FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST, VOLUME V Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944 Volume V The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East (Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Volume V) Contents Preface The Near East, South Asia, and Africa Regional: Letter from President Roosevelt to James M. Landis, American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East, concerning the vital interest of the United States in the Middle East (Documents 1-1) Exchange with the United Kingdom regarding the status of the diplomatic missions of the United States in Egypt and Iraq (Documents 2-3) Exchange with the United Kingdom regarding the conduct of United States and British policies in the Near and Middle East (Documents 4-5) Concern of the United States for the safeguarding and developing of petroleum resources in Saudi Arabia; formulation of a foreign petroleum policy for the United States (Documents 6-26) Special Economic Mission to the Middle East, for the restoration of trade to commercial channels (Documents 27-29) Representations to the United Kingdom, leading to a relaxation of the import controls administered by the Middle East Supply Center (Documents 30-30) Cultural relations program of the Department of State to provide technical assistance to the countries of the Near East and Africa, and to facilitate greater cultural cooperation between the United States and these countries (Documents 31-31) Afghanistan: Problems relating to the joint policy of the United States and the United Kingdom of supplying Afghanistan with essential import requirements (Documents 32-42) Egypt: Representations to Egypt and the United Kingdom regarding American post-war civil air rights in Egypt (Documents 43-51) Interest of the United States in possible transfer of post-war title rights in the Suez–Cairo pipeline (Documents 52-54) Informal representations by the Legation in Egypt regarding effect upon American petroleum interests of new Egyptian export duty (Documents 55-59) Ethiopia: Gift by the Emperor of Ethiopia of property, to constitute a permanent home for the American Legation in Ethiopia (Documents 60-61) Concern of the United States to have equal access with the United Kingdom in supplying arms to Ethiopia; shipment of 5,000 rifles (Documents 62-65) Interest of the United States in Anglo-Ethiopian negotiations for the replacement of the Agreement and Military Convention of 1942 by a new agreement (Documents 66-79) Greece: Policy of the United States regarding the question of the political organization of Greece following liberation from German occupation (Documents 80-191) Participation by the United States in arranging for relief supplies for liberated Greece (Documents 192-225) Request of the Greek Government for further financial assistance from the United States (Documents 226-233) Attitude of the United States toward the desire of the Greek Government to abolish the International Financial Commission (Documents 234-237) India: Interest of the United States in the situation in India; mission of William Phillips as personal representative of the President (Documents 238-257) Agreement between the United States and the Government of India, and exchange of notes between the United States and the United Kingdom, concerning the lend-lease of silver (Documents 258-280) Exchange of messages between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill regarding a proposed special allocation of ships to carry wheat to India from Australia (Documents 281-283) Representations by the Government of India regarding the effect of the United States surplus cotton export program on India’s trade (Documents 284-287) Initiation of a program of cultural cooperation between the United States and India (Documents 288-296) Informal exploratory talks between the United States and the government of India regarding post-war civil aviation (Documents 297-298) Establishment of direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and India (Documents 299-304) Representations in support of the application by the United Press for the lease of teletype telegraphic lines in India (Documents 305-309) Iran: Elevation of the American Legation in Tehran and the Iranian Legation in Washington to the status of Embassies (Documents 310-316) Policy of economic assistance by the United States to Iran; efforts to implement the Tripartite Declaration Regarding Iran of December 1, 1943 (Documents 317-357) Problems regarding proposed agreement covering the presence of United States troops in Iran; question of disposal of United States military installations and equipment in Iran (Documents 358-379) Representations by the United Kingdom for the assumption by the United States of financial obligations in the operation of the Trans-Iranian Railroad (Documents 380-398) Problems concerning the position of the American advisers in Iran; the Millspaugh Mission (Documents 399-469) Attitude of the United States toward decision of the Iranian Government to postpone all petroleum development negotiations; representations to the Soviet Union regarding unfavorable Soviet reaction (Documents 470-527) Representations to the United Kingdom and Iran regarding American postwar civil air rights in Iran, especially at Abadan Island (Documents 528-542) Iranian representations with respect to increasing transportation facilities for moving Iranian exports to the United States (Documents 543-544) Iraq: Settlement of claims for damages suffered by American nationals during the 1941 revolt in Iraq (Documents 545-547) Liberia: Adherence of Liberia to the United Nations Declaration; assurances by the United States of its interest in the defense and security of Liberia (Documents 548-551) Morocco: Consent by the United States, with reservations, to the application to American protégés in the French Zone of Morocco of certain decrees in furtherance of the war effort in North Africa (Documents 552-566) Concern of the United States that the war effort in North Africa should not be hampered by agitation to alter the character of the French Protectorate in Morocco (Documents 567-579) Representations to the Spanish authorities in Morocco regarding the closing of the German Consulate General at Tangier and the expulsion of Axis sabotage and espionage agents from the Spanish Zone of Morocco (Documents 580-601) Interest of the United States in the termination of the Spanish occupation of the International Zone of Tangier (Documents 602-608) Palestine: Attitude of the United States toward the Arab-Zionist controversy concerning the future status of Palestine and the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine (Documents 609-710) Saudi Arabia: Establishment by the United States of a Consulate at Dhahran with the permission of the Saudi Arabian Government (Documents 711-716) Exchange with, the Saudi Arabian Government regarding the attitude of the United States toward the general question of Arab Union Proposals by the United States for use of an air route over Saudi Arabia and the construction of an airfield near Dhahran (Documents 717-726) Extension of Lend-Lease assistance to Saudi Arabia; organization of a program for economic and military aid (Documents 727-827) Representations to Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom regarding proposed establishment of a direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia (Documents 828-847) Syria and Lebanon: Agreements regarding treaty rights of the United States and its nationals in Syria and Lebanon and recognition by the United States of the independence of Syria and Lebanon; attitude of the United States toward the question of treaty relations between these countries and France (Documents 848-877) Turkey: Representations by the United States and the United Kingdom in effecting a severance of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany (Documents 878-964) Break by Turkey of relations with Japan at the request of the United States and British Governments (Documents 965-968) Discussions regarding proposed Lend-Lease agreement between the United States and Turkey (Documents 969-977) Death of the Turkish Ambassador, Mehmet Münir Ertegün (Documents 978-978) The Far East: China Japan: Initiative of the United States to secure cooperation among interested governments on measures to limit and control production and to suppress illicit traffic in opium in areas of the Far East to be liberated from Japanese control Japanese treatment of American prisoners of war and civilian internees (Documents 979-1028) Efforts by the United States to send financial and other assistance to American nationals held by Japan (Documents 1029-1106) Efforts by the United States to arrange a third exchange of American and Japanese nationals (Documents 1107-1130) Representations by Japan regarding the treatment of Japanese nationals by the United States (Documents 1131-1150) Protests by Japan against attacks by the United States on hospital ships (Documents 1151-1164) Protests by Japan against bombing of allegedly non-military objectives (Documents 1165-1167) Assurance by the Japanese Government that it would not use poison gas provided the United States also did not use it (Documents 1168-1169) Protest by Japan against treatment accorded the Japanese envoy to the Vatican by American armed forces; protest by the United States against the conduct of Japanese armed forces toward the American Legation in Thailand (Documents 1170-1173) Protests by the United States against attacks by Japanese naval forces on survivors of torpedoed American merchant vessels (Documents 1174-1176) Violation by Japanese authorities of American diplomatic and consular property, including archives, in occupied China (Documents 1177-1177) Decision of the United States and British Governments not to reply to Japanese peace feeler received through Sweden (Documents 1178-1180) Postwar policy planning in regard to Japan and areas under Japanese control (Documents 1181-1226) Korea: Interest of the United States in the future status of Korea and the question of recognition of a Provisional Korean Government (Documents 1227-1235) Philippines: Consideration of problems relating to the Commonwealth of the Philippines (Documents 1236-1241) Thailand: Interest of the United States in question of recognizing a Free Thai movement; attitudes of the United States and the United Kingdom toward the postwar status of Thailand (Documents 1242-1250) Thai protests against bombing of allegedly non-military objectives (Documents 1251-1253) Index The Near East, South Asia, and Africa The Near East, South Asia, and Africa Contents Letter from President Roosevelt to James M. Landis, American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East, concerning the vital interest of the United States in the Middle East (Documents 1-1) Exchange with the United Kingdom regarding the status of the diplomatic missions of the United States in Egypt and Iraq (Documents 2-3) Exchange with the United Kingdom regarding the conduct of United States and British policies in the Near and Middle East (Documents 4-5) Concern of the United States for the safeguarding and developing of petroleum resources in Saudi Arabia; formulation of a foreign petroleum policy for the United States (Documents 6-26) Special Economic Mission to the Middle East, for the restoration of trade to commercial channels (Documents 27-29) Representations to the United Kingdom, leading to a relaxation of the import controls administered by the Middle East Supply Center (Documents 30-30) Cultural relations program of the Department of State to provide technical assistance to the countries of the Near East and Africa, and to facilitate greater cultural cooperation between the United States and these countries (Documents 31-31) Problems relating to the joint policy of the United States and the United Kingdom of supplying Afghanistan with essential import requirements (Documents 32-42) Representations to Egypt and the United Kingdom regarding American post-war civil air rights in Egypt (Documents 43-51) Interest of the United States in possible transfer of post-war title rights in the Suez–Cairo pipeline (Documents 52-54) Informal representations by the Legation in Egypt regarding effect upon American petroleum interests of new Egyptian export duty (Documents 55-59) Gift by the Emperor of Ethiopia of property, to constitute a permanent home for the American Legation in Ethiopia (Documents 60-61) Concern of the United States to have equal access with the United Kingdom in supplying arms to Ethiopia; shipment of 5,000 rifles (Documents 62-65) Interest of the United States in Anglo-Ethiopian negotiations for the replacement of the Agreement and Military Convention of 1942 by a new agreement (Documents 66-79) Policy of the United States regarding the question of the political organization of Greece following liberation from German occupation (Documents 80-191) Participation by the United States in arranging for relief supplies for liberated Greece (Documents 192-225) Request of the Greek Government for further financial assistance from the United States (Documents 226-233) Attitude of the United States toward the desire of the Greek Government to abolish the International Financial Commission (Documents 234-237) Interest of the United States in the situation in India; mission of William Phillips as personal representative of the President (Documents 238-257) Agreement between the United States and the Government of India, and exchange of notes between the United States and the United Kingdom, concerning the lend-lease of silver (Documents 258-280) Exchange of messages between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill regarding a proposed special allocation of ships to carry wheat to India from Australia (Documents 281-283) Representations by the Government of India regarding the effect of the United States surplus cotton export program on India’s trade (Documents 284-287) Initiation of a program of cultural cooperation between the United States and India (Documents 288-296) Informal exploratory talks between the United States and the government of India regarding post-war civil aviation (Documents 297-298) Establishment of direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and India (Documents 299-304) Representations in support of the application by the United Press for the lease of teletype telegraphic lines in India (Documents 305-309) Elevation of the American Legation in Tehran and the Iranian Legation in Washington to the status of Embassies (Documents 310-316) Policy of economic assistance by the United States to Iran; efforts to implement the Tripartite Declaration Regarding Iran of December 1, 1943 (Documents 317-357) Problems regarding proposed agreement covering the presence of United States troops in Iran; question of disposal of United States military installations and equipment in Iran (Documents 358-379) Representations by the United Kingdom for the assumption by the United States of financial obligations in the operation of the Trans-Iranian Railroad (Documents 380-398) Problems concerning the position of the American advisers in Iran; the Millspaugh Mission (Documents 399-469) Attitude of the United States toward decision of the Iranian Government to postpone all petroleum development negotiations; representations to the Soviet Union regarding unfavorable Soviet reaction (Documents 470-527) Representations to the United Kingdom and Iran regarding American postwar civil air rights in Iran, especially at Abadan Island (Documents 528-542) Iranian representations with respect to increasing transportation facilities for moving Iranian exports to the United States (Documents 543-544) Settlement of claims for damages suffered by American nationals during the 1941 revolt in Iraq (Documents 545-547) Adherence of Liberia to the United Nations Declaration; assurances by the United States of its interest in the defense and security of Liberia (Documents 548-551) Consent by the United States, with reservations, to the application to American protégés in the French Zone of Morocco of certain decrees in furtherance of the war effort in North Africa (Documents 552-566) Concern of the United States that the war effort in North Africa should not be hampered by agitation to alter the character of the French Protectorate in Morocco (Documents 567-579) Representations to the Spanish authorities in Morocco regarding the closing of the German Consulate General at Tangier and the expulsion of Axis sabotage and espionage agents from the Spanish Zone of Morocco (Documents 580-601) Interest of the United States in the termination of the Spanish occupation of the International Zone of Tangier (Documents 602-608) Attitude of the United States toward the Arab-Zionist controversy concerning the future status of Palestine and the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine (Documents 609-710) Establishment by the United States of a Consulate at Dhahran with the permission of the Saudi Arabian Government (Documents 711-716) Exchange with, the Saudi Arabian Government regarding the attitude of the United States toward the general question of Arab Union Proposals by the United States for use of an air route over Saudi Arabia and the construction of an airfield near Dhahran (Documents 717-726) Extension of Lend-Lease assistance to Saudi Arabia; organization of a program for economic and military aid (Documents 727-827) Representations to Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom regarding proposed establishment of a direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia (Documents 828-847) Agreements regarding treaty rights of the United States and its nationals in Syria and Lebanon and recognition by the United States of the independence of Syria and Lebanon; attitude of the United States toward the question of treaty relations between these countries and France (Documents 848-877) Representations by the United States and the United Kingdom in effecting a severance of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany (Documents 878-964) Break by Turkey of relations with Japan at the request of the United States and British Governments (Documents 965-968) Discussions regarding proposed Lend-Lease agreement between the United States and Turkey (Documents 969-977) Death of the Turkish Ambassador, Mehmet Münir Ertegün (Documents 978-978) Letter from President Roosevelt to James M. Landis, American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East, concerning the vital interest of the United States in the Middle East Letter from President Roosevelt to James M. Landis, American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East, concerning the vital interest of the United States in the Middle East [1] President Roosevelt to the American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East (Landis) [Washington, March 6, 1944.] 800.24/1541 President Roosevelt to the American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East (Landis) 800.24/1541 [Document 1] President Roosevelt to the American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East ( Landis ) 1 [ Washington , March 6, 1944.] My Dear Mr. Landis : The Middle East is an area in which the United States has a vital interest. The maintenance of peace in that area, which has so frequently seen disturbances in the past, is of significance to the world as a whole. A means of insurance against unrest of that character is to encourage the governments of the territories that comprise the Middle East to push ahead with the vigor that they may possess to stabilize and improve their economic systems in terms of the production and distribution of wealth. Though the United States, following traditional policy, should not seek to interfere in the internal affairs of these territories, it is interested in seeing that itself and other nations should not be discriminated against in dealing openly and fairly with these territories in the exchange of goods and resources. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, the objective of the United States is to make certain that all nations are accorded equality of opportunity. Special privileges, in so far as they do not rest upon acknowledged possession or trusteeship, should not be afforded to any country or its nationals for such privileges have little place in the type of world for which this war is being fought. The American point of view, naturally, has regard to the desires of the territories of the Middle East to seek, in the manner deemed best by their own governments, objectives consistent with the faiths for which this war is being waged. The realization of such aims will, naturally, further the broad interests of the United States in that it will assure equality of treatment being afforded to this country. As American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East, the daily pattern of your work in wartime economic affairs will have reference to, and your activities should be carried out in a manner consistent with, policies such as these. Your work, under the directives you have received from the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration, is primarily concerned with the conduct of economic activities relating to the war. In that work you will, of course, put first the strengthening in every way of the warm and cooperative relations with our Allies, upon which our success in the war, and thereafter, so largely depend. On occasion you may require the assistance of other branches of the United States Government, now active in the Middle East, to make your endeavors in the economic field effective. Within this area of operations you are authorized to show this letter to such officials of the United States in order that the aid that they may reasonably give you may be forthcoming within the limits of their staffs and in so far as is consistent with political and military policies. Very sincerely yours, [ Franklin D. Roosevelt ] 1 Copy transmitted by the Secretary of State tinder his instruction of March 20 to the diplomatic missions in Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, the missions near the Greek and Yugoslav Governments in Exile, and the Consulate General at Jerusalem. James M. Landis, American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East, with the personal rank of Minister, was concurrently principal American civilian representative at the Middle East Supply Center, Cairo, an organization set up initially by the British in 1941 to control the supply and distribution of essential goods to the civilian populations of the Near and Middle East; for correspondence regarding the decision of the United States in 1942 to participate in the Middle East Supply Center, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. Exchange with the United Kingdom regarding the status of the diplomatic missions of the United States in Egypt and Iraq Exchange with the United Kingdom regarding the status of the diplomatic missions of the United States in Egypt and Iraq [2] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State London, May 26, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 26—6 p.m.] 124.90G/47: Telegram [3] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) Washington, June 12, 1944—7 p.m. 124.90G/47: Telegram The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State 124.90G/47: Telegram [Document 2] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Bucknell ) to the Secretary of State London , May 26, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 26—6 p.m.] 4255. A letter dated May 25 signed by Eden 1 has been received, of which the following is a paraphrase: Mr. Wallace Murray, 2 during the discussions with members of my Department which he had recently, 3 said that it appeared likely that the question of the raising to Embassy status of the American Legations in Iraq and Egypt would soon arise. Mr. Murray drew attention to the fact that the representatives of the U.S. in many smaller countries had become Ambassadors and that in Egypt, in particular, where the American Minister to Egypt was U.S. Ambassador to Greece as well, the position was anomalous. It was recalled to Mr. Murray by Sir Maurice Peterson 4 that British representatives, by our Treaties of Alliance with Iraq and Egypt, 5 had precedence over other foreign representatives in those countries; altho there was a Persian Ambassador in Egypt our representative would in fact always be senior to him by virtue of special arrangements which had been made to ensure this. As Mr. Murray requested, Sir Maurice gave an undertaking that the position would be considered further and that our views would be transmitted to the Department of State. With reference to the conversations above referred to, I shall be pleased if you will be so good as to inform the Department of State that the British Government would much prefer, after considering the matter fully, that the missions of the U.S. in Baghdad and Cairo should not at present be raised to the rank of Embassy. If the Department of State nevertheless feels unable to permit this question to be held in abeyance, it is not the wish of the British Government to put opposition in the way of the appointment of U.S. Ambassadors, provided that it could be arranged that the present system should be maintained whereby the British representative in these two countries is entitled to the right of precedence. The importance of retaining this precedence is stressed by His Majesty’s Government, in view of the fact that they have undertaken special responsibilities, for example for the defense of the territories in question. The Department of State will no doubt recall that the Egyptian Government recently insisted, in agreeing to accept the Soviet Government’s representative, that he should have the rank of Minister only. In connection with this question, may I suggest that the sole arrangement necessary for the securing of the British Ambassador’s precedence is that, before the appointment of a U.S. Ambassador, copies of the relevant treaty provisions should be communicated by the Iraqi and Egyptian Governments to the U.S. Government together with a request that before appointing such an Ambassador the U.S. Government should accept the aforesaid treaty provisions. Bucknell 1 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 2 Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. 3 Mr. Murray was in London during much of April as a member of the mission of Under Secretary of State Stettinius which was engaged in informal conversations with officers of the British Foreign Office, April 7–29, 1944; for correspondence relating to the Stettinius Mission to London, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 4 Superintending Under Secretary, Eastern Department, British Foreign Office. 5 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, signed at Baghdad, June 30, 1930, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxii , p. 363; Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance, signed at London, August 26, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 401. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) 124.90G/47: Telegram [Document 3] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Bucknell ) Washington , June 12, 1944—7 p.m. 4658. Your 4255, May 26, 6 p.m. You are authorized to reply to Mr. Eden in the following sense: The Department has noted the preference of the British Government, as set forth in Mr. Eden’s letter of May 25, that the American Missions in Cairo and Baghdad should not be raised to the rank of Embassy at this time. In the light of the considerations set forth in this letter, as well as in the conversations between Sir Maurice Peterson and Mr. Wallace Murray, the Department will defer for the time being to the wishes of the British Government in this matter, while reserving full freedom of action to resume discussions on this point as well as on the question of precedence, at some time in the future. 6 The Legations at Baghdad and Cairo are being informed of the foregoing. 7 Hull 6 In his despatch No. 16,590, June 30, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom informed the Secretary of State that in a letter of June 28 the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had stated: “I note with much appreciation that your Government are willing to defer, for the time being, the raising of the United States Legations in Egypt and Iraq to the status of Embassies.” (124.83/6–3044) 7 In instructions Nos. 868 and 193, July 3, sent respectively to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) and the Minister in Iraq (Henderson), the Department transmitted copies of the foregoing exchange of telegrams, with the following statement: “If … the matter should be broached by representatives of either of the two Governments concerned, the Department perceives no objection to their being informed that this Government would be pleased to consider appointing Ambassadors to the countries in question whenever the situation is such as to permit American Ambassadors to become members of the Diplomatic Corps of these countries on a non-discriminatory basis.” (124.90G/47) Exchange with the United Kingdom regarding the conduct of United States and British policies in the Near and Middle East Exchange with the United Kingdom regarding the conduct of United States and British policies in the Near and Middle East [4] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) Washington, May 17, 1944—10 p.m. 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/101b: Telegram [5] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) Washington, June 23, 1944—6 p.m. 711.00/1926: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/101b: Telegram [Document 4] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Egypt ( Jacobs ) Washington , May 17, 1944—10 p.m. 1167. For Chargé and Landis. 1 During the recent visit of the delegation of the Under Secretary of State to London 2 officers of the Department and of the Foreign Office and other British agencies informally reviewed questions of mutual interest throughout the Near and Middle East from Egypt to Afghanistan. British and American interests were reciprocally explained, examined and recognized. It was cordially agreed that these interests do not conflict and that Anglo-American relations throughout the area should be conducted in a spirit of cooperation based upon mutual frankness and good will. Detailed memoranda are being forwarded by airmail to the Missions concerned. It was agreed that these ends and thus the long-run interests of general Anglo-American relations would be served by the provision of machinery in the Near and Middle East whereby rumors, complaints and grievances, which if left unsettled might subsequently be ventilated publicly with effects harmful to both sides, could be raised frankly, jointly examined and disposed of immediately they arose. If such points could not be settled on the spot and at once in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, they would be promptly and fully reported for direct settlement between Washington and London. Lord Moyne 3 and British Missions in the area have already received instructions to the foregoing effect. 4 You should accordingly consult your British colleagues with a view to arranging the proposed machinery at all necessary levels, reporting results to the Department. FEA 5 and War and Navy Departments are being asked to collaborate in this policy. Please repeat to Jerusalem, Beirut, Jidda, Addis Ababa, Tehran and Kabul. 6 Separate message being sent to Baghdad. 7 Sent to Cairo. Repeated to London for information of Foreign Office. 8 Hull 1 James M. Landis, Director of American Economic Operations in the Middle East, with the personal rank of Minister. Minister Landis was also ranking civilian representative of the United States at the Middle East Supply Center (MESC) at Cairo, an organization set up in 1941 by the British to control the supply and distribution of essential goods to the civilian populations of the Near and Middle East. 2 Under Secretary of State Stettinius led a mission to London in April to engage in informal conversations with British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Eden and officers of the Foreign Office, April 7–29, 1944. The principal member on the American side concerned with problems of the Near and Middle East was Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs; his British opposite was Sir Maurice Peterson, Superintending Under Secretary, Eastern Department. For correspondence concerning the Stettinius Mission, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 3 British Minister of State at Cairo. 4 The Department was informed of this action in a letter of May 10 from the Counsellor of the British Embassy to the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, in which it was also stated that “Mr. Eden hopes that it will be found possible to take corresponding action from Washington”. (880.24/5–1044) 5 Foreign Economic Administration. 6 Aden was subsequently included. 7 Telegram No. 80 of the same date. 8 Repeated as telegram No. 3933. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) 711.00/1926: Telegram [Document 5] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) Washington , June 23, 1944—6 p.m. 1575. For the Minister and Landis. War Department states that Commanding General, Persian Gulf Command 9 and Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Middle East 10 have been instructed to confer with appropriate State Department representatives and to collaborate in implementing policy and procedure regarding Anglo-American relations in Near and Middle East set forth in Department’s 1167, May 17, 10 p.m. Navy Department states its representatives throughout area have received similar instructions. Repeat to Jidda, Jerusalem, Beirut, Tehran, Kabul, Aden, Addis Ababa. Separate message sent to Baghdad. 11 Sent to Cairo. Repeated direct to London. 12 Hull 9 Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly. 10 Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles. 11 Telegram No. 107 of the same date. 12 Repeated to London as telegram No. 4950. Concern of the United States for the safeguarding and developing of petroleum resources in Saudi Arabia; formulation of a foreign petroleum policy for the United States Concern of the United States for the safeguarding and developing of petroleum resources in Saudi Arabia; 1 formulation of a foreign petroleum policy for the United States 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 921 – 952 . [6] The President of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (Davies) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) San Francisco, December 27, 1943. 890F.6363/91 [7] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Interior (Ickes) Washington, January 5, 1944. 800.6363/1420 [8] Memorandum by the Acting Petroleum Adviser (Rayner) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] January 6, 1944. 800.6363/1428 [9] The Acting Petroleum Adviser (Rayner) to the President of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (Davies) Washington, January 7, 1944. 890F.6363/91 [10] The Secretary of the Interior (Ickes) to the Secretary of State Washington, January 7, 1944. 800.6363/1–744 [11] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, January 8, 1944. 800.6363/1428 [12] Memorandum by President Roosevelt Washington, January 10, 1944. 800.6363/1431 [13] Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State Washington, January 10, 1944. 800.6363/1431 [14] Memorandum by the Executive Officer of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board (Carter) [Washington,] January 17, 1944. 800.6363/1–1744 [15] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State Washington, January 26, 1944. 800.6363/1494 [16] Memorandum by the Petroleum Adviser (Rayner) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] January 29, 1944. 800.6363/1–2944 [17] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Interior (Ickes) Washington, January 31, 1944. 800.6363/1–2944 [18] The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics Washington, February 17, 1944—7 p.m. 800.6363/1506c: Circular airgram [19] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) Washington, March 3, 1944—1 p.m. 800.6363/1515a: Telegram [20] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives Washington, March 21, 1944—11 p.m. 800.6363/1538g: Circular telegram [21] Memorandum by the Inter-Divisional Petroleum Committee of the Department of State [Washington,] April 11, 1944. 811.6363/4–1144 [22] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, June 27, 1944—5 p.m. 890F.6363/143: Telegram [23] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) Washington, October 16, 1944—1 p.m. 890F.6363/10–1644: Telegram [24] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 10, 1944—9 a.m. [Received November 22—5 p.m.] 890F.6363/11–1044: Airgram [25] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] November 23, 1944. 890F.6363/11–1044 [26] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to President Roosevelt Washington, [undated.] 811.6363/1–2245 The President of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (Davies) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) 890F.6363/91 [Document 6] The President of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company ( Davies ) to the Adviser on Political Relations ( Murray ) San Francisco , December 27, 1943. My Dear Mr. Murray : As you are aware, the Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Company have equal interests in certain oil concessions and operations in the Near East, notably in Bahrein and in Saudi Arabia. The concession in Saudi Arabia is held and operated by the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, whose shares are owned by the two companies equally. Hitherto, the principal outlet for oil from Saudi Arabia has been to the East, that is by tanker via the Persian Gulf to the consuming areas generally east of the Suez Canal. It is expected that production in Saudi Arabia will be greatly increased early in the post-war period in order to serve consuming areas which were formerly supplied from the western hemisphere. For this reason, we believe that a pipe line of large capacity will be necessary for the economic delivery of crude oil from the producing fields in Eastern Saudi Arabia to an appropriate seaport and future refinery location on the Mediterranean. Contingent upon political and other circumstances favorable to operations of this type being established among the nations concerned, at the peace table or prior thereto, it is contemplated that we would undertake the construction and operation of such a pipe line and related facilities. The pipe line, however, would not necessarily be restricted solely to the transportation of the company’s own oil. While California Arabian Standard Oil Company enjoys adequate rights under its present concession in Saudi Arabia to construct such a line through that domain, it would be necessary to cross other territory, for example Transjordan and Palestine, and perhaps Egypt, in order to reach a suitable terminus on the Mediterranean. This would entail negotiations with the governments having jurisdiction in those territories. In addition, to provide such an outlet for Saudi Arabian oil to the Mediterranean sea, and therefore to the western world, would introduce a new factor of high importance into the political and economic problems already facing the governments which are vitally concerned in the development and world-wide distribution of Near East oil. Moreover, we are aware of the great strategic importance which, under certain conditions, might attach to such a project. Chiefly for the foregoing reasons we desire to inform the Department of State concerning our plans and intentions in connection with such a pipe line, even in their present preliminary stage, and to invite such comment as the Department may wish to make. This letter is for that purpose, and will be supplemented, at the Department’s convenience, by whatever additional information is desired. In addition to informing the Department concerning this project, we would like to know from the Department whether it perceives any objection to our proceeding in the near future with the concessions and other arrangements which will be necessary; whether the Department chooses to have prior conversations with the other governments concerned for the purpose of resolving any political issues before we undertake such negotiations; and, in the event that it neither perceives objections to our going forward, nor chooses to deal in a prior manner with the other governments affected, whether and to what extent we might expect the Department to facilitate and assist us in securing the necessary rights and safeguards from those other governments. We believe that the Department will not need to be reminded of the importance which Saudi Arabian oil, available in large quantities in the Mediterranean and completely under the control of American nationals, would have as our own domestic oil reserves decline; nor that the best efforts of private American companies, without the assistance of their government, might not be successful in reaching a satisfactory and secure arrangement in the face of possible opposition in which other governments took an active part. It is hardly necessary to add that we have every desire to conduct the enterprise alluded to in complete harmony with the established policies of our government and with full regard for any relevant agreements which may be reached between our government and others. In view of the fact that the project outlined herein is in its formative stage, and that our present questions are entirely political in nature, copies of this letter are not being furnished to other departments of the government which might become interested later. Preliminary to taking our next steps we would appreciate having the Department’s comments concerning this proposal. Very truly yours, F. A. Davies The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Interior (Ickes) 800.6363/1420 [Document 7] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Interior ( Ickes ) 2 Washington , January 5, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I refer to the negotiations which the Petroleum Reserves Corporation recently undertook with the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, for direct governmental participation in, or control of, that company’s oil holdings in Saudi Arabia, and to similar negotiations which were initiated with the Gulf Oil Company relative to the latter’s holdings in Kuwait. It is understood that the above-mentioned negotiations have been based on the view that this Government should participate in companies holding foreign oil resources in order to protect the American interest in those resources and assure this country supplies in emergencies. As you know, we are planning to undertake exploratory conversations with the British Government on questions of mutual interest regarding Middle Eastern oil. Our intention is to determine the possibility of achieving close cooperation between the United States and British Governments in developing oil in the Middle Eastern area, and the manner in which such cooperation would be effectuated. Hence, the purpose of the conversations is to ensure that this country will have access to supplies of Middle Eastern oil to meet peace-time as well as security needs. At the same time, of course, the conversations will seek to assure that supplies of Middle Eastern oil will also be available, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, 3 to meet the similar needs of other friendly countries. Thus the broad objectives of the proposed conversations with the British Government include the purpose intended to be accomplished by the Petroleum Reserves Corporation negotiations with the California Arabian Standard Oil Company and the Gulf Oil Company. However, the Department believes that, until the outlines of our conversations with the British Government take shape, it is not possible to determine whether direct participation of this Government in petroleum companies holding foreign oil reserves will prove consistent with the steps we may wish to take to attain our objective. In fact, there is a danger that such an arrangement made now between this Government and the oil companies holding reserves in the Middle Eastern area might even adversely affect the course we may decide upon as a result of the conversations. Moreover, the question of the needs for assuring foreign oil reserves for security reasons must take into account the larger question of the character of the post-war security system growing out of the Moscow agreements. 4 Accordingly, the Department is of the firm opinion, with which I believe you will agree in view of the above-mentioned considerations, that negotiations of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation with the California Arabian Standard Oil Company and with the Gulf Oil Company, for the purpose of arranging participation by this Government in those companies or their foreign reserves, should be held in abeyance, and that no similar negotiations should be undertaken with any other company at this time. If developments growing out of the forthcoming conversations with the British Government should indicate that negotiations of the aforementioned nature should be again considered or that some alternative course might be advantageously examined as being within the scope of operations of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, the Department, of course, will be glad to discuss the subject through its representative on the Board of Directors of the Corporation. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 2 This letter was addressed to Mr. Ickes in his capacity as President of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation. 3 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. i , p. 367 . 4 Reference is presumably to the Declaration on General Security issued on November 1, 1943, at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, which was held at Moscow from October 18 to November 1, 1943; for text of declaration, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. i , p. 755 . Memorandum by the Acting Petroleum Adviser (Rayner) to the Secretary of State 800.6363/1428 [Document 8] Memorandum by the Acting Petroleum Adviser ( Rayner ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] January 6, 1944. Mr. Secretary : I called on Secretary Ickes this afternoon and advised him that it was your intention to call in, at an appropriate time, the top officials of oil companies operating abroad 5 and to advise them in confidence of the forthcoming conversations with the British; also, that their advice would be sought from time to time as the conversations progressed. Secretary Ickes said that he had just received your letter of January 5 disapproving of any further negotiations with the oil companies for stock participation by this Government pending the development of the discussions with the British. He indicated his belief that we were working at cross purposes and that the position taken in your letter was contrary to the President’s wishes. He, therefore, intended to put the matter before the President for decision. He spoke at some length on the value of government participation in foreign oil reserves through stock ownership as a means of protecting our national interests. However, after some discussion he admitted that there may be possible desirable alternative courses of action which would accomplish the same purpose without involving the disadvantages of government stock ownership in American corporations. The membership of the group to carry on the conversations with the British was not mentioned by Secretary Ickes and I did not bring up the subject. In view of Secretary Ickes’ statement, as indicated above, that he intended to take up with the President the subject of your letter of January 5 to him, it is believed that you may wish to advise the President concerning the reasons for the position you take in that letter. For that purpose a brief memorandum to the President is attached for your consideration. 6 Charles B. Bayner 5 This was done in letters of January 24 to these officials by the Secretary of State (800.6363/1455f). 6 See memorandum of January 8, p. 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] . The Acting Petroleum Adviser (Rayner) to the President of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (Davies) 890F.6363/91 [Document 9] The Acting Petroleum Adviser ( Rayner ) to the President of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company 7 ( Davies ) Washington , January 7, 1944. My Dear Mr. Davies : I have received your letter of December 27, 1943, addressed to Mr. Wallace Murray, outlining your plans and intentions, now in a preliminary stage, in connection with the construction of a pipeline, which would transport oil produced by your company and possibly other oil as well, from the producing fields in eastern Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean, and inviting the Department’s comment. I wish to thank you for informing us of this project and giving us an opportunity to comment upon it. First I wish to say that the Department, from the viewpoint of both the war time and long-range importance of petroleum, favors the development of all possible sources of that product, and is glad to see American companies participate in that development. The construction of a pipeline, such as the one you contemplate, would appear to be in line with these objectives, and the Department therefore would in principle look favorably upon such a project. However, there are now certain questions and developments relating to oil in the Middle Eastern area to which a project of this nature must be properly related. In this connection, we note with pleasure that you have every desire to conduct the enterprise in question in complete accord with the policies of this Government and with full regard for any relevant international agreements to which this country might be a party. Moreover, a project such as that in question must be viewed in the light of military requirements and the materials situation. Accordingly, we will appreciate being kept informed of the progress of your plans as they become more specific and, if, in the light of those plans and the above-mentioned circumstances, it should be agreed that the project should be advanced, you may be assured that this Government will assist you in every appropriate way with other governments concerned in regard to your endeavors to secure such rights and safeguards as may be necessary in connection with the construction of the pipeline. Sincerely yours, Charles B. Rayner 7 The company changed its name to the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) on January 31, 1944. The Secretary of the Interior (Ickes) to the Secretary of State 800.6363/1–744 [Document 10] The Secretary of the Interior ( Ickes ) to the Secretary of State Washington , January 7, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : Your letter of January 5 takes the position that the negotiations of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation with the California Arabian Standard Oil Company and with the Gulf Exploration Company, for the purpose of arranging participation by this Government in those companies or their foreign reserves, should be held in abeyance, pending conversations with the British Government. Your letter further states your view that it may be necessary to defer a decision as to the program of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation until the question of the character of post-war security is settled or more clearly defined. This statement of the policy of your Department is directly opposed to the program to which you agreed some months ago 8 and which was approved by the President. As a matter of fact, the State Department was one of the agencies which initiated the interest of this Government in the acquisition of a share in the two companies referred to above, or in their oil reserves in the Persian Gulf area. I think that it is fair to say that the State Department was primarily responsible for the initiation of the conferences among the departments concerned which eventually resulted in the program of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation which you approved and in the carrying out of which your Department has been represented by ranking officials. It is inconceivable to me that at the time that the program was originated, and during the time that negotiations and discussions were proceeding, the State Department was unaware that discussions and negotiations would be had with the British which would involve world oil problems or that arrangements with respect to Persian Gulf oil supplies would have an important bearing upon post-war security. In addition, I know of no new facts which have occurred upon which a change of position might be based, and your letter refers to none. Since the program of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation which you now ask be suspended has been approved by the President, I cannot, of course, agree that it be abandoned—which is what your letter really suggests—unless I receive a direction to that effect from the President. Nor can I join with you in a recommendation that the program be abandoned. In fact, I think that it would be a grave error which would prejudice this Nation’s position for generations if this program to strengthen our position with respect to the Persian Gulf oil reserves were not vigorously and promptly prosecuted at this time. I cannot appreciate how the effectuation of the program could adversely affect negotiations with the British or have a bearing upon other international problems. Indeed, it seems to me that the only foreign nations which could assert a legitimate interest in the program are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Shaikhdom of Kuwait. The principal reason for participation by this Government in the ownership of the two named companies or of their oil reserves in the Persian Gulf area is to strengthen the position of the companies and of this Government in those oil fields. It is the unanimous judgment of the departments which participated in the formulation of the program that American control of these oil reserves is vital to the security of this Nation, and that this control was imperiled so long as the companies did not have the participation, in an ownership capacity, of the United States Government. This view has been asserted by representatives of the companies themselves, particularly by the Standard Oil Company of California and the Gulf Oil Company. It was most ardently championed by representatives of the State Department. It is my considered judgment that unless steps are taken now— during the war —to achieve this objective, it will not be attained for many years to come; perhaps never. Consideration of the domestic political situation, as well as of our bargaining position internationally, supports this conclusion. If this Government should acquire an interest in the companies or in the reserves, it would merely be placing itself upon a par with the British. As a matter of fact, it is doubtful whether this Government, as a result of the negotiations, would acquire as full a degree of ownership and control as the British Government has in its companies operating in the Persian Gulf area. In view of the participation of the British Government in the Persian Gulf area, I cannot see that they would have any basis whatever for objecting to American participation in the ownership of American companies or of reserves controlled by them. Certainly, we should give no weight to such an objection by the British Government. In fact, it seems to me that, unless this Government places itself upon a basis in the Persian Gulf area which approximates the position of the British Government, our position in the negotiations will not be as good as it should be. It seems to me that the only relevant question of international policy is whether prosecution of the program would prejudice the relations of this Government with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Shaikhdom of Kuwait. The State Department has on several occasions, as well as by your own approval of the program, indicated that such prejudice need not result. I do not understand that you have changed your position in this respect and I do not know of any facts which might justify a change of position. Furthermore, I am advised that King Ibn-Saud has indicated to representatives of the Standard Oil Company of California that he would welcome participation by this Government in the California Arabian Company. 9 Accordingly, I propose to call a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation to consider your suggestion that negotiations be suspended. I hope that you will find it possible to attend this meeting, and I should be glad to arrange it to suit your convenience. It is my thought that the Board should consider the points which you make in your letter and should advise the President of its conclusions and recommendations. Sincerely yours, Harold L. Ickes 8 See joint letter of June 26, 1943, to President Roosevelt by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Acting Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 924 . 9 See telegram 172, November 3, 1943, from Jidda. Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 941 . Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 800.6363/1428 [Document 11] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington , January 8, 1944. As you know, the Petroleum Reserves Corporation has negotiated for governmental participation in companies holding oil reserves in the Middle East. As you also know, this Government is going to conduct conversations with the British on Middle Eastern oil. The broad objectives of these conversations, which look to the assurance of supplies for peace time and security needs as well as benefits to the countries owning the resources, encompass the purpose for which the Petroleum Reserves Corporation’s negotiations were undertaken. However, it is not now possible to determine whether the Petroleum Reserves Corporation’s negotiations would be consistent with the course we may decide to follow as a result of the conversations with the British. Therefore, I believe that negotiations of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation looking to governmental participation in companies having foreign reserves should be held in abeyance, and I have advised Secretary Ickes accordingly. The question of further negotiations of this nature can be reexamined, of course, at a later period in the light of the developments connected with the conversations with the British. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] Memorandum by President Roosevelt 800.6363/1431 [Document 12] Memorandum by President Roosevelt 10 Washington , January 10, 1944. I do hope that you can get together and straighten out this problem of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation. It is, of course, true that the State Department should handle, in general, matters relating to foreign affairs—but at the present time I think it vital that we should go ahead with some speed in negotiating with the American companies, in order to find out just where the United States stands before we take the matter up with the British. I thought that this policy had been settled at one of our earlier meetings in the White House. I feel that time is important—because after the war the American position will be greatly weaker than it is today. Can’t we agree on a policy and on the method of putting it into effect? I am referring especially to the letter of the Secretary of State of January fifth, and the reply thereto by the Secretary of the Interior on January seventh. F[ ranklin ] D. R[ oosevelt ] 10 Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Interior. Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State 800.6363/1431 [Document 13] Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State Washington , January 10, 1944. I will not do or say anything about the enclosed 11 until you and Ickes have a chance to talk things over. Offhand, I cannot approve holding this thing in reserve. Action is really necessary—and I think we should negotiate with our own people who have oil before we negotiate with the British. In other words, we ought to know just what our own assets are before we try to make out a case with the British. F[ ranklin ] D. R[ oosevelt ] 11 The memorandum of January 8 by the Secretary of State, p. 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] . Memorandum by the Executive Officer of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board (Carter) 800.6363/1–1744 [Document 14] Memorandum by the Executive Officer of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board ( Carter ) 12 [ Washington ,] January 17, 1944. Proposal The Problem 1. To outline a course of action to be adopted in connection with the development of petroleum reserves in the Persian Gulf area in such a manner as properly to safeguard United States interests in those reserves. Facts Bearing on the Problem 2. Beginning about a year ago some of the U.S. oil companies holding concessions in the Persian Gulf area requested that certain agencies of the U.S. Government consider plans under which the government would become interested directly or indirectly with the companies in the ownership of the petroleum reserves in that area. The purpose of such proposed interest by the government was to assure the security of the oil concessions of the companies involved, thus keeping the exportable portion of the oil available for the U.S. 3. During the course of the past year it has become more and more apparent that known petroleum reserves within the continental limits of the United States, and indeed within the Western Hemisphere, are inadequate to meet over a period of years either the war needs of the United States or the needs of the civil economy of the country once normal conditions are reestablished. 4. The great majority of informed opinion supports the thought that steps should be taken to assure to the United States a backlog of petroleum reserves free from any conditional arrangement with foreign governments other than such agreements as may be necessary with the governments of the states in which such reserves are located. 5. Several of the American oil companies holding concessions in the Persian Gulf area have expressed the belief that failure of the Government to act and to act promptly will result in undermining the position of the interested United States companies and will, in their view, threaten the availability of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf area to the United States. 6. The Petroleum Reserves Corporation was conceived and organized with the idea of assuring to the United States a proper backlog of petroleum reserves along lines indicated in paragraphs two (2) to five (5) above, and with the further idea of representing the U.S. Government in the solution of the problem of the long-term availability of petroleum products by day to day contact of representatives of that agency with the government and with the oil industry. The Petroleum Reserves Corporation entered into certain negotiations 13 which were not successful. This Corporation has not yet made a clear statement of policy with a view to defeating the organized propaganda having as its objective the discrediting of this organization. Objection to U.S. Government participation in the development of petroleum reserves in the Persian Gulf area has been raised through propaganda against government ownership and participation in any business, and specifically in the oil business, whether within this country or abroad. 7. Meanwhile the British, organized effectively as they are, have increased their requests for steel to be used in the expansion of crude oil producing, transportation and refining facilities in the Persian Gulf area, including steel for an additional pipeline to provide another outlet to the Eastern Mediterranean. 8. The United States companies, other than those directly associated with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 14 are bewildered. They do not know what course to follow, and, indeed, do not know what course the United States Government wishes them to follow. At least one group of these companies wishes to construct a crude oil refinery, without high octane facilities, capacity 50,000 barrels per day, in the Persian Gulf area, this being that group’s estimate of the output which its anticipated business could justify. Another group has been approached by representatives of the U.S. Government with the idea of obtaining some petroleum for war requirements, but is unable to act because of restrictive agreements imposed by its British partners. Conclusions and Recommendations 10. Recognizing that existing conditions must be altered with the least practicable delay, the following course of action is proposed: a . Either confirm the Petroleum Reserves Corporation as the government agency to handle foreign oil problems or, alternatively, designate another agency with a board representing the same government interests as are now represented by the Board of Directors of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation; namely, Departments of State, War, Navy and Interior and the Office of Foreign Economic Administration. b . The Petroleum Reserves Corporation (or other agreed agency) issue with the least practicable delay a clear statement of policy, stressing the need for the establishment of such an agency and emphasizing the fact that it is not intended to use this agency as a means of forcing United States Government participation in private business or enterprise at home or abroad. (See Appendix “A”, proposed statement of policy. 15 ) c . Agree to permit the building of a 50,000–barrel oil refinery in Saudi Arabia and take steps to release the steel and other equipment necessary to enable the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company to undertake this project with its own funds. d . In conjunction with the State Department as to negotiations, and under the guidance of that Department as to general foreign policy, take such action as is necessary to survey the route, obtain rights of way and build a pipeline to serve as an outlet for United States controlled crude oil and/or petroleum products in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf area, the Western terminus of such line to be at a point to be selected in the Eastern Mediterranean. e . Arrange for the proposed pipeline to be financed and owned by the United States Government with an agreed sinking fund on the investment to be paid for each barrel transported through the line. f . Request the State Department to undertake negotiations with the British to remove all restrictions on United States companies as to the production and marketing of products originating in the Persian Gulf area. g . As a further consideration for these undertakings the United States Government will have the right to acquire a specified amount of oil at a fixed and favorable price to be agreed, such products to be used by or reserved for the U.S. Army and Navy. h . The United States Government will have an option on an agreed volume of oil of not less than one billion barrels under terms to be agreed for the life of the leases. i . If subparagraphs 10 c to 10 h are acceptable, abandon the idea of obtaining an equity stock interest in any of the companies owning concessions in the Persian Gulf area at this time. 16 j . The Petroleum Reserves Corporation (or other agreed agency) with the State Department as outlined under paragraph 10 d above will enter into negotiations with the British and such other Government agencies as may be concerned for the conservation of oil in the Persian Gulf Basin and contiguous areas with a view to world conservation, thus preventing wasteful dissipation of assets. k . The Petroleum Reserves Corporation (or other agreed agency) will have the duty of maintaining continuous contact with its own Board of Directors, with the United States Petroleum industry, with appropriate U.S. Government agencies, and (to the extent required) with British and/or other interests affecting its problems. 12 Copy received from Commodore A. F. Carter by Charles B. Rayner, who had been designated Adviser on Petroleum Policy on January 15. The Department of Defense has supplied information to the effect that its records contain no indication that this memorandum resulted from any official action taken by the Army-Navy Petroleum Board. Accordingly, it is presumed to express the individual views of the Executive Officer, ANPB. 13 To obtain an equity stock interest in American oil companies operating in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 14 Presumably reference is to the Iraq Petroleum Company. 15 Not printed. 16 There is no indication in Department files that there were further negotiations on this matter. In a memorandum of January 25, 1944, to President Roosevelt, the Director of War Mobilization (Byrnes) opposed the proposed Government purchase of equity in the oil companies and approved the proposed pipeline project in Saudi Arabia; for text of the memorandum, see Investigation of the National Defense Program: Hearings before the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, pt. 41, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 25387. The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State 800.6363/1494 [Document 15] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State Washington , January 26, 1944. Dear Mr. Secretary : The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered your letter of 15 December 1943 17 which outlines the policy the Department of State believes should be followed in regard to the construction of refinery facilities in the Persian Gulf area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 99th Meeting on 3 August 1943 approved plans for the construction in Saudi Arabia of a refinery designed for an initial throughput of 100,000 barrels per day of Saudi Arabian crude to yield 20,700 barrels per day of Grade 130 aviation fuel and other products. The Petroleum Reserves Corporation undertook the handling of the plans for the proposed refinery in connection with its negotiations for part ownership in the crude oil reserves in Saudi Arabia. It was unable to conclude a satisfactory arrangement with the companies interested in the Saudi Arabia concession and asked to be relieved of the responsibility of further consideration of refinery construction in the Persian Gulf area. On 18 November 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff relieved Petroleum Reserves Corporation of the duty of further consideration at that time of refinery construction in the Persian Gulf area and requested the Petroleum Administrator for War 18 to develop plans for the construction of additional refining facilities in that general area. In a letter dated 18 January 1944 19 the Petroleum Administrator for War has advised that after having surveyed the situation primarily from the standpoint of military supply requirements, it is felt that new refining facilities in the Persian Gulf area to meet approximately the objectives originally scheduled can be provided most expeditiously and with minimum cost through the construction of a single refinery in Saudi Arabia. This letter recommends the construction of a plant with a crude oil charging capacity of 100,000 barrels daily to produce 15,500 barrels of Grade 130 aviation fuel and other products in conformity with established refining practice. Because of various changes in factors affecting military supply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended the construction of a 50,000 barrel refinery in the Persian Gulf area, such plant to have no facilities for the processing of Grade 130 aviation fuel in its initial phase but so designed that equipment to produce aviation fuel and/or additional motor gasoline may be installed if changes in requirements make such steps advisable. Should the outcome of studies now being undertaken by the Petroleum Administration for War indicate the need for additional facilities in the Persian Gulf area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will give careful consideration to such recommendations as may be made by the Petroleum Administration for War. A copy of letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Petroleum Administrator for War approving the construction of the refinery in Saudi Arabia is being furnished you. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in essential agreement with the thought expressed in the final paragraph of your letter of 15 December 1943 that those refining facilities best in accord with over-all American interests in the Middle Eastern area should be given priority to the maximum extent compatible with direct war needs. Copies of this letter are being sent to the Secretaries of War and Navy and to the Petroleum Administrator for War. 21 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: William D. Leahy Admiral, U. S. Navy Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 17 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 950 . 18 Harold L. Ickes. 19 Not printed. This letter was addressed to Admiral Ernest J. King of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations; a copy was transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Petroleum Administrator for War on January 18 (800.6363/1468). 21 For text of statement made by the Petroleum Administrator for War on February 3, 1944, that the Arabian American Oil Company would undertake the construction of a privately owned and financed refinery in Saudi Arabia, see Congressional Record , vol. 90, pt. 2, p. 1466. Memorandum by the Petroleum Adviser (Rayner) to the Secretary of State 800.6363/1–2944 [Document 16] Memorandum by the Petroleum Adviser ( Rayner ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] January 29, 1944. Mr. Secretary : In connection with the outline of principles of the proposed agreement covering the pipeline from the Persian Gulf area to the Eastern Mediterranean 22 which was discussed at the meeting of the Directors of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation yesterday [ January 27 ], I raised the question of the desirability of Government operation of the pipeline and also of Government ownership after the war emergency period had passed. There was complete agreement that the word “operate” should be deleted from the proposed agreement and the following sentence added: “The Government shall determine the most feasible plan for the operation of the facilities and shall retain supervision thereof” The general feeling was that actual operations would be conducted, under Government supervision, by the companies, as that would be the most practical arrangement. Secretary Ickes was strongly of the opinion that the pipeline should be Government owned throughout its entire period of operation. The representatives of the other agencies were in agreement. The Secretaries of War and Navy were not present. I agreed to Government ownership as far as the war emergency was concerned but stated that after that period had passed, it was my feeling that the question of ownership by private interests rather than by the Government should be examined in the light of the then existing conditions. After some discussion it was agreed that the minutes of the meeting would contain the following statement: “That without now committing itself to any policy in connection therewith, the Board is agreed that when the war is ended and the existing emergency has passed, the question of continued ownership by an agency of the United States Government of the pipeline system would be reviewed.” In view of the foregoing, I am in accord with the outline of principles of the proposed agreement as revised and recommend that you send the attached letter to Secretary Ickes 23 signifying your approval. Charles B. Rayner 22 In a letter of March 29, 1944, to the Secretary of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation (Fortas), Mr. Rayner stated he had been given a copy of the “Outline of Principles of the Proposed Agreement” a day or so prior to the meeting of the PRC Board of Directors on January 27 (800.6363/1566). Draft of Outline of Principles, dated January 24, 1944, not printed. 23 Infra. The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Interior (Ickes) 800.6363/1–2944 [Document 17] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Interior ( Ickes ) 24 Washington , January 31, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I wish to advise you of my approval of the outline of principles of the proposed agreement, dated January 24, 1944, covering the proposed pipeline from the Persian Gulf area to a port on the eastern Mediterranean, with the revisions made therein at the meeting of the Directors of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation on January 27, 1944. 25 Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 24 This letter was addressed to Mr. Ickes in his capacity as President of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation. 25 At a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation on February 5, 1944, Mr. Ickes submitted an additional paragraph (No. 11) which had been drafted at President Roosevelt’s direction. Mr. Rayner notified Mr. Ickes the same day of the approval of the additional paragraph by the Secretary of State (800.6363/2–544). The date January 24 was retained on the outline as finally approved. A summary was released on February 6, 1944, by the Department of the Interior (800.6363/2–644); for substance of the press release, see telegram 437, March 3, 1 p.m., to Cairo, p. 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] . The texts of the outline and of the press release are printed in the Congressional Record , vol. 90, pt. 2, p. 1466. The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics 800.6363/1506c: Circular airgram [Document 18] The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics 26 Washington , February 17, 1944—7 p.m. For your strictly confidential information, we are actively engaged in developing a firm post war foreign oil policy. Exploratory conversations will soon be initiated between this Government and the British Government on problems of mutual interest concerning Middle Eastern oil. It is quite possible that these conversations will lead to international oil discussions of a broader scope. On February 2, the Secretary met with the heads of the American companies operating abroad and with the President of the American Petroleum Institute and advised them of the forthcoming conversations with the British and indicated the Department’s interest in foreign petroleum matters. American oil companies with foreign interests are being encouraged to present their views and problems to the Department, and are discussing with the Department their interest in and endeavors to obtain foreign concessions. The Department is informing them that this Government, because of the wartime and long-range importance of oil, favors the development of foreign oil resources and welcomes the participation of American companies in that development. This Government takes the clear position that, if any country grants to foreigners rights concerning the exploration for or development of petroleum resources, the nationals of the United States should be accorded equal opportunity with the nationals of any other country to obtain such rights. With this end in view, if the occasion arises, you should render all appropriate assistance to representatives of American oil companies who may be seeking petroleum concessions or rights in the country to which you are accredited. This assistance should include such introductions by you as may facilitate proper contacts between the companies’ representatives and government officials and other persons where desirable. To the maximum extent appropriate, in the light of the foregoing policy, you should indicate an interest in the matter to government officials. The Department desires you to maintain such contact with any oil company representatives, who may be engaged in the above-indicated endeavors, as will encourage them to keep you advised of their activities. The Department wishes to be kept fully and currently informed of any action taken by the Embassy in line with the foregoing. Stettinius [For the texts of messages exchanged by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on February 20, 22, 24, and March 4, concerning the ownership of oil resources in the Middle East, see volume III, pages 100 , 101 , 102 , and 103 ; see also the portion of a message of March 3 in footnote 10, ibid. , page 103 .] 26 Sent to the diplomatic representatives in Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) 800.6363/1515a: Telegram [Document 19] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) Washington , March 3, 1944—1 p.m. 437. There is given below in substance the press release of February 6, issued by Secretary Ickes regarding the construction of a pipe line in the Middle East: “An Agreement in Principle with the Arabian American Oil Company and the Gulf Exploration Company was signed by Secretary Ickes with the approval of the President and of the State Department and upon the recommendation of the War and Navy Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, the purpose of which is to make provision for the construction of a pipe line from the Persian Gulf area to a point on the Eastern Mediterranean and to provide for United States Naval and Military forces a reserve of one billion barrels of oil. The Government will determine the most feasible plan for operation of the facilities and will retain supervision thereof. The entire cost of construction plus interest, estimated to be between $130,000,000 and $165,000,000, is guaranteed by the companies and will be returned to the Government within a period of 25 years. The pipe line facilities, subject to certain stipulated obligations, will be available to other oil producers and shippers in addition to those signing the Agreement. The companies agree to maintain a crude oil petroleum reserve of 1 billion barrels or 20 percent of the total crude reserve if they [ there ] are less than 5 billion barrels to be available for Government purchase for military or naval use at 25 percent below Persian Gulf area market price or of price of similar United States crude oil, whichever is the lower. The Government is not obligated to take any of this oil but has right to do so at any time for a period of 50 years and also has an option to purchase all crude petroleum and petroleum products thereof produced by the companies in times of war or other national emergency. Further, the Agreement provides that the companies will not sell petroleum or petroleum products to any Government or nationals of any Government when, in the opinion of the State Department, such sales would be unwise in the light of United States foreign policy and requirements of collective security. The companies also agree that they will give notice to the State Department and Petroleum Reserves Corporation before negotiating with governments of any foreign countries for the sale of petroleum and petroleum products from their concessions in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Petroleum Reserves Corporation does not propose to compete with private oil industry of the United States. Its purpose is to promote that industry, to further the interests of the people of the United States, and to promote the interests of the governments and of the peoples of the areas concerned. The agreement is conditioned upon obtaining the sanction of the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In addition, the sanction would be obtained of other interested foreign governments, including those of Trans-Jordan and Palestine.” 27 Repeat to Jidda, Jerusalem and Baghdad. 28 Copies of press release and the Outline of Principles of Proposed Agreement have been sent air mail. 29 Stettinius 27 For comments on the proposed pipeline made before the House of Commons by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) on February 9, March 1, and April 26, 1944, see Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 396, col. 1744, vol. 397, col. 1434, and vol. 399, col. 785. In telegram 561, March 9, 5 p.m., the Minister in Egypt reported a statement by the Egyptian Minister of Commerce and Industry before the Chamber of Commerce the previous night that the Egyptian Government had not been officially informed of the project and that there had been no negotiations on the subject between the Egyptian and American Governments (800.6363/1522). 28 Also repeated to Tehran with the following added: “Referring to your 122 of February 23, the foregoing may be brought to attention of Prime Minister.” (800.6363/1515a) No. 122 stated: “Would appreciate being informed of nature of reply which may be made to Prime Minister in response to his request for information concerning proposed new oil pipe [line] from this area to Eastern Mediterranean.” (800.6363/1501) 29 Instruction 697, February 19, not printed; copies of the enclosures were also transmitted the same day to Jidda and Baghdad in instructions 115 and 142, respectively. The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives 800.6363/1538g: Circular telegram [Document 20] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives 30 Washington , March 21, 1944—11 p.m. The following relates to both the proposed pipeline and the forthcoming conversations with the British on oil. For your confidential information, while the proposed pipeline, if constructed, would have a direct relation to any agreement that may be arrived at with the British on oil, it originated as an entirely separate proposal from the conversations. As indicated in Secretary Ickes’ press release, a summary of which we sent you, the proposed pipeline would start in Saudi Arabia with gathering systems to the Arabian and Kuwait oil fields and would presumably follow the most direct route feasible to an undetermined port on the Eastern Mediterranean. It is proposed that the Government would build, own, and arrange for the operation (presumably by the companies) of the line, although, for your strictly confidential information, the way is left open for a reexamination after the emergency period of the question of ownership. The Agreement which has been signed by Secretary Ickes with the American companies operating in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and which was referred to in the press release, is an Agreement on Principles only. No definitive contract for the construction of the pipeline has been signed, and there has developed considerable opposition to the line in Congress and on the part of the American oil industry. We contemplate that no positive action will be taken concerning the construction of the pipeline, including the surveying of possible routes, until the matter has been properly cleared with all interested governments in the area. However, the matter will not be discussed with such governments until there is no longer any question concerning the actual construction of the line. You have been informed by Radio Bulletin concerning the Acting Secretary’s announcement regarding the forthcoming conversations with the British (Department’s press release of March 7 31 ). As indicated in that statement, there will be preparatory technical discussions between British and American experts on oil problems of mutual interest to the two Governments. It is planned that these discussions will lead as rapidly as possible to conversations between high level groups representing the two Governments. The Secretary of State has been appointed by the President as chairman of the American group at the high level. It is contemplated that these conversations will be entirely between the British and ourselves. However, the Acting Secretary’s announcement (Department’s press release of March 7) specifically stated that should these conversations lead to conclusions, no decisions affecting producing areas will be taken without consultation with the governments of the countries concerned. Moreover, the Acting Secretary announced that this Government is at all times ready to discuss economic problems with any other friendly country concerning petroleum questions of mutual interest. You should endeavor to see that the Department’s release and particularly these statements are given adequate publicity. Also, you should bring them to the attention of the authorities in such manner as you think advisable. We will endeavor to keep you advised concerning any developments of which you should be aware in regard to either the pipeline or the discussions with the British. Hull 30 Sent to the diplomatic representatives in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia; the representative in Egypt was directed to repeat the message to the representative in Palestine. 31 Department of State Bulletin , March 11, 1944, p. 238. Memorandum by the Inter-Divisional Petroleum Committee of the Department of State 811.6363/4–1144 [Document 21] Memorandum by the Inter-Divisional Petroleum Committee of the Department of State 32 [ Washington ,] April 11, 1944. Foreign Petroleum Policy of the United States i objectives of united states foreign petroleum policy 1. The “equal access” clause of the Atlantic Charter should be implemented in respect of petroleum. 2. General recognition should be achieved of the principle of equal opportunity for American enterprise in exploration for additional sources of supply of petroleum, and in the development of whatever reserves may be found in the future. 3. A broad policy of conservation of Western Hemisphere petroleum reserves should be adopted in the interest of hemispheric security, in order to assure the adequacy for military and civilian requirements of strategically available reserves. This broad policy would need to be implemented by measures of domestic as well as foreign policy. The appropriate foreign policy should include these three elements: a . Curtailment, in so far as practicable, of the flow of petroleum and its products from Western Hemisphere sources to Eastern Hemisphere markets. This change in the flow of trade in Western Hemisphere oil should be accompanied by reasonable safeguards for the interests of Western Hemisphere producing countries having established market outlets in the Eastern Hemisphere. b . Facilitation, by international agreement and otherwise, of substantial and orderly expansion of production in Eastern Hemisphere sources of supply, principally in the Middle East, to meet increasing requirements of post-war markets. c . Removal, by international agreement and otherwise, of impediments to the exploitation of Middle Eastern concessions held by United States nationals. 4. In order that adequate supplies of Eastern Hemisphere petroleum may be available to the United States to permit it to take appropriate part in a system of collective security, steps should be taken to safeguard existing concessions held abroad by United States nationals. These steps are: a . To use diplomatic assistance where necessary to assure against alienation of those concessions. b . To arrive at an international understanding concerning the development of Middle Eastern petroleum resources free from unilateral political intervention. 5. This Government should endeavor to assure maximum economic benefits to the foreign areas in which petroleum is located. ii application of the policy to middle eastern petroleum Consideration has been given to the question of whether the accelerating depletion of United States oil reserves necessitates formulation of a program for Government-sponsored net imports of petroleum from the Middle East to the United States, either for current consumption or stockpiling or both. The evidence of the necessity for such a program is not conclusive. Furthermore, the complex political and economic difficulties that would be involved render the program unwise. A broad policy of conservation of Western Hemisphere reserves, however, does call for curtailment, in so far as practicable, of the flow of petroleum and its products from Western Hemisphere sources to Eastern Hemisphere markets. The logical and natural source of supply for these latter markets is the Eastern Hemisphere terminus of the oil axis, i.e., the broad area of sedimentary basins contiguous to the Black, Caspian and Ked Seas, the Persian Gulf and the eastern end of the Mediterranean. These geologic regions include the great developed oilfields of Russia, Roumania, Iraq, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula as well as the potential petroleum resources of Turkey, the Levantine Coastal areas, Afghanistan and Baluchistan. These latter areas are as yet almost entirely undeveloped. Russian oil production, unless the tempo of exploitation is greatly accelerated, will probably continue to be barely adequate for Russia’s expanding industrial requirements. Roumania has historically been a significant supplier of the European market and presumably will continue to be such; but Roumania cannot supply more than a fraction of Europe’s requirements. It is then, toward the remainder of this geologic region that the Eastern Hemisphere should logically turn for oil supplies—toward the Middle East—toward Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian peninsula including Saudi Arabia proper and the Sheikhdoms of Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and Trucial Oman. It is primarily with respect to these Middle Eastern areas, then that United States policy must be formulated and implemented. The key points in that policy must be ( a ) development, and ( b ) assurance of adequate American participation in that development. Prompt, full and orderly development of the known reserves of the area should be achieved in order to permit annual Middle Eastern production to supply the expanding net import requirements of Europe, Africa and such parts of Asia as are not more economically supplied from the East Indies. This in turn will conserve Western Hemisphere oil reserves for Western Hemisphere peace-time uses and as a security reserve in the event of War. Moreover, such development will create a potential outside source of supply for the United States in the event that the recent unfavorable curve of domestic discoveries should not take a turn for the better. In so far as such development is delayed by existing conflicts of short-run interest between the United States and the United Kingdom, and is impeded by existing political and contractual restrictions 33 upon United States companies having concession rights and proprietary interests in the Middle East, a close understanding with the British is most desirable in order to effectuate the basic United States policy. American participation in the development of Middle Eastern petroleum is equitable because American interests hold a large percentage of proven reserves in that area and participate only to a minor extent in current production. Such participation is desirable because there will then be greater assurance that the tempo of exploitation will be adequate in relation to the desired conservation of Western Hemisphere oil reserves. Furthermore, and of greater importance, United States policy should, in general, aim to assure to this country, in the interest of security, a substantial and geographically diversified holding of foreign petroleum resources in the hands of United States nationals. This would involve the preservation of the absolute position presently obtaining, and therefore vigilant protection of existing concessions in United States hands coupled with insistence upon the Open Door principle of equal opportunity for United States companies in new areas. The United States petroleum policy in the Middle East, then, must be predicated upon these two overall objectives: ( a ) full development of Middle Eastern Petroleum production, and ( b ) the stabilization and safeguarding of American concession rights. The more specific policy objectives are as follows: 1. An intergovernmental understanding with the United Kingdom should be reached immediately on broad principles governing petroleum development and distribution with particular reference to a development program for the Middle Eastern area. This understanding should provide for the establishment of a joint Anglo-American Petroleum Commission, the functions of which are summarized in Part IV hereof. This bilateral understanding with the United Kingdom should be preliminary to the early negotiation of a multilateral agreement establishing an International Petroleum Council with appropriate representation for producing and consuming countries. 2. A second specific policy objective should be to provide protection against alienation of American-held concessions into non-American hands. To accomplish this it is necessary to forestall those factors that might operate in the direction of alienating American-controlled concessions. They include: a . Failure to exploit such concessions fully with the resultant failure to confer upon the countries granting the concessions those benefits which they legitimately anticipated as a consequence of discovery of oil within their domains; b . Failure to foresee and guard against political complications that might develop. Any proposal of American-owned companies to transfer, in whole or in part, assets in foreign-held petroleum reserves should be subject to prior approval by this Government. 3. A third specific policy objective should be to influence the flow of world trade in petroleum products in such manner as to substitute Middle Eastern oil for Western Hemisphere oil in Eastern Hemisphere markets with due regard for the legitimate interests of the Western Hemisphere. This substitution may come about in consequence of natural economic forces once Middle Eastern production has been adequately stimulated. 4. A fourth objective should be to eliminate the unilateral political intervention that has characterized Middle Eastern petroleum affairs heretofore. This will come about necessarily after the negotiation of the proposed multilateral agreement and the establishment of the proposed International Petroleum Council. In the meanwhile, the preliminary bilateral understanding with the Government of the United Kingdom should include reciprocal assurances that petroleum development, processing and marketing shall not be impeded either by restrictions imposed unilaterally by either Government or by intercompany arrangements. 5. In implementation of the equal access clause of the Atlantic Charter, any international agreements should guarantee equality of treatment to all purchasers in respect of prices, quantities, and terms and conditions of sale. In this connection, it would be desirable to reach an agreed definition of the equal access concept as applicable to petroleum supplies which would assure outside buyers of continuing opportunity to purchase oil at a price based upon true cost plus a reasonable profit. iii relation of the policy to latin american petroleum The effect of the change in the flow chart of world petroleum trade, contemplated by the foregoing policy objectives, on the established marketing interests of Latin American producing countries must receive full consideration. The maximum provision that might be made to safeguard these interests would be firm guarantees with respect to minimum quantities of Latin American petroleum to be absorbed annually by the United States market. This would immobilize the trade position of a particular segment in an industry subject to continuing change and would, therefore, be undesirable. It is, nevertheless, necessary to provide reasonable safeguards for the legitimate interests of Latin American producing countries. To this end, it is imperative that these countries be accorded an effective participation in the proposed International Petroleum Council. iv implementation of the policy 1. An immediate objective of the forthcoming conversations with the British, as indicated in Part II, is to reach an understanding with the Government of the United Kingdom on the broad principles governing petroleum development and distribution, with particular reference to the Middle East. To effectuate this understanding, provision establishing a joint Anglo-American Petroleum Commission should be included in the accord. The agreement establishing this Commission should embody the principles enunciated in Parts I and II hereof. This agreement should be designed to accomplish, among other things, these ends: a . Schedule aggregate exports from the Middle Eastern area to meet expanding demand. To realize this end it is necessary to work out a flexible schedule of probable import requirements of Eastern Hemisphere markets. This schedule must make allowance for probable rate of annual increase in consumption, for indigenous production, and for probable imports from other sources of supply. The aggregate volume of export so determined should be allocated among the various producing countries on some equitable basis. b . Assure adequate representation of consuming countries in the determination of export schedules and price arrangements. c . Consider problems arising in connection with the distribution of Middle Eastern petroleum, all conclusions reached to be consistent with any relevant international understandings. d . Assure equitably distributed economic benefits to all the producing areas affected. e . Abolish restrictions on production, refining, transportation and exports of petroleum from concession reserves held solely or jointly by American and/or non-American interests, in so far as inconsistent with the terms of the contemplated agreement. f . Provide that the two countries will make their petroleum resources available to each other and to all friendly countries in emergencies or for security reasons, consistently with whatever collective security arrangements may be established. 2. Furthermore, the understanding should include the following: a . That the two Governments will propose to other interested countries a multilateral petroleum convention based upon the principles adopted in the bilateral agreement; and b . That this multilateral convention will establish an International Petroleum Council, and indicate the views of the two Governments concerning the appropriate composition, functions and purposes of such a Council. 32 A report entitled Wartime Evolution of Postwar Foreign Oil Policy , prepared on May 29, 1947, in the Department of State, stated: “Beginning in December of 1943 a working group of economic and political officers in the Department, known as the Inter-divisional Petroleum Committee, met rather frequently to consider policy documents and various drafts of an Anglo-American agreement and of an annotated agenda for Anglo-American discussions. “During the period of activity of this Inter-divisional Petroleum Committee the President established on February 15, 1944 a ‘Cabinet Committee’ to prepare for, directly or through designees, petroleum conversations with the Government of the United Kingdom. Secretary of State Hull was Chairman and Secretary of Interior Ickes was Vice Chairman of this Committee. The Cabinet Committee in turn established on April 1, 1944 the ‘Interdepartmental Petroleum Committee to consist of personal designees of the various members of the Cabinet Committee. The function of this Interdepartmental Committee was to examine and discuss documentation relative to the objective of the Anglo-American discussions. “The Inter-divisional Petroleum Committee of the State Department produced a policy document entitled ‘Foreign Petroleum Policy of the United States’. A first draft of this document dated approximately February 22, 1944 was considered and approved by the Postwar Programs Committee of the Department of State (which was then one of the two parallel top policy committees within the Department). It was subsequently discussed informally with an [ sic ] the Interdepartmental Petroleum Committee mentioned immediately above which conducted the first phase of the Anglo-American oil negotiations. As a result of this discussion certain minor changes were made in the document and as amended it was reconsidered and again approved by the Postwar Programs Committee on April 11, 1944. This document, while it still has a ‘secret’ classification and has never been disclosed, is still the only official statement of foreign petroleum policy (although there have been subsequent public statements by State Department officers based upon it and amplifying it; and it is due to be replaced by a policy document now under preparation in the Technical Committee on Petroleum which document should be ready for consideration by the Executive Committee in the summer or fall of 1947).” (811.6363/5–2947) The draft of February 22, identified as “CD I–c” is not printed (811.6363/4–1144). 33 With regard to political restrictions, see correspondence on the inquiry by the United States regarding British policy respecting the holding and operation by foreigners of petroleum concessions in territories such as Bahrein, and on efforts by the United States in support of American interests seeking an oil concession from the Sheikh of Kuwait, Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. iii , pp. 80 ff., and ibid. , 1932, vol. ii , pp. 1 ff. The contractual restrictions were embodied in the Group (Red Line) Agreement between private American and European oil interests on July 31, 1928. The text is printed in Current Antitrust Problems: Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 2, pp. 1004 ff.; for further information on the agreement and the events leading to the agreement, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 944 , footnote 42. The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 890F.6363/143: Telegram [Document 22] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) Washington , June 27, 1944—5 p.m. 116. The inquiry of the Acting Foreign Minister, 35 reported to us in your no. 178 of June 23, 36 whether there have been any recent developments in connection with the proposed trans-Arabian pipeline should be answered in the negative. For your confidential background information, there is an informal understanding within this Government to the effect that no further action will be taken on an Arabian pipeline as a governmental project until after the completion of the Cabinet-level conversations with the British and such subsequent public hearings as the Special Senate Oil Committee may wish to hold. 37 Hull 35 Yusuf Yassin. 36 Not printed. 37 Between March 31 and June 13, 1944, the Senate Special Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources held a series of eleven executive sessions regarding the proposed pipeline. The Committee’s intermediate report, issued on April 7, 1945, stated: “Quite apart, however, from constitutional and legal principles, the opinion began to develop, as a result of the committee’s investigation, that the determination of a sound and long-range national petroleum policy compelled the utmost care and public consideration prior to commitment on the part of the United States along the lines of the pipe-line proposal. Therefore, the committee unanimously concluded that the President of the United States and the Secretary of the Interior should be advised of these views. The chairman took action accordingly. “On June 12, 1944, the President wrote to the chairman of the Committee that he was asking the Secretary of the Interior to enter into no contract relating to an Arabian pipe line without giving the committee 30 days’ notice in advance. On the following day the Secretary of the Interior … appeared before the committee to testify, in executive session, in relation to the pipe line and the pending negotiations with the British looking toward an Anglo-American oil treaty. At the conclusion of the Secretary’s testimony, it was understood by the committee that, before any contract relating to the pipeline would be entered into, the committee would receive reasonable notice thereof while Congress was in session.” (Senate Report No. 179, 79th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2.) The question of building a pipeline across Saudi Arabia was handled thenceforth under private auspices. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) 890F.6363/10–1644: Telegram [Document 23] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) Washington , October 16, 1944—1 p.m. 213. Aramco is instructing its Jidda representative to acquaint you with information contained in company’s cable no. 57 from Davies to Ohliger 38 regarding pipeline reconnaissance party. 39 Although Aramco desires you to be fully informed of these plans, it is not expected that it will be necessary for you to take any action with regard thereto. However, should the King or Saudi Arabian officials inquire of you regarding the subject, you may state that it is purely an Aramco matter in which this Government is not involved, but that this Government has been fully informed of the company’s plans and entertains no objection to them. In the event it should appear necessary to take any active measures to assist the company in this matter, you should report fully to Department and request instructions. Hull 38 Floyd Ohliger, General Manager for Aramco in Saudi Arabia. 39 In telegram 2870, October 16, 1 p.m., to Cairo, the Department stated: “The Arabian American Oil Company plans to send soon a party of eight to the Near East to conduct a short preliminary reconnaissance, chiefly aerial, to ascertain the most advisable and best route in general, as well as terminus, of such pipeline as might be constructed, if and at such time as conditions permit, to the Mediterranean from the Persian Gulf. Although the company is not planning at present to construct the pipeline, it is making the reconnaissance on the basis of the company’s own initiative so that it will be prepared to build the line later should circumstances warrant. When the route is decided upon, the company intends to negotiate with the governments involved to obtain the right, but without obligation, to construct the line,” (800.6363/10–1144) The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.6363/11–1044: Airgram [Document 24] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , November 10, 1944—9 a.m. [Received November 22—5 p.m.] A–74. During visit of Aramco officials to Riyadh, October 18–20 (ReLegs 325, October 30, 5 p.m. 40 ), King Abdul Aziz consented readily to Aramco survey 41 of possible pipe-line route to Mediterranean (ReDepts 213, October 16, 1 p.m.). King had no objection to use of airplanes for survey. Aramco’s suggestion of route via Abqaiq–Yuriya Al Ilya–Hafar Al Batn was dismissed by King who said best route would be Abqaiq–Abu Hadriya, keeping sand belt always on left. He had obviously formed decided opinions in advance of any surveys. Equally obvious he is hospitable and friendly to construction of pipe-line. Aramco party reports that King’s close adviser, Khalid Bey al Gurgani, formerly always aloof in manner, and long reported hostile, was friendly and openly cordial for first time. Eddy 40 Post , p. 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] . 41 The results of the survey were embodied in “Prospectus for a Crude Oil Pipe Line from Oil Producing Regions in Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean Sea, May 31, 1945”, a copy of which was transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Egypt in despatch 337, April 23, 1948 (890F.6363/4–2348). Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 890F.6363/11–1044 [Document 25] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) [ Washington ,] November 23, 1944. Mr. Stettinius : As you may perhaps have noticed from airgram no. 74 of November 10 from our Minister at Jidda, King Ibn Saud “consented readily” to permit the survey of a possible pipe-line route to the Mediterranean 42 by the Arabian American Oil Company during a visit of officials of that company to Riyadh last month. This is good news and a further indication that the King is disposed to play ball with us in everything that pertains to the development of our great oil concession in his country. Wallace Murray 42 In a memorandum of November 25 in reply the Under Secretary of State said that he had noted favorably the King’s consent to permit a survey of a possible pipe-line route across Saudi Arabia. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to President Roosevelt 811.6363/1–2245 [Document 26] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Clayton ) to President Roosevelt 43 Washington , [undated.] The following comments will indicate, I believe, that foreign oil matters are in hand and therefore need not receive attention at the expense of other matters at your forthcoming meeting abroad. Our foreign oil policy should seek the development of Middle Eastern oil for peacetime commercial purposes in order to promote, for our national security, the relative conservation of strategically located Western Hemisphere supplies. Since there is sufficient Middle Eastern oil to supply world markets for the forseeable future, this Government should not look upon those distant fields as security reserves but as sources of peacetime supplies for Eastern Hemisphere markets so that oil exports from the Western Hemisphere may be curtailed. Accordingly, we should endeavor to (1) safeguard Middle Eastern concessions now held by American companies, and (2) encourage the companies to expand Middle Eastern production. As you know, in the Anglo-American petroleum negotiations the British and ourselves agreed upon principles in line with this objective. These were embodied in the Anglo-American oil agreement, 44 and it is our intention to preserve them although the agreement will be revised in early renegotiations with the British 45 to remove certain ambiguities. The British and ourselves have declared our intention of working toward a multilateral oil agreement with other interested governments, including of course the Russian Government. However, it is felt that oil discussions should not be held with that Government until we can determine more clearly the basis on which governmental oil systems and privately owned oil industries can meet. The Russians hold no concessions in the Middle East, the concessions there, as you know, being controlled by the British and ourselves, and the Anglo-American agreement should take care of all British-American oil problems in the area. When the Russians recently sought a concession in Iran, while American and British interests were also negotiating there, the Iranian Government decided to grant no new foreign concessions. 46 We recognized that such a decision rested solely with the Iranian Government, but expressed the hope that if in future Iranian concessions should be granted to foreigners, American interests would have equal opportunity with the nationals of other countries. We are now actively developing with the British a program to assure oil supplies to France and other liberated areas. As soon as the program has been sufficiently developed, it will be laid before other interested governments. W[ illiam ] L. C[ layton ] 43 Not sent; this memorandum was drafted in the Petroleum Division on January 19, 1945, to brief President Roosevelt on American foreign oil policy in connection with his forthcoming conference with British Prime Minister Churchill and Soviet Premier Stalin at Yalta. In an attached memorandum of January 22, 1945, to John E. Orchard, Special Assistant to Mr. Clayton, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Coordination and Review (Daniel) stated: “For reasons which you will understand we are not sending anything more to the White House for the President’s special attention.” (811.6363/1–2245) President Roosevelt left Washington on January 22. 44 For the text of this unperfected agreement of August 8, see Department of State Bulletin , August 13, 1944, p. 154; for negotiations leading to the agreement, see vol. iii , pp. 94 ff. 45 See footnote 36, ibid. , p. 127 . 46 See telegram 895, December 3, from Tehran, p. 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] . Special Economic Mission to the Middle East, for the restoration of trade to commercial channels Special Economic Mission to the Middle East, for the restoration of trade to commercial channels [27] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, September 4, 1944—4 p.m. 033.1151R/9–444: Circular telegram [28] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, October 6, 1944—noon. [Received October 7—5:30 a.m.] 033.115R/10–644: Telegram [29] Mr. William S. Culbertson, Chairman, Special Economic Mission, to the Secretary of State Cairo, November 15, 1944. 033.1151R/11–1545 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 033.1151R/9–444: Circular telegram [Document 27] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , September 4, 1944—4 p.m. A special Mission has been organized to study questions affecting foreign economic and commercial policies of this Government in relation to certain areas of North Africa 1 and the Middle East. The Mission is under the sponsorship of the Department of State and has as its Chairman William S. Culbertson who has been given the personal rank of Ambassador. In addition to Culbertson, personnel includes Homer Fox and Frederick Winant of State, Eric Biddle, Bureau of the Budget, Ray Miller, Department of Commerce, and John L. Gillis, William L. Friedlaender, Victor Bowman, Richard C. Thompson, and Van Lear Woodward of the Foreign Economic Administration. The Mission should arrive in Cairo early in September and later that month it is expected some of the members will leave Cairo to visit and make studies in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Palestine in the order mentioned. The scope of the proposed inquiry includes not only immediate questions of facilitating and increasing exports from the area to the United States but also recommendations for longer range plans for the promotion of commercial exchange. The Department requests that you facilitate activities of the Mission and render such aid and support as may be required. More detailed information concerning Culbertson Mission follows by air mail. Sent to Ankara, repeated to: Baghdad, Beirut, Jerusalem, Tehran and Cairo. Hull 1 For documentation on the activities of this mission in North Africa, see vol. iii , pp. 763 ff. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 033.115R/10–644: Telegram [Document 28] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , October 6, 1944—noon. [Received October 7—5:30 a.m.] 1912. The Turk authorities evidenced great interest in Ambassador Culbertson’s visit to Ankara of a week’s duration as it afforded them the opportunity to give evidence of their desire that trade between Turkey and the United States be returned to normal channels as soon as possible. The Minister of Commerce 2 gave a luncheon to which he invited nearly all Turkish officials and officers of the Embassy interested in trade and commercial matters. Culbertson had numerous conferences with many of these officials. I took him to call on the Prime Minister 3 and Foreign Minister 4 both of whom expressed the hope that his mission would result in liberalizing the restrictions and controls that are impeding the movement of trade between Turkey and the United States. Prior to his departure from Ankara Culbertson completed and forwarded his report 5 on Turkey which I regard as a sound resume of the existing situation. The report concludes with a recommendation that no special economic mission for Turkey is necessary at this time. Steinhardt 2 Celal Salt Siren. 3 Sükrü Saracoğlu. 4 Hasan Saka. 5 Not printed. Mr. William S. Culbertson, Chairman, Special Economic Mission, to the Secretary of State 033.1151R/11–1545 [Document 29] Mr. William S. Culbertson, Chairman, Special Economic Mission, to the Secretary of State Cairo , November 15, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I have the honor to submit the report of the Special Economic Mission to the Middle East. 6 The members of the Mission are William S. Culbertson, Chairman; Frederick Winant, Secretary; Homer S. Fox; E. C. Miller; Van Lear Woodward; John L. Gillis; William M. Friedlaender; Victor Bowman; Richard C. Thompson. The instructions of the Mission are set forth in full in the first paragraphs of the report. In their overall effect they reflect the Government’s purpose to restore commercial trade as rapidly as the exigencies of war permit on the basis of economic liberty without any inequality. For two months the members of the Mission have studied, in conformity with the terms of these instructions, the procedures, practices and policies affecting economic life within the area of the Middle East Supply Center. The report, submitted herewith, gives some idea of the diversity of the Mission’s activities. It would seem proper, however, for me to point out other and less obvious phases of the Mission’s accomplishments. In the first place, the members of the Mission have acquired information and experience which upon their return home may be utilized in conference and in advice by both government and business. In the second place and more important, the serious and constructive approach of the members of the Mission to their work has left a deep and favorable impression throughout the Middle East. In Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt they met socially and for conferences with both officials and private citizens. The resulting constant exchange of views has left behind appreciation and understanding which, if followed up by both government and business, will have helped substantially to build America’s economic future in this region. Very respectfully yours, William S. Culbertson 6 Not printed. The report itself consisted of a 32-page summary of general observations and recommendations; in addition, seven bulky annexes were attached. The original intention of the Department was to have Ambassador Culbertson conduct discussions in London with the British Government, somewhat along the lines of his Paris talks, but these discussions never took place. There did occur, however, an informal exchange of views between Ambassador Culbertson and the British Ambassador (Halifax) at the Department on March 7, 1945, which Lord Halifax followed up on July 4, 1945, by transmitting to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) an informal memorandum of comment by the British Foreign Office (033.1151R/12–144, 3–745, 7–445). The report, with its wide range of subject matter relating to lend-lease, financial and exchange questions, oil concessions and air and water communications, became the basis for much of the thinking in the Departmental approach to many of these problems in the years immediately ahead. Representations to the United Kingdom, leading to a relaxation of the import controls administered by the Middle East Supply Center Representations to the United Kingdom, leading to a relaxation of the import controls administered by the Middle East Supply Center [30] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , September 28, 1944. 800.24/9–2844 The Department of State to the British Embassy 800.24/9–2844 [Document 30] The Department of State to the British Embassy Aide-Mémoire The United States Government has been cognizant of the services to the war rendered by the Middle East Supply Center 1 and has been appreciative of the opportunity accorded to it by the British Government of cooperating in the administration of that Center. In the days when shipping was extremely scarce and supply difficulties beset both Governments, the Center conserved such shipping as was available to meet the essential needs of the Middle East. It also provided means whereby limited amounts of available goods could be equitably distributed and so best meet the needs of the populations of that area. In that enterprise the two Governments worked effectively together. The British Government is, of course, aware that these earlier conditions have changed and will continue to change with accelerated rapidity as the progress of the war in Europe proves steadily more favorable. Civilian supply has eased in a multitude of commodities, and limitations upon the production of goods for civilian end-use are being rapidly eliminated. The shipping situation shows signs of constant improvement as the supply of ships increases and the danger of the submarine menace diminishes. In these circumstances, the United States Government believes that it is no longer necessary to maintain the extensive system of import controls developed by the Middle East Supply Center for that territory. It proposes, however, to continue that system with reference to a select list of commodities in very short supply, where the necessity for equitable and controlled distribution requires resort to territorial import licensing coordinated by the operations of the Middle East Supply Center. It believes, however, that import licensing of this character is no longer required for most of the commodities involved. With reference to these, such supply and shipping considerations that are relevant to their export from the United States can be given due consideration by simple export or shipping controls administered through the appropriate agencies in the United States. The foregoing does not mean that the United States Government seeks to withdraw from the cooperative effort which has worked to such excellent advantage in the Middle East. The Center will still be the implement for such joint action as may be required with reference to those commodities which continue to be in very short supply during such period as may be considered necessary as a result of the existing emergency and the abnormal supply situation arising therefrom. It is suggested also that the United States Government and the British Government give consideration to the desirability of continuing to assist, through appropriate instrumentalities, in the promotion of the development of agricultural and industrial production in the Middle East, particularly in view of the developing regionalism of that area. The details of the program referred to above have been carefully worked out by the appropriate agencies of the United States Government. Consultation on these details will be desirable, so as to make clear to the British Government the nature of the controls which the United States Government will continue to maintain and those it will relax. Mr. Landis, the American Director of Economic Operations to the Middle East, is familiar with these matters. He hopes to proceed shortly to London, and thence to Cairo, there to work out such details as may be necessary to put into operation the policies of the United States described above. 2 Washington , September 28, 1944. 1 The Middle East Supply Center was an organization initially established by the British Government in April, 1941, under the stress of the growing crisis in shipping, to assume the task of planning and maintaining a supply of civilian goods for the populations of the Near and Middle East; the agency was partly civilian and partly military in composition, and was controlled by the British Ministry of Shipping at London. For correspondence concerning decision by the United States in 1942 to participate in the Middle East Supply Center, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. 2 For text of press release of December 31, 1944, concerning relaxation of the import controls administered by the Middle East Supply Center, effective January 1, 1945, see Department of State Bulletin , December 31, 1944, p. 846. Agreement to relax controls was reached in London on October 18 by James M. Landis, principal American civilian representative at the Middle East Supply Center, in an exchange with the appropriate British authorities (800.24/10–1944, 10–2744). Cultural relations program of the Department of State to provide technical assistance to the countries of the Near East and Africa, and to facilitate greater cultural cooperation between the United States and these countries Cultural relations program of the Department of State to provide technical assistance to the countries of the Near East and Africa, and to facilitate greater cultural cooperation between the United States and these countries [31] The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) Washington, June 9, 1944—8 p.m. 811.42700/179b: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) 811.42700/179b: Telegram [Document 31] The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut ( Wadsworth ) Washington , June 9, 1944—8 p.m. 77. Department has approved grant of $45,000.00 to American University Beirut and International College for each country named below five full 2-year scholarships or eight partial scholarships, approximately $900 per year maximum plus travel, to be awarded to students from Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. 1 Students will be chosen by national ministers of education in consultation with American ministers and in accordance with University requirements. University will have privilege of final choice. Staub 2 has accepted and countries have been informed. Please ask Dodge 3 to send missions above countries necessary information about requirements, qualifications and needs of students of American University Beirut and International College. Letter with details will follow. Stettinius 1 This was in pursuance of a program of cultural relations and technical assistance for the countries of the Near East and Africa, which was being organized by the Department of State from late 1942, and which represented an extension to the Moslem world of a program already successfully established with respect to the American Republics in 1938–1941 and China in 1941–1942. Focus of the program was centered mainly on American-founded schools in the area, the Department, via the Near East College Association of New York City, making grants-in-aid for special projects in education, health, engineering and agriculture, and sponsoring the exchange of professors and students. Throughout 1943 and 1944 this program was financed from the Emergency Fund for the President, as the Act of Congress approved August 9, 1939 (53 Stat. (pt. 2) 1290), which provided the legal basis for the American Republics program, had not yet been extended to include such activities conducted by the Department outside the Western Hemisphere. (811.42700/7–1344, 132) 2 Albert W. Staub, American Director, Near East College Association. 3 Bayard Dodge, president of the American University at Beirut. Afghanistan: Afghanistan: Contents Problems relating to the joint policy of the United States and the United Kingdom of supplying Afghanistan with essential import requirements (Documents 32-42) Problems relating to the joint policy of the United States and the United Kingdom of supplying Afghanistan with essential import requirements Problems relating to the joint policy of the United States and the United Kingdom of supplying Afghanistan with essential import requirements 1 1 For previous correspondence concerning this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 20 ff. passim. [32] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) Washington, February 10, 1944—7 p.m. 890H.24/151c: Telegram [33] The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State Kabul, February 11, 1944—7 p.m. [Received February 15—9:23 a.m.] 890H.24/154: Telegram [34] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) Washington, May 10, 1944—6 p.m. 890H.24/172a: Telegram [35] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [Washington,] May 16, 1944. 890H.24/180 [36] The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State Kabul, June 30, 1944—11 a.m. [Received July 4—8:16 a.m.] 890H.24/6–3044: Telegram [37] The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State Kabul, August 25, 1944. [Received September 9.] 890H.24/8–2544 [38] The Chief of the Afghanistan Section, Foreign Economic Administration (Meeker), to the Chief of the Eastern Hemisphere Division (Merchant) Washington, September 25, 1944. 890H.24/9–2544 [39] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) to the Chief of the Eastern Hemisphere Division (Merchant) [Washington,] September 26, 1944. 890H.24/9–2544 [40] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] October 23, 1944. 890H.24/10–2344 [41] The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State Kabul, November 11, 1944. [Received December 1.] 890H.24/11–1144 [42] The Assistant Adviser, War Supply and Resources Division (Farriss) to the Chief of the Afghanistan Section, Foreign Economic Administration (Meeker) Washington, December 18, 1944. 890H.24/9–2544 The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) 890H.24/151c: Telegram [Document 32] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Afghanistan ( Engert ) Washington , February 10, 1944—7 p.m. 23. The Department feels that every effort should be made, taking into account wartime conditions of supply and shipping, to accede to Afghanistan’s desire to meet its requirements by importations from the United States. For the duration of the present informal arrangement for joint screening with the British of Afghan requirements, the criteria for recommendation of imports from the United States are, as you know: 1. Essentiality of import to Afghan economy. 2. Unavailability of imports from Indian production or other closer sources of supply. With reference to point 2, the availability of imports from areas other than the United States should be considered in the light of our lend-lease contributions to those areas. The ability of closer areas to supply commodities furnished to such areas under lend-lease, or to supply commodities containing lend-lease components would not, except in special cases, justify adverse recommendation from the Legation. The same considerations apply to commodities the local production of which is substantially supplemented by lend-lease contributions. It is realized that the Legation may not always have at hand information which will enable it to be guided by the considerations mentioned in the foregoing paragraph. Those considerations are pointed out, however, as applicable insofar as information readily available to the Legation permits. For your confidential information the Department is informed that United States ships can be made available for transport of consignments to Indian ports, including those destined for Afghanistan. As the British Legation may view Afghan requests with less liberality, it is realized that attitudes of the two Legations toward recommendation may not always be identical. The Department desires full information when such divergence of opinion exists. In event that joint recommendation is unfavorable, basis therefor is desired in detail in order that the position of this Government may be fully explained to the Afghan Legation in Washington. Stettinius The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State 890H.24/154: Telegram [Document 33] The Minister in Afghanistan ( Engert ) to the Secretary of State Kabul , February 11, 1944—7 p.m. [Received February 15—9:23 a.m.] 19. Afghan authorities urge that a separate shipping quota be established for United States exports to Afghanistan and that within this quota Afghan representatives themselves be permitted to assign priorities for shipment of goods licensed for export by the United States. British Legation inclines to view that this would simplify procedure without depriving India of any significant tonnage and without interfering with control by export license. Beecroft 2 and I concur. Joint screening would of course remain necessary here both for preliminary determination of source of supply and to estimate total shipping program. British Legation is consulting its Government. Please inform FEA. 3 Engert 2 Eric Beecroft of the Office of the Special Representative of the Foreign Economic Administration at New Delhi was at Kabul January 12 to February 13 studying the Afghan supply situation. 3 Foreign Economic Administration. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) 890H.24/172a: Telegram [Document 34] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Afghanistan ( Engert ) Washington , May 10, 1944—6 p.m. 48. Part I . The Department informed the India Supply Mission of recommendation contained in Legation’s no. 19 of February 11 with request that recommendation be implemented. Mission replied that it would request instructions from the Government of India and now states that a telegram has been received to effect that proposal made by you which “originated with the Afghans” has been dropped as it would not facilitate procurement which is principal problem at present. In practice the Afghans are having no difficulty in securing shipping space at present and requests for allocations are made in each instance by them to an American agency rather than to the India Supply Mission. This arrangement is, of course, more acceptable to the Afghan representatives in this country than was the former which required that each request be transmitted in the first instance to the India Supply Mission. It may be, however, that the Afghans realize that actually the India Supply Mission still controls the allocations and hence that the existing agreement is also distasteful to them. The Department does not entirely understand the basis for the opposition of the Government of India to this proposal and is prepared to insist that a specific tonnage allocation be allocated for Afghan requirements if circumstances so warrant. Before taking further action, however, an expression of opinion from the Legation is desired. As there are a limited number of American flagships proceeding from the United States to India and as WSA 4 is understood to be extremely sympathetic to the proposal, it is believed that a specific tonnage allocation for Afghanistan could be established irrespective of opposition by the Government of India. Part II . Subsequent to the drafting of the aforegoing, Department has been informed by WSA that informal conversations on this subject have taken place between WSA and MWT. 5 Results of these talks will be communicated to you. Hull 4 War Shipping Administration. 5 British Ministry of War Transport. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs 890H.24/180 [Document 35] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] May 16, 1944. Participants: The Afghan Minister Abdol Hosayn Aziz Mr. Murray 6 Mr. Oakes The Afghan Minister called at his request. He proceeded to discuss the following matters: [Here follows section devoted to problems of Afghan students.] (2) The Minister stated that the quotas provided by FEA for Afghan requirements were not satisfactory in that they included many items which the Afghans did not need, and omitted many items which were necessary. Mr. Oakes replied that because of delay in receiving the schedule of requirements from Afghanistan, the requirements officers in FEA had been obliged to establish quotas without precise knowledge of Afghan needs. Mr. Oakes suggested that the Minister endeavor to have his Government submit its requirement lists more promptly, including therein an estimate of all items needed from the United States by either the Government or the people of Afghanistan, and of which the importation is contemplated. (3) The Minister referred to the desire of the Afghan-American Trading Company to import into the United States 2,000 tons of wool, 500 tons of pistachio nuts, and 100 tons of almonds, and to the refusal of this Government to authorize import quotas in the amount requested. Mr. Oakes replied that our refusal had been based on several grounds: ( a ) The items were unessential (it is understood that Afghan wool is used in this country almost exclusively for carpets), and hence the conservation of shipping space was involved; ( b ) The railways in India were so over-taxed and their continued efficient operation so essential to our and our Allies’ war effort in India that this Government considered it necessary to discourage the transportation to ports in India for shipment to the United States of unessential items; ( c ) Because of lack of shipping space it had been necessary to refuse import quotas for nuts to certain of our Allies in South America, and hence it was felt that we could not reasonably import nuts at this time from faraway Afghanistan without causing resentment by the South American countries concerned. The Minister stated that he was not so concerned about the quota for nuts but that he would greatly appreciate it if we would endeavor to do something about the wool. Our failure to permit any appreciable quantity of wool to enter this country resulted, he implied, in the British offering to pay only an unreasonably low price for Afghan wool. He felt that conditions should be such as to compel purchasers to pay the world market price. With regard to the railroads, he stated that wagons proceeding to Karachi must in many instances be empty because of the large quantity of goods entering India at that port, and that in any event there was a railroad from a point near the southern border of Afghanistan passing through Quetta to Karachi, over which very little traffic flowed. Wool could be shipped by this route. He remarked further that irrespective of the validity of our argument regarding the railroads, he felt as a friend that it was not a desirable one for us to advance as the officials in Kabul could not understand why we rather than the British must give consideration to that point. He was told that while it appeared improbable that anything could be done about the nuts, we would see if there could not be obtained an increase in the quota for Afghan wool. [Here follows discussion of miscellaneous questions.] 6 Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State 890H.24/6–3044: Telegram [Document 36] The Minister in Afghanistan ( Engert ) to the Secretary of State Kabul , June 30, 1944—11 a.m. [Received July 4—8:16 a.m.] 104. I should appreciate learning outcome of conversations referred to in second section of your 48, May 10. Since then I have had several talks with the British Minister and I know he has definitely recommended to his Government that a separate tonnage quota for American exports to Afghanistan be granted. We are in complete agreement that such quota would be desirable provided our two Legations continued to screen global Afghan requirements as to source of supply and urgency. Subject to this screening and selective licensing by FEA, the Afghans would be permitted to make their own priority rating within the quota. It is also assumed that War Shipping Administration would review Afghan cargo lists to prevent misuse of shipping space. It would have to [be] made clear to Afghans that if they wasted quota on nonessentials they could not expect to obtain additional tonnage for essentials. Quota of 300 tons per quarter should be adequate for the present but space for motor vehicles should be allocated in addition and as special case. Engert The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State 890H.24/8–2544 [Document 37] The Minister in Afghanistan ( Engert ) to the Secretary of State No. 525 Kabul , August 25, 1944. [Received September 9.] Sir : [Here follows section recapitulating the visit to Kabul in January 1944, of Dr. Eric Beecroft, and describing certain changes effected in the Afghan Ministry of National Economy relative to the problem of Afghan supply requirements.] The procedure adopted for the handling of 1945 requirements is explained in detail in an attached memorandum 7 prepared by Mr. Mathews. 8 It is only necessary to add here that this procedure provides an excellent basis for the establishment of a separate tonnage quota for American exports to Afghanistan. By January 1, 1945, there should be received in Washington a complete list of Afghanistan’s total import requirements from which a program of exports from the United States could be derived. A tonnage quota adequate for this program could then be determined and allotted to the Afghans. (Reference my telegram No. 104, June 30, 11 a.m., 1944.) One possible reservation with respect to the completeness of the Afghan requirements lists must be noted. These lists may not include certain requirements which the Afghans hope to obtain, or have reason to believe they can obtain, from or through Russia. However, at the present time imports into Afghanistan from Russia are negligible. The difficulties connected with requirements work here can be succinctly summarized as lack of information from Washington, London, and New Delhi. On the one hand, the British Legation has been unable to obtain from London or New Delhi any definite or comprehensive indication of the products which can, or cannot, be supplied from the United Kingdom or India. Moreover, unreasonable delays are encountered when inquiries are sent to the Government of India requesting information concerning the Indian supply position with respect to specific commodities. On the other hand, this Legation has never been able to obtain any information from Washington with respect to Lend-Lease shipments to India, total quarterly allocations for exports from the United States to Afghanistan (with the exception of allocations for one quarter which were provided), or actual exports from the United States to Afghanistan. (Reference my despatch No. 468, June 14, 1944 9 ). In the absence of the foregoing information, it is difficult for the two Legations to make intelligent recommendations as to the source of supply of Afghan requirements, or accurate evaluations of the urgency and extent of Afghan needs for 1945. I venture once again to express the hope that the Department, the Foreign Economic Administration, or some other United States agency will find it possible to provide this Legation with some reasonably current data on American exports to Afghanistan, both projected and actual. The importance of providing Afghanistan’s minimum essential import requirements is inherent in its geographic position as a Middle Eastern country. A cessation of imports would affect most seriously certain segments of the Afghan economy. The resulting difficulties might rouse the turbulent Afghans to widespread disturbances directed against the existing Government. Such disturbances would almost certainly affect the tribal areas abutting on India and result in border incidents which, in turn, would necessitate military action against the tribes by the Government of India. Moreover, trouble in Afghanistan might have repercussions throughout the Middle and Near Eastern area, from Iran to Saudi Arabia. Afghan requirements are not large, and to supply them at the present time could therefore be regarded as a small premium to insure against an annoying distraction while the war is still in progress, and a focus of Moslem disaffection in the post-war period. Respectfully yours, C. Van H. Engert 7 Not printed. 8 Elbert G. Mathews, Second Secretary of Legation. 9 Not printed. The Chief of the Afghanistan Section, Foreign Economic Administration (Meeker), to the Chief of the Eastern Hemisphere Division (Merchant) 890H.24/9–2544 [Document 38] The Chief of the Afghanistan Section, Foreign Economic Administration ( Meeker ), to the Chief of the Eastern Hemisphere Division ( Merchant ) Washington , September 25, 1944. Dear Mr. Merchant : It seems desirable to review the general procedure for screening Afghan import requirements in order to be certain that F.E.A. handling of such requirements is in accordance with State Department policy. It is our understanding that Afghanistan’s total import requirements are submitted simultaneously to the British and American Legations in Kabul for their joint decision as to sources of supply under the present wartime conditions. Those requirements which it is agreed should be exported from the United States are then transmitted to the F.E.A. by your Department in the form of lists broken down by Afghanistan Governmental departments or by Government-sponsored “projects”. At present, these lists are examined by F.E.A., in the light of supply conditions in the United States, and the Legation in Kabul is notified through your Department in cases where it is not possible to supply the commodities required. Those lists of commodities which can be supplied then constitute final approved programs of Afghanistan export requirements from the United States. Export license applications covering those commodities which are included in approved programs may then be accepted by F.E.A. However, the application must, in all cases, show that the requirement is for use in the specific government department or “project” for which it has been approved. If commodities for which an export license is requested are not listed in the program, the license is rejected even though the materials included are in free supply. Commodities under general license or otherwise not under license control are, of course, not included in the foregoing procedure. I should be grateful if you would let me know whether this method of handling exports to Afghanistan is in accordance with your understanding and with the procedure agreed upon by the United States and British Legations in Kabul. Sincerely yours, Kenneth Meeker Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) to the Chief of the Eastern Hemisphere Division (Merchant) 890H.24/9–2544 [Document 39] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs ( Allen ) to the Chief of the Eastern Hemisphere Division ( Merchant ) 10 [ Washington ,] September 26, 1944. I am not able to say precisely whether the attached letter 11 from FEA describes correctly the procedure with regard to screening exports to Afghanistan, but it seems to set forth the situation as I understand it. There are certain features of the arrangement, however, which we have never liked and which I would be very glad to see revised. Perhaps the present is a good time to do so. In the first place the Afghan Minister in Washington has always objected strenuously to the arrangement by which Afghan requirements must be submitted simultaneously to the British and American Legations in Kabul. The particular feature of this arrangement to which he objects is the fact that the British authorities are permitted to determine which Afghan requirements can be supplied from British or Indian sources. Those requirements which are left over are referred to the United States. The arrangement gives the British the refusal of all of Afghanistan’s foreign trade, regardless of any preference which Afghanistan may have in the matter. I concur with the Minister that this is an entirely undesirable situation both from the point of view of Afghanistan and the United States. If importers in Afghanistan prefer for reasons of their own to trade direct with the United States, I think some arrangement should be possible for them to do so. I am aware that the present situation grew out of the shortage of shipping space, but I do not believe this shortage is nearly as strenuous at present as it once was (we recently had a report from our Consulate at Tehran that cargo space from the Persian Gulf was not being fully utilized, and we know that available cargo space from the United States to the Middle East has been less than 25% utilized during the past quarter). Since there is now an Afghan Legation in Washington and an Afghan Consulate and trading organization in New York, I would suggest the discontinuance of the present system and the establishment of an arrangement by which the Afghans would determine themselves whether they desire to purchase from the United States. If so, they should submit their American requirements solely to the American Legation in Kabul. Our Minister there should subject the requirements to the appropriate screening tests and forward them to the Department with his recommendations. FEA could then determine whether appropriate export licenses should be issued. I think an arrangement reported in the following sentence in the FEA letter of September 25 is particularly objectionable: “If commodities for which an export license is requested are not listed in the program, the license is rejected even though the materials included are in free supply”. We recently had a striking example of the difficulty caused by this system. The Afghan Government desired to purchase a number of school laboratory supplies in the United States, totaling in value something over $800.00. We forwarded the export applications of the Afghan Government to FEA recently with a recommendation that they be approved despite the fact that the supplies were not included in a program for Afghanistan. It is almost impossible for forward programs to take care of numerous small items of this kind, and if the articles are a [ in ] free supply and there is shipping space, I see no reason in the world why the export licenses should not be issued. George V. Allen 10 Marginal notation by Mr. Merchant: “These objections seem cogent to me. 11 Supra. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 890H.24/10–2344 [Document 40] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) [ Washington ,] October 23, 1944. The Afghan Minister called at his request upon Mr. Murray. The Minister made the following observations. [Here follow discussions of miscellaneous matters.] 4. He understood that there are an increasing number of American flag ships on the United States–India run. He felt, therefore, that this might be a suitable time to establish a separate Afghan shipping quota. 5. He hoped that something could be done to lessen the difficulties being experienced at present in securing shipping space and import licenses for items of Afghan produce. 6. His Government urgently needs certain supplies of paper for which export licenses have been submitted to FEA. These licenses have not yet been issued and the Minister hoped that they might be in the near future. Mr. Murray replied that the several matters mentioned by the Minister would be looked into with a view to corrective or helpful action where possible. [Here follows further discussion of unrelated matters.] The Minister in Afghanistan (Engert) to the Secretary of State 890H.24/11–1144 [Document 41] The Minister in Afghanistan ( Engert ) to the Secretary of State No. 577 Kabul , November 11, 1944. [Received December 1.] Sir : In amplification of the final paragraph of this Legation’s despatch No. 566 of October 27, 1944, 12 I have the honor to report the results to date of the efforts of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and India to supply to Afghanistan its minimum essential import requirements in time of war. It will be recalled that the immediate objective which led the three supplying countries to agree upon a policy favoring the release from their war-restricted stocks of the minimum needs of Afghanistan was the prevention of internal disturbances in this country which might result in tribal uprisings along the Northwest Frontier of India. This objective has been achieved. Disturbances within the country have not exceeded the usual outbreaks of normal times, and the British-Indian authorities have been gratified by the absence of serious troubles on the Frontier. This satisfactory situation must in large part be credited to the arrival in Afghanistan of gasoline and other supplies and equipment which permitted the maintenance of minimum transportation facilities, of textiles, tea, sugar and other essential consumers goods, and of industrial supplies and equipment which enabled Afghanistan’s own productive plant to continue in operation. These imports, while far from lavish, prevented the average Afghan from falling to a level of privation which would have induced him to heed the promptings of malcontents urging revolt against the established regime. Moreover, the strength and prestige of the regime has been enhanced by its ability successfully to negotiate with foreign governments—success in this instance being tangibly attested by the importation of urgently needed goods. It would be difficult, for example, to estimate the bolstering which the present Afghan Government will receive from the appearance throughout the country of 648 new trucks, distinctively finished in the military drab of the American and British armies. The Afghan Government has not failed to appreciate the prestige value of its successes in obtaining supplies, as evidenced by two articles which appeared in the Kabul newspaper Islah on October 1 and 7, 1944. Translations of these articles are enclosed. 13 The first reports the acquisition of 648 trucks from the United States, and the second gives details with respect to textiles, gasoline, and other essential imports received under quota from India. It is understood that similar articles on subsequent imports will be published from time to time. As the enclosed articles reveal, the policy adopted by the supplying countries has had the further result of measurably improving relations between Afghanistan and India, and between Afghanistan and the British generally. This development, to some extent attributable to the joint American-British requirements procedure, is very gratifying. In the long view, the stability and progress of Afghanistan are dependent upon its establishing and maintaining amicable relations with its immediate neighbors. If supply assistance during wartime should prove to be a source of continuing better relations between the Afghans and the British, it will have been a major contribution to the stability of Central Asia. Afghan gratitude toward India and the British has not developed at the expense of the United States. The Afghan Government regards the United States as the prime source of its requirements, despite the fact that much the greater share of its needs are in fact supplied from India. Requirements problems are almost invariably discussed with this Legation in the first instance, regardless of the probable source of supply. Even after it has been determined that India or the United Kingdom will supply, this Legation is too often embarrassed by requests—usually unnecessary—from Afghan officials to intercede with the British Legation on Afghanistan’s behalf. There can be no doubt that our present policy is laying a firm foundation for cordial post-war relations between the United States and Afghanistan in the general political sphere, as well as in economic and commercial fields. If the results thus far achieved are to be lasting, it is, of course, important that our present policy be maintained throughout the war and in the immediate post-war reconstruction period. I am somewhat concerned lest Afghanistan’s needs may be lost sight of in the latter period, and I respectfully urge the Department, and other interested agencies in Washington now planning for that period, to bear in mind that this small country has an important strategic position in the Middle East, apart from its influence as an independent Mohammedan power. Respectfully yours, C. Van H. Engert 12 Not printed. 13 Neither printed. The Assistant Adviser, War Supply and Resources Division (Farriss) to the Chief of the Afghanistan Section, Foreign Economic Administration (Meeker) 890H.24/9–2544 [Document 42] The Assistant Adviser, War Supply and Resources Division ( Farriss ) to the Chief of the Afghanistan Section, Foreign Economic Administration ( Meeker ) Washington , December 18, 1944. My Dear Mr. Meeker : Because of a re-assignment of responsibility for Afghan economic matters in the Office of Wartime Economic Affairs, we have delayed answering your letter to Mr. Merchant of September 25. With reference to the question of general procedure raised in the penultimate paragraph of your letter, it is our understanding that all export license applications should indicate that the commodities covered are for use in the specific Government Department or project for which they have been approved. If the commodities, however, are not included in the approved program but have received the approval of the Department of State, the Foreign Economic Administration may validate the export license if the supply situation permits. It is also our understanding that the commodities under general license, even though not included in the program, may be shipped to Afghanistan. At the present time, we are discussing with the British the question of permitting licensing of materials in free supply in excess of the program, or items not included in the program. This problem is related to the availability of shipping. We shall inform you as soon as a reply is received from the British. Sincerely yours, James J. Farriss Representations to Egypt and the United Kingdom regarding American post-war civil air rights in Egypt Representations to Egypt and the United Kingdom regarding American post-war civil air rights in Egypt [43] The Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 8, 1944—11 a.m. [Received June 9—11:45 a.m.] 883.7962/51: Telegram [44] The Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 13, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 4:22 p.m.] 883.7962/52: Telegram [45] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) Washington, June 22, 1944—11 p.m. 883.7962/52: Telegram [46] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 29, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 9:04 p.m.] 883.7962/6–2944: Telegram [47] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, July 11, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 12—10:48 p.m.] 883.7962/7–1144: Telegram [48] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, July 12, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 12—5:53 p.m.] 883.7962/7–1244: Telegram [49] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, August 9, 1944. [Received August 18.] 883.7962/8–944 [50] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Chief of the Aviation Division (Morgan) Washington, September 26, 1944. 883.248/9–444 [51] The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan) Washington, October 19, 1944. 883.7962/10–1944 The Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 883.7962/51: Telegram [Document 43] The Chargé in Egypt ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 8, 1944—11 a.m. [Received June 9—11:45 a.m.] 1551. With reference to post-war aviation development in the Middle East, 1 Legation learns from usually reliable source of detailed proposal for construction and equipment by Royal Air Force of large modern airport at present Almaza Field near Cairo. Project is said to comprise two parts (1) a civil airport to cost about half million pounds to be borne by the Egyptian Government, the RAF providing material and transport at lowest available prices and (2) a military airport to cost 80,000 pounds at expense of RAF to revert to Egypt after hostilities cease in all theatres. The proposed airdrome is to be large enough to take and service virtually unlimited number of largest planes. Project will take about 18 months and the RAF would use and control the airport for the period of hostilities. Project is reputed to have already been approved by Technical Committee of National Defense Committee which has a 3-year plan for approximately same development against half that period by RAF. With this project there is reported to have been presented to Council of Ministers another proposal for creating an Egyptian Ministry of Aviation to begin as a Sub-Secretariat for Air under but relatively independent of Ministry of National Defense. According to the report these proposals were discussed at a secret meeting of Council of Ministers on June 6th lasting until 2 a.m. June 7th. I am trying to obtain confirmation and further details. Jacobs 1 For correspondence regarding civil and military aviation interests of the United States in Iran and in Saudi Arabia, see pp. 486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] ff. and 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 717 ] ff., respectively. See also vol. ii , section entitled “Preliminary and exploratory discussions regarding international civil aviation; conference held at Chicago, November 1–December 7, 1944.” The Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 883.7962/52: Telegram [Document 44] The Chargé in Egypt ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 13, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 4:22 p.m.] 1602. With reference to telegram 1551, June 8, 11 a.m., Legation is informed that no decision on airport project was adopted by Council of Ministers but that it will be discussed at another subsequent meeting. Contacted Commercial Counselor 2 of the British Embassy who has promised to furnish further information. Jacobs 2 Charles Empson. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) 883.7962/52: Telegram [Document 45] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Egypt ( Jacobs ) Washington , June 22, 1944—11 p.m. 1564. Department desires that you follow closely development of proposals described in your 1551, June 8, 11 a.m. and your 1602, June 13, 4 p.m. with respect to the civil airport to be constructed in Egypt. In your discussions with British and Egyptian authorities, please take a suitable occasion to express our confidence that duly authorized American air services will be entitled to use all such facilities on a national and most-favored-nation basis. Hull The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 883.7962/6–2944: Telegram [Document 46] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 29, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 9:04 p.m.] 1840. Reference Department’s No. 1564, June 22, 11 p.m. I have left an aide-mémoire with the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 3 along the lines of the Department’s telegram under acknowledgment. I was today informed by that official that the matter has been referred to Nahas Pasha, the Prime Minister, and that a reply will be forthcoming within a week’s time. I consider it advisable not to approach the British authorities again on the subject until I learn what the attitude of the Egyptian Government may be. I am following the matter closely and will report telegraphically when information becomes available. Tuck 3 Sallah ed Dine. The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 883.7962/7–1144: Telegram [Document 47] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , July 11, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 12—10:48 p.m.] 1969. After some effort I obtained from the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs an aide-mémoire dated July 11, regarding Almaza Airport in reply to mine referred to in telegram No. 1840, June 29, 8 p.m. The text is being sent in the telegram immediately following. This matter was also discussed informally between our Commercial Attaché 5 and the British Commercial Counselor who promised to supply what information he could. After a delay of 2 weeks the latter read over the telephone a brief prepared statement of which the text also is given in the telegram following. Further information is being assembled and will be reported in due course. Tuck 5 Karl L. Rankin. The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 883.7962/7–1244: Telegram [Document 48] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , July 12, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 12—5:53 p.m.] 1970. Translation of the aide-mémoire of July 11 6 on Almaza Airport follows: The present needs of military aviation have led the British military authorities to envisage the creation of a new airport near Cairo equipped with installations and apparatus appropriate to answer these needs. They have discussed it with the Egyptian Government which was planning at the same time the enlargement of Almaza Airport to meet the needs of civil aviation after the war; but this enlargement encountered current difficulties in procuring the necessary material. In the desire to harmonize the Egyptian interest in the preparation of the airport for the purpose mentioned with the present needs of military aviation, preliminary talks have taken place on the following basis: The new installations with which the airport will be equipped are divided into two categories: ( a ) The first will answer the needs of civil aviation: The Egyptian [Government?] will be responsible for necessary expenses in the execution of work in this category; the expected time is set at 18 months. The necessary material for this work will be furnished at a reduced price by the RAF which has graciously agreed to undertake the transport of this material and other facilities. ( b ) The second category will answer the needs of military aviation: The necessary expenses in the accomplishment of this category will be borne by the RAF. The fixed installations will be transferred to the Egyptian Government without obligation. The RAF will be subjected to payment of landing fees for its plans [ planes ] at the airport and will pay rent for the buildings and installations which shelter them. It follows from the preceding that the question has not arisen in these discussions as to the methods of using the new installations of the Almaza Airport for civil aviation. At this time it is appropriate to point out that in a note 7 presented to the Department of State Egyptian Government has made it known that it was convinced that it would be invited to participate in all general conferences which might be called to examine questions relative to civil aviation and to international aerial communications after the war. The Egyptian Government wishes to emphasize that in expressing this belief it was inspired by the greatest spirit of international cooperation on the basis of equality of rights. Furthermore, animated by the same spirit of cooperation and by the excellent relations of friendliness and confidence which so happily exist between Egypt and the great American democracy, the Egyptian Government would be disposed to take up again at an opportune time the examination of this question with the American Government, it being understood that this does not prejudice the question and that from now on all idea of utilization of the airport by non-Egyptian planes on the same basis of equality as Egyptian planes must be dismissed. The British statement follows: Discussions are being held with the Egyptian Government regarding the development of facilities at Almaza Airport with a view to the use of the latter by RAF transport aircraft in preference to Cairo West [Airport], which for obvious reasons has proved unsuitable for this purpose. Tuck 6 See telegram No. 1969, July 11, 6 p.m., supra . 7 Dated May 4; see vol. ii , section entitled “Preliminary and exploratory discussions regarding international civil aviation; conference held at Chicago, November 1–December 7, 1944.” The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 883.7962/8–944 [Document 49] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State No. 140 Cairo , August 9, 1944. [Received August 18.] Sir : [Here follows an account of events relating to Almaza Airdrome covered in the preceding telegrams.] John Payne Field was developed by the USAAF 8 in 1943 for the use of the ATC. 9 It is located on comparatively high ground about 13 miles east of the center of Cairo and has been described as the best airport in Africa. The land on which it is located was acquired from the RAF, 10 which had obtained possession of it under Anglo-Egyptian treaty terms. 11 Actually the land is understood to belong in part to the Egyptian Government and in part to the Heliopolis Company. It is said that the owners have no official knowledge of the fact that an airport has been constructed on their land. On this property the United States will have expended the following sums in construction work: Original investment $1,556,000 Additions to April 23, 1944 285,000 Estimated present program 811,000 Total $2,652,000 Only about 10 percent of the costs to date represent reciprocal aid from the British, and it is assumed that substantially the same percentage will apply to the entire cost when completed. Payne Field has two runways of 7,000 feet each, as already mentioned, in addition to one of 6,000 feet. It is said to be possible to extend at least one of these to 9,000 feet if necessary, but the present runways have proved adequate for the use of the new B–29 Super Fortresses. 12 In conclusion it may be noted that the British are actively developing a large airport 13 which already serves all of the civilian airlines operating through Cairo. Moreover, this is being done largely at the expense of the Egyptian Government. Payne Field, however, handles no civilian services, is being developed entirely at American expense and is located on land which it may well be necessary to vacate at the end of the war. The desirability of an early agreement with the Egyptian Government on this point seems obvious, perhaps along the lines of that recently concluded with Iceland 14 and in connection with the Lend-Lease Agreement now being negotiated with Egypt. 15 Respectfully yours, S. Pinkney Tuck 8 United States Army Air Forces. 9 Air Transport Command. 10 Royal Air Force. 11 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed at London, August 26, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 401. 12 The Minister in Egypt furnished further and detailed technical information on Payne Field in his despatch No. 218, September 9, 1944 (893.248/9–944). 13 The Almaza Airport. 14 In a memorandum of August 29, John O. Bell of the Aviation Division wrote that so far as he knew “there has been no recent agreement with Iceland with respect to airports …” (883.7962/8–944). 15 For correspondence relating to Lend-Lease negotiations with Egypt in 1944, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , bracketed note on p. 65 . Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Chief of the Aviation Division (Morgan) 883.248/9–444 [Document 50] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Berle ) to the Chief of the Aviation Division ( Morgan ) Washington , September 26, 1944. Mr. Morgan : Your memorandum of September 25 regarding Payne Field. I agree that it was not a propitious time to start negotiating. Instead, I think we should send a courteous note to the British Government saying that we do expect to bring up rights to a number of bases, naming them, with particular emphasis on the Near Eastern bases including Payne Field. This, I think, is a polite indication that we do not feel we want to be quietly excluded from those rights. In handing such note to the British Embassy, you might say orally that we do not, of course, expect to press negotiations until after the conference. I believe it will be wise to have an exactly similar note to the Egyptian Government, which should be handed them at the same time as our note to the British. My idea is not to start negotiations but to stake out a claim. A[ dolf ] A. B[ erle ], Jr . The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan) 883.7962/10–1944 [Document 51] The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister ( Hassan ) 16 Washington , October 19, 1944. Sir : As I am sure you are already aware, the United States Government in connection with the prosecution of the war and to expedite the delivery of supplies and lend-lease material to our allies has constructed or improved in whole or in part a large number of airports in various countries including countries in the Near and Middle East as, for example, Payne Field at Cairo. While there appears to be no question with respect to the right of United States military aircraft and aircraft of United States Air Transport Command to use these airports at the present time, in the absence of any clear understanding a question may arise at a later date with respect to the right of United States civil aircraft to use these airports when the time comes for the establishment of commercial services through these regions. This Government considers that airports which it has helped to construct or improve should be available for the use of United States commercial aircraft on international services or civil aircraft conducting private flights as may be authorized by the countries in whose jurisdiction these airports lie. No infringement of sovereignty is involved; nor does the Government of the United States seek ownership, control or exclusive rights. The receipt at an early date of a statement of your Government’s attitude in this matter would be greatly appreciated. 17 Accept [etc.] Cordell Hull 16 Handed on October 20 to a representative of the Egyptian Legation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler), with oral remarks stating that a “similar” note was being delivered to the British, and that this Government did not expect to press negotiations until after the Chicago International Civil Aviation Conference; for note to the British Ambassador (Halifax), October 19, and British aide-mémoire of October 30 in reply, see pp. 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] and 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , respectively. Copies of the notes to the Egyptian and British Governments were forwarded to the Minister in Egypt under instruction No. 1001, October 19, with the statement that the notes set forth “the position of this Government with respect to the use of airports which it has helped to construct or improve. It is contemplated that discussions with respect to these matters will be undertaken during or shortly after the forthcoming International Civil Aviation Conference although they do not form a part of the agenda for that meeting.”(883.248/9–444) 17 In a note of October 20, 1944, the Egyptian Minister acknowledged receipt of the Secretary’s note (883.7962/10–2044). Interest of the United States in possible transfer of post-war title rights in the Suez–Cairo pipeline Interest of the United States in possible transfer of post-war title rights in the Suez–Cairo pipeline [52] Memorandum by Mr. Merrill C. Gay of the Division of Commercial Treaties and Agreements [Washington,] February 28, 1944. 883.6363/103 [53] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) Washington, November 1, 1944—8 p.m. 883.6363/11–144: Telegram [54] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, November 6, 1944—7 p.m. [Received November 6—6:27 p.m.] 883.6363/11–644: Telegram Memorandum by Mr. Merrill C. Gay of the Division of Commercial Treaties and Agreements 883.6363/103 [Document 52] Memorandum by Mr. Merrill C. Gay of the Division of Commercial Treaties and Agreements [ Washington ,] February 28, 1944. The Department received despatch No. 1272 dated September 4, 1943 18 from Cairo describing a pipe line approximately 78 miles long between the main storage tanks of the Shell Company of Egypt, Suez to the Ghamer terminal of that company in Cairo, reported to have begun operations in September 1943. The pipe used in this construction is described by our Legation as American made provided under Lend-Lease for use by the British army in Libya. Such a pipe line was originally projected in 1927 but construction did not begin until April 1943. It was done as a war measure recommended by the Cairo Petroleum Committee of the Middle East War Council and approved by the War Office in London. The financial arrangements for building the pipe line were made by the Cairo Petroleum Committee, under the jurisdiction of the British Minister of State, 19 and the Shell Company. The Chairman of the Committee was formerly an executive of the Shell Company and the present Director General of that company was a member of the same Committee. The Egyptian Government opposed the construction of this pipe line pending settlement of the question of its post-war ownership. The director of the section of the Egyptian department of mines and quarries is said to be an outstanding Egyptian advocate of post-war ownership of the Suez–Cairo pipe line by the Egyptian Government and of steps to restrict the Shell Company from obtaining monopolistic advantages in Egypt. Representation by the British Ambassador, 20 however, citing the provisions of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of military collaboration, 21 was sufficient to break the deadlock. The Egyptian Government nevertheless undertook to limit the use of the pipe line to the transport of gasoline for military use, pending the acceptance of its demands that the pipe line become its property after the war and that its State Railroads be compensated for the loss of traffic suffered during the remainder of the war. It was planned that upon settlement of these questions the Shell Company would distribute to both military and civilian consumers the kerosene and gasoline transported by the pipe line. A supplemental despatch dated October 12, 1943 22 described some additional construction operations, indicated that it was hoped to have the line working satisfactorily by October 15 and indicated further that under the existing arrangements the pipe line would transport annually about a million and one-half barrels of kerosene for civilian consumption and 147 thousand barrels for military consumption as well as 483 thousand barrels of gasoline for civilian consumption and 484 thousand barrels of gasoline for military consumption. Upon receiving this information the Department and the Lend-Lease Administration were somewhat concerned about what appeared to be an unjustifiable retransfer and use of lend-lease materials. The Lend-Lease Administration indicated that they had received no notice of this transaction and felt that a rather firm position should be taken by this Government with respect to it. The Department was primarily concerned with the possibility that the title to the materials might be transferred to the Egyptian Government without the authorization of this Government as required under the terms of the lend-lease agreement. 23 It felt however that the information at hand was insufficient and that our first step should be to get more information. Before an instruction was sent certain letters from the Lend-Lease Administration to British officials concerning retransfers were found which made the British action in this case appear in a more favorable light although the Lend-Lease Administration still felt that it should have been notified of the retransfer and that the United States Government clearly held the right to the final disposition of such materials. An instruction was sent on November 25, 1943 to our Ambassador in London 24 requesting him to discuss the matter with the proper British officials indicating the interest of this Government under Article 3 of the master lend-lease agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom in any possible transfer of post-war title rights to lend-lease materials, the thought being that the British Government might wish to call this to the attention of the Egyptian Government in case the latter insisted upon an immediate settlement concerning the post-war disposition of these materials. It was pointed out that even if they were transferred to the Egyptian Government, under the terms of the proposed lend-lease agreement between the United States and Egypt we would still have a voice in the post-war disposition of the materials. The Department requested full information, pointing out its particular interest in the fact that a private company seemed to be closely involved in the transaction and the fact that it appeared probable the pipe line would be used largely for commercial purposes. It was further suggested that the British Government be reminded of the desirability of prior consultation between the two Governments with respect to such transfers wherever practicable and that in any case prompt notification should be made to this Government to avoid misunderstanding. A copy of the instruction was also sent to Cairo. A despatch from London dated February 4, 1944, 25 and enclosures, has just been received. From this it appears that our instruction was interpreted as evidence of concern over the possible transfer of title to the Shell Company although what the Department had in mind was any retransfer of title without our authorization as well as the use of the lend-lease materials for nonmilitary purposes. It is asserted that the title to the materials is still retained by the British military authorities and that the Shell Company “merely act as agents of the War Department in operating the lines”. From an enclosure to the despatch, a letter dated July 19, 1943 from the British military officer in charge of administration, Middle East forces, to the Ministry of Public Works Cairo, it appears that the need to gain the approval of the United States Government for transfer to the Egyptian Government of such installation constructed on Egyptian territory was clearly recognized. The covering despatch states that the full details regarding pipe line rates are not available at London but that a basic principle in the arrangements with the Shell Company was that it should pay to the British military authorities the going freight charge for petroleum products transported for civilian use. It further states that aside from the fee paid the Shell Company for its services as agent of the War Department the company gains no competitive advantage in transporting petroleum products. It states that the selection of the Shell Company to operate in this capacity appears to have been based on the fact of its holding a larger share of the Egyptian market, owning terminal and refining facilities, and that the arrangement “had the blessing of the Cairo petroleum committee … stated to include representations of United States military offices”. In the letter from our Embassy at London to the Egyptian Department of the Foreign Office, an enclosure to the despatch, attention was called to the fact that no record of any notice of the retransfer under consideration was received from the British authorities and the desirability was suggested of prior consultation in cases of this sort wherever practicable especially when private firms are substantially involved. In the reply from the Foreign Office to our Embassy it is asserted that the present pipe line was constructed as an urgent military requirement and that while some civilian use was contemplated the military authorities maintain a priority call on it. The aforementioned letter of July 1943 to the Minister of Public Works is cited as evidence that the United States interests in the materials were in no stage overlooked. Assurance was given that the British authorities in Egypt will be reminded to keep the United States officials on the spot informed regarding installations such as the present, in the ultimate ownership of which the United States Government has an interest. Our Embassy states that it was informed that the British Government might desire to utilize the pipe line equipment in the Far Eastern theater at a later time and that it would favor the removal of the pipe line for military use elsewhere rather than to cope with the difficulties inherent in its post-war disposition in Egypt. 18 Not printed. 19 Richard G. Casey. 20 Baron Killearn, British Ambassador in Egypt. 21 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed at London, August 26, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 401. 22 Despatch No. 1338, not printed. 23 Between the United States and the United Kingdom, signed at Washington, February 23, 1942; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433; for correspondence regarding negotiation of this agreement, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , pp. 525 ff. 24 Instruction No. 3429, not printed. 25 Despatch No. 13721, not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) 883.6363/11–144: Telegram [Document 53] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) Washington , November 1, 1944—8 p.m. 3147. The following represents the views of interested divisions in the Department and of FEA 26 with respect to the policy to be recommended in conversations with both the British and Egyptian authorities, on the question of ownership and administration of the Cairo-Suez Pipeline. It is transmitted for the information of the Legation and Landis. 27 A formal instruction will be drafted after Landis has reported the results of his discussions in London. 1. Ownership: It is not desired that there should be any discussion at this time of any arrangement whereby the ownership of the pipeline would pass from British and American hands. The division of ownership as between the US and UK Governments shall be determined on a basis of proportionate contributions to its construction made by each Government when a definitive accounting of such contributions is available. 2. Right-of-way: The Egyptian Government will agree to the utilization of the present right-of-way in return for a suitable rental which could be on the basis of an agreed minimum with or without a share of the profits resulting from operation of the line. An operating company will be formed to operate the pipeline and will be composed of oil companies which are now using or may in the future desire to use the line. It is understood that the pipeline will be open for the transportation of petroleum products on a common-carrier basis. 3. Policy: The determination of pipeline tariffs, the allocation of its capacity in the event that petroleum tendered for transportation exceeds the line’s capacity and other basic policy matters will be determined by a standing joint commission on which representatives of the Egyptian Government, British Government and the United States Government will sit. 4. Alternatives: Should the Egyptian Government prefer the operation of the pipeline on a cooperative basis under which net profits would be divided among the shippers in proportion to the quantity of petroleum products transported through the line, there would be no objection on our part. Other modifications which do not disturb the principle of maintaining present ownership by the British and American Governments and joint control of policy matters can be discussed on an ad referendum basis. You will wish to discuss the foregoing with appropriate British officials and obtain their concurrence in order that a joint approach to the Egyptian Government can be made. Please report the results of any conversations you may have in line with the foregoing. Stettinius 26 Foreign Economic Administration. 27 James M. Landis, American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East. The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 883.6363/11–644: Telegram [Document 54] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , November 6, 1944—7 p.m. [Received November 6—6:27 p.m.] 3372. I have reviewed the Department’s 3147, November 1, 8 p.m. with Landis who tells me that the covering documents 28 on his discussions in London relative to the Cairo–Suez pipeline were forwarded from London and that a further copy will be forwarded from Cairo. Landis states that these documents show that the British Government has declined to affirm the earlier commitment of the British Army to sell the pipeline. He is of the opinion, however, that some scheme for its future operation must be devised. Landis further states that suggestions along this line in accordance with conversations in Washington were tentatively advanced by him while in London. Due to the fact, however, that British technical skills on these matters are located in Cairo Landis believes that further discussions will have to be resumed here with the appropriate British authorities. The Department’s viewpoint will then be requested in the light of these preliminary discussions in which of course the Egyptians will not participate. Following this step the formal instruction for presentation by the Legation to the Egyptian Government mentioned in your reference telegram can then be officially delivered to the Foreign Office. Tuck 28 None printed. Informal representations by the Legation in Egypt regarding effect upon American petroleum interests of new Egyptian export duty Informal representations by the Legation in Egypt regarding effect upon American petroleum interests of new Egyptian export duty [55] The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Cairo, February 2, 1944—6 p.m. [Received February 3—9:32 a.m.] 883.6363/91: Telegram [56] The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Cairo, February 10, 1944—6 p.m. [Received February 11—4:10 p.m.] 883.6363/93: Telegram [57] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) Washington, February 29, 1944—5 p.m. 883.6363/93: Telegram [58] The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Cairo, March 3, 1944—noon. [Received 5:46 p.m.] 883.6363/96: Telegram [59] The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Cairo, March 24, 1944—noon. [Received 7:46 p.m.] 883.6363/100: Telegram The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 883.6363/91: Telegram [Document 55] The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , February 2, 1944—6 p.m. [Received February 3—9:32 a.m.] 232. New budget provision for 15% export duty effective February 1st is significant in connection with Petroleum Reserves Corp. 29 plans for Alexandria refinery (see Legation’s 194 and 196 January 29 and 205, January 30 30 ) and petroleum exploration programs of American companies in Egypt. American companies here express grave concern over their ability to develop Egyptian wells and export petroleum at competitive prices after paying 15% mining royalties to Egyptian Government, import duties on machinery and equipment, various local taxes and the new export duty. British interests are in a more favorable position because a very large proportion of their production is marketed in Egypt and they are not dependent upon export business. It would appear that if the proposed oil projects in Egypt and especially the refinery in Alexandria were not exempted from the burden of the new export duty they would operate at a considerable disadvantage in comparison with Middle Eastern wells and refineries outside Egypt. Kirk 29 The Petroleum Reserves Corporation was owned by the United States Government. 30 None printed. The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 883.6363/93: Telegram [Document 56] The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , February 10, 1944—6 p.m. [Received February 11—4:10 p.m.] 306. The American oil companies operating in Egypt are disturbed because they have not been able through their usual contacts to obtain a satisfactory explanation of the reasons which actuated the Egyptian Government in imposing the export duty of 15% ad valorem as well as a statement as to the nature of the application envisaged (see Legation’s 232, February 2). British Embassy at instigation of Shell Company is asking Minister of Finance 31 for explanation and I am approaching the Foreign Office informally and orally on the same thing. The following theses have been put forward as possible reasons for the new export duty which has been stated to apply to crude oil petroleum products and all other exports except cotton and scrap metals (which are subject to specific rates): (1) The Egyptian Government did not have petroleum in hand [ mind? ] when the duty was imposed. (2) The Egyptian Government did have petroleum in mind and the duty was aimed at the Shell Company which is exporting asphalt from Suez. (3) The duty is intended to remain in force for only 1 year for the purpose of balancing the budget. (4) The British have through the duty on petroleum to handicap the operation of the Alexandria refinery and the pipe line leading to it [ sic ]. Kirk 31 Amin Osman. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) 883.6363/93: Telegram [Document 57] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) Washington , February 29, 1944—5 p.m. 413. Your 232 of February 2, 1944 and 306 of February 10, 1944. Please keep the Department fully informed with respect to the reasons for the new 15 percent export duty, the nature of the application envisaged and particularly the effects it may have upon the development of American petroleum interests in Egypt. Stettinius The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 883.6363/96: Telegram [Document 58] The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , March 3, 1944—noon. [Received 5:46 p.m.] 499. Department’s 413, February 29, 5 p.m. Foreign Office has not as yet replied to informal memorandum referred to in Legation’s airgram 95, February 19 32 asking for information concerning details of manner of application of new 15 percent export duty but basic fact remains that as matter now stands tax applies to all petroleum products. After informal discussions with Foreign Office and Minister of Finance, Legation has every reason to believe that tax was imposed purely as a revenue raising measure and was intended to be applied only for duration of hostilities. I have, however, pointed out orally to appropriate Egyptian officials including Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Cabinet member that American oil interests now preparing to resume exploration operations in Egypt state that they are so seriously concerned at the effect of a 15 percent export duty being added to the usual 15 percent royalty payable under mining regulations that they are considering abandoning operations. Present status is that Government Commissioner for Customs who is now dealing with question on behalf of Minister of Finance has just stated to officer of Legation that he does not feel that Egypt’s best interests are served by imposition of any export duty, that he was not consulted prior to issuance of present export tax decree and believes it to be highly objectionable means of raising relatively small amount of revenue. He states he is now strongly urging Finance Minister with considerable hope of success to have a decree issued repealing the whole tax. British Embassy states it has received information from Commissioner for Customs similar to that given Legation and being hopeful that question may be settled soon is exercising no further pressure for time being. In view of foregoing, Legation is not urging matter further for a few days. Kirk 32 Not printed. The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 883.6363/100: Telegram [Document 59] The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , March 24, 1944—noon. [Received 7:46 p.m.] 693. My 499, March 3 and previous. Today’s press reports that Minister of Finance interview granted to Egyptian Gazette announced removal of 15 percent export duty as of March 22. While Legation is unable to obtain official confirmation of foregoing today due to Moslem holiday and while removal could not be considered definite until publication of decree in official Gazette the report bears out recent informed statement to Legation by Minister of Finance to effect that he had definitely decided to remove tax and that official action would be taken “within a week”. Local representatives of interested American oil companies have called Legation to express their satisfaction at abolition of tax. Legation will inform Department as soon as duty removal is officially promulgated. 33 Kirk 33 In telegram No. 738, March 28, 6 p.m., the Minister in Egypt reported that the Journal Officiel of March 25 published a royal decree abolishing the 15% export duty, while maintaining “higher specific export taxes introduced for cotton and a few other products …” (600.837/16). Gift by the Emperor of Ethiopia of property, to constitute a permanent home for the American Legation in Ethiopia Gift by the Emperor of Ethiopia of property, to constitute a permanent home for the American Legation in Ethiopia [60] The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, September 13, 1944. [Received September 22.] 124.841/9–1344 [61] President Roosevelt to the Emperor of Ethiopia (Haile Selassie) Washington, November 27, 1944. 124.841/9–1344 The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 124.841/9–1344 [Document 60] The Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State No. 224 Addis Ababa , September 13, 1944. [Received September 22.] Sir : Supplementing my telegram No. 179, September 6, 9 AM, 1 and previous correspondence, I have the honor to transmit herewith a letter from His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor, addressed to the President, giving to him “in fee absolute and in full and complete title and possession, the realty and premises, together with all appurtenances thereto and furnishings and moveables located thereon, on which is situated at Addis Ababa the Legation of the United States of America, together with certain additional realty specified in an attached document and deemed to be necessary and proper in order to provide an appropriate residence for the diplomatic representative”. A copy of this letter is attached for the files of the Department and an additional copy of the letter together with a copy of its enclosure (map of the property conveyed) is being retained in the files of this Legation. The map is referred to in the letter as “an attached document”. There is also enclosed a copy of a letter from the Emperor’s private secretary, Mr. T. Worq, No. 1556/44, dated September 4, 1944, 1 stating that the grant is “of the realty and premises, together with all appurtenances thereto and furnishings and moveables located thereon, on which is situated at Addis Ababa the Legation of the United States of America. A document, attached to the letter under reference, has also been enclosed from which it will be seen that certain additional realty has also been accorded.” I have ascertained from oral inquiry from Mr. John Spencer, the American advisor to the Foreign Office, that it is the intention of the Emperor to include in the gift everything belonging to the Imperial family now on the property, including the buildings with their contents—furniture, furnishings, table silver and dishes. I have been informed further by Mr. Spencer that it is the intention that the gift shall be as of date of occupancy of the premises, August 26, 1943, and that no rent is to be charged from that time to the present; Mr. Spencer stated that a statement to this effect will be given to me in writing, but it has not yet been received. Attention is invited to the statement in the letter to the President that the property now being presented was the “ancestral property of the royal family”. As I reported to the Department in my telegram No. 82, May 6, 9 AM, 3 the Steward of the Empress informed me at that time that it would not be possible for the United States Government to purchase this property or to obtain it on a long lease as the Empress had decided to reoccupy it at the end of three years. This property had been owned by the Mother of the Empress and in view of these circumstances the action of the Emperor in presenting it to the President is the more deserving of appreciation. The additional ground referred to in the letter of the Emperor consists of a strip of level ground adjoining the original Legation grounds and is very desirable for building sites for occupation by members of the staff of this Legation. This additional ground was added upon my mere suggestion that it would be desirable for the Legation to have that ground for the purpose indicated. I wish to emphasize that the gift by the Emperor was purely voluntary and not due even to so much as a suggestion from me. Respectfully yours, J. K. Caldwell [Enclosure] The Emperor of Ethiopia ( Haile Selassie ) to President Roosevelt Addis Ababa , 24 August, 1944. Great and Good Friend : It gives Us great pleasure to give over to you as Chief of the great and friendly Power, the United States of America, in fee absolute and in full and complete title and possession, the realty and premises, together with all appurtenances thereto and furnishings and moveables located thereon, on which is situated at Addis Ababa the Legation of the United States of America, together with certain additional realty specified in an attached document and deemed to be necessary and proper in order to provide an appropriate residence for the diplomatic representative of a Power so highly esteemed as is the Nation of which you are the Chief. In giving over this property, it is our pleasure to be giving personally to you and through you to the American Nation, ancestral property of the Royal Family. May the measure of our particular attachment to it serve to indicate in a small way, the measure of Our attachment and the attachment of Our People, to that great Power which has ever stood by Us and Our Nation in the hour of need, and to its esteemed Chief, the President of the United States of America. Your Good Friend Haile Selassie I, K. of K. 1 Not printed. 1 Not printed. 3 Not printed. President Roosevelt to the Emperor of Ethiopia (Haile Selassie) 124.841/9–1344 [Document 61] President Roosevelt to the Emperor of Ethiopia ( Haile Selassie ) 4 Washington , November 27, 1944. Great and Good Friend : I have received with very great appreciation your generous letter of August 24, 1944, in which Your Majesty has graciously conveyed to the United States of America absolute title and possession of property situated in Addis Ababa, together with all appurtenances, furnishings, and valuables located thereon, and certain additional realty deemed to be necessary and appropriate to the representation of the United States in Ethiopia. In the name of the United States I accept these gifts in the same cordial spirit of friendship in which they have been offered, and I welcome this added testimonial of the attachment that so happily binds our two peoples together in bonds of permanent understanding and mutual respect. Your Good Friend, Franklin D. Roosevelt 4 Transmitted in instruction No. 143, December 2, to the Minister in Ethiopia. Concern of the United States to have equal access with the United Kingdom in supplying arms to Ethiopia; shipment of 5,000 rifles Concern of the United States to have equal access with the United Kingdom in supplying arms to Ethiopia; shipment of 5,000 rifles [62] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] September 13, 1944. 884.24/9–1644 [63] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) Washington, September 29, 1944—8 p.m. 884.24/9–2944: Telegram [64] The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, November 27, 1944—4 p.m. [Received November 27—1:03 p.m.] 884.24/11–2744: Telegram [65] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) Washington, December 30, 1944—5 p.m. 884.515/11–2944: Telegram Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 884.24/9–1644 [Document 62] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 5 [ Washington ,] September 13, 1944. On August 23, 1944, the Munitions Assignment Board approved the assignment to Ethiopia from surplus stocks of 5,000 rifles and a small amount of other military equipment which the Ethiopian Government has for several months been particularly anxious to obtain, in anticipation of the increased responsibility for maintaining internal security in Ethiopia which fell upon that country on August 25, 1944, with the termination of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement. 6 The British members of the Board dissented on “political” grounds to this decision and have indicated their intention to carry the case to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The British Embassy has taken the matter up with the Department and has indicated that the British objections are based on “security” considerations. The War Department and the Department of State are unable to admit the validity of the “security” arguments so far advanced by the British. While this modest request of the Emperor may, if granted, give him the ability to enforce order among his restless people, it is difficult to see how British security in north-eastern Africa could be vitally affected by the Emperor’s possession of such a small amount of equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . While the political and economic interests of the United States in Ethiopia are not now of major importance, this Government does wish to maintain a position of equality of opportunity in Ethiopia so that any future development of American interests would not be prevented by exclusive or preferential rights obtained by third parties. This Government has a natural interest in the welfare of Ethiopia, one of the two independent countries of Africa, and is sympathetic to the desire of the Emperor to re-establish order and restore the economy of the country which was so badly disrupted during four years of Italian occupation. There does not appear to be a valid reason for the United States to acquiesce in British desires in this case. Since it is possible that this question may be raised with you by Mr. Churchill 7 at Quebec, 8 it is thought desirable that you should be informed on the matter. Unless you perceive some objection thereto, or unless more substantial reasons are advanced by the British against the release of the rifles than have so far been advanced, the Department proposes to advise the War Department that the rifles may be sent forward to Ethiopia at its convenience. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 5 Marginal notation: “CH OK FDR.” 6 For correspondence relating to the interest of the United States in negotiations leading to a new Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, see pp. 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] ff. 7 Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister. 8 No record has been found of any discussion of this question at the Second Quebec Conference; correspondence relating to this Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations . The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) 884.24/9–2944: Telegram [Document 63] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) Washington , September 29, 1944—8 p.m. 141. Military equipment including 5,000 rifles, 5 armored cars, twelve 37mm. field guns, four 75mm. field guns, fifty 30 cal. Browning machine guns, fifty 45 cal. submachine guns and ammunition has been assigned to Ethiopia and will probably be shipped within a month. Date of shipment will be announced to you as soon as known. Please inform Ethiopian Government. Hull The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 884.24/11–2744: Telegram [Document 64] The Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa , November 27, 1944—4 p.m. [Received November 27—1:03 p.m.] 246. ReDept’s 141, September 29. Emperor asks that shipment of arms be expedited and requests any information available as to status and probable arrival dates. Caldwell The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) 884.515/11–2944: Telegram [Document 65] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) Washington , December 30, 1944—5 p.m. 198. Reurtel [246] November 27. The Department has been endeavoring to facilitate shipment of military supplies and now understands from the Army that a part of the shipment will be ready to go forward about January 15, 1945. In view of the security problem involved not only in this shipment but in other imminent shipments of coins and currency, 9 the Department together with FEA 10 is exploring the possibility of sending all of these articles on one ship which would call at Djibouti. The mint states that the silver and the subsidiary coins will be ready for shipment about the end of January and the currency is expected to be ready at about the same time. It is now hoped that all supplies will leave the United States on the same ship about January 31. You will be advised as soon as definite commitments can be obtained from all agencies concerned. Reurtel 266 December 22 11 Ethiopian Minister has taken all necessary action regarding coins and is providing full report to his Government. 12 Stettinius 9 For correspondence relating to the Ethiopian request for lend-lease assistance, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 82 ff.; for text of the Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Ethiopia, signed at Washington, August 19, 1943, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 334, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1043. 10 Foreign Economic Administration. 11 Not printed. 12 The rifles and military equipment were delivered to the Ethiopian Government on April 8, 1945. Interest of the United States in Anglo-Ethiopian negotiations for the replacement of the Agreement and Military Convention of 1942 by a new agreement Interest of the United States in Anglo-Ethiopian negotiations for the replacement of the Agreement and Military Convention of 1942 by a new agreement 13 13 For previous correspondence regarding interest of the United States in the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 116 ff. [66] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) Washington, September 22, 1944—7 p.m. 741.8411/9–2244: Telegram [67] The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, October 24, 1944—4 p.m. [Received October 25—11:30 p.m.] 741.8411/10–2444: Telegram [68] The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, November 4, 1944—noon. [Received 1:45 p.m.] 741.8411/11–444: Telegram [69] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) Washington, November 6, 1944—7 p.m. 741.8411/10–2444: Telegram [70] The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, November 7, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 2:28 p.m.] 741.8411/11–744: Telegram [71] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) Washington, November 9, 1944—8 p.m. 741.8411/11–744: Telegram [72] The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, November 27, 1944—2 p.m. [Received November 27—1:45 p.m.] 741.8411/11–2744: Telegram [73] The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, November 29, 1944—10 p.m. [Received November 29—3:50 p.m.] 741.8411/11–2944: Telegram [74] The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, December 7, 1944—4 p.m. [Received December 8—1:30 a.m.] 741.8411/12–744: Telegram [75] The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, December 9, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 2:42 p.m.] 741.8411/12–944: Telegram [76] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) Washington, December 21, 1944—9 p.m. 741.8411/12–1944: Telegram [77] The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, December 27, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 11:47 a.m.] 741.8411/12–2744: Telegram [78] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) Washington, December 27, 1944—8 p.m. 884.77/10–1244: Telegram [79] The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, December 29, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 29—11:40 a.m.] 884.77/12–2944: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) 741.8411/9–2244: Telegram [Document 66] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) Washington , September 22, 1944—7 p.m. 135. The Department considers that before the impending Anglo-Ethiopian negotiations begin it would be advisable to call informally to the attention of the Ethiopian Government the most favored nation clause of the American Ethiopian Treaty of 1914. 14 This Government did not invoke the 1914 treaty in connection with rights obtained by the British under the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Military Convention of 1942 15 since the agreement was understood to be temporary and was negotiated during a period of great military stress in the Near Eastern area. The war has now moved away from that area and conditions are gradually returning to normal. The Department, viewing its treaty rights in the light of present circumstances, would now be disposed to invoke the terms of the treaty if necessary to obtain for the United States the rights and privileges to which it is entitled under the most favored nation clause. In bringing this matter to the attention of the Ethiopian Government you should be careful to avoid giving any impression that this Government is attempting to bring pressure to bear on Ethiopia or to influence the course of negotiations with the British. It is intended merely to remind the Ethiopian Government of its commitments under the 1914 treaty. Hull 14 Treaty of Commerce signed at Addis Ababa, June 27, 1914, ibid. , 1920, vol. ii , p. 243 ; for correspondence relating to the treaty, see ibid. , pp. 229 ff. 15 Signed at Addis Ababa, January 31, 1942, British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxliv , p. 989. The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 741.8411/10–2444: Telegram [Document 67] The Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa , October 24, 1944—4 p.m. [Received October 25—11:30 p.m.] 214. ReLeg’s 212, October 20, 210 October 19 and 206 October 12. 16 Negotiations for Anglo-Ethiopian agreement now in critical stage as British insist on retaining until after war of reserved area 17 and Ogaden 18 on both military and political grounds; Ethiopians consider former very weak and latter (involving possibly Greater Somaliland) real basis for insistence. British first stated their instructions were categorical and allowed of no negotiation regarding this matter but have now agreed to refer it to London. British have offered to lease only reserved area one-eighth of total of reserved area and Ogaden and propose to hold Ogaden, roughly one-third of area of Ethiopia, without recognition of Ethiopian sovereignty afforded by lease, I am informed. Today Emperor personally instructed Spencer 19 to ask me to inquire: Whether Department could indicate its views concerning British retention of Ethiopian territory; and whether Department could see its way clear to approaching British, not as an intermediary at the request of Ethiopia but as one of United Nations concerned over probable world effect of proposed British treatment of another of United Nations which was first of overrun countries to be liberated and whose territory in opinion of Ethiopians is to be treated by the British in same way as neighboring enemy Italian territory. As reported in despatch 254, October 17 20 Lord de la Warr 21 in conversation for purpose of informing me of progress of negotiations inquired as to probable opinion of American people in case negotiations fail because of above British demands; I replied that without instructions I could not speak officially as to this, but personally I believe American opinion would be critical of British action which would probably be regarded as unjustifiable; Lord de la Warr said he considered it likely such would be opinion in U.S. and perhaps in England as well. Lord de la Warr said Department can obtain information as to treaty negotiations progress from British Embassy in Washington which is being kept currently informed. Caldwell 16 None printed. 17 Certain areas of Ethiopia adjacent to the border of French Somaliland which, tinder the terms of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942 were placed under the occupation of the British Army forces in Ethiopia. 18 The easternmost province of Ethiopia, placed under the control of the British Military Administration of Somalia by the 1942 Agreement. 19 John Spencer, American Adviser to the Ethiopian Foreign Office. 20 Not printed. 21 Special representative and leader of the British delegation to negotiate the new agreement The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 741.8411/11–444: Telegram [Document 68] The Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa , November 4, 1944—noon. [Received 1:45 p.m.] 224. It is assumed by Ethiopian Government that as no reply has been received to my telegram 214, October 24, our attitude is negative and negotiations with British will proceed without expectation of support hoped for. Caldwell The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) 741.8411/10–2444: Telegram [Document 69] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) Washington , November 6, 1944—7 p.m. 161. Department has been discussing the subject of your 214, October 24, with the British Embassy. 22 Further word will be sent you shortly. Stettinius 22 Conversations concerning the British claim to control the Ogaden and the reserved areas were held between the Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard) and Mr. John Russell, Second Secretary of the British Embassy, on October 30 and November 4, 1944. The information received by Mr. Villard in these conversations corresponded to that received from the Legation in Ethiopia. Memoranda of the conversations were received in the Legation on November 22. The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 741.8411/11–744: Telegram [Document 70] The Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa , November 7, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 2:28 p.m.] 225. Upon being informed by British delegation that British Government, after consideration by Cabinet in response to telegram mentioned in my 214, October 24, insisted that without Ethiopian acceptance of British administration of reserved areas and Ogaden during life of agreement there could be no agreement and complaining of Ethiopian ingratitude, Ethiopian delegation delivered memo (copy of which I am forwarding 23 ) in which inter alia: Objection is made to application to Ethiopian territory of agreement between Britain, Russia and America 24 mentioned by Lord de la Warr (ReLegs 206, October 12 25 ) and question is asked whether this principle is to be applied to other liberated territory, reference is made to de la Warr’s allegation that this British demand is required by needs of war with Japan and his statement that policy of Britain and United States precludes present consideration of questions such as above-mentioned territories and it is suggested that as America is at present conducting main Pacific operations Britain should approach and reach agreement with United States, adding that as members of United Nations Ethiopia would place Ogaden (but not mentioning reserved areas) under British military administration until end of either agreement or Pacific War whichever is earlier if United States considers this necessary for military reasons and account will be taken of this action in post-war settlements. Spencer states reference to United States was not due to effort to involve us in dispute but was unavoidable because of de la Warr’s statements. I understand unofficially that de la Warr now refuses to confer with Ethiopian delegation but yesterday in audience with Emperor said no further negotiations are possible unless Ethiopia agrees to British military administration of both reserved areas and Ogaden; he had spoken frankly and his words had been used against him; tone of memo was discourteous and would be resented by his Government and particularly by Churchill if he should see it; reference to United States was objectionable; he had telegraphed for authorization to return home and reserved all space on plane leaving 9th; and requested Emperor’s reply today which was not promised. Agreement regarding Ogaden while seemingly impossible at moment may still be reached; it will be much more difficult to persuade Ethiopians to accept British demands for reserved areas which Ethiopians consider less justified than demands regarding Ogaden. Caldwell 23 Despatch No. 274, November 7, from the Minister in Ethiopia, not printed. 24 For Department’s comment on this alleged agreement, see telegram No. 164, November 9, 8 p.m., to the Minister in Ethiopia, infra . 25 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) 741.8411/11–744: Telegram [Document 71] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) Washington , November 9, 1944—8 p.m. 164. The British Embassy today was requested 26 to clarify the references in your telegrams 206 of October 12 27 and 225 of November 7 to the alleged existence of a British-American-Soviet agreement, or a British-American policy, to refrain from discussing territorial questions until the end of the war. It was pointed out to the Embassy that even if such an agreement existed it would be difficult to understand why it should be applied to areas embraced within the territory of Ethiopia. A request for clarification was also made in regard to Lord de la Warr’s reported assertion that the Ogaden was required for prosecution of the war against Japan. Finally, the Embassy’s attention was called to your conversation with Lord de la Warr regarding the probable effect on public opinion in the United States and England if the treaty negotiations should fail because of the British demand for retention of the reserved areas and the Ogaden. Despite the statement in your 214, October 24, that the Embassy was being kept currently informed as to the negotiations it is apparent that very little has reached Washington from British sources. The Embassy promised to telegraph immediately for further information and clarification regarding the British position. Stettinius 26 Communication not found in Department files. 27 Telegram No. 206 not printed. The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 741.8411/11–2744: Telegram [Document 72] The Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa , November 27, 1944—2 p.m. [Received November 27—1:45 p.m.] 245. ReLeg’s 225, November 7. Negotiations again suspended. Emperor finally agreed, as unavoidable if any agreement is to be reached, to transfer both reserved areas and Ogaden to British military administration for life of agreement or till end of hostilities (whichever is earlier) as contribution as one of United Nations in war against Japan (wording as in draft of article 8 with despatch 274, November 7 28 except for inclusion of reserved areas), but British have objected both to exclusion of reason and period of validity, stating that although reason should be included, since that given is only part of reason, an additional important consideration being inability of this Government to maintain order, which neither Government would wish to include; and period should be either life of agreement or till peace settlement. Termination of negotiations appears imminent, as Ethiopians not now disposed to make further concessions; however, they may eventually do so. Ethiopians find it strange that objection to wording was not made earlier as draft of article 8 was attached to memorandum to British of November 4 (enclosed with despatch mentioned above). Caldwell 28 Despatch and enclosures not printed. The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 741.8411/11–2944: Telegram [Document 73] The Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa , November 29, 1944—10 p.m. [Received November 29—3:50 p.m.] 248. Re Legation’s 245, November 27. Acceptance by Emperor this evening of British formula in which Ethiopia as contribution of ally to prosecution of war places reserved areas and Ogaden under administration of British military for life of agreement ensures resumption of negotiations and makes possible successful conclusion. Copies of documents in pouch on tomorrow morning’s plane. 29 Caldwell 29 Despatch No. 296, November 29, from the Minister in Ethiopia, not printed. The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 741.8411/12–744: Telegram [Document 74] The Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa , December 7, 1944—4 p.m. [Received December 8—1:30 a.m.] 255. Re Legation’s 248, November 29. Financial matters have now been reached in negotiations de la Warr informed me. He stated that: British finally received financial statement indicating balanced budget and no need of financial aid and at same time request for loan of 10 million pounds; as British consider loan not likely to be repaid request was refused with statement that loan was contrary to British policy; but development trust of 1 million pounds a year for life of agreement may be arranged; he regretted trust was not joint British-American affair, and said British are prepared to undertake it alone, but hoped there might be consultation and cooperation, or at least coordination of such British and American efforts in Ethiopia, particularly UNRRA 30 work. Caldwell 30 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 741.8411/12–944: Telegram [Document 75] The Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa , December 9, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 2:42 p.m.] 257. ReLegs 255, December 7. Unless some objection made by London, where draft resulting from negotiations has been referred, or difficulty arises regarding details of railway transfer, agreement should be signed next week. Ethiopians refused offer of development trust, even after suggestion of de la Warr that some Americans be included on control board, as they consider that amount is too small and since they surrender control of reserved areas and Ogaden for 2-year life of agreement without guarantee or compensation they should receive loan also without guarantee and without interest. Ethiopians feel that they have been compelled through fear of hostile British action in absence of any agreement to yield to superior strength and give British practically all they wanted with too little benefit to Ethiopia, and negotiations have not decreased their suspicion and dislike or [ of ] British. Although no one has so stated, I suspect that Ethiopians feel some disappointment at response, so far as known to them, to inquiry of Emperor transmitted in my telegram 214, October 24, although I have been most careful to avoid giving any encouragement to expectation or hope of support which might not be forthcoming; Spencer has assured me he has followed same course, but he probably hoped for more support than was given, so far as is known here. Caldwell The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) 741.8411/12–1944: Telegram [Document 76] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) Washington , December 21, 1944—9 p.m. 193. Reurtels 262 December 16 and 264 December 19. 31 Department is anxious to obtain brief telegraphic summary of provisions of final agreement 32 re following points: 1. Were Ethiopian rights to subsoil exploitation limited and was it agreed that enterprises in reserved areas and Ogaden should be subject to military control or other restrictions? Do you consider it likely that the British would take advantage of such restrictions effectively to hamper or prevent possible exploitation of the areas by American concerns? 2. Any exclusive features of military or commercial aviation rights. 3. What is period of validity of agreement and how may it be terminated? Stettinius 31 Neither printed. 