen. Edgar E., 1098 [ Pg. 1098 includes portions of Doc. 1108 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)] , and Doc. 1109 ] Hungary: Allied Control Commission, revision of procedure with regard to status of British and U. S. representatives ( see also Armistice , infra ) : Discussions concerning, 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 228–230 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 524–525 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] , 554–556 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 604–605 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1458–1459 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1494–1495 [ Pg. 1494 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1511 [ Pg. 1511 is part of Doc. 1384 ] ; Soviet proposals and policy, 689–690 [ Pgs. 689–690 include portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 829 and Doc. 830 ] , 736–737 [ Pgs. 736–737 include portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1494–1495 [ Pg. 1494 is part of Doc. 1383 ] ; U. S. proposals and consideration of Soviet proposal, 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 687–688 [ Pgs. 687–688 include portions of Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , and Doc. 795 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 703–708 [ Pgs. 703–708 include portions of Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , and Doc. 810 ] , 719–720 [ Pgs. 719–720 include portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 725–727 [ Pgs. 725–727 include portions of Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , and Doc. 826 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] Armistice agreement ( Jan. 20, 1945 ), discussions concerning revision of ( see also Diplomatic relations and Peace treaty , infra ), 67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 178–181 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 394–395 [ Pgs. 394–395 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] ; cited, 67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 804 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 808 ] Communist influence and Party activities, 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 799 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] Danube commission, Hungarian participation, 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 757 and Doc. 758 ] Diplomatic relations, establishment of ( see also United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria, etc. ), 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 326–328 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 370–372 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 529–530 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 589–590 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 598–599 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 731 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 804 ] , 1457–1458 [ Pg. 1457 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Economic and political matters, 721–722 [ Pgs. 721–722 include portions of Doc. 820 , Doc. 821 , and Doc. 822 ] Elections, question of Allied supervision of, 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 165–166 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 228–232 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 604–605 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 747 and Doc. 748 ] , 693–694 [ Pgs. 693–694 include portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] , 718–719 [ Pgs. 718–719 include portions of Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , and Doc. 819 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] Cerman assets in Hungary, 567–568 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1486–1487 [ Pg. 1486 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1506 [ Pg. 1506 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Hungarian external assets, 747–749 [ Pgs. 747–749 include portions of Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , and Doc. 847 ] Oil, 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1378–1388 [ Pgs. 1378–1388 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , Doc. 1317 , Doc. 1318 , Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , Doc. 1321 , Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , Doc. 1324 , Doc. 1325 , and Doc. 1326 ] passim Peace treaty, proposed conclusion of ( see also United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria, etc. ; and under Council of Foreign Ministers : Functions, etc. ), Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1492–1493 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509–1510 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Press. See Press : Balkans . Restrictions on U. S. and British officials, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] Transfers of populations (German minorities), 398–399 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 523–524 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 536–537 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 1459 [ Pg. 1459 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1495–1496 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1511 [ Pg. 1511 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , and Doc. 1407 ] United Nations, admission to. See United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria, etc. Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, implementation of. See Declaration under Yalta . Hunt, Col. Irvin L., 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] Hurley, Maj. Gen. Patrick J., 617–620 [ Pgs. 617–620 include portions of Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 721 (#1)] ] , 1224–1227 [ Pgs. 1224–1227 include portions of Doc. 1212 , Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , and Doc. 1215 ] , 1245–1246 [ Pgs. 1245–1246 include portions of Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , and Doc. 1222 ] , 1278 [ Pg. 1278 includes portions of Doc. 1246 and Doc. 1247 ] , 1282–1283 [ Pgs. 1282–1283 include portions of Doc. 1251 , Doc. 1252 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1252 (#1)] ] Ickes, Harold L., 1385–1386 [ Pgs. 1385–1386 include portions of Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , and Doc. 1324 ] I. G. Farben Industrie, 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 951 ] Immigration. See Palestine : Jewish immigration . Indo-China, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 83–84 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 271–272 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 1313 [ Pg. 1313 is part of Doc. 1267 ] , 1315–1316 [ Pgs. 1315–1316 include portions of Doc. 1267 and Doc. 1268 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 includes portions of Doc. 1269 and Doc. 1270 ] , 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 1271 ] , 1320 [ Pg. 1320 includes portions of Doc. 1272 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1272 (#1)] ] , 1321 [ Pg. 1321 is part of Doc. 1273 ] , 1465 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Inland waterways. See under European questions, general , 1444 [ Pg. 1444 is part of Doc. 1380 ] International Bank, 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] International Business Machines, 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago ( 1944 ), 1189–1190 [ Pg. 1189 is part of Doc. 1188 ] International Conference on Military Trials, 494 n [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 526–527 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] International inland waterways. See European questions : Inland waterways . International Telephone and Telegraph Co., 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 940 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 940 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 940 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] Intertype Corporation, 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Iran: Abadan, 1392 [ Pg. 1392 includes portions of Doc. 1330 and Doc. 1331 ] Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance ( Jan. 29, 1942 ), cited, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 1390 [ Pg. 1390 includes portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , and Doc. 1329 ] , 1391 [ Pg. 1391 includes portions of Doc. 1329 and Doc. 1330 ] Internal situation in Iran, and Iranian desire to eliminate Anglo-Soviet interference, 1389–1391 [ Pgs. 1389–1391 include portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , Doc. 1329 , and Doc. 1330 ] Oil reserves, 593–594 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 1392 [ Pg. 1392 includes portions of Doc. 1330 and Doc. 1331 ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1460 [ Pg. 1460 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Soviet policy toward Iran, effect on internal affairs, 1389–1391 [ Pgs. 1389–1391 include portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , Doc. 1329 , and Doc. 1330 ] Tehran: Agreement on immediate withdrawal of Allied forces from, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 1391 [ Pg. 1391 includes portions of Doc. 1329 and Doc. 1330 ] , 1393–1394 [ Pgs. 1393–1394 include portions of Doc. 1331 , Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] , 1441 [ Pg. 1441 is part of Doc. 1379 ] , 1442 [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] , 1460 [ Pg. 1460 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] ; air traffic between United States and Soviet Union via, 1166–1170 [ Pgs. 1166–1170 include portions of Doc. 1168 , Doc. 1169 , Doc. 1170 , Doc. 1171 , Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , and Doc. 1174 ] Tehran declaration on Iran ( Dec. 1, 1943 ), cited, 1390–1391 [ Pgs. 1390–1391 include portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , Doc. 1329 , and Doc. 1330 ] Withdrawal of Allied forces: British position and proposal, 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1391–1392 [ Pgs. 1391–1392 include portions of Doc. 1329 , Doc. 1330 , and Doc. 1331 ] ; decision of Conference concerning, 1393–1394 [ Pgs. 1393–1394 include portions of Doc. 1331 , Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1556 [ Pg. 1556 includes portions of Doc. 1412 and Doc. 1413 ] ; Iranian desire for British and Soviet withdrawals, 1390–1391 [ Pgs. 1390–1391 include portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , Doc. 1329 , and Doc. 1330 ] ; Soviet position, 309–310 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] ; Tehran, agreement on immediate withdrawal, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 1391 [ Pg. 1391 includes portions of Doc. 1329 and Doc. 1330 ] , 1393–1394 [ Pgs. 1393–1394 include portions of Doc. 1331 , Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] , 1441 [ Pg. 1441 is part of Doc. 1379 ] , 1442 [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] , 1460 [ Pg. 1460 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] ; U.S. arrangements for withdrawal and for a liquidation commission to remain, 309–310 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 1392–1393 [ Pgs. 1392–1393 include portions of Doc. 1330 , Doc. 1331 , and Doc. 1332 ] , 1394–1397 [ Pgs. 1394–1397 include portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , Doc. 1334 , Doc. 1335 , Doc. 1336 , Doc. 1337 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)] ] Iraq, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] Ismay, Gen. Sir Hastings, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Istria, 1221–1222 [ Pgs. 1221–1222 include portions of Doc. 1210 and Doc. 1211 ] Italy: Allied Commission: Appointment of a civilian chief commissioner, discussions concerning, 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 1100–1103 [ Pgs. 1100–1103 include portions of Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , Doc. 1113 , Doc. 1114 , Doc. 1115 , and Doc. 1116 ] ; Soviet desire for improvement of Commission procedures, 229–230 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 1093 ] Allied forces and combined command in Italy, question of retention of: Pope Pius XII, concern as to early withdrawal, 1098 [ Pg. 1098 includes portions of Doc. 1108 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)] , and Doc. 1109 ] ; recommendations by Joint Chiefs of Staff, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 1097–1098 [ Pgs. 1097–1098 include portions of Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)] , and Doc. 1109 ] Armistice agreement, Sept. 3, 1943 , cited, 67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 101 n [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] Armistice terms. See Peace treaty and Surrender terms , infra . Colonial territories. See United Nations Organization : Trusteeship, etc. Diplomatic relations, 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 358–361 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 370–371 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 468–469 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] Economic and political matters: Assistance by United States and United Kingdom, relationship to reparations payments, British and U. S. views and proposals, 148–150 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 432–433 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 469–470 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 1097 and Doc. 1098 ] , 1096 [ Pg. 1096 includes portions of Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] ; U. S. policy and proposals concerning, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1084 [ Pg. 1084 is part of Doc. 1091 ] , 1085 [ Pg. 1085 includes portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1092 (#1)] ] , 1088 [ Pg. 1088 includes portions of Doc. 1095 and Doc. 1096 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 1110 ] Elections, 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 747 and Doc. 748 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 1093 ] Government, democratic and responsible character of, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 358–359 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 370–371 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 462–463 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] Italian external assets, 1091 [ Pg. 1091 is part of Doc. 1098 ] Italian Fleet, disposition of, 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] ; agreement on the employment and disposition of the Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine ( 1943 ), cited, 1099 n [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 1110 ] Japan, Italy’s declaration of war against, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 722 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 722 and Doc. 723 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 1090 ] , 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Peace treaty, conclusion of ( see also Surrender terms and United Nations Organization , infra; also under Council of Foreign Ministers : Functions, etc. ): British policy, 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 1079–1080 [ Pgs. 1079–1080 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1087 (#1)] , Doc. 1088 , and Doc. 1089 ] , 1086–1087 [ Pgs. 1086–1087 include portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] ; Italian views concerning treaty terms, 1081–1083 [ Pgs. 1081–1083 include portions of Doc. 1089 and Doc. 1090 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] ; Soviet policy, 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 1093 ] ; U. S. policy and proposals, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1080–1081 [ Pgs. 1080–1081 include portions of Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , and Doc. 1090 ] , 1084–1085 [ Pgs. 1084–1085 include portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1092 (#1)] ] Prisoner of war camp in Italy (British), 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 259–260 [ Pgs. 259–260 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 367–368 [ Pgs. 367–368 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1162–1166 [ Pgs. 1162–1166 include portions of Doc. 1163 , Doc. 1164 , Doc. 1165 , Doc. 1166 , Doc. 1167 , Doc. 1168 , and Doc. 1169 ] , 1600 [ Pg. 1600 includes portions of Doc. 1432 and Doc. 1433 ] Reparations: Discussions concerning, 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 148–150 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 174–175 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 336–337 [ Pgs. 336–337 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 432–434 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 441–442 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 446–447 [ Pgs. 446–447 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 464–465 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 469–470 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 484–485 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] ; proposals and reports, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , and Doc. 765 ] , 664–665 [ Pgs. 664–665 include portions of Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 771 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 771 (#1)] ] , 1087–1097 [ Pgs. 1087–1097 include portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , Doc. 1098 , Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , Doc. 1107 , and Doc. 1108 ] ; restitution and reparation claims by Albania, Ethiopia, Greece, and Yugoslavia, 1088–1090 [ Pgs. 1088–1090 include portions of Doc. 1095 , Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , and Doc. 1098 ] , 1091–1092 [ Pgs. 1091–1092 include portions of Doc. 1098 and Doc. 1099 ] , 1094–1095 [ Pgs. 1094–1095 include portions of Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , and Doc. 1104 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 1107 and Doc. 1108 ] Restrictions on Soviet representatives, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 367–368 [ Pgs. 367–368 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] Soviet prisoners of war in British camp in Italy. See Soviet Union : Repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals ; also Prisoner of war camp , supra . Surrender terms: U. S. proposal of an interim arrangement pending conclusion of peace treaty, discussions concerning, 168–175 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 178–181 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 394–395 [ Pgs. 394–395 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1080–1081 [ Pgs. 1080–1081 include portions of Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , and Doc. 1090 ] , 1084–1085 [ Pgs. 1084–1085 include portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1092 (#1)] ] , 1085 [ Pg. 1085 includes portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1092 (#1)] ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 1093 ] ; instrument of surrender, Sept. 29, 1943 , cited, 67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 101 n [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 148 n [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 1080 [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] Tangier, Italian position as signatory of Statute of Tangier, 1414 [ Pg. 1414 is part of Doc. 1355 ] Territorial settlements. See United Nations Organization : Trusteeship, etc. United Maritime Authority, question of admission to, 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 1110 ] United Nations, admission to. See United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria, etc. U. S. policy and proposals concerning treatment of, 1080–1081 [ Pgs. 1080–1081 include portions of Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , and Doc. 1090 ] , 1084–1085 [ Pgs. 1084–1085 include portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1092 (#1)] ] Venezia Giulia ( see also under Yugoslavia ), 1067 [ Pg. 1067 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] , 1083 [ Pg. 1083 is part of Doc. 1090 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 1107 and Doc. 1108 ] Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, discussions concerning implementation of in connection with policy toward Italy, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 158–159 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 228–232 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] ] , 244–245 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 646–647 [ Pgs. 646–647 include portions of Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , and Doc. 749 ] Ivanov, 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] Jackson, Justice Robert H., 421–424 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 986 n [ Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 1018 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 1019 ] Jacobs, Joseph E., 1063 [ Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 1075 ] Jamison, Brig. Gen. Glen C., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Japan, war against: Atomic bomb, use against Japan: Aide-mémoire of conversation between Roosevelt and Churchill, Sept. 18, 1944 , 1370–1371 [ Pgs. 1370–1371 include portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] Attlee message to Truman regarding, 1375 [ Pg. 1375 includes portions of Doc. 1313 and Doc. 1314 ] Disclosure of information to Soviet Union, 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 81–82 [ Pgs. 81–82 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] ] ; Truman–Stalin conversation ( July 24 ), 378–379 [ Pgs. 378–379 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] ] Information concerning successful test of bomb: First telegraphic reports, 1360–1361 [ Pgs. 1360–1361 include portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , Doc. 1304 , and Doc. 1305 ] ; memorandum by Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves describing test, 1361–1368 [ Pgs. 1361–1368 include portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] ; observations by E. O. Lawrence, 1369–1370 [ Pgs. 1369–1370 include portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] ; press release, 1368 [ Pg. 1368 is part of Doc. 1305 ] ; relation of test to Allied warning to Japan to surrender, 1266 n –1267 n [ Pgs. 1266–1267 include portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] Preparations regarding targets and timetable for use of bomb, 1372–1374 [ Pgs. 1372–1374 include portions of Doc. 1307 , Doc. 1308 , Doc. 1309 , Doc. 1310 , Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , and Doc. 1313 ] Report received by Truman on bombing of Hiroshima, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 710 ] Statement by Truman following use of bomb on Hiroshima: Arrangements for, 1374–1375 [ Pgs. 1374–1375 include portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , Doc. 1313 , and Doc. 1314 ] ; text, released Aug. 6 , 1376–1378 [ Pgs. 1376–1378 include portions of Doc. 1315 and Doc. 1316 ] Test of bomb. See Information, etc. , supra . U. S.-British discussions and opinions, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 81–82 [ Pgs. 81–82 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 85 n [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 1370–1371 [ Pgs. 1370–1371 include portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] , 1375 [ Pg. 1375 includes portions of Doc. 1313 and Doc. 1314 ] British Commonwealth participation in, 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 1334–1341 [ Pgs. 1334–1341 include portions of Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , Doc. 1283 , Doc. 1284 , Doc. 1285 , Doc. 1286 , Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , and Doc. 1288 ] , 1464–1465 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1469–1470 [ Pg. 1469 is part of Doc. 1381 ] British participation in, 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] Control and command: Boundaries of command and higher strategic control, exchange of views between U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff, and conclusions reached, 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 85–86 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 201–202 [ Pgs. 201–202 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 1313–1318 [ Pgs. 1313–1318 include portions of Doc. 1267 , Doc. 1268 , Doc. 1269 , and Doc. 1270 ] , 1320 [ Pg. 1320 includes portions of Doc. 1272 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1272 (#1)] ] , 1464 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1465 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1469–1471 [ Pg. 1469 is part of Doc. 1381 ] ; Indo-China, situation with respect to, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 271–272 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 1313 [ Pg. 1313 is part of Doc. 1267 ] , 1315–1316 [ Pgs. 1315–1316 include portions of Doc. 1267 and Doc. 1268 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 includes portions of Doc. 1269 and Doc. 1270 ] , 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 1271 ] , 1320 [ Pg. 1320 includes portions of Doc. 1272 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1272 (#1)] ] , 1321 [ Pg. 1321 is part of Doc. 1273 ] , 1465 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Emperor of Japan ( see also Peace feelers through Soviet Union , infra; also Hirohito ), 36–37 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] , 1267 [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] , 1269 [ Pg. 1269 is part of Doc. 1239 ] French and Netherlands participation in, question of, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 377–378 [ Pgs. 377–378 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] , 1341–1349 [ Pgs. 1341–1349 include portions of Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , Doc. 1288 , Doc. 1289 , Doc. 1290 , Doc. 1291 , Doc. 1292 , Doc. 1293 , Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , and Doc. 1295 ] , 1465–1466 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Greater East Asia concept, 1255 [ Pg. 1255 is part of Doc. 1228 ] Italy’s declaration of war against Japan, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 722 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 722 and Doc. 723 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 1090 ] , 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Konoye, proposed mission as special envoy to Soviet Union. See Peace feelers , infra . Military objectives, strategy, and policies: Consideration by U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff of proposals and amendments, 112–113 [ Pgs. 112–113 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139–140 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 1299–1312 [ Pgs. 1299–1312 include portions of Doc. 1262 , Doc. 1263 , Doc. 1264 , Doc. 1265 , Doc. 1266 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1266 (#1)] ] ; text of basic undertakings and policies as included in Combined Chiefs of Staff report, 1463–1464 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 1381 ] ; tripartite military meeting, July 24 , 344–353 [ Pgs. 344–353 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] Netherlands and French participation in, question of, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 377–378 [ Pgs. 377–378 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] , 1341–1349 [ Pgs. 1341–1349 include portions of Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , Doc. 1288 , Doc. 1289 , Doc. 1290 , Doc. 1291 , Doc. 1292 , Doc. 1293 , Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , and Doc. 1295 ] , 1465–1466 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Operations in and near China and Korea, 345–352 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 410–412 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] Operations in Pacific and Southeast Asia, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 346–353 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 375–378 [ Pgs. 375–378 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] , 414–416 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 1468–1469 [ Pg. 1468 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Peace feeler through Sweden, possibility of, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 1589–1590 [ Pgs. 1589–1590 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] , Doc. 1420 , and Doc. 1421 ] Peace feelers through Soviet Union, Japanese efforts to obtain Soviet mediation and to send special envoy to Soviet Union: Berlin Conference, relation to, 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 1259 [ Pg. 1259 includes portions of Doc. 1230 and Doc. 1231 ] , 1260 [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 1232 and Doc. 1233 ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 is part of Doc. 1260 ] ; Japanese position and representations, 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 1248–1249 [ Pgs. 1248–1249 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] , Doc. 1223 , and Doc. 1224 ] , 1257–1259 [ Pgs. 1257–1259 include portions of Doc. 1228 , Doc. 1229 , Doc. 1230 , and Doc. 1231 ] , 1260–1264 [ Pgs. 1260–1264 include portions of Doc. 1232 , Doc. 1233 , Doc. 1234 , Doc. 1235 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)] ] , 1297–1298 [ Pgs. 1297–1298 include portions of Doc. 1260 and Doc. 1261 ] ; opinions of Japanese Ambassador in Soviet Union, 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] , 1252–1257 [ Pgs. 1252–1257 include portions of Doc. 1228 and Doc. 1229 ] , 1294–1295 [ Pg. 1294 is part of Doc. 1259 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 includes portions of Doc. 1260 and Doc. 1261 ] ; Soviet position, 460–467 [ Pgs. 460–467 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 1250–1251 [ Pgs. 1250–1251 include portions of Doc. 1225 , Doc. 1226 , and Doc. 1227 ] , 1263 [ Pg. 1263 includes portions of Doc. 1234 and Doc. 1235 ] , 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 1235 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)] ] , 1291–1293 [ Pgs. 1291–1293 include portions of Doc. 1256 , Doc. 1257 , and Doc. 1258 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 1261 ] , 1587–1588 [ Pgs. 1587–1588 include portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] ; Truman–Churchill discussion, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] ; Truman–Stalin discussion, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 1587–1588 [ Pgs. 1587–1588 include portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] Planning date for end of organized resistance by Japan, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Portuguese participation in any operations for liberation of Timor, question of, 65–66 [ Pgs. 65–66 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 1349–1360 [ Pgs. 1349–1360 include portions of Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , Doc. 1295 , Doc. 1296 , Doc. 1297 , Doc. 1298 , Doc. 1299 , Doc. 1300 , Doc. 1301 , Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] , 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1471–1472 [ Pg. 1471 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Proclamation ( July 26 ) by Heads of Government of United States, China, and United Kingdom calling for surrender of Japan: Chiang’s concurrence, 1278–1279 [ Pgs. 1278–1279 include portions of Doc. 1246 , Doc. 1247 , Doc. 1248 , and Doc. 1249 ] , 1281–1283 [ Pgs. 1281–1283 include portions of Doc. 1249 , Doc. 1250 , Doc. 1251 , Doc. 1252 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1252 (#1)] ] Churchill’s approval, 1279 [ Pg. 1279 includes portions of Doc. 1248 and Doc. 1249 ] Drafts of Proclamation: Discussions and amendments, 319–340 [ Pgs. 319–340 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 1267–1269 [ Pgs. 1267–1269 include portions of Doc. 1236 , Doc. 1237 , Doc. 1238 , and Doc. 1239 ] , 1271–1272 [ Pgs. 1271–1272 include portions of Doc. 1240 , Doc. 1241 , and Doc. 1242 ] , 1279 [ Pg. 1279 includes portions of Doc. 1248 and Doc. 1249 ] , 1282 [ Pg. 1282 includes portions of Doc. 1251 and Doc. 1252 ] , 1283 [ Pg. 1283 includes portions of Doc. 1252 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1252 (#1)] ] ; texts, 1275–1277 [ Pgs. 1275–1277 include portions of Doc. 1244 and Doc. 1245 ] , 1280–1281 [ Pgs. 1280–1281 include portions of Doc. 1249 and Doc. 1250 ] French consent, 1555–1556 [ Pgs. 1555–1556 include portions of Doc. 1411 , Doc. 1412 , and Doc. 1413 ] Interpretation of terms, and comparison with policy of Department of State, 1284–1289 [ Pgs. 1284–1289 include portions of Doc. 1253 and Doc. 1254 ] “Mokusatsu” statement by Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki, 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 1257 and Doc. 1258 ] OWI broadcast of warning to Japan, 1273–1274 [ Pg. 1273 is part of Doc. 1243 ] ; of text of Proclamation, 1290 [ Pg. 1290 is part of Doc. 1255 ] Peace feelers by Japan through Soviet Union, relation to Proclamation, 1291–1293 [ Pgs. 1291–1293 include portions of Doc. 1256 , Doc. 1257 , and Doc. 1258 ] , 1294–1298 [ Pgs. 1294–1298 include portions of Doc. 1259 , Doc. 1260 , and Doc. 1261 ] Press rumors concerning proposed Proclamation, and question of U. S. statement to quiet rumors, 1270–1271 [ Pgs. 1270–1271 include portions of Doc. 1240 and Doc. 1241 ] , 1272 [ Pg. 1272 includes portions of Doc. 1241 and Doc. 1242 ] , 1274 [ Pg. 1274 is part of Doc. 1243 ] Recommendations of U.S. Secretary of War Stimson, 1265–1267 [ Pgs. 1265–1267 include portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] Rejection by Japan, 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] , 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 1257 and Doc. 1258 ] , 1377 [ Pg. 1377 is part of Doc. 1315 ] Release, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 710 ] Soviet reaction and adherence, 449–450 [ Pgs. 449–450 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] , 1284 [ Pg. 1284 includes portions of Doc. 1253 and Doc. 1254 ] , 1474 n [ Pg. 1474 is part of Doc. 1382 ] Suzuki’s statement regarding, 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 1257 and Doc. 1258 ] Text of Proclamation, 1474–1476 [ Pg. 1474 is part of Doc. 1382 ] Release of tankers for war against Japan through altered distribution of European oil supplies, 1378–1388 [ Pgs. 1378–1388 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , Doc. 1317 , Doc. 1318 , Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , Doc. 1321 , Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , Doc. 1324 , Doc. 1325 , and Doc. 1326 ] Shipping ( see also under United Kingdom ): Cargo shipping for prosecution of war against Japan, 1303–1304 [ Pgs. 1303–1304 include portions of Doc. 1263 and Doc. 1264 ] , 1306 [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 1264 ] , 1308–1309 [ Pgs. 1308–1309 include portions of Doc. 1264 and Doc. 1265 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 includes portions of Doc. 1266 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1266 (#1)] ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 1381 ] ; release of tankers for war against Japan through altered distribution of European oil supplies, 1378–1388 [ Pgs. 1378–1388 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , Doc. 1317 , Doc. 1318 , Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , Doc. 1321 , Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , Doc. 1324 , Doc. 1325 , and Doc. 1326 ] ; use of German merchant vessels in connection with war against Japan, 119–121 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 474–475 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 969–970 [ Pgs. 969–970 include portions of Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , Doc. 1005 , and Doc. 1006 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 is part of Doc. 1009 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1010 and Doc. 1011 ] Soviet Union, relationship to ( see also Peace feelers through Soviet Union , supra ) : Adherence to Proclamation of July 26 calling for surrender of Japan, 449–450 [ Pgs. 449–450 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] , 1284 [ Pg. 1284 includes portions of Doc. 1253 and Doc. 1254 ] , 1474 n [ Pg. 1474 is part of Doc. 1382 ] Allied occupation of Japan, U. S. policy, 1322–1323 [ Pgs. 1322–1323 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)] , Doc. 1274 , and Doc. 1275 ] Atomic bomb, disclosure to Soviet Union of information concerning, 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 81–82 [ Pgs. 81–82 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] ] , 378–379 [ Pgs. 378–379 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] ] Entry into war against Japan: Discussions and U.S. attitude, 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] , 1302–1303 [ Pg. 1302 is part of Doc. 1263 ] , 1308 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 1264 ] , 1311 [ Pg. 1311 is part of Doc. 1266 ] , 1322–1323 [ Pgs. 1322–1323 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)] , Doc. 1274 , and Doc. 1275 ] , 1324 n [ Pg. 1324 is part of Doc. 1275 ] , 1325 [ Pg. 1325 includes portions of Doc. 1276 and Doc. 1277 ] , 1463 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 1381 ] ; Soviet intentions and plans with respect to Japan, 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] ; Truman–Stalin conversation, and Truman communication to Stalin, 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 1333–1334 [ Pgs. 1333–1334 include portions of Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , and Doc. 1283 ] , 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Release of information to Soviet Union, opinions of U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff, 99–100 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 113–115 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 1323 [ Pg. 1323 includes portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] , 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Release of tankers for war against Japan through altered distribution of European oil supplies, Soviet role in connection with, 1378–1388 [ Pgs. 1378–1388 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , Doc. 1317 , Doc. 1318 , Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , Doc. 1321 , Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , Doc. 1324 , Doc. 1325 , and Doc. 1326 ] Tripartite meeting of Chiefs of Staff, 344–353 [ Pgs. 344–353 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] U. S.