32 Signed at Addis Ababa on December 19, 1944, British Cmd. 7722, Treaty Series No. 38 (1949). The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 741.8411/12–2744: Telegram [Document 77] The Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa , December 27, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 11:47 a.m.] 268. ReDepts 193, December 21. Agreement runs until superseded by treaty; after 2 years it may be terminated by either party upon 3 months’ notice. Subject to Ethiopian regulations and any future international aviation agreements, British civil planes may operate in Ethiopia; planes registered in Ethiopia have similar reciprocal right; and British companies selected by British Government may operate commercial and mail services in Ethiopia. British and other Allied Air Forces have right of flight in Ethiopia without reference to Ethiopian regulations. Sub-soil rights not mentioned in agreement but paragraph 5 of British letter No. 1 printed with agreement concedes that with exception of water, sub-soil and mineral rights on [ sic ] Ogaden and reserved areas are Ethiopian property the exercise of rights to which will not be interfered with by British Military Administration. In view of this letter it seems unlikely that American firms would encounter difficulties on part of British in this connection (reLegs 265, December 21 33 ). Caldwell 33 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) 884.77/10–1244: Telegram [Document 78] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) Washington , December 27, 1944—8 p.m. 197. Please advise whether new agreement contained provision anticipated in your telegram 206, October 12, 34 that operation of railway by Ethiopians requires clearance with French. If so please report what if any steps the Ethiopian Government has taken to secure agreement with the French. Stettinius 34 Telegram not printed. The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State 884.77/12–2944: Telegram [Document 79] The Minister in Ethiopia ( Caldwell ) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa , December 29, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 29—11:40 a.m.] 272. ReDepts 197, December 27, 8 p.m. Transfer of railway operation is to be not later than 3 months after notice by Ethiopia that its proper operation has been arranged for, and Ethiopia agrees that operating arrangements will not violate French rights. In reply to my formal inquiry, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 35 stated yesterday that Ethiopian Government considers that no negotiations with French prior to transfer of operation are required, as Ethiopian operation like British Military operation is merely temporary. He showed me British note not published, copy of which is promised for transmission in next pouch, 36 indicating that British do not intend to insist upon evidence of agreement between Ethiopians and French before effecting transfer of operations. Caldwell 35 Aklilou Abte Wold. 36 Despatch No. 319, December 27, from the Minister in Ethiopia, not printed. Policy of the United States regarding the question of the political organization of Greece following liberation from German occupation Policy of the United States regarding the question of the political organization of Greece following liberation from German occupation 1 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 124 – 166 . [80] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State Moscow, January 4, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 8:45 p.m.] 868.01/429: Telegram [81] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State Moscow, January 5, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 10:05 p.m.] 868.01/430: Telegram [82] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, January 5, 1944—10 p.m. [Received January 7—1:59 p.m.] 868.00/1332: Telegram [83] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, January 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received January 15—11:58 a.m.] 868.00/1336: Telegram [84] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, January 21, 1944—8 p.m. [Received January 22—6:57 p.m.] 868.01/434: Telegram [85] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, March 13, 1944—3 p.m. [Received March 14—7:55 a.m.] 868.01/466: Telegram [86] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, March 16, 1944—8 p.m. [Received March 17—4:32 p.m.] 868.01/470: Telegram [87] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, March 31, 1944—7 p.m. [Received April 1—3:16 p.m.] 868.01/481: Telegram [88] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 1, 1944—8 p.m. [Received April 3—10:10 a.m.] 868.01/482: Telegram [89] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 3, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 6:48 p.m.] 868.01/483: Telegram [90] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 4, 1944—8 p.m. [Received April 5—11:17 a.m.] 868.01/485: Telegram [91] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 5, 1944—6 p.m. [Received April 6—11:00 a.m.] 868.01/488: Telegram [92] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 11, 1944—7 p.m. [Received April 12—9:30 a.m.] 868.01/493: Telegram [93] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received April 14—3:15 p.m.] 868.01/497: Telegram [94] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [London,] April 16, 1944. 868.00/1419: Telegram [95] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Washington,] 17 April 1944. 868.01/529: Telegram [96] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [London,] April 18, 1944. 868.01/530: Telegram [97] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] April 18, 1944. 868.01/554 [98] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 19, 1944—7 p.m. [Received April 20—9:20 a.m.] 868.01/505: Telegram [99] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 20, 1944—7 p.m. [Received April 21—2:40 p.m.] 868.01/507: Telegram [100] Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] April 22, 1944. 868.01/554 [101] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) [Washington,] April 24, 1944. 868.01/554 [102] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 26, 1944—9 p.m. [Received April 27—9:45 a.m.] 868.01/515: Telegram [103] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, May 1, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 2—9:27 a.m.] 868.01/528: Telegram [104] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] May 2, 1944. 868.01/563 [105] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, May 12, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 13—11:44 a.m.] 868.01/545: Telegram [106] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, May 15, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 15—5:09 p.m.] 868.01/548: Telegram [107] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, May 15, 1944. [Received May 16—4:29 p.m.] 868.01/549: Telegram [108] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) Washington, May 19, 1944—4 p.m. 868.01/549: Telegram [109] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, May 20, 1944—5 p.m. [Received May 20—1:24 p.m.] 868.01/557: Telegram [110] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, May 22, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 23—9:02 a.m.] 868.01/567: Telegram [111] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, May 22, 1944—7 p.m. [Received May 23—8:50 a.m.] 868.01/568: Telegram [112] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, May 23, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 24—1:10 p.m.] 868.01/570: Telegram [113] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) Washington, May 26, 1944—7 p.m. 868.01/568: Telegram [114] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] May 30, 1944. 870.00/43 [115] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , May 30, 1944. 870.00/46 [116] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [London,] 31 May 1944. [117] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 6, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 6—4 p.m.] 868.01/586: Telegram [118] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) Washington, June 10, 1944—2 p.m. 868.01/594a: Telegram [119] The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, June 10, 1944. 870.00/48 [120] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Washington, June 11, 1944.] [121] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt London, 11 June 1944. [122] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , June 12, 1944. 870.00/46 [123] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Washington,] 12 June 1944. [124] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 13, 1944—5 p.m. [Received June 13—2:45 p.m.] 868.01/594: Telegram [125] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 13, 1944—7 p.m. [Received June 14—10:48 a.m.] 868.01/593: Telegram [126] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [London,] 14 June 1944. [127] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 16, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 17—10:15 a.m.] 868.01/595: Telegram [128] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, June 17, 1944. 870.00/47 [129] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Washington,] 22 June 1944. [130] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt London, 23 June 1944. [131] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Washington,] June 26, 1944. [132] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 29, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 29—5:01 p.m.] 868.01/6–2944: Telegram [133] The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State Washington , July 1, 1944. 870.00/7–144 [134] The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State Cairo, July 8, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 11:32 p.m.] 868.01/7–844: Telegram [135] The Department of State to the Soviet Embassy Washington , July 15, 1944. 870.00/7–144 [136] The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State Cairo, August 10, 1944—6 p.m. [Received August 12—10:22 a.m.] 868.01/8—1044: Telegram [137] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [London,] August 17, 1944 868.01/8–2144: Telegram [138] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) [Washington,] August 19, 1944. 868.01/8–1944 [139] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Washington,] 26 August 1944. [140] The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State Cairo, September 2, 1944. [Received September 2—2:25 p.m.] 868.01/9–244: Telegram [141] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, September 8, 1944—10 a.m. [Received September 8—10 a.m.] 868.01/9–844: Telegram [142] The United States Representative, Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Caserta, September 26, 1944—midnight. [Received September 27—4 p.m.] 868.00/9–2644: Telegram [143] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, November 9, 1944—1 p.m. [Received November 10—9:33 a.m.] 868.01/11–944: Telegram [144] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, November 10, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 11—12:40 p.m.] 868.00/11–1044: Telegram [145] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, November 17, 1944—3 p.m. [Received November 19—4:40 p.m.] 868.01/11–1744: Telegram [146] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, November 30, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 2—8:41 a.m.] 868.20/11–3044: Telegram [147] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 3, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 4—11:20 a.m.] 868.00/12–344: Telegram [148] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 4, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 5—10:32 a.m.] 868.00/12–444: Telegram [149] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 5, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 9—2:52 p.m.] 868.00/12–544: Telegram [150] The United States Representative, Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk), to the Secretary of State Caserta, December 5, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 10:46 p.m.] 868.00/12–544: Telegram [151] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 8, 1944. [Received December 9—2:30 p.m.] 868.00/12–844: Telegram [152] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 8, 1944—10 a.m. [Received December 10—8:37 a.m.] 868.00/12–844: Telegram [153] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 11, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 9:15 p.m.] 868.00/12–1144: Telegram [154] The Appointed Ambassador to Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Caserta, December 11, 1944—midnight. [Received December 11—9:09 p.m.] 868.00/12–1144: Telegram [155] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 12, 1944—1 p.m. [Received December 14—10:34 a.m.] 868.00/12–1244: Telegram [156] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) Washington, December 12, 1944. 868.00/12–1244: Telegram [157] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] December 13, 1944. 768.00/12–1344 [158] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] December 13, 1944. 868.00/12–1344 [159] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Washington,] 13 December 1944. [160] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 13, 1944—3 p.m. [Received December 15—11:03 a.m.] 868.00/12–1344: Telegram [161] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Caserta, December 13, 1944—midnight. [Received December 13—9:16 p.m.] 868.00/12–1344: Telegram [162] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Caserta, December 14, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 10:40 p.m.] 868.00/12–1444: Telegram [163] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Caserta, December 14, 1944—midnight. [Received December 15—3:04 p.m.] 868.01/12–1444: Telegram [164] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [London,] 15 December 1944. [165] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 15, 1944—noon. [Received 2:03 p.m.] 868.00/12–1544: Telegram [166] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Caserta, December 15, 1944—9 p.m. [Received December 17—7:30 a.m.] 868.00/12–1544: Telegram [167] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) Washington, December 16, 1944—2 p.m. 868.00/12–1544: Telegram [168] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 16, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 17—2:06 p.m.] 868.00/12–1644: Telegram [169] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [London,] December 17, 1944. 868.00/12–1744 [170] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 17, 1944—1 p.m. [Received December 20—1:45 a.m.] 868.00/12–1744: Telegram [171] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Caserta, December 18, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 10:06 a.m.] 868.00/12–1844: Telegram [172] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 19, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 21—1:57 p.m.] 868.00/12–1944: Telegram [173] The King of the Hellenes (George II) to President Roosevelt December 19, 1944 868.00/3–945 [174] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 20, 1944—4 p.m. [Received December 22—5:50 p.m.] 868.00/12–2044: Telegram [175] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) [Washington,] December 22, 1944. Lot 122: Secretary’s Staff Committee Documents 1–45 [176] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 24, 1944—10 a.m. [Received December 27—11:25 a.m.] 868.00/12–2444: Telegram [177] The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Caserta, December 25, 1944—10 p.m. [Received December 26—1:04 p.m.] 868.00/12–2544: Telegram [178] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 26, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 28—11:28 a.m.] 868.00/12–2644: Telegram [179] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [London,] December 26, 1944. 868.00/12–2644: Telegram [180] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Washington,] 26 December 1944. [181] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 26, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 27—10:45 a.m.] 868.00/12–2644: Telegram [182] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 27, 1944—9 a.m. [Received December 28—12:30 p.m.] 868.00/12–2744: Telegram [183] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 27, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 28—7:10 a.m.] 868.00/12–2744: Telegram [184] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [Athens,] December 28, 1944. 868.00/12–2944: Telegram [185] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 28, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 2:15 p.m.] 868.00/12–2844: Telegram [186] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 28, 1944—4 p.m. [Received December 29—9:30 a.m.] 868.00/12–2844: Telegram [187] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 28, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 30—11:33 a.m.] 868.01/12–2844: Telegram [188] President Roosevelt to the King of the Hellenes (George II) [Washington,] December 28, 1944. [189] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt London, 29 December 1944. [190] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt London, 30 December 1944. [191] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 31, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 31—11:35 a.m.] 868.00/12–3144: Telegram The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 868.01/429: Telegram [Document 80] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , January 4, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 8:45 p.m.] 19. The Greek Ambassador 2 informed me today that he has received note from the Soviet Government to the effect that in view of assurances which the Soviet Government has received from the British Government regarding the possibility of achieving unity among the Greek guerrillas, the Soviet Government supports the efforts of Greek Government to form a united front in Greece against the common enemy (see my telegram No. 1, January 3, 9 a.m. 3 ). As the British Minister 4 received negative reply to the two appeals he made to Molotov prior to my delivery of your message, I infer that your message influenced the decision. Harriman 2 Athanasios Politis. 3 Not printed; in the last paragraph of this telegram (860N.00/242), Ambassador Harriman reported that he had informed Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov of Secretary Hull’s message to Greek Prime Minister Tsouderos. The message referred to was that of December 23, 1943, supporting Tsouderos’ attempts to achieve unity among the partisan groups in Greece; for text, see telegram Greek Series 67, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 164 . For correspondence concerning the outbreak of fighting among the Greek partisans, see ibid. , pp. 154 ff., passim . 4 John Balfour, Chargé d’Affaires. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 868.01/430: Telegram [Document 81] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , January 5, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 10:05 p.m.] 32. A memorandum dated January 4 has been received from the Foreign Office stating that a memorandum to the following effect has been delivered to the British Foreign Office by the Soviet Ambassador 5 (see my telegram 19, January 4, 3 p.m.): As the British Government, on the basis of the information available to it, considers that a reconciliation of the rivalry among the partisan groups in Greece is now possible, the Soviet Government considers it expedient, with the aim of strengthening the struggle against the German invaders, to support the creation of a unified front of all partisan groups in Greece. Harriman 5 Fëdor Tarasovich Gusev, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/1332: Telegram [Document 82] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , January 5, 1944—10 p.m. [Received January 7—1:59 p.m.] Greek Series 4. In regard to the matter discussed in my telegram No. 148, Greek Series of December 28, 4 p.m. 6 my British colleague informed me on January 3 that Mr. Eden 7 did have “another go” at Molotov and that the latter reiterated that he could not issue a statement for use by the Greek Prime Minister along with Mr. Eden’s and the Secretary’s because he was insufficiently [informed?] on the Greek situation. However, the Moscow radio emitted a broadcast to Greece on New Year’s Day (to which I understand Mr. Molotov made no reference) calling on “guerillas and citizens” to “unite for the final struggle against the Germans and for the independence and freedom of the Greek people” and I am today informed by the Greek Foreign Office that further word has been received now from Mr. Molotov to the effect that he will support the Allied attitude on the basis of information supplied him by the British Embassy in Moscow. Should a statement from Mr. Molotov be forthcoming, as now seems possible, it may be regarded as bringing the Soviet technically into concert with the other two powers but on the other hand the delay in its issuance as well as the absence in the above mentioned broadcast of any allusion to the British and American appeals is also likely to have the effect in Greece of giving the Russian pronouncement when it comes a unique distinction as that of a power peculiarly interested and specially to be heard and this may have been the Russian aim from the beginning. The Russian Foreign Office can hardly be presumed ignorant of the considerable activity of Communist groups in all the Balkan countries at the present time as well as of the existence of liaison if nothing more between Tito’s 8 Partisans and the direction of EAM 9 and though it may not be supporting such activity directly it is probably not averse to its continuance or to capitalizing on the opportunities it is offering so widely for the spread of Soviet influence and prestige. MacVeagh 6 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 165 . 7 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 8 Assumed name of Josip Broz, Yugoslav partisan leader. 9 Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon (National Liberation Front). The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/1336: Telegram [Document 83] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , January 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received January 15—11:58 a.m.] Greek Series 18. See my telegram No. 4, Greek Series January 5, 10 p.m. The Soviet Government’s statement in support of the Greek Prime Minister’s appeal for unity in Greece has now been handed to the Greek Government and was released to the press on January 12 in the following form “The Soviet Government support the creation of a united front of all guerrilla bands in Greece with the object of reinforcing the struggle against the German invaders”. I am informed that Mr. Tsouderos has decided against transmitting the statement to Greece in a special broadcast on the grounds that this might tend to make the Russian message appear over important (see my comment in paragraph 2 of my telegram above referred to) but that it has been included as a news item in the regular Greek program of the Cairo radio station. It is expected that the Soviet statement together with those of Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden will be printed in pamphlet form and dropped over Greece. MacVeagh The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/434: Telegram [Document 84] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , January 21, 1944—8 p.m. [Received January 22—6:57 p.m.] Greek Series 27. The Greek Prime Minister on January 16 received from the Central Committee of EAM a telegram which indicates that Mr. Tsouderos’ recent broadcasts have made a favorable impression within Greece and urges the formation of a government of national unity. Mr. Tsouderos answered pointing out that reconciliation between the guerrillas must precede the creation of such a government. Though he hopes that Mr. Eden’s fortuitously synchronized statement to the House on January 19 regarding unity and relief 10 (see my telegram No. 12, Greek Series January 11, 1 p.m. 11 ) may have a favorable effect, the Prime Minister is somewhat reservedly optimistic about the possibility of reconciling the guerillas. But he is on the whole pleased about the general situation in Greece, since the extent of the recognition of himself and his Government which he feels is implicit in EAM’s message, seems to bear out reports that in some sections, at least, of public opinion in Athens there has been in recent months a swing toward support of the Government in Exile. The text of the telegrams and further comment are being sent to the Department by airgram. 12 MacVeagh 10 Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 396, col. 153. 11 Not printed. 12 Airgram No. A–8, January 22, 7 p.m., not printed. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/466: Telegram [Document 85] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , March 13, 1944—3 p.m. [Received March 14—7:55 a.m.] 83. For the President. The Greek Prime Minister has asked me to inform you that he has written the King 13 on the basis of widespread advices from political leaders and other competent persons in occupied Greece that while it is not necessary for him to make any further public declaration beyond his letter of November 8, 14 he should certainly and at once authorize the appointment of a Regent to exercise Governmental powers in Greece from the moment of liberation until a plebiscite may determine the question of the regime. “On this” the Prime Minister has written “there is complete agreement among all the parties without any exception the resistance organizations and the Archbishop”, 15 who is proposed as Regent. The Prime Minister wants you to know this, he says, because he believes you to be interested in the King’s fate and he emphasizes his hope that the King will consent. If he does not the Prime Minister believes the cause of the monarchy will be lost in the situation now prevailing which he describes as being “controlled by Leftist elements and the armed guerrillas in the mountains”. On the other hand if he does “the situation will finally develop in favor of Your Majesty”. It is clear that the Prime Minister fears that the King may again appeal to you this time in a question which lies not between him and the British as was the case when you were here but between him and his own Government. The Prime Minister said to me that the only people to whose advice the King will listen are you and Mr. Churchill 16 and to a certain extent General Smuts. 17 As the King is in London he will probably be consulting Mr. Churchill presently. MacVeagh 13 George II, King of the Hellenes. 14 See Greek Series telegrams No. 110, November 23, and No. 128, December 12, 1943, and aide-mémoire from the British Embassy, December 22, 1943, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 155 , 157 , and 160 , respectively. 15 Archbishop Damaskinos of Athens. 16 Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister. 17 Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa and Commander of the South African Defense Force. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/470: Telegram [Document 86] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , March 16, 1944—8 p.m. [Received March 17—4:32 p.m.] Greek 88. My telegram No. 77, Greek, March 9, 6 p.m. 18 I called on Mr. Tsouderos yesterday afternoon and he told me that although the King has not yet finally replied to his letter regarding the proposal for a regency he has indicated in a telegram that he is indisposed to accept the proposal feeling that it would be tantamount to “abdicating the mandate which he has received from his people”; he will give his final answer only when he has studied the documents. Mr. Tsouderos expressed his own concern about the possibility of the King’s refusal to agree. He pointed out that such a refusal would open rifts between the King, his Government and the parties in Greece which would give to the newly formed “Political Committee” 19 (see my immediately preceding telegram 20 ) a fortuitous strength which it would otherwise lack. He went on to say that if the King persisted in his refusal he, Tsouderos, could not hold his Government and would himself have to resign. The King should then have no alternative but to form such a government as that of Yugoslavia, which would find no support whatever within the country and very little outside of it. In this event the Allies while continuing formal recognition of the King might feel obliged in the interests of the war effort to throw their effective support to the “Political Committee” as they have done in the case of Tito. The British Ambassador 21 informed me today that he has telegraphed these views of the Prime Minister most urgently to the Foreign Office in London. MacVeagh 18 Not printed. 19 During February and March, conferences were held between the various guerrilla organizations in Greece and certain political leaders to end fighting between the guerrillas, to establish a secret committee representing all anti-German groups to unify their efforts against the German occupying forces, and to collaborate with the Greek Government in Exile. Following the breakdown of negotiations, EAM organized on March 12–13 its own “Political Committee of National Liberation” ( Politike Epitrope Ethnikos Apeleftherosis , often referred to as PEEA). Though unsuccessful in establishing political unity, the conferences did succeed in bringing about an armistice between the guerrilla factions. 20 Not printed. 21 Reginald W. A. Leeper. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/481: Telegram [Document 87] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , March 31, 1944—7 p.m. [Received April 1—3:16 p.m.] Greek 98. My telegram 89, Greek, March 20, 8 p.m. 22 Mr. Tsouderos called on me today with reference to the situation created here by the formation of the Political Committee headed by Colonel Bakirjis. He is not worried about developments in Greece since he has had a second message from the Committee couched like the first on conciliatory terms and only urging speed in the negotiations for a government of national unity; and he believes that the Committee not only lacks popular support but is aware of the lack. He is, however, much concerned about the situation in the Middle East where the Committee’s existence has become widely known, while its character and its demands have been considerably misrepresented. As a result, there is a growing movement among Republican-minded groups particularly in the Armed Forces for recognition of the Committee. This has already been urged upon him by a number of delegations including a group of Army and Air Force officers. He believes that the agitation is being deliberately stirred by the EAM and other elements hostile to the Government and he fears that it may attain considerable if not dangerous proportions. The King in the meantime has given no further indication of what his final decision on the regency proposal is to be (my telegram No. 88, Greek, March 16, 8 p.m.) but has telegraphed asking for news about the latest developments. Mr. Tsouderos in answer has told him of the situation outlined above, has urged him to hasten his reply and has recommended that he should not for the present at least return to Cairo. MacVeagh 22 Not printed. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/482: Telegram [Document 88] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , April 1, 1944—8 p.m. [Received April 3—10:10 a.m.] Greek 99. Following a decision of the Council of Ministers the local Greek garrison commander ordered yesterday the arrest of the Army and Air Force officers, 14 in all, who called on Mr. Tsouderos (see my telegram No. 98, Greek, March 31, 7 p.m.) and 6 have already been apprehended. The reason given for this action is that the officers exceeded their military authority in approaching the Prime Minister with political demands. The British Embassy feels that the Greek authorities had no choice but to act as they have done and is inclined to believe with the Greek Government itself that the matter is not at present of any importance though it may become serious should repercussions spread from the idle officers in Cairo and the depot battalions now somewhat affected with EAMite enthusiasm to the 1st Brigade. Furthermore it is hoped in regard to this last that present prospects of early active employment will counteract any possible incitements to political agitation. In this connection in an effort to assure people both here and in Greece that the Government is serious in its efforts to achieve national unity Navy Minister Venizelos broadcast last night over the Cairo radio on behalf of his colleagues a statement which followed closely although at greater length the lines of the Government’s recent press release already reported to the Department (my telegram No. 91, Greek, March 27 23 ). MacVeagh 23 Not printed. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/483: Telegram [Document 89] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , April 3, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 6:48 p.m.] Greek 102. I have just had a long conversation with Mr. Tsouderos who told me that at noon today he sent his resignation to King George together with strong recommendations that he call Mr. Venizelos to form a new government. Mr. Tsouderos said that while he was fairly confident 2 days ago that what he called the “revolutionary movement” was limited and scattered so that it could be handled without great difficulty it became clear to him yesterday that it was getting out of control and this morning he learned of trouble in the Merchant Marine and the Navy and even in the refugee camp at Moses Wells where the few soldiers and officers present took the lead in organizing demonstration. This morning the officers arrested Saturday (see my telegram Greek 99, April 1, 8 p.m.) were liberated by their guards, a new commander of the garrison took over and he himself was called on by two colonels from among his personal friends who advised him that the situation was beyond cure. No trouble has occurred in the 1st Brigade as yet but Mr. Tsouderos is informed that “revolutionary committees” have issued instructions to remain quiet lest any outbreak lose the Brigade its opportunity of participating in the active operations for which it has been training. A revolt of the Brigade is held for use, Mr. Tsouderos said, as a last card by the “revolutionaries”. Before noon today Cabinet meeting was held at which Mr. Tsouderos unexpectedly found all his colleagues united against him personally. They urged him either to go to Palestine for his health or to fly to England to see the King, leaving them to carry on in his absence but he preferred a constitutional resignation to an informal disappearance from the scene. This meeting which was attended by Venizelos, Karapaniotis, Voulgaris and Sophoulis, 24 gave Tsouderos the feeling that if the dissidence in the forces was not actually started by his colleagues they have encouraged and exploited it. At their insistence he has given the fact of his resignation to the press before the King has been able to learn of it and make his decision. In conclusion Mr. Tsouderos pointed out the difficulties which lie ahead for the new government. Venizelos, he said, is inexperienced and prone to adopt easy solutions. But most of all he fears King’s reaction. He said that during the past month the King has either said no or returned no answer to every proposal made to him and he believes it very possible he will refuse to accept the present change which might lead to anti-Royalist outbursts or even to a declaration of a republic. While I was waiting to see Tsouderos his secretary expressed view that today’s work makes Colonel Bakirdjis the premier and EAM real government of Greece. This extreme view but much more will certainly depend on what wisdom the King and Venizelos can show at this juncture. I have not been able see British colleague who is ill in bed but his Embassy which has been completely surprised by the above events believes with Tsouderos that political intrigue probably long antedating formation of “Political Committee of National Liberation” has been cause and not recently developed Committee enthusiam which under this view was simply exploited for its own end. MacVeagh 24 Sophocles Venizelos, Minister of Marine; Byron Karapaniotis, Minister of War; Pierre Voulgaris, Minister of Air; Themistocles Sophoulis, Minister of Social Welfare. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/485: Telegram [Document 90] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , April 4, 1944—8 p.m. [Received April 5—11:17 a.m.] Greek 103. The King’s reply has just been received (see my Greek 102, April 3, 8 [ 2 ] p.m.). He says that he will not accept Mr. Tsouderos’ [resignation?], he will consider the question of his successor when order has been restored. He further directs Mr. Venizelos to come to London immediately and explain the situation to him. He has asked the British Foreign Office to authorize the British military here to take measures for the restoration of order but meanwhile the British have already intervened for the purposes of military security under their operational authority over the Greek forces in Egypt and have placed several hundred persons under preventive and temporary arrest. It is the opinion of my British colleague that the King’s action has been well taken in the circumstances although the King will undoubtedly be criticized for not returning himself at once. He also feels that the strong and prompt British military reaction will have the effect of quieting the situation which he believes to be the product of skillful propaganda by the EAM and the folly of the Republican Cabinet members who have now placed themselves in an impossible position. MacVeagh The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/488: Telegram [Document 91] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , April 5, 1944—6 p.m. [Received April 6—11:00 a.m.] Greek Series 104. Immediately following a new meeting of the Greek Cabinet (see my Greek Series No. 103, April 4, 8 pm) I had another talk with Mr. Tsouderos this morning. He told me that the King’s reply was found “dictatorial and unacceptable” by Messrs. Venizelos, Karapaniotis, Voulgaris and Sophoulis and that they therefore presented their resignations along with those of the other two members of the Cabinet, Dimitrikakis and Theophanides, 25 who merely said that under the circumstances they could no longer continue to hold their portfolios. Mr. Venizelos refused to go to London. Meanwhile before the meeting the commanding officers of all the Greek naval units at Alexandria had called on the Prime Minister and informed him that the sentiment of the Fleet is almost 100% for a government of national unity with greater recognition of the People’s Committee in Greece than he is understood to favor and that they support Mr. Venizelos for the Premiership. Order in the Fleet is still preserved, they said, but only barely and the Admiral of the Fleet, Alexandris, 26 confirmed their statements by phone. Accordingly Mr. Tsouderos is again telegraphing urgently to the King stating that it is absolutely necessary that he charge Mr. Venizelos with the formation of a new government. Comment in the present confused situation is difficult. Judging from deputations calling at this Embassy and from other sources of information open to me there is a rising tide of feeling in Greek circles here against the British who seem to have failed so far to make it plain to the excited Greek mentality that their military action has been taken purely for the preservation of order and not in support of Tsouderos and the King. This and other factors such as a possible continued refusal on the King’s part to accept offered solutions may eventually bring the old royalist question more into the picture than it is at present. Mr. Tsouderos said that he feels the existing alliance of Republican politicians and Leftist elements is “pointed” primarily at the King and at himself as being “too Royalist”. But fundamentally he feels it represents EAM-ite maneuvering for Communist aims. Asked what he thought the EAM expects to get from Mr. Venizelos whose public expressions of policy in its regard have so closely paralleled his own, he replied that the EAM doubtless considers the present movement merely as another step in the Leftist advance which has been making headway in Greece ever since the death of Metaxas 27 and that after destroying the “Royalist” Tsouderos with the help of the “Republican” Venizelos it will not delay long, perhaps no longer than a few months before attempting to supplant the latter with someone still more radical. Meanwhile he himself hopes that some stronger Republican personality such as Papandreou 28 may come out of Greece to help guide affairs here before this swing to the Left goes too far. The above naturally contrasts somewhat sharply with the views of the Venizelos faction. In conversation with Mr. Parsons 29 of this Embassy this morning, Mr. Karapaniotis agreed to a statement of one of his associates to the effect that, while the policy of Mr. Venizelos does not differ greatly from that of Mr. Tsouderos, the latter “can not be trusted” to carry it out. Unquestionably purely personal ambitions, jealousies and animosities color the present situation to a high degree. Incidentally in this conversation it came out that the Republicans may intend, should the King refuse to accept Mr. Venizelos as Premier, to form a government of national unity themselves irrespective of the Crown. Finally, it may interest the Department that according to Mr. Tsouderos his former Vice President of the Council, Mr. Roussos, who already had connections with EAM last year at the time of the revolt of the 2nd Brigade, has been busily instrumental in hatching the present movement though he has no desire to take office again on account of his advanced age. MacVeagh 25 Stelios Dimitrikakis, Minister of Justice and Labor, and Stavros Theophanides, Under Secretary of State for Merchant Marine. 26 Constantine Alexandris, Commander in Chief of the Greek Fleet in the Middle East. 27 Gen. John Metaxas, Greek Prime Minister, 1936–41. 28 George Papandreou, former Greek Cabinet member. 29 Arthur W. Parsons, Special Assistant to Ambassador MacVeagh. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/493: Telegram [Document 92] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , April 11, 1944—7 p.m. [Received April 12—9:30 a.m.] Greek Series 113. Attempts to allay the trouble in the Greek Armed Forces still continue. General Paget 30 received a deputation from the 1st Brigade in Alexandria this afternoon and it is hoped that if some beneficial results from this are obtained they may help to quiet feelings in the army now apparently running high. Meanwhile the King returned this morning very tired after his quick trip. Ambassador Leeper, whom I have just seen, believes it is essential that the King make a statement as soon as possible on the political situation which would satisfy the present emotional popular demand for some real evidence of intention to broaden the government. A meeting between the King, Admiral Cunningham, 31 General Paget and Air Marshal Sir Keith Park (who has so far had no trouble but is certain to have it should shooting begin between the British and the Greek Army and Navy) has been arranged for tomorrow morning at which the Ambassador hopes that the King may be convinced that he must absolutely make such a statement, not only in his own interest, but to relieve his Allies of an impossible situation. In a conversation I had this afternoon with Russian Ambassador to discuss other topics he told me he was not in sympathy with British action so far in this affair. He expressed the view that the Greeks are merely seeking a change in their own government and that under such circumstances to menace them with tanks and deprive them of food is unjust. Rigid censorship here has been remarkably successful in preventing news of the trouble in the Greek Armed Forces as distinguished from the Cabinet crisis from spreading abroad, but the Moscow press has now mentioned it attacking, however, the Tsouderos government for the action the British have been taking. MacVeagh 30 Gen. Sir Bernard Paget, British Commander in Chief in the Middle East. 31 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/497: Telegram [Document 93] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , April 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received April 14—3:15 p.m.] Greek 118. My Greek 114, April 12, 7 p.m. 32 Venizelos has been entrusted by the King with the formation of a service Cabinet pending the arrival of personalities from Greece and the construction of a Government on the wide basis promised. The King’s statement 33 has been generally accepted with reservation particularly as to how his actions will support his words. Meanwhile there has been little change in the military and naval situations. A few naval mutineers have abandoned their comrades and this may indicate that the crisis of revolutionary enthusiasm is passing as the local British continue to show patience. However, since the need for the Greek Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean is acute this continued patience, which would appear essential in the circumstances if incidents are to be avoided, may fail to extend to London. Furthermore, as the Greeks regard themselves as guilty of no misconduct toward their Allies and the British have issued orders to lay down arms, etc., which they feel they cannot rescind, the question of face seems likely to cause difficulties even if others are composed. Russian interest in the movement, as tending in general to swing the Government of Greece further to the left and in particular to bring EAM more powerfully into the picture, is now widely recognized in Greek circles here owing to the sympathetic attitude of the Soviet Ambassador (see my Greek 113, April 11, 7 p.m.) and the propaganda activities of the Moscow press and radio (see Moscow’s 1243, April 10 34 ) and is causing some speculation as to how far it will go and whether Russia now aspires to supplant Britain as the dominating foreign power in connection with Greek affairs. MacVeagh 32 Not printed. 33 In telegram No. 115, April 12, the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile reported that King George had issued on April 12 a public announcement stating his support of the formation of a government “as representative as possible made up of all trends of patriotic opinion … largely … composed of Greeks who have lived in their country under enemy occupation …”. (868.01/949) 34 Not printed. The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 868.00/1419: Telegram [Document 94] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 35 [ London ,] April 16, 1944. 648. You will be aware of disturbances which have broken out among Greek armed forces in the Middle East and of difficulties which have arisen with Greek Government in Cairo. 2. Outbreak in Greek army and navy followed closely on establishment in the mountains of Greece of political committee sponsored by E.A.M. and there is little doubt that extremist elements who have long been working to subvert allegiance of Greek forces to their legitimate King and Government seized on this as a heaven sent opportunity for open and violent action. The dissident elements are undoubtedly opposed to the King and in favour of a republic but throughout disturbances there have been almost no direct attacks on the King’s personal position and only specific demand put forward is that Greek Government should take immediate and effective steps to recognise and associate with themselves political committee in Greece. 3. This crisis came at a particularly unfortunate moment since Monsieur Tsouderos has already sent an invitation to a number of moderate politicians in Athens urging them to come to Cairo to join the Government. He had also invited representatives of E.A.M., the Communist controlled organisation which has created and now dominates political committee. Tsouderos was thus doing everything in his power to create a truly representative Greek Government. 4. In this programme he had support of his colleagues and they appear to have had no hand in provoking disturbances in Greek forces. But they were extremely jealous of Tsouderos’ position and used trouble in Greek army, which was at first on a small scale, to get rid of him. Feeling that he had lost control of the situation, Tsouderos resigned and proposed Venizelos for Premiership. The trouble in Greek army rapidly spread to the navy and assumed the proportions of a full scale mutiny in both forces. The politicians in Cairo realised that matter had gone beyond one of personal rivalries or ambitions and their only thought was to find some candidate for Premiership sufficiently notorious for his left wing views to be acceptable to the mutinous elements in the forces. 5. The King of Greece was reluctant to accept a new Government whose composition was in effect dictated by mutineers. He considered that order in Greek armed forces must be restored before any lawful reconstruction of Government could be undertaken. I entirely agree with him and instructed our Ambassador to the Greek Government to do his utmost to induce Greek ministers to remain at their posts until the King could get back to Cairo and take stock of the situation. This I am glad to say they agreed to do. I also gave instructions to military authorities in the Middle East to deal firmly with discipline [ indiscipline ?] in Greek forces under their command. Order in the Greek army and navy has not been completely re-established but dissident elements are being isolated and once ringleaders are under arrest mutiny should rapidly subside. 6. The King of Greece has now reached Cairo and after studying the position for himself has formed a Government under M. Venizelos. For the future I have informed our Ambassador to Greek Government that he should be guided by following considerations: “Our relations are definitely established with lawfully constituted Greek Government headed by the King, who is ally of Britain and cannot be discarded to suit a momentary surge of appetite amongst ambitious émigré nonentities. Neither can Greece find constitutional expression in particular set of guerrillas, in many cases indistinguishable from banditti, who are masquerading as saviours of their country while living on local villagers. If necessary I shall denounce these elements and tendencies publicly in order to emphasize the love Great Britain has for Greece, whose suffering she shared in a small measure, being alas not then armed as we are now. Our only desire and interest is to see Greece a glorious free nation in the Eastern Mediterranean, the honoured friend and ally of victorious powers. Let all therefore work for this objective and make it quite clear that any failure in good conduct will not be overlooked. “I had been working hard to arrange movement of Greek brigade in Italy. Here they might still take part in entry into Rome which is to be expected during the summer. This brigade, the 1st Greek brigade, representatives of the army which had beaten back the Italian invader and were only felled by treachery and brutal interruption of German hordes, had and still has chance of raising name of Greece high in the world. It is a lamentable fact that they should have signalized this opportunity by an undignified, even squalid, exhibition of indiscipline which many will attribute to an unworthy fear of being sent to the front. “In the same way the Greek navy which is full of daring seamen and is playing a worthy part in upholding its country’s good name should not suddenly have tried to meddle with politics and presume to recover a constitution to Greek people. I believe that both these two forces can be brought back to a high sense of national honour and duty if courageous leadership is forthcoming backed by overwhelming force in reserve. “All the time I have been planning to place Greece back high in counsels of victorious nations. Witness how we have included them in Italian Advisory Council and tried to send a brigade to take part in impending victories in Italy. Greeks who are in safety in Egypt under our protection, equipped with our vessels—or armed with our weapons or others in security under military authority of British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East will place themselves in an abject and shameful position before all history if they allow their domestic feuds to mar their performance of solemn duties to their country of which they have become the heirs. They may easily by selfish, excitable behaviour, reduce Greece to a country without expression either at home or abroad and their names will be stained as long as history is written. “The King is the servant of his people. He makes no claim to rule them. He submits himself freely to judgment of the people as soon as normal conditions are restored. He places himself and his Royal House entirely at the disposition of the Greek nation. Once the German invader has been driven out Greece can be a republic or a Monarchy entirely as the people wish. Why then cannot the Greeks keep their hatreds for the common enemy who has wrought them such cruel injuries and would obliterate them as a free people were it not for resolute exertions of the great Allies.” 7. In sending these instructions I have asked the Ambassador, Mr. Leeper, to make use of all these arguments freely in my name if necessary both to the troops and to the sailors as well as, of course, the politicians who have been clattering around him. In making it clear to them that this is the policy of his Majesty’s Government I have asked him to emphasize that we seek no advantage for ourselves and have no interests but in upkeeping of Greek independence, freedom and honour. 35 Copy sent to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador (Halifax) on April 18. President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) 868.01/529: Telegram [Document 95] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) 36 [Paraphrase] [ Washington ,] 17 April 1944. 523. Thank you for your 648 and the information about difficulties in Greek participation in our Allied effort recently encountered. With you I join in the hope that your line of action toward the problem may succeed in bringing back the Greeks into the camp of the Allies and to a participation that will be worthy of the traditions established by the heroes of the history of the Greeks against the barbarians. As one whose family and who personally has contributed by personal help for over a century to Greek independence, frankly I am not happy over the situation as it is at present and hope that everywhere Greeks will retain their sense of proportion and will set aside pettiness. Let every Greek show a personal unselfishness which is so necessary now and think of their glorious past. If you want to, you can in the above sense quote me. 36 Copy sent to the Secretary of State at his request from the White House on April 25. The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 868.01/530: Telegram [Document 96] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 37 [ London ,] April 18, 1944. 651. Your 523. Thank you so much. I have told our people to make use of your message to the King and his new Ministers and to read it to mutinous brigade and recalcitrant ships. It may have a most salutary effect. I am not publishing anything here. 37 Copy forwarded to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador (Halifax) on April 19. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) to the Secretary of State 868.01/554 [Document 97] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Alling ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] April 18, 1944. Mr. Secretary : The Greek Ambassador 38 came in to see me today to express the very serious concern of his Government regarding the Russian attitude toward the recent Greek political crisis which has arisen in Cairo, resulting in the formation of a new Cabinet by Mr. Venizelos and the adoption of strong coercive methods by the British toward the Greek armed forces which expressed their dissatisfaction with the Greek political situation. The Ambassador stated the Greek Government was concerned with the critical articles published on the Greek crisis by the Tass Agency. The new Greek Prime Minister Venizelos had discussed the situation with the Russian Ambassador in Cairo in an effort to allay Russian misgivings and had pointed out that the measures taken against the mutineering Greek forces had been essential for the presentation of order and were in no way intended to stifle the free expression by legitimate means of Greek popular feeling. It had been explained, moreover, to the Russian Ambassador that the Greek Government is fully desirous of associating with it the Greek leaders of the resistance movement in Greece and to that end only three of the Cabinet posts in the new Government had been filled, the remainder being left open for the entrance of Greek leaders in Greece. However, notwithstanding the assurances given the Russian Ambassador, the Greek Government feels that the Russian Government is not satisfied and the Greek Government’s concern over the developing situation appears to be shared by the British Ambassador near the Greek Government in Cairo. The latter is said to have telegraphed to London concerning the situation and has been informed by the Foreign Office that the situation could only be clarified by direct contact between Prime Minister Churchill and Mr. Stalin. The Greek Ambassador stated he felt the American Government should be informed of the disturbing situation in Greek relations with the Russian Government. Russian interest in the Greek political crisis in Cairo has been reported to the Department by Mr. MacVeagh in his telegram no. 118, April 14. Commenting on Russian interest in the movement of the Government of Greece farther to the left, the sympathetic attitude of the Soviet Ambassador thereto and the activities of the Moscow press and radio in that connection, Mr. MacVeagh stated that some speculation was being caused as to how far this interest would go and whether Russia aspires to supplant Britain as the dominating foreign power in Greek affairs. I do not know what we can do about it but I have felt that, in view of Greek concern in the matter and the British view that the situation could only be clarified by direct contact between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin, that you might desire to acquaint the President with the above facts. Alternatively as a first step, you might wish to make inquiries in London. In any case the Greek Ambassador anxiously awaits word whether we agree with the British view that the situation can be clarified only by direct contact between Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. Paul H. Alling 38 Cimon P. Diamantopoulos. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/505: Telegram [Document 98] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , April 19, 1944—7 p.m. [Received April 20—9:20 a.m.] Greek 121. My 120, Greek, April 17, 7 p.m. 39 I have just had another talk with my British colleague about the Greek situation. He denied reports that any precise term has as yet been fixed to British patience as regards either the Navy or the Army. Admiral Cunningham ha/S told Mr. Venizelos that it is up to him to see that the Naval mutiny is quelled and Venizelos is now understood to be trying to organize some loyal Greek personnel to undertake the recapture of a couple of the 12 ships held by the mutineers without involving the British. The latter feel that such an operation to be followed presumably by others should present little difficulty but determined leadership seems to be lacking in the Greek Government ranks. Venizelos himself is frightened and though Admiral Alexandris has been replaced by Voulgaris the British feel the change is hardly for the better. In the Brigade the situation remains static. I asked Mr. Leeper whether he thought there was anything the Americans could do to help and he replied “I don’t know but I think not. We have the military responsibility and must carry on. As for mediation we couldn’t have that.” He enlarged on the Russian influence at work in this affair saying that the Soviet broadcasts in Greek, the private expressions of sympathy with the movement on the part of the Russian Embassy, and the “news” given in the Tass reports which he said “certainly” comes through the Russian Embassy’s cypher have been “outrageous”. He said, “The Russians could stop the trouble in a minute if they would,” and told me that Mr. Churchill has sent a telegram to M. Molotov explaining what is happening here and protesting on the score of the Tass reports and the broadcasts. He also said that Mr. Churchill had telegraphed the President and he showed a garbled copy of a reply in which the President sympathizes with Mr. Churchill’s efforts to end the trouble and hopes that they may be successful in recalling the Greeks to their duty in line with their glorious tradition. Further as regards the Russian angle my colleague expressed the idea that the extent to which Soviet support is being given to this movement suggests a connection with Soviet policies elsewhere in Europe and in the Middle East which would appear out of keeping with the spirit of Tehran. 40 Reports have reached the British here from their agents in Greece that fighting has again broken out between EAM and EDES 41 but they are not passing this to London until confirmation is received. They have consented to bring two EAM and one EDES representative out from Greece and are considering holding the meeting for the construction of a national government somewhere outside of Egypt possibly Syria. Meanwhile Mr. Venizelos is showing such weakness in regard to the revolt that Mr. Leeper has suggested to the King that even for the present interim period a stronger personality should be found with Papandreou a possibility. MacVeagh 39 Not printed. 40 For correspondence regarding the conference between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Chairman (Premier) Stalin, at Tehran, November 27–December 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 459 ff. 41 Ellenikos Demokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos (Greek Democratic National League). The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/507: Telegram [Document 99] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , April 20, 1944—7 p.m. [Received April 21—2:40 p.m.] Greek 122. I have had a talk with Mr. Papandreou who has just come out of Greece (see my Greek 120, April 17, 7 p.m. 42 ) about the EAM and the background of the present Greek revolutionary movement. His views have some importance as being those of the first Greek of really considerable political status to come out of the country since 1941. Regarding the movement Mr. Papandreou said that he believes it was to a large extent worked up by the fifth column with a view to precisely its present result in hampering Allied operations, particularly naval, at a critical time. The method employed was to make clever use of Russian predispositions on the one hand and Greek political ferment on the other, not forgetting the anti-British suspicion and distrust among the Greeks due to the many mistakes of the past few years (see my Greek 51, February 18, 2 p.m. 43 ) Regarding EAM he said that recently it has ceased being a political and become frankly a revolutionary body and that it is feared and hated by the majority of the Greek people. He himself is a Leftist and was at one time asked to be the head of EAM but is against tyranny of any sort and tyranny of the Communist Party is what EAM aims to impose. This he said has not been at all understood outside the country and is not known even to many of EAM adherents within it but must be clearly realized if postwar anarchy and bloodshed are to be avoided. He believes that in any government of national unity which may now be formed EAM should be represented but he is sure that from EAM’s point of view such representation would only be another step to complete domination. Mr. Papandreou expressed himself as in sympathy with the British efforts to end the present mutinies peacefully if possible but in any event to end them and to being [ bring? ] the culprits to book. But he considers the Communist factor in the situation to be the most dangerous for the future since by adoption on the part of the Soviet press and radio EAM has become an instrument for the spreading of the Soviet influence in opposition to the hitherto dominant British throughout this region thus threatening Greece with possible further martyrdom as the crossroads of the powers. MacVeagh 42 Not printed. 43 Telegram not printed. Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) to the Secretary of State 868.01/554 [Document 100] Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Alling ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] April 22, 1944. Mr. Secretary : The Greek Embassy is pressing us for an answer on the question of whether we agree with the British view that the difficulties caused by the Russians in connection with the present Greek political crisis, can only be clarified by direct contact between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin. The Greek Embassy would like an indication of our attitude as early this afternoon as possible. It is unusual to say the least that the British view on this matter should be presented to the Department for comment by the Greek Ambassador. The British Embassy usually keeps the Department informed on such questions but has not done so in this instance. Moreover the current Greek crisis has occasioned a direct exchange between Mr. Churchill and the President within the past few days which resulted in a message from the President to King George. (The text of this message has not yet been communicated to the Department by the White House. 44 ) If you agree, we will inform the Greek Embassy that we are aware of an exchange of correspondence between the President and Mr. Churchill, initiated by the latter, regarding the Greek political crisis, and we assume that further developments might be handled at the same level. Paul H. Alling 44 Not found in Department files. A search in the Roosevelt papers at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N.Y., also failed to locate such a message. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) 868.01/554 [Document 101] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Merriam ) [ Washington ,] April 24, 1944. With reference to the attached memoranda of April 18 and 22, 1944, 45 from NEA 46 to the Secretary, having been informed by Mr. Brown 47 of S 48 that on April 23 the Secretary agreed that we should reply to the Greek request in the sense of the final paragraph of NEA’s memorandum of April 22, at Mr. Alling’s request I called up Mr. Philon 49 of the Greek Embassy and communicated the substance of that paragraph to him. Mr. Philon was a little puzzled at first, but finally appeared to understand. He asked to be kept informed of developments and I said that we would pass on to him all the information reaching us regarding this matter that we could make available. 45 Ante , p. 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , and supra , respectively. 46 Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. 47 James E. Brown, Jr. 48 Office of the Secretary of State. 49 Philon A. Philon, Counselor, Greek Embassy. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/515: Telegram [Document 102] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , April 26, 1944—9 p.m. [Received April 27—9:45 a.m.] Greek 130. My Greek No. 128, April 24, 6 p.m. 50 Papandreou was sworn in as Prime Minister late this afternoon. He is not attempting to form a regular government but is asking various Ministers to serve as temporary Under-Secretaries. A member of the British Embassy is leaving tomorrow for Syria to make arrangements for the long conference which will form the Government of National Unity and it is hoped that all the representatives will have arrived in the Middle East by the end of next week. It is not yet clear how many parties and organizations will be individually represented or in most cases who will represent them but it appears certain the EAM is sending Colonel Saraphis and one Stratis and that Svolos 51 is coming for the political committee. Word has just been received from Port Said that only the cruiser Averoff is still causing trouble by the refusal of its crew to surrender (my Greek No. 129 April 25, 7 p.m. 52 ). In an effort to avoid violence the ship is being subjected to a “battle of nerves”, its food supplies have been cut off and it is hoped that it may be reduced shortly. MacVeagh 50 Not printed. 51 Stephanos Saraphis, Commander of ELAS, D. Stratis, and Alexander Svolos, President of the Political Committee of National Liberation. 52 Not printed. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/528: Telegram [Document 103] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , May 1, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 2—9:27 a.m.] Greek 140. In reference to the message from Mr. Churchill, referred to in my Greek 121 of April 19, 7 p.m., I am now informed by my British colleague that Mr. Molotov has replied substantially as follows: Mr. Molotov has little information on Greek situation and it is therefore difficult to form a judgement. On the other hand the British have a military mission in Greece and Mr. Molotov would be glad to have additional information. The Tass Agency publishes only what it receives from its trustworthy sources and this of course it is entitled to do. However, in connection with Mr. Churchill’s wishes Tass has been instructed that greater care must be exercised in the verification of its reports. The Department will note that the above profession of ignorance re Greek affairs is similar to Mr. Molotov’s statements of last winter 53 which are even harder to believe now than they were then (see last paragraph of my Greek 128, April 24, 6 p.m. 54 ) and that Moscow’s present lack of information from British sources at least so far as the Cairo Embassy is concerned has not been due merely to inadvertence (see paragraph 2 of my Greek 137 of April 27, 8 p.m. 54 ) nevertheless some immediate easing of the situation would seem to have resulted from Mr. Churchill’s message. The Soviet official broadcast on April 27 reported Mr. Churchill’s remarks of April 26 in the House of Commons 55 with apparent approval stressing in particular his assertion that the British Government is ready to give the King any possible support in his decision to seek the formation of a Government of National Unity at this time and his statement that it is up to the Greek people to choose its own form of government after liberation. Repeated to American Representative, Algiers, for Murphy. 56 MacVeagh 53 See telegram Greek Series No. 4, January 5, 10 p.m., p. 85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] . 54 Not printed. 54 Not printed. 55 Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 399, col. 743. 56 Robert D. Murphy, United States Political Adviser on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) to the Secretary of State 868.01/563 [Document 104] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Alling ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] May 2, 1944. The Greek Ambassador is seeking an interview with you tomorrow. 57 The question which he wishes to take up and which he has already discussed with me this afternoon is the President’s message of April 17 to Mr. Churchill in regard to the Greek situation. As you know, the message was given out in Cairo yesterday and appears in several of today’s papers. I am attaching a typical text from the New York Herald Tribune . 58 The text in question, although differing somewhat in wording from the text which we obtained from the White House, is along the same general lines. The passage which has aroused the particular concern of the Greek Ambassador is that reading as follows: “I join you in the hope your line of action towards the problem may succeed in bringing the Greeks back into the Allied camp and to participation against the barbarians.” The Ambassador strenuously asserts that the Greeks have never abandoned the Allied camp, that the difficulties in the Greek military forces in Egypt were purely of a domestic character and had nothing to do with the Greek attitude towards the Axis powers whom they have vigorously opposed from the moment of the Italian attack upon Greece. The Ambassador is certain that his Government will be terribly disappointed at the tone of the President’s message. In this connection he pointed out that Mr. Churchill had also sent a message to the Greeks which had been harsh but had not gone so far as to assert that the Greeks had deserted the Allied cause. I made clear to the Ambassador that we did not know who had given out the message in Cairo. I said that it could not have been given out by our Ambassador since he had not received the text of the President’s message, which was dispatched from the Department only last night. 57 Memorandum of conversation of May 3 not printed. 58 Not reprinted. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/545: Telegram [Document 105] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , May 12, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 13—11:44 a.m.] Greek Series 150. In my opinion it would be highly undesirable for me or any member of my staff to proceed to the Lebanon at this time (the Department’s 1107, May 11, to the Legation in Cairo 59 ). The conference to which the Department refers has been called by the Greek Prime Minister as a wholly Greek matter concerned only with Greek interim [ internal? ] politics (see my Greek Series 137 of April 27, 8 p.m. 59 ) and for this reason no foreign representatives have been invited and none will “attend”. If the Department should see its way to issuing some statement expressive of hopes for Greek unity and for the success of the conference from this point of view I believe it might help, but I also believe that the presence of the American Ambassador in the coulisse would not. In this connection the Department will understand that after everything the Greeks have suffered in this war they are very touchy on the subject of foreign interference and that much of the success of this conference will depend on the feeling of the delegates that their deliberations will not be influenced from outside. [Apparent omission.] He 60 will be in the vicinity since his office has been saddled with the transportation and housing of the conference as well as with security but he told me just before leaving Cairo that he would not be at the disposal of the Greek Prime Minister or of any of the conferees during the session despite his earlier thoughts on this subject. It is possible that his attendance within a few miles of the conference, even with the above excuses, will prove a mistake on his part in view of the prevalent and growing Greek distrust and suspicion of British “meddling”. But for us to be there too would seem certain to compromise our established policy which couples aloofness from internal politics with interest in the welfare of the whole nation. As the Department knows, strict observance of our traditional policy has hitherto maintained great American influence in Greece. Recently however it has become increasingly difficult to keep this policy clear in Greek eyes owing to our military solidarity with Britain and the consequent too easy assumption that all British policy in this region is also Anglo-American. To hang around the outskirts of this conference along with the British could only further increase this difficulty. Accordingly while I have requested our already established representatives in the Lebanon, both diplomatic and OWI, 61 to keep this Embassy advised for informational purposes of anything they may hear during the course of the conference without showing undue interest I shall not undertake any closer approach unless the Department definitely so desires. Repeated to Algiers for Murphy. MacVeagh 59 Not printed. 59 Not printed. 60 Presumably Reginald W. A. Leeper, British Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile. 61 Office of War Information. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/548: Telegram [Document 106] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , May 15, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 15—5:09 p.m.] Greek 154. Ambassador Leeper at Beirut has transmitted to me a message for the President from Professor Svolos, Mr. Porphyrogennis and Mr. Roussos handed to him by the former who in so doing stated “that he had no objection to the publication of a similar message which he also handed to Mr. Leeper addressed to Mr. Churchill.” My immediately following telegram 63 contains the text of the message for the President followed by the text of the one for Mr. Churchill. I am informed that in forwarding the latter message to London the British contemplate recommending its publication as suggested in view of its “quite useful” condemnation by delegates of both the Political Committee and the Communist Party of the “mad action of irresponsible persons” in causing the recent mutinies. Owing to the illness of Mr. Papandreou the formal opening of the conference has been delayed but it is now expected to take place tomorrow. Repeated to Algiers for Murphy; sent to Department. MacVeagh 63 Infra . The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/549: Telegram [Document 107] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , May 15, 1944. [Received May 16—4:29 p.m.] Greek 155. The first message 64 reads: “We, the representatives of Fighting Greece at the Conference for National Unity, wish to express to you our respectful admiration and gratitude for the friendly interest which you take in our country. The Greek people, who are fighting in the towns and in the mountains against the most barbarous of tyrannies, will never allow themselves to be withdrawn from the camp of the Allies and of the United Nations who are fighting for freedom and amongst whom your great country occupies, under your illustrious leadership, so glorious a position. Though the desire for national unity has led to actions as melancholy as the late mutinies in the Middle East forces, actions deplored and condemned by all, we can assure Your Excellency that the Greek people, by their struggle of yesterday, today and tomorrow and by the help of their great Allies, will succeed in rubbing out that dark page. We rely on your sympathy which you have so often shown towards our country and we assure you that we will do our utmost to achieve that national unity which is an indispensable condition for the liberation, peace and well-being of our country which has endured so much from Italian, German and Bulgarian aggressors.” The second reads: “As representatives of Fighting Greece to Conference for National Unity, we desire to express to Your Excellency our respectful admiration and to thank you for interest which you take in our country and in her future. This interest springs from a more than century-old tradition which is dear to Greek people and which the actions of so distinguished a person as Your Excellency have been made still stronger. We believe it is this interest, coupled with sorrow, so rightly felt on account of recent events in our Middle East forces which evoked your severe judgment of our country. May we be permitted to state, however, that resistance and the bloody struggle of the Greek people in towns and in the mountains are such as to exceed in moral importance the mad actions of irresponsible persons which, although sprung from a desire for national unity, have led to deplorable and disastrous results which must be condemned by all. Your Excellency may rest assured that we will do all in our power to achieve national unity which is an essential condition not only for a more successful struggle against the enemy but also for the reconstruction of our country, victim of Italian, German and Bulgarian aggression. We know the help of our great Allies and especially of Great Britain under her dauntless leader will not be found wanting.” Repeated to Algiers for Murphy. MacVeagh 64 See telegram No. 154, May 15, 6 p.m., supra . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) 868.01/549: Telegram [Document 108] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt ( MacVeagh ) Washington , May 19, 1944—4 p.m. Greek 75. Please arrange delivery of following reply from the President to message quoted in your Greek 155, May 15: “I have received your welcome and reassuring message. We Americans are firm friends of the Greek people, who have fought so valiantly and suffered so direly during the course of the war, and have therefore been profoundly distressed by the recent disunity in Greek ranks. But we remember that the Greeks have always shown the capacity to submerge their differences and rally together in times of real national crisis. The occasion and the opportunity exist again today and it is our earnest hope and prayer that the Greek leaders assembled in the Near East will make of the current conference a new landmark of purposeful unity in Greek history.” If you consider such action desirable, we shall be glad to release both messages for publication. Please advise whether the authors should be mentioned by name or only as “certain Greek leaders now attending the Greek political conference in the Near East”. Hull The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/557: Telegram [Document 109] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , May 20, 1944—5 p.m. [Received May 20—1:24 p.m.] Greek Series 163. The reply contained in the Department’s Greek 75 of May 19, 4 p.m., has been repeated to Beirut for immediate delivery. The British Embassy advises that the Conference is due to conclude today but if it should continue the reply ought to have an excellent effect and if not it will at least have shown on the highest level the warm friendliness which exists in the United States towards the Greek people as a whole. For this reason as well as for the important purpose of providing a check on possible misquotation, I believe that both the original message and the reply should be released for publication. At the same time, I also feel that it would be a mistake not to mention the names of the individuals concerned since this could serve no useful purpose in view of the certainty of disclosures from this end and might give some offense. MacVeagh The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/567: Telegram [Document 110] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , May 22, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 23—9:02 a.m.] Greek 166. My Greek 163, May 20, 5 p.m. The Lebanon Conference closed on Saturday and Mr. Papandreou returned to Cairo yesterday. He is seeing the King today to report on the work of the Conference and to submit his resignation. The British Embassy believes the King will ask him to form the new government presumably from among the 24 delegates all of whom are expected here by tonight. The official releases from the Lebanon have given no indication that the composition of the new government was discussed although it had been understood that that was the whole purpose of the Conference but agreement on the question may have been reached by the delegates privately. The speeches of the opening days of the Conference reported in my Greek 164, May 20, 6 p.m., 65 were followed by others along the same general lines. The defense of EAM/ELAS 66 by several of their delegates was spirited and at the request of Porphyrogennis it was agreed that a committee should be set up to investigate the charges against EAM and the Communist Party. The Conference ended in a cordial and somewhat emotional atmosphere after the delegates had unanimously accepted and signed the national unity program originally advanced by Papandreou soon after he became Premier, my 138, April 28. 67 Repeated Algiers for Murphy. MacVeagh 65 Not printed. 66 Ethnikos Laïkos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (National People’s Liberation Army), the guerrilla arm of EAM. 67 Telegram not printed. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/568: Telegram [Document 111] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , May 22, 1944—7 p.m. [Received May 23—8:50 a.m.] Greek 167. My 163, May 20, 5 p.m. The following telegram has been received from Beirut: May 21, 3 p.m. for MacVeagh. Your May 20, 11 a.m. President’s reply was delivered yesterday evening a few hours after the Conference had terminated. Delivery was made by an Attaché of this Legation through Prime Minister Papandreou’s secretary (Francis [ Phrantzes ]) who handed a copy also to an American newspaper correspondent. He called on me this noon to express the appreciation of his chief and of the three particular addressees. Francis also asked that the following message from the Prime Minister be transmitted by you to the President: “Great was the distress of our beloved Fatherland caused by the recent mutiny of the Greek Armed Forces in the Middle East. I am happy today to announce, Mr. President, that the Congress of Greek Delegates in the Lebanon has put an end to the internal strife and determined the national unity against the barbarian invaders who are violating the sacred soil of our Fatherland. The United Greek nation looks with complete confidence to the noble people of the United States and to their great leader and invokes their full support for the realization of the struggle for national liberation.” He understands that similar messages are being addressed by the Prime Minister to Mr. Churchill “and others”. MacVeagh The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/570: Telegram [Document 112] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , May 23, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 24—1:10 p.m.] Greek 168. My Greek 166, May 22, 6 p.m. Mr. Papandreou has been entrusted with the formation of the Government of National Unity. It is reported that the number of portfolios which seems certain to be large and their apportionment among the various parties and organizations was clearly settled at the last meeting of the conference. As the delegates are now all in Cairo it is believed that Papandreou will complete his task very shortly. MacVeagh The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) 868.01/568: Telegram [Document 113] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt ( MacVeagh ) Washington , May 26, 1944—7 p.m. Greek 77. Please convey the President’s thanks to M. Papandreou for his message transmitted in your Greek 167, May 22, 7 p.m. The President and the American Government and people have learned with the utmost pleasure the good news of the unity agreement reached in Lebanon, which they are confident will help speed the liberation and restoration of Greece. Hull Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 870.00/43 [Document 114] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] May 30, 1944. The British Ambassador 68 called at his request. He brought up the question of the difficulties between Russia and Great Britain in the Balkans, especially relating to Rumania. He then inquired how this country would feel about an arrangement between the British and the Russians to the effect that Russia might have a controlling influence in Rumania and Great Britain a controlling influence in Greece. I replied that I would give this serious consideration, but that at first blush, in view of the many counter-charges now arising, and which would certainly arise in the future, about encroachments, first by one Government and then by another on the economic, political, military or other internal affairs of the Balkans and other countries in Europe, it would be a doubtful course to abandon the fixed rules and policies which are in accord with our broad basic declarations of policy, principles and practice. I said that if these are departed from in one or two important instances, as is proposed, then neither of the two countries parties to such act will have any precedent to stand on, or any stable rules by which to be governed and by which to insist that other governments be governed. Therefore, in my opinion, this phase should be carefully studied by all concerned before any definite departures take place. He said he appreciated that phase of it. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 68 Viscount Halifax. The British Embassy to the Department of State 870.00/46 [Document 115] The British Embassy to the Department of State Note of Conversation Consideration has been recently given in London to the best means of preventing any divergence of policy in the Balkans between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments, of which disquieting signs were beginning to appear. 2. After full review Mr. Eden concludes that the best solution would be for the United Kingdom Government to agree, as a practical matter, with the Soviet Government that since Roumania falls within the sphere of the Russian armies, Roumanian affairs should be in the main the concern of the Soviet Government; and, similarly, that since Greece is within the Allied Command under General Wilson 69 in the Mediterranean, Greek affairs should vis-à-vis the Soviet Government be in the main the concern of the United Kingdom Government, each Government agreeing to give such help as they can to the other in the respective countries concerned. Such understanding between the United Kingdom Government and the Soviet Government would apply only to war conditions, and since it would be essentially related to the military operations of the respective forces of the two Governments, would in no way affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the three great powers will have to exercise at the peace settlement, and afterwards in regard to the whole of Europe. 3. The United Kingdom Government are fully alive to the importance of avoiding action that might carry the appearance of carving up the Balkans into spheres of influence. They attach great importance to collaboration with the United States Government in the formulation and execution of Allied policy towards these countries, as elsewhere. But on the whole a temporary agreement on the lines suggested seems to them to offer the best chance of amicable cooperation in the military period between the Allies in the countries concerned, which is essential in the immediate interests of the war effort. 4. Would the United States Government see any objection to such an agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Soviet Government, and if not, may the United Kingdom Government so inform the Soviet Government? Washington , May 30, 1944. 69 Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater. The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [Document 116] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 70 [ London ,] 31 May 1944. 687. There have recently been disquieting signs of a possible divergence of policy between ourselves and the Russians in regard to the Balkan countries and in particular towards Greece. We therefore suggested to the Soviet Ambassador here that we should agree between ourselves as a practical matter that the Soviet Government would take the lead in Roumanian affairs, while we would take the lead in Greek affairs, each government giving the other help in the respective countries. Such an arrangement would be a natural development of the existing military situation since Roumania falls within the sphere of the Russian armies and Greece within the Allied command under General Wilson in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Ambassador here told Eden on May 18th that the Soviet Government agreed with this suggestion but before giving any final assurance in the matter they would like to know whether we had consulted the United States Government and whether the latter had also agreed to this arrangement. I hope you may feel able to give this proposal your blessing. We do not of course wish to carve up the Balkans into spheres of influence and in agreeing to the arrangement we should make it clear that it applied only to war conditions and did not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the three great powers will have to exercise at the peace settlement and afterwards in regard to the whole of Europe. The arrangement would of course involve no change in the present collaboration between you and us in the formulation and execution of Allied policy towards these countries. We feel, however, that the arrangement now proposed would be a useful device for preventing any divergence of policy between ourselves and them in the Balkans. Meanwhile Halifax has been asked to raise this matter with the State Department on the above lines. 70 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Paraphrased copy transmitted by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State on May 31 for the preparation of a reply. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/586: Telegram [Document 117] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 6, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 6—4 p.m.] Greek 183. My Greek 180, June 3. 71 An answer has been received by Svolos, Porphyrogennis and Roussos from the Political Committee, speaking apparently for EAM and the Communists also, which insists that a prerequisite to national unity must be a “clear solution of the constitutional question”. This is interpreted as meaning that these organizations are making their participation in the new government contingent on a definite statement from the King that he will not return to Greece before a plebiscite. In earlier messages other conditions (see my Greek 176, May 30 71 ) had been made, demanding particularly the replacement of Papandreou as Prime Minister and a larger representation in the government than the five Ministries, out of a probable total of 15, which have been promised, but the present message is regarded as in effect withdrawing these. At the Conference the question of the King’s return was expressly left for the new government to deal with, and furthermore, the delegates here of all three of the above mentioned organizations, both telegraphically and in their message transmitted through Sarafis, have strongly urged their principals to agree to participation in the government without further conditions. This new development therefore appears to represent a deliberate effort to obstruct the formation of the new government, and it is now considered probable that, although messages will continue to be exchanged with Greece, and certain portfolios may be kept open for the time being in the hope that the objecting organizations will eventually fill them, Papandreou will proceed with the completion of the Cabinet while issuing a statement that EAM and the Communists have thus far refused to collaborate. Repeated to Algiers (as number 4) for Murphy. MacVeagh 71 Not printed. 71 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) 868.01/594a: Telegram [Document 118] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt ( MacVeagh ) Washington , June 10, 1944—2 p.m. Greek Series 24. Following is digest of British Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire dated June 4 73 regarding Greece: “The British Government understands that the Greek politicians in Cairo are beginning to intrigue against M. Papandreou and that EAM may repudiate agreements reached by its representatives at the Lebanon Conference. The British Government, has ‘evidence’ that the Greek people welcomed the successful outcome of the conference and that a majority of the Greek people support M. Papandreou and his unity program. It has instructed Leeper to give him full support and hopes ‘some plain speaking to the troublesome politicians in Cairo will recall them to a sense of duty’ and prevent renewed chaos. Attaching great importance to close collaboration between United States and British Ambassadors to effect desired result, British Government would be grateful if Mr. MacVeagh could be instructed to concert action with Mr. Leeper toward this end.” Department is replying 74 to the effect that: 1. We have received little detailed information regarding the Lebanon Conference and are consequently unaware of specific agreements reached or steps taken toward their implementation. 2. We are distressed by the indications that the unity conference may not have been successful as claimed. 3. We have not and do not desire to intervene in Greek internal affairs and in view of our lack of detailed current information are particularly reluctant to risk involvement in supporting any individual or faction. 4. Within these limitations, however, we are prepared to use our friendly influence to promote Greek unity. We are instructing our Ambassador near the Greek Government to consult his British colleague and to take any appropriate steps to help the Greeks settle their differences among themselves. We believe only a freely and mutually agreed solution can be expected to last and enable the Greeks to make their full contribution to the war and the liberation and restoration of Greece. We, therefore, hope that every attempt will be made to achieve unity. Please be guided by foregoing, keeping Department informed. Stettinius 73 Not printed. 74 Memorandum to the British Embassy, June 10, not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 870.00/48 [Document 119] The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington , June 10, 1944. My Dear Mr. President : I am returning herewith Mr. Churchill’s telegram no. 687 of May 31 concerning the proposed agreement between the British and Soviet Governments regarding Rumania and Greece, together with a draft reply. 75 This same matter was discussed with the Secretary by the British Ambassador on May 30, and the Department had prepared a memorandum to be handed to Lord Halifax setting forth our position. 76 In view of Mr. Churchill’s telegram to you, the memorandum, a copy of which is also enclosed, has not yet been delivered, and I shall be grateful if you will inform me whether it is in accordance with your views. You will of course note at once the serious political implications of the British proposal, and its pertinence to the whole question of joint participation and joint responsibility of all the Allied Governments in the conduct of the war. However adroitly the proposed arrangement is presented, it seems really to amount to the establishment of spheres of influence, and an attempt to obtain American approval of such a policy. Faithfully yours, E. R. Stettinius, Jr. 75 The draft was approved by President Roosevelt and was sent to Prime Minister Churchill as telegram No. 557, infra . 76 Memorandum of June 12, p. 119 [ Pg. 119 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] . President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Document 120] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) 77 [ Washington , June 11, 1944.] 557. The proposed agreement between your Government and Russia concerning Rumania and Greece, outlined in your telegram no. 687 of May 31, was discussed by Lord Halifax with Mr. Hull on May 30. The State Department has communicated to Lord Halifax the reasons why this Government is unwilling to approve the proposed arrangement. Briefly, we acknowledge that the militarily responsible Government in any given territory will inevitably make decisions required by military developments but are convinced that the natural tendency for such decisions to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by an agreement of the type suggested. In our opinion, this would certainly result in the persistence of differences between you and the Soviets and in the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement to military matters. We believe efforts should preferably be made to establish consultative machinery to dispel misunderstandings and restrain the tendency toward the development of exclusive spheres. Roosevelt 77 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [Document 121] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 78 London , 11 June 1944. 700. 1. I am much concerned to receive your number 557. Action is paralysed if everybody is to consult everybody else about everything before it is taken. The events will always outstrip the changing situations in these Balkan regions. Somebody must have the power to plan and act. A consultative committee would be a mere obstruction, always overriden in any case of emergency by direct interchanges between you and me, or either of us and Stalin. 2. See, now, what happened at Easter when I had charge not only of the Foreign Office but of the British armed forces. We were able to cope with this mutiny of the Greek forces entirely in accordance with your own views. This was because I was able to give constant orders to the military commanders, who at the beginning advocated conciliation, and above all, no use or even threat of force. Very little life was lost. The Greek situation has been immensely improved and, if firmness is maintained, will be rescued from confusion and disaster. The Russians are ready to let us take the lead in the Greek business, which means that EAM and all its malice can be controlled by the national forces of Greece. Otherwise, civil war and ruin to the land you care about so much. I always reported to you and I always will report to you. You shall see every telegram I send. I think you might trust me in this. 3. [Here follow remarks on conditions in Egypt.] 4. If, in either of these two difficulties, we had had to consult other powers and a set of triangular or quadrangular telegrams got started, the only result would have been chaos or impotence. 5. It seems to me, considering the Russians are about to invade Rumania in great force and are going to help Rumania recapture part of Transylvania from Hungary, provided the Rumanians play which they may, considering all that, it would be a good thing to follow the same leadership considering that neither you nor we have any troops there at all and that they will probably do what they like anyhow. Moreover I thought their terms, apart from indemnity, very sensible and even generous. The Rumanian Army has inflicted many injuries upon the Soviet troops and went into the war against Russia with glee. I see no difficulty whatever in our addressing the Russians at any time on any subject, but please let them go ahead upon the lines agreed as they are doing all the work. 6. Similarly with us in Greece. We are an old ally of Greece. We had 40,000 casualties in trying to defend Greece against Hitler, not counting Crete. The Greek King and the Greek Government have placed themselves under our protection. They are at present domiciled in Egypt. They may very likely move to the Lebanon which would be a better atmosphere than Cairo. Not only did we lose the 40,000 men above mentioned in helping Greece, but a vast mass of shipping and warships, and by denuding Cyrenaica to help Greece, we also lost the whole of Wavell’s 79 conquests in Cyrenaica. These were heavy blows to us in those days. Your telegrams to me in the recent crisis worked wonders. We were entirely agreed, and the result is entirely satisfactory. Why is all this effective direction to be broken up into a committee of mediocre officials such as we are littering about the world? Why can you and I not keep this in our own hands considering how we see eye to eye about so much of it? 7. To sum up, I propose that we agree that the arrangements I set forth in my Number 687 may have a trial of three months, after which it must be reviewed by the three powers. 78 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Paraphrased copy sent to the Secretary of State by President Roosevelt on June 30. 79 Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell, British Commander in Chief, Middle East, 1939–41. The Department of State to the British Embassy 870.00/46 [Document 122] The Department of State to the British Embassy Memorandum The British Embassy’s note of conversation of May 30 expresses the view that the best means of preventing any divergence of policy in the Balkans between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would be in a solution whereby, as a practical matter, Rumanian affairs should be in the main the concern of the Soviet Government, and similarly Greek affairs should, vis-à-vis the Soviet Government, be in the main the concern of the United Kingdom Government. The Embassy then inquires whether the Government of the United States sees any objection to an agreement to this end between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and if not, whether the Government of the United Kingdom may so inform the Soviet Government. The Department has duly noted the Embassy’s observations regarding the practical considerations favoring such an agreement such as the fact that Rumania is within the sphere of operations of the Soviet armies and that Greece is within the Allied Command under General Wilson in the Mediterranean. It has likewise taken note of the intention that the contemplated understanding would apply only to war conditions, without affecting the rights and responsibilities of the principal Allied Governments at the peace settlement, and, afterwards, in regard to Europe generally. The Department acknowledges that the Government whose military forces are operating in a given territory will in the ordinary course of events take the principal initiative in making decisions affecting that territory, due to the circumstances of the military operations therein. The Department believes that the natural tendency for such initiatives to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by the conclusion of an agreement of the type suggested. Thus in the Department’s view the proposed arrangements would inevitably result in the persistence rather than the elimination of any divergence in the views of the British and Soviet Governments with regard to the Balkan region and would lead to the division of that region into spheres of influence, despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement to war conditions. The Department firmly believes that the practical and military advantages sought in resorting to plans of this general nature do not counterbalance the evils inherent in such a system. It is consequently unwilling to give the approval of this Government to the proposed arrangement. In the Department’s opinion it would be preferable to give attention to the proposals to establish adequate machinery for frank consultation regarding the Balkan region, and thus direct the policies of the Allied Governments along lines of collaboration rather than independent action. The importance which this Government attaches to this policy is especially evident at the present time, when special efforts are being made for concerted action in laying the foundations of a broader system of general security in which all countries great and small will have their part. Any arrangement suggestive of spheres of influence cannot but militate against the establishment and effective functioning of such a broader system. The President has received a communication on this subject from the Prime Minister, to which he has replied on the foregoing lines. Washington , June 12, 1944. President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Document 123] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) 82 [ Washington ,] 12 June 1944. 560. Personal for the Former Naval Person. 83 Your 700. 84 I am in agreement with your proposal in paragraph 7 of subject message. We must be careful to make it clear that we are not establishing any post war spheres of influence. Roosevelt 82 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Copy sent to the Secretary of State by President Roosevelt on June 30. 83 Code name for Winston S. Churchill. 84 Dated June 11, p. 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] . The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/594: Telegram [Document 124] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 13, 1944—5 p.m. [Received June 13—2:45 p.m.] Greek 190. For the Department’s information. In connection with its number 24 of June 11 [ 10 ] the British Ambassador called on me on June 1st, and regarding the possibility of the EAM repudiating agreements reached by its representatives at the Lebanon Conference, expressed the hope that I might help support Mr. Papandreou’s efforts to achieve Greek national unity. I replied that I understood my Government’s policy to be not to support a particular party or political personality in Greek affairs, but that I would be glad to take any opportunity to stress a general hope for the achievement of Greek unity, referring in this connection to my suggestions to the Department, conveyed in my telegram Greek 150 of May 12, 6 p.m., and to the present [ President’s ] subsequent message to the Leftist delegates (see the Department’s Greek 75 of May 20, 5 p.m. [ May 19, 4 p.m. ]). When called on by these same delegates on June 3, I spoke along the lines of the President’s message and the next day, June 4, the date of the British Embassy’s memorandum to the Department, Mr. Leeper told me that they had expressed pleasure over what I had said, while he showed every sign of being pleased himself. In regard to this all-important question of Anglo-American solidarity, the Department may be sure that every effort has been and will continue to be made toward close consultation and collaboration (within the limits specified in the Department’s telegram number 24) and to reduce causes of misunderstanding. For example, when Mr. Leeper recently complained to me of anti-British talk indulged in here by our extradepartmental agents working among the Greeks, I took the matter up personally with General Giles 85 and the local heads of OSS 86 and OWI, 87 all of whom have promised their effective help in stopping an evil highly detrimental to Allied relations. MacVeagh 85 Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Middle East. 86 Office of Strategic Services. 87 Office of War Information. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/593: Telegram [Document 125] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 13, 1944—7 p.m. [Received June 14—10:48 a.m.] Greek Series 191. The new Greek Cabinet met for the first time yesterday (see my Greek Series 187 of June 8). 88 Following the meeting Mr. Papandreou issued a declaration which, according to the official release, was enthusiastically endorsed by all the members of the Council, to the effect that it is the Government’s view that the King should not return to Greece before the plebiscite, and stating that the King, in accepting a government which he knew would hold this view, had thereby indicated his agreement with it. According to Mr. Papandreou, whom I saw this morning, he talked with the King both before and after the Cabinet meeting and obtained his consent to the issuance of this statement, telling him that otherwise the Government would have to resign. He said that he had pointed out that it was necessary to settle this vexed question definitely in order to deprive EAM of a weapon which it has been using to sabotage the work of the Lebanon Conference (see my Greek Series 183 of June 6) and also that it was advisable from the King’s own point of view to appear to support rather than obstruct national unity. The full text of the declaration is being transmitted in my immediately following telegram. 89 Mr. Papandreou further said to me that now that he has “disarmed EAM”, he is in a position to “attack” it, should it continue to refuse to collaborate, and later in the day, he told journalists that “I shall wait a few days [apparent omission] the nation, because the nation must know on whom the responsibility rests”. Repeated to Algiers for Murphy as number 9. MacVeagh 88 Not printed. 89 Telegram not printed. The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [Document 126] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 90 [ London ,] 14 June 1944. 703. 1. Your number 560: 91 I am deeply grateful to you for your reply to my number 700. I have asked the Foreign Secretary to convey the information to Monsieur Molotov and to make it clear that the reason for the three months limit is in order that we should not prejudge the question of establishing post-war spheres of influence. [Here follow comments by Prime Minister Churchill on Italian affairs, the visit of General Charles de Gaulle to France and military government in France, and the Prime Minister’s visit to the Normandy beachhead.] 90 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Paraphrase sent to the Secretary of State by President Roosevelt on June 30. 91 Dated June 12, p. 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] . The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/595: Telegram [Document 127] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 16, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 17—10:15 a.m.] Greek 195. In a long talk which I had with the King yesterday evening, he said that the Prime Minister had persuaded him to consent to the Government’s recent declaration (see my Greek 192 of June 13 92 ) by showing it to be an advisable immediate move in the campaign for national unity, but that he does not himself regard it as necessarily final or as having been so presented to him. He said that since he has personally made no declaration in the matter (and will not do so) he remains free to urge his Government to alter its present attitude and, furthermore, that he believes it may well do this later under stress of changing circumstances, with or without his instigation. In this connection, he said that he feels that Royalist sentiment is still very strong in Greece, and may become much stronger if EAM continues its opposition and the danger of a Leftist dictatorship becomes clearer to the population at large. In addition he appears genuinely to believe that among the delegates to the Lebanon Conference, from among whom the present Government has been largely constructed, only the extreme Leftists and a couple of radical Republicans without any real following in the country were against his returning to Greece before the plebiscite. He said that Mr. Papandreou himself told him this. By way of comment, I would say that perhaps Mr. Papandreou, in his diplomatic efforts to secure the King’s consent to his declaration, somewhat overstressed its immediate, as opposed to its long-term implications, and played down the practical unanimity of the delegates on the essential issue. In addition, the King has since been visited by various individuals offering him many brands of advice and thus contributing to his difficulty in appraising his situation. He appeared to be desperately perplexed and unhappy, at one moment talking rather wildly about returning to his country as a private citizen, and at another of possibly leading an invading force in the Balkans as Commander in Chief. In general, however, he seemed chiefly concerned with convincing himself that his personal position remains unchanged and that he still has a chance of entering Greece before the plebiscite if he so wishes. Unfortunately for his state of mind, however, public opinion appears to be taking the opposite view. In this connection it may be interesting to note yesterday’s issue of the local Royalist paper Phos carried a long editorial congratulating Papandreou on having definitely “solved the question of the regime” and praising the King most fulsomely for having made a great and patriotic gesture in accepting the solution. MacVeagh 92 Not printed, but see telegram No. 191, June 13, 7 p.m., p. 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] . The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 870.00/47 [Document 128] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington , June 17, 1944. My Dear Mr. President : Just as the Department was despatching to you the Acting Secretary’s letter of June 10, 1944, relating to the proposed agreement between the British and Soviet Governments regarding Rumania and Greece, Lord Halifax handed to Mr. Stettinius a further telegram from the Prime Minister and one from the Foreign Office on this subject, copies of which are attached for your information. 93 Mr. Churchill’s further exposition of the British case did not overcome our objections or seem to us to warrant any change in our views toward this dangerous proposal. You will be interested to note, however, that the Prime Minister refers to the British sacrifice for the Greeks in 1941 (but not the Greek sacrifice for British); that he openly applies the proposition to the entire Balkan region by mentioning Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in addition to Rumania and Greece; and that he advances our position in South America as an analogy. The Foreign Office telegram touches upon another and extremely disturbing aspect of this matter which the Department planned to take up with you as soon as the immediate issue was disposed of. This is the fact that the British did not discuss a proposal of this nature with us until after it had been put up to the Russians and the latter inquired whether we had been consulted. The Foreign Office, apparently realizing belatedly that Mr. Churchill’s frank telegram to you had exposed Lord Halifax’s failure to mention this aspect of the question to me, now describes the whole thing as the “Soviet Government’s proposal” and explains unconvincingly that it “arose out of a chance remark” of the Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Ambassador at London. The Prime Minister’s telegram clearly stated, however, that the British “suggested to the Russian Ambassador that we should agree between ourselves” and indicated that this Government would have been faced with a concluded spheres-of-influence agreement between the British and Russians if the latter had simply agreed without raising the question of our position. You may want to call this to the Prime Minister’s attention. A suggested draft is attached for possible use in this connection. 94 Faithfully yours, Cordell Hull 93 Neither printed. 94 The draft, with minor changes, was sent as telegram No. 565, June 22, infra. President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Document 129] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) 95 [ Washington ,] 22 June 1944. 565. With reference to your 687 and my 560 96 regarding matters in the Balkans, I am a bit worried and so is the State Department. I think I should tell you frankly that we were disturbed, that your people took this matter up with us only after it had been put up to the Russians and they had inquired whether we were agreeable. Your Foreign Office apparently sensed this and has now explained that the proposal “arose out of a chance remark” which was converted by the Soviet Government into a formal proposal. However, I hope matters of this importance can be prevented from developing in such a manner in the future. Roosevelt 95 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. 96 Dated May 31 and June 12, pp. 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] and 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , respectively. The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [Document 130] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 97 [Extracts] London , 23 June 1944. 712. Your number 565. 1. The Russians are the only power that can do anything in Roumania and I thought it was agreed between you and me that on the basis of their reasonable armistice terms, excepting indemnities, they should try to give coherent direction to what happened there. 98 In point of fact, we have all three cooperated closely in handling in Cairo the recent Roumanian peace feelers. On the other hand, the Greek burden rests almost entirely upon us and has done so since we lost 40,000 men in a vain endeavour to help them in 1941. Similarly, you have let us play the hand in Turkey, but we have always consulted you on policy and I think we have been agreed on the line to be followed. It would be quite easy for me, on the general principle of slithering to the left, which is so popular in foreign policy, to let things rip when the King of Greece would probably be forced to abdicate and EAM would work a reign of terror in Greece, forcing the villagers and many other classes to form security battalions under German auspices to prevent utter anarchy. The only way I can prevent this is by persuading the Russians to quit boosting EAM and ramming it forward with all their force. Therefore, I proposed to the Russians a temporary working arrangement for the better conduct of the war. This was only a proposal and had to be referred to you for your agreement. 2. I cannot admit that I have done anything wrong in this matter. It would not be possible for three people in different parts of the world to work together effectively if no one of them may make any suggestion to either of the others without simultaneously keeping the third informed. A recent example of this is the message you have sent quite properly to UJ 99 about your conversations with the Poles of which, as yet, I have heard nothing from you. I am not complaining at all of this because I know we are working for the general theme and purposes and I hope you will feel that has been so in my conduct of the Greek affair. 3. I have, also, taken action to try to bring together a union of the Tito forces with those in Serbia and with all adhering to the Royal Yugoslav Government, which we have both recognized. 1 You have been informed at every stage of how we are bearing this heavy burden which at present rests mainly on us. Here again, nothing would be easier than to throw the King and the Royal Yugoslav Government to the wolves and let a civil war break out in Yugoslavia to the joy of the Germans. I am struggling to bring order out of chaos in both cases and concentrate all efforts against the common foe. I am keeping you constantly informed; and I hope to have your confidence and help within the spheres of action in which initiative is assigned to us. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.; copy sent by President Roosevelt on June 30 to the Secretary of State. 98 For correspondence regarding United States policy with respect to armistice agreement with Rumania, see vol. iv , section under Rumania entitled “Negotiations leading to signing of armistice with Rumania…” 99 Uncle Joe”—Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin—Chairman of the Council of the People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union; for the message, see telegram No. 1506, June 17, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, vol. iii , p. 1284 . 1 For correspondence concerning the interest of the United States in affairs in Yugoslavia, see vol. iv , section on Yugoslavia. President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Document 131] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) 2 [Extract] [ Washington ,] June 26, 1944. 570. Your Number 712. It appears that both of us have inadvertently taken unilateral action in a direction that we both now agree to have been expedient for the time being. It is essential that we should always be in agreement in matters bearing on our Allied war effort. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Roosevelt 2 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Paraphrased copy sent to the Secretary of State by President Roosevelt on June 30. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/6–2944: Telegram [Document 132] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 29, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 29—5:01 p.m.] Greek 209. In his speech to the Greek people broadcast from Cairo last night, Mr. Papandreou made the following main points: 1. EAM has not yet joined the Government, despite the latter’s very generous promise of 5 important ministries. The Government and the Leftist delegates have made every effort to bring about unity, and blame for the delay belongs to EAM. 2. The “Committee in the Mountains” now states that collaboration is impossible, because of an attack on ELAS by Zervas, 3 for which the Government is held responsible since Zervas is now under its orders. The reply has been given to their representatives that the surest means of preventing such incidents is EAM’s participation in the Government. 3. If the committee does not agree within a few days to collaborate, the delegates of the extreme Left who signed the Lebanon Agreement will be invited to join the Government regardless. They will have the supply [ support? ] of the majority of EAM, and what appears to be an extremist group obstructing unity will have to yield. 4. In any case the Government of national unity which represents the great majority of the Greek people will continue its work of implementing the program set forth in the Lebanon Agreement. The full text of the speech is being transmitted to the Department by despatch. 4 Repeated to Algiers for Murphy as No. 25. MacVeagh 3 Napoleon Zervas, Commander of EDES. 4 Text transmitted in airgram No. A–48, July 1, 6 p.m., not printed. The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State 870.00/7–144 [Document 133] The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire On May 5, 1944 in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador at London, Mr. F. T. Gousev, on the Roumanian and Greek questions Mr. Eden stated that the British Government considers the Soviet Government as leading in the Roumanian affairs and that Roumania is the sphere of activities of the U.S.S.R. Mr. Eden also stated that, on its part, the British Government considers itself as leading in the Greek affairs, and considers Greece its sphere of activities. Mr. Eden expressed, besides, the wish of the British Government that England and the U.S.S.R. assist each other in this matter. In reply to this statement of Mr. Eden on May 18, 1944 Mr. F. T. Gousev, on instructions of the Soviet Government, has made an oral statement to Mr. Eden, in which he informed him that the Soviet Government agrees in principle with the stated point of view of the British Government but, before giving a final reply on the question raised, the Soviet Government would like to know whether the Government of the United States has been informed of the point of view of Great Britain, and if it has been informed does it have any objections against this point of view. Since in his latest statement of June 19, 1944 Mr. Eden has informed the Soviet Ambassador at London, that in respect to the leading role in the Roumanian affairs and the leading role of Great Britain in Greek affairs the Government of the United States as well as the Government of Great Britain are proceeding from the fact that the British proposal should refer only to military conditions and that the Government of the United States expresses certain fear that this plan should not go beyond the limit of the present circumstances and should not bring about the division of the Balkan countries into spheres of influence, and it was suggested to set a three months trial, after which the said question should be again considered by our three Governments,—the Soviet Government deems it necessary to subject this matter to additional study. The Soviet Government has in mind, besides, to ascertain whether the realization of such a proposal would introduce anything new into the already formed actual situation. The Soviet Government has also informed the British Government that it considers it expedient to get in touch directly with the Government of the United States so as to get better acquainted with its point of view on this question, as until this time that question will not yet become subject of Soviet-American discussion. The Soviet Government would be grateful to the Government of the United States for informing its point of view on the given matter. Washington , July 1, 1944. The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State 868.01/7–844: Telegram [Document 134] The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile ( Shantz ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , July 8, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 11:32 p.m.] Greek 216. The Greek Government last night released an account of Thursday’s Cabinet meeting at which the new demands of EAM (my Greek 213, July 6 5 ) were considered and rejected (my Greek 214, July 6 5 ). Papandreou opened the meeting by reading first a telegram received July 3 from Porphyrogennis and Sarafis listing counts on which EAM considered the Government to have violated the Lebanon Agreement, and second, the telegram in which these and other demands were formulated as “our final terms”. He read his reply to each condition in turn and then asked for the opinion of his Ministers. The account concluded with his summary of. the unanimous view of the Government that EAM’s demands not merely constitute a modification of the Lebanon Agreement but actually “upset its basis” and that to accept them would be tantamount to turning Greece over to the rule of a minority group. Text of release follows by airgram. 6 It is now generally felt by the partisans of both sides that the break is final. The Leftist delegates say that they made a last minute but vain effort to persuade Papandreou and the British Ambassador that negotiations might still be possible on the basis of EAM’s new demands. Discussing particularly the two points which the Government found most difficult of acceptance, that is, that the ELAS army be kept intact until liberation and that the Leftists should have 7 (not 6 as previously reported) out of a total of 15 Ministries and Under-Ministries, they point out with regard to the first that the Government would be better off with even nominal control of ELAS than with none at all, while with regard to the second they profess to believe that a compromise solution can still be reached. However, Svolos and his colleagues seem to be voices crying in the wilderness, for on one hand the tone of EAM’s most recent telegram, regardless of the character of its demands, is of such belligerence as to suggest that EAM leaders intended to provoke a break, while on the other hand it would appear that such a break is far from unsatisfactory to a number of Cabinet members, if not to Papandreou himself. I am informed that arrangements are already being made to send the Leftist delegates back to Greece. This is in accordance with their instructions (my Greek 213) but it appears that the initiative has been taken by the Greek Government and British authorities [apparent omission] have not consulted the wishes of the delegates. Papandreou has asked Mr. Leeper for a strong statement by the British Government in support of his own Government, maintaining that the present impasse is matter of Allied concern, since without unity in Greece there would be little fighting against Germans. Leeper said he sent this request to London for consideration. Repeated to Algiers for Murphy as No. 29. Shantz 5 Not printed. 5 Not printed. 6 Copy of text transmitted by the Chargé in his despatch No. 156, July 13, not printed. The Department of State to the Soviet Embassy 870.00/7–144 [Document 135] The Department of State to the Soviet Embassy Memorandum In its aide-mémoire of July 1 the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reviewed the conversations which have taken place at London concerning the positions of the Soviet and British Governments in taking the lead in Rumanian and Greek affairs, respectively. The Embassy states that the Soviet Government deems it necessary to subject this matter to additional study, in view of Mr. Eden’s statement to the Soviet Ambassador at London on June 19, in which he gave a new outline of the arrangement, mentioning the Government of the United States as associated with the British proposal if it should not go beyond the limit of the present circumstances and should not bring about the division of the Balkan countries into spheres of influence; Mr. Eden added that it was now suggested to set a three months’ trial, after which the question would be again considered by the three Governments. The Embassy then states that the Soviet Government desires to be acquainted with the point of view of this Government. It is correct that the Government of the United States assented to the arrangement, for a trial period of three months, this assent being given in consideration of the present war strategy. Except for this overriding consideration, this Government would wish to make known its apprehension lest the proposed agreement might, by the natural tendency of such arrangements, lead to the division in fact of the Balkan region into spheres of influence. It would be unfortunate, in view of the decisions of the Moscow Conference, 8 if any temporary arrangement should be so conceived as to appear to be a departure from the principle adopted by the three Governments at Moscow, in definite rejection of the spheres of influence idea. Consequently this Government hopes that no projected measures will be allowed to prejudice the efforts toward directing the policies of the Allied Governments along lines of collaboration rather than independent action, since any arrangement suggestive of spheres of influence cannot but militate against the establishment and effective functioning of a broader system of general security in which all countries will have their part. It is supposed that the three-month trial period will enable the British and Soviet Governments to determine whether such an arrangement is practicable and efficacious as applicable only to war conditions and essentially related to the military operations of their respective forces, without in any way affecting the rights and responsibilities which each of the three principal Allies will have to exercise during the period of the re-establishment of peace, and afterwards, in regard to the whole of Europe. Finally, this Government assumes that the arrangement would have neither direct nor indirect validity as affecting the interests of this Government, or of other Governments associated with the three principal Allies. Washington , July 15, 1944. 8 For correspondence regarding the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. i , pp. 513 ff. The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State 868.01/8—1044: Telegram [Document 136] The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile ( Shantz ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , August 10, 1944—6 p.m. [Received August 12—10:22 a.m.] Greek 249. Early this week the British Embassy received and transmitted to the Greek Government a message from the British Government reiterating its confidence in Papandreou and insisting that it could not agree to his resignation. Following a Cabinet discussion yesterday, Venizelos, 9 with, he states, the full assent of Papandreou, handed to the British Embassy a telegram for transmission to the Political Committee on behalf of himself, Mylonas, Rendis and Sakalis. 10 The message stated the British Government refused to agree that there should be a change of premiers just before liberation, and therefore, the Liberal, Progressive and Agrarian Parties were appealing to the Committee to join the Government as now constituted. It pointed out the heavy responsibilities which the Committee would otherwise assume at a time when, the postwar problems in the offing, national unity was more than ever essential. When personally handing me a copy of this message today Venizelos said that if it brought a negative reply he and his Liberal colleagues would seriously consider leaving the Government. He showed resentment at the British attitude, saying that Greek unity was “no longer a question between the Government and the mountains, but between Mr. Eden and the mountains”. Repeated to Murphy as No. 80. Shantz 9 Sophocles Venizelos, Vice Premier in the Papandreou government. 10 Alexander Mylonas, Minister of the Navy; Constantine Rendis, Minister without Portfolio; George Sakalis, Minister without Portfolio—all in the Papandreou government. The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 868.01/8–2144: Telegram [Document 137] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 11 [Paraphrase] [ London ,] August 17, 1944 [755.] We have always marched together in complete agreement about the Greek policy and I refer to you on every important point. The War Cabinet and Foreign Secretary are much concerned about what will happen in Athens and indeed in Greece when the Germans crack or when their divisions try to evacuate the country. If there is a long hiatus after the German authorities have gone from the city before organized Government can be set up, it seems very likely that E.A.M. and Communist extremists will attempt to seize the city and crush all other forms of Greek expression but their own. 2. You and I have always agreed that the destinies of Greece are in the hands of the Greek people and that they will have the fullest opportunity of deciding between a Monarchy or Republic as soon as tranquility has been restored but I do not expect you will relish more than I do the prospect either of chaos and street fighting or of a tyrannical Communistic Government being set up. This could only serve to delay and hamper all plans which are being made by UNRRA 12 for distribution of relief to the sorely-tried Greek people. I therefore think we should make preparations through Allied Staff in the Mediterranean to have in readiness a British force, not exceeding 10,000 men, which could be sent by the most expeditious means into the capital when the time is ripe. The force would include parachute troops for which the help of your air force would be needed. I do not myself expect anything will happen for a month and it may be longer but it is always well to be prepared. As far as I can see there will be no insuperable difficulty. I hope therefore you will agree that we may make these preparations but with staffs out here in the usual way. If so British Chiefs of Staff will submit to Combined Chiefs of Staff draft instructions to General Wilson. 11 Copy sent to the Department by the British Ambassador on August 21. 12 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) 868.01/8–1944 [Document 138] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Kohler ) [ Washington ,] August 19, 1944. The Greek Ambassador told me this morning that he had received an official telegram from his Government announcing that EAM was joining the Government without any condition whatsoever and that its representatives were en route to take up their Cabinet positions. President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Document 139] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) 13 [ Washington ,] 26 August 1944. 608. Personal for the Former Naval Person. Your 755 14 and 770. 15 I have no objection to your making preparations to have in readiness a sufficient British Force to preserve order in Greece when the German Forces evacuate that country. There is also no objection to the use by General Wilson of American transport airplanes that are available to him at that time and that can be spared from his other operations. Roosevelt 13 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. 14 Dated August 17, p. 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] . 15 Not printed. The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State 868.01/9–244: Telegram [Document 140] The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile ( Shantz ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , September 2, 1944. [Received September 2—2:25 p.m.] Greek 281. The EAM representatives reached Cairo August 31. Following Ministers were sworn in this noon: Svolos Finance with Angelopoulos Under Minister; Askoutsis Communications; Tsirimokos National Economy; Porphyrogennis Labor and Zevghos Agriculture. Repeated to AmPolAd 16 Caserta as number 40. Shantz 16 American Political Adviser, Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, with headquarters at Caserta, Italy. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/9–844: Telegram [Document 141] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , September 8, 1944—10 a.m. [Received September 8—10 a.m.] Greek 294. The Greek Government officially left Cairo for Italy yesterday, the Prime Minister and most of the Cabinet leaving by air with the rest to follow in next few days by sea accompanied by subordinate personnel. The Crown Prince Regent 17 expects to go next week (Embassy’s 289, September 5 18 ). Before departure the Government issued a declaration which was broadcast to the Greek people and of which a summary is contained in my immediately following telegram. 19 MacVeagh 17 Prince Paul. 18 Not printed. 19 Telegram Greek Series No. 295, September 8, 11 a.m., not printed. The United States Representative, Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 868.00/9–2644: Telegram [Document 142] The United States Representative, Advisory Council for Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Caserta , September 26, 1944—midnight. [Received September 27—4 p.m.] 560. I learned this evening that a conference presided over by the Supreme Allied Commander, 20 at which Papandreou with other members of his Government and the Greek guerrilla leaders, Generals Serrafis and Zervas, were present, following decisions were unanimously agreed upon: a . All Greek guerrilla forces announced that they are forming a national union in order to coordinate their activities in the best interest of the common struggle against the enemy. b . Supreme Allied Commander has nominated General Scobie and the Government has placed the guerrilla forces under his orders as GOC 21 Forces in Greece. c . Declaration by the leaders of Greek guerrillas states that in accordance with proclamation by Greek Government it is forbidden for any units under their command to attempt to take the law into their own hands, and that any such attempt will be regarded as a crime and punished as such. d . Nothing is to be undertaken with regard to Athens except at the command of General Scobie GOC Greek Force. e . Security battalions will be treated as enemy organizations unless they surrender in accordance with GOC orders, since they are considered to be instruments of the enemy. f . All guerrilla forces functioning in Greece have put themselves under the command of the National Unity Government of Greece. g . General Scobie has received certain operational orders from General Wilson as Commander of Force 140 which provide that General Zervas is to continue to operate within the limits of the Plaka Agreement. 22 A map showing the operational boundaries under the foregoing terms has been furnished to both commanders and the text of a brief press communiqué has been agreed upon which covers the foregoing. Sent to Department repeated to AmEmBalk Cairo as 75. Kirk 20 Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. 21 General Officer Commanding. 22 The armistice agreement between the guerrilla factions reached during the February–March conferences; see telegram Greek Series No. 88, March 16, 8 p.m., p. 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] and footnote 19. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/11–944: Telegram [Document 143] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) 23 to the Secretary of State Athens , November 9, 1944—1 p.m. [Received November 10—9:33 a.m.] 14. In a long talk which I had with the British Ambassador yesterday he told me that report recently appearing in the London press to the effect that the British had blocked the setting up here of a regency council was quite wrong. He said that the present situation, in which there is no regency and the King functions as he normally would if he were simply on a visit outside the country, seems to be a result of lack of interest rather than anything else. Thus, when he asked Mr. Papandreou whether he had given any thought to setting up a regency here at this time, the answer was simply no, there were so many other things to do. When the new Ministers were sworn in recently, they took the oath in the presence of the Prime Minister and of the Archbishop, the Ambassador “supposing” that the former was empowered by the King to represent him momentarily for the purpose in hand. It is Mr. Leeper’s impression that neither constitutional questions nor that of the regime figure in practical politics just now, though as regards the latter a growing reaction against Communist agitation and pretentions may be strengthening royalist sentiment with accretions from the Republican side. He thinks that after restoration of order though [ through ] British influence (“The Russians seem really to be keeping their hands off this country; apparently that was settled the other day at Moscow” 24 ), the present seemingly large extreme Left group will break up into parties of varying degrees of socialism, leaving the genuine Communists in a weak position, and that the political future will largely be a matter of new formations, with the old parties substantially defunct. He said he is at present advising Papandreou not to worry too much about conditions in the Provinces but to concentrate on improving those in Athens, on the theory followed by Lenin and Trotsky that in country in dissolution it is easier to spread control from the center than to impose it simultaneously in many and widely separated localities. I feel that the Ambassador’s views are in the main sound. The present popularity of Communism here is largely a function of starvation and of the total destruction of the country’s economic system centering in the capital. Perhaps the slight beginning already made to correct this situation has suggested to the head of the Communist Party that the immediate opportunity for direct action has passed. In any case Siantos 25 (see my Greek 389 of October 24, 7 p.m. from. Cairo 26 ) has recently stated in an interview given to the London Daily Herald that his party is in favor of “normal democratic solutions” and that the services of ELAS and other groups of partisans (including, it should be noted, what he calls the “volunteer groups from Egypt”, in the Sacred Brigade and the Mountain Brigade in Italy) are no longer necessary. He is in favor of the Government’s proposals for a nation[al] army “inspired by the democratic spirit of regeneration of the laboring nation”, though of course excluding “all officers of dictatorial or fascist tendencies”. Under these limitations, “the officers of the ELAS form a natural part of the army”. It may be presumed that the intention exists to “bore from within” in that army, and eventually to dominate it if possible. But this is far from, constituting an immediate menace. On the other hand, however, it should be realized that the situation here still retains possibilities of dangerous deterioration, particularly should the efforts at currency stabilization now being attempted result in failure. General Scobie has so far had little success in controlling demonstrations in the city or insuring order and public safety in the suburban [areas?], and the-confessed inability of the Government to give him support in his task augurs well [ ill ] for the enforcement of the strict price and other financial regulations on the observance of which stabilization must in. great part depend. MacVeagh 23 Ambassador MacVeagh returned to Athens on October 27, 1944. The United States Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) had reported in telegram No. 734, October 13, 11 a.m., from Caserta, that “Athens is free … the Greek flag is waving on the Acropolis”. (868.01/10–1344) 24 For correspondence regarding British Prime Minister Churchill’s visit to Moscow, see vol. iv , entry in Index under Churchill. 25 George Siantos, Acting Secretary General of the Greek Communist Party. 26 Not printed. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/11–1044: Telegram [Document 144] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , November 10, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 11—12:40 p.m.] 25. The Mountain Brigade arrived here yesterday morning 27 parading without incident and with great popular demonstrations of rejoicing. The troops looked fit and competent and marched well. In. greeting Mr. Papandreou and General Scobie the Commander pledged loyalty to the Government and to the British Command. For the moment the arrival has benefited local morale by contributing a new feeling of security. I had a talk with Mr. Papandreou this morning. He expressed himself as optimistic (which is his usual turn of mind) but said that the most critical moment for his efforts to reestablish Government in a demoralized country, by political means only and without force to impose it, will come early in December when the guerilla organizations have been ordered to disband (see my telegram No. 16 of November 7 [ 9 ], 7 p.m. 20 ). He emphasized that while his careful and gradual methods of tranquilizing and organizing would appear to have the support of EAM and the Communists at present, all depends on getting the people back to work, and he begged me to do all I can to insure the necessary supplies and credits for that purpose. He said the Liberals, though participating in the Government, are also providing the only political opposition he has presently to contend with but he believes this is not of a very serious nature and that in general the old parties as such have lost their hold on the people. He added that fear of Communism seems to be reviving Royalist sentiment particularly in “old Greece” but merely stated this as a fact which I believe it is, without expressing either pleasure or displeasure in regard to it. I asked Mr. Papandreou about the treatment to be accorded the Quislings and other collaborators now in prison and he said “There will have to be some executions”. It is essential, he said, that the Government take this matter in hand and show severity with justice otherwise the Communists will certainly attempt direct action not only with the likelihood that much injustice will be done but with fatal results to our Government’s prestige. I referred to the speech he made here on arrival in which he said that the country had been liberated from a tyranny of 8 years and asked him whether he intends to make no distinction between Metaxists and traitors and he replied that there would certainly be a distinction and that the proof is supplied by the fact that already laws have been passed against the collaborators but none as yet against participators in the Metaxas’ regime (see my 358 October 12, 6 p.m. from Cairo 29 ). He says it may even be that no specific laws against these persons will be passed at all but emphasized that Greece’s sufferings under the Metaxist tyranny have been too great to be overlooked: “That is why we must have a plebiscite on the Monarchy. If the King had not supported Metaxas the question would not arise.” MacVeagh 27 The Mountain Brigade, a unit of the Greek Army formed in the Middle East after the German occupation of Greece, had just returned from the battle front in Italy. 20 Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. 29 Not printed. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/11–1744: Telegram [Document 145] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , November 17, 1944—3 p.m. [Received November 19—4:40 p.m.] 55. The weakness of the Government is proving to be a most disturbing factor in the present uneasy Greek situation. (See my No. 47 of November 15, 8 p.m. 30 ) In a talk which I had with my British colleague this morning he expressed considerable concern over the lack of collaboration being shown by the demands [of] the Communist members of the coalition both as regards moderating labor’s demands for impossible wages (see my 29 of November 12, 5 p.m. 31 ) and as regards the maintenance of order (see the concluding sentence of my 14, November 6 [ 9 ], 9 [ 1 ] p.m.). He emphasized what is undoubtedly the case, namely that the indifference of the police in connection with this latter problem derives from the fact that the police force is still honey-combed with members of the extreme Leftist organizations and he further expressed doubts as to whether the national leaders of the organizations are really able any longer to control their men. According to Mr. Leeper, General Scobie yesterday summoned the extreme Left leaders including Messrs Siantos, Zevghos and Porphyrogennis to a conference in which he said that continued lack of cooperation would end in the imposition of martial law. Later Mr. Leeper himself had a conversation with the Prime Minister which resulted in a long Cabinet meeting at which I have been informed by another but equally reliable source that the Leftists stated that they could not conform to demands on the part of Scobie or [in?] general of the British until they knew the precise extent of the latter’s authority in this country. Mr. Leeper’s further remark to me that he has persuaded Mr. Papandreou to sign the proposed Anglo-Greek Civil Affairs agreement 32 as it now stands without further discussion of changes which the Greek Government has been proposing may [be] pertinent in this connection. As a first result of the urgent British CIS 33 recommendation 34 mentioned in my No. 47 above referred to, I understand that by General Wilson’s orders a blockade of Athens area exists from last night, no armed persons being allowed to enter. This follows other but less reliable information to the effect that there is a general rendezvous established for ELAS forces in the [garble] region on the Athens road south of Thebes. 2. Spitfire squadrons and one squadron of Baltimores of the Greek Air Force arrived here today from Italy and were at once reviewed by the Prime Minister and General Scobie at the Kalamaki airfield. The men were addressed by Mr. Papandreou and the new Minister for Air, Mr. Fikioris, a former Venizelist deputy, and made a good appearance. They are expected shortly to lay a wreath on the Unknown Soldier and to demonstrate over Athens. They, as well as the Sacred and Mountain Brigades, are notably Rightist in sentiment. The presence of these conservative troops here under British command may give promise of better order in Athens for the time being, but may also serve to strengthen EAM’s nation-wide claim to represent Greek ideals of liberty and freedom from foreign control. Repeated to Caserta. MacVeagh 30 Telegram No. 47 not printed. 31 Not printed. 32 For correspondence regarding this subject, see pp. 183–210 [ Pgs. 183–210 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] , passim . 33 Counter Intelligence Service. 34 Referring to a report by the Counter Intelligence Service that EAM–ELAS planned a coup d’état before December 1, 1944. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.20/11–3044: Telegram [Document 146] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , November 30, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 2—8:41 a.m.] 113 [ 111 ]. No decisions were reached at last evening’s Cabinet meeting (see my No. 104 of November 29 35 ) and today the deadlock continues over the question of disbanding the Mountain Brigade as well as the guerrilla forces in advance of the formation of the new National Army. Nevertheless the Prime Minister announced today that the new National Guard will take over from ELAS civil guard tomorrow as scheduled (see my No. 16 of November 7 [ 9 ] 36 ) and he is reported to be facing the continuing crisis with his customary optimism. Meanwhile British continue to be very apprehensive re possible serious trouble from the Left and my M.A. 37 has been advised by Third Corps operational staff that though General Scobie’s requests for combat reinforcements (see my 81 of November 23 38 ) have not been approved the airborne brigade of about 2000 effectives which has been used since D–day to follow up German withdrawal is to be kept in Greece for time being instead of being returned to Italy as contemplated. It is now in Attica. Furthermore 23rd Armored Brigade, formerly known as the Independent Motorized Brigade, will be concentrated in Attica and northeast Peloponnesus with all possible speed instead of being sent back to Egypt. Even the Indian Brigade formed of one British and two Indian battalions with British artillery is now in the Salonica area and the 11th Indian Brigade similarly divided between India and British troops is now in Patras and Missolonghi. In connection with these mixed brigades the MA was informed it is the practice in general to employ the Indians to guard military and relief stores and British for security purposes. 35 Not printed. 36 Telegram No. 16, November 9, not printed. 37 Military Attaché. 38 Telegram not printed. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–344: Telegram [Document 147] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 3, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 4—11:20 a.m.] 120. My 114, December 2, 39 The Communist Ministers duly resigned and this morning EAM attempted a demonstration in Constitution Square. The Government forbade this and when large crowds attempted an entrance the police opened fire and a number of casualties resulted. Some smaller demonstrations took place elsewhere including a peaceful one of several thousand people outside this Embassy cheering President Roosevelt and the United States. In this connection this morning’s Communist Rezospastis featured a reported declaration by Mr. Stettinius to the effect that, “unless important military reasons prevent, the policy of the United States is against any interference in the internal affairs of the countries now being liberated and especially as regards the formation of their governments. This policy has always been a doctrine of the United States and is now [apparent omission]”. 40 The British have now brought some tanks into Athens as well as armored cars and their troops are picketing the area around the Prime Minister’s apartment. In the suburbs the ELAS appears in complete control. I drove to Kephissia and saw posts along the road with machine guns pointed towards Athens and armed guerrillas in the village streets. A general strike has been called for tomorrow. Meanwhile, electric power has already been cut off preventing the Embassy radio transmitter from functioning until an emergency generator can be put into operation possibly tomorrow morning. The Under Minister for Foreign Affairs 41 told me this afternoon that negotiations are in progress with regard to filling the vacated Cabinet posts. Stronger representation from the Eight would appear likely. Please advise War and Navy Departments. MacVeagh 39 Telegram not printed. 40 See telegram No. 114, December 12, to the Ambassador in Greece, p. 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] . 41 Philip Dragoumis. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–444: Telegram [Document 148] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 4, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 5—10:32 a.m.] 125. The general strike went into effect today (see my 120, December 3) and all public services are affected. A large funeral was staged this morning by EAM for the victims of yesterday’s fracas and there has been considerable shooting in many parts of Athens all day while the naval cadet school at the Piraeus containing quarters of Naval Commander in Chief was besieged for several hours by ELAS which also surrounded and captured several police stations in that city. The cadet school was relieved by the British but not before a Greek Lieutenant was killed and three British ratings wounded. Phaleron is also in the hands of ELAS. In the early hours a column of ELAS marching from Thebes was intercepted by a British armored unit peacefully disarmed, given coffee and sent home. But ELAS seems determined to capture the city and the British fear that by infiltration from the suburbs where its forces are in control it may be able to concentrate important forces here. Meanwhile General Scobie whose attitude according to the British Ambassador has been all along in accord with Mr. Churchill’s wishes has this afternoon issued a proclamation stating that he will support constitutional government with all means in his power until free elections can be held. The British Ambassador informs me that he has advised the Foreign Office that Papandreou should no longer head the Government and that coalition having failed a new political government should be set up as soon as possible. Negotiations he said now tend toward a cabinet under Sophoulis with Papandreou as Minister without Portfolio. Repeated to Caserta as No. 12. MacVeagh The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–544: Telegram [Document 149] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 5, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 9—2:52 p.m.] 129. I have authorized the Foreign Office to deny reports printed in yesterday’s Leftist press according to which I had protested to my British colleague both verbally and in writing against British interference in Greek affairs. These inventions [ interventions? ] would appear not unconnected with the recent publication by the same press of an alleged statement by the Secretary concerning our Government’s policy of nonintervention (see my No. 120 of December 3, 6 p.m.) and perhaps represent a policy to play up America’s neutral attitude in contrast to British intervention here. While doing all I can not to allow this Mission to become involved in internal affairs, I have also been careful so far as possible not to embarrass our British Allies and my British colleague realizes this as well as the extreme delicacy of the position involved. MacVeagh The United States Representative, Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk), to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–544: Telegram [Document 150] The United States Representative, Advisory Council for Italy ( Kirk ), to the Secretary of State Caserta , December 5, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 10:46 p.m.] 1605. Churchill has sent a message to General Scobie in Athens 42 stating that he has given instructions to SAC to make certain that all British forces in Greece are left there and all possible reinforcements should be sent. He informed Scobie that he would hold him responsible for maintaining order in Athens and for neutralizing or destroying all EAM–ELAS groups who come near the capital. Churchill has authorized Scobie to make all regulations he wishes for strong control of the streets or for rounding up any numbers of truculent people. He pointed out that he expected ELAS would put women and children in the advance line when shooting began and that he, Scobie, must be clever about this and avoid mistakes. Churchill added that Scobie should not hesitate to fire at any armed male in Athens who assailed British authority or Greek authority with which British are working. Churchill stated that it would be well if Scobie command could be reinforced by authority of some Greek Government and added that Papandreou was being told by British Ambassador not to hesitate. In addition Churchill stated that Scobie should not hesitate to act as if he were in a conquered city where a local rebellion were in progress and suggested that with the forces at his command he should be able to give ELAS bands approaching from outside a lesson which would make others unlikely to behave similarly. Churchill’s message to Scobie concluded with statement that he would give his support to Scobie on all action taken on this basis and stated that British must hold and dominate Greek capital. He commented that it would be a great thing if Scobie could succeed in doing this without bloodshed if possible but that he should not hesitate to go through with bloodshed if necessary. Kirk 42 Text in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy (Boston, 1953), p. 289. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–844: Telegram [Document 151] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 8, 1944. [Received December 9—2:30 p.m.] The British Ambassador told me this afternoon that while negotiations were in progress among the Greek politicians this morning for a reconstitution of the Government he received instructions from London to the effect that there should be no political change at this time, that the British had undertaken to protect Athens against armed attack and should get on with the job while the Greeks should postpone politics until after the crisis is over. As a result Mr. Papandreou after resigning this morning has undertaken to carry on. General Scobie is concentrating troops including Greek Mountain Brigade in the center of Athens and the cruiser Orion is standing by to aid if necessary in further defense of the naval school in the Piraeus. The situation seems rapidly developing towards a clash between British and Greeks. Scobie told correspondents this morning, “I cannot promise that if the British troops are fired on they will not fire back” and said that further columns of ELAS (see my number 125 of December 4, 6 p.m.) are moving on the city. Meanwhile Greek factions continue their spasmodic civil war in various parts of the urban area. Latest reports reaching the British Ambassador from Salonika indicate that ELAS has repudiated the Government and has started looting ML 43 stores. Reviewing the whole situation he said, “Fundamentally the trouble is we haven’t enough troops. We must have enough troops if this job is to be handled right”. Under the above circumstances I have ordered all members of this Mission living in or around the center of the city to move either into the Embassy building or the American School for the time being. MacVeagh 43 Military Liaison. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–844: Telegram [Document 152] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 8, 1944—10 a.m. [Received December 10—8:37 a.m.] 132. I am convinced and my British colleague agrees with me that the greatest danger for the future in present deplorable Greek situation lies in the deep-seated mutual suspicions of groups in conflict. Many thousands of patriotic Greeks now siding with the extreme Left are undoubtedly doing so because they suspect that behind the Government’s actions lies an intention to bring back the King and possibly also the hated Fascist dictatorship for which they hold him personally responsible while many thousands of others equally patriotic are convinced that behind activities of the guerrillas lies a plot to establish a Communist dictatorship. These conflicting suspicions sedulously exploited by enemy agents and subversive propaganda are probably too profound and too firmly sealed by the blood which has now been shed to be cured by any purely Greek initiative. But I believe the danger of continued civil war here of indefinite duration and detriment to the peace of this whole region and the interests of the United Nations might still be avoided if after restoration of order in Athens the British were able and willing to announce formation of an international commission composed of British, Russian and American representatives to oversee the holding of a plebiscite on the regime and guarantee impartial settlement of other critical problems likely to cause trouble. This would give both sides equal assurance of fair play and also restore confidence in British intentions which is now so sadly if unjustly lacking throughout the Greek world. I do not know whether you will find this suggestion practicable but my British colleague tells me that “similar ideas have passed through his mind” which he is communicating to his Government and in any case I feel certain that the present drastic foreign support feeing given to one side of local Greek quarrel in which so much genuine patriotic fervor and even fanaticism is enlisted in the other contains little if any hope of furnishing a durable solution unless it can be followed by some such clear proof of genuine impartial interest in the Greek people as a whole. I am writing the President fully about this matter today. 44 MacVeagh 44 Letter not printed. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1144: Telegram [Document 153] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 11, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 9:15 p.m.] 140. Every day makes it clearer that the forces under Scobie’s command here are insufficient to assure the defense of a city of this size together with the Piraeus and the Kalamaki airfield and the roads between them against total available guerrilla forces estimated by the British staff to comprise 25,000. Savage battles continue in many parts of Athens and suburbs today. Meanwhile the ELAS which has so far been largely depending on its civilian reserves of about 10,000 in the city is now reinforcing with well equipped troops from outside and it is widely understood, though this is not yet officially confirmed, that its command has been taken over by Ares, regarded as the most unscrupulous and sadistic of the guerrilla leaders. Politically I am informed that the proposal to constitute a regency under the Archbishop has been revived. Field Marshal Alexander 45 and Macmillan 46 arrived today. MacVeagh 45 Sir Harold R. L. Alexander, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Italy; became Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, on December 12, 1944. 46 Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident, Allied Force Headquarters (Mediterranean). The Appointed Ambassador to Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1144: Telegram [Document 154] The Appointed Ambassador to Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Caserta , December 11, 1944—midnight. [Received December 11—9:09 p.m.] 1699. Macmillan and Field Marshal Alexander left this morning for Athens. Macmillan before his departure stated that Churchill had requested him to proceed immediately to Greece and “try to put an end to the fighting by some sort of a compromise”. He added that Churchill had given him broad authority to make some sort of a deal if such a thing was at all possible. When asked what this meant, Macmillan said that it was perfectly clear that Papandreou would probably have to be sacrificed but before the British decided to do this Macmillan was to survey the situation for British Prime Minister. He said that he was not at all optimistic as to the prospects but stated he felt that the fighting in Greece must be brought to an end in the very near future on one basis or another. The British Resident Minister stated that he expected to return with Alexander to Caserta on December 13 the date when the Field Marshal will formally take over AFHQ. Kirk The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1244: Telegram [Document 155] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 12, 1944—1 p.m. [Received December 14—10:34 a.m.] 144. My 138, December 10, 11 a.m. 47 While I understand from a good source that the British intend bringing in shortly two more divisions, this must take some days and meanwhile the ELAS appears determined to push all the advantages it now possesses to obtain a decision. General Scobie told our Treasury representatives this morning when he received them for the first time that the ELAS are deliberately exhausting the city water supply and “will stick at nothing”. It has now secured some light artillery as well as trench mortars and the center of town is under frequent fire from these. An American corporal brought in from Italy by General Scobie’s British political adviser as his chauffeur was wounded by a fragment this morning. The relief problem continues extremely difficult. Already friends are beseeching this Embassy for food. The International Red Cross has been able to secure a signed agreement from the EVAL [ ELAS? ] to respect its cars but under conditions of street fighting mistakes only too frequently occur. ML and UNRRA are both sending back to Cairo portions of their staffs here which for the time being cannot be employed. The visit of Field Marshal Alexander and Macmillan (my 140, December 11, 3 p.m.) seems likely to result in reinforcement to Mr. Leeper’s program for a political change to quiet the situation and I am reliably advised that especially in connection with the safety of the city during the next few critical days General Scobie as well as the British Embassy is counting heavily on London’s being persuaded to let the Archbishop assume the Regency. MacVeagh 47 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) 868.00/12–1244: Telegram [Document 156] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) Washington , December 12, 1944. 114. Declaration of United States policy attributed to Mr. Stettinius by December 3 issue of Rezospastis 48 probably translation of OWI statement which had Department clearance and which was released for broadcast on Voice of America station the same day. Exact text follows: “The ‘Voice of America’ has the authorization to point out once more that the United States policy has always been to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of other nations. In conformity with this policy, the United States has scrupulously refrained from interfering in the affairs of other countries which have been liberated from the Germans. The United States Government will continue to refrain from interference in the affairs of other countries. Unless the military security of the Allied armies is at stake, the United States will make no attempt to influence the composition of any Government in any friendly country. The American people have naturally viewed with sympathy the aspirations of the resistance movements and the anti-Fascist elements in liberated countries. The American people know that these groups which fought so courageously against the Germans have no intention of hampering the present all important military operations against Germany.” Stettinius 48 See telegram No. 120, December 3, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in Greece, p. 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] . Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 768.00/12–1344 [Document 157] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [ Washington ,] December 13, 1944. Serious armed conflict is raging in Athens today between some 16,000 British and Greek Government troops and an unknown proportion of the 50,000 EAM–ELAS guerillas. Basic causes of this dispute lie in EAM’s distrust of the intentions of the British-backed Government, as regards, first, the holding of fair elections and a plebiscite on the question of the King; and, second, EAM’s desire to exercise its share of power. While agreeing to a general program of disarming all irregular forces and reestablishing a regular Greek Army, EAM insisted that the Greek Mountain Brigade (4,000 men) remaining after the purge of the “mutinous” Greek forces in Egypt last spring, and Sacred Battalion (500 officers trained as commandos) be disarmed simultaneously with the ELAS guerilla forces. The Government offered instead to incorporate its units and an equal number of ELAS troops in the National Army. Fearing Government stacking of the units, the resistance groups refused and on December 1 the four EAM and two Communist Ministers resigned from the Cabinet (of twenty-three members). A crisis arose on Sunday December 3 when an EAM protest demonstration, which had first been authorized, then disapproved by the Government, was fired on by Greek gendarmes, who killed twenty-one and wounded one hundred and fifty of the demonstrators. On Monday Greek Premier Papandreou, on advice of British Ambassador Leeper, offered his resignation and proposed that a new Government be formed by the venerable Sophoulis, President of the Liberal (Venizelist) Party. The impasse came on Tuesday, when Mr. Churchill telegraphed Leeper vetoing any governmental change and ordering the British GOC to clear Athens of all ELAS forces. Bitter fighting has continued ever since, without conclusive results. The most the British can hope to win, without large-scale reinforcements, is control of the Athens area, with EAM–ELAS remaining in power elsewhere in the country. It seems clear that the serious turn of affairs resulted from Churchill’s arbitrary veto of Papandreou’s resignation, which made further political negotiation impossible. The Department has made a public statement 48a favoring a free Greek choice of future Government and attempting to disassociate us from British policy. Public opinion has been stirred to an unprecedented degree by the Greek crisis. In England a vote in Parliament was notable for abstentions. King George, who has aggravated the difficulties by refusing to appoint a Regency in Greece or to make any personal commitment regarding his return to Greece, has remained silent. In this country the public has strongly supported the Department’s declared position, but many demands are accumulating for: 1) Strong representations to the British; 2) United States mediation; and 3) establishment in Greece of a United States-Soviet-British Commission to ensure a fair deal. In the Department’s opinion, the situation would be considerably eased if King George would consent to the establishment of a Regency in Greece and make a statement clarifying his intention not to return to Greece unless recalled by a popular plebiscite. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. 48a Asked at his press conference on December 5, 1944, to comment on a statement on the situation in Greece made in the House of Commons that same day by Prime Minister Churchill ( Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 5th Series, vol. 406, col. 355), the Secretary of State had indicated that a statement would be forthcoming subsequently, after he had had an opportunity to study the report on Mr. Churchill’s remarks which he had seen only 15 minutes earlier ( Verbatim Reports Press Conferences , 1944, No. 124, December 5). Accordingly, at his press conference on December 7, 1944, Secretary Stettinius made the following statement: “I was interested to note that in his statement on the Greek situation on December 5, Prime Minister Churchill told the House of Commons the following: ‘Our own position, as I have said, is extremely clear. Whether the Greek people form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for their decision. Whether they form a government of the right or left is for their decision. These are entirely matters for them.’ With this statement, I am in full agreement. It is also our earnest hope that the people and authorities of Greece and our British Allies will work together in rebuilding that ravished country.” Department of State Bulletin , December 10, 1944, p. 713. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 868.00/12–1344 [Document 158] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [ Washington ,] December 13, 1944. I transmit herewith a copy of Ambassador MacVeagh’s telegram of December 8 48b proposing the formation of an international commission of British, Russian and American representatives to oversee the holding of a plebiscite on the Greek regime and generally supervise an impartial settlement of the Greek crisis. It seems likely that Mr. Churchill would immediately veto Russian participation, as he appears acutely to fear Russian penetration into Greece, and I think we should refuse any possible counter-proposal to intervene on a purely Anglo-American basis. I should also have some hesitancy in participating in an international commission unless we are prepared to send some civil affairs troops into Greece so that we could actually be sure of what was going on. You may consider Ambassador MacVeagh’s proposal impracticable, for the foregoing or other reasons. However, in communicating our reaction to his proposal, we might well ask the Ambassador to report whether he or the British there have any suggestions to submit as to any way in which we could be helpful. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. 48b Telegram No. 132, p. 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 152 ] . President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Document 159] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) 49 [ Washington ,] 13 December 1944. 673. Personal for the Former Naval Person. I have been as deeply concerned as you have yourself in regard to the tragic difficulties you have encountered in Greece. I appreciate to the full the anxious and difficult alternatives with which you have been faced. I regard my role in this matter as that of a loyal friend and ally whose one desire is to be of any help possible in the circumstances. You may be sure that in putting my thoughts before you I am constantly guided by the fact that nothing can in any way shake the unity and association between our two countries in the great tasks to which we have set our hands. As anxious as I am to be of the greatest help to you in this trying situation, there are limitations imposed in part by the traditional policies of the United States and in part by the mounting adverse reaction of public opinion in this country. No one will understand better than yourself that I, both personally and as head of State, am necessarily responsive to the state of public feeling. It is for these reasons that it has not been possible for this Government to take a stand along with you in the present course of events in Greece. Even to attempt to do so would bring only temporary value to you and would in the long run do injury to our basic relationships. I don’t need to tell you how much I dislike this state of affairs as between you and me. My one hope is to see it rectified so we can go along in this as in everything, shoulder to shoulder. I know that you, as the one on whom the responsibility rests, desire with all your heart a satisfactory solution of the Greek problem and particularly one that will bring peace to that ravished country. I will be with you wholeheartedly in any solution which takes into consideration the factors I have mentioned above. With this in mind I am giving you at random some thoughts that have come to me in my anxious desire to be of help. I know that you have sent Macmillan there with broad powers to find such a solution and it may be that he will have been successful before you get this. I of course lack full details and am at a great distance from the scene, but it has seemed to me that a basic reason—or excuse, perhaps—for the EAM attitude has been distrust regarding the intentions of King George. I wonder if Macmillan’s efforts might not be greatly facilitated if the King himself would approve the establishment of a regency in Greece and would make a public declaration of his intention not to return unless called for by popular plebiscite. This might be particularly effective if accompanied by an assurance that elections will be held at some fixed date, no matter how far in the future, when the people would have full opportunity to express themselves. Meanwhile, might it not be possible to secure general agreement on the disarmament and dissolution of all the armed groups now in the country, including the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion, leaving your troops to preserve law and order alone until the Greek national forces can be reconstituted on a non-partisan basis and adequately equipped. I shall be turning over in my mind this whole question and hope you will share your thoughts and worries with me. Roosevelt 49 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Draft prepared in the Department of State. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1344: Telegram [Document 160] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 13, 1944—3 p.m. [Received December 15—11:03 a.m.] 148. The guerrillas have now practically closed a ring around the British in the center of Athens effectively cutting off all traffic with the Piraeus as well as with the Kalamai Airfield except by armoured car. Yesterday and today “unofficial meetings” have taken place between Porphyrogennis representing EAM and General Scobie but so far nothing has come of these. Field Marshal Alexander after reviewing the military situation returned to Italy yesterday leaving Macmillan here. According to the British Ambassador, a brigade of reinforcements arrived yesterday in the Piraeus and an attempt is being made to clear that city and reestablish communications with Athens. He said the total reinforcements coming in would eventually exceed two divisions, but that meanwhile there is danger of cholera and typhus as well as typhoid and he feels there is no time to lose in setting up a government here possessed of some authority. He confirmed that he has been pressing London to permit the establishment of a regency under the Archbishop, and said that he has received the full and understanding support of Mr. Macmillan in this regard, but that so far no reply has been received from London, where not only Mr. Churchill must be won over but the King of Greece must be persuaded to give his consent. General Plastiras 50 arrived today. MacVeagh 50 Nicholas Plastiras, Greek Republican general, in exile after the restoration of the monarchy in 1935. The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1344: Telegram [Document 161] The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Caserta , December 13, 1944—midnight. [Received December 13—9:16 p.m.] 1740. Re my 1699 December 11. Broad 51 stated this evening that Macmillan has received instructions from Churchill to remain in Athens to work out a solution for the Greek problem. He stated that Papandreou was through and Churchill now wished Macmillan to devote his efforts to making Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens, Prime Minister. I am informed that Field Marshal Alexander is considering possibility of arriving at a compromise settlement in Greece on some “face saving proposal” based on a complete disarmament of all groups both left and right after which an immediate election would be held under supervision of British with American “observers” to see that justice and fairness is accorded everyone. This idea is still in preliminary phase but Alexander’s advisers are asking him to present it to Prime Minister in order that latter may take it up with President. Kirk 51 Philip Broad, British Chargé d’ Affaires, substituting at Allied Force Headquarters in Mr. Macmillan’s absence. The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1444: Telegram [Document 162] The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Caserta , December 14, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 10:40 p.m.] 1750. Reference my 1740, December 13 and 1699, December 11. Churchill has telegraphed Alexander stating that he placed Alexander’s telegraphic report on situation in Greece before War Cabinet which was very grateful for his appreciation of situation and approved his recommended action (gradual formation of Greek National Guard and introducing British reinforcements into Greece). Churchill authorized Alexander to proceed immediately towards appointment of Archbishop of Athens as Prime Minister of Greece without further consulting War Cabinet. He added that Eden, with authority of War Cabinet, would take up with King George of Greece proposal that Archbishop should be made Regent. He stated that the King, however, was opposed to this on the ground that it would be construed as imposing something on people before they had a chance to vote on King or government they wanted. Churchill stressed British anxiety to arrive quickly at some solution in Greek crisis. Kirk The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 868.01/12–1444: Telegram [Document 163] The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Caserta , December 14, 1944—midnight. [Received December 15—3:04 p.m.] 1759. Situation in Greece as of December 9 has been reported to AFHQ by British Ambassador as follows: “In recent operations we have definitely defeated the enemy’s main objective. This was to seize the small area around Constitution Square comprising the seat of the Government and in which members of the Government themselves are at present forced to live. Starting from this central area, the general plan has been to occupy strong points and to clear up systematically an increasing area from the center of the city outwards. It will be realized that consolidation of the new positions throughout a town of the size of Athens–Piraeus is a very difficult business. We are fighting an enemy 90% of whom are in civilian clothes and many of whom are practised in this kind of warfare from German times. When a block of houses has been ‘cleared’ and our troops pass on to the next block, it is easy for enemy personnel to infiltrate back especially at night and start once more to open fire from ‘cleared’ buildings. The Germans faced with a similar problem dealt with it by shooting large numbers of hostages. Short of using such terrorist tactics or of destroying a large number of buildings in the town, comparatively large numbers of troops are needed to hold and police all areas cleared. It says a great deal for the stamina and special qualities of our available forces that in 5 days’ fighting they have been able to do so much. At the same time a layman, reviewing the general situation up to date in the light of its political implications, is faced with the following state of affairs: The general strike continues; the strike of civil servants has paralyzed the governmental method with the partial exception of the Foreign Office and Ministry of War; no unloading is taking place; all utilities except water and part of the telephone have ceased; all but a very few shops are shut; the road to Piraeus and to the only operating airport at Kalamai can only be safely negotiated in an armoured car; most of Piraeus is in rebel hands; sporadic firing interrupts all safe circulation through the streets; the food situation is becoming serious.” Military report of December 13 indicates situation in Athens-Piraeus area shows little improvement and there is considerable ELAS movement towards center of city. General infiltration of ELAS continues, reinforcements arriving by air, and EAF continuing sorties over the area in support of ground troops. In Salonika dock workers have declared strike and opposing forces are preparing for showdown. Salonika radio is broadcasting anti-British news but over unpopular wave length. British naval forces state situation at Mitylene is very delicate and they are recommending that military forces should be sent as soon as possible to stabilize the situation. Kirk The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [Document 164] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 52 [ London ,] 15 December 1944. 851. Your number 673. I will send you a considered answer to your telegram, for the kindly tone of which I thank you, over the weekend. I hope that the British reinforcements now coming steadily into Attica may make a more healthy situation in Athens. You will realize how very serious it would be if we withdrew, as we easily could, and the result was a frightful massacre, and an extreme left wing regime under Communist inspiration installed itself, as it would, in Athens. My Cabinet colleagues here of all parties are not prepared to act in a manner so dishonourable to our record and name. Ernest Bevin’s 53 speech to the Labour Conference won universal respect. Stern fighting lies ahead, and even danger to our troops in the centre of Athens. The fact that you are supposed to be against us, in accordance with the last sentence of Stettinius press release, 54 as I feared has added to our difficulties and burdens. I think it probable that I shall broadcast to the world on Sunday night and make manifest the purity and disinterestedness of our motives throughout and also of our resolves. Meanwhile I send you a letter 55 I have received from the King of Greece, to whom we have suggested the policy of making the Archbishop of Athens Regent. The King refuses to allow this. Therefore an act of constitutional violence will be entailed if we finally decide upon this course. I know nothing to the credit of the Archbishop except that our people on the spot think he might stop a gap or bridge a gully. 52 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A garbled version was sent to the Secretary of State by the British Embassy on December 16. 53 British Minister of Labor and National Service. 54 Department of State Bulletin , December 10, 1944, p. 713. 55 Not printed. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1544: Telegram [Document 165] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 15, 1944—noon. [Received 2:03 p.m.] 150. According to the British Ambassador with whom I have just talked, the King has replied from London that he must have the advice of his Ministers before agreeing to the proposed Regency. Papandreou is already in agreement with the proposal and the British expect that the consent of the others can be obtained today. They feel that the solution proposed is most hopeful of success in stopping the civil war as the Archbishop is confident that he can deal with ELAS. His program if he is named Regent is to proclaim at once that if arms are laid down (1) there will be a general amnesty (2) the British Army will see to it that no reprisals against ELAS occur and (3) he will constitute a new government of all parties and resistance movements represented in the recent coalition. I asked Mr. Leeper if there is anything that we could do to help bring the present dreadful conditions in Athens to an end and he said “I hope the American Government will support this effort as it constitutes the only reasonable hope of saving the Anglo-American ( sic ) position here.” I personally feel that the effort is as well conceived as anything could be under the present circumstances in which compromise and moderation appear essential though the amnesty regarding which ELAS is reported to be particularly anxious and the reacceptance of the Communist Party into the Government are bound to be very unpopular with the extreme Right. Meanwhile, the British are continuing to bring in reinforcements and should have all of their two new divisions here today or tomorrow. Their plan according to the Ambassador is to show themselves strong enough to face any eventuality while at the same time attempting conciliation and placing the settlement of internal political questions squarely in Greek hands. MacVeagh The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1544: Telegram [Document 166] The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Caserta , December 15, 1944—9 p.m. [Received December 17—7:30 a.m.] 1776. Reference my 1750, December 14, 3 p.m. I have learned that on his return from Athens on December 12 Field Marshal Alexander reported to Churchill that he found the situation in Athens much more grave than he had felt it to be when he was in London. He stated he was obliged to travel in an armored vehicle from the airfield into town; that the British airfield (Kalamai) and road to Athens were under fire and not at all securely held. He said the initiative in the fighting did not rest wholly with the British. The British in fact were beleaguered in the heart of the city and held less of Athens than he thought. Port Heracles was not in firm possession of the British nor was the Piraeus area. ELAS held electrical power station and had cut off the water supply of the city. The British were not in a position to unload ships freely due to the military situation. He recommended that the port would have to be cleared as a primary military objective. He suggested that it should be proclaimed that all those who were fighting as rebels, and at the same time those who were found in civilian clothing and were carrying weapons or rifles would be shot. He suggested also certain military measures which I will not report for security reasons. Alexander added that it was most imperative that he and Macmillan be authorized to proceed with the proposal to name the Archbishop of Athens as Regent. Alexander stated that he was firmly opposed to discussing at this time any terms of settlement with ELAS lest they be regarded by ELAS as a sign of weakness. He said it was most desirable that no time should be lost before negotiations regarding the regency should begin and this might produce the effect of conciliation without the British themselves being pictured as the initiators of such negotiation. I am further informed that Macmillan has cabled personally to Churchill in similar vein urging him to take up with the King of Greece in the strongest possible terms the desirability of obtaining the King’s agreement to the appointment of Archbishop of Athens as Regent. (See my number 1750, December 14, 3 p.m.) He said he did not believe that the Archbishop would accept the title of Prime Minister, as such a measure would not give him the authority to handle the situation and remove the most powerful cry against the British which is that of foreign intervention. Macmillan said the King must not be permitted to ignore this appeal and said he felt certain that the King does not realize that Greece is a mass of violent internal hatred and that the country is on the brink of a bloody civil war. He added that the King must consent to this proposal for the sake of his people and that Churchill should point out to King George that such an act on his part would be regarded as that of a statesman and of a patriot. He suggested that King George ought to be told that this was his last chance to try to save the monarchy, otherwise any hope of doing so would be gone forever. Macmillan went on to say that the King must be told that this proposal is not the idea of the British Government but a spontaneous desire of the Greek people and that everyone in Athens is in favor of this arrangement. He pointed out to Churchill that if this matter should not be settled there is great danger of the British Government and the British people being accused of connivance with King George’s selfish policy. He added that the British and American press would be quick to take up such a line of attack. Macmillan added that there must be no compromising with the King and that he must agree to the regency as he felt certain that the Archbishop would not agree to act as Prime Minister. To be Prime Minister would not give him the dignity of that distance from the political scene which he would require in order to successfully handle the task which lay before him. Macmillan added that the parties of the Right felt that this was the last chance to save Greece from terrorist dictatorship of the Left and that the Archbishop must be appointed at once as Regent for a period of time calculated to give him the requisite confidence. Macmillan’s final appeal to Churchill was very strong and moving and it is clear that he is deeply concerned over the gravity of the present situation. He said that unless Churchill could put this matter through with the King the situation resulting would be a long and costly military operation in Greece to the embarrassment of the British in the field of international affairs. He added that the parties of the Left feel that if they should quit now, there will be reprisals from the Right. According to our informant, Churchill has replied urgently to Macmillan stating that both he and Eden talked with the King who has asked for more time to consider the matter. The King apparently stated that he had in particular to take account of advice which he is constantly receiving from Papandreou and others. He told Churchill and Eden that according to his information there was no enthusiasm in Greece for the proposal that the Archbishop be made Regent and the King read to Churchill and Eden a telegram which he had just received from Papandreou advising him strongly against accepting the proposal regarding the regency. Churchill then asked Macmillan to send him immediately reasons for supporting this proposal, who in Greece could be expected to back it, and suggested that Macmillan should see Papandreou, Sophoulis 56 and other Greek party leaders at once to sell them this line and urge them to address themselves in the same sense directly to the King. Kirk 56 Themistocles Sophoulis, head of the Greek Liberal Party. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) 868.00/12–1544: Telegram [Document 167] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) Washington , December 16, 1944—2 p.m. 124. Reurtel 150, December 15. Suggested solution appears to be most promising proposal yet advanced and closely parallels Department’s ideas already communicated to the British. Department is appreciatively aware of the difficulty of your position during this critical period when communications have been interrupted and when confused propaganda in Greece has misinterpreted certain United States statements and fundamental policy. Your correct reaffirmation of Department’s views has been most helpful. Stettinius The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1644: Telegram [Document 168] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 16, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 17—2:06 p.m.] 153. British Ambassador has just told me that while Sophoulis as head of the Liberal Party telegraphed the King yesterday supporting the proposal to name the Archbishop as Regent (see my 150, December 15, noon) Papandreou unexpectedly failed to concur and persuaded the Cabinet that a better idea would be to have a regency council of three composed of the Archbishop, Plastiras and Dragoumis, present Under Minister for Foreign Affairs. A telegram carrying this recommendation has, therefore, also gone to the King. It is obvious that if this council of three were to be set up it would strengthen Papandreou’s chances of retaining the Premiership since it would remove the possibility of competition from Plastiras and the naming of the Royalist Dragoumis would appear to have been included as a bait to secure the King’s acceptance. However, both Leeper and Macmillan are much alarmed as well as disgusted at this recrudescence of political maneuvering at this critical time and believe—as I feel correctly—that passions can now be calmed only by the appointment of a single Chief of State enjoying the confidence of the people and by an act which will completely and clearly remove the King question from the present picture. They have, therefore, telegraphed Churchill that he should at all costs and today, if possible, persuade the King to appoint the Archbishop as sole Regent. Meanwhile the battle of Athens continues with the British forces consolidating their new reinforcements at Piraeus and Kalamai and preparing an onward movement to Athens where at present they remain on the defensive. Repeated to Caserta. MacVeagh The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 868.00/12–1744 [Document 169] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 57 [ London ,] December 17, 1944. 855. About Greece. The present situation is that our representatives on the spot, Macmillan and Leeper have strongly recommended appointment of Archbishop as Regent. This is obnoxious to Papandreou Government though they might be persuaded to advocate a Regency of three, namely the Archbishop, General Plastiras and Dragoumis. There is suspicion that the Archbishop is ambitious of obtaining chief political power and that supported by EAM he will use it ruthlessly against existing Ministers. Whether this be true or not I cannot say. The facts are changing from hour to hour. I do not feel at all sure that in the setting up of a one-man Regency we might not be imposing a dictatorship in Greece. There is also to be considered the fact that the King refuses, I think inflexibly, to appoint a Regency certainly not a one-man Regency of the Archbishop whom he distrusts and fears. According to the Greek Constitution the Crown Prince is Regent in the absence of the King. The King also states that all of his Ministers under Papandreou advise him against such a step and that aware of Constitutional Monarchy we cannot be responsible. 58 The War Cabinet decided to await for 3 or 4 days the course of military operations. Our reinforcements are arriving rapidly and British General Staff Intelligence say that there are no more than 12,000 ELAS in Athens and Piraeus. The Greek King’s estimate is 15 to 22,000. Anyhow we shall by the middle of next week be far superior in numbers. I am not prepared, as at present informed, to give way to unconstitutional violence in such circumstances. Our immediate task is to secure control of Athens and Piraeus. According to latest reports ELAS may agree to depart. This will give us a firm basis from which to negotiate the best settlement possible between the warring Greek factions. It will certainly have to provide for disarming of guerilla forces. Disarmament of Greek Mountain Brigades who took Rimini and Sacred Squadron who have fought so well at the side of the British and American troops would seriously weaken our forces and in any case we could not abandon them to massacre. They may however be removed elsewhere as part of a general settlement. I am sure you would not wish us to cast down our painful and thankless task at this time. We embarked upon it with your full consent (see my message of August 18th [ 17th ] and your reply of August 27th [ 26th ] 59 ). We desire nothing from Greece but to do our duty by the common cause. In the midst of our task of bringing food and relief and maintaining the rudiments of order for a Government which has no armed forces we have become involved in a furious though not as yet very bloody struggle. I have felt it much that you were unable to give a word of explanation for our action but I understand your difficulties. Meanwhile the Cabinet is united and Socialist Ministers approve Mr. Bevin’s declarations at the Labour Conference which on this matter endorsed official platform by a majority of 2,455,000 votes to 137,000. I could at any time obtain, I believe, a 10 to 1 majority in the House of Commons. I am sure you will do whatever you can. I will keep you constantly informed. 57 Copy of telegram sent to the Department by the British Ambassador on December 17. 58 The latter portion of this sentence apparently garbled in transmission. The sentence as printed in Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , p. 303, reads as follows: “The King also states that all of his Ministers under Papandreou advise him against such a step, and that, as a constitutional monarch, he cannot be responsible for it.” 59 These discrepancies between the dates attributed by Mr. Churchill to the telegrams referred to and their dates as found in the files of the Department of State and the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library may be assumed to be due to the time difference between Washington and London. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1744: Telegram [Document 170] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 17, 1944—1 p.m. [Received December 20—1:45 a.m.] 154. The King’s reply to his Government, received yesterday, was to the effect (see Embassy’s No. 153 December 16, 2 p.m.) that he is not convinced that a Regency is necessary. This reply appears to have been owing, at least in part, to the fact that the Cabinet’s telegram included, along with the suggestion of a council of three, a statement (unknown to the British Ambassador yesterday) that the Ministers were themselves not in favor of a regency and were making their suggestion only because the British desired such a solution. On receipt of the King’s answer, Mr. Leeper and Mr. Macmillan conferred last night with the Archbishop and Mr. Papandreou, and the last-named promised that he would telegraph the King again today stating, this time, that it is the Greek Government’s desire that the Regency be conferred on the Archbishop. Mr. Leeper is hopeful that this will have the desired effect, but telegrams which I understand on good authority that the King has sent to other persons here, including Mr. Caphandaris and even General Plastiras, would appear to indicate that he is once more in one of his characteristic moods of fatal indecision. Meanwhile General Scobie has told the ELAS that there can be a cessation of hostilities only if the latter’s “regular” forces from the provinces will withdraw outside limits of Attica and the “city reserves” (about 10,000, see my 140, December 11, 3 p.m.) lay down their arms and so far ELAS has indicated willingness to accept first of these terms but has made no mention of the second while communicating a long list of grievances and counterproposals of its own. British Embassy feels that ELAS morale may be weakening though this is not apparent in the fighting. According to same source Archbishop is now inclined should he be made regent (see my 150 of December 15, noon) not to make any change in government until Scobie’s terms are accepted and thereafter to call General Plastiras to the Premiership with Sophoulis and Papandreou as Vice Premiers forming rest of Cabinet after receiving recommendations of a council of all political chiefs and resistance leaders. Mr. Leeper says that with appearance of British reinforcements the leaders of the Right here seem to be hoping that British will carry their battle for them throughout whole of Greece but he emphasized to me that British intend only to protect Athens and thereafter by all means possible to effect conciliation. He confirmed my information that trouble still seriously threatens in Salonika and Patras but that he hopes and expects it will not develop if matters here can be composed soon along lines of present effort; however ELAS forces have attacked already Indian units north of Gulf of Patras and these units have evacuated after suffering some casualties. Repeated Caserta. MacVeagh The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1844: Telegram [Document 171] The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Caserta , December 18, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 10:06 a.m.] 1804. It is now reported from Greece that four-fifths of the mainland is in control ELAS. Athens water supply is still interrupted and there is imminent risk of spread of typhoid and typhus. In Crete the military governor states he has the situation well in hand but there are rumors of possible coup d’etat by ELAS. Kirk The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–1944: Telegram [Document 172] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 19, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 21—1:57 p.m.] 166. While the King apparently still hesitates (see my No. 164 of December 19, 8 p.m. 60 ) to agree to British proposals regarding the regency, negotiations for a cessation of hostilities have made some progress here though as yet with no definite results. “Comrade” Porphyrogennis, the Communist emissary of EAM (see my No. 148 of December 13, 3 p.m.), conferred with Plastiras yesterday and according to reliable information stated that it was the desire of the “Left” that Plastiras should be either Regent or Prime Minister since the Left has faith in him as representing the democratic principles for which it is fighting. When Plastiras replied that he wished to stay out of politics, Porphyrogennis said that EAM would accept Sophoulis as Prime Minister. On the military side he then presented a new set of terms on which ELAS would be willing to evacuate Attica but while none of these would appear impossible from the British point of view and made no mention of any amnesty (see my telegram No. 150 of December 15, noon) they were presented as being dependent on Plastiras guaranteeing the democratic political solution desired and also make no mention of the laying down of arms on the part of the ELAS “civilian reserves” here in the city (see my No. 140 of December 11, 3 p.m.) on which point General Scobie has been insistent. Porphyrogennis was expected to see General Scobie here today for futher discussions but sent word that the fighting renders his coming in too dangerous. This may be true but on the other hand after his talk with Plastiras the latter came out with a statement in the pro-Government paper Hellas condemning, in accordance with his views expressed to me (see my No. 155 of December 18, 1 p.m. 60 ), “anarchistic elements and mischievous gangsters” for preparing and precipitating civil war “after leading astray a certain number of Greek patriots by deceit or force” and it is possible that Porphyrogennis’ decision not to come in to see Scobie today was caused by his having seen this statement. Repeated to Caserta as No. 21. MacVeagh 60 Not printed. 60 Not printed. The King of the Hellenes (George II) to President Roosevelt 868.00/3–945 [Document 173] The King of the Hellenes ( George II ) to President Roosevelt 60a December 19, 1944 The tragic vicissitudes the Greek people are going through today and mention of my name in connection with the news relative thereto compel me to bring to the attention of the President of the United States, the following elements pertinent to the situation: In whatever I was able to accomplish as the leader of my people during the present war, I had not and do not now have any desire other than to bring the Greek people back to a normal political life, so that they might enjoy in full freedom the blessings of the peace. With this in view, I declared from the first moment that I too, would abide by its sovereign will. I agreed not to return to my country without previously consulting my Government, though I had the happiness of leading Greece to victory through so many difficulties. I further agreed not to raise the issue of my return at a moment when the entire Greek people were celebrating their freedom. And I agreed also to form all my cabinets in exile from persons well known for their anti-monarchical opinions, in the hope that I would contribute to the general appeasement. Instead of this, unfortunately, an organized minority to whom the Allies had furnished arms in order to fight the Germans, used them immediately upon the liberation of the country, aiming at the violent usurpation of authority, and disruption of the Government composed of all parties, after the agreement of Lebanon. 60b All the political parties of the land backed by a huge popular majority, with the exception of the Communists, are today confronting the rebels. The British forces, which from the very first declared their intention not to interfere in our internal rifts, were compelled, in the face of Communist refusal to surrender their arms, to intervene reluctantly in order to protect the legitimate government and to preserve order in an Allied held territory. Consequently the present contest is waged not about any person or party, but as to whether or not the guerrilla groups, which had been armed by the Allies themselves to fight the enemy, have the right to impose by force the government and the country and to remain armed as an independent power within the State; whether in other words, democratic freedom is to be real or not. I do not wish to express an opinion as to whether or not Allied policy should secure to the liberated countries the reestablishment of their real freedom. But concerning Greece, there is a special obligation which cannot be overlooked, namely, that the guerrilla bands were armed by the Allies, themselves, while the rest of the people for obvious reasons, remain unarmed. It is not, therefore, permissible for these people to be left at the mercy of the minority armed by the Allies. The President will readily understand my deepest disappointment when I hear of the charge expressed here and in the United States that both I and the British Government are seeking to impose a definite form of government in Greece. I agree to whatever assurance or guaranty may be asked for the ascertainment of the genuine will of the Greek people. But that which no true democrat can accept is that an armed minority impose in advance its will upon the government of the country or on me. I am ready to make any personal sacrifice, provided it is for the benefit of my people and is freely asked by them. Today all the major political parties are on my side in this policy, and Mr. Sophoulis, leader of the Liberal party, who is known for his anti-monarchical stand, notified me a while ago that he seeks my intervention for the exercise of my constitutional prerogatives for the settlement of the political situation. I intend, on the termination of the present crisis, to form an all-party government, for a plebiscite and free elections. I bring these matters to the attention of the President in the certainty that his personal prestige will assist me and my country in dispelling the misunderstanding which I find existing in the United States, to the detriment of the national policy which I am endeavoring, in the midst of infinite difficulties, to put into operation in Greece. 60a Transmitted by the Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos) to the White House under cover of Note 4599, December 19, 1944; forwarded by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State on March 9, 1945. The Secretary in a memorandum of March 15, 1945, recalled that the President on December 28, 1944, sent a telegram to King George ( post , p. 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] ) which could be regarded as constituting an adequate reply; Secretary Stettinius further recommended that the Greek Ambassador be informed of the December 28 message. 60b May 20, 1944; see pp. 100–112 [ Pgs. 100–112 include portions of Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , passim. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–2044: Telegram [Document 174] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 20, 1944—4 p.m. [Received December 22—5:50 p.m.] 168. In connection with fact that no reply has yet been received from King (see my 164 of December 19, 8 p.m. 61 ) my British colleague has just told me that the Prime Minister while telegraphing his recommendation allowed members of Cabinet to telegraph individually as well and that a host of political figures here both great and small outside present Government have also sent personal messages so that King as usual has been deluged with advice. Leeper says he “knows” that besides that Social Democrat Papandreou, Liberals Sophoulis, Caphandaris, and Sophianopoulos, the Agrarian Mylonas and the Independent Isatsos all recommended Archbishop’s appointment and that in addition Svolos of EAM is personally in favor of it while Porphyrogennis, Communist, has indicated to Plastiras, Venizelist, that “the Left” would welcome it. Hence it can only be that such advice as King has received against it derives from the Popular Party now apparently reunited in support of royalism. This group and the King’s stubborn preference for the interests of his dynasty over all other considerations in this country seem threatening now to extend indefinitely the present deplorable struggle. Mr. Leeper feels that at any moment the ELAS may agree to General Scobie’s terms after which a political conference will immediately have to be called and points out that the Left will certainly not agree to come to a conference held under any auspices but those they feel they can trust. Macmillan has gone to Italy to consult with Alexander and Leeper is laying urgently before the Foreign Office this danger of a breakdown of a possible military settlement owing to failure to supply machinery acceptable to both sides for working out a political solution. MacVeagh 61 Not printed. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) Lot 122: Secretary’s Staff Committee Documents 1–45 [Document 175] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Kohler ) 61a [Extract] [ Washington ,] December 22, 1944. [Here follows discussion of the situation in Greece.] Ambassador MacVeagh recently suggested that a tripartite Allied commission in charge of elections and a plebiscite might solve the Greek problem. In transmitting this suggestion to the President, the Department pointed out that the British would probably veto Russian participation and that this Government should not intervene on a purely Anglo-American basis. However, Mr. Eden’s remarks in the House on December 21 [ 20 ] that “If our Allies will come and help” in organizing free elections, “their help will be welcomed” 61b would appear to indicate that the British Government may in fact be considering some such action. It is believed that we should be prepared to take an active part in a tripartite commission if requested to do so. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61a Prepared for the Secretary’s Staff Committee. The Committee met on December 26, and the following action was reported in the minutes: “ Greek Situation . Approved the recommendation that we should be prepared, if requested to do so, to consider sympathetically sharing responsibility in the administration of impartial plebiscite.” (Lot 122: Secretary’s Staff Committee Summary of Action) 61b Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 406, col. 1909. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–2444: Telegram [Document 176] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 24, 1944—10 a.m. [Received December 27—11:25 a.m.] 181. I am reliably informed that the King has replied to his Ministers merely thanking them for their advice and saying that he is in touch with the British Government (see my 175, December 22, noon 62 ). In addition the ELAS has replied to Scobie in a memo which according to the British Ambassador permits of further discussion though it rejects the idea of any mediation by an outsider such as Field Marshal Alexander and insists that there should be a government set up here “of a really free and independent state”. Such a government it says should undertake: (1) the removal of collaborationists from the state machinery; (2) punishment of traitors; (3) formation of a national army—“all volunteer forces including the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Company being disbanded”; and (4) the guidance of the country toward general elections. Meanwhile the “Mountain Brigade and the Greek units which have been brought recently from the Middle East or elsewhere” should be withdrawn to a distance from Athens as for instance to Syra or others of the Cyclades; gendarmerie must be disarmed and its personnel sent home until the whole corps is purged; and further light must be shed on the disposition to be made of the personnel in the former security battalions. Finally the memo states that “on general agreement being reached the ELAS will remove its forces from Athens and the Piraeus and its supporters in those cities will lay down their arms simultaneously with the supporters of the opposite party”. “We propose that the only real logical [ the only realisable ] method will be for this to be undertaken by the Greek Government of mutual confidence which will be formed. It is in any case a matter of principle that the surrender of arms by Greek citizens can be made only to a Greek Government.” A copy of this memorandum, which is prefaced by an argumentative paragraph on the responsibility for the present “blood-stained intervention of the British forces”, is being forwarded to the Department by airmail. 63 Mr. Papandreou regards the ELAS reply as “unacceptable” (its acceptance obviously involving the setting up of another government than his), but Mr. Leeper feels that it is now more than ever clear that the appointment of a regent (preferably the Archbishop) is essential to obtaining a solution and last night sent an urgent telegram to London to this effect. Sent Department as 181, repeated Caserta as 24. MacVeagh 62 Not printed. 63 Copy transmitted by the Ambassador in Greece in his despatch No. 331, December 27, not printed. The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–2544: Telegram [Document 177] The Ambassador in Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Caserta , December 25, 1944—10 p.m. [Received December 26—1:04 p.m.] 1911. Reference my 1750 December 14, 3 p.m. Macmillan has informed Churchill that 2 weeks have passed since he proposed to Churchill that the Archbishop of Athens be appointed regent by the King. He stated that if the King had accepted the advice which Churchill and Eden had offered him there probably would be peace by now and fewer British lives would have been sacrificed. Macmillan said that he thought the King never grasped this fact and has considered the Greek question too much from the point of view of the interests of his dynasty. Macmillan added that he hardly needed to remind Churchill that the King had a very difficult and illuminating experience with Greek politicians before he allowed control of the country to be taken over by Metaxas. This experience was repeated in the critical days after the death of Metaxas when the Nazis approached Athens. Macmillan stated that the King must know therefore that even in a severe crisis the advice of these politicians is apt to be uncertain. He pointed out that in the present situation the Ministers who advised the King not to agree to the regency felt so secure behind British bayonets that they preferred to remain in office and maintain their present course rather than risk the appointment of a man who might take a wider view and work for reconciliation, perhaps unseating them in the process. He stated that these motives perhaps played the major part in the advice which these politicians gave to the King. The British Resident Minister went on to say in his communication to the Prime Minister that in consequence of this the British are left with no person in authority to bring the two sides together while the fortunes of the Greek state grow more and more precarious. He said he had reported separately on economic and financial prospects which were bad enough, but stated that if the civil war continues much longer the Greeks may find it very difficult to win back Macedonia which is the “happy hunting ground” of various kinds of Slav insurgents whose infiltrations the British are unable to control and which the Kremlin shows no apparent desire to control. He added that the retention of Macedonia is vital to the Greek state with its present population and since the growth of the population after the influx of refugees from Turkey, Greece cannot recover without Macedonia. Churchill was also informed by Macmillan that the reason he thought the Archbishop could secure peace was because he not only had the confidence of a large circle among party politicians but he was trusted by the people in many walks of life aside from the politicians. This applied especially to people with Leftist sympathies who have no association with the Communists and are alarmed by the present strife in Greece. Macmillan stated that if the Archbishop is appointed regent, he intended to invite General Plastiras to be Prime Minister and form a government of personalities outside of party politicians who would be representative of many shades of political opinions and who would be respected. The Archbishop’s answer to the Communist Party would be that no party was directly representative in the Government. He stated that as the parties today have no means of substantiating press reports which they enjoyed in the country [ sic ], the Archbishop’s idea of a “caretaker government” until elections is a wise and proper answer. In Macmillan’s opinion this procedure would give an opportunity for a new start. Macmillan stated that he felt that so much was at stake for the British as well as for the Greeks and the need was so urgent that he begged the Prime Minister to do everything in his power to persuade the King to give a favorable decision without further delay. Macmillan stated that the noise of battle in Athens day by day for nearly 3 weeks is a very strong reminder of the havoc being caused morally and materially by the unhappy and divided Greek people. He said that if there is a man who can rescue the Greek people from all this, he should be given a chance at once. He added that Damoskinos himself is convinced that he can succeed. Field Marshal Alexander who is now in Athens stated before his departure 2 days ago that he had sent a message to the War Cabinet stating that peaceful settlement of the Greek affair must be made as soon as possible as with the forces at his disposal for operations in Greece, he could not undertake more than the pacification of the Athens-Piraeus area and would be remiss in his duty if he did not say to the War Cabinet that it would be futile for the British to attempt to control Greece by armed force. He repeated again the remark he has made on several occasions that, after all the Nazis could not do it with infinitely more forces than the British had at their disposal and even the Nazis had to make political deals. Military reports received today indicate that while British troops continue to make progress in the Athens-Piraeus area, there is stiff fighting in Epirus where Zervas’ forces continue to withdraw towards the coast. I understand that as a result of these reports to London from Macmillan and SAC 64 Churchill may “take charge” of Greek situation. Kirk 64 Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Field Marshal Alexander). The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–2644: Telegram [Document 178] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 26, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 28—11:28 a.m.] 188. While most hopeful way of attacking present problem in Greece would still appear to be to find a political solution satisfactory to the large democratic element in ELAS, recent developments emphasize the truly alarming extent to which this element is compromised by its Communist leadership which is now apparently giving free rein to lowest and most irresponsible part of the population. Duplicating a terrorism already well known in the provinces, ELAS bands, composed largely of youthful armed hoodlums of both sexes, have within last few days taken thousands of hostages from Athens and its environs and marched them to the hills. These hostages include many elderly people and children whose only crimes are either to possess property or to hold Rightist views or to be related to other persons similarly stigmatized. In addition to the suburban houses and even the town houses, where these can be reached by the ELAS, of rich conservatives have been systematically looted. Reliable evidence is to the effect that the sufferings of the hostages are intense and their numbers increasing every day. The prisoner of war section of the International Red Cross has not yet succeeded in obtaining ELAS agreement either to accord them the treatment provided in prisoner of war conventions or to allow Red Cross representatives to visit them, and I am informed that the Archbishop has threatened public condemnation by the church unless at least the women and children are released. MacVeagh The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 868.00/12–2644: Telegram [Document 179] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 65 [ London ,] December 26, 1944. 858. Anthony 66 and I are going out to see what we can do to square this Greek entanglement. The basis of action:— The King does not go back until a plebiscite in his favour has been taken. For the rest, we cannot abandon those who have taken up arms in our cause, and must of necessity [? fight it out with them]. 67 It must always be understood that we seek nothing from Greece, in territory or advantage. We have given much and will give more if it is in our power. I count on you to help us in this time of unusual difficulty. In particular I should like you to tell your Ambassador in Athens to make contact with us and to help all he can in accordance with above principles. 65 Paraphrase of telegram handed to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on December 26. 66 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 67 Brackets appear in the file copy; the clause as printed in Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , p. 315, reads “and must if necessary fight it out with them”. President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill) [Document 180] President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) 68 [ Washington ,] 26 December 1944. 680. Replying to your 858, I have asked our Ambassador to call upon you as soon as possible and I am ready to be of all assistance I can in this difficult situation. I hope that your presence there on the spot will result in achieving an entirely satisfactory solution. Roosevelt 68 Telegram sent to the Ambassador in Greece for delivery to Prime Minister Churchill. Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–2644: Telegram [Document 181] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 26, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 27—10:45 a.m.] 185. For the President. I have just come from a meeting called by Mr. Churchill and attended by representative Greek leaders of all factions including the resurgents [ insurgents ] for purpose of starting negotiations for the composition of political differences underlying present troubles. Mr. Eden, Field Marshal Alexander and Mr. Macmillan were also present and I attended as an observer at Churchill’s invitation along with French Minister and Chief of Russian Military Mission there being no other United Nations representatives in Athens. Churchill made a firm but very friendly speech stating that British troops originally came here to fight the Germans under arrangement with you and Marshal Stalin but that developments had compelled them to intervene in a Greek struggle to save the people from destruction. He said that General Scobie’s military terms for ceasing fire must be accepted but emphasized that Britain wants nothing here for herself but only the welfare of the country, the continuance of Anglo-Greek friendship and most-favored-nation treatment for her trade. He reiterated his recent statement made in London to effect that whether Greece has a republic or a monarchy is a matter for Greeks alone to decide. Finally he said that Britain wants to see Greece united, free and prosperous taking her place in the Councils of United Nations in a manner worthy of Greeks who broke the Italian power and fought so bravely against Germany; “I beseech you to believe me; I speak in the name of His Majesty’s Government”. Both the Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, and the insurgents who included Siantos, Communist leader, expressed appreciation of Churchill’s initiative and following these preliminaries Churchill turned meeting over to the Greeks with Archbishop in the chair and British together with foreign observers withdrew. The Greeks are still conferring and it is not to be expected that agreement on a “Government of General Confidence” which the insurgents have alleged to be their prime objective will immediately be realized but an earnest and spectacular attempt has at least been made toward allaying suspicions and substituting talking for shooting which are crying needs of the hour. Mr. Churchill told me that he would be telegraphing you himself tonight. 69 MacVeagh 69 See telegram No. 859, December 28, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, p. 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] . The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–2744: Telegram [Document 182] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 27, 1944—9 a.m. [Received December 28—12:30 p.m.] 189. After Mr. Churchill put a number of leading Greek personalities and insurgent leaders together yesterday (see my telegram 185 of December 26, 7 p.m., to the President), and the foreigners left the Council chamber, the ensuing discussions took an acrimonious and almost violent turn on account of a fiery speech by Siantos, who claimed to speak for the people of Greece and stated that ELAS would fight for freedom for 40 years if need be. However as he reported to the British this morning, the Archbishop was finally able to get the disputants to turn to consideration of constructive measures, and he now “does not exclude” the possibility of an agreement on a government of generally respected but nonpolitical personalities, possibly led by Plastiras. In this connection, he felt a strictly political government to be inadvisable since it might be impossible to exclude the Communist Party, which he believes would only use its participation to sabotage constructive efforts as heretofore. On the other hand he is sure that to secure agreement on a nonpolitical government will certainly be very difficult, and he thinks that his appointment as Regent would be of great help if not absolutely prerequisite. The Leftist representatives last night definitely stated that they are in favor of a Regency, and the other representatives present all agreed. These were, besides Papandreou for the Government, the “elder statesmen,” Sophoulis, Caphandaris and Maximos, representing Liberal and Moderate Popular Party opinion, Plastiras, attending as an ex-Chief of State, the Archbishop, and Siantos, head of the Communist Party, General Mandakas, commanding ELAS, and Partsalides, Secretary General of the EAM. This morning deliberations are continuing with the addition to the above groups of the Agrarian Mylonas, the Socialist Sophianopoulos and the Royalists Tsaldaris, Petros Rallis and Spiro Theotokis. Tsaldaris and Rallis are especially ardent Royalists and will probably not agree to the Regency idea. However both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden have been impressed by the Archbishop and it is now being discussed at the British Embassy whether further pressure should not be put on the King to take a decision which all but a small group feel to be required if any steps whatever are to be taken towards a solution of present difficulties. Before Mr. Churchill left London he endeavored to persuade the King in this sense but the latter refused absolutely. So far there has been no cessation of hostilities, the insurgent representatives proceeding to and from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs under safe conducts arranged by the British military while Mr. Churchill is staying on a cruiser off the Piraeus and proceeds to and from the British Embassy by armored car. MacVeagh The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–2744: Telegram [Document 183] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 27, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 28—7:10 a.m.] 190. For the President. I communicated your message 70 this morning to Mr. Churchill, who expressed his appreciation, and this afternoon had a long talk with him. He is clearly deeply disturbed over the situation here, and its dangers for British prestige and his own position, but is also determined to persist in military operations until Athens and its surroundings are cleared, unless the present Greek negotiations for a settlement of the governmental issue, which he himself set in motion yesterday, bring about an earlier acceptance of General Scobie’s terms. After that he appears to be thinking of the possibility of composing matters in the rest of Greece through the medium of a commission of the three great powers, somewhere along the lines of my suggestion to you in my letter of December 8. 71 He showed himself to me, both yesterday and today, to be resentful of American press criticism of his Greek policy and deeply disappointed over what he feels to be our Government’s lack of understanding of his attitude and its failure to support him. I asked him if he wanted me to send you any message and he replied “Tell him that I hope he can help us in some way. We want nothing from Greece. We don’t want her airfields or her harbors—only a fair share of her trade. We don’t want her islands. We’ve got Cyprus anyhow. We came in here by agreement with our Allies to chase the Germans out and then found that we had to fight to keep the people here in Athens from being massacred. Now if we can do that properly—and we will—all we want is to get out of this damned place.” While I was talking with him word came in from the Archbishop that the Insurgents insist on a Regency as a prerequisite for continuing conversations and that the other members of the Conference initiated yesterday but now including a larger number of political figures have all voted for a Regency to be set up under the Archbishop either now or after the cease fire has sounded. Mr. Churchill said that he would probably leave here tomorrow and have another go at the King on this question. MacVeagh 70 Telegram No. 680, December 26, p. 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] . 71 Not printed; the reference is to Ambassador MacVeagh’s suggestion for an international commission to oversee a plebiscite on the question of the regime; see telegram No. 132, December 8, 10 a.m., p. 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 152 ] . The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 868.00/12–2944: Telegram [Document 184] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 72 [Paraphrase] [ Athens ,] December 28, 1944. 859. Many thanks for your No. 680 73 which encouraged me amidst many difficulties. Ambassador MacVeagh called yesterday and we had a resumption of talk. Like everyone else here he is convinced that a Regency under the Archbishop is only course open at the moment. I have seen the Archbishop several times and he made a very good impression on me by sense of power and decision which he conveyed as well as by his shrewd political judgments. You will not expect me to speak here of his spiritual qualities for I really have not had sufficient opportunity to measure these. Greek Conference, of which you will have had from other sources full account, was unanimous in recommending a Regency. This was strongly supported by EAM. However, I do not consider the Archbishop is at all Left Wing in Communist sense. On the contrary he seems more or less extremely determined man bent on establishing a small strong executive in Greece to prevent a continuance of civil war. I am therefore returning with Anthony to England to press upon the King of Greece to appoint Archbishop Regent. The effect of this, if the King agrees, will of course mean that the Archbishop will form a government of 10 or less of the “best will”. I gather he would make Plastiras Prime Minister and that Papandreou would not be included. Naturally I could not probe too far while all these matters are hypothetical. On our return we shall advise our colleagues who are already inclined to this course that we should put strongest pressure on Greek King to accept the advice of his Prime Minister Monsieur Papandreou who changed his mind about three times a day but has now promised to send a telegram in his own words but in the sense of my immediately following message. 74 If Ambassador MacVeagh’s report should on these matters correspond with mine I should greatly hope you would feel yourself able to send a personal message to the King of Greece during the next few days supporting the representation we shall make to him of which we shall keep you informed. My idea is that Regency should be only for one year or till a plebiscite can be held under conditions literally called “normal tranquility”. The Archbishop has left this matter entirely in my hands so that I can put the case in the most favourable manner to the King. Of course if after these difficulties have been surmounted and Archbishop is Regent you feel able send him a telegram of support that would make our task easier. Mr. President, we have lost over 1,000 men and though the greater part of Athens is now clear it is a painful sight to see this city with street fighting raging, now here, now there and poor people all pinched and only kept alive in many cases by rations we are carrying, often at loss of life, to them at the various depots. Anything that you can say to strengthen this new layout as the time comes will be most valuable and may bring about acceptance by ELAS of terms of truce set forth by General Scobie. For this we. are reinforcing as necessary and military conflict will go on. The vast majority of the people long for a settlement that will free them from Communist terror. We have to think of an interim arrangement which can be reviewed when our long hoped for meeting takes place. This date should not now be far distant. It will then be possible to correlate our opinions and actions. In the meanwhile we have no choice but to recommend creation of a new and more competent executive government under Regency of the Archbishop and to press on with our heavy and unsought task of clearing Athens from very dangerous, powerful, well-organized and well-directed elements which are now regaining the area of advance [ now pressing into the area ]. 74a I should value a message when I return on Friday morning. 72 Copy sent to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on December 29. 73 Dated December 26, p. 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] . 74 Not found in Department files. 74a Corrected on basis of text printed in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy p. 321. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–2844: Telegram [Document 185] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 28, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 2:15 p.m.] 193. According to British Embassy Mr. Churchill is leaving for London today accompanied by Eden after having told his advisers here that he had come to conclusion that they are perfectly right in their estimate of situation and that he intends to tell King that he must appoint the Archbishop Regent without further delay. In addition Papandreou promised British last night that he would immediately telegraph King to following effect: 1. Political conference initiated here by Churchill (see my 189, December 27) voted unanimously yesterday afternoon for establishment of a Regency under the Archbishop; 2. All but the representatives of the Popular Party voted that Regency should be set up at once. Popular Party members voted it should be set up only after cessation of hostilities lest it appear as a concession to the insurgents; 3. He, Papandreou, voted for immediate appointment of Archbishop. As situation now stands the political conference has been adjourned and nothing further will be done here until Regency matter is settled. Archbishop will not discuss at present the panel he has in mind for the formation of a nonpolitical or what British Ambassador calls a “caretaker” government but he has apparently already made some soundings and feels that he can gather a representative group together which will be sufficiently to the Left to have the confidence of EAM while none of the professional politicians who will not like being left out retains sufficient influence in the country at large to make their objections dangerous. MacVeagh The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–2844: Telegram [Document 186] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 28, 1944—4 p.m. [Received December 29—9:30 a.m.] 194. I desire to thank the Department for the information conveyed in its No. 151 of December 27, 1 p.m. 75 just received. Mr. Churchill has left Athens, and I greatly regret that my long conversation with him yesterday (see my 190, of December 27, 7 p.m. for the President) had to be carried on without my knowledge of this important background. MacVeagh 75 Not printed; it informed Ambassador MacVeagh of President Roosevelt’s telegram No. 673, December 13, to Prime Minister Churchill, p. 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] . The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01/12–2844: Telegram [Document 187] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 28, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 30—11:33 a.m.] 196. My 193, December 28, 2 p.m. The difficulties which the Archbishop will have to face should he be appointed Regent may be judged by certain demands whose acceptance was stated by the Leftist members at yesterday’s meeting of the conference to be prerequisite to the disbanding of ELAS. These terms as reported by the Secretariat of the conference in a communiqué published this morning by General Scobie’s HQ are as follows: 1. Participation of “the Extreme Left” in the Government to the extent of 40 to 50 per cent. 2. “The Extreme Left” to be given the Ministries of Interior and Justice and Under Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. 3. Demobilization of gendarmerie. 4. Demobilization of Mountain Brigade, Sacred Squadron and new National Guard battalions. 5. A plebiscite on first Sunday in February. 6. Elections for a Constituent Assembly in April. The communiqué goes on to say that there was no discussion of these demands but that both General Plastiras and representatives of the Popular Party took occasion to brand them as inacceptable and the latter left the meeting before adjournment as a sign of protest. Why it was thought fit to publish the above details at all this time or at least to do so without explanation that they are not matters for discussion unless and until the Regency is established is not known. Certainly the publication has created an unfortunate impression in Athens that the conference which has only been adjourned sine die has already ended in failure just at the moment too when Mr. Churchill and his advisers are feeling hopeful of its eventually proving a success. MacVeagh President Roosevelt to the King of the Hellenes (George II) [Document 188] President Roosevelt to the King of the Hellenes ( George II ) 76 [ Washington ,] December 28, 1944. I have been profoundly distressed, and I know how anxious you must be about the situation which has arisen in Greece. We are not directly involved in this matter and are anxious not to intrude ourselves into the internal affairs of Greece or of any other of our liberated allies. We have welcomed your statements and those of your Government assuring the Greek people that they shall have full opportunity to pronounce themselves as to their future form of government, and we have had full confidence that these pledges would be carried out. Unhappily, however, it seems evident from the reports which I receive from Greece that there is still widespread confusion on this issue within the country. Whether or not this confusion has been deliberately spread by your opponents, it would seem to constitute a very real problem which must be disposed of if unity and order are to be restored. I am reluctant at this distance from the scene to offer what may appear to be gratuitous advice, but it has seemed to me increasingly clear that only a courageous and patriotic action on your part could restore confidence and clear the way for successful negotiations. The great love we Americans bear for Greece emboldens me, therefore, to express our hope that you will give favorable consideration to the recommendations which I understand have been made to you for the naming of the Archbishop as Regent of the Crown in Greece. It seems to me that this action might be particularly efficacious if it were accompanied by a reaffirmation of your intentions and by an assurance that elections will be held at some fixed date, no matter how far in the future. My heartfelt sympathy goes to you in these difficult and unhappy days. 76 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Drafted in the Department of State. The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [Document 189] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 78 London , 29 December 1944. 863. 1. Ambassador Winant has sent me a copy of your message to the Greek King. We are all very much obliged to you for acting so promptly. Anthony and I have just returned. The War Cabinet have endorsed all our actions and have authorized us to urge the King of Greece tonight to appoint the Archbishop as Regent. The Archbishop left it to me to discuss the period of the Regency with the King, so that this gives a little latitude. 2. Failing agreement His Majesty’s Government will advise the Archbishop to assume the Office of Regent and assure him that we will recognise him and the Government he forms as the government of Greece. 78 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt [Document 190] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 78 London , 30 December 1944. 864. 1. Anthony and I sat up with the King of Greece till 4:30 this morning at the end of which time His Majesty agreed to the announcement in my immediately following telegram. 79 I have sent this to Ambassador Leeper in Athens in order that the Archbishop may go to work at once. The Greek translation is now being made and I will furnish you with a copy of it at the earliest moment. This has been a very painful task to me. I had to tell the King that if he did not agree the matter would be settled without him and that we should recognise the new government instead of him. I hope you will be able to give every support and encouragement to the Archbishop and his government. [Here follows comment by Prime Minister Churchill on telegram No. 681, December 29, from President Roosevelt on Polish affairs (not found in Department files); this section of the telegram is quoted in footnote 4 to the message from Soviet Chairman (Premier) Stalin to President Roosevelt, December 27, Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, page 223 .] 78 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. 79 For text of announcement, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy , p. 322. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/12–3144: Telegram [Document 191] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , December 31, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 31—11:35 a.m.] 205. The establishment of the Regency was announced here this morning and the Archbishop took the oath of office at noon, in the presence of the Holy Synod. As he is himself President of that body and there is no Vice President, the oath was administered by the eldest among the other members. The very brief ceremony was held at the Foreign Office and was attended by the political, military and diplomatic worlds of Athens, despite the fact that invitations were issued only during the forenoon. I saw no insurgents present. Fighting still continues. MacVeagh Participation by the United States in arranging for relief supplies for liberated Greece Participation by the United States in arranging for relief supplies for liberated Greece 80 80 For previous correspondence on relief for Greece, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 167 ff. [192] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) Washington, February 24, 1944—1 p.m. 868.48/5142: Telegram [193] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, March 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 8:22 p.m.] 868.48/5226: Telegram [194] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, March 30, 1944—9 p.m. [Received March 30—8:55 p.m.] 868.48/5250: Telegram [195] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 14, 1944. [Received June 21.] 870.01 A.M.G./76 [196] The Secretary of State to the Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (Shantz) Washington, July 7, 1944—5 p.m. 870.01 A.M.G./76: Telegram [197] The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State Cairo, July 15, 1944—10 a.m. [Received July 16—1 p.m.] 868.01/7–1544: Telegram [198] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, August 17, 1944—9 p.m. 870.01 AMG/8–1744: Telegram [199] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) Washington, September 16, 1944—5 p.m. 840.50 UNRRA/9–1644: Telegram [200] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, September 29, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 9:07 p.m.] 868.01 A.M.G./9–2944: Telegram [201] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, September 29, 1944—9 p.m. [Received September 29—8:11 p.m.] 840.50 UNRRA/9–2944: Telegram [202] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) Washington, October 16, 1944—5 p.m. 868.01 AMG/9–2544: Telegram [203] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) Washington, October 16, 1944—7 p.m. 868.48/10–1644: Telegram [204] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) Washington, October 18, 1944—10:50 a.m. 868.01 AMG/10–1844: Airgram [205] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, October 19, 1944—6 p.m. [Received October 20—3:12 a.m.] 868.48/10–1944: Telegram [206] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, October 19, 1944—7 p.m. [Received October 20—3:48 a.m.] 868.48/10–1944: Telegram [207] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, October 27, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 9 p.m.] 868.48/10–2744: Telegram [208] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) Washington, October 31, 1944—9 p.m. 868.48/10–2744: Telegram [209] The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Caserta, November 2, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 5:10 p.m.] 868.00/11–244: Telegram [210] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, November 6, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 10—9:14 p.m.] 868.00/11–644: Telegram [211] The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Caserta, November 7, 1944—midnight. [Received November 8—12:15 p.m.] 868.48/11–744: Telegram [212] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, November 10, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 3 p.m.] 868.48/11–1044: Telegram [213] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, November 13, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 14—3:30 p.m.] 868.48/11–1344: Telegram [214] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, November 14, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 10:18 p.m.] 868.48/11–1444: Telegram [215] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) Washington, November 16, 1944—7 p.m. 868.01AMG/11–144: Telegram [216] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) Washington, November 16, 1944—9 p.m. 868.48/11–1444: Telegram [217] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) Washington, November 18, 1944—9 p.m. 868.48/11–1744: Telegram [218] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, November 21, 1944—5 p.m. [Received November 22—3:45 p.m.] 868.48/11–2144: Telegram [219] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Atheists, November 25, 1944—10 a.m. [Received November 27—11 a.m.] 868.01AMG/11–2544: Telegram [220] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, December 2, 1944—noon. [Received 9:15 p.m.] 868.48/12–244: Telegram [221] The Secretary of State to the American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) Washington, December 2, 1944—7 p.m. 840.50 UNRRA/11–2744: Telegram [222] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador to Italy (Kirk) Washington, December 13, 1944—8 p.m. 868.00/12–1144: Telegram [223] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, December 16, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 10 p.m.] 868.48/12–1644: Telegram [224] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) Washington, December 16, 1944—midnight. 868.48/11–1744: Telegram [225] The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Stockholm, December 21, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 22—11:28 p.m.] 868.48/12–2144: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) 868.48/5142: Telegram [Document 192] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) Washington , February 24, 1944—1 p.m. 289. Reference Department’s 39, January 7 and Department’s 263, February 18. 81 Further discussions have taken place here with the British and UNRRA 82 concerning handling of relief and rehabilitation supplies in Greece subsequent to liberation. However details of such plans have not been worked out and necessarily involve full agreement with British and American military authorities as well as with the Greek Government with respect to any period of military responsibility, since decision has been made for combined Anglo-American military responsibility in civil affairs matters in this area. In making such plans we need to know whether the Swedish Government is in principle agreeable to continuing Swedish relief activities subsequent to Greek liberation, and if so, whether they have any suggestions as to how the Swedish organization can best be utilized and what responsibility it might undertake. In presenting the matter to the Swedes it should be pointed out that we fully appreciate the value of the work which has been done and are anxious to utilize the existing machinery to the maximum extent possible and that we are desirous of protecting to the extent necessary the neutral position of Sweden. It is not known for how long a period the basic responsibility for procurement and distribution of supplies will rest with U.S. and U.K. military authorities and when UNRRA will be invited to assume general responsibility for relief and rehabilitation. Depending upon circumstances UNRRA might assume such responsibility almost immediately following liberation by agreement with Allied military authorities and the Greek Government. The Swedes should be informed that we have discussed the problem with UNRRA and that it is likewise anxious to work out a mutually satisfactory method for using the facilities of the relief organization pending the time when Sweden itself might desire to become a member of UNRRA. It is understood that if the Swedes indicate a general willingness to continue, a more definite program will be discussed with them at a later date. The substance of this telegram is being transmitted to the British Foreign Office for comment and the issuance of appropriate instructions to the British Minister at Stockholm. The British understand that the Greek Minister at Stockholm has been instructed to discuss with the Swedish Government the question of participation of the Swedish relief organization in post-liberation distribution of supplies and is waiting until his U.S. and British Colleagues are instructed. You are requested to join with your British and Greek colleagues in presenting the matter to the Swedish Government as soon as the British Minister receives appropriate instructions. Repeated to Cairo as Greek Series No. 30. Stettinius 81 Neither printed. 82 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 868.48/5226: Telegram [Document 193] The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Stockholm , March 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 8:22 p.m.] 880. Greek Chargé d’ Affaires presented short note March 14 to Swedish Foreign Ministry expressing his Government’s desire that Swedish Government agree in principle to continuing relief activities after liberation of Greece. Later same day British Chargé d’ Affaires and I presented notes to Foreign Ministry on same topic. Our note (see Department’s 289, February 24, 1 p.m.) is practically identical with British note and states that American and British Governments in agreement with Greek Government inquire whether Swedish Government is prepared in principle to continue relief activities after liberation. Both Governments appreciate work done and are anxious to use to greatest practicable extent existing machinery in connection with which Sweden’s neutral position will continue to receive due recognition. Accordingly they would welcome suggestions from Swedish Government as to manner in which relief organization could best function and what responsibility it might undertake. American and British Governments have discussed problem with UNRRA and find it equally anxious to reach understanding regarding continuance of relief organization until other arrangements can be made. When it is known whether Swedish Government is willing to continue relief work after liberation, more definite program could be discussed. (End of note.) In brief discussion when note was presented I mentioned interest of American and British Governments in knowing whether all facilities of Greek Relief Commission would remain available. Foreign Office officials mentioned probability that Germans would withdraw safe-conduct for ships if they were obliged to leave Greece. 83 British Chargé and I said that in such case Allies would presumably offer usual convoy protection for relief vessels. Foreign Office officials indicated agreement in principle and general willingness to consider matter favorably. I stressed our readiness to discuss any related questions which might arise. Minutes of meeting of Committee on Greek Relief (especially minutes of meetings on October 21 and November 4) which were transmitted with Department’s instruction No. 461 of February 11 84 furnished useful background information for my remarks. Johnson 83 For correspondence relating to negotiations for the operation of Swedish ships in Greek relief operations under safe-conduct from the German Government, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. ii , pp. 724 ff. 84 Not printed. The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 868.48/5250: Telegram [Document 194] The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Stockholm , March 30, 1944—9 p.m. [Received March 30—8:55 p.m.] 1087. Boheman 85 received British Chargé d’ Affaires and me March 30 to present Swedish reply to parallel British and American notes of March 14 (see my 880, March 14, 7[ 5 ] p.m.). Substance of Swedish reply follows: Swedish Government will be glad to continue its Greek relief activities during transition period after liberation. This applies also to Swedish Government’s members of relief organization. Presumably present organization should continue along past lines until other suitable arrangements can be made. No doubt agreement to this effect will be easily reached on spot between Sandström 86 and authorities which take over administration of Greece. As suggested in Legation’s note it would be helpful if more detailed program could already be submitted for discussion. However, question of continued use of Swedish ships now engaged in Greek relief traffic must in due time be object of special agreement with shipowners. End of note. Ancillary Swedish memorandum presented at the same time states Swedish Government has not consulted International Red Cross Committee. Foreign Ministry would appreciate being informed if, how and when Allied Governments concerned deem such consultation desirable. End of memorandum. Discussing last sentence of note Boheman said he supposes German safe conduct would be withdrawn after liberation of Greece. In reply to question whether fact that we grant safe conduct while Germans occupy Greece is reason for Germans to continue safe conduct after we reenter Greece, Boheman felt there was scant hope of retaining safe conduct on these grounds. British Chargé inquired whether Swedish Government could not when time comes exert influence with Swedish shipowners to induce them to keep their vessels in Greek relief traffic even if German safe conduct is withdrawn and vessels must navigate under Allied protection. Boheman replied Swedes could not requisition ships except for Swedish purposes. Government could wield influence but not necessarily decisive influence. He, Boheman, believes negotiations with shipowners should not begin until time is ripe because many factors cannot be foreseen. For instance, Greece could be liberated while war elsewhere continues and relief ships would be exposed to war hazards. Or Greece might be liberated in conjunction with general cessation of war. Regarding ancillary memorandum possibility was discussed that in case International Red Cross should prove to be unwilling to [continue] sponsorship of Greek relief after liberation, relief activities might be conducted as purely Swedish Red Cross venture. This solution might preserve Red Cross character of ships even though German safe conduct be withdrawn. Boheman indicated that if International Red Cross were to assume this negative attitude he saw no reason why purely Swedish scheme might not work out. Swedish Red Cross can, he considers, give humanitarian aid to any suffering people. Swedish note and Boheman’s comments constitute favorable and sympathetic reply to our démarche of March 14 and foreshadow receptive Swedish attitude toward whatever further Allied proposals may in due time be forthcoming. Johnson 85 Erik C. Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office. 86 A. Emil F. Sandström, President of the (Swedish) Greek Relief Commission. The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 870.01 A.M.G./76 [Document 195] The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State No. 133 Cairo , June 14, 1944. [Received June 21.] Sir : With reference to my despatch No. 130 of June 5, 1944, 87 reporting a second informal meeting called by Major General Hughes 88 in regard to the progress of the work of the Allied Military Headquarters, Balkans, I now have the honor to transmit a copy of a draft of a note 89 prepared by the British Embassy, designed to serve as the basis of an “agreed statement of the views of the Royal Hellenic Government and the British Government in regard to the functions and activities of the Allied Military Liaison forces in Greek territory and such matters as jurisdiction over Allied military and attached civilian personnel”. I am informed that the negotiations in regard to this proposed agreement are still in a preliminary stage and that while the enclosed draft may be said to represent the attitude of the British Foreign Office, the comments of General Hughes thereon have apparently not yet been formulated, nor have the views of the American military membership of A.M.H.Q. been sought. It may be noted that the negotiation of an agreement of this nature with the Greek Government was under consideration by the ATB committee 90 last October and that the matter was at that time referred by the ATB committee to the Middle East Defense Committee for consideration. It appears, however, that with the Allied loss of the Aegean Islands, the temporary liberation of which had made the conclusion of such an agreement urgent, further action in this connection was suspended for the time being. In the discussions on that occasion it was made clear that the British regard this matter as one of high policy and the question accordingly arises whether, for that reason and in view of the American participation in the operations contemplated, the American Government should not become a party to any arrangement agreed to. The Embassy is not aware of the nature or manner of conclusion of the similar agreements which have in the meantime been concluded with the Norwegian and other Governments, but an expression of the Department’s views as to the extent to which it may, by analogy with those previous instances, desire the Embassy to participate in the present Greek negotiations will be appreciated. Respectfully yours, Lincoln MacVeagh 87 Not printed. 88 Ivor T. P. Hughes, General Officer Commanding British Liaison Headquarters, Greece. 89 Draft of note not printed. 90 The Administration of Territory (Balkans) Committee. The Secretary of State to the Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (Shantz) 870.01 A.M.G./76: Telegram [Document 196] The Secretary of State to the Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt ( Shantz ) Washington , July 7, 1944—5 p.m. Greek 42. The Department has given preliminary consideration, in consultation with the War Department, to your despatch no. 133, June 14, 1944, and General Sadler’s 92 telegram No. N25881, July 2, to the War Department 93 concerning the proposed conclusion of an Agreement in Regard to the Functions and Actions of the Allied Military Liaison Force in Greek Territory. 1) An agreement with the Greek Government of the type in question appears necessary and desirable in order to regularize and define the status of the Allied Force. 2) Such agreement should be concluded between the British and the Greeks. 3) Notes would be exchanged between this Government and the Greek Government associating this Government with the Anglo-Greek Agreement in so far as it involved the status of the limited American personnel engaged only in the civilian relief and rehabilitation activities. 4) Consequently we have no objections to AMHQ Balkans proceeding with draft of agreement. In this connection we believe the following should be borne in mind: a ) There is a fundamental difference between the situation in Western Europe, where large-scale Allied military operations against the enemy are provided for, and Greece, where such operations are not presently contemplated. The agreement should accordingly provide for a more restricted delegation and speedy restoration of the sovereign authority of the Greek Government throughout Greek territory. b ) The agreement should spell out the limited extent of American participation, making it clear that United States military are not concerned with other than civilian relief and rehabilitation. c ) The agreement should be consistent with the agreement between UNRRA and the military authorities covering UNRRA’s participation during the military period. d ) In general the terms should be so drawn that the Agreement will obviously be to the mutual advantage of Greece and the other parties and therefore equally acceptable to the Greek Government in exile or to a Government formed in Greece after the liberation. e ) General Sadler’s Mission should participate in the drafting to the extent and on the lines indicated in the foregoing observations. f ) Draft of agreement should be submitted to you as well as your British colleague and should be approved by this Government prior to its formal presentation to the Greeks. War Department is sending similar instruction to General Sadler. Sent to Cairo, Greek Series. Repeated to London and to Algiers for Murphy. 94 Hull 92 Brig. Gen. Percy L. Sadler; appointed U.S. Deputy Commander for Relief and Rehabilitation (Greece) on September 2, 1944. 93 Not printed. 94 Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser, Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater. The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State 868.01/7–1544: Telegram [Document 197] The Chargé Near the Greek Government in Exile ( Shantz ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , July 15, 1944—10 a.m. [Received July 16—1 p.m.] Greek 221. I communicated the substance of the Department’s Greek 42 of July 7, 5 p.m. to Ambassador Leeper 95 and have now received a reply of which the following are the pertinent portions in paraphrase: “I believe, and in transmitting your Government’s views to the Foreign Office in London have suggested, that a satisfactory solution of the matter of the relations of the Allied forces with the Greek Government can be achieved along lines suggested in your letter, but with the following modification. An agreement covering the general situation which conceivably might include military operations to expel enemy forces from Greece might be negotiated by His Majesty’s Government with the Greek Government closely following the lines of similar agreements with, for example, the Norwegian Government. 96 The Allied Commander would be given by such an agreement certain powers indispensable to him in the case of military operations in Greece or in neighboring territories necessitating the use of bases or lines of communication in Greece and such an agreement would specify clearly that the United States military are concerned only with civilian relief and rehabilitation. A further and separate agreement on the general lines of the draft prepared by Allied Military Liaison Headquarters would provide for a situation in which no military operations are contemplated and in which the task of the Allied military liaison forces as a whole would be limited to the provision of relief and assistance to the distressed Greek civilian people. In this case it would seem that the terms of reference of the force as a whole would be identical with those of General Sadler’s Mission attached to it and that no specific reservation of the limitation of the functions of the American military would be necessary. In the circumstances foreseen the Greek Government would exercise sovereign authority throughout Greek territory although in practice it might be necessary to distribute operation of de facto local authorities in the early stages in the possible eventuality of certain areas not having at the outset recognized the authority of the Central Greek Government.” At the instance of the British Embassy a conference was held yesterday between Generals Hughes and Sadler with representatives of the British and American Embassies at which the above suggestion of Ambassador Leeper was discussed in conjunction with the draft prepared by AML 97 referred to by him of which a copy was sent by air courier to the War Department July 12 and is presumably available to the Department. General Sadler, favoring the Ambassador’s proposal, which had already been approved by Hughes, expressed the opinion that in view of the limitation on American military participation to activities involving relief and rehabilitation the negotiation by the British of an original agreement on the lines of the Norwegian covering “the general situation and including military operations to expel enemy forces” should not concern the United States Government nor would it be necessary or desirable to specify in such an agreement that the United States military activities are limited to civilian relief and rehabilitation. Assuming the adoption of this proposal to negotiate two agreements the conference then discussed certain amendments proposed by the British to the AML draft. The Embassy has been promised that the text of the draft with the amendments agreed to will be available today and a copy thereof will be forwarded to the Department 98 by air mail immediately upon receipt. Repeated to Algiers for Murphy as No. 32. Shantz 95 Reginald W. A. Leeper, British Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile. 96 For text of agreement between the United States and Norway regarding arrangements for Civil Administration and Jurisdiction in Norwegian territory liberated by an Allied expeditionary force, signed May 16, 1944, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1514, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1581. 97 Allied Military Liaison. 98 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 870.01 AMG/8–1744: Telegram [Document 198] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , August 17, 1944—9 p.m. 6541. [Here follows a summary of the contents of telegram Greek Series No. 42, July 7, 5 p.m., to the Chargé near the Greek Government in Exile, printed on page 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 196 ] .] Following discussion of Ambassador Leeper’s proposals between the American and British civilian and military authorities at Cairo, AMHQ (Balkans) produced a draft of the suggested “relief and rehabilitation” agreement, copy of which is presumably available at the Foreign Office. This draft was also submitted to SAC–Med, 99 who has commented thereon to CCS 1 that it would be easier for the Commander of either a relief mission or limited military force to proceed by proclamation but that if an agreement were deemed politically necessary too much responsibility should not be placed upon the military to assure equitable and nondiscriminatory relief distribution. General Wilson added that the agreement should provide for Allied command and control of all Greek forces. The Department and War Department, in consultation with UNRRA, have considered the proposed draft in the light of the various field comments and would make the following observations: The War Department is unwilling to be committed or appear to be committed to responsibilities which it is not able to assume under its present directives. It considers that the present draft, though ostensibly limited to relief by the preamble, contains clauses which provide for action considerably beyond the field in which the United States military is prepared to operate. It is likewise concerned with the use of the term “Allied” in the draft, since the very limited American participation makes operations in Greece “combined” only as regards the actual distribution of civilian relief and rehabilitation supplies in the narrow sense, e.g. United States military is not prepared to engage in maintenance of law and order even though such operations should be necessary to make relief distribution possible. At the same time, it appreciates that the British military must have sufficient authority available to permit it, if need arises, to cope with local disorders or even with enemy resistance. The additional factor regarding command of the Greek forces is likewise one which does not concern the United States. Consequently the Department and the War Department remain of the opinion that the requirements of the Greek situation could best be met by the method proposed in its telegram under reference. The British-Greek agreement could be broad enough to provide for any foreseeable contingency and to cover the entire field of possible operations, including relief provisions similar to those in the draft now under consideration. The authority conferred by such agreement could be invoked to the extent required by circumstances. The status of the American military contingent would be regulated in conformity with the pertinent provisions of the British-Greek agreement by a separate agreement between the United States and Greek Governments. Provisions of the British-Greek agreement relating to the status of military personnel and to relief and rehabilitation operations should of course be agreed to between the British and ourselves before being presented to the Greeks. Please discuss this questiton with the Foreign Office, keeping the Department and interested field missions informed. Sent to London. Repeated to AmPolAd 2 and to AmEmBalk. 3 Hull 99 Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. 1 Combined Chiefs of Staff. 2 The American Political Adviser at Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, transferred his Headquarters from Algiers to Caserta on July 21, 1944. 3 American Embassies, Balkans. Lincoln MacVeagh was Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile as well as Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) 840.50 UNRRA/9–1644: Telegram [Document 199] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) Washington , September 16, 1944—5 p.m. 1848. We have been advised that the British now desire to communicate further with the Swedish Government with reference to proposed arrangements for relief after liberation of Greece. There are three problems involved: First, the relationship between the Swedish-Swiss organization in Greece and the Allied and UNRRA authorities who will be entering; Second, the continued use of the Swedish ships and, Third, the continued furnishing of supplies under the present arrangements as supplemental to the supplies which would be provided by military authorities. Our views, which we understand are in substantial agreement with the British on these questions, are as follows: In the initial period, supplies for minimum relief and rehabilitation essential for relief will be imported by the military authorities. UNRRA will enter Greece as the agent of the military to assist the military authorities in the distribution of such supplies with a view to taking over the whole responsibility for importation and distribution at as early a date as possible under arrangements to be concluded between it and the Greek Government. Both UNRRA and the military authorities concerned with relief are most anxious to have the assistance of the Swedish organization and believe that from the outset there should be close cooperation between it and UNRRA and as soon as circumstances permit a fusion of the organization in UNRRA unless the Swedes prefer to withdraw at that time. We agree with the Swedish Government that the exact arrangements should be settled by local discussions between all parties concerned when the time comes. Impartial distribution of relief supplies on humanitarian principles is the policy of all concerned. As indicated previously to the Swedish Government, it is hoped that arrangements can now be worked out so that Swedish ships engaged in the relief program for Greece will continue to operate after Greece’s liberation. Since it is assumed that safe conduct will not be granted by the Germans to such ships the following arrangements are proposed. If Swedish ships desire convoy protection they would be required to accept Allied convoy and other protective measures including stationing in any routine convoys which may be running. They would be expected to accept in the same degree as Allied shipping the delays which may arise in newly liberated ports and no preferential treatment should be expected. It is hoped that if possible Swedish Government will agree that in case of emergency ships may be diverted to other ports. It is also hoped that the Swedish Government would agree that in case of necessity such ships would be available after discharging in Greece for local transport of relief supplies to Greece or from one port to another in Greece if desired by Allied authorities. Pending any revision of existing arrangements for obtaining and financing supplies under the present program such supplies would continue to be sent forward subject to convoy and shipping arrangements stated above. You are authorized to concert with your British colleague in approaching the Swedes regarding the above in such manner as seems appropriate in order to obtain their agreement to the proposal. We would prefer however that no approach be made regarding the relationship of the Swedish-Swiss organization in Greece until receipt of views on this point from the Mediterranean Theater Commander which are expected momentarily. If however your British colleague is unable to delay making an approach on this point you may join him along the lines indicated above. Hull The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 868.01 A.M.G./9–2944: Telegram [Document 200] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , September 29, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 9:07 p.m.] 8148. The Embassy has received a letter dated September 25 from the Foreign Office concerning the proposed civil affairs agreement with the Greek Government. See Department’s 6541, August 17, 9 p.m. The letter said: The draft of a comprehensive agreement based substantially on the model of those concluded with the western Europe Allied [ Allies ] and embodying most of the clauses from the agreement prepared in Cairo which related specifically to the work of the relief mission was as a matter of urgency telegraphed to Washington for consideration by the American authorities. In this draft an effort was made to meet UNRRA’s comments on the Cairo draft. (See Department’s 6769, August 24, 9 p.m. 4 ) The comments by the American authorities on this draft and particularly the objection to the use of the word “Allied” in view of the very limited United States participation in operations in Greece have been noted and the draft has been revised in London taking into account the suggestions put forward by the United States authorities and has been telegraphed to Washington. The Foreign Office hopes that it will receive early approval by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order that negotiations may be stated [ started? ] with the Greek Government. It is the Foreign Office’s understanding that the American Government proposes to conclude a shorter agreement with the Greek Government covering the specific activities regarding rehabilitation and relief with which the Government will be associated. Repeated to AmEmBalk and AmPolAd. Winant 4 Not printed. The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 840.50 UNRRA/9–2944: Telegram [Document 201] The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State 5 Stockholm , September 29, 1944—9 p.m. [Received September 29—8:11 p.m.] 3962. At a conference this morning with Mr. Grafström 6 whom we saw at Mr. Boheman’s suggestion, British Minister 7 and I discussed question of Greek relief during and after liberation. Remarks to Grafström were in keeping with Department’s 1848, September 16, 5 p.m. and parallel instructions received by British Legation. Grafström expressed confidence that Greek relief would develop along lines we desired, but added that questions raised would, of course, have to be considered by Swedish Government. According to Grafström, question of keeping Swedish ships in Greek relief traffic during transition period and also subsequently when UNRRA takes complete charge of relief in Greece, can presumably be arranged but should, in opinion of Swedish Government, be considered as part of general shipping pool question which Swedes are soon to discuss in London with Allied authorities. Mr. Gunnar Carlsson 8 is expected to reach London in a fortnight in connection with general shipping discussions. Grafstrom foresaw no difficulties regarding relationship which would evolve between Swedish members of the Commission and Allied military authorities concerned with relief in first stage or between Swedes and UNRRA in succeeding stage. Mallet and I stressed desire of Allied military authorities concerned with relief and of UNRRA to have full cooperation of Swedes and thus benefit from their experienced help. We were informed that Thyberg 9 and Sandström have no particular instructions regarding period of liberation except that suitable arrangements should be concluded at the time and on the spot. This was tenor of Ministry’s note of March 30 (my 1087, March 30, 9 p.m.). Consensus was that any confidential instructions which Ministry might wish to send Thyberg would have to be transmitted in cipher through agency of Allied forces entering Greece. Grafstrom confirmed total absence of cipher facilities until then. Fact that Swedish ships would, in absence of German safe conduct, have to proceed in convoy and could expect no preferential treatment in regard to delays, being diverted, et cetera, was explained on basis of details given in Department’s 1848, plus other details contained in British Legation’s instructions (contained in British Foreign Office’s telegram sent to Washington British Embassy as 277, September 9). Several features of Department’s instructions regarding necessity of conforming to convoy arrangements were not included in British Legation’s instructions, but the two sets of instructions regarding convoys were not contradictory and in fact seemed complementary. Under circumstances we combined both sets. Grafstrom appeared to perceive necessity of having Swedish ships comply with such regulations. British Minister had instructions to state that intention of Allies is to inform International Red Cross at moment of liberation that we appreciate inability of IEC to work with our military forces but hope their delegates in Greece will, as individuals, cooperate and continue relief activity. Grafstrom seemed to favor our approaching IEC in this manner. It was understood that Foreign Ministry would inform both Legations in case it had any further reaction to our informal remarks. 10 My 1177, September 29, 9 p.m. repeats this to London. Johnson 5 The substance of this telegram was sent as telegram No. 123, October 4, 5 p.m., to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt. 6 Sven H. Grafström, Assistant Chief of the Political Division of the Swedish Foreign Office. 7 Sir Victor A. L. Mallet. 8 President, Swedish Shipowners Association. 9 Swedish Consul General at Athens. 10 On September 30 the British Minister (Mallet) informed the Greek Chargé” in Sweden (Kindynis) of the substance of this joint conversation with Mr. Grafstrom (840.50 UNRRA/9–3044). The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) 868.01 AMG/9–2544: Telegram [Document 202] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt ( MacVeagh ) Washington , October 16, 1944—5 p.m. Greek 139. The British Government, US Government and the CCS have agreed upon texts of a British agreement with the Greek Government and of a supplemental note to be sent by you on behalf of the US Government to the Greek Government relative to military activities during the initial period of liberation. To protect our cipher the texts are being cabled to Caserta through combined military channels and will be made available to you and to Kirk by military authorities in the theatre. After the British-Greek Agreement is concluded you are instructed to present the note on behalf of this Government. The draft US note appended to your dispatch no. 229 of September 25 11 has been considered by the Department. It is believed that it does not differ fundamentally from the text previously agreed upon here after clearance in London. Repeated to AmPolAd, Caserta. Hull 11 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) 868.48/10–1644: Telegram [Document 203] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) Washington , October 16, 1944—7 p.m. 2075. Reurtel 3962, September 29. Current discussions with British here regarding plans for civilian relief to Greece as well as rapidly changing situation in Greece require urgent decision on status of Swedish ships now in relief scheme. Please consult with Swedish Foreign Office to discover whether ships will continue to proceed under safe conduct subject to Allied military control in Mediterranean waters or whether they will immediately be removed from safe conduct and placed under Allied convoy regulations in line with arrangements proposed in your previous discussions. Department fears that program will be jeopardized if this question is postponed for discussion of larger problem concerning shipping pool. Also, subject to early favorable action by interagency committee here, request Swedish Foreign Office concurrence in proposal that Sandström be instructed to accept suggestions of military authorities regarding distribution and disposition of supplies consigned to Commission and that military authorities be authorized to receipt deliveries of supplies in the name of the Commission should a representative of Commission not be present on arrival of supplies. In view of communications difficulties between Sweden and Greece, Department recommends that Swedish authorisation, if obtained, be telegraphed urgently to Department and London for transmission through military channels to Sandström. Hull The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh) 868.01 AMG/10–1844: Airgram [Document 204] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt ( MacVeagh ) Washington , October 18, 1944—10:50 a.m. A–45. There is quoted below the text of a draft note associating the U.S. Government with the “Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Questions Concerning Civil Administration, Jurisdiction and Relief Arising out of Operations in Greek Territory of a Military Force” executed by the British and Greek Governments. You were in no. 139 of October 16, instructed to deliver this note to the Greek Government in behalf of the U.S. Government, the text of which it was understood was being transmitted to you by military authorities in the Theatre. The Department should be promptly advised of the Greek reply to this note. “1. It is the desire of the United States Government to participate, for the initial period after liberation, in the military program for the relief and rehabilitation of Greece. 2. The United States Army has been authorized to participate in conjunction with the United Kingdom in the military program of essential relief and rehabilitation activities essential to relief in liberated Greek areas, within the limits of such supply and shipping as may be made available for the purpose. Such relief and rehabilitation will be limited to: a . relief services such as public health, welfare, and sanitation; b . the provision of relief supplies; c . such emergency rehabilitation of public utilities, agriculture, and transportation as may be essential to relief; and d . in connection with such relief, the furnishing of assistance to displaced persons and refugees. The military program will be carried out by a combined military headquarters which will include a limited number of United States officers. The United States financial participation in this undertaking is limited to its agreed share of the cost of civilian supplies furnished to Greece and to the services of the United States Army officers. It is understood that final settlement between the United States and Greek Governments for expenditures by the United States Government in connection with this undertaking shall be the subject of a separate agreement. 3. The Government of the United States desires to associate itself with the “Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Questions Concerning Civil Administration, Jurisdiction, and Relief Arising out of Operations in Greek Territory of a Military Force” of . . . . . . . (date) between the British Government and the Greek Government, but only for the purposes and to the extent specified in the preceding paragraph. 4. The Government of the United States would welcome an expression by the Greek Government of its acceptance of the principle of United States military participation in accordance with the foregoing, and agreement on the part of the Greek Government to accord to United States military personnel and United States nationals employed by or accompanying the military force, their property and that of the United States Government employed in furtherance of the purposes specified herein, all assistance, rights and tax and other immunities accorded to military forces and nationals of any country other than Greece in the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement . . . . . . . (date), including the right of the United States to establish military courts which will have exclusive jurisdiction over such United States persons and property.” Hull The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 868.48/10–1944: Telegram [Document 205] The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Stockholm , October 19, 1944—6 p.m. [Received October 20—3:12 a.m.] 4258. Re my 3962, September 29, 9 p.m. The following telegram has been sent to Caserta: 3, October 19, 6 p.m. For reason that yesterday Swedish Foreign Office received message in clear from Minister Thy berg, Swedish Consul General at Athens suggesting that Foreign Office ask Germans whether safe conduct for Greek relief vessels on trans-Atlantic run still holds good, it is requested unless there be some objection unknown to Stockholm that substance of following paraphrase of confidential message from Foreign Office Stockholm, reference Thyberg’s 646, be delivered urgently to Thyberg by Allied military authorities. Begin paraphrase: In our opinion Greek relief interests are best served by having German safe conduct covering trans-Atlantic routes remain in force as long as possible. So we do not want to enter into talks with Germans which might endanger said safe conduct. Greek Relief Commission will, we presume, find it possible with help of Allied and local craft to arrange shipments between Greek ports and islands. End of paraphrase. Note handed today to Mr. Massey of British Legation and Cunningham of this Legation by Grafstrom, Assistant Chief of Political Section of Swedish Foreign Ministry, contains following three points: (1) Greek relief ships may remain in traffic as long as both belligerent parties give safe conduct. (2) Should Germans cancel safe conduct then shipowners will have to decide individually whether their vessels remain in Greek relief traffic. Even in case vessels continue in traffic without German safe-conduct (Swedes thinking of possibility Germans withdrawing safe-conduct without insisting ships return at once to Sweden), they must still be operated as Red Cross ships under direction of Swedish authorities. (3) If German Government declares that conditions under which relief vessels were originally authorized to leave Swedish waters no longer obtain and on basis of guarantees in force ships must return to Sweden, then they have to return here. End of substance of note. Above note means Swedes have officially declined Allied suggestion that if safe-conduct withdrawn Greek vessels should sail in Allied convoys. Swedes hope and seem to expect German safe-conduct for trans-Atlantic routes to remain in effect for some time yet. If in time Germans ask relief traffic cease Swedes will make every effort to liquidate it in slow and orderly manner which will not leave Greeks suddenly without supplies and will give Allies opportunity to arrange on [ own? ] shipping. Swedes add that they want to continue to help Greeks and so hope safe-conduct will remain valid. Swedish policy outlined above implies neutral status of Commission be carefully preserved by avoidance of incidents which might lead Germans to denounce Greek relief as a whole. Further details cabled today to Department. 12 Legation suggests gist of note be communicated to Thyberg for Commission’s guidance and to prevent his sending any inopportune telegrams in clear. My cable to Department 4258 repeats this. Johnson 12 Telegram No. 4259, October 19, 7 p.m., infra . The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 868.48/10–1944: Telegram [Document 206] The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Stockholm , October 19, 1944—7 p.m. [Received October 20—3:48 a.m.] 4259. My 4258, October 19, 6 p.m. repeated as my 3 to Caserta. Discussion which Massey and Cunningham had October 17 with Lundborg and Ripa, who are the two Swedish ForOff Secretaries in charge of Greek relief, constitutes background of note which was then said to be in preparation and has now been received. Lundborg emphasized that German statement regarding safe-conduct for Greek relief ships in traffic between Greek ports had been phrased in such a manner that Germans did not in principle withdraw safe-conduct but merely gave warning that they could not “guarantee safety” of vessels which might sail along established safe-conduct routes between Greek ports (of my 4018, October 4, noon 13 ). Existing trans-Atlantic safe-conduct routes enjoy German recognition. Swedish procedure, according to Lundborg, is to notify both belligerents of sailings scheduled to take place on these established routes. British Government then informs Swedes whether notification of safe-conduct vessels is or is not accepted. Germans never reply to Swedish notification but their approval is tacitly understood. This means that safe-conduct routes which are already in effect remain valid as regards Germans unless or until Germans specifically refuse to accept Swedish notification of intended sailings. For example Swedish authorities have now notified both belligerents that Suorva will sail from St. John October 25 for Piraeus. If Germans do not specifically refuse this notification their concurrence in this sailing is automatically understood and, with it, their continued recognition of trans-Atlantic safe-conducts. This simple procedure makes Swedes anxious to avoid having to negotiate to change routes which are in effect. They suggest that shipments be directed to Piraeus and perhaps later to Salonika also. Transshipment at these harbors to caïques or small ship would make distribution possible to minor ports. Swedes are under impression that any direct shipments to small ports could take place on Allied ships. (We presume Allies will be importing rations for distribution to whole Greek nation. This would require much larger food shipments than hitherto and a large part of these would have to be imported on Allied ships capable of unloading at any Greek port). When asked whether Allied military authorities could give receipt in Commission’s name for relief supplies which might be delivered when no representative of Commission was present (Department’s 2075, October 16, 7 p.m.), Lundborg said such a question should be settled locally with Commission because formal concurrence by Foreign Ministry would not be compatible with Commission’s neutral character. Such a question in order to be dealt with formally, would also have to be referred to Germans. Fact that Germans still hold power in half of Greece must be kept in mind. Ripa recalled an incident when Germans had posted military guard around supplies landed at Mytilene while Commission representative was busy receipting for supplies delivered at another port. Such practical arrangements on the spot had been very satisfactory. If supplies were to arrive at some point where no representative of Commission was present Allied forces could presumably guard supplies until some representative of Commission could take charge of them. Proposal that Sandstrom be instructed to accept suggestions of our military authorities has not been raised because by compromising Commission’s neutral status it would run counter to Ministry’s policy of seeking to leave safe conduct undisturbed. This is a question of type which Swedes would feel obliged to refer to Berlin for German approval. Proposal that Commission be instructed to accept suggestions of Allied military authorities seems moreover to British Legation and this Legation to be incompatible with remarks which the two Ministers based on Department’s 1848 September 16, 5 p.m. and parallel British instructions. Department’s further instructions in this particular are requested. It is evident that among those remarks which the two Ministers made to Grafstrom September 29 14 one feature which pleased Swedes especially was statement that policy of all concerned is impartial distribution of relief supplies on humanitarian principles. Johnson 13 Not printed. 14 See telegram No. 3962, September 29, 9 p.m., from the Minister in Sweden, p. 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] . The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 868.48/10–2744: Telegram [Document 207] The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Stockholm , October 27, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 9 p.m.] 4382. During recent conversation Boheman explained he had at first not fully realized the extent to which original undertaking to Germans (which British and United States authorities had endorsed) was binding on Swedes to bring back to Sweden ships in Greek relief fleet in case conditions for their safe conduct would no longer obtain. (See my 1087, March 30, 9 p.m. and 4259 October 19, 7 p.m.) He said it was very important that he stressed necessity of avoiding anything that might compromise Commission’s neutral status. He added that Commission should continue to be regarded as functioning even after our military authorities and eventually UNRRA would have taken over. Boheman realized UNRRA would probably in long run absorb Commission. He wondered if this could not be arranged in such a manner that Commission would still exist nominally even though it might consist of only a couple of members to whom supplies brought by Red Cross vessels could be consigned. Telegram in which British Minister reported his conversation with Boheman regarding same matter was repeated to Washington British Embassy as Mallet’s 5. Johnson The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) 868.48/10–2744: Telegram [Document 208] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) Washington , October 31, 1944—9 p.m. 2188. Reurtel 4257, 4258, and 4259, October 19. 15 All concerned with Greek relief program anxious that it should continue despite changed status of Greece. For your confidential information military relief supplies are limited and subject to serious delays because of extreme shipping shortage. Backlog of approximately 90,000 tons of supplies allocated to Commission for remainder of 1944, not including Greek War Relief clothing, awaits return of Swedish ships from Greek waters, where operations have delayed their unloading. Department and military authorities appreciate difficulties of Swedish position and are grateful for generous Swedish desire to continue relief traffic. Swedish reluctance to reopen subject of safe conduct with Germans is also understandable and, in spite of early pessimism here regarding German continuance of safe-conduct, seems justified by subsequent sailing of Suorva and Pedro Christoforsen , as well as by German notification, without withdrawal of safe-conduct, that Swedish ships assigned to Greek waters could no longer be “guaranteed.” In concert with your British colleague and at your discretion you might discuss informally with Swedish authorities any possibilities for continued use of Swedish shipping in the event safe conduct is withdrawn, and what limitation Swedes might insist on if convoy regulations were accepted. Department knows that you have already discussed this question but we are most vitally interested in retaining the use of this Swedish tonnage under any circumstances and would appreciate your opinion as to whether further discussions along this line would serve any purpose at this time. Since shipping schedules must be planned in advance it would be of greatest value in planning if more definite information could be obtained. Please assure Swedish authorities that the Theatre Commander has been informed that nothing should be done to prejudice the neutral status of the Commission in Greece, that Commission cargoes are not subject to diversion, and that all Commission supplies are to be used for nondiscriminatory civilian relief, subject to limitations imposed by donors or procurement agencies. Department infers from your telegrams that Swedish authorities want general assurances of this sort but prefer that detailed arrangements of cooperation between Commission and military or UNRRA agents be made locally without reference to Sweden, so that no negotiations are necessary through official channels with Germans. Department notes (reurtel 4382, October 27) suggestion that Commission might exist nominally as consignee for relief supplies even after absorption of most of personnel by UNRRA, and considers such plan feasible. Department would also appreciate information on status of Aahus, Bohus , and Hemland . Sent to Stockholm. Repeated to Caserta for Kirk and for repetition to MacVeagh in Athens. Stettinius 15 Telegram No. 4257 not printed. The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 868.00/11–244: Telegram [Document 209] The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Caserta , November 2, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 5:10 p.m.] 1085. Following from MacVeagh: No. 5 to Department from MacVeagh, October 30, 5 p.m. The present message follows and amplified [ amplifies ] my Greek No. 3 of October 29, 6 p.m. 16 Senior ML 17 officers advise that conditions in Greece differ considerably from those which they had anticipated and planned for. Port facilities have been less damaged, transportation facilities are far worse than expected (especially since all railroads, owing to serious damage or destruction of rolling stock, bridges and tunnels, are entirely out of commission) and trucks existing or imported are quite insufficient to transport supplies from the ports to the rural districts or from the latter to the cities. In addition, all authorities here agree that currency and supply problems are critical and closely related. The printing presses continue to print drachmas daily, in astronomic denominations, to cover the Greek Government’s expenses. These consist mainly of Government salaries and allowances to Government servants and to employees of industries and private concerns for the purchase, on the free market, of food and other essentials which, as they decrease in quantity, rise in price. Even prices expressed in gold are increasing daily. Official opinion appears prevalent that the Government cannot continue to exist unless this situation is rectified within a fortnight, but no complete plan has yet been suggested to cope with it. As a result of Mr. Eden’s conversations here, instructions have been sent to General Paget 18 to forward urgently 300 trucks to relieve the supply situation; a proposal has been put forward to fly into the country, from the Middle East, approximately 2500 tons of luxury products, including coffee, tea, cocoa, fine leathers, pepper and spices, matches, cosmetics, and tobacco to be sold by the Greek Government on the free market at approximately the present prices, to augment its revenues; inquiries have been instituted as to what oil, oilseeds, raw cotton, sole leather and wool yarn, iron and steel can also be forwarded from that area to supply industry or to be sold on the free market; and finally another United Kingdom Treasury expert, Sir David Waley, arrived here yesterday. Meanwhile, the Greek Government has stated officially that under present conditions its approximate weekly expenses total 26,000 gold sovereigns for food allowances to Government servants, 180,000 gold sovereigns for similar allowances to industry and other private company workers, and 235,000 gold sovereigns per week, with the likelihood that as commodities rise (expressed in gold) these expenses will increase. It seriously questions whether, until the currency is stabilized, it will be able to collect any revenue or taxes, and therefore considers it essential to obtain as much revenue as possible from the sale of relief supplies. However out of approximately 60,000 tons of allocated food supplies, 52,000 tons represent wheat which to a large extent will have to be given away, and therefore the Government fears very little revenue can be obtained in this manner. It further insists that every effort must be made to supplement the present ration distributed by the Swedish Swiss Commission, which for more than a fortnight has given out nothing but bread, and that this must be done within the next week. However, so far, it appears likely that only one oke of flour, to be supplied by the military, will be forthcoming during that period. The Commission has other kinds of supplies on hand but will not release these until they are in sufficient quantity to make general distribution possible. The Commission has agreed in principle with the military to continue to distribute supplies, and considerable thought has been given to the possibility of selling these, including bread, at something above the handling and administrative expenses to those who can afford to pay. The Commission will, however, require authority from the United States and United Kingdom Governments, and presumably the Canadian Government, to sell in this fashion, as their instructions to date specify that they can only charge administrative, milling, baking and distribution costs. The Government is very anxious that this authority be given and promises that prices will be such as the entire population can pay. Meanwhile the Commission has four ships in the Piraeus, freighted chiefly with wheat, which as yet cannot unload, while the military have unloaded only 2000 tons of food supplies, mainly flour, for the civilian population, in the space of 15 days. In consequence ML has been forced to cable the Middle Eastern ports to hold ships another 5 days. This unloading delay appears to have been caused mainly by the necessity of giving priority to military stores, but also by misunderstandings and lack of coordination. Thus, some officers distributed food rations to labor, and when this was stopped labor refused to work. Financial circles in Athens, while considerably perturbed over the alleged Communistic tendencies of the Government, the general lack of order throughout the country, the increasing demands of labor and the apparent weakness of the authorities, believe the currency chaos is entirely due to lack of supplies. They point out that the people have become goldminded and the shortage of commodities on the market is making even gold lose its value so that gradually the only means of exchange will be by barter. They recommend that since the currency situation is so tied up with the shortage of supplies every effort be made to increase the importation and distribution of the latter. It is the opinion of this Embassy that if the present situation is to be brought under control, a full and coordinated plan must be urgently and carefully worked out, widely publicized and every part put into operation at the same time. This will require an entirely new currency to replace the present one, which the public insists has no backing, and will also require the fixing of a rate of exchange. Price ceilings for principal essential commodities and labor wages will have to be fixed. But before this fixation can be effected, considerably increased quantities of supplies must be imported to insure full rationing with a balanced diet at least on the subsistence level. In the larger urban centers, and particularly Athens, such rationing should provide MEA sugar, cheese, fats, and rice or spaghetti, as well as bread. Every effort should also be made to give the population at least the employment existing under German occupation, which can only be done by repairing roads, bridges and railroads and importing and supplying industry with raw material such as coal, cotton, wool, phosphate, rock leather and hides, iron and steel. Further delay in devising and implementing a program of this nature can only result in a mounting need on the part of the Greek Government (if such can continue to exist) for foreign financial assistance to cover its ever increasing expenses. Repeat to Treasury. [MacVeagh.] Kirk 16 Not printed. 17 Military Liaison. 18 Gen. Sir Bernard Paget, British Commander in Chief, Middle East. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.00/11–644: Telegram [Document 210] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , November 6, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 10—9:14 p.m.] 13. The Swedish-Swiss Commission, while willing to continue to assist in distribution in the interim, has decided to cease operations here December 15 (see section 2 of my No. 5 of October 30, 5 p.m. 19 ) According to Mr. Sandstrom, with whom I have talked at length, as well as with Mr. Thyberg, the local Swedish representative, and Mr. Deglutz of the International Red Cross, the reason for this decision is twofold: (1) The Commission’s task of protection vis-à-vis the Germans is over, and (2) the internal political situation is unfavorable to nondiscriminatory distribution. However, it would also seem that the Commission’s now intense, though perhaps inevitable unpopularity, which is not limited to the open hostility of the lower classes but, on one count or another, permeates all ranks of society, has made it anxious to be quit as soon as possible of an ungrateful job. While intending to turn over its functions to the Greek Government on the date set, the Commission will continue to distribute in Athens, and in the surrounding areas normally supplied from Athens, until that time. According to Mr. Sandstrom these areas include Thessaly (but only temporarily until the military can take it over) and the provinces east of the central mountain range and south of Thessaly as far as Corinth. In the other provinces, the Commission offered to continue during the interim period if the Government could guarantee that its operations would be free of local interference, but under present conditions the Government was unable to do this. However, in some places, like in Patras, where the Government’s early attempts to handle distribution have apparently failed completely, the Commission is authorizing its delegates to continue supervision for the time being as an exceptional procedure. Sandstrom concluded his remarks to me by emphasizing that it will be absolutely necessary for a foreign counselor to be on all local committees, both in the capital and in the provinces, if nondiscriminatory distribution is to be assured. There seems to be some hope that the ML and UNRRA can take over a good many, though by no means all, of the people hitherto employed by the Commission, in which case the disappearance from the scene of an organization necessarily connected in the Greek mind with the German occupation and all the miseries and horrors of the past may actually prove a gain. Meanwhile, according to Sandstrom and Thyberg, this question is quite separate from that of the continued functioning of the Swedish ships, whose service is so desperately needed. According to Thyberg, the Germans have not as yet withdrawn their safe conduct, nor insisted on the return of the ships to Sweden, and he entertains some hopes, from indications he has gathered, that his [ this ] favorable situation may continue. MacVeagh 19 See telegram No. 1085, November 2, from Caserta, supra . The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 868.48/11–744: Telegram [Document 211] The American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Caserta , November 7, 1944—midnight. [Received November 8—12:15 p.m.] 1203. Chief Administrative Office AFHQ in personal message to War Office has reported that Swedish-Swiss Red Cross will probably terminate their activities in Greece in about 6 weeks since they are in bad odor with Greeks owing to alleged collaboration with Germans. It is CAO’s view that this organization which has proved itself so efficient in the distribution of relief should not be allowed to lapse. He adds that ML (Greece) will step into the breach but suggests that a high powered businessman well vested [ versed? ] in the organization of distributing food supplies urgently needed to head this type of relief. Finally he asks whether War Office can suggest name of any civilian who for this purpose could be fitted into an UNRRA establishment. In this connection report has been received from ML (Greece) that demonstrations against the Swedish-Swiss Red Cross have ceased for first time in several days and that Greek police has agreed to take vigorous action if they recur. According to verbal advice from Swedish Minister the Germans have granted permission for Swedish ships now at Gibraltar and Malta to proceed to the Piraeus. Sent Department, repeated Athens as 12. Kirk The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 868.48/11–1044: Telegram [Document 212] The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Stockholm , November 10, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 3 p.m.] 4596. After ascertaining that British Legation was authorized to associate itself with assurances contained in paragraph 4 of Department’s 2188 October 31, 9 p.m. these assurances were communicated to Swedish Foreign Ministry in our note No. 577 of November 9. To meet British desires, assurance against diversion of Commission’s cargoes as expressed in our note reads “diversion from Greece to other destinations”. British Legation is not yet authorized to associate itself with any other action foreshadowed by Department’s 2188. In our discussing with British the general contents of Department’s 2188 they have shown pleasure over all points and, for our confidential information, expressed hope London will take same attitude. Johnson The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.48/11–1344: Telegram [Document 213] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , November 13, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 14—3:30 p.m.] 33. The Swedish Government has instructed its Commission here that if Swedish ships are to continue to bring supplies to Greece some members of the Commission must remain here in an advisory capacity to guarantee distribution on an indiscriminatory basis. Mr. Sandstrom is accordingly remaining with a couple of his assistants and the ML and UNRRA are now endeavoring to set up a policy committee which should include the Swedes and be acceptable to the Greek Government, the last named handling distribution from December 15 onwards subject to the committee’s advice with UNRRA contributing “inspectorial supervision”. Meanwhile the Government will prepare distribution plans to apply at first only in the capital and the areas normally served therefrom but to be extended later as and when its authority in the provinces permits (see my 13, November 6, 6 p.m.). The Swiss have not yet decided what they intend to do in this connection but may ask to be included on the policy committee. Their delegate Deglutz has gone to Geneva where he will seek instructions. MacVeagh The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 868.48/11–1444: Telegram [Document 214] The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Stockholm , November 14, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 10:18 p.m.] 4667. Substance of British Foreign Office’s policy telegram on Greek relief 371, November 8 to Embassy Washington repeated to Stockholm and Caserta has been discussed with us by British Legation here. It describes present status of Greek relief fleet as “unworkable” for forward planning purposes because of uncertainty regarding length of time German safe-conduct will remain available and advocates determined effort by two Legations to shake Swedish attitude. Telegram being sent today by British Legation to London and Washington represents concerted comment of both Legations on principles at issue in 371. If we have understood correctly, undertakings which US and British Governments gave through Swedes at time when Greek relief scheme was inaugurated constitute chief obstacle in way of persuading Swedes to alter any present arrangements without first obtaining German consent. (For these undertakings see in particular my despatches 773, June 26, 1942 and 811, July 10, 1942. 20 ) Meanwhile Swedes are at pains to maintain appearance that whole scheme, Commission and fleet, is functioning as before, with difference that Allies instead of Germans now hold Greece. We believe that if Swedes taxed their ingenuity they might possibly work our [ out ] some plan which would permit them to contend they had carried out their obligations toward Germans but would at same time be more satisfactory for us. However Swedish policy regarding relief fleet is inextricably bound up with degree of consideration which Allies show toward interest of Swedish commercial shipping during shipping pool discussions now beginning in London. We were told (my 3962, September 29, 9 p.m.) that Greek relief shipping would figure in general pool discussions. Gunnar Carlsson, Chairman of Swedish Shipping Commission, is in London and Boheman expects to join him any day. Until Swedes see how they are faring in pool discussions there is, in opinion of both Legations, small hope of obtaining satisfaction on any phases of relief scheme which would have to be referred to Berlin or which might seem at variance with Swedish commercial shipping interest. Both Legations have given careful study to contents of 371 with view to supplying prompt comment on any points concerning which Department or British authorities may wish to question us. Johnson 20 Neither printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) 868.01AMG/11–144: Telegram [Document 215] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) Washington , November 16, 1944—7 p.m. 27. Suggestion has been received from British Embassy along lines set forth in your 4, November 1. 21 In summary it states that the military period in Greece may extend for some time and that the military will be responsible for maintenance of Greek economy during that time. Particularly in field of finance expert advice from competent civilian authorities and close liaison with Greek Government will be needed. ML Greece are not equipped to handle such problems. British therefore intend to appoint Mr. Caccia as principal civil adviser to Lieutenant General Scobie 21a and to represent Mr. Macmillan. 21b They also intend to appoint a supply and a financial adviser and they would also be responsible for consultation concerning economic policy with Greek Government departments. British hope US Government will appoint similar advisers. End summary. Department has replied along following lines: This Government is prepared to appoint two advisers to Lieutenant General Scobie in view of our interest in the immediate economic and financial problems of Greece and of US Army participation in distribution of civilian supplies. US Ambassador to Greek Government will detail these advisers one of whom will serve as financial adviser and the other as economic and supply adviser. It does not appear necessary to appoint an adviser for general civil affairs and political matters since US Army participation in civil affairs activites is limited. Our Embassy will consult Greek Government concerning such problems and will give General Sadler such advice as he may need in this regard. If it subsequently appears that an additional American official especially to advise the military authorities is needed our Ambassador will make appropriate arrangement. End reply. Arrangements are being made with Treasury for departure in near future of expert to be attached to your Embassy and detailed as adviser to Scobie. It is suggested that you detail Harry Hill as economic and supply adviser. Stettinius 21 Sent as telegram no. 1084, November 1, 12 p.m., from Caserta, not printed. 21a Ronald M. Scobie, British General Officer Commanding in Greece. 21b Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) 868.48/11–1444: Telegram [Document 216] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) Washington , November 16, 1944—9 p.m. 2307. On basis of reports from MacVeagh in Athens that Commission intended to cease functioning on December 15, London is instructing British Legation in Stockholm to concert with you to discover Swedish attitude toward this information and whether, as Sandstrom and Thyberg thought, the liquidation of the Commission was a problem separate from that of the continued functioning of Swedish ships in Greek relief traffic. Prior to despatch of Department’s telegram to you on similar lines, MacVeagh has informed us (Athens’ 33, November 13) of Swedish Government’s instruction to Commission that some of its members must remain in Greece in advisory capacity if Swedish ships are to continue. Department has no objection to your confirming this information informally, in concert with your British colleague, if London so desires. However, in view of precarious overall situation, which is receiving urgent consideration here (reurtel 4667, November 14 and British 383 Relief), we believe it advisable to make no further approaches to Swedes until London and Washington can jointly present a firm proposal. Sent to Stockholm, repeated to Athens. 22 Stettinius 22 Repeated to Athens as telegram No. 26. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) 868.48/11–1744: Telegram [Document 217] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) Washington , November 18, 1944—9 p.m. 2329. Department and British Embassy have studied London’s telegram no. 371 Relief, November 8, as well as comments on that message from you (reurtel 4667, November 14) and from your British colleague (repeated to Washington as London’s 383 Relief). Basic assumption of our discussions here is that all urgent efforts must be made to retain Swedish ships in view of conditions in Greece and of critical shipping shortage. Swedish Government’s recent instruction to Commission that some of its members must remain in Greece as authorized consignees and distribution advisors indicates that, according to Swedish official view, there has been and should be no alteration in neutral position of Commission, and that nominal continuance of Commission guards safe conduct of ships (reurtel 4705, November 17 23 ). MacVeagh has reported that Sandstrom and two assistants will remain in Greece in advisory capacity and as members of a policy committee for relief distribution. Furthermore, we perceive nothing unsatisfactory in continuance of safe-conduct per se , except its extreme uncertainty and the impossibility of intelligent forward planning without assurance of continued availability of ships. In view of Swedish attitude, we see no advantage in attempting to urge Swedes to change status at present. However, we do seriously need informal assurance that, in case of withdrawal of safe conduct, Swedes will devise some scheme to continue the present amount of shipping in Greek relief traffic. Convoy would probably be the most feasible solution, but any other arrangements which would make ships available would be satisfactory. Swedes previously indicated (reurtel 1087, March 30, 1944) that convoy arrangements would probably be acceptable after liberation of Greece. As for neutrality status, we are aware that other Swedish ships, under British charter but still flying Swedish flag, are regularly traveling in convoy. Department recommends that, in concert with your British colleague and if you perceive no serious objection thereto, you make further informal approaches to the Swedes along aforementioned lines. Similar instructions are being telegraphed to British Legation. In our view the question of Swedish relief fleet in Greek traffic is not germane to shipping discussions currently being held in London and should preferably not enter those negotiations. Even if Swedes should decide to enter shipping pool (and for your confidential information shipping authorities here are sanguine that they will), pool commitments do not become effective until after the end of war with Germany, when the safe conduct arrangement would no longer be needed in any case. The period in which we primarily are interested for Greek relief scheme is from the present until German surrender. Reference Paragraph 10, London’s 381 Relief, Department has inquired of Athens if Swedish plan to recall Fenris and Virginia has approval of military authorities, but no reply has yet been received. Reports of caique shortages lead us to believe that small Swedish ships might be used to advantage for local relief distribution. Fenris could, in opinion of authorities here, be profitably used in St. John run. For your information, and at your discretion for communication to Swedes, 150,000 tons additional Argentine wheat have been made available to International Wheat Council (reurtel 4521, November 4 24 ). Department informed Greek Embassy but made it clear that we assumed no responsibility for shipment of any such supplies obtained. In view of wheat supply in Mediterranean and of backlog of varied foodstuffs in this country, Department and FEA think it advisable for time being that all Swedish ships load at St. John. Sent to Stockholm, repeated to Athens. 25 Stettinius 23 Not printed. 24 Not printed. 25 Repeated as telegram No. 33. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.48/11–2144: Telegram [Document 218] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , November 21, 1944—5 p.m. [Received November 22—3:45 p.m.] 67. Without (as I am informed) prior consultation with either the Swedish Swiss Commissions the Greek Government has telegraphed Stockholm and Geneva requesting that Commission continue its work for 6 months after December 15 (re my telegrams numbers 13 and 33 of November 6 and 16 [ 13 ] and Department’s 26 of November 16 26 ). While the official explanation of this action is that Government does not desire to appear ungrateful for Swedish Swiss efforts by abruptly accepting the Commission’s withdrawal and that it is not certain that the matter of the continuation of the operations of the Swedish ships is entirely separate from that of the continuation of the Commission, competent observers are of opinion that the Government’s move has been motivated by a disinclination to assume public responsibility for distribution with probable attendant criticism. On other hand Mr. Sandstrom has not changed his view that Commission should discontinue operations and is proceeding to Stockholm by air next Monday to consult his Government. Concurrently with these developments discussion of the whole question of distribution continues in General Scobie’s Advisory Committee and Matthews and Hugh Jackson of UNRRA are expected here this week in this connection. At present the general feeling in the Committee appears to be that while the Greek Government should be pressed to accept responsibility for distribution assisted by the advice of a policy committee such as that mentioned in my 33 above referred to and should be urged to set up appropriate distribution machinery immediately this may take so long that it may prove necessary for the Swedish-Swiss Commission to continue distribution at least for a while after December 15. The Department will be advised of further developments as they occur. MacVeagh 26 With reference to telegram No. 26, see footnote 22, p. 207 [ Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] . The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.01AMG/11–2544: Telegram [Document 219] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Atheists , November 25, 1944—10 a.m. [Received November 27—11 a.m.] 87. By an exchange of notes dated yesterday November 24, the British Ambassador and the Greek Prime Minister 27 concluded the agreement (see Department’s Number 139 of October 16, 5 p.m.) “regarding questions concerning civil administration, jurisdiction and relief arising out of military operations in Greek territory”. In accepting the agreement the Prime Minister made four “observations” not directly referring to clauses of interest to the United States except for the first in which Papandreou “notes” that since discrimination as to race, religion, nationality or political belief is forbidden by the Greek Constitution, 6 ( a ) of the agreement is superfluous. Copies of the notes exchanged are being sent to the Department by airmail. As regards associating the United States with this agreement in the manner authorized I have today informally handed to the Foreign Office a copy of the text contained in the Department’s A–45, October 18 and have suggested that if agreeable to the Prime Minister a formal note containing that text and a formal note embodying Papandreou’s reply (draft of which he will make available to me in the meantime) be exchanged simultaneously between us on a date to be decided on preferably not later than the middle of next week. 29 MacVeagh 27 George A. Papandreou, Greek Prime Minister. 29 The notes were exchanged on January 31, 1945. The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 868.48/12–244: Telegram [Document 220] The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State 30 Stockholm , December 2, 1944—noon. [Received 9:15 p.m.] 4926. I went November 30 with British Minister to make informal démarche at Foreign Ministry in keeping with first four paragraphs of Department’s 2329, November 18, 9 p.m. We spoke with Grafström and Lundborg and raised following points in particular: 1. Minister’s aide-mémoire of October 19 (enclosure 6 to my despatch 4341 of October 21 31 ) is very disappointing in that it gives no certainty that Swedish ships will remain in Greek relief service if Germans withdraw trans-Atlantic safe-conduct. American and British authorities would prefer to have Greek relief ships sail in convoy but will be satisfied with any arrangement insuring their continued use. Boheman (cf. my 1087, March 30, 9 p.m.) and Gunnar Carlsson (cf. paragraph 3 of British Legation’s telegram 776 transmitted as enclosure 3 to my despatch 4059 of September 8 32 ) gave impression that convoy idea would be feasible. 2. Distress in Greece is intense and there are no reserve stocks. Shipping shortage is such that continued use of Greek relief fleet is essential. This traffic cannot bear interruption such as might result if new sailings were held up during an argument with Germans. Such interruption might cancel whole effect of Swedish help to date. 3. Present satisfactory arrangements may be interrupted at any moment if Germans cease to grant safe-conduct. We need to have this uncertainty removed in order to allow for rational forward planning. 4. Certain other Swedish ships have been sailing regularly in Allied convoys. 5. Basic Greek relief undertaking is that ships be used for relief of Greek civilian population. We can give assurances that this condition will continue to be observed. 6. Question of continued operation of Swedish fleet of Greek relief ships is not germane to London shipping pool discussions. It is for period until German surrender that we desire certainty regarding Greek relief fleet. Grafstrom declared emphatically that Swedish Government for its part desires to continue its help. Should Germans withdraw safe-conduct, Swedes would exert every effort to induce them to allow traffic to continue. While appreciating this, we said it did not constitute sufficient certainty. Grafstrom explained that Swedish ships which operate in Allied convoys were already outside Skagerrak blockade at time it took effect. Ships in Greek relief traffic were let through blockade on basis of special commitments to Germans. Grafstrom and Lundborg mentioned certain commitments other than governmental made to Germans by owners of Greek relief ships. On this point we replied ( a ) we do not have these commitments on file; ( b ) such undertakings between private shipping companies and the German Government are surely on a plane subordinate to inter-governmental undertakings; ( c ) Foreign Minister should work out plan to overcome these engagements and should prepare minds of shipowners and crews to continue in traffic despite possible withdrawal of safe-conduct. Grafstrom did not seem to agree with our statement that present question was not germane to shipping pool discussions. He did not go into details, but expressed regret that Carlsson was not here. Grafstrom added that we submit a brief memorandum on subject to our démarche . He said he was not authorized to speak further now, but matter would receive sympathetic attention. Subsequent to above meeting Lundborg intimated that shipowners’ commitments to Germans were the “usual ones” for all Swedish ships which are let out through blockade. He contended that these engagements do not conflict with those Swedish Government gave but devise more exactly the conditions under which the vessels are allowed to leave and obligated to return to Swedish waters. Implication is that they are not susceptible of being interpreted as flexibly as assurances given by Swedish Government. Johnson 30 The substance of this telegram was sent as telegram No. 100, December 8, 3 p.m., to the Ambassador in Greece. 31 Not printed; see telegram No. 4258, October 19, 6 p.m., from Stockholm, p. 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] . 32 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) 840.50 UNRRA/11–2744: Telegram [Document 221] The Secretary of State to the American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy ( Kirk ) Washington , December 2, 1944—7 p.m. 444. Department somewhat concerned over statement made by Jackson (Caserta No. 1515, November 27—UNRRA from Jackson No. 95 32a ) that continuance of use of Swedish ships is not related to continuing operations of Swedish-Swiss Commission. As stated in our No. 33 to Athens 33 the question of Swedish ships is now under discussion with Swedish Government and it appears that continuance of Swedish-Swiss Commission at least in & nominal capacity may be necessary in order to assure continued use of the ships. You will be advised of any further developments. Repeated to Athens. Stettinius 32a Not printed. 33 See footnote 25, p. 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] . The Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador to Italy (Kirk) 868.00/12–1144: Telegram [Document 222] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Ambassador to Italy ( Kirk ) Washington , December 13, 1944—8 p.m. 471. Reurtel 1695, December 11, noon. 34 The Department’s information on the rapidly changing situation in Greece is incomplete and we should not wish to take any position at this distance which would put any lives in jeopardy. However, it is the Department’s view that our military participation in ML is for the purpose of helping to bring relief to a gallant Ally and to ensure distribution of relief supplies, largely of American origin, to the Greek people without discrimination. American withdrawal from relief operation might well be interpreted as use of relief as instrument of political pressure. We therefore believe that during present period of Greek-British conflict US officers should continue on combined basis where combined relief operations are possible, and that if authorized by SACMED 35 they should independently do everything possible in areas presently closed to British personnel to carry out objective of relief program, in cooperation with Swedish-Swiss Commission, appropriate UNRRA personnel and Greek organizations. It should be kept in mind that General Sadler is operating under orders of the Theater Commander and that no unilateral action can be taken by American officers without consent of the latter or instructions through appropriate military channels. Any questions you may have concerning the policies being pursued by ML Greece should be reported to the Department which can then act in consultation with military authorities in Washington. Sent to AmPolAd, Caserta, repeated to Athens. Stettinius 34 Not printed; in it Ambassador Kirk asked the Department for guidance on the Question of the position of American forces engaged in relief and rehabilitation activities in Greece, in view of the fighting there between Greek partisans and British forces (868.00/12–1144). For correspondence concerning interest of the United States in the political situation in Greece, see pp. 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] ff. 35 Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater. The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 868.48/12–1644: Telegram [Document 223] The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Stockholm , December 16, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 10 p.m.] 5142. My 4926, December 2, noon. Swedish reply to joint démarche of November 30 was communicated orally to American and British Ministers December 14 at Foreign Ministry. Although Grafstrom, Stahle, Lundborg and Ripa of Foreign Ministry were present, Gunnar Carlsson, representing Swedish shipowners did most of talking. He emphasized that owners have no desire to withdraw ships. Carlsson said shipowners had at time when each ship was released signed guarantee to German Government covering return of ship in question to Sweden. These guarantees fall into two types, viz.: type ( a ) requiring owner to bring ship back to Sweden whenever Germans so request and ( b ) later type which merely specifies ship must return to Sweden when purpose for which it was released shall have been accomplished. Type ( a ) guarantee applies to Akka, Formosa, Boolongena, Fenris and Parramatta (perhaps also to Boreland and one other vessel). Shipowners feel type ( a ) guarantee constitutes obligation which would have to be complied with should Germans so demand. Therefore, some solution is necessary to get around need for such compliance. Swedish Government licenses for validity of charters covering Greek relief vessels were formerly issued for 6-month periods. However, recent licenses have been limited to 3 months. Carlsson suggests that present charters on vessels bound by type ( a ) guarantee be replaced at once (not prolonged) by new charters valid for 6 months. After these new charters take effect Swedes will be in position to reply to an eventual German demand for return to Sweden of ship in this group by saying ships will return at expiration of charters. Shipowners might add that return trip requires Allied safe conduct and Allies refuse to authorize return of ships until charters expire. Swedes do not regard type ( b ) guarantee as sufficient basis for Germans to demand return of ships while they are still engaged in traffic for which originally released. They are convinced this group of ships can be kept in traffic for at least 6 months without heeding any efforts on part of Germans to force their withdrawal. Carlsson stressed that neither type of guarantee requires return of ships to Sweden merely in case safe conduct is withdrawn. If Germans cancel safe conduct, shipowners will be informed by Swedish authorities that it need cause no alarm and ships should continue in traffic. (Second point in Swedish note of October 19 reported in my 4258, October 19, 6 p.m., indicated that in case of cancellation of safe-conduct shipowners would decide individually whether vessels should continue to sail as before, with understanding that Red Cross markings be retained. Carlsson’s present remarks developed this point by indicating Swedish shipowners may be expected to continue. Presumably possibility cannot quite be excluded that some individual shipowner might insist on withdrawing his ships.) Stahle made it clear that Swedish Government would deal favorably with applications for 6-month licenses. Although new 6-month charters are not really necessary to insure continuance of ships with ( b ) type guarantee, Swedes may for sake of uniformity also want such charters for their group. Carlsson said he would begin at once preparing new charters. Steps are: (1) Approach Swedish Red Cross; (2) get new charter parties signed; (3) obtain license which renders charters valid for 6 months. Matter is urgent if only because new charters should be in force before Swedish intentions regarding Allied shipping pool become public. News of these intentions may provoke angry reaction from Germans. Carlsson said he thought convoys should be avoided. Swedish reply outlined above constitutes a type of informal assurance that, without heeding any adverse steps Germans may take, Swedes plan to keep Greek relief fleet in service for at least 6 months to come. Stahle stated this arrangement was best Swedes could do and British Minister and I believe that it represents limit to which they are willing to go in order to meet our wishes. Definite lists of ships affected by guarantees ( a ) and ( b ) will be telegraphed as soon as Foreign Ministry obtains particulars from Carlsson. Although he is at present unable to communicate with his Government Greek Chargé is prepared to sign new charters in accordance with usual procedure if American and British Ministers so recommend. Sir Victor Mallet and I consider that basic assumption of our démarche of November 30 (paragraph 1 of Department’s 2329, November 18, 9 p.m.) justifies our giving this recommendation and we shall do so as soon as charter parties are ready, unless contrary instructions are received. Please instruct whether in case Swedes prepare new charters for ships under type ( b ) guarantee, we should also give Greek Chargé recommendation to cover these vessels. Johnson The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) 868.48/11–1744: Telegram [Document 224] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) Washington , December 16, 1944—midnight. 2538. Reurtel 4705, Nov. 17. 36 Department and financing agencies envisage indefinite continuance of Greek relief program utilizing Swedish ships at present on St. John–Piraeus run under safe conduct. Financial arrangements have been made to cover first quarter 1945 for charter-hire of ships and for supply program similar to last quarter 1944. Plans are based on at least nominal existence of neutral commission with Swedish delegate to whom cargoes will be assigned. It is our understanding that Swedish Foreign Office concurs and will endeavor to maintain skeleton organization in Greece. You might at your discretion inquire if Swedish views remain unchanged and indicate importance Department attaches to continuance of identical status as before liberation so that Germans can have no overt justification for withdrawing safe-conduct. Sent to Stockholm, repeated to Athens. Stettinius 36 Not printed. The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 868.48/12–2144: Telegram [Document 225] The Minister in Sweden ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State Stockholm , December 21, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 22—11:28 p.m.] 5222. Confirmation was obtained today from Swedish Foreign Ministry of Swedish desire to continue Greek Relief Commission at least in skeleton form and to avoid any overt justification for Germans to withdraw safe-conduct for ships (cf. my 5142, December 16, 3 p.m.) not sent to Athens (and Department’s 2538, December 16, midnight, repeated to Athens). In talks here with Justice Sandstrom Foreign Ministry worked out tentative plan to continue Commission in its present functions (in these parts of Greece which Allied authorities have assigned to Commission for distribution) until February 15 at which time Commission would give up distributional activity and become mere skeleton control body to which cargoes would still be consigned. Control functions is important to demonstrate to Germans that neutral character of Commission remains. [Here follows a brief summary of some operational problems of the relief program.] My 1, December 21, 7 p.m., to Athens repeats this message. Johnson Request of the Greek Government for further financial assistance from the United States Request of the Greek Government for further financial assistance from the United States 37 37 For correspondence on the granting of financial assistance to the Greek Government in 1943, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 167 ff., passim . [226] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] July 28, 1944. 868.51/8–1044 [227] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) [Washington,] August 5, 1944. 868.51/8–544 [228] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, October 25, 1944—midnight. 868.51/10–2544: Telegram [229] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward G. Miller, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) [Washington,] October 28, 1944. 868.51/10–2844 [230] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) Washington, November 7, 1944—6 p.m. 868.51/11–744: Telegram [231] The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State Athens, November 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received November 15—7:20 a.m.] 868.51/11–1444: Telegram [232] The Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos) to the Secretary of State Washington, November 14, 1944. 800.515/11–1444 [233] The Secretary of State to the Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos) Washington , January 26, 1945. 800.515/11–1444 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 868.51/8–1044 [Document 226] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) [ Washington ,] July 28, 1944. The Greek Ambassador 38 called at his request to present Mr. Varvaressos, Ambassador Extraordinary for Economic Affairs and Governor of the Bank of Greece, who had attended the Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods 39 and was well satisfied with the results. Mr. Varvaressos feels that the plan adopted is sound, comprehensive, and workable. I recalled my conversations in London in April with the Greek Minister of Finance regarding the Greek Government’s financial situation. 40 They left with me the attached memorandum on the Greek financial position and stated that they wished to discuss the matter further with me next week. Mr. Varvaressos stated that he had applied to the British Government but had received no encouragement. The Greeks feel their financial situation is desperate and they hope aid of some kind can be granted. I assured the gentlemen we would analyze their memorandum promptly with the greatest care and would give it our most sympathetic consideration. [Annex] Mr. K. Varvaressos to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) No. 2654 Washington , July 27, 1944. Memorandum Concerning the Financial Situation of the Greek Government Sir : During your visit to London you were good enough to grant an interview to Mr. Mantzavinos, Mr. Spyros Skouras and myself, in the course of which we gave you a short account of the financial situation of the Greek Government. As you will recall, we then undertook to forward you a brief memorandum embodying exact particulars and figures. I have therefore the honor to submit to you hereunder these particulars which, I hope, will give a clear picture of the problem. We are confident that you will examine them with the same kind interest that you have devoted to every question concerning our country. When, on the 28th of October, 1940, Greece took up the struggle against Italian aggression, 41 the British Government declared to the Greek Government that it would afford unlimited financial aid to Greece for the conduct of the war. The British Government discharged this promise, undertaking to pay: a ) the value of all war materials which Greece might obtain within the sterling area, b ) a sum of £5,000,000 monthly for war expenditure incurred by the Greek Government inside Greece. This sum was to be paid up to April 1941, when the situation would again be reviewed. The Greek Government expended these sums within the country, acquiring the equivalent in drachmae by selling the total monthly amounts of pounds sterling to the Bank of Greece, c ) a single credit amounting to £5,000,000 towards the cost of supplies purchased outside the sterling area, in view of the fact that such purchases were exhausting the country’s exchange reserves. On the occupation of Greece by the enemy, the British Government intimated to the Greek Government, then provisionally established in Crete and later in Egypt, that it was not prepared to continue affording financial aid on the basis of the original agreement, even if the latter were amended in regard to the sums involved, but that negotiations should be opened in London for the purpose of arriving at a new basis. These negotiations took place when the Greek Government was established in London, and ended in an agreement 42 the substance of which is the following: The British Government will not demand from the Greek Government payment of the value of materials and services supplied by Departments or Agents of the British Government, in so far as they may be necessary for the equipment and maintenance of the Greek armed forces. All other expenditures of the Greek Government, including the remuneration, allowances, pensions, etc., of officers and men of the Greek armed forces, are a charge upon the Greek Government and must be defrayed out of its own resources. In addition, in every case where expenditure was to be incurred for the despatch of foodstuffs to the population within Greece or for the relief of refugees from Greece, the Greek Government was required to make a declaration, and in fact did so make this declaration, to the effect that it would make itself responsible for the expenditure involved. The Greek Government could not, of course, do otherwise than accept this settlement, although it was manifest that the commitments undertaken far exceeded its resources. Apart, however, from the financial assistance which the British Government had agreed to afford for the equipment and maintenance of the Greek forces, the Greek Government secured further invaluable aid of a financial nature for the discharge of its mission as follows: 1) The United States Government assisted Greece in very many ways. In particular, a ) it decided to despatch to Greece, under Lend-Lease, 44 substantial quantities of foodstuffs for the suffering population, specifically pulse, rice, milk, fish and other valuable foods, 45 which otherwise would have to be made at the cost of the Greek Government, b ) In response to the Greek Government’s appeal, it decided to furnish additional aid in accordance with the terms of the letter addressed on the 5th [ 4th ] of May, 1943, by the Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, to our Ambassador at Washington. 46 This assistance consists of: first, payment from the first of January 1943, of the costs of transporting to Greece the above-mentioned foodstuffs and the Canadian wheat by the Swedish steamers. These charges had previously fallen in part upon the Greek Government and in part upon the Greek War Relief Association. Secondly, it consists of American assent to an arrangement whereby the G.W.R. undertakes the cost of maintaining the Greek refugees as from the first of April 1943. By reason of difficulties which have arisen in Cairo, effect has not yet been given to this latter project. 2) The Canadian Government decided to make a free gift to the population of Greece of 15,000 tons of wheat and of certain other foodstuffs per month. Recently the amount of wheat has been increased substantially, and provisionally this increase is being covered by a gift of the Argentine Government. 3) The Greek War Relief Association , an exclusively American institution, continued to provide invaluable assistance to the Greek people, even after the occupation of Greece by the enemy. Thus, it shouldered part of the cost of despatching foodstuffs from Turkey to Greece, and expended in this connection a sum of approximately £1,250,000. Through the Red Cross it despatched medicines, foodstuffs and other articles for the maintenance and relief of the population. As already stated, it paid part of the costs of the Swedish ships, and in addition to its other relief work, undertook to help in connection with the relief of the Greek refugees. Figures are not available to make it possible to assess the financial value of the extensive assistance thus provided. This much, however, is certain: the extent of the assistance and the nature of the needs which it served have relieved the Greek Government of a heavy financial burden. In addition, this assistance has assured the daily bread and other vital needs of more than 3,000,000 inhabitants of our country, who otherwise would be exposed to the greatest privation and even to death from starvation. Yet, in spite of the generous assistance which the Greek Government received, the remaining items of expenditure which it still had to meet were very substantial and were constantly increasing, while conversely the revenue at its disposal was meagre and progressively declining. Thus, during the period of three years from April 1941 to March 1944, the Greek Government has incurred public expenditure in the sum of £13,214,600. Of this sum only £5,803,800 are covered by taxation and other forms of revenue created by the Greek Government outside Greece. Almost the sole source of such revenue is the Greek Mercantile Marine. The balance was derived from the assets of the country existing in foreign countries at the date of the enemy invasion. These assets consisted of the country’s gold, which had been saved from enemy spoliation and safely deposited outside Greece, and of other assets in dollar and sterling deposited in various accounts of the Bank of Greece with American and British Banks. At the time of the occupation of our Country by the enemy, the aggregate amount of these holdings of gold and foreign exchange totaled £52,455,800 (we include small amounts deposited later, being the proceeds of interest, sale of merchandise, etc.). On the 31st of March 1944, these assets had been reduced to £45,045,000. The difference of £7,410,800 had been utilized by the Greek Government, as stated above, to defray public expenditure, by far the greater part of which was incurred for the armed forces. In addition to the aforementioned £13,214,600, which embraces the sums actually paid by the Greek Government up to the 31st of March 1944, it is today called upon to make urgent payment of the following sums for expenditure relating to the same three year period: approximately £1,000,000, balance of the value of foodstuffs despatched from Turkey to Greece, part of which was, as stated above, defrayed by the G.W.R.; a sum of £756,000 against expenditure in connection with relief of refugees up to the end of last year. Such is the picture which our country’s finances present during the three-years period from the date when the Greek Government left Greek soil until the 31st of March 1944. The forecast for the future is even more unfavorable. Our expenditure has increased to a very considerable degree, and is estimated at approximately £7,880,000 for the financial year 1944–1945. Out of this amount, £5,111,400 correspond to expenditure for the armed forces, and a further sum of £1,496,000 is also connected with the conduct of the war. Conversely, our annual revenue has fallen by reason of the tremendous losses sustained by our Mercantile Marine, and cannot be estimated at more than £2,500,000, including certain extraordinary revenues. This situation compels the Greek Government to address themselves once again to the Government of the United States, and to request that favorable consideration may be given to the possibility of making available a measure of financial assistance whereby the Greek Government may meet their pressing needs. We consider that a credit of £25,000,000 47 would be of the greatest help and would very greatly facilitate the Greek Government by relieving it of the need to make further inroads upon the country’s assets, which constitute almost the sole national capital that has survived the general destruction of our country’s economy. I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to you, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration. K. Varvaressos Ambassador Extraordinary for Economic Affairs. Governor of the Bank of Greece . 38 Cimon P. Diamantopoulos. 39 For correspondence on the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, which met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, from July 1 to 22, 1944, see vol. ii . 40 Memorandum of April 18 not printed. 41 For correspondence on the Greek-Italian war, see Foreign Relations , 1940, vol. iii , pp. 524 ff. 42 Dated March 9, 1942; for summaries, see telegram 5202, September 17, 1942, 6 p.m., from London, and report of October 15, 1942, by the Greek Minister of Finance, ibid. , 1942, vol. ii , pp. 803 and 804 , respectively. 44 For correspondence on the Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Greece, signed at Washington on July 10, 1942, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. ii , pp. 814 ff. 45 For correspondence on the sending of relief supplies by the United States to Greece, see ibid. , pp. 724 ff. 46 Ibid. , 1943, vol. iv , p. 175 . 47 Hereinafter this amount is referred to as $25,000,000. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) 868.51/8–544 [Document 227] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Kohler ) [ Washington ,] August 5, 1944. Participants: Mr. Alexander Argyropoulos, Director of Economic and Treaty Division of Greek Foreign Office and Delegate to International Financial and Monetary Conference. Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh, United States Ambassador near the Greek Government. 48 Mr. Francis F. Lincoln (FMA) 49 Mr. Kohler Following consultation with Mr. Collado 50 with regard to the Greek Government’s request for a dollar loan (Under Secretary’s memorandum of July 28, 1944) I asked Mr. Argyropoulos to call, and talked with him today on the subject in the presence and with the assistance of Ambassador MacVeagh and Mr. Lincoln. We reviewed the Greek Government’s previous request of about two years ago for financial assistance, 51 the attitude taken by this Government at that time, and the action taken to meet that request by relieving the Greek Government of its principal dollar obligations, i.e., charter hire of the Swedish relief vessels and payment for relief foodstuffs provided from this country, now amounting to about 30 million dollars per year in total. With reference to the present request we assured Mr. Argyropoulos that this Government was anxious to give the most sympathetic consideration to the Greek Government’s needs, both those connected with the payment of its necessary operating expenses during the period of its exile and those connected with the post-liberation reconstruction of devastated Greece. In order properly to evaluate these needs and to determine the methods by which this Government might be helpful it was necessary that we have considerable information additional to that furnished in Mr. Varvaressos’ letter No. 2654 of July 27, 1944. This information should include particularly the breakdown of the Greek Government’s financial position in terms of dollars and of sterling, i.e., we needed to know, on the one hand, the Greek Government’s dollar assets, dollar income and dollar expenditures and, on the other hand, that Government’s sterling assets, sterling income and sterling expenditures. We also needed to know, particularly on account of domestic legal considerations, the use in some detail the Greek Government proposes to make of the requested funds, i.e., was it intended to meet current expenses or as a financial reserve for reconstruction purposes. Finally, we mentioned that Mr. Varvaressos’ paper raised certain questions for which our financial people would require answers, an example being that the Greek Government was apparently being called upon to reimburse the British Government for past expenditures made by the British for relief goods in Turkey. It was suggested that our authorities might be very reluctant to lend money to the Greek Government to enable it to reimburse the British Government for such expenses at a time when the American Government was itself making expenditures at the rate of almost 30 million dollars per annum for Greek relief. Mr. Argyropoulos promptly stated that no such use was intended, and was told in reply that this could and should be made clear by a fuller statement of the actual uses which the Greek Government contemplated making of a United States loan. Finally it was suggested to Mr. Argyropoulos that it would also be useful to have a statement of the financial relationship of the Greek and British Governments, since we understood that the British had expressed a willingness in principle to meet Greek needs for sterling. Mr. Argyropoulos said that he would telegraph for the desired information and let us have it as soon as received. 48 The Greek Government was in exile in Egypt. 49 Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs. 50 Emilio G. Collado, Chief of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs. 51 For correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. ii , pp. 798 ff. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 868.51/10–2544: Telegram [Document 228] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , October 25, 1944—midnight. 8899. In August [ July ] the Greek Government approached us for financial assistance in the form of a credit of $25,000,000, which they apparently contemplated using for current budgetary purposes. We asked for further information on certain points not covered in the original Greek request, and particularly for a dollar-sterling breakdown of current and anticipated expenditures. In this latter connection, we had in mind the Foreign Office statement, reported in your 5202, September 17, 1942, 52 that, “the provision of sterling for the Greeks is generally speaking regarded as falling within the province of the British,” and that the Foreign Office would be glad if we could help them in other respects. The supplementary information now received from the Greek Government 53 does not fully clarify its financial position. However, it appears that Greek dollar expenses, other than the $30,000,000 per annum expenditure for Swedish relief shipping and American relief foodstuffs met by this Government, do not exceed $1,500,000 per annum; and that the Greek Government’s dollar position has in fact improved slightly since we took over these relief expenses beginning January 1, 1943. We understand that the Greeks simultaneously approached the British for further financial assistance. 54 While we realize that the situation has changed fundamentally with the liberation of Greece and that present calculations will necessarily be subject to revision, we should appreciate any information you may obtain regarding British action on the Greek request and British views and comment on the Greek Government’s financial situation. 55 Sent to London. Eepeated to AmEmBalk, 56 Cairo. Stettinius 52 Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. ii , p. 803 . 53 Memorandum of August 31 to the Under Secretary of State by the Minister Plenipotentiary and Director of Economic Affairs at the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Argyropoulos) not printed; it estimated expenditures of the Greek Government at £7,890,827 of which the major part was in pounds sterling and of which £5, 111,400 represented expenditures for the armed forces, revenues at £2,576,400 and a deficit of £5,314,427. It fixed gold holdings at £6,719,000 and foreign exchange holdings at £38,326,000 as of March 31, 1944, as compared to gold holdings of the same magnitude and foreign exchange holdings of £45,736,800 at the time of enemy occupation in April 1941, a decline of £7,140,000 [ £7,410,800 ] resulting from the Greek Government’s prosecution of the war. The remaining holdings of £45,045,000 were said to be composed of £31,726,900 and $26,510,570. The memorandum stated that Greek revenues had dwindled because of heavy war losses by the Greek merchant marine and that in the first stages after the liberation of Greece the Government would be unable to draw substantial resources from the ruined country while it would have to face vital and pressing needs. (868.51/8–1044) 54 In despatch 169, July 26, the Chargé to the Greek Government in Exile in Egypt (Shantz) had advised that “the Greek Government has officially approached the British Government with a view to the extension of the mutual aid agreement of March 1942 between the Greek and British Governments to include payment of the salaries of the Greek armed forces.” (868.51/7–2644) In despatch 187, August 10, the Chargé reported the British Government had advised the Greek Government “it is not prepared to extend the provisions of the Mutual Aid Agreement with the Greek Government to include the payment of salaries to the Greek Armed Forces or to make any additional advances to the Greek Government at this time.” (868.51/8–1044) In telegram 9048, October 21, 8 p.m., the Ambassador in the United Kingdom advised that the British Government was arranging for the shipment of 200,000 gold sovereigns to Athens, to which the Greek Government had returned on October 18, after receipt of a firm commitment from the Bank of Greece that the equivalent in gold would be made available immediately to the British Treasury from reserves of the Greek Government, that the shipment would not be repeated and that the Greek Government must not rely upon receiving British financial assistance in correcting financial and monetary disorder (102.1/10–2144). 55 In telegram 9391, October 31, 6 p.m., the Chargé in the United Kingdom referred to several recent telegrams to the Department giving British views on the financial situation in Greece but gave no further substantive reply to the Department’s No. 8899 (868.51/10–3144). 56 Registered cable address for “American Embassies to the Balkans” used in connection with telegrams sent to the Ambassador to the Greek and Yugoslav Governments in Exile in Egypt (MacVeagh). Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward G. Miller, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) 868.51/10–2844 [Document 229] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward G. Miller, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Acheson ) 57 [ Washington ,] October 28, 1944. Participants: Mr. Diamantopoulos, Greek Ambassador Mr. Acheson Mr. Kohler, NE 58 Mr. Miller, A–A The Greek Ambassador called at his request. He thanked Mr. Acheson for his cooperation with the Greek Delegation at the Second Session of the UNRRA Council 59 and also felicitated the United States on recent developments in the Philippines. 60 He discussed three principal problems as follows: 1. Remittances to Greece. The Ambassador stated that he wished to urge that the United States extend all possible assistance in the present critical economic and monetary situation in Greece. Specifically, the Greek Government desires that arrangements be made as soon as possible to permit remittances from the United States to Greece by ( a ) individuals; and ( b ) organizations interested in the welfare of Greece. It was agreed that the matter would be taken up as soon as possible with the Treasury Department. 2. Ships. The Greek Ambassador asked for the Department’s support on a request of the Greek Government now pending before the War Shipping Administration. WSA has agreed to allocate to the Greek Government two Liberty ships now being completed. The Greek Government desires that before these ships should be turned over to the WSA pool by the Greek Government, they be permitted to make a special run to Piraeus 61 with relief supplies for Greece. Mr. Kohler will follow this matter up with WSA. 3. The Greek Ambassador renewed the request of the Greek Government for a loan from this Government of $25,000,000. Mr. Argyropoulos, Director of Economic Affairs of the Greek Foreign Office, and the Ambassador will return on October 30 at 4:00 p.m. to discuss this matter. 57 In a memorandum of October 28 to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray) reviewed previous discussions with Greek officials regarding the $25,000,000 loan, pointed out the financial problems of the Greek Government in starting the reconstruction of economic life and for immediate relief needs, and concluded: “It seems evident that we must find some way to provide dollar credits to the Greeks, and initially the amount might well be the $25 million for which they have applied.” (868.51/10–2844) 58 Division of Near Eastern Affairs. 59 The Second Session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration met at Montreal from September 15 to 27, 1944. For a brief account of its proceedings, see Department of State, Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, July 1, 1941–June 30, 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 134 ff. 60 United States forces had landed on Leyte October 20. 61 Port of Athens. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) 868.51/11–744: Telegram [Document 230] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) Washington , November 7, 1944—6 p.m. 4. Greek Ambassador called at Department October 30 62 with regard to his Government’s request for credit of twenty-five million dollars. Ambassador stated that in discussions of credit requests last August his Government was concerned largely with meeting deficit on account of reduced income from shipping. Since then situation had radically changed and assistance is now urgently needed ( a ) to assist in stabilizing Greek currency ( b ) to meet internal expenditures ( c ) to buy foodstuffs from neighboring countries and ( d ) to pay for raw materials and machinery to start Greek economy to work again. With regard to ( c ) Department stated emphatically it did not believe Greek Government should borrow for relief purposes but should rely on military and UNRRA. If present plans for UNRRA assistance were not adequate Greek Government should demand further assistance and this Government would support its request. It was also indicated that present relief problem did not seem to be one of credit but shipping, transport and distribution. With regard to ( a ) and ( b ) doubt was expressed as to need for or advisability of foreign credits. It was pointed out that little could be done until Greek Government itself undertook internal monetary reform and that present substantial Greek holdings of gold and foreign exchange would appear to provide an adequate basis for monetary reform. Ambassador was informed that under existing legal authority Export-Import Bank was probably only source of financial assistance by this Government and that Bank by its statutes would be limited largely to credits for purposes such as ( d ). Department further pointed out that unfortunately statutes establishing Bank prohibited loans to foreign governments in default to this Government on April 13, 1934 63 and that Greece appeared to have been in default on that date since it had not made reduced payments required under Hoover Moratorium. 64 It was agreed, however, to put Greek Ambassador directly in touch with Export-Import Bank to discuss kinds of loan Bank would make if situation as to its legal authority to extend credits to Greece was cleared up by amendment of Bank statutes. Ambassador met with Pier son, President of Export-Import Bank, on November 2. 65 Discussion covered much the same ground as previous discussion with Department. Pierson alluded to default difficulty and said that an attempt would probably be made to amend default provision of statute when Congress reconvenes. He also indicated that Bank did not have authority to make loans to finance internal expenditures in Greece. Pierson suggested that even before amendment of statute it might be possible for Bank to assist Greece in a limited way by financing exports from U.S. to Greece providing credit was extended to a Greek enterprise or Greek bank and was not extension of credit to Greek Government. Pierson then suggested that Greek Government provide him with a specific estimate of the quantities and kinds of machinery, materials, etc. required for reconstruction or specific reconstruction projects since it was difficult for Bank to consider requests for loans on any other basis. Ambassador inquired whether Bank or some other agency would be willing to send one or two industrial experts to Greece to assist Greek Government in formulating plans for industrial reconstruction and estimating requirements. Pierson said he would discuss matter with Department and FEA. 66 Department would like your comment on Ambassador’s suggestion. Stettinius 62 Memorandum of this conversation not printed. 63 Date of passage of Public Law 151, 48 Stat. 574; for correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1934, vol. i , pp. 525 ff. 64 For correspondence on the proposal by President Hoover for a moratorium on intergovernmental debts and the attitude of the Greek Government, see ibid. , 1931, vol. i , pp. 1 ff., and especially pp. 207 – 217 . For correspondence on the negotiation of an agreement on this subject, signed at Washington on May 24, 1932, by the United States and Greece, see ibid. , 1932, vol. i , pp. 626 , 627 . The text of this agreement is printed in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury … 1932 , p. 291. 65 Memorandum of conversation of November 2 not printed. 66 Foreign Economic Administration. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State 868.51/11–1444: Telegram [Document 231] The Ambassador in Greece ( MacVeagh ) to the Secretary of State Athens , November 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received November 15—7:20 a.m.] 37. Referring to the penultimate paragraph of the Department’s 4, November 7, 6 p.m., I am advised that the two obvious agencies in Greece to which credit might be extended by the Export-Import Bank may be somewhat compromised for this purpose since the Greek Government is appointing governors and directors of both the Bank of Greece and the National Bank of Greece. The latter has always been a private institution and perhaps if the Greek Ambassador were informed that there was an opportunity of its being used for reconstruction credit if it retained that character its present assimilation into the governmental machinery might be dropped or alternatively some other Greek agency might be found. In any case a revolving credit of perhaps two million dollars to pay for imports would approximate the volume of commercial credit extended by American exporters to Greek importers in normal times. The suggestion in the Department’s final paragraph regarding the sending of American industrial experts might well be extended to include transportation experts (see my despatch No. 237 of October 3 from Cairo 67 ) who are perhaps even more urgently needed but to avoid duplicating the work of present military and UNRRA personnel it would appear essential that anyone sent for this purpose be of outstanding reputation. Such individuals could contribute immensely in reviewing the work of the agencies and in making broad recommendations which would be supported by their professional prestige. MacVeagh 67 Not printed. The Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos) to the Secretary of State 800.515/11–1444 [Document 232] The Greek Ambassador ( Diamantopoulos ) to the Secretary of State 68 No. 4111 Washington , November 14, 1944. The Ambassador of Greece presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and has the honor to inform that he has been officially advised that monetary stabilization in Greece has been enacted by law and that a new currency has been issued and put into circulation on November 12. The relation of the new drachma to the dollar is 150 drachmas for a dollar and 600 drachmas for an English pound. The old drachmas in circulation, of any issue, will be exchanged for new drachmas to the rate of 50 billion old drachmas for a new drachma. With reference to the conversations that the Ambassador had with Mr. Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, on the matter, 69 he would appreciate it if the necessary steps would be taken in order to expedite the fulfilment of necessary formalities so that remittances to Greece be made possible. 68 Marginal notation by Harold R. Spiegel of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs on November 30: “Oral acknowledgment made to Greek Ambassador by Kohler NE who suggested in telephone conversation that no further response necessary till something develops on remittances”. 69 See memorandum of October 28, p. 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] . The Secretary of State to the Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos) 800.515/11–1444 [Document 233] The Secretary of State to the Greek Ambassador ( Diamantopoulos ) The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Greece and, with reference to the Greek Embassy’s note no. 4111, November 14, 1944, has the honor to inform the Ambassador that appropriate steps are being taken with a view to the early resumption of remittances to Greece. Until normal commercial means of communications can be reestablished, interim arrangements have been made for the transfer of funds, mainly for philanthropic organizations operating in Greece, through official Departmental channels. Washington , January 26, 1945. Attitude of the United States toward the desire of the Greek Government to abolish the International Financial Commission Attitude of the United States toward the desire of the Greek Government to abolish the International Financial Commission 70 70 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. ii , pp. 794 – 797 . [234] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, December 27, 1943. [Received January 4, 1944.] 868.51 War Credit/789 [235] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, March 25, 1944. 868.51 War Credits/790 [236] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State London, May 29, 1944. [Received June 3, 1944.] 868.51 War Credits/791 [237] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, July 26, 1944. 840.51FC/7–1344 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 868.51 War Credit/789 [Document 234] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State No. 12,945 London , December 27, 1943. [Received January 4, 1944.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s telegram No. 1497, March 28, 1942, and the Department’s reply thereto, No. 2251, May 19, 1942, 71 concerning the contemplated abolition of the International Financial Commission at Athens by the Greek Government. There is enclosed a copy of a letter dated December 16, 1943, from the Foreign Office, together with a copy of a draft of a note from the Greek Government to the British Government 72 in connection with this matter. This draft has not yet been shown to Mr. George Mantzavinos, Greek Under Secretary of State for Finance and Under Governor of the Bank of Greece, but it has been prepared on the basis of tentative ideas presented by him. With respect to Paragraph 4 E of the draft, in which it is stated that the provisions set forth in the preceding sub-paragraphs 73 will apply mutatis mutandis to the inter-governmental payments due to be made in respect of the 1833 Three Powers Loan, 74 the Foreign Office letter states that the British Government is wondering if the United States Government does not wish explicit mention to be made of the United States Government Loan of 1929. 75 The Foreign Office requests the views of the United States Government on this point. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: W. J. Gallman First Secretary of Embassy 71 Ibid. , pp. 795 and 796 , respectively. 72 Neither printed. 73 According to these paragraphs, upon the projected abolition of the International Financial Commission, the Bank of Greece, under the explicit direction of the Greek Government, would establish various accounts in connection with the external loans and assume the functions of the Commission to assure their service. 74 Reference is to the Guaranteed Loan promised to the new Greek State by the Three Protecting Powers, Great Britain, France and Russia, in the London Protocol of February 20, 1830 ( British and Foreign State Papers , vol. xvii , p. 203), the terms of which were spelled out in article XII of the Convention signed at London on May 7, 1832 ( ibid. , vol. xix , p. 33). In effect there were three loans or “instalments” (two in 1833 and one in 1836), each receiving the appropriate guarantee from the three Powers in separate diplomatic instruments and each the subject of a separate negotiation and contract between the Greek Government and private banking interests. 75 Provided for in the agreement between the United States and Greece signed at Washington on May 10, 1929, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury … 1929 , p. 308; for correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1928, vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 868.51 War Credits/790 [Document 235] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) No. 3887 Washington , March 25, 1944. Sir : A copy of the Embassy’s despatch No. 12,945 of December 27, 1943, and copies of the enclosures thereto, were transmitted by the Department to the Treasury Department with a request for its views and comment on the matter. For the Embassy’s guidance in making informal reply to the Foreign Office informal communication, No. R 12968/3988/19 of December 16, 1943, 76 on this matter, the Department quotes the substance of a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, 77 dated March 14, 1944, replying to this Department’s inquiry on the matter: “As stated in this Department’s letter of May 4, 1942, 78 the Secretary of the Treasury is not in a position to formally consent to the action proposed by the Greek Government for the abolition of the International Financial Commission at Athens, because the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to execute the agreement of May 10, 1929, pursuant to the Act of Congress approved February 14, 1929. 79 “Nevertheless, if such action is taken by the Greek Government, the Treasury Department feels that in order to safeguard American interests, paragraph 4 E should be slightly altered to read as follows: ‘The provisions of sub-paragraphs 4 C and 4 D above will apply mutatis mutandis to the intergovernmental payments due to be made in respect of the 1833 Three Powers Loan and of the agreements between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the United States of America, dated May 10, 1929 and May 24, 1932.’ 80 “In order to further stress the interest of this Government in the proposed draft, the Treasury Department wonders whether the British Foreign Office might not wish to give consideration to adding the following statement to sub-paragraph 4 I: 81 ‘In view of the interest of the United States of America as indicated in subparagraph 4 E above, like notification will be transmitted to the Government of the United States of America.’ ” Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: Dean Acheson 82 76 This was an enclosure to despatch 12,945, supra . 77 Daniel W. Bell. 78 Not printed; for quotation from this letter, see telegram 2251, May 19, 1942, to London, Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. ii , p. 796 . 79 45 Stat. 1176. 80 The latter agreement is printed in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury … 1932 , p. 291; for correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. i , pp. 626 ff. 81 This paragraph stated the Greek Government would inform the United Kingdom when the various measures set forth in the draft agreement would be put into effect. 82 Assistant Secretary of State. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State 868.51 War Credits/791 [Document 236] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Bucknell ) to the Secretary of State No. 15,937 London , May 29, 1944. [Received June 3, 1944.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction No. 3887 of March 25, 1944, concerning the proposed abolition of the International Financial Commission at Athens, and to state that the views of the State and Treasury Departments expressed therein were transmitted to the Foreign Office, from which a reply dated May 26, 1944, has now been received, pertinent excerpts from which are set forth below: “We find some difficulty in agreeing to the addition suggested to paragraph 41. The notes we propose to exchange with the Greek Government cannot, of course, constitute a formal abolition of the International Financial Commission. The Commission, being an international body, cannot be properly abolished either by the Greek Government acting alone, or by His Majesty’s Government and the Greek Government acting in agreement. All that the notes are intended to do is to set out the conditions on which His Majesty’s Government will consent to withdraw their representative on the Commission and to raise no objection to its abolition by the Greek Government. We feel, therefore, that it is of some importance that the notes should not be so phrased as to suggest that His Majesty’s Government are purporting to act for anyone except themselves. I am sure you will appreciate that unless we exercise some care on this point, we shall lay ourselves open to justifiable criticism from the other Governments which are represented on the Commission, and in particular the French, for not having associated them with ourselves in the present negotiations. The real purpose of paragraph 4 I is to enable His Majesty’s Government, to whom the Greek Government’s undertakings are addressed, to see that these undertakings are duly implemented. For the reasons given above, we feel that it might be better if the United States Government were not associated with His Majesty’s Government for this purpose. I do not think that the Treasury Department need feel any concern lest they should not be kept fully informed of all developments. The United States Government in respect of their 1929 loan are in somewhat the same position as the bondholders’ representatives and the bankers in respect of other loans. They will receive a copy of the standing instructions to the Bank of Greece, according to the provisions of paragraph 4 D and 4 E, and they will no doubt be approached by the Greek Government after the abolition of the Commission regarding the amendment of the Agreements of 1929 and 1932. We should be most grateful if you would transmit these considerations to the United States Government and ascertain whether they would agree not to press for the suggested addition to paragraph 4 I.” Respectfully yours, Howard Bucknell, Jr. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 840.51FC/7–1344 [Document 237] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) No. 4354 Washington , July 26, 1944. Sir : A copy of the Embassy’s despatch no. 15,937 of May 29, 1944, was transmitted by the Department to the Treasury Department with a request for it’s comments on the matter. For the Embassy’s guidance in replying to the communication from the British Foreign Office of May 26, 1944, excerpts from which are quoted in the Embassy’s despatch above-mentioned, the Department quotes the substance of a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, dated July 13, 1944, in response to the Department’s inquiry: “It is noted that the British Foreign Office has found exception to the Treasury’s suggestion that consideration be given to adding a statement to sub-paragraph 4 I of the proposed draft, indicating that notification should be transmitted to the Government of the United States of America as and when the proposed measures are put into effect. In view of the arguments set forth by the British Foreign Office in the above-mentioned document, the Treasury has no objection to the omission of this particular suggestion provided that inclusion of explicit mention of the loan agreements between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the United States of America, dated May 10, 1929 and May 24, 1932, remain as a part of the text of the proposed draft. “Inasmuch as provision for notification to the United States Government by the Greek Government concerning final acceptance of the agreement is to be omitted from the draft, it is suggested that the American Embassy in London be advised by the British Foreign Office when the proposed measures are put into effect. Upon receipt of such information, this Government will be in a position to communicate directly with the Greek Government with respect to the status of its indebtedness to the United States under the agreements of 1929 and 1932 if such action should be deemed necessary at any time.” Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: Dean Acheson [In the ensuing months, there is no further correspondence in the Department’s files concerning the desire of the Greek Government to abolish the International Financial Commission. Italy was eliminated from membership as an aftermath of World War II, membership thereby being reduced to Great Britain and France.] Interest of the United States in the situation in India; mission of William Phillips as personal representative of the President Interest of the United States in the situation in India; mission of William Phillips as personal representative of the President 1 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 178 – 231 . [For statement, “United States Objectives in India and the Far East,” made on February 1 by President Eoosevelt, regarding the presence of American troops in India, see Department of State Bulletin , February 5, 1944, page 145.] [238] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, February 19, 1944—1 p.m. [Received February 20—12:46 a.m.] 845.00/2217: Telegram [239] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, May 6, 1944—11 a.m. [Received May 6—8:29 a.m.] 845.00/2253: Telegram [240] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, May 19, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:08 p.m.] 845.01/272: Telegram [241] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] June 2, 1944. 845.01/6–1444 [242] The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) Washington, June 16, 1944—2 p.m. 845.01/272: Telegram [243] The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) Washington, July 7, 1944—8 p.m. 845.01/7–744: Telegram [244] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, July 10, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 7:20 p.m.] 845.01/7–1044: Telegram [245] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, July 22, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 22—3:30 p.m.] 845.00/7–2244: Telegram [246] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, July 25, 1944—midnight. 845.00/7–2544: Telegram [247] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) [Washington,] July 27, 1944. 845.00/7–2244 [248] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, July 28, 1944—4 p.m. [Received July 28—1:10 p.m.] 845.00/7–2844: Telegram [249] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, July 28, 1944—6 p.m. 845.00/7–2244: Telegram [250] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, July 28, 1944—7 p.m. 845.00/7–2244: Telegram [251] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] August 8, 1944. 845.00/8–844 [252] The British Minister (Campbell) to the Acting Secretary of State Washington, 8 August, 1944. 845.00/8–844 [253] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] August 15, 1944. 845.00/8–1544 [254] The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) Washington, 25 August, 1944. 845.00/8–2544 [255] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) [Washington,] September 2, 1944. 845.00/9–244 [256] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) [Washington,] September 4, 1944. 845.00/9–244 [257] The Officer in Chargé at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, September 4, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:30 p.m.] 845.00/9–444: Telegram The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State 845.00/2217: Telegram [Document 238] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) to the Secretary of State New Delhi , February 19, 1944—1 p.m. [Received February 20—12:46 a.m.] 132. After appealing for the cooperation of all elements in India in the prosecution of the war, the Viceroy 2 on February 17, 1944, in his first political pronouncement of importance told the Houses of the Indian Legislature that: (1) The British Government and people hope that as early as possible India can achieve complete self-government as a willing partner of the British Commonwealth. (2) The Cripps’ offer 3 which was not made in panic still stands and suggests one , but not the only way towards the framing of a new constitution which rests completely in Indian hands. (3) When a constitution is agreed upon Britain is ready to relinquish authority but this cannot take place until at least the two principal parties (Congress and Muslim League) come to terms. (4) India is a natural unit and it is up to Indians to devise arrangements so that the Hindu and Muslim communities can live within this unit. (5) Until the detained Congress leaders prove their willingness to cooperate in driving the enemy to the gates of India, and withdraw the quit India resolution, demands for their release are barren. The first reaction of both the Congress party and Muslim League press is disappointment and the assertion that the speech offers nothing new. The leading Muslim press newspaper is bitter at the Viceroy’s reiteration of the opposition to Pakistan 4 expressed by his predecessor 5 in December 1942. The Viceroy spoke courteously of the jailed Congress leaders recognizing their ability and high-mindedness and refrained from calling them pro-Japanese. He made it plain that they will not be released until they abandon their August 1942 stand. The Hindu press is bitterly disappointed in this, stating that a new constitution cannot be drawn up with these leaders in jail, and their imprisonment makes impossible the negotiation of a compromise between Congress and the League. Dawn 6 states that Gandhi wants an unconditional release by an apologetic government. The Viceroy apparently insists that admission of their errors and a promise of loyal cooperation during the war must precede release. Dawn sums up this situation neatly by stating that there is a spirit of unconditional surrender on both sides. One Indian Nationalist characterized the speech as “frank but cautious, disappointing but hopeful, tone not bad”. I feel that this speech does not alter the political situation materially and that there will be no progress until either the imprisoned Congress leaders, or the British, or both modify the stand both sides have taken of questioning the good faith and sincerity of the other. Full text of speech forwarded by air mail. 7 Merrell 2 Field Marshal Archibald P. Wavell, Viscount Wavell, Viceroy since October 1943. 3 In March, 1942, the British War Cabinet had commissioned Sir Stafford Cripps, then Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, to proceed to India to offer Indian nationalist leaders a plan proposing an interim transfer of political power in India, pending a permanent constitutional settlement at the end of the war. The “Cripps proposals” (printed subsequently as a White Paper, British Cmd. 6350: India ( Lord Privy Seal’s Mission ), April, 1942 ) were rejected by the Indian leaders, both of the predominantly Hindu Congress party and the Moslem League. With the subsequent evoking of mass civil disobedience by the Indian nationalist leader and proponent of non-violence, the Mahatma Mohandas K. Gandhi, and endorsed by the leadership and Working Committee of the Congress party, the Government of India in August 1942 had ordered the arrest and imprisonment of Gandhi; Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Congress party president; Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Gandhi’s “heir” in the Congress party leadership; and the Working Committee of the Congress party. Widespread disorders followed throughout the country. For interest of the United States in aspects of the situation in India in 1942, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , pp. 593 ff. 4 The concept of a separate Moslem state in India after independence and the touchstone of the political objectives of the Moslem League. 5 The Marquess of Linlithgow. 6 Influential Moslem newspaper. 7 Despatch No. 366, February 21, not printed. The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State 845.00/2253: Telegram [Document 239] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) to the Secretary of State New Delhi , May 6, 1944—11 a.m. [Received May 6—8:29 a.m.] 324. Gandhi was released unconditionally at 8 p.m. today. A communiqué issued by the Government of India at midnight reads in toto as follows: “In view of the medical reports of Mr. Gandhi’s health, Government has decided to release him unconditionally. This decision has been taken solely on medical grounds. The release takes place at 8 p.m. on May 6”. Merrell The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State 845.01/272: Telegram [Document 240] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) to the Secretary of State New Delhi , May 19, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:08 p.m.] 357. May I now in accordance with the Department’s 505, September 12, 4 p.m., 1942, request the Department’s instructions regarding the disposition of the President’s letter to Gandhi? 8 I feel sure that Gandhi understands why he did not receive a reply to his letter of July 1, 1942, 9 and he probably would not expect one at this late date. If a reply is made it might encourage him to correspond further with the President. It is probable too that the receipt of the reply would become known to the Government of India whose suspicions would be (my 674, Sept 3, 3 p.m., 1942) 10 aroused as to how Gandhi’s letter evaded censorship in India; the mission however is in position to assure the Government of India that it had nothing to do with the transmittal of Gandhi’s letter. In view of the changes in the world situation as well as the present political situation in India, I doubt that the implied emphasis in the President’s letter on military considerations is any longer time [ timely ]; and I anticipate that paragraph 5 page 5 of the Secretary’s radio broadcast of July 22 [ 23 ] 1942, 11 would awaken only skepticism now as Gandhi in common with most Indian Nationalists probably doubts that the U.S. has used the full measure of its influence during the past two years to support the attainment of freedom by India. I accordingly feel that no reply should be sent unless it is one which takes cognizance of the circumstances existing at present and is intended to serve a constructive purpose vis-à-vis the Indian political situation. Such a purpose might be served by the inclusion in a new letter of the following: “I am hopeful that you will experience a speedy recovery from your illness and am pleased to note that, according to reports reaching me, you intend upon your return to health to discuss Hindu-Muslim understanding with Mr. Jinnah; 12 I feel sure that the reaching of such an understanding would enlist maximum world sympathy.” With reference to the above suggested paragraph, Gandhi on May 14 telegraphed to the leader of the Khaksars 13 in response to latter’s suggestion that Gandhi and Jinnah should meet to explore the possibilities of an agreement and said that as soon as he was well enough he would be ready to discuss the question with Jinnah. Merrell 8 Telegram No. 505 not printed; for President Roosevelt’s letter of August 1 to Gandhi, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 703 . 9 Ibid. , p. 677 . 10 Ibid. , p. 728 . 11 Text in Department of State Bulletin , July 25, 1942, p. 639; President Roosevelt had enclosed a copy of the text of this radio broadcast in his letter of August 1 to Gandhi. 12 Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Moslem League president. 13 The Khaksars were a minor Indian political group; Allama Mashriqi, the Khaksar leader, had in 1942 written a booklet, Which Way to Pakistan , which was a condemnation of both the Moslem League and Hindu political organizations regarding the Pakistan question. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 845.01/6–1444 [Document 241] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [ Washington ,] June 2, 1944. I informed you on September 9, 1942 that delivery of your letter of August 1, 1942 to Gandhi 14 was impractical because of the latter’s imprisonment. You agreed to the suggestion that the letter be retained in the files of the Mission at New Delhi until delivery to Gandhi might be feasible and appropriate. The Mission now requests instructions. It recommends against delivery on the grounds that the context is not now entirely timely; that failure to have received a reply will be understood by Gandhi because of his having been held incommunicado; that difficulty may be experienced in convincing the Government of India that this Government was not a party to the evasion of censorship which occurred when Gandhi’s letter was delivered to you; and that it is inadvisable at this time to encourage Gandhi to communicate further with you. A copy of the Mission’s telegram no. 357 of May 19, 1944 on the subject is attached. 15 There appear to be three possible procedures: (1) that the letter not be delivered, with the resultant possibility that some day Gandhi may accuse you of a lack of interest in India’s problems; (2) that the original letter be delivered with appropriate explanation from the Mission, and—in order that no charge of subterfuge may be brought by the Government of India—after prior advice to the Government of India; (3) that a new letter with more timely context be drafted for delivery in the same manner, with the resultant possibility that, as in procedure no. 2, difficulty may arise from the censorship angle, and that Gandhi may be encouraged to endeavor to communicate further with you in a manner embarrassing to you and both embarrassing and annoying to the Government of India. An expression of your wishes in the matter is requested. 16 C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 14 Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 703 . 15 Supra . 16 Notation by President Roosevelt to Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State: “E. R. S. I think No. 2 best. F. D. R.” The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) 845.01/272: Telegram [Document 242] The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) Washington , June 16, 1944—2 p.m. 427. The President desires that his letter to Gandhi (your 357, May 19) be delivered, after you have appropriately advised the Government of India. You may wish to utilize Gandhi’s son as an intermediary for delivery. Appropriate explanations regarding the delay will of course be in order. Hull The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) 845.01/7–744: Telegram [Document 243] The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) Washington , July 7, 1944—8 p.m. 467. Please inform Department of present status of matter discussed in Department’s 427 of June 16. Drew Pearson’s 17 column of July 6 featured a story on this subject. There is some indication that he received his information from Indian nationals in the United States. Does the Mission believe that the existence of the letters in question could have been made known by Indian Congress circles to sympathizers in the United States. Hull 17 Drew Pearson was the writer of a syndicated newspaper column. The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State 845.01/7–1044: Telegram [Document 244] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) to the Secretary of State New Delhi , July 10, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 7:20 p.m.] 503. Pearson’s article was published in Extension India on July 8 (Department’s telegram 467, July 7, 8 p.m.) The Government of India previously having been advised, the President’s letter was handled [ handed? ] by Berry 18 to Birla 19 at Bombay on about June 24 for delivery to Gandhi. Birla was proceeding to Poona the following day. Several newspapers mentioned the letter in connection with Berry’s trip to Bombay and I believe that this was probably the source of Pearson’s information rather than any direct communication by the Indian Congress circles to sympathizers in the United States. In fairness to the Government of India and in compliance with the Foreign Secretary’s 20 request that I deny the report that the Government of India was responsible for the letter not having been delivered prior to Gandhi’s release I gave a statement today to Reuter’s correspondent to the effect that the American Mission had at no time requested the assistance of the Mission [ or permission? ] of the Indian Government to transmit a letter to Gandhi and that the report in the press is therefore erroneous. Merrell 18 James L. Berry, Secretary at New Delhi. 19 Probably G. D. Birla, Indian industrialist and member of a family prominent in Indian industrial, commercial, and financial life. 20 Sir Olaf Caroe, Secretary to the Government of India in charge of the External Affairs Department. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 845.00/7–2244: Telegram [Document 245] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , July 22, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 22—3:30 p.m.] 5810. Personal for the Secretary from Phillips. 21 Following a statement on foreign affairs in Parliament by the Prime Minister 22 on August 2d, it is possible that there will be a debate on the Indian situation. It is said that on July 29, Jinnah will meet with the Working Committee of the Moslem League to explain his attitude to Rajagopalachari’s 23 formula. Since coming to London I have carefully avoided showing any interest in Indian affairs in the belief that in view of my present connection with SHAEF 23a it was best not to do so. However because of developments which appear to be occurring in Germany 24 might it not be opportune for us to express again our interest in the Indian situation? This could be done in two ways; either by an informal call by me on Mr. Amery, 25 the Secretary of State for India, or better still by a word from the President to the Prime Minister, if the President feels inclined to take such a step. If left to me I should like to be able to express the hope of my Government that every opportunity will be taken to bring the opposing political parties together and that I was mentioning the matter now because of recent developments in Germany and because of the great importance which we in America attach to the contribution which a united India could make to the future peace of the world. Some such expression of American interest in the right quarters at the present time might be opportune. If the coming debate in Parliament could be so guided that India would feel the sincerity of the British position; and if the Viceroy on his part could invite the needed cooperation between the two leaders perhaps some forward step might be taken by the leaders themselves. Personally it seems to me that Gandhi is making an effort to come to terms with the Moslems although his approach from our point of view does not appear to be a very straightforward one. Jinnah’s response on July 29 will be exceedingly important. But in my opinion it would be far more important if a convincing effort could be made now by the British Government to bring the leaders together in the interest of world peace. [Phillips.] Winant 21 Appointed in December, 1942, Personal Representative of the President in India with the rank of Ambassador, William Phillips had been absent from his post at New Delhi since April 28, 1943. From September, 1943, he had been serving on a special assignment as the Secretary of State’s representative at the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, European Theater. For correspondence regarding the mission of Ambassador Phillips in India, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 178 ff. 22 Winston S. Churchill. 23 Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, former Premier of Madras and leading Indian nationalist. In 1942 Rajagopalachari had resigned from the Congress party in order to work for active resistance to the Japanese, in contrast to the “Quit India” policy of Gandhi and the Congress party leadership. Rajagopalachari also desired to promote a rapprochement between the Hindu Congress and the Moslem League, and, on April 8, 1944, had started a correspondence with Jinnah containing proposals for a Hindu-Moslem settlement on the Pakistan question. Due to his close relationship with Gandhi, Rajagopalachari’s proposals were considered to have Gandhi’s approval, and marked an important shift in Gandhi’s attitude toward the issue of Pakistan. Jinnah, however, had submitted the proposals to the Working Committee of the Moslem League without recommendations, as they had not come directly from Gandhi himself. 23a Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. 24 Apparently a reference to the attempt on July 20, 1944, by certain German Army officers to bring about the assassination of Adolf Hitler, German Reichschancellor and Führer. 25 Leopold S. Amery. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 845.00/7–2544: Telegram [Document 246] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , July 25, 1944—midnight. 5828. For the Ambassador and Phillips. Drew Pearson’s column today prints large part of Phillips letter to President 26 on Indian situation in which he advocated that British King Emperor issue declaration with respect to later independence for India after the war. This publication was made without any prior knowledge of the Department and we do not know how Pearson came into possession of copy of this letter addressed to the President. Hull 26 Dated May 14, 1943, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 220 . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) 845.00/7–2244 [Document 247] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Berle ) [ Washington ,] July 27, 1944. Sir Ronald 27 came in to see me at my request. I referred to his protest at the publication, in Drew Pearson’s column in the Washington Post , of a copy of William Phillips’ letter to the President about India. 28 I said this was a wholly unauthorized publication; that we regretted its appearance; and that no responsible officer of the Government had had anything to do with it. I added that we were cabling the substance of this statement to our Embassy in London. 29 A[ dolf ] A. B[ erle ], Jr. 27 Sir Ronald I. Campbell, British Minister. 28 Sir Ronald had called and made such a protest on July 25; memorandum of conversation not printed (845.00/7–2544). 29 This was done in telegram No. 5933, July 28, 8 p.m. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 845.00/7–2844: Telegram [Document 248] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , July 28, 1944—4 p.m. [Received July 28—1:10 p.m.] 6002. Personal for the Secretary from Phillips. I learned today that the Foreign Office has received a full report from the British Embassy in Washington of the Drew Pearson article referred to in your No. 5828, 25 July, midnight, and are considerably annoyed by it (which does not surprise me). In view of this fact, it would probably not be opportune at this time for me to carry out the suggestion contained in my No. 5810, 22 July, 6 p.m. of expressing to the Secretary of State for India our interest in the Indian situation. [Phillips.] Winant The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 845.00/7–2244: Telegram [Document 249] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , July 28, 1944—6 p.m. 5931. For William Phillips. The President is out of Washington and, as any action of the sort suggested in the Embassy’s 5810 of July 22 should presumably take place before the debate in Parliament on August second, your suggestion that the President might wish to speak to the British Prime Minister now does not under the circumstances appear practical. While the Department concurs in your opinion that any advance toward a settlement of the Indian problem would be particularly opportune at this time, it feels that your usefulness with SHAEF would be compromised were you to endeavor to influence the British Government in matters pertaining to India. The Department, however, approves of the Ambassador’s speaking on the subject if after discussion with you he considers that such action on his part would be desirable. While publication of your letter to the President, as reported to you, may increase British unwillingness to discuss the Indian situation, it is felt that while reiterating this Government’s expression of regret at the letter’s publication, as made to the British Embassy and reported telegraphically to the Ambassador and to you, the Ambassador might well make known to the British Government that this Government remains of the opinion that a satisfactory solution of the Indian problem would contribute much to the successful prosecution of the war in the Far East and is of great importance to the future peace of the world. Reports from the Mission are not encouraging regarding the possibility of any favorable developments as an outcome of the Rajagopalachari–Gandhi formula and the Gelder 30 statement. You may wish in that connection to refer to the Mission’s telegram of July 24 to the Embassy 31 on the subject. Stettinius 30 In his telegram No. 351, June 26, 4 p.m., the Consul at Bombay (Donovan) had reported that: “Stuart Gelder, correspondent in India of London News Chronicle had interview with Gandhi June 19 at Poona. Gandhi wanted the interview publicized but without direct quotation; it is believed that he wished the interview published as a trial balloon. Burden of the interview was that Gandhi is extremely anxious to settle political deadlock and to meet the Viceroy for that purpose, but he insists on the Viceroy making first move.” (845.00/2298) Letters were exchanged during the summer months between Lord Wavell and Gandhi, in which the Viceroy refused to meet Gandhi and at the same time called upon the Mahatma to produce constructive proposals, taking into account that India was in the war (845.00/8–144). These events were described in considerable detail to the House of Commons by Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, in closing a debate on India on July 28. 31 Presumably telegram No. 537, July 24, 5 p.m., to the Secretary of State, not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 845.00/7–2244: Telegram [Document 250] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , July 28, 1944—7 p.m. 5932. For the Ambassador. Your attention is invited to Deptel 5931 for Phillips on the subject of possible conversations with the British Government regarding the Indian situation. Stettinius Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State 845.00/8–844 [Document 251] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [ Washington ,] August 8, 1944. Sir Ronald Campbell called at his request this afternoon and referred to the Drew Pearson leak on the correspondence between Ambassador Phillips and the President regarding India. He stated his associates in London were very disturbed and there were three points on which his Government wished either the President or Mr. Hull would comment: 1. The damaging reference to the morale of the Indian Army; 2. The unfair reference on the part that Britain was going to play in the war against Japan; 3. Churchill’s reference to the fact that the Atlantic Charter 32 did not apply in India. I told Sir Ronald I could not discuss this with the Secretary or the President for a few days but I assured him I would raise the matter with both gentlemen upon their return and would communicate with him as promptly as possible. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] 32 Joint Declaration by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. i , p. 367 . The British Minister (Campbell) to the Acting Secretary of State 845.00/8–844 [Document 252] The British Minister ( Campbell ) to the Acting Secretary of State Washington , 8 August, 1944. Dear Ed : When speaking with you this afternoon on Drew Pearson’s article reproducing William Phillips’ report to the President about India, I mentioned that J. J. Singh’s India League was about to publish an appeal to His Majesty’s Government for immediate grant of Indian independence. I now hear that with this appeal which is to be published tomorrow, August 9th, they will also publish a photostatic copy of the Drew Pearson article. This seems to me to underline the desirability of a statement clearly dissociating the United States Government from the opinions expressed by Phillips on the three matters I mentioned, viz: ( a ) morale of Indian Army, ( b ) British role in the war against Japan, and ( c ) Mr. Churchill’s statement on the application of the Atlantic Charter to India. It also seems to indicate that the sooner such a statement can be made the better. Yours ever Ronald I. Campbell Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 845.00/8–1544 [Document 253] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [ Washington ,] August 15, 1944. Drew Pearson recently published in one of his columns a letter which Ambassador Phillips had sent you on India. The Department has expressed its regret over its publication but Sir Ronald Campbell recently asked if a statement could be issued by this Government disassociating us from the views expressed in Mr. Phillips’ letter. He referred especially to the following points: 1) The damaging reference to the morale of the Indian Army. 2) The unfair reference on the part that Britain was going to play in the war against Japan. 3) Churchill’s reference to the fact that the Atlantic Charter did not apply in India. It is the Department’s feeling that it would be impossible to issue a statement satisfactory to the British inasmuch as we share in general the views expressed in the Ambassador’s letter. Unless you feel that we should comply with the British request, I would appreciate having your permission to tell the British that we consider it preferable to make no public statement on the subject. The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 845.00/8–2544 [Document 254] The British Ambassador ( Halifax ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) Washington , 25 August, 1944. My Dear Ed : You will remember that Ronnie 34 spoke or wrote to you on the 8th August about Drew Pearson’s article on William Phillips’ report to the President about India. In your reply of the 9th August, you said that you were taking the matter up with Mr. Hull, and that either he or you would take it up with the President as soon as he returned. Have you been able to do anything about it? Of the points Ronnie mentioned, I think the most essential and urgent are that something should be said publicly disassociating the United States Government from what Phillips had said about:— a .) the morale of the Indian Army, and, b .) the future attitude of the British Commonwealth towards the Japanese war. It would appear to me that the matter might be handled in a positive way by means of some speech or statement in appreciation of the achievements of the Indian Army in Africa, Europe, and Burma, and referring to the many statements by the Prime Minister and other British Ministers about United Kingdom participation in the war against Japan. I hope you will have had a good time in New York, and that none of you will have got into trouble! Yours ever Edward 34 Sir Ronald I. Campbell. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) 845.00/9–244 [Document 255] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Long ) [ Washington ,] September 2, 1944. The British Ambassador came in to see me by appointment arranged by the Secretary’s office. Prior to the arrival of Lord Halifax but after reading the ticker text 35 of the quotation from the Caroe telegram to the British Foreign Office, and after talking again with Senator Connally 36 I had talked with Senator Chandler. 37 I told Senator Chandler that we were in a position of finding that a confidential message between the units of another government had been published without the authority and without the consent of a friendly government. I asked Senator Chandler if he would divulge the source of his information. He declined to mention the source. Upon pressing he stated that he obtained the copy directly from a high United States official and he broadly indicated that that official had obtained either directly or indirectly the document from some source in the British Embassy itself. In justification of his stand he aggressively stated that his original statement had been made to the effect that Phillips was “ persona non grata to the British Government”, whereas Lord Halifax stated in the reply to the effect that the British Government had never declared that Phillips was persona non grata , and that it looked to those who did not examine the niceties of the language that he himself (Chandler) had been placed in a false position. Consequently he stated that he had no recourse but to publish the text of this telegram which showed on the face of it that his original statement was correct and that the British answer was evasive and wrong and harmful to him. I explained to him the serious deterioration which might take place at this particular time in regard to the attitude of a large number of our people toward Great Britain. He said that he realized that there was that danger but that the reason for it was the position in which he had been placed by the British Ambassador and his statement under reference. When Lord Halifax came in he took up the subject and said that he wanted to discuss it separately from the merits or demerits of the telegram itself or of the matter in the original letter of Mr. Phillips addressed to the President. He said that he considered these two matters as within the provinces respectively of the two Governments. However, he would seriously question the propriety and the ethics of the publication by an official of this Government of a message which must have been known to be confidential and which was an internal message between different elements of his own Government. He thought the situation might deteriorate if something were not said on the part of the Secretary of State or by Senator Connally, though he preferred that a statement be made by the Secretary of State which would draw attention to the fact that the publication of a confidential message of another friendly government without previous consent of that government was hard to defend on ethical grounds or on grounds of propriety. He also feared that the publication in London of these particular facts would cause a considerable revulsion of feeling there against Americans because of the unethical use of information. I stated to Lord Halifax that we, of course, regretted the publication by any official of an unauthorized message without obtaining the previous consent of the government concerned; that the Department of State always followed the procedure unless we were at war with a government and that in the publication of our formal documents we always obtained the consent of the government on the other end of the correspondence before publishing the papers. However, in this case it seemed that the original source of the leak was British and not American; that no American authority could properly have this information unless it had come from some British source. I further stated that I had talked to Senator Chandler and that it was my belief, after talking with, him, that the person from whom Chandler obtained a copy of this paper had himself either directly or indirectly obtained it from some person in the British Embassy itself. That, I considered, should be taken into serious consideration in evaluating this whole incident. Lord Halifax replied that he realized that it was probably true that the information had come either directly from his Embassy or from one of the affiliated missions in Washington. He was not prepared to say just where and how, but he thought he was on the trail of discovering where information came from. He was concerned, however, not now so much with that for he considered that an internal question for his own attention, as he was concerned with the serious deterioration of American relations in England and he hoped very much that the Secretary of State would be able to make some prompt reference to it which would express his disappointment or disapproval of the act. I told the Ambassador that I had talked this morning with Senator Connally on the basis of a statement he might make in the premises as they existed prior to the publication by Senator Chandler of this latest message. However, the facts had changed since then so that I had subsequently talked to Senator Connally and he felt that the matter should go over until Tuesday and that in the meantime it might be considered what steps the British Embassy might take. However, I stated that I would bring the matter to the attention of the Secretary of State and would advise him that the Ambassador thought it important to make some prompt statement and if it was possible to reach Mr. Hull before Monday, and during Sunday, that I would be glad to bring it to his attention, but that he was inaccessible for the rest of this day. The Ambassador did not indicate that he would make any statement public or that he would treat it in any way except as a matter of internal administration in his own Embassy and in connection with the affiliated missions. B[ reckinridge ] L[ ong ] [Annex] Text of United Press Ticker News Extract Senator Chandler released the purported text of a cable from a British official in India declaring former Ambassador William Phillips “persona non grata” and stating that “we could not again receive him” should he be sent back to India. Chandler, who made a Senate speech on Wednesday denouncing “British interference” in American diplomatic affairs, released the cable in reply to charges by the British Ambassador, the Earl of Halifax, that “persons in responsible quarters” had made assertions “which are quite untrue”. The cable released by Chandler was signed by Sir Olaf Caroe, of the Department of External Affairs in New Delhi, India, and was sent to the Secretary of State for India in London. It termed Phillips “persona non grata” and revealed that the British have used censorship in an effort to block republication of the Pearson article in India. No date was on the cable as released by Chandler. “We have stopped this particular message from coming into the country,” the cable said, “and are doing our best to prevent entry of newspapers or letters carrying text of Pearson article. “It is regrettable to have to use censorship in defense of such attacks by our greatest ally. “We understand designation of Phillips is still President’s Personal Representative in India. Whether or not he was connected in any way with leakage, views he has stated would make it impossible for us to do other than regard him as persona non grata and we could not again receive him. His views are not what we are entitled to expect from a professedly friendly envoy. Viceroy has seen this telegram.” September 2, 1944. 35 Printed as annex to this memorandum. 36 Senator Tom Connally, Texas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 37 Senator A. B. Chandler, Kentucky. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) 845.00/9–244 [Document 256] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Long ) [ Washington ,] September 4, 1944. Sir Ronald Campbell called by telephone to ask if there was anything that I could say for the information of Lord Halifax as to the matters discussed in the conversation he had with me on last Saturday, September 2. I replied that the Secretary was laying the matter before the President and that there was nothing I could tell him further than that. He asked if there was any indication as to time of a decision. I told him that there was no way I could inform him as to the time of a decision. B[ reckinridge ] L[ ong ] The Officer in Chargé at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State 845.00/9–444: Telegram [Document 257] The Officer in Chargé at New Delhi ( Merrell ) to the Secretary of State New Delhi , September 4, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:30 p.m.] 687. Although there has yet appeared no editorial comment, this morning’s New Delhi press gave renewed prominence to Mr. Phillips’ letter to the President of May 14, and published for the first time the substance of the telegram sent by Sir Olaf Caroe the Foreign Secretary in which he referred to Mr. Phillips as persona non grata in India. In compliance with his request I called on Sir Olaf this afternoon and he said that he wanted to tell me quite frankly that the telegram was authentic except for the omission in the version published here of “the most important item” which was that Mr. Phillips’ letter had “sneered” at the Indian Army. He also mentioned particularly Mr. Phillips’ allusion to the Indian Army as “purely mercenary” which had been taken up in another telegram. He added that he wanted to make clear that the telegram was not personal but was sent on behalf of the Government in India and represented others’ views as well as his own. I confined my reply to expressing surprise and to emphasizing that the letter had been written more than a year before its publication. Caroe appeared shattered that his telegram had been made public and said that he had no idea how the leak had occurred. Sent to Department as 687, September 4, 4 p.m.; repeated to London. Merrell [Ambassador Phillips did not return to India, resuming his retirement status upon relinquishing his duties at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). The Officer in Chargé at New Delhi (Merrell) was on February 28, 1945, appointed Commissioner at New Delhi with the rank of Minister and on March 14, 1945, President Roosevelt accepted from Ambassador Phillips the latter’s resignation as Personal Representative of the President in India.] Agreement between the United States and the Government of India, and exchange of notes between the United States and the United Kingdom, concerning the lend-lease of silver Agreement between the United States and the Government of India, and exchange of notes between the United States and the United Kingdom, concerning the lend-lease of silver [258] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) [Washington,] January 8, 1944. 845.515/545 [259] The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the British Ambassador (Halifax) Washington, January 19, 1944. 845.515/539a [260] The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) Washington, January 22, 1944. 845.515/536 [261] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [Washington,] January 26, 1944. 845.515/545 [262] The Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) to the Secretary of State Washington, January 27, 1944. 845.515/529 [263] Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Department of State Policy Committee [Washington,] February 2, 1944. Files of the Policy Committee: Lot 122 [264] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [Washington,] February 9, 1944. 845.515/545 [265] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) [Washington,] February 11, 1944. 845.515/545 [266] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Executive Secretary of the Policy Committee (Yost) [Washington,] February 12, 1944. 845.515/541 [267] The Acting Secretary of State to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) Washington, February 17, 1944. 845.515/529 [268] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] February 29, 1944. 845.515/546 [269] The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Acting Secretary of State Washington, February 29, 1944. 845.515/546 [270] The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] March 1, 1944. 845.515/548 [271] The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) Washington, March 6, 1944. 845.515/546 [272] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax) Washington, March 14, 1944. 845.515/546 [273] The Secretary of State to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) Washington, March 14, 1944. 845.515/546 [274] The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State Washington, March 21, 1944. 845.515/549 [275] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax) Washington, April 7, 1944. 845.515/549 [276] The Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) to Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs Washington, May 30, 1944. 845.515/574 [277] The Acting Secretary of State to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) Washington, June 6, 1944. 845.515/546 [278] The Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) Washington, June 13, 1944. 845.515/6–1344 [279] The British Chargé (Campbell) to the Secretary of State Washington, July 15, 1944. 845.515/7–1544 [280] The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Campbell) Washington, July 28, 1944. 845.515/7–1544 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) 845.515/545 [Document 258] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations ( Murray ) [ Washington ,] January 8, 1944. Mr. Harry White 38 of the Treasury Department called me by telephone this morning to inform me of the latest developments in the question of lend-leasing 100,000,000 ounces of silver for use in combating inflation in India. Mr. White stated that during the discussion of this matter with the “silver senators”, when the question was asked whether this silver should be lend-leased to the British Government or to the Government of India, several of the senators had expressed a preference for a direct lend-lease transaction with the Government of India. Mr. White further stated that Secretary Morgenthau 39 favored dealing direct with the Government of India in this matter. Recalling that this matter had been discussed earlier with certain officials of this Department and that a preference had then been expressed for dealing with the British Government in this matter, Mr. White inquired what our views were at the present time. I informed Mr. White that in the discussions which had taken place here we had been strongly of the opinion that the silver should be lend-leased direct to the British Government for any use they might see fit to put it to in India and that the British Government should assume the responsibility for the eventual return of the silver ounce by ounce. In this connection I reminded Mr. White that the Government of India is not a “government” in our ordinary understanding of the word but is merely a term for the British Government exercising its rule in India; that in our view no possible political advantage would be gained by dealing with the Government of India in this matter, whereas certain future risks and disadvantages might result. Mr. White then stated that the Treasury had not considered that the risks were any greater in one case than in the other and that he could not conceive of any government repudiating an agreement to return silver which had been furnished it under a Lend-Lease arrangement. I told Mr. White that I was unable to follow his reasoning that there would be no greater risk in dealing with the Government of India than there would be in dealing with the Government of Britain in this matter for the reason that no one could foretell what the set-up in India would be after this war; that a violently nationalistic government made up of Indians themselves might gain power and that it would, in our view, be rash to assume that such a native government, with possibly strong color prejudice against the white peoples of the West, would voluntarily assume obligations undertaken on their behalf by the British under the name of “Government of India” at this time. It seemed to me, therefore, advisable to place the responsibility in this matter squarely upon the British Government which, in turn, is in a position, if it wishes, to shift the burden of obligation to the Indians. If it does not wish to do so or if it feels that it cannot do so, that is of course of an intra-Empire matter, and irrespective of any such action which might be taken by Great Britain we would be in a position to look to it for the fulfillment of the transaction. Mr. White inquired of me whether we had discussed this matter with Lend-Lease people since there was a feeling in Treasury that it was a matter for agreement between ourselves and Lend-Lease. I told Mr. White I did not know what there was precisely to discuss; that, however, in recent discussions regarding the method of obtaining under reverse Lend-Lease from India certain vitally needed raw materials we had strongly supported the view that Great Britain should assume the responsibility for coming to a satisfactory financial arrangement with the Government of India in order that the desired raw materials might be forthcoming. It seemed only natural to suppose that our viewpoint might be the same in the present matter of silver. Mr. White then said that he agreed that there would probably be no useful purpose in our conferring with the Lend-Lease authorities about this matter and that he would take it up again with Mr. Morgenthau who might view the matter differently in the light of the factors in the situation of which he had not been aware when he had come to the conclusion that it might be preferable to deal direct with the Government of India in the lend-leasing of this silver. Wallace Murray 38 Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in charge of Monetary Research and Foreign Funds Control. 39 Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury. The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the British Ambassador (Halifax) 845.515/539a [Document 259] The Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) to the British Ambassador ( Halifax ) Washington , January 19, 1944. My Dear Mr. Ambassador : Following your letter to me of November 9, 1943 40 relative to the proposed lend-lease silver arrangement for India, officials of the Department have had many conversations on the question with our Treasury. I am now informed and am happy to tell you that the Treasury has made a favorable recommendation on the proposal to the Foreign Economic Administration. I believe, therefore, that only certain details which can probably be easily worked out are all that remain before the plan can be put into effect. With best wishes, Sincerely yours, E. R. Stettinius, Jr. 40 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 280 . The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 845.515/536 [Document 260] The British Ambassador ( Halifax ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) Washington , January 22, 1944. My Dear Ed : I have received your letter of January 19th in which you inform me that the Treasury has recommended favourably the proposal to make a hundred million ounces of silver available to the Government of India, and I note that it is your belief that only certain details remain to be worked out. I have just received a telegram from Mr. Amery, 41 the Secretary of State for India saying how grateful he is that this valuable support to the Indian economy is forthcoming, and I want to thank you very much for your cooperation in arranging this matter. Yours sincerely, Halifax 41 Leopold S. Amery. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs 845.515/545 [Document 261] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] January 26, 1944. Participants: Mr. K. C. Mahindra, Chief of the Indian Supply Mission Mr. Alling 42 Mr. Oakes Mr. Mahindra called at his request in connection with the proposed lend-lease of 100 million ounces of silver for use by the Government of India. He commenced his conversation by stating that he had been astonished and distressed to find that arrangements now contemplated would render Great Britain responsible for the return of the silver; that it was his understanding that when this question was discussed last August in connection with the supply of 20 million ounces for coinage purposes it was decided that the return of silver provided to India would be an obligation of the Government of India. Mr. Stettinius, according to Mr. Mahindra, had indicated at that time that this would be the case. It was pointed out to Mr. Mahindra that it was our understanding that the transaction effecting the 20 million ounces of silver had been simply an ad hoc agreement, and that arrangements made with regard to that transaction did not affect the present one. Mr. Alling asked Mr. Mahindra why he thought that the Government of India should be held responsible for the return of the silver rather than Great Britain. Mr. Mahindra replied that, first, India was one of the United Nations and was regarded as a separate entity among those nations; and that, secondly, to refrain from making India responsible would suggest that we were concerned lest the Government of India would not honor its debt. He was sure that we did not have any such feeling, but that if we did he must consider it as an insult to his country. Before any very precise reply had to be given to that observation, Mr. Mahindra continued his remarks with reference to the firm financial position which his country enjoyed, its past financial history, and implied that of the two Governments the Government of India was more solvent than the United Kingdom. Mr. Alling replied that we were well aware of India’s large sterling balances and that we questioned the solvency of neither Government. Mr. Alling asked, however, whether the Government of India was entirely independent financially. Mr. Mahindra insisted that it was, except for the fact that the rupee was pegged to the pound. He admitted that his Government did not control the dollar balances accruing to it, but maintained that this was because of American insistence that empire credits be considered as a whole. He added confidentially that his Government expected shortly to have an independent dollar balance for purchases in the United States. Reverting to the reason for Mr. Mahindra’s call, Mr. Oakes stated that failing convincing argument to the contrary it appeared to the Department that the Government of the United Kingdom was the Government which should be expected to see to the return of the silver, in as much as lend-lease of the silver was being effected through the lend-lease agreement with the British Government, and in as much as it was the British Ambassador who had made representations to the Department on the subject. Mr. Mahindra replied that he was in disagreement, in that the transaction was not really one of lend-lease in that there was the promise to repay which did not exist in true lend-lease transactions; and, secondly, that it was the Government of India which had pressed for the loan of the silver. The British Ambassador had entered the picture only because it had been thought desirable to make representations on as high a plane as possible. The British Ambassador represented in the United States, moreover, not only the Government of the United Kingdom but the Government of India. In the earlier representations Mr. Mahindra had advanced the matter for the Government of India, assisted by Sir Cecil Kisch of that Government. Sir David Waley of the British Treasury had assisted in these representations only because a silver expert was needed in connection with the conversations on the subject with the United States Treasury. Mr. Mahindra continued that if we felt that the Government of India was worthy of receiving a note from us asking for reciprocal aid, he could not understand why his Government should not expect us to deal directly with it in so far as the present transaction is concerned. The lend-lease agreement with Great Britain simply provided a convenient means of effecting the transaction. He intimated that if we did not wish to treat his Government as an entity, his Government might well be justified in declining to provide reciprocal aid under the arrangement now contemplated. Mr. Alling asked whether Great Britain was not assisting India in making available to the United States the materials requested as reciprocal aid. Mr. Mahindra replied in the negative, stating that the Government of India alone was responsible for furnishing these materials and that the British entered into the picture only to the extent of having suggested in the first instance that we make the request of the Dominions and of India. Mr. Alling observed that he had been under a somewhat different impression. He continued that frankly, with regard to the general picture, he could not see quite where the Government of India began and where the Government of Great Britain ended; that we had reason to believe that the Indian people viewed lend-lease with considerable suspicion; that we did not wish to do anything which would suggest to the people of India that we were attempting to entrench ourselves in India; and that hence it appeared best that the return of the silver be made an obligation of Great Britain rather than of India. Mr. Mahindra replied that there was some suspicion on the part of the Indians and that he was compelled to remark that American protestations did not always coincide with American actions. However, he himself understood why certain recommendations advanced by us had not been implemented, but that the average Indian did not; that in making the silver available to the Government of Great Britain rather than to India direct there would be the feeling in India that this was a further indication of our tendency to strengthen the British yoke; and that, in fact, we would be increasing Britain’s hold upon India. Mr. Alling replied that Mr. Mahindra could be sure that in any of our actions regarding India we were motivated by a desire to do what was in the best interests of the Indians; that in this case there appeared to be an honest difference of opinion as to what the reaction would be among the Indians; that we felt that certainly from the long-range view there were apt to be less unfavorable repercussions if Great Britain was made responsible for the debt rather than the present Government of India. Mr. Alling requested that Mr. Mahindra put on paper his views on the subject and promised that they would be given consideration. Mr. Mahindra agreed to send Mr. Alling a memorandum. 43 In parting he emphasized that he was most anxious that a prompt decision be made as delay in securing the silver was occasioning his Government great concern. 42 Paul H. Alling, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. 43 January 26, not printed. The Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) to the Secretary of State 845.515/529 [Document 262] The Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration ( Crowley ) to the Secretary of State Washington , January 27, 1944. Dear Mr. Secretary : As you are aware, discussions have been going on since last summer with respect to a request from the Government of India for the lend-leasing of 100 million ounces of silver to be used to combat inflation in India and to provide a stabilization reserve there. The proposal contemplates an agreement for the return of the silver on an ounce for ounce basis at the end of five years. The proposal was initiated by the Government of India representatives here, with the knowledge and agreement of the representatives of His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain. Mr. Morgenthau and Mr. Stettinius participated in the discussions from the American side. Mr. Morgenthau has recently addressed a letter to me stating that the Treasury Department is now prepared to proceed with the lend-leasing of this silver as soon as an appropriate agreement for the return of the silver has been made by the Foreign Economic Administration. Vice Admiral F. J. Home has written Mr. Morgenthau on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stating that they have no objection from the military point of view to the proposed operation, and Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, has written Mr. Morgenthau, stating that it will not interfere with the domestic need of silver for use in the war effort. The Foreign Economic Administration is prepared to approve the transaction in general principle. A question has arisen, however, as to whether the transaction and the return agreement should be arranged directly with the Government of India or with His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain on behalf of the Government of India. The advantages of handling the transaction with His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain are the greater financial security provided, in view of the uncertainties of the post-war status of India, and the avoidance of creating possible ambiguities with respect to the present constitutional relations between India and Great Britain. The advantages of dealing with the Government of India are the greater simplicity of this method of operation and the fact that it is believed that the Government of India, which initiated the discussions, would take serious umbrage at being regarded as not in position to undertake international obligations of this sort on its own responsibility. The latter point is the more important because discussions are now in process between the Government of India, the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration with respect to the execution of an over-all agreement for the provision of reciprocal aid for lend-lease purposes by the Government of India to the United States. The general terms of this latter agreement, I believe, were agreed to in principle by the Department of State representatives on December 15, 1943. 44 The United States Government, if the second alternative method of handling the silver transaction be adopted, may therefore be in the somewhat difficult position of taking one attitude towards the Government of India with respect to mutual aid for lend-leasing purposes, and a contrary position with respect to the direct lend-leasing of silver. I have the honor to ask your opinion as to the more appropriate method of arranging the proposed lend-leasing of 100 million ounces of silver for the use of the Government of India, under the conditions set out above. Because the Government of India desires to use part of the silver for coinage, and because the reserve of silver now in the hands of the Government of India is shrinking rapidly and will probably last less than two months more at the present rate of reduction, it is urgent that a decision be reached and the necessary steps taken at as early a date as possible. Sincerely yours, Leo T. Crowley 44 For exchange of notes between the two Governments on October 6 and December 15, 1943, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 279 and 282 , respectively. Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Department of State Policy Committee Files of the Policy Committee: Lot 122 [Document 263] Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Department of State Policy Committee 45 [Extract] [ Washington ,] February 2, 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Proposal to Lend-Lease 100,000,000 Ounces of Silver to India Mr. Murray declared that the point at issue is whether the responsibility for the return of the silver should be placed on the British or on the Indian Government. Mr. Murray felt that in view of the great uncertainty in regard to the character of the Government of India five years hence, we are more likely to be reimbursed if the responsibility is placed on the British. Mr. Acheson suggested that if the responsibility is placed on the British alone they will have no claim on the Indians to serve as a basis for collecting from the latter. He felt that both should owe an obligation to the U.S. The Secretary expressed the view that the two Governments should assume the obligation jointly, and the Committee concurred. Mr. Hackworth suggested that this be effected by making the agreement with the Indians and having the British underwrite it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Attended by the Secretary of State (presiding); the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius); Messrs. Berle, Long, Acheson, and Shaw, Assistant Secretaries of State; the Legal Adviser (Hackworth) and the Directors of the several Geographic Offices. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs 845.515/545 [Document 264] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] February 9, 1944. I telephoned Mr. K. C. Mahindra, Chief of the India Supply Mission, at his request to inform him when the Department’s views regarding the lend-lease of 100 million ounces of silver for use by the Government of India would be conveyed to FEA 46 I told Mr. Mahindra that a letter on the subject had been drafted for the Secretary’s signature and that accordingly it could be expected that FEA would receive the requested advice in the immediate future. Mr. Mahindra then asked me if I could inform him of the Policy Committee’s decision, in so far as was concerned the question of responsibility by the Government of India for return of the silver. I stated that it had been decided that the Government of India and the Government of Great Britain should have joint responsibility. Mr. Mahindra was much distressed at this news and stated that this decision was much worse than would have been a decision that Great Britain should bear the responsibility alone. (It will be recalled that the proposal submitted by OEA [ NEA? ] 47 to the Policy Committee expressed the opinion that assumption of responsibility by Great Britain on behalf of the Government of India would in this instance be especially objectionable in India, and that hence responsibility to the United States should be borne by the Government of Great Britain alone.) Mr. Mahindra continued that insistence that Great Britain assume the responsibility for the return of the silver could be explained on the technical ground that as there was no direct lend-lease agreement with the Government of India responsibility by Great Britain was logical, but that to allow the Government of India to assume responsibility and then to ask the Government of Great Britain to underwrite that responsibility would be accepted as a definite indication of lack of faith in his Government’s integrity. He asked whether he and the Agent General might be permitted to present their views before the Policy Committee, prior to word being sent to FEA. He asked further if I would do what I could in the matter, phoning him again in the morning. I telephoned Mr. Mahindra this morning and stated that the Department would be glad to withhold its communication to FEA, pending such further representations as he and the Agent General might wish to make; that those representations should, however, be made before one of the executive officers of the Department rather than before the Policy Committee. Mr. Mahindra replied that the Agent General was at present in New York but that he would communicate with him by telephone to request that he seek an appointment with the Secretary or the Under Secretary in order that the matter might be discussed further. Mr. Mahindra expressed appreciation of the Department’s action in withholding temporarily its letter to FEA on the subject. I have asked Mr. Rostow to see that FEA is advised that reply to its letter is being delayed at the specific request of Mr. Mahindra. 46 Foreign Economic Administration. 47 Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) 845.515/545 [Document 265] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs ( Allen ) [ Washington ,] February 11, 1944. Participants: Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Agent General for India Mr. K. C. Mahindra, Chief, India Supply Mission Mr. Dean Acheson Mr. Wallace Murray Mr. Paul H. Alling Mr. George V. Allen Mr. C. H. Oakes Mr. Acheson reviewed the considerations involved in the lend-leasing of 100 million ounces of silver to India. He referred to the fact that silver always presents a special case and may not be treated as other commodities or supplies furnished under lend-lease, in view of the special interest of the Senate in any question which concerned silver. He said that the executive branches of the Government felt that special precautions should be taken to provide for the return of the silver, ounce for ounce, at the end of five years, in accordance with the wishes of the Senators concerned. Sir Girja said that he and Mr. Mahindra would like to present to the Department the attitude of the Government of India in this matter. He said that India had been struggling for some years for fiscal as well as for political autonomy, as evidenced by the emphasis placed on fiscal autonomy at the Sound Table Conference in London in 1931. 