-Soviet coordination of military operations and related matters, discussions concerning, 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 410–417 [ Pgs. 410–417 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 1323–1324 [ Pgs. 1323–1324 include portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] , 1327–1332 [ Pgs. 1327–1332 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] , Doc. 1279 , Doc. 1280 , and Doc. 1281 ] Weather stations in Siberian area, arrangements for, 200–201 [ Pgs. 200–201 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 409–410 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 1325–1327 [ Pgs. 1325–1327 include portions of Doc. 1276 , Doc. 1277 , Doc. 1278 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] , and Doc. 1279 ] , 1329 [ Pg. 1329 is part of Doc. 1280 ] , 1463 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Treaties: Anti-Comintern Pact (Germany–Japan), Nov. 25, 1936 , cited, 1256 [ Pg. 1256 is part of Doc. 1228 ] ; Russo-Japanese treaty of peace (Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905 ), cited, 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 1215 ] ; Sino-Japanese treaty of 1915 , cited, 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Unconditional surrender ( see also Peace feelers and Proclamation , supra ), 36–37 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 39–40 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] , 1462 [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 1381 ] War criminals, 1281 [ Pg. 1281 includes portions of Doc. 1249 and Doc. 1250 ] , 1287 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 1254 ] , 1323 [ Pg. 1323 includes portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] Yalta agreement ( Feb. 11 ) regarding Soviet entry into war against Japan, 45–46 [ Pgs. 45–46 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 1223–1247 [ Pgs. 1223–1247 include portions of Doc. 1212 , Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , Doc. 1217 , Doc. 1218 , Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , and Doc. 1222 ] passim , 1322 [ Pg. 1322 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)] and Doc. 1274 ] , 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Jebb, Gladwyn, 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] Jerram, Cecil Bertram, 963 n [ Pg. 963 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] Jews ( see also Palestine ), 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] Johnson, George H., 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] Johnson, Herschel V., 1589–1590 [ Pgs. 1589–1590 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] , Doc. 1420 , and Doc. 1421 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff ( see also Combined Chiefs of Staff ): Agenda for Conference meetings, question of, 31–32 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] Air route between United States and Moscow, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] Chairmanship of Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings, discussion concerning, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] Danube River, question of internationalization of, 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 651–654 [ Pgs. 651–654 include portions of Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , and Doc. 755 ] Dardanelles and Kiel Canal, U. S. policy regarding, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 649–650 [ Pgs. 649–650 include portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)] , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 1420–1422 [ Pg. 1420 is part of Doc. 1363 ] Enemy war matériel in Germany and Austria, question of disposal, 835–837 [ Pgs. 835–837 include portions of Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , and Doc. 896 ] German Navy and Merchant Marine, question of disposition, 969–970 [ Pgs. 969–970 include portions of Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , Doc. 1005 , and Doc. 1006 ] Japan, war against, discussions and recommendations in connection with: British and British Commonwealth participation in war, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] Combined Chiefs of Staff report to Truman and Churchill, recommendation concerning, 272–273 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Control and command, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 271–272 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] French and Netherlands participation in war, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 1341–1345 [ Pgs. 1341–1345 include portions of Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , Doc. 1288 , Doc. 1289 , Doc. 1290 , and Doc. 1291 ] , 1345–1346 [ Pgs. 1345–1346 include portions of Doc. 1289 , Doc. 1290 , Doc. 1291 , and Doc. 1292 ] Military objectives, strategy, and policies, 139–140 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 1299–1308 [ Pgs. 1299–1308 include portions of Doc. 1262 , Doc. 1263 , and Doc. 1264 ] Portuguese participation in war, 65–66 [ Pgs. 65–66 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 1349–1352 [ Pgs. 1349–1352 include portions of Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , Doc. 1295 , Doc. 1296 , and Doc. 1297 ] Release of information to Soviet Union, 99–100 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 113–115 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 1323–1324 [ Pgs. 1323–1324 include portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] , 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Shipping, 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 199–200 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 1191–1194 [ Pgs. 1191–1194 include portions of Doc. 1189 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)] , Doc. 1190 , Doc. 1191 , and Doc. 1192 ] , 1201–1202 [ Pgs. 1201–1202 include portions of Doc. 1196 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)] , and Doc. 1197 ] , 1306 [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 1264 ] Unconditional surrender, 39–40 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 1268–1269 [ Pgs. 1268–1269 include portions of Doc. 1238 and Doc. 1239 ] Weather stations in Eastern Siberia, 200–201 [ Pgs. 200–201 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 409–410 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 1325–1326 [ Pgs. 1325–1326 include portions of Doc. 1276 , Doc. 1277 , and Doc. 1278 ] , 1327 [ Pg. 1327 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] and Doc. 1279 ] Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] Lend-Lease, U. S. policy, 33–34 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 1181–1185 [ Pgs. 1181–1185 include portions of Doc. 1182 , Doc. 1183 , Doc. 1184 , and Doc. 1185 ] Meeting with British and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, July 24 , 344–353 [ Pgs. 344–353 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] ; with Soviet Chiefs of Staff, July 26 , 408–417 [ Pgs. 408–417 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 1327–1332 [ Pgs. 1327–1332 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] , Doc. 1279 , Doc. 1280 , and Doc. 1281 ] Meetings, July 16–21 and July 23 , minutes, 31–34 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39–42 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64–66 [ Pgs. 64–66 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 99–100 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139–140 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197–201 [ Pgs. 197–201 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 271–273 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Munitions assignments, 198–199 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 1203–1204 [ Pgs. 1203–1204 include portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] Postwar Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery, 1202–1204 [ Pgs. 1202–1204 include portions of Doc. 1196 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)] , Doc. 1197 , Doc. 1198 , and Doc. 1199 ] President’s directive to, 1184–1185 [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1185 ] U. S. forces in Italy, question of retention, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 1097–1098 [ Pgs. 1097–1098 include portions of Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)] , and Doc. 1109 ] Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] Jovanović, Lt. Gen. Arso R., 1216 [ Pg. 1216 is part of Doc. 1207 ] Jowitt, Sir William, 987 n [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 1019 ] Juin, Gen. Alphonse-Pierre, 1342 [ Pg. 1342 is part of Doc. 1288 ] Junkers aircraft factories, 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 951 and Doc. 952 ] Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft and Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, 837–839 [ Pgs. 837–839 include portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] Kaltenbrunner, Ernst, 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Kardelj, Edvard, 1208 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 1203 and Doc. 1204 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1204 ] Kattegat, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] Katyn Forest, 803 [ Pg. 803 is part of Doc. 867 ] Kausurev. See Kozyrev, S. P. Kavtaradze, S. I., 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Keenlyside, F. H., 1118 [ Pg. 1118 is part of Doc. 1126 ] Keitel, Field Marshal Wilhelm, 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Keith, Gerald, 506 n [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] Kennan, George F., 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 738–739 [ Pgs. 738–739 include portions of Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , and Doc. 836 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 838 and Doc. 839 ] , 952–953 [ Pgs. 952–953 include portions of Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , and Doc. 986 ] , 959–960 [ Pgs. 959–960 include portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , and Doc. 998 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 1125–1126 [ Pgs. 1125–1126 include portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] , 1139–1140 [ Pgs. 1139–1140 include portions of Doc. 1146 , Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] , 1168–1169 [ Pgs. 1168–1169 include portions of Doc. 1171 , Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , and Doc. 1174 ] , 1169–1170 [ Pgs. 1169–1170 include portions of Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , and Doc. 1174 ] Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 650 n [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 738 n [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] , 738–739 [ Pgs. 738–739 include portions of Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , and Doc. 836 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 1104–1105 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 1117 ] , 1108 [ Pg. 1108 is part of Doc. 1118 ] , 1158 [ Pg. 1158 includes portions of Doc. 1158 and Doc. 1159 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1571 [ Pg. 1571 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] , 1579 [ Pg. 1579 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Kessler, Brig. Gen. Alfred A., Jr., 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] , 961 n [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] Key, Maj. Gen. William S., 228 n [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 799 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 703 n [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 808 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 808 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 716 n [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] Keyser, 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 951 ] Khudyakov, Marshal of Aviation S. V., 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Kiel Canal, question of internationalization of, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 313–314 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] , 649–650 [ Pgs. 649–650 include portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)] , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] , 655–656 [ Pgs. 655–656 include portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)] ] , 1420 [ Pg. 1420 is part of Doc. 1363 ] , 1423–1424 [ Pgs. 1423–1424 include portions of Doc. 1364 and Doc. 1365 ] Kilgore, Harlev M., 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 849 ] Kilpatrick, Brig. Gen. John R., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 710 ] Kindleberger, Maj. Charles P., 1090–1092 [ Pgs. 1090–1092 include portions of Doc. 1097 , Doc. 1098 , and Doc. 1099 ] King, Alfred Hazell, 1077 n [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 1086 and Doc. 1087 ] King, Fleet Adm. Ernest J., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 33–34 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 64–65 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 82–83 [ Pgs. 82–83 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 99–100 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 112–114 [ Pgs. 112–114 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139–140 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 199–201 [ Pgs. 199–201 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 271–272 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292–294 [ Pgs. 292–294 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 343–344 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 348–349 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 351–352 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 408–411 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 974–975 [ Pgs. 974–975 include portions of Doc. 1009 , Doc. 1010 , and Doc. 1011 ] , 1329 [ Pg. 1329 is part of Doc. 1280 ] , 1332 [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 1280 and Doc. 1281 ] , 1361 n [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 includes portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Kirk, Alexander, 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 662–663 [ Pgs. 662–663 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , and Doc. 765 ] , 672–674 [ Pgs. 672–674 include portions of Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 701–702 [ Pgs. 701–702 include portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 1074 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] , 1100 [ Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , and Doc. 1113 ] , 1109–1110 [ Pgs. 1109–1110 include portions of Doc. 1118 , Doc. 1119 , and Doc. 1120 ] , 1163–1164 [ Pgs. 1163–1164 include portions of Doc. 1164 , Doc. 1165 , and Doc. 1166 ] Kiselev (Kissilev), E. D., 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 782 ] Kistiakowsky, George B., 1364 [ Pg. 1364 is part of Doc. 1305 ] , 1365 [ Pg. 1365 is part of Doc. 1305 ] Kleffens, Eelco N. van, 1346 n [ Pg. 1346 includes portions of Doc. 1291 and Doc. 1292 ] , 1347 [ Pg. 1347 includes portions of Doc. 1292 and Doc. 1293 ] Koeltz, Lt. Gen. Louis, 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 1027 and Doc. 1028 ] Koenig, Brig. Gen. E. F., 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] Koenig, Gen. Joseph-Pierre, 1028 n [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 1046 ] , 1545 n [ Pg. 1545 includes portions of Doc. 1396 and Doc. 1397 ] Kohler, Foy D., 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] Kokura, 1374 [ Pg. 1374 includes portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , and Doc. 1313 ] Kołodziejski, Henryk, 1133 [ Pg. 1133 includes portions of Doc. 1140 and Doc. 1141 ] Kondoianopoulos (Kondoyannopoulos), Andreas, 1054 [ Pg. 1054 is part of Doc. 1071 ] Konev (Koniev), Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S., 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 1529–1531 [ Pgs. 1529–1531 include portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1596 [ Pg. 1596 includes portions of Doc. 1427 and Doc. 1428 ] Königsberg, question of Soviet annexation. See under Germany . Konoye, Prince Fumimaro, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 1251 [ Pg. 1251 includes portions of Doc. 1226 and Doc. 1227 ] , 1257–1264 [ Pgs. 1257–1264 include portions of Doc. 1228 , Doc. 1229 , Doc. 1230 , Doc. 1231 , Doc. 1232 , Doc. 1233 , Doc. 1234 , Doc. 1235 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)] ] , 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 1256 ] , 1292 [ Pg. 1292 includes portions of Doc. 1256 and Doc. 1257 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 is part of Doc. 1259 ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 is part of Doc. 1260 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 includes portions of Doc. 1260 and Doc. 1261 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 1261 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 1419 ] Korea. See Japan : Operations in and near China and Korea , and United Nations Organization : Trusteeship for Italian colonial territories and Korea Koretsky, Col. M. M., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] Kosanović, Sava, 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 1203 and Doc. 1204 ] Kostov, Traicho, 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 827 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 827 ] Kostylev, M. A., 624 n [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] Kostyushchenko, 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 1054 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)] , and Doc. 1055 ] Kousnetsov. See Kuznetsov, Adm. of the Fleet N. G. Kozyrev, S. P., 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Kreiter, Gen., 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] Kruglov, Col. Gen. S. N., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] Krupp, 907 [ Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 951 ] Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Gustav, 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Kucherov, Adm. S. G., 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1529 n [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] Kurile Islands, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1287 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 1254 ] , 1323 [ Pg. 1323 includes portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] Kuter, Maj. Gen. Laurence S., 1574 [ Pg. 1574 includes portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Kuznetsov, Adm. of the Fleet N. G., 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 includes portions of Doc. 1012 and Doc. 1013 ] , 980–981 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1015 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Kwapiński, Jan, 1526 [ Pg. 1526 is part of Doc. 1386 ] Kyle, Col. William H., 1368 [ Pg. 1368 is part of Doc. 1305 ] Kyoto, 1372 n [ Pg. 1372 includes portions of Doc. 1307 , Doc. 1308 , and Doc. 1309 ] , 1373 n [ Pg. 1373 is part of Doc. 1310 ] Labrishchev. See Lavrishchev, A. A. Lacoste, Francis, 1348 [ Pg. 1348 includes portions of Doc. 1293 and Doc. 1294 ] , 1548 [ Pg. 1548 includes portions of Doc. 1401 and Doc. 1402 ] Land, Vice Adm. Emory S., 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 973–974 [ Pgs. 973–974 include portions of Doc. 1009 and Doc. 1010 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 1110 ] , 1118 [ Pg. 1118 is part of Doc. 1126 ] , 1119 [ Pg. 1119 includes portions of Doc. 1127 and Doc. 1128 ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] , 1340–1341 [ Pgs. 1340–1341 include portions of Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , and Doc. 1288 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 includes portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Lane, Arthur Bliss, 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 506–507 [ Pgs. 506–507 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 1106 [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 1117 ] , 1131–1132 [ Pgs. 1131–1132 include portions of Doc. 1138 , Doc. 1139 , and Doc. 1140 ] , 1153–1154 [ Pgs. 1153–1154 include portions of Doc. 1154 , Doc. 1155 , and Doc. 1156 ] , 1526 n [ Pg. 1526 is part of Doc. 1386 ] Lange, Oskar, 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] Larrabee, Lt. Col. Sterling L., 1060 [ Pg. 1060 includes portions of Doc. 1071 and Doc. 1072 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] Lascelles, Sir Alan, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 710 ] Laski, Harold J., 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] Laukhuff, Perry, 761–764 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 761 n [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 850 ] Lavrentyev, A. I., 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] Lavrishchev, A. A., 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Lavrov, 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] Lawrence, Ernest O., 1367 [ Pg. 1367 is part of Doc. 1305 ] , 1369–1370 [ Pgs. 1369–1370 include portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] Laycock, Maj. Gen. Robert Edward, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] League of Nations, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 1148 [ Pg. 1148 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1404 [ Pg. 1404 is part of Doc. 1345 ] , 1568 [ Pg. 1568 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1595 [ Pg. 1595 includes portions of Doc. 1426 and Doc. 1427 ] Leahy, Fleet Adm. William D., 4–7 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9–12 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17–26 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 31–34 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 39–42 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 64–65 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 139–140 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 197–199 [ Pgs. 197–199 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 339–340 [ Pgs. 339–340 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 344–346 [ Pgs. 344–346 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 1005 and Doc. 1006 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 includes portions of Doc. 1108 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)] , and Doc. 1109 ] , 1166 [ Pg. 1166 includes portions of Doc. 1168 and Doc. 1169 ] , 1167 [ Pg. 1167 includes portions of Doc. 1170 and Doc. 1171 ] , 1167 n [ Pg. 1167 includes portions of Doc. 1170 and Doc. 1171 ] , 1204 [ Pg. 1204 includes portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] , 1269 [ Pg. 1269 is part of Doc. 1239 ] , 1309 n [ Pg. 1309 is part of Doc. 1265 ] , 1323–1324 [ Pgs. 1323–1324 include portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] , 1324 n [ Pg. 1324 is part of Doc. 1275 ] , 1325–1326 [ Pgs. 1325–1326 include portions of Doc. 1276 , Doc. 1277 , and Doc. 1278 ] , 1328 [ Pg. 1328 includes portions of Doc. 1279 and Doc. 1280 ] , 1361 n [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] , 1371 n [ Pg. 1371 is part of Doc. 1306 ] , 1396–1397 [ Pgs. 1396–1397 include portions of Doc. 1335 , Doc. 1336 , Doc. 1337 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)] ] , 1434 [ Pg. 1434 includes portions of Doc. 1370 , Doc. 1371 , and Doc. 1372 ] , 1443 [ Pg. 1443 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 includes portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Leatham, Adm. Sir Ralph, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 710 ] Leathers, Lord, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 342–343 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 1043 and Doc. 1044 ] , 1198 [ Pg. 1198 includes portions of Doc. 1192 and Doc. 1193 ] , 1199 [ Pg. 1199 includes portions of Doc. 1194 and Doc. 1195 ] , 1299 [ Pg. 1299 includes portions of Doc. 1262 and Doc. 1263 ] , 1309 [ Pg. 1309 is part of Doc. 1265 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Lebanon. See Syria and Lebanon . Lebensraum , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] LeBreton, Rear Adm. David M., 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 710 ] Lee, Maj. Alfred K., 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] Lee, Col. Ernest R., 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 710 ] Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H., 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] Lekarsky, Lt. Gen. Krum, 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 817 ] Leluk, Gen., 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] Lend-Lease: Soviet Union, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 1185 [ Pg. 1185 is part of Doc. 1185 ] ; United Kingdom, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 1177–1187 [ Pgs. 1177–1187 include portions of Doc. 1180 , Doc. 1181 , Doc. 1182 , Doc. 1183 , Doc. 1184 , Doc. 1185 , and Doc. 1186 ] ; U. S. policy concerning, 33–34 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 1184–1185 [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1185 ] Lend-Lease Act of Mar. 11, 1941 , cited, 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 1178 [ Pg. 1178 is part of Doc. 1180 ] , 1183 [ Pg. 1183 includes portions of Doc. 1183 and Doc. 1184 ] , 1186 [ Pg. 1186 is part of Doc. 1186 ] ; of Apr. 16, 1945 , cited, 341 n [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] Leuna Werke, 907 [ Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 951 ] Levant States. See Syria and Lebanon . Levels, Lt. Col., 1163 [ Pg. 1163 includes portions of Doc. 1164 and Doc. 1165 ] Leverich, Henry P., 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] Ley, Robert, 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Libya, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] Lincoln, Brig. Gen. George A., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] List, Sgt. Eugene, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 137 n [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] Lithuania ( see also Baltic States ), 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] , 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 1429 ] , 1598 [ Pg. 1598 is part of Doc. 1430 ] , 1599 [ Pg. 1599 is part of Doc. 1431 ] Little Boy , 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] “Little White House” in Babelsberg, 9–24 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] passim Lockup , 1332 [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 1280 and Doc. 1281 ] Loftus, John A., 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] Łomnicky, Capt., 1113 [ Pg. 1113 includes portions of Doc. 1122 and Doc. 1123 ] Loudon, Alexander, 1347 n [ Pg. 1347 includes portions of Doc. 1292 and Doc. 1293 ] Lovell, Alfred H., Jr., 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] Lovett, Robert A., 1178 [ Pg. 1178 is part of Doc. 1180 ] , 1214 [ Pg. 1214 includes portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] , 1219 [ Pg. 1219 includes portions of Doc. 1208 and Doc. 1209 ] Lozovsky, S. A., 1248 [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] and Doc. 1223 ] , 1249 [ Pg. 1249 is part of Doc. 1224 ] , 1250–1251 [ Pgs. 1250–1251 include portions of Doc. 1225 , Doc. 1226 , and Doc. 1227 ] , 1260 [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 1232 and Doc. 1233 ] , 1262 [ Pg. 1262 includes portions of Doc. 1233 and Doc. 1234 ] , 1263–1264 [ Pgs. 1263–1264 include portions of Doc. 1234 , Doc. 1235 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)] ] , 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 1256 ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 is part of Doc. 1260 ] , 1297–1298 [ Pgs. 1297–1298 include portions of Doc. 1260 and Doc. 1261 ] Lubin, Isador, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 883 n [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 933 and Doc. 934 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 940 ] , 940–948 [ Pgs. 940–948 include portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 1138 and Doc. 1139 ] Lunghi, Maj. Hugh, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] Lupu, Nicolae, 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] Mac Arthur, Gen. of the Army Douglas, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 n [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 1316 [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 1268 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 includes portions of Doc. 1269 and Doc. 1270 ] , 1335 n [ Pg. 1335 is part of Doc. 1283 ] , 1336 [ Pg. 1336 is part of Doc. 1284 ] , 1339 [ Pg. 1339 includes portions of Doc. 1285 and Doc. 1286 ] , 1340 [ Pg. 1340 is part of Doc. 1287 ] , 1341 [ Pg. 1341 includes portions of Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , and Doc. 1288 ] , 1464 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1470 [ Pg. 1470 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Maček, Vladimir, 1208 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1204 ] Machold, Reinhold, 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] Mack, William H. B., 671 n [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] MacLeish, Archibald, 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] Macready, Lt. Gen. Sir Gordon, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 1184 n [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1185 ] MacVeagh, Lincoln, 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] , 1046–1047 [ Pgs. 1046–1047 include portions of Doc. 1067 , Doc. 1068 , and Doc. 1069 ] , 1048–1050 [ Pgs. 1048–1050 include portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] , 1060–1061 [ Pgs. 1060–1061 include portions of Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , and Doc. 1073 ] , 1066 n [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 1079 ] , 1076–1077 [ Pgs. 1076–1077 include portions of Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , and Doc. 1087 ] Mahler, Ernst, 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] Mailfist , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] Maiskv (Maiski), I. M., 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 110–111 [ Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 141–142 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 183–184 [ Pgs. 183–184 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 226–227 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 324 n [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 897 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 846 n [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] , 847 n [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] , 888 n [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] , 940 n [ Pg. 940 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 includes portions of Doc. 1002 and Doc. 1003 ] , 997–998 [ Pgs. 997–998 include portions of Doc. 1024 and Doc. 1025 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 1026 ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Makins, Roger, 1190 n [ Pg. 1190 is part of Doc. 1188 ] Malaya. See Japan : Operations in Pacific and Southeast Asia . Mallaby, Lt. Col. G., 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] Mallet, Sir Victor, 1172 [ Pg. 1172 includes portions of Doc. 1175 and Doc. 1176 ] Manchuria. See under China . Maniu, Iuliu, 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 814 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 814 and Doc. 815 ] Maples, Rear Adm. Houston L., 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] Marković, Lazar, 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1204 ] Marshall, Gen. of the Army George C., 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 31–34 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#3)] ] , 39–42 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 50–51 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 64–65 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 82–86 [ Pgs. 82–86 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 99–100 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 112–114 [ Pgs. 112–114 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139–140 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 161–162 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 197–198 [ Pgs. 197–198 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 201–202 [ Pgs. 201–202 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 271–273 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 341–344 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 346–353 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 375–377 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 408–417 [ Pgs. 408–417 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 458 n [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 1324 n [ Pg. 1324 is part of Doc. 1275 ] , 1342 [ Pg. 1342 is part of Doc. 1288 ] , 1361 n [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] , 1394 [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 includes portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] , 1584 [ Pg. 1584 