48 At that time India was a debtor nation vis-à-vis Great Britain, and some justification might have existed then for asking Great Britain to underwrite a debt of the Government of India. At the present time, he said, India is a creditor nation, and the people of India would be particularly resentful of a demand by the United States that the British Government underwrite a debt of the Government of India. Mr. Murray said that the attitude of the American Government that Great Britain should be made responsible for the return of the silver, either separately or jointly with the Government of India, resulted in part from the fact that no one could say at this time what government would be in power in India five years hence. Sir Girja felt confident that any government in India would wish to maintain its credit and would be careful to avoid repudiation. He pointed out that the silver would be of assistance to all of India and that the obligation for its repayment was quite a different matter from the payment of expenses for the re-conquest of Burma, (which, he admitted, Gandhi and the Congress Party 49 had objected to being made an obligation of the Indian people). Mr. Mahindra said that our insistence that Great Britain underwrite the debt would have a most unfortunate effect in India, and he felt that if the British Government is to be obligated in the matter at all, Great Britain should be made solely responsible for repayment. Mr. Acheson asked whether the Government of India would prefer joint responsibility by the Governments of India and Great Britain, instead of an obligation assumed by the Government of India and underwritten by the Government of Great Britain. Sir Girja replied that what was preferred was an obligation on the part of the Government of India alone, without involving Great Britain in any way. Mr. Mahindra suggested the possibility of consummating the transaction without any formal agreement. He thought the matter could be handled, perhaps, in the same manner as all other lend-lease transactions with India; that is, the British authorities in Washington would sign a requisition for the silver, with a notation that it was being requested for retransfer to India. An accompanying exchange of letters might specify that the silver was to be returned ounce for ounce at the end of five years. He said that the American Government’s insistence upon Great Britain’s guarantee might well give the impression in India that the United States was attempting to strengthen and continue British rule in India. Mr. Acheson said that he agreed with Sir Girja that repudiation on the part of the Government of India was most unlikely and asked how much importance the Government of India attached to the form of guarantee. Sir Girja said that very great importance was attached to the subject, since the Government of India felt that its good faith was involved. Mr. Acheson stated that the views of Sir Girja and Mr. Mahindra would be taken into consideration by the Department. 48 The three Round Table Conferences on the affairs of India held in London during 1930–1932 represented attempts to find a solution to the constitutional problems of India by direct discussions between the British Government and Indian leaders. The second conference was held September 7–December 1, 1931. 49 The Mahatma Mohandas K. Gandhi, proponent of non-violence in resistance to British rule in India, was also unofficial leader of the Indian National Congress, Hindu nationalist party. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Executive Secretary of the Policy Committee (Yost) 845.515/541 [Document 266] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Acheson ) to the Executive Secretary of the Policy Committee ( Yost ) [ Washington ,] February 12, 1944. Sir Girja Bajpai has made urgent representations that his Government would take most serious offense at any suggestion on our part that the agreement for the return of the million ounces of silver to be transferred under the Lend-Lease Act for use in India be made with the Government of the United Kingdom as sole obligor, as joint obligor with the Government of India, or as guarantor of the promise of the Government of India. He pointed out that even though the constitutional position of the Indian Government might well change after the war, it was inconceivable that any Indian Government would repudiate an obligation with the United States. His Government, like the Government of the United States, regards the obligations of a government as binding upon its legal successor. India views its relations with the United States as of the highest importance to it, on the political, the commercial and the financial planes. In view of the seriousness which the Indians attach to this issue, we recommend that the decision of the Policy Committee of February 2 be revised to propose that the Foreign Economic Administration transfer the silver to the Indians in the usual way, through the re-transfer procedure (which may itself carry with it certain British responsibility), making the agreement for the return of the silver, however, exclusively with the Government of India. 50 Agreements for the return of lend-lease silver in kind are a special feature of the lend-lease program, developed through arrangements between Secretary Morgenthau and the Silver Committee of the Senate. They are not required by law. So far as the Treasury is concerned, an agreement directly with the Government of India will be regarded as entirely satisfying the understanding between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Silver Committee. It should be noted that we must apply considerable pressure to the Indians this coming week in connection with the reverse lend-lease of raw materials, on which they have proposed an unacceptable procedure. It will not help this negotiation, of direct importance to the war production program to have the Government of India in a mood of irritation. We are not unmindful either, in making this recommendation, of the confusion and difficulty which have resulted for American troops in China in direct consequences of the deterioration of our lend-lease relations with China. Reverse lend-lease for the troops in India is not in perfect condition, and measures for its amelioration are receiving consideration. From the point of view of the conduct of the war, the good-will of the Government of India for such purposes seems of more direct importance than the remote possibility that some future Indian Government might repudiate its obligation to return to us a quantity of silver which we do not need. The decision of this issue seems to require a choice. If we accept the obligation of the Government of India alone, some future government may repudiate it, or, as is conceded to be more likely, may feel some resentment at having to meet it. On the other hand, if we involve the British Government in the transaction, the present Government of India will feel a very strong resentment, which cannot help but prejudice reverse lend-lease arrangements of immediate importance to us in the war. As between the two possible resentments, we have no hesitation. The good relations of the United States and a future Indian Government will depend on many factors beyond the return of the silver involved here. On the other hand, it seems clear that nothing but harm can come to the supply arrangements in India upon which our forces depend for support and well being, and on which the success of the Burma campaign may largely hinge, if we insist on a British promise to return the silver. We can see no gain to the United States from giving offense in this case to the British and the Indians. 50 In a meeting on February 14, the Policy Committee recommended that the loan be made with joint responsibility by the Indian and British Governments. The Acting Secretary of State to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) 845.515/529 [Document 267] The Acting Secretary of State to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration ( Crowley ) Washington , February 17, 1944. My Dear Mr. Crowley : We have considered your letter of January 27, 1944, on the proposed transfer under the Act of March 11, 1941, 51 of 100 million ounces of silver for use in India. You state that question has arisen concerning “whether the transaction and the return agreement” should be arranged direct with the Government of India or with the British Government. It is the view of this Department that the obligation for the return of the silver should be assumed jointly by the Government of Great Britain and the Government of India. Sincerely yours, Edward E. Stettinius, Jr. 51 55 Stat. 31. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State 845.515/546 [Document 268] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [ Washington ,] February 29, 1944. Lord Halifax called upon me this afternoon at his request to discuss the Indian Silver matter. The British feel badly that we are requesting them to guarantee the loan of the silver to India. I told Lord Halifax that this was a matter that had been carefully considered in the Department. He asked if I would mind reviewing the matter with my associates again and he stated he would send me a letter this evening that we could have at 9:30 tomorrow morning for our Policy Committee meeting, at which time I would review the matter. He said that even though our answer was in the negative, could we let ten million ounces of silver go immediately to the Indians without prejudicing the final solution. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Acting Secretary of State 845.515/546 [Document 269] The British Ambassador ( Halifax ) to the Acting Secretary of State Washington , February 29, 1944. My Dear Ed : When I raised with you this afternoon the question of Indian silver, you asked me after our talk to let you have a brief note on the subject. This I gladly do. I have just had a telegram from the Secretary of State for India in which he expresses his great anxiety at the position taken up on this matter by the United States Administration. The Government of India, as you know, has learnt with much gratitude of the willingness of the United States Government to help in this matter of silver, but the Secretary of State for India is much perturbed that along with this readiness to help should have gone the request that His Majesty’s Government should accept with the Government of India a joint obligation to the United States Government. He assumes that this attitude is partly the result of His Majesty’s Government having sponsored the Indian case, but also arises from a feeling in the mind of the United States Government that an undertaking for replacement from the Government of India alone is in the present constitutional situation, and in view of possible future developments, inadequate. He has asked me to represent to you as strongly as I may the fact that for over twenty years India has been recognised by all countries as fully competent to enter into separate International obligations and has done so freely. Moreover the United States Government themselves have hitherto treated India on this basis in respect of mutual aid and reciprocal aid including coinage silver supplied last autumn, though admittedly it was stated at the time this was not to be regarded as a precedent. He greatly regrets that the State Department should have now felt it necessary to adopt so rigid an attitude, and he would wish on behalf of His Majesty’s Government to make it quite clear that he cannot accept the implication that India is in any respect wanting in competence to conclude such a deal, or that the prospect of future Governments honouring obligations of their predecessors can properly be questioned. He feels too that you have perhaps given insufficient weight to possible, or even probable, repercussions upon Indian susceptibilities of such open distrust of India’s future as your present attitude would appear to imply, and accordingly hopes that for this and other reasons, including that of the future relations subsisting between India and the United States, you may be prepared to reconsider this attitude. May I add just this from my own judgment, on the basis of my past knowledge and experience of India? I do think that the Indian Political leaders who perhaps before long are likely to find themselves in a position of responsibility, are bound to resent the suggestion that they are unworthy of confidence in this matter. Nor can I imagine that, purely on the basis of Indian self interest, any such fear of Indian failure to honour their obligations is likely to be well-founded. If it so turns out that an Indian Popular Government is established in the not too distant future, the last thing in the world that I should imagine they would wish to do would be to quarrel with the United States. Every consideration would lead them to follow a different line! I do therefore venture to associate my own personal argument with those of the Secretary of State for India in the hope that it may be possible for your Administration to reconsider their present position on this subject. In any case, and however this discussion may go, I am asked finally to put this further request of urgency before you. The Government of India are pressing for deliveries of silver to commence and attach very great importance to the time factor. His Majesty’s Government would accordingly ask that if a discussion of the main issue, as I have tried to set it out above, is likely to take more than two or three days, you would be willing to allow immediate shipment of say ten million ounces, without prejudice to the larger question. Yours sincerely, Halifax The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State 845.515/548 [Document 270] The Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] March 1, 1944. Mr. Secretary : You will recall during recent months discussions relative to lend-leasing silver to India and as to whether this should be a direct relation to India or whether the loan should be guaranteed by the British. The last time this matter was discussed you were definitely of the opinion the British should guarantee the loan. This was confirmed at a meeting of the Policy Committee in your absence. However Acheson and Taft 52 think there should be a direct relationship with the Indian Government. The decision was made that the loan should be guaranteed by the British and Lord Halifax has come back with a strong plea that the matter be reconsidered. He called upon me yesterday afternoon and submitted a note this morning. I have reviewed the matter with those in the Department again and they feel we should not change our position. Inasmuch as it is likely the British will make quite an issue of the matter, I want to be sure that there is no possibility of your changing your position before advising the British definitely once and for all that we cannot change our position in the matter. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] 52 Charles P. Taft, Director of the Office of Wartime Economic Affairs. The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) 845.515/546 [Document 271] The Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration ( Crowley ) Washington , March 6, 1944. Dear Leo : With reference to my letter of February 17 on Indian silver, I am enclosing herewith a copy of a letter from Lord Halifax, dated February 29 53 requesting reconsideration of the decision regarding the guarantee for the return of the 100,000,000 ounces of silver for use in India. You will note that he requests immediate shipment of 10,000,000 ounces without prejudice to the larger question. I have told Lord Halifax that we shall review carefully the decision regarding guarantees and that in the meantime I felt it would be possible to ship the 10,000,000 ounces without prejudicing the final decision, and with the understanding that the decision on the guarantee for the remaining 90,000,000 ounces will also apply to the emergency shipment of 10,000,000 ounces. With the understanding outlined above, I would appreciate it if you would consult with your administration and Treasury Department in order to determine the manner in which the 10,000,000 ounce shipment should be temporarily documented. With best wishes, Sincerely yours, E. R. Stettinius, Jr. 53 Ante , p. 261 [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] . The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax) 845.515/546 [Document 272] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador ( Halifax ) Washington , March 14, 1944. Dear Mr. Ambassador : I refer to your conversation of February 29, 1944 with the Under Secretary, and to your letter of the same date, on the subject of this Government’s decision that 100 million ounces of silver should be made available for use by the Government of India upon the assumption of joint responsibility of the Governments of the United Kingdom and of India for the return of the silver in question. This matter has again been the subject of consideration with careful attention to the views conveyed by you. I regret the necessity of informing you, however, that it has not been found possible to alter the decision which the Department has taken in this matter. You may be sure that I should have been very glad to have been able to give you a reply more nearly in accord with your wishes. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull The Secretary of State to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) 845.515/546 [Document 273] The Secretary of State to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration ( Crowley ) Washington , March 14, 1944. My Dear Mr. Crowley : I refer to the Under Secretary’s letter of March 6, 1944 on the subject of the 100 million ounces of silver to be provided for use by the Government of India. I have, upon my return, given further consideration to this matter. The decision rests, however, that in the opinion of the Department the supply of the silver should be conditioned upon the assumption of joint responsibility by the Governments of the United Kingdom and of India for its return. The British Ambassador has been informed in the premises. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State 845.515/549 [Document 274] The British Ambassador ( Halifax ) to the Secretary of State Washington , March 21, 1944. Dear Mr. Hull : I write to acknowledge your letter of March 14th in which you confirm the United States Government’s decision that 100 million ounces of silver should be made available for use by the Government of India, upon the assumption of joint responsibility of the Governments of the United Kingdom and of India for the return of the silver in question. You further inform me that it has not been found possible to alter the position taken by the State Department in this matter. 2. I have now received notice from London that my Government authorises me to propose a further solution. The suggestion is made that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom subscribe to an agreement with the United States Government that, in the event of the Government of India failing to fulfil their obligation, His Majesty’s Government will take all necessary steps to secure delivery to the United States Treasury of the amounts of silver required to implement the agreement. 3. Such an undertaking would be a formal agreement between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States, and would be complementary to, instead of part of, any agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the United States. 4. An agreement along these lines would not prejudice the recognised power of the Government of India to enter into international governmental agreements in their own name. And it is out of consideration of India’s status in this respect that I am obliged to ask that, should the United States Government be ready to enter into an agreement with the United Kingdom Government on the lines which I have indicated above, any such agreement should not be made public. 5. I am afraid that misunderstanding regarding the status of the Government of India persists in many quarters. It is true that India is not an independent sovereign state: the Government of India being in law subject to the general control and the particular directions of His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for India. The extent, however, to which this statutory right of control can be exercised is substantially qualified. In many matters, it would be in practice no more possible than it would be expedient to attempt to overrule the Government of India, composed as it is today in overwhelming proportion of Indian public men. 6. You will recall that India was a separate signatory of the Treaty of Versailles 54 and of the Paris Convention of 1919 on International Air Navigation. 55 She was an original member of the League of Nations and of the International Labour Office. For the past twenty-five years, she has regularly had her own representative at conferences. I may further add that the Government of India will be treated by my Government in exactly the same way as the Governments of Dominions should preliminary conversations take place on post-war civil aviation as has been proposed. 7. In view, therefore, of the great concern which my Government has for the fostering and developing of India’s status towards independence, and at the same time recognising the urgency of combating the unhappy tendencies towards inflation now prevalent in that country, it is my most earnest hope that you will give careful consideration to the suggestion that an agreement be entered into by your Government and mine which will assist the internal stability of India, without prejudice to the cause of her own political evolution. Yours sincerely, (For the Ambassador) Michael Wright 54 Signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919; annotated text in Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , p. 55 . 55 Signed at Paris, October 13, 1919, Foreign Relations , 1926, vol. i , p. 152 . The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax) 845.515/549 [Document 275] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador ( Halifax ) Washington , April 7, 1944. My Dear Mr. Ambassador : I desire to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 21, 1944 on the subject of this Government’s decision regarding silver in the quantity of 100 million ounces, which has been requested for use by the Government of India. It is entirely acceptable to my Government that in lieu of the arrangement earlier suggested there be an agreement between the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom that should for any reason the Government of India fail to return the silver at the time stipulated, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such steps as may be necessary to effect delivery to the United States Treasury of the amount of silver involved. The Department will make every effort to comply with your request that any such agreement not be made public and the confidential nature of the matter will be emphasized in any information on the subject which it may be necessary to convey to other branches of the Government. I assume that the Embassy will wish to transmit a draft agreement for consideration by the Department. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull The Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) to Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs 845.515/574 [Document 276] The Counselor of the British Embassy ( Wright ) to Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs Washington , May 30, 1944. Dear Mr. Oakes : I am writing to confirm the several points made in conversations which you have had with Mr. Miles of this Embassy, about the Indian silver question. I note that you favour abandoning the draft agreement between my Government and yours 56 in favour of an exchange of notes: such a procedure will be entirely acceptable to this Embassy. The draft agreement, which I understand was studied and approved in principle by those concerned in the State Department, will serve to indicate what would be the substance of the exchange of notes, namely that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will take the necessary steps to effect delivery to the United States Treasury of “such amounts of silver and within such a period” as is required for the implementation of the agreement which, I understand, will be signed immediately between your Government and the Government of India. As soon as we have word that the agreement between the Foreign Economic Administration and the Government of India has been signed, His Majesty’s Ambassador will be very happy to address a note to Mr. Hull on these lines, and on receipt of Mr. Hull’s acknowledgment it will be understood that the exchange of notes puts on record my Government’s obligation to restore to the United States Treasury any part of the silver loaned by the United States Government to the Government of India, in respect of which the latter Government may fail to meet its obligation. Yours sincerely, Michael Wright 56 This refers to a draft agreement on the subject submitted by the British Embassy to the Department on May 27, not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) 845.515/546 [Document 277] The Acting Secretary of State to the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration ( Crowley ) Washington , June 6, 1944. My Dear Mr. Crowley : I refer to the Department’s letter of March 14, 1944, on the subject of the 100 million ounces of silver requested for use by the Government of India. Conversations regarding the matter have continued between the Department of State and the British Embassy, and an arrangement has now been agreed to, which, in the Department’s opinion, fully protects the interests of the United States Government while permitting representatives of the Government of India alone to make the agreement with the Foreign Economic Administration for return of the silver within the time stipulated. It is recommended, therefore, that the Foreign Economic Administration permit delivery under Lend-Lease of silver for use by the Government of India in an amount not exceeding 100 million ounces upon acceptance by it of a promise to repay signed only by representatives of the Government of India. Sincerely yours, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. The Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration (Crowley) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 845.515/6–1344 [Document 278] The Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration ( Crowley ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) Washington , June 13, 1944. Dear Mr. Stettinius : In accordance with your letter of June 6, 1944, concerning the lend-leasing of 100,000,000 ounces of silver for use by the Government of India, an agreement was executed on June 8 with the Agent General for India governing this transaction and containing the promise of the Government of India to return the silver on an ounce-for-ounce basis after the end of the existing emergency. A copy of the agreement is enclosed for your information. Sincerely yours, Leo T. Crowley [Annex] Special Lend-Lease Agreement Regarding Silver, Concluded Between the United States and the Government of India The Government of the United States, through the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Government of India, through the Agent General for India, recognizing that the maintenance of an adequate supply of silver coinage and the stabilization of prices by the Government of India are essential to the effective continuance of the war effort, hereby agree as follows: Article I The Government of the United States agrees to make available to the Government of India, under the Act of Congress of the United States of March 11, 1941, 57 as amended, from stocks of United States Treasury silver, such amounts of silver, totalling not in excess of 100,000,000 ounces, as the Government of India may request from time to time prior to the end of the existing emergency as determined by the President of the United States, for use for coinage purposes and as a stabilization reserve; provided, however, that the Government of the United States may reduce the total quantity of silver to be made available to the Government of India in the event that the war needs of the United States for silver so require. Article II The Government of India agrees that it will not sell any silver made available to it under Article I outside the territorial limits of India. Article III The Government of India agrees to return to the United States Treasury within five years after the end of the existing emergency, as determined by the President of the United States, an amount of silver bullion in an equivalent or higher fineness and equivalent in quantity and form to the silver made available to the Government of India under Article I; provided, however, that if the conditions of the world supply of silver make it advisable, such period may be extended by agreement of the parties hereto for an additional two years. Article IV The quantity of silver referred to in Article I of this Agreement shall include the 9,999,998.85 ounces of silver transferred to the account of the Government of India pursuant to the requisition dated March 9, 1944 and numbered 20839, and this Agreement shall supersede the Agreement of the Government of India in a letter dated March 15, 1944 from the India Supply Mission to the Foreign Economic Administration concerning the aforesaid 9,999,998.85 ounces of silver. Signed at Washington in duplicate on this 8th day of June, 1944. For the Foreign Economic Administration: Leo T. Crowley Administrator For the Government of India: G. S. Bajpai Agent General for India 57 55 Stat. 31. The British Chargé (Campbell) to the Secretary of State 845.515/7–1544 [Document 279] The British Chargé ( Campbell ) to the Secretary of State No. 437 Ref. 430/ – /44 Washington , July 15, 1944. Sir : I have the honour to call your attention to the agreement signed on June 8th, 1944 between the Foreign Economic Administration on behalf of the Government of the United States and the Agent General for India on behalf of the Government of India, whereby the United States Government undertakes to make available to the Government of India under the Act of Congress of the United States of March 11th, 1941, as amended, from stocks of United States Treasury silver, such amounts of silver totalling not in excess of 100,000,000 ounces as the Government of India may request from time to time prior to the end of the existing emergency as determined by the President of the United States. The purpose of this agreement is to implement the anti-inflation policy of the Government of India, which policy, it has been agreed, is essential to the effective continuance of the war effort. In connection with the obligations of His Majesty’s Government in respect of this agreement, I would further call your attention to the letter which His Majesty’s Ambassador addressed to you, dated March 21st, 1944, and your reply to that letter dated April 7th, 1944. Inasmuch as it has now been agreed that an exchange of notes would constitute a satisfactory recognition of the obligations of His Majesty’s Government in respect of this agreement, I have the honour to inform you that, in the event of the Government of India failing to return to the United States Treasury any part of the silver made available to it by the United States Government under the terms of this agreement, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will take such steps as may be necessary to effect the delivery to the United States Treasury of such amounts of silver and within such a period as is required for the implementation of this agreement. His Majesty’s Government would be glad to have your assurance that the Government of the United States would recognise that should His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom be called upon at any time to play any part in fulfilling the Government of India’s agreement with the Government of the United States, the action of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in the matter shall be regarded as discharging pro tanto the obligations of the Government of India. I have the honour [etc.] Ronald I. Campbell The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Campbell) 845.515/7–1544 [Document 280] The Acting Secretary of State to the British Chargé ( Campbell ) Washington , July 28, 1944. Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of July 15, 1944 setting forth the undertaking of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in respect of the recently signed agreement between my Government and the Government of India concerning the provision by my Government of 100,000,000 ounces of silver for the purposes of combatting inflation in India. I take pleasure in noting that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom undertakes that in the event of the Government of India failing to restore to the United States Treasury any part of the silver which had been made available to it by the United States Government under the terms of the above-mentioned agreement, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will take such steps as may be necessary to effect the delivery to the United States Treasury of such amounts of silver and within such a period as is required for the implementation of the said agreement between my Government and the Government of India. My Government will, as you suggest, recognize that should His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom be called upon to play any part in fulfilling the Government of India’s agreement with my Government, the action of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in the matter would be considered as discharging pro tanto the obligations of the Government of India. 58 Accept [etc.] Edward E. Stettinius, Jr. 58 Subsequent exchanges of notes, under the same terms as agreed upon here, made provision for further loans of silver to the Government of India as follows: the British note of December 29, 1944, and the American reply of January 19, 1945 (845.515/12–2944), covering a recent requisition for silver to the Government of India in the amount of 20,000,000 ounces; the British note of April 30 and the American reply of May 7, 1945 (845.515/4–3045), covering a recent requisition for silver to the Government of India in the amount of 45,000,000 ounces; and the British notes of July 4/July 30 and the American reply of July 19, 1945 (845.515/7–445, 845.515/7–3045), covering a recent requisition for silver to the Government of India in the amount of 41,000,000 ounces. Exchange of messages between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill regarding a proposed special allocation of ships to carry wheat to India from Australia Exchange of messages between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill regarding a proposed special allocation of ships to carry wheat to India from Australia 59 59 For previous correspondence relating to the food situation in India see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 296 ff. [281] The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 29 April 1944. 845.48/368: Telegram [282] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, May 31, 1944. 845.48/368 [283] The British Minister (Campbell) to the Secretary of State Washington, 20 July, 1944. 845.5018/7–2044 The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt 845.48/368: Telegram [Document 281] The British Prime Minister ( Churchill ) to President Roosevelt 60 [Paraphrase] 29 April 1944. 665. The food situation in India and its possible reactions to our joint operations is of serious concern to me. At least 700,000 people died last year as a result of a serious famine which we had in Bengal. There is a good rice crop this year, however, an acute wheat shortage faces us which is further aggravated by the serious damage which has been inflicted on the Indian spring crops by unprecedented storms. Any possible surplus of rice even if it can be taken from the peasants cannot overcome India’s shortage. The problem has been increased by our recent losses in the Bombay explosion. 61 The gravest warnings have been given to me by Wavell 62 who is very anxious about our position. If he is to cope with the situation and meet the needs of the United States, British and Indian troops as well as the civil populations particularly in the large cities, he estimates that he will need imports of about one million tons this year. Unless arrangements are made promptly to import wheat requirements, Mountbatten 63 considers the situation so serious that he will have to release military cargo space of Southeast Asia Command in favor of wheat and to advise Stilwell 64 formally that it will also be necessary that he arrange to curtail American military demands for this purpose. During the first 9 months of 1944, I have been able to make arrangements for shipping 350,000 tons of wheat to India from Australia by cutting down military shipments and by other means. This is the shortest haul. I see no way of doing more. We have the wheat (in Australia) but we lack the ships. I have had much hesitation in asking you to add to the great assistance you are giving us with shipping but a satisfactory situation in India is of such vital importance to the success of our joint plans against the Japanese that I am impelled to ask you to consider a special allocation of ships to carry wheat to India from Australia without reducing the assistance you are now providing for us, who are at a positive minimum if war efficiency is to be maintained. For some time I have resisted the Viceroy’s request that I ask your help, but with this recent misfortune to the wheat harvest and in view of Mountbatten’s representations, I believe that I am no longer justified in not asking for your aid. Wavell is doing his utmost in India by special measures. I would let you know immediately if he should find that he is able to revise his estimates of his requirements. 60 Transmitted to the Secretary of State under a White House memorandum of April 30 in which the Secretary was directed by President Roosevelt to prepare a draft reply “after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” 61 On April 14 two British munitions ships blew up at the Victoria Docks at Bombay, devastating the docks and adjacent areas, causing an estimated loss of 2,000 lives. 62 Field Marshal Archibald P. Wavell, Viscount Wavell, Viceroy of India since October 1943. 63 Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia Command. 64 Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commander, U.S. Forces in the China–Burma–India Theater. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 845.48/368 [Document 282] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington , May 31, 1944. I refer to the memorandum of April 30, 1944 65 from the White House transmitting a paraphrased copy of message no. 665 from the British Prime Minister, in which there is set forth the urgent need for additional shipping if the probability of a recurrence of famine conditions in India is to be averted. This matter was immediately referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 66 with the statement that in the Department’s opinion the appeal of the Prime Minister should be granted if it should be found to be at all feasible to do so in keeping with the over-all demands of the war situation. A reply dated May 29, 1944 67 has now been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which it is stated that they are unable on military grounds to consent to the diversion of shipping necessary to meet the Prime Minister’s request, because of the adverse effect such diversion would have upon military operations already undertaken or in prospect. A copy of this reply is enclosed. In accordance with the directive contained in the memorandum of April 30, 1944, there is also enclosed for your consideration a draft of a reply to the Prime Minister. C[ ordells ] H[ ull ] [Annex] Draft Telegram I refer to your telegram No. 665 of April 29, 1944 in which you set forth the urgent need for additional shipping in order that greater quantities of wheat than now contemplated may be imported within the year into India from Australia. Upon receipt of your telegram I immediately directed that the matter be taken under urgent consideration by the appropriate authorities of this Government. The appeal has my utmost sympathy and you may be sure that there is full realization of the military, political and humanitarian factors involved. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff have reported, however, that they are unable on military grounds to consent to the diversion of shipping necessary to meet the request because of the adverse effect such a diversion would have upon military operations already undertaken or in prospect. Needless to say, I regret exceedingly the necessity of giving to you this unfavorable reply. 65 See footnote 60, p. 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] . 66 In a memorandum by the Secretary of State, May 2, not printed. 67 Not printed. The British Minister (Campbell) to the Secretary of State 845.5018/7–2044 [Document 283] The British Minister ( Campbell ) to the Secretary of State Washington , 20 July, 1944. Dear Mr. Secretary : With reference to Lord Halifax’s 68 letter to you of May 1, 67 enclosing a copy of a message from the Prime Minister to the President, I write to let you know that we have now received a further telegram from London about the food situation in India. You will no doubt have seen the Viceroy’s announcement that His Majesty’s Government have made arrangements to ship 400,000 tons of wheat (a larger figure than had been previously promised) to Indian ports before the end of September 1944, in addition to 400,000 tons arranged since October 1943. You may like to know how this has been achieved. In his reply to the Prime Minister of June 1, 69 the President said that he regretted exceedingly the necessity of giving Mr. Churchill an unfavourable reply to his request. Meanwhile the Viceroy’s demands were increased by the poor wheat harvest and he emphasised more strongly than ever that without the imports he asked for he could not feed the fighting services and feared a breakdown in civil supplies for the provinces. Further careful consideration in London made it abundantly clear that no British controlled shipping could be made available unless corresponding reductions were made in military programmes. The matter was accordingly considered afresh by the military authorities who accepted the great strategic importance of the provision of wheat for India, drawing attention to the military consequence of a second famine, both on the morale of the Indian Army and on the security of India as a base. No other source of supply being available they agreed to cancel sailings on military maintenance programs for all theatres over the next three months, so as to provide ships for another 200,000 tons of wheat to India in the third quarter of the year, and advised further consideration in August and again in November. Mr. Eden 70 wishes me to explain the above for your confidential information. The amount of shipping which it is hoped will be released in this way is still much less than was asked for by the Viceroy but the latter’s announcement by taking into account all that we have sent to India since last October puts the most favourable possible complexion on the situation with the object of promoting confidence and so preventing wheat prices from soaring and hoarding from developing. Yours very sincerely, Ronald I. Campbell 68 British Ambassador in the United States. 67 Not printed. 69 See draft telegram, supra . 70 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Representations by the Government of India regarding the effect of the United States surplus cotton export program on India’s trade Representations by the Government of India regarding the effect of the United States surplus cotton export program on India’s trade [284] The Agency General for India to the Department of State Washington , December 4, 1944. 600.458/12–444 [285] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James H. Lewis of the Division of Commercial Policy [Washington,] December 15, 1944. 600.118/12–1544 [286] The Department of State to the Agency General for India Washington , December 19, 1944. 600.458/12–444 [287] The Agent General for India (Bajpai) to the Assistant Secretary of State Washington, 22 December, 1944. 600.458/12–2244 The Agency General for India to the Department of State 600.458/12–444 [Document 284] The Agency General for India to the Department of State Memorandum on the Relative Positions of the United States and India in Cotton Export Markets and the Effect of the Present United States Policy of Assisting the Export of Cotton by Subsidy 1. ( a ) The United States is the world’s largest cotton producer. India is second. ( b ) Over the six years 1933–34 to 1934–39 inclusive, U. S. exports averaged 5,490,000 bales (500 lbs) compared with crops averaging 12,768,000 bales (500 lbs) i.e., 42.9% of the crops while, over the same years, India’s exports averaged 3,398,766 bales (400 lbs) compared with crops averaging 6,148,166 bales (400 lbs), i.e. 55% of the crops. Details are shown in statement “A” attached. 71 ( c ) Both countries carry a cotton surplus; the United States about 10½ million bales (500 lbs), India, 4 million bales (400 lbs). ( d ) Indian markets have always been “free” in the sense that supply and demand have been the major influences on prices and the flow of pre-war exports was steadily maintained. The increase in the Indian surplus from 1,062,000 bales (400 lbs) on August 31, 1939 to 4,000,000 bales (400 lbs) on August 31, 1944 (both figures exclude mill stocks) was caused directly by war closing the export markets. ( e ) The Indian surplus would have been greater had not the Indian Government taken steps: (i) To increase, with the cooperation of the Textile Industry, domestic cotton consumption from 2,999,609 bales (400 lbs) in 1937–38 to 4,200,000 bales in 1943–44. (ii) To switch over acreage from unwanted cotton to wanted food. The 1944–45 crop is estimated at 4,250,000 bales (400 lbs), no more than is required for domestic consumption. 2. It was anticipated that the post-war reopening of export markets would restore balance to cotton statistics and the cotton trade but, instead, India is faced with a position in which the United States subsidy policy 72 of 4¢ a pound on cotton exports, combined with the sharp market discounts already ruling for lower grades and shorter staples, reduces the prices for such qualities below world levels as measured by India, the second largest producer. 3. Attachment “B” 73 shows that Americans f.o.b. Houston as on November 20, 1944 were 3 to 3½ cents a pound cheaper than equivalent Indians f.o.b. Karachi. Specimen calculations are given in attachment “C”. 73 4. The American Seed Indians selected for comparison are not only export cottons with American equivalents but of the 1944–45 crop of 4,200,000 bales (400 lbs), 1,668,000 bales are American Seed descriptions. The breakdown in bales (400 lbs) is 289F, Punjab 317,000, Sind 450,000; L.S.S., Punjab 470,000, Sind 10,000; 4F Punjab 414,000, Sind 7,000. 5. Furthermore, it is acknowledged in the world’s cotton markets that qualities which bear little or no similarity to higher descriptions are, nevertheless, affected on grounds of sentiment, by the prices of higher descriptions; from which it follows that the adverse effect of the United States policy of assisting exports by subsidy will extend even to those lower Indian descriptions in which there is no quality overlap with Americans. 6. The Indian cultivator has only a limited number of cash crops, of which cotton is the most important, a fact which tended even to prejudice the switchover to food cultivation. It will be realised, therefore, that by bringing the prices of lower grade and shorter stapled Americans below world levels as measured by Indians, the present United States policy will disturb the economic balance of India, essentially an agricultural country, by its serious effects on the incomes of Indian farmers, whose return from their produce is already little above a bare subsistence level. 7. The immediate effect in India of the announcement of the United States subsidy policy was a decline in the Jarilla hedge contract price from Rs.425 per candy to Rs.392, equivalent to 1.27 cents per pound at exchange 30.37 cents per rupee. That the decline was not greater was accountable to the nearness of several descriptions to the minimum prices at which Government buys, a fact which cushioned pressure. In the normal swing of markets there has since been a partial recovery but, in the minds of Indian traders, the threat to their export markets remains. 8. In examining the position it may be stressed that: ( a ) India did not take advantage of the United States price raising policy over the last ten years by increasing her cotton production. ( b ) The Government of India realises the futility of cotton production in excess of domestic and export requirements, as shown by the short-term policy of reducing the 1944–45 crop to an estimated 4,250,000 bales (400 lbs) when food was needed and not cotton. The crop in prospect is no more than is required for domestic consumption, leaving no provision for export. ( c ) The Government of India is prepared at all times to take a realistic and rational view of the cotton problem. 9. In the light of the facts contained in this memorandum and the assurance given by the Government of the United States in the announcement dated Washington, November 11, 1944 that the United States “has no intention of precipitating mutually injurious price competition in world wheat and cotton markets”, the Government of India requests that the Government of the United States may see its way to reduce the export subsidy of 4 cents per pound so far as that subsidy applies to qualities Middling ⅞” staple and lower. Washington , December 4, 1944. 71 Not printed. 72 Authorized by the Surplus Property Act of October 3, 1944 (58 Stat. 765), and promulgated by the War Food Administration, of the Commodity Credit Corporation, on November 11. 73 Not printed. 73 Not printed. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James H. Lewis of the Division of Commercial Policy 600.118/12–1544 [Document 285] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James H. Lewis of the Division of Commercial Policy [ Washington ,] December 15, 1944. Participants: Mr. S. D. Chard, Cotton Adviser to the Government of India Mr. Norris, United States Department of Agriculture Mr. Corse, 74 CP Mr. Ross, 75 CP Colonel Cook, 76 SR Mr. Evans, 77 CD Mr. Phillips, 78 CD Mr. Linville, 79 SR Mr. Lewis, CP Mr. Chard called with reference to the memorandum which the Agent General for India handed to Mr. Acheson 80 on December 4, 1944, in which reference was made to the relative positions of the United States and India in cotton export markets and the effects of the United States cotton subsidy program on India’s trade. Mr. Corse explained to Mr. Chard the background of the subsidy program, mentioning the legislative authority and the WFA 81 announcements implementing the program. He pointed out that the program was a corollary of the domestic program of assistance to American cotton growers and that it was not the intention of the Government of the United States to enter into a competitive cotton price war. He said he believed the actual operation of the cotton program in its few weeks of existence substantiated this statement and it was expected that future operations would bear it out. Mr. Corse then referred to Mr. Acheson’s recent statement 82 before a special subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives, in which he indicated it was desirable to deal with problems like the cotton problem on a basis of international cooperation, and Mr. Corse referred to the proposed meeting of the International Cotton Advisory Committee which is to be primarily for the purpose of drawing up a recommendation to governments in regard to possible international collaboration in respect of cotton. Mr. Corse indicated that this Government hoped that all aspects of the problem, including the effects of the United States program on India, could be discussed at that time (probably January 1945). Mr. Chard expressed his satisfaction with our attitude, and said that the India Government was fully aware of the reasons for our subsidy program and only wanted in a friendly way to make sure that we were aware of India’s interests and the possible repercussions of our program on India’s trade. Colonel Cook emphasized that at present our program was not harming India but Mr. Chard said it was necessary to make plans a year in advance. He said the American proposal for a meeting of the International Cotton Advisory Committee in January had been forwarded to the India Government by the Agent General here but no definite reply had yet been received. He felt sure, however, that the India Government would welcome the proposed meeting of the Committee and would be glad to see some international solution of the problem. There was discussion of the technical aspects of the memorandum received from the India Agent General, and Mr. Chard was questioned particularly regarding the comparability of the price data which was quoted for Indian and American cotton to indicate the possible harmful effects of the United States subsidy. Mr. Chard said he felt sure the price data and types and grades shown were generally comparable although comparison was very difficult because of changes this year in grade classifications for Indian cotton. Mr. Corse said a memorandum along the lines of the conversation would be prepared for the Agent General. 74 Carl D. Corse, Assistant Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy. 75 James A. Ross, Jr., Assistant Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy. 76 Everett R. Cook, adviser, Supply and Resources Division. 77 James G. Evans of the Commodities Division. 78 William T. Phillips of the Commodities Division. 79 Francis A. Linville of the Supply and Resources Division. 80 Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State. 81 War Food Administration. 82 Statement regarding United States cotton policy, made on December 5 at the cotton conference of the Subcommittee of the House of Representatives for the study of policies of post-war agriculture, released to the press December 5, Department of State Bulletin , December 10, 1944, p. 700. The Department of State to the Agency General for India 600.458/12–444 [Document 286] The Department of State to the Agency General for India Memorandum 1. The Department of State has received the memorandum of December 4, 1944, of the Agency General for India concerning the relative positions of the United States and India in cotton export markets and the effect of the present United States policy of assisting the export of cotton by subsidy. It is noted that the Government of India requests “that the Government of the United States may see its way to reduce the export subsidy of 4 cents per pound so far as that subsidy applies to qualities Middling ⅞” staple or [ and ] lower.” 2. The facts regarding the cotton export program of the United States are as follows: ( a ) Section 21( c ) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (P.L. 457, 78th Congress, 2d Session, approved October 3, 1944) authorizes the Commodity Credit Corporation, an agency of the War Food Administration, to dispose of surplus United States agricultural products in world markets at competitive world prices. This section reads as follows: “Surplus farm commodities shall not be sold in the United States under this Act in quantities in excess of, or at prices less than, those applicable with respect to sales of such commodities by the Commodity Credit Corporation, or at less than current prevailing market prices, whichever may be the higher, unless such commodities are being disposed of, pursuant to this Act, only for export; and the Commodity Credit Corporation may dispose of or cause to be disposed of for cash or its equivalent in goods or for adequately secured credit, for export only, and at competitive world prices, any farm commodity or product thereof without regard to restrictions with respect to the disposal of commodities imposed upon it by any law: Provided , That no food or food product shall be sold or otherwise disposed of under this subsection for export (1) if there is a shortage of such food or food product in the United States or if such sale or other disposition may result in such a shortage, or (2) if such food or food product is needed to supply the normal demands of consumers in the United States.” ( b ) On November 11, 1944 the War Food Administration announced a program to facilitate the exportation of cotton in accordance with the above-quoted provisions of law (copy of announcement enclosed). Initial export prices and differentials were announced on November 15 (a copy of this announcement and a copy of a release of the War Food Administration on “Terms and Conditions of Cotton Sales for Export Program” are also enclosed 83 ). 3. The reduction in payment on cotton exports of qualities Middling ⅞” staple and lower, as requested, would render the program largely ineffective. 4. The cotton export program of the United States is a corollary of the present domestic program of assistance to American cotton growers. The occasion for the export program arises from the fact that the United States maintains, through crop loans and other price supporting measures, a domestic price for cotton substantially higher than would be the case if the price were to be freely determined by competitive forces. With a domestic cotton price above the general world level little, if any, exports could take place in the absence of an export program. This export program is intended only to permit United States cotton to maintain a reasonable share of the world cotton market. 5. It was made clear in the War Food Administration announcement of November 11 that it was not the intention of the Government of the United States to enter into a competitive cotton price war. It is believed that the actual operation of the cotton program in its few weeks of existence substantiates this statement, and it is expected that actual operations in the future will continue to bear it out. 6. The Government of the United States considers it highly desirable that the problems involved in the present cotton situation be dealt with on the basis of international cooperation. In this connection Mr. Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, made the following statement on December 5 before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives, meeting to consider and recommend future programs and policy with regard to cotton: “Burdensome commodity surpluses should be dealt with on a basis of international cooperation in such a way as to avoid the development of unfair trade practices and unhealthy international rivalry. If provision is made for the orderly liquidation of world surplus stocks no one country will dispose of its surplus in a fashion detrimental to the interests of other countries who are also burdened with large accumulations. Furthermore the fear of disorderly world markets will be removed and trade will be carried on in an atmosphere of mutual respect for the rights of other exporting countries. In such an atmosphere there will be hope for the expanded world trade which is so necessary for the attainment of high levels of employment and income.” 7. The proposed meeting of the International Cotton Advisory Committee is primarily for the purpose of drawing up a recommendation to governments in regard to possible international collaboration in respect of cotton. If the Committee should recommend that an international cotton conference be held, it is the view of this Government that the representation should be as wide as possible under existing conditions; and that representatives of importing as well as exporting countries should be present. The Committee can, and it is believed should, take full account of the interests of importing countries in its deliberations. 8. For the further information of the Agency General for India there are enclosed copies 84 of the statements by Mr. Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture, and Mr. Acheson before the Special Subcommittee referred to above, which discuss the cotton problems, domestic and international, facing the United States. Washington , December 19, 1944. 83 Neither attached to file copy. 84 Not attached to file copy. The Agent General for India (Bajpai) to the Assistant Secretary of State 600.458/12–2244 [Document 287] The Agent General for India ( Bajpai ) to the Assistant Secretary of State F.171/44 Washington , 22 December, 1944. Dear Mr. Dean Acheson : You must have seen the State Department memorandum 600.458/12–44 [ 444 ] dated December 19th, on the subject of the assistance given to American cotton by means of a subsidy for purposes of export. I have informed my Government of the purpose of the proposed meeting of the International Cotton Advisory Committee and await their instructions. Possibly an international conference will provide the best means of resolving the problems raised by the existing cotton situation, and I sincerely hope that the initiative of your Government in suggesting international cooperation as the basis of a solution equitable to all concerned will evoke prompt and favourable response. 2. May I, before concluding, draw your attention to paragraph 5 of the memorandum. We accept, of course, the statement that it was not the intention of the United States subsidy programme to start a competitive cotton price war. As we explained, however, in paragraph 3 of our memorandum dated December 4th, the effect, at least in India, was to reduce the prices of comparable varieties of Indian cotton by 3 to 3½ cents per lb. With best wishes for Christmas and the New Year, I am, Yours sincerely, G. S. Bajpai Initiation of a program of cultural cooperation between the United States and India Initiation of a program of cultural cooperation between the United States and India [288] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, April 28, 1944. [Received May 12.] 811.42745/76 [289] The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) Washington, July 14, 1944. 811.42745/76 [290] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, September 28, 1944. [Received October 13.] 811.42745/9–2844 [291] The Consul at Bombay (LaMont) to the Secretary of State Bombay, September 30, 1944. [Received October 13.] 811.42745/9–3044 [292] The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Trevelyan) to the Special Assistant, Division of Cultural Cooperation (Peck) Washington, 21 November 1944. 811.42745/11–2144 [293] The Special Assistant, Division of Cultural Cooperation (Peck), to the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Trevelyan) Washington, November 29, 1944. 811.42745/11–2144 [294] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 11, 1944 December 11, 1944 811.42745/12–1144 [295] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 16, 1944 December 16, 1944 811.42745/12–1644 [296] The Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Cultural Cooperation (Peck) to Dr. J. M. Kumarappa, Director of the Tata Institute of Social Studies at Bombay Washington, January 11, 1945. 811.42745/1–1145 The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State 811.42745/76 [Document 288] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) to the Secretary of State No. 458 New Delhi , April 28, 1944. [Received May 12.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to despatch No. 1333 dated April 18, 1944, 85 from the Consulate at Bombay forwarding a letter received by the Consulate from Dr. Jagadisan Mohandas Kumarappa which discusses relations between India and the United States, and to recommend that the Department extend to Dr. Kumarappa an invitation to visit the United States as its guest. Such a visit would enable the Science, Education and Art Division of the Department’s Office of Public Information to discuss the question of a closer link between American and Indian educators and social workers with an Indian who not only is interested in the subject but also has many constructive ideas. As an official guest of the Department it would be possible to obtain for Dr. Kumarappa priority travel to the United States via ATC 86 planes which at present are not crowded on west bound flights. The Consulate’s despatch states Dr. Kumarappa feels the time may not yet be ripe for the inauguration of a system of visiting professorships between the two countries. It is my understanding that under the convention providing for the exchange of professors among the American Republics, the country sending a professor pays his salary, although the opposite is true in the case of exchange students. If the United States should follow the same system with respect to India, the receiving institution in India would not have to worry about the salary of a visiting American professor. For political reasons, however, the present may be an inappropriate time to arrange an official system of exchange. I believe the analysis of British antagonism to any growth in American educational influence in India found on pages 4 and 5 of the Consulate’s despatch under reference is substantially true. It would, therefore, be unlikely that the British dominated Government of India would be willing at this time to arrange for an official exchange of professors. Similarly, the Government of India probably would try to dissuade any public institution of higher learning from adding an American expert to its faculty even temporarily. In view of these conditions, the best opportunity now in sight of introducing American influence into Indian education may be through the private Tata Institute of Social Sciences which Dr. Kumarappa heads. The Department may wish to consider seriously the granting of stipends to American teachers picked out by Dr. Kumarappa and willing to teach for a time at the Tata Institute but unable to do so because of the small remuneration the Institute is able to offer them. Modestly enough Dr. Kumarappa discusses research fellowships purely from the American viewpoint perhaps not realizing that both the Rockefeller Institute and the Guggenheim Fund also award fellowships for graduate study by foreigners in the United States. In his speech before the legislative bodies on February 17, 1944, the Viceroy stated that there would be opportunities for Indians connected with industry, the health services, and other branches of development to visit the United Kingdom, “and if required the U.S.A.” No doubt the British authorities in India would like to reward loyal supporters by giving them such opportunities. Nevertheless, in view of the Viceroy’s statement, British authorities would find it difficult to stand in the way if the United States Government invited health and social welfare authorities to visit the United States as guests of the Department; or if the Guggenheim Fund or the Rockefeller Foundation granted research fellowships to them. No doubt the Department could tactfully explore this question with Dr. Kumarappa if he should visit the United States. The “International House” which Dr. Kumarappa proposes to establish in Bombay sounds much like the cultural institutes which Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the United States have established in many foreign countries, only in this case the agency would be in the home country and would present the accomplishments of the country to foreign visitors. The idea has merit, however, and careful thought might be given to presenting to such an International House, if established, a library of American books and subscriptions to American periodicals. The Department should not tie itself too closely to the Tatas in embarking on a closer interchange with India for, after all, they represent Indian capital rather than the Indian masses. Unlike most Indian industrialists, however, they appear to have developed a habit of philanthropy almost American in character. Pending the time when India is free to establish intellectual relationships as national leaders of the country themselves see fit, the school founded by the Tatas provides a ready made vehicle for spreading a greater appreciation of our country without obvious effort. Respectfully yours, George R. Merrell 85 Not printed. 86 Air Transport Command. The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) 811.42745/76 [Document 289] The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) No. 186 Washington , July 14, 1944. The Secretary of State refers to the Mission’s despatch no. 458 dated April 28, 1944 concerning the proposed visit to the United States of Dr. J. M. Kumarappa. The Department is in agreement with the opinion of the Officer in Charge and desires to extend an invitation to Dr. Kumarappa to visit the United States as the guest of the Department at his earliest convenience. However, at present, the Science, Education and Art Division of the Department is faced with a lack of funds. It is hoped that this problem will be resolved satisfactorily within a fortnight. As soon as funds become available the Department will send confirmation of its invitation to Dr. Kumarappa to visit this country as its official guest. If other funds become available for the coming fiscal year the Department will be pleased to consider assisting American teachers who may desire to teach at the Tata Institute. If the funds become available to enable the Department to bring Dr. Kumarappa to the United States as a guest all efforts will be made to facilitate all the purposes of his proposed visit as set forth in despatch no. 1333 dated April 18, 1944 87 from the American Consular Officer in Charge, Bombay, which was read with great interest and appreciation by officers of the Department. It is repeated that the Department will notify the Officer in Charge, confirming its invitation to Dr. Kumarappa as soon as new funds become available. 88 Pending such confirmation the Officer in Charge may wish to inform Dr. Kumarappa of the deep interest of the Department in his proposals. A copy of this instruction is being sent to the American Consular Officer in Charge, Bombay, India. 87 Not printed. 88 The Department confirmed its invitation in telegram No. 643, September 2, 7 p.m., to New Delhi (811.42745/9–244). The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State 811.42745/9–2844 [Document 290] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) to the Secretary of State No. 790 New Delhi , September 28, 1944. [Received October 13.] Sir : I have the honor to report that on September 26, 1944, the undersigned was asked by Lieutenant General Sir Thomas J. Hutton, Secretary of the newly created Planning and Development Department of the Government of India, whether it is true, as he had heard, that American universities and technical schools have set aside places for students from India. He was told that the Mission had not heard that places had been set aside for students from particular countries, but an inquiry would be made regarding the situation if he so wished. General Hutton stated that he thought inquiries were being made through the Agent General of India in Washington. He then expanded a thesis which has not been heard before, namely that the similarities of size, climate, and problems of India and the United States suggest the advisability of sending Indian engineering students to the United States to study. Moreover, he observed, the constitutional framework of the United States is somewhat similar to that of India. In India the Constitution is on the federal pattern with large fields of activity reserved to the Provinces. This creates problems similar to the “States rights” difficulties which have had to be overcome in the United States before development projects involving several States, such as the TVA, could be achieved. Moreover, he pointed out, the constitutional powers of the Viceroy resemble those of the President of the United States much more than they do those of the British Prime Minister, who, essentially, is chairman of a governing committee, the Cabinet. The intention of the Government of India to send young Indians to the United States, as well as to the United Kingdom, for technical training was announced by the Member of the new Department of Planning and Development. Sir Ardeshir Dalai, at his first press conference on September 14, 1944, as reported in the Mission’s despatch no. 773 of September 18, 1944. 89 The statement of Sir Ardeshir and the remarks of General Hutton are at variance with the actions of the Exchange Control Authorities in Calcutta which the Consulate General, in its despatch no. 358 of September 21, 1944, 89 interpreted as: “… advanced planning to prevent future engineers and technicians from falling under so-called ‘non-British influence’ and possibly looking towards other markets than the United Kingdom as a possible supply for the demand of India’s imports.” The atmosphere of New Delhi is, in many ways, far different from that of Calcutta where long established British interests often appear to look at the future from a narrow self-interested point of view. It is also possible that the Government of India views differently those Indians it selects for study abroad and those who endeavor to go abroad to study as a result of their own initiative. If this differentiation exists, it is believed it is due primarily to political rather than commercial motivation. Respectfully yours, For the Secretary in Charge: Sheldon T. Mills Secretary of Mission 89 Not printed. 89 Not printed. The Consul at Bombay (LaMont) to the Secretary of State 811.42745/9–3044 [Document 291] The Consul at Bombay ( LaMont ) to the Secretary of State No. 1594 Bombay , September 30, 1944. [Received October 13.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram No. 643 of September 2, 1944 91 to the American Mission at New Delhi inviting Dr. J. M. Kumarappa, Director, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay, to come to the United States as the guest of the Department. Dr. Kumarappa has informed the Mission and the Consulate that he accepts the Department’s invitation with pleasure. He has now submitted to the Consulate a list of governmental and voluntary social agencies, social service institutions, colleges and universities that he would like to visit during his sojourn in the United States. A copy of this list is enclosed. 92 In presenting the list, Dr. Kumarappa stated that he realized it was too comprehensive for the relatively brief period of five months which he will be able to spend in the United States. He would appreciate the Department’s making a selection of as many of the institutions as it will be practicable for him to visit during his stay in the United States. It is Dr. Kumarappa’s desire to make as extensive a survey as possible of American institutes doing either practical or teaching work in the field of sociology. He pointed out in this connection that the development of the social sciences in India, both applied and theoretical, are in such an embryonic stage that he believes his visit will have the maximum value if he is enabled to get a comprehensive birds-eye view of American progress in this direction. He has, however, indicated that he wishes to devote the bulk of his time to visiting institutions actually engaged in social work and to consulting the officials of such agencies. He mentioned, for example, that there does not exist in the whole of India an institution for the care of crippled children as such, and that he is therefore anxious to obtain practical ideas and suggestions which he may be able to put into effect in India through his own influence and the influence of the social workers trained in the Tata Institute. He is, nevertheless, most vitally interested in obtaining the services of American professors for the Tata Institute, particularly in the field of psychiatry, and he will no doubt discuss with the Department the question of whether any financial assistance may be extended to American teachers desiring to teach at the Tata Institute. The Department will undoubtedly wish to keep the foregoing considerations in mind in selecting from Dr. Kumarappa’s list the institutions and persons to be placed on his itinerary. [Here follow details as to Dr. Kumarappa’s travel plans for the visit extending from December 1944 to May 1945.] Respectfully yours, George D. LaMont 91 Not printed, but see footnote 88, p. 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] . 92 Not printed. The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Trevelyan) to the Special Assistant, Division of Cultural Cooperation (Peck) 811.42745/11–2144 [Document 292] The First Secretary of the British Embassy ( Trevelyan ) 93 to the Special Assistant, Division of Cultural Cooperation ( Peck ) F.170/44 Washington , 21 November 1944. Dear Mr. Peck : The Government of India note that one of the recommendations of the Hot Springs Conference on Food and Agriculture 94 was that arrangements should be made for an exchange of agricultural workers between different countries. The recommendation has already been given a practical aspect in the Cultural Relations Programme of the United States, and India would like to take advantage of this and to request that this programme should be extended to India, particularly at the present time when a big programme for agricultural development in India is under consideration. 2. In particular, the Government of India hope that it will be possible for the services of a number of experienced agricultural workers from the United States to be made available to India for employment in posts in which they may be able to give advice and guidance to Indian workers. At the same time they would like to send trained workers to the United States to work in the appropriate agricultural institutes and departments and gain a thorough experience in United States methods of work and research. The Government of India suggest that the scheme on both sides might be arranged to last for two or three years. A statement is enclosed 95 giving the list of posts for which the Government of India hope to obtain experts from the United States. The Agent General would be most grateful if the Department of State could inform him what prospects there are of instituting a programme of this nature and would be most grateful for your cooperation in the matter. I shall be glad to discuss with you at any time the terms on which the experts from the United States could be made available to the Government of India. I understand that it is recognised that exchange schemes of this nature are of benefit to both countries and that in the past the United States Government have to a certain extent subsidised such schemes. This is an aspect for further discussion. The scales of pay mentioned in the enclosure to this letter need not be taken as a firm basis for offer to those who may be selected to fill these posts; they do however indicate the class of posts which the Government of India have in mind. 3. For convenience I summarise the points upon which we should be glad to have some indications of your views and which I shall be glad to discuss with you at any time. i) Whether in your opinion a general scheme of the nature suggested by the Government of India would be acceptable to the State Department. ii) Whether suitable men could be obtained for a substantial number of the posts envisaged by the Government of India, and, if so, which posts could be most hopefully considered in the first instance. iii) What in your opinion should be in general the terms of appointment to be offered to the persons who would fill these posts. iv) Whether in your opinion the United States Government would be willing to subsidise in any way a scheme of this nature, in view of the advantages which would be likely in the long run to accrue to the United States in its commercial and other relations with India. v) Whether there will be any difficulty in the corresponding placing of Indian agriculturists in the United States Department of Agriculture. What terms should be offered to them by the Government of India and could satisfactory training courses be arranged. Yours Sincerely, H. Trevelyan 93 Indian Agency General. 94 For correspondence regarding the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18–June 3, 1943, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. i , pp. 820 ff. 95 Not printed. The Special Assistant, Division of Cultural Cooperation (Peck), to the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Trevelyan) 811.42745/11–2144 [Document 293] The Special Assistant, Division of Cultural Cooperation ( Peck ), to the First Secretary of the British Embassy ( Trevelyan ) Washington , November 29, 1944. My Dear Mr. Trevelyan : I take pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your letter of November 21, 1944 (F. 170/44) describing the proposal for an exchange between this Government and the Government of India of agricultural experts and summarizing points upon which preliminary indications of the views of the Department of State would be welcomed. On the basis of our conversations and of your letter under acknowledgment I have discussed the plan, in outline, with other interested officers of the Department of State and of the Department of Agriculture. As a first step toward the possible carrying out of this plan, I am authorized to say that, subject to the practicability of an agreement on details, the Department of State is heartily in favor of an arrangement whereby American agricultural specialists shall be made available for employment in India in posts in which they may be able to give advice and guidance to Indian agricultural workers and whereby Indian agriculturists may be placed in the Department of Agriculture at Washington for training. An officer of the Department of Agriculture has orally stated that that Department would view the proposal with equal favor. Officers of the two Departments are now engaged in a study of the tentative proposals set forth in your letter. Sincerely yours, Willys R. Peck Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 11, 1944 811.42745/12–1144 [Document 294] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 11, 1944 December 11, 1944 A group of seven leading Indian scientists arrived in the United States on December 8 for an eight weeks’ tour of the country. The group has just completed a similar visit to Great Britain at the invitation of the British Government and before returning to India were anxious to meet with leading American scientists particularly in the physics and chemistry fields. The following eminent scientists are included in this group: Dr. Nazir Ahmad, Colonel S. L. Bhatia, Sir Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar, Sir Jnan Chandra Ghosh, Professor S. K. Mitra, Professor Meghand Saha and Professor J. N. Mukherji. The tour is under the joint auspices of the Indian Agency General, the National Eesearch Council and the Department of State. Mr. Frank S. Coan, an officer of the Department, has been delegated to accompany the scientists on their tour. The scientists will reside at the Blair-Lee House during the first part of their Washington stay as guests of the Department. Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 16, 1944 811.42745/12–1644 [Document 295] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 16, 1944 December 16, 1944 Dr. J. M. Kumarappa, who is visiting the United States as the first guest from India of the Department of State under its program of cultural cooperation, arrived in Washington on December 11 for a three-week stay. Dr. Kumarappa is Director of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences at Bombay, India’s leading institute for the education and training of workers in social welfare. Here in the United States in response to an invitation which attracted considerable favorable comment in the newspapers in India, Dr. Kumarappa plans to visit many well-known institutions and centers for social science study, and also to meet with organizations and persons prominent in the social science field. Dr. Kumarappa is residing at the Blair-Lee House during the first part of his stay in Washington as a guest of the Department, and has been offered office and library facilities by the Office of Education. The Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Cultural Cooperation (Peck) to Dr. J. M. Kumarappa, Director of the Tata Institute of Social Studies at Bombay 811.42745/1–1145 [Document 296] The Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Cultural Cooperation ( Peck ) to Dr. J. M. Kumarappa, Director of the Tata Institute of Social Studies at Bombay Washington , January 11, 1945. My Dear Dr. Kumarappa : Now that you are starting on your tour of the United States, permit me to wish you pleasant experiences and success in your undertakings. It is particularly important that, as the first guest of the Department of State from India under its program of cultural cooperation, you should achieve the principal objects of your visit, among them being conferences with specialists in the fields of social welfare and of education and the obtaining of data that will be of use to students and technicians who in the future may desire to come from India to the United States for academic instruction and technical training. The Department has found a general and cordial response on the part of the American public to opportunities presented for participation in the Department’s program of cultural cooperation with other nations. I am confident that you will meet with friendly and helpful consideration along your way. Sincerely yours, Willys R. Peck Informal exploratory talks between the United States and the government of India regarding post-war civil aviation Informal exploratory talks between the United States and the government of India regarding post-war civil aviation [297] Minutes of the Fourth and Final Conference on Post-War Civil Aviation Held With Representatives of India on August 22, 1944 [Washington , August 22, 1944.] 811.79665/8–2244 [298] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, August 27, 1944 August 27, 1944 800.796/8–2644 Minutes of the Fourth and Final Conference on Post-War Civil Aviation Held With Representatives of India on August 22, 1944 811.79665/8–2244 [Document 297] Minutes of the Fourth and Final Conference on Post-War Civil Aviation Held With Representatives of India on August 22, 1944 [ Washington , August 22, 1944.] Present: American Group Indian Group Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr. 96 The Hon. Sir Girja Bajpai 4 Mr. S. W. Morgan 97 Sir Gurunath Bewoor 5 Mr. G. S. Roper 98 Sir Frederick Tymms 6 Mr. G. V. Allen 99 Mr. Humphrey Trevelyan 7 Mr. Lampton Berry 1 Mr. Josh Lee 2 Mr. George Burgess 3 Mr. Berle greeted the Indian delegation saying that he was sorry to have been away during the earlier talks. Sir Girja thanked him for the cordial reception and for the competence with which Mr. Morgan had covered the subject in his absence. He said that there were two fundamental points of difference: The first concerned the scope and functions of the international authority and the second, the basis on which civil aviation arrangements should be concluded. The Indians wanted a multilateral arrangement, and the Americans preferred bilateral arrangements. [Here follows discussion of question relating to the constitution and function of an international air organization.] 8 Mr. Morgan asked for the attitude of the Indian Government if we approached it now on the question of a bilateral agreement. Sir Gurunath said that the Indian delegation had come with instructions to explore the possibility of an international arrangement through an international authority and that they were not prepared, without further instructions, to pursue the question of bilateral arrangements. Mr. Berle asked whether the Indians were prepared to discuss an a.i., 9 arrangement such as he had outlined. He said the war in Europe was near an end and that the civil populations would want air services. He asked whether the Indian Government felt that everything should stop short until an international agreement had been reached. Sir Girja replied that he fully agreed that everything could not stop, but that with regard to a bilateral agreement they would have to request further instruction. Sir Gurunath said that they did not want to give the impression of being obstructionists and that they saw the force of our point of view. They would have to give their government some time, however, to consult with their experts. Mr. Berle pointed out that B.O.A.C. 10 was making bilateral arrangements, that the Canadians were developing trans-Atlantic traffic and that for many months we had been carrying forward our negotiations with Spain. 11 He asked why the Government of India also could not make bilateral arrangements. Sir Gurunath repeated that they had come with instructions to explore only the multi-lateral approach. Mr. Allen asked whether the arrangements made by K.L.M., Air France etc., were between the Government of India and the commercial companies. Sir Gurunath said they were between Governments. Mr. Allen asked whether these arrangements would continue after the war, and Sir Frederick replied that they could not be changed since the agreements were still in effect. Sir Girja said that the Indian Government could not refuse to consider any proposals made by the United States Government, but that a multilateral agreement was their ultimate desire. Mr. Berle suggested that the bilateral agreements might be drawn in such form that they could be made multilateral later at an international conference. [Here follows additional discussion on international air questions.] It was agreed to get together to draft a joint statement to be released to the press. The meeting terminated with the expression of mutual thanks and cordial esteem. 96 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State. 4 Agent General for India at Washington. 97 Stokely W. Morgan, Chief of the Aviation Division. 5 Secretary to the Government of India, Posts and Air Department. 98 George S. Roper of the Aviation Division. 6 Director of Civil Aviation for the Government of India. 99 George V. Allen, Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs. 7 First Secretary of the British Embassy, with the Indian Agency General. 1 Secretary of Mission at New Delhi. 2 Member of the Civil Aeronautics Board. 3 Assistant to Mr. William A. M. Burden, Special Aviation Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce (Jones). 8 For correspondence, see vol. ii , section entitled “Preliminary and exploratory discussions regarding international civil aviation; conference held at Chicago, November 1–December 7, 1944.” 9 Ad interim . 10 British Overseas Airways Corporation. 11 For correspondence regarding this subject, see vol. iv , section under Spain entitled “Air transport service agreement between the United States and Spain.” Press Release Issued by the Department of State, August 27, 1944 800.796/8–2644 [Document 298] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, August 27, 1944 August 27, 1944 Representatives of the Government of India arrived in the United States recently at the invitation of the Government of the United States for a series of talks with American officials on the subject of post-war civil aviation. The discussions, which have now terminated, were conducted on a friendly and informal basis and were preliminary and exploratory in character. Both sides were agreed that it was desirable to adopt all practicable measures to promote the early expansion and development of international air services for the common benefit of the peoples of the world. Questions relating to the transit and commercial entry of aircraft, as well as the constitution and functions of an International Air Organization, were discussed. The exchange of views disclosed a considerable measure of agreement in regard to regulatory measures in the technical field. Both sides were also agreed that the calling of an international conference to draw up a multilateral air navigation convention would be both beneficial and desirable. Establishment of direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and India Establishment of direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and India [299] The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) Washington, January 5, 1944—6 p.m. 811.7445/43: Airgram [300] The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (Fly) to the Secretary of State Washington, May 2, 1944. 811.7445/51 [301] The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) Washington, May 12, 1944. 811.7445/51 [302] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, July 25, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 11:40 p.m.] 811.7445/7–2544: Telegram [303] The Acting Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) Washington, August 12, 1944—6 p.m. 811.7445/8–1244: Telegram [304] The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (Fly) to the Chief of the Telecommunications Division (DeWolf) Washington, August 15, 1944. 811.7445/8–1544 The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) 811.7445/43: Airgram [Document 299] The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) Washington , January 5, 1944—6 p.m. A–8. On February 11, 1943 Board of War Communications approved the shipment of two transmitters from the United States under Lend-Lease 12 to India for the establishment of direct radio telegraph circuits between the United States and India 13 with the understanding that delivery would be made in June 1943. The Board has received information from the British Ministry of Supply that the two transmitters manufactured by KCA Manufacturing Company should arrive in India about January 15, 1944 and be ready for service in the latter part of February 1944. See your 952, December 14, 5 p.m. 14 Hull 12 Lend-Lease Act approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31. 13 The view of the Board was that in the interest of national security duplicate circuits should be established between the United States and Bombay (811.7445/–51). 14 Not printed. The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (Fly) to the Secretary of State 811.7445/51 [Document 300] The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission ( Fly ) to the Secretary of State Washington , May 2, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : Certain difficulties have arisen in connection with the establishment, upon a satisfactory basis, of direct radiotelegraph circuits between the United States and Bombay, India, by Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company 15 and R.C.A. Communications, Inc. Accordingly, the assistance of your Department is requested in this matter. The pertinent facts are as follows: [Here follows account of negotiations on technical aspects of the question between American communications officials and their counterparts in the Government of India.] In summary, the Commission would appreciate the cooperation of the Department of State in obtaining the consent of the appropriate Indian authorities to the establishment of the direct circuits with both RCAC and Mackay upon the following basis: 1. The volume of traffic from India to the United States to be transmitted over the direct circuits shall bear the same relation to the total traffic from India to the United States as the volume of traffic from the United States to India over the direct circuits bears to the total traffic from the United States to India. 2. Traffic from India to the United States shall be divided between the RCAC and Mackay circuits, respectively, in the same proportions as the Indian Company received traffic from each of these companies. 3. The radio link portions of the tolls shall be divided equally between the parties. 4. Accounts shall be established and maintained by all parties in gold francs. 5. The settlement of traffic balances shall be effected in United States currency at the rate of 5.1825 gold francs equals one United States dollar. By direction of the Commission James Lawrence Fly 15 The Mackay circuit was to be established for the duration of the war and six months thereafter (811.7445/51). The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) 811.7445/51 [Document 301] The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) No. 158 Washington , May 12, 1944. The Secretary of State refers to previous correspondence in connection with the establishment of direct radiotelegraph circuits between the United States and India to be operated at the United States end by Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company and R.C.A. Communications, Inc., and encloses for the information of the Mission, as well as of the appropriate Indian authorities, a copy of a letter of May 2, 1944 16 received from the Federal Communications Commission requesting the Department’s assistance on account of certain difficulties which have arisen in connection with the establishment of the aforementioned circuits. The Mission is requested to bring this matter to the attention of the Indian authorities and to urge that the direct circuits be established upon the basis requested by the Commission, as set forth in summary on pages 3 and 4 of its letter. The Mission is requested to advise the Department by telegraph of the result of its action in this matter. 16 Supra . The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State 811.7445/7–2544: Telegram [Document 302] The Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) to the Secretary of State New Delhi , July 25, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 11:40 p.m.] 542. I have just been advised informally by Sir Gurunath Bewoor, the Secretary of the Posts and Air Department that all of the suggestions contained in the enclosure to the Department’s air mail instruction No. 158 of May 12 have been accepted, that the Indian company is in direct communication with the two American companies and that August 15 is aimed at as the target for opening the circuits. Bewoor suggests the possible advisability of having the direct communication opened by an exchange of messages between Sir Mohammed Usman, the Honorable member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council for Posts and Air and a corresponding official of the American Government. He would appreciate the Department’s views on this suggestion. Bewoor who has been most helpful in these negotiations plans to arrive in Washington, in company with Sir Frederick Tymms, Director of Civil Aviation, between the tenth and fifteenth of August to participate in the postwar civil air transport talks. 17 During his visit to the United States, he would like very much to be put in touch with the officials of Mackay and RCA. Merrell 17 For correspondence regarding these talks at Washington between American officials and representatives of the Government of India, see pp. 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 297 ] ff. The Acting Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) 811.7445/8–1244: Telegram [Document 303] The Acting Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi ( Merrell ) Washington , August 12, 1944—6 p.m. 570. Re your 542 July 25. Following is message which Mr. Fly, Chairman of Federal Communications Commission will transmit to Sir Mohammed Usman through facilities of RCA Communications and Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company upon occasion of opening of direct radio telegraph circuit between United States and India. “It is a pleasure indeed to greet the Indian government and people on the occasion of the opening of the first direct commercial radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and India. By means of such radio circuits, messages which a century ago would have taken weeks or even months to reach their destination are now transmitted with the speed of light. I trust that the new circuit will further strengthen the bonds of friendship between us, and will hasten the day of victory in the war which we are fighting together.” Stettinius The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (Fly) to the Chief of the Telecommunications Division (DeWolf) 811.7445/8–1544 [Document 304] The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission ( Fly ) to the Chief of the Telecommunications Division ( DeWolf ) Washington , August 15, 1944. Dear Mr. DeWolf : Here is a copy of the telegram received from Sir Mohammed Usman today on the occasion of the opening of the circuit between India and the United States. Sincerely yours James Lawrence Fly [Enclosure—Telegram] Sir Mohammed Usman, Member for Posts and Air in the Viceroy’s Executive Council to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission ( Fly ) I warmly appreciate your message on the occasion of the opening of direct radio telegram circuit between India and United States and heartily reciprocate the sentiments expressed therein. I am confident that this measure will help to hasten the day of victory and further strengthens the bonds of friendship between our countries. Sir Mohammed Usman Representations in support of the application by the United Press for the lease of teletype telegraphic lines in India Representations in support of the application by the United Press for the lease of teletype telegraphic lines in India 19 19 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 289 – 296 . [305] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs London, April 22, 1944. 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/146 [306] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [Washington,] May 24, 1944. 811.91245/45 [307] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, June 3, 1944. 811.91245/45 [308] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, July 8, 1944. [Received July 19.] 811.91245/7–844 [309] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, September 22, 1944. [Received September 28—5 p.m.] 811.91245/9–2244: Airgram Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/146 [Document 305] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 20 London , April 22, 1944. Participants: Sir David Monteath, Under Secretary of State for India, Mr. Eric E. Crowe, Foreign Office, Mr. P. J. Patrick, India Office, Mr. A. H. Joyce, India Office, Mr. Wallace Murray, Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State, Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State, Mr. Robert D. Coe, American Embassy. Sir David and Mr. Murray reviewed the correspondence regarding the request of the United Press for communications facilities in India which has taken place between the Embassy and the Foreign Office during the past year, based on the Department’s telegram number 2009, March 31, 12 noon [ midnight ], to London; London’s number 5650, August 27, 7 p.m., to the Department, and the Department’s number 5684, September 12 [ 16 ], 12 midnight to London. 21 Sir David said that he thought that it had been accepted that land line facilities were simply unavailable and mentioned that the Government of India had recently asked for 20,000 miles of telephone and telegraph circuits which were badly needed for the Indian railroads and regarded as indispensable to the war effort. As regards the proposed wireless circuits he said that the Government of India felt that were such equipment available it should be used for official purposes. Elaborating as regards the security aspects of this question, Mr. Patrick begged us to believe that the Government of India was perfectly sincere in saying that the proposed use of radio circuits was quite out of the question. He pointed out that much foreign news even though passed by British or American censorship was not necessarily suitable for publication in India; and that such news, as well as the domestic news transmitted by this method, would be heard by the Japs. He added that there was, of course, always danger of the improper use of wireless equipment or of its use by unauthorized persons, and that the Government of India was simply unable to provide enough control personnel to assure safety. Mr. Murray said that he appreciated the reasoning of the Government of India but that frankly he could not say that we were satisfied with it. He emphasized that there was no discrimination whatsoever against Reuters 22 in the United States and that that company had absolutely equal access to all available American facilities for the transmission of its news service both within the country and abroad. He continued that it was difficult to understand why, if the Government of India was so short on communications facilities desperately needed for war purposes, it had not long since taken over for its own use the land line system now leased to Reuters and placed all news services, both Reuters and others, on the same basis as regards the use of any facilities which might still be available after official needs have been met. He said that the matter would certainly have been handled this way in the United States, if a similar situation existed. He continued that he was concerned over the possible effect of this matter of apparent discrimination on the good relations which must prevail between the British and ourselves, pointing out that the United Press could have a widespread influence on public opinion in the United States if it felt that it had been deliberately discriminated against by the Government of India. He went on to say that the attitude of the Government of India had been completely negative in this matter being limited to a flat refusal, with unconvincing explanations, of the proposals which had been made to it by the United Press and supported by the American Government. He suggested that it would be quite possible for the Government of India to take a positive rather than a negative approach: that if it were absolutely necessary for them to say “no” to the specific proposals which had been advanced they might say what they could offer instead in the way of facilities for the. United Press. In reply to this exposition Mr. Patrick and Mr. Joyce claimed that Reuters facilities were in fact placed at the disposition of the Government of India and used rather generously by the latter; that Reuters had simply been in the field first and made the contracts, both with the Government of India and with the newspapers it serves under which it is now operating; that under normal circumstances any competing company would have full opportunity to secure the same facilities; and that the cancellation of the Reuters contract by the Government, aside from being legally impracticable, would result in a complete disruption of news service facilities in India, since no agency would then be in a position adequately to serve the Indian press. The British representatives agreed, however, that they were anxious to avoid any disturbance of Anglo-American relations because of this matter and that they would examine the question carefully again with a view to recommending to the Government of India that it make every effort to make existing facilities available to the United Press to the fullest extent compatible with war needs. 20 Mr. Kohler and Mr. Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, were in London to discuss Near Eastern subjects in connection with general talks inaugurated on April 7 between the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) and officials of the British Foreign Office; for report to the Secretary of State by the Under Secretary on his mission to London, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 21 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 289 , 292 , and 294 , respectively. 22 British news agency. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs 811.91245/45 [Document 306] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] May 24, 1944. Participants: Mr. Harry Flory 23 United Press Mr. John Morris 24 Mr. DeWolf—TD 25 Messrs. Murray Allen 26 Kohler Oakes [Here follows lengthy discussion of problems involved in the desire of the United Press to secure facilities in India.] Summary . The foregoing discussion clarified the following points: (1) The United Press is opposed to retaliation against Reuters; (2) The United Press is opposed to any action designed to compel Reuters to share its present facilities in India with the United Press; (3) The Government of India maintains, and the United Press appears to accept, that even with an enlargement of telegraph facilities generally in India, military needs will preclude during the war the exclusive use of any of those facilities by the United Press; (4) Unless military demands on the Indian telegraph system decrease or the Government of India can be persuaded that its calculations regarding military needs have been incorrect, the only possible solution during the war appears to be one permitting the use of radio facilities by the United Press. 23 Vice President of the United Press. 24 Far Eastern representative of the United Press. 25 Francis C. DeWolf, Chief of the Telecommunications Division. 26 George V. Allen. Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 811.91245/45 [Document 307] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) No. 4142 Washington , June 3, 1944. The Secretary of State refers to a conversation which took place at the India Office on April 22, 1944 between officials of the United States and British Governments, on the subject of facilities in India requested by the United Press. Among those participating in the conversation was Mr. Robert D. Coe of the Embassy, and it is understood that a copy of the memorandum of conversation is in the Embassy’s files. There is now enclosed for the Embassy’s information a copy of a memorandum of conversation of May 24, 1944 28 which took place at the Department between officials of the Department and of the United Press. It is requested that the Embassy inform the Department whether there have been any developments in London since the conversation of April 22, 1944 which would indicate in what manner further representations on behalf of the United Press might be useful at this time. 28 Supra . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 811.91245/7–844 [Document 308] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State No. 16,738 London , July 8, 1944. [Received July 19.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction No. 4142 of June 3, 1944, concerning the facilities in India requested by the United Press. Inquiry of the Foreign Office has been made regarding any further developments on this matter, and the Embassy has been informed that although the India Office has asked the Government of India to examine the question afresh with a view to assisting the United Press no reply from the Government of India as yet has been received in London. The Foreign Office will ask the India Office to press the Government of India for an early statement of its reactions to the re-examination of the problem, and the Embassy will be informed as soon as a reply is received. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Howard Bucknell, Jr. Minister-Counselor The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 811.91245/9–2244: Airgram [Document 309] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , September 22, 1944. [Received September 28—5 p.m.] A–1166. With reference to the subject of United States facilities in India (see the Embassy’s despatch No. 16,738 of July 8, 1944), we have now received a letter dated September 20 from the Foreign Office in the following sense: “Would you kindly refer to the correspondence ending with my letter (7082/118/801) of the 6th July to Bucknell about facilities for the United Press in India? 2. You will recollect that at his meeting with Mr. Wallace Murray on the 22nd April, Sir David Monteath undertook that the India Office would apprise the Government of India of Mr. Wallace Murray’s representations and ask them to consider whether, for example, transmission over the India Posts and Telegraphs system of messages of the United Press could in any way be facilitated with a view to reducing to the absolute minimum, subject to Government requirements, the disadvantages now felt by the Agency. 3. The Government of India have re-examined the question, but while fully appreciating the position of the State Department, regret that it is impossible for them to grant the United Press any special facilities for the transmission of their messages in India. They repeat that their inability to accord special facilities is based on no ground of principle but on purely practical considerations. They have no wish to discriminate between one news-agency and another, or to interfere with legitimate commercial competition. As explained in the third paragraph of Le Rougetel’s 29 letter to you of the 26th August, 1943, such facilities cannot be given solely because of the insufficient number of lines available at present. A number of new lines have been under construction for some time, and the hope had been entertained that it would become possible to afford certain facilities to the United Press of America and other Agencies operating in India when these were completed. Recently, however, the widening scale of operations in India occasioned by the creation of the South East Asia Command has again greatly increased the heavy burden on the telegraphic lines available in India, with the consequence that the new lines coming into operation will only suffice to absorb the extra traffic resulting from the increasing scale of operations in and near India. The Government of India, however, expect that these lines will bring some relief to the existing lines used for civil traffic, and in this expected relief the United Press will share, in the shape of a reduction of delays, along with the other news agencies concerned.” Winant 29 John H. Le Rougetel, Counsellor, British Foreign Office. Elevation of the American Legation in Tehran and the Iranian Legation in Washington to the status of Embassies Elevation of the American Legation in Tehran and the Iranian Legation in Washington to the status of Embassies [310] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, December 22, 1943. 124.91/104 [311] The Secretary of State to the Chargè in Iran (Ford) Washington, January 13, 1944—11 p.m. 124.91/101a: Telegram [312] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, January 15, 1944—6 p.m. [Received January 16—3:22 a.m.] 124.91/102: Telegram [313] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, January 20, 1944—10 a.m. [Received January 21—7:54 a.m.] 124.91/106: Telegram [314] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, January 27, 1944—9 p.m. 124.91/106: Telegram [315] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, February 2, 1944—5 p.m. 124.91/106b: Telegram [316] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, February 5, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 8:01 p.m.] 124.91/107: Telegram Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 124.91/104 [Document 310] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington , December 22, 1943. In his report to you of May 13, 1943, General Hurley 1 recommended that our Legation at Tehran be raised to the status of an Embassy. He also recommended that we assure Iran that the principles of the Atlantic Charter 2 apply to that country, and that Iran be permitted to join the United Nations in a declaration of war against the Axis. Since that time Iran, of her own volition, has declared war against Germany and Japan, and adhered to the United Nations Declaration. 3 The recent Three-Power Declaration at Tehran 4 definitely assures Iran’s future in accordance with Atlantic Charter principles. The elevation of our Legation at Tehran to an Embassy, at this time, would constitute recognition of these facts, and of the difficulties and suffering which Iran has experienced in making available her transport system, by means of which huge quantities of military supplies have been and are being moved to Russia. A certain precedent for the action suggested lies in the fact that about a year ago, the Shah 5 appointed a distinguished elder statesman to Washington and asked that he be received with the rank of Ambassador. This request was referred to you and received your approval. Unfortunately Mr. Foroughi, the statesman in question, died before he could leave Iran. A further precedent exists in the fact that General Hurley recently received a temporary appointment to Tehran with the rank of Ambassador. 6 As you know, Soviet Russia already has an Embassy in Iran. If it is decided to raise our Legation to the status of an Embassy it would seem desirable to inform the British of our plan in order that they may consider taking similar action at approximately the same time. I should be glad to know whether, in view of the considerations above-mentioned, you concur in the suggestion of raising our Legation at Tehran to the rank of Embassy. 7 C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 1 Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in the Near East. In March 1943, General Hurley had been designated to undertake a mission to the Near East in this capacity to report on general conditions in that area. For his report of May 13. 1943, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 363 . 2 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, ibid. , 1941, vol. i , p. 367 . 3 Declaration signed January 1, 1942, ibid. , 1942, vol. i , p. 25 ; for correspondence regarding the entry of Iran into the war and adherence to the United Nations Declaration, see ibid. , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 428 ff. 4 Declaration Regarding Iran, signed December 1, 1943, by President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier Stalin, Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 646 . 5 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. 6 This occurred in October 1943; see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 392 ff., passim . 7 Notation on the original reads: “CH OK FDR.” The Secretary of State to the Chargè in Iran (Ford) 124.91/101a: Telegram [Document 311] The Secretary of State to the Chargè in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , January 13, 1944—11 p.m. 23. The Department proposes to raise the Legation in Tehran to the rank of Embassy. Please inform the Iranian Government and inquire whether this step meets with its approval and whether it agrees similarly to raise the status of the Iranian Legation in Washington. For your information only: The British have been advised informally of the Department’s intended action. Hull The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 124.91/102: Telegram [Document 312] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , January 15, 1944—6 p.m. [Received January 16—3:22 a.m.] 18 [ 28? ]. Today I interviewed Foreign Minister 8 regarding Department’s telegram No. 23 dated January 13, 11 p.m. and he assured me his Government is “flattered by, appreciative of and thoroughly agreeable to” proposal to raise our respective Legations to Embassies. He stated he was immediately telegraphing this favorable attitude to his Minister at Washington. Ford 8 Mohammed Saed. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 124.91/106: Telegram [Document 313] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , January 20, 1944—10 a.m. [Received January 21—7:54 a.m.] 37. Legation’s telegram No. 28, January 15. British Minister 9 has requested that I inform him when decision is made to present formal notification to Iranian Government that Legation is being raised to status of Embassy in order that our respective Governments may act simultaneously vis-à-vis the Iranian Government in this respect. He states his Foreign Office is communicating with Washington in this sense. While I perceive no objection to such joint action I should appreciate Department’s specific directive on this point. Would it not also be advisable to avoid appearance of secret concerted action by British and ourselves to inform Soviet Ambassador here 10 of action we propose. Ford 9 Sir Reader W. Bullard. 10 Konstantin Alexandrovich Mikhailov. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 124.91/106: Telegram [Document 314] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , January 27, 1944—9 p.m. 43. Your 37, January 20. British Embassy in Washington has requested Department to time announcement of raising Legation at Tehran to status of Embassy to coincide with similar British announcement. Department agrees to this procedure and you may so inform your British colleague. You may also notify your Soviet colleague of the intended action. It should be emphasized to both your British and Soviet colleagues and to the Iranian authorities that care should be taken to avoid any premature publicity. Hull The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 124.91/106b: Telegram [Document 315] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , February 2, 1944—5 p.m. 54. Please inform the Foreign Office that this Government proposes February 10 as the date on which announcements will be made in Washington, London, and Tehran regarding the elevation of the Iranian, British and American diplomatic establishments in those cities from Legations to Embassies. If this date is agreeable to the British and Iranian Governments, the American Government contemplates making an announcement on February 10 in the following sense: “The Government of the United States has decided to elevate the status of its diplomatic mission at Tehran from that of a Legation to an Embassy. The Iranian Government has notified the Department of State of its intention to take corresponding action with regard to the status of its diplomatic mission in Washington. This action has been agreed upon in recognition of the greatly increased relationships between the two countries which have recently developed, and is in accordance with the status of Iran as a full member of the United Nations.” Please report whether the Iranian Government concurs in this proposal. Hull The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 124.91/107: Telegram [Document 316] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , February 5, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 8:01 p.m.] 67. Department’s telegram No. 54 dated February 2. Foreign Minister assures me his Government concurs fully with proposed action and will make announcement locally on February 10 similar to that quoted in Department’s telegram under reference. British Minister likewise has informed me informally that February 10 has been agreed upon by our respective Governments for formal announcement. 11 I have orally advised Soviet Ambassador of proposed action. Ford 11 For announcement by the Department of State released to the press February 10, 1944, see Department of State Bulletin , February 12, 1944, p. 181. The change in status became effective August 21, 1944 (see ibid. , August 27, 1944, p. 208). Policy of economic assistance by the United States to Iran; efforts to implement the Tripartite Declaration Regarding Iran of December 1, 1943 Policy of economic assistance by the United States to Iran; efforts to implement the Tripartite Declaration Regarding Iran of December 1, 1943 12 12 For previous correspondence concerning these subjects, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 561 ff. and pp. 319 ff., respectively; for text of Declaration issued at the Tehran Conference by President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier Stalin, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 646 . [317] The Secretary of State to Major General Lucius D. Clay of the War Department General Staff Washington, December 1, 1943. 891.24/605 [318] Major General Lucius D. Clay of the War Department General Staff to the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) Washington, 24 December, 1943. 800.24/1507 [319] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) [Washington,] January 29, 1944. 861.24/1773 [320] Memorandum by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [Washington,] February 14, 1944. 761.91/259½ [321] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, February 14, 1944. [Received February 28.] 861.24/1742 [322] The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) Washington, February 17, 1944. 861.24/1743 [323] The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) Washington, February 26, 1944. 861.24/1743 [324] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, February 28, 1944—8 p.m. 861.24/1744a: Telegram [325] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, March 7, 1944—4 p.m. [Received March 7—1:40 p.m.] 861.24/1747: Telegram [326] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, April 7, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 8—1:30 p.m.] 761.91/263: Telegram [327] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs London, April 13, 1944. 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/136 [328] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, April 15, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 11:36 p.m.] 891.5018/36: Telegram [329] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, April 19, 1944—7 p.m. [Received April 19—5:45 p.m.] 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/43: Telegram [330] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, April 22, 1944—6 p.m. 891.5018/36: Telegram [331] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) London, April 24, 1944. 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/109 [332] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) London, April 25, 1944. 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/147 [333] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, April 27, 1944—5 p.m. [Received April 27—3:55 p.m.] 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/73: Telegram [334] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, April 30, 1944—2 p.m. 891.00/3037a: Telegram [335] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 5, 1944—5 a.m. [Received May 6—3:18 p.m.] 891.00/3043: Telegram [336] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, May 12, 1944—5 p.m. 891.00/3043: Telegram [337] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 24, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 25—4 p.m.] 891.00/3057: Telegram [338] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, June 2, 1944—midnight. 891.00/3057: Telegram [339] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State Moscow, June 10, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 7 p.m.] 891.50/59: Telegram [340] The Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) to President Roosevelt [Tehran,] June 17, 1944. 891.001 Pahlavi, Reza Mohammad/8–1544 [341] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 8, 1944—4 p.m. [Received July 8—2:15 p.m.] 891.154A/7–844: Telegram [342] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , 10 July, 1944. 891.154A/7–1044 [343] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 12, 1944—7 p.m. [Received July 13—10:27 a.m.] 711.91/7–1244: Telegram [344] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 23, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 3:55 p.m.] 891.91/7–2344: Telegram [345] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, July 27, 1944—10 p.m. 891.91/7–2344: Telegram [346] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, July 31, 1944—8 p.m. 711.91/7–1244: Telegram [347] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, August 12, 1944. 711.91/7–1244 [348] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War Washington, August 16, 1944. 891.154A/8–1144 [349] Memorandum by Colonel H. R. Maddux, Chief of Liaison Section, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, to the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) Washington, 18 August 1944. 891.154A/8–1844 [350] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State Washington, August 21, 1944. 711.91/8–2144 [351] President Roosevelt to the Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) Washington, September 2, 1944. 891.001 Pahlavi, Reza Mohammad/9–444 [352] President Roosevelt to the Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) Washington, September 2, 1944. 891.001 Pahlavi, Reza Mohammad/9–444 [353] The Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) to President Roosevelt Saad-Abad, [Tehran,] October 4, 1944. 891.001 Pahlavi, Reza Mohammad/10–1244 [354] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) [Washington,] October 24, 1944. 761.91/10–2444 [355] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, November 28, 1944—7 p.m. [Received November 28—6:02 p.m.] 761.91/11–2844: Telegram [356] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 6, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 8—5:30 p.m.] 891.00/12–644: Telegram [357] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State Moscow, December 11, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 6:11 p.m.] 761.91/12–1144: Telegram The Secretary of State to Major General Lucius D. Clay of the War Department General Staff 891.24/605 [Document 317] The Secretary of State to Major General Lucius D. Clay of the War Department General Staff Washington , December 1, 1943. My Dear General Clay : For some time the Department has felt that it would be helpful if the War Department would broaden the directive of the Commanding General of the Persian Gulf Service Command 13 to enable him to give such assistance to the American and Iranian civil authorities as may be possible without interfering with the transportation of supplies to the Soviet Union. James M. Landis 14 telegraphed from Cairo that you are familiar with the situation and suggested that it be emphasized to you with particular reference to the grain collection and transport situation in Iran, which is briefly as follows: Crops in Iran this season were large enough to feed the entire country. 15 The minimum amount needed to feed the cities is 310,000 tons. This must be transported quickly since many roads become impassable in December. Collection and transport of grain are functions of the grain and transport sections of the American Financial Mission to Iran. 16 These divisions have neither enough personnel nor trucks to do the job. If the job is not done, the Allied Governments will have to ship thousands of tons from overseas to prevent starvation in Iranian cities. In these circumstances the Mission asked the British, Soviet and American forces in Iran for help. The British provided 500 trucks and promised 150 more. They have offered to lend 25 British officers and non-commissioned officers to assist in transport control and operation, and 14 British officers to assist in cereal collection outside the Soviet zone. These men will be under direction of the American Financial Mission. The Soviet authorities have promised delivery to Tehran of 40,000 to 50,000 tons of grain if trucks are made available from the Iranian civil fleet. General Connolly was asked to lend a few trucking experts and declined on the ground that he has none to spare and that responsibility for conditions in Iran rests primarily with the British and not at all on the American forces. Mr. Landis telegraphed the following views on the matter: The cereal and transport situation in Iran is so serious that unless the difficulties are overcome it will react on our aid to Russia. A gesture of help from the American forces in Iran will do much to enhance American prestige and promote cooperative concern for Iran on the part of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. There is good cooperation on the civilian and diplomatic side. It is sound policy to implement the work of our Minister at Tehran 17 and to make possible the success of Dr. Millspaugh, head of the American Financial Mission. The War Department’s help, in the form of broadening General Connolly’s directive, is necessary if our aims are to be achieved. It seems clear to us that some cooperation by General Connolly in these matters would benefit our aid to Russia program. Assistance in grain transport would help to obviate a need such as arose a year ago, when we and the British Government arranged to ship 25,000 tons of wheat to the Persian Gulf for the people of Tehran, thus using cargo space and port and railroad facilities which otherwise might have been used for supplies to Russia. Sincerely yours, For the Secretary of State: Wallace Murray Adviser on Political Relations 13 Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly. 14 Director of American Economic Operations in the Middle East, with the personal rank of Minister, and Principal American Representative at the Middle East Supply Center (MESC), Cairo, an organization established in 1941 by the British to handle the supply of civilian goods to the countries of the Near East; for correspondence regarding American decision in 1942 to participate in the Middle East Supply Center, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. 15 For correspondence concerning interest of the United States in the food situation in Iran, see ibid. , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 600 ff. 16 For correspondence regarding the Financial Mission, headed by Arthur C. Millspaugh, Administrator General of Finances in the Iranian Government, see pp. 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] ff. 17 Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. Major General Lucius D. Clay of the War Department General Staff to the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) 800.24/1507 [Document 318] Major General Lucius D. Clay of the War Department General Staff to the Adviser on Political Relations ( Murray ) Washington , 24 December, 1943. Dear Mr. Murray : In your letter of 1 December 1943 you suggested the advisability of broadening the War Department directive to General Connolly to permit him to give technical assistance to the Iranian Government when possible without interference to the movement of supplies to Russia. As I have advised Mr. Winant, 18 it was believed desirable to hold this question in abeyance pending the completion of the recent Teheran Conference. It is my understanding that arrangements were made then at Mr. Landis’ request for some assistance from General Connolly in the agricultural field. 19 We are now proceeding to obtain General Connolly’s views on the broader question so that we may advise you in full. Reply to your suggestion will be made at an early date. Sincerely yours, Lucius D. Clay 18 Frederick G. Winant, Adviser, Eastern Hemisphere Division, Department of State. 19 A final decision on this matter apparently had been made by President Roosevelt at Cairo about December 6, 1943. As a result, the Army in mid-February authorized the assignment of 27 officers and men from the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC) to the services of Floyd F. Shields, American Director-General of the Iranian Road Transport Administration. Mr. Landis hailed the move as “essential to the realization … of the objectives of the Tehran declaration …” For subsequent developments regarding this situation, see pp. 339–340 [ Pgs. 339–340 include portions of Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , and Doc. 343 ] , and 346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] . The whole problem of Army cooperation in United States aid to Iran is treated in T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia in the official Army history United States Army in World War II: The Middle East Theater (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 435 ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) 861.24/1773 [Document 319] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs ( Allen ) [ Washington ,] January 29, 1944. Subject: Broadening Directives of General Connolly Participants: Mr. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War Mr. Murray 20 Mr. Allen Mr. Murray said that he was calling on Mr. McCloy at the suggestion of Mr. Stettinius 21 for the purpose of discussing the above subject. Mr. Murray reviewed briefly the history of American relations with Iran, with particular reference to the special interest we have had in that country since Mr. Morgan Shuster, a prominent American economist and financial authority, was appointed Adviser to the Iranian (then Persian) Government in 1912 [ 1911 ]. 22 Mr. Murray referred to the long history of American missionary, educational, philanthropic and cultural activities in Iran. He said that our interest in that country, however, had recently been increased to a remarkable extent, and for very realistic causes. Some 28,000 American troops are now stationed in that country, engaged in forwarding supplies to Russia. Large numbers of British and Russian troops are also stationed in the country. It is there, he said, that the three great Powers: United States, United Kingdom and U.S.S.R., come in most intimate contact. We have every reason not only to desire but to insist that Iran be kept peaceful and that causes for disturbances there be eliminated. Mr. Murray pointed out that the fruit of our carefully cultivated policy towards Iran had ripened in the Tehran Declaration issued December 1, 1943 by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. This Declaration, for which the American officials at Tehran were primarily responsible and the wording of which, in fact, had been prepared by our own officers, not only guaranteed the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iran but also gave assurances that the three Powers concerned would aid in the economic development of that country. Mr. Murray said that recently General Patrick Hurley, the President’s Personal Representative in Iran, had reported to the President that one of the principal means by which we could implement the policy of the Tehran Declaration would be for the War Department to broaden General Connolly’s directives to enable him to take such measures as might be possible, without detriment to the primary objective of his mission, to render such assistance as he could, through men and matériel to the Iranian Government. 23 At this point Colonel Johnson, the officer in immediate charge of Iranian matters in the Operations Division, joined the conversations at Mr. McCloy’s request. Mr. McCloy asked for suggestions regarding the type of help General Connolly might render. Mr. Murray said that there frequently arose opportunities for the American forces in Iran to help the Persians in large or small matters. Reference was made to the question of digging wells with equipment which General Connolly controls, to the question of possible assistance in road-building or other construction projects, and to the supplying of technical personnel for communications. Colonel Johnson said that General Connolly recently had been asked to report on the possible assistance which he might render the Persians, but that his absence in Russia had doubtless prevented a reply. The War Department expected to receive an answer within a week or so. Colonel Johnson added that General Connolly had already reported a shortage of troops under his command and an inability to release any of his men for service in other war areas. Mr. Allen suggested that while General Connolly might feel an over-all shortage, certain categories of technicians might be available from time to time as their jobs are completed. Mr. Allen thought that there were two reasons which General Connolly might give for declining to assist the Iranians: (1) A lack of any surplus of men or matériel, and (2) a lack of any authorization from the War Department to accord such assistance, even if he had the men and matériel. Mr. Allen thought that the principal object of the present discussion was to remove the second possible objection. Colonel Johnson said that General Connolly had received numerous requests from the Iranians for assistance and referred to a very improper request from the President of the Medjlis 24 to build a private road on his property. Mr. Murray said that the State Department was certainly not proposing that General Connolly be authorized to render any assistance to private individuals, but to the Iranian people. Mr. McCloy said that he personally saw no reason why General Connolly’s directives should not be broadened and that the War Department would examine the question as sympathetically as possible. He said that Colonel Johnson would keep us informed of developments, particularly as regards any reply which might be received from General Connolly. 20 Wallace Murray became Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, January 15, 1944. 21 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State. 22 For correspondence regarding Iranian employment of American financial advisers, see Foreign Relations , 1911, pp. 679 ff. 23 For General Hurley’s letter of December 21, 1943, to President Roosevelt, and the latter’s comments thereon, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 420 . 24 The Iranian Parliament. Memorandum by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs 761.91/259½ [Document 320] Memorandum by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] February 14, 1944. Soviet Exploitation of Iran There has been noticeable for some time a tendency on the part of the Soviet Government to negotiate with the Iranian Government agreements and contracts in which the scales are tipped heavily in Russian favor. This trend has developed to the point where it amounts to consistent Soviet exploitation of the Iranians. The agreements find Iranian acquiescence only because the Iranians fear the consequences of opposing the much-feared Russians. Previous examples of such agreements in which the Russians have imposed their desires on the Iranians include an arms agreement 25 in which the Iranians provide capital and materials to produce arms for the Russians, a financial agreement 26 in which the Russians dictated terms much less favorable than those given to the Iranians by the United States and United Kingdom, and an arrangement under which the Iranians finance to a great extent the railways and roads which the Russians are using for war purposes in the north of Iran. There are many instances of less important but equally objectionable action on the part of the Russians, such as failure to pay rent on premises occupied. A more detailed statement of examples of such Soviet exploitation is contained in the annex hereto. 27 Two new examples of this Soviet attitude toward Iran have just come to light: one in the form of an agreement already signed; 28 and the other an agreement now proposed by the Soviet Government. The first of these consists of two contracts, on a cash basis, under which the Iranians will furnish the Russians 36,000 tons of rice at half the price the Iranian Government must pay to acquire the same rice, in exchange for cotton piece goods, newsprint and miscellaneous goods. The cotton piece goods, which comprise two-thirds of the value of the Russian items, are to be furnished at almost 50 percent more than the same goods would cost the Iranians in India. The second case concerns an agreement the Soviet Government is now endeavoring to negotiate with the Iranians covering the operation of the northern section of the Trans-Iranian Railway. This agreement, discussed in the annex, is considered consistently unfair to the Iranians. Preliminary examination of the text bears out this statement. The Iranians naturally wonder whether the guarantees of the Atlantic Charter 29 have any significance if a strong nation is able to impose its will upon a weaker one through this kind of negotiation. We have every reason to hope and expect that the Russians will cooperate more fully and frankly with the allies in matters of common interest in Iran as a result of the declaration on Iran made at the Tehran Conference, which pledged the three powers to assist Iran economically. We have the right also to anticipate, as a result of this declaration, more friendly and fair treatment of the Iranians by the Soviet Government in economic matters. We may, in fact, take the Tehran Declaration as a point of departure to mark the inauguration of a new era of better allied cooperation in Iran and of more considerate treatment of the Iranians. It is believed that the British Government, which gave evidence at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences of desire to support such a policy, would welcome any suggestions we might make as to how to bring about this desired end. Some Instances of Soviet Economic Exploitation of Iran 1. The Agreement for Manufacture of Small Arms . A Soviet-Iranian agreement was made early in 1943 providing for the manufacture of certain small arms and ammunition in Iranian plants for delivery to the Soviet Government. Under this agreement, the Iranian Government is required to finance the preparation and operation of the plants and to furnish raw materials. The Russians agree to cooperate with technical advice, plans and, in some instances, machinery and tools. Soviet military delegates are to be stationed in the plants to observe and stimulate production. Severe financial penalties are to be levied against the Iranian Government in case of failure to meet the impossible rates of delivery called for in the contract. In spite of the fact that the Iranians finance the plants, the Russians have not yet agreed as to the price to be paid for the finished products or the method of payment, these matters being left to a later date. The contract is regarded by all observers as unfair to the Iranians. It was agreed to by the Iranian Government only because there seemed no other course than to acquiesce in the Russian demands. The Iranians have thus bound themselves to a contract which is clearly impossible to fulfill and have had in addition to make a cash outlay of several million dollars at a time when the country is in a financial crisis. 2. The Financial Agreement . A general financial agreement was signed by the Iranian and Soviet Governments on March 18, 1943. The financial treatment accorded the Iranians under this agreement is substantially less favorable than that given the Iranians by the British under their financial agreement and than that accorded the Iranians by the United States Government in the absence of an agreement. Briefly, this agreement provides for the advance by the Iranian Government of the rials needed by the Soviet Government for its operations in Iran. Balances are convertible at the end of each semester into 60 percent gold and 40 percent into a special dollar account. The gold thus converted is held in Russia for delivery after the war. The dollars can be utilized only for the purchase of goods from the United States and only after other dollar funds available to the Iranian Government have been utilized. Under the British-Iranian Financial Agreement, the British obtain rials by the direct sale of sterling and convert at the end of each semester the accrued balances of sterling held by the Iranians into 60 percent deliverable gold and 40 percent sterling guaranteed in terms of gold. The United States Government also obtains its rials for use in Iran by direct sales of dollars, not on credit as in the case of the Russians, and has expressed its willingness to convert 100 percent of Iranian dollar holdings into gold. Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, Administrator General of Finances of Iran advised the Iranian Minister of Finance against signing the agreement on the grounds that Iran’s basic interests were not sufficiently safeguarded. 3. The Rice–Cotton Piece Goods Deal . The Iranian and Soviet Governments signed in November 1943, two contracts calling for sales of Iranian rice to the Russians and of Russian cotton piece and miscellaneous goods to the Iranians. The terms of the contracts, which are on a cash basis, are briefly as follows: The Iranians agree to sell to the Russians 36,000 tons of rice at prices averaging about three rials per kilo, although this rice, purchased from growers by a company especially set up for the purpose, will cost the Iranian Government more than six rials a kilogram. The Russians, in partial compensation for this loss, agree to transport 24,000 tons of Iranian rice to Tehran. In the second of these contracts the Soviet Government sells the Iranians 115,000,000 rials worth of cotton piece goods, newsprint, glassware and miscellaneous goods. The cotton piece goods, which comprise three-quarters of the value of the Russian deliveries under the contract, are sold the Iranians at fifty percent above prevailing prices in India. The Iranian loss on the rice sales is estimated at several million dollars. While the Iranians will sustain no actual monetary loss on the entire deal, since the cotton piece goods will be sold to the public at sufficiently high prices to offset the loss on rice, the net result is the payment by the poverty-stricken Iranian public of a rice subsidy to the Soviet Government. The Iranian Government, as in other agreements and contracts, was fully aware of the disadvantageous nature of these two contracts. In this case Dr. Millspaugh agreed to its signature for political reasons, mainly in the hope that if the Russians were appeased on this deal they might be more cooperative in other matters, especially the essential task of collecting and transporting wheat from the province of Azerbaijan. It was feared, too, that unless the contract were signed, the Russians might simply take the rice they wanted from the northern part of the country, using their own agencies and disregarding the needs of the population. 4. The Proposed Soviet-Iranian Railway Agreement . The Soviet Government has been endeavoring for several months to negotiate an agreement with the Iranian Government covering the operation of the northern section of the Iranian railway. A draft agreement was drawn up to be signed on January 3, 1944, but the Iranians were successful in obtaining Soviet consent to its withdrawal on the understanding that a subsequent draft would be prepared and presented. This proposed agreement is said by the Legation in Tehran to be consistently and thoroughly unfair to the Iranians and substantially less favorable than treatment provided for in the general railway agreement now under negotiation in Tehran between the allied military authorities on one hand and the Iranian Government on the other. For example, under the proposed bilateral Soviet-Iranian agreement, the Iranians would be required to pay the Soviet Government for certain services rendered by the Russians while under the general proposed agreement these services would be performed by the allies free of charge. The Legation at Tehran takes the logical view that the Russians should not be permitted to sign a bilateral agreement with the Iranians on the subject of the railways until the conclusion of the general allied-Iranian agreement now under negotiation. 5. Statement of Dr. Millspaugh regarding Soviet Treatment of Iran . Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, Administrator General of Iranian Finances, takes a serious view of the unfair treatment of the Iranians by the Soviet Government. In a confidential memorandum of June 29, 1943. 30 he set forth his views on the matter and capitulated some of the instances wherein he felt the Iranian Government was receiving inequitable treatment at the hands of the Russians. This memorandum, prepared for internal Iranian Government use and intended as a statement of the Iranian case for possible future use in making an approach to the Soviet Government to seek correction of abuses, made the following points in addition to some of the cases discussed above. (1) The Soviet Government owed the Iranian Government 5,800,000 rials on account of advances to the Soviet Trade Delegation against goods sold in Iran. Also owing were 3,400,000 rials for detonators and fuses for use on the railway. (2) The Soviet Government owed the Iranians an amount of 57,000,000 rials for advances made in the year 1320 30a to the Soviet Trade Delegation. (3) Under a contract for operation of the Shahi canning factory, the Iranian Government is required to finance the plant for production of goods for Soviet use. The Russians made the suggestion that they would pay an outstanding debt of 1,172,934 rials to the Iranian Ministry of Commerce if the entire proceeds were used to buy raw materials for the canning factory. (4) The Russo-Iranian Fisheries Company is running a deficit, fifty percent of which must be borne by the Iranians. The deficit appears to be due to the fact that the Russians have a monopoly on the caviar obtained and fix the prices themselves. (5) The Russians are utilizing the shoe factories in Azerbaijan and exporting the shoes, while the Iranians must endeavor to obtain shoes from abroad. Similarly the Russians are taking the products of the cotton goods and blanket factory, although the Iranian Army is badly in need of these articles. (6) The Russians are making no payments to the Iranian Government for maintenance of roads in the north of Iran. The Iranian Government has had to build roads at its own expense for Soviet use. An item in the Iranian budget calls for 22,500,000 rials for road repairs requested by the Soviet Government. The Ministry of Roads has asked for the sum of 126,800,000 rials for maintenance of roads in the entire country, roads used to a great extent by the allies for military purposes. (7) The Soviet Government owed the Iranian Government the sum of 80,000,000 rials for work performed on the railways in the year 1321. 31 (It is understood that the British Government has agreed, on its part, to pay the Iranian Government this year more than 300,000,000 for the use of the southern section of the Trans-Iranian Railway.) (8) The Iranians were paying during the current year 7,525,000 rials for maintenance of Caspian Sea ports being used by the Russians. The Americans and British, on the other hand, are said to be paying themselves for the upkeep of the Persian Gulf ports they are using. (9) The Russians occupy buildings and facilities in northern Iran without payment of rent. In addition, they sometimes demand that the Iranian Government pay for repairs on these properties. (10) The Russians owed the Iranians on April 22, 1943, the sum of 50,000,000 rials for customs duties. (11) The Russians are said to cut trees in Iranian forests without payment of the three percent tax on timber. 25 Signed January 23, 1943; for correspondence regarding United States interest in this agreement, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 628 ff. 26 Signed March 18, 1943; text transmitted to the Department in despatch 513, April 8, 1943, from Tehran (not printed). 27 Not printed. 28 This agreement of November 4, 1943, consisted of two contracts, one for the sale of rice to the Soviet Union by Iran and the other for the sale of certain manufactured goods to Iran by the Soviet Union; in actual fact related to each other, they were understood by the Legation to be legally separate (891.6131/4). Texts of these contracts were transmitted to the Department in despatch 811, January 24, 1943, from Tehran (not printed). 29 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. i , p. 367 . 30 Not printed. 30a i. e., 1941. 31 i. e., 1942. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 861.24/1742 [Document 321] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State No. 840 Tehran , February 14, 1944. [Received February 28.] Sir : I have the honor to report that on February 10, 1944, at the invitation of Major General Connolly, commander of the Persian Gulf Command, the Shah 32 and Prime Minister 33 of Iran made a trip by American Army airplane from Tehran to Abadan and return. In addition to the Shah, the Prime Minister and General Connolly, the party included Minister of Roads Entezam, General Yazdan Panah, General Razmara, the Chief of Ceremonies of the Imperial Court, and Colonel John B. Stetson, fiscal officer for the Persian Gulf Command. The trip south was made in a C–87 (Liberator) which has been waiting at Tehran at the disposition of Ambassador Harriman. No stops were made, but the plane flew over Isfahan and Basra en route. Lunch was served at the American Army mess at Abadan, after which the Shah inspected the assembly plant for airplanes being delivered to the Soviet Union. Because of a defect in one of the motors of the C–87, the return trip was made in a transport plane of the Douglas DC–3 type, and the Shah was given an opportunity to handle the controls while the ship was in the air. The line of flight was arranged to enable the members of the group to see from the air several of the camps and installations of the P.G.C. 34 I understand that the excursion went off very well. This gesture by General Connolly toward the Iranian Government was, apparently, the first move on his part in a general change of policy toward the devotion of more attention to Iran and Iranian problems. When I saw him several days ago, following his return from an extended visit to the Soviet Union, the General said that his trip had convinced him of the success of the P.G.C. in its primary objective, the movement of supplies to the U.S.S.R. Consequently, he felt that the command could now afford to concern itself more with Iran, which he realized was an important country, and to extend assistance in various ways to the Iranians. As additional indications of interest in the Iranian scene, it may be mentioned that the General is also making plans for the Shah to visit Camp Amirabad, P.G.C. headquarters at Tehran, and review the troops stationed there in the near future. When Nelson Eddy 35 came to Tehran recently on a tour of American camps, General Connolly arranged for a special concert at Amirabad, which was attended by the Princesses Ashraf and Shams, the Prime Minister, several cabinet ministers, and a number of high Iranian Army officers, in addition to the British Minister, 36 Soviet Ambassador, 37 and Soviet and British army officers. The General has also suggested to me, and to some of the others concerned, that he would like to arrange periodic meetings of the American advisers in Iran, Legation representatives, and P.G.C. officers, to discuss their respective problems in an informal, round-table fashion. His idea was to combine these discussions with a luncheon or dinner. I have told General Connolly that I heartily approve and feel that such meetings would serve a very useful purpose. Respectfully yours, Richard Ford 32 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. 33 Ali Soheily. 34 Persian Gulf (Service) Command. 35 American singer. 36 Sir Reader W. Bullard. 37 Konstantin Alexandrovich Mikhailov. The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 861.24/1743 [Document 322] The Assistant Secretary of War ( McCloy ) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) 38 Washington , February 17, 1944. My Dear Mr. Murray : With reference to changing instructions to General Connolly to permit deviation from his primary mission in order to assist Iran, you will recall that you were told about February 2, 1944, that General Connolly had already been queried on the subject. General Connolly has now recommended that his directive be changed to grant him discretionary authority to assist Iran in order to increase the good will and prestige of the American forces, such authority not to interfere with the movement of supplies to Russia. General Connolly envisions this authority to include the occasional furnishing of technical advice, or equipment or personnel for short periods. General Connolly’s directive has been amended accordingly. He has been informed that, where practicable, such assistance should be rendered through the Ridley and Schwarzkopf Missions. 39 It is considered that an excellent example of American assistance to Iran occurred in the collection of the harvest. General Ridley conducted a school for the training of drivers and mechanics of the Iranian Army transport units. U.S. trucks furnished to Iran were assembled mostly by the Persian Gulf Command, although the Iranians in connection with their schools were able to assemble some of these trucks themselves. The trucks were then operated by the Iranian Army in collecting the harvest, with the assistance of certain supervisory American Army personnel. This largely avoided interruption to the work of American troop units, and the Iranians have an organization capable of continuing the work in other years. It also avoided the criticism which intelligence reports indicate have been made of the British Army. The local public has believed that the British were collecting the harvest for their own purposes and this has resulted in opprobrium to the British. Sincerely yours, John J. McCloy 38 Copy transmitted to Tehran by the Department in instruction 338, February 26, which stated in part: “The Department is deeply appreciative of this action by the War Department, which it is felt will be of great value in the implementation of our policy in Iran. For its part, the Department hopes the Legation will be able to prevent any unwarranted requests for assistance being made of the Persian Gulf Service Command.” (861.24/1743) 39 Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley was American military adviser to the Iranian Government on matters pertaining to the services of supply to the Iranian Army, and Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf was similarly engaged for the organization of the Iranian Gendarmerie (rural police); for correspondence relating to the Ridley and Schwarzkopf Missions, see Foreign Relation , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 510 ff., and post , pp. 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] ff. The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) 861.24/1743 [Document 323] The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Assistant Secretary of War ( McCloy ) 40 Washington , February 26, 1944. My Dear Mr. McCloy : It is with a keen sense of appreciation that I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 17, 1944, informing me that General Connolly’s directives have been broadened to permit him, within the limits imposed by his primary objective of moving war supplies to Russia, to give assistance to Iran in the form of technical advice, equipment or the loan of men for short periods. The last paragraph of your letter was especially interesting in revealing the interest the War Department and the Persian Gulf Service Command have taken in the affairs of the Iranian Ministry of War and the vital question of the movement of the wheat harvest. We have also been informed that General Connolly has consented to the loan to the Iranian civil transport board of 27 officers and men for the purpose of assisting our adviser, Mr. Shields, to reorganize the badly disrupted Iranian organization. Actions of this kind, I am sure, will lead to insuring the security of the supply corridor and to the strengthening of our long-range position in Iran. We have informed the Legation at Tehran of your action and also of General Connolly’s desire that assistance to Iran be granted where possible through General Ridley or Colonel Schwarzkopf. We have also cautioned the Legation against any tendency which might arise on the part of the Iranian authorities or the American advisers to make unwarranted requests for assistance. The criterion, it seems to us, should be to endeavor to help Iran to help herself, avoiding any suggestion that we are willing or in a position to carry out extensive and continuing works with our own men and equipment. We look forward with assurance to a period of the closest cooperation between the Persian Gulf Service Command on the one hand and our Legation and advisers on the other. Sincerely yours, Wallace Murray 40 Copy transmitted to Tehran in Department’s instruction 338, February 26. The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 861.24/1744a: Telegram [Document 324] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , February 28, 1944—8 p.m. 113. There follows a paraphase of a message being sent General Connolly by War Department. Begin paraphrase. War Department is aware, with reference to your radio February 23, 41 that as result of the change in your directive you may receive large number of requests you cannot meet. Legation at Tehran is being instructed by State Department to screen such requests as are made through it with view to elimination of those which are not urgent or reasonable. State Department is also requesting Legation to advise the civilian missions in Iran of change in your directive. No reasons exist therefore for withholding such information from Schwarzkopf or Ridley. On contrary cases of requests for assistance in which Iranian aid could be used should be referred to General Ridley in order to determine whether the task can be accomplished in whole or in part by the Iranian Gendarmerie or Army. War Department does not wish to have American forces perform any tasks which can be done by Iranian civilians or Army. In case the work cannot be done by these agencies it remains of course within your discretion as to whether you will undertake it or not. War Department recognizes that the most efficient way to meet any request is for you to assign American troops to execute it. This procedure however would not be in keeping with the principle of helping the Iranians to help themselves nor would it develop Iranian abilities. The military and gendarmerie missions above mentioned are in Iran with the primary objective of establishing American goodwill, which is a consideration secondary to your operations. Actions you take which reflect credit on those missions will achieve American objective in Iran. The above information is being sent by the State Department to the Legation at Tehran for distribution to the civilian missions. You should deliver a paraphrase to Schwarzkopf and Ridley. End paraphrase. Please bring foregoing to attention of various civilian missions to Iran and offer to General Connolly your full cooperation in the implementation of this new directive. Please endeavor to screen requests made to you by Iranian Government or advisers with view to eliminating those which are not urgent or reasonable. Stettinius 41 Not printed; General Connolly had stated, in part, “It has been my attitude heretofore to be rather hard-boiled and the publication of my new instructions will bring innumerable requests for assistance which I must carefully screen. I desire to conform strictly to the policy expressed in the new directive and I shall possibly have to refuse a number of requisitions which may cause hard feelings.” (861.24/1744a) The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 861.24/1747: Telegram [Document 325] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , March 7, 1944—4 p.m. [Received March 7—1:40 p.m.] 164. Reference Department’s 113, February 28. General Connolly held a meeting of all American advisers, at which I was present, on March 6 and read them substance of War Department’s instructions. All expressed appreciation. I emphasized that advisers themselves should make every effort to screen requests for assistance before presentation to Legation and should put forward only those projects which would be of substantial benefit to Iran. Furthermore I pointed out what [ that ] in the final analysis the ultimately decisive factor in granting or refusing requests must necessarily be ability of PGC to comply without interference with its primary task of moving goods to Russia. General Connolly has expressed to me his desire to work in close cooperation with Legation and he is hopeful [in?] fact [of?] doing so. He is already assisting advisers in various ways. Apart from transport personnel being assigned to road transport department he is lending men to help Winsor 42 with a small water storage project in Tehran and a mechanic to assist Crawford 43 in moving a grain cleaning machine. He is likewise being most helpful in certain minor matters affecting the Legation and its staff. I am gratified by the attitude of the General and his subordinates and believe that we shall be able to collaborate in an entirely satisfactory manner in implementing his new instructions. My only present fear is that the Iranian Government and the advisers will tend to overdo things and deluge the Legation and Connolly with requests for help. Ford 42 Luther Winsor, American head of the Iranian Irrigation Department. 43 J. Forrest Crawford, Chief Administrator of the Cereals and Bread Section of the Millspaugh Mission. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 761.91/263: Telegram [Document 326] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State 44 Tehran , April 7, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 8—1:30 p.m.] 240. British Ambassador today informed me Department had asked Foreign Office to join in making representations to Soviet Government against Russian exploitation of Iran. Foreign Office, consequently, had asked him of Soviet action detrimental to Iran. 45 Sir Reader said he proposed to reply in general terms to effect that Russian-occupied area is not making its proper contribution to Iran’s economic life and that this situation must be changed, especially in view of anticipated poor harvests in southern section of country this year. I assume that in broaching this subject with Foreign Office, Department had in mind various incidents, such as rice and munitions contracts, reported by Legation from time to time. I am asking Millspaugh to inform me of any similar Soviet activities which may not have been reported hitherto. In this general connection, Department may wish to consider asking Soviets to justify restrictions placed upon travel of Americans, British and other non-Iranians in Soviet zone of Iran. Soviet permit system at present is very strict, and procedure unpredictable, and while merely source of inconvenience and annoyance to American civilians and military not connected with Iranian Government, it is grave handicap to operations of American advisers, both economic and military. Under present circumstances, I do not see that military necessity requires such close and arbitrary control of the movements of nationals of Allied nations, especially when they are in the service of Iranian Government, whose sovereignty and responsibilities include zone in question. As Department may know, Iranian nationals are not required to obtain permits for travel in Soviet zone. Sent to Department as No. 240; repeated to Moscow. Ford 44 In telegram 2830 April 10, midnight, to London, the Department reported the substance of this telegram to Mr. Murray, then in London as a member of the Stettinius Mission (see vol. i , pp. 1 ff.). 45 In telegram 226, April 12, 9 p.m., to Tehran, the Department replied: “The Foreign Office instruction to the British Ambassador in Tehran must have arisen out of the current Anglo-American conversations in London. A paraphrase of your telegram has been sent to London, for the attention of Mr. Murray. Department will relay to you any further information obtained.” (761.91/263) Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/136 [Document 327] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs London , April 13, 1944. Participants: British: Sir Maurice Peterson, K.C.M.G., Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. C. W. Baxter, C.M.G., M.C., Head, Eastern Dept; Hon. R. M. A. Hankey, Eastern Dept; Mr. William Hilary Young, Eastern Department, FO American: Mr. Wallace Murray, State Department; Mr. Foy D. Kohler, State Department; Mr. Robert Coe, American Embassy. Mr. Murray opened the discussion by stating that the Department had been increasingly apprehensive about Soviet economic exploitation of the Russian zone in Iran, contrary to the Atlantic Charter, the Tehran Declaration and Soviet pledges to Iran. He cited in particular the onerous Soviet-Iranian financial agreement of March 18, 1943, the agreement between Iran and Russia for the manufacture of small arms and ammunition; the agreements of November, 1943 for the disadvantageous exchange of Iranian rice against Russian cotton piece and other goods; and the Russian requirement that the Iranians pay for road and railway maintenance in the Soviet zone and for other railway services provided to the Russians. Mr. Murray said that while direct representations to the Russians on these points would obviously not be fruitful, the Department had felt that talks based upon the implementation of the Tehran Declaration might be desirable and, we hope, lead to a more cooperative attitude on the part of the Russians. Sir Maurice said that the Foreign Office completely sympathized as to the desirability of getting the Russians to ease up on Persia. He felt, however, that Russian diplomatic representatives abroad are given so little latitude by their Government that it would probably not be productive to take the matter up “cold” in Tehran itself or in Washington or London. In this connection he said that the former Soviet Ambassador Maisky had called on him last year and presented a new counsellor who was familiar with Iranian matters. When Sir Maurice suggested that he would be glad to see the counsellor and discuss Iran from time to time the Ambassador said that such matters should be discussed with him (Maisky). The net result was that the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office seldom has an opportunity to talk with the Russians about Middle Eastern matters. Consequently Sir Maurice thought that the question must first be broached in Moscow. He expressed some doubt as to whether any conversations were likely to be fruitful so long as the Russians continued to carry the principal military burden on land and to be as conscious of this as they are at present and thought that we should have to give careful consideration to the timing of any approach. Sir Maurice suggested, however, that a list of points which we would be interested in trying to cover with the Soviets be drawn up during our current talks. The list could then be cleared with the Northern Department in the Foreign Office and, after Mr. Murray’s return to Washington, with the appropriate authorities in the State Department so that an agreed basis might be established on which we could proceed at the appropriate time. During the resulting discussion on Soviet-Iranian relations the Foreign Office representative said that the marked friendliness which the Russians had shown toward the Iranians at the time of the Tehran Conference had now been replaced by a policy of sulking, due mainly to Russian resentment over Persian resistance to the conditions requiring reception of Soviet officers by the Iranians in connection with the USSR’s recent offer of planes and tanks. 50 The point was made by Mr. Hankey that perhaps we and the British could make more headway in helping the Persians in such situations of Soviet exploitation if the Persians would put up more resistance in advance, since it was much easier for the British and American Governments to back up a Persian stand in these matters than to try to talk the Russians out of something which had become an accomplished fact. Sir Maurice cited as an example that the Iranians had not consulted either the British or Americans before ceding to the Russians on the small arms manufacturing deal and expressed the opinion that this onerous contract might have been avoided or at least ameliorated if the Iranians had taken a stand and had been backed up by the Americans and British. Mr. Baxter raised the point as to whether it would be desirable to include the Persians in the proposed talks with the Russians. After some discussion it was agreed that it would be better not to include the Persians, at least at the beginning, but that arrangements should be made to keep them currently informed. Referring to Iranian financial difficulties, Mr. Murray suggested the possibility that British goods might be provided to Iran on a credit basis instead of against cash as now required by the UKCC. 51 Sir Maurice replied that he had understood that Iran actually had excess sterling, mainly from Anglo-Iranian oil royalties, and that the British were in fact favoring the Persians by thus removing inflationary possibilities. He had thought that the main trouble was a shortage of rials due to the absorption of a large quantity of currency by the Soviets. However, he said that the British would be glad to look into this matter to see if the adoption of a credit procedure in regard to payment for British goods would ease the situation. Mr. Murray expressed the Department’s appreciation of the support which the British have given to the American advisers to the Iranian Government. He said he thought that the Russians were inclined to be suspicious of these advisers and Sir Maurice agreed that the Foreign Office had received indications confirming that this was the Russian attitude. Sir Maurice continued that the British were wholeheartedly behind the American advisers for a number of reasons. To mention only the lowest motive, and he begged us to believe that they had higher ones as well, the British consider that foreign advisers are indispensable and realize that British nationals would not under present circumstances be suitable. Consequently, they were glad indeed to have the advisers be of American origin. He said that there was only one aspect of the adviser program which he would venture to mention with some diffidence and that was an apparent need for better coordination. To illustrate, he said that while Millspaugh desired on the one hand to economize, General Ridley and Colonel Schwartzkopf desired to expand and thus to spend. Sir Maurice accordingly hoped that the new American Ambassador, Mr. Leland Morris, 52 would be the type of man who could “pull the team together”. Mr. Murray said that the Department was very interested in securing increasingly better coordination among the American advisers. He considered Mr. Morris well suited to effect such coordination and said that he would be instructed to do everything possible in this line. He added that the Department had recognized that Millspaugh had certain weaknesses in the administrative field, but that his knowledge of Persia and earlier experience in that country had in the Department’s view outweighed this weakness. Sir Maurice agreed and said that the British held Mr. Millspaugh in high esteem. 50 An offer to provide Iran with 30 planes and 35 tanks, made originally by Soviet Premier Stalin to the Shah in a personal interview during the Tehran Conference. This failed to materialize because of Soviet insistence on a formal agreement, including provision for 250 Russian technicians and instructors to train the Iranians in operation of the vehicles, which the Iranian Government had declined. (891.24/625, 633, 641) 51 United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. 52 Leland B. Morris, appointed Ambassador to Iran on March 21, 1944, presented his credentials on September 7, 1944. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.5018/36: Telegram [Document 328] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , April 15, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 11:36 p.m.] 266. We have recently discussed grain collection prospects our 1944–45 harvest year with Millspaugh, MESC and British Embassy. Situation seems to be as follows: (1) Despite excellent harvest in 1943, Iranian Government will have only small reserve of perhaps 25,000 tons on hand as it enters new crop year; (2) If northern provinces of Azerbaijan and Zenjan, and to some extent Khorassan, which are under Soviet occupation, had contributed even their minimum expected share, this reserve could have been larger by at least another 18,000 tons; (3) Joint Anglo-American efforts have produced results 25% above original target in southern areas of Iran; (4) At most an average harvest for country as a whole is expected for the coming crop year, but good harvest is again anticipated in Zenjan and Azerbaijan as well as other northern provinces. Because of expected smaller harvest, Millspaugh fears large-scale hoarding may make collections difficult unless something is done quickly to establish public confidence. He therefore wishes to have at an early date a guarantee from Allies, including Soviets, along lines of 1942 grain agreement. 53 Along with guarantee, Millspaugh feels Allies should make early shipment to Iran of about 10,000 tons grain. In addition to assisting in establishment of confidence and so helping collections, such an actual delivery would enable Iranian Government further to reduce prices paid for grain, with wholesome effect upon economy of country as whole. (It is proposed in any case to reduce grain prices by about 10%.) Amount delivered if not ultimately needed by Iran, could be returned later to Allied Armies or other agencies this area. Although British Embassy, MESC, Tehran and ourselves agree that guarantee would be desirable, Dr. Murray 54 of MESC, Cairo, tells us that Allied Governments would probably find difficulty in assuming an obligation of this kind in light of present world grain supply and transport situation, increasing Allied commitments, and shortage of shipping. It is therefore doubly necessary that complete Soviet cooperation with Iranian authorities be obtained in order to ensure collection and delivery to Tehran, from next harvest, of at least 25,000 tons from Zenjan and Azerbaijan, as well as normal amounts from other northern provinces. (25,000 tons is well within capacity of two provinces cited). Important reason for unsatisfactory results during present harvest year in north has been refusal of Soviet authorities to allow foreign advisers to Iranian Government free access to and freedom of movement in Soviet zone. Such freedom of action is essential for adequate organization and coordination of Iranian Government’s transport and grain collection operations in the area. Although Soviet authorities have recently issued 3-month permit for Azerbaijan to an American employee of Cereals and Bread Section, 55 there is no assurance that they will continue this slightly more liberal attitude. The fact that 3-month limit was imposed is not good augury for future grain operations in the region. In summary, if times were normal it would appear that Iran could be self-sustaining in grain for 1944–45. Under present conditions, however, and in view of anticipated serious deficit in extreme southern districts, it seems that Allied Governments must choose between three alternatives: (1) making sure that maximum possible surplus of grain from northern provinces is moved to Tehran; (2) bringing in grain from outside Iran; (3) risking famine conditions in certain districts of the south. British Embassy is sending similar telegram to London. I would appreciate an indication of Department’s views. Paraphrase by air mail to Cairo for Landis. Ford 53 Tripartite food agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Iran, signed at Tehran, December 4, 1942, 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1835, or Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 292; for correspondence regarding this agreement and the 1942 food crisis, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 120 ff. 54 Keith Murray, Food Director, Middle East Supply Center, Cairo. 55 The Cereals and Bread Section of the Millspaugh Mission, of which Albert C. Black, formerly Governor of the Farm Credit Administration in the United States Department of Agriculture, had been appointed Chief Administrator. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/43: Telegram [Document 329] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State 56 London , April 19, 1944—7 p.m. [Received April 19—5:45 p.m.] 3206. Deles 57 No. 22. From the Under Secretary. Department’s 2859 April 11, 9 p.m., 58 Esdel 59 number 12. Question of Soviet exploitation of Iran has been discussed at length by Murray with Sir Maurice Peterson and aides at Foreign Office who are sympathetic with the idea of approaching the Soviet Government in this regard. Since it is essential to avoid giving the Soviets any impression that the British and ourselves are concerting against them, it has been suggested that Mr. Eden 60 and I might take the matter up informally with the Soviet Ambassador here, 61 with whom we are both lunching on Tuesday, April 25. We would explain that our conversations have touched upon the subject of Iran and the desirability of Anglo-American-Soviet discussions with a view to working out methods of collaboration in implementing the pledges of economic assistance to Iran given by all three Governments at Tehran. We would therefore propose that the Soviet Ambassador ask his Government to instruct the Soviet Ambassador at Tehran to join with his British and American colleagues there for this purpose. The actual questions to be raised and the order and manner in which they should be broached would be a matter for the discretion of our representatives on the spot, subject, of course, to any general instructions from the Department and the Foreign Office. The suggestion is now being cleared with the various authorities concerned in the Foreign Office. I personally consider the idea sound and likely to avoid the suspicion and even resentment which might be aroused by a parallel approach to the Soviets by our Ambassadors at Moscow. If you agree, I request authority to follow the suggested procedure in case suitable arrangements can be worked out prior to my departure. 62 [Stettinius.] Winant 56 Repeated in paraphrase to Tehran in telegram 246, April 22, 8 p.m. 57 Designation for serial numbering of telegrams emanating from the Stettinius Mission in London. 58 Not printed. 59 Designation for serial numbering of telegrams originating in the Department for the Stettinius Mission. 60 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 61 Fëdor Tarasovich Gusev. 62 In his telegram 3242, April 22, midnight, to London, the Secretary of State said, “I approve course of action suggested … Dr. Millspaugh especially needs the cooperation of Soviet authorities in Iran, particularly as regards permission for American advisers to carry out their functions in the northern provinces.” (740.0011 Stettinius Mission/51b) Repeated in paraphrase in telegram 248, April 22, 10 p.m., to Tehran. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.5018/36: Telegram [Document 330] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , April 22, 1944—6 p.m. 244. Your 266, April 15. You may inform Millspaugh and any other Iranian officials that this Government will give, as it has in past instances, its earnest and sympathetic consideration to Iranian requests for grain should a serious shortage develop. However Department does not feel justified, on basis of evidence at hand, in supporting Millspaugh’s suggestion for immediate shipment of 10,000 tons of grain or for an allied guarantee along lines of 1942 Anglo-American-Iranian wheat agreement. This view is based on probability of a sizeable carryover of Iranian grain into next crop year, lack of indications of a crop failure in mid-1944, heavy demands on allies for cereals for other areas, and continuing tight shipping situation. Please follow grain situation closely in consultation with MESC and your British colleague, reporting especially on prospects for coming crop and on deliveries of this year’s harvest surplus from northern provinces. Department agrees that it is essential, in order to avoid necessity for importation of foreign grain into Iran during next crop year, to obtain Soviet cooperation in collection and transportation of surplus cereals from northern Iran. A paraphrase of your telegram has been sent to Mr. Murray in London for use in discussing this phase of problem with British. Repeated to Cairo for Landis, and to Moscow. Hull Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/109 [Document 331] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) London , April 24, 1944. In the Teheran Declaration of December 1, 1943, signed by Messrs. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, it was agreed that: “… 63 The three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran and they [are] agreed that they will continue to make available to the Iran Government such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.” While Iran’s economic position is somewhat better than last summer, it is still very precarious and could be vastly improved by closer coordination of Russian, British and American policy in Iran with a view to the implementation of our common pledges of economic assistance. Exactly what action needs to be taken can be best judged by our representatives on the spot. We are therefore proposing that all three Governments should instruct their diplomatic representatives at Teheran to consult together and to exchange information and concert action. From an American point of view, we are particularly anxious to secure Soviet support of the work of Dr. Millspaugh and the other American advisers to the Iranian Government. We have promoted the American adviser program solely in the interest of stabilizing the general situation in Iran because of that country’s great importance as a transport route to Russia, and the Soviets can be reassured that we have no ulterior motives whatsoever in this connection. Sir Maurice Peterson, British Under Secretary of State, and I are meeting on Tuesday morning at 10:30 with the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy at London, Mr. Zinchenko, to “break the ice” on this subject prior to the lunch which you and Mr. Eden are having later the same day with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Gousev. I should add that we are being careful to avoid giving the Soviets any impression that the British and ourselves are “ganging up” on them. 63 Omission indicated in the original memorandum. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/147 [Document 332] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) London , April 25, 1944. Participants: Sir Maurice Peterson, K.C.M.G., Superintending Under Secretary, Eastern Department Hon. R. M. A. Hankey, Eastern Department; Mr. Constantine Zinchenko, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy Mr. Wallace Murray, Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State Sir Maurice Peterson said that the meeting was to profit by the presence in London of the Stettinius Mission in order to discuss Persia, especially economic affairs. The economic outlook there was fairly serious. He recalled, however, that under the Tehran Declaration the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain were pledged to give Persia economic assistance to meet her special economic difficulties. The question arose what should be done to implement that Declaration, what machinery should be set up for the purpose and where any discussions should take place. Mr. Wallace Murray said that he thought it might be a useful plan to authorize the three Allied Ambassadors in Tehran to form a committee to examine problems of an economic nature. He emphasized that Iran was unique in that the military forces of the three Powers met and cooperated together there. The whole effort which Great Britain and America were making by the provision of advisers and supplies and in other ways was directed to keeping the country going and to giving assistance to Persia to meet her difficulties. There would be obvious advantage in coordinating these efforts with those made by the U.S.S.R. They were as much in Russia’s interest as in Persia’s, since if Persia collapsed, it would vitally affect the supply route. Mr. Wallace Murray said that the American advisers had a particularly tough job. Mutual consultation was in his view the ideal way to help solve the difficulties which Dr. Millspaugh had to face. It would be necessary for this purpose that instructions should be sent to the Allied representatives in Tehran. Mr. Zinchenko enquired whether the situation in Persia had recently got worse. Sir Maurice Peterson said that the Foreign Office had recently received a telegram from Tehran saying that the harvest was expected to be below average, though it might be better in the North than in the South, Dr. Millspaugh was sure that even if things were well organized, there would only just be sufficient foodstuffs in the country and had already asked for the shipment of a certain supply to be held in reserve. It was, however, difficult for us to ship supplies of cereals to Persia without affecting the supply route to Russia and our own requirements of shipping for war purposes and it was obvious that every effort ought to be made to enable the Persians to feed themselves so far as possible. That was why Mr. Wallace Murray was suggesting discussions for which Tehran seemed to be the best place. The three Ambassadors might make agreed recommendations to their Governments, who could then consider what further action could be taken. Mr. Zinchenko asked whether any special arrangements were really necessary. He imagined that the Ambassadors were already in contact. He was not an expert on Persian affairs and it was difficult for him to discuss the question in detail, but he quite saw that Tehran was the best place for the discussions. He enquired whether the Ambassadors in Tehran all worked separately at present. In the course of the subsequent discussion, it was explained to Mr. Zinchenko that there was not at present such a degree of cooperation as was desirable. It was perhaps natural that the Ambassadors should not discuss together and pool their information unless they were instructed to do so. Mr. Wallace Murray emphasized the great value of pooling information. The Russian Ambassador would have information from the North, the British Ambassador would have information from the South and the American Ambassador would naturally be in close contact with Dr. Millspaugh, and in that way a complete picture of the situation could be formed and the best measures devised for meeting Persia’s difficulties. The difficulties which the Persian Government had experienced in controlling their crops were briefly outlined to Mr. Zinchenko during the conversation and it was emphasized that the smaller any surplus might be, the greater would be the difficulties of combatting hoarding and illicit traffic in cereals. Mr. Wallace Murray said in the course of the discussion that the American Government would particularly welcome coordinated efforts to deal with Persian problems. All three Allies were working for the same purpose. He hoped that the new Soviet Ambassador 64 would get to know Dr. Millspaugh and would cooperate with him in solving common problems. He emphasized that the sole aim of the American advisers was to help the common Allied war effort. The vital common concern of the Allies to send supplies to Russia was the sole reason why American troops and so many American advisers were now in Persia. He explained that the American Government had no control over Dr. Millspaugh, who was paid by the Persian Government and only took their instructions. Unfortunately, Dr. Millspaugh had found it almost impossible to see the previous Soviet Ambassador and he greatly hoped that a period of cooperation could now be initiated. Sir Maurice Peterson, summarizing the discussions, said that instructions to the British Ambassador in Tehran would be prepared, but that they would be held up until he heard from the Soviet Embassy whether the Soviet Government agreed to instruct their representative in Tehran to cooperate with his British and American colleagues in framing any recommendations which might be necessary on economic difficulties in Persia. Mr. Zinchenko said that he felt sure that his Ambassador would telegraph to Moscow recommending action in the sense desired. 64 The Soviet Chargé in Iran, Mikhail Alexeyevich Maximov, had been named Ambassador-designate. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/73: Telegram [Document 333] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , April 27, 1944—5 p.m. [Received April 27—3:55 p.m.] 3446. Deles 36. From the Under Secretary. I discussed the question of Iran yesterday with Eden and the Soviet Ambassador, on the lines indicated in Deles number 22, April 19, after Murray and Sir Maurice had paved the way by a similar talk with the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy. The Soviet reaction was favorable in both instances and the Ambassador is telegraphing Moscow as requested. I suggest that appropriate instructions be sent to Ford without delay and that Moscow be informed of these developments. 65 The British are telegraphing their representatives at Tehran and Moscow today. [Stettinius.] Winant 65 Repeated in paraphrase in telegram 261, April 28, 5 p.m., to Tehran, and in telegram 1058, 5 p.m., to Moscow. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.00/3037a: Telegram [Document 334] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , April 30, 1944—2 p.m. 266. Department’s 261, April 28. 66 You are authorized and instructed to participate, in fullest spirit of friendly collaboration, with your British and Soviet colleagues, in discussions on general subject of allied assistance to Iran in economic matters. The British Foreign Office is instructing Bullard, and the Soviet Ambassador in London has recommended to Moscow that the Soviet representative in Tehran be given similar instructions. In suggesting these discussions the Department had in mind bringing about more effective allied cooperation in Iran both in support of the war effort and for purpose of protecting Iran’s economic interests. The discussions would have for their purpose the implementation of allied economic pledges to Iran given by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt at the Tehran Conference. The conversations might well cover such subjects as allied support for the American advisers in Iran, the general Iranian supply situation, possible Soviet participation in Tehran MESC, 67 increased allied cooperation and consultation in all matters of mutual interest in Iran, restrictions on travel in the northern provinces, and the necessity for Soviet cooperation in collecting and transporting Iranian wheat from the north to southern deficit areas. One of the primary considerations which motivated Department was desirability of discussing with the Soviet authorities the harmful effects of certain agreements which have appeared to represent a policy of economic exploitation of Iran. You are fully familiar with these agreements, contracts and informal arrangements. This aspect should be introduced into the discussions in a most careful manner in order to avoid creating an atmosphere of recrimination or the impression that the conversations are aimed at the actions of any one Power. A frank discussion of the relations of all three Powers with Iran should be encouraged. It is essential also to avoid throughout the discussions the impression of a British-American front. Please draw up and submit to Department, after consultation with your British and Soviet colleagues, a tentative agenda for the discussions. The necessity for keeping the Iranian authorities informed of the discussions may be mentioned, in view of the provisions therefor in the British-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1942. 68 The Department leaves to your judgment the attitude which you should take should this subject be introduced, but no objection is perceived to appropriate discussion with the Iranian Government. Repeated to London and Moscow. 69 Hull 66 See footnote 65, p. 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] . 67 Tehran office of the Middle East Supply Center. 68 Signed at Tehran, January 29, 1942, British and Foreign State Papers , vol cxliv , p. 1017; for correspondence regarding interest of the United States in this treaty, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 263 ff. 69 As telegrams 3479 and 1076, respectively. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.00/3043: Telegram [Document 335] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 5, 1944—5 a.m. [Received May 6—3:18 p.m.] 315. This is preliminary report in response to interesting and most promising directive in Department’s telegram No. 266, April 30. Initial discussions yesterday, first with Maximov, Soviet Chargé, who said he had not yet received instructions from Moscow, and subsequently with Bullard, who said he had received instructions from London. I endeavored to keep conversation to generalities, with central theme being my Government’s keen interest in seeing American adviser program made successful not only for Iran’s present economic betterment but also for possible future guidance when and if the three Allies are called upon elsewhere to cooperate in helping to rehabilitate small nations. I expressed the hope that, in subsequent conversations we may hold together, this immediate as well as long-range basis for cooperation in Iran may be given primary consideration and that I felt my Government would welcome both suggestions and concrete acts which might tend toward realization of this cooperative ideal and I obviously avoided in these preliminary talks any mention of specific cases. Maximov, inscrutable, skeptical but withal receptive and friendly, promised to let me know immediately when he heard from Moscow. He asked if I had yet seen Bullard on this matter and I was happily able to say no but I had appointment to see him afternoon. He asked if the discussions had been originated by Iranian Government, and I assured him the suggestion, aimed at implementing Allied economic pledges given at Tehran Conference, had come from my Government. He questioned whether Iran really wanted to be saved and I replied that Iran itself had invited advisers here and was maintaining them at considerable expense and that repeated instances of Soviet and British assistance in transport needs during last harvest had been received gratefully by Iran constituted clear proof that this country did indeed welcome any assistance the Allies individually or cooperatively might give her in helping to maintain her economic stability. Bullard was equally receptive and promised fullest cooperation in any talks we may have.… He realized necessity for avoiding impression of a British-American front, and expressed pleasure that I had seen Soviets first. I feel that a tentative agenda for our discussions might well be held in abeyance until I have had further conversation with Maximov based on any instructions he may receive from Moscow. However, I hope Department will agree that, insofar as our participation is concerned, we should stress grave importance we attach to success of adviser program in Iran, and that we hope any action the British and Soviets may take vis-à-vis Iranian economy will have as a criterion whether or not such action will help or hurt our advisers’ chances of success in their efforts to rescue Iran. More specific matters can of course be dealt with under this over-all statement of policy in the manner suggested by the Department, but I feel it is highly desirable, in order to avoid appearance that discussions are aimed at any one power, to base our part of conversations on our expressed determination to support adviser program and to invite and possibly to urge both British and Soviets to join us in that determined support. I am seeing the Prime Minister 70 tomorrow on other matters and should the moment seem propitious shall speak to him informally of proposed discussions. If not, I shall delay until talks have progressed further, and in any event am grateful to Department for its open attitude in this regard. I further hope the excellent directive under acknowledgement will be supplemented by further instructions on this supremely important subject. Ford 70 Mohammed Saed, who had formed a Cabinet in succession to the government of Ali Soheily, which had resigned on March 17. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.00/3043: Telegram [Document 336] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , May 12, 1944—5 p.m. 293. Your 315, May 5. Department welcomes your promptness in beginning the preliminary conversations. The Department’s only suggestion at this time is that too great emphasis by you on the adviser question may create the impression that our suggestion of general discussions was merely to accomplish the specific end of support for the advisers. The Department hopes that during the discussions the British or Russians, preferably the latter, will offer suggestions for implementing the program of assistance to Iran, and that these suggestions will include more equitable financial agreements with Iran and better facilities for Iranian officials, including the American advisers, to operate throughout the country. The purpose of the discussions is to bring about genuine and effective American-Soviet-British cooperation in Iran. You should repeatedly emphasize this desire on the part of the United States. Department is sending you by airmail copies of memoranda of conversations bearing on Iran which took place in London between officers of the Department and British officials. Please repeat your telegrams on this subject to Moscow and London. Sent to Tehran, repeated to London and Moscow. 71 Hull 71 As telegrams 3805 and 1181, respectively. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.00/3057: Telegram [Document 337] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 24, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 25—4 p.m.] 370. My telegram No. 315 dated May 5. Maximov (whose acceptability as new Soviet Ambassador to Iran was announced publicly yesterday) called today to inform me that he had been instructed officially by Moscow to enter into discussions with Bullard and this Legation regarding more effective mutual Allied aid to Iran. In a set little speech he gave full assurance of cooperation in any conversations that might be undertaken, stated that his Government’s policy likewise envisaged a strong internal economy for Iran, and hoped that our talks might help, first, to solve specific problems now hindering Iran’s rehabilitation; and second objective of friendly and constructive Allied cooperation in this area. He stressed need for more effective foodstuffs distribution throughout Iran, and stated his Government was particularly interested in an early solution of this problem. He suggested, and I agreed, that we each draw up a list of concrete cases requiring discussion and that these lists be exchanged prior to our next meeting, at which Bullard would also be present. He mentioned the American adviser program but tended to veer away from any outright commitment as to what his Government’s policy is or may be toward this program. Acting in accordance with Department’s telegram No. 293 dated May 12, I refrained from dwelling on our acute interest in success of our advisers, but did point out that many of the items which I as American representative would bring up for discussion must inevitably reflect the problems of Americans who are endeavoring to advise Iran how best to put her economic house in order. Maximov admitted the reasonableness of this position, but added with a twinkle, that while he and Bullard were trying to save Iran, it would be up to me to save the advisers. In my efforts to draw up an intelligent list of questions I should welcome any suggestions the Department may care to give. Any number of concrete cases occur to me which need airing, but bearing in mind the delicacy which must characterize any approach we may make at this time toward Soviet sensibilities, I hesitate about becoming too specific at this stage and feel that attention should preferably be given to current problems and future developments rather than to past controversial items. In any event, I view with considerable reassurance this first step volunteered by Maximov, and hope that his friendly attitude presages a reasonable measure of sincerity, tempered always, of course, by the ruthless realism which is Russia. Repeated to Moscow. Department is requested to repeat to London if deemed of sufficient interest. Ford The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.00/3057: Telegram [Document 338] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , June 2, 1944—midnight. 342. Your 370, May 24. Department is pleased that Maximov has received instructions from his Government to enter into conversations and that in opening talk he seemed hopeful of results. The emphasis which he placed on an early solution of Iranian food problem was especially helpful. The discussions might well begin with consideration of this vital question, in which there is a definite community of allied interest and apparently a good chance of success. Discussion of such questions before more controversial problems are considered seems best method of procedure. Once atmosphere of confidence is established it is hoped that all three Powers will examine any of their actions in Iran which have not served the best interests of the Iranians and have not been in keeping with the terms of the tripartite pact 72 or the declaration on Iran. It is hoped that, by tactful handling, some of the more inequitable contracts with the Iranians, such as that covering the arms factories, may be revised and new contracts of similar kind in the future be avoided. Department believes it would not be wise to stress at the outset the angle of the American advisers. When the moment arrives to discuss this question you should make clear to the Russians that the adviser program is a means of assistance to Russia as well as to Iran. In developing this program, at Iranian request and insistence, we had prominently in mind its connection with our program of aid to Russia by maintaining the tranquility of the Iranian supply corridor. An additional motive was the idealistic and traditionally American one of assisting a friendly nation which turned to us for help in time of great need. Failure to support the advisers can only result in harm to the Allies no less than to Iran. With the foregoing consideration in mind your suggestions for the agenda should include items which will not give the appearance of being directed against any particular power but broad enough to enable us to bring up for discussion at a later date any of the points mentioned in the Department’s telegram no. 266, April 30, 1944. The Department has full confidence in your discretion and ability to handle the negotiations and will welcome your suggestions or requests for guidance. Repeated to Moscow. 73 Hull 72 Reference is to the Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and Iran, January 29, 1942. 73 As telegram 1401. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 891.50/59: Telegram [Document 339] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , June 10, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 7 p.m.] 2070. Refer Tehran’s 370, May 24, 6 p.m. The British Ambassador has furnished me with a copy of his note to Molotov 74 dated May 7 concerning the closer coordination of Allied economic policy in Iran and the Soviet reply thereto dated May 31. I note that the British communication states in part: “My Government also shares the view expressed by Mr. Stettinius that all possible support should be given to Dr. Millspaugh”. In reply to this statement the Soviet note states as follows: “As regards the furnishing of all possible support to Dr. Millspaugh’s activities the Soviet Government does not quite understand the motives connecting this question with that of the desirability of closer contact between the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers in Iran, inasmuch as Dr. Millspaugh is, as far as we know, in Iranian service”. Sent to Department, repeated to Tehran. Harriman 74 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. The Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) to President Roosevelt 891.001 Pahlavi, Reza Mohammad/8–1544 [Document 340] The Shahanshah of Iran ( Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi ) to President Roosevelt 75 [ Tehran ,] June 17, 1944. My Dear Mr. President : I was distressed to hear, by your letter of February 10th, that you had been laid up for some time with an attack of the “flu” and hope you are now enjoying the best of health and strength. You will need all your accustomed vigour and energy to bring to final accomplishment the colossal and unprecedented efforts your country is making, under your brilliant leadership, for the early termination of the war and the establishment of a just and lasting peace. It was indeed a source of regret to me that circumstances, over which I had no control, deprived me of the pleasure of seeing more of you in Tehran and extending to Your Excellency the warm hospitality which my people and I like to show to illustrious friends of Iran. It is, I assure you, more than ever the firm intention and earnest desire of my government and myself to intensify the cooperation of the United States of America with Iran, now and after the war. The confidence happily existing between our two nations should create an atmosphere of more comprehensive understanding and mutual aid. Mr. Abol-Hassan Ebtehadj, Governor of our National Bank, the bearer of this letter, who is our delegate to the Monetary Conference 76 to be held shortly in your country, will be able to furnish all necessary details on this and other subjects. A frank exchange of views between him and the members of Your Excellency’s Government will, no doubt, be extremely useful. With all good wishes for the continued success of your arms and assurances of my highest esteem, I am, my dear Mr. President, always yours sincerely, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 75 This letter was brought to the United States by Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran (Banque Mellie); it was forwarded to the Secretary of State by the Iranian Minister on August 15, and was transmitted to the White House by the Chief of Protocol on August 31. 76 For correspondence, see vol. ii , section entitled “United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944.” The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.154A/7–844: Telegram [Document 341] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , July 8, 1944—4 p.m. [Received July 8—2:15 p.m.] 485. From Hoskins. 77 Reference Legation’s 429, June 15. 78 Millspaugh, Black and Shields seriously disturbed over impending withdrawal of American military personnel from Iranian Road Transport Administration. Although General Connolly has acquiesced in token releases for June and July, balance of men must be released by August 26 unless orders are changed. How soon can we expect word from Landis as to results of his efforts with War Department for continued service of these men in this vital work? They are needed until January 1 if firm operating foundation is to be laid and at least until November 15 when critical harvest collection period will be largely past. Sent to Department as 485; repeated to Cairo for Short. [Hoskins.] Ford 77 Harold B. Hoskins, Head of Middle East Supply Center at Tehran. 78 Not printed; the Chargé had reported that General Connolly had “raised question of release of American military personnel serving with Iranian Road Transport Administration.” (891.154A/6–1544) The British Embassy to the Department of State 891.154A/7–1044 [Document 342] The British Embassy to the Department of State Ref: 173/29/44 Aide-Mémoire The United States and British military authorities in the Middle East have each lent a number of officers to assist the Millspaugh Mission in the control of road transport in Persia. This control is essential in order to prevent wastage and abuse in the employment of motor transport and to ensure the collection of the forthcoming harvest. 2. His Majesty’s Government are informed that General Connolly now proposes to withdraw his officers, whereas the British authorities are prepared in the general interest to continue the loan of British officers for some months longer in order to cover the critical period after the harvest. It is understood that the United States Chargé d’Affaires at Teheran has asked the State Department to urge the War Department to order a periodical secondment of United States officers if their periods of duty are not prolonged. 3. Sir Ronald Campbell 79 has been instructed to support the request of the United States Chargé d’Affaires, as in the view of His Majesty’s Government the continued assistance of United States officers, which would have been important in any case, is doubly important if Mr. Millspaugh is to continue for a further three months his efforts to improve economic conditions there. Washington , 10 July, 1944. 79 Sir Ronald I, Campbell, British Minister. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 711.91/7–1244: Telegram [Document 343] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , July 12, 1944—7 p.m. [Received July 13—10:27 a.m.] 494. Having just weathered with fair success another American adviser crisis 80 in Iran, Legation feel it desirable to enlist Department’s aid in clarifying and perhaps strengthening our policy in Iran. Although situation is now more calm following recent period of acute uncertainty, the forces which created crisis are still existent and may be expected shortly to step up campaign to discredit our efforts here. Two courses appear open to us and whether we take one or the other would seem to depend upon future role we hope to play in Middle Eastern affairs. One would ultimately return us to relatively unimportant position we occupied before war, present implementation [ sic ]. It would require only that we keep Iranians reasonably satisfied regarding our good intentions in order to protect our military supply line. Being designed for present usage only it would lead nowhere and so would necessitate no longer range consideration. In this connection it seems to me that as the threat to military operations formally [ formerly? ] presented by disturbed conditions in Iran no longer looms so large, I think Axis defeats will deter any important group from endeavoring to interfere seriously. The tribes even though discontented with conditions do not appear disposed to provoke the Allied forces and most Axis agents have been rounded up. The formal alignment of Iran with the United Nations 81 also helps in this regard. The maintenance of civil food supply and transport and improvement of general economic conditions, of course, remain important from security standpoint but I am not sure we can assume that this could not be accomplished after a fashion by the British and/or Russians without our help if we should decide to abandon the Iranians to whatever fate their neighbors might choose for them. The second course open to us would necessitate a stronger and broader implementation of policy than we have hitherto attempted. As I see it, we would have to decide that our interests in Iran political and economic, practical and idealistic, are sufficiently important to warrant continuing strong affirmative action regardless of whether or not such action could be directly related to the prosecution of the war; this is true premise adopted by the British and Soviets who by no means restrict their activities in Iran to promotion of the war effort. This second course would require the active unconditional cooperation of each agency of our Government which could in any way help with Iranian problems. It would require a new directive to PGC 82 which without subordinating our war effort would nevertheless provide for affirmative present participation by our military in building up our prestige and realizing our hopes for a future prominent position in Iran. It would require strong unequivocal backing by the Department of our advisers in their efforts to strengthen Iran. A policy of all-out continuing advice and assistance based partly on our presently enunciated aim of helping Iran to help herself and partly on our determination to assume a positive rather than negative position in the Middle East would be imperative. This Legation keenly aware of actual or potential Russian and British opposition and faced daily with adviser problems largely the result of proffered help to an ignorant people dominated by leaders who prefer not to be helped is nevertheless inclined to favor the second harder course. The hoped-for acquisition of an oil concession in Iran 83 is alone sufficient to justify a strong stand here both now and in the future. The long-range protection of our oil concessions on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf 84 and the potentialities of Iran as a market for American goods present further reasons for such a course. And beyond these concrete considerations there is the desirability, long recognized by the Department, of preventing Iran from continuing to be a bone of contention and source of friction between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. But if we decide to follow this line we must do the following things: 1. Restate our policy clearly and firmly and make it understood and accepted by all agencies of the United States Government and so far as may be politic by the American Adviser and the Iranian and Allied Governments. (There are still Americans in Iran including General Connolly and some of the advisers who profess that the United States had no policy toward this country.) 2. Obtain the affirmative cooperation of the War Department in issuing directives to its forces here to render concrete aid separate and distinct from the overall war effort in furtherence of our policy—a policy based upon our long-range objective rather than the exigencies of the moment. (This is not to belittle General Connolly’s piecemeal assistance which has proven useful in current emergencies but is of no great value in the permanent structure our advisers are trying to build.) 3. Treat Iran’s needs for supplies and her other economic problems on a basis at least as favorable as that applied to other countries whose good will and well-being we especially desire to promote. This would involve convincing the economic agencies of our Government, once and for all, that Iran is a country of immediate interest to the United States and not a “sphere of British responsibility”. It would also involve reduced emphasis on immediate cash return for our assistance. 4. Empower our ambassador here to exercise a firm overall (through [ though? ] behind the scenes) supervision over our entire adviser effort in this country. To make this effective, strengthen the Legation staff along the lines indicated in my airgram No. A–23 of June 6, 1944 and my despatch No. 980 of June 6, 1944. 85 5. Strengthen the advisory mission when need arises by taking the initiative in replacing men who for any reason do not measure up to the requirements of the situation. This would include replacing the head of the mission if necessary. The Department’s ready understanding and vigorous support of forceful stand we felt obliged to take during the recent Millspaugh crises are deeply appreciated and lead me to believe that in the suggestions set forth above we may be merely outlining an attitude toward which the Department is already moving. Ford 80 For correspondence regarding this situation, see pp. 411–420 [ Pgs. 411–420 include portions of Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] . 81 For correspondence regarding this matter, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 428 ff. 82 Persian Gulf (Service) Command. 83 For correspondence concerning oil negotiations, see pp. 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 470 ] ff. 84 For correspondence regarding United States concern for American oil interests in the Middle East, see pp. 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 6 ] ff. 85 Neither printed. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.91/7–2344: Telegram [Document 344] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , July 23, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 3:55 p.m.] 527. Soviet Ambassador Maximov at regular tripartite meeting July 21, stated he was most alarmed at present tone of Iranian press, particularly as regards attacks on Allies. He specifically cited newspaper Darya which appeared towards the end of June and which has published a number of articles bitterly attacking the United States and Great Britain, particularly over the hunt for oil concessions. This paper has been generally held to have Soviet leanings if not definite backing, a report given some credence by the British Embassy. Maximov said he deplored such attacks on the Allies and proposed that the press Attaches of the three Embassies meet to form plans for united representations to the Iranian Government. While I made no commitment in this connection, there would appear to be considerable merit in the proposal, if only from point of view of further inter-Allied exchange of views, and I would appreciate any instructions or comments the Department may care to make. I welcome Soviet Ambassador’s initiative in proposing joint action in a matter of concern to the Allies in Iran and feel it a most encouraging indication of increased Soviet desire for cooperation. On other hand, this is dangerous ground, and while Legation is prepared vigorously to defend American prestige as reflected in local press, it does not propose to participate in muzzling tactics or otherwise to pull chestnuts from fire on behalf of either Soviets or British. Ford The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.91/7–2344: Telegram [Document 345] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , July 27, 1944—10 p.m. 453. Your 527, July 23. Department welcomes the proposal of the Soviet Ambassador regarding representations to the Iranian Government in the matter of press attacks on the Allies. This is a further helpful sign of Soviet desire to cooperate in matters of mutual interest in Iran. The Soviet initiative appears the more significant since the brunt of these press attacks has been borne by the American advisers. Joint action by the US, U.K., and U.S.S.R. in a matter of this kind would serve to impress on the Iranians the cooperation of the three Powers in Iran and discourage possible efforts to play one against the other. The Department appreciates, however, the dangers which you suggest and the possible difficulty of finding a common approach with the Soviet authorities in matters pertaining to the press. Any joint representations made should be worded in a restrained and friendly manner. You should make it clear to the Iranian authorities that the American Government has no desire to restrain freedom of speech or to muzzle the press but wishes to emphasize the heavy responsibilities of the press, particularly in time of war, when criticism of an ally is of material aid to the common enemy. Hull The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 711.91/7–1244: Telegram [Document 346] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , July 31, 1944—8 p.m. 462. Your 494 July 12. Dept recognizes the increasing importance of American relations with Iran and is prepared to assume a more active and positive role in Iranian affairs than was possible or necessary in the prewar period. While our position in Iran prior to the war was relatively unimportant except in a cultural sense and while our present accelerated interest there derives to a great extent from war exigencies, there are important reasons why our present heightened interests in Iran should be extended into the postwar period. These may be grouped into the following three categories: (1) General motives. Iran having turned to us for assistance, we are obliged, in accord with the policy of this Government, to render unselfishly such aid as we may. This help comprises such technical advice and economic assistance as may be possible within the limits imposed at present by the war effort. The President and Dept have considered Iran as something of a testing ground for the Atlantic Charter and for the good faith of the United Nations. (2) Practical international considerations. From a purely practical international viewpoint a strong and independent Iran, free from the internal weaknesses and dissensions which breed foreign intervention, would contribute toward building a healthy international body politic and establishing a lasting peace. A weak Iran would create an incipient condition in which future wars might germinate. (3) Protection and furtherance of national interests. This includes the possibility of sharing more fully in Iran’s commerce and in the development of its resources; the strategic location of Iran for civil air bases; 86 and the growing importance of Iranian and Arabian oil fields. Numerous recent attitudes and actions of Dept reflect the increasingly active policy we are following with regard to Iran. These include: (1) Support of the American adviser program. (2) Close interest in the present negotiations for a petroleum concession in Iran. (3) Expression of interest in postwar civil air bases in Iran. (4) Raising of the Legation in Tehran to an Embassy 87 and strengthening of the staff. (5) Dept’s initiative in suggesting and pressing the British-Russian-American diplomatic conversations now taking place in Tehran. (6) The leading part played by the President in the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943. (7) The conversations with War which resulted in the broadening of General Connolly’s directives and permitted our military forces in Iran to give concrete aid to the Iranian Government. In the development of this policy, stress has been laid on the aspect of assisting the Iranians, at their own request, to build up a strong and independent national entity, free from foreign domination and from internal dissension. The impression should be avoided at all costs that we intend to stand at the side of Iran as a political buffer to restrain our Allies the British and Russians with regard to Iran. We should emphasize rather the importance to the world of a strong and independent Iran as a member of the community of nations and should seek the support and sympathy of our Allies in achieving this end. We should avoid any unilateral commitment to Iran which would promise or intimate the use of force. With the above objectives and considerations clearly in mind, the implementation of this policy should be positive but flexible. The Department is persuaded of the present usefulness of the adviser program and is prepared to support it strongly within the limits already indicated. These are briefly that we have no intention of imposing any adviser or group of advisers on the Iranians but must expect the Iranian Government to accord any advisers retained the support and protection necessary to permit the creation of an atmosphere in which they will have a chance successfully to accomplish their tasks. However, the adviser program is only one manifestation of this policy and its discontinuance should not alter our basic policy of strengthening Iran by other feasible means. In the furtherance of this basic policy we should obtain the understanding and active cooperation of all agencies of the United States Government. Americans in Iran should be made aware of the policy and conscious of their part in the implementation. The Ambassador should coordinate all American civilian activities in Iran, maintaining close and effective liaison with the American military authorities, directing and controlling the various American civilian agencies operating in the country and exercising such supervision over the advisers as would not be inconsistent with their status as Iranian employees. The Department will emphasize among the U.S. agencies represented in Iran the great importance of all American officials and individuals in Iran working together as a team, under the Ambassador’s direction, to implement this Government’s policy towards Iran. In summary, the response to the important query posed by urtel under reference is that America’s position in Iran is not intended to lapse again in any way to that of relative unimportance. An active policy of strengthening Iran and of protecting American interests against any discrimination will be followed. Every effort will be made to obtain British and Russian collaboration. At the same time no implication of the use of armed force to maintain Iran’s independence will be given. A paraphrase of this telegram is being furnished the Secretary of War under cover of a letter 88 from the Secretary requesting the earnest cooperation of War in carrying out this policy. Stettinius 86 For correspondence concerning postwar civil air rights, see pp. 486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] ff. 87 For correspondence regarding this subject, see pp. 