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Marshall, J. Howard, 873–876 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 929 ] , 918–919 [ Pgs. 918–919 include portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] , 922 n [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] , 928–929 [ Pgs. 928–929 include portions of Doc. 967 , Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 980 ] Martin, John Miller, 1371 n [ Pg. 1371 is part of Doc. 1306 ] Massigli, René, 668 n [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 772 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 1003–1004 [ Pgs. 1003–1004 include portions of Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , and Doc. 1033 ] , 1011 [ Pg. 1011 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] Masterwork , 1087 [ Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] Matthews, H. Freeman, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 324 n [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 1102–1103 [ Pgs. 1102–1103 include portions of Doc. 1114 , Doc. 1115 , and Doc. 1116 ] , 1128 n [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1140 n [ Pg. 1140 includes portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] , 1219 [ Pg. 1219 includes portions of Doc. 1208 and Doc. 1209 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 1387 ] , 1541 [ Pg. 1541 is part of Doc. 1394 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 includes portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Matwin, Władysław, 1125 n [ Pg. 1125 is part of Doc. 1133 ] Maximov, Mikhail, 1394 n [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] Maxton, James, 1404 [ Pg. 1404 is part of Doc. 1345 ] McCann, Rear Adm. Allan R., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 710 ] McCarthy, Lt. Charles E., 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 710 ] McCarthy, Rear Adm. E. D. B., 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] ] , 980–981 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1015 ] McCloy, John J., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 421–423 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 707–708 [ Pgs. 707–708 include portions of Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , and Doc. 810 ] , 754 n [ Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 849 ] , 800–801 [ Pgs. 800–801 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , and Doc. 866 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 883 and Doc. 884 ] , 925–926 [ Pgs. 925–926 include portions of Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , and Doc. 966 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 1027 and Doc. 1028 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] , 1100–1101 [ Pgs. 1100–1101 include portions of Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , and Doc. 1113 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 1114 and Doc. 1115 ] , 1103 [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 1115 and Doc. 1116 ] , 1155 n [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] , 1184 n [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1185 ] , 1219 [ Pg. 1219 includes portions of Doc. 1208 and Doc. 1209 ] , 1324 n [ Pg. 1324 is part of Doc. 1275 ] , 1349 n [ Pg. 1349 includes portions of Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , and Doc. 1295 ] , 1423–1424 [ Pgs. 1423–1424 include portions of Doc. 1364 and Doc. 1365 ] , 1424 n [ Pg. 1424 is part of Doc. 1365 ] McCreery, Lt. Gen. Sir Richard, 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 673–674 [ Pgs. 673–674 include portions of Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] McDill, Capt. Alexander S., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] McDonald, 1st Lt. C. M., 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 710 ] McFarland, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., 31–32 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 39–40 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 808 ] , 1350 [ Pg. 1350 is part of Doc. 1295 ] , 1354 [ Pg. 1354 includes portions of Doc. 1298 and Doc. 1299 ] , 1422 [ Pg. 1422 is part of Doc. 1363 ] McIntire, Lt. Col. A. M., 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] McMahon, Capt. Alphonse, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] McNeill, Capt. William H., 1048 [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1057–1060 [ Pgs. 1057–1060 include portions of Doc. 1071 and Doc. 1072 ] , 1068–1071 [ Pgs. 1068–1071 include portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] Mediterranean Shipping Board, 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] Melbourne, Roy M., 647 n [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 690–691 [ Pgs. 690–691 include portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , and Doc. 803 ] , 699–701 [ Pgs. 699–701 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , and Doc. 812 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 814 and Doc. 815 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 820 and Doc. 821 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] Meller, Dr., 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 951 ] Merenditis, Alexander, 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 1071 ] Metals Coating Co., 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Metaxas, Gen. John, 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 1071 ] Meyrier, Jacques, 1409–1410 [ Pgs. 1409–1410 include portions of Doc. 1349 , Doc. 1350 , and Doc. 1351 ] , 1417 [ Pg. 1417 includes portions of Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , and Doc. 1361 ] Michael I, King of Rumania, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 806 ] Middleton, G. H., 624–625 [ Pgs. 624–625 include portions of Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 1419 [ Pg. 1419 includes portions of Doc. 1362 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)] ] Mihailović, Gen. Draža, 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1204 ] Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 334–335 [ Pgs. 334–335 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 490 n [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 506–507 [ Pgs. 506–507 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1112 [ Pg. 1112 includes portions of Doc. 1121 and Doc. 1122 ] , 1128–1131 [ Pgs. 1128–1131 include portions of Doc. 1135 , Doc. 1136 , Doc. 1137 , Doc. 1138 , and Doc. 1139 ] , 1140–1141 [ Pgs. 1140–1141 include portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , Doc. 1149 , and Doc. 1150 ] ; notes on Foreign Ministers Meeting of July 24 , and other memoranda, 1517–1542 [ Pgs. 1517–1542 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)] , Doc. 1385 , Doc. 1386 , Doc. 1387 , Doc. 1388 , Doc. 1389 , Doc. 1390 , Doc. 1391 , Doc. 1392 , Doc. 1393 , and Doc. 1394 ] Milepost , 1332 [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 1280 and Doc. 1281 ] Miles, Richard T. G., 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 1049 and Doc. 1050 ] Military talks, sections in Protocol and Communiqué, 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 594 n [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 1443–1444 [ Pg. 1443 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1460 [ Pg. 1460 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1498 n [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Millar, Frederick Hoyer, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 1408 [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 1348 and Doc. 1349 ] Minc, Hilary, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 478–479 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 480 n [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 1532–1538 [ Pgs. 1532–1538 include portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] Ministry of War Transport (MWT), 1196 [ Pg. 1196 is part of Doc. 1192 ] , 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 1192 ] , 1198 [ Pg. 1198 includes portions of Doc. 1192 and Doc. 1193 ] , 1199 [ Pg. 1199 includes portions of Doc. 1194 and Doc. 1195 ] , 1340–1341 [ Pgs. 1340–1341 include portions of Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , and Doc. 1288 ] Mironenko, 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 1054 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)] , and Doc. 1055 ] Mishshenko, 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] Mitchell, Maj. Nicholas A., 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] Modzelewski, Zygmunt, 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 1108 n [ Pg. 1108 is part of Doc. 1118 ] , 1132–1133 [ Pgs. 1132–1133 include portions of Doc. 1139 , Doc. 1140 , and Doc. 1141 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 1386 ] , 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 1387 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1532 [ Pg. 1532 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1540 [ Pg. 1540 includes portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, 1418 [ Pg. 1418 includes portions of Doc. 1361 and Doc. 1362 ] “Mokusatsu,” 1293 n [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 1257 and Doc. 1258 ] Molotov, V. M.: Exchange of communications with Byrnes, 747–748 [ Pgs. 747–748 include portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 933–934 [ Pgs. 933–934 include portions of Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , and Doc. 974 ] , 936–937 [ Pgs. 936–937 include portions of Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 976 (#1)] , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] , 1042–1043 [ Pgs. 1042–1043 include portions of Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , and Doc. 1063 ] , 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , and Doc. 1064 ] , 1284 [ Pg. 1284 includes portions of Doc. 1253 and Doc. 1254 ] Foreign Ministers Meetings, participation in, 66–79 [ Pgs. 66–79 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 101–109 [ Pgs. 101–109 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 143–160 [ Pgs. 143–160 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)] ] , 185–197 [ Pgs. 185–197 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 226–243 [ Pgs. 226–243 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 276–292 [ Pgs. 276–292 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 295–298 [ Pgs. 295–298 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 322–338 [ Pgs. 322–338 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 397–401 [ Pgs. 397–401 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 425–447 [ Pgs. 425–447 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 483–503 [ Pgs. 483–503 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 543–564 [ Pgs. 543–564 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 1517–1524 [ Pgs. 1517–1524 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)] and Doc. 1385 ] ; reports as Rapporteur , 157–160 [ Pgs. 157–160 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)] ] , 165–167 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 289–292 [ Pgs. 289–292 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 300–301 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 400–401 [ Pgs. 400–401 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 445–447 [ Pgs. 445–447 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] Letter from Bevin, 1038–1040 [ Pgs. 1038–1040 include portions of Doc. 1057 and Doc. 1058 ] Meetings with Byrnes, 274–275 [ Pgs. 274–275 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 449–452 [ Pgs. 449–452 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 480–483 [ Pgs. 480–483 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] ; with Byrnes and Eden, 354–355 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] ; with Polish Delegation, 1529–1531 [ Pgs. 1529–1531 include portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] ; with Truman, 471–476 [ Pgs. 471–476 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] Miscellaneous, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 23 n [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 43–46 [ Pgs. 43–46 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 86–87 [ Pgs. 86–87 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 789 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)] , and Doc. 790 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 800 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 745–746 [ Pgs. 745–746 include portions of Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)] ] , 797 n [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 810 n [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 874 and Doc. 875 ] , 888 n [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] , 913 n [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] , 921 n [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 984 n [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 1000 n [ Pg. 1000 includes portions of Doc. 1026 and Doc. 1027 ] , 1035 n [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 1053 and Doc. 1054 ] , 1037 [ Pg. 1037 is part of Doc. 1056 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 1104–1105 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 1117 ] , 1163 [ Pg. 1163 includes portions of Doc. 1164 and Doc. 1165 ] , 1164 [ Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 1165 and Doc. 1166 ] , 1245 [ Pg. 1245 includes portions of Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , and Doc. 1221 ] , 1248 [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] and Doc. 1223 ] , 1298 n [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 1261 ] , 1401 n [ Pg. 1401 is part of Doc. 1343 ] , 1415 n [ Pg. 1415 includes portions of Doc. 1355 and Doc. 1356 ] , 1474 n [ Pg. 1474 is part of Doc. 1382 ] Plenary Meetings, participation in, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 164–167 [ Pgs. 164–167 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 177–178 [ Pgs. 177–178 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 244–247 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 252–254 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 257–261 [ Pgs. 257–261 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 299–301 [ Pgs. 299–301 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 359–361 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 365–366 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 371–372 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 459–461 [ Pgs. 459–461 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 520–523 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 527–529 [ Pgs. 527–529 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 535–538 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 571–573 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 583–584 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 586–601 [ Pgs. 586–601 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Tripartite dinner meetings, participation in, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] Truman-Stalin meetings, participation in, 43–46 [ Pgs. 43–46 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 86–87 [ Pgs. 86–87 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 1582–1583 [ Pgs. 1582–1583 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] and Doc. 1418 ] , 1587–1588 [ Pgs. 1587–1588 include portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] Monckton, Sir Walter, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 141–142 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 183–184 [ Pgs. 183–184 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 831 n [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 848 n [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Mongolia. See Outer Mongolia . Monroe, Thomas, 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 1131 and Doc. 1132 ] , 1198 [ Pg. 1198 includes portions of Doc. 1192 and Doc. 1193 ] , 1341 [ Pg. 1341 includes portions of Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , and Doc. 1288 ] Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 895 ] , 1027 n [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 1044 and Doc. 1045 ] , 1028 n [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 1046 ] , 1449 [ Pg. 1449 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1545 n [ Pg. 1545 includes portions of Doc. 1396 and Doc. 1397 ] Montreux Convention regarding regime of the Straits ( 1936 ). See Turkey : Straits question . Moore, Capt. Charles J., 31–32 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] Moran, Commodore Edmond J., 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1010 and Doc. 1011 ] Moran, Lord, 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] Morawski. See Osóbka-Morawski, Edward Boleslaw . Morgan, Lt. Gen. W. D., 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 1113 [ Pg. 1113 includes portions of Doc. 1122 and Doc. 1123 ] , 1164 [ Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 1165 and Doc. 1166 ] Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., 1177 [ Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 1180 ] Morrison, Herbert, 1404 [ Pg. 1404 is part of Doc. 1345 ] , 1405 [ Pg. 1405 is part of Doc. 1345 ] Morse, Huntington T., 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 1117 [ Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 1125 ] , 1118 [ Pg. 1118 is part of Doc. 1126 ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] Moscow Declarations ( 1943 ), cited, 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 784 and Doc. 785 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 1018 ] , 1333 [ Pg. 1333 is part of Doc. 1282 ] , 1334 [ Pg. 1334 includes portions of Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , and Doc. 1283 ] , 1445 [ Pg. 1445 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1489 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Mosely, Philip E., 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)] ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 407 n [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#145)] ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 784 and Doc. 785 ] , 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] , 681 n [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 788 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 789 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)] , and Doc. 790 ] , 741 n [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 838 and Doc. 839 ] , 750 n [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 848 n [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] , 849 n [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] , 850–852 [ Pgs. 850–852 include portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] , 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] , 992–998 [ Pgs. 992–998 include portions of Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , and Doc. 1025 ] , 1003 n [ Pg. 1003 includes portions of Doc. 1031 and Doc. 1032 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] , 1008 n [ Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 1037 and Doc. 1038 ] Mountbatten, Adm. Lord Louis, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 162 n [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 352–353 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 375–378 [ Pgs. 375–378 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 1292 [ Pg. 1292 includes portions of Doc. 1256 and Doc. 1257 ] , 1313 n [ Pg. 1313 is part of Doc. 1267 ] , 1314 [ Pg. 1314 is part of Doc. 1267 ] , 1315 [ Pg. 1315 includes portions of Doc. 1267 and Doc. 1268 ] , 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 1271 ] , 1321 [ Pg. 1321 is part of Doc. 1273 ] , 1338 n [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 1285 ] , 1465 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Munitions Assignments Boards, London and Washington, question of abolishment of, 836–837 [ Pgs. 836–837 include portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1203–1206 [ Pgs. 1203–1206 include portions of Doc. 1198 , Doc. 1199 , and Doc. 1200 ] Murphy, Robert D., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 110–111 [ Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 141–142 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 788 n [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 789 n [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 794 n [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 802–804 [ Pgs. 802–804 include portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 810 n [ Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 846 n [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] , 847 n [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] , 848 n [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] , 1224 n [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 1212 and Doc. 1213 ] , 1512 n [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1525–1527 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 1386 ] Murray, Wallace, 1389 [ Pg. 1389 is part of Doc. 1327 ] , 1390–1391 [ Pgs. 1390–1391 include portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , Doc. 1329 , and Doc. 1330 ] , 1394–1396 [ Pgs. 1394–1396 include portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , Doc. 1334 , Doc. 1335 , and Doc. 1336 ] , 1397 [ Pg. 1397 includes portions of Doc. 1336 , Doc. 1337 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)] ] Mussolini, Benito, 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 1179 ] , 1217 [ Pg. 1217 is part of Doc. 1207 ] Myers, Lt. Col. Henry T., 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] National Cash Register Co., 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Neikov, Petur, 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 827 ] Nelson, Lt. Col. Lawrence, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] Netherlands ( see also under Japan, war against ): Coal shipments to Netherlands, 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] ; German ships, Netherlands share, 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] ; international protectorate in Rhineland and Ruhr, proposed, question of participation, 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 1021 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 1023 and Doc. 1024 ] , 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 is part of Doc. 1024 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 1026 ] ; miscellaneous, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] ; reparations from Germany, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] ; Rhine commission, Netherlands participation, 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 757 and Doc. 758 ] ; shipping losses in World War II, 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] New Zealand (see also British Commonwealth ), 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] Nicholson, Edward Max, 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] Niigata, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 1374 [ Pg. 1374 includes portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , and Doc. 1313 ] Nimitz, Fleet Adm. Chester W., 48 n [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 1316 [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 1268 ] , 1335 n [ Pg. 1335 is part of Doc. 1283 ] , 1339 [ Pg. 1339 includes portions of Doc. 1285 and Doc. 1286 ] , 1464 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1470 [ Pg. 1470 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Nixon, Robert, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 710 ] Noel-Baker, Philip John, 1404 [ Pg. 1404 is part of Doc. 1345 ] Norstad, Maj. Gen. Lauris, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] Northern, Capt. Ernest M., Jr., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] Norway: German assets in Norway, 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] ; German ships, Norwegian share, 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] ; German troops in Norway, 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 387–388 [ Pgs. 387–388 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1037–1040 [ Pgs. 1037–1040 include portions of Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , and Doc. 1058 ] ; loan from United States, 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] ; reparations from Germany, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] ; shipping losses in World War II, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Novikov, K. V., 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 734 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 789 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 789 (#1)] , and Doc. 790 ] , 1036 n [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 1054 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)] , and Doc. 1055 ] , 1037 [ Pg. 1037 is part of Doc. 1056 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 is part of Doc. 1058 ] , 1162–1163 [ Pgs. 1162–1163 include portions of Doc. 1163 , Doc. 1164 , and Doc. 1165 ] , 1165 n [ Pg. 1165 includes portions of Doc. 1167 and Doc. 1168 ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Nuremberg, selection as place for trial of war criminals, 494–495 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] Obbov, Alexander Christov, 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 827 ] Occupation. See under Austria and Germany . Oder–Neisse Line. See under Poland . Office of War Information (OWI), 1261 [ Pg. 1261 is part of Doc. 1233 ] , 1273–1274 [ Pg. 1273 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1290 [ Pg. 1290 is part of Doc. 1255 ] Oil: Austria and Hungary, 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1378–1388 [ Pgs. 1378–1388 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , Doc. 1317 , Doc. 1318 , Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , Doc. 1321 , Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , Doc. 1324 , Doc. 1325 , and Doc. 1326 ] passim Iran, oil reserves in, 593–594 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 1392 [ Pg. 1392 includes portions of Doc. 1330 and Doc. 1331 ] Rumania. See under Rumania . War against Japan, release of tankers through altered distribution of European oil supplies, 1378–1388 [ Pgs. 1378–1388 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , Doc. 1317 , Doc. 1318 , Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , Doc. 1321 , Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , Doc. 1324 , Doc. 1325 , and Doc. 1326 ] Western Europe, question of oil supplies for, 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 323–324 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1382–1383 [ Pgs. 1382–1383 include portions of Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , and Doc. 1321 ] ; attitude of Soviet Union, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1378–1388 [ Pgs. 1378–1388 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , Doc. 1317 , Doc. 1318 , Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , Doc. 1321 , Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , Doc. 1324 , Doc. 1325 , and Doc. 1326 ] Okamoto, Suemasa, 1589 n [ Pg. 1589 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] and Doc. 1420 ] Oliver, Covey T., 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 957 [ Pg. 957 includes portions of Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , and Doc. 993 ] , 958–959 [ Pgs. 958–959 include portions of Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] Olympic , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] Onodera, Maj. Gen. Makoto, 1589–1590 [ Pgs. 1589–1590 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] , Doc. 1420 , and Doc. 1421 ] Open-door policy in China, 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 1212 ] , 1224 n [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 1212 and Doc. 1213 ] , 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] , 1229 [ Pg. 1229 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1243 [ Pg. 1243 includes portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] , 1244 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 1218 ] , 1322 [ Pg. 1322 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)] and Doc. 1274 ] , 1586 [ Pg. 1586 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 1364 [ Pg. 1364 is part of Doc. 1305 ] , 1365 [ Pg. 1365 is part of Doc. 1305 ] , 1366 [ Pg. 1366 is part of Doc. 1305 ] Osóbka-Morawski, Edward Bolesław, 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 1105 [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 1117 ] , 1106 [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 1117 ] , 1138–1139 [ Pgs. 1138–1139 include portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , Doc. 1146 , and Doc. 1147 ] , 1140 [ Pg. 1140 includes portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] , 1529–1531 [ Pgs. 1529–1531 include portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] Oster, Capt. Henry R., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] Otto, Archduke of Austria, letter to Truman, 659–661 [ Pgs. 659–661 include portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] Outer Mongolia, status of, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 1225 [ Pg. 1225 includes portions of Doc. 1213 and Doc. 1214 ] , 1227 [ Pg. 1227 includes portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] , 1234–1235 [ Pg. 1234 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1236 [ Pg. 1236 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1246 [ Pg. 1246 includes portions of Doc. 1221 and Doc. 1222 ] , 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 1418 ] , 1587 [ Pg. 1587 includes portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] Oxley, Maj. Gen. W. H., 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 1074 ] Pacific War. See Japan, war against . Paetz, 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 951 ] Page, Edward, Jr., 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 354–355 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Pahlevi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 1389 [ Pg. 1389 is part of Doc. 1327 ] Palestine: Jewish immigration: Anglo-American discussions suggested, 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 1344 ] , 1406 [ Pg. 1406 includes portions of Doc. 1345 and Doc. 1346 ] , 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 1347 ] Balfour Declaration of Nov. 2, 1917 , 1403 [ Pg. 1403 is part of Doc. 1345 ] , 1405 [ Pg. 1405 is part of Doc. 1345 ] British Labor Government, probable attitude toward Palestine question, 1403–1406 [ Pgs. 1403–1406 include portions of Doc. 1345 and Doc. 1346 ] British White Paper ( 1939 ): Attitude of British Labor Party, 1403–1406 [ Pgs. 1403–1406 include portions of Doc. 1345 and Doc. 1346 ] ; cited, 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 1344 ] Truman correspondence with Attlee and Churchill, 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 1344 ] , 1406 [ Pg. 1406 includes portions of Doc. 1345 and Doc. 1346 ] Maintenance of peace in Palestine, 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] Palmer, Col. Alan, 1063 [ Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 1075 ] Panama Canal, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] Papandreou, George, 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 1068 and Doc. 1069 ] Papen, Franz von, 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Paramount Pictures, 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Parks, Maj. Gen. Floyd L., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 710 ] Parri, Ferruccio, 624 n [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] Parten, J. R., 859 n [ Pg. 859 is part of Doc. 916 ] , 860 n [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 916 and Doc. 917 ] , 888 n [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1383–1384 [ Pgs. 1383–1384 include portions of Doc. 1320 and Doc. 1321 ] Patterson, Gardner, 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] Patterson, Richard C., Jr., 1214 n [ Pg. 1214 includes portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] , 1216 [ Pg. 1216 is part of Doc. 1207 ] Patterson, Robert P., 1178 [ Pg. 1178 is part of Doc. 1180 ] Patton, Gen. George S., Jr., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] Pauker, Ana, 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] Pauley, Edwin W.: Allied Reparations Commission and other Committee activities, ( see also Reports, etc. , infra ), 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 141–142 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 183–184 [ Pgs. 183–184 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 778–779 [ Pgs. 778–779 include portions of Doc. 852 , Doc. 853 , and Doc. 854 ] , 797 n [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 798 n [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 812 n [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 878 ] , 817–818 [ Pgs. 817–818 include portions of Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , and Doc. 882 ] , 819 n [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 882 ] , 827–828 [ Pgs. 827–828 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 841–843 [ Pgs. 841–843 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 845–846 [ Pgs. 845–846 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] , 854–856 [ Pgs. 854–856 include portions of Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , and Doc. 915 ] , 867–869 [ Pgs. 867–869 include portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] , 873–878 [ Pgs. 873–878 include portions of Doc. 929 and Doc. 930 ] , 888–897 [ Pgs. 888–897 include portions of Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] , 898–899 [ Pgs. 898–899 include portions of Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , and Doc. 946 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 956 ] , 923–925 [ Pgs. 923–925 include portions of Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , and Doc. 965 ] , 928–929 [ Pgs. 928–929 include portions of Doc. 967 , Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] , 934 n [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 973 and Doc. 974 ] , 935–936 [ Pgs. 935–936 include portions of Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , and Doc. 976 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 957–958 [ Pgs. 957–958 include portions of Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , and Doc. 995 ] , 963–964 [ Pgs. 963–964 include portions of Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , and Doc. 1003 ] , 1030–1031 [ Pgs. 1030–1031 include portions of Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , and Doc. 1048 ] , 1087 [ Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] , 1378–1380 [ Pgs. 1378–1380 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , and Doc. 1317 ] , 1382 [ Pg. 1382 includes portions of Doc. 1319 and Doc. 1320 ] , 1388 [ Pg. 1388 is part of Doc. 1326 ] Foreign Ministers Meetings, participation in, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] Miscellaneous, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 428–429 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 438–439 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 1461 [ Pg. 1461 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Plenary Meetings, participation in, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] Reports and memoranda for Truman, 873–876 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 929 ] , 893–897 [ Pgs. 893–897 include portions of Doc. 942 and Doc. 943 ] , 904–912 [ Pgs. 904–912 include portions of Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , and Doc. 952 ] , 940–949 [ Pgs. 940–949 include portions of Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 971–972 [ Pgs. 971–972 include portions of Doc. 1007 and Doc. 1008 ] , 1087–1088 [ Pgs. 1087–1088 include portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , and Doc. 1096 ] , 1380 [ Pg. 1380 includes portions of Doc. 1316 and Doc. 1317 ] , 1381 [ Pg. 1381 is part of Doc. 1318 ] Tripartite dinner meeting, participation in, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] Pavlov, Assen, 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] Pavlov, V. N., 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 471 n [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 includes portions of Doc. 1012 and Doc. 1013 ] , 1582 [ Pg. 1582 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] and Doc. 1418 ] , 1587 [ Pg. 1587 includes portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] Peace conference and peace settlements at future date, 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 62–63 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 130–131 [ Pgs. 130–131 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 305–306 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 551–552 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] , 1138 [ Pg. 1138 includes portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , and Doc. 1146 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1215 [ Pg. 1215 is part of Doc. 1207 ] , 1220 [ Pg. 1220 includes portions of Doc. 1209 and Doc. 1210 ] , 1421 [ Pg. 1421 is part of Doc. 1363 ] , 1422 [ Pg. 1422 is part of Doc. 1363 ] , 1425 [ Pg. 1425 is part of Doc. 1366 ] , 1447 [ Pg. 1447 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1523 [ Pg. 1523 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1540 n [ Pg. 1540 includes portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] , 1563 [ Pg. 1563 is part of Doc. 1414 ] , 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 1429 ] Peace treaties. See under Bulgaria , Finland , Hungary , Italy , and Rumania . Pearl Harbor, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 1376 [ Pg. 1376 is part of Doc. 1315 ] Peck, Col. Clarence R., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Perkins, Lt. Comdr. Kenneth D., 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] Persia. See Iran. Persian Gulf Command (PGC), evacuation from Iran, 1394–1396 [ Pgs. 1394–1396 include portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , Doc. 1334 , Doc. 1335 , and Doc. 1336 ] Peterson, Sir Maurice Drummond, 1437 n [ Pg. 1437 is part of Doc. 1376 ] , 1437–1438 [ Pgs. 1437–1438 include portions of Doc. 1376 and Doc. 1377 ] Pethick-Lawrence, Frederick W., 1404 [ Pg. 1404 is part of Doc. 1345 ] Petkov, Nikola Dimitrov, 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , and Doc. 812 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 822 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 823 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 827 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 827 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 827 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 829 and Doc. 830 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 832 (#1)] ] Petroleum. See Oil . Petroleum Administration for War (PAW), 1379 [ Pg. 1379 is part of Doc. 1316 ] , 1385–1386 [ Pgs. 1385–1386 include portions of Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , and Doc. 1324 ] , 1388 [ Pg. 1388 is part of Doc. 1326 ] Petrov, A. A., 616 n [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] , 1225 n [ Pg. 1225 includes portions of Doc. 1213 and Doc. 1214 ] , 1246 n [ Pg. 1246 includes portions of Doc. 1221 and Doc. 1222 ] Petrov, Army Gen. I. E., 670 n [ Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 787 ] Phelps, Dudley Maynard, 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 835 and Doc. 836 ] Philippines. See Japan : Operations in Pacific and Southeast Asia . Picknett, B. F., 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] Piesch, Hans, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , and Doc. 765 ] Pius XII, Pope, 1098 [ Pg. 1098 includes portions of Doc. 1108 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)] , and Doc. 1109 ] Plenary Meetings, July 17–Aug. 1: Records of proceedings, 52–63 [ Pgs. 52–63 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 88–98 [ Pgs. 88–98 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 116–137 [ Pgs. 116–137 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 164–182 [ Pgs. 164–182 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 203–221 [ Pgs. 203–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 244–268 [ Pgs. 244–268 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 299–319 [ Pgs. 299–319 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 357–374 [ Pgs. 357–374 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 381–392 [ Pgs. 381–392 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 459–470 [ Pgs. 459–470 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 510–540 [ Pgs. 510–540 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] , 565–585 [ Pgs. 565–585 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 586–601 [ Pgs. 586–601 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Résumés of problems before the Conference as of July 21 , 221–223 [ Pgs. 221–223 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] ; July 27 , 447–449 [ Pgs. 447–449 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] ; July 30 , 503–505 [ Pgs. 503–505 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] ; July 31 , 540–541 [ Pgs. 540–541 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)] ] Tripartite communiqué issued after first meeting, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] Truman, selection as chairman, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 320–321 [ Pgs. 320–321 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] , 1445 [ Pg. 1445 is part of Doc. 1380 ] Podobed, Col., 1163 [ Pg. 1163 includes portions of Doc. 1164 and Doc. 1165 ] Pogue, L. Welch, 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 1187 ] Poland: Air communications between London and Warsaw, discussions concerning, and British-Polish agreement on, 518–520 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 533–534 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] Assets and properties in United Kingdom and United States. See Polish assets in United Kingdom and United States , infra . Baltic Sea, 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 849 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 includes portions of Doc. 1151 and Doc. 1152 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1489 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 1429 ] , 1598 [ Pg. 1598 is part of Doc. 1430 ] , 1599 [ Pg. 1599 is part of Doc. 1431 ] Bierut. See Bierut, Bolesław . Boundaries. See Frontiers, etc. , infra . Breslau, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 1562 [ Pg. 1562 is part of Doc. 1414 ] Coal and food supply for German occupation zones, discussions concerning ( see also Economic matters and Frontiers, etc. , infra ), 210–215 [ Pgs. 210–215 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 218–221 [ Pgs. 218–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 248–251 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 262–263 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 398–399 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 1387 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1558 [ Pg. 1558 is part of Doc. 1414 ] ; U. S. and Polish transaction regarding coal for Berlin, 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] Communist Party activities, 1128 [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1129 [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 1136 and Doc. 1137 ] , 1130–1132 [ Pgs. 1130–1132 include portions of Doc. 1137 , Doc. 1138 , Doc. 1139 , and Doc. 1140 ] Curzon Line, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 1141 [ Pg. 1141 includes portions of Doc. 1149 and Doc. 1150 ] , 1144 [ Pg. 1144 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1519 [ Pg. 1519 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1520 [ Pg. 1520 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1572 [ Pg. 1572 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1580 [ Pg. 1580 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Danzig, 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 includes portions of Doc. 1151 and Doc. 1152 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1522 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1533 [ Pg. 1533 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1534 [ Pg. 1534 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1535 [ Pg. 1535 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1562 [ Pg. 1562 is part of Doc. 1414 ] East Prussia ( see also under Germany ), 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] , 1142 [ Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1489 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Eastern territory ceded to Soviet Union, economic value of, 1145–1147 [ Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 1150 ] Economic matters: Assistance from United States, 1153–1154 [ Pgs. 1153–1154 include portions of Doc. 1154 , Doc. 1155 , and Doc. 1156 ] ; Mikołajczyk notes, 1522–1523 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1525–1529 [ Pgs. 1525–1529 include portions of Doc. 1386 , Doc. 1387 , and Doc. 1388 ] , 1532–1538 [ Pgs. 1532–1538 include portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] ; Soviet-Polish commercial treaty, July 7 , cited, 406 n [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] ; Soviet-Polish discussions, 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] ; U. S.-Polish discussions concerning, and transaction with regard to coal, 403–406 [ Pgs. 403–406 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 455–458 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 478–479 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] , 1525–1529 [ Pgs. 1525–1529 include portions of Doc. 1386 , Doc. 1387 , and Doc. 1388 ] , 1532–1538 [ Pgs. 1532–1538 include portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] Elections, Allied supervision of, in accordance with Yalta decisions: Discussions concerning, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 78–79 [ Pgs. 78–79 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 188–189 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 193–194 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 206–207 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 1121 [ Pg. 1121 includes portions of Doc. 1129 and Doc. 1130 ] Polish views and statement, 1112 [ Pg. 1112 includes portions of Doc. 1121 and Doc. 1122 ] , 1128–1129 [ Pgs. 1128–1129 include portions of Doc. 1135 , Doc. 1136 , and Doc. 1137 ] , 1130 [ Pg. 1130 includes portions of Doc. 1137 and Doc. 1138 ] , 1141 [ Pg. 1141 includes portions of Doc. 1149 and Doc. 1150 ] , 1456 [ Pg. 1456 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1541 [ Pg. 1541 is part of Doc. 1394 ] Proposals and position of the three powers: British views and proposal, 1107–1109 [ Pgs. 1107–1109 include portions of Doc. 1117 , Doc. 1118 , and Doc. 1119 ] , 1111–1112 [ Pgs. 1111–1112 include portions of Doc. 1121 and Doc. 1122 ] ; Soviet policy, 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1135 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 1142 ] ; statement considered and approved by Heads of Government, 1122 [ Pg. 1122 is part of Doc. 1130 ] , 1123–1124 [ Pgs. 1123–1124 include portions of Doc. 1130 , Doc. 1131 , and Doc. 1132 ] ; U. S. views, 1105 [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 1117 ] , 1106–1107 [ Pgs. 1106–1107 include portions of Doc. 1117 and Doc. 1118 ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1456 [ Pg. 1456 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] European Central Inland Transport Organization, question of Polish participation in, 1159 [ Pg. 1159 includes portions of Doc. 1159 and Doc. 1160 ] , 1162 [ Pg. 1162 includes portions of Doc. 1163 and Doc. 1164 ] Frontiers and areas of administration: Discussions, and acceptance of U. S. proposal, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 208–215 [ Pgs. 208–215 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 217–221 [ Pgs. 217–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 247–252 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 261–264 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 331–336 [ Pgs. 331–336 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 369–370 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 384–385 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 388–389 [ Pgs. 388–389 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 472–473 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 489–490 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 491–492 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 512–513 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 518–520 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 529–530 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 533–534 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] ] , 587–589 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] German frontiers of 1937 as basis for territorial settlements with Poland, 89–90 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 893 ] , 1024–1025 [ Pgs. 1024–1025 include portions of Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , and Doc. 1042 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 1044 and Doc. 1045 ] , 1033–1034 [ Pgs. 1033–1034 include portions of Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] ] , 1136–1137 [ Pgs. 1136–1137 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)] , Doc. 1143 , and Doc. 1144 ] Poland as a “fifth occupying power”, comments on, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 263–264 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] Polish claims (with historical background and statistics), 332–336 [ Pgs. 332–336 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 1138–1139 [ Pgs. 1138–1139 include portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , Doc. 1146 , and Doc. 1147 ] , 1140–1149 [ Pgs. 1140–1149 include portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , Doc. 1149 , and Doc. 1150 ] , 1456–1457 [ Pg. 1456 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1517–1524 [ Pgs. 1517–1524 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)] and Doc. 1385 ] Polish Delegation, presentation of Polish position concerning western frontier. See Polish Delegation , infra . Proposals and policy of the three powers ( see also Discussions , supra ): Soviet Union, 1138 [ Pg. 1138 includes portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , and Doc. 1146 ] , 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] ; United Kingdom, 1136–1138 [ Pgs. 1136–1138 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)] , Doc. 1143 , Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , and Doc. 1146 ] , 1152–1153 [ Pgs. 1152–1153 include portions of Doc. 1154 , Doc. 1155 , and Doc. 1156 ] ; United States, 1136 [ Pg. 1136 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)] , Doc. 1143 , and Doc. 1144 ] , 1150–1151 [ Pgs. 1150–1151 include portions of Doc. 1151 , Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1456–1457 [ Pg. 1456 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1491–1492 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Relationship to German reparations, 209–211 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] ] , 472–473 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 489–490 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 491–492 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 500–501 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] , 926–927 [ Pgs. 926–927 include portions of Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 980 ] Transmittal to France of decisions reached on western frontier question, and French reaction, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 1546 [ Pg. 1546 includes portions of Doc. 1397 , Doc. 1398 , and Doc. 1399 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 1404 and Doc. 1405 ] , 1551–1552 [ Pgs. 1551–1552 include portions of Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , and Doc. 1409 ] , 1561–1562 [ Pg. 1561 is part of Doc. 1414 ] Gdynia, 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 1533 [ Pg. 1533 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1534 [ Pg. 1534 is part of Doc. 1389 ] German ships, Polish share, 559–561 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 1488 [ Pg. 1488 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Gold, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 1134 [ Pg. 1134 includes portions of Doc. 1141 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1141 (#1)] ] Government: Government-in-Exile in London, liquidation of ( see also Polish assets and Polish troops , infra ): British arrangements in connection with, 1127–1128 [ Pgs. 1127–1128 include portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1133–1134 [ Pgs. 1133–1134 include portions of Doc. 1140 , Doc. 1141 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1141 (#1)] ] Diplomatic and consular establishments, British arrangements regarding liquidation of, 1127–1128 [ Pgs. 1127–1128 include portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1134 [ Pg. 1134 includes portions of Doc. 1141 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1141 (#1)] ] Discussions concerning, 55–56 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 91–94 [ Pgs. 91–94 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 97–98 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 103–105 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 187–188 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] Soviet policy, 1135 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 1142 ] Statement approved by Heads of Government, 1123–1124 [ Pgs. 1123–1124 include portions of Doc. 1130 , Doc. 1131 , and Doc. 1132 ] United Maritime Authority, discontinuance of participation in functions of, 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 1131 and Doc. 1132 ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] Polish Provisional Government of National Unity: Communist representation and influence, 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1128 [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1129 [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 1136 and Doc. 1137 ] , 1130–1132 [ Pgs. 1130–1132 include portions of Doc. 1137 , Doc. 1138 , Doc. 1139 , and Doc. 1140 ] Delegation to Conference. See Polish Delegation , infra . Desire to participate in Allied Commissions. See Participation, etc. , infra . Polish seamen’s strike in protest against recognition of Provisional Government, U. S. problems resulting from, 1114–1119 [ Pgs. 1114–1119 include portions of Doc. 1123 , Doc. 1124 , Doc. 1125 , Doc. 1126 , Doc. 1127 , and Doc. 1128 ] Political situation in Poland, 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1112–1113 [ Pgs. 1112–1113 include portions of Doc. 1121 , Doc. 1122 , and Doc. 1123 ] , 1128–1129 [ Pgs. 1128–1129 include portions of Doc. 1135 , Doc. 1136 , and Doc. 1137 ] , 1130–1132 [ Pgs. 1130–1132 include portions of Doc. 1137 , Doc. 1138 , Doc. 1139 , and Doc. 1140 ] ; British views concerning, 1107–1109 [ Pgs. 1107–1109 include portions of Doc. 1117 , Doc. 1118 , and Doc. 1119 ] Position of Government regarding maintenance of independence and sovereignty, 1128–1130 [ Pgs. 1128–1130 include portions of Doc. 1135 , Doc. 1136 , Doc. 1137 , and Doc. 1138 ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1455–1456 [ Pg. 1455 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1490–1491 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Statement by the three powers with respect to: British suggestion, and subsequent drafts, 1107–1109 [ Pgs. 1107–1109 include portions of Doc. 1117 , Doc. 1118 , and Doc. 1119 ] , 1110–1112 [ Pgs. 1110–1112 include portions of Doc. 1119 , Doc. 1120 , Doc. 1121 , and Doc. 1122 ] , 1120–1123 [ Pgs. 1120–1123 include portions of Doc. 1129 , Doc. 1130 , and Doc. 1131 ] ; discussions, 103–104 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 187–189 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 204–207 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] ; Soviet policy, 1135 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 1142 ] ; text approved by Heads of Government, 1123–1124 [ Pgs. 1123–1124 include portions of Doc. 1130 , Doc. 1131 , and Doc. 1132 ] , 1456 [ Pg. 1456 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1490–1491 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] U. S. policy toward, 1104–1107 [ Pgs. 1104–1107 include portions of Doc. 1117 and Doc. 1118 ] Mikołajczyk. See Mikołajczyk, Stanisław . Neisse River, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Oder River, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Oder–Neisse Line ( see also Frontiers, etc. , supra ): Miscellaneous, 841–842 [ Pgs. 841–842 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 854–855 [ Pgs. 854–855 include portions of Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , Doc. 913 , and Doc. 914 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] , 879–881 [ Pg. 879 is part of Doc. 931 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] , 1138 [ Pg. 1138 includes portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , and Doc. 1146 ] , 1561 [ Pg. 1561 is part of Doc. 1414 ] , 1562 [ Pg. 1562 is part of Doc. 1414 ] Views of French Provisional Government, 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 1404 and Doc. 1405 ] , 1551–1552 [ Pgs. 1551–1552 include portions of Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , and Doc. 1409 ] , 1562 [ Pg. 1562 is part of Doc. 1414 ] ; of Polish Delegation, 332–336 [ Pgs. 332–336 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 1517–1524 [ Pgs. 1517–1524 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)] and Doc. 1385 ] Participation in Allied Councils and Commissions, Polish desire for, 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 569–570 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 1125–1126 [ Pgs. 1125–1126 include portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] , 1125 n [ Pg. 1125 is part of Doc. 1133 ] Polish assets in United Kingdom and United States: British agreement with former Polish government, 1119 [ Pg. 1119 includes portions of Doc. 1127 and Doc. 1128 ] , 1127–1128 [ Pgs. 1127–1128 include portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] ; discussions concerning, 90–91 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 103–105 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 187–188 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 189–192 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 204–207 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 215–216 [ Pgs. 215–216 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] ; proposals and reports, 1110 [ Pg. 1110 includes portions of Doc. 1119 and Doc. 1120 ] , 1111 [ Pg. 1111 is part of Doc. 1121 ] , 1120 [ Pg. 1120 is part of Doc. 1129 ] , 1121–1122 [ Pgs. 1121–1122 include portions of Doc. 1129 and Doc. 1130 ] , 1123 [ Pg. 1123 includes portions of Doc. 1130 and Doc. 1131 ] , 1591 [ Pg. 1591 includes portions of Doc. 1421 and Doc. 1422 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1456 [ Pg. 1456 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] ; Soviet policy, 1135 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 1142 ] Polish assets removed by Germany, 1125 [ Pg. 1125 is part of Doc. 1133 ] Polish Delegation: Appearance at Foreign Ministers Meeting, and presentation of Polish views and claims on western frontier question, 322–323 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 331–336 [ Pgs. 331–336 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 369–370 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 1140–1149 [ Pgs. 1140–1149 include portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , Doc. 1149 , and Doc. 1150 ] , 1456–1457 [ Pg. 1456 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1517–1524 [ Pgs. 1517–1524 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)] and Doc. 1385 ] Discussions with British Delegation, 490 n [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] ; with Stalin and Soviet officials, 1529–1531 [ Pgs. 1529–1531 include portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] ; with Truman and U. S. officials, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] , 1128–1130 [ Pgs. 1128–1130 include portions of Doc. 1135 , Doc. 1136 , Doc. 1137 , and Doc. 1138 ] , 1525–1529 [ Pgs. 1525–1529 include portions of Doc. 1386 , Doc. 1387 , and Doc. 1388 ] , 1532–1538 [ Pgs. 1532–1538 include portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] , 1540–1542 [ Pgs. 1540–1542 include portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] Invitation to appear at Conference, and acceptance, 249–250 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 263–264 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 1139–1140 [ Pgs. 1139–1140 include portions of Doc. 1146 , Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] Memoranda on Polish prerequisites for maintenance of independence and sovereignty, 1128–1130 [ Pgs. 1128–1130 include portions of Doc. 1135 , Doc. 1136 , Doc. 1137 , and Doc. 1138 ] Notification by Truman of decisions reached by the three powers concerning Poland, 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 538–539 [ Pgs. 538–539 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1540–1541 [ Pgs. 1540–1541 include portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] Polish seamen’s strike, 1114–1119 [ Pgs. 1114–1119 include portions of Doc. 1123 , Doc. 1124 , Doc. 1125 , Doc. 1126 , Doc. 1127 , and Doc. 1128 ] Polish troops and Merchant Marine in United Kingdom and Western Europe ( see also Repatriation of Polish nationals , infra ): British views and proposal, discussions concerning, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 91–93 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 97–98 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 1118 and Doc. 1119 ] , 1111 [ Pg. 1111 is part of Doc. 1121 ] ; policy and attitude of General Anders (Commander, Polish troops in Italy), 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 1109–1110 [ Pgs. 1109–1110 include portions of Doc. 1118 , Doc. 1119 , and Doc. 1120 ] , 1113–1114 [ Pgs. 1113–1114 include portions of Doc. 1122 , Doc. 1123 , and Doc. 1124 ] ; Polish request for U. S. intervention regarding repatriation of, 1132–1133 [ Pgs. 1132–1133 include portions of Doc. 1139 , Doc. 1140 , and Doc. 1141 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Press, freedom of: Discussions concerning free access of Allied correspondents, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 193–194 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 206–207 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 556–557 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 575–578 [ Pgs. 575–578 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 582–583 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] ; Polish views, 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] , 1128–1129 [ Pgs. 1128–1129 include portions of Doc. 1135 , Doc. 1136 , and Doc. 1137 ] ; proposals and position of the three powers, 1106 [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 1117 ] , 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 1118 and Doc. 1119 ] , 1112–1113 [ Pgs. 1112–1113 include portions of Doc. 1121 , Doc. 1122 , and Doc. 1123 ] , 1121 [ Pg. 1121 includes portions of Doc. 1129 and Doc. 1130 ] , 1123 [ Pg. 1123 includes portions of Doc. 1130 and Doc. 1131 ] , 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 1131 and Doc. 1132 ] , 1135 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 1142 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1456 [ Pg. 1456 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1455–1457 [ Pg. 1455 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1490–1492 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508–1509 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Provisional Government of National Unity. See Government : Polish Provisional Government, etc. , supra . Reconstruction. See Economic matters , supra . Red Army, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 782 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 842 and Doc. 843 ] , 1128 [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , 1237–1238 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Reparations and restitution from Germany: Polish claims, 849–850 [ Pgs. 849–850 include portions of Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] , 851–852 [ Pg. 851 is part of Doc. 909 ] , 857 [ Pg. 857 is part of Doc. 915 ] , 861–862 [ Pgs. 861–862 include portions of Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , and Doc. 919 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 933 and Doc. 934 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 953 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] , 926–927 [ Pgs. 926–927 include portions of Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] ; relation to question of boundaries, 472–473 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 489–490 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 491–492 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 857–858 [ Pgs. 857–858 include portions of Doc. 915 and Doc. 916 ] , 861–862 [ Pgs. 861–862 include portions of Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , and Doc. 919 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 933 and Doc. 934 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] , 926–927 [ Pgs. 926–927 include portions of Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 980 ] Repatriation of Polish nationals abroad: Discussions concerning, 97–98 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 192–193 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 1163–1164 [ Pgs. 1163–1164 include portions of Doc. 1164 , Doc. 1165 , and Doc. 1166 ] Polish views, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 369–370 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 1125–1126 [ Pgs. 1125–1126 include portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] , 1128 [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1130 [ Pg. 1130 includes portions of Doc. 1137 and Doc. 1138 ] , 1132–1133 [ Pgs. 1132–1133 include portions of Doc. 1139 , Doc. 1140 , and Doc. 1141 ] , 1148 [ Pg. 1148 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1541 [ Pg. 1541 is part of Doc. 1394 ] ; policy of General Anders, 1109–1110 [ Pgs. 1109–1110 include portions of Doc. 1118 , Doc. 1119 , and Doc. 1120 ] , 1113–1114 [ Pgs. 1113–1114 include portions of Doc. 1122 , Doc. 1123 , and Doc. 1124 ] Proposals concerning, 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 1118 and Doc. 1119 ] , 1111 [ Pg. 1111 is part of Doc. 1121 ] , 1120–1121 [ Pgs. 1120–1121 include portions of Doc. 1129 and Doc. 1130 ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Soviet policy, 1135 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 1142 ] Seamen’s strike, 1114–1119 [ Pgs. 1114–1119 include portions of Doc. 1123 , Doc. 1124 , Doc. 1125 , Doc. 1126 , Doc. 1127 , and Doc. 1128 ] Silesia ( see also Upper Silesia , infra ), 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 1112 [ Pg. 1112 includes portions of Doc. 1121 and Doc. 1122 ] , 1143 [ Pg. 1143 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1146 [ Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1521 [ Pg. 1521 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1522 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 1387 ] , 1530 [ Pg. 1530 is part of Doc. 1388 ] , 1533 [ Pg. 1533 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1536 [ Pg. 1536 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] , 1558 [ Pg. 1558 is part of Doc. 1414 ] Soviet-Polish commercial treaty, July 7 , 406 n [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] Stettin, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] , 1138 [ Pg. 1138 includes portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , and Doc. 1146 ] , 1139 [ Pg. 1139 includes portions of Doc. 1146 and Doc. 1147 ] , 1141 [ Pg. 1141 includes portions of Doc. 1149 and Doc. 1150 ] , 1142 [ Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 includes portions of Doc. 1151 and Doc. 1152 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , 1518 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1521 [ Pg. 1521 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1522 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1524 [ Pg. 1524 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1530 [ Pg. 1530 is part of Doc. 1388 ] , 1534 [ Pg. 1534 is part of Doc. 1389 ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] , 1540 n [ Pg. 1540 includes portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] Swinemünde, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#86)] ] , 587–588 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 1138 [ Pg. 1138 includes portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , and Doc. 1146 ] , 1139 [ Pg. 1139 includes portions of Doc. 1146 and Doc. 1147 ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 includes portions of Doc. 1151 and Doc. 1152 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 includes portions of Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1153 (#1)] ] , 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1518 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 1385 ] Territorial settlements. See Frontiers, etc. , supra; also geographic items, supra and infra . Transfers of German populations: Discussions concerning, 210–212 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 217–221 [ Pgs. 217–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 383–387 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 388–390 [ Pgs. 388–390 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 398–399 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 523–524 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 536–537 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] ; French attitude, 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , and Doc. 1407 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1495–1496 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1511 [ Pg. 1511 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Troops. See Polish troops, etc. , supra . UNRRA. See United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration . Upper Silesia ( see also Silesia , supra ), 405 [ Pg. 405 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 1146 [ Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1536 [ Pg. 1536 is part of Doc. 1389 ] U. S. consular offices in Poland, establishment of, 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] U. S. Embassy at Warsaw, establishment of, 1105–1106 [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 1117 ] ; Soviet delay of transportation clearance for Embassy personnel, 1131–1132 [ Pgs. 1131–1132 include portions of Doc. 1138 , Doc. 1139 , and Doc. 1140 ] U. S. policy toward Provisional Government of National Unity, 1104–1107 [ Pgs. 1104–1107 include portions of Doc. 1117 and Doc. 1118 ] Vistula, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 1522 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 1385 ] Western