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 310 ] ff. 88 Infra . The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) 711.91/7–1244 [Document 347] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) Washington , August 12, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I have pleasure in enclosing a paraphrase of a telegram which has been sent to our Legation in Tehran 89 outlining the policy of this Government toward Iran. You will observe that, while we have stated clearly that it is not our intention to stand beside Iran as a buffer for the purpose of restraining other countries in their dealings with Iran, we contemplate a considerably more active policy with regard to Iran than has been necessary in the past. The telegram makes clear that we shall not enter into any undertaking in the nature of a unilateral obligation to defend Iran’s independence by force of arms. The chief elements of American policy in Iran is to strengthen the country to the extent feasible, for international security reasons, and to protect the increasing American interests there, notably in the field of commerce, petroleum, and aviation. Since the more positive policy we contemplate in furtherance of American aims in Iran can be carried out successfully only by the combined efforts of all agencies of the American Government, working as a team with a full understanding of the issues involved and awareness of the important part to be played by each individual and agency, the cooperation of the War Department and its representative in Iran will be of the greatest importance. It would be helpful if you could cause this information to be brought to the attention of the appropriate officials of the War Department and Persian Gulf Command, in order that they may be aware of the policy and make their important contribution toward its implementation. Sincerely yours, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. 89 Telegram 462, July 31, 8 p.m., supra . Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War 891.154A/8–1144 [Document 348] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War Washington , August 16, 1944. The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of War and refers to the impending withdrawal by the War Department on August 26, 1944, of the balance of American military personnel serving with the Iranian Road Transport Administration. The Department of State is seriously concerned over the intended withdrawal, since the services of these American military personnel are required until January 1, if a firm foundation for civilian transportation operations in Iran is to be laid, and at least until November 15 when the critical period of harvest collection will be nearly over. The British authorities have authorized the continued services of a similar number of British military personnel serving with the Road Transport Administration, and the British Government has urged this Government to permit the American personnel to remain. Since the Road Transport Administration is under the direction of an American, a special responsibility rests on the United States to make possible its success. Reference is made in the above connection to the Secretary of State’s communication of August 12, 1944, addressed to the Secretary of War, enclosing an outline of the policy of the United States in Iran and requesting the cooperation of the War Department in the implementation of this policy. The retention of the services of the military personnel in question would be in keeping with the policy adopted. The consequences of the withdrawal of the personnel and the failure of the Road Transport Administration to maintain grain collections might require, as in the past, considerably larger numbers of military personnel for this work, to avoid disturbances in Iran. In view of the urgent need in Iran for the personnel in question, this Department recommends that their services with the Iranian Road Transport Administration be continued until January 1, 1945, if possible, or at least until November 15, 1944. Since the date set for their release is less than two weeks off, the need for an urgent reply will be appreciated. Memorandum by Colonel H. R. Maddux, Chief of Liaison Section, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, to the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) 891.154A/8–1844 [Document 349] Memorandum by Colonel H. R. Maddux, Chief of Liaison Section, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, to the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs ( Allen ) 20 Washington , 18 August 1944. The War Department has carefully considered State Department letter of 16 August 1944 requesting the deferment of the removal of U.S. military personnel on temporary loan to the Iranian Road Transport Administration. Although it is recognized that this personnel is serving in a helpful capacity as far as Iran is concerned there is no U.S. military necessity involved. This lack of military necessity and the great need for military personnel elsewhere make it necessary to request the return of this personnel by 26 August 1944 as expressed in the letter of 6 March 1944 from the Under Secretary of War to the Under Secretary of State. For the Secretary of War: H. R. Maddux 20 In telegram 519, August 21, 9 p.m., the Department informed the Chargé in Iran of the decision indicated in this memorandum by the War Department; the British Embassy was orally informed on August 29, in response to its aide-mémoire of July 10, p. 339 [ Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] . The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State 711.91/8–2144 [Document 350] The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the Secretary of State Washington , August 21, 1944. Dear Mr. Secretary : I have read with interest the letter from the Acting Secretary of State of August 12, 1944 outlining the policy of the United States Government toward Iran and suggesting that the cooperation of the War Department and its representatives in Iran will be of the greatest importance in furthering this policy. As is mentioned in the paraphrase of the telegram 91 sent to the American Legation in Teheran, which was enclosed with the Acting Secretary’s letter, General Connolly’s directives were broadened so that he could give assistance to the various Iranian Government Agencies, when such assistance was permitted without detriment to his primary mission of transporting supplies to Russia. I understand from General Connolly that the American Legation at Teheran and the Persian Gulf Command are now working together in close harmony. The information contained in the letter from the Acting Secretary of State has been brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities in the War Department. As you know, General Connolly is presently in the United States and this information will be brought to his attention before he returns to Teheran. Sincerely yours, Henry L. Stimson 91 Telegram 462, July 31, 8 p.m., p. 343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] . President Roosevelt to the Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) 891.001 Pahlavi, Reza Mohammad/9–444 [Document 351] President Roosevelt to the Shahanshah of Iran ( Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi ) 92 Washington , September 2, 1944. My Dear Shah Mohammad Reza : I was pleased and touched to receive, on my return to Washington, your friendly communication of June 17, 1944. It is unfortunate that I was prevented by pressing matters, including my extended visit to the Pacific Coast and Hawaii, from receiving your communication directly from the hands of Mr. Ebtehadj. I should have been glad to learn from him at first-hand of your health and of developments in Your Majesty’s intention to endeavor to intensify the cooperation already existing between Iran and the United States, both now and after the war. Although the pressures under which I have labored during the past year have not always made it possible for me to demonstrate, in ways I should have liked, my special interest in and personal regard for Iran, I know I can rely on Your Majesty’s deep understanding of the exigencies which have demanded my attention during these past months. Iran and America have every reason to be close friends. Patience and understanding on both our parts are needed. If matters of irritation arise, I hope you will let me know your views in the spirit of frankness and cordiality which I hope will always characterize our relations. General Hurley has spoken to me often of Your Majesty and has assured me that you would understand and reciprocate my sentiments. With the warmest personal regards and wishes for Your Majesty’s health and the welfare of your people, I am Cordially yours, Franklin D. Roosevelt 92 Transmitted to the Chargé in Iran by the Secretary of State in instruction 483, September 6, for delivery to the Shah. President Roosevelt to the Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) 891.001 Pahlavi, Reza Mohammad/9–444 [Document 352] President Roosevelt to the Shahanshah of Iran ( Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi ) 93 Washington , September 2, 1944. My Dear Shah Mohammad Reza : Of course, I do not pretend to know Iran well on account of the shortness of my visit, but may I write you about one of the impressions which I received on my air trip to Teheran? It relates to the lack of trees on the mountain slopes and the general aridity of the country which lies above the plains. All my life I have been very much interested in reforestation and the increase of the water supply which goes with it. May I express a hope that your Government will set aside a small amount for a few years to test out the possibility of growing trees or even shrubs on a few selected areas to test out the possibility of trees which would hold the soil with their roots and, at the same time, hold back floods? We are doing something along this line in our western dry areas and, though it is a new experiment, it seems to be going well. It is my thought that if your Government would try similar small experiments along this line it would be worthwhile for the future of Iran. I do not need to tell you how much interested I am in that future, and the future of the people of Iran. With my warm regards, Cordially yours, Franklin D. Roosevelt 93 Iranian Communist Party. The Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) to President Roosevelt 891.001 Pahlavi, Reza Mohammad/10–1244 [Document 353] The Shahanshah of Iran ( Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi ) to President Roosevelt 94 Saad-Abad , [ Tehran ,] October 4, 1944. My Dear President : I have received from the hands of Your Ambassador, Leland B. Morris, who has made a very good impression upon me, the two letters which Your Excellency was good enough to write me on September 2nd. The friendly interest which You take in the welfare of my country has touched me deeply. Please believe that I fully reciprocate your sentiments and share the view that the United States and Iran have every reason to be close friends and everything to gain by intimate, confident relations. If we cooperate wholeheartedly and unswervingly abide by the principles for which you entered the War and which you have advocated in the Atlantic Charter, the progress and prosperity of Iran as well as the maintenance of peace and security in this part of the World will no doubt be assured to our mutual advantage. No misunderstanding or temporary friction must ever be allowed to affect in any way the cordiality and sincerity of our relations. Your suggestion regarding the reforestation of our arid mountain slopes is very valuable, coming as it does from one who is an expert in the matter and who has done so much on the same lines for his own country. I am drawing the attention of my Ministry of Agriculture to the necessity of testing out in certain areas the possibility of growing trees. In conjunction with reforestation and afforestation, which will in themselves increase the supply of water, there is the very important, I might say, vital problem of irrigation. The soil of Iran is extremely fertile if we can only get water to it. There are immense desert regions which could be made to blossom into fair fields of corn and wheat etc. We are beginning to tackle this problem, and here again the vast experience and technical and material assistance of America will be most useful and welcome to us. I can quite realise how busy you must be in these days of preparation for the Presidential Elections. With warmest wishes [etc.] Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 94 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 73, October 12, from Tehran; received October 26. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) 761.91/10–2444 [Document 354] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs ( Bohlen ) 95 [ Washington ,] October 24, 1944. We should pay the closest attention in the immediate future to the question of Soviet-Iranian relations. Recent evidence of the Soviet displeasure towards Iran obviously because of the cancellation by the Iranian Government of all negotiations for oil concessions is increasingly ominous. When the news of the decision of the Iranian Government was published in the Soviet press in the form of a Tass despatch, Soviet displeasure was made known in the charge that the Iranian Government, in calling off the negotiations with the Soviet Union for a Soviet oil concession in the north, was acting “contrary to public opinion in Iran”. While this was in itself a disturbing indication of Soviet attitude, at least the Tass despatch dealt openly with the question at issue. The violent attack on the Iranian Government and on Saed, the Iranian Premier and Foreign Minister, which appeared in Trud on October 22 is more serious. ( Trud , although technically the organ of the Soviet trade unions, like all publications in the Soviet Union expresses official Soviet policy.) The disturbing feature of this attack is that it does not make any specific mention of the oil concession question. It accuses the Iranian Government and Saed in particular of tolerating and even encouraging acts of sabotage of the flow of supplies to the Soviet Union on the part of “pro-fascist elements in Iran” and of the persecution of Iranian officials who were loyally trying to carry out the treaty obligations between Iran, the USSR and Great Britain. The article is replete with characteristic charges of pro-fascist tendencies and opposition to pro-democratic elements on the part of Saed and the Iranian Government. In fact, this article has all of the customary elements of the build-up in order to justify extreme Soviet pressure if not action against the present Iranian Government. Its immediate purpose appears to be to force the resignation of Saed and the formation of a new government in Iran which would be prepared to continue the negotiations for an oil concession. In view of the obvious dangers which may result from the tactics of the Soviet Government in regard to Iran, we should formulate in advance of any crisis in Soviet-Iranian relations the policy and attitude of this Government. 97 Charles E. Bohlen 95 Addressed to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) and the Deputy Director (Matthews). 97 For instructions to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to deliver a note to the Soviet Government regarding the views of the United States concerning the oil concessions problem, see telegram 2566, October 30, 10 p.m., p. 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] . The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 761.91/11–2844: Telegram [Document 355] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , November 28, 1944—7 p.m. [Received November 28—6:02 p.m.] 10498. In commenting to us on the Soviet-Iranian situation 98 a Foreign Office official today said the following: The new Iranian Prime Minister … is friendly to the Allies. The Cabinet is composed of men about whom little is known. The Foreign Office believes however that the new Cabinet is not likely to give in to the continued Russian pressure. The Foreign Office feels real concern over the Soviet attitude towards Iran, and believes that this situation created by the Soviets is in fact a test case of future Soviet relations with Iran, and, indeed, with other countries adjacent to the Soviet Union. Kavtaradze 99 and those Iranian newspapers controlled by the Soviets are keeping up their campaign about the oil concessions, which is worrying. The British Embassy at Washington has been instructed to inform the Department about the new British note to the Soviets 1 on this general subject, a note which is a reminder that the British expect an answer to their previous note to the Soviet Government 2 on this matter. Winant 98 Mohammed Saed had resigned as Prime Minister on November 9, it was widely believed, under Russian pressure; a new government had been formed on November 26 by Morteza Qoli Bayat; for correspondence on the political crisis, see pp. 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 470 ] ff. 99 Sergey Ivanovich Kavtaradze, Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who headed the Russian delegation which came to Iran in September seeking oil concessions for the Soviet Union. 1 On November 20 the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr) had sent a letter to Molotov inviting a clarification of Russian intentions in Iran; see telegram 4459, November 22, 10 p.m., from Moscow, p. 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] . 2 November 2; see telegram 810, November 3, 2 p.m., from Tehran, and telegram 4438, November 20, 7 p.m., from Moscow, pp. 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] and 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 510 and Doc. 511 ] , respectively. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.00/12–644: Telegram [Document 356] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] Tehran , December 6, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 8—5:30 p.m.] 909. On December 4 Ambassador Harriman 3 and I were received in an audience for a matter of 2 hours by His Majesty Mohammad Reza. Court Minister Hussein Ala 4 was present. The atmosphere was very friendly and it was obvious that the Shah was extremely pleased to have Ambassador Harriman visit him. I feel certain he interpreted this visit as a gesture of friendliness on the part of President Roosevelt and appreciates it as such. Ambassador Harriman conveyed the President’s greetings to the Shah and spoke tactfully and forcefully about aspects of Iranian and American relationship. I have no doubt that Mr. Harriman will wish to report himself on this conversation. . . . . . . . . The Shah spoke in a sensible and sincere manner in regard to the problems and needs of his country. In my opinion, which I think Mr. Harriman shares, he showed a very certain grasp of the economic necessities of his country and he also appears to have a very clear picture and a determined attitude in respect of Iran’s political relationships. He pointed out that the country could not be truly democratic, which he desired, until the people had acquired sufficient education to understand the principles of democratic government and be able to form intelligent individual opinion. To arrive at this the Shah desired very strongly to establish free education without the exclusion of private education for those able to afford it. To accomplish this required money which would have to be raised by greater taxation of the easy classes and the acquisition of funds from the increased exploitation of the agricultural and mineral resources of the country which were potentially great. To do this he recognized the necessity of outside help and particularly desired the wholehearted support of the United States in such a program. Both Mr. Harriman and I explained firm desire of the President and United States Government to assist along these lines and Mr. Harriman made a concise and effective exposition of the difficulties due to the war effort in initiating help on a large scale at the present moment. The Shah expressed his understanding of the situation.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Shah brought forward once again the question of a treaty covering the presence of American troops. 5 I took occasion to state with considerable positiveness that the United States desired nothing better than a quick conclusion of an appropriate agreement. I reminded Mr. Ala that I had expressed this view on several occasions to members of the Government and only a few days previously to the new Prime Minister. I then suggested to the Shah that he could do a service in getting his Government to approach us on this matter. As an interesting sidelight, the Shah said that in conversation with Kavtaradze some time ago the matter of the American troops being here without a formal treaty in contrast to the British and Russians had been touched upon. Kavtaradze had expressed the opinion that the American army here were not troops in the military sense but on the contrary were railway working specialists. The Shah said that while this viewpoint might be held it was nonetheless true that these men are under military discipline and are armed and that they could not be regarded otherwise than as troops. It was the Shah’s disclosure of Kavtaradze’s remark to him cited above which Court Minister Ala later asked me to be particularly discreet about. I have cited briefly the salient points of the conversation and I think that Ambassador Harriman will also wish to report upon this interview. Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow as 107, London, Cairo as 356, and Baghdad. Morris 3 Ambassador Harriman was returning to his post in the Soviet Union from the United States. 4 Iranian Minister of the Imperial Court. 5 For correspondence concerning this proposed agreement, see pp. 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] ff. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 761.91/12–1144: Telegram [Document 357] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , December 11, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 6:11 p.m.] 4771. Ambassador Morris has comprehensively reported in his telegram to the Department of December 6 repeated to Moscow as No. 105 [ 107? ] 6 on his audience with the Shah. In conveying the President’s greetings to the Shah I spoke of the President’s personal interest in Iran enhanced by the information and understanding he had obtained at first hand during his visit a year ago. The Shah spoke frankly and directly regarding his concern over the recent attitude and actions of the Soviet Government in connection with the oil concession. I pointed out that the declaration on Iran was of course the accepted policy of our Government and that I was authorized to call to the attention of the Soviet Government my Government’s views on any action which it was felt might be inconsistent with the declaration. On the other hand I emphasized that it was the Iranian Government’s responsibility to work out its relationship directly with the Soviet Government. The Shah stated he believed the Soviets would continue to attempt to stimulate agitation in the north against him and his Government and that the best way to counteract this influence was for his Government to develop a forward social and economic policy. In this policy he hoped for American assistance not only in furnishing advisers to his Government but in a practical way as well. I was impressed by his intelligent grasp of the problems of Iran but could not help wonder whether Iranian political leaders have the ability and integrity to carry through such a policy. In the talk Ambassador Morris and I had with Maximov, reported in Tehran’s telegram to the Department No. 907, December 6, 7 the latter made it very plain that he had no intention of letting matters drop but intended to take aggressive measures to attain the Soviet objectives which appear to be much more far-reaching than simply the oil and mineral concession and to include the upsetting of the Government which he characterized as representing only 5% of the Iranian population. Maximov expounded the extraordinary thesis that, since the Iranian Government did not truly represent the Iranian people and since the Soviets knew what the Iranian people wanted, it was proper for the Soviet Government to see that this opinion found political expression. Although there appears to be no action called for by us at this time, I feel that the Shah’s fears have basis and that the situation should be watched carefully. Sent to Department as 4771 and repeated to London as 302, Tehran as 108, Cairo as 23 and to Baghdad. Harriman 6 Supra . 7 Post , p. 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] . Problems regarding proposed agreement covering the presence of United States troops in Iran; question of disposal of United States military installations and equipment in Iran Problems regarding proposed agreement covering the presence of United States troops in Iran; 8 question of disposal of United States military installations and equipment in Iran 8 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 453 ff. [358] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, February 1, 1944—6 p.m. 740.0011 European War 1939/30843: Telegram [359] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, February 8, 1944—11 a.m. [Received February 9—3:50 a.m.] 811.24591/30: Telegram [360] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [Washington,] March 4, 1944. 811.24591/35 [361] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 18, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 2:30 p.m.] 811.24591/38: Telegram [362] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, May 20, 1944—6 p.m. 811.24591/38: Telegram [363] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 6, 1944—5 p.m. [Received June 6—1:18 p.m.] 811.24591/38: Telegram [364] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Afairs (Murray) [Washington,] August 15, 1944. 711.91/8–1244 [365] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, August 23, 1944—10 p.m. 711.91/8–1244: Telegram [366] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, September 7, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 5:36 p.m.] 711.91/9–744: Telegram [367] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, September 22, 1944. [Received October 3.] 740.00119 European War 1939/9–2244 [368] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, September 28, 1944—4 p.m. 811.24591/9–2644: Telegram [369] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, September 29, 1944. [Received October 13.] 891.24/9–2944 [370] The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, November 2, 1944. 891.24/9–2944 [371] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, November 6, 1944—4 p.m. 740.00119 European War 1939/9–2444: Telegram [372] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 6, 1944. [Received November 16.] 811.24591/11–644 [373] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 15, 1944—noon. [Received November 15—11:45 a.m.] 811.24591/11–1544: Telegram [374] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 24, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 2:30 p.m.] 811.24591/11–2444: Telegram [375] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, November 24, 1944—6 p.m. 811.24591/11–1544: Telegram [376] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 5, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 5:07 p.m.] 811.24591/12–544: Telegram [377] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, December 12, 1944—7 p.m. 811.24591/11–2444: Telegram [378] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, December 21, 1944—8 p.m. 811.24591/12–2144: Telegram [379] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, January 24, 1945—11 a.m. [Received 1:48 p.m.] 811.24591/1–2445: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 740.0011 European War 1939/30843: Telegram [Document 358] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , February 1, 1944—6 p.m. 52. With reference to your despatch 759, December 15, 9 Iranian Minister here 10 has not approached Department concerning resumption of negotiations for agreement covering presence of American forces in Iran. You may bring this fact to the attention of Iranian officials should inquiry be made. The Department believes that the Prime Minister 11 will agree on reflection that in his note of August 21 to the Legation quoted in Legation’s telegram 874, August 23, 12 he did not intend to place the United States in an unfavorable light in a manner entirely unjustified by the facts. Please take this matter up informally and confidentially with the Prime Minister, making the discreet suggestion that in order to put the record straight he may desire to withdraw his note of August 21. Hull 9 Not printed. 10 Mohammed Shayesteh. 11 Ali Soheily. 12 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 471 . The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 811.24591/30: Telegram [Document 359] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , February 8, 1944—11 a.m. [Received February 9—3:50 a.m.] 73. Department’s 52, February 1. I have talked at length with Prime Minister regarding status of agreement covering presence of American troops in Iran pointing out that tenor his note of August 21 plus subsequent failure his Government to accept agreement as finally approved by State and War Departments, which believed they were acting in harmony with Iranian Government, had placed my Government in unfavorable light which it desired to have rectified. Prime Minister readily admitted justice of our position but stated that whereas necessity which dictated his note of August 21 may no longer govern, he must nevertheless cling to stand which he then assumed and entreat that an agreement covering presence American troops in Iran be finally concluded. He added with some vehemence that he was today instructing his Minister in Washington to take up at once with Department the preparation of one of the proposed drafts enclosed with my despatch No. 759, December 15 13 with view to having it signed immediately Minister Dreyfus 14 returns. Without wishing in the least to appear to be questioning wisdom of asking Soheily to retract note in question I think it desirable to point out that the fundamental premise of this note was that American troops came to Iran illegally and without having obtained permission from sovereign this country. That original and basic premise has not changed; while Iran’s declaration of war in meantime may be considered to have removed illegality their presence here and thus to have affected both the intent and urgency of Prime Minister’s note, I find it exceedingly difficult to ask him to cancel statements made in heat of political necessity 6 months ago, and before this is done I earnestly request that, rather than muddy the waters with further controversial discussions, renewed efforts be made to iron out draft of agreement as finally drawn up at beginning of December and to have it ready for signature upon Minister’s return here. Furthermore, while Soheily evinces a continuing concern over progress of this agreement it is probable that until his own political position is somewhat more settled he will at best have but an academic interest in agreement. This situation which probably will tend to build up to climax with opening new Majlis 14a on February 26 is felt to be further reason why we should hesitate to ask Prime Minister to make any retraction at this time which he might feel would hurt his own political future. I have talked with General Connolly 15 regarding point he raised relative to jurisdiction in criminal cases over American troops in Iran 16 and he is in full agreement that this matter be considered apart from the executive agreement and made subject to either joint or parallel action with British and Soviets. He still feels that his command in [ is ] functioning quite satisfactorily without any agreement but he admits that for the record some form of agreement is probably desirable. I feel convinced he would now offer no objection to our concluding one of the proposed drafts forwarded by despatch 759. Ford 13 None printed. 14 Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., at this time in the United States. 14a The Iranian Parliament. 15 Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, Commanding General, Persian Gulf Service Command. 16 For correspondence regarding this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 487 ff., passim . Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs 811.24591/35 [Document 360] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] March 4, 1944. Participants: The Iranian Minister Mr. Daftary, Counselor of the Iranian Legation Mr. Dreyfus, U.S. Minister to Iran Mr. Allen 17 Mr. Minor The Iranian Minister and Mr. Daftary called today at their request to discuss the question of resuming negotiations for an agreement on the presence of American forces in Iran. Mr. Shayesteh reviewed the negotiations which took place last year for an executive agreement covering the presence of American forces in Iran. He said that it had been his impression, gained from conversations with Mr. Paul Alling 22 and others, that the United States Government had not desired to press for an agreement on this subject and inquired whether this was still the case. Mr. Allen replied that the initiative in requesting the agreement had come from the Iranians and that the United States Government had in fact not pressed for completion of an agreement but that once negotiations had been inaugurated the United States War and State Departments had carried them on vigorously in order to arrive at a successful conclusion. This was confirmed by Mr. Dreyfus. The Minister said that his Government had in the end objected to the executive agreement as drafted on the grounds that it was too long and complicated and did not protect Iranian interests fully. He mentioned particularly that the agreement would exempt from income tax payments large numbers of foreigners such as Syrians, Iraqis, et cetera, who are employed by the United States Army and are making large profits from war contracts, although Iranians in similar positions would be required to pay the tax. His Government would like to abandon the present draft and resume negotiations for an agreement along the lines of the Tripartite Pact. 23 If the United States Government objected to this the Iranian Government would be willing to proceed on the basis of the draft already under consideration but wished to suggest a number of amendments. He said that he had received full instructions from his Government by mail but has just telegraphed to Tehran for certain information, after which he would approach the Department with a suggested draft. 17 George V. Allen, Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs. 22 Paul H. Alling, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. 23 Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and Iran, signed at Tehran, January 29, 1942, British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxliv , p. 1017; for correspondence regarding the attitude of the United States toward this treaty, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 263 ff. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 811.24591/38: Telegram [Document 361] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 18, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 2:30 p.m.] 349. Recent difficulties between Persian Gulf Command railway service and Iranian Ministry of Communications have again brought out uncertainty of position of our military forces vis-à-vis Iranian Government, in absence of any formal agreement covering presence of American troops in Iran. It would be appreciated if the Department would inform the Legation whether any progress being made in negotiation of such an agreement. Ford The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 811.24591/38: Telegram [Document 362] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , May 20, 1944—6 p.m. 315. Your 349, May 18. There have been no developments in matter of agreement covering presence of our forces in Iran since the conversation between officers of Department and Iranian Minister on March 4. Copy of the memorandum of this conversation was sent to you. Iranian Minister states that immediately after this conversation he requested new instructions from his Government but has as yet received no reply. Department suggests you inquire of Iranian authorities whether they still desire to conclude such an agreement and, if so, when the Department may expect to receive the Iranian counter draft which it is understood was to be prepared. Hull The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 811.24591/38: Telegram [Document 363] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 6, 1944—5 p.m. [Received June 6—1:18 p.m.] 404. Department’s 315, May 20. Prime Minister 24 states that suggestions regarding troop agreement which Shayesteh sent by mail have never been received. Iranian Government still desires to conclude agreement and has prepared new proposals to be carried to Washington by Ebtahaj 25 this month for delivery to Shayestah. Prime Minister is unwilling to consider agreement on criminal jurisdiction over troops until after conclusion of the general agreement. Ford 24 Mohammed Saed. 25 Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, Director of the Central Bank (Banque Mellie) of Iran. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Afairs (Murray) 711.91/8–1244 [Document 364] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Afairs ( Murray ) 26 [Extract] [ Washington ,] August 15, 1944. [A few sentences of remarks by the Shah made to the British Chargé, Daniel W. Lascelles, are here omitted.] … there are unfortunately grounds for the Shah’s resentment against us arising from the President’s visit to Tehran last December. 27 As you will recall, when the President arrived in Tehran the Shah made a courtesy call upon him and expected that the call would be returned. The Shah and Iranian officialdom felt deeply offended when, for reasons that are not clear, it was not found practicable for the President to return the call or even to drive by the Royal Palace on his way to the airfield to return to this country. The Iranians felt all the more resentful over what they regarded as an omission in elementary courtesy, since Marshal Stalin took particular pains to pay a personal visit on the Shah, with whom he remained for two hours. The Iranians were particularly struck by the fact that Stalin came to the Shah’s palace without guards or attendants. An additional reason why the Iranians became offended with us was the announcement made by the President, after his return, that there had been a plot, during his stay in Tehran, to kill the distinguished visitors. The Iranians interpreted this remark to mean that they had instigated such a plot which, as they pointed out, would have violated all laws of hospitality which are highly cherished in Iran. Wallace Murray 26 Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius). 27 For documentation on the Tehran Conference between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier Stalin, November 27–December 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 457 ff. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 711.91/8–1244: Telegram [Document 365] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , August 23, 1944—10 p.m. 526. As regards the Shah’s reference to the “refusal” of the United States to sign a treaty regularizing presence of American troops in Iran, you are requested to remind him, whenever an occasion arises, that the American Government has been ready to sign such an agreement for many months and that the agreement was in fact on the point of signature last December 28 when the Iranian Government suddenly declined to sign. The grounds for this action by Iran have never been adequately explained. The Iranian Minister in Washington informed Dept several months ago that his Government was preparing a counterproposal. He now states that although he has subsequently telegraphed his Government on the subject, he has had no reply. The American Government is not pressing for the agreement, but the Shah’s description of the situation, if correctly reported, is entirely unwarranted. Hull 28 See memorandum of December 8, 1943, by the Minister in Iran, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 484 . The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 711.91/9–744: Telegram [Document 366] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , September 7, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 5:36 p.m.] 671. ReDepts 526 August 23. On the occasion of presentation of my credentials the Shah expressed himself as displeased at the failure of the United States to sign the troop agreement. I said I understood it was the Iranian Government which was delaying signature and the Prime Minister intervened to say the matter was receiving attention and he hoped to send new proposals to Washington by the recently appointed Iranian Ambassador. Before doing so he said he wished to have a conference on the question with the Ambassador and me. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 European War 1939/9–2244 [Document 367] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State No. 37 Tehran , September 22, 1944. [Received October 3.] Sir : I have the honor to report that the Iranian Government, Majlis and press have lately shown increased interest in the question of compensation to be obtained by Iran from the Allied nations for the asserted sacrifices she has made and assistance she has rendered in furtherance of the cause of the United Nations. It appears to be taken for granted in all quarters that compensation is due. As an example, there is enclosed herewith a translation of some remarks made by the Shah 29 on this subject a few days ago before a group composed of the Cabinet, the President of the Court of Cassation, the governors of the National and Agricultural Banks, the Chief of Police, the Mayor of Tehran, and various other important persons, including newspapermen. Nothing has as yet been published which would indicate the form of compensation desired. Deputies of the Majlis and some newspapers have been urging the Government to expedite the drawing up of the bill which, it would seem, is to be rendered to the Allied powers at the conclusion of hostilities, and the Prime Minister has given assurances that the matter is receiving attention. Apart from whatever else may be under way in this connection, the Embassy knows that Dr. Burdett Lewis of the Millspaugh Mission 31 is engaged in assembling data for use in the presentation of Iran’s case. Although no approach of any kind has been made to the Embassy as yet, I think it may be regarded as certain that Iran will look to the United States as well as Great Britain and Russia for settlement of her claims, whatever they may be, and I feel the Department should be forewarned. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Richard Ford First Secretary 29 Not printed. 31 For correspondence regarding the American adviser program in Iran, see pp. 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] ff. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 811.24591/9–2644: Telegram [Document 368] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , September 28, 1944—4 p.m. 590. The Iranian Minister, under instructions from his Government, has informed the Department that rumors are current in Tehran that American troops may be withdrawn from the country in the near future. The Minister expressed the hope of his Government that certain American military supplies, including notably food, drugs and clothing, might be left in Iran when the American troops withdraw. He said that you have already been approached by the Iranian Foreign Minister in this matter. 32 The Minister was informed that according to information the Department has received from the War Department, no action in regard to the movement of American troops in Iran is being contemplated, other than the possible withdrawal of some troops as a result of the discontinuance of the truck route. Hull 32 Mohammed Saed, Iranian Prime Minister and also Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed a note dated September 25 in the above sense to the Ambassador in Iran, which the latter transmitted to the Department in his despatch No. 56, September 29, infra . The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.24/9–2944 [Document 369] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State No. 56 Tehran , September 29, 1944. [Received October 13.] Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation of a note received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs which states the expectation of the Iranian Government that all American military installations and all surplus equipment in Iran will be turned over to the Iranian Government upon the departure of the American forces. It will be noted that the language used is somewhat abrupt and seems to take a great deal for granted. The Government does not “request” or “hope”, it “expects”. “It is certain that immovable establishments … will also be ceded to the Imperial Government without demolition.” The Embassy’s translator was so struck with the phraseology used that he took special pains to render the meanings exactly, at the sacrifice of smoothness in translation. I assume that this démarche is the first step by the Iranian Government looking toward compensation for Iran’s war-time hardships, as forecast in the Embassy’s despatch No. 37 of September 22, 1944. The opening paragraph of the Foreign Minister’s communication is a loose and completely inaccurate statement. He did not have any conversation with me stressing the difficulties of Iran and leading up to the expectation that the American forces should leave their equipment here for the use of the Iranian Government. The Foreign Minister did mention to me that when the forces withdrew, the Government would be interested in acquiring such material as it could. I gave him no encouragement whatsoever to think that the United States Government was going to make a present of its military equipment here to the Iranian Government. In fact, the matter was not discussed; it was simply mentioned by the Foreign Minister and I made to him an entirely noncommittal reply. The opening statement in his letter to me is highly overdrawn. A copy of the enclosed note is being sent to General Connolly, commander of the Persian Gulf Command, for his information. I shall, of course, make no reply to the Foreign Minister, other than a simple acknowledgment, unless instructed by the Department. Respectfully yours, Leland Morris [Enclosure–Translation] The Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Saed ) to the American Ambassador ( Morris ) No. 2604 Tehran , September 25, 1944. Mr. Ambassador : As I stated in our conversation in view of the privations suffered by Iran as a result of war, the intolerably high cost of living which also is due to war, the method employed in immoderate transactions by certain vendors in the interior of the country, the scarcity caused by the non-arrival of goods, which has always impaired the living condition of the people and the needs of the Government the Imperial Government expects the American forces when leaving Iran to cede to Iran whatever articles and equipment they may have in Iran which on their return they may not consider as essential to take away with them, in case the Iranian Government should need them. The idea is that the American forces should not take away with them whatever nonessential articles that we may need, especially the various kinds of provisions and medicine, and that they should not sell these articles to private individuals and establishments, but that they should cede to the Government whatever the Government may desire. It is certain that immovable establishments belonging to the American forces in this country will also be ceded to the Imperial Government without demolition. Telegraphic instruction has been sent to the Imperial Embassy in Washington along the foregoing lines asking the Embassy to take up the matter with the appropriate authorities and secure their consent. I also expect Your Excellency to be so kind as not to refrain from affording every necessary assistance to support this design. As to other details which may be in mind for the fulfilment of this view and which may be necessary to discuss, I shall be at Your Excellency’s disposal. I avail myself [etc.] Mohamed Saed The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.24/9–2944 [Document 370] The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , November 2, 1944. Dear Iceland : We have received your timely and interesting despatch no. 56 of September 29 enclosing a copy of a note from the Foreign Minister which tackles the question of the disposal of military installations and equipment in terms of “it is certain” and the Iranian Government “expects”. We are somewhat concerned that the Iranians may believe that your simple acknowledgment of the note from the Foreign Office expresses acquiescence in this exaggerated viewpoint. They may later take the view that we failed to take issue with them when they brought the Iranian viewpoint to the Embassy’s attention. While we do not wish to make an issue of the matter or to treat it out of proportion to its importance, it is suggested that you inform the Foreign Minister that while we cannot agree to the categoric language used in his note we will be pleased in disposing of military equipment to bear in mind the desires expressed in his note. However, in disposing of these materials we will necessarily have to bear in mind not only Iranian needs but also the American military needs and other interests in the light of the war situation prevailing at the time of the withdrawal of our forces from Iran. Sincerely yours, W[ allace ] M[ urray ] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 740.00119 European War 1939/9–2444: Telegram [Document 371] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , November 6, 1944—4 p.m. 661. Dept has furnished War copies of your despatches 37 and 56, September 22 and 29, and requested that question of disposal of installations and materials be treated urgently. Dept expressed hope that Iran will be accorded as generous treatment as possible in view of hardship and inconvenience it has suffered, especially as regards depletion of civil transport, and in view of the settled policy of the United States to strengthen Iran. Supplies and installations, however, should not be ceded outright without obtaining assurances regarding possible Iranian claims against us. War is being reminded, at the same time, that possible United States Government needs for certain Army supplies and perhaps installations should be borne in mind, and that American educational and other interests should be considered. In view of the urgency and importance of this question, please report, after consultation with General Connolly any steps taken or contemplated in question of disposal of installations and materials. Information is needed particularly concerning the location and valuation of all installations and estimate of the nature and amount of supplies which the Army may leave in Iran. Stettinius The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 811.24591/11–644 [Document 372] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State No. 93 Tehran , November 6, 1944. [Received November 16.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the informal comment by the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs on the Embassy’s despatch No. 37 of September 22, 1944 regarding Iran’s desire for compensation for asserted war damages. The Division asks whether the apparent reluctance of the Iranian Government to sign the proposed agreement covering presence of American troops in Iran may be attributed to a desire to improve Iran’s bargaining position with respect to the eventual presentation of Iranian claims. The Embassy is definitely of the opinion that this consideration has been a major reason for Iranian unwillingness to sign the draft agreement in the form proposed by the American Government. The Department will recall that Article VI of the draft provides that the ultimate disposition of American installations in Iran shall be the subject of agreement between the two governments, such agreement to include the compensation to be paid to the United States. When the negotiation of the agreement in Tehran was suspended last December by the Iranian Government, it was made clear that objection to this clause by the Cabinet was a major reason. It is the Embassy’s understanding that the Iranian Government has consistently taken the view that Allied military installations left in Iran after the war should be turned over to Iran automatically and without compensation. This is, of course, borne out by the Foreign Minister’s note of September 25, 1944, a translation of which was forwarded with my despatch No. 56 of September 29. The Iranian authorities may have been encouraged in this attitude by certain informal discussions with local British representatives in which the British seem to have acted on the assumption that improvements made on the Trans-Iranian Railway would revert automatically to the Iranian Government. (I do not know, however, whether any definite proposal or agreement of this nature has been made by the British Government.) There may be, of course, additional explanations for the failure of the Iranian Government to show a more active interest in the agreement. The new Majlis, which was inaugurated in February, has displayed comparatively little interest and has not been urging on the Prime Minister in the same fashion as the preceding legislature. Mr. Saed, therefore, may well have felt that other problems deserved his prior attention and that little could be gained through raising again an issue on which he (as Foreign Minister) had already suffered one defeat in the Cabinet, especially since the American command had become pretty well stabilized and had worked out reasonably satisfactory relations with the Iranian authorities and communities concerned. With respect to the Division’s suggestion that the Persian Gulf Command might study the benefits resulting to Iran from the operations of the Command, it is understood that Colonel Stetson, Fiscal Director under General Connolly, is already making such a survey. Respectfully yours, Leland Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 811.24591/11–1544: Telegram [Document 373] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , November 15, 1944—noon. [Received November 15—11:45 a.m.] 845. General Connolly has been ordered to cease operation of motor transport service of his command north from Andimeshk. This will presumably make available certain heavy equipment such as trucks, cranes and road machinery for transfer elsewhere for army needs or for disposal here. General Connolly has asked War Department instructions relative to this material stating that Iranian Government has need of such equipment. He holds the view which I share that such equipment should be offered first to the British and Russian military forces if they can justify its use for war needs in Persia. Connolly has informed his department that Soviet military command has expressed interest in taking over the military camp at Kazvin just as it stands and he believes the British when they know of the contemplated withdrawal may be interested in Hamadan. It is Connolly’s disposition to offer these camps to the Russian and British military prior to offering them to the Iranian Government. I feel that the American Army should not attempt to pass title to its fixed installations in Iran to a foreign power. I think the proper treatment of this question should be either for our Army to retain title and allow the British and Russians respectively to occupy the camps for their military needs up to time of their withdrawal from Iran or to sell the fixed installations to the Iranian Government with the condition that British and Russian tenancy should be agreed to pending their final withdrawal from here. It appears this withdrawal order must be executed very shortly and a decision taken in regard to the disposition of the movable and immovable property. I suggest Department may wish to discuss immediately this question with War Department and inform me subsequently of its views as I will initiate any discussions with Iranian Government concerning its possible acquisition of the property in question subsequent to Connolly’s receipt of orders. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 811.24591/11–2444: Telegram [Document 374] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , November 24, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 2:30 p.m.] 868. Paiforce 33 and British Embassy Tehran have received instructions from London to consult with Persian Gulf Command regarding ultimate disposal of American and British immovable assets in Iran in order to concert joint Anglo-American approach to Iranian Government in this connection. At meeting held here November 21 between chief administrative and financial officers of PGC and Paiforce with representatives of British and American Embassies present as observers, following points were tentatively agreed subject to approval by respective War Departments in Washington and London: 1. All articles and materials which can be moved and which are needed for military operations elsewhere will be removed. Military needs will in principle override other considerations. However consideration should be given to cases where need for equipment elsewhere is not urgent and where its removal from Iran would render valueless an installation otherwise useful to Iranian Government. Under similar circumstances equipment might also be left for bargaining purposes. In such cases opinions of two Embassies should be sought. 2. If one foreign force abandons an installation desired by another Ally, the latter should be given first call on it. (A concrete example has arisen in case of American Kazvin Camp which Soviets wish to take over. As reported my 845, November 15, PGC has recommended to War that in these cases definitive transfer should be made from American Army to British or Russians. I have already expressed opinion that this is unwise and that it would be preferable to lend installations in question with proviso that they should ultimately be sold or transferred to Iranians for account of American Government. Department may wish to discuss this with War.) 3. Both British and American military wish to reserve right to withhold from sales negotiations certain installations. PGC has in mind Sultanabad Hospital (my 710, September 26 34 ). British War Office has specified three categories: ( a ) Installations which may be needed by other British agencies; ( b ) Oil installations; ( c ) Communications installations which may be of future strategic value. (Department will appreciate possible implications in class c . British military here profess to be ignorant of what is intended by these reservations.) 4. Subject to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above all fixed assets should be offered first for sale to Iranian Government. If not purchased by Government at reasonable prices some properties might be sold to private individuals provided customs duties or taxes are not prohibitive. Failing sale, installations should be demolished. Virtually all British and American leases have provisions permitting demolition of buildings erected by our forces. Main reason advanced for demolition was that it would prevent Iranian Government from acquiring installations by default and so would strengthen Allied bargaining power in asking payment. 5. Basis of pricing should be fair value of installation as it stands to buyer for use to which he will put it. It was recognized in some cases this value might be nonexistent. 6. Very high percentage of structures represent expenditures by both British and American Governments. Paiforce and PGC should work together in these cases to assess proportion contributed by each, and any proceeds received from sale should be divided accordance this proportion. Because of this intermingling of interest, it was believed most negotiations for sale would have to be conducted jointly by British and American authorities. 7. PGC and Paiforce will draw up lists of installations involved, determine original cost and agree upon proportion contributed by each. (PGC has already done some work on this line for submission to War.) 8. Both British and American military felt negotiations with Iranian Government should be undertaken by Embassies on diplomatic rather than military level. British Embassy appears to agree. Suggestion was made that Iranian Government should be informed at once that it cannot expect to receive installations free of charge. (British Embassy proposes to convey this informally and orally to Lewis of Millspaugh Mission, to which I have agreed. I hesitate however, to make formal communication to Iranian Government without formal instructions from Department regarding its policy in this respect.) Paiforce and PGC are cabling London and Washington setting forth points listed above and requesting approval. Except as already noted, I see no objection. I believe British agree with us that in some instances it may be necessary to cede installations to Iranians in exchange for cancellation of claims against us. British also appear willing to consider special political aspects of individual questions as they arise. Everyone here agrees we cannot hope to recoup high percentage of investment in view of rapid depreciation and fact that military installations may have little peacetime utility. British Foreign Office has expressed opinion it is not necessary to consult Russians at this time regarding disposal arrangements. This is technically correct since there is little or no overlap between their installations and those erected by British and Americans. However, both General Connolly and I think Russians should be advised that study of problem has begun, so that they may offer their views if they wish. Connolly is informing local Russian commander informally, and Department may wish to instruct me to convey formal notice to Soviet Embassy. I think this is important so that they may have no opportunity later to complain that they were kept in dark regarding our policy. It is obvious they could create difficult situation if they should adopt entirely different line in disposing of their assets. I requested [ request ] Department, after consulting War, instruct me on following additional points: (1). Is it agreed that in principle we should insist upon payment by Iranians, with demolition as alternative? May I formally notify Iranian Government? (2). Decision regarding cession of installations from American Army to Russians or British. (3). Does Department wish joint or parallel American and British approach to Iranian Government? Morris 33 British military command, Persia and Iraq Force. 34 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 811.24591/11–1544: Telegram [Document 375] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , November 24, 1944—6 p.m. 686. Dept has transmitted to War a paraphrase of urtel 845, November 15, noon, with a statement that Dept concurs in your view that title to fixed American installations in Iran should not be passed to a foreign power other than Iran. War is being informed the Dept is inclined to favor the suggestion that the United States Army retain title to the camps at Kazvin and Hamadan until we make a final settlement with Iran. If the Russian and British military authorities can show a clear military need for these camps, they might be permitted to use them temporarily. Care should be taken to determine clearly that the need is military, for the prosecution of the war against the Axis and not for other reasons. If no such need can be demonstrated, Dept is suggesting that plans be made for sale of the camps to the Iranian Government. The foregoing is also pertinent in part as regards trucks, cranes, road machinery, et cetera. Dept considers that such supplies as the American Army wishes to leave in Iran should be offered for sale there unless the Russians and British authorities can show a clear military need for them. This need should be judged in the light of the remoteness of Iran from military operations and any plans for reducing the use of Iran for a corridor for transit of war supplies. Stettinius The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 811.24591/12–544: Telegram [Document 376] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 5, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 5:07 p.m.] 103. During Medjliss debate on new Cabinet, 35 two or three deputies criticized absence of treaty or other legal sanction for presence of American troops in Iran. In his reply yesterday Premier Bay at gave assurance that action would be taken to conclude a special agreement on this subject at earliest possible moment. Morris 35 A new Iranian Government had been formed November 26 by Morteza Qoli Bayat. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 811.24591/11–2444: Telegram [Document 377] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , December 12, 1944—7 p.m. 723. Urtel 868, November 24. Dept concurs in tentative agreement reached between PGC and Paiforce on November 21 with following exceptions: (1) Our installations may be lent to the British and Russians, if a definite war need is shown, but we should retain title. (2) Demolition should be resorted to with greatest reluctance. Every effort should be made to agree on terms of sale before destroying anything of value. (3) American, British and Soviet policy towards surplus disposal in Iran should be as similar as possible, to avoid invidious comparisons and to accomplish more effective results. Dept doubts wisdom of joint British-American approach which conspicuously omits the Russians. This however does not preclude possible parallel action with either British or Russians in particular cases. In all cases both Russians and British should be kept informed of developments. (4) It is agreed that the Iranians should pay for the installations and supplies transferred to them. The value of these assets may possibly be used later to offset claims, but this point can be determined later. You may notify the Iranian Government that payment is expected. Dept is conferring with War and FEA 36 continuously in this matter. Sent to Tehran, repeated to Cairo. Stettinius 36 Foreign Economic Administration. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 811.24591/12–2144: Telegram [Document 378] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , December 21, 1944—8 p.m. 732. Dept’s discussions with War on subject of disposal of PGC trucks has resulted in a determination by War that the following vehicles are considered to be in the category of surplus and are to be held intact for negotiation purposes by State with a view to their ultimate disposal by outright sale to Iran, for cash at a fair estimate of present evaluation: 1. 300 Studebaker 2½-ton trucks, total of 750 truck tons. 2. 300 Studebaker trucks with 7-ton semi-trailers, total of 2100 truck tons. 3. 215 Mack 10–ton trucks, total 2150 truck tons. Summary—815 trucks with total of 5000 truck tons. After consultation with Connolly and Hoskins, 37 please inform the Iranian Government that these trucks are being held as available for sale to Iran. You should state that in spite of other demands for these trucks Dept has insisted upon their being offered for sale first to Iran in view of our desires to assist the Iranian transport situation and in implementation of the economic assurances of the Declaration Regarding Iran of December 1, 1943. 38 Prompt action should be taken to dispose of this matter since the trucks are needed elsewhere. FEA will instruct Hoskins regarding valuation of trucks, form of payment and disposal of proceeds. Sent to Tehran, repeated to Cairo for Aemme. 39 Stettinius 37 Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, representative of the Foreign Economic Administration in Iran. 38 For text of Declaration, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 646 ; for correspondence regarding United States efforts in 1944 to implement the Declaration, see ante , pp. 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] ff. 39 Reference is to the Office of the American Economic Mission, Middle East. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 811.24591/1–2445: Telegram [Document 379] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , January 24, 1945—11 a.m. [Received 1:48 p.m.] 49. During interview with Foreign Minister 40 he discussed pending question of agreement regularizing status of our troops in Iran and suggested that since troops may shortly be leaving Iran matter might be adjusted by having Majlis pass a resolution approving action of Government in originally admitting troops to Iran and otherwise legalizing their status in this country for the duration of the war. In advancing his suggestion Entezam professed he was motivated by sincere desire to settle this question as simply and expeditiously as possible. I gave no opinion as to what reception this proposal might receive from my Government but suggested that Entezam submit matter through his Minister in Washington to Department to which he agreed. This initial telegram is for Department’s information. I shall follow it up with further comments after I have had an opportunity to discuss question with PGC. 41 Morris 40 Nasrollah Entezam. 41 In despatch 203, February 13, 1945, the Ambassador expressed his opposition to the Iranian suggestion that the status of American military forces in Iran be regularized by an act of the Majlis, He pointed out that although this course of action would provide legality for the presence of the troops from the viewpoint of Iranian domestic law, it might fail to give the United States adequate protection against possible Iranian claims for damages, taxes, customs duties, etc. The Ambassador concluded that he and Brig. Gen. Donald P. Booth, Commanding General of the Persian Gulf Command, believed it advisable to negotiate a formal treaty or agreement to handle the matter. (811.24591/2–1345) No further action on the question of regularizing the status of American troops in Iran occurred until March 1945 when the Iranian Minister informed the Department of State that the Iranian Government no longer deemed an agreement necessary and considered the matter closed. No correspondence concerning this action by the Iranian Minister has been found in Department files. However, on September 29, 1945, the American Embassy in Iran issued a statement in reply to critical articles in certain Tehran newspapers about the presence of American troops in Iran and other matters. The statement noted the abrupt suspension by the Iranian Government of negotiations for an agreement governing the presence of American troops in Iran in December 1943 (see telegram 1103, December 10, 1943, from Tehran, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 486 ), and stressed that the United States Government had repeatedly expressed willingness thereafter to reopen negotiations until the matter was closed by the action of the Iranian Minister in March 1945. The text of this statement was transmitted to the Department in telegram 789, October 2, 1945, 5 p.m. (891.24/10–245) Representations by the United Kingdom for the assumption by the United States of financial obligations in the operation of the Trans-Iranian Railroad Representations by the United Kingdom for the assumption by the United States of financial obligations in the operation of the Trans-Iranian Railroad 42 42 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 437 ff. [380] The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State Washington , January 31, 1944. 891.77/736 [381] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, February 10, 1944—7 p.m. 891.77/736: Telegram [382] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax) Washington , February 10, 1944. 891.77/736 [383] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, March 4, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 2:25 p.m.] 891.77/737: Telegram [384] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, April 28, 1944—9 p.m. 891.77/739: Telegram [385] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 19, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 5 p.m.] 891.77/740: Telegram [386] Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State Washington, 20 May 1944. 891.77/743 [387] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, May 22, 1944—10 p.m. 891.77/740 [388] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, June 1, 1944—8 p.m. 891.77/745: Telegram [389] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 28, 1944—4 p.m. [Received June 29—noon.] 891.77/6–2844: Telegram [390] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, July 6, 1944—6 p.m. 891.77/6–2844: Telegram [391] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 24, 1944. [Received August 7.] 891.77/7–2444 [392] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [Washington,] July 27, 1944. 891.77/7–2744 [393] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [Washington,] July 29, 1944. 891.77/7–2944 [394] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [Washington,] August 9, 1944. 891.77/8–944 [395] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) [Washington,] August 11, 1944. 891.77/8–1144 [396] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, August 17, 1944. [Received August 29.] 891.77/8–1744 [397] The Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) Washington, October 11, 1944. 891.77/10–1144 [398] The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) Washington, November 24, 1944. 891.77/10–1144 The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State 891.77/736 [Document 380] The British Ambassador ( Halifax ) to the Secretary of State Aide-Mémoire Ref: 131/8/44 His Majesty’s Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and has the honour to inform Mr. Hull that His Majesty’s Government are anxious to proceed as soon as possible to the conclusion of a financial agreement covering Allied use of the Persian railway system. 2. Under Article 4(2) of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian treaty 43 the Allied powers undertook to conclude such an agreement as soon as possible after the entry into force of the treaty. But owing to the new factor created by the transfer to the United States authorities of operational responsibility for the railway south of Teheran, two years have now elapsed since the signing of the treaty without appreciable progress towards a financial agreement about the railway. 3. From the practical point of view it has become urgently necessary to regularize the position as regards freight rates, payment of traffic bills, etc. The present lack of definition has led to considerable confusion besides provoking complaints from the Persian Government. 4. When the matter was raised at the Moscow conference 44 the Soviet representatives said that it was a question for the experts of the three Governments at Teheran. Mr. Eden 45 accordingly proposes to instruct His Majesty’s Minister shortly to concert with his Soviet and United States colleagues with a view to preparing an agreed draft as a basis for subsequent negotiation with the Persian Government. It is suggested that the draft should be based on the following main principles:— (1) The Allies to pay rail charges for freight and passengers at 50 per cent of the public tariff. No change in the public tariff without prior Allied agreement. (2) The Allies to guarantee a minimum annual revenue of 103,000,000 rials, the first year beginning 21st March 1942. The guarantee to be based on revenue for Persian year 1319, 45a i.e. the year preceding Allied occupation. Any monthly excess revenue to be credited and monthly payments implementing guarantee charged to suspense. Payments to guarantee will be first charge on any credit balance. Any final balance to be divided on a basis to be subsequently negotiated. The whole agreement including guarantee provision to be determinable at three months’ notice. (3) The Persians to pay hire charges for moveable assets (rolling stock) loaned to their railways. (4) The Persians to pay for services of Allied military personnel loaned to railways. (5) The Persians to grant equal facilities for Allied acquisition of land as obtain for the Persian Government. (6) The Allies to reserve full rights regarding subsequent disposal of capital assets (it seems impossible to cover this point in the railway agreement in view of the major difficulties over other capital expenditure in Persia). 5. Lord Halifax is instructed to request that the United States representative at Teheran may be instructed to concert action in this matter with his British and Soviet colleagues. A similar communication is being addressed to the Soviet Government. Washington , January 31, 1944. 43 Signed at Tehran, January 29, 1942, British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxliv , p. 1017; for correspondence regarding interest of the United States, in this treaty, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 263 ff. 44 For correspondence regarding the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943, see ibid. , 1943, vol. i , pp. 513 ff. 45 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 45a i. e., 1940. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.77/736: Telegram [Document 381] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , February 10, 1944—7 p.m. 71. British Ambassador has requested that Legation in Tehran be asked to lend its support, in concert with British and Soviet diplomatic missions, in concluding the agreement for operation of railways. Please continue the efforts you are already making, in cooperation with your British and Soviet colleagues and the PGSC, 46 to effect early conclusion of this agreement. Hull 46 Persian Gulf Service Command, the American military (services of supply) force commanded by Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly. The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax) 891.77/736 [Document 382] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador ( Halifax ) The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor, with reference to Aide-Mémoire 131/8/44 of January 31, 1944, to inform the Ambassador that the American Chargé d’Affaires at Tehran has been instructed by telegraph to lend his support, in concert with his British and Soviet colleagues and the military authorities, in effecting the early conclusion of the railway agreement. Washington , February 10, 1944. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.77/737: Telegram [Document 383] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , March 4, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 2:25 p.m.] 156. Reference Department’s 71, February 10. British have submitted draft railway financial agreement for consideration by Soviet Embassy and this office. Substance of draft appears satisfactory to PGC and to me after careful study. Text will be forwarded by air pouch leaving March 8. 47 Ford 47 Text of draft agreement was transmitted to the Department in despatch 869, March 7, from Tehran. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.77/739: Telegram [Document 384] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , April 28, 1944—9 p.m. 264. Your despatch 869, March 7. 48 War Department expresses view that it is inadvisable, unless there are urgent diplomatic considerations of which it is not aware, to enter into the proposed agreement covering financial responsibility for Iranian railways. Letter to Department from War Department 49 states that existing arrangement has proved satisfactory and there is no reason to believe the agreement would have effect of speeding flow of war supplies to Soviet Union; that agreement might cause confusion at a time when operation of railways at full capacity is essential; and that under existing arrangement British pay freight charges on all goods moved over railway on behalf of Russians including lend-lease goods, whereas under the proposed agreement new and complicated financial arrangements would have to be worked out. Department understands that instructions were issued to General Connolly last October authorizing him, jointly with Russians and British, to work out such an agreement with Iranian railways provided the United States Government was not obligated to incur any expenditures in connection therewith. This latter type of agreement, if one is needed, would be preferable from point of view that any agreement entered into on a political level which included a minimum financial guarantee to Iran would require concurrence of the fiscal agencies of this Government and perhaps Senate approval. Please inform Department, after full consultation with General Connolly, Colonel Stetson, 50 and your British colleague, of your views and recommendations on subject. Please indicate extent to which Iranians have pressed for conclusion of this agreement and what their reaction might be to refusal of United States Government to participate. An indication of the attitude of the Russians would also be helpful. You will have in mind, of course, that the question involved is not whether a general railway agreement should be concluded with Iran as one of the series of agreements contemplated by the Tripartite Pact 51 but merely whether the United States should be a party thereto. Hull 48 See footnote 47, p. 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , and Doc. 383 ] . 49 Dated April 8, not printed. 50 Col. John B. Stetson, Jr., Fiscal Officer of the Persian Gulf Service Command. 51 British-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance signed at Tehran, January 29, 1942, British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxliv , p. 1017. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.77/740: Telegram [Document 385] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 19, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 5 p.m.] 350. We have had frank and full discussion of question raised in Department’s 264 April 28 with General Connolly, Colonel Stetson, and other ranking officers of Persian Gulf Command. As result of this exchange of ideas, both PGC and Legation have revised previous opinion and now feel disadvantages of being signatory to agreement probably outweigh advantages. Following points pro and con, were brought out and are submitted for consideration by Department and War Department: 1. American adherence would place us in better position to prevent unfair Soviet or British exploitation of railroads to detriment of Iran, if our Government should wish to take a strong line in this regard. (Soviets have twice tried to force inequitable terms upon Iranian Government in connection with railway operations.) 2. American adherence would give us stronger basis for ultimate assertion of our rights and claims with respect to supplies and rolling stock furnished railroad and improvements made with our assistance. 3. On other hand, both foregoing points really concern long-range policy unconnected with war effort. (In any case, point No. 2 is probably adequately covered by Lend-Lease agreement 52 and fact title to United States Army goods has never been relinquished.) So far as immediate war effort is concerned, PGC does not believe agreement would facilitate American task in moving goods to USSR. 4. British and Iranians are parties who really stand to gain by agreement, since they are both interested in ensuring that Soviets bear their proper share of financial burden of railroad operations, which they are not doing at present. Position of our War Department, as PGC understands it, is that British must pay all aid to Russia, expenses not paid by Russians; therefore British are anxious to pin responsibility definitely on Russians to pay their fair share. Iranians of course have same interest. 5. If we are to be party to agreement, logic and fairness will require us during the negotiations to support principle of Soviet payment and afterwards to insist that Russians live up to obligations assumed. If we are not party, onus of bringing Russians into line and keeping them in line will fall on British, which seems proper in view of fact that United States has never assumed any financial responsibility. 6. Importance of good relations with USSR in Iran and in overall prosecution of war that we should hesitate to place ourselves in position which will invite conflict with or in any way jeopardize our present or future relations with Soviets unless there are strong reasons for doing so. 7. Both Iranians and British would undoubtedly like to have us participate, if only as buffer against Russians, but in view of our lack of financial responsibility, it would seem we have good grounds for declining to join in a purely financial agreement. In summary, only forceful argument which has occurred to us in support of our participation is that it would make it easier for us to protect Iranians against foreign exploitation. On other side, participation would probably involve us in prolonged and possibly unsuccessful negotiations with Russians from which United States itself would have little or nothing to gain and might lose much in Soviet confidence and goodwill. (I wish to emphasize again that circumstances would probably bring us into alignment with British, inevitably giving impression that we were presenting “United Front” to Russians.) I have thought it best to communicate these views to Department before saying anything to British or Russians. Foregoing shown to General Connolly, who concurs. 54 Ford 52 Proposed in 1943; negotiations in 1944 and 1945 were terminated by the ending of the war, and no agreement was concluded. 54 The appropriate War Department official was informed of the substance of this telegram on May 20 by Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs. Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State 891.77/743 [Document 386] Memorandum by the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the Secretary of State 55 Washington , 20 May 1944. The War Department has received a message from the Commanding General, Persian Gulf Command, which expands on State Department Message No. 350 of 19 May 44 from Teheran. General Connolly believes that the proposed railroad agreement would endanger harmonious relations between U.S. and Russia in the Persian Corridor, and that as dilatory action would probably be resorted to by the Russians, nothing could actually be accomplished by pushing the agreement. It appears from the above two messages that both Mr. Ford and General Connolly are in agreement as to the undesirability of forcing an agreement. The above message introduced nothing to change the War Department view from that portrayed in a letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State dated 8 April 1944 56 when it was stated that “the War Department does not see any reason to enter into the proposed agreement”. For the Secretary of War: H. R. Maddux Colonel, G.S.C. 55 For the attention of Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. 56 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.77/740 [Document 387] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , May 22, 1944—10 p.m. 320. War Department official responsible for PGC matters connected with operation of Iranian railway states that in view of information contained in your 350 May 19, negotiations in connection with American participation in the proposed railway agreement may be considered as having terminated. Since the Department has been acting merely as a negotiating agent for the War Department in this matter, you should consult with General Connolly as to the best method of bringing the decision to the attention of British and possibly Soviet authorities in Tehran. You may also in your discretion inform the Iranian authorities although it is understood they have not made any direct approach in the matter to the Legation. Hull The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.77/745: Telegram [Document 388] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , June 1, 1944—8 p.m. 339. British Embassy has furnished Department copy of Foreign Office telegram (repeated to Embassy Tehran as no. 35 57 ) in which it is stated that Vyshinski 58 has informed British Ambassador Moscow that Soviet Government shares with British Government desire to begin as soon as possible negotiations for conclusion of general Allied-Iranian agreement covering use of Iranian railways. While War Department can give no official reaction to this telegram until it has been studied, a responsible official of War Department expresses informal opinion that this development will not alter decision of his Department to refrain from American participation in the agreement. He believes that, while the British and Russians may desire to negotiate an agreement with the Iranians under the provisions of the Tripartite Pact, the War Department should confine itself to making bilateral financial arrangements with British for operation of southern section of railway. The Department is inclined to believe that our decision not to participate should be re-examined. American participation would tend to establish our status in Iran as coordinate with that of Great Britain and Russia. Furthermore, continued refusal to enter into these negotiations may be embarrassing or harmful in your coming general conversations with the British and Russians on the broad subject of collaboration. 59 You may wish to discuss with General Connolly who will appreciate the necessity of maintaining close relations with our Allies. Your views will be welcome. Hull 57 Not printed. 58 Andrey Yanuaryevieh Vyshinsky, First Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.Andrey Yanuaryevieh Vyshinsky, First Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. 59 For correspondence regarding this matter, see pp. 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] ff passim . The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.77/6–2844: Telegram [Document 389] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 28, 1944—4 p.m. [Received June 29—noon.] 464. Reference Department’s 339, June 1. After discreet sounding out of British and Soviet Embassies here and further conversations with Persian Gulf Command on this I still feel obliged to adhere to views set forth in my 350, May 19. General Connolly does not think Vyshinski’s statement to British Ambassador Moscow (cited in Department’s 339) changes situation sufficiently to warrant reconsideration. I concur. Impression I have gotten from both British and Soviet representatives is that Russians are merely acquiescing in our participation but have no special interest in it while British would like us to join but do not regard this as essential. I do not believe failure to participate would affect tripartite economic conversations. Railroad question has never been mentioned in two meetings held so far. Department’s 320, May 22 was delayed in transmission and received after Department’s 339. Accordingly Legation has not informed British or Russians that United States proposed to withdraw from negotiations and I shall take no action in this regard pending further instructions. However my feeling is we should notify all parties as soon as possible that we have decided our participation is unnecessary. If Russians should then strongly insist that we join, a new question would be presented but Legation’s information does not at present indicate that we have grounds for expecting such an attitude. Ford The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.77/6–2844: Telegram [Document 390] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , July 6, 1944—6 p.m. 409. In view of recommendations contained in your 464 June 28, you should take early occasion to inform your British and Soviet colleagues that the United States Government does not perceive any necessity for its participation in the proposed Allied-Iranian agreement on financial responsibility for operation of Iranian railways. Hull The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.77/7–2444 [Document 391] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State No. 1039 Tehran , July 24, 1944. [Received August 7.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram No. 409 of July 6, 1944 instructing the Legation to advise the authorities concerned that the United States Government feels it unnecessary to join in the proposed Irano-American-Soviet-British agreement on financial responsibilities for the war-time operation of the Iranian State Railways. The British Embassy was informed of this decision by letter dated July 12, a copy of which was sent to the Soviet Embassy. To date, I have had no reply nor comment from either Embassy. Since the Legation had never discussed the question with the Iranian authorities, no notification of the Department’s decision has been made to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Respectfully yours, Richard Ford Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs 891.77/7–2744 [Document 392] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] July 27, 1944. Participants: Mr. Frank Lee, British Treasury Delegation Mr. Michael Wright, First Secretary, British Embassy Messrs. Murray Alling 60 Allen 61 Minor Mr. Frank Lee of the British Treasury Mission, and Mr. Michael Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy, called today to discuss the question of the proposed agreement between the Allies and Iran covering financial responsibility for the operation of the Iranian Railways. Mr. Wright outlined briefly the history of this agreement and said that he understood that the United States War Department has taken the position that the United States Government should not participate in it. He said that he wished to make it clear that the British Government recognizes this is a question to be determined solely by the United States Government. Mr. Allen explained that a main deterring reason against our participation in the agreement is that we have no basic treaty governing the presence of our forces in Iran, while the British and Russians are carrying out the agreement under the provisions of the Tripartite Pact of January 29, 1942. Mr. Wright said he realized this but did not believe, on the other hand, that the Tripartite Pact excluded United States participation in any agreement. Mr. Wright said that, whether or not the United States desires to participate in this agreement, the British Government would like to arrive at an agreement with the United States Government by which each would bear its own financial responsibility for the movement of its lend-lease goods through Iran. He submitted a very rough and provisional draft of the British idea of such an agreement, a copy of which is attached. 62 Mr. Lee declared that the British feel they are bearing an unfair burden in Iran. They are required to pay 60% in gold and 40% in sterling for rials to carry on Allied operations in Iran, which consist almost entirely of the movement of American lend-lease goods to Russia. This is a strain on the British financial position and an unfair arrangement, considering that the payments are made for American goods being moved over a foreign railway. He made a rough guess that the British have already paid out some sixty million dollars for movement of American lend-lease goods through Iran, and are spending for this purpose currently at the rate of about thirty million dollars a year. In addition, he said, the proceeds of British gold sales in Iran are credited to the United States Treasury. Mr. Wright said that his purpose in approaching the Department at this time was to state the British position and to suggest the appointment of a small British and American committee to study the facts, which are far from clear, and to endeavor to arrive at a mutually agreeable solution. Mr. Murray agreed that it would be useful to set up a committee to seek out the facts. He stated that we here in the Department would give the question our consideration and get in touch with Mr. Wright at a later date. 60 Paul H. Alling, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. 61 George V. Allen, Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs. 62 The draft reads as follows: “General Principle. It is agreed that the responsibility for the payment of all expenses (including freight) on the Persian Railways in respect of American Aid to Russia and American military traffic, will be borne by the United States Government, and that the responsibility for the payment of all expenses (including freight) on the Persian Railways in respect of British aid to Russia and British military traffic will be borne by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom; each government being free to reclaim payment from the Soviet Government if they so desire.” (891.77/7–2744) Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs 891.77/7–2944 [Document 393] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] July 29, 1944. I telephoned Major Patton of the Foreign Fiscal Affairs Branch of the War Department concerning the approach made to the Department by the British Embassy on the subject of American participation in the Allied-Iranian Railway Agreement and the desire of the British Government to have the United States assume responsibility for freight bills for movement of lend-lease goods on the Iranian railways. Major Patton said that the United States formally took over operation of the southern section of the Iranian railways in April 1943, at British request. Negotiations were conducted in Tehran between the Persian Gulf Command, represented by Colonel Stetson, and the British. Colonel Stetson visited the United States during the discussions to consult with the War Department. The British did not approach the War Department direct but only through the Persian Gulf Command. The War Department decided, after considering the matter for some time, not to agree to the British request to assume financial responsibility for the Iranian Railway. This decision was communicated to the Persian Gulf Command, which informed the British. The matter never reached the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the directive 63 under which our forces operate the railways contains no provision as to payment of the bills. Major Patton declared that the financial arrangements now in force in Iran are muddled. The War Department is willing to pay for movement of supplies used by our forces but has not been doing so since its claims to the railways for maintenance goods furnished have not been met. The British are responsible for payment of all freight bills other than those for the use of our forces. They have not met these in full but have made payments on account in order to keep the railways operating. The railway is unable to pay the Americans for maintenance equipment because of lack of funds. The British have had also to assume responsibility for payment of freight bills for the Russian section of the railway. Major Patton was of the opinion that any change in the present arrangement must be taken up with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, since the Iranian Railways are operated under the directive of that group. He thought that the British approach should therefore be to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He said he would like to discuss the question with other officers in the War Department after which he would telephone me. 64 63 No. 109/1 of September 22, 1942, of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, issued simultaneously to the Persian Gulf Service Command and the Persia and Iraq Force (Paiforce). 64 Mr. Minor and Major Patton had a second telephone conversation regarding this subject on August 9. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs 891.77/8–944 [Document 394] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] August 9, 1944. Lieutenant-Colonel Pforzheimer 65 called personally today to follow up the telephone conversations I have held with Major Patton concerning the British desire to have this Government assume financial responsibility for the movement of American lend-lease goods through Iran. Colonel Pforzheimer said he was authorized to say the following as coming from General Richards, Budget Officer of the War Department. “In the absence of any change in Combined Staff Directive 109/1, which governs operation of the Iranian Railways, the War Department must continue to hold that the British are responsible financially for the movement of goods through Iran. It is true that the directive does not mention financial responsibility but it has been well understood that this was and continues to be a responsibility of the British Government. Any British desire for a change in the existing situation should be broached directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” Colonel Pforzheimer said that the British have made a number of informal approaches to the War Department on this subject, through both civilian and military channels. None of these had materialized since the British had apparently been reluctant to broach the subject formally to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He added that the feeling in the War Department is that the British should bear financial responsibility for the railways since our part has been merely to help them, at their request, with the operation of a specific war project. 65 Lt. Col. Carl H. Pforzheimer, of the Budget Division, War Department General Staff. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) 891.77/8–1144 [Document 395] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs ( Allen ) [ Washington ,] August 11, 1944. Subject: Financial Responsibility for Operation of Iranian Railways. I telephoned Mr. Wright to inform him that, after conversations with the War Department, it was suggested that the British Embassy be informed that its approach on this subject should be made directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.77/8–1744 [Document 396] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State No. 1070 Tehran , August 17, 1944. [Received August 29.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the approach which has been made to the Department by the British Embassy at Washington, as recorded in a memorandum of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs dated July 27, 1944, looking toward payment by the United States of a share of the expenses incurred in transporting aid to the Soviet Union through Iran. The Legation notes that the British Government has now raised this question, for the first time so far as I am aware, on a political level. A previous British proposal, in 1943, that the American Government should take over the financial responsibilities of the operation, was made to the American military authorities in Iran and was rejected by the War Department after only informal consultation with the Department. Neither the Department nor the Legation was brought directly into the negotiations. In the present instance, it would seem that the decision to be taken depends largely upon general political and financial policy vis-à-vis the British Government. However, there are certain conditions peculiar to Iran which have a bearing on the matter and which it may be worth while to bring again to the Department’s attention: 1. None of the Allied powers operating in Iran has any definite agreement with the Iranian Government with respect to the costs chargeable to the various parties in connection with transportation of aid to Russia and supplies to their respective military forces in Iran. 2. The British Government, under pressure of circumstances, has been the only Allied agency to make substantial payments on account. The American Government has hitherto disclaimed responsibility, and the Soviet Government has, for one reason or another, failed to settle its accounts to any appreciable extent. For practical purposes, therefore, it may be said that the British Government is shouldering the greater part of the financial burden at present. It has been forced into this position, because, if money had not been forthcoming from some source, functioning of the railways would have been affected and political repercussions might have been expected as well. 3. In order to get out of this undesirable position, the British have taken the initiative in attempting the negotiation of an agreement which would fix the relative shares of the parties concerned and provide a procedure for the orderly payment of those shares in such a way as to ensure that the railways would at all times have adequate working funds. The agreement was also designed to fix, at reduced rates, the charges to be levied by the railways for the transport of Allied goods and to establish the rights of the several parties with respect to their contributions of supplies and permanent improvements. (See my despatches Nos. 869 and 946 of March 7 and May 16, 1944 66 for draft agreements put forward by the British Embassy at Tehran.) 4. It was proposed that the United States should be a party to this agreement, the others being Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and Iran, but after consideration it was decided by the Department and the War Department, on recommendation of the Legation and American military authorities in Iran, that the disadvantages of participation would outweigh the advantages. Since we were not to pay the costs, it was not of direct interest to us to join in fixing those costs, and it was feared that the negotiation of the agreement might entail conflict with the Soviet Government from which we would have much to lose and little to gain. (See my telegram No. 350 of May 19, 1944.) 5. If, however, the United States Government should agree to share with the British and Soviet Governments the cost of the aid to Russia movement through Iran, I believe a different situation would present itself. We would then have a concrete interest in determining the amount of the costs to be paid and also in ensuring that our partners lived up to their financial obligations. It would seem undesirable to place ourselves in a position similar to that of the British, whereby we might be forced to pay more than our share merely to keep the line of supply functioning. In this respect, the draft proposal left with the Department by the British Embassy and Treasury representatives on July 27 67 would appear inacceptable, since it would leave it to us to get reimbursement from the Soviet Government as best we could. 6. The Legation would suggest, therefore, that the Department consider the desirability of making any American financial commitment conditional upon the conclusion of an agreement with all four parties, United States, Britain, U.S.S.R. and Iran, regarding freight rates and other charges, the shares to be paid by each, and the procedure for determining the amounts of those shares and the manner of their payment. The Department may wish to discuss this question with Major General Donald H. Connolly, Commanding, Persian Gulf Command, and Colonel John B. Stetson, fiscal adviser to General Connolly, both of whom are now in the United States and are expected to remain there for some five or six weeks. Respectfully yours, Richard Ford 66 Neither printed. 67 See footnote 62, p. 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 392 ] . The Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 891.77/10–1144 [Document 397] The Counselor of the British Embassy ( Wright ) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) Ref. 131/46/44 Washington , October 11, 1944. Dear Wallace Murray : Since Mr. Lee and I first raised with you some weeks ago the question of the incidence of freight charges in respect of lend-lease goods to Russia carried on the Persian railways, we have been endeavouring to obtain certain additional information from London in the hope of clarifying the position. There has, too, been an informal meeting between Mr. Goschen, of the United Kingdom Treasury Delegation, and Mr. Landis, 68 together with a number of representatives of F.E.A. 69 At the conclusion of that meeting it was agreed that the matter could now most appropriately be carried forward by the communication to the State Department of a memorandum setting out the general view taken by the United Kingdom Government of this matter. Accordingly I enclose a copy of such a memorandum. We shall, of course, be happy to discuss this further with you should you wish to do so. I enclose copies of this letter and of the memorandum in case you wish to send them to Mr. Denby 70 of F.E.A. and to General Richards of the War Department. Yours ever, Michael Wright [Annex—Memorandum] Incidence of Cost of Transporting Goods on the Persian Railways 1. The Persian railways have been operated under Allied control since the early days of the Allied entry into that country, but hitherto there has been no formal agreement with the Russian Government governing the Allied use of the railway. It is now hoped to conclude such an agreement on a tripartite basis (i.e. between the United Kingdom, Russia and Persia) in pursuance of Article 4(ii) of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of January 1942. It is understood that the United States Government does not wish to become a party to such an agreement. 2. The proposed agreement will provide for an Anglo-Russian guarantee, under certain conditions, of a minimum revenue for the Persian Railways, but the United Kingdom and Russian Governments will remain responsible for paying freight charges to the railway in respect of the carriage of goods and personnel for which they are responsible. Thus there is no question of either the United Kingdom or the Russian Government taking over the railway financially, in the sense of being entitled to an agreed share of the profits or receipts of operation. It remains, so far as both the United Kingdom and Russia are concerned, a foreign owned railway in a foreign country, to which both Governments have to make payments for services rendered. Similarly the fact that, under a directive from the Chiefs of Staff, the railway was operated before April 1943, by the British and after that date by the Americans, has made no difference to this fundamental position. 3. Nevertheless an anomalous position has been allowed to come into existence as regards the payment for the carriage on the railway of American lend-lease goods going to Russia, and it is desired to agree upon a rectification of that position without delay. Although the bulk of the goods carried by the railway has consisted of American lend-lease goods consigned to Russia, the United States Government has so far paid no bills in respect of the freight charges on such goods. The cost of such bills has in fact been financed by advances made to the railways by the United Kingdom Government: in December 1943 it was estimated that 80% of the bills against which payments were being made by the United Kingdom were in respect of the cost of transporting United States lend-lease goods. 4. The burden of this temporary financing has imposed a heavy strain on the United Kingdom Government, especially as the rial payments which are involved necessitate an outlay in gold of 60% of their value. Accordingly the United Kingdom Government consider that the present arrangement should be brought to an end as soon as possible and an appropriate adjustment made which will give effect to the principle (which it is assumed is fully accepted by the United States Government) that the United States and the United Kingdom Government are each responsible for meeting the cost of the carriage to Russia over the Persian railways of United Kingdom “aid to Russia” goods and, American lend-lease goods respectively. 5. It is thought that an attempt to secure an adjustment ante-dated to the beginning of the traffic to Russia would involve elaborate calculations which would be rendered very difficult by the virtual impossibility of producing accurate records of the exact origin and nature of goods carried on the railways in the early days. Accordingly the United Kingdom Government has put forward the proposal for adjustment summarized in the following paragraph in the hope that this will provide a simple and equitable division of financial responsibility. 6. The proposal is that we should obtain from the Persian Railways a complete record of the total railway bills to date and we should then divide these in the same proportion as arrivals of American goods in the Persian Gulf bear to arrivals of British goods. It is appreciated that this division will not be strictly accurate, but it is thought that it would form a reasonable basis for division. Indeed, it would appear to favour the Americans somewhat since British goods have latterly tended to be sent via the Iraq and Khanaqin routes. 7. It would not be proposed that a settlement on the above lines would affect (i) the incidence of cost of the carriage of goods to Russia by United States and United Kingdom road transport organizations operating in Persia; (ii) the right of either the United States or the United Kingdom Governments to recover from Russia the whole or part of the respective sums expended under the above arrangement by either Government on the carriage of goods to Russia; (In practice any United Kingdom claim would be confined to one in respect of civilian goods carried to Russia); (iii) the incidence of the cost of transporting on the railway goods required by the United States and United Kingdom military forces in Persia. 8. The United Kingdom Government hope that the United States Government will be prepared to accept and to implement an arrangement on the lines summarized in paragraph 6 above. 68 James M. Landis, Director of American Economic Operations in the Middle East. 69 Foreign Economic Administration. 70 Charles Denby, Director, General Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration. The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) 891.77/10–1144 [Document 398] The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Counselor of the British Embassy ( Wright ) Washington , November 24, 1944. Dear Michael : We have considered carefully the points raised in your letter of October 11, 1944 (your reference 131/46/44), concerning payment of the Persian railway freight charges for American lend-lease goods transported to Russia. This matter has been further reviewed in the Department and in a meeting with the Foreign Economic Administration. While the point of view of the British government is appreciated, we cannot escape the conclusion that the question of adjustment of the freight bills for lend-lease shipments to Russia on the Persian railways cannot be settled independently of the other financial issues in connection with the operation of the Persian railways, or of the responsibility of the British and American Governments for the transportation of lend-lease goods across Persia. It is the opinion of the Department and of FEA that the total contributions of the British and American Governments in connection with aid to Russia in this area must be worked out so as to include the cost of installations, running equipment, maintenance, personnel and similar factors. Once the British and American Governments have arrived at what they feel to be an adequate presentation of their individual expenses, representatives of the two Governments would confer on this matter and a final balance would be struck off. With this in mind, we have requested the Foreign Economic Administration and the Combined Chiefs of Staff to prepare a statement of the complete American contribution to the aid to Russia program in this area. It is hoped that your Government will do likewise and that when these two accounts have been completed, a joint accounting can be worked out which will be satisfactory to all parties concerned. 71 Sincerely yours, Wallace Murray 71 In a further letter to Mr. Wright on March 27, 1945, Mr. Murray reviewed the Directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff under which the southern section of the Trans-Iranian Railroad was being operated and the decision by the War Department that the assumption of responsibility for this operation as agent for the Persia and Iraq Force entailed no new financial responsibilities for the United States (see memorandum of July 29 by Mr. Minor, p. 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] ). Mr. Murray concluded his letter with: “It appears, therefore, that since the existing arrangement under which the Trans-Iran railroad has been operating depends upon an order issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to both the Persian Gulf Command and to Paiforce, the proper channel through which to obtain a decision on the question of responsibility for freight charges is the Combined Chiefs of Staff.” (891.77/3–2745) Problems concerning the position of the American advisers in Iran; the Millspaugh Mission Problems concerning the position of the American advisers in Iran; the Millspaugh Mission 72 72 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 510 – 561 . [399] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, February 21, 1944—9 p.m. [Received February 23—12:20 a.m.] 891.51A/1017: Telegram [400] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, March 7, 1944—5 p.m. [Received March 8—9:05 a.m.] 891.002/397: Telegram [401] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, March 28, 1944. [Received April 18.] 891.20 Missions/11 [402] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, April 11, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 4:15 p.m.] 891.51A/1087: Telegram [403] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, April 18, 1944. [Received April 28.] 891.51A/1114 [404] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, April 21, 1944—10 p.m. 891.20 Mission/11a: Telegram [405] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, April 25, 1944. [Received May 4.] 891.51A/1120 [406] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 6, 1944—4 p.m. [Received May 6—1:55 p.m.] 891.20 Missions/12: Telegram [407] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 13, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 5:47 p.m.] 891.51A/1131: Telegram [408] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, May 17, 1944—3 p.m. 891.51A/1120: Telegram [409] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 17, 1944—3 p.m. [Received May 18—9:45 a.m.] 891.51A/1140: Telegram [410] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, May 17, 1944—4 p.m. 891.51A/1120: Telegram [411] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 19, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 19—2:30 p.m.] 891.51A/1141: Telegram [412] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 19, 1944—7 p.m. [Received May 19—2:01 p.m.] 891.51A/1142: Telegram [413] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 22, 1944—7 p.m. [Received May 23—4:05 p.m.] 891.51A/1144: Telegram [414] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 24, 1944—4 p.m. [Received May 24—2:08 p.m.] 891.51A/1143: Telegram [415] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, May 25, 1944—2 p.m. 891.51A/1140: Telegram [416] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 30, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 30—1:35 p.m.] 891.51A/1148: Telegram [417] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 2, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 3—9:10 p.m.] 891.51A/1158: Telegram [418] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 2, 1944—7 p.m. [Received June 4—12:39 p.m.] 891.51A/1155: Telegram [419] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, June 8, 1944—6 p.m. 891.51A/1160a: Telegram [420] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 13, 1944—noon. [Received June 13—10:12 a.m.] 891.51A/1165: Telegram [421] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 20, 1944—7 p.m. [Received June 20—6:45 a.m.] 891.51A/1173: Telegram [422] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 22, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 22—1:30 p.m.] 891.51A/1180: Telegram [423] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 23, 1944—4 p.m. [Received June 23—12:45 p.m.] 891.51A/1181: Telegram [424] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State Washington June 23, 1944. 891.20 Missions/17 [425] The Secretary of State to the Chargé m Iran (Ford) Washington, June 24, 1944—1 p.m. 891.51A/1181: Telegram [426] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 25, 1944—3 p.m. [Received June 25—11:45 a.m.] 891.51 A/1185: Telegram [427] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 26, 1944—10 a.m. [Received June 26—9:48 a.m.] 891.51A/1186: Telegram [428] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 27, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:15 p.m.] 891.51A/6–2744: Telegram [429] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 27, 1944—7 p.m. [Received June 28—9:30 a.m.] 891.51A/6–2744: Telegram [430] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 29, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 10:15 p.m.] 891.51A/6–2944: Telegram [431] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 30, 1944—noon. [Received June 30—11 a.m.] 891.51A/6–3044: Telegram [432] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, July 1, 1944—7 p.m. 891.51A/6–3044: Telegram [433] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 1, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 1—3:20 p.m.] 891.20 Mission/7–144: Telegram [434] The Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) Washington, July 1, 1944. 801.51A/7–144 [435] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 3, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 9:57 a.m.] 891.51A/7–344: Telegram [436] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, July 4, 1944—4 p.m. 891.20 Mission/7–444: Telegram [437] The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) Washington, July 8, 1944. 891.51A/7–144 [438] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 15, 1944—5 p.m. [Received July 15—12:24 p.m.] 891.20 Mission/7–1544: Telegram [439] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 21, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 12:30 p.m.] 891.105A/7–2144: Telegram [440] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, July 26, 1944—2 p.m. 891.105A/7–2644: Telegram [441] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, July 31, 1944—7 p.m. 891.51A/7–1344: Telegram [442] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, August 1, 1944—7 p.m. 891.51A/8–144: Telegram [443] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, August 3, 1944—9 a.m. [Received August 4—5:36 p.m.] 891.20 Mission/8–344: Telegram [444] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, August 12, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 4:24 p.m.] 891.51A/8–1244: Telegram [445] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, August 14, 1944—2 p.m. 891.20 Mission/8–344: Telegram [446] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, August 18, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 6 p.m.] 891.105A/8–1844: Telegram [447] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, August 26, 1944—7 p.m. 891.20 Mission/8–1844: Telegram [448] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, September 12, 1944—noon. 891.105A/8–1844: Telegram [449] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, September 12, 1944. [Received September 22.] 891.51A/9–1244 [450] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, September 22, 1944—8 p.m. 891.105A/9–2244: Telegram [451] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 2, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 11:30 a.m.] 891.105A/10–244: Telegram [452] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, October 7, 1944—2 p.m. 891.51A/10–744: Telegram [453] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 11, 1944—5 p.m. Received October 12—3:10 p.m. 891.51A/10–1144: Telegram [454] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 13, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 2:22 p.m.] 891.51A/10–1344: Telegram [455] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 19, 1944—3 p.m. [Received October 19—1:50 p.m.] 891.51A/10–1944: Telegram [456] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, October 25, 1944. 891.20 Mission/10–1944 [457] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, October 25, 1944—8 p.m. 891.20 Mission/10–2544: Telegram [458] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State Washington, October 30, 1944. 891.20 Mission/10–3044 [459] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, November 29, 1944—5 p.m. 891.105A/11–2944: Telegram [460] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 1, 1944—4 p.m. [Received December 2—10:10 p.m.] 891.51A/12–144: Telegram [461] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 5, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 4:55 p.m.] 891.002/12–544: Telegram [462] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, December 6, 1944—7 p.m. 891.51A/12–144: Telegram [463] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 15, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 2:08 p.m.] 891.51A/12–1544: Telegram [464] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 18, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 5:45 p.m.] 891.51A/12–1844: Telegram [465] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 20, 1944—5 p.m. [Received December 21—2:53 p.m.] 891.51A/12–2044: Telegram [466] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 21, 1944—4 p.m. [Received December 22—10:20 p.m.] 891.105A/12–2144: Telegram [467] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) [Washington,] December 21, 1944. 891.20 Mission/11–2844 [468] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 26, 1944—3 p.m. [Received December 26—1:05 p.m.] 891.51A/12–2644: Telegram [469] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State Washington, December 27, 1944. 891.20 Mission/12–2744 The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1017: Telegram [Document 399] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , February 21, 1944—9 p.m. [Received February 23—12:20 a.m.] 116. Foreign Minister Saed summoned me to long personal conference this afternoon regarding Millspaugh. 73 Immediate cause was resignation rumored some days ago and confirmed today of General Shafai, Minister of Commerce and Industry. 74 Saed stated categorically this resignation was essentially a protest by the Government against (1) Millspaugh’s tendency to regard Government arms factory as a commercial undertaking for money making purposes instead of a political instrument for implementing Iranian Soviet relations and (2) his insistence that Soviets pay for at least part of arms and munitions 75 they have received before Millspaugh will approve payment of wages of munitions workers. Saed insisted this state of affairs could be tolerated no longer, that Millspaugh had taken his stand vis-à-vis the Soviets without having consulted Foreign Ministry regarding possible political considerations at issue, that in meddling in such affairs the Doctor was stepping outside realm economics and interfering in Iranian politics, and that in a long interview this morning with Millspaugh he had endeavored apparently without success to show Doctor error of his ways. Saed hoped that I too would see Millspaugh and insist that his position respecting operation of arms factory be forthwith abandoned, since 9,000 munitions workers unpaid for 2 months could only hurt both Government and Millspaugh without helping either financial position or Soviet relations. I shall see Millspaugh tomorrow but pending possible directive from Department do not propose to do more than outline to him gist of Foreign Minister’s remarks, leaving to him responsibility of either maintaining or altering his stand. He is of course acting in good faith since he is merely seeking to protect Iran’s financial interests, but Saed has clearly indicated that any move tending to antagonize Soviets will not have support either of Shah or Iranian Government. Saed pointed out this afternoon that his country had lost heavily on virtually every contractual arrangement that had been entered into with Soviets, and he cited CQRS contracts, rice and piece goods agreements, 76 et cetera but he stated emphatically that continued good relations with Soviet Union just at this time were worth many times the millions of tomans such relations had already cost Iran. Remainder of my 2–hour session with Foreign Minister was devoted largely to general exposition by him of his unhappy conclusion that Millspaugh was making a dismal failure of his program in Iran. Saed was neither very original nor consistent in his statements and I gathered that he was voicing second-hand opinions which might well have been a composite of Iranian-British-Soviet thought. He repeatedly stressed that he had personally been responsible for bringing American advisers to Iran but that from the beginning he had felt that this country did not need their technical skill so much as for them to act as cushion between British-Soviet conflicting political interests. Virtually with his next breath Saed was expressing conviction that (1) Millspaugh’s mentality had remained exactly where it was 20 years ago, 77 (2) Millspaugh refused to employ Iranians, many of whom were well qualified to do work for which high priced American amateurs were being brought to Iran, (3) he (Saed) had become extremely doubtful either of Millspaugh’s ability or of that of most of his staff, many of whom spent only few days or weeks in Iran before returning home in disgust, all at expense of Iranian people, and (4) while Millspaugh had been granted every demand he had made of Iran he had failed thus far to make as intructive [ any constructive? ] contribution toward betterment of conditions in this country. This situation warrants the most careful attention but until political picture has been clarified in light of forthcoming convening of Majlis, 78 now scheduled for next Saturday, I feel any immediate action on our part is unnecessary. Saed is an honest man, is essentially friendly, and it would be a pity if he should turn or be turned against our adviser program. Several times this afternoon I sensed in his unaccustomed forcefulness a rehearsal for premiership. Ford 73 Arthur C. Millspaugh, American Administrator General of Finances in the Iranian Government; the Millspaugh Financial Mission was composed of approximately 60 American experts, of whom each of about 15 senior members was charged with the management of an important segment of the Iranian economy. 74 Brig. Gen. Ismail Shafai, an appointee of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in the Cabinet reorganization of mid-December, 1943. 75 For correspondence regarding interest of the United States in the Iranian-Soviet arms contract of January 23, 1943, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 628 ff. 76 For correspondence relating to interest of the United States in the Iranian-Soviet rice-cotton piece goods contract of November 2, 1943, see pp. 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] ff., passim . 77 For correspondence regarding Dr. Millspaugh’s mission to assist in the administration of the finances of Persia, 1922–1927, see Foreign Relations , 1927, vol. iii , pp. 523 ff. 78 The Iranian Parliament. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.002/397: Telegram [Document 400] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] Tehran , March 7, 1944—5 p.m. [Received March 8—9:05 a.m.] 165.… I asked Prime Minister what measures he would suggest to save adviser program should he lose power. He replied that he thought the only possibility would be to present to the Shah a united American-British front. He said British have always supported advisers in their conversations with him. It is of course possible that Soheily has an ulterior motive in making these statements. Perhaps he hopes we will intervene to keep him in office. However Saed recently criticized Millspaugh Mission very severely in conversation with me (my 116 of February 21) and the last few weeks have seen an ever swelling volume of press criticism directed at almost all American advisers. There is talk of Majlis investigation of their work. I do not think therefore that Soheily’s remarks can be lightly dismissed. I plan to see British Minister 79 this evening, tell him frankly substance of Prime Minister’s statements regarding advisers and sound out his attitude toward a possible joint démarche , if such action should seem advisable. I also plan a more discreet approach to Soviet Embassy, and shall try to see Minister of Court and with a view to gauging court sentiment directly. Ford 79 Sir Reader W. Billiard. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.20 Missions/11 [Document 401] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State No. 899 Tehran , March 28, 1944. [Received April 18.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a letter 80 written by Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, 81 the American adviser to the Iranian Gendarmerie , to the War Department concerning certain difficulties he is encountering in carrying out his work in Iran. The Schwarzkopf Mission has encountered an extraordinary series of ups and downs during its stay in Iran. The long period of being mere advisers with no legal authority to put their reforms into effect finally terminated last December with the signature of the agreement providing for the engagement of this mission. 82 Immediately subsequent to that event and for some time thereafter, everything went smoothly for this mission, and Colonel Schwarzkopf upon his return from the United States was delighted and greatly surprised at the cooperation and the eagerness to please that he met in all Iranian circles. He was made Director of the Gendarmerie and his word was said to be final, subject only to the control of the Minister of the Interior. Several months ago Colonel Schwarzkopf became involved in a struggle with the Iranian Army over the independence of the Gendarmerie in which he appeared to achieve a marked victory, obtaining separation from the Army of all matters pertaining to the promotion, discipline, and pensions of the Gendarmerie . He won this fight against the opposition of the Shah and his advisers and against the advice of several of the more reliable members of the War Ministry. A number of persons felt that the Gendarmerie could not be completely divorced from the Army since in the final analysis, it was upon the latter that the country must depend for security, a security that the Gendarmerie could not possibly hope to achieve by itself. (I must admit that there is much to be said for the argument in favor of a quasi-unified organization to keep the tribes in order and give Iran her great dream of peace and quiet.) Whatever the pros and cons of his argument, Schwarzkopf emerged from the struggle with increased prestige and also with a number of new enemies and a reputation for stubbornness which caused alarm to a number of people, including General Ridley. 83 Some time ago Colonel Schwarzkopf reported to me that he was encountering considerable opposition to his reforms from the Under Secretary of the Interior, and he appeared seriously worried about this development. When the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Hajir, returned from London a few weeks ago, he evinced no particular interest in cooperating with the mission and was felt by the members of the mission to be under the influence of his Under Secretary. The matter, as will be seen by the enclosed letter, has come to a head with the complete flouting of Colonel Schwarzkopf’s wishes in the question of the New Year’s promotions. This particular matter is not in itself overly serious, but it does indicate that the appropriate Iranian officials intend to cooperate with the mission only when it is in their interest so to do. This trend will bear particularly close attention since the Gendarmerie mission has since its arrival enjoyed far more popularity in Iran than any of the other American advisory organizations and since the present campaign in the press against the American advisers makes it most inadvisable that any of these men become involved in controversies with their Iranian superiors. A great deal of Colonel Schwarzkopf’s difficulties arise from his rank, the prestige minded Iranian officials resenting a mere Colonel requesting the attentions usually reserved for Generals and issuing orders which they, who consider themselves his superiors, are supposed to obey. This office has recommended on more than one occasion that Colonel Schwarzkopf be promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in order to obtain the prestige in Iranian eyes that he must have for his mission to be a success. I cannot emphasize this matter too strongly and I recommend that the Department take all the steps in its power to convince the War Department of the importance of this promotion. It would also be helpful if Colonel Schwarzkopf’s second in command, Lt. Colonel Boone, were to be promoted to the rank of full Colonel. In addition to the importance of these promotions as far as the success of the mission is concerned, both men are in my opinion fully deserving of raises in rank. As an example of what the mission suffers by the lowness of its chief’s rank, I am enclosing a translation 84 of an article appearing in Mihanparastan on March 15 on this subject. If necessary, it might be wise to point out to the War Department the great interest shown by the President in the adviser program at the time of the Tehran conference 85 and to remind it that such promotions would be entirely in line with the War Department’s recent change in General Connolly’s directives. I do not mean to imply in this report that the Gendarmerie Mission has in any way been a failure, which it has not. It still is the most popular of our missions here and still, by the sincerity and ability of its members, is able to make its weight felt in Gendarmerie matters. It must, however, have the full support of our Government and at the present moment this can best be shown by promoting its officers. If, on the other hand, the situation in the Ministry of the Interior deteriorates, I recommend that we give this mission the fullest measure of our support by representations, formal or informal to the Iranian officials involved. Respectfully yours, Richard Ford 80 Not printed. 81 Former head of the New Jersey State Police, appointed by the Iranian Government to organize the Iranian Gendarmerie (rural police); for previous correspondence regarding the Schwarzkopf Gendarmerie Mission, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 510 ff. 82 Signed Pt Tehran, November 27. 1943, Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 361, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1262. 83 Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley was American military adviser to the Iranian Government on matters pertaining to the services of supply to the Iranian Army; for correspondence relating to the Ridley Mission, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 510 ff. 84 Not printed. 85 See Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, footnote 33, p. 469 and editorial note, p. 564 . The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1087: Telegram [Document 402] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , April 11, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 4:15 p.m.] 249. Debate on Cabinet was resumed today. 86 Deputy Kazemi spoke at length and bitterly against Millspaugh, emphasizing what he called Millspaugh’s dictatorial attitude and demanding that he be removed. Kazemi likewise criticized subordinate members of Mission by name, among them Solomon (Financial Agent in Khlizistan), Vivian (now Director General of Industrial Development), Shuckman (Director of Movements), and [omission] (assistant in Price Stabilization Section). Deputies Etebar and Keshavar also criticized Millspaugh but in milder vein. No vote was taken today. Debate is to be continued April 13. Ford 86 Mohammed Saed had replaced Ali Soheily as Prime Minister, and had organized a new government on April 6, 1944. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1114 [Document 403] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State No. 920 Tehran , April 18, 1944. [Received April 28.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to my despatch number 906 dated April 4, 1944 enclosing an editorial 87 from a Tehran newspaper on the subject of the Millspaugh Mission and to enclose a further collection of calumnies on this subject. Dr. Millspaugh has a tough skin and, while upset over the bitterly hostile press he has suddenly acquired, he does not appear to be unduly alarmed over it. Far more important to him are the attitudes of the Prime Minister and the Majlis which may be said to be definitely hostile at the moment. I intend to forward the Department a separate despatch 88 within the next few days recounting the stormy sessions of the past week in the Majlis with special emphasis on the violent attacks on Dr. Millspaugh and his mission. At this time however, I wish merely to transmit typical articles of the Iranian press on the Millspaugh question. Bad as the reputation of the Tehran papers may be, continued onslaughts of this sort cannot but do the Mission irreparable harm and I shall not fail to let the Department have the more interesting of these diatribes as they appear. Respectfully yours, Richard Ford 87 Neither printed. 88 No. 922, April 25, p. 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] . The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.20 Mission/11a: Telegram [Document 404] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , April 21, 1944—10 p.m. 243. The agreement signed on November 27, 1943 providing for the assignment of a United States Military Mission to Iran (Schwarzkopf) expires on October 2, 1944. Please ascertain discreetly and inform the Department by cable whether the Iranian Government desires to renew the agreement for an additional period of 2 years under the authority contained in Title I, Article 2 of the basic agreement. This is a routine inquiry, under the Department’s policy of making adequate preparation in advance for renewal of missions. Hull The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1120 [Document 405] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State No. 922 Tehran , April 25, 1944. [Received May 4.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to my telegrams number 246 dated April 10 and number 249 dated April 11, 1944 89 concerning the Majlis debate on the program submitted by the New Prime Minister, Mr. Saed, and the violent attacks it produced on the American Financial Mission. Reference is also made to the Legation’s despatch number 920 dated April 18, 1944 covering the recent press campaign against Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh and his mission. The attacks on Dr. Millspaugh in the Majlis were not entirely unexpected, but the number of deputies desirous of voicing anti-Millspaugh sentiments, the violence of the attacks and the complete lack of any adequate defense of the mission have come as something of a surprise. The prestige of certain of the attacking deputies, moreover, especially Dr. Mossadegh, bodes no good for the future of the mission. Dr. Mossadegh’s speech in opposition to the Financial Mission was devoted primarily to criticism of the Mission’s handling of the food supply, price control and distribution, the phases of his work concerning which Millspaugh meets the most criticism and opposition. Mossadegh also flayed the Government for the type of men selected for the Mission, maintaining that all American advisers should be recommended and their performance guaranteed by the United States Government. This argument is, of course, completely ridiculous since all men coming to Iran for service with the Iranian Government come under strong Departmental recommendations and for the most part, all have been extremely capable men. Unfortunately as stated above, Dr. Mossadegh, despite his recent defeat at the hands of Seyid Zia ed-Din, 90 is a very popular man in Iran, and his words carry a great deal of weight. His speech for the most part was from start to finish rather absurd and showed an amazing lack of knowledge for a man of his experience and reputation. Other deputies involved in the onslaught worthy of mention here were Etebar, Kazemi (a cousin of the famous Bagher Kazemi, now Minister to Sweden), Keschavar, Tussi, Farivar, and Abdoh. Many others joined in the chorus, but for the most part merely echoed what had already been said by those mentioned. Of the speeches delivered, Kazemi’s was by far the worst, greatly exceeding the others in both vituperation and misstatement of facts. He singled out certain members of the mission for personal attacks either on moral grounds or because they were too young or because they were inefficient. He included Messrs. Shuckman, Lamb, Ferguson, Hansen, Solomon, and Wiens. Deputy Etebar demanded an investigation of the Mission and submitted a resolution to this effect. Such an investigation will in all probability take place and may be a very good thing for the Mission since a great number of the critics may quiet down when the fallacy of their arguments is shown. It is understood that Dr. Millspaugh intends to appear before a Majlis committee next week to explain his program and answer any questions the deputies may put to him. Keschavan attacked Millspaugh for engaging various non-American foreigners solely because they are foreigners while there are plenty of qualified Iranians available. Although the defense was weak, Dr. Millspaugh was not entirely without supporters during the Majlis debate. Mr. Ardalan, the new Minister of Commerce and Industry and former Minister of Finance, made a speech in which the most telling argument he could muster was that he thought Dr. Millspaugh a very fine man. Deputy Heaqbat of Khuzistan also defended the Mission, particularly Mr. Solomon whose work he had observed and who in his opinion had demonstrated definite capabilities despite his youth. Support also came, surprisingly enough from none other than Seyid Zia ed Din Tabatabaj presumably at the suggestion of Sir Reader Bullard. The Seyid’s principal line of reasoning appeared to be that this is not the time for Iran to antagonize the United States Government no matter what the faults of the financial mission. He stated that he was opposed in principle to the idea of foreign advisers but that since they were here, it was the duty of the Government to support them. I personally doubt the Seyid’s sincerity but of course welcome any support our missions here may receive no matter what the source. Many more deputies put themselves on the record as anxious to address the chamber attacking Millspaugh but fortunately the question of the Government’s program was after many days’ delay put to the vote, and the Saed Government was given the vote of confidence reported in my telegram number 260 dated April 17. 91 It is a curious situation which finds the main attack on the Government consisting of opposition to Millspaugh, an opposition Saed fully shares with the deputies. It is also interesting to note that when the Government’s program was put to the vote the Tudeh party 92 deputies voted en masse against the Saed Government. The opposition to Millspaugh seems to come from three distinct groups: (1) the extreme nationalists led by Mossadegh; (2) the profiteers; and (3) the Russians. Of the three groups the second is by far the most vocal and the most irrational in its criticism and the third the most quiet but potentially the most dangerous. The Tudeh party vote mentioned above undoubtedly reflects the Soviet view on the American program since there is no reason to assume that the Russians are in any way hostile to Saed with whom they have usually been on good terms. Despite these trends and despite the furor of the past few weeks, I do not believe that the Iranian Government has any intention of dropping the adviser program although they would undoubtedly be delighted with the withdrawal of Millspaugh himself. It is possible, of course, that the Majlis may enact legislation limiting the powers of the Americans so that they will become literally “advisers.” While Dr. Millspaugh is having a stormy passage and may not himself be able to weather the storm, I believe that there will be no serious attempt on the part of the Iranians to get rid of the whole financial mission. The air has been cleared now and Millspaugh now has a chance to answer specific complaints which I believe he will be able to do satisfactorily. The deputies have had their say and for the most part will probably let the matter drop at least for a while although certain members of the Majlis who are irreconcilably hostile to Millspaugh, such as Mossadegh, will keep up the attacks for some time to come. The situation is serious but not at the moment critical and it demands the utmost in tact, perserverance, and tolerance from every American in the employ of the Iranian Government. I shall not fail to keep the Department informed regularly of the position of the Financial and other missions in Iran. Respectfully yours, Richard Ford 89 Telegram No. 246 not printed. 90 Seyid Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai, Iranian Deputy in the Majlis. 91 Not printed. 92 Iranian Communist Party. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.20 Missions/12: Telegram [Document 406] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 6, 1944—4 p.m. [Received May 6—1:55 p.m.] 317. Department’s 243, April 21. Prime Minister, who has been ill for some time, has now advised me informally that he personally is agreeable to extension of Schwarzkopf contract but will investigate matter and furnish Legation with an official opinion in the near future. Saed states he has been impressed by Schwarzkopf’s eagerness and industry and would like to see him remain in Iran although, he states, no manifest results of his efforts have been visible to date. Ford The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1131: Telegram [Document 407] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 13, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 5:47 p.m.] 334. I think it advisable to warn Department that Majlis opposition to Millspaugh has not diminished, despite vote of confidence received by Saed, and that situation remains very threatening. It seems likely that Deputies will make determined, and quite possibly successful, effort to oust Millspaugh personnally, if not entire mission. This might be done by repealing part or all of his extensive executive powers, which I have no doubt would bring about this resignation. British Ambassador agrees that danger is real and called me in yesterday especially to say so. Many of Deputies have selfish interests to serve by eliminating advisers. In this connection, it is worth noting that attacks are almost entirely directed against economic side of mission, that concerned with rationing, distribution, transportation, etc., and that men in strictly financial work like Pixley 93 and Le Count 94 are ignored. Interested Deputies also may be able to win support of some who are sincere but have been misled by anti-Millspaugh propaganda or discouraged by apparent lack of tangible results of his efforts. Millspaugh recently asked me whether Department would be willing to make representations to Iranian Government with view to checking opposition to his work. I asked Prime Minister whether it would be helpful to him if we formally expressed hope that Government would find means to support Millspaugh more strongly. He said he would consider and let me know after meeting he was to have with Millspaugh and associates to discuss mission’s situation. I do not recommend action at the moment, but I think Department should be considering what attitude it should take in event Majlis seems on verge of repealing Millspaugh powers or otherwise forcing him out. Ford 93 Rex Pixley, Director General of Accounts and Audits in the Millspaugh Financial Mission. 94 Walter K. LeCount, Treasurer General in the Millspaugh Financial Mission. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.51A/1120: Telegram [Document 408] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , May 17, 1944—3 p.m. 302. Please inform Dr. Millspaugh that in addition to the conversations in which we are engaged with the British and Soviet authorities 95 to obtain full support for the adviser program, we are prepared also to make strong representations to the Iranian Government. The next following telegram 95a contains the text of a note we are prepared to authorize you to transmit to the Iranian Government in support of the adviser program. Dr. Millspaugh’s suggestions regarding the note will be welcome. Before instructing you to deliver the note to the Iranian Government, the Department must be certain that the individual Americans at present employed as advisers, including Dr. Millspaugh, can be depended upon to cooperate fully in order to eliminate any justifiable grounds for criticism. You are instructed to request Dr. Millspaugh’s assurance that he will request the Legation’s advice before making appointments to the Mission or important changes of assignment therein. [Here follows section regarding certain appointments, actual or contemplated, to the staff of the Financial Mission.] You should inform Dr. Millspaugh that the foregoing instructions are not in any way a reflection on his sincere effort. The necessity for making them is particularly regretted at a time when he is under attack. However, the importance of the adviser program in Iran to American foreign policy at this time leaves no alternative. Regardless of the individuals concerned, the Department intends fully to support the program, which constitutes an important implementation of an American policy supported by the highest authority of this Government. Hull 95 For correspondence relating to conversations at Tehran between the American, British, and Soviet Ambassadors regarding economic problems of the three powers in Iran, see pp. 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] ff. 95a Telegram 303, p. 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] . The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1140: Telegram [Document 409] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 17, 1944—3 p.m. [Received May 18—9:45 a.m.] 347. Ebtehaj 96 of Bank Melli called on May 14 to say he is sure Majlis will soon launch full fledged attack on Millspaugh and that majority of Deputies will join opposition. In support of this statement, he asserted that ability [ a bill? ] to repeal Millspaugh’s plenary powers had been drawn up recently. Although he said his (Ebtehaj’s) personal intervention through friends had so far prevented its presentation to Majlis, it might at any moment be brought forward. Ebtehaj suggested the best way to meet inpending attack would be for Millspaugh voluntarily to ask to be relieved of his economic administrative duties in order to concentrate on financial side of his work, the economic functions to be transferred to some other American, possibly Black, 97 who would be given equal status with Millspaugh. I do not yet feel able to evaluate this estimate of situation. However, Department may wish to consider certain points which it suggests, namely: 1, possible desirability of urging Millspaugh to shift part of his responsibility, perhaps through appointment of a sort of deputy administrator general of finances to have semi-autonomous control over economic work; 2, possible advisability of having available a suitable replacement for Millspaugh if latter is forced to withdraw. In this latter connection, I do not believe we should allow Millspaugh’s resignation, if matters come to that point, automatically to carry with it resignation and withdrawal of entire mission. With all his fine qualities, I do not feel it need be assumed if Millspaugh fails anyone else must necessarily fail. If Iranian Government expressed desire for continuation of American Mission on terms satisfactory to United States, and if a first class replacement were quickly available, there would seem to be still a good chance of ultimate success. With reference to Ebtehaj’s mention of Black, it should be explained that publicity given his departure from United States and apparently high position he held in American Government has led many Iranians, including Shah, to speculate that Black is destined to be Millspaugh’s successor. British Ambassador told me last night he had cabled London regarding dangerous position of Millspaugh Mission and had asked that Foreign Office assure Department of its continued readiness to lend support if needed. Ford 96 Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran (Banique Mellie). 97 Albert G. Black, American Chief Administrator of the Cereals and Bread Section in the Millspaugh Financial Mission, formerly Governor, Farm Credit Administration, Department of Agriculture. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.51A/1120: Telegram [Document 410] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , May 17, 1944—4 p.m. 303. The following is the proposed note to the Prime Minister, referred to in the Department’s preceding instruction: “The American Government has observed with growing anxiety the increasing intensity and frequency of the attacks being made against the American advisers in the Iranian Majlis and press. The failure of the Iranian authorities to give the persons attacked the support which they have the right to expect not only as foreign advisers but also as high officials of the Iranian Government has been observed in Washington with especial surprise and concern. It should be recalled that the American advisers were sent to Iran at the repeated and insistent request of the Iranian Government. The Department of State has done its utmost to cooperate, by selecting men of ability and integrity to staff the various missions and to expedite their departure in spite of war restrictions on travel. The Iranian authorities were confidently expected to be no less cooperative in return. The Legation endeavored to make clear to the Iranian Government from the outset that it was worse than useless to send advisers to Iran unless they were given full support and sympathy by all persons concerned and that the American Government would hardly feel justified in continuing its efforts to furnish advisers unless the Iranian Government shared this attitude. This viewpoint was expressed to Prime Minister Qavam on August 11, 1942, by Minister Dreyfus acting under the Department’s instructions. 98 It is only after receiving the Prime Minister’s warm assurances of support for the advisers that the Department agreed to lend its assistance. The Department deprecates any suggestion that American advisers were sent to Iran to act as mere political buffers. They were sent to Iran to assist the Iranian Government to rebuild its financial and economic structure which had suffered so severely because of the war, and for no other purpose. The American Government would welcome assurances that the Iranian Government concurs in our view of the purpose of the adviser program. Moreover, it is sincerely hoped, for the ultimate benefit of Iran and in the interests of the cordial relations existing between our two countries, that the Iranian Government may be able to bring about an atmosphere of harmony in which the advisers will be able to accomplish the task which they have undertaken and which the Department ardently desires be carried to a successful conclusion. President Roosevelt, in sponsoring and signing the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943, 99 manifested his sincere desire to devote the influence of the United States and its available resources to the assistance of Iran. The American adviser program is a prominent implementation of this policy. If the Iranian Government and people do not desire this help, the American Government has no intention of pressing them to continue to accept it.” Hull 98 For Department’s instruction, see telegram 207, August 8, 1942, 8 p.m., to Tehran, Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , p. 245 ; for the Minister’s reply, see telegram 257, August 11, 1942, 4 p.m., ibid. 99 For text of the Declaration Regarding Iran, signed December 1, 1943, at Tehran by President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier Stalin, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 646 ; for correspondence concerning efforts by the United States in 1944 to implement the Declaration, see ante , pp. 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] ff. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1141: Telegram [Document 411] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 19, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 19—2:30 p.m.] 351. Today I brought to Millspaugh’s attention substance of Department’s 302, May 17, and read to him suggested note transmitted by Department’s 303, May 17. He expressed appreciation of note and said only change he would like would be addition of statement that American Government has confidence in his (Millspaugh’s) ability to make a success of mission. He agreed to consult closely with Legation on all matters. [Here follows statement of personal views about a certain staff matter.] Millspaugh says he understands 30 Deputies have signed petition calling for repeal of his plenary powers. He does not know whether majority of Deputies will support such a move. If powers are revoked, he feels he must resign, and thinks it probable a number of his assistants will follow suit, although he would not try to force their resignation. I recommend that Department authorize me to deliver note contained in its 303, May 17, whenever it appears to Legation, in consultation with Millspaugh, that critical moment has come. Next following message 1 contains paraphrase of draft message Millspaugh prepared which he would like sent by President to Shah. I feel I can make no recommendation and must leave it for Department to decide whether it wishes to carry matter to so high a level or to use phraseology of type suggested by Millspaugh. Ford 1 Telegram 352, infra . The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1142: Telegram [Document 412] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 19, 1944—7 p.m. [Received May 19—2:01 p.m.] 352. Following is paraphrase of draft mentioned in first sentence of final paragraph of my immediately preceding telegram: “For the reason that I want to help your country and am interested in its welfare, I have been deeply disturbed by instructions [ obstructions? ] placed in way of American Mission and propaganda against it. I repose full confidence in Dr. Millspaugh, and if necessary assistance and support are given by Majlis and Government, I feel sure he and his associates will be able successfully to accomplish their undertaking. Therefore, I ask that full and prompt support be given to him and that all departments of the Iranian Government be issued strict instructions to follow without obstruction or delay all decisions, within scope of authority which has been granted him, that he may take. Any movement to restrict his field of usefulness or reduce his powers would cause me grave concern. According to my understanding, Dr. Millspaugh’s economic powers will come to end at termination of war emergency. I consider that any reduction of his authority prior to that time would imperil success of his work and that relations between our two countries might thereby be prejudiced.” Ford The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1144: Telegram [Document 413] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 22, 1944—7 p.m. [Received May 23—4:05 p.m.] 359. Prime Minister summoned me today to lengthy conference attended by Hajir, 2 Forouhar, 3 Adle, 4 Bayat, 5 and later Millspaugh. Gist of Prime Minister’s long discourse was that present economic situation in Iran was intolerable and that Millspaugh system was incapable of handling both financial and economic matters. To solve this crisis and to relieve Millspaugh of a load he was no longer able to carry Saed suggested the creation of a Ministry of Economy under Mosharref Naficy to absorb all economic departments of financial mission as well as some of the divisions of Ministry of Commerce and Industry, with present American economic personnel being transferred to new ministry. Millspaugh was of course unalterably opposed to this suggestion which he said would completely wreck the economic structure he has slowly built up and which is only just now beginning to show results. At the outset of conversation I informed Prime Minister that I did not believe the adviser in general and Millspaugh in particular were receiving the cooperation to which they were entitled and which they sorely needed. Saed vigorously denied this assertion and endeavored to point to many instances of his support. I agreed that he himself had been a tower of strength but that unfortunately this had not been the case in most other instances. Saed stated that he does not wish the advisers to go (including Millspaugh) and looks forward to American assistance to Iran both during and after the war. I informed the assembled Ministers that I trusted they were not permitting themselves to be stampeded into any hasty action by the present press and Majlis campaigns against the advisers, which was also denied, as was a suggestion I made that this project was a device artificially concocted to ease Millspaugh out of the country with a minimum of embarrassment. Department will recall that this move, also involving Naficy, was tried shortly before Millspaugh’s arrival in Iran (Legation’s No. 76, January 22, 1943 6 ) but was blocked at that time. The present interjection of Naficy into the picture may be a bid to enlist British support in the campaign against Millspaugh or may possibly indicate British opposition to our adviser program despite Bullard’s reiterated reassurances to the contrary. No conclusions were reached at this meeting, Prime Minister requesting me to talk matter over with Millspaugh and let him know our recommendations. After consultation with Millspaugh this evening I shall probably see Saed again tomorrow or Wednesday for further discussion. Ford 2 Abdol Hossein Hajir, Iranian Minister of the Interior. 3 Abolqasem Forouhar, Iranian Minister of Finance. 4 Mostafa Adle, Iranian Minister Without Portfolio. 5 Morteza Qoli Bayat, Iranian Minister Without Portfolio. 6 Not printed. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1143: Telegram [Document 414] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 24, 1944—4 p.m. [Received May 24—2:08 p.m.] 366. My 359 May 22. Millspaugh and I both feel that note suggested in Department’s 303 May 17, should be presented at once before he and I have our next interview together with Prime Minister. I hope therefore Department will telegraph authorization urgently. Ford The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.51A/1140: Telegram [Document 415] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , May 25, 1944—2 p.m. 325. Your 351, May 19. The note given in Department’s 303, May 17 is designed as a preventative measure to forestall a crisis rather than to meet one which may arise. Furthermore, the events which have already occurred fully justify representations to the Iranian Government. Unless you perceive strong objections, you should take an early occasion to deliver the note. As regards Dr. Millspaugh’s requested amendment, the Legation is on strong grounds when making representations on the general subject of the advisory program but should hesitate to press the Iranians on specific details either as regards the powers of the advisors or the individuals concerned. The question of possible representations by the President to the Shah is under consideration. Hull The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1148: Telegram [Document 416] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , May 30, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 30—1:35 p.m.] 381, Department’s 325, May 25. Note was presented to Prime Minister in person May 22 [ 27? ]. Millspaugh and I had lengthy conversation yesterday with Saed and several Cabinet Ministers but no conclusion was reached. Essence of situation seems to be that Prime Minister has allowed Majlis and press to get out of hand to such an extent that he now feels it necessary to do something to pacify them. Millspaugh absolutely refuses to listen to any proposal to create new Ministry of Economy or otherwise limit scope of his powers. Saed therefore has asked that he present some kind of written proposal which could be put before Majlis, in other words, provide something for Deputies to chew on and give them impression Prime Minister has been working on Millspaugh. The Doctor has no intention of compromising and intends to insist simply that Prime Minister check present campaign against American Mission and allow him (Millspaugh) to get on with his work. Report that Majlis had defeated bill to repeal Millspaugh powers proves to have been incorrect (my 322 [ 372 ], May 26 7 ). Deputies discussed question at length on May 25 but no bill was introduced and no vote was taken. Saed defended advisers in speech at end of session. During session of May 28 Millspaugh issue was not raised. Ford 7 Not printed. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1158: Telegram [Document 417] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 2, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 3—9:10 p.m.] 393. Department’s 325, May 25 and my 37 [ 372 ], May 26. 8 Foreign Minister has sent me lengthy note dated June 1 in reply to our note delivered May 27. Summary follows: 1. Foreign Minister regrets Washington believes Iranian Government “has been subject to influence and looks upon American advisers in the unfavorable light in which they are regarded by the people and the Majlis”. Iranian Government is entirely favorable to advisers; has supported them in the past and intends to continue its support in the future. It confirms assurances given by former Prime Minister Qavam in this regard. It will defend its American employees against obstructions placed in way of their useful economic and financial measures. 2. Iranian Government is most grateful that, notwithstanding pressing war needs for manpower, American Government has been willing to allow a number of efficient Americans to accept employment with Iranian Government. Saed is very glad that American Government wishes to devote its influence and available resources to assist Iran and that it considers adviser program as means of implementing this policy. Iranian Government and people look to United States for help and hope to take full advantage of such assistance. 3. Saed is surprised Department has conceived idea that Iranian Government brought advisers to Iran in order to use them as political buffers. Iranian Government has always intended to employ these Americans for purely financial and economic reforms. 4. Iran’s desires, which are happily in agreement with those of United States, are, first, that through the American advisers Iranian financial and economic conditions shall be improved; and, second, that friendship between two Governments should be made stronger than ever. Iranian Government is most pleased with existing good relations and Saed will not fail to take any action necessary to maintain those relations. 5. Legation has been informed of “well-grounded reasons” for public agitation and for press criticism directed at person of Millspaugh. This criticism should not be interpreted as attack against all American advisers. Reflection of this agitation in Majlis made it necessary to find some means of relieving popular concern, and, after consultation with Deputies it was proposed to Iranian Government that Millspaugh should confine himself to his original financial duties, being relieved of his recently added economic powers, which have nothing to do with his contract. There has been no action whatsoever against American advisers, but present situation must be studied amicably and existing defects in operations removed in spirit of goodwill. Note concludes by expressing hope that friendly solution will be found. Full text by air mail. Ford 8 Latter not printed. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1155: Telegram [Document 418] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 2, 1944—7 p.m. [Received June 4—12:39 p.m.] 394. Reference summary of Iranian note transmitted my immediately preceding telegram. Despite Saed’s assertions, Department is, ‘Of course, aware that Iranian Government has not fully cooperated with advisers. Some of Millspaugh’s greatest difficulties have arisen with members of past and present Cabinets. Furthermore, Prime Minister has been notably weak in his defense of Millspaugh and other advisers against press and Majlis attacks and has permitted these attacks to get completely out of hand. He is himself badly informed and undoubtedly shares some of views of the attackers. With respect to statement that Iranian Government does not regard advisers as political buffers, I refer Department to my telegram 116, February 21. I believe Saed’s note indicates two things: 1. It confirms my impression that he is afraid to face Majlis and press without having brought about some change, however slight, to appease them. He will probably grasp at any straw of compromise, even though meaningless, that will save his face. (As yet no suggestion has been brought forward to which Millspaugh will agree.) 2. Iranian Government does not wish to push matters to point at which Millspaugh and part or all of his staff would leave. My feeling which, however, does not amount to conviction, is that if Millspaugh stands firm, both Saed and Majlis will ultimately back down, although much unpleasantness may occur in meantime. Department has made its position clear to Iranian Government and for the moment I feel there is no further move we could profitably make. I am strengthened in this opinion by fact that rather distorted information regarding our note has been permitted to become public and has called forth press and Majlis criticism on ground that it constitutes interference in internal affairs of Iran. In any event, Dr. Millspaugh is away on short visit to Shiraz and Isfahan; and I think we should have further consultation with him before considering any new action. Ford The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.51A/1160a: Telegram [Document 419] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , June 8, 1944—6 p.m. 357. Iranian Minister 9 has informed the Department orally that he has received from Prime Minister Saed a long telegram expressing surprise at the tenor of the American note regarding the advisory missions, and pointing out the Iranian Government’s disappointment at the lack of accomplishment of the American advisers. The Iranian Government suggests that Dr. Millspaugh be divested of certain of his economic powers. The Minister was reminded that the American Government did not originate the idea of American advisers in Iran and that the Department had in no way interfered in the matter of the powers freely accorded them by the Majlis. The Department would feel it necessary to insist, however, that any American advisers in Iran should be given support and protection by the Iranian Government and every opportunity to make a success of their work. On the question of Dr. Millspaugh’s powers, it was pointed out to the Minister that the Iranian authorities should consider carefully before attempting any absolute separation of two matters so closely interrelated as economics and finance. The Iranian Government would not wish to create conditions which would make it unlikely that Dr. Millspaugh or others who might undertake his work could succeed. It might be impossible for a financial adviser to accomplish the difficult task under wartime conditions unless there was also a strict regulation over the economy of the country. The Minister was also reminded that the Iranian authorities should consider carefully before taking action which might result in their having to request the Department’s assistance in obtaining other advisers to replace any of those in Iran. He was told that the Department would continue, as always, to accede to any appropriate Iranian request for assistance but in view of the difficulties in recruiting the advisers already there, replacements would inevitably entail very great difficulties. Stettinius 9 Mohammed Shayesteh. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1165: Telegram [Document 420] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 13, 1944—noon. [Received June 13—10:12 a.m.] 422. I wish to warn Department that Ebtehaj has turned violently against Millspaugh and open warfare has broken out between the two men. Speaking before Tehran Chamber of Commerce few days ago, Ebtehaj said: “Five days after I reach Washington, Millspaugh will be removed.” 10 My letter June 9 to George Allen 11 gives details of Ebtehaj’s attitude. Ford 10 Abol Hassan Ebtehaj had been appointed Chairman of the Iranian delegation to the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference to be held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–July 22, 1944; for correspondence regarding this Conference, see vol. ii . 11 Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1173: Telegram [Document 421] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 20, 1944—7 p.m. [Received June 20—6:45 a.m.] 439. Prime Minister summoned me yesterday afternoon and informed me it had been decided to introduce bill in Majlis repealing Millspaugh’s plenary economic, as distinguished from financial, powers. Project to create new Ministry of Economy had been dropped temporarily, he said, and it was planned that economic divisions of Millspaugh operations should continue independently under present American heads, while Millspaugh confined himself to financial matters. I noted Department’s remarks to Shayesteh, as reported in Department’s 357, June 8 and reiterated the various arguments I have previously advanced in talking to Saed. I pointed out, as Saed himself had virtually admitted, that Millspaugh would almost certainly resign if his powers were reduced. If Iranian Government were really aiming at ousting Millspaugh completely, it would be fairer to ask for his resignation, rather than force him out by this method. Saed denied any desire to have Millspaugh go, and insisted Iranian Government wanted him and entire mission to remain. If the Doctor should leave, he hoped rest of mission would remain. Millspaugh is to see Prime Minister today, at which time Saed will inform him of Government’s intention. Saed expressed hope to me that friendly agreement with Millspaugh would still be possible. Ford The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1180: Telegram [Document 422] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 22, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 22—1:30 p.m.] 449. Bill to repeal Millspaugh economic powers was introduced into Majlis today. It is to be discussed at one secret session in next 2 days and vote taken on June 25. Friendly Majlis Deputy has told Millspaugh only miracle can prevent passage. Millspaugh is determined to resign but undecided whether to do so immediately or await passage of bill. He says he has no idea how many members of mission will follow suit. Ford The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1181: Telegram [Document 423] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 23, 1944—4 p.m. [Received June 23—12:45 p.m.] 450. Millspaugh today submitted his resignation to the Prime Minister to be effective June 29. In letter transmitting resignation Millspaugh accuses said [ Saed? ] government of violation of its obligations under the law for his engagement and the full powers acts and of failing to give him a chance to provide full information to meet the Government’s criticisms. He reiterates his objection to the creation of a separate organization to handle economic matters and states that if the attitude of the Government had been different, the mission would now be on the verge of great achievements. He concludes by stating that the Government’s present policy makes a continuance of any useful work in Iran impossible and that his only course is to resign. Millspaugh in a note to me transmitting a copy of his resignation states he has come to this decision only after the most careful deliberation and after convincing evidence had been compiled that it is hopeless for him to continue unless conditions change. He also states “that the only possible prospect of changing the present conditions lies in his resigning”. If by quoted statement Millspaugh intends to convey impression that his resignation may cause the Iranians to reconsider, Legation fears he is under a misapprehension. Millspaugh is calling a conference of mission personnel this afternoon presumably to discuss steps to be taken by subordinate members but there is no definite information yet as to how many, if any, will follow his lead. Legation will telegraph as soon as results of conference are known. Ford The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State 891.20 Missions/17 [Document 424] The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the Secretary of State Washington June 23, 1944. Dear Mr. Secretary : The Chief of the U.S. Military Mission to Iran, General Ridley, has submitted a report on his Mission and has recommended that the Mission be recalled. A copy of this report and recommendation are attached hereto. 12 The War Department agrees with General Ridley that there exists no military necessity for this Mission and that virtually its entire usefulness to Iran has already been accomplished. It is felt that the Mission should be withdrawn whether or not the Iranian Government agrees. However, the Military Mission to Iran originally was dispatched because of State Department considerations and no action leading to its withdrawal will be taken without your agreement. Will you kindly inform the War Department of your views on this matter. Sincerely yours, Henry L. Stimson 12 Neither printed. The Secretary of State to the Chargé m Iran (Ford) 891.51A/1181: Telegram [Document 425] The Secretary of State to the Chargé m Iran ( Ford ) Washington , June 24, 1944—1 p.m. 386. As regards last paragraph your 450, June 23, 4 p.m., please inform members of American Financial Mission that it would not be in the interests of the United States for the American advisers in Iran to resign in a body. Each member of the Mission should determine for himself whether he desires to remain in the employment of the Iranian Government. You may assure them that the Department of State will continue to support them as American citizens in every appropriate manner, and that they are regarded as performing a highly important service in behalf of the war effort and in the implementation of the American policy of assistance to Iran. Please inform Dr. Millspaugh that the Department sincerely regrets his decision to resign. It realizes that this decision is one which he alone can make, but his departure from a country where he has rendered such distinguished service could be regarded only with the deepest regret. Please express to Dr. Millspaugh the sincere hope that if he persists in his intention to leave, he will avoid, in the interests of the United States, anything in the nature of public recriminations and that his departure from the high position in Iran which he has held on two occasions will be effected in a manner worthy of his great reputation. Hull The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51 A/1185: Telegram [Document 426] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 25, 1944—3 p.m. [Received June 25—11:45 a.m.] 455. Prime Minister has today written Millspaugh refusing to accept his resignation. Finance Minister this morning summoned all subordinate members of mission asking them to stay and to endeavor to persuade Millspaugh to stay. If Millspaugh declines, he requested them to choose one of their number as chief of the mission. Bill repealing full powers law is still before Majlis but will not come to a vote today as was expected. While Legation endeavored to persuade individual members of mission to delay any action regarding their own resignations, I am informed that all members now in Tehran have submitted their resignations to Millspaugh but have not yet informed the Iranian Government of their action. Ford The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/1186: Telegram [Document 427] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 26, 1944—10 a.m. [Received June 26—9:48 a.m.] 457. Faced with responsibility of taking steps with possible grave repercussions, Iranian economy [ Government? ] is showing itself reluctant to take steps that will force the departure of Millspaugh and his mission. Legation has been informed that at secret session yesterday majority of better elements of Majlis felt Millspaugh should stay under a system whereby a council of Iranians would review his economic regulations before promulgation. Millspaugh is to appear before Majlis today in secret session to discuss this idea and it now appears possible that a modus vivendi may be worked out which will permit Millspaugh to remain. Should this occur, it is difficult to see how Saed government could remain in office and still enjoy the confidence of the Majlis and the people. Ford The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/6–2744: Telegram [Document 428] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 27, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:15 p.m.] 460. In view of fact that Department’s 386 June 24 arrived after subordinate members of Financial Mission had submitted their resignations to Millspaugh and at urgent behest of Millspaugh, Black and Pixley to whom the message was shown, I have not delivered the Department’s message to other members of the mission. These three men all believe that mission’s present improved position might be seriously compromised by splitting its ranks at present time when unanimity of action is highly desirable if mission is to remain as a useful and efficient unit. Ford The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/6–2744: Telegram [Document 429] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 27, 1944—7 p.m. [Received June 28—9:30 a.m.] 461. Millspaugh conferred this morning with Prime Minister who urged him to accept compromise whereby his economic powers would not be curtailed but his measures in economic field would be subject to concurrence of Minister of Finance as is the case with financial measures under law of Millspaugh’s original engagement. Millspaugh flatly refused but put forward following formula as counterproposal. (1) He recognizes that Majlis has right to repeal any or all laws granting him power. However, if it revokes his economic powers, he must insist upon resigning. (2) He is willing to consult with Minister of Finance on all economic measures before taking action and give Minister full information. (3) Recognizing vast extent of administrative problems, he will appoint two Deputy Administrators General, Pixley to direct financial affairs and the other, Black to direct economic phases of mission’s work under Millspaugh’s overall supervision. (4) Committee including responsible Cabinet Minister should be formed to discuss questions of supply with MESC 13 and Embassies so that Government could have opportunity to pre [apparent omission] receive information from authorities concerned with supply shipping and transport. Prime Minister said he would discuss this with Cabinet and Majlis Deputies. Millspaugh says Saed gave impression of a beaten man who rather expected to lose his post soon. There is in fact growing talk among Deputies and others to effect that Cabinet will fall. Hajir is prominently mentioned as successor to Saed. Millspaugh has not yet appeared before Majlis but says he will go if small group is formed with which he could have satisfactory discussion. Ford 13 The Middle East Supply Center, set up by the British at Cairo in 1941 to control the supply and distribution of goods to the civilian populations of the Middle East; for correspondence regarding the decision of the United States in 1941 to participate in the Middle East Supply Center, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/6–2944: Telegram [Document 430] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 29, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 10:15 p.m.] 468. Millspaugh situation remains unchanged. Millspaugh is adamant in declining to consider repeated Iranian proposals that he allow his economic powers to come under the control of the Minister of Finance as suggested by Saed, the Majlis and the Court. Millspaugh had a long meeting with a group of Deputies last night during which he explained his views at length only to meet the above suggestion repeated over and over again. It appears that Saed has informed no one except Cabinet of Millspaugh’s proposed compromise (my 461, June 27) and is trying to give the impression that while the Government is willing to retreat a long way from its position Millspaugh is exhibiting his usual stubbornness. Millspaugh has now informed Majlis of his plan. Situation still appears hopeful however as Majlis and Shah have given indications that they sincerely wish Millspaugh to stay. Subordinate members of mission are remaining at their jobs and I have advised those who have asked to await developments before taking any further action. A number of these men did not actually submit formal resignations but merely informed Millspaugh in writing that they agreed with him in his stand and that it would be impossible to carry on effective work under the conditions proposed by the Government. Most members of the mission wish to remain in Iran and two have stated to me specifically that they hope for Millspaugh’s withdrawal and Robinson’s 14 appointment as his successor. Ford 14 James G. Robinson, formerly with Dr. Millspaugh in Iran, acted as recruitment officer in the United States for the Millspaugh Mission. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/6–3044: Telegram [Document 431] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 30, 1944—noon. [Received June 30—11 a.m.] 470. Although there is yet no clear sign that Medjliss or Cabinet is yielding, Millspaugh feels situation appears more favorable and that chances seem good for continuance of mission on effective working basis. Since Prime Minister declined to accept his resignation, he and rest of mission are still working. Millspaugh says, however, there are indications that Saed is waiting to see what Ebtehaj may accomplish in talking to Department. He fears anything said by Department implying indifference to Millspaugh resignation or desire for rest of mission to stay on without him would seriously weaken his position at this juncture. He points out that Ebtehaj has become leading opponent of mission and might exaggerate or distort Department’s remarks in reporting to Prime Minister. It may be helpful if the Department will keep Legation immediately informed of any conversations held with Ebtehaj regarding Millspaugh Mission. Ford The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.51A/6–3044: Telegram [Document 432] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , July 1, 1944—7 p.m. 402. Your 470 June 30. Memorandum of conversation on June 23 between officers of Department and Ebtehaj and Iranian Minister has been sent you by mail. Statements of officers of Department to Ebtehaj were similar to those made in earlier conversation with Shayesteh summarized in Department’s 357 June 8. Ebtehaj began conversation with long statement, allegedly made at request of his Government, in which he criticized Millspaugh strongly. He referred to his long support of Millspaugh but said he had become convinced that no one could possibly carry out the many duties and responsibilities of the position. He thought it particularly necessary to relieve Millspaugh of some of his duties because of his weakness as an administrator, his inability to delegate authority and his age. He gave Millspaugh full credit for his good intentions and loyalty to Iranian interests. He thought our note to the Iranian Government showed that we were not informed of the true situation in Iran. Mr. Murray 15 in reply outlined the Department’s position as follows: (1) The Department has in fact been kept very fully informed on all phases of the situation in Iran, both by our Legation in Tehran and by Shayesteh. (2) This Government has no authority over the advisers, has no intention of imposing any individual or group on Iran and has no desire to establish or control the conditions and powers under which the advisers work. (3) The Department must insist however that as long as the Iranian Government has American advisers it must accord them full support and protect them from slanderous and unjustified attacks. Mr. Murray repeated the recommendation that before taking any action to separate Millspaugh’s economic and financial powers or before taking any other action in the matter, the Iranian Government should think through the consequences and have in mind workable alternatives which would not make the situation worse rather than better. Finally Mr. Murray said that while we earnestly hoped that Dr. Millspaugh and the Iranian authorities would be able to arrive at a solution satisfactory to both, the controversy should not be permitted to disturb our friendly relations with Iran which are based on deep and historic considerations. You are authorized to make any appropriate use of this information which you may consider helpful. Hull 15 Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.20 Mission/7–144: Telegram [Document 433] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , July 1, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 1—3:20 p.m.] 472. Department’s 243, April 21. Although Legation has approached Foreign Minister several times regarding renewal of agreement on American Military Mission to Iranian Gendarmerie no formal reply has been received. However, Colonel Schwarzkopf today received letter from Minister of Interior stating his desire that agreement be renewed for one additional year. I shall continue to press Saed for formal statement. Ford The Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 801.51A/7–144 [Document 434] The Counselor of the British Embassy ( Wright ) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) Ref: 173/24/44 Washington , July 1, 1944. Dear Mr. Murray : As I said to you over the telephone this morning, the Ambassador 16 has been asked by Mr. Eden 17 to convey to you the regret which is felt in London that Mr. Millspaugh should have received such treatment in Teheran that he has felt obliged to resign, and to express the hope of His Majesty’s Government that if this decision is irrevocable another American Financial Adviser may be appointed as his successor. Mr. Eden understands that Mr. Millspaugh’s colleagues are considering whether or not to follow suit. Without wishing in any way to interfere, His Majesty’s Government hope that this may be avoided. Mr. Eden adds that if the United States Government sees any way in which they could help in the present situation, His Majesty’s Government would be very ready to do so. Yours sincerely, Michael Wright 16 Viscount Halifax. 17 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/7–344: Telegram [Document 435] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , July 3, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 9:57 a.m.] 474. Millspaugh informs me Prime Minister yesterday expressed to Majlis his confidence United States Mission and supported Millspaugh proposal that question of economic powers be allowed to rest 3 or 4 months to give time for results of mission’s operations to become visible. Majority of Majlis was favorable and Millspaugh regards immediate crisis as past and that he has won victory. In view of this classification [ clarification? ] of status of road transport directors am authorizing resumption of Lend Lease deliveries. 18 Ford 18 The Chargé had temporarily held in abeyance the delivery of unpaid for Lend-Lease goods then in Iran awaiting delivery to the Iranian Government; he had taken this action on his own initiative in connection with another matter involving technical considerations and unrelated to policy matters. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.20 Mission/7–444: Telegram [Document 436] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , July 4, 1944—4 p.m. 407. War Department has informed us that it desires to terminate the military mission in Iran but will take no action before obtaining the Department’s views. Unless you and General Ridley perceive objection, please inform the Iranian Government that the War Department considers it necessary to terminate the mission on November 1, 1944, since its chief purpose will have been accomplished by that time and the need for military man power is pressing. You should add that if the Iranian authorities have strong reason for requesting the continuation after that date, their reasons therefor will be given sympathetic consideration, although no assurance can be given that it will be possible for the United States to spare the military personnel for continuation. Termination of the military mission has no connection with the difficulties of the financial mission, and you should make this clear should the point arise. With reference to your 451, June 24, 10 a.m., 1 19 the Department agrees that any decision regarding a joint American-British program of supplies for the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie should be contingent upon a satisfactory settlement regarding the Ridley and Schwarzkopf missions. In your discussions with the Iranians, however, you should of course avoid any implication that the Iranians would be well advised to press for the continuation of the missions if they hope to obtain further American supplies. The record of the military mission in obtaining American supplies, as set forth in General Ridley’s report to the War Department of May 31, 21 is an impressive one and should be adequately appreciated by the Iranians. The Iranian authorities must show a clear and strong desire for the advice and assistance which the personnel of the mission can render, irrespective of supply questions, before the Department will be willing to recommend continuance of the mission. You should keep the British informed, with reference to the question of joint supply [and?] of the status of the military mission. Hull 19 Not printed. 21 Not printed; see letter of June 23 from the Secretary of War, p. 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] . The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) 891.51A/7–144 [Document 437] The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Counselor of the British Embassy ( Wright ) Washington , July 8, 1944. My Dear Michael : Thank you very much for your letter of July 1, 1944 regarding the Millspaugh situation. I am happy to say that the question appears to have been resolved for the moment. The Iranian Government refused to accept Dr. Millspaugh’s resignation and the Majlis has now agreed not to raise the question of reducing Dr. Millspaugh’s powers for a period of three or four months. Please convey to Mr. Eden our warm thanks for his friendly suggestion and inform him that we shall not hesitate to take advantage of his kind offer of assistance should this prove desirable at a later date. Sincerely yours, Wallace Murray The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.20 Mission/7–1544: Telegram [Document 438] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , July 15, 1944—5 p.m. [Received July 15—12:24 p.m.] 505. Department’s 407 dated July 4. After consulting with General Ridley who requested that matter be held up one week until his progress report (based on report to Washington dated May 31 21 ) had been presented to and read by Iranian Government, I have now handed an aide-mémoire to Prime Minister setting forth War Department’s wishes respecting withdrawal Ridley Mission as of November 1, 1944. Saed promised to take up question with Council of Ministers and let me know immediately his Government’s wishes. Ford 21 Not printed; see letter of June 23 from the Secretary of War, p. 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] . The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.105A/7–2144: Telegram [Document 439] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , July 21, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 12:30 p.m.] 520. British Chargé d’Affaires Lascelles today told me his Foreign Office is seriously concerned because Timmerman’s 22 death has left Iranian municipal police without foreign adviser. As Allied power responsibility [ responsible? ] for security in Iran he said British Government feels definitely that an adviser is needed. It would prefer an American but if this were not possible would suggest a Swiss or Swede. (He referred in passing to good work done by Swedes when in Iran some years ago.) I said Iranians had not asked us to replace Timmerman and that in view of campaign against American advisers we had not thought it advisable to raise question. Personally however I felt that it might be helpful if Lascelles would inform Iranians of British interest in matter and inquire regarding Government’s intentions. I understand British have suggested to Schwarzkopf that he might take over municipal police in addition to Gendarmerie . Although hesitant about assuming more responsibility he believes he could do so if given five additional assistants. If British in fact approach Iranian Government I think it probable latter would agree to request new American adviser or extension of Schwarzkopf’s operations and it seems preferable to allow British to take initiative. Can Department give me for communication to Lascelles statement of its attitude if Iranian request should be forthcoming? Ford 22 L. Stephen Timmerman, American City Police Adviser to the Iranian Government. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.105A/7–2644: Telegram [Document 440] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , July 26, 1944—2 p.m. 446. Department would be reluctant under present circumstances to recommend a police adviser to replace the deceased Timmerman. It will naturally, however, consider any Iranian request on basis of merits of case as presented and in light of conditions then prevailing. Department has in mind the unsatisfactory conditions under which Timmerman, Millspaugh, Ridley and Schwarzkopf Missions have worked and possibility of withdrawal of one or more of the three remaining missions. Before recommending a police adviser for Iran Department would in any case desire to receive from the Iranian Government convincing assurances that he would be accorded the fullest cooperation and encouragement in his work. It would seem desirable also to have a mission of several experts since Timmerman’s experience showed that the reorganization of the vast and inefficient municipal police departments was too great a task for one individual. Difficulties of finding these would be great and some delay might occur. Department would have no objection to Schwarzkopf assuming responsibility for the municipal police if requested by the Iranian Government and approved by the War Department. You may bring foregoing to attention of British Chargé with the suggestion that pending clarification of the present confused situation with regard to the other advisers a formal Iranian request for a police adviser might be difficult for the Department to handle. Hull The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.51A/7–1344: Telegram [Document 441] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , July 31, 1944—7 p.m. 461. Depts approach to Ebtehaj on the basis of your 499, July 13 23 was only partially satisfactory. He authorized Dept to inform Millspaugh that while he is still of the opinion Millspaugh is incapable of carrying out the duties undertaken he (Ebtehaj) will be willing to meet with him “at the bank” to hear his views immediately on his return to Tehran. For your information Ebtehaj in a meeting at Dept on July 26 expressed deep dissatisfaction at the trend of relations between the United States and Iran and stated bluntly that it appears the United States has refused the hand of friendship extended by the Iranians. He bases this statement on the following series of incidents: President Roosevelt’s failure to return the Shah’s visit while in Tehran, his own inability to obtain an interview with the President for the purpose of delivering a letter addressed to the President by the Shah, 24 the recall of Minister Dreyfus, and the subordinate and humiliating position of Iran at the Monetary Conference. He had he said intended to return to Iran and recommend that his country no longer humiliate itself but seek friendship elsewhere “even from a third-rate power”. However, he was somewhat placated by a meeting July 26 with the Secretary, whose sincere and convincing statement of friendship for Iran impressed him greatly. He states that he is taking the Shah’s letter back to Iran undelivered since his instructions were to hand it personally to the President. It seems not unlikely that Ebtehaj will take a strong anti-American line on return to Tehran, although his conversations on July 26 with the Secretary, with Ambassador Steinhardt (on the basis of the latter’s personal friendship with Prime Minister Saed) and with the officers of the Middle Eastern Division may have caused him to modify his position. Please inform Millspaugh that certain articles regarding the Monetary Conference are enroute to you by mail. Further information will be sent when available. The matter treated in your 491, July 11, 25 is under confidential investigation by Treasury. Please keep the Department informed of Ebtehaj’s attitude on his return. He plans to leave here by air July 30. Stettintus 23 Not printed; it read in part: “Millspaugh has requested Legation to telegraph Department asking that message be conveyed to Ebtehaj to the effect that Millspaugh who desires to patch matters up with him would like to see him immediately upon his return Tehran before he sees anyone else.” (891.51 A/7–1344) 24 Dated June 17, p. 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 340 ] . 25 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.51A/8–144: Telegram [Document 442] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , August 1, 1944—7 p.m. 464. Ambassador Morris 26 is requested to inform the Department as soon as he feels in a position to do so, whether he would consider it advisable for the Department to request Dr. Millspaugh to come to Washington to give the Department the benefit of his views regarding the American adviser program in Iran. Stettinius 26 Leland B. Morris, Appointed Ambassador to Iran; Ambassador Morris presented his credentials on August 21, 1944. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.20 Mission/8–344: Telegram [Document 443] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , August 3, 1944—9 a.m. [Received August 4—5:36 p.m.] 567. Re Depts No. 407 dated July 4. Iranian Government has formally requested that American Military Mission headed by General Ridley be retained here for period of 1 year from November 1, 1944. Reason given for desiring this extension is that mission has certain useful works under way which are important to Iran and which cannot be completed within some months’ time. Government further avows its complete satisfaction with work of mission and requests necessary steps be taken with War Department to have extensions approved. General Ridley consulted regarding this request feels that if any concession is made to Iranian Government it should not extend beyond March 1, 1945 because by that time all useful work commensurate with his effort will be completed. While reason advanced by Iranian Government is not particularly compelling one in face of War Department’s stand I nevertheless feel our interests in Iran would be materially served by having mission remain long enough to complete its work and accordingly urge Department’s active support vis-à-vis War Department of compromise suggested by Ridley. He and I concur that should this 4–month extension be granted Iranian Government should be advised now of date when mission will be withdrawn. 27 Ford 27 In a letter of August 14 the Secretary of State conveyed this information to the Secretary of War and recommended that the Ridley Military Mission continue its services in Iran until March 1, 1945 (891.20 Mission/17). The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/8–1244: Telegram [Document 444] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , August 12, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 4:24 p.m.] 610. Newspaper Setareh published July 26 interview with Millspaugh in which he was quoted as saying that since days of Shuster 28 Iranian patriots had always turned to us whenever independence of country was threatened. He went on to say that if American advisers had not come to Iran various things might have happened, one possibility being that troubles would have occurred which would have resulted in Russian occupation of north and British occupation of south. Millspaugh says he thought he was talking off the record and in any case was misquoted. He says paper will publish correction. I think, however, substance of his remarks was probably correctly reported as his own account of what he said does not differ very much from published version and I feel he is responsible for treating [ creating? ] dangerous incident through serious indiscretion. British Chargé d’Affaires Lascelles told me yesterday Soviet Ambassador 29 had taken serious view of matter and had proposed to him a joint démarche to this Legation. I spoke briefly to Maximov at a reception last night and he said he had reported incident to Moscow for such action as might be deemed desirable. I told Maximov of Millspaugh’s statement that he was misquoted and that retraction would be published but he replied that damage had already been done. He was plainly determined to exploit situation and I should not be surprised if Soviets took opportunity to demand Millspaugh’s dismissal. Legation feels and has pointed out to Millspaugh that this incident is especially unfortunate in that it comes at a moment when we had through the tripartite conversations outlined full British cooperation with advisers and had brought Russians at least to point of recognizing their existence. Sent to Department repeated to Moscow. Ford 28 W. Morgan Shuster, financial adviser to the Persian (Iranian) Government in 1911; for correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1911, pp. 679 ff. 29 Mikhail Alexeyevich Maximov. The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.20 Mission/8–344: Telegram [Document 445] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , August 14, 1944—2 p.m. 497. Iranian Minister acting under instructions has requested Dept to obtain consent of War to renewal of Ridley and Schwarzkopf contracts for additional year. 30 Minister was told verbally that in view of urgent need for trained military personnel this Government would not feel warranted in continuing to lend personnel to Iran for these missions unless it is clearly demonstrated that they are accomplishing important results for Iran and for the war effort. Minister was informed frankly that the officers in charge of these missions are dubious regarding their achievements, a situation due mainly to lack of adequate support from Iranian Government and officials. Dept further expressed opinion that it would not be justified in pressing War for renewal of these contracts unless certain specific recommendations made by the heads of the missions and considered by them as necessary to obtain results are adopted. Minister stated on August 2 that he would transmit these views to his Government by telegraph. Dept is recommending to War on basis of urtel 567, August 4 [ 3 ] that Ridley contract be renewed for 4 months, that is, to March 1, 1945 and that in case renewal is approved immediate notification be given Iranian Government of intention to withdraw mission on that date. A responsible War official expresses opinion that War will be guided by recommendations of Dept. You will be informed of War’s decision. Before approaching War on Schwarzkopf contract it would be helpful for Dept to have a brief statement from Schwarzkopf setting forth his views and recommendations. Please obtain such a statement and telegraph it to Dept together with your own recommendations. Stettinius 30 The Iranian request regarding the Schwarzkopf Mission was made in note 1081, August 4, from the Iranian Minister to the Secretary of State (891.105a/8–444). The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.105A/8–1844: Telegram [Document 446] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , August 18, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 6 p.m.] 630. I have discussed with Schwarzkopf question of renewal of his contract raised in Department’s 497, August 14, and in response to my request he has prepared written statement reviewing work thus far accomplished by his mission and recommending that mission only be retained if American interest in Iran is deep and lasting, an interest in which question of security assumes major importance. Should this be case, mission should be kept in Iran not for one additional year, but for as many years as may be necessary to create a really effective organization. If, however, our interest in this matter is only passing and dictated primarily by necessity for wartime security, mission may be withdrawn at conclusion of its present contract since its plans for reorganization of Gendarmerie are complete and Iranian Government will be free to take whatever action it desires toward putting these plans into effect. I believe Schwarzkopf’s argument is well put and should receive Department’s careful consideration. Wartime security in Iran probably does not now require continued presence of Gendarmerie Mission and only possible justification for its continuance would be a desire to see more or less permanent security here and to continue our policy of aid to Iran. This is a long range proposition and if it is decided to renew mission’s contract with this in mind, it should be brought to War Department’s attention that there will be no use consenting to renewal of contract at this time unless it is prepared to place mission in Iran on a quasi permanent basis. Copy of Schwarzkopf’s statement 31 follows by airmail. Ford 31 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.20 Mission/8–1844: Telegram [Document 447] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , August 26, 1944—7 p.m. 530. War has agreed to the extension of the Ridley Mission until March 1, 1945, but states the Mission will definitely be withdrawn on that date. Please make appropriate notification to the Iranian Government. War is notifying General Ridley. Hull The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.105A/8–1844: Telegram [Document 448] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , September 12, 1944—noon. 552. Dept has informed Iranian Minister 32 that this Government is agreeable to extension of agreement covering Schwarzkopf Mission for period of one year effective October 2, 1944, provided the authority given the President for detail of such officers remains in effect for that period. Please inform Iranian Government. In reply to point raised in urtel 630 August 18 you may assure Schwarzkopf of the permanent nature of our interest in Iran along lines given in Dept’s 462 July 31. 33 You may say that Dept will lend its support to continuance of Gendarmerie Mission until it has accomplished its task or until it becomes clear that its presence in Iran will no longer contribute to furtherance of American interests. However it should be made clear that Mission’s continuance on present military basis is limited by legislation. Dept will at appropriate time use its best endeavors with War to obtain amendment of this limiting legislation or if that is not possible will recommend continuance of Mission on civilian basis. Hull 32 In a note of September 6, not printed. 33 Ante , p. 343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] . The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/9–1244 [Document 449] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State No. 25 Tehran , September 12, 1944. [Received September 22.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a self-explanatory letter 34 which has been addressed to the Iranian Minister of Finance by Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, Administrator General of Finances. It will be noted that Dr. Millspaugh proposes to dismiss the Director of the Bank Melli Iran, Mr. A. H. Ebtehaj. Although dated August 29, the letter was not delivered until September 7, and I have not yet learned the reaction of the Minister to this proposal. As the Department may judge from the letter, there has been no slackening in the tension between Dr. Millspaugh and Mr. Ebtehaj since the return of the latter from the Bretton Woods conference, and the existence of the feud between the two men is public knowledge in Tehran. This new move by Millspaugh may well provoke an explosion, since Ebtehaj will almost certainly fight violently against dismissal. He has strong influence with the Prime Minister and in official circles, and it seems Millspaugh is taking a grave risk in forcing the issue. However, it is believed Ebtehaj is not popular with the Majlis, which may leave the Doctor with the strongest hand, especially if the new Minister of Finance, who is sympathetic, is willing to back him up. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Richard Ford First Secretary 34 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.105A/9–2244: Telegram [Document 450] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , September 22, 1944—8 p.m. 581. British Embassy states Schwarzkopf has asked War for additional personnel to enable him to assume responsibility for Iranian police and that War has refused the request. However, responsible War official informs Dept that no such request has been received from Schwarzkopf. Please report on status of this matter. For your information British have again expressed to Dept their preoccupation over security situation in postwar Iran and urged Dept to do everything possible to strengthen Iranian Army, Gendarmerie and Police. While regretting withdrawal of the Ridley Mission they welcome renewal of Schwarzkopf contract for additional year. They urge strengthening of latter mission to enable it to assume responsibility for Iranian police or alternatively assignment of a separate police mission. Dept is entirely favorable to the idea of keeping the Gendarmerie Mission in Iran and of strengthening it as much as possible. Hull The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.105A/10–244: Telegram [Document 451] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 2, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 11:30 a.m.] 726. ReDept’s No. 581, September 22. Schwarzkopf states that report probably originated as result of suggestion made to him some 3 months ago by General Fraser, British Military Attaché, that Schwarzkopf take over police mission in addition to gendarmerie duties. Schwarzkopf says he categorically refused at that time but that when further urged by Fraser he stated he would only take police mission if he could name his own assistants and even then solely in supervisory capacity. He states that his attitude today remains unchanged and that he definitely does not seek any participation in Iranian police affairs which he describes as being even more deplorably chaotic than conditions in Iranian Gendarmerie . I feel that Schwarzkopf is completely sincere in his attitude and I agree with him that his present gendarmerie duties are sufficiently onerous to preclude his assuming any others. Furthermore I strongly doubt the wisdom of making any approach to Iranian Government regarding filling vacant police post. I have been reliably informed that British preoccupied over security situation in Iran have questioned this Government about an American replacement for the late Timmerman and possibly may have specified Schwarzkopf as successor but Iranians have never mentioned subject to this Embassy since Timmerman’s death. And while sympathizing with British desire to maintain security of Iran I urge that unless and until Iranians make first move this matter be held in abeyance. 35 Morris 35 The Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) was informed of the contents of this telegram on October 3, 1944, by Harold Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.51A/10–744: Telegram [Document 452] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , October 7, 1944—2 p.m. 610. Should question of Millspaugh’s resignation again arise Department desires that you make very clear to members of the Financial Mission that the Department’s attitude as expressed in the first paragraph of telegram 386 June 24 remains unchanged. It would not be in the interests of the United States for them to resign in a body. Hull The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/10–1144: Telegram [Document 453] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 11, 1944—5 p.m. Received October 12—3:10 p.m. 753. [Here follows an account by the Ambassador of certain efforts made by him during his first weeks in Tehran.] Unfortunately in a perverse manner Millspaugh has opened a battery of criticism again by his ill-judged letter to Ebtehaj attempting to dismiss the latter from his functions as Governor of the Bank. (See telegram No. 748 of October 10 36 ) The Prime Minister sent for me and expressed his great regret at this new development. He stressed very strongly that his own Cabinet might fall under the impact of the controversy made possible by Millspaugh’s action towards Ebtehaj. I told the Prime Minister that I equally regretted this development. I further reminded him that it was his responsibility and that of his Government to decide their attitude towards Dr. Millspaugh. I told him that I would bring forward no opposition and I felt confident the Department would feel likewise about it if it was the decision of the Iranian Government to dispense with the services of Dr. Millspaugh. I made no suggestion that he should do so but merely made it clear what the position of the Embassy would be if Iranian Government arrived independently at that decision. I made it clear that I did not expect to be consulted and would not give an opinion on the retention of Dr. Millspaugh. The Prime Minister thanked me and said he would discuss the matter with the Cabinet. This has been done apparently with the result that the Cabinet itself is afraid of responsibility and is inclined to pass the buck to the Majlis. Certain guarded publicity has been given in the press to the letter dismissing Ebtehaj. However, there have been no violent polemics on this subject. In some measure this may be due to my earnest and consistent statement to all concerned that I would not brook any further press campaign of a derogatory personal nature directed at Dr. Millspaugh as it involved not only him but the prestige of the United States Government and Americans in general. [Here follows statement of personal views by the Ambassador.] Morris 36 Not printed; this telegram quoted a letter from Millspaugh saying that he had dismissed Ebtehaj as Governor of the Banque Mellie. Millspaugh had requested the support of the Ambassador in this action, and, in answer, the Ambassador had criticized the action and declined to give support. The Department in telegram No. 623, October 17, 8 p.m., concurred in the Ambassador’s reply to Millspaugh. (891.51A/10–1044, 10–1144) The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/10–1344: Telegram [Document 454] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 13, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 2:22 p.m.] 755. With further reference to Millspaugh’s attempted dismissal of Ebtehaj, I wish to say that Millspaugh in basing himself upon article VIII of the law of 21 Aban 1321 37 has presumably derived the authority for his action from the language of that article which says, (in paraphrase) “Under the general supervision of the Minister of Finance, the Administrator General of the Finances shall have direct charge of all the administration of financial affairs—and in conformity with the employment laws and after consulting with the Minister of Finance, he has the right to promote, demote, appoint, dismiss or transfer any employee of the Finance Ministry or any employee connected with the administration of finance and or establishments which are operated with Government capital, and employees of the offices directly connected with the expenditure of public funds and or with the collection of accounts.” Presumably Millspaugh interprets the language “establishments which are operated with Government capital” to include the Bank Melli. On the other hand, the viewpoint expressed by the Prime Minister to me is that the bank is an autonomous institution and the appointment of its general manager, called locally governor by courtesy, is made by the Council of Ministers upon nomination by the Minister of Finance and requires ratification by imperial firman. The statutes of the bank confirm this. However, the statutes are silent as to the mode of dismissal of the governor. I think we can take it for granted that the Iranian Government and Parliament in granting Millspaugh such powers did not contemplate giving him the sole right of employment and dismissal of a high official whose employment is clearly defined in the statutes of the bank, yet this is just what Millspaugh is attempting to do without the support of the Minister of Finance and despite the verbal disapproval of the President of the Council of Ministers. Nothing further has come to light in respect to the Government’s decision in this matter. It has not yet been discussed openly in Parliament and the newspapers are refraining from comment, much to my present satisfaction. One newspaper, indeed, printed that Zand, former Minister of War, had been appointed to succeed Ebtehaj. There is no official confirmation of this. Zand is said to be in favor with the Shah and Court Minister Ala. The latter, however, protested to me very quickly and vigorously against Millspaugh’s action. I had the distinct impression that Ala supports Ebtehaj strongly even though he may also like Zand. Morris 37 i.e., 1942. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/10–1944: Telegram [Document 455] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 19, 1944—3 p.m. [Received October 19—1:50 p.m.] 768. I am informed by an official of the Foreign Office that the Council of Ministers decided that Millspaugh does not have the authority to dismiss Ebtehaj as Governor of the Bank Melli and further considers the charges brought forward by Millspaugh against Ebtehaj as unfounded. However this decision does not appear to have been communicated to Dr. Millspaugh so far. Despite the Government’s apparent decision not to support Millspaugh in his action against Ebtehaj, Millspaugh wrote me on October 14 which is a date subsequent to that on which the Council of Ministers took its decision. Quotations from Millspaugh’s letter are following: “I expressed a personal desire to leave about February 1, 1945. It seems to me that the situation has now been altered for the better. Were it not for Mr. Ebtehaj, I would feel that the position of the mission had been strengthened and stabilized as much as one could expect. With his dismissal, opposition and obstruction to the mission will be further diminished if not practically eliminated. Accordingly I feel it is possible for me to defer the question of terminating my services. My contract may be terminated at the end of 3 years by the Government or myself on 4 months’ notice. It is my intention to give such notice about a year from now. I am sure the Department (State) will be glad to learn that I have no purpose of taking any action during the next few months that would have the effect of disturbing the position of the mission. My departure next February or my resignation 2 months earlier would certainly precipitate a situation that would be difficult to handle. I hope you will let the Department know that I am only too glad to cooperate in averting such a major complication.” From the foregoing it will be seen that Millspaugh has changed his mind and expects to stay here despite the rebuff from the Government received in the Ebtehaj case. He also seems to cling to the belief that Ebtehaj will be removed despite the fact that he must have known when he wrote this letter that the Government had supported Ebtehaj and not him. Millspaugh had further stated prior to the Government’s decision that it was a question of either Ebtehaj or him. He would go if Ebtehaj did not. It looks as though when put to the test, however, that he has not maintained that viewpoint. Morris The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) 891.20 Mission/10–1944 [Document 456] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) Washington , October 25, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I am enclosing a copy of a note dated October 19, 1944, from the Minister of Iran 38 transmitting the request of his Government that the War Department reconsider its decision to terminate on March 1, 1945 the American Military Mission to the Iranian Army, headed by Major General Ridley, and agree to the renewal of the Mission’s contract for an additional year. The Department endorses the request made by the Iranian Minister. A primary consideration in this Government’s stated policy toward Iran is a desire to strengthen that country so that it may maintain internal security and avoid the dissensions and weaknesses which breed foreign intervention and aggression. A most practical way to implement this policy is to strengthen Iran’s security forces. The Department is aware that the decision of the War Department to terminate the Ridley Mission on March 1, 1945, was based on the recommendation of General Ridley, who is of the opinion that the projects and objectives of his mission will have been accomplished by that time. While the Department agrees that the limited objectives of the Mission in an advisory capacity to the Quartermaster Corps of the Iranian Army may be largely fulfilled by March 1, 1945, the ultimate objective of building up the Iranian Army to an efficient and self-reliant organization has only been begun. Furthermore, it is feared that the withdrawal of the Mission at this time when the Iranian Army is about to meet its crucial test in view of the imminent withdrawal of foreign armies from the country might have unfortunate political and psychological repercussions. The Department is bringing these views to the attention of the Ambassador at Tehran in order that he may discuss the question with General Ridley in the light of the overall policy toward Iran. It is hoped that, as a result of this approach, General Ridley may see his way clear toward recommending to the War Department the continuance of his Mission for an additional year. The War Department’s earnest consideration of the Iranian Minister’s request is recommended. I might add, as a further reason for meeting the Iranian request, that the dignified and efficient manner in which General Ridley and his officers have worked in Iran has not only been of benefit to Iran but also has reflected much credit on the United States. Sincerely yours, Edward E. Stettinius, Jr. 38 No. 1707, not printed; the note was acknowledged by the Department on October 25. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.20 Mission/10–2544: Telegram [Document 457] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , October 25, 1944—8 p.m. 634. Iranian Minister acting on instructions has formally requested Dept to endeavor to obtain War consent to the continuing of the Ridley Mission contract for additional year. Minister states that there are many projects which will not be finished by March 1, 1945, while on the other hand the need of Iran for a well organized armed force justifies and necessitates the continuance of the mission. Dept is impressed with the Iranian Government’s views and desires to reopen the question of the termination of the Ridley Mission on March 1, 1945. As stated in Dept’s 462, July 31 39 a primary consideration in our policy toward Iran is a desire to strengthen that country so that it can maintain internal security and avoid the dissensions and weaknesses which breed interference and aggression. A cornerstone of this policy should be the building up of Iran’s security forces. In view of these considerations Dept is requesting War to reconsider its decision to terminate the Mission on March 1. However it must be remembered that War decision to terminate the mission was based largely on General Ridley’s strong recommendation. Consequently it would greatly strengthen Dept’s approach to War were General Ridley to reconsider his position and so inform War. Please bring Dept’s views to General Ridley’s attention and urge that he consider the question in the light of policy toward Iran expressed in Dept’s 462. You might say that while the limited objectives of the mission as originally conceived may be largely accomplished by March 1, the more important objective of building up Iran’s security forces to the point where they can maintain internal security after the withdrawal of foreign forces has only been begun. In addition to these practical considerations the withdrawal of the mission against Iranian desires at the very time when the Iranian Army will have to meet its crucial test might have unfortunate psychological and political repercussions. While Dept hopes that General Ridley himself would be willing to continue as head of the mission, a replacement could be considered if he should insist on coming home. Stettinius 39 Ante , p. 343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] . The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State 891.20 Mission/10–3044 [Document 458] The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the Secretary of State Washington , October 30, 1944. Dear Mr. Secretary : I have your letter of October 25, 1944, recommending the continuance of the Ridley Mission in Iran (Persia) after its present expiration date of March 1, 1945. It is the opinion of the War Department that in order to safeguard the interests of the United States in Iran all of the problems concerning that country should be set forth in integrated study similar to the way the questions concerning Saudi Arabia were presented in my letter dated October 27, 1944. 40 In addition to the present request for the extension of the Army Mission, several other matters concerning Iran are pending, for example, the claim by that Government for asserted war damages in connection with the operations of the Persian Gulf Command, the disposition of surplus war materials, and the request that surplus trucks be turned over to the Iranian Government to augment their present transportation facilities. 41 With this in mind, I have asked that a study be prepared with the view to arriving at a solution as to the present and future policy on military matters that the War Department should adopt as to Iran. The views of this Department will then be set forth in a letter to you with the request that the Department of State submit its views as to the means and methods which should be adopted in order to promote and preserve any interest that the United States may have in Iran. Sincerely yours, Henry L. Stimson 40 Post , p. 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 816 and Doc. 817 ] . 41 For correspondence regarding these problems, see pp. 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] ff., passim. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.105A/11–2944: Telegram [Document 459] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , November 29, 1944—5 p.m. 697. British Embassy here has again raised question of possibility of Schwarzkopf assuming jurisdiction over Iranian police. Imminent arrival in Tehran of Major Preston after having discussed this and other gendarmerie problems in Washington offers good opportunity to discuss question with Schwarzkopf with idea of arriving at a definite decision. Dept has no desire to put pressure on Iranian Government to accept Schwarzkopf or any other American as police adviser. However, it is understood that Iranian Government has already made tentative approach to Schwarzkopf on subject so that renewal of the discussions at Schwarzkopf’s instance could not be considered as pressure from this end. Please discuss with Schwarzkopf and with Iranian Government if you deem advisable and give Dept benefit of your recommendations. You may inform Schwarzkopf that Dept will support with War his recommendations for increase in staff to meet the added work and responsibility entailed. Stettinius The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/12–144: Telegram [Document 460] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 1, 1944—4 p.m. [Received December 2—10:10 p.m.] 890. I visited Prime Minister Bayat 42 at his request yesterday evening and held a 2–hour conversation with him on the subject of Dr. Millspaugh. Entezam, Minister of Communications, was present at the conversation which was largely conducted between him and me as the Prime Minister’s French is defective. Let me digress here to say that the British Ambassador told me he was consulted earlier the same day by the Prime Minister in regard to Dr. Millspaugh. Ambassador Bullard said he expressed the opinion that it would be unwise for the Cabinet to bring forward the Millspaugh question at the present time just after sympathetic reaction had apparently been shown by the United States press and public to the problems of Iran. He added that the matter was of course not his concern and that the Prime Minister would no doubt wish to talk to the American Ambassador. Earlier the same day Dr. Millspaugh visited me and asked whether the Prime Minister had talked to me or sent me any communication concerning Dr. Millspaugh. I told him no and he said that he was quite sure the Prime Minister was going to take up with me the question of his employment. At this meeting I discussed with Dr. Millspaugh the Department’s telegram No. 679 of November 20 43 announcing the return of Gresham with the Department’s full support. As was to be expected, this news got a most unfavorable reception from Millspaugh. I am furnishing him the Department’s message in writing as he requested and he will reply. Prime Minister Bayat asserted, as the Iranian officials always do in conversation with me, their desire to see the Financial Mission maintained and the regret that Dr. Millspaugh does not seem to be the man to carry it on as chief. He said that his Government desired to bring a solution to the Millspaugh matter and stop the endless controversy which continued in the press and in private. He asked whether he could count upon my support in arriving at a decision to terminate Dr. Millspaugh’s service and what the reaction of my Government would be. I told him what I have told previously to his predecessor Saed, to the Shah, to Court Minister Ala and other high officials; namely that the responsibility for action in regard to Dr. Millspaugh belongs to the Iranian Government which employs him: that I would neither take a position officially or personally in the matter. I said that if it were the decision of the Government to terminate the services of Dr. Millspaugh, that it was free to do so and that I would not oppose such action nor would I recommend it or participate in any understanding on the matter. I further said, as I have previously done to Premier Saed (Embassy’s telegram No. 753, October 11) that I felt confident the State Department would not feel irritation if it was the decision of the Iranian Government to dispense with the services of Dr. Millspaugh. I made a strong reserve however that any action on the part of the Government respecting Dr. Millspaugh should be undertaken in a dignified manner compatible with the status of Dr. Millspaugh as a distinguished citizen of the United States and with due respect to fairness of treatment to him in the terms of his discharge and with complete attention paid to Dr. Millspaugh’s personal feelings and comfort. The Prime Minister asked whether the Embassy or its Government would encourage or look favorably upon other members of the mission resigning in solidarity with Dr. Millspaugh. I told him that we regarded the mission as an entity not dependent upon its chief as a body, but working under his direction only; that if the chief were removed for reasons desired by the Iranian Government, that we would not encourage in any fashion the voluntary separation of other members. I pointed out to him, however, that these American citizens were naturally free to take their own decision and no guarantee could be extended that one or more of them might not desire to depart together with Dr. Millspaugh and that neither the Embassy nor its Government had any means of control over the actions of these individual American citizens. He said he appreciated that and only wished to be told that the Embassy would not encourage them to act in such a fashion. I then pointed out to the Prime Minister that I felt the mission itself had made substantial progress in its contribution to the improvement of Iranian finance and economy, particularly during the last few months and queried him as to whether a new chief would be able to accomplish more than Millspaugh. He said he felt himself that the mission, whose work he had followed closely, had improved in its functioning despite Millspaugh; that as he saw it the whole trouble lay in the personality of Millspaugh who continuously rubbed everybody the wrong way. I pointed out to him the possible danger of losing the powers granted to the chief of the Financial Mission by the Majlis which were of a personal nature accorded to Millspaugh. He said he had foreseen that and that his thoughts ran as follows: He would endeavor to get Millspaugh to agree to taking a leave of absence in the US over a period of several months asking Millspaugh to delegate his powers to his two assistants Black and Pixley. Millspaugh apparently has the right to delegate his powers temporarily. Whether he will do so, in my opinion, is a horse of another color. He would put Black in charge of either finance or economics and Pixley in charge of the other branch as temporary chiefs. In the meanwhile he would seek from the Majlis agreement to allow empowering the Government to employ a chief of Financial Mission and authorizing the Government to confer upon this chief the powers, both financial and economic, possessed by Dr. Millspaugh personally at the present time. Thus the Government would be in a position to appoint an advisor without further reference to the Majlis which would have given its general authority to that effect. He said at present time about 65 to 70 Deputies were opposed to Millspaugh and were demanding from the Prime Minister that he terminate Millspaugh’s services. He felt that if he did not act this block of Deputies would be strong enough to rescind law of Millspaugh’s engagement and would not grant appropriate powers to any new chief of Financial Mission. I told him at this juncture that while my Government did not wish to interfere in operation of mission, that it does feel mission should possess appropriate authority to make its functions effective and I did not personally believe my Government would be willing to recommend any eventual successor to Millspaugh whose position was of a figurehead without real authority. Prime Minister said he thoroughly understood and agreed it was useless to invite a foreign advisor in here in such important work without his possessing necessary authority. He said if Black and Pixley proved capable in respective fields they might be asked to carry on permanently. If not he hoped American Government would assist him in finding successor to Millspaugh. [Here follows personal observation by the Ambassador.] I am not prepared to say whether Prime Minister’s idea of separating responsibilities in financial and economic fields is well based or not. I am inclined to think these duties overlap so closely they should better be under united control of one official; however, it seems to me that is primarily for the Prime Minister and his associates to decide. The long conversation with the Prime Minister was carried out in a cordial spirit and at the en[d it was evident that Prime Minister and Entezam both understood that I did not intend to take sides or to participate directly with recommendations, suggestions or agreement of any nature in the Millspaugh controversy. I emphasized that I would go no further than making clear the attitude of the Embassy if the Government independently took a decision to terminate Millspaugh’s services. I feel confident that I acted in accordance with the Department’s viewpoint in this respect as explained in the penultimate paragraph of its telegram No. 604, October 5 44 in which the Department expresses the feeling that Dr. Millspaugh should be informed that if occasion should arise for requesting the Department’s support in connection with his employment the Department would not feel justified in lending this support. In the conversation yesterday I did not consider it desirable to make any reference to the return of Mr. Gresham. First of all I want to see what Dr. Millspaugh’s reaction is going to be in that particular. Secondly the more I think it over the less it seems to me desirable to tell the Iranian officials that Mr. Gresham is returning here with the full support of the Department. When I arrived here I found that the Iranians from the Shah down were firmly of the belief that Dr. Millspaugh was an agent of the United States Government despite the outward appearances. I have had considerable difficulty in overcoming this belief and endeavoring thereby to remove the considerable resentment which the Iranians felt on this score. If I tell the Iranians that Gresham is coming here with the support of the State Department they will certainly interpret it as meaning he is a United States Government agent. That will immediately throw them into confusion as to what to do about the Financial Mission: Whether to appoint Gresham to please the United States or whether to follow out their plan of appointing Black and Pixley temporarily. Both the Majlis and the press will get a hold of it and some type of controversy will start even if Millspaugh is eliminated. I therefore think it highly desirable to let Gresham come back here and we will see after his arrival what seems to be the best thing to do. It may be that the Iranians will themselves take the initiative in appointing him to succeed Millspaugh if they feel that way about it as some of them have expressed the belief that he might be a proper successor. Personally I do not know. Therefore I think the matter of Gresham can safely ride for the moment except insofar as Millspaugh is concerned who already has knowledge of his prospective return. While the Prime Minister seemed very confident of himself even in talking about Millspaugh he has yet to receive a vote of confidence from the Majlis for his general program and we must not forget that Millspaugh has Seyid Zia-ed-Din as a supporter together with certain others. In other words I am not at all certain that the Prime Minister will or can take definitive action with respect to Millspaugh. I will of course report further developments as they occur. If the Department has any comments or suggestions to make in respect to this development I should be glad to hear from it at once. Morris 42 Morteza Qoli Bayat became Prime Minister November 26, 1944. 43 Not printed; it conveyed a strong endorsement of the return to Iran of Harold Gresham, formerly of the Millspaugh Mission, and requested the Ambassador to inform the proper Iranian authorities and Dr. Millspaugh of this (891.51A/11–2044). 44 Not printed. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.002/12–544: Telegram [Document 461] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 5, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 4:55 p.m.] 901. Nearly every Deputy who spoke during debate on new Cabinet whether supporting or opposing Bayat took occasion to attack Millspaugh violently. At one point in reply to a question the Prime Minister is reported to have said that if one of the world’s greatest political leaders such as Churchill were brought to administer Iran no progress would be made so long as Millspaugh remained. In his concluding speech yesterday Bayat said that the question of the foreign employees would be among the first to be studied by the Government and that action would be taken within 10 days to settle the status of the Administrator General of Finances. This promise was enthusiastically received by the Deputies. Morris The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.51A/12–144: Telegram [Document 462] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , December 6, 1944—7 p.m. 712. Dept concurs in position taken in your conversation with the Prime Minister, as reported in urtel 890, December 1. Dept believes that, in view of intervening developments you acted wisely in refraining from informing Iranian authorities of the purport of our 679, November 20. 45 The intent of that message was not to suggest Gresham as a possible successor to Millspaugh but merely to express concurrence in his continued service in Iran as an American who has demonstrated good performance and cooperation with the Iranians. Stettinius 45 See footnote 43, p. 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 460 ] . The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/12–1544: Telegram [Document 463] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 15, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 2:08 p.m.] 932. The Prime Minister yesterday presented to the Medjliss a bill to repeal the economic powers granted Millspaugh by the law of 13 Ordibehesht, 1322 45a and to vest those same powers in the Cabinet which would be empowered to dissolve, retain or transfer to other Ministries the economic organizations set up in the Ministry of Finance under that law. The bill was referred to committee under procedure of single urgency. Morris 45a i.e., 1943. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/12–1844: Telegram [Document 464] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 18, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 5:45 p.m.] 936. My 932, December 15. Medjliss Finance Committee has approved proposal to take away from Millspaugh the economic powers granted by the law of 13 Ordibehesht. The committee is still undecided regarding the clause in the Prime Minister’s bill providing that these powers be vested in the Government. It seems to be realized that they cannot be completely abolished and various suggestions are under consideration including the creation of a Ministry of Economics or alternatively a special committee which would be given authority to conduct the emergency economic operations now under Millspaugh’s direction. There is as yet no indication as to when the committee will report the bill back to the assembly. Yesterday’s newspapers published text of letter Millspaugh has written Medjliss President in which he asserted that repeal of powers would be harmful to Iran and consequences. He concluded however by saying he hoped the Government would be successful in its efforts to reorganize economic administration and declared himself ready to cooperate within the scope of his financial powers. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/12–2044: Telegram [Document 465] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 20, 1944—5 p.m. [Received December 21—2:53 p.m.] 939. Foreign Minister Entezam 46 told me today that Millspaugh and Prime Minister Bayat have reached agreement by which Millspaugh will accept repeal of his economic powers and remain to administer financial affairs under authority granted by law of 21 Aban. Mossadegh yesterday introduced into Majlis bill to repeal all Millspaugh powers, including those granted by law of 21 Aban and establish committee of 5 men to supervise operations of Ministry of Finance. His attempt to rush this through failed, however, and Majlis has as yet taken no action on it. Entezam expects that Prime Minister’s bill reported in my 932, December 15 will be adopted. Morris 46 Nasrollah Entezam, formerly Minister of Communications, became Minister for Foreign Affairs on December 7, 1944. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.105A/12–2144: Telegram [Document 466] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 21, 1944—4 p.m. [Received December 22—10:20 p.m.] 944. I have received a letter from Schwarzkopf sent to me after full discussion with him of the proposal contained in Department’s telegram No. 697 of November 29 that Schwarzkopf approach Iranian Government on the subject of his assuming jurisdiction over the Iranian city police. Contrary to the information given to the state [ sic ] Schwarzkopf has never been approached by the Iranian Government on this subject. Schwarzkopf and I are definitely of the opinion that it is inadvisable that the approach come from the American side. I am forwarding by dispatch a copy of Schwarzkopf’s letter and my own opinion in regard to this subject. 47 Morris 47 Neither printed. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) 891.20 Mission/11–2844 [Document 467] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) [ Washington ,] December 21, 1944. The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of War and has the honor to refer to Mr. Stettinius’ letter of October 25, 1944, setting forth the urgent political reasons for the continuance of the American Military Mission to the Iranian Army. At a meeting held at the State Department on December 18, 1944, between officials of the War and State Departments and attended by Major General Ridley, the political and other reasons for the continuance of the military mission beyond the date already set for its termination, March 1, 1945 were reviewed. General Ridley made it clear that the mission could not attain the objective desired by the Department of State in consonance with the United States policy toward that country, unless high priority could be given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the shipment to Iran of certain essential military supplies. The Department desires to urge that high priority be given to the shipment of these military supplies for the Iranian Army. It is realized that the War Department is being pressed to supply arms not only for urgent war needs but also for the use of postwar armies. It is considered, however, that the Iranian case differs in several essential respects from that of many other countries. American policy in Iran is based specifically on the Declaration on Iran, signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. This Declaration recognized the sacrifices made by Iran in the interests of the war effort and pledged Allied assistance to Iran both during and after the war. A prominent implementation of this policy has been the American adviser program, under which this military mission has so successfully carried out its duties. Protection and advancement of our interests in Iran require that we give the military mission the tools with which to work. Furnishing the Iranian Army with essential supplies is in line with the Department’s basic policy toward Iran, which envisages strengthening the Iranian security forces to the point where they can maintain order after the withdrawal of Allied forces. The United States can contribute substantially to world security by assisting to create a strong Iran, free from internal weakness which invite foreign intervention or aggression. To carry out this policy requires strong and well-equipped security forces. Iran is perhaps the most prominent area of the world where inter-Allied friction might arise. Such friction would grow out of the chaos and disorder in Iran which would result from a weak Iranian Army. It is in our interests to prevent this from happening. For these reasons it is urgently recommended that the American military mission to the Iranian Army be continued for an indefinite period beyond March 1, 1945, and that a sufficiently high priority rating be given to General Ridley’s request for military supplies to enable him to continue his mission in Iran with reasonable assurance of success. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.51A/12–2644: Telegram [Document 468] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 26, 1944—3 p.m. [Received December 26—1:05 p.m.] 950. My telegram No. 932 December 15. On December 20 Medjliss Finance Committee approved modified form of Prime Minister’s bill for transfer of Millspaugh economic powers. Changes provide that powers shall be exercised by Bayat personally with the assistance of a committee of 4 chosen with the consent of the Council of Ministers. He would be authorized to take under his direct control all organizations created under the law of 13th Ordibehesht, as well as economic organizations existing before that law and all state monopolies and Government-owned institutions, and to operate them independently or attach them to one or more ministries. He would also be empowered to dissolve such organizations. Any new or altered organizations should be presented for Medjliss approval within 3 months. Government would be instructed to make an audit of all economic organizations and report to Medjliss within 3 months. Law to be valid for 6 months. This bill was to have been reported to Assembly December 21 but was sidetracked for provisional budget bill for current 2 months. Sessions of December 22 and 24 produced no action and next meeting has been set for December 31. Morris The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State 891.20 Mission/12–2744 [Document 469] The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the Secretary of State Washington , December 27, 1944. Dear Mr. Secretary : I have your memorandum of December 21, 1944, setting forth the urgent political reasons for the continuance of the American Military Mission to the Iranian Army and asking that consideration be given to the request of General Ridley, the Chief of this mission, for the granting of a priority for the allocation of military supplies required by the Iranian Army. In view of the cogent reasons expressed in your memorandum for the continuance of the mission after its present expiration date of March 1, 1945, it has been carefully considered by the War Department and it has been decided that the mission will be continued for an indefinite period after March 1. General Ridley, Chief of the mission, has been informed of this decision. It is recognized, also, that the protection and advancement of our interests in Iran will require the strengthening of the Iranian security forces so that order may be maintained in this area, where world security might be threatened, after the withdrawal of Allied troops. This Department, therefore, will present to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration the request for a priority for these military supplies. Sincerely yours, Henry L. Stimson Attitude of the United States toward decision of the Iranian Government to postpone all petroleum development negotiations; representations to the Soviet Union regarding unfavorable Soviet reaction Attitude of the United States toward decision of the Iranian Government to postpone all petroleum development negotiations; representations to the Soviet Union regarding unfavorable Soviet reaction 48 48 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 625 ff. [470] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, March 9, 1944—noon. [Received March 10—7:57 a.m.] 891.6363/827: Telegram [471] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, March 27, 1944—11 p.m. 891.6363/835f: Telegram [472] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, April 3, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 3:15 p.m.] 891.6363/836: Telegram [473] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, April 4, 1944—7 p.m. 891.6363/834: Telegram [474] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, May 2, 1944—9 p.m. 891.6363/846: Telegram [475] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, May 10, 1944—1 p.m. 891.6363/853b: Telegram [476] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 16, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 6:48 p.m.] 891.6363/854: Telegram [477] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, May 20, 1944—7 p.m. 891.6363/855a: Telegram [478] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 16, 1944—2 p.m. [Received June 16—1:58 p.m.] 891.6363/860: Telegram [479] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, June 27, 1944—8 p.m. 891.6363/860: Telegram [480] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, August 4, 1944—5 p.m. [Received August 4—2:18 p.m.] 891.6363/8–444: Telegram [481] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, September 21, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 7:20 p.m.] 891.6363/9–2144: Telegram [482] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, September 22, 1944—5 p.m. [Received September 22—1:15 p.m.] 891.6363/9–2244: Telegram [483] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 2, 1944—3 p.m. [Received October 2—2:15 p.m.] 891.6363/10–244 [484] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 7, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 3:20 p.m.] 891.6363/10–744: Telegram [485] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 9, 1944—midnight. [Received October 9—1:05 p.m.] 891.6363/10–944: Telegram [486] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 10, 1944—6 p.m. [Received October 11—9:40 a.m.] 891.6363/10–1044: Telegram [487] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 13, 1944—10 p.m. [Received October 13—1 p.m.] 891.6363/10–1344: Telegram [488] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, October 16, 1944—4 p.m. 891.6363/10–1044: Telegram [489] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State Moscow, October 17, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 4:05 p.m.] 891.6363/10–1744: Telegram [490] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 24, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 4:37 p.m.] 761.91/10–2444: Telegram [491] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 25, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 3:33 p.m.] 891.6363/10–2544: Telegram [492] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 25, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 5 p.m.] 761.91/10–2544: Telegram [493] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 25, 1944—5 p.m. [Received October 26—3:30 p.m.] 761.91/10–2544: Telegram [494] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 27, 1944—4 p.m. [Received October 27—1:35 p.m.] 891.00/10–2744: Telegram [495] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 27, 1944—5 p.m. [Received October 27—1:30 p.m.] 891.6363/10–2744: Telegram [496] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received October 30—1:15 p.m.] 891.6363/10–3044: Telegram [497] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) Washington, October 30, 1944—10 p.m. 891.6363/10–3044: Telegram [498] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State Moscow, November 1, 1944—1 p.m. [Received November 1—11:08 a.m.] 891.6363/11–144: Telegram [499] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 1, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 4:50 p.m.] 891.00/11–144: Telegram [500] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, November 1, 1944—4 p.m. 891.6363/10–2744: Telegram [501] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 8, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 4:30 p.m.] 891.00/11–344: Telegram [502] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] November 3, 1944. 761.91/11–344 [503] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] November 3, 1944. 761.91/11–344 [504] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 4, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 10:18 p.m.] 761.91/11–444: Telegram [505] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 5, 1944—5 p.m. [Received November 6—12:53 p.m.] 761.91/11–544: Telegram [506] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State Moscow, November 7, 1944—7 p.m. [Received November 8—6:39 a.m.] 891.6363/11–744: Telegram [507] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, November 7, 1944—9 p.m. 761.91/11–744: Telegram [508] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 8, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:15 p.m.] 761.91/11–844: Telegram [509] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 9, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 4:05 p.m.] 891.002/11–944: Telegram [510] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 15, 1944—8 p.m. [Received November 17—1:20 a.m.] 761.91/11–1544: Telegram [511] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State Moscow, November 20, 1944—7 p.m. [Received November 20—5:45 p.m.] 891.6363/11–2044: Telegram [512] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State Moscow, November 22, 1944—10 p.m. [Received November 23—10:46 a.m.] 891.6363/11–2244: Telegram [513] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) [Washington,] November 24, 1944. 761.91/11–2444 [514] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 25, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 5:39 p.m.] 891.6363/11–2544: Telegram [515] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 30, 1944—2 p.m. [Received November 30—1:35 p.m.] 891.6363/11–3044: Telegram [516] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, November 30, 1944—7 p.m. 891.6363/11–2544: Telegram [517] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 3, 1944. [Received December 7—1:08 a.m.] 891.6363/12–344: Telegram [518] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 5, 1944—noon. [Received 4:40 p.m.] 891.6363/12–544: Telegram [519] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 6, 1944—3 p.m. [Received December 8—9:45 p.m.] 891.6363/12–644: Telegram [520] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, December, 1944. 761.91/12–844 [521] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 8, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 7 p.m.] 761.91/12–844: Telegram [522] Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State [Warm Springs, Georgia,] December 8, 1944. 761.91/12–844 [523] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 9, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 18—11:03 a.m.] 891.6363/12–944: Telegram [524] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] December 11, 1944. 761.91/12–844 [525] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] December 18, 1944. 761.91/12–844 [526] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] December 19, 1944. 761.91/12–1944 [527] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 21, 1944—noon. [Received 10:10 p.m.] 891.6363/12–2144: Telegram The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/827: Telegram [Document 470] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , March 9, 1944—noon. [Received March 10—7:57 a.m.] 176. Department’s special instruction 317, January 27. 49 Status of our oil negotiations with Iranian Government is as follows: Draper has presented his proposition to Prime Minister 50 and it is now being studied. Certain essential figures are being withheld until negotiations have reached more positive stage. In interview yesterday with Soheily he stated British 51 had just presented supplemental proposal which had not yet been translated. He told me that should he continue in power (which becomes increasingly problematical) he would give us every ethical opportunity to meet our competitors in this field since he remained desirous of having American oil interests enter Iran and was particularly opposed to having entire southern coast of Iran tied up under British concessions. For our future guidance and particularly [ pending? ] decisions reached at forthcoming London discussions, I should welcome Department’s directive regarding attitude I should adopt vis-à-vis my British colleague in Tehran 52 on general subject our oil negotiations here. Thus far I have remained completely noncommittal regarding active interest we are taking in this subject in Iran despite repeated openings by Bullard. My first reaction has been and still is to be quite frank with him, (1st), because he unquestionably knows Draper is here and has presented his proposition and thus when our activities eventually are brought into the open he will be in position of being able to question the degree of our good faith which otherwise characterizes all of our relations, and (2nd), because without wishing to appear overly naive in this matter, I feel that with a careful and open handling of this question with both British and Soviets we might well be given, if not a free hand, at least a less competitive field in Iran than might otherwise be the case. Britain is determined to keep her political skirts clear in Iran, and while she will never be above turning an honest penny either now or in postwar developments, my personal belief is that we would be on firmer ground by inviting her cooperative interest in our negotiations now than by appearing to be keeping her in the dark about them. Certainly every effort should be made to avoid having the pending oil negotiations degenerate into an auction sale which might well happen with Iran acting as auctioneer. In recent talks with Saed, 53 who appears to be most favored candidate for next premiership, and with Ala, 54 mouthpiece of Shah, it is evident Iran wants our oil interests here, but in last analysis financial considerations will carry great weight. Sir Reader Bullard, who is today presenting his letters credence to Shah as Ambassador, informs me he is leaving for London toward end of March, presumably in time to participate in London discussions. Ford 49 Not printed; it transmitted a letter from the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company to its representative in Iran for oil negotiations, Thomas J. Draper. 50 Ali Soheily. 51 The Royal Dutch Shell Company. 52 Sir Reader W. Bullard, British Ambassador in Iran. 53 Mohammed Saed, Iranian Foreign Minister. 54 Hussein Ala, Minister of the Iranian Imperial Court. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.6363/835f: Telegram [Document 471] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , March 27, 1944—11 p.m. 192. Your 176, March 9. Department has no objection to your mentioning to your interested colleagues fact that Draper is in Tehran representing Standard-Vacuum Company in negotiations connected with an oil concession, information which is beyond question already in their possession. Department believes it would be unwise to go beyond this simple statement, which represents the actual situation. You should avoid any action or statement which might give the Iranians cause to infer, or British oil interests at later date grounds to imply, that there exists any British-American understanding whatsoever to hold down cost of oil concession or to share any concession obtained. With reference to Tass release setting forth Soviet claim to prior rights to petroleum concessions in north Department would welcome any further information you may obtain on subject. Hull The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/836: Telegram [Document 472] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , April 3, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 3:15 p.m.] 227. Department’s 192, March 27. In informal conversation with Prime Minister Saed 55 I called to his attention Tass release on oil concessions. He pointed out that provisions of Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 56 could be revoked only with respect to valid concessions, and that concessions must be approved by Majlis to be valid. He then reiterated Iranian position that Khostaria Concession, principal basis for Russian claims to exclusive rights in northern Iran, was never valid since never approved by Majlis. 57 He therefore considered northern Iran definitely open to development by oil interests of any nation. When Draper of Standard-Vacuum asked whether northern area could be included in concession being sought by his company, Saed replied he knew of no reason to contrary, although he admitted it might be wiser to defer any active exploration of that area until after Soviet troops should have been withdrawn and suggested that a clause to that effect might be inserted in concession. Draper privately assures me that despite this apparent freedom to enter northern zone, he proposes to confine his present negotiations to southeastern area. Ford 55 A change of government had occurred on March 17, 1944. 56 Signed at Moscow, February 26, 1921, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix , p. 384. 57 For correspondence regarding the Iranian position, see Foreign Relations , 1921, vol. ii , pp. 649 – 651 . The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.6363/834: Telegram [Document 473] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , April 4, 1944—7 p.m. 207. Messrs. William Campbell and Walter Wilson will arrive at Tehran about April 3 or 4. They are representing Mr. Marcel E. Wagner (American Eastern Corporation) who is acting for Sinclair interests. 58 We have discussed with Mr. Wagner the possibility that the entry of another American company in the Iranian oil negotiations might jeopardize the overall American interest. Wagner indicated he would discuss this with Mr. Sinclair. However, Wagner is of the opinion (1) that Iranian concession will not be granted to Standard-Vacuum interests in any case because the Iranians consider Standard-Vacuum to be tied too closely to the British Anglo-Iranian interests, 59 and (2) because of the foregoing the chances of the Sinclair group to secure a concession would be jeopardized by any merger of forces with the Standard-Vacuum group, and (3) the Sinclair interests will be diligent in developing any concession rights obtained. The foregoing is for your confidential information and we would like your comments thereon. We made it clear to Mr. Wagner and his associates that the Department and the Legation at Tehran would take an identical attitude toward the Sinclair and Standard-Vacuum negotiations and toward the representatives of the two companies, and that any appropriate assistance rendered by this Government would be given equally to any American enterprise seeking foreign concessions. You should therefore deal accordingly with the Sinclair and Standard-Vacuum representatives and with the Iranian authorities. We have requested Wagner to keep both you and the Department fully advised concerning any discussions or developments. You should make both companies feel that they can discuss any matter with you on a confidential basis. Therefore, you should not divulge to either company information given you by the other where such disclosure might be to the disadvantage of the latter. You may, of course, in your discretion, give either company such information as you may obtain from any source which you feel would be of assistance to the American companies impartially. The above information is in reply to your 214 of March 27. 60 Hull 58 The Sinclair Oil Company. 59 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 60 Not printed; the Chargé had voiced concern at the entrance of a second American oil company (Sinclair) into the concession picture, fearing the position of both would be weakened, and had suggested that the Department consider urging the two companies either to combine to share a concession or for one to withdraw (891.6363/834). The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.6363/846: Telegram [Document 474] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , May 2, 1944—9 p.m. 273. This refers to your urgent telegram number 281 of April 24. 61 We are also concerned lest a situation develop in which American interests would lose a possible concession in Iran and have so indicated to both Standard Vacuum and Sinclair. However, we have also made it clear to both companies that any joint arrangement is entirely up to them, and that, if they do not wish to take joint action, we shall continue to render both companies the same impartial assistance. Sinclair representatives delivered to the Department today copies of their preliminary proposal to the Government of Iran. These will be forwarded by pouch at an early date. For your confidential information, it appears that the Sinclair company is more anxious to cooperate in a joint bid than is the Standard-Vacuum. Hull 61 Not printed; in this telegram Col. John H. Leavell, Petroleum Attaché in Iraq on special duty at Tehran, had reported his views on the petroleum situation after consultation with interested local officials (891.6363/846). The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.6363/853b: Telegram [Document 475] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , May 10, 1944—1 p.m. 290. British Embassy has shown Department copy of telegram sent by British Embassy Tehran to Foreign Office on March 1 concerning a message filed by the AP representative in Tehran on the subject of the oil negotiations in Iran and copy of Foreign Office reply of March 2. If this question is still alive, the Department suggests that in addition to the British amendments, alteration be made throughout the text to read “United States oil interests” or “companies” instead of “United States Government” or any other wording which would make it appear that negotiations are being carried on by this Government. It is further believed wise to alter the penultimate sentence to avoid giving impression that Prime Minister believes Iranians are negotiating with British and American Governments. Hull The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/854: Telegram [Document 476] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] Tehran , May 16, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 6:48 p.m.] 342. From Leavell. Standard has presented firm offer and been promised Prime Minister’s answer in 2 weeks. Understand Shell has also presented firm offer. Sinclair has presented to [ no? ] firm offer and only verbal promise through intermediary that they will make better terms than their competitors subject confirmation by their board of directors. This in effect asking for more favorable consideration than competitors. All firms making preliminary arrangements for support their proposals by rival factions in Parliament. Matter is beginning to be discussed in newspapers. Entire matter is following the pattern predicted in our cable No. 281 of April 24. 62 This is worst possible manner to have negotiations proceed from American viewpoint and will probably result in failure of Americans to receive concession at all or on unacceptable terms. It is possible that concession may ultimately be as productive as the Anglo-Iranian concession and situated closer to future big markets so that we cannot too strongly urge that Department in Washington insist that Americans present consolidated offer or one company withdraw. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Situation here critical account health Prime Minister, (imminent?) fall his Cabinet and increasingly severe and continuous criticism Millspaugh Mission. 63 [Leavell.] Ford 62 See footnote 61, p. 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] . 63 Arthur C. Millspaugh, American Administrator General of Finances in the Iranian Government; for correspondence regarding the Millspaugh Mission, see pp. 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] ff. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.6363/855a: Telegram [Document 477] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , May 20, 1944—7 p.m. 316. To William Campbell from Marcel Wagner. The number of this message is 0031. We have learned from the Iranian Minister at Washington that his Government has requested him to instruct Curtice and Hoover 64 who are now the official representatives of the Government of Iran to examine under his auspices in Washington offers of both companies. The Minister has requested that their recommendations be subsequently telegraphed to him. If you can, cable confirmation. [Wagner.] Hull 64 A. A. Curtice and Herbert Hoover, Jr., petroleum geologists, had been commissioned by the Iranian Government as petroleum advisers. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/860: Telegram [Document 478] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , June 16, 1944—2 p.m. [Received June 16—1:58 p.m.] 432. From Leavell. Any assistance that could be rendered to Curtice and Hoover in advancing their priorities would be exceedingly helpful in the negotiations here as negotiations are at a standstill until their arrival and the American position is steadily deteriorating for reasons mentioned in previous wires and the fear by Iranians that London negotiations may either divide the territory between Americans and British or turn it over to the British. Please cable if Sinclair have delivered final bid in their name to Hoover and Curtice. If they have failed to do so it would appear on information gathered here that they are delaying matters in order to learn what the other bidders for the concession have submitted which information can be secured through leaks here. Any instructions as to policy to be followed here would be greatly appreciated. Believe concession can still be had for American company if no delays by Sinclair and if concession does not get entangled in Millspaugh Mission controversy. [Leavell.] Ford The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.6363/860: Telegram [Document 479] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , June 27, 1944—8 p.m. 394. Your 432, June 16, 2 p.m. Hoover and Curtice will probably not be able to leave before early July. We have carefully considered your telegrams numbers 342 of May 16 and 365 of May 24, 65 as well as your 432, June 16, and have been keeping in close touch with Wagner, Sinclair and Standard-Vacuum. With reference to the alternatives suggested in your 342 of May 16 it would be contrary to policy for the Department to insist either that one of the American companies withdraw or that the two companies present a combined bid. Hence we could not adopt either alternative. Both Standard-Vacuum and Sinclair appear confident of securing a concession and we have no indication that either will withdraw or that they will present a combined bid. Sinclair presented a firm proposal to the Iranian Minister here last week, and it has been studied by Hoover and Curtice. The Department will continue to render impartially all appropriate assistance to American firms desiring to bid for Iranian concessions and you should render similar assistance to their representatives in Iran. However, the Department would not countenance any activity of a character by an American firm, such as a campaign against a competitor (your 365 of May 24), which would prejudice overall American interests in Iran. As a result of our expression of concern in this regard, Wagner sent the message to Campbell transmitted in our 356 of June 7. 66 There has never been any suggestion, in London negotiations or elsewhere, of an agreement with the British to divide foreign areas between ourselves and the British for purposes of seeking petroleum or other concessions, and no such agreement is contemplated. As stated in the Department’s circular telegram of May 8, 10 p.m., 67 the ad referendum agreement with the British resulting from the preliminary oil discussions here 68 pledges both Governments to observe the principle of equal opportunity with respect to new concessions. Undue pressure by the British for Shell or by us for an American interest or interests would be inconsistent of course with the agreement on that principle. Please continue to keep the Department closely informed of developments. Hull 65 Telegram No. 365 not printed. 66 Not printed. 67 Vol. iii , p. 115 . 68 For correspondence regarding the oil discussions and unperfected agreement signed August 8, 1944, see ibid. , pp. 94 ff. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/8–444: Telegram [Document 480] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , August 4, 1944—5 p.m. [Received August 4—2:18 p.m.] 577. Petroleum concession negotiations have reached point at which I believe it imperative that American companies send representatives from highest executive level to complete presentation of bids, if an American firm is to get concession. Representatives should be empowered to make decisions on spot without reference to home office. May I urge upon Department utmost necessity of prevailing upon companies to get their men to Tehran without delay. Competent authorities state prospects of proposed concession area have no equal in Middle East, but to gain this rich prize for American interests will require quick action, including granting of number one air priorities for top caliber negotiators with full powers. I am reliably informed that one bid or another will be accepted by Cabinet and presented to Majlis for approval by September 1. Ford The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/9–2144: Telegram [Document 481] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , September 21, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 7:20 p.m.] 698. A Russian delegation headed by Kavtaradze, Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, with two other members and several technical experts has arrived here. On September 13 they had an interview with the Prime Minister and on the 16th were received by the Shah. I learned from a trustworthy official source that the purpose of this delegation is to examine into the oil fields at Kavirkhourian in the region of Semnan. This field has been the object of dispute and uncertainty for many years. It is, however, only a small part of the northern area where oil may be expected to be found. Kavtaradze has told the Prime Minister of Iran so far only that he would like to make a technical examination of the fields and the Russian experts have already proceeded to the spot for that purpose. The Prime Minister has said confidentially to the British Ambassador that so far no proposal has been made to revive the old concession which was never ratified nor to make new proposals regarding oil concessions in the northern region. There is no indication at present that the Russian object is to block concessions in the south to either the Americans or British. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/9–2244: Telegram [Document 482] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , September 22, 1944—5 p.m. [Received September 22—1:15 p.m.] 701. The Prime Minister last night told me that the principal object of the Kavtaradze Commission concerned the petroleum fields in the north mentioned in my telegram 698, September 21. He said, however, there were other questions which would be explored concerning the economic and commercial relations between Russia and Iran. He added the interesting comment that he would broach to Kavtaradze the subject of the withdrawal of Russian armed forces and endeavor to explain [ explore? ] the mind of Moscow if possible towards this subject and would suggest that the Russians should make preparations for withdrawal within the near future. The Prime Minister was not pessimistic [ optimistic? ] about withdrawal but said he thought it was a good opportunity to show interest in this subject of prime importance. Dr. Millspaugh has heard that the commission is here to settle some outstanding commercial accounts as one of its secondary interests. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/10–244 [Document 483] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 2, 1944—3 p.m. [Received October 2—2:15 p.m.] 728. Soviet Ambassador Maximov and Vice-Commissar Kavtaradze had audience with Shah yesterday morning substance of which was given me last night by Court Minister Ala as follows: Soviet representatives asked for exclusive rights over 5-year period for petroleum exploration by Russian Government in 200,000 square kilometer area of northern Iran stretching from Azerbaijan to Khorassan. Requested concession be granted prior to Kavtaradze’s departure from Iran which is apparently contemplated in the near future. Shall replied matter was outside his competence and should be taken up with Prime Minister and Cabinet who would doubtless consider it in conjunction with American and British requests now pending. Maximov and Kavtaradze disagreed saying that American and British proposals were on commercial basis whereas they were proposing agreement between states and therefore the Russian proposals should be considered on a different basis. I understand however that they will approach Prime Minister. Ala said he had seen Saed after audience and had urged him to stand firm against Soviet demand for immediate grant. Ala suggested he use argument that Anglo-American petroleum agreement envisaged consultation among all powers interested in oil and Three Great Powers should therefore get together on this matter. Ala has informed British Ambassador of foregoing. Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/10–744: Telegram [Document 484] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 7, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 3:20 p.m.] 737. My 698 of September 21, 701 of September 22 and 728 of October 2. I have recently discussed with the Prime Minister, British Ambassador, Minister of Finance and others closest to the situation the matter of the Kavtaradze delegation and its interest in petroleum. The position at present appears to be as follows: The Russians have dropped any talk about reviving a concession on the terms of the old Kavirkhourian arrangement. Instead they talk of exploitation at the end of the 5-year exploration period without defining on what terms. The Russians are pressing for answer and the Prime Minister says that he expects to arrive at a decision within the next 4 or 5 days. Iranian Cabinet is thinking of attempting to withdraw from its embarrassment vis-à-vis the Russians by proposing to exploit all of Iran’s petroleum resources by the formation of Iranian development companies. This of course would be only a weak bluff on paper if attempted. I told the Minister of Finance that nothing could be gained by this maneuver. My general impression is that in the end the Government here will yield to the Russian demand unless it knows that the Russian request meets the opposition of the British and American Governments in principle and that those Governments are prepared to state their objections directly to the Russians. The British Ambassador is of the personal opinion that the Russian demand for a state concession in the territory of an independent friendly Government is unacceptable under international practice. He is particularly fearful that if such a concession is obtained the Russians will use it as a precedent for similar demands in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and possibly Greece to extend their influence over any type of wealth possessed by those countries. I think the Department will wish to give careful and immediate attention to this phase with a view to possible representations directly to the Russian Government either singly or conjointly with the British Government. If higher policy precludes action of this nature it might be well to encourage the Iranian Government to postpone for 6 months or a year the granting of any concessions. Any instructions as to action or policy by this Embassy I feel should be sent promptly to be of any utility. From a source close to the Russian Embassy here I learned that Kavtaradze has sounded out the local Government on the granting of a free port somewhere in the Persian Gulf. I have not yet ascertained the Persian reaction. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/10–944: Telegram [Document 485] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 9, 1944—midnight. [Received October 9—1:05 p.m.] 744. Today’s press reports that at special session of Majlis yesterday Prime Minister announced that his Cabinet had agreed to postpone all oil concession negotiations until after war when world’s economic situation is clearer. His stand was opposed by certain Majlis members who insisted that concession be granted, the members pointedly remarking on discourteous attitude in thus breaking off negotiations just at moment “our northern Ally” had sent its representative to discuss oil. Prime Minister promised to give further particulars at next session. I saw Ala, Court Minister, last night, who stated that [Shah?] after learning Soviets proposed to exploit not only petroleum in north zone but other minerals which Persians could not themselves undertake with added demand that all other foreigners would be excluded from such exploitation, directed Prime Minister to call off all concession negotiations. Ala expressed hope that this action would not irritate United States. I am seeing Prime Minister this evening and shall ask for definite confirmation of Government’s stand. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/10–1044: Telegram [Document 486] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 10, 1944—6 p.m. [Received October 11—9:40 a.m.] 749. ReEmbstel No. 744, October 9. Prime Minister confirmed to me last night that oil concession negotiations had been postponed until after war. He further stated he was immediately informing Soviet representatives here as well as representatives of American and British oil companies now in Tehran of this postponement. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/10–1344: Telegram [Document 487] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 13, 1944—10 p.m. [Received October 13—1 p.m.] 756. ReEmbs 749 October 10. Kavtaradze visited the Prime Minister alone at the request of the latter when informed that the Iranian Government had decided not to grant any oil concessions until after the war. Kavtaradze replied that this decision could have unhappy consequences to which the Prime Minister reported that he supposed that if the Russian proposals were received but not accepted integrally as offered that they might also have unhappy consequences. The Prime Minister added it would be acceptable to the Iranian Government for the Russian delegation to submit its detailed proposals but that they would not be acted upon and until after the war. It has not yet been ascertained what attitude the Soviet delegation proposes to take or whether it intends to remain here. The Prime Minister interviewed yesterday Vice President Schultz of the Standard-Vacuum and informed him of the Government’s decision. He has done likewise with the British representative who is finally definitely leaving for London within a few days. It is believed that the Sinclair representative has also been informed. Morris The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.6363/10–1044: Telegram [Document 488] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , October 16, 1944—4 p.m. 622. Urtel 749, October 10, 6 p.m. You are requested to inform the Iranian Government that the American Government has taken note of the decision of the Iranian Government to postpone all petroleum development negotiations. While the two American firms which have gone to considerable effort and expense in pursuing these negotiations during the past year are naturally disappointed, having been given to understand that the Iranian authorities contemplated entering into a contract at this time, we are confident that the Iranian authorities were acting in good faith. The American Government naturally expects that if and when the Iranian Government is in a position to consider applications for such concessions, the applications of American nationals will receive no less favorable treatment than the applications of the nationals or government of any other country. Furthermore, the American Government expects that the Iranian Government will inform us or the interested American companies immediately the Iranian Government is ready to consider applications. Sent to Tehran. Repeated to London and Moscow. 69 Hull 69 As telegrams 8537 and 2443, respectively. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/10–1744: Telegram [Document 489] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , October 17, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 4:05 p.m.] 3967. ReDeptel 2443, October 16, 4 p.m. 70 The Department’s attention is drawn to Iranian press comment on Iranian Government’s refusal to accept Soviet request for oil concessions in northern Iran reported in immediately preceding telegram. 71 This material appeared in Pravda for October 16 and in other Moscow papers for October 17. Following customary Soviet press technique in such cases, the citations selected undoubtedly express the Soviet attitude toward the Iranian Government’s action and are an indication of Soviet dissatisfaction with the Iranian Government’s decision. Repeated to Tehran. Harriman 70 See footnote 69 above. 71 Telegram 3966, not printed. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 761.91/10–2444: Telegram [Document 490] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 24, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 4:37 p.m.] 779. Very considerable perturbation is being felt in Iranian official circles by reason of the attitude assumed by the Soviet Embassy in manifesting its displeasure in an unofficial fashion over the Iranian Government’s decision to postpone the petroleum concessions until after the war. I am informed by Court Minister Ala that no official protest has been received on this subject but the following occurrences have taken place. Members of the Soviet Embassy staff either directly or through intermediaries particularly newspaper editors whose journals are supported by the Soviets have been in contact with members of the Majlis expressing the Embassy’s great dissatisfaction with Mr. Saed the Prime Minister, the Soviet Embassy laying the blame for the decision of the Government individually on Saed. The talk of the Embassy and personnel is to the effect that Saed must resign and the Embassy will see to it that he does. The Soviet Ambassador at a recent Irano-Soviet football match declined to sit with the official Iranian party which included both the Shah and the Prime Minister although the Chief Military Adjutant of the Court was sent to extend the invitation when the Soviet Ambassador appeared at the playground. Last Saturday for the first time a considerable body of Russian soldiers in military trucks and conspicuously armed with Tommy-guns paraded rapidly through certain sections of the city and notably before the Parliament building. This caused considerable uneasiness to the inhabitants. There is certain evidence of obstructive measures under way in the Soviet occupied zone. Forrest Crawford, Chief of Cereals and Bread Section of the Millspaugh Mission, has a copy of a telegram addressed to Soviet station masters in North Persia directing them to reserve all railway cars for the sole use of the Soviet military and trade delegation. This has resulted in the holding up of some grain shipments between Zenjan or Mianeh and Tehran. A Reuter telegram received here but not published locally at the request of the British Embassy quotes the newspaper Trud of Moscow in a violent attack on Prime Minister Saed. This newspaper described Saed as unfriendly to the Soviets and calls him a Fascist reactionary who is obstructing and oppressing the working people of Persia. The Russian Vice Consul at Tabriz whose removal was requested by Prime Minister Saed because of his interference in local politics whereby he attempted and successfully it appears to influence the election of Deputies from that district to the Majlis has been transferred to Zenjan and promoted Consul. He is of course working in a district where he can cause trouble amongst the workers. Last week when the Prime Minister exposed to the Majlis the decision of his Government to postpone the oil concessions he received a viva-voce expression of confidence. Unfortunately in his own interest Saed neglected to make a formal role [ roll ] call and record a vote but all sources agree that lie received an overwhelming approval of his policy. The Shah has let it be known to me and to the British Ambassador through his Court Minister that he desires and intends to oppose the Russian effort to oust Saed and that short of armed opposition will resist any Russian efforts in the nature of economic or other sanctions. However he is not disposed to do this unless he feels that the British and American Governments are ready to approve this policy. If he received no encouragement from these Governments and Russian pressure becomes too strong he says he will yield and displace Saed on the pretext of an issue not connected with the oil question. He will replace him by a man pledged to the same policies as Saed in regard to petroleum and resistance to Russian manoeuvres. The Ambassador at London Taqizadeh has declined selection as Prime Minister on the grounds that he must return for personal affairs to London. It is likely that Jam [ Djam? ] Ambassador to Egypt would succeed Saed. The British Ambassador here has expressed to me his great concern and points out that the Russian Embassy’s action began with the departure of Mr. Churchill from Moscow. 72 Vice Commissar Kavtaradze remains in Tehran and shows no disposition to leave. Last night the Shah invited Ambassador Maximov and the Prime Minister to dinner in the hopes of arriving at an understanding. I will learn and report what took place. Sent to Department repeated to Cairo and Moscow. Morris 72 For correspondence regarding British Prime Minister Churchill’s visit to Moscow, see vol. iv , index entry under Churchill, Winston S. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/10–2544: Telegram [Document 491] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 25, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 3:33 p.m.] 781. Following is paraphrase of note I have received from Prime Minister in reply to my note embodying substance of Department’s 622, October 16: “I was exceedingly pleased to learn that the American Government has taken note of the fact that the Iranian Government’s decision to postpone the oil negotiations was done in good faith. I wish to express my Government’s appreciation. When the Iranian Government deems it advisable to reconsider the question of oil development the Embassy will be informed and it goes without saying that applications of American nationals will receive consideration.” Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 761.91/10–2544: Telegram [Document 492] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 25, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 5 p.m.] 782. RefEmbstel 779 of October 24. At the last moment Prime Minister Saed was not included in the dinner invitation of the Shah. Apparently the Shah felt after full reflection that the presence of the Prime Minister and Mr. Maximov together would not be helpful. Those present were Ambassador Maximov, Vice Commissar Kavtaradze, Court Minister Ala and another court functionary who speaks Russian. The Shah attempted to persuade the Russian officials that there was nothing unfriendly towards Russia in the action of his Government in postponing the oil concessions. A long discussion took place and Court Minister Ala is of the opinion that a slight improvement in the atmosphere resulted. He is not under the impression however that the Russians will cease their opposition to Prime Minister Saed. He is inclined to feel now that the Russian Embassy’s attitude may be the result of a personal understanding between Kavtaradze and Maximov in order to save face with their own Government by reason of the failure of the Kavtaradze Mission. However, Ala says that this is only a surmise on his part. To the contrary of this view I recall the Trud newspaper article published in Moscow which must have received official approval there. Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow and Cairo. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 761.91/10–2544: Telegram [Document 493] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 25, 1944—5 p.m. [Received October 26—3:30 p.m.] 783. 1. Soviet military transport authorities here have notified the Iranian Government officials that all transport to and from Tehran and points in Russian zone of Iran (with exception of Soviet military supplies) has been suspended until November 1 with no assurance that it will be resumed even then. While I am informed that supplies of grain here are sufficient to carry over until receipt of new harvest now being gathered the Soviet action may have effect of nullifying certain beneficial regulations which now exempt small grain producers from requirement to sell portion of their crop to Government. Soviet action also harmful just at this time since it stops protective warehousing of newly harvested grain which must be done within next week or so because of bad weather. 2. Other developments of interest this connection: 1. Passage yesterday by Parliament of controversial army bill providing credits for army of 90,000 men by vote of 76 out of 86 members present which is taken to be gesture of Iranian unity for straight Soviet consumption. 2. Press conference held last night by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze in which he is quoted as having stressed benefits to Iran of a Soviet oil concession but hedged as to payment of royalties which he said would be left for future consideration and declared that while Soviet Government’s relations with Iran are friendly collaboration with present government of Saed is impossible. This is first open declaration made by a Soviet official against Saed government which has come to my attention although as noted in my wire 779 of October 24 local Soviet Embassy has been and continues in general opposition to Saed personally. Sent to Department repeated to Moscow and Cairo. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.00/10–2744: Telegram [Document 494] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 27, 1944—4 p.m. [Received October 27—1:35 p.m.] 786. Tudeh (masses) Party 73 started mass demonstration today in front of Majlis demanding ouster of Saed government. While crowd has been estimated as high as 35,000 persons it was completely orderly and though a great quantity of Iranian armed troops, tanks, et cetera appeared there have been no incidents as far as Embassy is aware. Some Soviet troops armed with Tommy guns were present and Soviet sponsorship of the demonstration cannot be questioned. Sent to Department repeated to Moscow. Morris 73 Iranian Communist Party. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/10–2744: Telegram [Document 495] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 27, 1944—5 p.m. [Received October 27—1:30 p.m.] 787. Local press has been informed presumably by Iranian Government of receipt by Prime Minister of my note regarding oil concession presented in accordance with Department’s No. 622, dated October 16. As usual note was badly mangled by Persian press and one purely imaginary statement attributed to my note stating that “Iran is an independent country and therefore free to make its own decisions and determine its own destiny” has aroused curiosity of local Soviet Embassy which has requested copy of actual note in question. I have informed Embassy that Persian version is erroneous but that copy of actual note exchanged by my Government with Iran may not be furnished it without consent of two Governments involved. Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/10–3044: Telegram [Document 496] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , October 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received October 30—1:15 p.m.] 795. Following is exact text of my note to Prime Minister as requested in Department’s 643, October 28: 74 “I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed by my Government to inform Your Excellency’s Government that the American Government has taken note of the Imperial Iranian Government’s decision to postpone all negotiations in connection with petroleum development in Iran. While the two American firms which have gone to considerable expense and effort during the past year in pursuing these negotiations are naturally disappointed my Government is confident that the Iranian authorities were acting in good faith. The American Government expects of course that if and when the Imperial Iranian Government is in a position to consider applications for concessions the applications which American nationals may wish to make will receive no less favorable treatment than the applications made by the nationals or Government of any other country. The American Government furthermore expects that the Imperial Iranian Government will inform it or the interested American companies immediately the Imperial Government is ready to consider applications. Accept Your Excellency the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.” Morris 74 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) 891.6363/10–3044: Telegram [Document 497] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) Washington , October 30, 1944—10 p.m. 2566. You are requested to inform the Soviet authorities that the Government of the United States has observed indications of Soviet annoyance, as demonstrated by articles in the Soviet press 75 and statements by Mr. Kavtaradze, following the recent announcement by the Government of Iran that all negotiations concerning petroleum concessions in Iran have been suspended for the duration. In this connection the American Government desires to let the Soviet authorities know that the American Embassy in Tehran was instructed some days ago to inform the Iranian Government that the American firms which have been negotiating for an oil concession in southern Iran during the past year, at considerable expense and effort, have naturally been disappointed at the Iranian Government’s decision. We have expressed confidence, however, that the Iranian authorities have been conducting these negotiations in good faith, and have let it be known that when negotiations are resumed we expect American firms to be accorded no less favorable treatment than that given to any other foreign national or government. Our policy in this case is based on the American Government’s recognition of the sovereign right of an independent nation such as Iran, acting in a nondiscriminatory manner, to grant or withhold commercial concessions within its territory. We are particularly concerned with the strict application of this policy in Iran, in view of the Declaration signed in Tehran as recently as December 1, 1943, 76 by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill, containing assurances of respect for Iranian sovereignty. In the light of that Declaration, the American Government would not be able, for its part, to concur in any action which would constitute undue interference in the internal affairs of Iran. Sent to Moscow. Repeated to Tehran 77 and London. Stettinius 75 Telegrams 4087, October 25, and 4100, October 26, from Moscow, reporting such indications, not printed; but see Moscow’s telegram 3967, October 17, p. 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , and Doc. 490 ] . 76 For text of Declaration, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 646 ; for correspondence concerning efforts by the United States in 1944 to implement the Declaration, see ante , pp. 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] ff. 77 As telegram 649. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/11–144: Telegram [Document 498] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , November 1, 1944—1 p.m. [Received November 1—11:08 a.m.] 4190. I have sent a note to Molotov 78 this afternoon following closely the line of the Department’s 2566, October 30, 10 p.m. Kennan 78 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.00/11–144: Telegram [Document 499] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , November 1, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 4:50 p.m.] 804. Measures which smack of Hitlerian methods continue to be used in increasing crescendo by the Soviet authorities here. About 8 o’clock on October 30 a serious demonstration took place in Tabriz following upon demands made by the Tudeh (Communist) Party on the Iranian Government to reverse its policy on the petroleum concession demanded by the Russians. A crowd of Iranians most of whom are employed by Russian authorities assembled under the auspices of the Tudeh Party and demonstrated before the police station and the Government Administration Building at Tabriz, These demonstrators were under the leadership of the chief representative of the Tudeh Party in Tabriz. An Iranian officer was beaten up by the crowd in front of the police station and the Iranian police fired on the crowd wounding several people. The crowd then attempted to storm both the police station and the Administration Building. At this juncture Russian troops intervened and dispersed the crowd. About the same time there was an organized attempt at jail break from the city’s prison. The Russian military disarmed the Iranian police and also put a guard around the Iranian Army military barracks. This guard is still maintained and the Iranian soldiers are not permitted to leave the barracks. Iranian officers are permitted to come and go from the building but unarmed. The shops at Resht have been closed in so-called protest against the Iranian Government’s decision not to grant the Russian petroleum concession. Rumors of disorder are trickling in from other points north. The Prime Minister apprehends the possibility of further trouble in Tehran next Friday. The Russian Ambassador and Kavtaradze continue to refuse contact with Prime Minister Saed. Communication between the Russian Embassy and the Government is being conducted by the Iranian Ambassador to Moscow Ahy at present in Tehran who is acting as intermediary. The Russian Ambassador also avoids contact with the Court of [ and? ] the Shah. Last night Mr. Ahy asked Messrs. Maximov and Kavtaradze for an explanation of the Russian interference at Tabriz. They denied that there had been any interference on the part of the Russians. The facts about the demonstration cited above are reported to me personally by Prime Minister Saed and by Court Minister Ala and are confirmed by a telegram from the British Acting Consul General at Tabriz to his Ambassador here. A report from Consul Ebling 79 was requested yesterday by telegram but has not been received. I am trying to get in touch with him through our military sources as I can suspect that nothing [ anything? ] he may have sent by Persian telegraph may have been held up. The Prime Minister has just told me and the British Ambassador that he plans to offer his resignation this afternoon. He believes that this will relieve the tension, at least temporarily. The Shah will accept the resignation reluctantly unless he is given encouragement by the British and American Governments to resist Russian interference. I have just received the Department’s 649 of October 30, 10 p.m. 80 instructing the Embassy at Moscow to make representation to the Soviet authorities and stating that the American Government will not concur in any action which would constitute undue interference in the internal affairs of Iran. That very interference is taking place at the present moment. The British Ambassador has shown me a copy of the Foreign Office’s instructions to Lord Halifax 81 suggesting a concerted representation to the Soviet Government. The British Ambassador here has not received any instructions up to the present to encourage the Iranian Government to resist Soviet oppression. While the Iranian Government deserves our full sympathy in the circumstances which exist, I personally feel that it would be a very grave step to offer it any type of encouragement to resist Russian aggression on the matters at issue unless we are prepared to back up to the ultimate limit the Iranian Government in its opposition. That is something which it appears to me might precipitate a very great divergence, if not a split, at the present time in Soviet-American relations. I should be happy to receive with the utmost urgency any instructions or comment that the Department may feel in a position to give me in regard to policy. I have maintained up to the present a sympathetic but noncommittal and negative attitude to Iranian insistences for support in their dilemma. Sent to Department repeated to Moscow and Baghdad. Morris 79 Samuel G. Ebling, Consul at Tabriz. 80 See footnote 77, p. 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] . 81 British Ambassador at Washington. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.6363/10–2744: Telegram [Document 500] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , November 1, 1944—4 p.m. 653. Urtels 787, Oct. 27 and 795, October 30. You are authorized to give the Soviet and British Ambassadors a copy of your note to the Prime Minister. While concurrence of the Iranian Government is not strictly necessary, you will doubtless wish to clear with Saed. Stettinius The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.00/11–344: Telegram [Document 501] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , November 8, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 4:30 p.m.] 810. Political situation here shows signs of improvement largely because of indications Soviets may be relaxing pressure. Although it is almost certain Tudeh leaders had been planning another demonstration here today they yesterday sent note to Prime Minister urging him to prevent any form of demonstration assenting [ asserting ] they had word Seyid Zia-ed-Din 82 was plotting coup d’état . Simultaneously local Soviet military commander offered Iranian and British commanders his cooperation and assistance if requested in suppressing any disturbance. Encouraged by this and by assurances of Majlis support Prime Minister Saed this morning told British Ambassador he would not resign immediately. Sir Reader today read me British Foreign Office telegram of October 30 to Moscow pointing out methods used by Russians in seeking oil concession seemed out of line with policy set forth in Tehran Declaration regarding Iran and expressing hope Soviet Government would not press matter. Iranian Government has not been informed of this communication nor have I mentioned Department’s similar telegram to Moscow. Although it is still too early to say that there is a real change in Soviet attitude it is possible that American and British notes plus pro-Iranian publicity in London may have decided Russians to back water. It may be significant that Soviet censors here yesterday passed Reuters despatch from London presenting Iranian side of controversy. Sent to Department repeated to Moscow. Morris 82 Seyid Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai, Iranian Deputy in the Majlis. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 761.91/11–344 [Document 502] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) [ Washington ,] November 3, 1944. Dr. Daftary, the Iranian Chargé d’Affaires, called this afternoon at his request. He stated that he had been instruction [ instructed ] to call upon me immediately to advise me of the deplorable relations between Iran and the Soviet Union. He said that the Russians captured many Iranian troops and police in the northern part of the country, had taken their weapons and ammunition, and that the highways had been cut off and large segments of the population left without water and food. He characterized the situation as most distressing and critical and stated that his Government was appealing to the United States to take a firm position with Russia immediately. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 761.91/11–344 [Document 503] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) 83 [ Washington ,] November 3, 1944. Dr. Daftary called on me this afternoon, after his talk with the Acting Secretary of State, under instructions from his Government, regarding the present critical situation of Soviet-Iranian relations. Dr. Daftary, who was in a state of great excitement recounted the various acts of brutality and oppression which he said the Russians visited upon the Iranians as punishment for the refusal by the Iranian Government to grant an oil concession to the Soviets on territories in the northern part of Iran. He pointed out that his Government felt that they had no one else to turn to except the United States for help in this time of need, and his Government trusted that we would lend every possible assistance to bring about a cessation of the present activities of the Russians in Iran. I told Dr. Daftary that we, of course, intended to live up to the provisions, as far as we are concerned, of the Declaration on Iran signed last December in Tehran by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Premier Stalin. He would, of course, have to realize that we are in the midst of a war and that we cannot take any action which would interfere with the conduct of the war and with our vitally important relations with Soviet Russia. He could, however, rest assured that we were studying the situation carefully and that we would be prepared to do anything that might be practicable to bring about a better state of relations between Soviet Russia and Iran. Turning then to some possible steps that might be taken by the Iranians themselves, I observed that according to information which we had received the Shah had had in mind the possible desirability of sending a special emissary to Moscow to discuss the situation fully with Stalin. I asked whether there was any likelihood of such a procedure being followed since, as he was well aware, it was often possible to settle problems of this kind by direct negotiation rather than by note-writing or protests. I mentioned in this connection that we had noted with special interest the fact that when Mr. Stalin was in Tehran during the conference last December, he had called upon the Shah personally and spent two hours with him. This seemed to be a good augury for the re-establishment of personal relations with Mr. Stalin that might give some promise of reaching an amicable settlement of the present difficulties. Dr. Daftary replied that no one in Iran, with the possible exception of the Prime Minister himself, was sufficiently acquainted with the Soviet mentality and the Russian language to undertake such a mission. In reply to my suggestion that Mr. Ala, Minister of Court, was a highly accomplished negotiator, Dr. Daftary observed that Mr. Ala could, of course, negotiate with people like ourselves or the British, but that he would be totally inadequate to deal with people like the Russians. In assuring Dr. Daftary that we would, of course, examine this situation sympathetically with a view to rendering such assistance as might be possible, in view of the exigencies of the war, my own advice to him and to his people was not to take the situation too tragically; to bear in mind that Iran, with its ancient history, has gone through many crises far more serious than the present one; and that with patience and good will which they should endeavor to inspire in the Russians they might be able to pass successfully through the present crisis, however dark the situation might look at the present time. During my discussion of this situation I expressed my surprise that there should be any newspapers in Iran today who would lend themselves to exploitation by any foreign powers for the purpose of rendering the position of the Iranian Government more precarious than it would otherwise have been. I also observed that in similar crises in the past the Iranians have found it possible, through a strong stand taken by the Medjliss, to resist demands from foreign powers which they believed to be unjust. A case in point was, of course, the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919 84 which the British sought to impose upon the Iranians without success because of opposition in the Medjliss. I also recalled that the Iranian Constitution requires that all foreign concessions in the country must be approved by the Medjliss in order to obtain validity. In other words, and returning again to my original advice, I said I hoped the Iranians would not take this situation too tragically but would exert every effort on their part to win over the Russians to a more friendly attitude in the spirit of the tripartite Declaration on Iran signed by the Russians, the British and ourselves. Dr. Daftary thanked me for the remarks I made to him but it was obvious that he has little hope of any outcome of the present crisis that will be favorable to his country. 83 Copy transmitted on November 4 to the Under Secretary of State by Mr. Murray under a covering memorandum which stated in part “… the situation has fortunately greatly improved due, I feel sure, to the firm but friendly representations which we made on November 1, through our Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Government”. (761.91/11–344) 84 Signed at Tehran August 9, 1919, Foreign Relations , 1919, vol. ii , p. 703 . The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 761.91/11–444: Telegram [Document 504] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , November 4, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 10:18 p.m.] 813. Further reports indicating change in Soviet attitude give increasingly hopeful tinge to local picture. Iranian Chief of Staff says Russian restrictions on Iranian troops Tabriz have been removed and situation there restored to status quo ante . He also states his reports indicate all quiet throughout Russian zone. Soviet military here and Tabriz appear to be trying to explain, minimize or disavow reported arbitrary actions of officer commanding at Tabriz and have suggested formation of mixed Soviet and Iranian military commission to investigate. (Purely Iranian mission to investigate recent events has either left or is supposed about to leave for Tabriz.) Soviet railroad authorities today informed Cereals and Bread Section 85 they had accepted proposed program for rail movement of grain south to Tehran during November. If made in good faith this statement means that ban imposed by Russians October 16 on civilian goods transport to and from northern zone has been lifted. Unconfirmed report originating in Iranian Foreign Office says Kavtaradze has been recalled to Moscow. Sent to Department repeated to Moscow and Tabriz. Morris 85 Of the Millspaugh Mission. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 761.91/11–544: Telegram [Document 505] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , November 5, 1944—5 p.m. [Received November 6—12:53 p.m.] 819. During conversation with Soviet Ambassador Maximov on November 3 British Ambassador expressed hope differences between Soviet Embassy and Iranian Government over oil concession would be adjusted. Maximov seemed to have great difficulty controlling himself and replied that there had never been any dispute over oil concession, that difficulty was solely with Saed personally. From this and reports received through sources close to Soviet Embassy Bullard thinks Russians have decided to take line that Saed is personally unfriendly to USSR and tinged with fascism and that this rather than refusal of concession is cause of their dissatisfaction. Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow. Morris The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/11–744: Telegram [Document 506] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , November 7, 1944—7 p.m. [Received November 8—6:39 a.m.] 4266. No specific background is available here on Soviet action in northern Iran other than what has been reported in the press. Judging from this and from the general pattern of Soviet methods and reactions the following thoughts suggest themselves. 1. The basic motive of recent Soviet action in northern Iran is probably not need for the oil itself but apprehension of potential foreign penetration in that area coupled with the concern for prestige which marks all Soviet policy these days. The oil of northern Iran is important not as something Russia needs but as something it might be dangerous to permit anyone else to exploit. The territory lies near the vital Caucasian oil centers which so closely escaped complete conquest in the present war. The Kremlin deems it essential to Russian security that no other great power should have even the chance of gaining a footing there. It probably sees no other way to assure this than by seeking greater political and economic control for itself and finds this aim consistent with contemporary Soviet conceptions of prestige. If the methods employed in this connection seem unimaginative and old-fashioned it must be remembered that there is extensive preoccupation in Moscow today with the methods as well as the aims of Tsarist diplomacy. 2. The Russians may think that we are opposing their political program in northern Iran. They may even suspect that with this in mind we have hinted to the Iranians we would rather forego concessions ourself than see the Russians get them. Viewed against this background our note to the Iranian Government could appear to them a clever and effective move on the chess board. 3. Unable to proceed in pressing for oil concessions without risk of drawing us still further into the picture and of attracting unfavorable publicity, Moscow may well now drop the oil issue and the policy of intimidation for the time being and set about to undermine those individuals, particularly Saed, who are considered to have loaned themselves to the creation of this set of circumstances. If this course should be adopted the oil question would then probably be held in abeyance until conditions were more auspicious. 4. Too much importance should not be attached to Kavtaradze’s personal role. It is not likely that he took any important step except on Moscow’s instructions. If there has been any question of his prestige it is because the Soviet Government saw its own prestige involved in his rank and position. The fact that he was granted the Order of Lenin 3 or 4 days ago hardly indicates he is being blamed for anything in connection with his present mission. 5. Among foreign observers here the most charitable interpretation of Izvestia’s unenthusiastic reference to American forces in Iran is that it was designed to make Soviet action look relatively legitimate. The more critical view associates it with the prospects for early opening of the Black Sea route for supplies to Russia. Sent to Department. Repeated to Tehran as No. 69. Kennan The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 761.91/11–744: Telegram [Document 507] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , November 7, 1944—9 p.m. 666. Although articles regarding the Iranian situation continue to appear in the American press with a Moscow dateline, only one story direct from Tehran has been seen here recently. Today’s Associated Press article, datelined Moscow, quotes a Tass report from Tehran alleging continued demonstrations against Saed in northern Iran. The fact that virtually all of the telegraphic news in American papers concerning Iran is being sent from Moscow naturally gives the American public a distorted view of conditions. Our Embassy in London reports that Reuter messages filed from Tehran are appearing in the British press. Please report whether failure of American press representatives to send stories direct from Tehran is due to inactivity or to continued censorship difficulties. If the latter, you are requested to use every endeavor to obtain equality of treatment for American press services. This would appear to be an appropriate subject for tripartite discussions with your British and Soviet colleagues, within the framework established for the settlement of problems locally by frank and friendly interchange of views. Dept places considerable importance upon the functioning of this arrangement, which was established as a result of discussions in London last April. 86 Stettinius 86 For correspondence regarding this arrangement, see pp. 322–336 [ Pgs. 322–336 include portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , and Doc. 338 ] , passim . The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 761.91/11–844: Telegram [Document 508] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , November 8, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:15 p.m.] 830. Three days ago Soviet censor in Iran held up five clear telegrams from Iranian ForOf to Iranian Missions abroad setting forth Iranian side of oil concession dispute. At request of Soviet Ambassador who refuses to speak to Prime Minister, British Ambassador asked Saed to send future telegrams of this sort in code to which latter agreed. Today Russian censor informed British censor he had definitely stopped two official Iranian code telegrams, one addressed to Washington. It is assumed these are code versions of clear telegrams held up November 5. British Ambassador has so far been unsuccessful in attempts to get explanation of this Soviet action which violates Anglo-Soviet-Iranian censorship agreement 87 providing that Iranian Government is free to send any type of message in code or clear without interference. Sent to Department repeated to Moscow as No. 72. Morris 87 The framework of British and Soviet communications responsibilities in Iran was stipulated in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance signed at Tehran, January 29, 1942, British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxliv , p. 1017; for correspondence concerning attitude of the United States toward this treaty, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 263 ff. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.002/11–944: Telegram [Document 509] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , November 9, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 4:05 p.m.] 832. Saed Cabinet resigned this afternoon. Sent to Department repeated to Moscow. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 761.91/11–1544: Telegram [Document 510] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , November 15, 1944—8 p.m. [Received November 17—1:20 a.m.] 847. On instructions from Foreign Minister Eden British Ambassador presented oral protest to Russian Ambassador Maximov stating Russian action in holding up and suppressing Iranian Government telegrams was in direct violation of agreement entered into by Great Britain and Soviet Union with Iranian Government. Maximov replied Russian censor here acted on instructions of Russian military authorities in Iran whose action was motivated by their own estimation that Iran had become hostile to Russia. Russian Ambassador appeared completely embarrassed and quickly passed responsibility to Vice Commissar Kavtaradze. He said he would take up matter with Commissar who would answer in name of Foreign Commissar Molotov. British Ambassador has not yet received a reply to his démarche which took place day before yesterday. He believes and so do I that matter has been referred to Moscow to determine nature of reply. In view of his having received instructions to protest formally the Russian censorship action Bullard did not believe that a tripartite talk would be of utility or appropriate at present time as suggested in Department’s telegram No. 666, November 7. Nevertheless I decided to take up matter with Russian Ambassador myself. I had a long conversation with him this morning: I took attitude I was acting on my own initiative to express in friendly fashion my view that it was not helpful to Russia’s own interest to have censored press despatches intended to be sent to the great American news agencies by our local correspondents. I said this step not unnaturally aroused some misgiving in American press and through the press, in the public, as to the nature and intent of Russian actions in Iran. I expressed feeling that if American news agencies had been allowed to carry reports of their own correspondents in American press simultaneously with what came out from Moscow that the Russian position and the thesis on which it was built would have been better presented. I expanded this general theme considerably and rather insistently. I believe my colleague was somewhat impressed by the argument. He defended Russian position, however, by counter stroke; he asserted in all the [Millspaugh?] controversy [nothing?] had appeared in Russian press detr[imental] to American financial mission. He said he was responsible for this attitude. He further said the Russian press had carried nothing about negotiations between Anglo-American petroleum companies and Iranian Government prior to arrival of Russian official delegation here. He put forward thought that right manner for tripartite understanding on matters of this nature in Iran was for each member nation to refrain from any comment upon actions of other members in respect to negotiations or undertakings with Iranian Government as long as matter at hand concerned only Iranian Government and one of tripartite members. I answered that his course might have tendency to keep from the public legitimate news of world interest and in the end would not serve interests of powers concerned or of Iran itself. Maximov did not insist very far on this theme. The upshot of our conversation was that Maximov has agreed to review personally with me any future case where an American press correspondent has his material withheld by Russian military censor. Whether this arrangement will have any value only a test can show. I have instructed our correspondents here to submit to Embassy at once any case in point. When Russian Embassy reply is given to British Ambassador I will forward it to Department. Repeated to Moscow and London. Morris The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/11–2044: Telegram [Document 511] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , November 20, 1944—7 p.m. [Received November 20—5:45 p.m.] 4438. ReDepts 2566, October 30, 10 p.m. I called on the British Ambassador 88 at his suggestion on November 18 and he showed me instructions he had from Eden requesting him to take up with Molotov the questions raised in the British note of November 2 with respect to Soviet action in Iran which was along lines somewhat similar to ours. It was proposed to him in these instructions that he ask Molotov for an explanation of Soviet policy in the light of what had occurred since that time. He had decided to reply to his Government stating that he thought it would be unwise to approach Molotov with such a request, that it might only cause the Russians to dig their toes in just at a moment when it looked as though there might be a possibility of their shifting ground. He asked me whether he might say that I agreed with this view. I told him that I agreed with him that it would probably serve no useful purpose to ask Molotov for an explanation of Soviet policy as this would presumably only elicit the usual recitation of the Soviet position as we know it from the press. I had no objection to his saying that I associated myself with his recommendation although I was not optimistic as to the permanency of any Russian shifting of ground. I repeated to him in this connection the views which I set forth to the Department in my 4266, November 7, 7 p.m. I told him that I could think of no action on our part which would tend to apply the brakes to Soviet action in Iran except possibly an intimation that this subject might or might not—depending on Soviet action in the meantime—have to come up for discussion in the light of the Tehran Declaration at the next meeting of Marshal Stalin with the President and Prime Minister Churchill whenever that might take place. I believe the British Ambassador incorporated this thought into his telegram. I think I made it clear to the British Ambassador that I do not mean by this to suggest that the subject should be made in any way a formal matter of agenda for any future meetings. I did mean that the only thing I could think of which might serve to deter the Russians from projecting further their present line of action in Iran would be the thought that if they went too far they might have to explain such action in the light of the Tehran Declaration when another meeting occurs. Whether it is desirable from the broader standpoint of policy that such a thought should be intimated to them at this time is another question the merits of which could be appraised only in Washington. Kennan 88 Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/11–2244: Telegram [Document 512] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kennan ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , November 22, 1944—10 p.m. [Received November 23—10:46 a.m.] 4459. ReEmbs 4438, November 20, 7 p.m. On November 20 the British Ambassador sent a letter to Molotov inviting a clarification of Russian intentions in Iran. He pointed out the reports received from Tehran at the time of the resignation of the Saed government indicated that for the time being the Soviet Government did not intend to press further the question of oil concessions in northern Iran but that Kavtaradze’s continued presence in Iran and the tone of certain press articles on the situation there seemed to indicate otherwise. His Government felt some concern on this account, he wrote, because it was of real importance in their view that the cosignatories of the Tehran Declaration should pursue a policy toward Iran conceived on similar lines and followed in consultation between each other. The letter pointed to public expressions of uneasiness in England about this situation and suggested that Soviet Government let it be known that it had agree[d], in common with the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom, that the whole question of oil concessions in Iran should now be left until after the war. Communication was the result of further exchanges which the British Ambassador had had with his Government over the week-end. Sent to Department, repeated to Tehran. Kennan Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) 761.91/11–2444 [Document 513] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Alling ) 89 [ Washington ,] November 24, 1944. Michael Wright of the British Embassy called yesterday to review the various steps which have been taken in regard to Soviet pressure on Iran. On November 18 Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador at Moscow, reported in reply to inquiry from the Foreign Office that he believed that some kind of reiteration of the British position would be desirable in order to check the headlong progress of the Soviet policy in Iran. However, Clark Kerr said that he doubted the wisdom of asking Molotov the meaning of Soviet activities. He felt that any such query during a visit to Molotov would bring nothing but denials and prevarications. At the same time Clark Kerr thought it would be well to let Molotov know that the British had an eye on him, and he therefore proposed that something be said in writing. He was inclined to believe that an intimation might be given in such a communication that if the Iranian question was not settled soon it would obviously have to come up at the next meeting of the Big Three. London’s reply to the foregoing message was that if Clark Kerr felt it would be better to write rather than to speak to Molotov, that was quite acceptable. However, the Foreign Office did not feel that it was desirable at the present juncture to suggest the possibility of the Iranian situation being brought to the attention of the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin. The Foreign Office explained that it took this viewpoint partly because consultation with the United States would be necessary before any such statement as Clark Kerr proposed could be made to Molotov. On the same day, November 20, the Foreign Office telegraphed to Tehran, urging the Ambassador there to do all he could to keep the Iranians “in heart”. On the same day a second telegram was sent to Tehran agreeing with the Ambassador’s views that the effect would be bad if it became clear that the Russian methods had succeeded in accomplishing their purpose. The hope was expressed therefore, that the Embassy would do its utmost to see that the new Prime Minister followed Saed’s policy. I told Mr. Wright that the foregoing had been my understanding of the situation, although I believed some of our people gained the impression that the British Ambassador in Moscow was not in favor of making any communication to the Soviet Government. I told Mr. Wright that the present situation, so far as we were concerned, was that we proposed to wait until we had heard from Mr. Harriman who was planning to stop off in Tehran en route to his post at Moscow. Mr. Wright said he agreed that it was important not to give the Russians the impression that the British and Americans were “ganging up” on them. At the same time he felt it was equally important to avoid the impression that one Government was taking a greater interest in the Iranian problem than the other. I told Mr. Wright it seemed to me there was some advantage in spacing our respective representations so as to make clear that there was a continuing interest on the part of both of us. 89 Addressed to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray), the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen), and Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/11–2544: Telegram [Document 514] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , November 25, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 5:39 p.m.] 871. Prime Minister Bayat has told British Ambassador he would follow same policy as his predecessor in regard to Russian desire to obtain oil concession. Ambassador Bullard does not appear to feel confident Bayat will not yield under pressure. Vice Commissar Kavtaradze still here and there is nothing to indicate he does not intend to stay. Under instruction from Foreign Office Bullard is informing Shah through Court Minister Ala that British Government made representations to Soviet Government with respect to oil controversy and interference in Iranian internal affairs. Bullard says he will not disclose precise terms of representations, but will say Iranian position met sympathetic attention from British public which was shared by his Government. He will further add if any compromise or change of position is contemplated by Iranian Government under Bayat the British Government should be informed immediately. Bullard with consent of his Government is apparently preparing to endeavor to keep Iranian Government firm in policy which Saed adopted. At present I have impression this is somewhat of personal policy recommended by Bullard and accepted by Foreign Office. He would be happy if we adopted same line. I have no evidence that present Iranian Government has any intention to change its policy towards Russians. In conversation with Court Minister Ala he seemed very confident the Government would continue Saed policy. Same expression of feeling has been conveyed to me by Chief of Protocol and one or two other officials. I am not inclined to recommend we follow British initiative for moment, at least, unless Department feels once Iranians have been informed of British representations they should know for a matter of our own prestige we likewise intervened on their behalf. I should be glad to receive any comment as to policy to pursue in these circumstances. Sent Department; repeated London, Moscow. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/11–3044: Telegram [Document 515] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] Tehran , November 30, 1944—2 p.m. [Received November 30—1:35 p.m.] 882. I had a long conversation with the Shah who invited me to come to see him the day before yesterday. His Majesty took occasion to affirm that he had not changed his mind in any way in regard to the Russian concessions. He added that Prime Minister Bayat had given assurance that he would follow the policy of Saed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Shah felt that Iranian policy would be reinforced and made clearly evident if a new government which had not negotiated with anyone on petroleum would come into power and maintain the policy of no negotiation about concessions until after the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Iran. He felt strongly that it was more logical and defensible to hinge concession negotiations upon withdrawal of foreign troops rather than upon the termination of the war in Europe. He felt the Iranian public would understand and approve this viewpoint. The Shah’s remarks on other matters were of a general nature and not worthy of comment but I think I should say that his attitude was distinctly more friendly than in any previous audience. I had sent him previously clippings from the American press discussing favorably the Iranian position in the Russian controversy. This had evidently had a markedly good effect and the Shah expressed his satisfaction at the understanding shown in the US in regard to the position of his country in respect to the Russian issue. Morris The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.6363/11–2544: Telegram [Document 516] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , November 30, 1944—7 p.m. 702. Urtel 871, November 25. You may inform the Iranian Government that this Government addressed a note to the Soviet Government with regard to the oil controversy. You may add that the Soviet Government was informed of the position taken by this Government in the matter as set forth in your note to the Iranian Government (urtel 795, October 30) and was told that our action was based on the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943. Stettinius The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/12–344: Telegram [Document 517] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 3, 1944. [Received December 7—1:08 a.m.] 895. The Majlis yesterday received and enacted during the same session the following introduced by Dr. Mossadegh. 90 “Article 1. No Prime Minister or Minister or Acting Minister or Under Secretary of State may undertake any official discussions or discussions having a local character or sign any agreement regarding a petroleum concession with official or unofficial representatives of neighboring or distant governments or with representatives of oil companies or with any other person. Article 2. The Prime Minister and the Ministers may undertake negotiations for the sale of petroleum and with regard to the manner in which the Iranian Government is to exploit and administer its oil wells; the Majlis must however be informed of the progress of the negotiations. Article 3. Any person or persons violating the above provisions will be sentenced to from 3 to 8 years of imprisonment and will be permanently debarred from Government office.” Sent to Department repeated to Moscow, London, Cairo, Baghdad. Morris 90 Mohammed Mossadegh, Deputy in the Majlis. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/12–544: Telegram [Document 518] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 5, 1944—noon. [Received 4:40 p.m.] 900. ReEmbs 895, December 3. Law forbidding oil concession negotiations with foreign representatives was put through the Majlis in 2 hours from time of presentation, meeting only feeble opposition. The success of this tour de force was undoubtedly made possible only by the personal prestige of Dr. Mossadegh but the brevity of the debate and certain other indications point to the possibility that a large group of Deputies knew of the project in advance and had agreed to act quickly in order to forestall opponents. If this was the case, however, they seem to have maintained complete secrecy as there was no advance hints or rumors of the move. Tudeh Deputies from whom real opposition might have been expected appear to have been taken absolutely by surprise and could only make technical objections and plead almost abjectly for time to consider the bill, a request which was briskly denied by the majority. A story to which I am inclined to give considerable credence says that the bill was prepared in consultation with Saed and Court Minister Ala. Another rumor attributes it to British inspiration, but I have no reason to believe this was the case. Mossadegh himself said the idea was given him by another Deputy some weeks ago. Whatever the source, the law is entirely in accord with Mossadegh’s previous public statements and bears the marks of his handiwork. From the one point of view the law is superfluous since the Iranian Constitution has always required that any projected concession be approved by the Majlis before taking effect. However, its significance under present circumstances is clear. At one and the same time it ratifies in effect the oil policy of the Saed Cabinet and specifically takes the question of such policy out of the hands of the present and any future Cabinet. It provides the Government with extremely strong defense against future pressure or persuasion which will now have to be directed at the Majlis, a more difficult target for attack by virtue of its numbers. Article 2 of the law has reference to a proposal frequently put forward in recent weeks by some Deputies and newspapers that Iran should form an organization of its own to exploit and market petroleum. In his speech on December 2 Mossadegh urged the creation of a Petroleum Ministry to undertake this task and proposed that the products be sold to the Soviets or any other interested country at the world market price; he envisaged employment of foreign technical assistance but under Iranian administration. Press reaction will be forwarded when analyzed. Morris The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/12–644: Telegram [Document 519] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 6, 1944—3 p.m. [Received December 8—9:45 p.m.] 907. ReEmbs 900 of December 5. On December 2 Ambassador Harriman 91 and I paid a call upon the British Ambassador. While we were talking, Sir Reader was called to the telephone and informed that the Majlis had just passed the law forbidding negotiations with foreigners on oil concessions. Sir Reader, both by word and in manner, registered complete surprise and I am confident that he had no previous knowledge of this action and therefore any stories to the effect that this measure was British-inspired I think are without foundation. From the British Embassy Mr. Harriman and I proceeded to the Russian Embassy to call upon the Ambassador and Vice Commissar Kavtaradze. 92 Interpretation was carried out by Major Pantuhoff of General Connolly’s 92a staff and an English-speaking secretary of the Russian Embassy was also present. We remained about an hour with the Soviet representatives and the atmosphere was entirely cordial insofar as Russian-American affairs are concerned, some aspects of which were briefly touched upon. The attitude of the Soviet officials towards the Government of Persia was one of contempt and sarcasm intermingled with an air of injured innocence. Ambassador Maximov was the more outspoken relative to relations with Persia. He also had just learned of the action of the Majlis. He expressed the view that it was the United States and the Soviets who were the losers by this action and addressing himself to me by name made a broad hint that we might put our heads together to contemplate defensive steps. It was pretty clear he had in mind that the British being already established would benefit by the exclusion of Russian and American interests in regard to oil. He disclosed somewhat his line of thought by asserting that new elections for the Majlis would have to be held within 5 months and it was possible to expect that Deputies might be elected who would not hold the views on oil concessions which the present Deputies appeared to possess as judged by their resolution. There can be little doubt that he was thinking of influencing the selection of Deputies and perhaps meant to implant the same thought in my mind. He spoke of the wretchedness of the Persian working classes which he attributed to the exploitation by the 500 (according to his enumeration) ruling families who owned the land and exchanged governmental positions amongst themselves in rotation. He suggested that such a government could not be of an enduring nature. At this juncture Kavtaradze interrupted to highlight the conversation by quoting from Lord Byron to the effect that while waiting for empires to crumble slowly it occurred that an empire might disappear overnight. I have so far been unable to find the quotation. I do not know whether Lord Byron was correctly cited. However, rightly or wrongly, there is no doubt as to what Kavtaradze had in mind. Mr. Harriman tactfully attempted to find out when Kavtaradze thought of returning to Moscow. The Commissar replied good humoredly that he was enjoying a vacation here which was doing him a lot of good. That is about as far as we got on that point. Ambassador Harriman was shown the recently unveiled plaque in commemoration of the historic meeting of last November 93 and we took our departure in an atmosphere of cordiality. Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow, Cairo, Baghdad and London. Morris 91 Ambassador Harriman was returning to the Soviet Union from the United States. 92 For Ambassador Harriman’s report of this conversation, see last paragraph of his telegram 4771, December 11, 6 p.m., p. 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] . 92a Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, Commander of the Persian Gulf Service Command. 93 The Tehran Conference. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 761.91/12–844 [Document 520] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington , December, 1944. 94 As agreed in our recent conversation, I present below for your convenience, a summary of the status of Soviet-Iranian relations and a recommendation as to this Government’s attitude. The British Government has taken up again with the Soviet Government the question of Soviet pressure on Iran which has resulted in the resignation of the Iranian Prime Minister and which, while it appeared to have relaxed for a brief time, is now apparently being renewed. The British are basing their plea for the respect of Iranian sovereignty on the Declaration of Iran of December 1, 1943 and on the tripartite British-Soviet-Iranian treaty. Mr. Eden hopes very much that the American Government will also press the Russians to respect Iranian sovereignty. We are of course following the developments in Iran with the closest attention, and should be prepared to make representations to the Soviet Government if the situation appears to warrant such a step. I am not yet convinced that we should immediately take up the question with the Russians as the British request but would like to have your approval in advance in order that we may be able to take quick action if that appears necessary. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. 94 Notation by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen): “Apparently went to the White House without a date. Probably about Dec. 6.” The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 761.91/12–844: Telegram [Document 521] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 8, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 7 p.m.] 917. ReDepts memo of conversation with Michael Wright November 25 [ 24 ]. Since Saed’s resignation on November 9, I have heard of no action by Soviet Embassy or Kavtaradze which could be clearly construed as undue interference with internal Iranian affairs. Minor incidents continue to occur but they do not appear serious although it is, of course, possible that a new flare-up may come at any time. Therefore, it would not appear that recent actions by responsible Soviet authorities here have been such as to warrant at this moment new representations to Soviet Government regarding its policy in Iran. Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow and London. Morris Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State 761.91/12–844 [Document 522] Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State [ Warm Springs, Georgia ,] December 8, 1944. I think this Soviet-Iranian matter should be taken up by Harriman with Stalin in person. The Teheran agreement was pretty definite and my contribution was to suggest to Stalin and Churchill that three or four Trustees build a new port in Iran at the head of the Persian Gulf (free port), take over the whole railroad from there into Russia, and run the thing for the good of all. Stalin’s comment was merely that it was an interesting idea and he offered no objection. F[ ranklin ] D. R[ oosevelt ] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/12–944: Telegram [Document 523] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 9, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 18—11:03 a.m.] 918. Court Minister Ala told me today Soviet Ambassador Maximov and Kavtaradze had called on Prime Minister Bayat 2 or 3 days ago and Maximov had read statement to effect that Soviet Government considered passage of law forbidding oil negotiations as objectionable and obstructive and felt that it should be revised. Bayat replied that even if he wished he could do nothing about it since it was a law enacted by the legislature. Kavtaradze left by air for Moscow this morning. To Department as No. 918; repeated Moscow as 112; repeated London. Morris Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 761.91/12–844 [Document 524] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) 95 [ Washington ,] December 11, 1944. The attached memorandum to the President 96 on Soviet-Iranian relations represents the considered views of this Office, after consultation with Mr. Bohlen. Our proposed memorandum tells the story and I will therefore not amplify it here. Needless to say, all of us and Mr. Bohlen are in complete agreement that it would be a great mistake to proceed along the lines suggested in the President’s underlying memorandum of December 8, 1944. 96a To take such action now might well cause the whole house to fall in on our heads, and we do not see how we could properly act in the sense suggested by the President without full prior consultation and approval of the British who are parties with us to the Declaration on Iran, signed just a year ago. Wallace Murray 95 Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn). 96 Apparently the memorandum, or a draft thereof, which went to President Roosevelt under the date of December 18, infra . 96a Ante , p. 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] . Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 761.91/12–844 [Document 525] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [ Washington ,] December 18, 1944. Your memorandum of December 8, 1944 suggested that Harriman take up with Stalin the question of difficulties between the Soviet Union and Iran. Fortunately, a telegram from Ambassador Morris in Tehran dated December 8, 97 reports that since the Iranian Government resigned last month, Morris has heard of no action by the Russians which could clearly be construed as further undue interference in internal Iranian affairs. An approach by us to the Russians at this moment might aggravate the situation, causing the Russians to flare up with a harder policy against Iran than ever. I believe it would be a mistake for Harriman to approach Stalin at the moment, as long as there is a possibility that the tension in Iran is easing. We are following the developments minutely, and are keeping Harriman posted. If you concur, we will instruct him to stand by, to be ready to act when the proper moment comes. I should like to talk with you about the free port-railway trusteeship plan at one of our early meetings. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. 97 Telegram 917, p. 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] . Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State 761.91/12–1944 [Document 526] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] December 19, 1944. Mr. Secretary : On December 8, 1944 the President said, in a memorandum to you, that he thought Harriman should talk with Stalin regarding an international trusteeship to operate the Iranian railways and a port on the Persian Gulf. In your memorandum of December 18, you informed the President that you would like to talk with him regarding the trusteeship plan. In any conversation you may have with the President on the subject, you may wish to have in mind the following considerations: The high motives which prompted the President’s suggestion are obvious. An honest international trusteeship for the railway and port could serve both Iran and Russia profitably, and might conceivably aid in preventing Soviet aggression against Iran. However, those of us in the Department who have considered the idea are unanimous in our view that it would be impossible to make the trusteeship plan attractive to the Iranians at this time. No matter how it might be drawn up, it would look to Iran, and I am confident to the rest of the world, like power politics and old-world-imperialism. The Iranians made the most strenuous efforts, with much self-denial, to build the railroad themselves, at a cost of some $150,000,000, without foreign borrowings, and their ownership of it, is a matter of the most intense patriotic pride. Our experts on Soviet Russia are most dubious that Russia would be interested, at least for the present, in an international trusteeship or would participate in it in the genuine manner intended by the President. The British, moreover, would doubtless raise strenuous objections. Britain’s policy for a hundred years has been to prevent Russia or any other great power from establishing itself on the Persian Gulf, and there is no indication that British policy has changed in this respect. There is, in fact, sound reason for the continuation of this policy. If we proceed on the assumption that the continuance of the British Empire in some reasonable strength is in the strategic interests of the United States (and I understand the strategists of the War Department proceed on this assumption), it is necessary to protect the vital communications of the Empire between Europe and the Far East. Britain has always tried desperately to keep Russians, whether of the Czarist or Soviet variety, away from the Persian Gulf, and will doubtless continue to do so. The foregoing considerations might possibly be brushed aside if there were any reason for confidence that the Soviets would participate in an international trusteeship on the high principles the President has in mind. We would be deluding ourselves, however, if we built our plans on such hopes. Wallace Murray The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.6363/12–2144: Telegram [Document 527] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , December 21, 1944—noon. [Received 10:10 p.m.] 942. Re Embassy’s 918 December 9. Foreign Minister Entezam has told British Ambassador that Soviet Ambassador Maximov called on him 2 or 3 days ago to say that following Kavtaradze’s return to Moscow and consultations with him there Soviet Government saw no reason to modify its view that law prohibiting oil negotiations was ill advised and should be modified. (Sent Department as 942 repeated Moscow as 129 and to London.) Morris Representations to the United Kingdom and Iran regarding American postwar civil air rights in Iran, especially at Abadan Island Representations to the United Kingdom and Iran regarding American postwar civil air rights in Iran, especially at Abadan Island [528] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, July 7, 1944—8 p.m. 891.6363/7–744: Telegram [529] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 13, 1944—3 p.m. [Received July 13—11:45 a.m.] 811.248/7–1344: Telegram [530] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, July 18, 1944—6 p.m. 811.248/7–1344: Telegram [531] The Third Secretary of Legation in Iran (Calhoun) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 18, 1944—7 p.m. [Received July 18—2:20 p.m.] 811.248/7–1844: Telegram [532] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 21, 1944—9 p.m. [Received July 21—1:10 p.m.] 811.248/7–2144: Telegram [533] The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received July 31—1:55 p.m.] 811.248/7–3044: Telegram [534] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, July 31, 1944—4 p.m. 811.248/7–2144: Telegram [535] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, September 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received September 30—3:51 p.m.] 891.248/9–3044: Telegram [536] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax) Washington, October 19, 1944. 800.7962/10–1944 [537] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , October 30, 1944. 891.248/10–3044 [538] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 16, 1944. [Received November 28.] 891.796/11–1644 [539] The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 21, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 4 p.m.] 891.248/11–2144: Telegram [540] The American Embassy in Iran to the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs Tehran , November 27, 1944. 891.796/12–2744 [541] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) Washington, November 29, 1944—8 p.m. 891.248/11–2144: Telegram [542] The American Embassy in Iran to the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs Tehran, December 11, 1944. 891.248/12–1144 The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 891.6363/7–744: Telegram [Document 528] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , July 7, 1944—8 p.m. 411. Military Attaché 98 Tehran has informed the War Department that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has reportedly applied to the Iranian Government to buy the land at Abadan 99 on which the United States air field, camp and assembly plant have been built. Such a purchase, it is thought, would be a serious blow to the large American investment involved and to eventual postwar rights on the fields. Please give the Department urgently any information you may obtain on this subject. Hull 98 Col. Joseph K. Baker. 99 Island 40 miles long by 2 to 12 miles wide in the Shatt-al-Arab delta in western Iran; the town of Abadan on the island is the terminus of the oil pipe line from Masjid-i-Sulaiman, one of the important oil fields of western Iran, and has large oil refineries. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 811.248/7–1344: Telegram [Document 529] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , July 13, 1944—3 p.m. [Received July 13—11:45 a.m.] 498. Department’s 411 July 7. Iranian Government Administration of Public Domains informally states land on which our Abadan installations are built is public domain and that Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has recently filed application to occupy it under provisions of its concession. I hope to have further details in next few days. There appears no danger that early action will be taken on application which would require approval of Cabinet. PGC 1 has received instructions from War Department to block any attempt at purchase of land in question and has requested Legation to act accordingly through Iranian Government circles but I have so far confined myself to informal inquiries regarding facts. If it develops that application might prejudice our interests I suggest that in interest of mutual American British understanding it would be better for Legation to approach British Embassy frankly and endeavor to reach adjustment rather than ask Iranian Government officially to refute [ refuse ] request. Ford 1 Persian Gulf Command, the service command of the United States Army charged with the mission of operating a supply route across Iran for the transit of lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union, Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly commanding. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 811.248/7–1344: Telegram [Document 530] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , July 18, 1944—6 p.m. 434. Your 498, July 13, 3 p.m. For your information Department is advising British Government of its intent to seek commercial air transport rights in Middle Eastern countries where funds have been expended to construct or improve airport facilities, that it does not seek ownership, control or exclusive rights and that it trusts no objection will be interposed by British Government. Please consult British Embassy. We desire that no change in present status be made without adequate provision for protection of present United States operations, disposition of property after the war and securing of commercial rights. Department should be kept fully informed. Hull The Third Secretary of Legation in Iran (Calhoun) to the Secretary of State 811.248/7–1844: Telegram [Document 531] The Third Secretary of Legation in Iran ( Calhoun ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , July 18, 1944—7 p.m. [Received July 18—2:20 p.m.] 513. Reference Legation’s 498, July 13. Further discreet inquiries regarding Abadan Island property have only confirmed that Anglo-Iranian has applied to acquire an area which probably includes at least part of our military installations. I hesitate to pursue investigations before approaching British since I interpret understanding reached at London by Under Secretary 2 to mean that possible sources of misunderstanding such as this should be frankly discussed before these parties have opportunity to misinterpret them. I am afraid Legation’s informal questions may already have given some Iranian officials idea we and British are out to cut each other’s throats on this issue. Please instruct. Calhoun 2 For correspondence regarding informal United States-British agreement concerning cooperation in the Near and Middle East, see pp. 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] ff. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 811.248/7–2144: Telegram [Document 532] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , July 21, 1944—9 p.m. [Received July 21—1:10 p.m.] 519. ReDept’s 434, July 18, and my 498, July 13. British Chargé d’Affaires 3 called on me today about another matter and I took occasion to mention reported AIOC 4 application for additional property on Abadan Island. Although we were not sure, I said it appeared that application might affect land covered by our military installations. My Government hoped to obtain compensation for its investment in permanent works in Iran, and, of course, our prospects in this regard would be diminished if property were held by private owner. I was bringing matter to his attention frankly in interest of mutual understanding. Lascelles expressed his appreciation of our friendly attitude and said he had heard nothing of any such action by AIOC but would investigate. Ford 3 Daniel W. Lascelles. 4 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State 811.248/7–3044: Telegram [Document 533] The Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , July 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received July 31—1:55 p.m.] 554. Legation’s 519, July 21. British Chargé has sent me statement by AIOC official regarding Abadan property; main points are: (1) Application was made some months ago and few if any American buildings were then on area in question, which covers 1682 hectares. (2) Transfer of title to land would not affect title to buildings, since Iranian law recognizes separate ownership of land and superstructures. (3) Disposal value of installations would probably be enhanced by AIOC ownership of land, since it would be in best position to adapt them to general developments scheme of area. (4) AIOC wants land for the future establishment of supply, reception and distribution center, housing schemes, and other improvements for local community. Statement mentions incidentally that majority of American buildings were, at least until recently, located on land previously granted to AIOC. This of course does not entirely clarify matter. I propose to go direct to AIOC and, in consultation with General Connolly, determine exact status of land covered by all American installations at Abadan. Ford The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 811.248/7–2144: Telegram [Document 534] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , July 31, 1944—4 p.m. 459. Your 519, July 21, 9 p.m. For your information the principal interest of the United States in Abadan is the obtaining of landing rights on the airport for civil aircraft more than the question of financial compensation for investments. Stettinius The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.248/9–3044: Telegram [Document 535] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , September 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received September 30—3:51 p.m.] 723. Redesp 1063, August 9. 5 Tehran manager of AIOC has been informed by Iranian authorities that action on application for Abadan land is suspended because of American interest in matter. He has, therefore, asked Embassy informally if action can be taken to settle question soon since company wants to begin certain construction work. American head of Iranian agency concerned says he has ordered no action on application until Embassy agrees. However, under terms of AIOC concession company can force Iranian Government to act after lapse of 4 months, which has already expired. Only basis Government would have for refusal to grant application would be formal request from American Government. Although I do not think AIOC desires to force issue against our wishes it may be difficult, and certainly will be embarrassing, to hold up action much longer unless we are prepared to interpose formal objection with Iranian Government or make other proposals to safeguard our interests. I should appreciate telegraphic instructions as requested last paragraph despatch under reference. Morris 5 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax) 800.7962/10–1944 [Document 536] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador ( Halifax ) 6 Washington , October 19, 1944. Excellency : As I am sure you are already aware, the United States Government in connection with the prosecution of the war and to expedite the delivery of supplies and lend-lease material to our allies has constructed or improved in whole or in part a large number of airports in various countries including countries in the Near and Middle East. While there appears to be no question with respect to the right of United States military aircraft and aircraft of the United States Air Transport Command to use these airports at the present time, in the absence of any clear understanding a question may arise at a later date with respect to the right of United States civil aircraft to use these airports when the time comes for the establishment of commercial services through these regions. This Government considers that airports which it has helped to construct or improve should be available for the use of United States commercial aircraft on international services or civil aircraft conducting private flights as may be authorized by the countries in whose jurisdiction these airports lie. No infringement of sovereignty is involved; nor does the Government of the United States seek ownership, control or exclusive rights. It is the intention of this Government, therefore, at a suitable time to seek agreement with the countries in whose territory these airports are located on matters relating to general landing rights and the use of airports. In so far as concerns the use of airports in these countries, such as Payne Field at Cairo, Egypt, 7 the airport at Abadan in Iran, and others, I feel confident that your Government will not interpose any objection to the efforts of this Government to obtain general landing rights for United States aircraft and the right to use suitable airports, including those referred to above, under terms as favorable as those accorded the aircraft of any nation utilizing the airports for international civil aviation. The receipt at an early date of a statement of your Government’s attitude in this matter would be greatly appreciated. Accept [etc.] Cordell Hull 6 Text transmitted to the Ambassador in Iran in airgram A–94, October 27, 12:40 p.m., with the instruction: “It is desired that you similarly advise the Iranian Government. For your information Department contemplates that discussions with respect to these matters will be undertaken during or immediately following the forthcoming Aviation Conference.” (891.248/9–3044) For correspondence on this subject, see vol. ii , section entitled “Preliminary and exploratory discussions regarding international civil aviation; conference held at Chicago, November 1–December 7, 1944.” 7 For correspondence regarding United States representations concerning postwar civil air rights in Egypt, see pp. 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 43 ] ff. The British Embassy to the Department of State 891.248/10–3044 [Document 537] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire The landing ground used by American aircraft at Abadan is the private airfield of the Anglo Persian Oil Company. The greater part of it is situated on land already owned by the Company though landing strips have been extended beyond this area into an area which the Company now wish to acquire. The Company applied to the Persian Government last April under the procedure for the acquisition of land laid down in its concession. It is understood that their application has been held up as the result of intervention by the United States Embassy and United States Persian Gulf Command. 2. The transfer of this land to the Anglo Persian Oil Company would not affect legal title to structures erected on it by the United States authorities. Separate ownership of land and of standing properties is recognised by Persian law. It is understood that the United States authorities are not seeking to acquire title to the land and it is hoped that the United States Government will not stand in the way of the Company doing so. 3. [Here follows section relating to the status of the Dhahran airfield in Saudi Arabia; for correspondence, see pages 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 717 ] ff.] 4. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have, of course, no intention of trying to prevent the United States Government from obtaining post-war air facilities in the Persian Gulf area in accordance with the provisions of whatever international convention is agreed upon. As regards the particular case of post-war use of the airfield at Abadan, it is understood to be probable that developments of the refining plant and housing area will make it necessary to build over the landing ground after the war. The area immediately adjoins the Company’s existing plant and there is no other direction in which they can expand since the plant on all other sides is bordered by branches of the refinery. Washington , October 30, 1944. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.796/11–1644 [Document 538] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State No. 119 Tehran , November 16, 1944. [Received November 28.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation of a Memorandum Note the Embassy has received from the Iranian Foreign Office concerning the operation of foreign airlines in Iran. This note which was undoubtedly sent to all allied missions in Tehran is believed to be directed almost entirely at the Soviets who, as the Department is aware, last spring opened commercial airlines from Tehran to various points in Iran including Meshed, Tabriz, and Pahlevi and who have been doing a very healthy business on these lines. This note was probably prepared in the last days of the Saed Government 8 when it had decided, before expiring, to get off of its chest all points at issue with the Soviets, and it is not believed that it is directed at any present American activity in this country. I do not believe that Iran intends to withdraw itself ostrich-like from international aviation after the war despite the rather strong language of the note. The Iranians realize that their country may very well become a great center of global airlines and it is unlikely that they will miss the opportunity to profit by such a development although anything is possible when their national pride is offended and it is conceivable that Iran might cut itself off from the rest of the world merely to assert its sovereignty. The last paragraph of the enclosed note, however, is probably nothing more than a reservation of rights and a notice that new negotiations will be required before any foreign air lines may operate in and out of Iran. As far as internal lines are concerned, the note appears quite clear and I believe we may take it for a fact that no foreign airlines may operate solely within the internal limits of the country if the Iranians have anything to say about it, which, of course, they may not. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Richard Ford First Secretary of Embassy [Enclosure—Translation] The Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy No. 3517 Tehran , November 15, 1944. Memorandum The Iranian Government finds it necessary to bring the following, in connection with airmail transport and passenger service in Iran, to the attention of the Government of the United States of America: The Iranian Government will not permit the use of its internal airlines to any Government and the present situation which is the result of the presence of the allied forces in Iran should not establish a precedent. The Iranian Government will renew its internal mail and passenger airlines as soon as the ordered planes arrive in Iran from London and America. The airlines between Iran and abroad such as Tehran–Moscow, Tehran–Baghdad and Cairo are provisional and based upon the present war requirements. 8 For correspondence relating to the resignation of Mohammed Saed as Prime Minister on November 9, 1944, see pp. 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 470 ] ff. The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State 891.248/11–2144: Telegram [Document 539] The Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) to the Secretary of State Tehran , November 21, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 4 p.m.] 861. Embassy is informing Foreign Office of Department’s general attitude toward American airport rights, as set forth in Department’s airgram A–94, October 27. 9 I should appreciate advice of any further developments in this regard which may have resulted from Aviation Conference at Chicago. Although Department’s approach to British should be helpful in resolving larger problems, it does not furnish much guidance for Embassy in dealing with immediate question of AIOC request for more land at Abadan. I should appreciate specific instructions (as requested my telegram 723, September 30) either to interpose definite objection or to allow Iranian Government to decide matter in normal course without intervention on our part. Present situation with American official of Iranian Government blocking action merely because of Embassy’s informal oral expression of interest seems to me improper and likely to produce doubts regarding impartiality of advisors and our own good faith. Morris 9 See footnote 6, p. 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] . The American Embassy in Iran to the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 891.796/12–2744 [Document 540] The American Embassy in Iran to the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 10 No. 92 The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to set forth hereunder, on instructions from the Department of State, a statement of the views of the American Government with regard to the airports in foreign countries which it has been instrumental in constructing or improving during the present war. The American Government, in connection with the prosecution of the war and the delivery of supplies and Lend-Lease materials to the other United Nations, has constructed or improved, in whole or in part, a large number of airports in various countries. The American Government considers that these airports which it has helped to construct or improve should be available for the use of United States commercial aircraft on international services or civil aircraft conducting private flights as may be authorized by the countries in whose jurisdiction the airports lie. No infringement of sovereignty is involved; nor does the Government of the United States seek ownership, control or exclusive rights. It is the intention of this Government, therefore, at a suitable time to seek agreement with the countries in whose territory these airports are located on matters relating to general landing rights and the use of airports. The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurance of its highest consideration. Tehran , November 27, 1944. 10 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 129, November 27, from Tehran; received December 16. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) 891.248/11–2144: Telegram [Document 541] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Morris ) Washington , November 29, 1944—8 p.m. 698. Urtels 861, November 21, 10 a.m. and 723, September 30, 5 p.m. Please inform the Iranian and British authorities and the AIOC that the American Government’s only interest in the question of the ownership of the land on which the Abadan airfield is located is to assure that American aircraft are accorded no less favorable treatment than that which may be accorded any other foreign planes, including British, as regards postwar use of the field. If these assurances are given by the Iranian and British authorities and by the oil company, the American Government will have no further interest in the question of the proposed sale of the land. The foregoing is naturally without prejudice to the eventual settlement of questions related to the American funds and effort which have gone into the development of the field, or to existing arrangements for the continued use of the field by the American military authorities. Stettinius The American Embassy in Iran to the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 891.248/12–1144 [Document 542] The American Embassy in Iran to the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 11 No. 111 Tehran , December 11, 1944. The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to state that the Embassy understands the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has made application, under the terms of its concession, for the grant of certain additional land on Abadan Island. The Embassy is informed that this land adjoins on the north the territory already occupied by the Company on Abadan Island and that it includes areas now occupied by a portion of the American military installations on the island. Because it has expended large sums of money in the erection of these installations, including fundamental improvements to the airfield, the Government of the United States is, naturally, interested in any possible change in the ownership of the land in question. As the Embassy stated in its note No. 92 of November 27, 1944, the United States plans to seek agreements with the governments concerned whereby American civil aircraft may enjoy landing rights after the war at airports which the United States has constructed or improved during the course of the war. It is felt that the substantial contribution made by the American Government in the development of the Abadan airfield entitles it to equality of treatment with any other foreign government, foreign agency, or foreign private company in so far as the post-war use of the field is concerned. Accordingly, the Department of State has instructed the Embassy to request assurances that American aircraft will receive no less favorable treatment after the war, with regard to utilization of the airport in question, than that which may be accorded any other foreign airplanes, including those operated by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company or any other British company or agency. If such assurances are given, the United States Government will have no objection to the proposed transfer of land on Abadan Island to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. It will be understood, of course, that this acquiescence would not affect the existing arrangements for war-time use of the field by the American military authorities nor the settlement of questions relating to compensation for the funds and effort expended by the American Government in the development of the airport and other installations on Abadan Island. It would be appreciated if the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs would consult the appropriate section of the Ministry of Finance with respect to this question and advise the Embassy as soon as possible whether the Iranian Government is able to give the desired assurances. The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Imperial Ministry the assurance of its highest consideration. [In a conversation between the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) and the Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) on January 5, 1945, agreement was reached that the United States would modify the statement of assurances desired from the British to the extent that no objection would be raised to the postwar operation of the Abadan Airfield by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for the sole use of the Company’s own planes in accordance with the terms of its concession; in case the field were opened to public use, American aircraft would be accorded equal treatment. In telegram 18, January 13, 1945, 9 p.m., the Ambassador in Iran was instructed so to inform the Iranian Government with a request for agreement thereto and “assurance that American planes would be permitted to use Abadan airfield in emergencies caused by weather or mechanical needs.” (891.248/1–545) This was done by the Ambassador in note 151 of January 18 (891.248/1–1845) but no reply was received to this and other inquiries on the subject. The Air Transport Command continued to operate the airport during and after the war. In telegram 648, November 24, 1945, noon, the Department made known to the Ambassador the desire of the War Department to turn over operation of the airport to Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. (TWA) for a limited period, in connection with the program to withdraw American troops from Iran by January 1, 1946 (891.7962/11–2445). The oral agreement of the Iranian Foreign Office to operation of the airport by TWA for three periods of two months each was conveyed to the Department in telegram 1114, December 12, 1945, 6 p.m. (891.248/12–1245).] 11 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 146, December 11, from Tehran; received January 5, 1945. Iranian representations with respect to increasing transportation facilities for moving Iranian exports to the United States Iranian representations with respect to increasing transportation facilities for moving Iranian exports to the United States [543] The Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Legation in Iran [Tehran,] December 15, 1943. 611.9131/251 [544] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) Washington, March 28, 1944—3 p.m. 800.8890/1076: Airgram The Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Legation in Iran 611.9131/251 [Document 543] The Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Legation in Iran 12 [Translation] No. 24167/3000 [ Tehran ,] December 15, 1943. Note Verbale The Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Legation of the United States of America and has the honor to state that as the Legation is aware the Trade Agreement between Iran and the United States 13 was voted by the National Consultative Assembly and it will be exchanged and put into effect after the remaining formalities have been performed. The Legation will, of course, agree that the common purpose of both Governments in concluding the Agreement to promote trade between the two countries necessitates that appropriate decisions be taken and arrangements made now to the end that the Agreement may be enforced in its true sense. Towards this end it appears that it will not be possible to make use of the advantages and privileges granted thereunder unless an arrangement is made primarily with regard to the means of transportation of goods. Last year a large quantity of Iranian goods, especially carpets, was left accumulated in the southern seaports waiting for transportation. If it was not for the Legation’s assistance some goods might have deteriorated. Furthermore, if the Iran Carpet Corporation, which manufactures and exports rugs desirable in the American market, as well as other Iranian exporters find out that their shipments would not meet with difficulties, they would thus be encouraged and enabled to prepare the needed goods for transportation. Now that the Agreement has been voted and trade between Iran and the United States will be carried on a fixed basis, the interested authorities and exporting merchants expect the Legation and the authorities concerned to afford the necessary facilities especially in connection with the means of transport. It goes without saying that war conditions and large army shipments create hindrances or difficulties in the matter of trade and transportation of commercial shipments. However, if an arrangement is made that commercial vessels carrying American goods when unloading their cargo in Iranian borders would take Iranian goods including carpets, it is certain that the trade deadlock would thus be alleviated and the ground paved for the days of improved trade conditions and for the promotion of commerce. The Legation’s courtesy will be greatly appreciated in kindly inviting the attention of the appropriate authorities to this matter and informing the Minister of the result. (Seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 12 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 786, January 7, from Tehran; received January 26. 13 For text of agreement and accompanying notes signed at Washington, April 8, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 410, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1322. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford) 800.8890/1076: Airgram [Document 544] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran ( Ford ) Washington , March 28, 1944—3 p.m. A–26. Despatch no. 786 of January 7, 1944 14 enclosing translation of note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated December 15, 1943. Your inquiry with respect to increasing transportation facilities for moving Iranian exports to the United States has been discussed with the appropriate officials of this Government. While wartime restrictions control with respect to nonessential cargo, we are informed that the only large tonnage item that has not been lifted from Iranian ports in recent months is wool, which we have not bought because the Russians and British wanted it for essential purposes. A proposed wool quota of 3,000 tons was approved with a D rating on March 8, 1944 by the Shipping Priorities Advisory Committee, and it is believed that shipping facilities will be provided for this. While shipping facilities in that area are now easier and a shortage of shipping space may not be a problem, there are other aspects that have to be considered such as the need for avoiding port congestion and delay in getting vessels to other points. For these reasons shipping authorities have to exercise discretion in accepting goods for shipment. It is believed, however, that little difficulty should arise except in cases of large shipment of a thousand tons or over which are more likely to cause a delay in the movement of vessels. As port congestion is reduced, and it is understood it has been reduced in that area, there should be less danger of larger tonnages delaying vessels. Information with respect to probable amounts of goods available for shipment would be of interest to the shipping authorities here. All efforts, consistent with necessary wartime controls, will be made to move goods offered for shipment. Hull 14 Not printed. Iraq: Iraq: Contents Settlement of claims for damages suffered by American nationals during the 1941 revolt in Iraq (Documents 545-547) Settlement of claims for damages suffered by American nationals during the 1941 revolt in Iraq Settlement of claims for damages suffered by American nationals during the 1941 revolt in Iraq 1 1 For previous correspondence concerning this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. iii , pp. 486 ff., passim . [545] The Minister Resident in Iraq (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, May 12, 1943—10 a.m. [Received June 5—5:13 p.m.] 390G.115 Singer Sewing Machine Company/7: Airgram [546] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Baghdad (Gaudin) Washington, November 16, 1943. 390G.115 Singer Sewing Machine Company/7 [547] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, September 23, 1944. [Received October 9.] 490G.11 Crouse, Raymond B./9–2344 The Minister Resident in Iraq (Wilson) to the Secretary of State 390G.115 Singer Sewing Machine Company/7: Airgram [Document 545] The Minister Resident in Iraq ( Wilson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , May 12, 1943—10 a.m. [Received June 5—5:13 p.m.] A–25. Reference: (1) Legation’s despatch no. 1938, June 2, 1942, 2 regarding the difficulties in obtaining compensation for American losses during the looting of June 1941 in Iraq.Iraq (2) Legation’s despatch no. 2003, September 24, 1942, 2 describing method by which British subjects in Iraq received payment from Iraqi Government for their losses during the period of looting. (3) Legation’s despatch no. 66, November 11, 1942, 2 regarding payment by Iraqi Government for Jewish losses in pogrom and looting of 1941. As the Department was informed in the final paragraph of third despatch under reference, on November 13, 1942, Legation again addressed a note to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, requesting a reply to its previous note of June 2, 1942 which asked what arrangements had been made for the compensation of American citizens and firms for their losses. After long delay, in a note dated March 31, 1943, the Ministry asked for a list of the names of American nationals whose property was looted, with details of this property “in order that the Iraqi appropriate authorities may investigate the matter.” The Ministry suggested that if the Legation preferred, it might ask the persons concerned to report directly to the Investigating Magistrate, Judge Murad Al-Shawi, “in accordance with the procedures adopted in this respect.” The Legation replied in a note dated April 5, giving all the information desired, and also wrote to each American claimant suggesting that he approach the Investigating Magistrate directly. However, Judge Al-Shawi disclaimed all responsibility for compensation of their claims, saying that he was empowered only to prosecute looters, if the complainants had any evidence or witnesses to produce. The matter thus stands that after two years of correspondence between the Legation and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, there has been no success in the Legation’s efforts to obtain compensation of these claims, although British and Jewish claims in much larger amounts have been settled. The Legation hesitates to press the matter without the Department’s instructions, which have been requested in each of the despatches under reference. The total amount involved in personal claims is I.D.661.610, with I.D.16,236.498 in commercial claims. 3 The Legation feels that the Iraqi Government should at least settle the personal claims unless it wishes to render itself liable to accusation of discrimination against American citizens. The Department’s instructions in this matter are again requested. Wilson 2 Not printed. 2 Not printed. 2 Not printed. 3 One Iraqi dinar was equivalent to one British pound sterling. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Baghdad (Gaudin) 390G.115 Singer Sewing Machine Company/7 [Document 546] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Baghdad ( Gaudin ) No. 105 Washington , November 16, 1943. Sir : Reference is made to the Legation’s airgram no. A–25 of May 12, 1943 and previous despatches concerning claims for damages suffered by American nationals during the Iraq revolt in 1941. It is noted that claims have been presented to the Iraq Government by three American individuals for property losses estimated at I.D.761.610 [ 661.610 ], equivalent at the official rate of exchange to $3103.56 and that American commercial firms have claimed property losses estimated at I.D. 16,236.498, equivalent at the official rate of exchange to approximately $65,000, of which I.D. 14, 193.048 represents the claim of the Singer Sewing Machine Company for losses of sewing machines and shop equipment. It is not apparent from your despatches that the Iraq Government could be held responsible for the disorders which resulted in the losses under reference or that they failed to take reasonably adequate measures to prevent the losses or to punish those responsible therefor. In the absence of evidence that the Government of Iraq could be held legally liable for the losses resulting from mob violence the Department, in accordance with a generally accepted rule of international law, would not be warranted in pressing the Government of Iraq to compensate American citizens who suffered property losses as a result of the disorders in Baghdad. However, if the disorders and the resulting American losses could reasonably be attributed to the failure of the responsible Iraq authorities to (1) take necessary and available measures for the maintenance of order, (2) afford reasonably adequate protection to the property of American citizens in Baghdad or (3) apprehend and punish those responsible for the losses, the Department desires to receive a full report of all facts and circumstances which would afford a basis for a legal claim against the Government of Iraq. If evidence of the legal liabilities of the Government of Iraq should not be obtainable, you are authorized to suggest to the Iraq Foreign Office, that, in view of the compensation paid in behalf of British nationals and considering the relatively insignificant total of the American claims, it would appear to be advisable for the Government of Iraq, in order to avoid any question of discrimination against American nationals, to compensate American claimants on the basis of reasonable evidence of the value of their property lost as a result of the disorders. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: Breckinridge Long The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 490G.11 Crouse, Raymond B./9–2344 [Document 547] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State No. 449 Baghdad , September 23, 1944. [Received October 9.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction No. 105 dated November 16, 1943, and to the Legation’s Airgram No. A–25 of May 12, 1943 and previous despatches concerning claims for damages suffered by American nationals during the Baghdad riots in 1941. As the result of oral representations made to the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs along the lines suggested by the Department in the last paragraph of the instruction under reference, the Ministry has sent the Legation a check to the amount of Iraq Dinars 661.610 ($2,650.00 approximately), “as a grant to those American nationals who sustained losses during the May and June, 1941, incidents”. A translation of the Ministry’s conveying note is enclosed (enclosure No. l). 4 This sum satisfies in full the claims of the three American individuals who suffered losses during the riots. It is not, however, intended to cover the losses sustained by American commercial firms. The Legation, in its note No. 142 of September 19, 1944, (copy enclosed as enclosure No. 2 4 ) reminded the Foreign Office of these claims and stated that it assumed the Government of Iraq intends to take appropriate measures for compensating the two American firms in question. The Department will be informed of developments in this connection. 5 [Here follows section relating to the payments made to the three individual claimants.] Respectfully yours, Loy W. Henderson 4 Not printed. 4 Not printed. 5 No record of further action on losses to commercial firms has been found in Department files. Liberia: Liberia: Contents Adherence of Liberia to the United Nations Declaration; assurances by the United States of its interest in the defense and security of Liberia (Documents 548-551) Adherence of Liberia to the United Nations Declaration; assurances by the United States of its interest in the defense and security of Liberia Adherence of Liberia to the United Nations Declaration; assurances by the United States of its interest in the defense and security of Liberia 1 1 For previous correspondence relating to the interest of the United States in the defense and security of Liberia, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 355 ff. [548] The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State Monrovia, January 16, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 3:40 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/32720: Telegram [549] The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State Monrovia, January 24, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 7:40 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/32808: Telegram [550] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton) Washington, January 28, 1944—8 p.m. 740.0011 European War 1939/32808: Telegram [551] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton) Washington, February 14, 1944—8 p.m. 740.0011 European War 1939/33088: Telegram The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/32720: Telegram [Document 548] The Minister in Liberia ( Walton ) to the Secretary of State Monrovia , January 16, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 3:40 p.m.] 16. Legation’s telegram, No. 12, January 13, 7 p.m. 2 At the call of President Tubman the State Council composed of representative Liberians from all sections of the Republic met today and approved action of Cabinet in favoring adherence to the United Nations Declaration. 3 I am in receipt of a formal note from Secretary of State Dennis under date of January 15, in parts as follows: “There exist apprehensions which seem not to be without justification from the sinking of ships by German submarines off our coast, and in some instances within our territorial waters, of probable submarine attacks by day or night and by naval craft that might successfully slip through, as acts of retaliation for such a declaration when made. The Government would therefore be grateful were you to telegraph the above information to your Government and ascertain if immediate assistance other than what is at present in operation could be procured and guaranteed; that is to say, my Government desires to know if your Government would provide, immediately upon the Declaration 4 being made, sufficient craft as may be necessary for controlling our coastal waters as additional protection, especially at nights, to Robertsport, Monrovia, Buchanan, Sasstown, Rivercress, Grandcress, Greenville and Harper. It is also the desire of my Government to have direct telephone communications established between Camp of USAFIL 5 and Central Government at Monrovia.” Walton 2 Not printed. 3 Signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 25 . 4 i.e., adherence to the United Nations Declaration. 5 Headquarters of the United States Army Forces in Liberia. The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/32808: Telegram [Document 549] The Minister in Liberia ( Walton ) to the Secretary of State Monrovia , January 24, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 7:40 p.m.] 24. President Tubman and Secretary of State Dennis on several occasions have inquired if I had heard from my Government relative to question posed in penultimate paragraph of Legation’s telegram No. 16, January 16, 10 a.m. President Tubman was to have addressed joint session of Legislature on subject today. He informs me that it was postponed pending my Government’s reply. 6 Walton 6 Without waiting for the reply of the United States Government, President Tubman addressed a Joint Session of the Liberian Legislature on January 26, 1944, requesting authority to declare war on Germany and Japan and to adhere to the United Nations Declaration. This authority was granted on January 27, and a state of war was proclaimed on the same day. On February 26, the Liberian Secretary of State wrote to the Secretary of State informing him of the Liberian Government’s endorsement of the principles of the Atlantic Charter (Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. i , p. 367 ) and adherence to the United Nations Declaration. The Secretary of State replied on April 6, welcoming the Liberian action. This exchange is printed in Department of State Bulletin , April 15, 1944, p. 346. Liberia signed the United Nations Declaration on April 10, 1944. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton) 740.0011 European War 1939/32808: Telegram [Document 550] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia ( Walton ) Washington , January 28, 1944—8 p.m. 9. The Department has brought this matter, reference your telegram no. 16, January 16, and no. 24, January 24, to the attention of the War and Navy Departments and has asked for their comments. Pending the receipt of formal responses the Department is unable to state whether they would be willing to assume the responsibility indicated in your no. 16. It is our impression, however, that they would not be in a position at this time to undertake such commitments, although it is to be assumed of course that such protection as may be possible will continue to be afforded within the general framework of Allied strategic plans. Hull The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton) 740.0011 European War 1939/33088: Telegram [Document 551] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia ( Walton ) Washington , February 14, 1944—8 p.m. 17. The Department has now been informed by the Navy Department reference your telegram no. 16 January 16, 10 a.m. and Department’s no. 9 January 28, 8 p.m., that American naval forces in the Atlantic Ocean are disposed in areas where it is considered they will be most effective in finding and destroying German naval forces. A commitment to the Government of Liberia to provide naval vessels for the particular purpose of giving additional protection and control of coastal waters of Liberia is considered undesirable. American naval forces operating against German naval forces anywhere in the Atlantic Ocean contribute to the protection of the coast of Liberia. The War Department states that it does not object to the establishment of direct telephone communication between the Liberian Central Government at Monrovia and Headquarters, United States Army forces in Liberia. However, the United States Army cannot provide supplies nor undertake installation operation or maintenance of such a line. Stettinius Consent by the United States, with reservations, to the application to American protégés in the French Zone of Morocco of certain decrees in furtherance of the war effort in North Africa Consent by the United States, with reservations, to the application to American protégés in the French Zone of Morocco of certain decrees in furtherance of the war effort in North Africa 1 1 For previous correspondence relating to the protection of American treaty rights in Morocco, see Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. iii , pp. 550 ff. and 586 ff. [552] The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State Casablanca, February 4, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 8 p.m.] 381.81/320: Telegram [553] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, February 8, 1944—6 p.m. [Received February 16—4 p.m.] 881.044/30: Airgram [554] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, February 11, 1944. [Received February 25.] 881.044/31 [555] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) Washington, February 12, 1944—8 p.m. 381.81/320a: Telegram [556] The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation (Chapin) to the Secretary of State Algiers, February 15, 1944—8 p.m. [Received February 16—6:01 a.m.] 381.81/321: Telegram [557] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs) Washington, February 26, 1944—6 p.m. 881.044/30: Telegram [558] The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State Casablanca, March 24, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 9:30 p.m.] 381.81/326: Telegram [559] The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) Washington, March 24, 1944. 781.001/311 [560] The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) Washington, March 24, 1944. 381.81/326a [561] The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) Washington, March 28, 1944—2 p.m. 381.81/326: Telegram [562] The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation (Chapin) to the Secretary of State Algiers, April 6, 1944—5 p.m. [Received April 7—9:52 a.m.] 381.81/327: Telegram [563] The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the French Resident General in Morocco (Puaux) Tangier, April 13, 1944. 881.044/36 [564] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, June 28, 1944. [Received July 14.] 781.003/6–2844 [565] The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs) Washington, August 16, 1944. 781.003/6–2844 [566] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, September 5, 1944. [Received September 11.] 781.003/9–544 The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State 381.81/320: Telegram [Document 552] The Consul General at Casablanca ( Russell ) to the Secretary of State Casablanca , February 4, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 8 p.m.] 32. Persons under American protection in French Morocco according to treaties and regime of capitulations inform me that French authorities are threatening requisition of their entire olive crops. Such requisition is absolutely contrary to treaty rights as emphasized since beginning of war by Department [of] State. French general at Marrakech in such requisition case states that “The American authorities themselves have insisted that this rule be strictly applied”. I have ascertained that the General is correct inasmuch as order apparently comes from head of Combined Food Committee at Algiers. This matter was never discussed with us or apparently notified to Department State authorities in Morocco. Combined Food Committee apparently does not realize that the status of Morocco is very different from that of Algeria and Tunisia and that above action taken here, without discussion with us and apparently without notification to Department, and thus giving Protectorate authorities certain rights contrary to treaty, gravely embarrasses us in insisting on treaty rights in general. It is respectfully suggested that matters affecting Morocco should first be discussed by other Government agencies with us so that, if of importance to general war effort and contrary to treaty, they may be referred to Department for permission temporarily to derogate from treaty rights and make them applicable here through normal channels. In view of fait accompli in the present matter instructions are requested whether I should notify protected persons upon whom requisition is levied, and who have complained to Consulate, that U.S. Government approves of action of Protectorate authorities. I am informed further that the entire olive oil production of French North Africa is being blocked by Allied action reportedly at French instigation so that it can be shipped to France immediately after liberation. Speaking for Morocco I regret this as this production is badly needed here notably in absence of pre-war imports of French West African peanut oil which are understood to be directed now mainly to Great Britain. Requisitions here of foodstuffs will complicate the political situation as Nationalist leaders will doubtless use the economic argument of scarcity resulting therefrom with the masses of natives to further their own ends. Repeated to Tangier as my 17 and to Algiers as my 10, true reading to Rabat. Russell The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 881.044/30: Airgram [Document 553] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , February 8, 1944—6 p.m. [Received February 16—4 p.m.] A–25. Reference is made to Consul General Russell’s telegram no. 17 of February 3 [ 4 ], 5 p.m. 2 concerning the total requisition of olive crops in French North Africa, including French Morocco, reported to have been taken as a result of action of the Combined Food Committee in Algiers. This Legation is in entire agreement with the conclusions expressed by Mr. Russell in his telegram. Specifically and consistently with the last two paragraphs of my despatch no. 1910 of January 14, 1944, 3 the Legation concurs in the view expressed by Mr. Russell as to the jeopardy to American treaty status and rights in Morocco involved in the extension to this country of measures adopted by authorities or entities outside the Shereefian Empire in the absence of the conveyance, through the usual channels, of the Department’s approval or qualified approval thereof to the Shereefian Government. In the present instance, as well as in future, for the safeguarding of our treaty position it is recommended that the procedure mentioned above be applied in each individual similar case. If qualified approval is to be granted, it should be done under the following reservations: 4 1) that, inasmuch as the measure may be regarded as temporary and due to exceptional circumstances, the Department’s assent thereto is subject to withdrawal at its discretion; 2) that charges of evading the requisition measures brought against American ressortissants are of the exclusive competency of the American consular courts; 3) that the requisitions are applicable to the nationals of all countries without discrimination; and 4) that equitable compensation should be made for the requisitioned property of American ressortissants . As the Department is aware, the requisitioning of the property of American ressortissants is a violation of existing treaties, and runs counter to the Department’s conception of such rights as contained in its previous instructions (see Department’s telegram to the Legation no. 16 of September 16, 1939 5 ). That instruction was based, it is true, on our then neutral status. In the present circumstances it is believed that the procedure and reservations above outlined would safeguard our treaty rights and, at the same time, would eliminate any obstruction implied in those rights to measures of policy in the interest of our war effort such as the requisitions under reference. It is to be noted that cognate reservations have been approved by the Department subsequent to our entrance into the war and to our landings in North Africa. (See Department’s telegram no. 224 of December 17, 1943 to Tangier and Legation’s despatch no. 1857 of December 20, 1943. 6 ) Prior to the action taken by the Combined Food Committee, the Legation and the Consulate at Casablanca had been engaged in efforts to establish a formula in connection with requisitions which would satisfy both the exceptional circumstances with which we are confronted in Morocco and at the same time not do violence to our treaty position. In that connection the Legation informed Mr. Russell in a letter dated January 17, 1944, in part, as follows: “In the present exceptional circumstances the Legation is inclined to take the view that, in consideration of the problem confronting the authorities concerning the general provisioning of the community, aside from the promotion of the economic contribution of Morocco to the common war effort, no individual member of the community should ethically expect to enjoy a privileged position vis-à-vis his fellow citizens, such as accrues to him in normal times from his possession of property. “In the case of olive growers, if, in return for the total requisition of their crops, they receive fair indemnity, and if their individual household supplies of olive oil are assured to them on the same basis as to all other members of the community, it is not believed that they should deem themselves to be subjected to unjust hardship. “On such considerations it is thought that the American ressortissants concerned should be induced voluntarily to acquiesce in the total requisition under reference, provided of course that it is scrupulously applied without discrimination to every other grower in all parts of the French Zone.” Again, on January 31, the Legation communicated with him, at which time it was stated: “In the present circumstances any adequate treatment of the question in each and all of its various aspects is obviously extremely difficult, particularly, as you observe, in the absence of precise data on the subject such as should be expected from the Protectorate authorities in reply to your note. Our primary objective is the safeguard of the principle of our extraterritorial and other pertinent treaty rights, and in this connection you would be justified in refusing to discuss any requisition on an American ressortissant , unless previously notified by the authorities to your Consulate. Secondarily we should endeavor to obtain the maximum fairness of treatment for American ressortissants within the broad lines of any necessary practical compromise.” The political apprehensions mentioned in the final paragraph of Mr. Russell’s telegram under reference would appear to be deserving of careful consideration although not relating to the specific question, under present discussion, of our treaty rights. Childs 2 See last paragraph of telegram 32, February 4, from Casablanca, supra . 3 Not printed. 4 The Chargé reserved the United States position in principle, along the lines of the reservations outlined here, in a note to the Resident General on February 11, pending receipt of instructions from the Department for the granting of qualified consent. 5 Foreign Relations , 1939, vol. iv , p. 686 . 6 Neither printed; they related to the consent of the United States in the application to American ressortissants of increased rates of income and patente taxes in the French Zone of Morocco (881.512/180, 183). The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 881.044/31 [Document 554] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State No. 1963 Tangier , February 11, 1944. [Received February 25.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy and translation of a note dated January 24, 1944 7 addressed to the Legation by the Resident General of France in Morocco who proposes, subject to the Department’s consideration, that the American consular courts in the French Zone be instructed to deem automatically enforcible upon American ressortissants any decrees or regulations issued by the Protectorate authorities in execution of an enabling dahir of September 13, 1938 concerning the organization of the French Zone in time of war. The Legation’s comments on this proposal are set forth in the form of a draft reply to the Resident General 8 which, if approved by the Department and upon its instructions, is intended to be addressed to M. Gabriel Puaux. The Legation desires to add that even if, contrary to the conditions set forth in the enclosed draft note, it might be feasible to acquiesce in the Resident General’s suggestion, the Legation would strongly recommend abstention from such a concession, in as much as it would result in emasculation of our extraterritorial guarantees, veritable corner-stone of our treaty position in the Shereefian Empire. The Legation’s view is that in the interest of the influence of the United States in regard to post-war reconstruction, political and economic, in this part of the world, it is essential that no action should be taken at this time such as would diminish or prejudice the authority accruing to the United States from its actual treaty position in this country. This consideration, it is emphasized, suggested the terms of the Legation’s airgram A–25, February 8, 1944, in support of the tenor of Consul General Russell’s telegram of February 3 [ 4 ], 5 p.m., to the Department (no. 17 to Tangier) in reference to the extension to French Morocco of the reported decision of the Combined Food Commission at Algiers in regard to the total requisition of olive crops in North Africa. It will be of interest to the Department to know that in a recent conversation with the French Protectorate authorities I was assured, in reply to my specific question on the subject, that those authorities had no complaint to make, or any inconveniences to register, from the normal delays required for the Department’s validation of decrees issued in French Morocco. There would therefore appear to be no grounds for the consideration of any departure from the actual policy or procedure in this connection. If the draft note herewith submitted in reply to the French Resident General’s suggestion is approved by the Department, the Legation will appreciate telegraphic instruction to that effect, in order that a speedy presentation of the note may remove any false expectations entertained in the premises by the Protectorate authorities. The Department will note that a copy of this despatch is being made available, among other officers, to Consul General Russell in Casablanca, who is being requested to comment directly to the Department concerning a subject on which he has so extensive a practical background. 9 Respectfully yours, J. Rives Childs 7 Not printed. 8 Not printed; in instruction 167, March 30. the Department approved the draft; see the Chargé’s note of April 13 to the French Resident General, p. 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , and Doc. 563 ] . 9 In his despatch 1293, February 21, the Consul General at Casablanca transmitted a copy of a letter of February 8 which he had written to the Chargé at Tangier; the Consul General summed up his conclusions on the French request in the last paragraph: “… all these restrictive dahirs and decrees should be individually considered, and any that are accepted should be accompanied by rigid provisos that the restrictions must be regarded as war time measures, temporary in character, withdrawal at pleasure by our Government and imposable against American ressortissants only by the Consular Court and in the light of equity as well as the texts of the legislation.” (881.044/32.) The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) 381.81/320a: Telegram [Document 555] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers ( Chapin ) Washington , February 12, 1944—8 p.m. 470. Reference Casablanca’s telegram no. 32, February 4, 5 p.m. Please submit a full report at once, on reported action of Combined Food Committee at Algiers in insisting that French authorities requisition entire olive crop of persons under American protection in French Morocco. The Department would take a serious view of any attempt to infringe the treaty rights of American ressortissants in Morocco. The Department has emphasized repeatedly that no decrees promulgated in Morocco are applicable to American protégés until this Government’s consent is conveyed to the Resident General. Repeat to Casablanca. Stettinius The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation (Chapin) to the Secretary of State 381.81/321: Telegram [Document 556] The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation ( Chapin ) to the Secretary of State Algiers , February 15, 1944—8 p.m. [Received February 16—6:01 a.m.] 490. Department’s 470, February 12, 8 p.m. The NAEB 10 at the insistence of CCNA 11 has consistently urged French authorities to take all possible measures in North Africa to commercialize resources of wheat and olive oil which are often hoarded by native producers. In so urging, however, there was no intention of endorsing procedures which are illegal or which give “protectorate authorities certain rights contrary to treaty”. At no time have methods of commercializing Moroccan olive oil been discussed at the Combined Food Committee and NAEB and this Mission were unaware until receipt of Casablanca’s telegram No. 10 to the Department of February 3 [ 4 ], 5 p.m. 12 of any difficulties which may have involved contravention of American treaty rights in Morocco. Moreover the Allied authorities have never taken action to requisition production in French North Africa since such production is under control of the French authorities. NAEB feels strongly, however, that all conservation measures for wheat and edible oils are essential and that it would have unfortunate repercussions if all producers in French Morocco were not treated alike. Accordingly it is suggested that our consular authorities in Morocco might be informed that while they should naturally insist to the French authorities on maintenance of our treaty rights, every effort should be made consistent therewith to insure that American protégés comply with measures taken in interest of the common war effort and that such measures can not constitute a precedent. With respect to third paragraph in Casablanca’s telegram under reference NAEB points out that edible oil actually consumed in all territories normally considered as French North Africa has always been in excess of production and that present plans contemplate that it will continue to be. 1500 tons of peanut oil were imported during the last months of 1943 from French West Africa. The food situation in French Morocco is in any event appreciably better than that obtaining in Algeria and Tunisia. Chapin 10 North Africa Economic Board. 11 Combined Committee of North Africa. 12 See last paragraph of telegram 32, February 4, from Casablanca, p. 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 552 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs) 881.044/30: Telegram [Document 557] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) Washington , February 26, 1944—6 p.m. 27. The Department approves, reference your airgram A–25, February 8, 6 p.m., extension of the requisition measures to olive crops of American ressortissants in French Morocco subject to the reservations outlined in your airgram. In this connection see Algiers telegram no. 490, February 15, 8 p.m. to the Department. Repeat to Algiers, Casablanca and Rabat. Stettinius The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State 381.81/326: Telegram [Document 558] The Consul General at Casablanca ( Russell ) to the Secretary of State Casablanca , March 24, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 9:30 p.m.] 76. Another situation similar to that described in my 32, February 4, 5 p.m. has arisen. In three different cases protégés have sent me originals of letters from Protectorate authorities stating that they must apply to French military commanders of their regions for permission to operate their cars and that this permission is obligatory for every civilian car circulating in Morocco even if used and owned by American ressortissant as result of agreement with American authorities. I find that such agreement was made by our military authorities in Algiers. This restriction is flatly contrary to our treaty rights in Morocco and was put into force without the slightest discussion with or notification to Department of State agencies in Morocco by either our military authorities or Rabat. Effect is same as in olive requisitions. I request authorization to inform Protectorate authorities that we cannot accept the restriction as the Department of State is only agency that could make such agreement legal and applicable to American ressortissants . As reported to Tangier the Protectorate authorities are attempting to ride roughshod over American treaty rights by invoking war measures of all kinds and using as tools the ignorance as to our treaty rights of other of our Government agencies in Algiers the actions of which compromise our situation and prevent insistence on treaty rights in general. There is every evidence of a definite continued campaign on the part of Protectorate Government to defeat our extraterritorial position here. Repeated to Algiers as my 15, to Tangier as my 20, copy true reading to Rabat. Russell The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) 781.001/311 [Document 559] The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) No. 166 Washington , March 24, 1944. The Secretary of State has received Mr. Russell’s despatch no. 1281 of February 7, 1944, 13 a copy of which was sent to the Legation in Tangier, making certain suggestions for the safeguarding of the American treaty position in French Morocco. The Legation is authorized in its discretion to inform the French Resident General that the war time restrictions which have been introduced in French Morocco as a result of joint action by the American and French authorities in North Africa are recognized as applicable to American ressortissants with the understanding that they are war time measures which are applicable only for the duration of the present emergency and are not to be interpreted as in any way prejudicing American treaty rights in Morocco or as in the nature of a precedent. The action to be taken in the case of other restrictions referred to in Mr. Russell’s despatch under reference, relating to the requisitioning of the olive crop, has already been the subject of a telegraphic instruction from the Department, no. 27 of February 26, 6 p.m., to the Legation. A copy of this instruction is being sent to the Officer in Charge of the Mission at Algiers and to the Consuls General at Rabat and Casablanca. 13 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) 381.81/326a [Document 560] The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers ( Chapin ) No. 78 Washington , March 24, 1944. Sir : Reference is made to the Department’s telegram no. 470 of February 12, 8 p.m., with respect to the extraterritorial rights of American ressortissants in Morocco. In view of the different status of Morocco as compared with Algeria and Tunisia and the special treaty rights possessed by this Government in Morocco, the Department desires that in future no action or decision be taken by the Office of the Representative of the United States in Algeria which might affect those treaty rights without reference of the subject to the Legation in Tangier for an expression of its views. Owing to military exigencies and pressing practical considerations, it has been deemed necessary by the Department to consider problems affecting Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia under the general reference of French North Africa. Now that the more immediate practical considerations compelling that decision have passed and with the return of more normal conditions in North Africa, it is considered desirable that all possible care should be taken in the conservation of our treaty rights in Morocco by the avoidance of any misconceptions of our position with respect to those rights on the part of the French Protectorate and other authorities in French North Africa. In addition to affording the Legation in Tangier an opportunity to present its views on questions affecting French Morocco which might involve American treaty rights, it is desired that you keep the Legation in Tangier and the Consulates in Casablanca and Rabat currently informed on all matters reported on by you relating to French North Africa which might be of interest to those offices. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: A. A. Berle, Jr. The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) 381.81/326: Telegram [Document 561] The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers ( Chapin ) Washington , March 28, 1944—2 p.m. 926. Please investigate and verify statement made in Casablanca’s telegram No. 76, March 24, 5 p.m. to Department, repeated to Algiers as no. 15, that American military authorities in Algiers have made an agreement with French whereby American ressortissants in French Morocco must apply to French military commanders of their regions for permission to operate their cars. As stated in the Department’s telegram no. 470 of February 12, 8 p.m., a serious view is taken of any attempt to infringe the treaty rights of American ressortissants in Morocco. The Department has emphasized repeatedly that no decrees promulgated in Morocco are applicable to American ressortissants until this Government’s consent is conveyed to the Resident General by our Legation in Tangier in accordance with the customary formal procedure. The authorization given the Legation in Tangier in the Department’s instruction no. 166 of March 24, 1944 has reference of course only to the wartime financial restrictions which were the subject of Mr. Russell’s despatch mentioned in that instruction. Please repeat this telegram and your reply to Tangier, Casablanca and Rabat. Hull The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation (Chapin) to the Secretary of State 381.81/327: Telegram [Document 562] The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation ( Chapin ) to the Secretary of State Algiers , April 6, 1944—5 p.m. [Received April 7—9:52 a.m.] 1139. Your 926, March 28, 2 p.m. American military authorities here state that they have made exhaustive investigation and have failed to discover any indications whatsoever that an agreement such as that mentioned in first paragraph of Russell’s telegram 76, March 24, 5 p.m. was entered into between American and French authorities in Algiers. At their request we phoned Russell and asked for further particulars which he said he would immediately endeavor to obtain for transmission here. Will telegraph further developments. Your 926, March 28, 2 p.m. was repeated to Tangier, Casablanca and Rabat. Sent to the Department as 1139; repeated to Tangier as 25; repeated to Rabat as 5; repeated to Casablanca as 6. Chapin The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the French Resident General in Morocco (Puaux) 881.044/36 [Document 563] The Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) to the French Resident General in Morocco ( Puaux ) 14 Tangier , April 13, 1944. Mr. Resident General : I have the honor to refer to Your Excellency’s note no. 62–D of January 24, 1944 15 which suggests that the Government of the United States be requested to examine the possibility of its addressing general instructions to the American consular authorities in French Morocco enjoining them to consider as automatically applicable to American ressortissants any decrees taken by the Protectorate authorities for the enforcement of the enabling dahir of September 13, 1938, concerning the organization of the French Zone in time of war. In this connection reference is made by Your Excellency to a note dated January 9, 1940, 16 addressed by Mr. Maxwell Blake to General Noguès to the effect that the then American Diplomatic Agent was disposed to examine and report to the Department of State suggestions concerning measures of cooperation with the Protectorate authorities designed to avoid special difficulties which might result from the failure of the American Government to give its approval to French Zone legislation enacted as a result of the present exceptional circumstances . It would seem that Your Excellency’s above-mentioned proposal was put forward on the assumption that it might be deemed to fall within the compass of the terms of Mr. Blake’s note. That such is not the case is apparent from the terms of the note itself, limited as they are to the consideration of situations arising from the failure or the inability of the Department to validate certain Protectorate legislation. The ensuing explanations, it is believed, will further elucidate the position. Your Excellency’s suggestion has been brought to the attention of the Department of State, and in pursuance of its instructions the Legation is directed to point out that the enforcement upon American ressortissants of decrees and regulations to implement the dahir of September 13, 1938 would necessarily be incumbent upon the American consular courts in Morocco and that, pursuant to the Statutes of the United States, the system of laws, both criminal and civil, to be applied in these courts shall, in all cases, be in conformity with the laws of the United States. The Statutes, however, further make provision for the issuance of special decrees emanating from the appropriate American authorities, necessary to furnish suitable remedies where the provisions of the American system of laws applicable in the American consular courts may be deficient to meet particular exigencies in extraterritorial countries. In regard to Morocco, local laws or decrees validated by the Department of State are deemed to be equivalent to the special decrees envisaged by the Statutes as above said. It follows, therefore, that no local dahir, decree, or regulation can become part of the corpus juris of the American consular courts in this country, in the absence of the Department of State’s previous validation, with its attendant reservations, of each of such local enactments individually. From the foregoing Your Excellency will appreciate that, on treaty, statutory, and juridical grounds the Department of State is not in a position to entertain a proposal such as that submitted by Your Excellency, which would imply a foregone approval to the enforcement by the consular courts upon American ressortissants of local legislation eventually to be enacted. While, therefore, it is unable to consider any departure from the normal procedure established for the validation of Moroccan legislation which it is sought to apply to American ressortissants in this country, the Department is anxious at all times, as Your Excellency is aware, to afford the Protectorate authorities the fullest cooperation. In all cases, therefore, particularly those which the Residency General may consider of urgent interest, the procedure under reference is carried out with the greatest possible expedition. The Residency General at Rabat will have noted further that the Department’s validation of dahirs and decrees appears not to have been withheld nor have its reservations been formulated except in respect of legislation which, in the opinion of the Department, was at variance with fundamental principles of the Moroccan treaties, or for other cogent reasons. Prior to the receipt of Your Excellency’s note of January 24, 1944, no suggestions have been submitted on the part of the Protectorate authorities in response to Mr. Blake’s note of January 9, 1940. Nevertheless, the Legation at Tangier and the American Consulates in French Morocco have, since then, been consistently engaged in carrying its terms into practice. They have successfully induced American ressortissants voluntarily to comply with local dahirs, decrees, and regulations issued in the interest of the Moroccan community at large in the present exceptional circumstances, but to which laws the Department is unable to give its formal assent because of their departure from the basic treaty principles. As an instance, the matter of the requisition of olive crops may be cited. While such expedient implies no waiver of treaty rights, it brings about the desired cooperation with the Protectorate authorities. In taking such action, the American Consuls concerned must of course be assured that American ressortissants shall not incur discriminatory or otherwise inequitable treatment as a result of their voluntary compliance with laws and regulations not legally binding upon them. The efforts of American Consuls in French Morocco to promote the success of the above modus operandi will be facilitated if they are opportunely furnished by the Protectorate authorities with complete data in regard to the requirements of the pertinent Protectorate legislation and regulations. Through such mutual cooperation it is hoped that such difficulties as are referred to in Your Excellency’s note can be reduced to a negligible minimum. Finally, the two specific matters which have occasioned Your Excellency’s note, namely, the suppression of the constitution of clandestine stocks and the restraint of excessive consumption of water or electrical power, have occupied the sympathetic attention of the Legation and of the Consulate at Casablanca. As regards the first, it is obvious that the existence of local “black” markets proceeds from temporary departure from observance of the basic treaty principle of the liberty of commerce in Morocco. Consequently, as above shown, the American Consulates’ treatment of this matter could not be conducted on a legal plane. Consideration is, however, being given to the feasibility of applying administrative action susceptible of deterring American ressortissants from engagement in discreditable transactions on the “black” markets. The particular case to which Your Excellency refers is apparently the alleged constitution of clandestine stocks of kerosene by Mohammed Ben Driss Drissi, a semsar of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company at Moulay Idriss Zerhoun. Correspondence between the American Consul General at Casablanca and Your Excellency’s Diplomatic Cabinet reveals that this matter had been complicated by the unwarranted action of the local authorities of control in taking such proceedings against the American ressortissant as, in virtue of the Moroccan treaties, are of the exclusive competency of the American Consulates in their judiciary capacity. Incidentally the Legation has since been informed that Mr. H. Earle Russell’s investigation in this connection has shown the unsustainable character of the charges brought against the above named Mohammed Ben Driss Drissi. As regards the regulation of the use of electrical power, the legislation would not appear intrinsically to involve a basic treaty principle and might therefore be susceptible of receiving the Department’s eventual approval, subject to appropriate reservations, of its enforcement upon American ressortissants , following the formal application to that end on the part of the Sherifian Government. This initial procedure having now been followed as the result of the presentation to the Legation of Your Excellency’s note no. 235–D of March 14, 1944, the legislation in question is at present under consideration. Please accept [etc.] C. Burke Elbrick 14 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2072, May 8, from Tangier; in this despatch the Chargé noted that the last two paragraphs had been “recast to take into account subsequent developments …” (The earlier copy had been transmitted to the Department in despatch 1963, February 11, p. 510 [ Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] .) 15 Not printed. 16 Foreign Relations , 1940, vol. iii , p. 772 . The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 781.003/6–2844 [Document 564] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State No. 2178 Tangier , June 28, 1944. [Received July 14.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to instruction No. 166 of March 24, 1944 by which the Legation was authorized at its discretion to inform the French Resident General that the wartime restrictions which have been introduced in French Morocco as the result of the joint action of the American and French authorities in North Africa are recognized as applicable to American ressortissants with the understanding that they are wartime measures which are applicable only for the duration of the present emergency and are not to be interpreted as in any way prejudicing American treaty rights in Morocco or as in the nature of a precedent. The Legation is of the opinion that, in the present exceptional circumstances, such a communication to the French Resident General will usefully clarify the situation in connnection with the safeguarding of our treaty position in Morocco. As the result of an exchange of views on the subject with the American Consuls General at Casablanca and Rabat, the following comments are submitted. At the date of the Department’s instruction, the only existing measures under reference of which the Legation is aware, concern (1) exit visas, (2) exchange and currency control, and (3) the requisition of wheat and olive crops. If there are any others, the Legation respectfully requests that it be informed thereof. It is recommended that every joint Franco-American measure which may be taken in the future and intended to extend to Morocco, should be the subject of a relative note to the Protectorate Government with respect to the validation of the application of the measure to American ressortissants . It is therefore desirable that the issuance of any such eventual measure should be made known to the Legation as promptly as possible. The reason for the foregoing suggestions is that the Consul General at Casablanca has reported instances in which Protectorate departments and district commissioners have sought to restrict the activities of American ressortissants on the grounds of alleged joint Franco-American decisions which, upon investigation, have proved to be inexistent. Furthermore, the Protectorate Government’s decrees and orders for the implementation of the wartime restrictions must necessarily be subjected to the scrutiny of the Legation and of the consular officers in French Morocco for the purpose of enabling them to prevent discrimination against American interests and ressortissants in the practice of which the local authorities are increasingly prone to avail themselves of every opportunity. It is therefore believed that a reiterated reference to specific points of reservation such as were included in the Legation’s note of February 11, 1944 to the Resident General in the matter of the requisition of olive crops (detailed in the Legation’s airgram A–25 of February 8, 1944, 6 p.m.) should follow the general terms of the reservation as stated in the instruction under reference. This suggestion is supported by opinions quoted below from letters to the Legation by Consul General Russell at Casablanca and by Consul General Cole at Rabat, respectively: “I do not believe that in dealing with the French authorities, any reservations are superfluous, as every effort will be made at all times to avoid complying with any understanding reached with the French Protectorate authorities and unless such understanding is couched in writing in unmistakable terms, there will always be trouble.” (Mr. Russell) “I have no comment to make other than that it would seem advisable, in view of the undoubted concerted and persistent policy of the Residency to encroach if, as, when, and where it can upon American treaty rights, to tack down every corner and possible loose edge.” (Mr. Cole) Insistence upon the specific reservations is, of course, not at variance with the Legation’s desire to promote conciliatory and expeditious solutions of questions arising from the execution of joint measures in Morocco. In this connection the enclosed copy of a letter dated June 20, 1944, addressed by the Legation to the Consul General at Casablanca, 17 may be of interest to the Department. A further suggestion is made that, following the word “emergency” in the text of the instruction, there should be inserted the words “such recognition being withdrawable at the discretion of the Department of State”. The object of this addition is to avoid misleading the Moroccan authorities into supposing that, in opposition to our view of a given situation, they may invoke a continuation of emergencies as justifying a prolongation of restrictions on American treaty liberties. In conclusion, there is submitted the text of a note which the Legation has addressed to the French Resident General with the modifications mentioned above which, it is believed, will meet with the Department’s approval. Respectfully yours, J. Rives Childs [Enclosure] The American Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the French Resident General in Morocco ( Puaux ) 18 Tangier , June 28, 1944. Mr. Resident General : I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Legation is authorized to notify the Protectorate Government that the wartime restrictions which have been introduced into French Morocco as a result of joint action by the American and French authorities in North Africa are recognized as applicable to American ressortissants with the understanding that they are wartime measures which are applicable only for the duration of the present emergency, such recognition being withdrawable at the discretion of the Department of State, and is not to be interpreted as in any way prejudicing American treaty rights in Morocco or as in the nature of a precedent. Consequently the application of the existing measures under reference to American ressortissants is subject to the specific reservations set forth in the Legation’s note to Your Excellency of April [ February ] 11, 1944 19 concerning the requisition of olive and wheat crops. Decision in all cases of dispute in the premises between American ressortissants and the local executive authorities shall appertain to the American consular authorities in French Morocco. Every measure taken in the future as a result of joint action by the American and French authorities in North Africa of which the extension is intended to apply to Morocco will be the subject of a relative notification to Your Excellency in respect of the application of such measure to American nationals and protected persons. In conclusion, Your Excellency may be assured of the fullest cooperation on the part of the Legation as well as of that of the American Consulates in the French Zone with the Protectorate authorities in an endeavor to promote the fulfilment of the purposes of the exceptional and temporary measures in question. Please accept [etc.] J. Rives Childs 17 Not printed. 18 In despatch 2262, August 5, the Chargé transmitted a note of July 25 from the Resident General, which acknowledged receipt of this note of June 28 (881.044/7–1244). 19 See footnote 4, p. 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] . The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs) 781.003/6–2844 [Document 565] The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) No. 246 Washington , August 16, 1944. The Secretary of State refers to the Legation’s despatch no. 2178 of June 28, 1944, regarding the application to American ressortissants of joint Franco-American wartime measures in Morocco. The Department concurs with the suggestion on page 2 of the despatch under reference that specific points of reservation should follow the general terms used in the Department’s instruction no. 166 of March 24, 1944. The Department likewise concurs with the inclusion in notes to the French Resident General of the phrase suggested by the Legation in the penultimate paragraph of its despatch. Such a reservation was approved by the Department in its telegraphic instruction no. 131 of June 29, 1943 20 regarding exit visas, and in its telegram no. 27 of February 26, 1944 regarding the requisition of olive crops. The Department notes that the Legation’s communication to the French Resident General notifies him of this Government’s approval of “the war restrictions” which have been introduced as a result of joint action by the French and American authorities. This follows the language used in the Department’s instruction no. 166 of March 24, 1944. In other words, the particular restrictions to which approval has been given have not been specified. The Legation lists on the first page of the despatch under reference the existing wartime measures to which the Department has given its assent. The Department feels that for the sake of clarity, it might now be advisable for the Legation to address a note to the Resident General specifying the restrictions to which its note of June 28, 1944 referred, in order that the French may not be able to argue at a later date that the broad language of the note covered restrictions regarding which neither the Legation nor the Department may at the time have been informed. 20 Not printed. The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 781.003/9–544 [Document 566] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State No. 2324 Tangier , September 5, 1944. [Received September 11.] Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department’s instruction No. 246 of August 16, 1944, commenting upon the note dated June 28, 1944, addressed by the Legation to the French Resident General following the Department’s instruction No. 166 of March 24, 1944, setting forth the conditions under which wartime restrictions, which had been introduced into French Morocco as a result of joint action of the American and French authorities in North Africa, are recognized as applicable to American ressortissants . In pursuance of the Department’s directions the Legation, under date of September 5, 1944, has addressed a further note to the French Resident General, a copy of which is enclosed, specifying the particular wartime measures to which reference was made in its note of June 28, 1944, above mentioned. Respectfully yours, J. Rives Childs [Enclosure] The American Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the French Resident General in Morocco ( Puaux ) Tangier , September 5, 1944. Mr. Resident General : In further reference to the note which I had the honor to address to Your Excellency under date of June 28, 1944, setting forth the conditions under which my Government recognized as exceptionally and temporarily applicable to American ressortissants , wartime restrictions which have been introduced into French Morocco as a result of joint action by the American and French authorities in North Africa, I now have the honor to add that the measures to which reference was made, as being in force at the date of that note, are specified as concerning the following matters: 1. Exit visas required of American nationals on their departure from the French Zone of Morocco; 2. Measures relative to the control of exchange and currency; 3. The requisition of crops of olives and of wheat (froment). Please accept [etc.] J. Rives Childs Concern of the United States that the war effort in North Africa should not be hampered by agitation to alter the character of the French Protectorate in Morocco Concern of the United States that the war effort in North Africa should not be hampered by agitation to alter the character of the French Protectorate in Morocco 21 21 For previous correspondence relating to the interest of the United States in the political situation in Morocco, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 738 ff. [567] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, December 28, 1943. [Received January 8, 1944.] 881.00/2732 [568] The Consul at Rabat (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Rabat, January 5, 1944—6 p.m. [Received January 14—11 a.m.] 881.00/2739: Airgram [569] The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State Casablanca, January 8, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 10:47 p.m.] 881.00/2730: Telegram [570] The Consul at Rabat (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Rabat, January 12, 1944—3 p.m. [Received January 13—6 a.m.] 881.00/2737: Telegram [571] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, January 14, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 1:45 p.m.] 881.00/2738: Telegram [572] The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State Casablanca, January 14, 1944—4 p.m. [Received January 15—12:40 a.m.] 881.00/2740: Telegram [573] The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State Casablanca, January 15, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 9:34 p.m.] 881.00/2741: Telegram [574] The Consul at Rabat (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Rabat, January 29, 1944—7 p.m. [Received January 30—3:51 a.m.] 881.00/2767: Telegram [575] The Consul at Rabat (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Rabat, January 31, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 8:10 p.m.] 881.00/2771: Telegram [576] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Rabat (Mayer) Washington, January 31, 1944—8 p.m. 881.00/2737: Telegram [577] The Consul at Rabat (Mayer) to the Secretary of State Rabat, February 2, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:33 p.m.] 881.00/2777: Telegram [578] The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State Algiers, February 3, 1944—6 p.m. [Received February 4—6:55 a.m.] 881.00/2780: Telegram [579] The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) Washington, February 8, 1944—midnight. 