frontier. See Frontiers, etc. , supra . Yalta decisions concerning, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 78–79 [ Pgs. 78–79 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 208–209 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] , 1105 [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 1117 ] , 1106–1107 [ Pgs. 1106–1107 include portions of Doc. 1117 and Doc. 1118 ] , 1110 [ Pg. 1110 includes portions of Doc. 1119 and Doc. 1120 ] , 1111 [ Pg. 1111 is part of Doc. 1121 ] , 1120 [ Pg. 1120 is part of Doc. 1129 ] , 1121 [ Pg. 1121 includes portions of Doc. 1129 and Doc. 1130 ] , 1123 [ Pg. 1123 includes portions of Doc. 1130 and Doc. 1131 ] , 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 1138 and Doc. 1139 ] , 1135 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 1142 ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] , 1142 [ Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1143 [ Pg. 1143 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1144 [ Pg. 1144 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 includes portions of Doc. 1151 and Doc. 1152 ] , 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1518 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1523 [ Pg. 1523 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1524 [ Pg. 1524 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1541 [ Pg. 1541 is part of Doc. 1394 ] , 1571–1572 [ Pg. 1571 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1579–1580 [ Pg. 1579 is part of Doc. 1417 ] , 1583 [ Pg. 1583 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Pope Pius XII, 1098 [ Pg. 1098 includes portions of Doc. 1108 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)] , and Doc. 1109 ] Popiel, Karol, 1108 [ Pg. 1108 is part of Doc. 1118 ] , 1112 [ Pg. 1112 includes portions of Doc. 1121 and Doc. 1122 ] , 1130 [ Pg. 1130 includes portions of Doc. 1137 and Doc. 1138 ] Port Arthur. See China : Manchuria . Portal, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 48–50 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 1181–1182 [ Pg. 1181 is part of Doc. 1182 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Portugal: German assets in Portugal, 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , and Doc. 995 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] ; miscellaneous, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 125–126 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 134–135 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] ; participation in war against Japan, 65–66 [ Pgs. 65–66 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 1349–1360 [ Pgs. 1349–1360 include portions of Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , Doc. 1295 , Doc. 1296 , Doc. 1297 , Doc. 1298 , Doc. 1299 , Doc. 1300 , Doc. 1301 , Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] , 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1471–1472 [ Pg. 1471 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Post-Conference memoranda by Bohlen regarding Truman–Stalin conversations, 1582–1588 [ Pgs. 1582–1588 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] , Doc. 1418 , and Doc. 1419 ] Post-Conference memorandum on disposition of questions discussed at Conference, 602–606 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] Potrubach, M. M., 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] “Potsdam Declaration”. See Japan : Proclamation . Potter, Charles J., 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 1041 and Doc. 1042 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 1043 and Doc. 1044 ] Press, arrangements for at Berlin Conference, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 94–95 [ Pgs. 94–95 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] Press, freedom of: Balkans, question of admission of foreign correspondents and freedom of communications and information: Discussions and proposals, 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 193–194 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 228–232 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 269–270 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 417–418 [ Pgs. 417–418 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 556–557 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 575–576 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 582–583 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 604–605 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 731 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] ] , 644–645 [ Pgs. 644–645 include portions of Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , and Doc. 747 ] , 646–647 [ Pgs. 646–647 include portions of Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , and Doc. 749 ] , 648–649 [ Pgs. 648–649 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)] , and Doc. 751 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1458 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1492–1493 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Finland, admission of foreign correspondents and radio representatives, 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 731 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1458 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1492–1493 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Germany, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1483 [ Pg. 1483 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1504 [ Pg. 1504 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Greece, 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] passim , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 1079 ] Poland. See under Poland . Prisoners of war: Germany, 765–766 [ Pgs. 765–766 include portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] ; repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals (British prisoner of war camp in Italy), 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 259–260 [ Pgs. 259–260 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 367–368 [ Pgs. 367–368 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1162–1166 [ Pgs. 1162–1166 include portions of Doc. 1163 , Doc. 1164 , Doc. 1165 , Doc. 1166 , Doc. 1167 , Doc. 1168 , and Doc. 1169 ] , 1600 [ Pg. 1600 includes portions of Doc. 1432 and Doc. 1433 ] Prodanović, Jaša, 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 1203 and Doc. 1204 ] Protocol of Proceedings: Discussions concerning preparation of, 400–401 [ Pgs. 400–401 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 419–420 [ Pgs. 419–420 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 548–554 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 595–596 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 597–599 [ Pgs. 597–599 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 1477–1478 [ Pgs. 1477–1478 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] and Doc. 1383 ] ; meeting of Protocol Subcommittee, 419–420 [ Pgs. 419–420 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] ; text, 1478–1498 [ Pgs. 1478–1498 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] and Doc. 1383 ] Prussia, 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 851 ] Pushkin, G. M., 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] Pyron, Brig. Gen. Walter B., 1381 [ Pg. 1381 is part of Doc. 1318 ] , 1382 [ Pg. 1382 includes portions of Doc. 1319 and Doc. 1320 ] Quebec Conferences ( 1943 and 1944 ), 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 1181 [ Pg. 1181 is part of Doc. 1182 ] Quislings, 422–423 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#120)] ] Raczkiewicz, Władysław, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] Raczynski, Count Edward, 1133–1134 [ Pgs. 1133–1134 include portions of Doc. 1140 , Doc. 1141 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1141 (#1)] ] Radio. See Poland : Press ; and Press, freedom of . Rajchman, Ludwik, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 478–479 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 1532 [ Pg. 1532 is part of Doc. 1389 ] Rákosi, Mátyas, 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 799 ] Rankin, Lt. Col. J. T., 1113 [ Pg. 1113 includes portions of Doc. 1122 and Doc. 1123 ] Reams, R. Borden, 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] Reber, Samuel, 624–625 [ Pgs. 624–625 include portions of Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 687–688 [ Pgs. 687–688 include portions of Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , and Doc. 795 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)] ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] , 1100 [ Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , and Doc. 1113 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 1114 and Doc. 1115 ] Red Army, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#135)] ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 782 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 842 and Doc. 843 ] , 1128 [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1142 [ Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 1150 ] , 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , 1237–1238 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Redecker, Sydney B., 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 850 ] Reed, Capt. Arthur D., 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] Reinstein, Jacques J., 1087 [ Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 1097 and Doc. 1098 ] , 1119 [ Pg. 1119 includes portions of Doc. 1127 and Doc. 1128 ] Relief and rehabilitation: Coal. See under Germany and Poland . Economic matters. See under Austria , Germany , Hungary , Italy , Poland , Rumania , and Soviet Union . Food. See under Austria and Germany . Rehabilitation of Germany, general, 753–757 [ Pgs. 753–757 include portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 808–809 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 871 ] United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , and Doc. 765 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] ] , 1035 n [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 1053 and Doc. 1054 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 1076 ] , 1089–1090 [ Pgs. 1089–1090 include portions of Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , and Doc. 1098 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 1114 and Doc. 1115 ] , 1180 [ Pg. 1180 includes portions of Doc. 1181 and Doc. 1182 ] , 1181 [ Pg. 1181 is part of Doc. 1182 ] , 1184 [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1185 ] , 1379 [ Pg. 1379 is part of Doc. 1316 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 1386 ] , 1526 [ Pg. 1526 is part of Doc. 1386 ] Renner, Karl, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] Renner government in Austria. See Austria : Provisional government . Reparations. See under Austria , Germany , Greece , Italy , Poland , Rumania , and Yugoslavia . Reparations Commission (Allied). See under Germany . Repatriation. See under Poland and Soviet Union . Restitution. See under Austria and Germany ; also Poland : Reparations and restitution . Rhee, Syngman, 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] Rhine River, free use of. See European questions : Inland waterways . Rhineland. See Germany : Rhineland and Ruhr . Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Riddleberger, James W., 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 453–454 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 760 (#1)] ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 786 n [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 874 and Doc. 875 ] Ridley, Maj. Gen. Clarence S., 1394 [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] , 1395 [ Pg. 1395 includes portions of Doc. 1334 and Doc. 1335 ] , 1396 [ Pg. 1396 includes portions of Doc. 1335 and Doc. 1336 ] Rigdon, Lt. William M., 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document preceding Document 710 (#1)] ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] Riggs, Col. Theodore S., 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Rogozhin, Col. A. I., 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] Rokossovsky, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K., 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] Rola-Żymierski, Marshal Michał, 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] Romagna, Jack, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] Ronald, Nigel, 1158 [ Pg. 1158 includes portions of Doc. 1158 and Doc. 1159 ] , 1162 [ Pg. 1162 includes portions of Doc. 1163 and Doc. 1164 ] Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 45 n [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 129 n [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 631 n [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 744 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 1107 [ Pg. 1107 includes portions of Doc. 1117 and Doc. 1118 ] , 1171 n [ Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 1175 ] , 1174 [ Pg. 1174 is part of Doc. 1178 ] , 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 1198 ] , 1204 [ Pg. 1204 includes portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 1212 ] , 1223 n [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 1212 ] , 1239 [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1240 [ Pg. 1240 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1247 [ Pg. 1247 is part of Doc. 1222 ] , 1323 n [ Pg. 1323 includes portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] , 1371 [ Pg. 1371 is part of Doc. 1306 ] , 1377 [ Pg. 1377 is part of Doc. 1315 ] , 1390 [ Pg. 1390 includes portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , and Doc. 1329 ] , 1421 n [ Pg. 1421 is part of Doc. 1363 ] , 1557–1558 [ Pgs. 1557–1558 include portions of Doc. 1413 and Doc. 1414 ] ; Protocol of Yalta Conference, 1567–1581 [ Pgs. 1567–1581 include portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Rosato, CWO Frank J., 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] Rosenberg, Alfred, 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] Rosenman, Samuel I., 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 897 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 987–988 [ Pgs. 987–988 include portions of Doc. 1019 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1019 (#1)] , Doc. 1020 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1020 (#1)] ] Rosenson, Alexander M., 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] Ross, Charles G., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 1442 [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] , 1499 n [ Pg. 1499 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Ross, Capt. John B., 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 710 ] Rowan, Leslie, 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] ] Royen, Jan Herman van, 1346–1347 [ Pgs. 1346–1347 include portions of Doc. 1291 , Doc. 1292 , and Doc. 1293 ] Rubin, Seymour J., 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 870–872 [ Pgs. 870–872 include portions of Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , and Doc. 928 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 968–969 [ Pgs. 968–969 include portions of Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , and Doc. 1005 ] Rueff, Jacques, 1553 [ Pg. 1553 includes portions of Doc. 1409 and Doc. 1410 ] Ruhr. See under Germany . Rumania: Allied Control Commission, revision of procedure with regard to status of British and U. S. representatives ( see also Armistice , infra ) : Discussions concerning, 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 228–230 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 524–525 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] , 554–556 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 604–605 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1458–1459 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1494–1495 [ Pg. 1494 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1511 [ Pg. 1511 is part of Doc. 1384 ] ; Soviet proposals and policy, 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 829 and Doc. 830 ] , 736–737 [ Pgs. 736–737 include portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] ; U. S. position and consideration of Soviet proposal, 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , and Doc. 748 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 686–687 [ Pgs. 686–687 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 792 (#1)] , Doc. 793 , and Doc. 794 ] , 690–692 [ Pgs. 690–692 include portions of Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , and Doc. 798 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 802 and Doc. 803 ] , 701–702 [ Pgs. 701–702 include portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 709–711 [ Pgs. 709–711 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 715–716 [ Pgs. 715–716 include portions of Doc. 814 , Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 719–720 [ Pgs. 719–720 include portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 820 and Doc. 821 ] , 726–727 [ Pgs. 726–727 include portions of Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , and Doc. 826 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] Allied property (American and British), use for satellite reparations and war booty. See Reparations , infra . American property rights and interests, relation to reparations and Soviet economic policy, 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 835 and Doc. 836 ] , 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , and Doc. 840 ] Armistice agreement ( Sept. 12, 1944 ), revision of, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] , 726–727 [ Pgs. 726–727 include portions of Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , and Doc. 826 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , and Doc. 841 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)] ] ; cited, 67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 804 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 812 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 839 and Doc. 840 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)] ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] Communist influence and Party activities ( see also Government , infra ), 326–327 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 647–648 [ Pgs. 647–648 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , and Doc. 803 ] , 699–701 [ Pgs. 699–701 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 814 and Doc. 815 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] Danube commission, Rumanian participation, 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 757 and Doc. 758 ] Diplomatic relations, discussions concerning establishment of ( see also Government and Peace treaty , infra; also United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria, etc. ), 172–173 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 326–328 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 370–372 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 529–530 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 589–590 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 598–599 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] ; Soviet proposal, 698–699 [ Pgs. 698–699 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] Economic agreement with Soviet Union, U. S. views, 737–738 [ Pgs. 737–738 include portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , and Doc. 835 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 838 and Doc. 839 ] Elections, question of Allied supervision of, 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 165–166 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 228–232 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 604–605 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 747 and Doc. 748 ] , 647–648 [ Pgs. 647–648 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 814 and Doc. 815 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] German assets in Rumania: Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1454 [ Pg. 1454 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1486–1487 [ Pg. 1486 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1506 [ Pg. 1506 is part of Doc. 1384 ] ; Soviet claims, 567–568 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 812 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 951–952 [ Pgs. 951–952 include portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] Government: Groza government, 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 814 ] National Peasant Party, 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 699–700 [ Pgs. 699–700 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 814 and Doc. 815 ] NDF (National Democratic Front), 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , and Doc. 803 ] , 699–701 [ Pgs. 699–701 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 814 ] Reorganization of minority government prior to establishment of diplomatic relations and conclusion of peace treaty: Discussions concerning, 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 326–327 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 370–372 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 394–395 [ Pgs. 394–395 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] ; U. S. position and reports, 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , and Doc. 748 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 699–701 [ Pgs. 699–701 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 814 and Doc. 815 ] Oil ( see also Soviet removal , infra ), 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 812 ] , 737–738 [ Pgs. 737–738 include portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , and Doc. 835 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 838 and Doc. 839 ] , 1378–1388 [ Pgs. 1378–1388 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , Doc. 1317 , Doc. 1318 , Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , Doc. 1321 , Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , Doc. 1324 , Doc. 1325 , and Doc. 1326 ] passim Peace treaty, conclusion of ( see also United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria, etc. ; and under Council of Foreign Ministers : Functions, etc. ), Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1457–1458 [ Pg. 1457 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1492–1493 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509–1510 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Press. See Press : Balkans . Reparations: Soviet demands, 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 812 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 951–952 [ Pgs. 951–952 include portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] Use of Allied property for payment of: Discussions of U. S. proposal, and acceptance in principle, 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)] ] , 545–546 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 576–577 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 583–584 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 812 ] , 744–745 [ Pgs. 744–745 include portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] ; Protocol, section concerning, 1497–1498 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] ; U. S. and British protests, and Soviet attitude, 737–746 [ Pgs. 737–746 include portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)] ] Restrictions on U. S. and British officials, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 362–363 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] Rumanian external assets, 747–749 [ Pgs. 747–749 include portions of Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , and Doc. 847 ] Rumanian ships, Soviet acquisition, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 1014 ] Soviet removal of British and American property (oil equipment): British and U. S. protests and proposals, 737–740 [ Pgs. 737–740 include portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , and Doc. 837 ] , 741–745 [ Pgs. 741–745 include portions of Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)] ] ; Soviet position, 745–746 [ Pgs. 745–746 include portions of Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)] ] Discussions concerning, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 136–137 [ Pgs. 136–137 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 234–237 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 328–329 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#154)] ] , 547–548 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 593–594 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Protocol and Communiqué sections concerning, 1459–1460 [ Pg. 1459 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Soviet troops in Rumania, 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 812 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 825 and Doc. 826 ] United Nations, admission to. See United Nations Organization : Admission of Bulgaria, etc. War booty. See Reparations and Soviet removal, etc. , supra . Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. See Declaration under Yalta . Rusk, Col. Howard A., 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] Russell, Donald, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 268 n [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 380 n [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 417 n [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 970 and Doc. 971 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 972 ] , 933 n [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 1227–1228 [ Pgs. 1227–1228 include portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] Russia ( see also Soviet Union ): Manchuria, Russian interest. See Manchuria and Treaties and agreements under China . Mongolia, Russian interest. See Outer Mongolia and Treaties and agreements under China . Turkish Straits, Russian interest. See Turkey : Straits question . Rzymowski, Wincenty, 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 333–334 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 1140 [ Pg. 1140 includes portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] , 1519 [ Pg. 1519 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1520 [ Pg. 1520 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 1386 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] S–1 bomb. See Atomic bomb . Saar, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] Saburov, M. Z., 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 includes portions of Doc. 1002 and Doc. 1003 ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Sadr, Mohsen, 1389 [ Pg. 1389 is part of Doc. 1327 ] , 1390 n [ Pg. 1390 includes portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , and Doc. 1329 ] , 1390–1391 [ Pgs. 1390–1391 include portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , Doc. 1329 , and Doc. 1330 ] Safehaven , 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] Sa’id-Maraghah’i, Mohammad, 1389 [ Pg. 1389 is part of Doc. 1327 ] Saito. See Sato, Naotake . Saka, Hasan, 1426 [ Pg. 1426 includes portions of Doc. 1366 and Doc. 1367 ] Saksin, G. F., 138 n [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)] ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 1032 and Doc. 1033 ] , 1011 [ Pg. 1011 is part of Doc. 1038 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] Salazar, António de Oliveira, 1350–1351 [ Pgs. 1350–1351 include portions of Doc. 1295 and Doc. 1296 ] , 1354–1357 [ Pgs. 1354–1357 include portions of Doc. 1298 , Doc. 1299 , Doc. 1300 , and Doc. 1301 ] , 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] San Francisco Conference. See United Nations Conference on International Organization . Saracoğlu, Şükrü, 1437 n [ Pg. 1437 is part of Doc. 1376 ] , 1437–1438 [ Pgs. 1437–1438 include portions of Doc. 1376 and Doc. 1377 ] Sargent, Sir Orme, 1112–1113 [ Pgs. 1112–1113 include portions of Doc. 1121 , Doc. 1122 , and Doc. 1123 ] , 1130 [ Pg. 1130 includes portions of Doc. 1137 and Doc. 1138 ] Sarper, Selim, 256 n [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 266–267 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] Sato, Naotake, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 1250–1257 [ Pgs. 1250–1257 include portions of Doc. 1225 , Doc. 1226 , Doc. 1227 , Doc. 1228 , and Doc. 1229 ] , 1259 [ Pg. 1259 includes portions of Doc. 1230 and Doc. 1231 ] , 1260 [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 1232 and Doc. 1233 ] , 1262–1264 [ Pgs. 1262–1264 include portions of Doc. 1233 , Doc. 1234 , Doc. 1235 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1235 (#1)] ] , 1291–1292 [ Pgs. 1291–1292 include portions of Doc. 1256 and Doc. 1257 ] , 1294–1298 [ Pgs. 1294–1298 include portions of Doc. 1259 , Doc. 1260 , and Doc. 1261 ] , 1298 n [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 1261 ] , 1587 [ Pg. 1587 includes portions of Doc. 1418 and Doc. 1419 ] Satterthwaite, Livingston, 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 1187 ] Saudi Arabia, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] Saugstad, Jesse E., 1116 [ Pg. 1116 includes portions of Doc. 1124 and Doc. 1125 ] Saunders-Jacobs, Brig. J. C., 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 1079 ] Sawyer, Charles, 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] Schacht, Hjalmar, 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Schade, Commodore Henry A., 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] Scheibe, Dr., 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 951 ] Schermerhorn, Willem, 1346–1347 [ Pgs. 1346–1347 include portions of Doc. 1291 , Doc. 1292 , and Doc. 1293 ] Schoenfeld, H. F. Arthur, 644–645 [ Pgs. 644–645 include portions of Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , and Doc. 747 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] , 693–694 [ Pgs. 693–694 include portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 718–719 [ Pgs. 718–719 include portions of Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , and Doc. 819 ] , 721–722 [ Pgs. 721–722 include portions of Doc. 820 , Doc. 821 , and Doc. 822 ] Schuyler, Brig. Gen. Cortland T. Van R., 362 n [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 686–687 [ Pgs. 686–687 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 792 (#1)] , Doc. 793 , and Doc. 794 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 802 and Doc. 803 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 812 ] , 709–711 [ Pgs. 709–711 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 715–716 [ Pgs. 715–716 include portions of Doc. 814 , Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 820 and Doc. 821 ] , 726–727 [ Pgs. 726–727 include portions of Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , and Doc. 826 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , and Doc. 841 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 844 (#1)] ] Schwarzkopf, Lt. Col. H. Norman, 1394 [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] , 1395 [ Pg. 1395 includes portions of Doc. 1334 and Doc. 1335 ] , 1396 [ Pg. 1396 includes portions of Doc. 1335 and Doc. 1336 ] Scobie, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald, 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 1076 ] Semenov, V. S., 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] Sepahbodi, Anoshiravan, 1390 n [ Pg. 1390 includes portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , and Doc. 1329 ] , 1390 [ Pg. 1390 includes portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , and Doc. 1329 ] Sextant , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] Seymour, Sir Horace, 616 n [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] Sforza, Count Carlo, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] SHAEF, 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 867 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1379 [ Pg. 1379 is part of Doc. 1316 ] Shantz, Harold, 1066 n [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] , 1209–1212 [ Pgs. 1209–1212 include portions of Doc. 1202 , Doc. 1203 , Doc. 1204 , and Doc. 1205 ] , 1219–1220 [ Pgs. 1219–1220 include portions of Doc. 1208 , Doc. 1209 , and Doc. 1210 ] Shell Oil Co., 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] Sherman, Lt. C. D., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] Shinwell, Emanuel, 1404 [ Pg. 1404 is part of Doc. 1345 ] Shipping. See under Germany , Japan , and United Kingdom ; see also Italy : Italian Fleet . Shipping “Agreement on Principles”, Aug. 5, 1944 , cited, 1196–1197 [ Pg. 1196 is part of Doc. 1192 ] , 1472–1473 [ Pg. 1472 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Shmega, 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 1054 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)] , and Doc. 1055 ] Siberia, 200–201 [ Pgs. 200–201 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 351–352 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 409–410 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 1242–1243 [ Pgs. 1242–1243 include portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] , 1325–1327 [ Pgs. 1325–1327 include portions of Doc. 1276 , Doc. 1277 , Doc. 1278 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] , and Doc. 1279 ] , 1329 [ Pg. 1329 is part of Doc. 1280 ] , 1463 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Siemens, 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 951 ] Sikorski, Gen. of the Armies Władysław, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] Silesia. See under Poland . Sinclair, Sir Robert, 1184 n [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1185 ] Sinkiang, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 1235–1237 [ Pg. 1235 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1585–1586 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Skoropadskv (Skoropadski), Gen. Pavlo, 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 1054 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1054 (#1)] , and Doc. 1055 ] Slavin, Lt. Gen. N. V., 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] Slipchenko, 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] Smith, Merriman, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 710 ] Snyder, John W., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 710 ] Sobolev, A. A., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#143)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#144)] ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#155)] ] , 585 n [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 includes portions of Doc. 1012 and Doc. 1013 ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Sofianopoulos. See Sophianopoulos, Ioannis . Solborg, Col. Robert A., 1354 n [ Pg. 1354 includes portions of Doc. 1298 and Doc. 1299 ] , 1354–1356 [ Pgs. 1354–1356 include portions of Doc. 1298 , Doc. 1299 , and Doc. 1300 ] , 1357 [ Pg. 1357 is part of Doc. 1301 ] Somervell, Gen. Brehon B., 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 139–140 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 197–200 [ Pgs. 197–200 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 201 [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 1178 [ Pg. 1178 is part of Doc. 1180 ] , 1299 [ Pg. 1299 includes portions of Doc. 1262 and Doc. 1263 ] , 1309 [ Pg. 1309 is part of Doc. 1265 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 includes portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Somerville, Adm. Sir James, 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Soong, T. V., 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 1224–1247 [ Pgs. 1224–1247 include portions of Doc. 1212 , Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , Doc. 1217 , Doc. 1218 , Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , and Doc. 1222 ] passim , 1278 [ Pg. 1278 includes portions of Doc. 1246 and Doc. 1247 ] , 1283 n [ Pg. 1283 includes portions of Doc. 1252 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1252 (#1)] ] , 1582 [ Pg. 1582 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] and Doc. 1418 ] , 1285–1587 [ Pgs. 1285–1587 include portions of Doc. 1254 , Doc. 1255 , Doc. 1256 , Doc. 1257 , Doc. 1258 , Doc. 1259 , Doc. 1260 , Doc. 1261 , Doc. 1262 , Doc. 1263 , Doc. 1264 , Doc. 1265 , Doc. 1266 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1266 (#1)] , Doc. 1267 , Doc. 1268 , Doc. 1269 , Doc. 1270 , Doc. 1271 , Doc. 1272 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1272 (#1)] , Doc. 1273 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)] , Doc. 1274 , Doc. 1275 , Doc. 1276 , Doc. 1277 , Doc. 1278 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] , Doc. 1279 , Doc. 1280 , Doc. 1281 , Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , Doc. 1283 , Doc. 1284 , Doc. 1285 , Doc. 1286 , Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , Doc. 1288 , Doc. 1289 , Doc. 1290 , Doc. 1291 , Doc. 1292 , Doc. 1293 , Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , Doc. 1295 , Doc. 1296 , Doc. 1297 , Doc. 1298 , Doc. 1299 , Doc. 1300 , Doc. 1301 , Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , Doc. 1304 , Doc. 1305 , Doc. 1306 , Doc. 1307 , Doc. 1308 , Doc. 1309 , Doc. 1310 , Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , Doc. 1313 , Doc. 1314 , Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , Doc. 1317 , Doc. 1318 , Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , Doc. 1321 , Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , Doc. 1324 , Doc. 1325 , Doc. 1326 , Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , Doc. 1329 , Doc. 1330 , Doc. 1331 , Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , Doc. 1334 , Doc. 1335 , Doc. 1336 , Doc. 1337 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)] , Doc. 1338 , Doc. 1339 , Doc. 1340 , Doc. 1341 , Doc. 1342 , Doc. 1343 , Doc. 1344 , Doc. 1345 , Doc. 1346 , Doc. 1347 , Doc. 1348 , Doc. 1349 , Doc. 1350 , Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , Doc. 1353 , Doc. 1354 , Doc. 1355 , Doc. 1356 , Doc. 1357 , Doc. 1358 , Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , Doc. 1361 , Doc. 1362 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)] , Doc. 1363 , Doc. 1364 , Doc. 1365 , Doc. 1366 , Doc. 1367 , Doc. 1368 , Doc. 1369 , Doc. 1370 , Doc. 1371 , Doc. 1372 , Doc. 1373 , Doc. 1374 , Doc. 1375 , Doc. 1376 , Doc. 1377 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1377 (#1)] , Doc. 1378 , Doc. 1379 , Doc. 1380 , Doc. 1381 , Doc. 1382 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1382 (#1)] , Doc. 1383 , Doc. 1384 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1384 (#1)] , Doc. 1385 , Doc. 1386 , Doc. 1387 , Doc. 1388 , Doc. 1389 , Doc. 1390 , Doc. 1391 , Doc. 1392 , Doc. 1393 , Doc. 1394 , Doc. 1395 , Doc. 1396 , Doc. 1397 , Doc. 1398 , Doc. 1399 , Doc. 1400 , Doc. 1401 , Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , Doc. 1404 , Doc. 1405 , Doc. 1406 , Doc. 1407 , Doc. 1408 , Doc. 1409 , Doc. 1410 , Doc. 1411 , Doc. 1412 , Doc. 1413 , Doc. 1414 , Doc. 1415 , Doc. 1416 , Doc. 1417 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] , Doc. 1418 , and Doc. 1419 ] Sophianopoulos, Ioannis, 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] , 1046 n [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 1046–1047 [ Pgs. 1046–1047 include portions of Doc. 1067 , Doc. 1068 , and Doc. 1069 ] South Manchuria Railway, 1226 [ Pg. 1226 is part of Doc. 1214 ] , 1231 [ Pg. 1231 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1238–1241 [ Pgs. 1238–1241 include portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , and Doc. 1217 ] Southeast Asia Command and Southwest Pacific Area. See Japan : Control and command . Soviet Union (see also Austria ; Bulgaria ; China ; Communist activities ; Finland ; Germany ; Greece ; Hungary ; Iran; Poland ; Rumania ; Syria and Lebanon ; Turkey , Yugoslavia ; also under Japan and Tangier ): Access to the sea, Soviet interest in, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1240 [ Pg. 1240 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1243 [ Pg. 1243 includes portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] , 1429 [ Pg. 1429 is part of Doc. 1370 ] , 1430 [ Pg. 1430 is part of Doc. 1370 ] , 1431 [ Pg. 1431 is part of Doc. 1370 ] Air traffic between United States and Soviet Union, establishment of a route via Berlin, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 1166–1170 [ Pgs. 1166–1170 include portions of Doc. 1168 , Doc. 1169 , Doc. 1170 , Doc. 1171 , Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , and Doc. 1174 ] ; Truman–Stalin exchange of messages, 1167–1168 [ Pgs. 1167–1168 include portions of Doc. 1170 , Doc. 1171 , and Doc. 1172 ] , 1169 [ Pg. 1169 includes portions of Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , and Doc. 1174 ] Atomic energy ( see also Japan : Soviet Union : Atomic bomb ), question of sharing information with Soviet Union, 1157 [ Pg. 1157 is part of Doc. 1157 ] Baltic nationals and Eastern Europeans, question of repatriation to Soviet Union. See Repatriation , infra . Danube and Rhine commissions, Soviet participation, 654–657 [ Pgs. 654–657 include portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , and Doc. 759 ] Displaced persons. See Repatriation , infra . Economic matters: European economic organizations, question of Soviet participation in, 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 1009 and Doc. 1010 ] , 1158–1162 [ Pgs. 1158–1162 include portions of Doc. 1158 , Doc. 1159 , Doc. 1160 , Doc. 1161 , Doc. 1162 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1162 (#1)] , Doc. 1163 , and Doc. 1164 ] , 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 1383 ] ; Lend-Lease to Soviet Union, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 1185 [ Pg. 1185 is part of Doc. 1185 ] Entry into war against Japan. See under Japan : Soviet Union . Freedom of speech, 1155 n [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] German Navy and Merchant Marine, Soviet share. See under Germany . Königsberg, question of Soviet annexation. See under Germany . Lack of differences with United States, 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] Lend-Lease, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 1185 [ Pg. 1185 is part of Doc. 1185 ] Molotov. See Molotov, V. M. NKVD, 1128 [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1129 [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 1136 and Doc. 1137 ] OGPU, 1155 n [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] Oil for Western Europe, Soviet attitude, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1378–1388 [ Pgs. 1378–1388 include portions of Doc. 1315 , Doc. 1316 , Doc. 1317 , Doc. 1318 , Doc. 1319 , Doc. 1320 , Doc. 1321 , Doc. 1322 , Doc. 1323 , Doc. 1324 , Doc. 1325 , and Doc. 1326 ] Relations of Western democracies with Soviet Union, memorandum by Henry L. Stimson, 1155–1157 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] Repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals, 259–260 [ Pgs. 259–260 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 367–368 [ Pgs. 367–368 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 549–550 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#158)] ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1162–1166 [ Pgs. 1162–1166 include portions of Doc. 1163 , Doc. 1164 , Doc. 1165 , Doc. 1166 , Doc. 1167 , Doc. 1168 , and Doc. 1169 ] , 1600 [ Pg. 1600 includes portions of Doc. 1432 and Doc. 1433 ] Shipping losses in World War II, 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Siberia, 200–201 [ Pgs. 200–201 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 351–352 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 409–410 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 1242–1243 [ Pgs. 1242–1243 include portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] , 1325–1327 [ Pgs. 1325–1327 include portions of Doc. 1276 , Doc. 1277 , Doc. 1278 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] , and Doc. 1279 ] , 1329 [ Pg. 1329 is part of Doc. 1280 ] , 1463 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 344–353 [ Pgs. 344–353 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 408–417 [ Pgs. 408–417 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 1323–1324 [ Pgs. 1323–1324 include portions of Doc. 1274 and Doc. 1275 ] , 1327–1328 [ Pgs. 1327–1328 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] , Doc. 1279 , and Doc. 1280 ] Spain, Soviet attitude toward Franco regime, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 46–47 [ Pgs. 46–47 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 122–127 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 133–135 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 1173 [ Pg. 1173 includes portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] , 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 1179 ] , 1583 [ Pg. 1583 is part of Doc. 1418 ] , 1584 [ Pg. 1584 is part of Doc. 1418 ] Spheres of influence, 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 647–648 [ Pgs. 647–648 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 827 ] , 1051–1053 [ Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1056–1057 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 1079 ] , 1428–1431 [ Pgs. 1428–1431 include portions of Doc. 1369 and Doc. 1370 ] Stalin. See Stalin, I. V. Territorial trusteeships for Soviet Union, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 252–256 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 632–634 [ Pgs. 632–634 include portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , and Doc. 737 ] , 636–637 [ Pgs. 636–637 include portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 637–638 [ Pgs. 637–638 include portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 1583 [ Pg. 1583 is part of Doc. 1418 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Treaties and agreements ( see also under China ): Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance ( 1942 ), 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 1390 [ Pg. 1390 includes portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , and Doc. 1329 ] , 1391 [ Pg. 1391 includes portions of Doc. 1329 and Doc. 1330 ] Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar cooperation ( 1943 ), 1585 n [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 1418 ] ; agreement regarding administration of liberated Czechoslovak territory ( 1944 ), 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Soviet-Polish commercial treaty, July 7 , 406 n [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 1389 and Doc. 1390 ] Soviet-Rumanian economic agreement, May 8 , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 838 and Doc. 839 ] Yalta agreements on Soviet entry into war against Japan, 45–46 [ Pgs. 45–46 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 1223–1247 [ Pgs. 1223–1247 include portions of Doc. 1212 , Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , Doc. 1217 , Doc. 1218 , Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , and Doc. 1222 ] passim , 1322 [ Pg. 1322 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)] and Doc. 1274 ] , 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 1418 ] ; on liberated prisoners of war and civilians, 368 n [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Western frontiers of. See Germany : Königsberg . Spain: Franco regime, general policy toward ( see also United Nations , infra ): Discussions concerning, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 46–47 [ Pgs. 46–47 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] ] , 122–127 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 133–135 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] ; proposals and position of the three powers, 1171–1176 [ Pgs. 1171–1176 include portions of Doc. 1175 , Doc. 1176 , Doc. 1177 , Doc. 1178 , and Doc. 1179 ] , 1583 [ Pg. 1583 is part of Doc. 1418 ] , 1584 [ Pg. 1584 is part of Doc. 1418 ] German assets in Spain, 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 952–953 [ Pgs. 952–953 include portions of Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , and Doc. 986 ] , 959–960 [ Pgs. 959–960 include portions of Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , and Doc. 998 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] Tangier, Spanish position with regard to, 285–286 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 1172 [ Pg. 1172 includes portions of Doc. 1175 and Doc. 1176 ] , 1408–1411 [ Pgs. 1408–1411 include portions of Doc. 1348 , Doc. 1349 , Doc. 1350 , Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] , 1413–1415 [ Pgs. 1413–1415 include portions of Doc. 1355 and Doc. 1356 ] , 1417–1418 [ Pgs. 1417–1418 include portions of Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , Doc. 1361 , and Doc. 1362 ] United Nations, unfavorable attitude toward admission of Spain, 146–150 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 226–227 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 324–325 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#125)] ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 628–629 [ Pgs. 628–629 include portions of Doc. 730 and Doc. 731 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 731 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] ] , 1458 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1593 [ Pg. 1593 includes portions of Doc. 1424 and Doc. 1425 ] U. S. facilities in Spain, 1408 [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 1348 and Doc. 1349 ] Spheres of influence, 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 647–648 [ Pgs. 647–648 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 827 ] , 1051–1053 [ Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1056–1057 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 1079 ] , 1428–1431 [ Pgs. 1428–1431 include portions of Doc. 1369 and Doc. 1370 ] Sproul, Robert G., 841–842 [ Pgs. 841–842 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] , 862–863 [ Pgs. 862–863 include portions of Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , and Doc. 920 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 950 and Doc. 951 ] Stainov, Petko, 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 708 n [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 711–713 [ Pgs. 711–713 include portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] , 718 n [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] Stalin, I. V.: Communication from Chiang, 1225–1227 [ Pgs. 1225–1227 include portions of Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , and Doc. 1215 ] Conversations with Stimson, 396–397 [ Pgs. 396–397 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ; with Truman, 43–46 [ Pgs. 43–46 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 86–87 [ Pgs. 86–87 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 182–183 [ Pgs. 182–183 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 378–379 [ Pgs. 378–379 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 1582–1588 [ Pgs. 1582–1588 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] , Doc. 1418 , and Doc. 1419 ] Exchange of messages with Truman, 1028–1030 [ Pgs. 1028–1030 include portions of Doc. 1046 and Doc. 1047 ] , 1031 [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 1047 and Doc. 1048 ] , 1167–1168 [ Pgs. 1167–1168 include portions of Doc. 1170 , Doc. 1171 , and Doc. 1172 ] , 1169 [ Pg. 1169 includes portions of Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , and Doc. 1174 ] , 1326–1327 [ Pgs. 1326–1327 include portions of Doc. 1277 , Doc. 1278 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] , and Doc. 1279 ] , 1333–1334 [ Pgs. 1333–1334 include portions of Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , and Doc. 1283 ] Meetings with Bierut and Polish Delegation, 1529–1531 [ Pgs. 1529–1531 include portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 includes portions of Doc. 1391 and Doc. 1392 ] Miscellaneous, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 46–47 [ Pgs. 46–47 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 138 n [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)] ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#69)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#70)] ] , 450 n [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 1007 and Doc. 1008 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 includes portions of Doc. 1012 and Doc. 1013 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 1093 ] , 1156–1157 [ Pg. 1156 is part of Doc. 1157 ] , 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 1179 ] , 1212–1213 [ Pgs. 1212–1213 include portions of Doc. 1204 , Doc. 1205 , and Doc. 1206 ] , 1224 n [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 1212 and Doc. 1213 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1237–1247 [ Pgs. 1237–1247 include portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , Doc. 1217 , Doc. 1218 , Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , and Doc. 1222 ] passim , 1260 [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 1232 and Doc. 1233 ] , 1274 [ Pg. 1274 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 is part of Doc. 1259 ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 is part of Doc. 1260 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 includes portions of Doc. 1260 and Doc. 1261 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 1261 ] , 1380 [ Pg. 1380 includes portions of Doc. 1316 and Doc. 1317 ] , 1399 n [ Pg. 1399 includes portions of Doc. 1339 , Doc. 1340 , and Doc. 1341 ] , 1437 [ Pg. 1437 is part of Doc. 1376 ] , 1442 [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] , 1513 n [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1589 n [ Pg. 1589 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] and Doc. 1420 ] , 1592 n [ Pg. 1592 includes portions of Doc. 1423 and Doc. 1424 ] , 1596 [ Pg. 1596 includes portions of Doc. 1427 and Doc. 1428 ] Plenary Meetings, participation in, 52–63 [ Pgs. 52–63 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 88–98 [ Pgs. 88–98 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 116–137 [ Pgs. 116–137 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 164–182 [ Pgs. 164–182 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 203–221 [ Pgs. 203–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 244–268 [ Pgs. 244–268 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 299–319 [ Pgs. 299–319 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 357–374 [ Pgs. 357–374 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 381–391 [ Pgs. 381–391 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 459–470 [ Pgs. 459–470 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 510–540 [ Pgs. 510–540 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] , 565–585 [ Pgs. 565–585 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 586–601 [ Pgs. 586–601 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Tripartite dinner meetings, participation in, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 319–321 [ Pgs. 319–321 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] Stambolisky (Stamboliski), Assen, 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 823 ] Stańczyk, Jan, 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] Standard Oil Co., 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] Stanojević, Aca, 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1204 ] Stark, Adm. Harold R., 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] Stassen, Comdr. Harold E., 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 734 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 734 ] Stetson, Col. John B., Jr., 1396 [ Pg. 1396 includes portions of Doc. 1335 and Doc. 1336 ] Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 734 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 734 ] , 639–640 [ Pgs. 639–640 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] , 1177 [ Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 1180 ] , 1350 [ Pg. 1350 is part of Doc. 1295 ] , 1567–1581 [ Pgs. 1567–1581 include portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Stevenson, Air Vice Marshal Donald, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 362 n [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 807 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Stevenson, R. C. Skrine, 1067 n [ Pg. 1067 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 1085 and Doc. 1086 ] , 1207 n [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1207–1208 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1214 n [ Pg. 1214 includes portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] , 1220 [ Pg. 1220 includes portions of Doc. 1209 and Doc. 1210 ] Stimson, Henry L.: Conversations with Churchill, 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] ; with Stalin, 396–397 [ Pgs. 396–397 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] Letter from Churchill, 1370–1371 [ Pgs. 1370–1371 include portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] ; from Truman, 821–823 [ Pgs. 821–823 include portions of Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , and Doc. 885 ] Memoranda to Truman, 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 753–757 [ Pgs. 753–757 include portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 808–809 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 871 ] , 820–821 [ Pgs. 820–821 include portions of Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , and Doc. 884 ] , 990–991 [ Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 1053 and Doc. 1054 ] , 1136 [ Pg. 1136 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)] , Doc. 1143 , and Doc. 1144 ] , 1223–1224 [ Pgs. 1223–1224 include portions of Doc. 1212 and Doc. 1213 ] , 1265–1267 [ Pgs. 1265–1267 include portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] , 1271–1272 [ Pgs. 1271–1272 include portions of Doc. 1240 , Doc. 1241 , and Doc. 1242 ] , 1322–1323 [ Pgs. 1322–1323 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)] , Doc. 1274 , and Doc. 1275 ] , 1374–1375 [ Pgs. 1374–1375 include portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , Doc. 1313 , and Doc. 1314 ] Miscellaneous, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 n [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 111–112 [ Pgs. 111–112 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 458 n [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 1155–1157 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] , 1228 [ Pg. 1228 is part of Doc. 1215 ] , 1293 n [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 1257 and Doc. 1258 ] , 1324 n [ Pg. 1324 is part of Doc. 1275 ] , 1350 [ Pg. 1350 is part of Doc. 1295 ] , 1360 n [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] , 1361 n [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] , 1372 [ Pg. 1372 includes portions of Doc. 1307 , Doc. 1308 , and Doc. 1309 ] , 1373 [ Pg. 1373 is part of Doc. 1310 ] , 1377 [ Pg. 1377 is part of Doc. 1315 ] , 1424 n [ Pg. 1424 is part of Doc. 1365 ] Stirbey, Prince Barbu, 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 806 ] Stone, Rear Adm. Ellery W., 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 1100 [ Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , and Doc. 1113 ] , 1101 [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 1113 ] Stone, Col. John N., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Stoner, CWO Frank G., 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] Stoyanov, Christo, 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 822 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 827 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] Straits question. See under Turkey . Strang, Sir William, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 1003 n [ Pg. 1003 includes portions of Doc. 1031 and Doc. 1032 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 is part of Doc. 1058 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Streicher, Julius, 984 [ Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 1016 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 1017 ] Stroop, Capt. Paul D., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Šubašić, Ivan, 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 135–136 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] , 1207–1212 [ Pgs. 1207–1212 include portions of Doc. 1201 , Doc. 1202 , Doc. 1203 , Doc. 1204 , and Doc. 1205 ] , 1214–1215 [ Pgs. 1214–1215 include portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] , 1219 [ Pg. 1219 includes portions of Doc. 1208 and Doc. 1209 ] , 1221–1222 [ Pgs. 1221–1222 include portions of Doc. 1210 and Doc. 1211 ] , 1572 [ Pg. 1572 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1580 [ Pg. 1580 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Submarines. See Germany : German Navy and Merchant Marine . Sudeten Germans, 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] Sudetenland, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] Suez Canal, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 1429 [ Pg. 1429 is part of Doc. 1370 ] , 1439 [ Pg. 1439 includes portions of Doc. 1377 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1377 (#1)] , and Doc. 1378 ] Sumer, Nurullah Esat, 1426 n [ Pg. 1426 includes portions of Doc. 1366 and Doc. 1367 ] Surtees, Maj. Gen. George, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 710 ] Susaikov (Susaicov), Col. Gen. I. Z., 362 n [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 701–702 [ Pgs. 701–702 include portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 814 and Doc. 815 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] Sutej, Juraj, 1209–1210 [ Pgs. 1209–1210 include portions of Doc. 1202 , Doc. 1203 , and Doc. 1204 ] , 1212 [ Pg. 1212 includes portions of Doc. 1204 and Doc. 1205 ] Suzuki, Adm. Baron Kantaro, 1248 n [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] and Doc. 1223 ] , 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 1257 and Doc. 1258 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 is part of Doc. 1259 ] Sweden: Coal shipments to Sweden, 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] ; German assets in Sweden, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 956–959 [ Pgs. 956–959 include portions of Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , and Doc. 1000 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] ; Japanese peace feeler through Sweden, possibility of, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 1589–1590 [ Pgs. 1589–1590 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] , Doc. 1420 , and Doc. 1421 ] ; railway cars shipped to Poland, 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] ; United Nations, admission to, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] Swinton, Viscount, 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 1187 ] Switzerland, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 757 and Doc. 758 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 983 ] , 956–959 [ Pgs. 956–959 include portions of Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , and Doc. 997 ] Syria and Lebanon, crisis in Franco-Levantine relations, 246–247 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 306–308 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 314–316 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 317–319 [ Pgs. 317–319 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1398–1401 [ Pgs. 1398–1401 include portions of Doc. 1338 , Doc. 1339 , Doc. 1340 , Doc. 1341 , Doc. 1342 , and Doc. 1343 ] , 1441 [ Pg. 1441 is part of Doc. 1379 ] , 1442 [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] Szakasits, Arpad, 721–722 [ Pgs. 721–722 include portions of Doc. 820 , Doc. 821 , and Doc. 822 ] Szalai, Sándor, 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 820 and Doc. 821 ] Szent-Iványi, Sándor, 718–719 [ Pgs. 718–719 include portions of Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , and Doc. 819 ] Taft, Charles P., 1159–1160 [ Pgs. 1159–1160 include portions of Doc. 1159 , Doc. 1160 , and Doc. 1161 ] Tangier, status of International Zone: Act of Algeciras ( 1906 ), cited, 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 1409 [ Pg. 1409 includes portions of Doc. 1349 and Doc. 1350 ] , 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 1350 and Doc. 1351 ] , 1413–1414 [ Pg. 1413 is part of Doc. 1355 ] Advisability of raising subject at Berlin Conference, question of, 285–286 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 1408 [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 1348 and Doc. 1349 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] , 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 1353 and Doc. 1354 ] , 1419 [ Pg. 1419 includes portions of Doc. 1362 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)] ] Minutes of Conference, 285–286 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 593–594 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Soviet proposal and Conference decision ( see also Minutes , supra ), 1415 [ Pg. 1415 includes portions of Doc. 1355 and Doc. 1356 ] , 1416 [ Pg. 1416 includes portions of Doc. 1357 and Doc. 1358 ] , 1441 [ Pg. 1441 is part of Doc. 1379 ] , 1460 [ Pg. 1460 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1556 [ Pg. 1556 includes portions of Doc. 1412 and Doc. 1413 ] Spanish opposition to Soviet participation in Tangier administration, 1410–1411 [ Pgs. 1410–1411 include portions of Doc. 1350 , Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] , 1413–1415 [ Pgs. 1413–1415 include portions of Doc. 1355 and Doc. 1356 ] , 1417–1418 [ Pgs. 1417–1418 include portions of Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , Doc. 1361 , and Doc. 1362 ] Statute of Tangier ( 1923 ), cited, 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 1350 and Doc. 1351 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] , 1413–1414 [ Pg. 1413 is part of Doc. 1355 ] ; amendment to include Italy ( 1928 ), cited, 1414 [ Pg. 1414 is part of Doc. 1355 ] U. S.-British-French conversations in Paris ( see also Minutes , supra ), question of Soviet participation, 1409–1410 [ Pgs. 1409–1410 include portions of Doc. 1349 , Doc. 1350 , and Doc. 1351 ] , 1411–1412 [ Pgs. 1411–1412 include portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , Doc. 1353 , and Doc. 1354 ] , 1416 [ Pg. 1416 includes portions of Doc. 1357 and Doc. 1358 ] , 1417 [ Pg. 1417 includes portions of Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , and Doc. 1361 ] , 1418–1419 [ Pgs. 1418–1419 include portions of Doc. 1361 , Doc. 1362 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1362 (#1)] ] U. S. position, 1408–1409 [ Pgs. 1408–1409 include portions of Doc. 1348 , Doc. 1349 , and Doc. 1350 ] Tappin, Lt. Col. John L., 1113 [ Pg. 1113 includes portions of Doc. 1122 and Doc. 1123 ] Tarchiani, Alberto, 621 n [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 722 ] , 1081 n [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 1089 and Doc. 1090 ] , 1082–1083 [ Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 1090 ] Tariffs, U. S. and British policy concerning, 79–80 [ Pgs. 79–80 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] “Task Force 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] ”, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] Tatarescu, Gheorghe, 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , and Doc. 803 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] Taylor, Capt. Edmund B., 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] Tehran Conference ( 1943 ), 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 252 n [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] Tehran declaration on Iran, Dec. 1, 1943 , 1390–1391 [ Pgs. 1390–1391 include portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , Doc. 1329 , and Doc. 1330 ] Teleki, Count Géza, 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] Terminal , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 1462 [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Territorial settlements. See under Germany and Poland ; see also Soviet Union : Territorial trusteeships ; United Nations Organization : Trusteeship, etc. Theakstone, Maj. Louis Marguarde, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Thiessen, Peter, 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 896 ] Thomas, Charles A., 1370 [ Pg. 1370 includes portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] Thomas, Edward J., 1170 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 1174 ] Thompson, Comdr. C. P., 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 35 n [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 319–321 [ Pgs. 319–321 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., minutes of Foreign Ministers Meetings, 66–77 [ Pgs. 66–77 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 101–106 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 186–195 [ Pgs. 186–195 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 226–238 [ Pgs. 226–238 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] , 397–399 [ Pgs. 397–399 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] ; of Plenary Meetings, 52–59 [ Pgs. 52–59 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 88–94 [ Pgs. 88–94 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 116–130 [ Pgs. 116–130 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 165–177 [ Pgs. 165–177 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 244–260 [ Pgs. 244–260 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 357–368 [ Pgs. 357–368 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 382–388 [ Pgs. 382–388 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 459–466 [ Pgs. 459–466 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 566–578 [ Pgs. 566–578 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] Thorne, Gen. Sir Andrew, 1165 [ Pg. 1165 includes portions of Doc. 1167 and Doc. 1168 ] Thorp, Willard L., 815–817 [ Pgs. 815–817 include portions of Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , and Doc. 881 ] , 1023–1024 [ Pgs. 1023–1024 include portions of Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , and Doc. 1041 ] Tiernan, Col. L. Curtis, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] Timor, question of liberation of, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 1349–1360 [ Pgs. 1349–1360 include portions of Doc. 1294 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1294 (#1)] , Doc. 1295 , Doc. 1296 , Doc. 1297 , Doc. 1298 , Doc. 1299 , Doc. 1300 , Doc. 1301 , Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] , 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1471–1472 [ Pg. 1471 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Tindall, Brig. Gen. Richard G., 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 788 and Doc. 789 ] Tischler, Josef, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , and Doc. 765 ] Tito, Marshal (Josip Broz), 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 135–136 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] , 1069 [ Pg. 1069 is part of Doc. 1079 ] , 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 1085 and Doc. 1086 ] , 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1208 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1209 [ Pg. 1209 includes portions of Doc. 1202 and Doc. 1203 ] , 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 1203 and Doc. 1204 