881.00/2780: Telegram The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 881.00/2732 [Document 567] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State No. 1876 Tangier , December 28, 1943. [Received January 8, 1944.] Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Department’s No. 128, December 21 [ 1 ], 1943, 22 concerning the interest of our Government in the native situation in French North Africa, and to inform the Department that according to reliable information given me, spokesmen of the Moorish Nationalist movement in French Morocco are expected to make an appeal in late January, 1944, through the Sultan to the French National Committee of Liberation, as well as to Allied representatives, for a greater participation by the native population in the administration of the Protectorate at the close of the war. The foregoing information was given to me today by Muley el Larbi, Khalifa of the Pasha of Marrakech, who is in close touch with the Sultan and with Moorish Nationalists. Muley el Larbi has just returned from a visit to the Sultan in Rabat where he went to obtain instructions concerning the difficulties between the Sultan of Morocco and the Khalifa of Spanish Morocco regarding the settlement of the estate of the late Sultan Abdul Aziz (see the Legation’s despatch No. 1806 of November 30, 1943 23 ). The information was given me on the occasion of my entertainment of Muley el Larbi at a luncheon at which the French Consul in Tangier was also present, but the latter was not a participant in our conversation. I may say by way of parenthesis that I have always made it a point, when inviting Muley el Larbi to the Legation, to invite at the same time a member of the staff of the French Consulate General in Tangier in order that there may be no suggestion given my French colleague of any interference in the internal affairs of the French Protectorate. My Moorish guest stated that at the time of the Lebanese crisis, 24 the French Resident General, M. Gabriel Puaux, sent word to Moorish Nationalist leaders and informed them of the French desire to give consideration to a larger participation by the Moors in the French administration of Morocco. He is stated to have requested them to formulate their desires in this respect in order that they might be transmitted to the French National Committee of Liberation in Algiers. The Moorish Nationalist leaders are stated to have expressed their intention of examining M. Puaux’s request, but, in reality, according to Muley el Larbi, they were not at all satisfied to have their aspirations considered solely by the French North African authorities. Accordingly, they have proposed to formulate a petition expressive of Moorish Nationalist aspirations which will be delivered personally by one or more of the following: Hadj Omar Ben Abdel Jalil (Nationalist leader, agronomic engineer, residing on a farm at Boulhaut near Casablanca), Abdel Kabir el Fassy (Judge of the Higher Shereefian Tribunal at Rabat), and Si Mohamed el Fassy (Vice President of the Oulemas Councils of the University of Karaouyne, Fez), to Mr. Bird, British Consul General in Rabat, and to Mr. H. Earl Russell, American Consul General in Casablanca, during the latter part of January some days in advance of the presentation of a like petition to the Sultan intended for M. Puaux and the French National Committee of Liberation. Muley el Larbi did not give any hint as to what the communication to be delivered to Mr. Russell, Mr. Bird, and to the Sultan might contain, but he was explicit in emphasizing the desire of the Moorish Nationalists that the communication should not be considered as one intended solely for the French North African authorities but that it was also directed to the Allies. It is evident to me from the foregoing that the Moorish Nationalists are bent upon using the American and British authorities to play them off against the French, and I would respectfully suggest that while avoiding giving offense to legitimate Moorish Nationalist aspirations, we refrain from being made cat’s-paws for the circumlocutory intrigues to which the Moors are so addicted. In this connection my British colleague 25 informs me that when the Pasha of Marrakech, El Glaoui, visited Tangier he made light, in his conversation with M. Gascoigne, of the importance of the Moorish Nationalists. If Mr. Russell and Mr. Bird receive the Moorish Nationalist leaders, their reception is likely to give offense to the French Resident General, while on the other hand, the failure to receive them may be made much of by the Moorish Nationalists. Solution of the dilemma is one which will no doubt be dictated on the basis of broad governmental policy with respect to the native problem and our relations with the French North African authorities. It has seemed desirable to bring this information to the attention of the Department in order that prompt consideration may be given to the instructions to be given to this Legation or to Mr. Russell directly as to the policy to be pursued in receiving the delegation of Moorish Nationalist leaders mentioned above, or similar delegations which may ask to be received by us in the future. In this connection I would recall to the Department my despatch No. 1645 of August 25, 1943, 26 in which there was set forth the misuse by a Spanish Moroccan Nationalist leader of my alleged reception of him at the Legation. As the Department is aware, we have sedulously refrained in the past from direct contact with the Moorish Nationalist movement, or with local Moorish officials in view of the terms of the French Protectorate Treaty with the Sultan of March 30, 1912, 27 Article 5 of which provides, inter alia , that “the Resident Commissioner General shall be the sole intermediary of the Sultan near foreign representatives and in the relations which these representatives maintain with the Moroccan government. In particular he shall have charge of all matters relating to foreigners in the Shereefian Empire.” The French Government has, in the past, contended that our recognition of the French Protectorate in Morocco carried with it the recognition in particular of the above quoted provision of the Protectorate Treaty. It would seem, therefore, that the most careful study should be given to the question raised in this despatch regarding the possible reception by an American diplomatic or consular officer of Moorish Nationalist leaders which would represent a signal departure from our policy in Morocco since the date of our recognition of the Protectorate in 1916 [ 1917 ]. 28 Respectfully yours, J. Rives Childs 22 Not printed; it repeated mutatis mutandis the unnumbered instruction sent to the Consul General at Casablanca on the same date, ibid. , p. 745 . 23 Not printed. 24 For correspondence relating to the representations made by the United States to the French Committee of National Liberation concerning the Franco-Lebanese crisis of November 1943, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 996 ff. 25 Alvary D. F. Gascoigne, British Consul General at Tangier. 26 Not printed. 27 Traité entre la France et le Maroc pour l’établissement d’un régime régulier et l’introduetion des réformes nécessaires , signed at Fez, March 30, 1912, British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cvi , p. 1023. 28 For correspondence relating to United States recognition of the French Protectorate in Morocco, see Foreign Relations , 1916, pp. 800 ff., and ibid. , 1917, pp. 1093 ff. The Consul at Rabat (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 881.00/2739: Airgram [Document 568] The Consul at Rabat ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] Rabat , January 5, 1944—6 p.m. [Received January 14—11 a.m.] A–2. The Nationalist leaders Hadj Ahmed Balafrej and Mohamed Lyazidi called at the Consulate yesterday to inform it of the intention of their party to present in the near future to the Sultan, the Resident General and the American and British Consulates a memorial calling for a revision of the international status of Morocco. They said that the wording of the memorial had not yet been definitely decided, but the tentative draft which they read called for nothing less than independence. I told them that although I should be glad to see a copy of the document when its text was definitely decided, I did not think the Consulate could appropriately receive formally such a paper. In reply to an inquiry concerning the nature of their complaints against the Protectorate authorities, my visitors replied that Morocco was being administered solely for the benefit of the French. They would not concede that the country had benefited in any way from French administration. They hedged in replying to a further inquiry as to whether or not they thought that Morocco was prepared to rule itself, saying simply that they would abide by whatever the Sultan decided. I asked if their movement enjoyed the Sultan’s approval to which they replied that they had reason to believe that he was informed about their plans and that they hoped to obtain his support. They made no satisfactory answer to a question concerning the number of Moroccans who shared their views. In reply to their request for my views and advice, I stated that I did not think that the American people and Government would look with favor upon any political movement which would tend to distract us from our present all-encompassing absorption in the prosecution of the war. Having in mind our desire to see agricultural production increased in Morocco, I suggested that the best way to evidence their sincere interest in democratic government would be to encourage Moroccans to contribute as much as they could to the war effort and thereby to earn the gratitude and admiration of the United Nations. I also advanced the opinion that broad changes might be anticipated after the war in the concepts of colonial administration and the administration of mandates and protected countries. My interlocutors replied that they could not wait until after the war to take action because then France, having presumably regained her power, could not be driven from her privileged position in Morocco. They protested that they had no intention of provoking a disturbance, but added that they did not know what their partisans might do if the French took reprisals against them for presenting the memorial. In closing the conversation, they said that they wanted the American Government to know that their plans had not been instigated by the Germans, a theory that, they said, the French would be sure to advance. They affirmed that they were true democrats and, in support of their assertion, added that before the war they had been in close touch with the French socialist and communist parties. In view of the potential consequences of the move contemplated by the nationalists, I deemed it expedient to acquaint the Protectorate authorities with the information I had received and therefore called yesterday afternoon upon the Chief of the Civil Cabinet. I told M. de Hose that I had learned on what I thought was good authority (I did not of course state who my informants were) of the nationalists’ plan to present a petition for far-reaching reforms to the Sultan and Resident. I suggested that the authors of the petition might hope thereby to provoke the French authorities into taking harsh repressive measures which would enable them to emerge as martyrs of the nationalist cause, not only in their own country but also in Great Britain and the United States, where they might hope to gain the support of an aroused public opinion. M. de Rose told me that the Residency had received similar reports from other sources but had understood that the plan had been abandoned for the time being. He added that the British Consul General had called on the Resident General on New Year’s eve to inform him about rumors to the same effect which had been reported by the British Consul at Fez. M. de Rose assured me that the Residency would not take any hasty action against the nationalist agitators. I called this morning on the Resident General, at the latter’s request. He thanked me for the information I had given M. de Rose and referred to the remark that he had made to me on New Year’s day (see my A–1, January 4, 10 a.m. 29 ). In view of the reports he had received concerning the alleged plans of the Nationalists, he had made a point of asking the Sultan if he had any changes or reforms to propose, pointing out that under the Protectorate treaty it behooved the Sultan, rather than the latter’s subjects, to propose changes and reforms. The Sultan denied that he desired any change in the administrative structure of Morocco and took occasion to express his satisfaction over the dahir concerning the instruction of Moslem girls, which is referred to below. I pointed out to the Resident how, in view of the interest of the American Government and people in the broad principles of the Atlantic Charter 30 and the Four Freedoms, 31 any harsh measures which might be taken against nationalist agitators in Morocco might cause profound reactions in American opinion. The Resident assured me that he would deal “with justice but firmness” with any situation that might arise. He would not in any event take preventative measures (i.e. arrest the agitators before they acted) as some of his predecessors had done under similar circumstances. He then inquired about the extent of American interest in native affairs. I said that I thought it was considerable and, in answer to his further inquiry, indicated that it was not centered particularly on Morocco but extended to all Arab countries generally. He asked if I thought the Arab nationalists had received any encouragement from Americans, to which I replied that I thought they may have received some encouragement in the past from certain Americans who were no longer in Morocco.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. Puaux then spoke of the reforms decided upon or contemplated for Morocco. A dahir providing for the instruction of Moslem girls had already been signed. The Sultan was very interested in this question and the dahir had been prepared at his suggestion. Reforms in the system of moslem justice were also being studied (I had learned previously from a Residency official that what is contemplated is the training of legal advisers to the cadis—the dispensers of native justice—in an effort to bring about greater uniformity in the interpretation and application of Koranic and customary laws). Mr. Puaux mentioned other measures which are projected. In answer to my inquiry if greater opportunity for education was to be given to the natives, he replied in the affirmative, adding that in particular the establishment of trade and agricultural schools was contemplated. He said that he had been shocked to find upon his arrival in Morocco that not more had been done in this sense for the natives. The Resident General also volunteered the information that he had been studying the cases of the exiled nationalists Brahim El Wazzani (who is interned at Itzer in the Sahara) and Si Allal Fassi (who is interned in Gabon 32 ). He had decided, he told me in confidence, to permit El Wazzani to take up residence at Mazagan, where he would enjoy a better climate and the usual amenities of Moroccan life; he had concluded after careful consideration, however, that he could not permit the return of Allal Fassi, whom he described as an incorrigible fanatic. Following this interview with M. Puaux, I called upon the British Consul General. Mr. Bird told me that he had visited M. Puaux on December 31, following the receipt of more alarming reports from the Consulate at Fez. He read to me extracts from reports he made to his Government following this conversation with the Resident General. I noted with interest that Mr. Bird had reported that M. Puaux felt, as I had, that the plan of the nationalists was to provoke precipitate action on the part of the Protectorate authorities in an endeavor to arouse sympathy abroad, particularly in America and Britain. The report also stated that M. Puaux had expressed concern that the nationalists may have received encouragement from certain American officials. Mr. Bird shares my view that since apparently neither the British nor the American Governments are desirous of assuming any responsibility for the maintenance of order in Morocco, it is unfair to the French to give any encouragement to Moroccan nationalist agitators or to the intriguers in the Sherifian hierarchy.… We are both inclined to believe, furthermore, that M. Puaux intends to respect the obligations that France assumed when it took on the role of protecting power in Morocco and, unlike most of Marshal Lyautey’s 33 successors, will not attempt to administer the country primarily for the benefit of French commercial and industrial enterprises. The foregoing has been reported in detail not so much because serious trouble is anticipated (although the possibility must not be overlooked) as because this would seem to be an appropriate occasion to review our attitude toward the French administration in Morocco. The writer does not believe that Morocco can be said to have any national aspirations.… Neither group 34 is representative of the Moroccan people as a whole, nor, it is suggested, merits encouragement from the American authorities. Yet both groups appear to feel that they have received, in different ways, such encouragement.… Mayer 29 Not printed. 30 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. i , p. 367 . 31 Contained in President Roosevelt’s message to the Congress, January 6, 1941, Congressional Record , vol. 87, pt. 1, p. 44. 32 In French Equatorial Africa. 33 Louis H. G. Lyautey, first French Resident General in Morocco following the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1912. 34 i.e., the officials of the Shereefian Government and the intellectual class. The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State 881.00/2730: Telegram [Document 569] The Consul General at Casablanca ( Russell ) to the Secretary of State Casablanca , January 8, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 10:47 p.m.] 11. Reference Tangier’s despatch 1876, December 28. In opinion of Consulate the strength of Moorish Nationalists in French zone is not such that any real dilemma is presented if delegation of that group presents itself at Consulate. Even if such dilemma existed I believe strongly that, unless otherwise instructed, I should inform delegation that the United States has recognized French Protectorate in Morocco, that as American representative here I can only deal in official matters with French Protectorate authorities and that consequently I cannot receive their petition or representations. I then intend to see Chief of Cabinet Diplomatique and verbally inform him of such visit and of my statement to the delegation. See my despatch 121 [ 1217 ], December 17 35 regarding my opinion of anti-French movements, also Rabat’s airgrams A–1 36 and A–2. This telegram deliberately held so that Tangier despatch may be received and noted. Department will note that Childs, Mayer and myself substantially agree. Repeated to Tangier as my no. 2, Algiers as my no. 1 and copy true reading to Rabat. Russell 35 Not printed. 36 Dated January 4, 10 a.m., not printed. The Consul at Rabat (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 881.00/2737: Telegram [Document 570] The Consul at Rabat ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State Rabat , January 12, 1944—3 p.m. [Received January 13—6 a.m.] 1. Nationalists yesterday presented to the Sultan a memorial calling for Moroccan independence under Sultan, adherence to Atlantic Charter and representation at Peace Conference. Although probably not more than handful of natives have any hope of or desire for independence there is reason to believe that not only Nationalists but also members of Sultan’s entourage think time may be ripe to obtain a change in Morocco’s status. Their concepts of what new status might be have not crystalized but [garbled group] whether American Protectorate or of condominium of several powers including U.S.A. and Great Britain are among the possibilities contemplated. How far movement will develop will depend probably upon the Sultan who has not yet made known his views.… The attitude he will adopt depends probably upon his estimate of how much support and sympathy he may be able to gain in Great Britain and more especially in the United States. Although movement has little if any popular support, its leaders may promote popular unrest by playing upon general dissatisfaction over French authorities’ policy of compelling natives to dispose of their stocks of grain, wool and other produce for benefit of liberated areas—a policy we have strongly endorsed. Moroccans take no pride in contributing to war effort by being deprived not only of imported consumer goods such as textiles, sugar and tea but also of the commodities they produce. In conversing with Moroccans I have expressed personal opinion that the United States would not wish to enter into any political commitments involving Morocco; that this is not opportune moment to agitate question of change in Morocco’s status; that American Government and people could not look with favor on political movement which would tend to detract from war effort, and that broad changes may be anticipated after the war in concepts of administration of colonies and protectorates. The example of the Lebanon is, however, an incitation to press for immediate consideration of revision of Morocco’s status, especially since many Moroccans believe Great Britain and particularly the United States will support their aspirations. If Department wants to nip in bud this movement before it could reach serious proportions, I respectfully suggest desirability of official pronouncement to the effect that American Government cannot look with favor upon political movements in areas associated in war effort which might hamper progress of war. Background on the foregoing will be found in my A–2, January 5, 1944. As is implied herein, I take a more serious view of situation now than then. Repeated to Algiers and Tangier; true readings to Casablanca and Tunis. Mayer The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 881.00/2738: Telegram [Document 571] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , January 14, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 1:45 p.m.] 6. Mulay el Larbi now in Tangier representing Sultan in estate negotiations called today and stated Nationalists would present this week a petition to Sultan embodying their aspirations. He added Sultan had asked him to inform me and my British colleague that these aspirations met with Sultan’s approval. I made no observation as El Larbi is Shereefian functionary and in my opinion method chosen by Sultan for communication to American Government is improper and acknowledgment of it would have been inconsistent with obligations we assumed when recognizing French Protectorate. I dined a few days ago with Marchal in Rabat where Puaux, French Resident General, was only other guest. At end of evening Puaux remarked “You have seen from your visit Morocco is calm with exception of some agitation in Fez which appears to have been stimulated from outside sources. Do you think Doolittle 40 could have had anything to do with it”. I replied I did not see how Doolittle could be responsible as, so far as I knew, he was in Cairo. Puaux remarked British Consul General had called on him and he was instructing his Consul in Fez to avoid giving any aid to Nationalists. Puaux asked if I had any idea who might be responsible for inciting Nationalists. I replied I had no exact knowledge on subject but it was possible some irresponsible officers might have spoken in a manner which Nationalists might have misinterpreted. Puaux then asked if he might assume any conversations of such officers with Nationalists were conducted on their own responsibility. I replied it seemed perfectly obvious to me it was not in our common interest when winning the war was a paramount consideration that disorder should occur in French Morocco hampering the military effort. Puaux and Marchal replied that certainly seemed self-evident. Puaux said he had had an audience within last few days with Sultan and had asked him to state his desires. Sultan had replied he was satisfied with reforms recently introduced in female education and justice and had nothing more to request. Fez is extremely sensitive nerve center of Nationalism. Some American officers with more gift of gab than prudence may have encouraged Moroccans to believe we were ready to take their part against the French. I do not consider it in our interest to provoke political activity in French Morocco at this time, or to give least opportunity to Moors to play us off against French as they are only too ready to do. Wilson’s self-determination 41 when heralded after last war as equally applicable to all peoples set off a powder magazine in Egypt, and premature talking in Morocco about Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms, in respect of a people who are several generations behind Egyptians in political development, is dangerous. It is unsettling for both Moroccans and French, creating in the minds of the one impossible [ impossibility ] of fulfillment in immediate or near future and distrust and suspicions in minds of other, already sufficiently distrustful of us. I understand that in part of Italy occupied by Allies political activity has been prohibited on grounds of military necessity. If this is so in a relatively mature country, it should be the more essential in a backward country such as Morocco where native political development is still largely in a stage of feudalism. Department will note Russell, Mayer and I are in complete agreement concerning this problem. Repeated to Rabat with request that true readings be sent by pouch to Algiers, Casablanca and Tunis. Childs 40 Hooker A. Doolittle, First Secretary of Legation in Egypt. 41 A reference to President Woodrow Wilson’s policies as expressed in such public statements as the “Fourteen Points” speech (address to a Joint Session of Congress, January 8, 1918) and the “Mount Vernon” speech of July 4, 1918, Foreign Relations , 1918, supp. 1, vol. i , pp. 12 and 268 , respectively. The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State 881.00/2740: Telegram [Document 572] The Consul General at Casablanca ( Russell ) to the Secretary of State Casablanca , January 14, 1944—4 p.m. [Received January 15—12:40 a.m.] 18. Referring to my 11, January 8, 1 p.m. Possible native demonstration here tomorrow night, thought to be stirred up by certain Nationalists, has been responsible for cancellation all permissions to American officers and enlisted personnel as from noon January 15 for indefinite period. Repeated to Algiers as my 4, to Tangier as my 5, and true reading Rabat. Russell The Consul General at Casablanca (Russell) to the Secretary of State 881.00/2741: Telegram [Document 573] The Consul General at Casablanca ( Russell ) to the Secretary of State Casablanca , January 15, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 9:34 p.m.] 19. My 18, January 14, 4 p.m. French and British have also cancelled permissions their troops. Belief among middle class Arabs and workers is that Nationalist movement is supported and backed by United States Government. Consulate considers this belief encouraged by ill-considered actions of officers mentioned in my despatch 1186 November 22 42 and by over friendly attitude of former U.S. general officers here. French are taking precautions but do not intend to interfere unless native demonstrations become disorderly. Repeated to Algiers as my 5, to Tangier as 6 and true reading to Rabat. Russell 42 Not printed. The Consul at Rabat (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 881.00/2767: Telegram [Document 574] The Consul at Rabat ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State Rabat , January 29, 1944—7 p.m. [Received January 30—3:51 a.m.] 9. See my A–8, January 21. 43 Following arrest last night Nationalist leaders Balafrej and Lyazidi throng of natives gathered before Sultan’s palace 11 a.m. today and seized and assaulted Si Mohammed Memmeri, Chief of Protocol, as he was about to enter palace. Injuries reported serious. Arrest above leaders coming as climax to detention of certain Nationalists at Marrakech and Oudja during this week probable incitation to crowd to attack Memmeri because of role of modulation ( moderation? ] he played during recent agitation. Troops stationed within and at entrances of Medina 44 since noon have had encounters with natives; reports so far indicate small number of injuries both sides and possibly some deaths, but details lacking. No indications that manifestations have assumed alarming proportions. Diplomatic Cabinet takes deprecatory attitude as to seriousness of situation. To Department, repeated Algiers as No. 8, Tangier as 7, true copies to Casablanca and Tunis. Mayer 43 Airgram not printed. 44 The Moorish quarter of the city; from the Arabic meaning “town” or “city”. The Consul at Rabat (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 881.00/2771: Telegram [Document 575] The Consul at Rabat ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State Rabat , January 31, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 8:10 p.m.] 10. [Here follows a report of a conversation between the Chief of the Diplomatic Cabinet of the French High Commissioner and the British Consul General at Rabat.] I am convinced that rioting was not spontaneous but was carefully planned and organized. Leaders doubtless expected arrests to follow immediately presentation of memorial to Sultan and if as probably was intended rioting had then occurred it would have lent color to leaders’ claims that they were merely the spokesmen for popular movement. Arrests at Marrakech and Oudja mentioned my 9, January 29 are not connected with the last group of arrests made. Former were caused by continued circulation of petitions for independence contrary to Sultan’s orders. Persons arrested were released by pacha after day’s detention upon promise they would cease their activities. No further incidents of importance are reported. Medina at Fez has been occupied by military forces since this morning. Medinas and European quarters at Rabat, Sale and Casablanca under military guard since yesterday or day before. To Department. True readings to Algiers, Tangier, Casablanca, Tunis. Mayer The Secretary of State to the Consul at Rabat (Mayer) 881.00/2737: Telegram [Document 576] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Rabat ( Mayer ) 46 Washington , January 31, 1944—8 p.m. 6. We have conferred with the War Department on the subject of your no. 1, January 12, 3 p.m. and subsequent telegrams regarding the situation created by the demands of the Moroccan nationalists for independence. It is obvious that any agitation likely to hamper the war effort cannot be regarded with favor by this Government and that a political movement designed to alter the character of the French protectorate at this critical juncture of the war would be inopportune to say the least. While the American people would view with sympathy any steps to improve the standard of civilization among the Moors which might be taken by the Sultan in collaboration with the French, 47 an unfavorable reaction would certainly be created in this country if the demands of the nationalists led to disturbances or incidents in what is still a theatre of war operations. It would therefore appear advisable for the Sultan and the nationalist groups to avoid challenging the authority of the French and thereby undermining the security of the zone at this time. We feel that you have taken the correct attitude in your conversations with Moroccans by suggesting that this is not the moment to argue the question of political independence but that broad changes in the concept of colonial or protectorate administrations may be anticipated after the war. Notwithstanding the support which the people of the United States recently gave to the aspirations of the Lebanon, it cannot be expected that the matter of Morocco’s status would be regarded in the same light because of the military and security considerations affecting our position in North Africa. An open dispute with the French at present could only harm Morocco and work to the advantage of Axis agents and propaganda. You may make use of the foregoing in any conversation you may have with either French or Moroccan personalities. Repeat to Tangier, Algiers, Casablanca and Tunis. Hull 46 Notation on original: “Approved by the President.” 47 On January 17, 1944, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) wrote in a letter to Mayer: “… while the Department does not have a precisely defined policy with respect to the Arab problem in French North Africa and while we are careful to bear in mind the desirability of dealing through the French on these matters, we are nevertheless aware of what appears to be a sympathetic interest in the native problem of Morocco in the highest quarters.” (881.00/1–1744) The Consul at Rabat (Mayer) to the Secretary of State 881.00/2777: Telegram [Document 577] The Consul at Rabat ( Mayer ) to the Secretary of State Rabat , February 2, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:33 p.m.] 11. My 10, January 31, 2 p.m. Serious disturbances occurred in Medina at Fez following its occupation by the military. According to French officials a military post which had been established in the town was attacked by the Tanner’s Guild acting as an organized body and about 15 natives were killed before order was restored. According to certain other sources the number of killed was about 30. The rioting did not last more than a few hours and no further disorders appear to have occurred since day before yesterday. De Rose yesterday admitted that the police and military (both French and native) on duty in the Medina at Rabat were using perhaps unnecessarily rough [methods?] but explained that the murder of 2 policemen and 2 other innocent Frenchmen by the mob which attacked Si Mammeri (my 9, January 29, 6 [ 7 ] p.m.) had naturally aroused the police and military. Those arrested for participating in the riot at Rabat are being tried today by the pacha’s court. To Department, repeated to Algiers as No. 10; to Tangier as No. 9. True readings to Casablanca and Tunis. Mayer The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State 881.00/2780: Telegram [Document 578] The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers ( Chapin ) to the Secretary of State Algiers , February 3, 1944—6 p.m. [Received February 4—6:55 a.m.] 358. Massigli 48 who, as the Department may be aware, has recently returned from Morocco, informed me last night that the situation in Morocco had eased considerably and that in the light of the assurances given him personally by the Sultan he felt confident that situation was well in hand and that no further serious trouble would occur. He added that there was ample proof that German instigation had played a part in the recent disturbances and that a number of the principal Nationalists were unquestionably in German pay. Unfortunately the French police had lost the trail in Oran of the principal agent (a notorious German) before authorities were ready to spring the trap but they still hoped to pick him up. Although gravity of situation in Morocco had not been generally known outside of Morocco, through an oversight a Reuters article passed Allied military censorship last night with result that although now the situation has calmed down it has been seized upon by German radio. It is not clear from Department’s telegram No. 6 of January 31, 8 p.m. to Rabat whether Department wishes me to present the views expressed therein to Massigli. While it would probably have a good effect generally upon our relations with the Committee it is not impossible that the French would use even such an oral statement to bolster their position. In this connection I was told by Duff Cooper 49 this morning that Puaux claimed that British Prime Minister 50 had made similar statements to him before his departure. Since French officials have apparently given some surreptitious publicity to this alleged statement question was raised by British, consular officials in Morocco whether statement should be confirmed or denied. It was decided here that no action should be taken. If Department wishes me to present views expressed in telegram under reference to Massigli and because of possible French and British reaction I request clarification of penultimate sentence in paragraph 3 which as received here differentiates between our attitude toward Lebanese and Moroccan independence movements only on grounds of United States military expediency. Sent to Department as 358, repeated to Rabat as 1. Chapin 48 René Massigli, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the French Committee of National Liberation. 49 Alfred Duff Cooper, British Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation. 50 Winston S. Churchill. Mr. Churchill had spent several days in Morocco convalescing after an illness following the Tehran and Cairo Conferences; for correspondence concerning these Conferences, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 . The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) 881.00/2780: Telegram [Document 579] The Secretary of State to the Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers ( Chapin ) Washington , February 8, 1944—midnight. 415. Reference your 358, February 3, 6 p.m. The Department’s telegram to Rabat of January 31 was intended solely to serve as a guide in any conversations which our officers might have on the subject of the nationalist movement in Morocco. If you are asked for an expression of this Government’s views in the matter, you may reply along the lines described, but no need is perceived for you to take the initiative in presenting our position to Massigli. Repeat to Rabat. Hull Representations to the Spanish authorities in Morocco regarding the closing of the German Consulate General at Tangier and the expulsion of Axis sabotage and espionage agents from the Spanish Zone of Morocco Representations to the Spanish authorities in Morocco regarding the closing of the German Consulate General at Tangier and the expulsion of Axis sabotage and espionage agents from the Spanish Zone of Morocco [580] The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State Tangier, May 3, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 2:45 p.m.] 711.52/437: Telegram [581] The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State Tangier, May 4, 1944—5 p.m. [Received May 4—2:32 p.m.] 711.52/443: Telegram [582] The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State Madrid, May 4, 1944—11 p.m. [Received May 5—7:33 a.m.] 711.52/449: Telegram [583] The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State Tangier, May 5, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 3:25 p.m.] 711.52/448: Telegram [584] The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State Madrid, May 6, 1944—4 p.m. [Received May 8—2:53 p.m.] 711.52/457: Telegram [585] The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State Tangier, May 8, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 8:10 p.m.] 711.52/458: Telegram [586] The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State Madrid, May 10, 1944—5 p.m. [Received May 11—6:40 a.m.] 711.52/464: Telegram [587] The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State Tangier, May 10, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 8:24 p.m.] 711.52/463: Telegram [588] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) Washington, May 10, 1944—midnight. 711.52/458: Telegram [589] The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) Washington, May 11, 1944—7 p.m. 711.52/458: Telegram [590] The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State Tangier, May 12, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 9:17 p.m.] 711.52/468: Telegram [591] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) Washington, May 15, 1944—8 p.m. 711.52/464: Telegram [592] The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State Tangier, May 17, 1944—3 p.m. [Received May 17—11:20 a.m.] 702.6281/92: Telegram [593] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, May 22, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 2:08 p.m.] 702.6281/101: Telegram [594] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, May 23, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 4:55 p.m.] 702.6281/102: Telegram [595] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, June 1, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 7:02 p.m.] 800.20281/52: Telegram [596] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, June 16, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 24—8 a.m.] 800.20281/55: Airgram [597] The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs) Washington, June 28, 1944—4 p.m. 800.20281/55: Airgram [598] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, July 2, 1944—noon. [Received 1:32 p.m.] 800.20281/7–244: Telegram [599] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) Washington, November 17, 1944—7 p.m. 862.20252/11–1744: Telegram [600] The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State Madrid, November 21, 1944—3 p.m. [Received November 22—10:24 a.m.] 862.20252/11–2144: Telegram [601] The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State Madrid, December 6, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 7—1:10 p.m.] 862.20252/12–644: Telegram The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State 711.52/437: Telegram [Document 580] The Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , May 3, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 2:45 p.m.] 99. News of settlement at Madrid 51 spread instantly through Tangier following BBC 52 broadcast yesterday and was received with general satisfaction by everyone except presumably Germans and certain of their paid henchmen and sympathizers. Allied prestige has increased enormously overnight despite fact morning press was carefully censored by authorities to exclude any reference to expulsion German Consul here and German agents in Spanish North Africa reference being made only to a few already expelled. British paper Tangier Gazette appeared with several blank spaces on front page representing censored parts of Eden’s 53 announcement and British Consul General 54 making vigorous protest to High Commission’s delegate Tangier this a.m. (Orgaz 55 has been visiting Melilla and eastern part of zone since May 1.) Other points of settlement (release of Italian merchant ships, submission question Italian warships to arbitration, withdrawal Blue Division, 56 reduction wolfram exports to Germany and resumption oil shipments to Spain and colonies) adequately treated. Chief reason for satisfaction over settlement is announced resumption of oil shipments which it is assumed will again permit circulation of private cars. I have just seen Castillo 57 who informs me that while he has not yet received any official information it is his opinion publicity has not been given to agreement regarding expulsion of Germans in the interest of public order. He admitted that agreement on this point was no secret and that majority of local population had already been apprised of it through Allied broadcasts but asserted that publicity here might give rise to disturbances among partisans of the belligerent powers. I pointed out the paradoxical nature of his assertion but could obtain no more satisfactory explanation from him. He said most important point was agreement regarding expulsion of Germans and that question of publicity is minor issue. I replied that it involved question of prestige and that both the other contracting parties had seen fit to make public all points of settlement. In reply to my question Castillo said he did not know whether publicity had been given to entire settlement in metropolitan Spanish press. He seemed relieved that a settlement had been reached but said that most difficult phase, namely, actual expulsion of Germans has yet to be undertaken. He said no instructions regarding matter had yet been received by High Command from Madrid. I remarked that it was to Spain’s interest as well as ours to see to it that agreement is given effect by expelling Germans at earliest possible date. He agreed and observed they would have to be given 2 weeks or so to arrange their affairs before they leave. Their departure will hinge, of course, on Madrid’s instructions to Orgaz and his interpretation of such orders. Repeated to Madrid. Elbrick 51 By an agreement between the United States and Spain concluded on May 2, 1944, the latter undertook, inter alia: to close the German Consulate in Tangier and to require its personnel to depart from Spanish or Spanish-controlled territory; to expel all German agents from Spanish or Spanish-controlled territory; to require the Japanese Legation in Spain to withdraw its Military Attaché from Tangier; and to expel Axis sabotage and espionage agents from Spanish-controlled territory and Metropolitan Spain. For agreement, see exchange of letters between the Ambassador in Spain and the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, May 1 and 2, vol. iv , first section under Spain. 52 The British Broadcasting Corporation. 53 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 54 Alvary D. F. Gascoigne. 55 Gen. Luís Orgaz, High Commissioner of Spain in Morocco. 56 Spanish Volunteers with the German Army on the Russian Front. 57 Cristóbal del Castillo, Spanish Consul General at Tangier. The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State 711.52/443: Telegram [Document 581] The Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , May 4, 1944—5 p.m. [Received May 4—2:32 p.m.] 49. Legation’s 99, May 3, to Department. I have just seen Uriarte 58 who informed me that no instructions have yet been received from Madrid regarding expulsion of Germans. I told him that it is most important to everyone concerned that this phase of agreement be executed at once since any delay will only complicate matters and make eventual expulsion more difficult. He agreed but said matter rests with Madrid Government and High Commissioner, who is returning tomorrow from Melilla, will not act without instructions. British Consul General and I feel such instructions should be issued at once. Undue delay could easily dissipate every favorable impression already created here by the announcement of the settlement. Uriarte informed Gascoigne today that publication of Eden’s statement in British Tangier Gazette will be permitted as soon as permission is received officially from Madrid. He told Gascoigne yesterday publication of reference to their expulsion would have been discourtesy to Germans. He said he had given orders to local censor to eliminate such references since paper is circulated in Spanish Zone as well as Tangier and since local authorities had not received instructions from Madrid regarding agreement. Repeated to Department and Algiers for Murphy. 59 Sent to Madrid. Elbrick 58 Gen. D. Jenaro de Uriarte, Spanish Military Governor of Tangier, and Delegate of the High Commissioner at Tangier. 59 Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers, United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and United States member of the Advisory Council, Allied Control Commission for Italy. The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State 711.52/449: Telegram [Document 582] The Ambassador in Spain ( Hayes ) to the Secretary of State Madrid , May 4, 1944—11 p.m. [Received May 5—7:33 a.m.] 1549. High Foreign Office official stated this morning that Foreign Office had just received a telegram from the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin, 60 who reported that he had been called to the German Foreign Office by the Sub-Secretary 61 (von Ribbentrop 62 is not in Berlin). Sub-Secretary had been pale with rage and had protested in the most violent terms against Spain’s agreement with Britain and United States. He seemed to take greatest offense at suppression of German Consulate General in Tangier. Sub-Secretary said that this was especially offensive to Germany inasmuch as British and American diplomatic and consular offices were being allowed to remain. The Ambassador explained patiently to the Sub-Secretary that Allied offices had a right to remain there while the Germans had been prohibited by international treaty 63 from establishing a Consulate General in Tangier in the first place, and that Spain was merely carrying out an obligation which was especially pressing inasmuch as Spain had occupied Tangier in order to guarantee its neutrality. The Ambassador reported that when the conversation ended the Sub-Secretary had calmed down considerably. German Ambassador in Madrid 64 likewise has protested against agreement. Hayes 60 Gen. Ginés Vidal. 61 Andor Hencke. 62 Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister. 63 The Treaty of Versailles, part IV, section V, articles 141–146; Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, vol. xiii , pp. 292 – 295 . 64 Hans Dieckhoff. The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State 711.52/448: Telegram [Document 583] The Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , May 5, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 3:25 p.m.] 103. British Consul General was informed by Castillo today that text of Madrid settlement has now been received by the High Commissariat and that question of the removal of German Consulate and Japanese from Tangier had been taken up by Spanish Government in Berlin and Tokyo. Gascoigne expects to see Orgaz today or tomorrow when he will present formal demand for immediate implementation agreement which Castillo said he would be glad to support. List prepared by Allied intelligence service of German consular personnel here and German agents in Spanish North Africa will be presented at the same time. Castillo intimated that Orgaz may refuse to act until definite instructions are received from Madrid. Neither British Consul General nor this Legation has yet received text of settlement. Sir Samuel Hoare 65 has telegraphed Gascoigne from Lisbon that Spanish Government has been informed by Berlin that German Government will take steps appropriate to the situation. According to Hoare, Jordana 66 is complaining that British and Americans appear to be treating settlement as a victory over Spain rather than Germany and that his position has been made extremely difficult. Germans here are attempting to make it appear that agreement regarding their expulsion is merely Allied propaganda. It is reported that local Italian Fascist leaders were called to German Consulate yesterday and informed that Madrid settlement made no mention of closing German Consulate here. Repeated Madrid and Algiers for Murphy. Elbrick 65 Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador in Spain. 66 Count Francisco Gómez Jordana, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State 711.52/457: Telegram [Document 584] The Ambassador in Spain ( Hayes ) to the Secretary of State Madrid , May 6, 1944—4 p.m. [Received May 8—2:53 p.m.] 1568. I saw the Foreign Minister this morning and among other things discussed the subject matter of Tangier’s 49 of May 4 to the Department. Jordana stated that the first step in implementing the agreement had been taken, namely, by the Spanish Government serving written notice on the German Government that the German Consulate General must be closed. Incidentally, I learn from another but well-informed source that the German reply was that it would “take the action appropriate to the circumstances” which was the same reply it made to Portgual in connection with the Azores Agreement. 67 Jordana went on to say that Spain fully intended to take all necessary steps to carry out the agreement promptly but that they would have to be taken one at a time. At the same time he complained with some vehemence that the character of recent British and American radio broadcasts was such as to cause him embarrassment. Hayes 67 Presumably a reference to the agreement between the United Kingdom and Portugal concerning facilities in the Azores; the notes constituting the agreement were exchanged at Lisbon on August 17, 1943; British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxlvi , pp. 447–452. For correspondence relating to the interest of the United States in the negotiations leading to the agreement and in obtaining its own facilities in the Azores, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. ii , pp. 527 ff., and ibid. , 1944, vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State 711.52/458: Telegram [Document 585] The Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , May 8, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 8:10 p.m.] 107. Legation’s 104, May 6. 68 Gascoigne reports interview with Orgaz today was very unsatisfactory and that latter was most uncooperative. Orgaz said no instructions had been received re expulsion of Germans and he would take no action until he receives them. He said German agents and saboteurs in special zone and Tangier were to be considered for expulsion on their merits. He indicated, however, that Jap Military Attaché there would be asked today to arrange his departure. Later Castillo informed Gascoigne that Orgaz will try to sabotage the agreement, that he will do everything possible to avoid necessity of expelling Germans, that he instructed Castillo to inform Jap representative here that he may take as long as he likes to arrange his departure. Castillo said Orgaz has actually received instructions from Madrid but is delaying action by posing questions to Jordana such as eventual disposition of Mendoubia now occupied by German Consul and future representation of German interests here. It is apparent that Orgaz will not act unless forced to do so and Castillo feels he will take action only on Franco’s 69 direct orders. In order to keep this question alive and to stress importance of execution this phase of agreement I shall ask for an appointment to see Orgaz toward end of week if Department has no objection. Sent to Department, repeated to Madrid and Algiers. Elbrick 68 Not printed. 69 Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State. The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State 711.52/464: Telegram [Document 586] The Chargé in Spain ( Butterworth ) to the Secretary of State Madrid , May 10, 1944—5 p.m. [Received May 11—6:40 a.m.] 1616. Embassy’s 1568 of May 6, 4 p.m. In the course of a conversation yesterday the Under Secretary of the Foreign Office referred to the statement made by Jordana to the Ambassador and said that there was no question but that the closing of the German Consulate General in Tangier would be accomplished within a reasonable time and he recited the steps that had been taken by the Spanish Government with the German Government both in Madrid and Berlin. It seemed evident that Jordana is taking the obvious course of attempting to effect the closing of the German Consulate General by order direct from Berlin or through the German Embassy in Madrid before resorting to more forceful methods in Tangier. There is very good reason to believe that regardless of Castillo’s statement quoted in Tangier’s 107, May 8, 7 p.m., that Orgaz has, as he so stated, not yet received instructions from Madrid except possibly as regards the Japanese Assistant Military Attaché. Therefore as regards the last sentence of Tangier’s telegram under reference my own feeling is that since we have made an agreement approved by the Council of Ministers and Franco we should avoid being drawn into subsidiary negotiations and hold the Spanish Government here responsible for implementing appropriately its undertakings. Repeated to Tangier and Algiers. Butterworth The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State 711.52/463: Telegram [Document 587] The Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , May 10, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 8:24 p.m.] 110. Legation’s 107, May 8. In discussing Madrid settlement today with Castillo, he again intimated that Orgaz would act only on direct orders from Franco. He said he, Castillo, had sent an officer of the Spanish Consulate on May 8 to German Consulate and Japanese Military Attaché to notify them orally that they must leave. He expects the Japanese will leave within very few days but Germans state they will take no action without instructions from Berlin. I said it is imperative that German Consulate be closed at once even though departure of personnel may be delayed. He agreed accord should be implemented at once but feels Orgaz will delay action as long as possible. I have requested interview with Orgaz which will take place possibly on Friday. British Foreign Office has instructed British Embassy, Madrid, to insist strongly that Jordana send necessary instructions to Orgaz to insure departure of Germans and closing of Consulate in immediate future. Repeated Madrid and Algiers for Murphy. Elbrick The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) 711.52/458: Telegram [Document 588] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain ( Hayes ) Washington , May 10, 1944—midnight. 1317. Situation reported in Tangier’s 107, May 8, 7 p.m. is seriously disturbing. Unless prompt measures are taken by Spanish Government effectively to carry out agreement in regard to expulsion of Germans, Department will be compelled to consider withdrawing its authorization of petroleum loadings for Spain. Repeat to Tangier and Algiers. Hull The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) 711.52/458: Telegram [Document 589] The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) Washington , May 11, 1944—7 p.m. 64. Although the Department is taking up with Madrid the subject matter of your telegram No. 107, May 8, 7 p.m., no objection is perceived to your seeing Orgaz. Hull The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State 711.52/468: Telegram [Document 590] The Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , May 12, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 9:17 p.m.] 113. Legation’s 107, May 9 [ 8 ]. In my interview with Orgaz today he was as uncommunicative and seemingly as uncooperative as he had been with Gascoigne earlier in the week. Orgaz stated no instructions had been received from Madrid and that he could not undertake any action. The accord had been signed by Spanish Government, he said, and would be implemented in due course and he would carry out his instructions with diligence. He said however that proposed expulsion of German Consuls here involved official personnel of German Government and he would see that they were treated with courtesy and respect in connection with their departure. He gave me to understand that he had no knowledge of any instructions from Berlin to Consulate here although Castillo had informed him along lines of my 111, May 11. 70 Prior to interview Castillo had told me that Orgaz had warned him last night to say nothing to anyone about orders issued by Berlin to German Consulate here. Castillo said he thought this attitude was a further indication of Orgaz’ reluctance to see accord implemented. British Consul General and I are under impression that Orgaz is prepared to delay execution of agreement as long as possible. Repeated to Madrid, Algiers for Murphy. Elbrick 70 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) 711.52/464: Telegram [Document 591] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Spain ( Butterworth ) Washington , May 15, 1944—8 p.m. 1365. Your 1616, May 10, 5 p.m. For your information our press, which generally received the wolfram agreement 71 very favorably, is already commenting on tardiness in closing German Consulate General in Tangier and expressing skepticism as to Spain’s fulfilment of agreement. Spanish Government should recognize importance of proceeding rapidly in order to make most of improved atmosphere. Hull 71 The agreement between the United States and Spain, concluded May 2, 1944, contained certain provisions concerning wolfram; for text, see exchange of letters between the Ambassador in Spain and the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, vol. iv , first section under Spain. The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State 702.6281/92: Telegram [Document 592] The Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , May 17, 1944—3 p.m. [Received May 17—11:20 a.m.] 122. Legation’s 115, May 13. 72 Shield of German Consulate was removed last night. Uriarte phoned this morning to tell me of this development and to assure me entire matter will be liquidated shortly. Castillo informed Gascoigne later that Consulate is no longer open for business and that Germans will cease sending cypher telegrams tomorrow night. Repeated to Algiers as our 33, repeated to Madrid as our 56, May 17, 3 p.m. Elbrick 72 Not printed. The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 702.6281/101: Telegram [Document 593] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , May 22, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 2:08 p.m.] 132. Legation’s 120, May 16. 72 Orgaz has now replied to Legation’s note of May 18 requesting expulsion of German agents from Spanish North Africa (see paragraph 6, section 1, Madrid’s 2430, May 4 73 ). He states he likewise is interested in execution of Madrid agreement and that necessary measures have been taken for departure from zone of Germans in question. He has ordered brief investigations of these individuals to “guarantee strict equity and justice.” As soon as necessary investigations are completed he will inform Legation of their departure dates and respective routes. Department should note that foregoing refers to German agents in Spanish Morocco and Tangier as distinguished from German consular personnel in Tangier. Arrangements for departure of last named are now in progress. Repeated to Algiers as our 38, repeated to Madrid as our 60. Childs 72 Not printed. 73 Printed in vol. iv , first section under Spain. The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 702.6281/102: Telegram [Document 594] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , May 23, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 4:55 p.m.] 135. Our 129, May 20. 75 In interview with Orgaz yesterday Gascoigne was told German Consulate General would be finally closed and sealed and placed in charge of Tangier administration this evening, after which Germans would no longer have access to it. Repatriation of Consulate personnel is to begin immediately, he said, and majority of higher officers should have left before May 28. Entire staff, according to Orgaz, should be on its way by May 30, but in any case all of them will have left by June 5. He added that no members of Tangier staff would be permitted to remain at Tetuan or elsewhere in Spanish Morocco. Our 124, May 18. 76 Orgaz said he would lend his personal plane to help in transporting personnel as far as Seville, but that all personnel travelling in this way would, of course, surrender their passports to us for examination in order to obtain aircerts in exactly same way as those proceeding by Iberia. In this interview Orgaz appeared to be in friendly and helpful mood and it may be expected expulsions will be carried out as he has indicated. Timetable was that proposed by Castillo as reported our 129. As for espionage and sabotage agents, he said, Bureau of Native Affairs had been instructed to inquire into each case immediately. He indicated majority of agents should have left by June 5 with exception of few cases which he may wish further to discuss. He said question of expulsion of all Germans entering International Zone since 1940 would have to be discussed between Government and Allied Embassies since this point did not figure in text of agreement. Yesterday nine German passports were presented to us through Spanish Consulate for aircerts for travel to Spain. These include press and Commercial Attachés, two other Attachés and lesser functionaries. Jap Military Attaché also applied for aircert. It is understood all the above will leave this week. Algiers for Murphy as our 40; repeated to Madrid as our 64. Childs 75 Telegram not printed. 76 Not printed. The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 800.20281/52: Telegram [Document 595] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , June 1, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 7:02 p.m.] 155. My 154. 77 In agreement with British colleague I presented Orgaz today with list of Axis agents of Italian nationality for expulsion. List included prominent Republican Fascists in German service or known for pro-Axis activities compiled by Italian Consul General and carefully reviewed by all Allied services. In receiving list, Orgaz remarked that British had presented German list, and now the Italian, and asked if I would concern myself with Vichy French and others. I explained American and British accords differed in that British referred to German agents while ours stipulated Axis sabotage and espionage agents of any nationality. He promised to take appropriate action at once and said all German consular staff in Tangier including military police officials who had sought refuge in Tetuán would be expelled. I said I had informed my Government I was impressed by loyalty with which he was executing the accord. Orgaz was deeply moved and remarked with great feeling [“]these are the only comforting words I have received in the execution of this most difficult task which I have tried to fulfill with the high sense of duty and honor of a soldier[”]. He said it was most difficult to determine the status of German agents some of whom had lived in Morocco since birth or for many years. In a sense every German citizen is a German agent. He had to refer some doubtful cases to Madrid but wishes earnestly to discharge his task with scrupulous adherence to the accord. I said I did not intend to take up particular German cases as Gascoigne was occupying himself with these but I did wish to emphasize the nefariousness of Kraemer 78 at Melilla with whom certain Spaniards had actively cooperated and I feel this expulsion desirable for all concerned. Orgaz said as Melilla is part of metropolitan Spain Kraemer’s decision would have to come from Madrid where he had already referred it. Repeated to Algiers for Murphy as our 53, Madrid as our 75. Sent to the Department. Childs 77 Not printed. 78 Walter E. Kraemer, honorary German Vice Consul at Melilla, and reputedly the head of German espionage activities in that city. The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 800.20281/55: Airgram [Document 596] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , June 16, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 24—8 a.m.] A–112. Reference is made to the Legation’s despatch No. 2122 of June 1, 1944 79 reporting the submittal to the Spanish High Commissioner of a list of Italian Republican Fascists for expulsion from Spanish North Africa as Axis agents under the terms of our recent accord with the Spanish Government. The Legation is now undertaking to prepare a supplementary list of such Axis agents, including Hungarians, White Russians, Vichy French and other Axis agents about which opinion is unanimous on the part of British and American services in Tangier. The question has been raised whether the Vichy representatives in Tangier might appropriately be included in a list of Axis agents to be submitted to the Spanish High Commissioner for expulsion. In this connection reference is made to the Treasury Department’s P.I. No. 15 under Foreign Funds Control, concerning the application of General Ruling No. 11, as amended, to diplomatic representatives of the Vichy Government, where it is held that “The Vichy Government and its representatives, wherever situated, are acting for the Government of Germany within the meaning of Section (4) ( a ) (i) of General Ruling No. 11, as amended, …” However, neither my British colleague nor my French colleague nor I believe that the Vichy representative in Tangier is engaged in activities sufficiently inimical to our interests at the present time to justify raising the question of his expulsion with the Spanish authorities. The Vichy representative’s influence is now practically nil as a result of his inclusion and that of his assistants in our Proclaimed List, which has had the effect of reducing his authority to insignificance. The closing of the French-Spanish Moroccan frontier reduces still further the opportunity for evil practices on the part of the Vichy representative and his associates. Moreover, as has been previously reported to the Department, General Orgaz seems to have taken a personal interest in the Vichy representative here (perhaps because of a sense of loyalty to the representatives of a Government still recognized by the Spanish) and any effort on our part at the present time to oust the Vichy representatives might irritate Orgaz to the point where the whole program of the removal of Axis agents might be jeopardized. Accordingly it is our view that no action is called for with respect to the Vichy representatives at this time. Childs 79 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier (Childs) 800.20281/55: Airgram [Document 597] The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) Washington , June 28, 1944—4 p.m. A–73. The Department concurs with the view expressed in you’re A–112, June 16, 1944, 6 p.m., that no action should be taken with regard to the expulsion of Vichy representatives at this time. Hull The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 800.20281/7–244: Telegram [Document 598] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , July 2, 1944—noon. [Received 1:32 p.m.] 190. My despatch 2181, June 29 and 2145, June 15. 80 Gascoigne presented note to High Commissioner yesterday requesting he expedite departure not only of 10 German agents Orgaz had promised should leave Morocco today of whom only Richter and Krueger have left but also the 6 others whose investigation by Spanish authorities has been proceeding for some 6 weeks. My British colleague informed me today Foreign Office telegraphed Embassy Madrid expressing increasing dissatisfaction with execution of Anglo-Spanish agreement of May 2 and instructing Ambassador to insist on expulsion of all German agents in Spanish Morocco notified to Spanish authorities numbering 39. Of these, 3 had left before presentation of list and only 2 since. I have had no reply to my note regarding Italian Axis agents and I am renewing request for action. To Department. Repeated to Madrid, by pouch to Algiers. Childs 80 Neither printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) 862.20252/11–1744: Telegram [Document 599] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain ( Hayes ) Washington , November 17, 1944—7 p.m. 3052. Please furnish by cable a recapitulation of present status of situation arising from our demands for expulsion or internment of Axis agents. Department desires to know exactly to what extent our demands have been satisfied. Stettinius The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State 862.20252/11–2144: Telegram [Document 600] The Ambassador in Spain ( Hayes ) to the Secretary of State Madrid , November 21, 1944—3 p.m. [Received November 22—10:24 a.m.] 3807. Reurtel 3052, November 17, 7 p.m. Despatch No. 3389, November 9 83 contains copies of exchange of notes with the Foreign Office on the expulsion of Axis agents. However, the situation to date can be summarized as follows: 1. Tangier. Of the 21 Italians named, 20 have left Africa but none Spain. Of 42 Germans named, excluding staff of German Consulate General, 31, October 31 had left North Africa; since that time 4 more have gone. Just 9 of the 35 are known by us to have left Spain. 2. Spain. There has been no action taken to expel from Spain Italian Socialist Republican Representative Morreale or 29 Italians listed in Embassy’s note 2827, July 28 (no doubt due to vulnerability of Spanish interests in North Italy). Of 220 German agents listed by the British Embassy to the Spanish Government June 6, 71 are Spanish, and 31 left before May 2, thus reducing list to 118, of which Foreign Office stated 57 have departed. Of the remaining 68 Foreign Office indicated orders were given October 23 to intern 19 and on November 6 a further 19 and concludes that “from the total of non-Spanish agents named in list of June 6 hardly a dozen cases remain to be dealt with”, a conclusion we cannot quite follow and are requesting explanation. The Department will note that in enclosure to despatch No. 3389 the Foreign Office gives assurance that orders for transfer to residence at Caldas de Malavella (near Gerona) subject to “strict vigilance” have been issued for those German agents under expulsion order but unable to leave, a detailed list of whom is promised in due course. Repeated to Tangier by courier. Hayes 83 Not printed. The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State 862.20252/12–644: Telegram [Document 601] The Ambassador in Spain ( Hayes ) to the Secretary of State Madrid , December 6, 1944—6 p.m. [Received December 7—1:10 p.m.] 3961. Despatch 3389, November 9. 83 A note has now been received from the Spanish Foreign Office dated November 27 in reply to Embassy’s note verbale 827, November 6 supplying lists of names of the following: ( a ) 53 German agents expelled from North Africa plus 5 who are to leave shortly. This list includes name of an unknown individual not appearing in Tangier’s despatch 2470, November 25; 83 ( b ) 36 German agents ordered interned at Caldas and 3 ordered interned at other unspecified places about which we propose to get specific data; ( c ) 750 German customs guards and officials transferred to Sobrón from Miranda concentration camp, the remaining 500 others at Miranda, names of whom are promised. Reourtel 3807, November 21, 3 p.m. Despatch follows. 84 Following oral representations to the Under Secretary the Foreign Office includes written undertaking that orders have been given prohibiting interned foreigners from using the interurban telephone. Repeated to Tangier by courier. Hayes 83 Not printed. 83 Not printed. 84 Despatch 3583, not printed. Interest of the United States in the termination of the Spanish occupation of the International Zone of Tangier Interest of the United States in the termination of the Spanish occupation of the International Zone of Tangier 85 85 For correspondence relating to the Spanish occupation and control of the Tangier Zone, and reservation of American rights therein, see Foreign Relations , 1940, vol. iii , pp. 783 ff., and ibid. , 1941, vol. ii , pp. 586 ff. [602] The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State Tangier, October 19, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 5:10 p.m.] 852.01/10–1944: Telegram [603] The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State Tangier, October 21, 1944—noon. [Received 2:46 p.m.] 881.01/10–2144: Telegram [604] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Lewis) [Washington,] October 26, 1944. 881.01/10–2644 [605] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) Washington, October 30, 1944—4 p.m. 881.01/10–2144: Airgram [606] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard) [Washington,] November 9, 1944. 881.01/11–944 [607] The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State Madrid, November 20, 1944—8 p.m. [Received November 22—12:04 p.m.] 881.01/11–2044: Telegram [608] The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State Tangier, November 25, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 27—12:20 p.m.] 881.01/11–2544: Telegram The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State 852.01/10–1944: Telegram [Document 602] The Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , October 19, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 5:10 p.m.] 312. Circular note of October 16 86 received this a.m. from Orgaz 87 announces appointment of Suner, Spanish Consul General here, as, delegate on High Commission in Tangier to succeed General Uriarte who left for Madrid October 13 to take advance course at Army War College. Although Uriarte announced by note to heads of foreign representations that he would be absent only a month, Orgaz note confirms his definitive departure. As pointed out in our A–244 October 17 88 Spaniards have apparently chosen this face-saving method of removing Uriarte who has acted as its delegate since November 1942 and as Commander of Spanish 52d Provisional Division and Military Governor. Transfer of Uriarte’s power to a civilian diplomatic officer possibly signifies beginning or [ of ] withdrawal of Spanish Armed Forces from International Zone. This move, together with withdrawal of 13th Infantry Regiment (Legtel 306, October 9 89 ) and rumored retirement in near future of regiments of 52d Provisional Division would indicate adoption of more realistic policy by Spanish in regard to their unpopular occupation of International Zone. There is no indication, however, that they intend to withdraw from Tangier entirely; there is reason to believe [apparent omission] stress the civilian rather than the military aspect of the occupation in the hope that this will placate the interested powers to a point where they may be willing to acknowledge Spain’s claim to a dominant position here in any future revision of Tangier’s status. Repeated to Madrid. Elbrick 86 Not printed. 87 Gen. Luis Orgaz, Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco. 88 Airgram not printed. 89 Telegram not printed. The Chargé at Tangier (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State 881.01/10–2144: Telegram [Document 603] The Chargé at Tangier ( Elbrick ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , October 21, 1944—noon. [Received 2:46 p.m.] 313. In an interview of over an hour late yesterday Suner substantially confirmed interpretation of recent events as outlined in Legation telegram 312 October 19. He was most friendly and appeared to be very frank and sincere. He gave me to understand Uriarte’s removal had been prompted by Spain’s desire to eliminate discordant note in connection with its occupation of the Zone and that Orgaz (presumably after consulting Madrid) had chosen Uriarte’s departure to attend War College as propitious moment to effect the change. Suner assured me that his efforts would be directed toward maintaining harmonious relationship with all elements in Tangier and we could always count on his friendly and complete cooperation in our dealings with the Spanish authorities. In reply to my question Suner stated his new appointment implied no present change in Spanish administrative organization here. He said he looked forward to the day when the interested powers would gather round a table to discuss Tangier and related problems and at that time he expected Spain would be accorded the recognition she deserved. He dwelt at length upon the many benefits accruing to Tangier from Spanish occupation. When I remarked Spanish administration left much to be desired he agreed but argued that Spain had saved the Zone from a worse fate by its timely intervention. This is the line which the Spanish may be expected to take henceforth. They seem to have abandoned hope of annexing the Zone and for the moment at least are reduced to appealing for a large measure of recognition as participants in any regime which may be set up in future. Elbrick Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Lewis) 881.01/10–2644 [Document 604] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of African Affairs ( Lewis ) [ Washington ,] October 26, 1944. Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor, British Embassy; Messrs. Villard, 90 Lewis, Wasson, 91 AF. Mr. Wright came in to follow up a recent conversation between Sir Ronald Campbell 92 and Mr. Villard in regard to the future of Tangier. Mr. Villard had made the suggestion that with the end of the war in sight, consideration might appropriately be given as to the Spanish position in the International Zone and the steps which might be regarded as desirable there by members of the United Nations at the end of hostilities. In Sir Ronald’s absence, Mr. Wright had been asked to discuss the matter in the Department. Mr. Villard reviewed recent developments in Tangier as reported to the Department by the Legation, indicating that the Spanish might be preparing to abandon their military occupation in favor of a substantial civilian interest in the administration. He then referred to the conversations which Mr. Murray 93 had had in London with Mr. Frank Roberts of the Foreign Office, on the subject of the International Zone, at which time it was agreed that a further exchange of views on the future status of Tangier would in due course be desirable. Mr. Villard said that recent events at Tangier, as well as the present course of the war, seemed to indicate that the time had arrived for a discussion between the British and ourselves on the subject for the purpose of concerting our thoughts. Mr. Wright said that while he was personally unfamiliar with the situation in Tangier and with his Government’s thinking on the future status of the International Zone, he would be glad to bring Mr. Villard’s suggestion to the attention of the Foreign Office and would ask for documentation on the present British attitude toward the Spanish occupation and other matters related to this problem. 90 Henry S. Villard, Chief, Division of African Affairs. 91 Thomas C. Wasson of the Division of African Affairs. 92 Sir Ronald I. Campbell, British Minister. 93 Wallace Murray, Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) 881.01/10–2144: Airgram [Document 605] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain ( Hayes ) Washington , October 30, 1944—4 p.m. A–585. The Department would like to receive from the Embassy such information as may be available concerning the present Spanish attitude toward Spain’s future position in Tangier. In this connection reference is made to telegrams no. 312 of October 19 and 313 of October 21 from the Legation at Tangier. Since the latter telegram appears not to have been repeated to Madrid the Embassy will doubtless wish to ask Tangier for the text. Is it the opinion of the Embassy that the withdrawal of Spanish regiments has any association with this question, as suggested by the Legation? Copy to Tangier. Stettinius Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard) 881.01/11–944 [Document 606] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of African Affairs ( Villard ) [ Washington ,] November 9, 1944. Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, British Embassy. Mr. Henry S. Villard, AF. Mr. Wright telephoned to say that in response to our recent suggestion for a discussion of the future of Tangier, the British Embassy had received a telegram from London to the effect that this subject was being considered simultaneously in the Foreign Office. The British were very grateful that we had indicated a desire to open conversations on the matter, and they were preparing material which would shortly be transmitted to Washington to be presented to us. Mr. Wright said that we could look forward to receiving the British views within a week or two and that he would then suggest a date for a conference. The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State 881.01/11–2044: Telegram [Document 607] The Ambassador in Spain ( Hayes ) to the Secretary of State Madrid , November 20, 1944—8 p.m. [Received November 22—12:04 p.m.] 3802. Department’s airgram 585, October 30. The question of the future Spanish position in Tangier has not been brought up in conversation or otherwise between Embassy and Spanish Government officials both parties having studiously avoided this subject as have officials of the British Emb[assy]. It is my view that initiative in approaching subject appropriately should come from Statutory Powers 94 acting in concert, not from the United States. My reasons are: (1) We are not a Statutory Power and have not participated in the international administration; 95 (2) We made no protest against Spanish occupation in June, 1940, and when the international administration was substantially ousted in November, 1940, we by implication gave credence to the unilateral undertaking given by Spain as to the temporary character of the occupation when we merely expressed the presumption that this further Spanish action would not conflict with the assurances given to the Statutory Powers in June; (3) Following the Spanish announcement on December 1, 1940, of the incorporation of Tangier into the Spanish Zone, we limited ourselves to claiming most favored nation rights under the British modus vivendi of December 31 as confirmed by Spain on February 21, 1941; (4) Our sole direct approach was in the Spartel Lighthouse Case in July, 1941, 96 when we reserved our rights but under the Convention of May 31, 1865. 97 Regarding last sentence of reference airgram, I believe that replacement of General Uriarte by a civil official as delegate of the High Commissioner at Tangier has more significance than the noted transfer of troops away from Tangier and Spanish North Africa. These two divisions (41st and 52d) were both provisional and had been sent to North Africa for protection of Spanish holdings during the supposed international emergency. Having long overstayed that emergency and become surplus they were transferred to the Pyrenees provinces where reinforcements were needed in view of the threats of incursion of Spanish irregulars from southwestern France. Repeated to Tangier as 152. Hayes 94 i.e., Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands. Portugal, and Sweden. Great Britain, France, and Spain signed the “Statute of Tangier” (Convention regarding the organization of the Statute of the Tangier Zone) at Paris, December 18, 1923; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxviii , p. 541. These three countries, together with Italy, signed the Agreement revising this Convention at Paris July 25, 1928 ( ibid. , vol. lxxxvii , p. 211). Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden later adhered to the Statute. 95 For correspondence on the reservation of American treaty rights with respect to the Statute of Tangier, see Foreign Relations , 1928, vol. iii , pp. 367 ff. 96 For the protest by the United States regarding the Spanish seizure of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse, see ibid. , 1941, vol. iii , pp. 581 ff. 97 Convention as to Cape Spartel Lighthouse, signed at Tangier, May 31, 1865, William M. Malloy (ed.), Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers , 1776–1909 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910), vol. i , p. 1217. For correspondence relating to American participation in the Convention, see Foreign Relations , 1864, vol. iv , pp. 412 ff., passim , and ibid. , 1865, vol. iii , pp. 350 ff, passim . The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State 881.01/11–2544: Telegram [Document 608] The Chargé at Tangier ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State Tangier , November 25, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 27—12:20 p.m.] 345. Madrid’s 152, November 20. 98 1. Our nonparticipation in the international administration was due fundamentally to a foreign policy of isolation which time has presumably rendered invalid. It is difficult to believe we would continue to maintain a position of non-participation in a future international regime for Tangier if as is assumed we are to share responsibilities in the control of strategic parts of the world among which Tangier is of conspicuous importance. I can perceive no useful purpose in refraining now from joining with the other principally interested parties in an approach to Spain concerning the termination of the special mission assumed by the Spanish in Tangier. 2. My understanding of the Department’s motives in taking cognizance in November 1940 of the Spanish unilateral action in Tangier is that notwithstanding fact that we were not a party to the Tangier Statute it was felt that already in 1940 our relation to world political problems had so changed and Tangier had become of such strategic importance to us as a great maritime power as to make it at that time of vital importance in the national interest to assert our views with respect to Tangier and to serve notice on Spain that our interests in this area were not to be ignored. 3. Our note to Spanish Government in November ’40 99 specifically stipulated we would not recognize any unilateral action taken by Spain with reference to Tangier. 4. The accumulating force of our interest in this area was evidenced by the energetic protest made in ’41 in connection with Spain’s unilateral action in taking over the Cape Spartel lighthouse. I am still of the opinion as expressed in the memorandum of March 2, ’44 enclosed with Department’s instruction 176 of April 14, ’44 1 that a suitable moment, i.e. on the eve of the close of hostilities in Europe, the Spanish Government should be approached by the American and British Governments with reference to Tangier. The joint or identic démarches might recall that in June ’40 in communications made in Madrid and Tangier (see enclosures to Tangier despatch 1545, June 15, ’40 2 and Madrid’s telegram 192, June 14, ’40 3 ) the Spanish Government gave notice of its intention to occupy the Tangier Zone provisionally to insure its neutrality and that the Spanish Government’s task in the opinion of the interested powers has now ended and that the continued Spanish occupancy of Tangier is considered inconsistent with the aims and purposes of the United Nations as expressed in the Atlantic Charter 4 and other declarations as well as in the Stimson Doctrine 5 (see last paragraph on page 1 of the section headed “Provisional Interim Regime” in the memorandum on the future status of the International Zone of Tangier enclosed in the instruction mentioned). In view of the changed position of France since that memo was written it may be desirable that France be associated in the démarche . The Department will doubtless also desire to keep Russia informed as well as those powers belonging to the United Nations or benevolently neutral nations who by virtue of their adherence to the Tangier Statute or the international instruments relating to Morocco are entitled to be informed of our intentions. Repeated to Paris and Madrid. Childs 98 See last paragraph of the telegram supra . 99 For text of note, see telegram 297, November 9, 1940, 6 p.m., to Madrid, Foreign Relations , 1940, vol. iii , p. 789 . 1 Not printed. 2 Not printed; see telegram 21, June 15, 1940, 11 a.m., from Tangier, Foreign Relations , 1940, vol. iii , p. 785 . 3 ibid. , p. 783 . 4 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, ibid. , 1941, vol. i , p. 367 . 5 See telegram 2, January 7, 1932, noon, to Nanking, Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. iii , p. 7 . This telegram and a telegram the same mutatis mutandis to Tokyo instructed the presentation of notes to the Chinese and Japanese Governments in which the statement was made that the United States would not recognize situations, treaties, or agreements brought about contrary to the obligations of the Pact of Paris. The Pact of Paris renounced war as an instrument of national policy and by its terms the contracting parties agreed never to seek the settlement of disputes among them except by peaceful means. For text of this Pact, signed August 27, 1928, see Foreign Relations , 1928, vol. i , p. 153 . Palestine: Palestine: Contents Attitude of the United States toward the Arab-Zionist controversy concerning the future status of Palestine and the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine (Documents 609-710) Attitude of the United States toward the Arab-Zionist controversy concerning the future status of Palestine and the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine Attitude of the United States toward the Arab-Zionist controversy concerning the future status of Palestine and the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine 1 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 747 – 829 . [609] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] January 5, 1944. 867N.01/2093 [610] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] January 28, 1944. 867N.01/2373 [611] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) [Washington,] January 28, 1944. 867N.01/2192 [612] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) [Washington,] January 31, 1944. 867N.01/2187 [613] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, February 3, 1944. [Received February 22.] 867N.01/2198 [614] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Connally) Washington, February 7, 1944. 867N.01/2–744 [615] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Connally) Washington, February 9, 1944. 867N.01/2–744 [616] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] February 9, 1944. 867N.01/2193 [617] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, February 14, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 7:23 p.m.] 867N.01/2185: Telegram [618] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) Washington, February 16, 1944—6 p.m. 867N.01/2185: Telegram [619] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, February 18, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 7:33 p.m.] 867N.01/2197: Telegram [620] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] February 19, 1944. 867N.01/2280 [621] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] February 19, 1944. 867N.01/2282 [622] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, February 23, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 5:40 p.m.] 867N.01/2205: Telegram [623] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] February 23, 1944. 867N.01/2–2344 [624] The Chargé at Damascus (Farrell) to the Secretary of State Damascus, February 24, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 6:42 p.m.] 867N.01/2209: Telegram [625] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) [Washington,] February 24, 1944. 867N.01/2315 [626] The Egyptian Legation to the Department of State [ Washington ,] February 24, 1944. 867N.01/2315 [627] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) Washington, February 26, 1944—9 p.m. 867N.01/2205: Telegram [628] The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) [Washington,] February 26, 1944. 867N.01/2–2644 [629] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, February 27, 1944—11 a.m. [Received February 28—4:35 a.m.] 867N.01/2215: Telegram [630] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, February 28, 1944—noon. [Received 4:15 p.m.] 867N.01/2217: Telegram [631] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, February 29, 1944—10 p.m. [Received March 1—9:45 a.m.] 867N.01/2223: Telegram [632] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, March 2, 1944—6 p.m. [Received March 3—10:53 a.m.] 867N.01/2225: Telegram [633] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) Washington, March 2, 1944—7 p.m. 867N.01/2205: Telegram [634] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] March 2, 1944. 867N.01/2251½ [635] Amir Abdullah of Transjordan to President Roosevelt Amman, March 3, 1944. 867N.00/3–344 [636] The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Cairo, March 4, 1944—11 a.m. [Received March 6—10:42 a.m.] 867N.01/2231: Telegram [637] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, March 4, 1944—11 p.m. [Received March 6—12:45 p.m.] 867N.01/2232: Telegram [638] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, March 4, 1944. [Received March 5—1 p.m.] 867N.01/2228: Telegram [639] The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Cairo, March 4, 1944—noon. [Received March 5—11:08 a.m.] 867N.01/2233: Telegram [640] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President Roosevelt [Washington,] March 4, 1944. 867N.01/2275a [641] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] March 10, 1944. 867N.01/2280 [642] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, March 11, 1944—9 a.m. [Received March 11—8:30 a.m.] 867N.01/2251: Telegram [643] The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Cairo, March 11, 1944—7 p.m. [Received March 11—4:19 p.m.] 867N.01/2254: Telegram [644] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, March 13, 1944—7 p.m. 867N.01/2185: Telegram [645] The Egyptian Minister (Hassan) to the Secretary of State Washington, March 14, 1944. 867N.01/2304 [646] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) Washington, March 15, 1944—9 p.m. 867N.01/2255: Telegram [647] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) Washington, March 17, 1944—midnight. 867N.01/2276a: Telegram [648] Memorandum by Mr. Evan M. Wilson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] March 17, 1944. 740.00119 Stettinius Mission/3–1744 [649] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] March 18, 1944. 867N.01/3–1844 [650] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, March 23, 1944—12:30 p.m. [Received April 8—8 a.m.] 867N.01/2403: Airgram [651] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) Washington, March 23, 1944—8 p.m. 867N.01/2284a: Telegram [652] The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan) Washington, March 28, 1944. 867N.01/2222 [653] The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Damascus (Farrell) Washington, March 28, 1944—5 p.m. 867N.01/2209: Telegram [654] The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Cairo, March 29, 1944—4 p.m. [Received March 30—11:30 a.m.] 867N.01/2299: Telegram [655] The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan) Washington, March 31, 1944. 867N.01/2304 [656] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) Washington, April 5, 1944—1 p.m. 867N.01/2299: Telegram [657] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs London, April 11, 1944. 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/125 [658] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs London, April 19, 1944. 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/142 [659] The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, June 26, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 8:15 p.m.] 840.48 Refugees/6–2644: Telegram [660] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, July 18, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 6:55 p.m.] 867N.01/7–1844: Telegram [661] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] July 26, 1944. 867N.01/7–1844 [662] The First Secretary of Legation in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State Damascus, August 3, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 5:08 p.m.] 867N.01/8–344: Telegram in Syria [663] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, August 5, 1944—9 a.m. [Received August 12—8 a.m.] 867N.01/8–544: Airgram [664] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, August 10, 1944. [Received August 10—10:37 a.m.] 867N.01/8–1044: Telegram [665] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, August 18, 1944. [Received August 30.] 867N.01/8–1844 [666] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) Washington, August 31, 1944—6 p.m. 867N.01/8–3144: Telegram [667] The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, August 31, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 9:34 p.m.] 840.48 Refugees/8–3144: Telegram [668] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, September 5, 1944—7 p.m. [Received September 5—12:30 a.m.] 867N.01/9–544: Telegram [669] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) Washington, September 15, 1944—1 p.m. 867N.01/9–544: Telegram [670] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] September 30, 1944. 867N.01/9–3044 [671] President Roosevelt to Senator Robert F. Wagner Washington, October 15, 1944. 867N.01/12–244 [672] The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, October 19, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 8:12 p.m.] 867N.01/10–1944: Telegram [673] The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, October 21, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 7:44 p.m.] 867N.01/10–2144: Telegram [674] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, October 21, 1944—10 p.m. [Received October 22—1:58 p.m.] 867N.01/10–2144: Telegram [675] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] October 23, 1944. 867N.01/10–2344 [676] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] October 23, 1944. 867N.01/10–2344 [677] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, October 26, 1944—3 p.m. 867N.01/10–2644: Telegram [678] The Chargé in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State Damascus, October 27, 1944—noon. [Received 12:55 p.m.] 867N.01/10–2744: Telegram [679] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] October 27, 1944. 867N.01/10–2744 [680] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] October 27, 1944. 867N.01/10–2544 [681] Memorandum, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] October 27, 1944. 867N.01/10–2744 [682] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, October 31, 1944—1 p.m. [Received November 1—9:33 a.m.] 867N.01/10–3144: Telegram [683] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, November 1, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 4—2:23 p.m.] 867N.01/11–144: Telegram [684] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, November 2, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 11:07 p.m.] 867N.01/11–244: Telegram [685] The Chargé in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State Damascus, November 3, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:50 p.m.] 867N.01/11–344: Telegram [686] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) Baghdad, November 4, 1944. 867N.01/11–444 [687] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Temporarily in Washington [Washington,] November 4, 1944. 867N.01/10–2344 [688] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] November 8, 1944. 867N.01/10–3144 [689] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, November 9, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 10—2:05 p.m.] 867N.01/11–944: Telegram [690] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] November 11, 1944. 867N.01/12–1344 [691] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, November 14, 1944. [Received November 21—1 p.m.] 867N.01/11–1444: Airgram [692] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] November 15, 1944. 867N.01/11–1544 [693] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, November 17, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 23—11:20 a.m.] 867N.01/11–1744: Telegram [694] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, November 21, 1944—8 a.m. [Received 3:30 p.m.] 867N.01/11–2144: Telegram [695] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, November 21, 1944—11 a.m. [Received December 6—2 p.m.] 867N.01/11–2144: Airgram [696] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] November 23, 1944. 867N.01/11–2344 [697] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] November 24, 1944. 867N.01/11–2444 [698] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] December 5, 1944. 867N.01/12–544 [699] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] December 6, 1944. 867N.01/12–644 [700] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, December 6, 1944. [701] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, December 8, 1944. [702] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] December 8, 1944. 867N.01/11–1044 [703] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 11, 1944 December 11, 1944 867N.01/12–1144 [704] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State Moscow, December 13, 1944—10 p.m. [Received December 14—6:50 a.m.] 867N.01–/12–1344: Telegram [705] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] December 13, 1944. 867N.01/12–1344 [706] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, December 19, 1944—6 p.m. [Received January 3, 1945—3 p.m.] 867N.01/12–1944: Airgram [707] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] December 19, 1944. 867N.01/12–1944 [708] The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, December 21, 1944—9 p.m. [Received January 3, 1945—3 p.m.] 867N.01/12–2144: Airgram [709] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] December 22, 1944. 867N.01/12–2244 [710] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] December 23, 1944. 867N.01/12–2344 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State 867N.01/2093 [Document 609] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] January 5, 1944. Some three days after my conversation with the British Ambassador 2 on December twenty-second, 3 I had a further conversation with him on the telephone regarding the Jewish question. The Ambassador said that he had just heard from Mr. Eden 4 to the effect that they were giving urgent consideration to my suggestion about the White Paper 5 and related phases of the Jewish situation. I thanked him and said that that in itself would not be sufficient unless he contemplated a further reply which would give this Government a chance to say something publicly on the White Paper. I desired respectfully to urge that the British Government acquiesce in our saying something just as Mr. Churchill 6 was saying something on this question to important people who are interested in it. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 2 Viscount Halifax. 3 See memorandum of December 22, 1943, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 827 . 4 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 5 British Cmd. 6019: Palestine, Statement of Policy , May 1939. The immigration clauses of the White Paper, establishing a new policy for Jewish immigration into Palestine, provided for “… the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years.… After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.…” For correspondence regarding American interest in the White Paper, see Foreign Relations , 1939, vol. iv , pp. 732 ff. 6 Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2373 [Document 610] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Berle ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] January 28, 1944. Mr. Secretary : H. Res . 418 and 419 “Resolved, that the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.” (This is approved by both McCormack 7 and Martin. 8 ) Mr. Sol Bloom 9 telephoned me today to state that the foregoing resolution had been introduced by a Republican and a Democrat, 10 and approved by the majority and minority leaders. Unless otherwise advised, he plans to call his Committee for Tuesday; have no hearings but merely read Prime Minister Churchill’s statement objecting to the White Paper; 11 and then report the resolution out favorably and let it go at that. A. A. Berle, Jr. 7 John W. McCormack, Majority Leader, House of Representatives. 8 Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Minority Leader, House of Representatives. 9 Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. 10 Representatives Ranulf Compton of Connecticut and James A. Wright of Pennsylvania, respectively. 11 The New York Times had reported on January 18, 1944, that the American Jewish Committee, a non-Zionist organization but opposed to the White Paper, had submitted a memorandum to the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, calling attention to the Churchill opposition to the White Paper policy of the 1939 British Government; for Mr. Churchill’s speech in opposition in the House of Commons as a private member, on May 23, 1939, see Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 347, cols. 2167 ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) 867N.01/2192 [Document 611] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Berle ) [ Washington ,] January 28, 1944. Sir Ronald Campbell 12 came in to see me at my request. Representative Sol Bloom telephoned me just prior to Sir Ronald’s arrival that H. Res. 418 and 419, regarding the opening of Palestine to immigration and its constitution as a democratic Jewish commonwealth, had been introduced with both Republican and Democratic support; and that he expected to put it through his Committee. He asked that we speak to the British about it. I therefore said to Sir Ronald that this was the situation: that, in my judgment, the support of these Resolutions assured their passage; and that we thought his Government should be informed. We should be glad to have any ideas they might have. I added however that, in my judgment, there was real likelihood that the Resolutions would be passed by a large majority, if not unanimously. A[ dolf ] A. B[ erle ], Jr. 12 British Minister. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) 867N.01/2187 [Document 612] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Berle ) [ Washington ,] January 31, 1944. Sir Ronald Campbell came in to see me with reference to the resolutions recently proposed in the House asking that Palestine be opened to colonization and set up as a democratic Jewish commonwealth, of which I had previously informed him. He said obviously the British Government would not wish to comment on an American legislative matter; it might be pointed out that such a course involved certain obligations, including military, and that the British policy in this respect might be influenced by American willingness to join in maintaining the ensuing situation. He added that we were quite familiar with their views on the subject. I thanked him for coming down. I told him that, as he well understood, I had brought this matter to his attention merely for information, and indeed had done so at the suggestion of Chairman Sol Bloom of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It did not follow, of course, that we would want to say anything. A[ dolf ] A. B[ erle ], Jr. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2198 [Document 613] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 13,676 London , February 3, 1944. [Received February 22.] Sir : In a general discussion on Palestinian affairs on January 29th, a Foreign Office official told a member of the Embassy staff that the British Government does not expect any particular trouble on March 31, 1944, the expiration date of the five-year period for the entry of 75,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine as set out in the White Paper. During this period the quota has not been filled, despite the great efforts made by the British to get prospective immigrants out of Nazi-controlled territory. At the present time there are still some 30,000 places to be filled in the immigration, and it has been agreed that these will be permitted to come in after March 31st. The Foreign Office official said that the present Jewish agitation, which is, of course, extremely strong in the United States, has as its objective the withdrawal of the White Paper. The British Government does not intend, he continued, to give in to this campaign, as it would raise a storm in the Arab world, and any serious trouble in the Middle East would constitute a grave menace to the war effort. For this reason the British believe that no solution of this vexatious problem will be possible before the conclusion of hostilities.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: W. J. Gallman Counselor of Embassy The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Connally) 867N.01/2–744 [Document 614] The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ( Connally ) Washington , February 7, 1944. Dear Senator Connally : I have your letter of February 5, 1944 enclosing a copy of S. Res. 247 13 and requesting consideration of that resolution and a report thereon. Because of a suggestion that the passage of such a resolution might have an effect upon the military situation in North Africa and perhaps other Middle Eastern territories, you inquire particularly as to such possible repercussions. The subject of this resolution is a matter of deep military concern to the War Department. I feel that the passage of this resolution at the present time, or even any public hearings thereon, would be apt to provoke dangerous repercussions in areas where we have many vital military interests. Any conflict between Jews and Arabs would require the retention of troops in the affected areas and thus reduce the total forces that could otherwise be placed in combat against Germany. The consequent unrest in other portions of the Arab world would keep United Nations resources away from the combat zone. I believe therefore that our war effort would be seriously prejudiced by such action. Sincerely yours, Henry L. Stimson 13 A measure drafted identical to the proposed House Resolution (see memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State, January 28, p. 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] ) and placed before the Senate on February 1, 1944, by Senators Robert F. Wagner of New York and Robert A. Taft of Ohio. The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Connally) 867N.01/2–744 [Document 615] The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ( Connally ) Washington , February 9, 1944. My Dear Senator Connally : I wish to refer to your letter of February 4, 1944, regarding the resolution introduced into Congress relative to Palestine, and your letter of February 5, 1944, 14 with which you sent me a copy of your letter to the Secretary of War on the same subject. This Department has received a copy of the reply which the Secretary of War has addressed to you under date of February 7, 1944, 15 expressing the view that the war effort would be seriously prejudiced by the passage of this resolution. In view of the military considerations advanced in this regard by the Secretary of War, it is believed that without reference to its merits no further action on this resolution would be advisable at this time. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 14 Neither found in Department files. 15 Supra . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 867N.01/2193 [Document 616] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) [ Washington ,] February 9, 1944. The Egyptian and Iraqi Ministers 16 called on me this afternoon at their request. The conference lasted approximately twenty-five minutes. The Egyptian Minister opened the conversation by saying he was greatly disturbed over the Resolution that had been introduced on the Palestine question. He stated that he had had several conferences with the President during the past few months in which the President had assured him that he hoped the whole question would be postponed until after the war. The Egyptian Minister then stated he greatly resented the attack made against his people recently by Congressman Celler of New York and asked if anything could be done. I told him that due to our democratic system of government any member of Congress could speak in any way he wished, and that it was impossible for the Executive branch of the government to exercise any restraint over members of Congress. The Iraqi Minister then said that he also shared the same concern as the Egyptian Minister over the Palestine matter, and he was hopeful that the whole matter could be postponed. I explained to the gentlemen that Secretary Hull was keeping closely in touch with the entire matter and I told them I appreciated their having come to express their views. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] 16 Mahmoud Hassan and Ali Jawdat, respectively. The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2185: Telegram [Document 617] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , February 14, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 7:23 p.m.] 31. Nuri Pasha 17 told me yesterday he would appreciate it if I would inform my Government by telegram of the deep concern of the Iraqi Government lest the pressure which the Zionists are exerting at present on the U.S. might result in responsible American officials or candidates for high office making commitments with regard to Palestine not in conformity with the principles which in past guided American foreign policy in general and which had been incorporated in the Atlantic Charter 18 and the declaration of the United Nations. 19 As an illustration of Zionist activities he referred to a resolution introduced recently by Senator Wagner in the Senate which he understood had the backing of Senators Taft and Barkley 20 demanding that restrictions upon immigration to Palestine be lifted. He said the Arab world did not have the facilities available to the Zionists for presenting its side of the case to the American Senate, that he hoped that a resolution of the kind would not be passed since its passage would add to certain misconceptions of the Palestine problem which many people in the U.S. seem to have and would strengthen Axis propaganda in this area. He pointed out that the German radio broadcasts in the Arabic language was making wide use of this resolution in an endeavor to create a lack of confidence among the Arabs in the sincerity of purpose of the Allies and of Allied expressions of friendliness toward the Arab world; he and his colleagues sincerely hope that the Zionists will not be successful in making the future of Palestine a political issue during the coming electoral campaign. He added that it would be extremely helpful in combatting Axis propaganda and in stilling certain misgivings even among those Arabs most friendly to the Allied cause if assurances could be given that the Government of the U.S. would not decide on what its attitude on Palestine is to be until spokesmen for the Arabs are given a full opportunity to make clear the issues at stake. During conversation Nuri Pasha cited fact that it was Iraq Government’s view that while papers [ White Paper ] would continue to govern Palestine situation until a final solution of problem could be found. Henderson 17 Nuri as-Said, Iraqi Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defense. 18 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. i , p. 367 . 19 Signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, ibid. , 1942, vol. i , p. 25 . 20 Alben W. Barkley, Senator from Kentucky. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) 867N.01/2185: Telegram [Document 618] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) 21 Washington , February 16, 1944—6 p.m. 19. Your 31, February 14, 7 p.m. In any future conversations which you may have with Nuri relative to the resolutions introduced into each House of Congress regarding Palestine you should bear in mind that the passage of such resolutions by either or both Houses would be only an expression of the individual members of that House and would not be binding upon the executive branch or an expression of the foreign policy of the United States. Stettinius 21 Repeated to Cairo as telegram 318, February 16, 9 p.m., with the instruction that it be repeated in turn to Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda. The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2197: Telegram [Document 619] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , February 18, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 7:33 p.m.] 36. My Iraqi colleague called today “to discuss as matter of courtesy” instructions received from Nuri regarding pro-Zionist resolutions referred to in your 318, February 16, 9 p.m., to Cairo. 22 He is directed to inform Lebanese and [Syrian] Governments and Parliamentary leaders of nature of resolutions (which are described as advocating recognition of Palestine as a Jewish state) and to suggest that Arab cause would be served were they to follow Iraq’s lead in telegraphing protests to American Government and Congress. He is to mention also representations made to Department by Ali Jawdat against Celler’s speech impugning trustworthiness of Arab rulers and to inform them of Under Secretary’s expression of regret and assurance to the effect that “the President’s idea is to leave settlement of the Palestine problem for after the war”. He assured me there is no intention of encouraging local Parliamentary discussion or inciting popular protest but rather that his démarche is motivated by belief that Arab-Allied relations will be troubled anew by present pro-Zionist campaign and that our, as well as Arab, interests will be best served by reaffirmation of Arab solidarity in opposition to establishment of Jewish state or to further Jewish immigration into Palestine. No mention of resolutions has been made in local press (although Palestine Post , which has small circulation here, has referred to current hearings thereon) nor have any local leaders mentioned matter to me. It seems probable however that Foreign Minister 23 will do so after receiving Iraqi démarche . I should consequently appreciate receiving any directives (including perhaps texts of resolutions) which Department may see fit to send at this time. Repeated to Baghdad and Jerusalem. Wadsworth 22 See footnote 21, above. 23 Jamil Mardam. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2280 [Document 620] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] February 19, 1944. Mr. Secretary : After Breck Long’s 24 call to you on the Palestine question and the matter of making Mr. Stimson’s letter public, Mr. Stimson, the President and I had a discussion, in which it was agreed that the War Department would try first to kill the resolution by executive session testimony by Army representatives. If this fails, Stimson will then give consideration to making his letter public. The strongest point in Mr. Stimson’s mind was that General Marshall 25 had military considerations in mind and the effect the letter would have on the enemy. Breck has had a very satisfactory talk with Mr. Connally and Mr. Bloom and they both feel much better about the whole situation. I believe the situation is under control. Incidentally, Connally had in a few of the outstanding leaders of Jewry for a frank discussion. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] 24 Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State. 25 Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 867N.01/2282 [Document 621] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) 26 [ Washington ,] February 19, 1944. At yesterday’s Cabinet meeting the Palestine resolution was thoroughly discussed. The President expressed the opinion to Secretary Stimson that it was important for his letter on the matter to be made public. 27 The Secretary replied that he first wished to try the executive session method and hoped that Mr. McCloy 28 and General Handy 29 would be able to stop the resolution in executive session. He added that General Marshall was anxious that the letter not be made public but that he would review the matter with the General again. I stated that the State Department felt it was important for the letter to be made public. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] 26 Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long), the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray), and the Deputy Director (Alling). 27 The letter (February 7, p. 563 [ Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , and Doc. 615 ] ) was not made public. 28 John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War. 29 Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy of the War Department General Staff. The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2205: Telegram [Document 622] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , February 23, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 5:40 p.m.] 35. Information regarding resolutions on Palestine introduced into both houses of Congress contained in Department’s 341 to Cairo 30 relayed here is appreciated. Since Prime Minister’s talk with me described in my 31, February 14 a number of members of the Government have approached me with expressions of concern regarding Senate Resolution. The fact that a similar resolution was also introduced into the House has just become known here. The Minister for Foreign Affairs 31 has told me that the Government is taking every possible precaution to prevent the resolution from becoming a subject of discussion in the Parliament and press. He said that the Government had been successful thus far, in spite of the efforts of the Axis radio, to limit knowledge regarding the resolution to relatively few persons in the country. If, however, the resolution should be passed he feels that the fact would eventually become known and that it would be impossible to convince the Arab world including the people of Iraq that the resolution did not reflect the views of the American people. There is no doubt that interest in the fate of the resolution has become so intense here that for the time being it has crowded all other aspects of foreign affairs into the background and that those leaders of the Government who bear the main responsibility for having prevailed upon Iraq to adopt a pro-Allied policy and for bringing Iraq into the fold of the United Nations are deeply worried. I have been informed that several telegrams have been sent by prominent Iraq officials to members of the Senate expressing the hope that the resolution will not be passed and that additional telegrams will probably be sent to the House now that it is realized that a similar resolution is before that body. In my opinion it would be impossible for the bulk of the politically conscious people of Iraq to reconcile the policies called for in the resolution with the pronouncements of the war aims of the United States and of other members of the United Nations. It is felt here that the successful carrying out of the policies advocated in the resolutions would mean the removal of the keystone of the arch of future Arab unity and an almost irreparable blow towards the eventual setting up of an Arab Commonwealth 32 which would permit the Arab peoples to play the part in the world to which they feel their history and talents entitle them. The news of the passage of these resolutions would come as a bitter shock even to those Arabs here who have not based their hopes for the future primarily upon an Arab union since the bulk of the population of the country have deep sympathy for their Arab kinsmen in Palestine whom they feel are being pushed about by strong nationalistic minority backed by powerful foreign interests. Although I believe that the Iraqi Government in case the resolutions are passed would take steps to quiet demonstrations nevertheless the news of the passage would certainly give rise to intense indignation against both the Jews and the United States and possibly by demonstrations of a spontaneous character. I am convinced that the passage of the resolutions would greatly assist the efforts of the Axis to convince the Arabs of this area of the lack of sincerity and of the duplicity of the United States and would more than offset the good will which has been created for the United States in this area by various American governmental organizations during recent years. Repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut. Henderson 30 Dated February 19, 5 p.m., not printed. 31 Mahmood Subhi al-Daftari. 32 Regarding the attitude of the United States toward the general question of Arab union, see bracketed note, p. 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 715 and Doc. 716 ] . Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 867N.01/2–2344 [Document 623] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) 33 [ Washington ,] February 23, 1944. In my talk with the President on Tuesday, I asked him if he had any instructions to leave with us on the question of the Palestine Resolution. He did not but he is hopeful that the McCloy–Handy testimony may end the matter but if not he continues to feel the Stimson letter should then be made public. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] 33 Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) and the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray). The Chargé at Damascus (Farrell) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2209: Telegram [Document 624] The Chargé at Damascus ( Farrell ) to the Secretary of State Damascus , February 24, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 6:42 p.m.] 3. Reference Beirut No. 36, February 18, 4 p.m. Syrian Foreign Office today handed me a note dated February 23 enclosing copy of telegrams of protest despatched yesterday by Speaker Faris al-Khoury and Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee Adnan al-Attassi of Syrian Parliament to their counterparts in Congress, against resolutions demanding creation of Jewish state in Palestine, as follows: “Motions in Congress demanding continued immigration to create Jewish state in Palestine fatally compromise Arab rights and jeopardize public peace in Arab States in the Middle East where all available resources are being put willingly at the disposal of the Allies for assuring victory. The passing of such motions shakes all confidence in international justice and those good hopes guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter. Rendering service to Jews at the expense of Arabs cannot be justified. We request that full study of the Arab rights in Palestine should be made before bringing the aforesaid motions up for debate.” Foreign Office covering (full text by air mail 34 ) states: Syrian Government fully shares views and cannot conceal surprise that Jewish national home question should be raised without regard to deep effects on Arab opinion at a time when Arab States are giving utmost assistance to Allied cause; warns of grave repercussions if policy of resolutions is adopted and enforced; opines that while Syrian Government will never tolerate settlement of Jews in Palestine at the expense of Arabs, present is inopportune time to raise question, and expects any decision to be deferred to the end of war; concludes that foregoing is clear and frank definition of Syrian Government policy and requests reply to dissipate Arab fears. I have orally informed Foreign Minister of substance of Department’s No. 19, February 16, 6 p.m. to Baghdad and now request guidance in formulation of expected reply to Foreign Office specifically whether any further expression can be added to that stated therein. Urgency of matter and probable receipt of Parliamentary protests have prompted me to despatch this message direct from Damascus but further report will reflect consultation with Beirut not immediately possible in person and indiscreet by telephone. Farrell 34 Despatch 81, February 24, not printed. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) 867N.01/2315 [Document 625] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Alling ) 35 [ Washington ,] February 24, 1944. The Egyptian Minister called today and handed me the attached note 36 regarding the Palestine question. He indicated that it was along the lines of his recent conversation with the Acting Secretary and he stressed the fact that it was being submitted under instructions from his Government. I told the Minister that I hoped that he understood that Resolutions adopted in Congress on such matters represented only the views of the legislative branch of the Government and did not necessarily reflect the views of the executive. He said that he himself was quite aware of this fact. He went on to say that nevertheless it was difficult to explain our system of government to the man in the street in Egypt and in nearby countries and when they learned from the Axis radio that some prominent Senator or Representative was advocating action in regard to Palestine, it was naturally assumed that such action represented the views of the United States Government. The Minister said he would appreciate receiving at our early convenience a reply to the attached aide-mémoire , since his Government was anxiously awaiting our views in this important matter. 35 Addressed to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and the Under Secretary of State. 36 Not printed: for annex, see the aide-mémoire of February 24, infra . The Egyptian Legation to the Department of State 867N.01/2315 [Document 626] The Egyptian Legation to the Department of State 37 Aide-Mémoire The Egyptian Government had the honor of submitting two Aide-Mémoires to the Government of the United States, the first dated January 21, 1943, and the other March 23rd, 1943, on the question of Palestine and its immigration. 38 In them it enunciated its point of view as regards this problem, which in turn happens to coincide fully with the views of all the other Arab peoples of the Middle East. As a result of this démarche on the part of Egypt, she was accorded some satisfaction by the assurances given by the American Government to the Egyptian Minister at Washington in March 1943, when it was stated to him “that the Question of Palestine in general will not be considered and threshed out without the consent of all the parties interested in it.” 39 But it appears that a new current of opinion is in course of taking shape in certain Congressional circles of the United States, with the final aim of declaring null and void the White Paper which, while never earning the full approval of the people of Palestine, none the less handled the matter in a way which did not bear down too heavily upon them. Another movement also seems to be unfurling in America, which, while inciting the passions of the Jews in Palestine, at the same time tends to frustrate the Palestinians in their national sovereignty, and aspirations towards political independence; and this has been doubly intensified by the bombastic utterances and writings of certain Congressmen, whose language was aggressive, intolerant and unfair towards the Arabs; and it is feared that the demand for the abolition of the White Paper will hardly meet any opposition in Congress. The Zionist problem which has already caused no little amount of trouble and bloodshed, tends by a recrudescence of this fresh fiery attitude, and the encouragement given it, to revive even greater troubles and difficulties, and create conflict not only amongst the Palestinian people themselves, but also amongst the Arab nations who are, at this moment, striving to combine and form a united front. It is useful to recall, in this connection, that the question of persecuted Jews and that of the Zionist problem are not one and the same thing. While the Arab people, in common with the rest of the world, bitterly condemn the barbarous treatment to which the Jews have been subjected, nevertheless they feel that such oppression should not, under any circumstances, serve as a reason for persecuting, in turn, the people of Palestine, made up of Moslems, Christians and Jews, thus subjecting them to the tender mercies of the Zionists! For neither Palestine, nor the neighbouring Arab people, will accept such a situation with equanimity. The Egyptian Government, which has never ceased to try to conciliate the various elements, and to bring them nearer towards a common understanding along lines acceptable to all, views with no little apprehension and concern the movement which appears to be gaining force now towards converting Palestine into a Jewish homeland. It is well to recall that the Arabs never failed to give proof of their amity and friendship towards the United Nations; in fact they have given of their best loyally and unstintedly, spurred on by the idea of creating a system of universal democracy and political justice. And to this political justice the Arabs have as much a claim as other peoples. They have also found in the Atlantic Charter as much satisfaction for the present, as hope for the future. Firmly united, they find in the aggression on one of them aggression on all; and will thus not tolerate politicians and Zionists denying Palestinians the benefits of the Atlantic Charter. The Egyptian Government would, therefore, like to emphasise once more the danger and gravity of the declarations of the Zionist leaders, who make no secret of their intention to transform Palestine into a purely Jewish State. Their concealed activities, which find a ready response in America, has had a deplorable effect on both Arab and Moslem public opinion the world over; for this unfortunate propaganda, unhappily, tends to give the Arabs and the Mohammedans the impression that America is supporting the Jews at the expense of the Arabs. The Egyptian Government, therefore, firmly believes that official and responsible circles in America cannot afford to overlook such a state of affairs, already most irritating in itself as it has proved. For Egypt and the other Arab Peoples are firmly resolved to develop even still further the friendly ties already binding them with the United States and hope nothing can impair them. Egypt, thus, finds it incumbent upon herself once again to recall the gravity and import of the declarations made by responsible personages, whether in the form of public utterances, or solemn pledges, in favour of the Zionists. The Egyptian Government, accordingly, trusts that the American Government will give the present Aide-Mémoire its fullest consideration and study. Hence the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, as well as the rising tide of American interests in the Middle East, both call for a reconsideration of the Palestinian Question. In any event no settlement can be arrived at without the concurrence and approval of the party most directly interested of all, namely, the People of Palestine. [ Washington ,] February 24, 1944. 37 Forwarded under cover of a note of February 24 from the Egyptian Minister to the Acting Secretary of State. 38 The Egyptian Minister’s notes were dated February 2 and March 29, 1943; for texts, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 751 and 766 , respectively. 39 See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, March 30, 1943, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 767 . The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) 867N.01/2205: Telegram [Document 627] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) 40 Washington , February 26, 1944—9 p.m. 23. Department’s 341, February 19, 5 p.m. to Cairo 41 and your 35, February 23, 3 p.m. It now appears unlikely that the Palestine Resolutions will be reported out of either the Senate or the House Committee. You may make discreet use of this information in any conversations you may have on this subject. In such conversations you should stress (Department’s 19, February 16, 6 p.m.) the point that even if the Resolutions had been reported out and passed, such action would merely have represented the views of the members of the two Houses and would not have been binding upon the Executive. In this general connection the Department is under the impression that few people in your territory, even educated and intelligent leaders, fully understand the structure and method of operation of the American form of government. You should take every opportunity to explain our system, particularly with regard to such matters as the Resolutions under discussion. Stettinius 40 Repeated, mutatis mutandis , in telegram 408, February 26, 9 p.m., to Cairo, with instructions to repeat in turn to Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda. 41 Not printed. The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) 867N.01/2–2644 [Document 628] The Assistant Secretary of War ( McCloy ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Long ) [ Washington ,] February 26, 1944. Dear Mr. Secretary : In accordance with our telephone convertion I am sending you herewith a memorandum which I prepared for General Marshall at his request, preparatory to his talking to several senators about the pending Palestine resolution. I do not know what the General actually said to the Senators beyond his statement to me that he had followed the general facts and tone of this memorandum, so I assume that it can be safely treated as a basis for the remarks which he made. Mr. Bloom, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, has asked me to advise him informally of about what I would say if I were called upon to testify before his Committee, and I propose to testify in conformity with this memorandum. Sincerely, John J. McCloy [Enclosure] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War ( McCloy ) to the Chief of Staff ( Marshall ) [ Washington ,] 22 February 1944. I believe the Secretary before he went away arranged with Wadsworth that an officer to be selected by you and I should attend an Executive Meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House in connection with the pending Palestine resolution. It was originally arranged that this meeting should take place on Tuesday of this week but it has been postponed until Thursday. Mr. Wadsworth has advised me that the meeting will now take place some time Thursday morning. In preparation for this meeting I have read the old resolution of 1922 42 and compared it with the pending resolution. I have also talked to some G–2 43 officers and gone over some reports, and I intend to testify in general along the following line: The pending resolution deals with highly controversial issues in that it comes out for unlimited immigration into the area, a matter definitely in sharp issue, as well as for the establishment of a Jewish state as distinguished from a homeland. It also requires that the United States take “appropriate measures” to bring these things about. Our G–2 reports all indicate that there is a high degree of tension in Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews and that each side have substantial quantities of arms. Bombings have occurred in the Migration Offices maintained by the British Government in Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Any action which would tend to increase this tension or threaten an outbreak in this area would greatly compromise our military capacities. Among other considerations there are the following: 1. There are substantial Allied forces in that area which we are seeking to reduce and any outbreak at this particular time would be certain to pin down troops for garrison duty that are badly needed for replacement and other duty both in Italy and for other operations. 2. Our military forces are in contact with the Moslem world not only in Palestine but throughout the entire Mediterranean area and in many places further east. The Palestine issue is a source of more or less concern to all the Moslem population of the Near East and North Africa. The tribes in Morocco are restive and already disturbances have occurred there. These activities are mainly pointed against French dominion but it is known that German agents are active in the area and certainly will use the Arab-Jew issue to the limit in order to foment further disturbances if an opportunity presents itself. 3. We are dependent not only upon peace in the area but our lines of communication throughout Africa are to an important degree dependent upon the cooperation and goodwill of the Arab. His willingness to supply goods and services in furtherance of the Allied effort is a matter of real military importance. 4. The strategic supply routes to Russia via the Persian Gulf as well as the supply routes to the Far East run through Moslem territory and would be subject to constant threat of sabotage and disruption in the event of any disturbances or hostilities. There are Allied Moslem troops scattered throughout the area on whom we depend for active operations as well as supply. Such troops are in Italy at the present time and we intend to use them elsewhere. 5. The Near East is an important supply base for European operations. Any threat to it is a great military concern, particularly in respect of oil and aviation gasoline supply. The existing pipeline from Iraq to Palestine could be cut or damaged as it has been in the past. This naturally affects naval and military operations in the Mediterranean which depend on the Haifa refinery for their oil. The Abadan refinery at the head of the Gulf is the only Allied source of aviation gasoline outside the Western Hemisphere. The distances are great and the supply and installations in many places are highly vulnerable. It would require a substantial number of troops to protect them in the event of disorders. I do not intend to exaggerate the consequences which would flow from the adoption of this resolution as I can not be certain that all these results will flow, but from the foregoing considerations I think it is quite apparent that from a military point of view we would much prefer to let such sleeping dogs lie. I have debated whether to refer to the pending negotiations for the laying of an oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the Mediterranean 44 as there may be some controversial aspects to this question. However, Secretary Ickes 45 indicated that the primary purpose of this new pipeline was to provide a reserve of one billion gallons of oil for the United States Army and Navy. I doubt that we could get very far with these negotiations if this issue is agitated in the United States. My rather strong inclination is not to bring this up, however. The one thing that I imagine we will be pressed for will be to suggest a form of resolution which will not be provocative and which will not in our judgment induce the disorders that we fear. This is a matter on which I feel we should be most reluctant to express any view. What is provocative or unprovocative in the Palestine problem is a political matter on which the State Department rather than the War Department should speak. It has been pointed out to us by the State Department that this resolution does embody burning issues. What lesser position might be taken without offence is not a matter for military determination, but from a military standpoint I think we can and should say that we would be in favor of taking any steps which would postpone without prejudice to either side this issue for determination after the war when military considerations will be less acute. The State Department has furnished us with a telegram conveying expressions from the Governor [ Government ] of Iraq to the effect that German agents in the area are using as propaganda against the Allied effort the existence of this resolution. General Bissell is prepared to go up and give in very general terms the disposition of troops in the area and generally buttress by factual data statements made along the above lines. I am going to emphasize that I am dealing with the matter purely from the point of view of military considerations and that is the limit of my competence. I attach hereto a copy of the resolution together with a copy of Secretary Stimson’s letter to Senator Connally. 45a I would like to know how you make out. John J. McCloy 42 June 30, 1922, Congressional Record , vol. 62, pt. 10, p. 9799. 43 War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence. 44 For correspondence regarding the concern of the United States for the safeguarding and developing of petroleum resources in Saudi Arabia, see pp. 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 6 ] ff. 45 Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, and Chairman of the Government-organized Petroleum Reserves Corporation. 45a Ante , p. 563 [ Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , and Doc. 615 ] . The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2215: Telegram [Document 629] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , February 27, 1944—11 a.m. [Received February 28—4:35 a.m.] 57. Finance Minister 46 called yesterday and read me telegram he had just received from King Ibn Saud about Palestine resolution mentioned Department’s 341, February 19, 5 p.m., to Cairo. 47 After citing news items published in London, King’s message continued in translation as follows: “Meet American Minister in Jidda; notify him of this news; advise him that the news has disturbed us; that it will have an ill-effect in Arab circles; that we think discussion of the subject of Palestine at this moment premature; that it will stir up emotions and produce uncertainty; that we ask him to refer the matter to his Government in view of the friendship and attachment between us because we know of its good aims toward the Arabs and of the good will and assistance which the friendly American Government and its ally the British have shown and of which the recent incident in the Lebanon 48 is the greatest proof.” In reply I explained to Finance Minister sense of Department’s 19 to Baghdad, February 16, 6 p.m. Sent Department, repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Beirut; Beirut repeat to Damascus. Moose 46 Abdullah Suleiman. 47 Not printed. 48 See correspondence regarding representations by the United States to the French Committee of National Liberation concerning the Franco-Lebanese crisis of November 1943, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 996 ff. The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2217: Telegram [Document 630] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , February 28, 1944—noon. [Received 4:15 p.m.] 43. See my 36, February 18, 4 p.m. Foreign Minister 49 has handed me note dated February 26 expressing attitude of Lebanese Government toward pro-Zionist resolutions currently before American Congress. Its principal points are: Palestine is an Arab country whose fate vitally concerns Lebanon; adoption of proposed measures would have serious consequences, including racial repercussions throughout Arab world; such measures would be directly opposed to democratic ideals because disinheriting a whole people and reducing it to state of servitude; and measures would too be opposed to principles of justice and would undermine Atlantic Charter. Minister handed me also copy of telegram to be sent to Congress by officers of Lebanese Parliament, stressing first and last of above arguments and urging withholding approval of resolutions before American public opinion is apprised of rights of Arabs. Minister then elaborated on his note substantially as follows: We Lebanese too have interest in common Holy Land and are not fanatical. Our Jews are well treated and contented non-Zionists. Our Christians, looking to Atlantic Charter, do not fear domination of Moslem Arabs. However, we all fear Zionism as a problem of colonization because of its supporters’ money, organization, influence and numbers. To us it is matter of self-defense. We beg America, while aiding persecuted Jews, to refrain from support of political Zionism. Finally, in course of informal discussion during which I quoted substance of Department’s 318 February 16, 9 p.m. to Cairo, 50 Minister voiced strictly personal view that political settlement of Palestine problem could be based on following elements of solution: Promise of half our declaration has been fulfilled, a full-fledged Jewish National Home having been established in Palestine; all reasonable future development of that home can be assured by delimitation on [ sic ] under great powers’ guarantee of Jewish canton or cantons on coastal plain and inland from Haifa where cultural Zionism rooted in Jewish institutions and fostered by Jewish administration could flourish; and spiritual interests of Christians and Moslems, as well as of Jews, would be effectively served by establishment of “a small zone of the holy places centered on Jerusalem” under international administration. Repeated to Baghdad, Jerusalem, Jidda and Cairo. Wadsworth 49 Selim Tacla. 50 See footnote 21, p. 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619 ] . The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2223: Telegram [Document 631] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , February 29, 1944—10 p.m. [Received March 1—9:45 a.m.] 40. Legation received today your 19 February 16. Its delay in transmission has caused no inconvenience since naturally I have lost no occasion to explain to interested Iraqi officials the respective functions and limitations of the legislative and the executive branches of the Government in the field of foreign affairs. My despatch 176 February 18 51 will make it evident that Nuri was quite well aware during our initial conversation that congressional resolutions of this character could have advisory force only. During a conversation which I had with the Prime Minister today I told him in confidence I had just received a telegram from the Department (your 23 February 26) which indicated that I was probably correct in expressing to him on February 13 the opinion that the resolution in question would not be reported out of the Senate Committee and that probably the resolution before the House would meet a similar fate. I also endeavored to impress upon him again the fact that the responsibility for making decisions of the kind called for by the resolution created [ rested? ] upon the executive rather than upon the legislative branch of the Government. Nuri expressed both appreciation and relief. He pointed out again that even though these resolutions if passed would not have had executive force it would have been difficult nevertheless to convince the Arab world that members of the legislative body of a great democracy such as the U.S. would have voted for them if they had not felt that they were voicing the sentiments of the American people. Nuri stated that BBC 52 broadcasts had yesterday reported that the Egyptian Government had protested to the American Government with regard to these resolutions and that in view of these broadcasts it had become impossible to keep the matter entirely out of the Iraqi press. He would, however, immediately take steps with the purpose of minimizing the importance of the introduction of the resolution. He was sorry to hear that the Egyptian Government had approached the American Government formally on the subject; he had suggested to the other Arab Governments that they refrain from taking formal action and that communications be limited to telegrams from prominent Arabs to members of the American Congress. He had taken care that the Iraqi Legation in Washington be not instructed to broach the matter to the State Department. I told Nuri that I was glad to hear that he was taking steps to minimize the importance of the resolutions, that since it was likely that they would not be reported out of committees in both houses of Congress it did not seem that anything would be gained from keeping the matter alive by sending further messages to members of Congress. The Iraqi press this morning carried without comment a news despatch from Cairo stating that the Egyptian Government had taken up the subject of the resolutions formally with the American Legation at Cairo. Henderson 51 Not printed. 52 British Broadcasting Corporation. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2225: Telegram [Document 632] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , March 2, 1944—6 p.m. [Received March 3—10:53 a.m.] 59. Yesterday I conveyed to Finance Minister sense of first part Department’s 408 February 26, 9 p.m., to Cairo. 53 He received information with apparent satisfaction and said he would inform King. Though Department’s message to large extent answers objections repeated my 57 February 27, 11 a.m., it is suggested that Department may wish to reply specifically to King’s communication. 54 Moose 53 See footnote 40, p. 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 626 and Doc. 627 ] . 54 In his telegram 64, March 7, noon, the Minister Resident reported that the King had indicated he would appreciate a reply; the Department replied in telegram 35, March 8, 7 p.m., that the matter was under active consideration (867N.01/2244). The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) 867N.01/2205: Telegram [Document 633] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) 55 Washington , March 2, 1944—7 p.m. 27. Today’s press carries reports of a telegram sent by Senator Wagner to the Presidents of the Iraqi Senate and Chamber in reply to their telegram to him. These reports quote the Senator as predicting the ultimate passage of the Palestine resolutions. The Department, however, is still of the opinion expressed in the Department’s No. 23, February 26, 9 p.m., that it appears unlikely that the resolutions will be reported out of committee and you may indicate this continuing belief if you have further discussions on the matter. Stettinius 55 Repeated to Cairo in telegram 446, March 3, 9 p.m., with the instruction to repeat in turn to Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Jidda. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 867N.01/2251½ [Document 634] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) [ Washington ,] March 2, 1944. Mr. Stettinius : At your suggestion I joined Mr. Dunn 56 during a call from Mr. McCloy on Thursday, March 2, to discuss the present status of the resolutions on Palestine. Mr. McCloy stated that General Marshall had been invited personally by Senator Connally to discuss informally with him in his office and with “several members of the Committee” the War Department’s attitude toward the Palestine resolutions. When General Marshall got to Senator Connally’s office he found that the whole Committee had foregathered there so that his remarks were heard by all the members. Mr. McCloy also informed me that he had prepared for General Marshall a careful memorandum 57 outlining the points that he should bring out during the discussion with the members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Meanwhile, Chairman Bloom of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House had asked Mr. McCloy and General Handy to appear before that Committee. If and when such an appearance occurs Mr. McCloy said he intends to follow the same line taken by General Marshall upon his, Mr. McCloy’s, advice. Mr. McCloy added that Chairman Bloom was expected to call upon him at the War Department that afternoon and that Bloom was endeavoring to induce the competent officials of the War Department to agree to some substitute resolution on Palestine to be introduced in Congress. Mr. McCloy feels that it would be a mistake for the War Department to be drawn into any discussions of this kind, and I inferred that he expected to tell Congressman Bloom as much. In conclusion, Mr. McCloy expressed the view that the Department of State should take a more active part in opposing these resolutions since they had political as well as military implications. I reminded Mr. McCloy of the earlier experience the Department had had in endeavoring to obtain the support of the War Department to the issue of a joint American-British statement on Palestine 58 and of the complete lack of cooperation of the War Department in that instance. It was, I added, our distinct feeling that at the present time military considerations far outweigh any possible political implications in this matter, as was clear from the text of Mr. Stimson’s letter to Senator Connally 59 on this subject. With reference to Mr. Stimson’s above-mentioned letter, I informed Mr. McCloy that the competent officials of this Department were strongly of the opinion that the letter should be published at the earliest possible moment. Mr. McCloy remarked that he did not know why Mr. Stimson had hesitated to publish the letter but believed it was because he was not sure that General Marshall would approve. I expressed the view that since the President himself desired the letter published and since the substance and the purport of the Stimson letter were pretty generally known on the Hill, there would seem to be no compelling reason for withholding publication at this time. Mr. McCloy did not disagree with this view. Wallace Murray 56 James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State. 57 Presumably the memorandum of February 22, p. 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] . 58 For correspondence regarding this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 747 ff., passim . 59 Dated February 7, p. 563 [ Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , and Doc. 615 ] . Amir Abdullah of Transjordan to President Roosevelt 867N.00/3–344 [Document 635] Amir Abdullah of Transjordan to President Roosevelt Amman , March 3, 1944. The deliberations of Congress affecting Palestine and the formation of a Jewish State therein have caused a great and heartfelt distress throughout the East. I say and I am convinced that the absence of sufficient information in the House of Congress respecting the true situation has facilitated the way to those in sympathy with the Zionist cause to further these deliberations. Remembering the great respect and admiration in which I hold you, your country and the American people, I say that while you are fighting with the United Nations for the freedom of the world and the removal of oppression at the same time the present deliberations are I feel contrary to that principle and would lead to the greatest sorrow and suffering if the intentions of the promoters of those deliberations were to be realized. I mention this personally in my capacity as a close neighbor of Palestine and as a loyal friend of the United Nations. Abdullah The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2231: Telegram [Document 636] The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , March 4, 1944—11 a.m. [Received March 6—10:42 a.m.] 503. Following is essential part of communications left with me last night by El Sayyid Hussein El Kobsi, representative of King Yemen in recent Arab Union discussions, regarding proposed congressional resolution on Palestine: “His Majesty, The King of Yemen and Commander of the Faithful, Yehya Ibn Mohamed Hamid El Dine, and His Majesty’s Government disapprove of the resolution submitted to the American Congress designed to remove restrictions imposed on the immigration of Jews into Palestine. His Majesty disapproves everything that causes trouble to the rightful owners of Palestine—Moslems, Christians and native Jews—and although he condemns every cruelty to which Jews in Europe are subjected he does not consider that it justifies the oppression of the Arabs of Palestine in their own legal abode.” Text of communication was carried in this morning’s Al Misri in verbatim form except for omission of phrase “Moslems, Christians, and Jews”. Repeated to Jerusalem, Jidda, Baghdad and Beirut. Kirk The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2232: Telegram [Document 637] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , March 4, 1944—11 p.m. [Received March 6—12:45 p.m.] 47. 1. The information contained in your 27, March 2 has been most helpful. 2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call on him this morning. The following contains the substance of some of the statements which he made to me: a . Iraqi Government deeply regrets the publicity which has been given in the last 3 days in the Iraqi press to Zionist activities in the United States and to the resolutions in particular. The Government had endeavored to keep the matter from becoming public but following announcements made by the BBC and Reuters 60 regarding the protest of the Egyptian Government it was compelled to issue its communiqué on March 1. b . The Government has since been under fire on the ground that it had failed to take stronger steps and that it had concealed a matter [of] so grave importance from the public. It had already been attacked in Parliament and was preparing to meet further attacks. It was handicapped because it could not divulge all that had taken place without adding fresh fuel to the flames. The Iraqi Legation in Washington had reported that it had refused to accept for transmission a nonsympathetic message from Senator Wagner to the President of the Iraqi Senate. The message was reported to be coming through other channels but had not as yet been received. Since the matter had become public the Foreign Office was being bombarded with enquiries from all sides. The diplomatic representatives in Baghdad of other Arab States had been approaching it several times daily for information regarding developments. 3. I replied to the Foreign Minister along the lines suggested in second paragraph of telegram under reference. I said that the endeavors of the Government to prevent the matter from developing in a manner that might adversely affect Iraqi-American relations were appreciated. I pointed out, however, that it seemed to me that the Government was itself partly responsible for the embarrassment which it was experiencing. So far as I could see the Government had not made any real attempt to make the situation clear to the public. In Iraq for instance one of the leading papers of Baghdad in its leading editorial of March 1 had given the distinct impression to its readers that the United States was embarking on a policy to deprive the Arabs of their rights in Palestine. Relatively few of the numerous articles which had appeared in the last few days in Baghdad press had left the impression on the readers that the resolutions were thus far merely the expressions of the Congressmen who had introduced them and had no connection with the policy of the American Government. 4. The Foreign Minister promised that he would discuss my remarks with the Prime Minister and try to make the situation more clear for the public. 5. Beginning March 1 the resolutions and activities of the Zionists in the United States have been the chief topic of discussion of the Iraqi press and people with the result that in some quarters there is considerable feeling against the United States and even against the local Jews. Students of the secondary schools yesterday desired to make a demonstration before the Legation but the Government refused to permit them to do so. It was suggested to some of the Jewish students that they refrain from attending their schools yesterday since there was a danger that while en route they would be attacked by Arab students for whom Friday is a holiday. 6. Various rumors are current in the bazaars as to the real reasons behind this agitation. There is a tendency in some quarters as might be expected to credit the British with stirring up feeling against the United States in order ( a ) to make it difficult for the United States to exploit its oil concessions in fear of Arab hostility or ( b ) to place the onus on the United States for any decision unpleasant to the Arab world which Great Britain might reach in regard to Palestine. The Legation has not been able to find any evidence which I got [ which might? ] substantiate these rumors, however the British censorship in control of the local press has prohibited the publication of the articles in question. 7. It would appear from articles published today that the campaign is losing its anti-American tone and is developing into agitation for Arab unity and/or Arab control of Palestine. 8. Translation of the Government communiqué of March 1 the tone of which is mild in comparison with that of articles appearing in the press is being sent in telegram No. 48 of today’s date. 61 Paraphrases by pouch to Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Beirut. Henderson 60 British news agency. 61 Infra . The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2228: Telegram [Document 638] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , March 4, 1944. [Received March 5—1 p.m.] 48. The following is the translation of the communiqué of the Iraq Government of March 1: “The Iraq Government has been informed of the endeavors of Zionist propagandists in the United States of America in regard the question immigration into Palestine with a view to obtaining support in the American Senate and Congress for a proposal to open the doors of immigration into Palestine for the Jews in contravention of the British White Paper. The Iraq Government has taken all necessary steps to defeat those endeavors (which are based on an attempt to exploit public sympathy in America and to enlighten public opinion about the real situation). Sayid Jamil Almadfai, President of the Senate, and Ridha Alshabibi, President of the Chamber of Deputies, have sent telegrams to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in America as well as the American Senators who submitted the proposal explaining the harmful repercussions and pointing out what [ that? ] it would transgress on the rights of the Arabs in Palestine. The Governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Lebanon have taken similar action. These efforts have lead to satisfactory results.” Henderson The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2233: Telegram [Document 639] The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , March 4, 1944—noon. [Received March 5—11:08 a.m.] 510. My 503, March 4, 10 [ 11 ] a.m. In conversation preceding delivery of communication Yemen representative outlined its contents and I was afforded opportunity for explaining situation along lines of Department’s telegrams on subject. Most of his conversation, however, was devoted to professions of sympathy of Moslems with democratic cause and more particularly to expressions of friendship toward United States with which he said it was desire of Yemen to become more closely associated after war owing to reputed interest without ulterior motives of United States in small states. Kirk Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President Roosevelt 867N.01/2275a [Document 640] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) to President Roosevelt 62 [ Washington ,] March 4, 1944. You will recall some weeks ago you and I had quite a discussion relative to the Palestine situation with the possibility of the British and ourselves issuing a joint statement. 63 At that time you did not think you wished to take any action until later on. Since then there have been quite a number of new developments, which are summarized below, and I would urge that you have a talk with Colonel Hoskins 64 relative to the whole question if it is possible for you to do so in the relatively near future. I am attaching a paraphrase of telegram No. 57, February 27, 11 a.m., from our Legation at Jidda, 64a which transmits a protest from King Ibn Saud against the Palestine Resolutions in Congress. Protests have also been received from the Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian Governments. I am more and more convinced that the time has come to clarify the situation through the issuance of a joint American-British statement affirming (after a suitable introduction); ( a ) that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine will be taken without full and prior consultation with all concerned, including both Arabs and Jews; ( b ) that if, prior to the conclusion of the war, the interested Arabs and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts, such a development will be most welcome; and ( c ) that in the absence of such an understanding, there will be a review of the Palestine situation after the war has been won, with the objective of establishing a just and definitive solution equitable to all parties concerned. The British have indicated that they would welcome such a statement, and if you approve, I shall promptly take the matter up with them. I shall, of course, submit for your final approval the exact text which may be agreed upon with the British Foreign Office. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. 62 Marginal notation: “ERS Jr. OK FDR”. In a memorandum of March 8 to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) the Under Secretary wrote: “The President has just returned to me the memorandum which I sent to him on March 4 regarding Palestine, copy of which I enclose herewith. “Would you be good enough to give the most careful thought to the question of exactly when and how we should take up with the British the issuance of a joint statement on Palestine.” (867N.01/2275a) 63 Regarding the decision “to review from time to time the question of issuing a joint statement in regard to Palestine,” made by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill at the First Quebec Conference, August 17–24, 1943, see telegram 6063, October 1, 1943, to London, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 814 ; also the memorandum of August 21 and footnote 88, ibid. , p. 804 . Documentation concerning the First Quebec Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations . 64 Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, Special Representative of President Roosevelt on two missions to the Near East in 1942 and 1943; for correspondence relating to these missions, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 24 ff., and ibid. , 1943, vol. iv , bracketed note on p. 19 . 64a For text of telegram, see p. 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] . Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2280 [Document 641] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] March 10, 1944. Mr. Secretary : Last Saturday I forwarded to the President a memorandum suggesting that, in view of the concern manifested in the entire Arab world by the Palestine resolutions now before the Congress, it might be wise to consider taking up with the British the possibility of issuing a joint statement which would postpone the settlement of the Palestine question until after the war unless the interested Arab and Jewish parties could reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts. The President subsequently returned this memorandum to me with his approval. I wish you would consider whether the matter should be taken up now with the British Embassy with a view to issuing a statement before I leave for London or whether you would prefer to have Mr. Murray and me raise the question with the British in London. 65 In view of Secretary Stimson’s letter and General Marshall’s statement to the Foreign Relations Committee, I believe we are fully covered this time with regard to the military phase of the situation. Needless to say, information about the proposed statement should in no way be allowed to leak. I think that when a statement is issued, it should be released by the White House rather than by the Department. During my absence you may wish to consult with Mr. Murray, and if you should decide to have the negotiations with the British here, I think you should ask Mr. Murray to initiate them promptly. 66 E. R. Stettinius, Jr. 65 For correspondence regarding the Stettinius Mission to London, to engage in general and informal conversations with officers of the British Foreign Office, April 7–April 29, 1944, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 66 Wallace Murray was later detailed to accompany the Stettinius Mission to London. The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2251: Telegram [Document 642] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , March 11, 1944—9 a.m. [Received March 11—8:30 a.m.] 56. A Reuters despatch which has thus far been withheld from publication here by the British reads as follows: “Rabbis Stephen Wise and Abba Silver 67 representing Zionist Palestine movement said today that President Roosevelt authorized them to make this statement: 68 American Government has never given its approval to White Paper of 1939. President is happy that doors of Palestine are today open to Jewish refugees. When future decisions are reached full justice will be done to those who seek Jewish national home for which our Government and American people have always had deepest sympathy—and today more than ever in view of tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees.” 69 I should appreciate receiving confirmation or correction of the statement allegedly authorized by the President. If the statement is substantially as authorized please instruct me how to reply when I am approached by the Iraqi Government since the statement must eventually become known. Henderson 67 Dr. Stephen S. Wise and Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, co-chairmen of the American Zionist Emergency Council. 68 Copies of the statement were handed out at a dinner of the American Palestine Committee held in Washington on the evening of March 9, 1944. 69 Telegram 585, March 11, 8 a.m., from Cairo reported that text of this statement was printed in the Arabic language paper Al Misri that day (867N.01/2255). The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2254: Telegram [Document 643] The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , March 11, 1944—7 p.m. [Received March 11—4:19 p.m.] 593. Following is pertinent portion of letter received today from Egyptian Prime Minister. 70 “The papers of this morning published a Reuters despatch dated March 10 of which I enclose a copy. Given the importance of the questions for Palestine and all the Arab world, I request your Excellency to be so good as to advise me regarding the facts of the matter.” Enclosure was copy of Reuters despatch referred to in my 585, March 11, 7 [ 8 ] a.m. 71 In acknowledging the receipt of the letter I stated that inquiry had been transmitted to my Government and accordingly I request instructions as soon as possible. Strong reaction is appearing in local press which is being telegraphed. Repeated to Jerusalem. Kirk 70 Mustapha Nahas Pasha. 71 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 867N.01/2185: Telegram [Document 644] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) 72 Washington , March 13, 1944—7 p.m. 38. Your 57, February 27, 11 a.m. You are authorized to reply to the Finance Minister in the following sense: The President has read with interest the message from the King. You may state that the President was glad that the King communicated his views frankly to this Government and that the President considered this as a manifestation of the attachment and friendship existing between the United States and Saudi Arabia. You may further advise him that the President is in agreement with the views regarding the Palestine resolutions contained in the Department’s telegram no. 408, to Cairo, 73 the substance of which you have already conveyed to the King. You may also say that the President wishes to renew the assurances he has previously given to the King that it is the view of this Government that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Hull 72 Marginal notation: “OK FDR”. 73 See footnote 40, p. 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 626 and Doc. 627 ] . The Egyptian Minister (Hassan) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2304 [Document 645] The Egyptian Minister ( Hassan ) to the Secretary of State 74 Washington , March 14, 1944. Sir : I have the honour to inform you of the following: “His Majesty the Imam Yehya of Yemen has requested His Excellency Mustapha Nahas Pasha, President of the Council of Ministers of Egypt, and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, to express through him, his and his people’s dissatisfaction and disapproval of the Resolution of the American House of Representatives purporting to create a National Home for the Jews in Palestine. “His Majesty re-affirms the traditional and firm friendship of the Arabs for the Anglo-Saxon allies, and, therefore, deems it unfair and unjust to usurp the long-established rights of the Arabs in the Holy Places. “His Majesty, accordingly, has fully empowered Nahas Pasha to protest on his behalf in this matter; and in carrying out this mission, Nahas Pasha renews his hope that the Government of the United States of America will, accordingly, give due consideration to the apprehensions of the whole Arab World in regard to this subject.” While bringing this matter to the attention of Your Excellency, I avail myself [etc.] M[ ahmoud ] Hassan 74 Copy of text forwarded to President Roosevelt under cover of a memorandum of March 22 in which the Secretary of State said: “We are replying to this note along the lines which you have previously approved.” (867N.01/2291a) For text of reply, see the Secretary’s note to the Egyptian Minister, March 31, p. 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] . The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) 867N.01/2255: Telegram [Document 646] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) 75 Washington , March 15, 1944—9 p.m. 531. Your 593, March 11, 7 p.m. In replying to the Egyptian Prime Minister you may state that the President in fact authorized the statement made by Zionist leaders and that this statement was substantially as summarized in your 585, March 11, 8 a.m. 76 You should point out that the statement of the Zionist leaders mentions a Jewish national home rather than a Jewish commonwealth as referred to in the resolutions recently introduced into Congress. You should say that while it is true that the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939, it is also true that this Government has never taken a position with regard to the White Paper. You should in addition assure Nahas that it is the view of this Government that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Repeat to Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem and Jidda for their information. A separate message is being sent to Baghdad. 77 Hull 75 Marginal notation on the original: “Approved by the President”. 76 Not printed. 77 As telegram 34, March 15, 6 p.m., with the following instruction: “You may reply along similar lines to the Iraqi Government (your 56, March 11, 9 a.m.) if approached by the latter.” (867N.01/2254) The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) 867N.01/2276a: Telegram [Document 647] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) Washington , March 17, 1944—midnight. 565. Following statement regarding the proposed resolutions respecting Palestine was issued by the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on March 17: “At an executive meeting held today by the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. Res. 418 and H. Res. 419, and following the receipt of a letter from the Secretary of War, the Committee approved the issuance of the following statement: ‘Advice and information given to us by those responsible for the conduct of the war, have convinced the Committee that action upon the resolutions at this time would be unwise.’” The above-mentioned letter of the Secretary of War to the Chairman is dated March 17 and reads as follows: “Concerning our conversation with respect to House Resolutions 418 and 419, it is the considered judgment of the War Department that without reference to the merits of these resolutions, further action on them at this time would be prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war.” Inform appropriate authorities. Repeat to Jerusalem, Jidda, Baghdad and Beirut for repetition to Damascus. Hull Memorandum by Mr. Evan M. Wilson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 740.00119 Stettinius Mission/3–1744 [Document 648] Memorandum by Mr. Evan M. Wilson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs [ Washington ,] March 17, 1944. Palestine: Topics for Discussion With the British 1. Implementation of the White Paper . The immigration clauses of the British White Paper of 1939, under which Jewish immigration into Palestine would be prohibited after March 31, 1944 except with the consent of the Arabs of Palestine, have been modified in fact if not in substance by the recent decision to permit some 31,000 potential immigrants now in occupied Europe to proceed to Palestine after that date. The Arabs have protested this arrangement and will undoubtedly oppose any further modification of the White Paper provisions. The Jews are putting pressure both on ourselves and on the British Government to have the White Paper abrogated and to permit free entry of Jews into Palestine. We understand that the British Cabinet is split on this question, with certain members in favor of making no further concessions to the Jews and others, including Mr. Churchill, opposed to the White Paper policy and presumably favoring some relaxation of its provisions. We have received no definite indication of the intentions of the British Government in this regard, and it would be of the greatest interest if we could learn whether a decision has been reached, and if so, what the Government plans to do. 2. British Conversations with Zionist Leaders . Several prominent Zionists, including Rabbi Israel Goldstein, the head of the Zionist Organization of America, and Dr. Nahum Goldmann, who represents the World Jewish Congress and the Jewish Agency 78 in this country, are now in London where they are conferring with Dr. Weizmann, the head of the world Zionist organization, and presumably with high British officials. Various rumors are circulating as to these conversations, and it is obvious that the Zionists have lost no opportunity to put pressure on the British Government to adopt a solution favorable to the Jews. We should, of course, be interested in learning the nature of these conversations and of any decision reached. 3. Partition . The British may suggest partition of Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews. This solution, when first advanced in 1937, 79 was rejected by both Arabs and Jews and was superseded by the White Paper of 1939. There have been many reports in recent months that this question has been or will be revived by the British, but we have obtained no confirmation of these reports. If the British raise the question with us, we should avoid any commitment on this point at present. 4. Post-war settlement . A study has been made in the Department of the post-war status of Palestine and a tentative plan has been reached, of which a summary is attached. This plan is based upon the idea of trusteeship and provides for the constitution of Palestine as an international territory with a Board of Overseers representing the three world religions as an advisory body. The plan names Great Britain as the trustee power. We may wish to discuss this plan informally with the British and in any case, it would be useful to ascertain what views, if any, they have regarding a post-war settlement for Palestine and whether they are receptive to the idea of trusteeship. 5. Proposed Joint American-British Statement on Palestine . The President has approved a proposed joint American-British statement, submitted to him by the Department, deferring a decision on the Palestine question until after the war. We want to get British concurrence to this statement. They agreed to such a statement last year but we were not able to concur at that time. We are attempting to clear the attached statement with the British in the immediate future, but if this cannot be accomplished, the matter will have to be discussed with the British in London. In any case, we should take this statement with us so as to be able to show the actual text to the British. [Annex 1] Palestine (A Summary) 1. With the failure of twenty-five years of government in Palestine, a radically different settlement, freed from the commitments arising from World War I, seems to be required. 2. A Trusteeship for Palestine exercised by the three religious groups would be a failure . However, there is moral and political justification for the proposal that the three principal religious groups should be associated with the future plan of government. 3. It is recommended that Palestine be constituted as an International Territory under a charter; that a great power be appointed Trustee; that a Board of Overseers representing the three world religions be set up as an advisory body. The reasons and conditions that support this recommendation are as follows: a . The administrator of Palestine must be capable of firm, decisive and prompt action. This requires experienced officials under central control. b . Firm, decisive and prompt action cannot be taken if sectarian and political differences are allowed to exercise their divisive and delaying influences. c . The political and economic problems being highly complex and interwoven with hitherto irreconcilable religious differences, only a centralized and experienced rulership will guarantee justice. 4. It is recommended that the Trusteeship should be awarded to Great Britain by the United Nations Organization under the charter. The charter would recognize the interest in Palestine of Christians, Jews, and Muslims. It would establish the Arab and Jewish communities as autonomous political entities with wide powers of local self-government. 5. The advantages of the proposed settlement are: a . It would eliminate the difficulties that arise because of the conflicting commitments of the past. b . It would place Palestine outside the bounds of both nationalist and imperialist ambitions. c . It would provide means by which to solve the basic economic problems. d . It offers a better prospect than any other plan yet proposed for cooperation in the government of Palestine and for eventual self-government of the people of Palestine. [Annex 2] Draft Statement The Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom have been in consultation in regard to Palestine. The common war effort compels both Governments to concentrate all energies on the primary objective of winning the war. They therefore look with concern on any activities which may delay the final victory. The American and British military authorities attach the highest importance to the maintenance of order in the Middle East. Accordingly the two Governments are agreed ( a ) that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine will be taken without full and prior consultation with all concerned, including both Arabs and Jews; ( b ) that if, prior to the conclusion of the war, the interested Arabs and Jews can reach a friendly understanding through their own efforts such a development will be most welcome; and ( c ) that in the absence of such an understanding, there will be a review of the Palestine situation after the war has been won, with the objective of establishing a just and definitive solution equitable to all parties concerned. In the meantime the British Government, which is responsible for the administration and security of Palestine, wishes to make it clear that it has no intention of permitting or acquiescing in any changes brought about by force in the status of that country or in its administration. 78 Article 4 of the Mandate for Palestine made provision for the recognition of a Jewish Agency “… as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine …” ( Foreign Relations , 1924, vol. ii , p. 214 ), and from 1922 until 1928 the (World) Zionist Organization acted as such. In 1929 agreement was reached between Zionists and non-Zionists for the inclusion of the latter in the Agency, as provided for in the same Article 4, and the enlarged Jewish Agency was officially recognized by the British Government in a letter dated August 6, 1930. The Executive of the Agency, located at Jerusalem, came to function virtually as a government existing side by side with the Mandatory Government. 79 See British Cmd. 5479: Palestine Royal Commission Report (the Peel Report), July 1937; see also British Cmd. 5854: Palestine Partition Commission Report (the Woodhead Report), October 1938, for a study of the partition plan by a technical commission; and additionally, British Cmd. 5893, Palestine: Statement by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom , November 1938, for announcement of abandonment of the partition policy. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 867N.01/3–1844 [Document 649] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) [ Washington ,] March 18, 1944. Mr. Stettinius : I think you would wish to know that after the meeting of your group 80 yesterday in the Secretary’s office, Dr. Bowman 81 and I had a moment to discuss with the Secretary the attached draft text of a joint American-British statement on Palestine. 82 As you will recall, you sent the President the substance of such a statement during the Secretary’s absence 83 and the President approved of issuing it after consultation with the British. During our conversation with the Secretary yesterday on this subject he expressed general approval of the attached form of the statement but suggested that we might hold it for discussion with the British when we get to London. I think this procedure is a good one, particularly for the purpose of avoiding leaks that are almost inevitable if we start exchanging telegrams with London on this subject. Meanwhile, however, the Secretary said he wished to clear the draft statement in its present form with the President at an early moment, and I have left a copy with him for that purpose. Wallace Murray 80 Members of the projected mission to London. 81 Isaiah Bowman, president of Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. 82 Supra . 83 See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, March 4, p. 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] . The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2403: Airgram [Document 650] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , March 23, 1944—12:30 p.m. [Received April 8—8 a.m.] A–25. The contents of the Department’s telegram no. 566 [ 565 ] March 17, 10:00 p.m. [ midnight ] to Cairo have been transmitted to King Ibn Saud. While local people have had their interest in proposed Resolutions stimulated by radio broadcasts in Arabic, there is nothing to show that there was any alarm nor that the standing of the United States was affected. Copy to Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Beirut and Damascus. Moose The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) 867N.01/2284a: Telegram [Document 651] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem ( Pinkerton ) 84 Washington , March 23, 1944—8 p.m. 54. Please convey the following message, which you may deliver in person at your discretion, from the President to the Emir of TransJordan in reply to the latter’s telegram of March 3 to the President regarding the Palestine resolutions: “I have received Your Highness’ telegram of March 3, 1944 in which you refer to the resolutions which have been introduced into Congress relative to Palestine. I appreciate the friendly sentiments which you express regarding the American people and the United Nations. In so far as Palestine is concerned, I am glad to convey to you the assurance that in the view of the Government of the United States no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.” Hull 84 Marginal notation: “OK FDR”. The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan) 867N.01/2222 [Document 652] The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister ( Hassan ) 85 Washington , March 28, 1944. Sir : I have the honor to refer to your communication dated February 24, 1944, with which you transmitted an aide-mémoire bearing the same date relative to immigration into Palestine. 86 Due note has been taken of the considerations outlined in this aide-mémoire relative to the Palestine problem and to those aspects of the matter which are mentioned therein. You are, I am sure, familiar with the American form of government and with the freedom afforded thereunder to individuals, whether private citizens or members of the different branches of the Government, to express their opinions from time to time regarding current matters. In this connection I wish to assure you that although Palestine is primarily a British responsibility, it is the view of the Government of the United States that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be taken until an appropriate time is reached and that at such a time the governments responsible for the establishment of peace and the maintenance of law and justice in the world should come to an equitable settlement of all the questions involved in full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Accept [etc.] Cordell Hull 85 Text transmitted to Cairo in telegram 657, March 28, 9 p.m., with instructions to repeat to Baghdad, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus and Jidda. 86 Note not printed; for aide-mémoire , see p. 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] . The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Damascus (Farrell) 867N.01/2209: Telegram [Document 653] The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Damascus ( Farrell ) Washington , March 28, 1944—5 p.m. 5. You are authorized to reply to Syrian Foreign Office (your telegram no. 3 and your despatch no. 81 of February 24, 1944 87 ) in the same sense as the Department’s reply, 88 text of which is being repeated telegraphically to you through Cairo, 89 to the Egyptian Minister’s note regarding immigration into Palestine. Hull 87 Latter not printed. 88 See note to the Egyptian Minister, March 28, supra . 89 See footnote 85, above. The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/2299: Telegram [Document 654] The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State 91 Cairo , March 29, 1944—4 p.m. [Received March 30—11:30 a.m.] 750. Following is the substance of letter received from Nahas Pasha dated March 27 replying to letter of March 17, communicating substance of Department’s 531, March 5 [ 15 ], 1 [ 9 ] p.m. (Begin summary) Regrets that President authorized Palestine declaration but happy that supplemental clarification partially attenuates declaration without, however, entirely reassuring Palestinians nor Arab peoples in general. The assurance that no decision regarding Palestine would be taken without consultation with Arabs and Jews is in accord with Egyptian policy, but in meantime it would seem desirable that responsible political personages refrain from declarations liable to mislead Palestine and the Arab countries. The recent declaration coming from a great statesman justly regarded as greatest champion of liberty and democracy had been regarded by Arabs as official support of Zionism and had caused a wave of protest which Nahas had sought to calm by assuring neighboring countries that he was looking into matter. As was stated in recent Egyptian aide-mémoire , Jewish persecution in Europe is deplored but Zionism merely substitutes one persecution for another by depriving Palestinians of their absolute right to sovereignty. Middle East had greeted Atlantic Charter as message of hope and Palestine question should be treated in accordance with its principles and care taken to avoid giving Arab peoples impression that Charter might be a “mere oral manifestation”. Charter, of which President was author, is regarded as expression of his determined will and it was feasible that implicit confidence was placed therein. Desiring to see this confidence shared by all the Arabs request that foregoing be communicated to American Government in conviction that United States will pursue policy of recognizing legitimate claims of Palestine people. (End summary) Text being transmitted by air pouch. 92 Text to Jerusalem, Jidda, Beirut and Baghdad. Kirk 91 Copy transmitted to President Roosevelt under cover of a memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 1 (not printed). 92 Transmitted in despatch 1705, March 28, not printed. The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan) 867N.01/2304 [Document 655] The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister ( Hassan ) 93 Washington , March 31, 1944. Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note dated March 14, 1944 conveying a communication, transmitted through the Prime Minister of Egypt, from His Majesty the Imam Yehya of Yemen relative to Palestine. I should appreciate it if you would be good enough to request His Excellency Mustapha Nahas Pasha to inform His Majesty the Imam Yehya that his message has been received by this Government and that careful consideration has been accorded to the views put forward therein. I should be grateful if the Prime Minister would express to His Majesty the appreciation of the Government of the United States for the friendly spirit which prompted him to send this message. With reference to the resolutions which were introduced into the Senate and House of Representatives respecting Palestine, it should be pointed out that these resolutions have not passed either House of Congress and, in fact, are not likely to be acted upon at this time. In communicating this message to His Majesty the Imam Yehya, His Excellency Nahas Pasha may wish to express the assurance conveyed in my communication to you dated March 28, 1944, in which it is stated that although Palestine is primarily a British responsibility, it is the view of the Government of the United States that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be taken until an appropriate time is reached and that at such a time the governments responsible for the establishment of peace and the maintenance of law and justice in the world should come to an equitable settlement of all the questions involved in full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Accept [etc.] Cordell Hull 93 Text communicated to the Minister in Egypt in telegram 692, March 31, 1 p.m., with the instruction that a reply in the same sense be made to El Sayyid Hussein El Kobsi and that the telegram be repeated to Jerusalem, Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, and Beirut for their information (867N.01/2307). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) 867N.01/2299: Telegram [Document 656] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) 94 Washington , April 5, 1944—1 p.m. 737. Your 750, March 29, 4 p.m. You may inform the Egyptian Prime Minister that his message has been communicated to the President. You may wish to refer in your reply to the assurances and observations contained in the Department’s 657 and 692 95 as well as other recent communications on the subject. Repeat to Jidda, Baghdad, Jerusalem, Beirut and Damascus. Hull 94 The substance of this telegram was approved by President Roosevelt. 95 See footnotes 85 and 93, pp. 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] and 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , respectively. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/125 [Document 657] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs London , April 11, 1944. Participants: Sir Maurice Peterson, K.C.M.G., Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Mr. C. W. Baxter, C.M.G., M.C., Head, Eastern Dept The Honorable R.M.A. Hankey, Eastern Department Mr. Wallace Murray, Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Department of State Mr. Foy Kohler, Department of State Mr. Robert Coe, American Embassy Sir Maurice expressed the pleasure of the Foreign Office in having members of the State Department present to discuss Middle Eastern questions and stated that he believed it had been agreed that the talks were to start with Palestine. British White Paper Policy By way of introduction Sir Maurice said that a principal concern of the Foreign Office was Zionist agitation in the United States and the desirability that this be kept in hand during the war. Sir Maurice went on to say that the Foreign Office does not consider the question of Palestine urgent, explaining that there is still a quota of about 27,500 open for Jewish immigrants of which only about 8,000 are presently earmarked. In view of the difficulty of arranging the release and transportation of Jewish refugees from Europe he felt that this number is more than ample for foreseeable emigrants from Europe during the course of the war. The White Paper he felt, so far as the Foreign Office is concerned, will certainly be maintained during the war. However, it must be regarded as provisional to be superseded by some definitive solution following the termination of hostilities. Sir Maurice thought that the continuance of the immigration quota would enable the British Government to withstand the pressure from Dr. Weizmann and the Zionists during the course of the war. As to the post-war settlement Sir Maurice said that there were many schools of thought and many proposals. Particularly in political circles in Britain he said that there is a strong feeling for partition. In this connection Mr. Murray said that the Zionists in the United States were using very effectively Mr. Churchill’s statement of 1939 opposing the White Paper. Sir Maurice confirmed that Mr. Churchill does in fact continue to be opposed to the White Paper. He said that he had not himself discussed the question recently with Churchill, who goes back in his stand to the Balfour Declaration. 96 However, Sir Maurice commented that he had been associated with Lord Balfour in those times and that he was satisfied that Balfour had at no time considered that a Jewish state in Palestine had been promised to the Jews. Mr. Murray stated that he understood that Lord Balfour had been somewhat vague about the implications of the Declaration and that whenever concrete problems had arisen he referred them to someone else to work out. Sir Maurice replied that this was so. He said Lord Balfour had hardly been aware of the existence of the Arabs, but that he suddenly became acutely conscious of their existence when he went to Damascus in 1922 and they stoned him in the streets! [Here follows brief discussion regarding visit of certain American Zionists to Great Britain, concerning which Sir Maurice indicated that he had no information.] Post-War Status of Palestine Sir Maurice then went on to expound his own conception of postwar settlement in Palestine. He thought that Palestine should be a bi-national state of Arabs and Jews with a single Palestinian citizenship and that the Jewish population should be permanently limited to something less than the Arab population. He mentioned for example that the Jewish population should be restricted permanently to a figure of 100,000 less than the Arab population. Palestine should be continued under a mandate or some similar assignment of responsibility to a single power (presumably Great Britain; here there was some bantering discussion of United States refusal to accept any mandates after the last war) by whatever international organization that may be then set up. Under the central mandatory government there would be local Jewish and Arab communal governments; for example, Tel-Aviv would be governed by the Jews; Jaffa by the Arabs; and areas with mixed populations perhaps by mixed commissions. This latter point was developed by Dr. Bowman who went on to outline briefly the conception of a trusteeship for Palestine along the lines we have been discussing in the Department. Sir Maurice replied that he could not speak of course for the British Government, since Cabinet members totally unconnected with the foreign field were liable to have concrete, though sometimes extraordinary, opinions about the Palestine question, but that he could say that the Foreign Office would go all out for such a solution as that suggested by Dr. Bowman. Sir Maurice felt that a Palestinian state of this type might develop cultural and economic ties with the major Arab states but he did not contemplate the political inclusion of Palestine in any Arab union; he expressed considerable skepticism in fact on the subject of Arab unity and opined that we would not see political union among the Arab states in our day. During this phase of the discussion Mr. Baxter mentioned that some Zionists in Britain are thinking of a possible fusion of Transjordan and Palestine with the idea that such fusion would placate the Arabs and allow room for Jewish administration and settlement. Mr. Murray also mentioned the thought which had been expressed in Zionist circles in the United States that the development of Iraq might encourage considerable Arab emigration from Palestine to that country and thus provide for expansion of Jewish settlement in Palestine. Proposed Joint Statement on Palestine Mr. Murray then recalled the efforts which had been made last year to secure the issuance of a joint Anglo-American statement on Palestine and inquired about the present British attitude. Sir Maurice replied that there had been a number of developments since last year; that the British Government had particularly desired to make clear that it had no intention of permitting or acquiescing in any changes brought about by force in the status of Palestine or in its administration; and that the recent outbreaks on the part of Jewish extremists had given them the occasion to demonstrate this attitude in no uncertain terms. He added, however, that the British Government is always prepared to join in the issuance of such a statement if it would be useful on the other side of the Atlantic. Mr. Murray said that he thought the issuance of such a statement should be determined principally by the possibilities of an explosion in Palestine which might deflect troops to that area to maintain order and that he wondered what the British estimate of the situation would be in that regard. Sir Maurice replied that he thought that the Arabs were on the whole satisfied with the White Paper and that they were conscious that their interests lay with a victory of the United Nations. Consequently, he did not fear trouble from them as long as the White Paper was maintained. With respect to the Jews he was a little less certain. He said that the Jewish extremists had murdered seven British policemen during the last few weeks and he did not think it unlikely that they might attempt to assassinate prominent British officials in that country. He said that the moderate Zionists deplored these outbreaks of the extremist elements but that they were either unable or unwilling to help much in their suppression. Referring particularly to the Stern gang, he characterized this as an underground organization, the extent of which was difficult to estimate but said the Foreign Office thought its membership limited to about 200 to 250 persons. Attitude of Arabs toward Palestine [Here follows expression of personal views by Sir Maurice Peterson.] There was some discussion of the Zionist resolutions recently introduced into the American Congress. Mr. Murray outlined the sequence of events in this connection and the attitude taken by the War Department and the Chief of Staff which had led to the indefinite shelving of the resolutions. Sir Maurice mentioned the Arab protests against the resolutions, explaining that His Majesty’s Government had had nothing whatsoever to do with these protests despite reports to the contrary. Mr. Murray replied that there had indeed been an impressive Arab unanimity on this subject, but that the protests had all arrived after the stand of the military authorities had already caused the resolutions to be shelved. 96 Contained in a letter concerning the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine written by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur James Balfour, to Lord Walter Rothschild on November 2, 1917; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 752 , footnote 14. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/142 [Document 658] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Foy D. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs London , April 19, 1944. British American Participants: Sir Maurice Peterson, K.C.M.G. Mr. Wallace Murray Mr. C.W. Baxter, C.M.G., M.C. Mr. Foy D. Kohler Hon. E. M. A. Hankey Mr. Robert Coe At today’s meeting Sir Maurice reported that the draft statement on Palestine had now been discussed with the Colonial Office and other interested authorities. He said that the British had welcomed this opportunity of studying the matter again and would retain the draft on a basis for future discussions with the State Department; but that after thorough consideration they believed that it would be inadvisable to issue it at present. They felt that issuance now might well irritate rather than calm the Zionists in the United States and this was their principal worry. They do not expect any trouble, either from the Arabs or from the Jews in Palestine, which they will be unable to handle, despite the current activities of the Jewish extremists. If only the United States Zionists can be kept quiet the situation will remain under firm control. Mr. Murray expressed appreciation of this exposition of the British position and agreed that if the British consider that there is no present threat of a blow-up in Palestine which would impede the war effort we should let well enough alone. He recalled in this connection that the British military at Quebec had been very concerned about the situation and very anxious to secure the issuance of a joint statement. As regards the question of Zionist agitation in the United States he felt that the pressure had been eased for the moment by the stand our own military had taken against the resolutions in Congress, but that the agitation might spring up again at any time. Sir Maurice said that he hoped not, but that it would be very useful to have the Department’s draft for consideration if there should be a recrudescence of American Zionist agitation. The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State 840.48 Refugees/6–2644: Telegram [Document 659] The Consul General at Jerusalem ( Pinkerton ) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem , June 26, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 8:15 p.m.] 84. Palestine Government has informed Jewish Agency that British passport officer in Spain may grant immigration certificates to refugees in Spain, Portugal, and Tangier up to total 600 principal immigrants, although information has been received from London that Spain has now threatened to stop refugees entering Spain until those already there are removed. Government has declined to make additional allotment for Southern Italy, Yemen, and other safe countries except in unusual individual cases. British passport officer in Turkey continues to have authority to grant Palestine visas to bona fide refugees from occupied countries without referring cases to Jerusalem and with no numerical limitation except White Paper totals. Jewish Agency is pressing hard for certificates for refugees from Yemen now in Aden. Pinkerton The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/7–1844: Telegram [Document 660] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , July 18, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 6:55 p.m.] 167. 1. Minister for Foreign Affairs 97 on July 15 and the Prime Minister 98 on the 16th told me that the members of the Iraqi Government were perturbed at the insertion in the Republican Party platform of a Zionist plank 99 and said they hoped that the plank did not express the true feelings of the large number of American citizens who belonged to the Republican Party. 2. Foreign Minister said that the matter had been discussed in the Cabinet, that it had been decided to ban its publication in the local press at least for the time being in order to avoid the stirring up of resentment and that he had been deputized to suggest that I transmit to my Government the deep concern of the Iraqi Government lest the Zionists in the United States, taking advantage of the internal political situation, succeed in committing both major American political parties to a course of action which is not in accord with the principles for which the United Nations are fighting. 3. The Foreign Minister said that he appreciated that American political parties did not speak for the American Government, that a party platform was quite different from a Government policy. Nevertheless, pre-election commitments may have an influence upon post-election Government policies. 4. The Iraqi Government was convinced that the maintenance of really friendly relations between the Arab world and Great Britain and the United States was important to the development of the Arab countries. The policy of the Government was assiduously to cultivate those relations. However, if the British and American Governments under the pressure of Zionist schemers should turn Palestine over to Zionist control, no Government of Iraq could stem the wave of indignation which would spontaneously sweep the country. The Foreign Minister said that he felt he should be frank in saying that all that had been accomplished in building up friendly relations between Iraq and Great Britain and the United States would be instantly undone. 5. The Minister said that he was not making a protest since there was no ground for protest. He felt, however, that it was his duty to make clear the concern of his colleagues and himself and to let the American Government know of the serious nature of the problems the Iraqi Government would face if the Zionist plank of the Republican Party should become a policy of the American Government. 6. I thanked the Minister for his frankness and pointed out that lie was quite correct in distinguishing between party platforms and Government policies. I said that I hoped that the Government would bear in mind that in the United States no one speaks for the Government except the Government and that neither Government nor the Iraqi press should become unduly excited at statements that would be made during the coming campaign. I added that in making this statement I did not wish him to obtain the impression that I was given any intimation of what might eventually be the policy of the American Government towards Palestine. I did not know and I doubted whether anyone else in the United States knew precisely what that policy would be, that in any event the United States at present was not determining or carrying out Palestine policy. Henderson 97 Arshad al-Umari. 98 Hamadi al-Pachachi. 99 The statement of the Republican Party platform adopted at Chicago on June 27, 1944, was as follows: “In order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jewish men, women, and children driven from their homes by tyranny, we call for the opening of Palestine to their unrestricted immigration and land ownership, so that in accordance with the full intent and purpose of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of a Republican Congress in 1922 [June 30, 1922, Congressional Record , vol. 62, pt. 10, p. 9799], Palestine may be constituted as a free and democratic Commonwealth. We condemn the failure of the President to insist that the mandatory of Palestine carry out the provision of the Balfour Declaration and of the mandate while he pretends to support them.” (House Report No. 1997, 78th Cong. 2d sess.) Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 867N.01/7–1844 [Document 661] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [ Washington ,] July 26, 1944. I believe that you will be interested in the attached paraphrase of a telegram 1 from our Minister in Baghdad, Loy Henderson, summarizing conversations which he has had with members of the Iraqi Government regarding the Palestine plank in the Republican platform. (This plank is similar to that just adopted by the Democratic Convention and in effect provides for free immigration into Palestine and the creation there of a Jewish State. 2 ) You will note that while the Iraqi Government appreciates the fact that a party platform is not the same as a Government policy, the Cabinet decided to ask Mr. Henderson to inform us that the Iraqi Government is deeply concerned lest the Zionists take advantage of the political situation in this country to commit both major parties to a course which would not be in accord with the war aims of the United Nations. I have no doubt but that the reaction in the Arab world to the Democratic plank on Palestine will be similar, and in view of the strategic importance to us of the Near East, I believe that it would be advisable for leaders of both parties to refrain from making statements on Palestine during the campaign that might tend to arouse the Arabs or upset the precarious balance of forces in Palestine itself. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 1 The telegram printed supra . 2 The plank in the platform of the Democratic National Convention adopted at Chicago on July 24, 1944, reads as follows: “We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.” (House Report No. 1997, 78th Cong., 2d sess., p. 3.) The First Secretary of Legation in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/8–344: Telegram in Syria [Document 662] The First Secretary of Legation in Syria ( Satterthwaite ) to the Secretary of State Damascus , August 3, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 5:08 p.m.] 17. Prime Minister Jabri (in the absence of the Foreign Minister) sent for me this morning to express verbally and in a friendly manner the anxiety and even provocation which the statements on Palestine in the Democratic and Republican Party platforms have caused in Syria. Remarking that these statements have been a blow to American prestige here he mentioned the especially high esteem in which the United States has been held in this country since the days of the King-Crane Commission 3 as expressed at that time in the overwhelming vote for an American mandate. He also mentioned the close cultural relations between our two countries; the moral as well as material interest which the United States has in maintaining Syria’s friendship; the fact that Syrians have been at the forefront of Arab movement; and in conjunction with our petroleum policy Syria’s very close friendship with Saudi Arabia. He likewise reviewed the familiar arguments regarding Arab rights in Palestine including that of the comparable justice of giving the United States back to the Indians. The Prime Minister asked me to transmit the views of his Government to my Government which I said I would be glad to do notwithstanding the fact that the party platforms were unofficial and could not be considered as an expression of American policy. He said he was aware of this and was for that reason making a verbal rather than a written protest. Satterthwaite 3 The American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey organized by the Paris Peace Conference in 1919; for correspondence relating to the Commission and the report of the American Section, see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, vol. xii , pp. 745 ff. The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/8–544: Airgram [Document 663] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , August 5, 1944—9 a.m. [Received August 12—8 a.m.] A–36. Reference my telegram no. 154 of August 2, 3 p.m. 4 regarding the resolution on the Palestine question voted at the July 25 sitting of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. A member of the Legation staff obtained from the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 1 a copy of the Arabic text of what was stated to be the official text of the resolution in question. It reads, in close translation, as follows: The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies opposes any move which aims at the establishment of a Zionist National Home in the long-established Arab land of Palestine, for Lebanon considers itself directly threatened by the Zionist menace. The Chamber requests the Ministry to notify the ambassadors of the great Allied Powers of its decision, so that they may be kind enough to transmit this decision to the American, British, and French Governments. The Chamber considers that the principles of the Atlantic Charter are contrary to the idea of turning any part of the Arab Lands into a National Home for Zionism. The Chamber of Deputies hopes that the Allied Powers will take the side of the Arabs in their just cause, and that they will take note of the feelings of the allied Arab countries. Copies mailed to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Algiers, Jerusalem and Naples for Murphy. Wadsworth 4 Not printed. The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/8–1044: Telegram [Document 664] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , August 10, 1944. [Received August 10—10:37 a.m.] 2363. Last night at Senate’s closing session Prime Minister Nahas in reply to a formal question by Senator Abdel Meguid Ibrahim Saleh Pasha made an important pronouncement on Egypt’s attitude toward Palestine question with special reference to electoral platforms of Republican and Democratic Parties. Senator asked, “What action has the Government taken by diplomatic and other means respecting programs of political leaders in democratic USA which advocate ceding Palestine to Jews as national home when for 13 centuries that country has been an Arab patrimony?” Prime Minister’s answer postponed several days by conferences in Alexandria stressed special interest he had always taken in Arabs of Palestine and his solicitude in defending their interests. Declared he had been increasingly aware of unfavorable public opinion manifesting itself in United States and had neglected no opportunity to protest to American Government. Nahas then proceeded to enumerate his successive démarches . (1) In January 1943 directed Egyptian Legation to transmit to State Department his memorandum defending Arabs of Palestine and stressing unfortunate effects of Zionist propaganda on Egypt and Middle East. (2) In March 1943 transmitted not [ note ] to Department urging maintenance of status quo respecting immigration into Palestine urging that persecuted European Jews emigrate to other areas capable of absorbing them. (3) In February 1944 pointed out that congressional resolutions advocating termination of White Paper were flagrantly incompatible with principles of Atlantic Charter submitting memorandum to this effect through Egyptian Legation Washington and also stressing unfortunate repercussions in Egypt of such measures. (4) In March 1944 transmitted a similar message to United States Government on behalf of Imam of Yemen. (5) Later at time of officially sponsored Silver-Wise statements exchanged views with American Minister here. Declared that these various protests had had in some measure favorable results in that White Paper still applied and American Government had given assurances that no decision affecting Palestine would be reached without full consultation of Jews and Arabs. Regarding declarations of Republican and Democratic Parties Nahas continued: “There is no doubt that they are of the utmost importance and gravity for they indicate that American politicians have agreed that Palestine shall be torn from its rightful Arab owners who have been settled there for several centuries in order to offer it as bait to the Jews. What is particularly regrettable is that this tends to shake the confidence of the Arab peoples and of other small nations in the promises made by the United Nations and particularly the United States concerning the rights of peoples and the triumph of justice. However we are not dealing with an act of government but with an electoral campaign and international law does not permit in such cases the official exchange of views by governments. That is why although Mustapha Nahas, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, has not been able to take official action in this regard he has nevertheless not failed to protest strongly to the two American political parties as president of the Wafd Party and leader of the Egyptian people.” Senator thereupon thanked Prime Minister for his enlightening address declaring that humanitarian public opinion was appalled to see the leading politicians of a great democracy making statements at variance with former promises and with that country’s declared principles which for the past 4 years have given hope to all peoples who aspire to liberty and independence. Tuck The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/8–1844 [Document 665] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State No. 399 Baghdad , August 18, 1944. [Received August 30.] Sir : I have the honor to attach hereto a memorandum 5 which contains a summary of statements made to me on August 10, 1944, by Arshad al-Umari, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, outlining the policy which the Iraqi Government has decided to adopt with regard to the activities of Zionists in the United States. It will be observed that the Iraqi Government plans to prevent the appearance at least during the next few months in the local press of articles criticizing the United States and Great Britain because of the activities of Zionists in those countries and hopes after the American presidential elections have taken place to establish in cooperation with other Arab countries bureaus in the United States and Great Britain for the purpose of explaining to the public the Arab side of the Palestine problem. The Foreign Minister in outlining the decisions of the Iraqi Government in this respect to the British Chargé d’Affaires 6 added that it was hoped that Nuri Pasha, the former Iraqi Prime Minister, might be appointed Iraqi Minister in London where he would be in a position to play an important role in directing the work of the Arab bureaus and in explaining the Arab cause to the British Government and people. The fact that there has been a decline in references in the Iraqi press to the Zionist planks in the platforms of the Republican and Democratic Parties indicates that the Iraqi Government is already applying its new policy. Among Iraqis interested in international affairs these planks continue to be the favorite topic of conversation. Respectfully yours, Loy W. Henderson 5 Not printed. 6 Geoffrey H. Thompson. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) 867N.01/8–3144: Telegram [Document 666] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) Washington , August 31, 1944—6 p.m. 154. Department has been informed by OWI 7 that a report has been received from OWI Baghdad to the effect that the Iraqi Government censorship is planning to release in the near future a “deluge” of press accounts received through Reuters respecting statements made by Americans in favor of Zionism. If circumstances warrant, you should discuss this matter with the appropriate authorities with a view to clarifying this matter locally. On the assumption that the censorship is British controlled, you might wish to point out to the local British authorities that any attempt, such as appears on the basis of the report under reference to be under contemplation, to initiate a campaign which would have the effect of discrediting the United States in the Arab world would clearly be contrary to the spirit of joint American-British cooperation in the Near and Middle East as set forth in the Department’s telegram no. 80 of May 17, 10 p.m. 8 and other instructions on this subject. You may also wish to point out in this connection that members of the British Government have on many occasions expressed to members of this Government their concern at the possible repercussions which Zionist activities in the United States might have upon the political situation in the Near East as well as their hope that it might be possible for this Government in some way to curtail those activities. It would clearly be inconsistent with the attitude of the British Government in this regard if the British officials in question were to contribute in any way to the undoubtedly harmful effects which the release of a sizeable volume of pro-Zionist statements attributed to American leaders would have upon the situation in Palestine and in the neighboring Arab countries. You should bear in mind in this connection that a distinction is to be drawn between statements which may have been made informally by various persons in the United States, in Government circles as well as in private life, on the one hand and on the other the formal attitude of this Government toward the Palestine question, as set forth in such recent instructions as the Department’s telegram no. 34, March 15, 6 p.m. to you and the Department’s 657, March 28, 9 p.m. to Cairo, repeated to you. 9 Hull 7 Office of War Information. 8 See footnote 7, p. 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] ; for correspondence regarding the exchange between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding cooperation of the two Governments in the Near and Middle East, see pp. 