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1204 ] , 1212 [ Pg. 1212 includes portions of Doc. 1204 and Doc. 1205 ] , 1214–1215 [ Pgs. 1214–1215 include portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] , 1219 [ Pg. 1219 includes portions of Doc. 1208 and Doc. 1209 ] , 1221–1222 [ Pgs. 1221–1222 include portions of Doc. 1210 and Doc. 1211 ] , 1572 [ Pg. 1572 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1580 [ Pg. 1580 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Tittmann, Harold H., Jr., 1098 [ Pg. 1098 includes portions of Doc. 1108 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)] , and Doc. 1109 ] Togo, Shigenori, 1248 [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] and Doc. 1223 ] , 1249 [ Pg. 1249 is part of Doc. 1224 ] , 1257 [ Pg. 1257 includes portions of Doc. 1228 and Doc. 1229 ] , 1258–1259 [ Pgs. 1258–1259 include portions of Doc. 1230 and Doc. 1231 ] , 1260–1262 [ Pgs. 1260–1262 include portions of Doc. 1232 , Doc. 1233 , and Doc. 1234 ] , 1292–1293 [ Pgs. 1292–1293 include portions of Doc. 1256 , Doc. 1257 , and Doc. 1258 ] Tomlinson, George, 1404 [ Pg. 1404 is part of Doc. 1345 ] Torch , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] Toyoda, Adm. Soemu, 1248 n [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] and Doc. 1223 ] Transfers of populations. See under Germany , Hungary , and Poland . Trans-Siberian Railway, 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] ] Treaties, conventions, etc. ( see also under China , Japan , Soviet Union , Turkey , and United Kingdom ): Act of Algeciras ( 1906 ), 1409 [ Pg. 1409 includes portions of Doc. 1349 and Doc. 1350 ] , 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 1350 and Doc. 1351 ] , 1413–1414 [ Pg. 1413 is part of Doc. 1355 ] Anti-Comintern Pact ( 1936 ), cited, 1256 [ Pg. 1256 is part of Doc. 1228 ] Atlantic Charter, 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 1076 and Doc. 1077 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1066 n [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 1082 and Doc. 1083 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] , 1261 [ Pg. 1261 is part of Doc. 1233 ] , 1273 [ Pg. 1273 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1274 [ Pg. 1274 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1294 [ Pg. 1294 is part of Doc. 1259 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1577 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 1417 ] , 1578 [ Pg. 1578 is part of Doc. 1417 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Austria, agreements concerning: Control machinery ( July 4 ), 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 670–671 [ Pgs. 670–671 include portions of Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 677–679 [ Pgs. 677–679 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] ; zones of occupation and administration of Vienna ( July 9 ), 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 677–679 [ Pgs. 677–679 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] Belgrade Agreement of June 9. See Yugoslavia : Venezia Giulia . Germany, agreements concerning: Acts of military surrender by Germany, May 7 and May 8 , cited, 67 n [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] “Additional Requirements” Agreement. See under Germany . Allied declaration on Germany, June 5 , cited, 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 788 and Doc. 789 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] , 1008 [ Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 1037 and Doc. 1038 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 1038 ] EAC Agreement on control machinery ( Sept. 12, 1944 , as amended), cited, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 998 [ Pg. 998 is part of Doc. 1025 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] , 1481 [ Pg. 1481 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1502 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 1384 ] EAC Agreement on zones of occupation ( Sept. 12, 1944 , as amended), 1001–1006 [ Pgs. 1001–1006 include portions of Doc. 1027 , Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , and Doc. 1035 ] , 1137 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 1144 ] Hague Conventions, cited: 1899 , 1273 [ Pg. 1273 is part of Doc. 1243 ] ; 1907 , 920 [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 959 and Doc. 960 ] , 1273 [ Pg. 1273 is part of Doc. 1243 ] Portsmouth, Treaty of ( 1905 ), cited, 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 1215 ] Shipping, agreement on principles between United States and other Governments, Aug. 5, 1944 , cited, 1196–1197 [ Pg. 1196 is part of Doc. 1192 ] , 1472–1473 [ Pg. 1472 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Statute of Tangier ( 1923 ), 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 1350 and Doc. 1351 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] , 1413–1414 [ Pg. 1413 is part of Doc. 1355 ] Tito–Šubašić agreement. See under Yugoslavia . Treaty on limitation and reduction of naval armament ( 1980 ). cited, 119 n [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] United Maritime Authority agreement ( 1944 ), 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , and Doc. 1005 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 1009 and Doc. 1010 ] United Nations Charter, June 26 , cited, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 44 n [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 128 n [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 252–253 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 731 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , and Doc. 737 ] , 1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1066 n [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 1082 and Doc. 1083 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] , 1333–1334 [ Pgs. 1333–1334 include portions of Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , and Doc. 1283 ] , 1406 [ Pg. 1406 includes portions of Doc. 1345 and Doc. 1346 ] , 1458 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1593 [ Pg. 1593 includes portions of Doc. 1424 and Doc. 1425 ] , 1595 [ Pg. 1595 includes portions of Doc. 1426 and Doc. 1427 ] Varkiza Agreement, Feb. 12. See under Greece . Yalta agreements. See Yalta . Treaty-making powers of U. S. President, constitutional restraints on, 384–385 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 744 ] Trieste ( see also Venezia Giulia under Italy and Yugoslavia ), 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#91)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] Tripartite military meeting, July 24 , 344–353 [ Pgs. 344–353 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] Tripartite Naval Commission in Berlin, 979 [ Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 1014 ] , 982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 1015 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 1015 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)] ] , 1564–1566 [ Pgs. 1564–1566 include portions of Doc. 1414 and Doc. 1415 ] Tripoli, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] Trone, Solomon, 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 949 ] Truman, Sgt. Harry, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 710 ] Truman, Harry S.: Approval of EAC Agreement on zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Berlin, 1004–1005 [ Pgs. 1004–1005 include portions of Doc. 1032 and Doc. 1033 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 1034 and Doc. 1035 ] ; approval of EAC agreements relating to Austria, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 668 n [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 772 ] Atomic bomb, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 1374–1378 [ Pgs. 1374–1378 include portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , Doc. 1313 , Doc. 1314 , Doc. 1315 , and Doc. 1316 ] ; statement issued to the press, 1376–1378 [ Pgs. 1376–1378 include portions of Doc. 1315 and Doc. 1316 ] Chairmanship of Conference meetings, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 320–321 [ Pgs. 320–321 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] , 1445 [ Pg. 1445 is part of Doc. 1380 ] Combined Chiefs of Staff: Participation in meeting of, 339–344 [ Pgs. 339–344 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] ; report ( July 24 ), approved by Truman and Churchill, 1462–1473 [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Communications to Clay, 964–968 [ Pgs. 964–968 include portions of Doc. 1002 , Doc. 1003 , and Doc. 1004 ] ; Eisenhower, 919 [ Pg. 919 includes portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] ; Marshall, 1394 [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] ; Stimson, 821–823 [ Pgs. 821–823 include portions of Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , and Doc. 885 ] Constitutional restraints on treaty-making powers, 384–385 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 744 ] Conversations with Attlee, 458–459 [ Pgs. 458–459 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 476–477 [ Pgs. 476–477 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#134)] ] ; Bierut, 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 1540–1541 [ Pgs. 1540–1541 include portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] ; Churchill, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 79–82 [ Pgs. 79–82 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] ; Mikołajczyk, 1540–1541 [ Pgs. 1540–1541 include portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] ; Molotov, 471–476 [ Pgs. 471–476 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#133)] ] ; Mountbatten, 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] ; Rowan, 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#146)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#147)] ] ; Stalin, 43–46 [ Pgs. 43–46 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] ] , 86–87 [ Pgs. 86–87 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#17)] ] , 182–183 [ Pgs. 182–183 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 378–379 [ Pgs. 378–379 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 1582–1588 [ Pgs. 1582–1588 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1417 (#1)] , Doc. 1418 , and Doc. 1419 ] Exchange of messages with Bierut, 1138–1140 [ Pgs. 1138–1140 include portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , Doc. 1146 , Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] ; Chiang, 1225–1227 [ Pgs. 1225–1227 include portions of Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , and Doc. 1215 ] , 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , and Doc. 1217 ] , 1278 [ Pg. 1278 includes portions of Doc. 1246 and Doc. 1247 ] , 1282 [ Pg. 1282 includes portions of Doc. 1251 and Doc. 1252 ] , 1321 [ Pg. 1321 is part of Doc. 1273 ] ; Churchill and Attlee, 1179–1183 [ Pgs. 1179–1183 include portions of Doc. 1180 , Doc. 1181 , Doc. 1182 , Doc. 1183 , and Doc. 1184 ] , 1184–1187 [ Pgs. 1184–1187 include portions of Doc. 1185 and Doc. 1186 ] , 1204 [ Pg. 1204 includes portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] , 1205–1206 [ Pg. 1205 is part of Doc. 1200 ] , 1279–1281 [ Pgs. 1279–1281 include portions of Doc. 1248 , Doc. 1249 , and Doc. 1250 ] , 1375 [ Pg. 1375 includes portions of Doc. 1313 and Doc. 1314 ] , 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 1344 ] , 1406 [ Pg. 1406 includes portions of Doc. 1345 and Doc. 1346 ] ; Stalin, 1028–1030 [ Pgs. 1028–1030 include portions of Doc. 1046 and Doc. 1047 ] , 1031 [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 1047 and Doc. 1048 ] , 1167–1168 [ Pgs. 1167–1168 include portions of Doc. 1170 , Doc. 1171 , and Doc. 1172 ] , 1169 [ Pg. 1169 includes portions of Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , and Doc. 1174 ] , 1326–1327 [ Pgs. 1326–1327 include portions of Doc. 1277 , Doc. 1278 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] , and Doc. 1279 ] , 1333–1334 [ Pgs. 1333–1334 include portions of Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , and Doc. 1283 ] Letters from Archduke Otto of Austria, 659–661 [ Pgs. 659–661 include portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] ; from Tito and Šubašić, 1214–1218 [ Pgs. 1214–1218 include portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] Log of trip to Berlin Conference: July 6–15: Details regarding trip to Potsdam, 3–8 [ Pgs. 3–8 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document preceding Document 710 (#1)] and Doc. 710 ] ; housing and various facilities for Truman and others, 8–10 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] July 16–17 , pre-Conference activities, 10–12 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 710 ] July 17–Aug. 1 , meetings of the Conference, 12–24 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 710 ] Aug. 2–7 , return trip to Washington, 24–28 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 710 ] Miscellaneous, 450 n [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 471 n [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#132)] ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] , 894 n [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 1082–1083 [ Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 1090 ] , 1106 [ Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 1117 ] , 1107 [ Pg. 1107 includes portions of Doc. 1117 and Doc. 1118 ] , 1123–1124 [ Pgs. 1123–1124 include portions of Doc. 1130 , Doc. 1131 , and Doc. 1132 ] , 1266 n –1267 n [ Pgs. 1266–1267 include portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] , 1270 [ Pg. 1270 is part of Doc. 1240 ] , 1272 [ Pg. 1272 includes portions of Doc. 1241 and Doc. 1242 ] , 1272 n [ Pg. 1272 includes portions of Doc. 1241 and Doc. 1242 ] , 1273 [ Pg. 1273 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1274 [ Pg. 1274 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1275 n [ Pg. 1275 is part of Doc. 1244 ] , 1360 n [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 1302 , Doc. 1303 , and Doc. 1304 ] , 1361 n [ Pg. 1361 includes portions of Doc. 1304 and Doc. 1305 ] , 1373 n [ Pg. 1373 is part of Doc. 1310 ] , 1374–1375 [ Pgs. 1374–1375 include portions of Doc. 1311 , Doc. 1312 , Doc. 1313 , and Doc. 1314 ] , 1394 [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 1332 , Doc. 1333 , and Doc. 1334 ] , 1396 [ Pg. 1396 includes portions of Doc. 1335 and Doc. 1336 ] , 1397 [ Pg. 1397 includes portions of Doc. 1336 , Doc. 1337 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1337 (#1)] ] , 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 1347 ] , 1437–1438 [ Pgs. 1437–1438 include portions of Doc. 1376 and Doc. 1377 ] , 1440 [ Pg. 1440 is part of Doc. 1378 ] , 1558 [ Pg. 1558 is part of Doc. 1414 ] , 1589 n [ Pg. 1589 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1419 (#1)] and Doc. 1420 ] Plenary Meetings, participation in, 52–63 [ Pgs. 52–63 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 88–98 [ Pgs. 88–98 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 116–137 [ Pgs. 116–137 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 164–182 [ Pgs. 164–182 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#45)] ] , 203–221 [ Pgs. 203–221 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 244–268 [ Pgs. 244–268 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 299–319 [ Pgs. 299–319 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 357–374 [ Pgs. 357–374 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 381–391 [ Pgs. 381–391 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#103)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 459–470 [ Pgs. 459–470 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 510–540 [ Pgs. 510–540 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#149)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] , 565–585 [ Pgs. 565–585 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#163)] ] , 586–601 [ Pgs. 586–601 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] Press conference regarding Palestine, 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 1347 ] Proclamation calling for the surrender of Japan. See Japan : Proclamation . Reports and memoranda to Truman from Byrnes, 1177–1179 [ Pgs. 1177–1179 include portions of Doc. 1180 and Doc. 1181 ] ; from Davies, 1428–1434 [ Pgs. 1428–1434 include portions of Doc. 1369 , Doc. 1370 , Doc. 1371 , and Doc. 1372 ] ; from Joint Chiefs of Staff, 969–970 [ Pgs. 969–970 include portions of Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , Doc. 1005 , and Doc. 1006 ] , 1097–1098 [ Pgs. 1097–1098 include portions of Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1108 (#1)] , and Doc. 1109 ] , 1167 [ Pg. 1167 includes portions of Doc. 1170 and Doc. 1171 ] , 1203–1204 [ Pgs. 1203–1204 include portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] , 1325–1326 [ Pgs. 1325–1326 include portions of Doc. 1276 , Doc. 1277 , and Doc. 1278 ] ; from Pauley, 940–949 [ Pgs. 940–949 include portions of Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , and Doc. 982 ] , 971–972 [ Pgs. 971–972 include portions of Doc. 1007 and Doc. 1008 ] , 1087–1088 [ Pgs. 1087–1088 include portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , and Doc. 1096 ] , 1380 [ Pg. 1380 includes portions of Doc. 1316 and Doc. 1317 ] , 1381 [ Pg. 1381 is part of Doc. 1318 ] ; from Stimson, 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 990–991 [ Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 1022 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 1053 and Doc. 1054 ] , 1136 [ Pg. 1136 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1142 (#1)] , Doc. 1143 , and Doc. 1144 ] , 1155–1157 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 1157 ] , 1223–1224 [ Pgs. 1223–1224 include portions of Doc. 1212 and Doc. 1213 ] , 1265–1267 [ Pgs. 1265–1267 include portions of Doc. 1236 and Doc. 1237 ] , 1271–1272 [ Pgs. 1271–1272 include portions of Doc. 1240 , Doc. 1241 , and Doc. 1242 ] , 1322–1323 [ Pgs. 1322–1323 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1273 (#1)] , Doc. 1274 , and Doc. 1275 ] Tripartite dinner meetings, participation in, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 319–321 [ Pgs. 319–321 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#84)] ] Trusteeship territories. See under United Nations Organization . Tsamados, Michael, 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 1085 and Doc. 1086 ] Tsarapkin, S. K., 1514 [ Pg. 1514 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Tube Alloys . See Japan : Atomic bomb . Turkey: European Inland Transport Conference, question of participation, 1159 [ Pg. 1159 includes portions of Doc. 1159 and Doc. 1160 ] German assets in Turkey, 949–960 [ Pgs. 949–960 include portions of Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , Doc. 989 , Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , and Doc. 998 ] passim Greece, relations with, 1053–1054 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 1071 ] Montreux convention regarding regime of the Straits ( 1936 ). See Straits question, etc. , infra . Soviet-Turkish frontier, 302–303 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] Soviet Union, relations with ( see also Straits question , infra ), 256–258 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 1437–1438 [ Pgs. 1437–1438 include portions of Doc. 1376 and Doc. 1377 ] , 1440 [ Pg. 1440 is part of Doc. 1378 ] Straits question, and proposed revision of Montreux Convention: Discussions, 257–258 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 266–267 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 301–305 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312–314 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#83)] ] , 365–367 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 372–373 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#127)] ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] Historical background, 1428–1434 [ Pgs. 1428–1434 include portions of Doc. 1369 , Doc. 1370 , Doc. 1371 , and Doc. 1372 ] Protocol, section concerning, 1496–1497 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Soviet policy and proposals, 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1421–1422 [ Pg. 1421 is part of Doc. 1363 ] , 1427–1428 [ Pgs. 1427–1428 include portions of Doc. 1368 , Doc. 1369 , and Doc. 1370 ] , 1439–1440 [ Pgs. 1439–1440 include portions of Doc. 1377 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1377 (#1)] , and Doc. 1378 ] , 1600 [ Pg. 1600 includes portions of Doc. 1432 and Doc. 1433 ] Turkey’s concern over situation, 1437–1438 [ Pgs. 1437–1438 include portions of Doc. 1376 and Doc. 1377 ] Understanding reached at Conference, 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 1435–1436 [ Pgs. 1435–1436 include portions of Doc. 1373 , Doc. 1374 , and Doc. 1375 ] , 1496–1497 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 1383 ] Views and position of British Government, 1426 [ Pg. 1426 includes portions of Doc. 1366 and Doc. 1367 ] , 1436 [ Pg. 1436 includes portions of Doc. 1374 and Doc. 1375 ] , 1438–1439 [ Pgs. 1438–1439 include portions of Doc. 1376 , Doc. 1377 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1377 (#1)] , and Doc. 1378 ] , 1440 [ Pg. 1440 is part of Doc. 1378 ] ; of U. S. Government, 655 [ Pg. 655 includes portions of Doc. 756 and Doc. 757 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 757 and Doc. 758 ] , 1420–1426 [ Pgs. 1420–1426 include portions of Doc. 1363 , Doc. 1364 , Doc. 1365 , Doc. 1366 , and Doc. 1367 ] , 1427 [ Pg. 1427 includes portions of Doc. 1368 and Doc. 1369 ] , 1434–1435 [ Pgs. 1434–1435 include portions of Doc. 1370 , Doc. 1371 , Doc. 1372 , Doc. 1373 , and Doc. 1374 ] Yalta discussions, 1426 n [ Pg. 1426 includes portions of Doc. 1366 and Doc. 1367 ] , 1573 [ Pg. 1573 is part of Doc. 1416 ] Treaties: Lausanne treaty of July 24, 1923 , cited, 1425 [ Pg. 1425 is part of Doc. 1366 ] , 1429 [ Pg. 1429 is part of Doc. 1370 ] , 1430 [ Pg. 1430 is part of Doc. 1370 ] , 1437 [ Pg. 1437 is part of Doc. 1376 ] Montreux Convention regarding regime of the Straits ( 1936 ). See Straits question , supra . Russo-Turkish relations and Straits question (historical summary), treaties cited: 1805 , treaty of defensive alliance, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] ; 1812 , Treaty of Bucharest, 1432 [ Pg. 1432 is part of Doc. 1370 ] ; 1826 , Convention of Ackermann, 1432 [ Pg. 1432 is part of Doc. 1370 ] ; 1833 , Treaty of Unkiar Eskelessi, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 1432 n [ Pg. 1432 is part of Doc. 1370 ] ; 1840 , Convention of London, 1432 n [ Pg. 1432 is part of Doc. 1370 ] ; 1856 , Treaty of Paris, 1433 [ Pg. 1433 is part of Doc. 1370 ] ; 1887 , Russo-German treaty, 1433 n [ Pg. 1433 is part of Doc. 1370 ] Turner, Mark, 110–111 [ Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 183–184 [ Pgs. 183–184 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#46)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 970 and Doc. 971 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 972 ] , 933 n [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] Tuthill, John Wills, 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 850 ] , 764–765 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 850 ] Tyree, Comdr. John A., 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] Ukraine and Ukrainians, 259–260 [ Pgs. 259–260 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 367–368 [ Pgs. 367–368 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 includes portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] , 1163–1164 [ Pgs. 1163–1164 include portions of Doc. 1164 , Doc. 1165 , and Doc. 1166 ] , 1165 [ Pg. 1165 includes portions of Doc. 1167 and Doc. 1168 ] , 1524 [ Pg. 1524 is part of Doc. 1385 ] , 1567 [ Pg. 1567 is part of Doc. 1416 ] Umezu, Gen. Yoshijiro, 1248 n [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] and Doc. 1223 ] Unconditional surrender. See under Japan . Underwood–Elliot Fisher, 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union . United Kingdom ( see also Austria ; Bulgaria ; Germany ; Greece ; Hungary ; Iran: Withdrawal of Allied forces; Italy ; Poland ; Rumania ; Syria and Lebanon ; Tangier : U. S.-British-French conversations ; and Turkey ): American airfields and bases, British policy, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] Atomic bomb, U. S.-British discussions, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 81–82 [ Pgs. 81–82 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 1370–1371 [ Pgs. 1370–1371 include portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] , 1375 [ Pg. 1375 includes portions of Doc. 1313 and Doc. 1314 ] Attlee. See Attlee, Clement R. Bevin. See Bevin, Ernest . British Chiefs of Staff ( see also Combined Chiefs of Staff ): Control and command in Southeast Asia, 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 83–86 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 1315–1316 [ Pgs. 1315–1316 include portions of Doc. 1267 and Doc. 1268 ] ; Lend-Lease, 1181–1182 [ Pg. 1181 is part of Doc. 1182 ] ; military objectives, strategy, and policies in war against Japan, 1299–1304 [ Pgs. 1299–1304 include portions of Doc. 1262 , Doc. 1263 , and Doc. 1264 ] ; release of information to Soviet Union, opinions concerning, 99–100 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 113–115 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] ; shipping problems in connection with war against Japan, 1199–1200 [ Pgs. 1199–1200 include portions of Doc. 1194 and Doc. 1195 ] , 1303–1304 [ Pgs. 1303–1304 include portions of Doc. 1263 and Doc. 1264 ] Churchill. See Churchill, Winston S. Civil aviation policy, 1188–1191 [ Pgs. 1188–1191 include portions of Doc. 1187 , Doc. 1188 , Doc. 1189 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)] , and Doc. 1190 ] Coal, position on export of, 1025–1026 [ Pgs. 1025–1026 include portions of Doc. 1041 , Doc. 1042 , Doc. 1043 , and Doc. 1044 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 1049 and Doc. 1050 ] Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery, proposed abolishment of Munitions Assignments Boards, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 1202–1206 [ Pgs. 1202–1206 include portions of Doc. 1196 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)] , Doc. 1197 , Doc. 1198 , Doc. 1199 , and Doc. 1200 ] ; exchange of memoranda between Truman and British Prime Minister, 1204–1206 [ Pgs. 1204–1206 include portions of Doc. 1198 , Doc. 1199 , and Doc. 1200 ] Danube and Rhine commissions, British participation, 650 n [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 654–657 [ Pgs. 654–657 include portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , and Doc. 759 ] Eden. See Eden, Anthony . Elections, 44–45 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 388 n [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 431 n [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 1445–1446 [ Pg. 1445 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1531 [ Pg. 1531 is part of Doc. 1388 ] German forces in Norway, British explanation of situation relative to, 1038–1040 [ Pgs. 1038–1040 include portions of Doc. 1057 and Doc. 1058 ] Japan. See War against Japan , infra . Lend-Lease, U. S.-British arrangements relative to continuation of ( see also Lend-Lease : U. S. policy concerning ), 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 1177–1187 [ Pgs. 1177–1187 include portions of Doc. 1180 , Doc. 1181 , Doc. 1182 , Doc. 1183 , Doc. 1184 , Doc. 1185 , and Doc. 1186 ] Palestine, problem of Jewish immigration and suggested Anglo-American discussions, 1402–1407 [ Pgs. 1402–1407 include portions of Doc. 1344 , Doc. 1345 , Doc. 1346 , and Doc. 1347 ] Postwar financial arrangements and question of British dollar payments to United States on certain items, 1179–1180 [ Pgs. 1179–1180 include portions of Doc. 1180 , Doc. 1181 , and Doc. 1182 ] , 1180–1181 [ Pgs. 1180–1181 include portions of Doc. 1181 and Doc. 1182 ] , 1184 [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1185 ] , 1187 [ Pg. 1187 is part of Doc. 1186 ] Shipping, U. S.-British negotiations regarding allocation for operations against Japan and for repatriation, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 1191–1202 [ Pgs. 1191–1202 include portions of Doc. 1189 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1189 (#1)] , Doc. 1190 , Doc. 1191 , Doc. 1192 , Doc. 1193 , Doc. 1194 , Doc. 1195 , Doc. 1196 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1196 (#1)] , and Doc. 1197 ] , 1306 [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 1264 ] , 1309 [ Pg. 1309 is part of Doc. 1265 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 includes portions of Doc. 1266 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1266 (#1)] ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1472–1473 [ Pg. 1472 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Shipping losses in World War II, 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Soviet Union, repatriation of alleged Soviet nationals from British prison camp in Italy, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 259–260 [ Pgs. 259–260 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 367–368 [ Pgs. 367–368 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1162–1166 [ Pgs. 1162–1166 include portions of Doc. 1163 , Doc. 1164 , Doc. 1165 , Doc. 1166 , Doc. 1167 , Doc. 1168 , and Doc. 1169 ] , 1600 [ Pg. 1600 includes portions of Doc. 1432 and Doc. 1433 ] Treaties and agreements ( see also Yalta agreements and discussions ): Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance ( 1936 ), 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] ; Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance ( 1942 ), 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 1390 [ Pg. 1390 includes portions of Doc. 1327 , Doc. 1328 , and Doc. 1329 ] , 1391 [ Pg. 1391 includes portions of Doc. 1329 and Doc. 1330 ] United Nations Organization, British position regarding admission of Italy, 53–54 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 621–622 [ Pgs. 621–622 include portions of Doc. 722 and Doc. 723 ] , 624–625 [ Pgs. 624–625 include portions of Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 1080 [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] , 1080 n [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 1088 and Doc. 1089 ] , 1086–1087 [ Pgs. 1086–1087 include portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] War against Japan: Atomic bomb, 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 81–82 [ Pgs. 81–82 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#59)] ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#64)] ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 1370–1371 [ Pgs. 1370–1371 include portions of Doc. 1305 and Doc. 1306 ] , 1375 [ Pg. 1375 includes portions of Doc. 1313 and Doc. 1314 ] British Commonwealth participation in, 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 1334–1341 [ Pgs. 1334–1341 include portions of Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , Doc. 1283 , Doc. 1284 , Doc. 1285 , Doc. 1286 , Doc. 1287 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1287 (#1)] , and Doc. 1288 ] , 1464–1465 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1469–1470 [ Pg. 1469 is part of Doc. 1381 ] British participation in, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 48–51 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] Chiefs of Staff, discussions and views on— Control and command, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 83–86 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#16)] ] , 1315–1316 [ Pgs. 1315–1316 include portions of Doc. 1267 and Doc. 1268 ] Military objectives, strategy, and policies, 1299–1304 [ Pgs. 1299–1304 include portions of Doc. 1262 , Doc. 1263 , and Doc. 1264 ] Release of information to Soviet Union, 99–100 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 113–115 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Shipping problems, 1199–1200 [ Pgs. 1199–1200 include portions of Doc. 1194 and Doc. 1195 ] , 1303–1304 [ Pgs. 1303–1304 include portions of Doc. 1263 and Doc. 1264 ] United Maritime Authority (UMA), 119 n [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , and Doc. 1005 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 is part of Doc. 1009 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 1009 and Doc. 1010 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 1010 and Doc. 1011 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 1015 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1015 (#1)] ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 1110 ] , 1115–1116 [ Pgs. 1115–1116 include portions of Doc. 1124 and Doc. 1125 ] , 1116 [ Pg. 1116 includes portions of Doc. 1124 and Doc. 1125 ] , 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 1131 and Doc. 1132 ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] , 1195–1198 [ Pgs. 1195–1198 include portions of Doc. 1192 and Doc. 1193 ] ; UMA agreement, Aug. 5, 1944 , cited, 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 1004 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1004 (#2)] , and Doc. 1005 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 is part of Doc. 1009 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 1009 and Doc. 1010 ] , 1472–1473 [ Pg. 1472 is part of Doc. 1381 ] United Maritime Executive Board (UMEB), 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 1131 and Doc. 1132 ] , 1198 [ Pg. 1198 includes portions of Doc. 1192 and Doc. 1193 ] United Nations Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco, 44 n [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 55 n [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] ] , 252–253 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 264–265 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 734 ] , 633 n [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 734 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 734 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , and Doc. 737 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 738 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 includes portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] , 1171 [ Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 1175 ] , 1174 [ Pg. 1174 is part of Doc. 1178 ] , 1334 [ Pg. 1334 includes portions of Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , and Doc. 1283 ] United Nations declarations, cited, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#18)] ] , 844 n [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 984 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 1076 and Doc. 1077 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 1082 and Doc. 1083 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference (Bretton Woods, 1944 ), 844 n [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 1526 n [ Pg. 1526 is part of Doc. 1386 ] United Nations Organization: Admission of Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Rumania, and non-admission of Spain: Discussions and proposals, 53–54 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 122–127 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 133–135 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 146–150 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 177–178 [ Pgs. 177–178 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 226–227 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 324–328 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 337–338 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#87)] ] , 357–364 [ Pgs. 357–364 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 370–372 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 394–395 [ Pgs. 394–395 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#108)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 426–428 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 437–438 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#123)] ] , 445–446 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#124)] ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#126)] ] , 461–464 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 467–469 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 480–481 [ Pgs. 480–481 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#136)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 491–492 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 513–514 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 528–529 [ Pgs. 528–529 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 529–530 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] ] , 575–576 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 589–590 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 598–599 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 600–601 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 621–630 [ Pgs. 621–630 include portions of Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] ] , 1592–1593 [ Pgs. 1592–1593 include portions of Doc. 1423 , Doc. 1424 , and Doc. 1425 ] Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1457–1458 [ Pg. 1457 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1492–1493 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1509–1510 [ Pg. 1509 is part of Doc. 1384 ] Admission of neutral countries, 147–148 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 325–326 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#131)] ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1458 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1593 [ Pg. 1593 includes portions of Doc. 1424 and Doc. 1425 ] Charter, cited, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 44 n [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 128 n [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 252–253 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 731 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , and Doc. 737 ] , 1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1066 n [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 1082 and Doc. 1083 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] , 1333–1334 [ Pgs. 1333–1334 include portions of Doc. 1282 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1282 (#1)] , and Doc. 1283 ] , 1406 [ Pg. 1406 includes portions of Doc. 1345 and Doc. 1346 ] , 1458 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1593 [ Pg. 1593 includes portions of Doc. 1424 and Doc. 1425 ] , 1595 [ Pg. 1595 includes portions of Doc. 1426 and Doc. 1427 ] Objectives of, relationship to Allied occupation of Germany, 782 [ Pg. 782 is part of Doc. 855 ] Preparatory Commission of United Nations, discussions concerning selection of officers, 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#114)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#115)] ] , 639–641 [ Pgs. 639–641 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , Doc. 741 , Doc. 742 , and Doc. 743 ] San Francisco Conference. See United Nations Conference on International Organization . Security Council, 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 711 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 731 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 1021 ] Trusteeship for Italian colonial territories and Korea: Discussions and proposals, 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#6)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#7)] ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#38)] ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 238–239 [ Pgs. 238–239 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] ] , 252–256 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 264–266 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 281–283 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#73)] ] , 290–291 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] ] , 300–301 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#79)] ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#80)] ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 550–551 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 631–638 [ Pgs. 631–638 include portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 1083 [ Pg. 1083 is part of Doc. 1090 ] , 1086–1087 [ Pgs. 1086–1087 include portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] , 1583 [ Pg. 1583 is part of Doc. 1418 ] , 1594–1595 [ Pgs. 1594–1595 include portions of Doc. 1425 , Doc. 1426 , and Doc. 1427 ] ; Protocol and Communiqué, sections concerning, 1441 [ Pg. 1441 is part of Doc. 1379 ] , 1442 [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 1379 and Doc. 1380 ] , 1458 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 1384 ] United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#113)] ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 764 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 764 (#1)] , and Doc. 765 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 892 (#1)] ] , 1035 n [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 1053 and Doc. 1054 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 1071 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 1076 ] , 1089–1090 [ Pgs. 1089–1090 include portions of Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , and Doc. 1098 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 1114 and Doc. 1115 ] , 1180 [ Pg. 1180 includes portions of Doc. 1181 and Doc. 1182 ] , 1181 [ Pg. 1181 is part of Doc. 1182 ] , 1184 [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1185 ] , 1379 [ Pg. 1379 is part of Doc. 1316 ] , 1379 n [ Pg. 1379 is part of Doc. 1316 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 1386 ] , 1526 [ Pg. 1526 is part of Doc. 1386 ] United Nations Security Council, 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 711 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 731 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 731 (#1)] ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 1021 ] United States. See specific subjects; for relations with other countries, see individual countries . U. S. and Soviet Chiefs of Staff meeting, July 26 , 408–417 [ Pgs. 408–417 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 1327–1328 [ Pgs. 1327–1328 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] , Doc. 1279 , and Doc. 1280 ] U. S., British, and Soviet Chiefs of Staff meeting, July 24 , 344–353 [ Pgs. 344–353 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] U. S. Chiefs of Staff. See Joint Chiefs of Staff . U. S. Delegation, list of, 1461 [ Pg. 1461 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 is part of Doc. 1384 ] U. S. President, treaty-making powers, constitutional restraints on, 384–385 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#104)] ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 744 ] V–1’s and V–2’s, 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 896 ] , 1376 [ Pg. 1376 is part of Doc. 1315 ] Vacarro, Ernest, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 710 ] Valentin, 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Vandenberg, Arthur H., 719 [ Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] , 1104–1107 [ Pgs. 1104–1107 include portions of Doc. 1117 and Doc. 1118 ] Vardaman, Capt. James K., Jr., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] Vardaman, 1st Lt. James M., 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 710 ] Varela Iglesias, Lt. Gen. José Enrique, 1417–1418 [ Pgs. 1417–1418 include portions of Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , Doc. 1361 , and Doc. 1362 ] Varkiza Agreement ( Feb. 12 ). See under Greece . Vasilyevsky (Vassilievski), Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M., 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] Vassilios, 1055 n [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 1071 ] Vaughan, Brig. Gen. Harry H., 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] Velchev, Col. Damian, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 827 ] Venezia Giulia ( see also under Yugoslavia ), 1067 [ Pg. 1067 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] , 1083 [ Pg. 1083 is part of Doc. 1090 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 1107 and Doc. 1108 ] Venizelos, Eleftherios, 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 1071 ] Versailles Treaty ( 1919 ), 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#19)] ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 711 ] Villard, Henry S., 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 1353 and Doc. 1354 ] , 1417–1418 [ Pgs. 1417–1418 include portions of Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , Doc. 1361 , and Doc. 1362 ] Vincent, John Carter, 1227–1237 [ Pgs. 1227–1237 include portions of Doc. 1214 and Doc. 1215 ] , 1241–1243 [ Pgs. 1241–1243 include portions of Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , Doc. 1217 , and Doc. 1218 ] Vinogradov, S. A., 257 n [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] Vinogradov, Lt. Gen. V. P., 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] Vishinski. See Vyshinsky, A. Ya. Voice of America, 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E., 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] Voskresentev, 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] Voulgaris, Adm. Petros, 1046 n [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1067 and Doc. 1068 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 1068 and Doc. 1069 ] , 1066 n [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 1077 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 1085 and Doc. 1086 ] Vyshinsky, A. Ya., 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#5)] ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#30)] ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#31)] ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#34)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#42)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 187–189 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#53)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#57)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#58)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 234–236 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#78)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 326–327 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#92)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#101)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#102)] ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#129)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#130)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#148)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#159)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#160)] ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 785 n [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 786 n [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 894 n [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 942 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 1036 ] , 1168 [ Pg. 1168 includes portions of Doc. 1171 and Doc. 1172 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 includes portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Waley Sir David, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 141–142 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#33)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 765 and Doc. 766 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 827–828 [ Pgs. 827–828 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 891 (#1)] ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 1044 and Doc. 1045 ] , 1089–1090 [ Pgs. 1089–1090 include portions of Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , and Doc. 1098 ] Wang Shih-chieh, 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 721 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 721 (#1)] ] , 1246 [ Pg. 1246 includes portions of Doc. 1221 and Doc. 1222 ] , 1283 [ Pg. 1283 includes portions of Doc. 1252 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1252 (#1)] ] War booty. See under Austria and Germany . War Crimes Commission, 494–495 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] War crimes trials, plans for, 494–495 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 526–527 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 1547 [ Pg. 1547 includes portions of Doc. 1399 and Doc. 1400 ] , 1549 [ Pg. 1549 includes portions of Doc. 1402 , Doc. 1403 , and Doc. 1404 ] War criminals. See under Germany and Japan . War Department, 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 871 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] , 820–823 [ Pgs. 820–823 include portions of Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , and Doc. 885 ] War Shipping Administration (WSA), 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 1043 and Doc. 1044 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 1110 ] , 1114–1115 [ Pgs. 1114–1115 include portions of Doc. 1123 and Doc. 1124 ] , 1116 [ Pg. 1116 includes portions of Doc. 1124 and Doc. 1125 ] , 1117 [ Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 1125 ] , 1119 [ Pg. 1119 includes portions of Doc. 1127 and Doc. 1128 ] , 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 1131 and Doc. 1132 ] , 1196 [ Pg. 1196 is part of Doc. 1192 ] , 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 1192 ] , 1198–1199 [ Pgs. 1198–1199 include portions of Doc. 1192 , Doc. 1193 , Doc. 1194 , and Doc. 1195 ] , 1340 [ Pg. 1340 is part of Doc. 1287 ] Warburg, Otto, 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 896 ] Ward, J. G., 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#71)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#110)] ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#111)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#145)] ] , 681 n [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 788 ] Warner, Edward, 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 1187 ] Weather stations in Siberia, 200–201 [ Pgs. 200–201 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#51)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#52)] ] , 409–410 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 1325–1327 [ Pgs. 1325–1327 include portions of Doc. 1276 , Doc. 1277 , Doc. 1278 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1278 (#1)] , and Doc. 1279 ] , 1329 [ Pg. 1329 is part of Doc. 1280 ] , 1463 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 1381 ] , 1466 [ Pg. 1466 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C., 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 1271 ] , 1465 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 1381 ] Weeks, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald, 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 1027 and Doc. 1028 ] Weimar Republic, 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] Weston, W. G., 163 [ Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#40)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#41)] ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#76)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#77)] ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#96)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#97)] ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] , 1158 [ Pg. 1158 includes portions of Doc. 1158 and Doc. 1159 ] , 1160 [ Pg. 1160 includes portions of Doc. 1160 and Doc. 1161 ] , 1162 [ Pg. 1162 includes portions of Doc. 1163 and Doc. 1164 ] Westphalia, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#47)] ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 1026 ] White Russia, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 503–504 [ Pgs. 503–504 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#140)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#141)] ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 includes portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] , 1567 [ Pg. 1567 is part of Doc. 1416 ] Willson, Vice Adm. Russell, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] Wilson, Edwin C., 1426 [ Pg. 1426 includes portions of Doc. 1366 and Doc. 1367 ] , 1437–1438 [ Pgs. 1437–1438 include portions of Doc. 1376 and Doc. 1377 ] Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#2)] ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#8)] ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#14)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#15)] ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#24)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#25)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#26)] ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#27)] ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#39)] ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#74)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#75)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#88)] ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#89)] ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 1384 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Winant, John G., 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 788 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 788 and Doc. 789 ] , 1002–1004 [ Pgs. 1002–1004 include portions of Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , and Doc. 1033 ] , 1005 n [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 1033 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 1034 and Doc. 1035 ] , 1006 n [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 1034 and Doc. 1035 ] , 1008–1023 [ Pgs. 1008–1023 include portions of Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , and Doc. 1040 ] , 1024 [ Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 1040 and Doc. 1041 ] , 1112–1113 [ Pgs. 1112–1113 include portions of Doc. 1121 , Doc. 1122 , and Doc. 1123 ] , 1127–1128 [ Pgs. 1127–1128 include portions of Doc. 1135 and Doc. 1136 ] , 1130–1131 [ Pgs. 1130–1131 include portions of Doc. 1137 , Doc. 1138 , and Doc. 1139 ] , 1133–1134 [ Pgs. 1133–1134 include portions of Doc. 1140 , Doc. 1141 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1141 (#1)] ] , 1158–1159 [ Pgs. 1158–1159 include portions of Doc. 1158 , Doc. 1159 , and Doc. 1160 ] , 1172 [ Pg. 1172 includes portions of Doc. 1175 and Doc. 1176 ] , 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 1187 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 1351 , Doc. 1352 , and Doc. 1353 ] , 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 1353 and Doc. 1354 ] , 1417 [ Pg. 1417 includes portions of Doc. 1359 , Doc. 1360 , and Doc. 1361 ] , 1570 [ Pg. 1570 is part of Doc. 1416 ] Winterton, Maj. Gen. John, 669 n [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 670–671 [ Pgs. 670–671 include portions of Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 672–673 [ Pgs. 672–673 include portions of Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , and Doc. 778 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 787 ] Withdrawal of troops: Allied forces from Iran. See under Iran . British and French troops from Syria and Lebanon, 1398–1399 [ Pgs. 1398–1399 include portions of Doc. 1338 , Doc. 1339 , Doc. 1340 , and Doc. 1341 ] Soviet troops to own occupation zone in Austria, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#44)] ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] Woodward, Lt. Col. Harper L., 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#1)] ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#4)] ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#11)] ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#20)] ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#32)] ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#68)] ] Woolworth, F. W. & Co., 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] World Organization. See United Nations Organization . World Security Organization. See United Nations Organization . Wu, K. C., 1283 [ Pg. 1283 includes portions of Doc. 1252 and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1252 (#1)] ] Yakovlev, Col. P. G., 1163 [ Pg. 1163 includes portions of Doc. 1164 and Doc. 1165 ] Yale, William, 1403–1406 [ Pgs. 1403–1406 include portions of Doc. 1345 and Doc. 1346 ] Yalta agreements and discussions: Balkans, 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 1404 and Doc. 1405 ] China. See China : Negotiations with Soviet Union . Declaration on Liberated Europe, implementation of: Bulgarian appeal based on, 722–725 [ Pgs. 722–725 include portions of Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , and Doc. 824 ] Discussions concerning, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#21)] ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#22)] ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#23)] ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 135–136 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 150–155 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#35)] ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#36)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 158–159 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#37)] ] , 165–166 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#43)] ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#48)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#49)] ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#50)] ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#54)] ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#55)] ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 228–232 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#60)] ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#61)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#62)] ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#63)] ] , 244–245 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 268–270 [ Pgs. 268–270 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#85)] ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#107)] ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#112)] ] , 417–418 [ Pgs. 417–418 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] , 524–525 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 604–605 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] Greece. See Greece : Elections . Italy. See Italy : Yalta Declaration . Proposals by Soviet Union, 648–649 [ Pgs. 648–649 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#1)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 750 (#2)] , and Doc. 751 ] , 689–690 [ Pgs. 689–690 include portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 698–699 [ Pgs. 698–699 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 1063 and Doc. 1064 ] ; by United States, 643–644 [ Pgs. 643–644 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 744 (#1)] , Doc. 745 , and Doc. 746 ] , 645–647 [ Pgs. 645–647 include portions of Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , and Doc. 749 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] Protocol and Communiqué of Yalta Conference, sections concerning Declaration on Liberated Europe, 1568–1569 [ Pg. 1568 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1577–1579 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Subcommittee on, meetings, 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#67)] ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#98)] , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#99)] , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#100)] ] , 417–418 [ Pgs. 417–418 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#117)] ] Declaration on Yugoslavia. See under Yugoslavia . Far East. See Soviet Union : Yalta . Foreign Ministers Meetings, 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#9)] ] , 62–63 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#10)] ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 69–70 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#12)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#13)] ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 712 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 1448 [ Pg. 1448 is part of Doc. 1380 ] , 1480 [ Pg. 1480 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1573 [ Pg. 1573 is part of Doc. 1416 ] , 1580–1581 [ Pg. 1580 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Germany. See under Germany : Reparations . Greece. See Greece : Elections . Italy. See Italy : Yalta Declaration ; also Territorial trusteeship , infra . Liberated prisoners of war and civilians, 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Military discussions, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#90)] ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#93)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#94)] ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#109)] ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Poland. See under Poland . Protocol and Communiqué of Yalta Conference, 1567–1581 [ Pgs. 1567–1581 include portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Reparations. See under Germany : Reparations . Soviet entry into war against Japan. See Soviet Union : Yalta . Territorial trusteeship, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#65)] ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 734 ] , 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 1383 ] , 1568 [ Pg. 1568 is part of Doc. 1416 ] Turkey, Straits question, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#66)] ] , 1573 [ Pg. 1573 is part of Doc. 1416 ] Yugoslavia. See under Yugoslavia . Yalta Conference, Protocol of Proceedings and Communiqué, 1567–1581 [ Pgs. 1567–1581 include portions of Doc. 1416 and Doc. 1417 ] Yemashev. See Yumashev, Adm. I. S. Yonai, Adm. Mitsumasa, 1248 n [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1222 (#1)] and Doc. 1223 ] Yordanov, Georgy Ilchev, 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 822 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 823 ] Yost, Charles W., 391 n [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#105)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#106)] ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 602–606 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 636–638 [ Pgs. 636–638 include portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 736 (#1)] , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 736–737 [ Pgs. 736–737 include portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 971 n [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 1007 and Doc. 1008 ] , 980 n [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 1015 ] , 1034 n [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1052 (#1)] ] , 1077–1078 [ Pgs. 1077–1078 include portions of Doc. 1086 and Doc. 1087 ] , 1086–1087 [ Pgs. 1086–1087 include portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 1107 and Doc. 1108 ] , 1135 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 1142 ] , 1152–1153 [ Pgs. 1152–1153 include portions of Doc. 1154 , Doc. 1155 , and Doc. 1156 ] , 1175–1176 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 1179 ] , 1209 n [ Pg. 1209 includes portions of Doc. 1202 and Doc. 1203 ] , 1212–1213 [ Pgs. 1212–1213 include portions of Doc. 1204 , Doc. 1205 , and Doc. 1206 ] , 1439–1440 [ Pgs. 1439–1440 include portions of Doc. 1377 , Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 1377 (#1)] , and Doc. 1378 ] Yugoslavia: Allied Military Government (AMG), territory under. See Venezia Giulia , infra . Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AVNOJ), 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 1208 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1209–1210 [ Pgs. 1209–1210 include portions of Doc. 1202 , Doc. 1203 , and Doc. 1204 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1204 ] , 1580 [ Pg. 1580 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Belgrade agreement of June 9. See Venezia Giulia , infra . Communist influence and activities, 1208 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 1203 and Doc. 1204 ] , 1211–1212 [ Pgs. 1211–1212 include portions of Doc. 1204 and Doc. 1205 ] Croatian Peasant Party, 1208 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 1201 ] Danube commission, Yugoslav participation, 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 757 and Doc. 758 ] Elections, question of, 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1204 ] , 1215 [ Pg. 1215 is part of Doc. 1207 ] , 1220 [ Pg. 1220 includes portions of Doc. 1209 and Doc. 1210 ] , 1221 [ Pg. 1221 includes portions of Doc. 1210 and Doc. 1211 ] German assets in Yugoslavia, 567–569 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#161)] ] , 579–580 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#162)] ] German ships, Yugoslav share, 560–561 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] Political situation, internal, 1207–1208 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1209–1212 [ Pgs. 1209–1212 include portions of Doc. 1202 , Doc. 1203 , Doc. 1204 , and Doc. 1205 ] Possible invitation to attend Berlin Conference, 127–129 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 135–136 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] Relations with Greece and Bulgaria, 116–117 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 130–131 [ Pgs. 130–131 include portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 1048–1057 [ Pgs. 1048–1057 include portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , and Doc. 1071 ] , 1060–1061 [ Pgs. 1060–1061 include portions of Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , and Doc. 1073 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 1074 ] , 1065–1071 [ Pgs. 1065–1071 include portions of Doc. 1076 , Doc. 1077 , Doc. 1078 , Doc. 1079 , and Doc. 1080 ] , 1073–1078 [ Pgs. 1073–1078 include portions of Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , Doc. 1084 , Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , and Doc. 1087 ] , 1573 [ Pg. 1573 is part of Doc. 1416 ] Reparations from Austria, 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] ; from Germany, 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#137)] ] , 517 n [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] ; from Italy, 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#121)] ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#122)] ] , 1089–1090 [ Pgs. 1089–1090 include portions of Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , and Doc. 1098 ] , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 1097 and Doc. 1098 ] , 1091 [ Pg. 1091 is part of Doc. 1098 ] , 1093 [ Pg. 1093 includes portions of Doc. 1099 and Doc. 1100 ] , 1094–1095 [ Pgs. 1094–1095 include portions of Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , and Doc. 1104 ] , 1096 [ Pg. 1096 includes portions of Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] Šubašić, Ivan ( see also Tito–Šubašić agreement , infra ), 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 1207–1212 [ Pgs. 1207–1212 include portions of Doc. 1201 , Doc. 1202 , Doc. 1203 , Doc. 1204 , and Doc. 1205 ] Tito. See Tito, Marshal . Tito–Šubašić agreement ( Nov. 1, 1944 ), question of implementation of, 127–129 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 135–136 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#152)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#153)] ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] , 1207–1209 [ Pgs. 1207–1209 include portions of Doc. 1201 , Doc. 1202 , and Doc. 1203 ] , 1580 [ Pg. 1580 is part of Doc. 1417 ] Trieste–Istria district. See Venezia Giulia , infra . Venezia Giulia, civil administration based on Belgrade Agreement of June 9: Appeal by Yugoslav Government on basis of Agreement: Communication from Tito and Šubašić to Heads of Government, 1214–1218 [ Pgs. 1214–1218 include portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] ; reaction of U. S. and British Governments, 1219–1221 [ Pgs. 1219–1221 include portions of Doc. 1208 , Doc. 1209 , Doc. 1210 , and Doc. 1211 ] ; Soviet proposal in connection with, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#138)] ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#139)] ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#151)] ] , 1221–1222 [ Pgs. 1221–1222 include portions of Doc. 1210 and Doc. 1211 ] Interpretation by U. S. War and State Departments of par. 3 of Agreement, 1213–1214 [ Pgs. 1213–1214 include portions of Doc. 1205 , Doc. 1206 , and Doc. 1207 ] , 1219 [ Pg. 1219 includes portions of Doc. 1208 and Doc. 1209 ] Yalta Declaration, question of implementation of, 127–129 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#28)] ] , 135–136 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#29)] ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#56)] ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#166)] ] , 1207–1213 [ Pgs. 1207–1213 include portions of Doc. 1201 , Doc. 1202 , Doc. 1203 , Doc. 1204 , Doc. 1205 , and Doc. 1206 ] , 1580 [ Pg. 1580 is part of Doc. 1417 ] ; British proposal and subsequent withdrawal, 1209 [ Pg. 1209 includes portions of Doc. 1202 and Doc. 1203 ] , 1212–1213 [ Pgs. 1212–1213 include portions of Doc. 1204 , Doc. 1205 , and Doc. 1206 ] Yugov, Anton, 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 823 ] Yumashev, Adm. I. S., 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#116)] ] Yurdonov. See Yordanov, Georgy Ilchev . Zacharias, Capt. Ellis M., 1261 [ Pg. 1261 is part of Doc. 1233 ] , 1273–1274 [ Pg. 1273 is part of Doc. 1243 ] , 1294 [ Pg. 1294 is part of Doc. 1259 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 is part of Doc. 1259 ] Zakinthinos, Dionysios, 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 1072 and Doc. 1073 ] Żebrowski, Tadeusz, 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#118)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#119)] ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#128)] ] , 506 n [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#142)] ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#156)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#157)] ] , 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 1387 ] , 1540 [ Pg. 1540 includes portions of Doc. 1393 and Doc. 1394 ] Zeiss, 908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 951 ] Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K., 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#72)] ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#81)] and Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#82)] ] , 514 n [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#150)] ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#164)] ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#165)] ] , 903–912 [ Pgs. 903–912 include portions of Doc. 949 , Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , and Doc. 952 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 includes portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] , 1028 n [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 1046 ] , 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 1138 and Doc. 1139 ] , 1529–1531 [ Pgs. 1529–1531 include portions of Doc. 1387 and Doc. 1388 ] , 1545 n [ Pg. 1545 includes portions of Doc. 1396 and Doc. 1397 ] Zink, Maj. Harold, 766–775 [ Pgs. 766–775 include portions of Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , and Doc. 852 ] Zipper , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. [Unnumbered document following Document 710 (#95)] ]