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] ff. 9 See footnotes 77 and 85, pp. 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] and 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , respectively. The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State 840.48 Refugees/8–3144: Telegram [Document 667] The Consul General at Jerusalem ( Pinkerton ) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem , August 31, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 9:34 p.m.] 123. Retel 84, June 26, 6 p.m. Total Jewish immigration to Palestine for first 7 months of 1944 was 9,348 which included 5,290 from Europe. State of White Paper quota as of July 31 was as follows: 18,000 vacancies against which there were commitments amounting to about 12,000 leaving actual vacancies of about 6,000. These commitments were 5,000 certificates allotted to protecting power for veteran Zionist party members, persons escaping from Rumania for whom 2,000 reserved for next 2 months, and about 5,000 for unused past quotas including 2,000 provisionally reserved for wives of soldiers, deserters from armies rec [ etc? ]. Refugees through Turkey continue to be admitted without numerical limitation but persons from liberated territory and safe countries including Spain, Portugal and North Africa admitted only in unusual individual cases approved in Jerusalem. Jewish Agency continues to press for allotment covering Yemenite refugees now in Aden as it understands Aden Government may return them to Yemen unless provision is made for their maintenance which has heretofore been arranged by Joint Distribution Committee. JDC has advised Agency it will not be able to continue beyond September 3. Immigrants charged against quota of 75,000 to July 31 were 37,000 legal and 20,000 illegal immigrants. Pinkerton The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/9–544: Telegram [Document 668] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , September 5, 1944—7 p.m. [Received September 5—12:30 a.m.] 201. 1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me today that his Government had been informed that Zionists had handed the Dumbarton Oaks Conference 10 a memorandum demanding that a Jewish national state be established in Palestine, that his Government could not permit such a document to remain unanswered, that it was therefore instructing the Iraqi Legation in Washington in case it was confirmed that the Zionists had actually made a démarche to reply in behalf of the Iraqi Government. 2. The Minister thereupon read to me a draft of the reply which he planned to send to the Iraq Legation and asked if I had any suggestions. The draft was comparatively restrained in tone and contained the usual Arab arguments against the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. I said that I knew nothing whatsoever regarding any Zionist approach to the Conference and that in any event I did not believe that the agenda of the Conference would permit to consider such a memorandum. I said that it might be wise for the Iraqi Minister in Washington before submitting a reply to endeavor to ascertain by informal inquiry in the Department of State whether such a Zionist document if submitted could properly be incorporated in the proceedings of the Conference. It might be preferable for the Legation not to undertake to reply to a document which was not being made a matter of record. The Minister indicated that he could adopt my suggestion. It is possible, therefore, that the Iraqi Minister may in the near future make appropriate inquiries in the Department. 3. During our conversation the Minister stated that in pursuance of the policy of the Iraqi Government as outlined by him in our conversation of August 10 (redes 399, August 18,) the Iraqi Government would make every effort to prevent the Iraqi press from learning or at least from discussing any protest which might be submitted. His Government has determined that until after the American elections at least the Iraqi press would not be used in a campaign against pro-Zionist activities in the United States. 4. I told him that I had informed my Government of his remarks to me of August 10 and that my Government was appreciative of the efforts of the Iraqi Government not to permit Iraqi displeasure at Zionist activities in the United States to express itself in a senseless press campaign which might stir up feeling among the Iraqi Arabs of unfriendliness against the United States—feelings which would not be in the interests of either the United States or Iraq. I added that I had recently heard a rumor which I was not disposed to credit to the effect that the Iraqi censorship authorities were planning to release a number of articles containing pro-Zionist statements made by a [ sic ] prominent American citizens. The Minister replied that such a rumor was of course without basis and that the policy of present Government as outlined to me had undergone no change. 5. In view of the Minister’s statement to me and of the restraint which the Iraqi press has been showing in dealing with American pro-Zionist activity I am inclined to believe that in spite of the report referred to in the first paragraph of Department’s 154, September 1 [ August 31 ] the Iraqi Government is not contemplating any kind of a campaign in the immediate future which will tend to arouse feelings against the United States. Undoubtedly the Iraqi Government censorship is holding numerous press accounts from abroad respecting statements made by Americans in favor of Zionism. I would be surprised, however, if these statements are released in the immediate future. Various conversations which I have had with the British Ambassador 11 and the British Chargé in the last few months cause me to believe that the British Embassy would not encourage at the present time any kind of a press campaign against the United States based on American Zionist activities. Zionists are also not inactive in Great Britain. 6. I took occasion during the course of my conversation with the Foreign Minister again to draw his attention to the attitude of the American Government towards the Palestine question as outlined in Department’s 34, March 16 [ 15 ] to me and 657, March 28 to Cairo. 12 The Minister expressed his appreciation of this reminder. Henderson 10 See vol. i , section entitled “Preliminaries to the establishment of an international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security”, part II, Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. 11 Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. 12 See footnotes 77 and 85, pp. 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] and 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , respectively. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) 867N.01/9–544: Telegram [Document 669] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) Washington , September 15, 1944—1 p.m. 163. ReLegs 201, September 5, 7 p.m. It is likely that the Foreign Minister referred to a memorandum which was reported in the press to have been submitted to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on August 25 by the new Zionist organization of America (Revisionists). There is no record, however, of the receipt of such a memorandum nor is there any indication that any statement was submitted by the regular Zionist organization. Department has not been approached by Iraqi Legation in this regard. You may, if you deem it desirable, inform the Foreign Minister of the foregoing, and you should in this connection point out that in any event the informal conversations being held at Dumbarton Oaks are concerned entirely with the principles of a general international organization, and no questions of a territorial character are being considered. You may also in your discretion convey to the Foreign Minister the Department’s appreciation for the policy of restraint mentioned in your despatch no. 399 13 as well as your telegram under reference. Hull 13 Dated August 18, p. 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] . Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 867N.01/9–3044 [Document 670] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) 14 [ Washington ,] September 30, 1944. This Military Attaché report from Beirut 15 is of considerable interest as illustrating the effect which continued tension in Arab-Jewish relations will have, not only upon the local situation in the Near East, but also upon the relationship between Soviet Russia on the one hand and Great Britain and the United States on the other. The report summarizes a conversation which the Assistant Military Attaché 16 had with the Assistant Chief of the British Security Mission for Syria and Lebanon, 17 who made the following points: 1. Continued unrest between Arabs and Jews affects not only the local situation but the over-all relationship between the United States and Great Britain on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other. The Arabs, suspecting that Great Britain and, to a larger extent, the United States may have “sold out” to world Zionism, are turning to the Soviet. More significantly, Russia is reciprocating as shown again by the recent recognition of Syria and Lebanon. It is to be noted that the Russian representative in the Levant States will reside in Moslem Damascus rather than in Christian Beirut. 2. Fundamentally the Arabs and Jews get on well together, and their hostility toward each other has been caused by the mistaken Allied policy of over-emphasizing Jewish aims. 3. The United States and Britain should give their strong support to movements for Arab-Jewish rapprochement such as that of Dr. Magnes, of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, so as to give full rein to the creative qualities of both peoples. 4. If such a policy is not followed, the extremists in both camps will gain control, and an equitable solution will then be impossible. This report is just one of many indications which we continue to receive regarding the present tension in the Near East, and its implications for the future. Wallace Murray 14 Addressed to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State. 15 Dated August 11, not printed; Maj. Virgil A. Jackson was the Military Attaché in Syria and Lebanon. 16 Maj. Duncan D. MacBryde. 17 Lt. Col. C. Reid. President Roosevelt to Senator Robert F. Wagner 867N.01/12–244 [Document 671] President Roosevelt to Senator Robert F. Wagner 18 Washington , October 15, 1944. Dear Bob : Knowing that you are to attend the forty-seventh annual convention of the Zionist Organization of America, I ask you to convey to the delegates assembled my cordial greetings. Please express my satisfaction that, in accord with the traditional American policy and in keeping with the spirit of the “four freedoms,” 18a the Democratic Party at its July convention this year included the following plank in its platform: “We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.” Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if reelected I shall help to bring about its realization. [ Franklin D. Roosevelt ] 18 Reprinted from file copy of House Report No. 1997, 78th Cong., 2d sess., p. 3. 18a The Four Freedoms were enunciated by President Roosevelt in the State of the Union Message, January 6, 1941, Congressional Record , vol. 87, pt. 1, p. 44. The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/10–1944: Telegram [Document 672] The Consul General at Jerusalem ( Pinkerton ) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem , October 19, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 8:12 p.m.] 153. Arab reaction to recent American statements on Palestine 19 has been heretofore restricted to rather mild newspaper editorials and private conversations protesting against them. There have been no organized protests. Yesterday afternoon, however, Arab Chamber of Commerce canceled appointment with Culbertson Mission 20 members now visiting Palestine and said, “We would like this action of the Chamber to be read as a protest against the President’s pronouncement, and as a sign of our unlimited disappointment.” Mission left this morning for Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jaffa where it expects to meet Jewish and Arab organizations and upon its return I will report as to its reception in those cities. Mr. Culbertson himself has not yet arrived in Palestine. Pinkerton 19 See letter from President Roosevelt to Senator Wagner, October 15, supra; for statements by Governor Thomas E. Dewey and others, see footnotes 21 and 24, pp. 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] and 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] , respectively. 20 For correspondence regarding the Special Economic Mission to the Middle East, headed by William S. Culbertson, see pp. 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 27 ] ff. The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/10–2144: Telegram [Document 673] The Consul General at Jerusalem ( Pinkerton ) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem , October 21, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 7:44 p.m.] 156. Retel 153, October 19, 4 p.m. Members of Culbertson Mission visited Haifa October 19 where meeting with Arab Chamber of Commerce was scheduled but this meeting was cancelled. Chamber addressed letter to this Consulate which was received 1 day after time of meeting saying “We cannot but accept the one and only interpretation of such political influence as Jewish complete mastery of the economic, social and political life of America and, therefore, as no useful purpose would be served by the meeting of the Arab Chamber of Commerce of Haifa with the American delegation the Chamber has decided not to meet the delegation.” Arab press has been increasingly drastic in its criticism but formal protests have not been made to this Consulate by Arab organizations or individuals other than letters from Jerusalem and Haifa Chamber of Commerce. Pinkerton The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/10–2144: Telegram [Document 674] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , October 21, 1944—10 p.m. [Received October 22—1:58 p.m.] 230. See Legation’s 201, September 5. Dewey’s recent statement regarding Palestine has created a sensation in Iraqi Government circles. 21 I have been reliably informed that the Prime Minister after referring to it with considerable heat stated during a personal conversation that Iraqi Government and Arab nationalist circles in Iraq had been following a policy of ignoring pro-Zionist utterances on the part of leading American officials and citizens on the ground that such utterances should not be given face value during an American electoral campaign, that however while the Arabs were remaining quiet the Zionists were endeavoring irrevocably to commit the future American administration to the carrying out of the Zionist program and that he did not believe that it would be possible much longer to restrain the Iraqi press from commenting on the wooing of the Zionists by American political leaders of both parties. (2) The recent letters of Sumner Welles, 22 Ickes 23 and Stimson 24 regarding Palestine have added to the irritation of those Iraqis who have known about them. (3) Several days ago the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that the Dewey statement as reported by Reuters and the Egyptian press but not thus far published in Baghdad had deeply angered local Arab leaders. He said that the President of the Senate was planning to send a telegram to Dewey on the subject. British Ambassador tells me that Prime Minister also mentioned the matter to him and that he informed the Prime Minister that in his opinion it would be wiser to ignore Dewey’s statement at least for the time being. 25 (4) The recently established leftist pro-Soviet newspaper Ash Sha’b yesterday broke the silence which has been observed by the Iraqi press with regard to Zionist propaganda in the United States with a series of brief articles summarizing the statements made by Dewey, Welles, Ickes and Stimson. The statement credited to Welles that the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine should be a part of the future peace appears particularly to have attracted attention since Welles is regarded here more as an authority on American foreign policy than a politician. 26 The statement credited to Stimson that the solution of the Palestine problem will undoubtedly depend upon “political considerations” is regarded here as a signal for the Zionists to begin to press their cause with all the weapons at their disposal. No other Baghdad newspaper has thus far referred to these various statements and no editorial comment has appeared. (5) A Foreign Office official told me this morning that Foreign Office had just received a Reuters dispatch stating that in view of President’s statement on Palestine, Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine had decided to boycott the Culbertson Mission. In reply to his question I said that I had no knowledge of any recent statement made by the President on the subject of Palestine. He also told me that the articles referred to in paragraph (4) of this telegram had been taken from the Egyptian press and had been published without the knowledge of Foreign Office. There was no intention of changing the policy of press silence laid down by the Foreign Minister at least until his return within the next few days following which the matter would probably be reconsidered in the Cabinet. He added that since Egyptian newspapers are giving wide publicity to pro-Zionist statements of rather responsible American Government officials and other prominent Americans it was becoming increasingly difficult for the Iraqi Government to restrain the local press. Henderson 21 On October 12, 1944, Governor Thomas E. Dewey, of New York, the Republican candidate for President, issued the following statement: “I heartily endorse the Palestine plank in the Republican Party platform. Again I repeat what I previously stated to the great leader of the American Zionist movement and distinguished American, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, that I am for the reconstitution of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth in accordance with the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the resolution of the Republican Congress in 1922. I have also stated to Dr. Silver that in order to give refuge to millions of distressed Jews driven from their homes by tyranny, I favor the opening of Palestine to their unlimited immigration and land ownership. “The American people have time and again declared themselves in favor of these principles. The Republican Party has at all times been the traditional friend of the movement. “As President I would use my best offices to have our Government working together with Great Britain to achieve this great objective for a people that have suffered so much and deserve so much at the hands of mankind.” (H. Rept. 1997, p. 3; copy filed in Department under 867N.01/12–244.) 22 Former Under Secretary of State. 23 Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior. 24 Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, had written a letter on October 10 to Senator Robert A. Taft withdrawing his earlier objection to the proposed Palestine Resolution, stating, “In my judgment, political considerations now outweigh the military, and the issue should be determined upon the political rather than the military basis.” (867N.01/12244) 25 A telegram of protest was sent by the Presidents of the Iraqi Senate and Chamber of Deputies to Governor Dewey on October 19 (867N.01/10–2644). 26 In transmitting this telegram to the Under Secretary of State, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs commented: “It is interesting to note that according to our Minister in Baghdad, Loy Henderson, particular attention has been attracted by Mr. Sumner Welles’ statement as he is regarded in Iraq as an authority on American foreign policy rather than a politician.” (867N.01/10–2644) Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 867N.01/10–2344 [Document 675] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) 27 [ Washington ,] October 23, 1944. I believe that you will wish to note the two attached telegrams from Jerusalem 28 regarding the action of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Jerusalem and Haifa in cancelling meetings which had been scheduled with the Culbertson Mission. That this action was taken in protest against the President’s recent message to the Zionists is quite evident from the statement of the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem to the effect that: “We would like this action of the Chamber to be read as a protest against the President’s pronouncement, and as a sign of our unlimited disappointment.” [Here follows additional quotation and comment based on telegram 156.] Episodes of this kind may, if they spread to other parts of the Arab world, create a very serious problem for American interests in that area. To be specific, if King Ibn Saud ever adopts this form of reasoning, our great economic stake in Saudi Arabia might well become so compromised that our efforts through ordinary diplomatic channels to protect our interests there might be unavailing. Wallace Murray 27 Addressed to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State. 28 Telegrams 153, October 19, 4 p.m., and 156, October 21, 5 p.m., p. 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , and Doc. 673 ] . Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 867N.01/10–2344 [Document 676] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) 27 [ Washington ,] October 23, 1944. Referring to recent developments on the Palestine question, I wish to call your attention to the attached Daily News Bulletin of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency which purports to give on page 3 the text of the statement made by Congressman Bloom on October 15 regarding the Palestine resolutions. You will recall that Mr. Bloom was reported in the press to have announced that hearings on the resolutions would be resumed next month. The attached article, however, attributes to him the additional statement that: “… In view of the approval of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War I have no doubt but that the resolution will be favorably reported by the Foreign Affairs Committee without delay.” While the recent letter of Secretary Stimson to Senator Taft 30 withdrawing the War Department’s objections to the Palestine resolution might be interpreted as indicating approval of the resolutions, it is not, of course, correct that you have ever given your approval, and when the occasion arises you may accordingly wish to bring this to Mr. Bloom’s attention. Wallace Murray 27 Addressed to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State. 30 See footnote 24, p. 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 867N.01/10–2644: Telegram [Document 677] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , October 26, 1944—3 p.m. 8925. Department is informed by JDC 31 that British Government in London has approved allotment of 10,300 additional Palestine immigration certificates, to be distributed as follows: 3,200 for children (Comprising 1,000 for Switzerland, 2,000 for France and 200 for Belgium); and 7,100 others (comprising 5,000 for Rumania and Bulgaria, 1,000 for the Yemen, 900 for Italy and 200 for Turkey); these 10,300 certificates to be issued at the rate of 1,500 monthly for each of the 3 months of the present quarter (October, November and December) without decision as to the subsequent rate of issuance. JDC states that this appears tantamount to the using up of the outstanding certificates under the White Paper quota, that it was taken following a recent interview between Weizmann and Premier Churchill, and that it portends an early decision regarding the political future of Palestine, possibly in the direction of partition. Please report promptly any confirmation of the foregoing which you may be able to obtain informally. Sent to London repeated to Jerusalem as No. 174 with reference to its No. 123, August 31, 6 p.m. Stettinius 31 Joint Distribution Committee. The Chargé in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/10–2744: Telegram [Document 678] The Chargé in Syria ( Satterthwaite ) to the Secretary of State Damascus , October 27, 1944—noon. [Received 12:55 p.m.] 30. The Syrian public and press are expressing increasing alarm over statements of Roosevelt, Dewey and other American statesmen advocating a Jewish Commonwealth and unrestricted immigration into Palestine as American electoral campaign draws to its close. Former students of the American University at Beirut and of American universities now holding prominent positions are particularly disturbed and have taken the lead in organizing an association to carry on counter-propaganda in defense of Arab cause in Palestine. According to reliable reports a demonstration in protest will be held in Damascus, November 2, the anniversary of Balfour Declaration. The Syrian Government itself has not as yet made any new official démarche (see my 17, August 3) presumably because of its preoccupation with more immediate political problems but is the subject of some criticism for its failure to do so. The press is giving increasing prominence to this question and has published conspicuously the various declarations of American statesmen defending Zionism and particularly the decision of Arab Chamber of Commerce in Palestine to boycott the Culbertson Mission. Practically all local newspapers are devoting their daily editorials to the subject in which they repeat the various arguments previously reported and note especially their disillusionment at the alleged disregard of Arab rights in Palestine by American politicians for the purpose of winning votes. They repeatedly assert that the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms are thus being utterly disregarded and ask why the Arabs should be the ones made to suffer as a result of German persecution of the Jews. The editorials also assert that these American statements are encouraging the terrorists in Palestine. Inasmuch as most of the editorial comment gives favorable mention to the British position regarding Palestine there is a belief on the part of some well-informed Syrians that the campaign against the United States is receiving the active encouragement of the British press authorities. Satterthwaite Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 867N.01/10–2744 [Document 679] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) [ Washington ,] October 27, 1944. Mr. Stettinius : I believe that you will wish to note the attached extract from the Daily News Bulletin of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 32 which carries an item (page 2) dated October 25, 1944 from Cairo stating that as a result of recent pro-Zionist manifestations in this country the Cairo newspaper Al Wafd al Misri has proclaimed a boycott of American goods and has called on the entire Egyptian press to take similar action. While we do not as yet have any further details regarding this development, it is significant of the growing reaction which is appearing in the Near East as a result of certain recent declarations in the United States in favor of Zionism. Wallace Murray 32 Not reprinted. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 867N.01/10–2544 [Document 680] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) [ Washington ,] October 27, 1944. Mr. Stettinius : I think you will wish to note with particular care the attached memorandum containing the highly important information, obtained from the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara, 33 that the Soviet official position is opposed to an independent Jewish state in Palestine. If the Soviet Government continues in this attitude of opposition to Zionist ambitions in Palestine it may have far-reaching effects on the position both of ourselves as well as of the British in the Arab world. The prestige of the United States in the Arab world will undoubtedly seriously deteriorate by reason of recent official declarations in this country by the President and by Mr. Dewey supporting the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. The British have already been improving their position in the Arab world by pointing to the far greater official support given to Zionism in this country than is the case in Great Britain. If now the Soviet Government comes out opposing all Zionist ambitions in Palestine, it will have an electrical effect among the Arabs and will place us in a greatly inferior position to the British and the Russians in that area. When we think of our stake in Saudi Arabia alone, this situation should cause us to do some very serious thinking regarding the future of our interests in the Arab world and particularly in Saudi Arabia. Wallace Murray [Annex] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) 34 [ Washington ,] October 25, 1944. Of unusual interest as indicating the attitude of Soviet Russia toward the Palestine question is the following extract from a memorandum 35 prepared by Mr. Hirschmann, who until recently was War Refugee Board representative at Ankara, following a conversation on October 3 with Mikhailov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy there. Mr. Hirschmann states: “Early in the conversation, Mikhailov asked whether I had any opinion on the Arab Conference, which was currently in session in Alexandria with relation to Palestine. I replied that I was not familiar with the reasons for the convocation of the conference or the complex political situation in Palestine, but that I was planning to spend three or four days in Palestine with a view to learning something more about the country, the people and its possibilities; that Palestine was the one center where it had been possible to send homeless refugees; and that it interested me as a creative force in a world in the process of war. “Mikhailov volunteered that he had spent some weeks in Palestine making a study and that he was convinced that the country could not justify its aims as an independent Jewish State; that it was economically unsound and politically unnecessary. ‘With the United States treating its Jewish citizens as Americans, the British treating its Jewish citizens as Britains and the Soviet treating its Jewish citizens as Russians, there is no necessity in the future for a separate Jewish State,’ Mikhailov stated. He asked whether I had any opinion regarding the British attitude towards the Arabs and the Jews from a political point of view. I stated that I did not; though I had read a number of conflicting articles about this. Mikhailov then adroitly indicated, by implication rather than by a categorical statement, that the British skirts might not be entirely clean where the Arab unrest was concerned. “I stated that I had read in a magazine … 36 an article indicating that the Soviet policy regarding Palestine as an independent Jewish State had recently undergone a change in the direction of favoring such a State. Mikhailov stated that he did not know of this article or any propaganda tending to suggest this change. I then asked Mikhailov if he could tell me the official position of the Soviet Government with regard to Palestine. After some hesitation, Mikhailov stated that the Soviet official position, as he knew it, was opposed to an independent Jewish State in Palestine in view of the lack of need for such a state in the new society and political orientation that would be developed in the future. “I gathered from this statement that Mikhailov was indicating his own definite views which unquestionably must have some support in official circles; although my impression was that the subject was one which was under consideration and was probably not closed or settled in principle from the Soviet point of view. “I referred again to the creative force and contribution that was apparently being made in Palestine as a good society, but these opinions apparently fell on barren soil.” We have every reason to believe that this interview provides a plausible indication of the official Soviet attitude toward Palestine, since it has been our belief for years that the Soviets were hostile to Zionism. In addition, the fact that the Arabs outnumber the Jews so overwhelmingly in the Near East as a whole would make it unlikely that the Russians, who undoubtedly are showing a greater interest in the area, would adopt a pro-Zionist policy in the face of clearly expressed Arab opposition. Wallace Murray 33 Sergey Sergeyvieh Mikhailov. 34 Addressed to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State. 35 Memorandum not printed; copy sent to Moscow in instruction 346, November 7 (not printed). 36 Omission indicated in the original memorandum. Memorandum, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 867N.01/10–2744 [Document 681] Memorandum, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) [ Washington ,] October 27, 1944. Mr. Stettinius : I have come to the conclusion that the reaction in the Near East to recent developments in this country affecting Palestine is going to have so serious an effect upon our foreign relations as to make it advisable for you to discuss this matter with the President at the earliest opportunity. The Arabs of Palestine and Iraq have already protested, and it is most likely that this reaction will spread to neighboring Arab countries and will become intensified. Such a development will have such far-reaching effects upon our relations with the area that I feel you would be entirely justified in bringing it to the President’s attention, even at this time. 37 In discussing this with him, you will, of course, wish to make it quite clear that we entirely appreciate the present domestic position. The endorsement of a Jewish state, however, goes beyond any previous official American pronouncements on Palestine, which have been limited to expressing sympathy with the idea of a Jewish national home rather than a Jewish Commonwealth. It is inconsistent, moreover, with the assurance which the President gave to King Ibn Saud on two occasions during 1943, to the effect that both Arabs and Jews would be consulted in the reaching of any definitive settlement of the Palestine question. 38 Finally, on several occasions early in the present year the President authorized us to inform a number of Near Eastern Governments and political leaders that in the view of this Government no decision should be reached without full and prior consultation with all concerned, including both Arabs and Jews. It is difficult to see how recent developments can be taken by the Arab countries as showing anything but a lack of good faith and an intention on the part of this Government not to carry out its previous commitments when political expediency dictates otherwise. Such an impression, if not speedily and completely counteracted, would seriously prejudice our ability to afford adequate protection to American interests in the Near East. This does not only imply that our prestige, which has been declining for some months as a result of recent pro-Zionist manifestations in this country, will reach a new low in the Near East. It does not simply mean that the Department and the Foreign Service will be placed in a difficult position in attempting to promote American business and philanthropic interests in that area. It means, specifically, that the basic long-term American economic interest in Saudi Arabia will be seriously threatened and possibly jeopardized. King Ibn Saud, whose wholehearted opposition to Zionism has been made known in no uncertain terms, will now undoubtedly be inclined to question the sincerity of this Government’s intentions toward Palestine as previously communicated to him. Since the King is in entire control of his country’s policy, this in turn will have a very definite bearing upon our relations with Saudi Arabia and upon the future of the American oil concession in that country, which is of incalculable value to the present and future strategic requirements of the United States. Another aspect of the matter which is rather disturbing is the effect which these developments will unquestionably have upon our position in the Near East vis-à-vis the two other great powers who are now interested in that area, Great Britain and Soviet Russia. The British, whose situation with regard to Palestine is admittedly a difficult one and who must realize the conflicting nature of the commitments which they themselves have made regarding that country, welcome any development, such as this, which strengthens their own position with the Arabs by putting us in an unfavorable light. Even more serious are the implications as far as Russia is concerned. We have had the most definite indications that the Soviet Union is showing growing interest in the Near East and that this is no temporary manifestation. The Russians are in effective occupation of a considerable portion of Iran, and we have recently received reports to show that they would like to expand their influence and gain some sort of long-term foothold, through the concession of a free port or by other means, upon the shores of the Persian Gulf. This, of course, would place the Russians within a very short distance not only of the oil fields in southern Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, but also of those in Bahrein and eastern Saudi Arabia. 39 As far as the Soviet position toward Palestine is concerned, we have never had any reason to doubt that the Soviets were opposed to Zionism. We now, as you will recall, have pretty definite evidence that Soviet Russia opposes the creation of a Jewish state. This, of course, would be completely consistent with the recent manifestations of Soviet interest in the Arab world. The situation as I have tried to outline it above is so serious that I have no hesitation in urging you to find an early opportunity to discuss frankly with the President its implications from a realistic point of view. Needless to say, I would be pleased to discuss this entire question with you at your convenience. Wallace Murray 37 A reference to the presidential election campaign; the election was held on November 7, 1944. 38 See undated letter from President Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud (about June 12, 1943), Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 790 ; see also telegrams 1307, July 23, 1943, 9 a.m., from Cairo, and 1059, July 31, 1943, 5 p.m., to Cairo, ibid. , pp. 800 and 802 , respectively, concerning remarks to be made to the King by Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, on special mission for President Roosevelt to confer with King Ibn Saud. 39 For correspondence concerning the Soviet interest in oil concessions in Iran, see pp. 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 470 ] ff.; regarding the Soviet interest in a free port on the Persian Gulf, see telegram 737, October 7, 3 p.m., from Tehran, p. 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] . The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/10–3144: Telegram [Document 682] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , October 31, 1944—1 p.m. [Received November 1—9:33 a.m.] 237. ReLegs 230, October 21. The Iraqi press continues to remain editorially silent regarding the subject of Zionist activities in the United States. The Conservative Arab nationalist an-Nida on October 24 carried a Reuters despatch reporting a statement by Rabbi Wise to the effect that the President in his capacity as a presidential candidate has promised to support unlimited immigration into Palestine and to send a message to the Forty-Ninth [ Forty-Seventh ] American Zionist Congress. The pro-royal family al-Bilad on October 27 published a collection of statements relating to Palestine ostensibly emanating from various parts of the world. These statements were so arranged that those showing sentiments in the United States favorable to the Zionists alternated with those indicating British support of the Arab cause. No other statements of this kind have thus far been published except those reported in my 230. 2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that these statements have been published without his knowledge and contrary to his directions and that he is again requesting the Ministry of Interior to keep stories of this nature out of the press, at least until after the American elections. He states that knowledge gained from articles condemning pro-Zionism in the United States which are appearing in the press of neighboring Arab countries and information gleaned from foreign radio broadcasts are rendering it increasingly difficult for the Government to restrain the local press. 3. The Minister says that he will be compelled to lift the lid after the elections. He will do everything possible to prevent a sudden avalanche of news on the subject and to prevail upon the press to handle pro-Zionist activities in the United States in such a manner as to create a minimum amount of resentment in Iraq against the Government and people of the United States. He hopes that he will be successful in view of the importance to Iraq of the maintenance of friendly relations with the United States in convincing the press that it could best serve the Arab cause by concentrating its fire upon the Zionist cause, methods and activities rather than upon the United States and [apparent omission] Americans whose support of Zionism he is still convinced is primarily due to ignorance or misinformation. He points out, however, that if the United States Government actually begins to take steps to implement pre-election statements supporting the Zionist cause, Arab friendship for and trust in the United States will change instantly in spite of any restraining measures which the Government might take into a feeling of betrayal and into a resentment which will render further friendly relation impossible. Such a development, he says, might appear unimportant to a great power like the United States but it would represent a bitter defeat to those forces in Iraq who have been endeavoring to lead the Arab people along the paths of the great Western Democracies and who have been pinning their hopes for the future upon the maintenance of good will between the Arabs and the democratic Western World. 4. The Minister adds that he has reminded his colleagues who have been disquieted lest they find themselves facing a fait accompli in Palestine of the statement of the American Government to the effect that the settlement of the Palestine question should be taken only after a full discussion with the Arabs as well as the Jews. Henderson The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/11–144: Telegram [Document 683] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , November 1, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 4—2:23 p.m.] 238. Most Iraqis interested in international affairs, while cognizant of certain Zionist sympathies in the United States, have never really been convinced that the United States intended actively to espouse the Zionist cause. Recent information coming in from abroad by radio, press and word of mouth however is causing them for the first time to believe that the United States may have the intention to intervene in Palestine on behalf of the Zionists. As this belief is deepening their first reaction appears to be one of bewilderment accompanied by bitter disappointment and a feeling of betrayal; their second, growing resentment. Their bewilderment arises from the fact that for many years most of the better educated and more progressive Iraqis have been accustomed to regard the United States as the one great power which could be trusted to strive for a fair solution of international problems. They fail to find principles in international justice or any factors connected with the preservation of world peace which would justify American support of Zionist demands. They find it difficult to reconcile themselves to the belief that the United States merely for the sake of internal political expediency is favoring a course in Palestine which in their opinion not only would be unjust, but would inevitably lead to bloodshed and to misery for all concerned. They can perceive no reason for the recent pronouncements and promises of American Government and political leaders who should have a complete understanding of the Palestine situation other than a desire to obtain the support of the American Zionists. They are asking whether it is possible that American foreign policy in the future is to be shaped in such a manner as to meet the demands of private pressure groups possessed of ample funds and exercising extensive control over American channels of information. Their disappointment arises not merely from their conviction that the [ a? ] victory for Zionist [ Zionism? ] would mean a death blow to their hopes for Arab unity but because they feel that the United States, the most idealistic of all the great powers, commits itself to following a policy in the case of Palestine which they find so inconsistent with the terms of the Atlantic Charter and other noble pronouncements of the United Nations; the general outlook in the postwar world for the Arabs is sure to be bleak. Those Iraqis possessed of Western education who have been hoping that Arab civilization will look westward for its inspiration are particularly concerned. They feel that a loss of confidence by the Iraqi Arabs in the fairness and good intentions of the United States would effectively nullify the efforts of the advocates of a Western democratic civilization for Iraq, would strengthen the forces of autocracy and reaction, and would eventually throw Iraq if not also some of the other Arab countries into the arms of the Soviet Union which would at once extirpate all elements favoring the adoption by Iraq of the Western democratic way of life. Those groups which believe merger with the Soviet Union is the most desirable solution of all problems are making strenuous efforts to complete the disillusionment of those who are still inclined to look to the West for inspiration and guidance. 3. The swelling resentment has not as yet made itself manifest partly because there is still some hope that what appears to be a unanimous sentiment for Zionism in the United States will not transfer itself into concrete measures and partly because the Government has blocked the channels through which increasing Arab anger can readily be expressed. If the United States does take steps to implement the Zionist program the feeling in Iraq is likely to be more intense than in most Arab countries. The desire for Arab unity here is especially deep in part because it is closely linked with a desire for closer tie-up with the West—most politically conscious Iraqis desire their country to face the Mediterranean and beyond instead of the Persian Gulf, India and the Far East—in part because the fires of Arab nationalism have burned with particular brightness in Iraq ever since the days of Arab rebellion. 40 As I have already pointed out, the Iraqis are convinced that the success of Zionism would mean a decisive defeat for the cause of Arab unity. 4. The British here do not appear to be particularly disturbed by the situation although the Ambassador and members of the Embassy have told me that they deplore the publicity which has been given to the American pronouncements. Certain British subjects particularly those engaged in commercial pursuits who have a dread of possible American trade rivalry are said to be pleased at growing Iraqi hostility towards the United States. A few of the more thoughtful Britishers, however, who realize that Arab loss of confidence in the integrity of the United States is likely to be accompanied by a disillusionment with regard to Western civilization as a whole and a consequent decline in British influence in this area, are becoming increasingly concerned. Henderson 40 A reference to the Arab Revolt of 1916 against the Turks. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/11–244: Telegram [Document 684] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State London , November 2, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 11:07 p.m.] 9498. See the Department’s 8925 of October 26, 3 p.m. We had occasion to discuss with the Foreign Office today the Palestinian situation. The Foreign Office does not anticipate any change in policy regarding the situation in Palestine, but an official said that “sooner or later” (when the immigration quotas have been exhausted) the British Government would have to reach a new decision on the problem. He did not believe that this would be before the early days of next summer. He said that it is obviously to the Allied interest to have a quiescent situation in the Middle East and that no chances could be taken that might lead to major disorders on the part of the Arabs. The official said that the statements made during our presidential campaign on the Jewish question have not aroused as much reaction among the Arabs as had been expected. We are attempting to confirm the figures contained in the telegram under reference. Gallman The Chargé in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/11–344: Telegram [Document 685] The Chargé in Syria ( Satterthwaite ) to the Secretary of State Damascus , November 3, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:50 p.m.] 31. Demonstrations protesting against a Zionist state in Palestine were held in Damascus yesterday the 27th anniversary of Balfour Declaration as foretold in my 30, October 26 [ 27 ]. They were, however, very orderly and the Government, apparently fearing that demonstrations might get out of hand and be used for political purposes, did not permit any portion of the city to be closed as originally planned. The demonstrators were mostly composed of students and were addressed by the Prime Minister. 41 One group of about 100 Moslem students marched to the Legation but caused no disturbance. Their representatives and those of the university students called on me, however, to protest against the statements of American politicians advocating a Jewish commonwealth. Two committees representing the association [of] organized former students of the American University at Beirut mentioned in my telegram No. 30 and another association of leading deputies and journalists also called and left notes of protest. A number of telegrams of protest were also received from various associations. While earnestly defending their cause and expressing disappointment in the attitude toward Palestine of President Roosevelt, Dewey and others the visitors took pains to express their admiration and friendliness otherwise for the United States. Satterthwaite 41 Faris el-Khoury. The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 867N.01/11–444 [Document 686] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) Baghdad , November 4, 1944. 42 Dear Wallace : Please don’t get the idea from my two long telegrams No. 237 and No. 238, 43 relating to Zionism and the problem of Palestine that I have any intention of flooding the Department with telegraphic messages of this kind. I am fully aware that my despatch of these two telegrams may cause certain members of the Department, and perhaps government officials outside the Department who see them to believe that I am attaching too much importance to the policy which we shall eventually adopt with regard to Palestine. Furthermore, the readers of these telegrams are likely to feel that I am rabidly anti-Zionist. I can only say that intervention by the United States on behalf of Zionists in Palestine would, in my opinion, adversely affect our relations with Iraq in every field. I have no intention of taking sides in the Palestine dispute. I am merely endeavoring truthfully to inform my Government what results might be expected in this area from its espousal of the Zionist cause. If it decides to do so, and I am so informed, I shall, of course, try in every possible way to soften the impact on Iraq. Such a task would not be easy, but I have faced tasks of a similar nature in other posts. I sent in these telegrams because I had come to the conclusion that it was my duty to inform the Department with force and bluntness of the situation here as I see it. I felt that for me to mince words in order to save myself from hostile criticism would be cowardly. I did not send these telegrams until I had discussed them thoroughly with members of my staff and with representatives of OSS, 44 OWI and of the Military Attaché’s office. 45 These telegrams, therefore, represent our consensus, not merely my personal views. The Minister of Foreign Affairs spent more than two hours last Sunday morning, October 29, discussing the feelings in this country with regard to Zionist activities in the United States. Our conversation was friendly and informal. He made it clear that what he said represented his own personal views and that he was making no representations of any kind to me. He appears to be deeply disturbed because of the rapidly increasing influence of the Soviet Union in this area. He said that those left-wing pro-Soviet elements in Iraq who claim to have inside knowledge of Soviet foreign policy were assiduously spreading the news that the Soviet Union if necessary would intervene to prevent the United States and Great Britain from establishing a Jewish State in Palestine and that at the proper time the Soviet Union would demonstrate to all the world who the true friend of the Arab was. He said that recent developments in Iran 46 had greatly strengthened and encouraged friends of the Soviet Union in Iraq. He stated that he feared that Sa’ed would lose out in his struggle not to become a Soviet puppet and that this struggle would continue until the Government of Iran would degenerate into a mere Soviet tool. The Foreign Minister continued that Iraq could not remain independent if it maintained close friendly relations with only one Great Power. That was one of the reasons why the Iraqi Government was so anxious to have relations with the United States as friendly as the relations which it has with Great Britain. If the American Government would prefer the support of the Zionists to the friendship of the Arabs, the Iraqis would have the choice of complete subservience to Great Britain or the establishment of close relations with the Soviet Union. Many of the more intelligent Iraqis were convinced that if Iraq is a British dependency the improvement in their political and economic conditions would be extremely slow, and would, therefore, turn to the Soviet Union which they had been taught during the present war to admire and regarding which they had little actual knowledge. He felt that in any struggle between the Soviet Union and Great Britain for predominance in Iraq, the Soviet Union would be the victor in view of its proximity and its willingness to make use of all weapons at its command in order to attain its international aims. Sincerely, Loy W. Henderson P.S. Now that I have told my story I shall settle down to the usual routine of reporting developments. L.W.H. 42 Received about November 14. 43 Dated October 31, 1 p.m., and November 1, 6 p.m., pp. 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] and 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 683 ] , respectively. 44 Office of Strategic Services. 45 Col. Paul H. M. Converse was the Military Attaché in Iraq. 46 With regard to Soviet pressures being exerted upon the Iranian Government at this time, and in particular against the Prime Minister, Mohammed Saed, see pp. 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 470 ] ff., passim . Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Temporarily in Washington 867N.01/10–2344 [Document 687] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ), Temporarily in Washington [ Washington ,] November 4, 1944. Referring to our conversation respecting the Soviet attitude toward Palestine and other Near Eastern matters, we have telegraphed to the Embassy in Moscow and have also drafted an airmail instruction along the lines which we discussed. 47 I am attaching as of possible interest and as background for your forthcoming talk with the President on this subject a number of memoranda 48 which we have recently sent to Mr. Stettinius outlining the sharp reaction in the Arab world to recent pro-Zionist pronouncements in this country and the consequent effect upon our position in the Near East. Four of these memoranda are concerned specifically with the reaction of the Arabs, while the fifth summarizes the extremely interesting conversation between Mr. Hirschmann, of the War Refugee Board, and Mr. Mikhailov, of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara, regarding the attitude of Soviet Russia toward the Palestine problem. When we consider that there are according to our best estimates about 50 million Arabs in the Near East and North Africa, as compared with half a million Jews in Palestine, it is not difficult to see why the Soviet Union, in pursuing a realistic and active policy in the Near East, should be inclined to give its support to the Arabs. When the attached memoranda have served their purpose, we would very much appreciate your returning them, together with any comments which may occur to you. 49 Wallace Murray 47 Telegram 2591, November 2, 11 p.m., and instruction 346, November 7, respectively, to Moscow, neither printed. The telegraphic instruction directed that the Department be furnished with “full coverage to press articles or other developments bearing upon what is evidently a growing Soviet interest in Near Eastern affairs”; the Chargé was requested further to furnish a report on information, said by Ambassador Harriman to be in the Embassy files, concerning the Soviet attitude on Near Eastern matters, especially the Palestine question (867N.01/11–244). 48 Five memoranda from the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Under Secretary of State; for those dated October 23 and October 27, see pp. 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] and 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] , respectively; others not printed. 49 Apparently Ambassador Harriman did not make any written commentary. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State 867N.01/10–3144 [Document 688] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Acting Secretary of State [ Washington ,] November 8, 1944. You will undoubtedly have noted the news flash which came over the ticker this morning to the effect that the assassins of Lord Moyne 50 in Cairo have confessed that they were members of the Stern Gang and that they came to Egypt from Palestine for the specific purpose of killing him. This incident, of course, is bound to have the most serious repercussions not only in Palestine, but throughout the Near East, since it serves to point up once again the underlying instability in the Palestine situation and the potential threat which is thereby presented to the security of the entire region. In the face of these developments it is difficult to see how the Secretary of War can claim, as he recently did, that the military situation in the Near East has eased to such an extent that the ventilation of the Palestine issue, for example by the reintroduction of the Congressional resolutions, would no longer interfere with the war effort. On the contrary, I am more and more of the opinion that the question of security in Palestine is a very serious one and that ill-considered statements in this country for political purposes have indirectly contributed to the present insecurity by giving encouragement, albeit unwittingly, to the more extreme Zionist elements such as the assassins of Lord Moyne represent. For your background, the Stern Gang (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) is one of the two principal secret, illegal Jewish military organizations in Palestine, the other being the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization). Both of these groups are made up of fanatical young Jews who are completely unscrupulous and who, as recent events have shown, will stop at nothing in what they consider to be a just battle for freedom from “oppression”, i.e., from the British administration. These groups are offshoots of the extreme right-wing of the Zionist movement, the Revisionists or New Zionists, and their training and methods are essentially totalitarian. Information about the two organizations is hard to get because of their secret nature, but a British official told us recently that the Stem Gang had from one hundred to two hundred members and the Irgun about four thousand. The Stern Gang was formed about three years ago by one Abraham Stern, who was subsequently killed by the police. It is difficult to say today wherein the difference between the two groups lies, and, in fact, we have reason to believe that they are no longer distinct organizations, but rather are two parts of one secret terroristic organization which seeks the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine through the overthrow by violent means of the present administration there. It was the Stern Gang, you will recall, that boasted openly that they had tried (unsuccessfully) to assassinate the High Commissioner. 51 Wallace Murray 50 Lord Moyne, British Minister of State in the Middle East, resident at Cairo, was assassinated in Cairo on November 5, 1944. 51 On August 8, 1944, an attempt had been made on the life of Sir Harold A. MacMichael, the retiring High Commissioner; Field Marshal Lord Gort’s appointment had been announced on July 19, 1944. The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/11–944: Telegram [Document 689] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , November 9, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 10—2:05 p.m.] 244. The Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me today. He said that he wished to express the gratification of the Iraqi Government upon the reelection of President Roosevelt. The Iraqi Government had felt that it would be disastrous to the world for any change to take place in the Presidency of the United States at this time. The Arabs continue to look to President Roosevelt for leadership in bringing about a peaceful post-war world based on principles of justice. He added that statements made during the presidential campaign had unfortunately been extremely discouraging to the Arab people. He then repeated his statements made to me previously as reported in the first 2 sentences of paragraph 3 of my 237, October 31. He said that the Arabs were now fully awake to the fact that if they did not exert themselves to the full the Zionists would be successful in closing the door to Arab unity. He added that it was his personal hope and that of his Government that the Arab struggle against Zionism would not adversely affect the friendly relations between the United States and the Arab countries. 2. The Minister referred to the publicity given during the last few days in the Iraqi press to a letter written by Senator Bailey 52 and a memorandum submitted to the Department by the American Council for the Jews 53 both of which opposed Zionist ambitions. He said that he had caused these documents to be published and that during the course of the campaign against Zionism, which would be conducted in Iraq, every effort would be made to give publicity to anti-Zionist statements made in America in order to combat the idea that America was irrevocably committed to Zionism. Henderson 52 Apparently Senator Josiah W. Bailey, of North Carolina; letter not printed. 53 Not printed. Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 867N.01/12–1344 [Document 690] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) [ Washington ,] November 11, 1944. I had an opportunity to talk with the President yesterday about the American position in the Near East and I suggested that he discuss the question of the Soviet policy with Ambassador Harriman. The President asked for a memorandum covering this whole matter and I agreed to send him one promptly. I would appreciate it if you would have something prepared which I might send to him. 54 [Here follows statement of administrative detail.] E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] 54 The rapidly changing situation in the weeks immediately ahead resulted in the discarding of two draft memoranda prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs before a final draft of December 4 was sent to President Roosevelt on December 13; see p. 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/11–1444: Airgram [Document 691] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State London , November 14, 1944. [Received November 21—1 p.m.] A–1366. With reference to Department’s telegram No. 8925, October 26, 3 p.m., and supplementing the last sentence of Embassy’s telegram No. 9498, November 2, 7 p.m., the following information was received in a communication dated November 11, 1944, from the Foreign Office regarding the number of immigrants permitted by the Government of Palestine to enter that country, which confirms the figures set forth in the Department’s telegram under reference: “A re-allocation of part of the balance of places still available under the White Paper of 1939 has been made in the light of recent developments in the Balkans. It has been decided to provide for the entry into Palestine of Jews to the total of 10,300 persons as follows: Roumania and Bulgaria 5,000 Italy 900 France (children) 2,000 Switzerland (children) 1,000 Belgium (mostly children) 200 Yemeni Jews in Aden 1,000 Turkey (mostly children)  200 Total 10,300 souls “In making the above decision the very difficult housing situation in Palestine and the possibility of serious difficulties in the economic sphere as regards absorption of immigrants have been taken into account. Further, for the present not more than 1,500 immigrants will be permitted to enter Palestine in any one month from the 1st October; the monthly rate of entry may be reviewed at the 1st January, 1945 in the light of the position at that time.” Gallman Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 867N.01/11–1544 [Document 692] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [ Washington ,] November 15, 1944. Congressman Bloom has inquired what the attitude of the Department would be toward the reconsideration by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the proposed resolution on Palestine. 55 The resolution looks forward to the free migration of Jews into Palestine and to the ultimate reconstitution of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. Last spring the Foreign Affairs Committee deferred action on the resolution on the grounds that it might have an adverse military effect upon the conduct of the war. Secretary Stimson has since withdrawn his objections in a letter to Senator Taft, which has been made public. 55 In a memorandum of November 15 the Acting Secretary informed the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) as follows: “The President feels it would be a mistake to have the Palestine Resolution re-introduced at this time. I have advised Sol Bloom and Dr. Wise to this effect.” (867N.01/11–1544) In a meeting with the Acting Secretary on November 9, 1944, Dr. Stephen S. Wise, co-chairman with Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver of the American Zionist Emergency Council, had asked whether the Department would object to introduction of the Palestine Resolution into the current session of Congress. The Acting Secretary had told him that it was a matter he wished to discuss with the President. The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/11–1744: Telegram [Document 693] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , November 17, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 23—11:20 a.m.] 251. Tahsin Qadri, Iraqi Minister at Beirut now in Baghdad, told me today that the new Soviet Minister to Syria and the Lebanon 56 has told him in confidence that the Soviet Government is unqualifiedly opposed to the Zionist program. ReDept’s circular infotel November 14, 6 [ 10 ] p.m. 57 Wadsworth is undoubtedly in a better position than I to evaluate the reliability of the Iraqi Minister. Repeated to Beirut. Henderson 56 Daniil Semenovich Solod. 57 Not printed. In reply to an inquiry from the Department, the Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) in telegram 277, December 6, 4 p.m., stated that he had been informed by the Iraqi Minister that the Soviet Minister had told him that the Soviet Union would do nothing to support Zionism. Mr. Wadsworth expressed confidence in the Iraqi Minister’s statement. The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/11–2144: Telegram [Document 694] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , November 21, 1944—8 a.m. [Received 3:30 p.m.] 3534. Some 500 members of various Arab groups, including Fuad Abaza’s Arab Union Society, Ikwan Al-Muslimin and representatives of neighboring Arab states including Tunisians and Moroccans, Christians as well as Moslems, assembled at Young Men’s Moslem Association on November 19 to consider telegram will [ to ] be sent to President Roosevelt protesting against American policy toward Palestine. Speeches by Fuad Abaza Pasha, Allouba Pasha and other leaders emphasized following points. 1. Palestine question must be settled in a manner favorable to paramount Arab interests. 2. If Palestine is thrown open to Jews as national home it will be a source of constant trouble throughout Arab world after the war. 3. Roosevelt should, therefore, publicly retract Zionist declarations made during the campaign. Text of conference’s telegram which has been [apparent omission] by United Press follows [in] airgram. 58 It is learned that some of the speeches were couched in rather violent terms, Allouba, for instance, vowing that if the Jewish national home policy was not retracted he would be the first to denounce United States as a false champion of freedom and democracy. Another speaker was loudly acclaimed when he swore that Arab societies believed that American Zionism was more than just a vote-getting election formula and they would go “to any lengths” to support their Palestine brethren against Jewish encroachment. Atmosphere of the meeting was described as heated and observers believe it may be precursor of similar unofficial manifestations to come. Copies to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem and Jidda by pouch. Tuck 58 See A–634, November 21, 11 a.m., infra . The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/11–2144: Airgram [Document 695] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , November 21, 1944—11 a.m. [Received December 6—2 p.m.] A–634. Reference Legation’s telegram no. 3534 of November 21, 8 a.m. Fuad Abaza Pasha called on me this morning bearing the Arabic text of the protest referred to in my above telegram. During the course of the conversation, it developed that for various reasons it had been decided not to send the telegram to the President, and one object of the visit appeared to be a hope of inducing the Legation to transmit it on his behalf. When I explained the impracticality of such a scheme, he gave me the Arabic text which reads in translation as follows: “To the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The White House, Washington. “1. The Arabs, who are anxious to maintain cordial relations with America, do not wish to attach great importance to certain declarations regarding Palestine which were made during the recent political campaign, for they realize, on the one hand, that these declarations were made in abnormal circumstances and they consider, on the other hand, that the declarations contradict the spirit of justice sponsored by you and by the noble American Nation, and are prejudicial to the cause of peace for which America is fighting. Moreover, they are contrary to the right of Arabs to live freely in their own country. “The American political campaign is now over, and Arabs expect you, Mr. President, to dispel their fears, restore their faith in American justice, and draw closer the bonds of friendship planted by American schools and nurtured by American teachings and doctrines in the Middle East. “2. No country in the world has suffered a greater injustice than Palestine. From time immemorial it has been an Arab country. Jews entered it as invaders and only occupied it for a short time; for they were constantly at war with the aborigines, and other invaders soon drove them out until the Arabs, more than thirteen centuries ago, finally liberated the country and settled it. “3. Palestine is, by the will of God and the patriotism of its people, an Arab country and will forever remain so. Seventy million Arabs, supported by three hundred million Moslems, are determined to redeem it with their lives. Neither the Balfour Declaration, nor the declarations of statesmen and the power of Zionism employing various measures of force and coercion can change the course of history or dissuade Arabs from defending Palestine and checking the tide of Zionism. “4. Arabs have always sympathized with Jews in their afflictions in past, mediaeval and modern times, and history bears witness to this fact. But Zionism has met this kindness by conspiring against Arabs and attempting to wrest Palestine from them. This has naturally led to feuds and bitter feelings which have left no hope of reconciliation or mutual understanding. “5. The project of installing Jews in Palestine will undoubtedly lead to permanent conflicts which will not only come to an end by one people destroying the other, not only in Palestine but in the whole East as well. This fact is worthy of your attention and the attention of all those who are anxious to establish universal peace and tranquillity in the future. “6. Arabs cannot believe that Democratic America is capable of helping usurpers, encouraging injustice, sacrificing her reputation, repudiating her mission in this world, discarding her friendship with the Arab world, and foregoing the moral and material interests which she has in Arab and Moslem countries, all for the sake of a race which is widely scattered in the world, and which only relies on the power of money for the realization of its designs. “For the above reasons, Arabs meeting in Congress hope that you will uphold them in their own country and that Zionism will be given no support by you, your Government or your people.” (Signed) The Arab Union Society,  Fouad Abaza Pasha, President  Assad Dagher, Secretary General . The Young Men’s Moslem Association,  Dr. Dardiri, Secretary General . Executive Committee of the International Arab Parliamentary Union Conference,  Mohamed Aly Allouba Pasha, President . El-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin,  Hassan El-Banna, President . Moslem Sofie Sects, Shaikh El-Sayed Ahmed Al-Bakri, President .  Higher Committee for the Defense of Palestine,  Haned El-Meligui Bey, Secretary General . Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem and Jidda. Tuck Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State 867N.01/11–2344 [Document 696] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [ Washington ,] November 23, 1944. Senator Wagner telephoned to me today from New York to inquire whether there was now any objection to the reporting of the resolutions regarding the Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. I told the Senator that at the request of Rabbi Wise I had discussed this matter with the President only a few days ago. I said it was the President’s considered judgment that in view of the recent murder of Lord Moyne in Cairo and the generally delicate situation in the Middle East, it would be unwise to bring out the resolutions at this time. I explained further that, as the Senator knew, the President would meet some time in the future with high representatives of other governments, and he was hopeful that at that time he could be helpful in arranging a suitable solution. Senator Wagner indicated that he would go along with the President’s views. I indicated that of course the President could not be quoted on this matter, but that I would explain the situation to Senator Connally, whom I expected to see within the next day or two. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State 867N.01/11–2444 [Document 697] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Acting Secretary of State [ Washington ,] November 24, 1944. Mr. Stettinius : A telegram from our Minister at Baghdad no. 251, November 17, states that the Iraqi Minister at Beirut, now in Baghdad, has told Mr. Henderson that the new Soviet Minister to Syria and Lebanon has told him in confidence that “the Soviet Government is unqualifiedly opposed to the Zionist program”. I have, as you will recall, on several occasions pointed out that the attitude of the Soviet Government toward Zionist ambitions in Palestine, once that attitude becomes publicly known, will undoubtedly turn out to be the most important card in the deck. The American Government and both political parties in this country have gone far out on a limb in support of Zionism despite the fact that the long-range interests of the United States clearly indicate the importance of establishing ourselves solidly in the good will of the Arab world and particularly in Saudi Arabia, where we have a great stake. I discussed this situation with Mr. Harriman and found him deeply impressed with its significance. As you may know, he brought the matter up with the President and discussed it at length with Harry Hopkins. 59 Soviet prestige is already rising in the Arab world like a star in the East. It requires no particular knowledge of the situation to predict that on the day when the Soviet Government publicly announces that it is opposed to Zionist ambitions in Palestine, both the British position in the Arab world and more particularly ours will start on the downgrade, and we shall eventually lose out altogether unless we have meanwhile shown by deeds and not merely words that we appreciate the importance of our relations with the Arab world of 50,000,000 people. Wallace Murray 59 Special Assistant to President Roosevelt. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 867N.01/12–544 [Document 698] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [ Washington ,] December 5, 1944. Senator Wagner called upon me this morning with Dr. Abba H. Silver. Senator Wagner had received your note on not pressing for the passage of the Palestine Resolution at this time. The Senator still feels that no damage would be done by its passage now and that it does nothing more than endorse the statement you made to him on October 15 which I quote below: “Efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if reelected I shall help to bring about its realization.” In the afternoon I went to Senator Connally’s office to review the matter and informed him of your letter to Senator Wagner which I termed official. It has, therefore, been made clear both to Senator Wagner and to Senator Connally that it is felt it would be a mistake to allow the Resolution to pass at the present time. The question will probably come up for discussion at a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow. My feeling is that Senator Wagner will still press for passage but that Senator Connally will be able to persuade the Committee not to take action at this time. He feels he has the situation in hand and that he will not have to ask me to testify. I shall advise you of the result. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/12–644 [Document 699] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] December 6, 1944. Mr. Secretary : There recently came to our attention a letter, of which I am attaching a copy, 60 from Dr. Weizmann the head of the World Zionist Organization to Rabbi Silver in Washington, giving some very interesting information regarding a recent conversation which Weizmann had with Prime Minister Churchill. The highlights of this conversation were: 1. The British Government has not yet made a decision regarding the future of Palestine and nothing will be decided until after the end of the war with Germany. 2. Mr. Churchill, (whose sympathy to Zionism is well known), frankly recognizes the opposition to Zionism within the Cabinet but believes he can carry the day with the support of President Roosevelt. He stresses the need for American participation in the settlement. 3. Partition is under consideration, but no definite plan has evolved which will recognize the need, which Weizmann claims Churchill recognizes, for bringing one and one-half million Jews into Palestine in the next ten years. 4. The Prime Minister was very critical of the opposition to Zionism advanced by certain American Jews such as Baruch. 61 Dr. Weizmann accordingly urges upon Rabbi Silver that the two following steps be taken by American Zionists: 1) men like Baruch, Secretary Morgenthau, 62 Eugene Meyer, 63 Felix Frankfurter 64 and Ben Cohen, 65 should impress it upon the President that while they are opposed to the creation of a Jewish state, they desire unrestricted immigration into Palestine; and 2) a project like that of Dr. Lowdermilk of the American Department of Agriculture for developing Palestine’s resources should be endorsed by the President. I am sure that you will agree with me that the comments of both Mr. Churchill and Dr. Weizmann regarding American participation in the Palestine settlement are of the greatest significance. We also have in this letter a very clear indication as to the policy which the Zionists are likely to follow in the next few months. Wallace Murray 60 Not attached to file copy of memorandum. 61 Bernard Baruch, prominent financier and “elder statesman”. 62 Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury. 63 Editor and publisher of the Washington Post. 64 Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. 65 Benjamin V. Cohen, lawyer; holder of numerous and important legal positions in the Executive Branch of the Government at various times. The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Document 700] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 66 Washington , December 6, 1944. The Foreign Relations Committee insisted that I appear this morning on five minutes notice to testify on the Palestine Resolution. Senator Connally telephoned me himself saying that unless I came up and made an official statement to the Committee for the Administration saying we thought this legislation was unwise at the present time, it would be immediately voted out favorably and we would have to take the responsibility. He said he had gone as far as he could. I immediately went over and testified in secret session of the Committee, making clear that this was a highly delicate matter; that I would talk to them in absolute confidence; and that there might be serious repercussions if there was any violation of this confidence. I explained the delicate situation in the Arab World; that you, yourself, had not yet had an opportunity to deal with this question as exhaustively as you have in mind; and that we felt that passage of the Resolution now would tie your hands and not leave you in a flexible position. The general sentiment of the Committee was that they would be willing to leave the entire matter in the hands of the Executive for the time being and not report out the Resolution. However, they insist on a public statement from the Executive, saying that in our judgment the passage of this legislation at this time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation. We must give Senator Connally a prompt answer since the Committee will meet again on Friday. Would you please advise me by wire whether, because of the broad issues involved, you would be willing to make the statement, or whether you prefer that the statement be issued from the State Department. The statement would be simply “It is felt that the passage of the Palestine Resolution at the present moment would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation.” Stettinius 66 Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Document 701] The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 67 Washington , December 8, 1944. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee discussed the Palestine Resolution this morning but took no final action. It will consider the resolution again on Monday. Senator Connally read confidentially to the committee the following statement which we may issue if necessary; however, our decision as to whether to issue this statement will not be made until we see what happens on Monday. “Resolutions pertaining to Palestine have recently been before the appropriate committees of the Congress, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has inquired as to the attitude of the State Department toward these resolutions. The Department has the utmost sympathy for the persecuted Jewish people of Europe and has been assisting them through active support of the work of the War Refugee Board and in every other possible way. The Department considers, however, that the passage of the resolutions at the present time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation, and has so informed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.” The Zionist leaders have been told that we may issue this statement and they hope very much that it will not be issued. It is possible, therefore, that between now and Monday they may indicate to Congressional leaders that they will not push for the passage of the Palestine resolution at this time. We have been in touch with Chairman Sabath of the House Rules Committee and he informed us very confidentially that he may be able to get that committee to defer action on the House resolution. If you have any suggestions would you be good enough to give them to me by wire. 68 E. R. Stettinius 67 President Roosevelt was at Warm Springs, Ga., at this time. Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. 68 Subsequently the Secretary of State received from the White House a memorandum dated December 9 concerning a telegram from President Roosevelt which read: “I think your course in regard to the Zion Resolution is just right. F.D.R.” (Hyde Park files) Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/11–1044 [Document 702] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] December 8, 1944. These two despatches from Beirut and Damascus, 69 respectively, give further information regarding the reaction in the Near East to pro-Zionist statements in this country and are worth your glancing through if time permits. Our Minister at Beirut, Mr. Wadsworth, says that the reaction in Lebanon was one of “shocked disillusionment that the author of the Four Freedoms, joint author of the Atlantic Charter and champion of democracy should have so sacrificed principles for votes”. His despatch summarizes the press comment and describes a mass meeting in Beirut attended by some two thousand persons. Mr. Wadsworth also transmits several protests, including one from the students of the American University at Beirut which is remarkable for its restraint. The second despatch, from our Chargé at Damascus, fills in the picture by showing that the reaction in Syria was parallel to that in Lebanon and that the press constantly referred in this connection to the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. Wallace Murray 69 Despatch 559, November 10, and despatch 193, November 15, neither printed. Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 11, 1944 867N.01/12–1144 [Document 703] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, December 11, 1944 70 December 11, 1944 Resolutions pertaining to Palestine have recently been before the appropriate Committees of the Congress, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has inquired as to the attitude of the Department of State toward these resolutions. The Department has the utmost sympathy for the persecuted Jewish people of Europe and has been assisting them through active support of the work of the War Refugee Board and in every other possible way. The Department considers, however, that the passage of the resolutions at the present time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation, and has so informed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 70 Text sent to Cairo in telegram 3596, December 11, with request that it be repeated to Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus and Jidda; a separate telegram, No. 263, was sent on the same date, to Baghdad. The Secretary read this statement while testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on December 11, in opposition to the proposed Palestine resolution; the Committee voted 10 to 8 to take no action on the resolution but asked the immediate issuance of the statement. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 867N.01–/12–1344: Telegram [Document 704] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State 71 Moscow , December 13, 1944—10 p.m. [Received December 14—6:50 a.m.] 4812. ReDeptel 2757, November 30, 2 p.m. 72 The Embassy has little direct information other than that already available to the Department of the Soviet attitude toward Palestine, Zionism, the Arab union movement, and Soviet policies generally on Near Eastern questions. We have however come to the following conclusions based on the information available and the general trends of Soviet policy: Specifically regarding the conversation of Mr. Hirschmann with the Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Ankara covered by the Department’s instruction to Moscow No. 346 of November 7 73 we have every reason to believe that the Soviet official correctly interpreted Soviet policy toward an independent Jewish state in Palestine and the Soviet attitude generally toward the Jewish question. The absence of editorial comment in the Soviet press on these questions leads to the conclusion that either the Soviet Government considers it premature to take a definite position or that a definite line has not yet been established on the highest [apparent omission]. It may be assumed however that the newly established diplomatic missions in Arab countries are privately circulating the views expressed by the Soviet official. The aims would appear clear, namely to create an atmosphere of friendship for the Soviet Union in the Arab world, to break down existing suspicions of and hostility to Soviet Communist doctrine, and to obtain Arab support in furthering any specific Soviet objective which may develop. Mr. Shchiborin, recently appointed Soviet Minister to Egypt, has guardedly questioned me regarding the campaign statements of the President and Dewey in respect to Palestine and indicated that he was familiar with the adverse reaction among Arabs. I doubt whether the Soviet Government wishes to come out openly against American and British policies in this connection at this time. On the other hand we may be sure that the Soviets will use this issue to increase Soviet influence to the detriment of Great Britain and the United States among the Arab states. The reason for Soviet reluctance to come out in the open may be their consistent desire not to weaken the relationships with their major Allies in the prosecution of the war and for the peace, and also the Soviets may wish to await a more precise formulation of American and British policy on Palestine. A step for increasing Soviet prestige in the Arab world has been the development of the recently established diplomatic missions in Arab states. The activities of these missions can best be reported by our own diplomatic missions in these localities. It may be expected however that the size and competence of these missions will expand and the penetration of Soviet concepts and accomplishments increase. The affinity with the Moslems in the Soviet Union will be emphasized and Soviet success in improving the economic situation of these people will undoubtedly be effectively used. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Soviets appear to be using the close affinity of the various peoples within the Soviet Union with those of the Near and Middle East to provide convenient channels of contact. These include the Armenian, Azerbaijanian, and Turko-Tartar peoples, as well as in the religious field the Orthodox Christians. The Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem have recently been invited to attend the forthcoming election of the new Russian Patriarch. Although the Soviets may find it difficult to support all of these conflicting groups it is in accordance with Soviet tactics to cultivate them all in order to break down the prejudices of a generation and to create sympathetic interest in the Soviet Union. On the Arab union movement there has been only one brief item in the press reporting the establishment of the league of independent Arab countries at the Alexandria conference last October. 74 The Soviet attitude probably conforms to the general Soviet view on the subject of international blocs: Favorable if the Soviet Union can dominate the bloc, strongly opposed if it is outside the orbit of Soviet influence or potentially directed against the Soviet Union. The absence of Soviet editorial comment on the Arab union movement accordingly indicates that the Soviet Union either feels that the league will not operate in such a manner as to affect Soviet interests adversely or that through increasing Soviet influence in the Arab world it may be useful in the furtherance of Soviet interests. A fuller report discussing Soviet policy toward the individual countries of the Near and Middle East follows by air. 75 Since this message was called for by the Department, I have not repeated it to other missions and leave it to the Department to make such distribution of it as it sees fit. Harriman 71 Copy transmitted to President Roosevelt under cover of a memorandum by the Secretary of State, December 19 (not printed). 72 Not printed; it repeated a request made initially in telegram 2591, November 2, 11 p.m., to Moscow (see footnote 47, p. 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] ). 73 Not printed; see footnote 47, p. 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] . 74 See bracketed note, p. 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 715 and Doc. 716 ] . 75 Despatch 1319, December 20, not printed. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 867N.01/12–1344 [Document 705] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [ Washington ,] December 13, 1944. Attached is a brief summary statement of the effect on our position in the Near East of recent developments on the Palestine question based on the best information from the field available to the Department. I am sending this to you so that it will be readily available to you for background purposes in the event that this issue continues extremely active. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. [Annex] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt As agreed in our recent conversation regarding Palestine, I am giving below a brief account of the effect upon our position in the Near East of recent developments. The bipartisan endorsement of a Jewish state during the recent campaign in this country produced a strong reaction in the Near East. You will recall in this connection that last year assurances were given on your authority to King Ibn Saud that in our view no decision should be reached regarding Palestine without consultation with both Arabs and Jews. These assurances were repeated subsequently to various Governments in the Near East and are regarded by them as a solemn commitment in harmony with the Atlantic Charter. The recent pro-Zionist statements in this country accordingly gave rise to a wave of shocked disillusionment and protest in the Near East. There were demonstrations in Syria, an intensive anti-American campaign was carried on in the press of several countries, and many telegrams of protest were dispatched to political leaders in this country as well as to our representatives in the field. In Palestine itself, the reaction took the form of a boycott of the Culbertson Economic Mission, and there was a press campaign in favor of a complete boycott of American trade. A significant comment was that made by the Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, who suggested that economic concessions might well be withheld from countries which did not respect “Arab rights”. If this trend should continue, it would seriously prejudice our ability to afford protection to American interests, economic and commercial, cultural and philanthropic, throughout the area. It, of course, would have a very definite bearing upon the future of the immensely valuable American oil concession in Saudi Arabia, where the King’s opposition to Zionism is well known. From the broad political view, moreover, our position in the area vis-à-vis Great Britain and Soviet Russia would be weakened. The British, whose situation with regard to Palestine is already difficult, naturally welcome any development which strengthens their own position with the Arabs. The Russians are showing a growing interest in the Arab world and are quite plainly anxious to expand their influence in the area, particularly toward the Persian Gulf. Such expansion would of course, be in the direction of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein as well as those in Iran, Iraq and Kuwait. The Soviet Union has never endorsed Zionism. In fact, and on this point you recently had some first-hand information from Ambassador Harriman, we now have reason to believe that Soviet Russia definitely opposes a Jewish state and is actively cultivating the goodwill of the fifty million Arabs. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/12–1944: Airgram [Document 706] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State Baghdad , December 19, 1944—6 p.m. [Received January 3, 1945—3 p.m.] A–75. 1. Several weeks ago the Foreign Office asked me informally if I possessed any details regarding the resolutions relating to Palestine which had been presented to the appropriate committees in Congress. I replied in the negative and was informed that the Iraqi Legation in Washington had reported that the House Committee had already approved the resolution which had been placed before it. The Foreign Minister informed me several days later that the resolutions had been discussed at a Cabinet meeting; that the Government was extremely disturbed at what the effect in Iraq would be if the resolutions would be passed; and that it had decided to send a friendly note on the subject to the American Government. Judge Lloyd, 76 who still acts occasionally in a drafting capacity for the Prime Minister, and Jamali, the Director General of the Foreign Office, told me subsequently that they were working on the draft of such a note. At various times members of the Government and other prominent Iraqis mentioned to me their concern lest these resolutions should be passed and their passage should become known to the Iraqi public. No mention of the resolutions, however, was permitted to appear in the Iraqi press. 2. On the morning of December 12 Jamali informed me by telephone that the Foreign Office had received a message from Washington to the effect that the Secretary of State had advised the Senate Committee that, in the opinion of the Department, it would be unwise at the present time for the resolutions to be passed, and asked me to let him know in case I should receive any confirmation of this report. Several hours later I was able to give to the Foreign Office the contents of the Department’s telegram No. 263 of December 11. 77 On the evening of the same day the Minister of Foreign Affairs made a special point of telling me how deeply the Iraqi Government appreciated the action of the Secretary of State. He said his Government regarded this action as convincing evidence that the United States really had an interest in maintaining good relations with the Arab world. 3. Following a dinner given by the Prime Minister on December 14, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Finance Minister 78 called me to one side in order again to express the appreciation of the Iraqi Government of the action of the Secretary of State. They said that they hoped that the statement of the Secretary would definitely put to an end attempts of the Zionists to achieve their ends by resorting to internal political pressure in the United States; that the American Government would be free in the future to consider the problem of Palestine purely upon its merits and would be able to apply to the solution of that problem the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter and in the Declaration of the United Nations. They said that it was extremely important to Iraq and to other Arab countries that future relations between the United States and the Arab World be close and friendly and that they were relieved that a threat to these relations had been removed, at least for the time being. 4. The Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me several days ago that the Cabinet had decided, despite the Secretary’s statement to the Senate Committee, to send a note to the American Government on the subject of the passage of resolutions in Congress relating to Zionism. He said that his Government felt that it was its duty to have a formal expression of its feelings on the subject on record in the Department of State. It is probable that such a note will be handed to me in a few days. 5. No mention other than that referred to in paragraph number 6 below has appeared in the Baghdad press of the Secretary’s statement to the Senate Committee and the fact that he has made such a statement is thus far known to relatively few people. The Foreign Minister informs me that since the Iraqi press was not permitted to publish announcements with regard to the resolutions, it considered it inadvisable to give to the press at present the contents of the Secretary’s statement on that subject. 6. The only reference to the resolutions which has appeared in the Iraqi press was a story published in As Sa’a , a conservative Shia newspaper, of December 13, and repeated with several variations in An-Nida of December 19. Both of these papers are in opposition to the present Government. This story pointed out that following a visit of the Secretary of State upon the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, it had been announced that the discussion of the resolution would be postponed to an indefinite date. The article added that it had been learned that the White House was opposed to the passage of the resolution just now and that the White House opposition arose from the possible effect of the passage upon “American-Saudi Arabian economic and political relations”. The Director General of the Foreign Office informs me that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has complained because the Iraqi censor permitted this article to be published. He says that it was apparently based on stories coming out of Egypt and that the reference to Saudi Arabia was included in it in order to make it appear that the present Iraqi Government had been inactive in the matter. Henderson 76 Judge H. L. Lloyd, British Adviser to the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 77 See footnote 70, p. 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] . 78 Saleh Jabur. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/12–1944 [Document 707] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] December 19, 1944. Mr. Secretary : More than a week has passed since we issued our statement in connection with the Palestine Resolutions, and I believe that it is highly significant that this matter appears to have attracted comparatively little attention among the Zionists. We have received only a few letters or telegrams in connection with our action, and I understand that the same is true of the Division of Public Liaison, which handles the “public comment” mail. The press coverage of the incident both here and in New York has also been fairly light, although there were a few critical articles as well as one cartoon in the New York Sun lampooning the Department for its attitude. The most likely explanation for the comparative absence of adverse comment is undoubtedly the split within the Zionist leadership, notably the difference of opinion between Rabbi Wise and Rabbi Silver resulting in the resignation of the former [ latter ] as Co-Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council. As far as the Arabs are concerned, we have had very little reaction to the postponement of the resolutions, although the Egyptian Minister did telephone to congratulate us on our action. Wallace Murray The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 867N.01/12–2144: Airgram [Document 708] The Minister in Iraq ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State 79 Baghdad , December 21, 1944—9 p.m. [Received January 3, 1945—3 p.m.] A–77. Reference is made to my airgram A–75 of December 19, referring to a note which I was expecting from the Iraqi Foreign Office relating to Congressional Resolutions on the subject of Palestine. The note in question bearing today’s date was received this afternoon. The English translation of this note made in the Legation reads as follows: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the American Legation in Baghdad and has the honor to state that, being motivated by a feeling of sincere friendship toward the Government of the United States of America, the Iraqi Government wishes to draw the American Government’s attention to the difficult situation in which it finds itself. This situation is created by the deep feeling of the Iraqi people for the Arabs of Palestine and by their anxiety over the future of their brethren in that country, an anxiety which is heightened whenever the Foreign Affairs Committee in each of the two Houses of Congress are presented resolutions recommending the taking of decisions favoring the unrestricted opening of the doors of Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state therein. “Iraq and the other Arab countries consider Palestine to be an Arab country not dissimilar in any way from the other Arab Wilayets (provinces) which were attached to the Ottoman Empire and which have all now become independent Arab States. “The Palestinian incidents which took place on several past occasions have had direct effects on Iraq. It has, therefore, become incumbent upon the Iraqi Government to be constantly vigilant. These circumstances have impelled it to explain the situation to the friendly Government of the United States. The Iraqi Government is exceedingly anxious that American-Iraqi relations shall be developed in an atmosphere fraught with sincere friendship and mutual confidence, and it is feared that such resolutions and events might affect the situation and disturb the calm, all of which is not desirable to anyone. “The Ministry wishes to state that it may be remembered that there are still many people in the world who are interested in creating difficulties and disturbances among the members of the United Nations and that the propaganda of the Axis powers is persisting in a fiendish effort to affect the unity of the United Nations by taking advantage of the Palestine question; this behooves us to avoid giving such opportunities to the enemy. “The position of the Iraqi Government is rendered more difficult when the committees of such important institutions as Congress make such recommendations. The Iraqi Government cannot remain as a spectator of the tragedy which the Zionists wish to enact on the stage of the world. “The resolution for the adoption of such a decision is directly opposed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and violates all the lofty principles of humanity. It undoubtedly arises from the effect of Zionist propaganda on the statesmen in America which leaves no scope for many of them to study, to investigate the justice of the case, and freely to hear the opposite point of view. The principle of interference in the destiny of the countries of others is an extremely dangerous one. This war is raging to exterminate that principle and to bring about justice among the peace-loving nations. It is not reasonable for a power permeated with the spirit of justice to give Arab Palestine away to the Jews in contravention of these lofty principles. This reassures us that the Palestine cause would inevitably and ultimately be solved in the interest of its Arab inhabitants. “All the Arabs are completely confident of the justice of their cause in Palestine and of the transgression resulting from Zionist interference therein. Nothing shall, therefore, prevent them from fighting in defense of their legitimate right in Palestine regardless of costs. The Arabs appeal to the leaders of America to weigh the Zionist cause and the benefits which may result from supporting it against the sacrifices und efforts which America has made in the Arab and Islamic countries and the firm traditional friendship and material and moral interests which these sacrifices and efforts have created now and will create in the future in the Arab countries, and also against America’s reputation for upholding justice and right. Only then will appear the wide difference between the profit and loss which America will experience in the event she supports the unjust Zionist policy. “The Iraqi Government is fully cognizant of the fact that the Constitution of the United States of America imposes the principle of the division of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches. It, therefore, hopes that the American Government will, in its Executive capacity, make the viewpoint of the Iraqi Government known to the Legislative authority. It must be stated in this connection that the statement which Mr. Stettinius has recently sent to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee has more or less alleviated the crisis which has arisen in the hearts of the Iraqi people. But we wish to be reassured that the American Government will not be affected by Zionist attempts which are undoubtedly contrary to the principles of right and justice. We likewise wish to reiterate here that the continued application by the Zionists of their plans for the realization of their unlimited ambitions will inevitably lead to the occurence of unrest and disturbances and the shedding of blood in this part of the world. We do not believe that this will gain the support of the American nation which is famed for its adherence to the principles of justice and peace. “The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and respect.” Henderson 79 In airgram A–16, January 20, 1945, the Minister in Iraq was informed that copies of the note of the Iraqi Government, transmitted herein, were furnished to the Chairmen of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and that he might so inform the Foreign Office (867N.01/12–2144). Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 867N.01/12–2244 [Document 709] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) 80 [ Washington ,] December 22, 1944. We have sent you considerable material in recent weeks bearing upon the reaction of the Arab statesmen and politicians in the Near East to pro-Zionist pronouncements in this country. In this connection I think that you will be interested in noting the following extract from a letter to a member of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs from an official of the OWI who had occasion to discuss various matters with the Iraqi delegation to the International Business Conference: “Every member of the Delegation gave me to understand in no uncertain terms that the fair settlement of the Palestine issue is the most important condition for creating and building up any friendly relations between the Arab people of Iraq and those of the United States. They said heretofore the contributions of such institutions as the American University of Beirut, as well as the friendly feelings brought back by Iraqi students who had studied in the United States, were very instrumental in creating in Iraq a friendly disposition towards this country. The recent actions of various groups and legislative bodies in America regarding Palestine, however, have counteracted this friendly orientation to a large measure. Every member of the group assured me that this feeling was shared by every Arab citizen of Iraq and that the feeling on this question was very intense.” I think this statement is of considerable significance, coming as it does not from any official source or from any political group in the Near East, but from a representative group of Iraqi business men. It shows that the anti-Zionist sentiment is not confined to the political leaders in the Near East, but is a universal feeling which we must constantly take into consideration. Wallace Murray 80 Addressed to the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary (Grew), and the Assistant Secretary (Dunn). Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 867N.01/12–2344 [Document 710] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) [ Washington ,] December 23, 1944. Mr. Murray : I had the memorandum you prepared on Palestine with me when I saw the President yesterday. When I mentioned the subject, he complimented us on the fine manner in which this problem had been handled in his absence and then expressed the hope that he would not have to get into it again for some time. It therefore seemed inappropriate for me to bring up your memorandum and I think we should not send it over for the time being. It can be worked into our general preparation for what is ahead which we shall be undertaking on a broad scale in the Department in the next few weeks. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] [Annex] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 81 Washington [undated]. I believe the time has come when we should decide upon the next step to be taken with respect to the Palestine problem. After consultation within the Department, I submit herewith, for your consideration, a course of action in regard to Palestine in view of the projected meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. 82 [Subannex] Suggested Procedure Regarding the Palestine Question 83 In determining what action should be taken in regard to the Palestine question, the following are the principal factors to be considered: 1. The Department’s policy up to the present time has been directed primarily at forestalling any action which would be likely to create a situation in the Near East that would endanger the war effort and jeopardize American interests in that area. This preventive policy cannot be continued indefinitely. The adoption of a more positive policy is clearly desirable. The coming meeting would seem to be the appropriate time to initiate such a policy. 2. Ibn Saud and the heads of other Governments in the Near East have been informed, with the President’s concurrence, that it is the view of the United States that no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine should be made without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. 3. The British Government has officially stated that it will not enter into commitments regarding the future of Palestine without prior consultations with all those, including both Arabs and Jews, whom it may judge to be concerned. 4. Soviet officials have stated recently that the Soviet Government does not favor the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. In view of the foregoing factors, it would be inadvisable for the United States at the present time to take a definite attitude toward the future of Palestine. It also follows that it would be inadvisable for the United States and Great Britain to undertake any long-range settlement for Palestine without the approval of the Soviet Government. We should not give the Soviet Government an opportunity to augment its influence in the Near East by championing the cause of the Arabs at the expense of the United States or at the expense of both the United States and Great Britain. It would be inadvisable, also, to discuss, or for any of the three great powers to formulate, a Palestine settlement until there has been full consultation with both Arabs and Jews in accordance with commitments made both by us and the British. It is therefore suggested that the President might raise at the forthcoming meeting the question of initiating consultations with Arabs and Jews and representatives of the three religions interested in Palestine. Specifically it is proposed that the British Government be asked to take steps to implement its commitment to consult Arabs and Jews and other interested parties by inviting them to present their views regarding a Palestine settlement in writing to the British Government. The proposals submitted by these groups should be made available to the Soviet and United States Governments for their consideration in the formulation of a proposal for a Palestine settlement, which would have concurrence of the three great powers. This body of material might be presented, at an appropriate time after the cessation of hostilities, to any future international conference at which a Palestine settlement was under consideration. It is thought that the present unprofitable and increasingly dangerous activities of both Arab and Jewish pressure groups would in part be checked, if all the interested groups were to occupy themselves with the organization and presentation of proposals to the British Government with respect to the post-war settlement for Palestine. It is thought, also, that this procedure would give the more moderate and less vociferous groups among both Arabs and Jews, who now lack the means to present their views, an opportunity to do so officially. It would also make it possible for ecclesiastical organizations with important interests in the Palestine settlement to give expression to their views in regard to the future of the Holy Land. In view of the widespread humanitarian interest in the fate of Jews whose lives are or may be jeopardized in Axis Europe, the British should at the same time be asked to consider formulating and announcing the immigration policy which they will pursue in Palestine between the time when the White Paper quota becomes exhausted and the time when a long-range settlement of the Palestine question becomes operative. 81 Marginal notation on the original: “Held for preparation. Not sent.” 82 A reference to the forthcoming Conference at Yalta, February 4–11, 1945. Documentation on this Conference is printed in Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 ; no record has been found of discussion regarding Palestine at the Conference. 83 Marginal notation on the original: “Not sent.” Establishment by the United States of a Consulate at Dhahran with the permission of the Saudi Arabian Government Establishment by the United States of a Consulate at Dhahran with the permission of the Saudi Arabian Government 1 1 For previous correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 833 ff. [711] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, January 16, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 8:15 p.m.] 125.0090F/13: Telegram [712] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, January 29, 1944—3 p.m. 125.0090F/13: Telegram [713] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, February 8, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 1:06 p.m.] 125.0090F/15: Telegram [714] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, March 4, 1944—10 p.m. [Received 11:26 p.m.] 125.0090F/18: Telegram [715] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, May 29, 1944—midnight. 125.0090F/29a: Telegram [716] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, June 1, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 1—4 p.m.] 125.0090F/30: Telegram The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 125.0090F/13: Telegram [Document 711] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , January 16, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 8:15 p.m.] 21. A request was made to the King 2 on December 15 for permission to put into effect plan for consular representation in Dhahran referred to in Department’s 110, November 30, 10 p.m., 3 and the King referred question to Yusuf Yassin, Acting Foreign Minister. No reply has yet been received and I fear that if the matter is pressed now the answer will be no. Minister of Finance 4 who favors plan suggests that it be left dormant until opportunity occurs for discussing it directly with Amir Faisal. 5 Details follow by mail. 6 Moose 2 Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia. 3 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 840 . 4 Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman. 5 Second son of the King, Viceroy of the Hejaz, and Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs; for correspondence regarding the Amir Faisal’s visit to the United States, from which he was returning at this time, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 840 ff. 6 Despatch 92, January 12, not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 125.0090F/13: Telegram [Document 712] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) Washington , January 29, 1944—3 p.m. 17. It is hoped that you will seek an early favorable opportunity with reference to your no. 21, January 16, 3 p.m. to discuss with Amir Faisal plans for representation in Dhahran. Hull The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 125.0090F/15: Telegram [Document 713] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , February 8, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 1:06 p.m.] 41. Plans for consular representation in Dhahran referred to in Department’s 17, January 29, 3 p.m., discussed with Amir Faisal February 6. His personal reaction appeared favorable though he promised nothing more than a reply after having referred matter to King. Moose The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 125.0090F/18: Telegram [Document 714] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , March 4, 1944—10 p.m. [Received 11:26 p.m.] 61. My 58, March 2, 5 p.m. 7 In a note dated today Saudi Government granted permission for appointment of an American Consul at Dhahran. Such permission regularizes the status of officer to be stationed there and will provide better argument for eventual inclusion of Bahrein in Dhahran district. In my opinion it is still advantageous to recruit consular staff at Dhahran from personnel of this Legation and all recommendations in my 58 apply to new situation with same force as to former plan. 8 Moose 7 Not printed. 8 The Consulate at Dhahran was established effective August 17, 1944, and opened formally on September 2. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 125.0090F/29a: Telegram [Document 715] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , May 29, 1944—midnight. 4283. Reference is made to Mr. Wallace Murray’s conversation with Sir Maurice Peterson 9 and other British officials on April 18 regarding the performance of American consular functions in Bahrein. It is expected that an American consular office will be opened at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in the near future. This office will have no separate consular district in Saudi Arabia but will function under the supervision of the Legation at Jidda. It is proposed however to include Bahrein within the consular jurisdiction of the office at Dhahran on an informal basis. In view of the inclusion of Bahrein within the jurisdiction of Dhahran on an informal basis, it would be understood that no exequaturs would be issued to American consular officers for Bahrein by the appropriate authorities. It would be appreciated if officials in Bahrein would extend such facilities as would prove helpful to American consular officers in the performance of their duties in Bahrein. Please discuss the foregoing proposal with the Foreign Office and report to the Department whether the foregoing suggested arrangements are agreeable to the British authorities. Hull 9 Mr. Murray, Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, was chief member, with respect to Near Eastern affairs, on the staff of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), who was engaged in informal and general conversations at London, April 7–April 29, 1944, with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden); Sir Maurice Peterson held a corresponding position in the British delegation; for correspondence regarding the Stettinius Mission, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 125.0090F/30: Telegram [Document 716] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , June 1, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 1—4 p.m.] 4389. The Foreign Office is in entire agreement with the proposals contained in the Department’s telegram 4283, May 29, midnight, regarding opening of American Consular Office at Dhahran. As regards extension of facilities which would prove helpful to American consular officers in the performance of their duties in Bahrein, the Foreign Office will arrange that the India Office so instruct the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (resident at Bushire, where he is British Consul General) who will advise British Political Agent at Bahrein to that effect. Winant Exchange with, the Saudi Arabian Government regarding the attitude of the United States toward the general question of Arab Union Exchange with, the Saudi Arabian Government regarding the attitude of the United States toward the general question of Arab Union [In continuation of an exchange of views, initiated in 1943 by a request from the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, as to the attitude of the United States Government on the general question of Arab union (see Foreign Relations , 1943, volume IV, pages 852 ff.), the Department of State responded to a second request by Shaikh Yusuf in July, 1944, by reiterating the position which it had set forth in 1943 (telegrams 213, July 17, 1944, 11 a.m., from Jidda, and 141, July 21, 1944, 5 p.m., to Jidda, respectively, neither printed [890B.00/7–1744]). This exchange was made against the background of discussions then proceeding in the capitals of the Arab States for the convening of an exploratory conference on Arab unity. This conference, organized as a “Preparatory Committee”, met at Alexandria, Egypt, on September 25, 1944, and on October 7, 1944, passed a series of resolutions which endorsed the formation of a League of Arab States and which became known as the Alexandria Protocol. The League came into being on March 22, 1945, with the conclusion at Cairo of the Pact of the League of Arab States. For a survey of the wartime sequence of events, 1941–1945, relating to the question of Arab union, together with the texts of the Alexandria Protocol and the Arab League Pact, see Department of State Bulletin , May 18, 1947, pages 963 ff.] Proposals by the United States for use of an air route over Saudi Arabia and the construction of an airfield near Dhahran Proposals by the United States for use of an air route over Saudi Arabia and the construction of an airfield near Dhahran [717] The American Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tusuf Yassin) Jidda, July 29, 1944. 883.79690F/9–444 [718] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 4, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 8:05 p.m.] 883.79690F/9–444: Telegram [719] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, October 6, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 5:25 p.m.] 890F.248/10–644: Telegram [720] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) [Washington,] October 9, 1944. 811.248/10–944 [721] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) Washington, October 9, 1944—11 p.m. 890F.248/10–644: Telegram [722] The Vice Consul at Dhahran (Hart) to the Secretary of State Dhahran, October 12, 1944—5 p.m. [Received November 6—6 p.m.] 890F.248/10–1244: Airgram [723] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, October 17, 1944—midnight. 890F.248/10–1744: Telegram [724] Informal Statement Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs [Washington, November 9, 1944.] 890F. 74/11–944 [725] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] November 11, 1944. 890F.248/11–1144 [726] Memorandum by Colonel John W. Bowen of the War Department General Staff Washington, 22 November 1944. 890F.248/11–2244 The American Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tusuf Yassin) 883.79690F/9–444 [Document 717] The American Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Tusuf Yassin ) 10 No. 87 Jidda , July 29, 1944. Excellency : I have the honor to refer to my conversation with His Majesty King Abdul Aziz ibn Abdurrahman at Riyadh on Tuesday evening, July 25, 1944, and, in continuation thereof, to ask Your Excellency to present to His Majesty the request of the United States military authorities for permission to make an aerial and engineering survey in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to determine the feasibility of a direct air route from Cairo, Egypt, to a point near Dhahran. As has already been explained to Your Excellency, the United States military air forces are responsible for heavy air traffic movements between points in North Africa and India, and the responsible authorities believe that a direct route between Cairo and a point near Dhahran would materially facilitate the movement of this traffic, and aid in the prosecution of the war. The flight of airplanes between Cairo and Karachi now follows the Cairo–Habbaniyah–Abadan–Bahrein–Karachi route, or a distance of 2471 statute miles. The direct route Cairo–Dhahran–Karachi would reduce the distance to 2259 statute miles, thereby effecting a saving of 212 statute miles for each flight of each plane. In addition to the saving in distance, flight along the direct alignment from Cairo to Dhahran would mean that the entire route from Morocco to India would be divided into approximately equal stages, and that the loading of a plane need not be changed because of the necessity of taking on greater or smaller quantities of gasoline proportionate to the length of variable stages. Your Excellency will no doubt recall that the United States military authorities have no intention of abandoning the route Cairo–Abadan–Bahrein, but desire to supplement it by the more direct route from Cairo to Dhahran. In order to determine the feasibility of the proposed direct route from Cairo to Dhahran, the United States military authorities request permission to make an aerial survey of the proposed route, to consist of six round trip flights from Cairo east across Saudi Arabia to Dhahran, to observe weather conditions, and to determine locations of emergency landing fields and of radio aids to navigation, as well as the general feasibility of the route. They also request permission to carry out an engineering survey in the area lying within 150 miles of Dhahran to determine the most suitable site for an airport on the Persian Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia. The surveys can begin immediately, and can be terminated within a period of sixty days. Should the proposed route be found feasible, and should the present runways at Bahrein not be capable of supporting the heavy traffic expected, the United States military authorities will desire permission to construct an airport somewhere within the area lying within 150 miles of Dhahran. If His Majesty desires further details of the projected air route, I shall be glad to obtain and supply any information desired. There is forwarded with this note a map showing the present air route from Cairo to Bahrein via Habbaniyah and Abadan, as well as the direct route from Cairo to Dhahran. It is hoped that His Majesty will be able to assist the United States military authorities in their task by granting the permission indicated above. Accept [etc.] James S. Moose, Jr. 10 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 1, September 4, from Jidda; received September 13. The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 883.79690F/9–444: Telegram [Document 718] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , September 4, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 8:05 p.m.] 265. Received reply from Saudi Arabian Government to Legation note July 29 requesting on behalf of Commanding General USAFIME 11 permission to make aerial and engineering surveys for direct air route Cairo to Dhahran. Summary as follows: 1. Proposed air route raises serious problems. Studies and discussions to remove great obstacles must precede decision to grant permission or not. 2. Before decision can be made to permit surveys or not Saudi Arabian Government must know detailed survey program: Exactly when the surveys would take place; whether planes will land; whence they come, which direction they go, whether each returns each time to point of takeoff. Furthermore, route should be shifted further to north, if, as appears on map furnished, it would pass close to Jauf, Tayma and Hayil. End summary. Complete text 12 follows by air pouch. Sent Department, repeated Cairo for Giles. Eddy 11 Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME). 12 Text not printed; in his covering despatch 1, September 4, the Minister in Saudi Arabia said: “It would appear that careful and detailed negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government will be necessary before progress can be expected in this important matter.” (883.79690F/9–444) The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 890F.248/10–644: Telegram [Document 719] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , October 6, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 5:25 p.m.] 3007. Re No. 7 from Dhahran, October 4. 13 From Eddy. Most authentic confidential source confirms that British told Saudi Government to refuse aerodrome to US Army at Dhahran. Royal Air Force Chief Cairo stated to same source that Air Ministry London would not concur in US Army request for Dhahran aerodrome. In view of British survey for Dhahran airfield this appears to be an unfriendly act constituting (1) anti-American coercion of Saudi Government (2) obstruction to Allied war effort. Perhaps it is test of equal opportunities for US and of British cooperation in Saudi Arabia. 14 [Eddy.] Tuck 13 Not printed; it reported the visit of two British officers to Dhahran for the purpose of finding a site for a Royal Air Force landing field (890F.248/10–444). 14 For correspondence relating to the American-British joint supply program in Saudi Arabia, see pp. 670 [ Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 726 and Doc. 727 ] ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) 811.248/10–944 [Document 720] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Berle ) [ Washington ,] October 9, 1944. Mr. Michael Wright 15 came in to see me and I raised with him the question of the Dhahran airfield. I told him that, as he knew, we had had a field in Abadan, in Iran; the British oil interests had purchased oil interests in that field; this gave us reason to believe that eventually the field would be taken over by British interests. 16 We then had undertaken to get a concession for a field at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, across the Gulf, which would serve our purposes as well. Ibn Saud had declined the concession, urging us to consult with the British; we now had information that this had been done at British instance, accompanied by information that the British were unalterably opposed to our having this field. At the same time a British survey party had appeared in Dhahran. I said that, as Mr. Wright knew, we had worn ourselves out here trying to prevent this kind of thing from the very beginning. There was no law in heaven or eirth which entitled anybody to interfere with our building an airfield for legitimate purposes in Saudi Arabia. I pointed out that the top-ranking diplomatic officer who had reported on the incident had characterized it as an “unfriendly act”. He said that, bluntly, this kind of thing could not continue. Wright said that this was entirely contrary to the whole spirit of the arrangements in respect of the Middle East; 17 they were consulting on everything. He could not believe that the facts were as reported. I said I certainly hoped this would prove to be the case. He volunteered to get the facts from his Government and come in and discuss them. I said that my observation had been that statements of policy from Whitehall did not always reflect what happened on the ground, and that the situation certainly ought to be cleared up. I said that he had to remember that all these incidents were being added up here—for instance, the conjunction of this with the attempt to negotiate a four-year meat contract with the Argentine 18 was beginning to open a good many questions. For this reason, I hoped a prompt solution could be had. A[ dolf ] A. B[ erle ], Jr. 15 Counselor of the British Embassy. 16 For correspondence regarding the Abadan airfield, see pp. 486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] ff. 17 For correspondence regarding arrangements to insure Anglo-American cooperation at all levels in the Middle East, see pp. 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] ff. 18 See vol. vii , section under Argentina entitled: “Efforts of the United States to enlist the American Republics and the United Kingdom in a common policy toward Argentina.” The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) 890F.248/10–644: Telegram [Document 721] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) Washington , October 9, 1944—11 p.m. 2777. ReLegs 3007, October 6, 11 a.m. from Eddy. For Eddy. Please report nature, extent and dates of British airfield survey at Dhahran referred to in your message from Cairo. Please state also whether at any time King Abdul Aziz suggested that we consult with the British regarding the proposed field at Dhahran. Dhahran’s no. 7, October 4 19 not yet received by Department. Sent to Cairo, repeated to Jidda. 20 Hull 19 Not printed. 20 Repeated to Jidda as telegram 207. In his telegram 302, October 11, 11 a.m., the Minister in Saudi Arabia reported that the “King at no time suggested our consultation with British regarding Dhahran field.” (890F.248/10–1144) The Vice Consul at Dhahran (Hart) to the Secretary of State 890F.248/10–1244: Airgram [Document 722] The Vice Consul at Dhahran ( Hart ) to the Secretary of State Dhahran , October 12, 1944—5 p.m. [Received November 6—6 p.m.] A–12. Major General Benjamin F. Giles, Commander, USAFIME, Cairo, accompanied by a plane-load of officers and men, flew to Dhahran from Tehran on October 11, 1944, arriving about 2:45 p.m. They left for Cairo via Abadan the following morning. Purpose of visit was technical inspection of Dhahran airfield for suitability as ATC base on India route. General and staff declared themselves entirely satisfied with potentialities of the field and did not visit alternate field at Ras Tanura, which has been recently flooded by exceptional tides. No contacts made with Saudi authorities, although General stated he had previous clearance for his visit. Soil samples were taken and data assembled. General had been informed by Colonel Eddy at Cairo of visit of two British officers reported in my secret telegram no. 7 of October 4, 1944, and my secret despatch no. 16 of October 8, 1944. 21 Their visit appeared to him particularly significant in view of fact that he had recently been told by a high British authority at Cairo that British were opposing concession of field to American Army on grounds that it was “unnecessary to war effort”. General agreed with view given by British visitors here that Muharraq Field, Bahrein, is not strong enough to support heavy planes of type henceforth to be sent to India. He is eager to have negotiations with King expedited to enable Army to initiate development of field at earliest possible date. General also supports oil company project, now before King at Riyadh, for importation of some 800 Italian skilled workers from Eritrea to help in refinery construction, but insists such matters be given second place to negotiations for Dhahran airdrome. He offered to delegate Colonel Weathers of his staff to assist company in recruiting this labor at Asmara, and will authorize transportation to Ras Tanura when final clearance made. Repeated to Jidda and Cairo. Hart 21 Neither printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 890F.248/10–1744: Telegram [Document 723] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , October 17, 1944—midnight. 8598. A covert contest which begins to assume unpleasant proportions is prevailing over airfields in the Middle East. As you are aware, the United States constructed an airfield at Abadan, which is an important link in our airways to India and the Far East. Part of the land on which this field was constructed was owned by British oil interests; recently these British oil interests purchased the rest of the land on which this was situated, under circumstances which convinced the Department that in due time the British proposed to retake the field. Chiefly in view of the need of the United States Air Corps for a better field than the one at Bahrein and because the proposed oil developments in Saudi Arabia will call for a very considerable number of Americans to work at Dhahran, in Saudi Arabia, across the Gulf, King Ibn Saud was approached to grant us the right to build an airfield there. He declined. We now have reliable, but highly confidential information indicating that the British directed Ibn Saud to refuse; however, the King has not at any time suggested that we consult with the British regarding the matter. Early in October two British officers from Bahrein, as civilians, paid a visit to Dhahran announcing it to be their purpose to find a site for an RAF airfield to supplement the one at Bahrein. These two officers, however, appeared only to be technicians acting under instructions and unaware of political obstacles and the neutral status of Saudi Arabia. You might take a convenient occasion to suggest to Mr. Eden 22 that this has made an extremely painful impression here; and it is being connected with such matters as the Argentine meat contract, and other similar incidents, as evidencing the real trend of British policy. Needless to say, it does complicate the problem of the forthcoming air conference 23 in view of the wholly different basis on which matters have been discussed thus far. The essence of our approach in aviation matters heretofore has been non-exclusivity, coupled with a generally cooperative live-and-let-live attitude in respect of British and American aviation, along with the development of institutions which might lead to closer cooperation as rapidly as facts might warrant. This last incident is, of course, a reversion to a dog-eat-dog policy which, if continued, has possibilities we are not presently able to appraise. Hull 22 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 23 For correspondence regarding the International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago, November 1–December 7, 1944, see vol. ii , index entry under Civil Aviation Conference. Informal Statement Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 890F. 74/11–944 [Document 724] Informal Statement Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 24 [ Washington , November 9, 1944.] The Dhahran Airfield Matter At present the United States Army Air Corps is flying planes to the Far Eastern theater of war via Iraq and Bahrein. The field at Bahrein, because of the soft character of the soil on the island, is not suitable for heavy planes. It will be necessary, therefore, to find a suitable field in another locality nearby. Furthermore, the Air Corps desires to fly its planes directly across the central part of Saudi Arabia to this field. The Air Corps has found the terrain in the vicinity of Dhahran, Saudi Arabia suitable for an airfield. It desires, therefore, to secure permission from the Saudi Arabian Government to construct a field there and to fly planes directly across the country rather than over the northern part. The direct flight to Dhahran would save about 220 miles. The Saudi Arabian Government has not granted permission to the Government of the United States for the U.S. Army Air Corps to build a field in the vicinity of Dhahran or to fly its planes directly across the country because of an objection expressed by the British Government to the Saudi Arabian Government to the construction of such an airfield in the vicinity of Dhahran. It is understood, however, that the Government of Saudi Arabia would grant such permission provided the objection of the British Government thereto is withdrawn. American military authorities consider that the construction of an airfield near Dhahran at the earliest possible moment is necessary for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. The specific issue involved is whether the British Government will inform the Saudi Arabian Government immediately that it withdraws its objection to the granting of such permission. 24 Forwarded under cover of a letter of November 9 to the Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling). Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 890F.248/11–1144 [Document 725] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) 25 [ Washington ,] November 11, 1944. Mr. Michael Wright of the British Embassy telephoned me this morning in connection with our most recent conference with him regarding our desire that the British Government give its consent to the construction of the military airfield at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia and to the erection of a radio-telegraph broadcasting station at Dhahran to be owned and operated by the Saudi Arabian Government. 26 Mr. Wright said he had already telegraphed his Government regarding the question of the landing field and suggested that it would be most helpful in pushing this matter through speedily if we would suggest to the War Department that it get in touch with the competent British military officials here urging those officials to support the War Department’s request for the landing field at Dhahran. I immediately called General Howard A. Craig 27 and conveyed this information to him requesting that he take the necessary steps with the competent military authorities. General Craig said he thought the idea was an excellent one and that he would immediately get in touch with the Army Air Forces, urging them to contact the RAF delegation with a request for the assistance of the delegation in the establishment of the Dhahran airfield. I told General Craig that Mr. Wright had strongly urged that in handling this matter at this stage we make no mention of any post-war civil aviation rights since that would be sure to cause endless delay in London. Any mention of desired post-war uses of the Dhahran airfield would be sure to bring a reply from London that since an international aviation conference was going on in Chicago the matter would have to await the outcome of that conference before a decision could be given affecting the post-war use of the field. General Craig said he fully agreed with this and that in taking it up with the RAF authorities the Army Air Forces would confine their recommendations solely to the military use of the field in question. 25 The substance of this memorandum was conveyed on November 14 to Col. John W. Bowen of the War Department General Staff in an undated memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling). 26 For correspondence regarding the proposed establishment of a direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia, see pp. 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] ff. 27 Maj. Gen. Howard A. Craig of the War Department General Staff. Memorandum by Colonel John W. Bowen of the War Department General Staff 890F.248/11–2244 [Document 726] Memorandum by Colonel John W. Bowen of the War Department General Staff 28 Washington , 22 November 1944. Subject: Air Field at Dhahran Reference is made to your undated memorandum 29 on the above subject addressed to Colonel Bowen, Chief of the Mediterranean Theater Section, Operations Division. Your memorandum was submitted to the Army Air Forces for their comment and a reply has now been received from them stating that the acquisition of a military airfield at Dhahran is considered to be a military necessity. For your information, the following is quoted from the memorandum from the Army Air Forces: “Should the British be concerned about possible desires for Saudi Arabian interests on the part of nations other than Great Britain and the United States, it seems reasonable to expect that they would be willing to aid in securing the King’s approval for an entirely American military air field at Dhahran which could be used by British aircraft, if necessary. Any mention of post war civil aviation rights in this matter certainly would meet with British delay, if not active opposition. Therefore, it should be considered on a purely military basis. The acquisition of an American military air field at Dhahran, for use in redeployment of our forces to the Far East and to increase the efficiency of present military air transport operations, is considered an immediate necessity. “The Army Air Forces considers that joint tenancy of the Dhahran air field with British forces would be most undesirable. In the event that rights for construction and use of the airdrome can be obtained only on the condition of joint tenancy, however, such an arrangement would be accepted, provided command and operational control of the field would be vested in American forces.” After due consideration, it is believed inadvisable to approach the Royal Air Force on this matter through informal channels. The acquisition of this airport therefore should be considered with the other matters concerning Saudi Arabia as set forth in the letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State elated 27 October 1944. 30 J. W. Bowen 28 Sent to the Department for the attention of the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. 29 See footnote 25, p. 668 [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] . 30 Post , p. 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 816 and Doc. 817 ] . Extension of Lend-Lease assistance to Saudi Arabia; organization of a program for economic and military aid Extension of Lend-Lease assistance to Saudi Arabia; organization of a program for economic and military aid 31 31 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 854 – 920 . [727] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, January 1, 1944—6 p.m. 800.24/1160: Airgram [728] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, January 7, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 9:51 p.m.] 102.1/9829: Telegram [729] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, January 7, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 10:51 p.m.] 890F.515/76: Telegram [730] The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Cairo, January 13, 1944—9 p.m. [Received January 14—11:56 a.m.] 890F.515/78: Telegram [731] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, January 25, 1944—noon. [Received 4:58 p.m.] 890F.515/83: Telegram [732] The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State Washington , February 1, 1944. 890F.51/58 [733] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, February 7, 1944—4:15 p.m. [Received February 15—1 p.m.] 800.24/1512: Airgram [734] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, February 24, 1944—11 a.m. [Received February 26—6:12 a.m.] 102.1/10220: Telegram [735] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, February 24, 1944—9 p.m. [Received February 26—7:43 a.m.] 890F.5018/1: Telegram [736] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, March 13, 1944—9 a.m. [Received March 13—8:48 a.m.] 890F.5018/2: Telegram [737] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, March 13, 1944—midnight. [Received March 14—12:27 p.m.] 890F.5018/4: Telegram [738] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, March 23, 1944—7 p.m. 102.1/10441a: Telegram [739] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, March 29, 1944. [Received April 18.] 890F.24/149 [740] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] April 3, 1944. 890F.24/4–1044 [741] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 9, 1944—4 p.m. [Received April 9—11:22 a.m.] 890F.515/96: Telegram [742] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, April 12, 1944—8 p.m. 102.1/10574b: Telegram [743] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 13, 1944—8 a.m. [Received 10:55 a.m.] 890F.51/67: Telegram [744] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, April 13, 1944—7 p.m. 890F.515/97a: Telegram [745] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, April 15, 1944—noon. [Received April 15—9:22 a.m.] 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/27: Telegram [746] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 15, 1944—9 p.m. [Received April 16—2:18 a.m.] 890F.24/145: Telegram [747] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 18, 1944—5 p.m. [Received April 19—3:44 a.m.] 890F.51/68: Telegram [748] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, April 18, 1944—8 p.m. 890F. 515/99: Telegram [749] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, April 18, 1944—9 p.m. 890F. 51A/3a: Telegram [750] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 20, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 8:49 p.m.] 890F.51A/4: Telegram [751] The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 21, 1944—2 p.m. [Received April 21—12:45 p.m.] 800.51/1460: Telegram [752] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 21, 1944—10 p.m. [Received April 22—11:30 a.m.] 890F.51/71: Telegram [753] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, April 22, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 22—8:50 p.m.] 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/51: Telegram [754] The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 25, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 4:26 p.m.] 890F.50/3: Telegram [755] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, April 25, 1944—8 p.m. 890F. 51A/4: Telegram [756] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, April 26, 1944—10 p.m. [Received April 26—9:27 p.m.] 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/64: Telegram [757] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 27, 1944—1 p.m. [Received April 28—9:44 a.m.] 890F.51A/6: Telegram [758] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, April 27, 1944—5 p.m. [Received April 27—3:20 p.m.] 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/76: Telegram [759] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) Washington, April 27, 1944—midnight. 890F.515/101: Telegram [760] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 29, 1944—10 p.m. [Received May 3—9:07 a.m.] 890F.24/172: Telegram [761] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 29, 1944—11 p.m. [Received May 2—10:41 p.m.] 890F.24/164: Telegram [762] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 30, 1944—7 p.m. [Received May 3—2:30 p.m.] 890F.24/170: Telegram [763] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, May 1, 1944—5 p.m. 890F.20 Mission/11a: Telegram [764] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, May 3, 1944—4 p.m. [Received May 4—4 p.m.] 890F.20 Missions/11: Telegram [765] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, May 11, 1944—noon. 890F.20 Missions/11: Telegram [766] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, May 31, 1944—5 p.m. 890F.20 Missions/13a: Telegram [767] The Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 3, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 6 p.m.] 890F.515/113: Telegram [768] The Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 7, 1944—10 a.m. [Received June 8—10:52 a.m.] 890F.24/183: Telegram [769] The Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 8, 1944—8 p.m. [Received June 9—10:50 a.m.] 890F.24/185: Telegram [770] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, June 9, 1944. [Received June 9—2:48 p.m.] 890F.20 Mission/15: Telegram [771] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 17, 1944—11 a.m. [Received June 17—9:45 a.m.] 890F.515/115: Telegram [772] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 18, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 5:57 p.m.] 890F.515/116: Telegram [773] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 20, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 4:55 p.m.] 890F.515/118: Telegram [774] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) Washington, June 20, 1944—6 p.m. 890F.515/115: Telegram [775] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) Washington, June 21, 1944—2 p.m. 890F.24/189a: Telegram [776] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, June 22, 1944—10 p.m. [Received 10:09 p.m.] 890F.24/188: Telegram [777] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] June 26, 1944. 701.4190F/5–2444 [778] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, June 27, 1944—11 p.m. 890F.24/6–2744: Telegram [779] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, June 29, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 1:30 p.m.] 890F.24/6–2944: Telegram [780] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, July 1, 1944—11 p.m. 890F.20 Mission/15: Telegram [781] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , July 7, 1944. 890F.24/7–744 [782] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, July 11, 1944—2 p.m. 890F.24/7–1144: Telegram [783] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, July 12, 1944—6 p.m. 890F.24/7–1244: Telegram [784] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, July 13, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 10:50 p.m.] 890F.5151/7–1344: Telegram [785] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, July 17, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:42 p.m.] 890F.24/7–1744: Telegram [786] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, July 21, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 22—6:30 a.m.] 890F.20 Missions/7–2144: Telegram [787] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) Washington, July 26, 1944—5 p.m. 890F.24/7–2644: Telegram [788] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, August 6, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 2:19 p.m.] 890F.24/8–644: Telegram [789] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, August 6, 1944—noon. [Received 2:37 p.m.] 890F.24/8–644: Telegram [790] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, August 6, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 6:45 p.m.] 890F.24/8–644: Telegram [791] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, August 9, 1944—noon. [Received 8:04 p.m.] 890F.515/8–944: Telegram [792] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) Washington, August 10, 1944. 890F.515/8–1044 [793] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, August 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 9:01 p.m.] 890F.24/8–1444: Telegram [794] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) Washington, August 14, 1944—7 p.m. 890F.24/8–1444: Telegram [795] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, August 16, 1944—6 p.m. [Received August 17—2:07 a.m.] 890F.24/8–1644: Telegram [796] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) Washington, August 23, 1944—9 p.m. 890F.24/8–1944: Telegram [797] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Geier) to the Secretary of State Jidda, August 26, 1944—midnight. [Received August 27—11:12 a.m.] 890F.24/8–2644: Telegram [798] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Geier) to the Secretary of State Jidda, August 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 5:46 p.m.] 890F.24/8–3044: Telegram [799] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 4, 1944—8 a.m. [Received 4:47 p.m.] 890F.24/9–444: Telegram [800] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , 5 September, 1944. 890F.51/9–544 [801] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 7, 1944. [Received September 13.] 890F.50/9–744 [802] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 8, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 11:07 p.m.] 890F.24/9–844: Telegram [803] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 8, 1944—3 p.m. [Received September 9—1:03 a.m.] 890F.24/9–844: Telegram [804] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 9, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 8 p.m.] 890F.24/9–944: Telegram [805] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 10, 1944—12 a.m. [Received 2:20 p.m.] 890F.24/9–1044: Telegram [806] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 10, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 8:22 p.m.] 890F.24/9–1044: Telegram [807] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) Washington, September 12, 1944—5 p.m. 890F.24/9–844: Telegram [808] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) Washington, September 14, 1944—8 p.m. 102.1/9–1444: Telegram [809] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 15, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 11:29 p.m.] 890F.24/9–1544: Telegram [810] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) Washington, September 16, 1944—7 p.m. 890F.515/9–1644: Telegram [811] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) Washington, September 16, 1944—9 p.m. 890F.24/9–1044: Telegram [812] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 18, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 11:21 p.m.] 890F.24/9–1844: Telegram [813] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 25, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 1:12 p.m.] 890F.24/9–2544: Telegram [814] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, October 5, 1944. 890F.20 Missions/9–2944 [815] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, October 16, 1944. [Received October 23.] 890F.24/10–1644 [816] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , October 16, 1944. 890F.51/9–544 [817] The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State Washington, October 27, 1944. 890F.51/10–2744 [818] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, October 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received October 30—12:10 p.m.] 890F.24/10–3044: Telegram [819] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 3, 1944—4 p.m. [Received November 3—2:30 p.m.] 890F. 24/11–344: Telegram [820] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 24, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 4:10 p.m.] 890F. 24/11–2444: Telegram [821] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 28, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 9:14 a.m.] 890F.24/11–2844: Telegram [822] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, December 6, 1944—midnight. 890F.51A/12–644: Telegram [823] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) Washington, December 9, 1944—8 p.m. 890F.24/11–2844: Telegram [824] The Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State Washington, December 11, 1944. 890F.6363/12–1144 [825] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, December 22, 1944. 890F.51/12–2044 [826] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) Washington, December 24, 1944—2 p.m. 890F.51/12–2444: Telegram [827] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] December 30, 1944. Files of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs: Lot 57–D178 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 800.24/1160: Airgram [Document 727] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , January 1, 1944—6 p.m. A–5. In replying to the Foreign Office’s communication set forth in your A–766, August 3, 9:15 a.m., 32 you should make the following statements after appropriate introductory phrases of acknowledgment and reference: “As the Foreign Office is doubtless aware, the question of furnishing military supplies to the Government of Saudi Arabia has been considered by the Munitions Assignments Board in London, which is understood to have agreed in principle that such supplies should be provided in substantially equal measure by the Government of the United States and by the British Government. The Government of the United States is in accord with the view of the British Government that types and quantities thereof shall be determined upon the basis of needs for the maintenance of law and order in Saudi Arabia. In order to determine the nature and extent of these needs, an American military mission 33 has proceeded from Cairo to Saudi Arabia and upon completion of its investigation will report to the War Department. It is believed that the findings of this mission will contribute to the establishment of a basis upon which the appropriate American and British munitions assignments authorities can act. “In the interests of uniformity of procedure it is considered highly desirable that such military supplies as the British Government may furnish to the Government of Saudi Arabia be provided under terms of settlement analogous to conditions under which similar supplies are furnished by the Government of the United States. The British Government, therefore, may wish to inform the Saudi Arabian Government that questions of reimbursement will be deferred for consideration until after the termination of hostilities. “With respect to procedural questions raised in the Foreign Office’s communication regarding requests for and assignments of munitions, it is confirmed that it is the policy of the Government of the United States to receive direct inquiries from officials of independent countries (except Turkey for which a special exception has been made) regarding the availability of American military supplies to meet their needs and to furnish such supplies to them if it is feasible to do so. 34 It follows, therefore, that the Government of the United States considers that the above policy is incompatible with the establishment of exclusive channels through which requests for and allocation of military supplies with respect to such independent countries are made.” Hull 32 Ibid. , p. 885 . 33 For correspondence regarding this mission, see ibid. , pp. 903 ff., passim. 34 For correspondence regarding this policy, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 102.1/9829: Telegram [Document 728] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , January 7, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 9:51 p.m.] 5. For Treasury. Plan for conversion of dollars into Saudi riyals described in Department’s 111, December 15, 9 p.m., 35 has been informally discussed with responsible local officials on whose advice King 36 will rely and it will be presented formally to Foreign Ministry today. Discussions indicate that King will approve plan, provided Lend-Lease silver over and above other Saudi requirements is supplied for sale to Legation and commercial enterprises. It has been pointed out both orally and in writing once plan is in operation sale of gold in Jiddah market at or near existing sovereign-riyal rate should give local government substantial benefit over and above recovery of riyal sums sold. Nevertheless it is likely that Saudi Government will wish to increase its request for Lend-Lease silver by full amount of expected sales of riyal for dollars. Best guess now is that total demand from Legation, Casoc 37 and same in 1944 would be about 10 million riyals. 37a Reasonably accurate estimate may be available in a few days. Attention is called to the fact that insofar as Legation is concerned suggested plan is more complicated and less economical than that of supplying sovereigns as recommended in Gunter’s letter to White dated September 24. 38 A formal reply cannot be expected for more than a week. Moose 35 Ibid. , p. 916 . 36 Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia. 37 California Arabian Standard Oil Company, American oil company operating a concession in Saudi Arabia; the Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Company owned the stock of this company. On January 28, 1944, the Minister Resident was informed that the name of the company had been changed to Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). 37a Sentence apparently garbled. 38 Letter not found in Department files. Harry Dexter White was Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau), and Director of the Division of Monetary Research, and John W. Gunter was Treasury Attaché assigned to Ankara, temporarily in Saudi Arabia; for correspondence regarding the Gunter Mission to Saudi Arabia, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 854 ff., passim. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.515/76: Telegram [Document 729] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , January 7, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 10:51 p.m.] 6. The second 2 million riyals minted in England mentioned in Department’s 113, December 20, 10 p.m., 39 arrived here January 5, and were delivered to Finance Minister 40 against temporary receipt. Preparation of final receipts awaits Treasury certification of quantity of silver used. Legation already has such certification from London and Bombay mints. Responsible officials indicate that further quantities of Lend-Lease silver will be requested in 1944 but that accurate determination of requirements awaits agreement between local and British authorities about disposition of pilgrimage “tariff items” now on deposit in sterling funds outside Saudi Arabia. See also my 5, January 7, 2 p.m. Any developments will be promptly reported. Moose 39 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 919 . 40 Abdullah Suleiman. The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 890F.515/78: Telegram [Document 730] The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , January 13, 1944—9 p.m. [Received January 14—11:56 a.m.] 83. Jordan, British Minister to Saudi Arabia, has requested that we rush shipment of the 7 million riyals minted in the United States. Saudi Arabian Government has deficit of 30 million riyals carried over from 1943 and British expect immediate call for advance of gold sovereigns. Jordan believes he can hold off their demand for a few months if the riyals arrive within a month. British want to withhold further gold subsidies until a program of fiscal reform has been developed. 41 Saudi Arabian 1944 budget calls for expenditures of 109 million riyals, revenue of 37 [million] riyals, leaving deficit of 72 million riyals in addition to 1943 deficit. British believe program for fiscal reform should be introduced in order to avoid payment of large subsidies and expect this question to be taken up at Anglo-American Conference on Middle East, understood to be held soon. Please cable when riyals may be expected to arrive. Above for Secretary of Treasury from Mikesell. 42 Kirk 41 In his telegram 22, January 16, 4 p.m., the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia repeated a telegram which he sent to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) in which he stated: “I agree with Jordan as to desirability of fiscal reforms but foresee difficulty in effecting them even if King concurs and possible danger to our interests if he does not.” (890F.515/82) 42 Raymond F. Mikesell, United States Treasury Representative at Cairo. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.515/83: Telegram [Document 731] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , January 25, 1944—noon. [Received 4:58 p.m.] 30. Shaikh Yusuf Yassin 43 advised me this morning that the Saudi Government is completely out of funds and that the King had inquired when remaining riyals from Lend-Lease silver would arrive. Sense of Department’s 98, January 18, 11 a.m. 44 to Cairo was communicated to Shaikh Yusuf. When informed of latest shipment of silver, British Minister here offered services of British naval vessel if needed to bring silver from Egypt without delay. While not minimizing need for prompt delivery I still believe it important to land bulk of shipment from American vessel preferably naval even if token shipment delivered by air. 45 Repeated to Cairo for Mikesell. Moose 43 Private secretary to the King and at this time Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 44 Not printed; it contained information from the Treasury Department that shipment would be made January 19, 1944, of 7 million riyals, expected to arrive at Jidda within a month (890F.515/78). 45 After continuing discussion as to the timing and means for effecting shipment of the silver in the final phase of the journey from Egypt, the 7 million riyals were delivered to the Saudi Arabian Government at Jidda on March 6, 1944. The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State 890F.51/58 [Document 732] The British Ambassador ( Halifax ) to the Secretary of State Aide-Mémoire His Majesty’s Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and has the honour to refer to the Department’s aide-mémoire of November 29th last 46 suggesting that immediate consideration be given to ways and means whereby the British and United States Governments might assist the Government of Saudi Arabia in fiscal and currency problems, and that informal discussion to this end be held in Washington. 2. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom agree to this proposal, and instructions have been issued to the United Kingdom Treasury Delegation in Washington to get in touch with representatives of the United States Treasury to this end. 47 Washington , February 1, 1944. 46 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 914 . 47 Meetings of officers from the Department, the Treasury Department, and the British Embassy began on February 17, 1944, and continued through much of the year. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 800.24/1512: Airgram [Document 733] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , February 7, 1944—4:15 p.m. [Received February 15—1 p.m.] A–153. In reply to statements on military supplies for Saudi Arabia, quoted in Department’s A–5 of January 1, Foreign Office has now answered as follows: “Thank you for your letter of the 13th January about military supplies for Saudi Arabia. “We are glad to note that agreement has been reached that such supplies are to be provided in substantially equal measure by the Government of the United States and by His Majesty’s Government.” Winant The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 102.1/10220: Telegram [Document 734] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , February 24, 1944—11 a.m. [Received February 26—6:12 a.m.] 55. Acting Foreign Minister asks that his note of January 12 attached my despatch 98, January 17, 48 be considered request for Lend-Lease silver sufficient for 20 million riyals irrespective of fate of Treasury’s dollar riyal conversion scheme. He is ready sign formal request at any time. He suggests 5 million riyals to be minted and shipped immediately followed similar shipments in or about months of June, August, and October. 1944 Saudi budget with brief comment was reported in my despatches 91 and 93 January 12. 48 British Minister thinks any considerable increase in silver riyals circulating in Saudi Arabia will be inflationary. While recognizing his objection all alternative schemes thus far proposed also present risks. In my opinion pending questions between United States and Saudi Government and maintenance of good relations with King justify sympathetic consideration of request. This is particularly true since British Minister is now pressing Saudi Government for substantial economies. Sent Department, repeated Cairo for Landis. 49 Moose 48 Neither printed. 48 Neither printed. 49 James M. Landis, Director of American Economic Operations in the Middle East, with the personal rank of Minister. Mr. Landis was also ranking civilian representative of the United States at the Middle East Supply Center (MESC), Cairo, an organization set up in 1941 by the British to control the supply and distribution of essential goods to the civilian populations of the Near and Middle East; for correspondence regarding decision by the United States, in 1942 to participate in the Middle East Supply Center, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.5018/1: Telegram [Document 735] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , February 24, 1944—9 p.m. [Received February 26—7:43 a.m.] 54. King is disturbed over position of his country with regard to (1) adequacy of food supply, (2) distribution of food and other essentials from ports into interior and, (3) governmental finances. All are chronic problems and probably are serious though there are indications King has exaggerated their gravity. Lack of reliable information makes accurate estimate difficult. Most likely causes King’s anxiety are: (1) British Minister’s insistence on Saudi Government economics and consequent failure reach agreement with British Government as to 1944 Saudi budget, (2) natural irritation King and all other Arabs at inability to secure needed motor trucks while locust missions have several hundred operating in Saudi Arabia, (3) possible misinformation or concealment information by King’s officials. Saudi Finance Minister, Abdullah Sulaiman, came to Jidda about a week ago to discuss three questions with British Minister. Outcome was not satisfactory to King who requested Mr. Jordan, British Minister, to come Riyadh for further conversations. Jordan and Shaikh Yusuf Yassin are setting out for Riyadh tomorrow. Shaikh Abdulla Sulaiman is remaining here, he says, for the purpose of keeping this Legation informed of course of conversations. Sent Department, repeated Cairo for Landis. Moose The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.5018/2: Telegram [Document 736] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , March 13, 1944—9 a.m. [Received March 13—8:48 a.m.] 73. My 54, February 24. 9 p.m. Prior to departure from Jidda Mr. Jordan, British Minister, offered to keep me currently informed of his conversations with King Ibn Saud. This he failed to do and an inquiry to local British Legation elicited no information. From Saudi sources it has been learned that subjects of supply, transportation and finance were discussed between Jordan and Abdullah Sulaiman, Saudi Finance Minister, who returned to Riyadh about March 2. A committee appointed by King assisted Shaikh Abdullah. Agreement is reported to have been reached on all points and a British plane left here yesterday morning to bring Jordan to Jidda and then to take him on to Cairo. He will be accompanied to Cairo by Shaikh Yusuf-Yassin who will visit his family in Egypt and by Shaikh Hafiz-Wahba en route to his post in London. The United States has an interest in the three subjects on which agreement is said to have been reached and it seems likely that Jordan may be going to Cairo there to discuss recent conversations and arrangements with Saudi Government. If so Landis may wish to participate and it might be useful for me to be present. Authorization to go to Cairo for that purpose is therefore requested if after talking to Jordan the situation seems to warrant it. Repeated to Cairo. Moose The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.5018/4: Telegram [Document 737] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , March 13, 1944—midnight. [Received March 14—12:27 p.m.] 77. My 73 to Department, March 13, 9 a.m. For Landis and Short, 51 Jordan passed through Jidda today en route from Riyadh to Cairo. He advised no agreement reached but that he had had detailed informative discussions with King’s Committee and would continue discussions in Cairo. He stated he would welcome American participation in such conversations and suggested I be present, Pending authorization from Washington, I am making plans to come to Cairo March 17. In my opinion American officials should attend such discussions even if they contribute little. If British reached decision without consulting United States authorities then cooperation on our part would consist of acquiescence. Sent Cairo. Repeated Department as No. 77. Moose 51 Livingston L. Short, Deputy Director of American Economic Operations in the Middle East, and second ranking civilian representative of the United States at the Middle East Supply Center, Cairo. The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 102.1/10441a: Telegram [Document 738] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) Washington , March 23, 1944—7 p.m. 45. 1. Please explain to the King that the Treasury in presenting its proposal contained in cable No. 111, December 15, 1943, 52 did not envisage that it would be necessary to lend-lease additional silver for riyals to be sold to foreign legations and to commercial companies for the reason that: the dollar receipts derived from the sale of riyals would be convertible into gold which could either be used to defray expenses which would otherwise deplete the King’s stock of riyals or could be sold directly for riyals at a price which would give the government a net profit in riyals on the transactions. In view of Saudi Arabia’s critical shortage of riyals, Treasury requests that you make the following proposal to the King: The Treasury will recommend the lend-leasing of an additional 3,437,500 ounces of silver for the minting of 10 million riyals that will be sold at a rate of 30 U.S. cents per riyal to foreign legations and commercial companies in 1944, provided: (1) that the King leaves on deposit with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 60 percent of the dollar proceeds from the sale of all riyals lend-leased to Saudi Arabia for the purpose of acquiring silver to be returned to the U.S. Treasury; and (2) that Saudi Arabia will pay the costs of minting and shipping the riyals to Jidda from the dollar proceeds of the sale of riyals, which costs will be over and above the amount set aside for the purchase of silver to be returned to the U.S. Treasury. The King would be free to invest the dollar funds held with the Federal Reserve Bank in United States Government securities and the income from such securities will be at the free disposal of the Government of Saudi Arabia. The King would also be free to purchase, with the funds not placed in reserve, after allowing for minting and shipping costs on riyals, gold in bars of 5 to 400 ounces, at the price provided in the provisional regulations issued under the Gold Reserve Act, as such may be in effect at the time of each such purchase, which price is now $35.00 per fine ounce plus ¼ of one percent. Gold purchased may be exported to Saudi Arabia as facilities for transport become available. See cable No. 111 for details as to net realizable by the Saudi Arabian Government on such gold shipments. With reference to the minting and shipping costs of the riyals, it may be well to explain to the King that such costs are as a general rule borne by the government receiving silver for coinage under lend-lease arrangements. In the case of the 7 million riyals previously minted by the United States mint, an exception was made because of Saudi Arabia’s lack of dollar exchange. The costs were therefore extended as lend-lease aid by the United States to the Government of Saudi Arabia. Please ascertain whether the King will assent to this proposal. The documents providing for the lend-leasing of an additional 3,437,500 ounces of silver on the above terms will be cabled to the Legation at Jidda within a few days. 2. If the King agrees to the proposal, suggest that the Government of Saudi Arabia begin selling riyals to commercial companies and the Legation from the 7 million riyals arriving from the United States. 3. It will be necessary in connection with the sale of riyals for the Government of Saudi Arabia to open appropriate accounts with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. These accounts will be the subject of a later cable, 53 [Here follows reference to staff level discussions of a proposed plan for a Bank of Saudi Arabia.] Hull 52 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 916 . 53 Telegram 56, April 12, not printed; see footnote 61, p. 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 742 ] . The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/149 [Document 739] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State No. 145 Jidda , March 29, 1944. [Received April 18.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to my telegram no. 79 of March 16, 1944, 6:00 p.m., 54 and to report that on March 20, 1944, this Legation received from the United States Army authorities in Cairo 1,667 rifles with accessories and 350,000 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition which was delivered to the Saudi Government with the understanding that it would be stored in Jidda pending the arrival of an American military mission composed of eight officers and four enlisted men who would instruct the Saudi Army in the use, repair and maintenance of the rifles, and of any other military equipment which might be delivered. The tentative date of arrival of the mission has been set for April 15, 1944. A similar shipment of rifles and ammunition from the British Army was delivered to the Saudi Government by the British Legation at the same time. [Here follows discussion of problems involved in the actual delivery of the shipment into Saudi Arabian custody.] Respectfully yours, James S. Moose, Jr. 54 Not printed. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 890F.24/4–1044 [Document 740] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 55 [ Washington ,] April 3, 1944. It is believed necessary for this Government to extend additional financial and economic assistance to Saudi Arabia in order to safeguard adequately the American national interest in the great petroleum resources of that country. 56 During the past few years the Government of Saudi Arabia has relied principally upon British subsidies to meet its deficits arising from inadequate sources of revenue. Recently this Government has furnished limited quantities of Lend Lease durable goods and also silver for coins, which is to be repaid in kind five years after the war. It has now been ascertained that the British Government proposes in 1944 to subsidize Saudi Arabia to the extent of nearly 12 million dollars for the purchase from British sources of such consumer goods as foodstuffs and textiles. This sum is approximately six times greater than the value of Lend Lease aid this Government contemplates extending during the current year. Furthermore, it has just been reported 57 that the British Minister in Jidda has persuaded King Ibn Saud to remove certain key Saudi Arabian officials known to be friendly to the United States and to agree to appoint a British economic adviser and possibly a British petroleum adviser as well. If Saudi Arabia is permitted to lean too heavily upon the British, there is always the danger that the British will request a quid pro quo in oil. To obviate this danger, it is recommended that this Government share the subsidy on an over-all equal basis with the British. In view of the immediate urgency of so doing, it is suggested that the American share of the subsidy take the initial form of Lend Lease aid and that the Foreign Economic Administration be authorized to provide whatever goods may be necessary. Subsequently Congressional approval might be sought for outright financial assistance. In connection with the extension of such assistance it is recommended also that a proposal be made to the Saudi Arabian Government to establish a central bank under purely American auspices, in as much as nothing has been heard of a proposal made by this Government to the British on February 17, 1944 for the establishment of such a bank under joint American and British auspices. 58 55 Marginal notation: “OK FDR.” 56 For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 6 ] ff. 57 In telegram 90, March 30, 11 p.m., from Jidda, not printed. 58 See footnote 47, p. 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] . The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.515/96: Telegram [Document 741] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , April 9, 1944—4 p.m. [Received April 9—11:22 a.m.] 98. In note dated today Saudi Government accepted Treasury’s proposal for conversion dollars into rials described first paragraph Department’s unnumbered [ 45? ] March 23, 9 [ 7? ] p.m. Last 7 million Lend-Lease rials arrived Jidda March 6 and delivered to Saudi Government immediately. Probably most have been spent already. In reply suggestion that Saudi Government begin sale rials under conversion plan price receipt of 10 million new Lend-Lease rials both Finance Minister and Acting Foreign Minister expressed willingness do so within limitations of Government’s financial resources. Acting Foreign Minister confirmed that Saudi Government cannot accept interest payments (my 81, March 27, noon 59 ) and therefore suggested that deposit with Federal Reserve Bank be utilized as revolving fund for conversion dollars to rials by some procedure to be agreed on later. This suggestion was not a condition of acceptance of Treasury’s plan. Please advise immediately details procedure to put plan into effect. When new rials are shipped Saudi Government wishes delivery of 1 million rials at Jidda and 9 million via Bahrein or if that is impracticable, delivery of entire number through Bahrein. 60 Moose 59 Not printed. 60 In his telegram 250, August 14, 7 p.m., the Minister Resident advised that the Saudi Arabian Government preferred to receive all 10 million riyals at the Saudi Arabian port of Ras Tanura (890 F.515/8–1444). The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 102.1/10574b: Telegram [Document 742] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) 61 Washington , April 12, 1944—8 p.m. 57. From Treasury. The following is the text of the letter to be sent to the Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury: “My dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to previous communications between representatives of our respective governments relative to the vital need of Saudi Arabia for a supply of silver for coinage purposes. An additional demand for silver coin has developed. Foreign diplomatic missions and foreign business enterprises in Saudi Arabia require silver riyals in order to meet their expenses in Saudi Arabia and have requested that such riyals be made available to them in exchange for dollar credits in the United States. The Government of Saudi Arabia will be unable to meet this demand unless an additional quantity of silver is provided under the Act of March 11, 1941, for the specific purpose of exchanging silver riyals for dollar credits in the United States. Accordingly, I request on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, that you will be so kind as to inform the Foreign Economic Administration that the need of Saudi Arabia for silver for coinage to be used to supply foreign diplomatic missions and foreign business enterprises in Saudi Arabia with riyals in exchange for dollar credits in the United States during the balance of the calendar year 1944, may be met to the extent of 3,437,500 ounces of silver from the stocks of silver of the United States Treasury. I am prepared, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, to transmit to the Foreign Economic Administration requests of Saudi Arabia for the above mentioned silver, and the agreement of Saudi Arabia to fulfill the commitments made in this letter and to return to the United States Treasury within 5 years after the end of the existing emergency as determined by the President of the United States, an amount of silver bullion equivalent to the total number of ounces of silver transferred to Saudi Arabia under the Act of March 11, 1941, from the stocks of the United States Treasury silver, provided, however, that if conditions of the world supply of silver make it advisable, such period may be extended by agreement of both Governments for an additional 2 years. I agree, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, that the 3,437,500 ounces of silver to be transferred to Saudi Arabia under the agreement which I am prepared, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, to transmit to the Foreign Economic Administration, shall be coined into 10 million riyals by the United States Mint for Saudi Arabia, to be used only for the purpose of providing riyals for foreign diplomatic missions and foreign business enterprises in Saudi Arabia in exchange for dollar credits in the United States at the rate of 30 United States cents per riyal. I further agree, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, that whenever silver transferred to Saudi Arabia, under the Act of March 11, 1941, is used for the purpose of providing riyals for foreign diplomatic missions and foreign business enterprises, 60 percent of the dollar credits so obtained shall be deposited in an account to be opened with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as fiscal agent of the United States, in the name of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, and shall be held for the sole purpose of purchasing silver to be returned to the United States Treasury. It is understood that the dollars in such account may be invested and reinvested from time to time in direct obligations of the Government of the United States; that all such securities shall be held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as fiscal agent of the United States, in a securities account in the name of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia; and that the earnings accruing thereon need not be held for the sole purpose of purchasing silver to be returned to the United States Treasury. The costs incurred by the United States Mint in minting the 10 million riyals and the cost of shipping the riyals from the United States to Saudi Arabia will be paid by Saudi Arabia out of the dollars derived from the provision of riyals to foreign diplomatic missions and foreign business enterprises in Saudi Arabia. It is understood that these costs will be over and above the amount deposited with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for the purpose of purchasing silver to be returned to the United States Treasury. It will be appreciated if you will kindly advise the Foreign Economic Administration of your approval of the foregoing request. Respectfully yours,” The following is the text of the letter to be sent to the Honorable Leo T. Crowley, Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration: “Sir: His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, through (name) (title) , hereby requests the Foreign Economic Administration to supply, as soon as possible, 3,437,500 ounces of silver under the Act of March 11, 1941, from the stocks of the United States Treasury silver. I hereby agree, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia that Saudi Arabia shall return to the United States Treasury, within 5 years after the end of the existing emergency, as determined by the President of the United States, an amount of silver equivalent to the total number of ounces of silver transferred to Saudi Arabia under the Act of March 11, 1941, from the stock of the United States Treasury silver, provided, however, that if the conditions of the world supply of silver make it advisable, such period may be extended by an agreement of both Governments for an additional 2 years; and that Saudi Arabia will fulfill the commitments made in the letter addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States on . . . . . 1944. Respectfully yours,” [Treasury] Hull 61 The Minister Resident, replying in telegram 153, May 11, 6 p.m., reported that “Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs has just delivered signed letters dated April 24 as prescribed in Department’s 57, April 12, 8 p.m. He also delivered royal decree authorizing him to sign prescribed letters.…” (102.1/10822) A signed letter was also delivered in which the Saudi Arabian Government agreed to open appropriate accounts, in the name of the King, with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as fiscal agent of the United States, as requested by the Secretary of State in his telegram 56, April 12, 8 p.m. (not printed). The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.51/67: Telegram [Document 743] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , April 13, 1944—8 a.m. [Received 10:55 a.m.] 106. My 96, April 8, 9 a.m. 62 Both Saudi Finance Minister and Acting Foreign Minister state that Saudi Government must have assistance in excess of that contemplated in budget figures of British Minister. They have indicated that they would like the United States to supply deficiency. Request for specific sums expected in few days. Sent Department, code text airmail to Cairo for Landis. Moose 62 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 890F.515/97a: Telegram [Document 744] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) Washington , April 13, 1944—7 p.m. 58. Upon receipt of your 90, March 30, 11 p.m. 63 a memorandum was sent to the President 64 recommending increased financial and economic assistance to Saudi Arabia and that this Government share the subsidization of Saudi Arabia on an over-all, equal basis with the British. It was recommended further that this Government’s share of the subsidy assume the initial form of Lend Lease aid and that the Foreign Economic Administration be authorized to furnish the necessary goods, it being contemplated that Congressional approval might be sought subsequently for outright financial assistance. It was also recommended to the President that this Government propose to the Saudi Arabian Government the establishment of a central bank under purely American auspices, as no official reaction has been heard from the British in regard to a previous proposal to them for the establishment of such a bank under joint auspices. 65 The President has now indicated his complete approval of all the recommendations made in this memorandum submitted to him. While plans for joint American-British assistance on an over-all equal basis must necessarily be discussed with the British, the Department desires as soon as possible to make such concrete plans as may be feasible for the extension of the American share of this aid. In order to make these plans it is essential to obtain accurate factual information regarding the financial and economic needs of Saudi Arabia. As you are aware, the information the Department has received based on your recommendations together with those of Treasury representatives and Jordan are conflicting and therefore totally inadequate as a basis for a concrete plan. In particular the Department wishes to ascertain the types and quantities of goods that Saudi Arabia will need over given periods as well as to receive your recommendations as to the types and quantities which should be furnished from American sources in order to provide assistance on an over-all equal basis with the British. Furthermore, before any decision can be reached regarding minting of riyals referred to in your 103, April 11, 11 a.m., 66 it will be necessary to obtain accurate information regarding Saudi Arabia’s need for Lend Lease silver coins. It is desired therefore that you, in cooperation with Landis and Treasury representatives, provide the Department with this essential factual background information as soon as possible. Repeated to Cairo for Landis. 67 Hull 63 See footnote 57, p. 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] . 64 Memorandum of April 3, p. 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] . 65 This plan had been advanced informally by Treasury Department experts at the meeting on February 17 at Washington of representatives of the United States and British Governments with regard to Saudi Arabian fiscal problems (see footnote 47, p. 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] ). 66 Not printed. 67 Repeated as telegram 822. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/27: Telegram [Document 745] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , April 15, 1944—noon. [Received April 15—9:22 a.m.] 3073. Deles 68 No. 10. From the Under Secretary. During a recent conversation on Saudi Arabia between Murray 69 and Sir Maurice Peterson, 70 the latter stated that the British Government, on the request of King Ibn Saud, contemplated furnishing the Saudi Arabian Government with a financial adviser and with military advisers “to train and establish a Saudi Arabian army on modern lines”. He said that only Sunni Moslems were desired, as they would live at Mecca and other interior cities, and that the British were already seeking a suitable financial adviser in India. As regards the military advisers, Sir Maurice saw no impediment in principle, pointing out that they would reside in different areas than the American military personnel recently sent to Saudi Arabia, but desired to let us know of the request and ascertain our views. Murray replied that this was a question which would have to be considered in Washington, particularly by the War Department, on the basis of full information. Sir Maurice agreed to secure more details on the subject for submission to the Department. Meanwhile we should appreciate any information which the Department may be able to obtain on this subject and an indication of the attitude which the Department and the War Department would be likely to adopt. Sent to Department. Repeated to Jidda. 71 [Stettinius.] Winant 68 Designation for telegrams sent by the Stettinius Mission from London. During the period from April 7 to April 29, 1944, the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) was engaged in informal conversations at London with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) relating to problems of foreign policy; for correspondence regarding this Mission, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 69 Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, at this time a member of the Stettinius Mission. 70 British Superintending Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Eastern Department. 71 Repeated in summary by the Department to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia at his request, in telegram 70, April 25, 9 p.m. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/145: Telegram [Document 746] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , April 15, 1944—9 p.m. [Received April 16—2:18 a.m.] 109. British Minister has just informed me that when he was in Riyadh recently King Ibn Saud asked that British Government supply British Moslem Army officers to reorganize Saudi Armed Forces. Compare paragraphs 2 and 6, my 99, April 10, 5 p.m. 72 He referred request to London and says no reply has yet been received. Present disclosure explained by saying Wallace Murray had already discussed subject in London. When I observed that his [ this ] was another project which infringed on American plans he replied that there was no conflict because the American military mission would stay only a few months in Taif to teach the use of the new arms and would then retire leaving British mission to train and organize the Saudi forces. I reminded him that no limitation had been placed by anyone on period of instruction by US Army mission. British Minister thought it would really be advantageous to United States to have British military mission here because of added security to oil field. In a reflective mood he observed that oil reserves are very large and very important. General Paget, 73 commanding British ME 74 forces and Jordan will visit King Ibn Saud at or near Riyadh. Jordan describes it as a purely courtesy call and says it will take place about April 19. Acting Foreign Minister says Jordan knows that General Paget’s visit has been postponed. An attempt will be made to verify British Minister’s other statements. Sent to Department repeated to Cairo for Giles. 75 Moose 72 Not printed. 73 Gen. Sir Bernard Paget. 74 Middle East. 75 Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME). The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.51/68: Telegram [Document 747] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , April 18, 1944—5 p.m. [Received April 19—3:44 a.m.] 114. My 106, April 13, 8 a.m. No agreement has yet been reached on extent and kind of aid to be given by British Government to Saudi Arabia in 1944. Few days ago King Ibn Saud sent letter by British Minister in Jidda expressing gratitude and friendship toward British Government, stating in substance that after full and frank discussion of Saudi needs King was uncertain of extent British aid and asking written statement of aid British Government is prepared to give. Then, continued letter, Saudi Government will know where it stands, and if intended aid is not sufficient, other possibilities such as securing help from Oil Company will be examined. British Minister proceeding to King’s camp tomorrow for further conversations but high Saudi officials think he will not make written answer nor will he offer assistance which King’s advisers consider adequate. If British Minister persists in present policy of drastic economy now, it may soon be time to consider point at which harmful political effects of such policy outweigh beneficial economic effects. Code text airmail to Cairo for Landis. Moose The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 890F. 515/99: Telegram [Document 748] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) Washington , April 18, 1944—8 p.m. 64. The Department approves of your plans set forth in your 110, April 15, 10 p.m. 76 to visit King Ibn Saud in Riyadh. Furthermore, it is believed that you should make frequent periodic trips to Riyadh in the future in order to keep in close touch with the King. You should endeavor to arrange with the military authorities in the Middle East to make a plane available not only for your forthcoming visit to Riyadh but also to make a plane available to you at such times as you consider necessary for other trips to Riyadh in the future. If you are not able to make these arrangements locally with the military authorities, please advise the Department immediately so that the question may be taken up with the War Department. Hull 76 Not printed; in this telegram the Minister Resident reported that the King had requested him to come to Riyadh, presumably to discuss the question of increased United States aid (890F.515/99). The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 890F. 51A/3a: Telegram [Document 749] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) Washington , April 18, 1944—9 p.m. 65. In view of the developments reported in your 90, March 30, 11 p.m., 97, April 8, 6 p.m., and London’s 3073, April 15, noon, 77 to Department, it is suggested that King Ibn Saud may wish to avail himself, at the expense of this Government, of the services of Colonel Eddy 78 as financial and economic adviser, as well as military adviser with respect to such matters as the King may wish to discuss with him. (This arrangement would be permissible under the provisions of Public Law 722, approved October 1, 1942, 79 authorizing the President to designate military and naval personnel to advise with respect to military and naval matters such countries as he considers necessary to assist in the interest of national defense.) Please state whether you consider it advisable to suggest the foregoing arrangement to the King during your forthcoming visit to Riyadh, provided in your judgment it should appear opportune to do so. If you concur in principle with this suggestion but in the event that the time of your visit should not appear propitious for discussing the matter with the King, do you believe, in view of Amir Faisal’s 80 invitation to Eddy to visit Riyadh, that arrangements could be made for Eddy to stay on there for a while and that the suggestion should be made to the King subsequently after he has had an opportunity to become better acquainted with Eddy? Unless you consider it inadvisable to make this suggestion to the King, please discuss the matter with Eddy and report whether he would be willing to undertake this important mission. If he should be unwilling, please express your opinion as to whether the King might wish to avail himself of the services of Colonel Hoskins 81 in a like capacity. If you concur, the Department will recommend to the President that he designate either Eddy or Hoskins, as circumstances warrant, to serve as an adviser to King Ibn Saud. Hull 77 Telegrams 90 and 97 not printed. 78 Col. William A. Eddy, former college president and Arabic scholar, had been detailed from the United States Marine Corps in December 1943 for duty with the Department of State. Colonel Eddy had been instructed by the Department on January 28 to proceed to Saudi Arabia where he was to serve at the United States Legation as Special Assistant to the Minister Resident; it was contemplated that he would also visit other parts of Arabia and other countries of the Near and Middle East. Colonel Eddy’s duties on this special mission were “in general, to establish contact with both official and nonofficial persons for the purpose of acquainting yourself with local personalities, problems, currents of thought, wants, needs, and aspirations, both political and nonpolitical, with particular reference to American interests, friendly and helpful relations between the United States and the local governments and peoples, and the attitude of their governments and their respective nationals regarding these matters”. (123 Eddy, William A./1) 79 56 Stat. 763. 80 Second son of King Ibn Saud and Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 81 Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins; with regard to Colonel Hoskins’ missions to the Near East in 1942 and 1943, see bracketed note, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 19 . The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.51A/4: Telegram [Document 750] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , April 20, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 8:49 p.m.] 116. Department’s 65, April 18, 9 p.m. It would be of interest to know substance of London’s 3073 April 15, noon, which was not repeated here. 82 Telling King that, if he so desires President is ready to name military adviser might be useful. If King desires, adviser designation of officer becomes detail; if not, refusal might set a useful precedent should question again arise. In my opinion subject of financial adviser should not now be discussed other than to say that if King would like Americans in advisory capacity Government would give sympathetic consideration to any request. Specific proposal for financial adviser might be considered when plans for increased financial aid to Saudi Arabia take more definite shape. Colonel Eddy will accompany me to Riyadh and no objection is perceived if he wishes to remain there or to return a second time. He is willing to accept post as military adviser. Moose 82 See footnote 71, p. 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] . The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 800.51/1460: Telegram [Document 751] The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , April 21, 1944—2 p.m. [Received April 21—12:45 p.m.] 995. To Wallace Murray from Landis. Have been informed by the British that Jordan, British Minister to Saudi Arabia, will be in Cairo next Monday for the Middle East Financial Conference. They say that London after consultation with you has instructed Jordan to discuss certain aspects of supply to Saudi Arabia with me. In the light of the existing Saudi Arabian situation, I would be pleased to receive any instructions that you may have on this matter. Sent London as No. 44 repeated Department as No. 995. [Landis.] Kirk The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.51/71: Telegram [Document 752] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , April 21, 1944—10 p.m. [Received April 22—11:30 a.m.] 118. My 114, April 18, 5 p.m. While Jordan was in King’s camp King repeated request for written statement of intended British aid to Saudi Arabia and said if adequate assistance could not be had from British he would appeal to oil company or American Government. Jordan was unable to give desired statement but promised to secure data in Cairo and to answer when he and General Paget visit King at Riyadh about April 26. Moose The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/51: Telegram [Document 753] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , April 22, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 22—8:50 p.m.] 3341. Deles No. 27. From the Under Secretary. During discussions on Saudi Arabia, Sir Maurice Peterson and Murray agreed British and American economic authorities in Cairo should explore possibility of joint Anglo-American goods subsidy program for Saudi Arabia being guided in principle by standard of 50–50 participation so far as this compatible with appropriate assignment of loading areas. If Department perceives no objection I suggest Landis be authorized to discuss the question in this sense with Jordan in reference to Cairo’s 995, April 22 [ 21 ], 2 p.m. repeating to Department Cairo’s 44 same date to London. Sent to Department. Repeated to Jidda and to Cairo for Landis. [Stettinius.] Winant The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 890F.50/3: Telegram [Document 754] The Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , April 25, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 4:26 p.m.] 1041. Although the matter is without my province the interest which I have maintained in my former post Saudi Arabia, induces me to offer the following observations prompted by the receipt here of unofficial and disturbing reports on conditions as they are apparently developing there: The indications are that Saudi Arabia is rapidly becoming an active battle ground in the implementation of two systems of foreign policy—the British which in the past has aimed to make countries in which they are interested dependent in perpetuity both economically upon the Empire, and the American system which is based on the intent to help backward countries to help themselves in order that they may lay the foundation for real self dependence. Needless to say a stable world order can be achieved only under the American system. The conflict between the application of these two policies in Saudi Arabia is not only operating against the basic welfare of the country itself but is injuring the prestige of Western methods in this typically Arab country. I believe therefore that this conflict should be thrashed out between Washington and London at once and a settlement reached which in fact will also serve to determine now the course of Anglo-American cooperation throughout the world in the post-armistice period. Once this settlement is reached the fact should be made known to the American and British representatives in Jidda whose duty it should then be to judge each problem involving foreign [assistance?] of its contribution to the essential welfare of the country both with regard to its internal progress as well as to its relation with other countries and then to strive to implement the decisions so reached in a spirit of cooperation and not of competition. This problem is larger than the boundaries of Saudi Arabia as it goes to the essence of post-war action by the United States and Great Britain throughout the world. The situation in Saudi Arabia, however, involving as it does the presence of important and increasing American interests established in a primitive state from which until recently the United States has stood aloof and in which Great Britain has been manifesting its interest in a practical way, offers a ready field for the conflict of the two systems of policy outlined above and therefore presents a necessity for reaching some understanding on the basis of which the two countries may cooperate there and elsewhere. Kirk The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 890F. 51A/4: Telegram [Document 755] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) Washington , April 25, 1944—8 p.m. 69. During your forthcoming talks with the King you may state, if it appears advisable to do so, as suggested in your 116, April 20, 1 p.m., that if King Ibn Saud would like to have American advisers in a military, financial or other capacity, sympathetic consideration will be given to his request. It appears desirable that Eddy remain in Riyadh if it is feasible to arrange for him to do so. Hull The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/64: Telegram [Document 756] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , April 26, 1944—10 p.m. [Received April 26—9:27 p.m.] 3443. Deles No. 34. From the Under Secretary. During their talks on Saudi Arabia Sir Maurice Peterson and Murray agreed as to the desirability of accelerating consideration of the Saudi Arabian financial problem, and particularly of the proposals for the establishment of a currency system, now under discussion between the Department and the Treasury and the British Embassy. 83 Since this is closely related to the question of a goods subsidy program and the contemplated shipment of further supplies of silver from the United States, which the British consider undesirable, I hope the Department can expedite action on this subject in Washington. [Stettinius.] Winant 83 See footnote 47, p. 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] . The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.51A/6: Telegram [Document 757] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , April 27, 1944—1 p.m. [Received April 28—9:44 a.m.] 123. Authorization to mention advisers contained in Department’s 69, April 25, 8 p.m. received after my return to Jidda. Substance of Department’s message will be conveyed to King at first favorable opportunity. Suggestion of military adviser would be presented under more favorable circumstances if Department authorized me to say that President is ready to appoint adviser should King so desire. Colonel Eddy arrived at King’s camp; he is probably in Riyadh today and intends to reach Baghdad May 5 after visiting Dhahran; he is ready to return to Riyadh any time needed there. Moose The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Stettinius Mission/76: Telegram [Document 758] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , April 27, 1944—5 p.m. [Received April 27—3:20 p.m.] 3447. Deles 37. Reference Esdel 84 No. 54. 85 From the Under Secretary. Murray’s talks on Saudi Arabia have developed increasingly toward close American-British cooperation and collaboration. The Foreign Office, in accord with the War Office, now suggests, subject to Ibn Saud’s consent, that there be a joint Anglo-American military mission, headed by an Anglo-Saxon British officer with Arabian training and experience. The British contingent would consist mainly, if not entirely, of the Sunni Moslem Indian officers requested by the King. Details would be worked out in Cairo, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities in Washington and London. Murray has reserved reply until proposal can be examined in Washington. Department may wish to initiate discussions with War Department. [Stettinius.] Winant 84 Designation for telegrams being sent to the Stettinius Mission at London. 85 Telegram 3293, April 25, 2 p.m., to London, not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk) 890F.515/101: Telegram [Document 759] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Kirk ) Washington , April 27, 1944—midnight. 973. For Landis. The Department is thoroughly in accord with the suggestion made in London’s 3341, April 22, 11 p.m. that American and British economic authorities in Cairo explore the possibility of a joint goods subsidy program for Saudi Arabia based upon the principle of joint over-all 50–50 participation. However, in view of the political implications involved, the expectation that Jordan will take part in the discussions, and the probability that Moose will acquire additional factual information regarding Saudi Arabia’s economic requirements in the course of his current visit to King Ibn Sand, the Department considers it advisable that no discussions take place before Moose is able to proceed to Cairo to participate therein. Accordingly, Moose is being instructed to proceed to Cairo as soon as possible, 86 and, if practicable by the military plane being furnished for his visit to the King. Please inform Jordan that it is desired that these discussions begin as soon as Moose can get to Cairo and express the hope that Jordan will be able to remain in Cairo until Moose arrives. It is desired that you and Moose cooperate closely in obtaining all factual information possible regarding Saudi Arabia’s economic needs and collaborate in submitting to the Department your and his recommendations concerning the nature and extent of this Government’s participation in the goods subsidy and related matters after the forthcoming discussions with Jordan and British economic officials in Cairo. It is suggested also that Friedman, Treasury representative at financial conference, might be invited to participate in these discussions. Upon receipt of this information and these recommendations, the Department, together with other interested agencies of this Government, will endeavor to formulate appropriate plans for the implementation of the program suggested in London’s 3341 and the extension to Saudi Arabia of such economic and financial assistance to Saudi Arabia as circumstances warrant. Sent to Cairo. Repeated to Jidda. 87 Hull 86 This instruction was sent to the Minister Resident in telegram 75, April 27, midnight. 87 Repeated as telegram 74; the Under Secretary of State was informed of action taken herein in telegram 3409, April 27, midnight, to London (740.0011 Stettinius Mission/67d). The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/172: Telegram [Document 760] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , April 29, 1944—10 p.m. [Received May 3—9:07 a.m.] 134. My 120, April 22, 8 p.m. 88 Saudi problems of supply and transport were discussed with King on April 23 and 24. King stated that successive dry seasons have reduced number of camels in country thereby increasing dependence on motor vehicles for transport of food. He fears risk of famine in interior if additional vehicles not obtained. He expressed pleasure over 50 lend-lease trucks expected to arrive shortly (my 131, April 29, 7 p.m. 88 ). In reply to question King stated that no agreement had yet been reached as to extent of Britain [ British aid? ] to Saudi Arabia for 1944. He was informed that President has approved policy that within legal limitations United States is ready to share subsidization of Saudi Arabia equally with British. King expressed satisfaction and emphasized need for friendly cooperation between American, British and Saudi Governments. When asked for additional data on Saudi needs he stated that his Ministers would supply it. Ministers subsequently said that budget figures give essentials of information desired. When it was suggested that estimates for a few years ahead would be informative Ministers replied that 1944 budget was good indication of recurrent annual needs and that extraordinary needs would be requested Lend-Lease from time to time. See my 135 following. Moose 88 Not printed. 88 Not printed. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/164: Telegram [Document 761] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , April 29, 1944—11 p.m. [Received May 2—10:41 p.m.] 135. After recent conversations with King Ibn Saud his Ministers drew up memorandum of parts of conversations regarding finance, supply and transportation which King agreed should be divulged to the British authorities and summary thereof is embodied in my 134, April 28 [ 29 ], 10 p.m. He requested that further discussion reported in this message not be mentioned to British until plans for increased United States help to Saudi Arabia have taken definite shape. In advising King of substance of Department’s 58 April 13, 7 p.m. no mention was made of bank. King was informed over 6 months ago of willingness of United States to assist in establishment of central banking institution and it is believed that next move should be definite proposal. King recalled long friendship between British and himself and expressed gratitude for their help. At present, however, British did not seem able to help to extent of Saudi Arabia’s needs. King went into details of decrease in recent British aid adding that no agreement for 1944 had been reached and that during July British would review supply situation for last 5 months of year. He stated that British withheld 1943 pilgrimage tariff items, but when pressed, offered to arrange loan of half million pounds sterling to Saudi Arabia on security of revenues of next pilgrimage. King refused. King would welcome additional aid from USA. He had instructed his Ministers to prepare statement of over-all Saudi annual requirements to be delivered to me. Statement of extent of British commitment would be delivered as soon as received. King expected such statement after few days when Jordan returns to Riyadh for General Paget’s visit. King said British would continue to be his friends because he is grateful for past aid and because he fears they might loose their restraint on his enemies, such as the Hashemite 89 family. But, he continued, their present policy would ruin his country. His people are sorely tried by wartime conditions and progressive desiccation of Arabia. If his bounty to poor is curtailed blame will be attributed to British and German radio propaganda will, in public mind, be confirmed or alternatively King will be blamed with consequent weakening of his authority. Therefore additional aid from friendly United States of America would be most welcome. He remarked that one day it might be necessary for Saudi Arabia to look to United States of America for all its requirements. Two lists of Saudi over-all annual requirements were supplied by King’s Ministers, but they add little to budget figures. They include 3,000 tons cotton goods, 9,000 tons sugar, 66,000 tons cereals, 25,000,000 silver riyals, 500,000 gold sovereigns, 640 motor vehicles, 10,000 tires, agricultural machinery, medicines. Further details by mail. 91 Moose 89 The family of Hussein, Sherif of Mecca and guardian of the Moslem holy places in the Hejaz, who, in alliance with the British, led the Arab revolt during World War I which led to the detachment of the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire from Turkish sovereignty. Sons of Hussein founded dynasties in Iraq and Transjordan. 91 Despatch 169, May 2, not printed. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/170: Telegram [Document 762] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , April 30, 1944—7 p.m. [Received May 3—2:30 p.m.] 138. My 135, April 29, 11 p.m. Achievement of equality with British in aid to Saudi Arabia will help but alone will not assure protection of US interests. Anti-locust campaign and Jordan’s recent activities relating to military mission, financial expert, road work, dismissal of local officials, administrative reforms and retention of pilgrimage revenues look remarkably like attempt to establish British influence here. My despatch 153, April 13. 92 It is difficult to reconcile Jordan’s acts with Halifax statement cited in Department’s instruction 127, March 27. 93 In my opinion US interests can be adequately protected only if United States Government is ready if necessary to take over entire problem of Saudi supply and finance until oil royalties substantially increase. With assurance of such help the King will be able to resist British pressure. Without it he is vulnerable. True reasons for US interest in Saudi Arabia is obvious to all particularly to British. Now that Saudi supply problem is to be discussed with British it might be useful for Department to consider the ultimate aim of policy recently manifested by Jordan. Moose 92 Not printed. 93 Not printed; an enclosure to the instruction reported a conversation between the Under Secretary of State and the British Ambassador on March 10 as follows: “Lord Halifax mentioned having lunch with Hurley and having had a frank discussion with him relative to the political activities of the British in Saudi Arabia. Halifax stated they had no desire to promote such activity and would I please reassure my associates.” (741.90F/24) Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley was Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in the Near and Middle East at various times in 1943. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 890F.20 Mission/11a: Telegram [Document 763] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) 94 Washington , May 1, 1944—5 p.m. 3489. The Department, with the concurrence of the War Department, approves of the British suggestion set forth in Deles 37 95 for a joint American-British military mission, to be headed by a British officer of Anglo-Saxon extraction and with experience and training in Arab countries, it being recognized that the British have primary military responsibility in that area. However, the Department’s and the War Department’s approval of the Foreign Office’s suggestion is contingent upon the Foreign Office’s acceptance of the viewpoint that, in view of preponderant American economic interests in Saudi Arabia, any financial or economic mission such as the one referred to in Deles no. 10 96 that may be sent to Saudi Arabia at the request of Ibn Saud should be headed by an American. If the Foreign Office concurs in this viewpoint, it is believed that our Minister Resident and the British Minister at Jidda should seek jointly to obtain King Ibn Saud’s consent to such a mission and that the American and British military authorities in Cairo should be instructed to work out the details thereof among themselves. Hull 94 Repeated substantially to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia in telegram 80, May 1, 5 p.m., with the following instruction: “If the Foreign Office concurs in the foregoing, it is suggested that you and your British colleague may wish jointly to seek the King’s consent to such a military mission. “The War Department is advising General Giles of these developments for his information and will instruct him to take up the matter with the British military authorities in Cairo. If the Foreign Office concurs in the Department’s views, you may wish to discuss this matter with General Giles when you go to Cairo.” (890F.20 Missions/9a) 95 April 27, p. 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] . 96 April 15, p. 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] . The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.20 Missions/11: Telegram [Document 764] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , May 3, 1944—4 p.m. [Received May 4—4 p.m.] 144. Department’s 80, May 1, 5 p.m. 97 Colonel Garret B. Shomber was presented to King April 23 as chief of United States military mission. I fear grave weakening of American standing and influence with King Ibn Saud if United States mission now withdrawn and British-led mission replaces it. If Department intends effectively to defend oil reserves here such considerations cannot be ignored. The King in discussing military mission never indicated any preference for Moslem instructors. Please confirm that Department wishes me in concert with British Minister to obtain King’s consent in change in mission. Because of overwhelming American economic interests in Saudi Arabia, British should recognize American priority in economic and financial missions’ advisers and experts without necessity of bargaining. Code text to Cairo airmail for Giles. Moose 97 See footnote 94, above. The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 890F.20 Missions/11: Telegram [Document 765] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) Washington , May 11, 1944—noon. 93. The following is for your confidential background information only: It has been agreed, as a result of the preliminary petroleum discussions just concluded in Washington between American and British officials, 98 that the proposed oil agreement between this Government and the British Government should contain a clause providing that each Government and its nationals shall respect all valid concessions, contracts and rights lawfully acquired and shall not attempt unilaterally to interfere with such contracts or rights either directly or indirectly. If this clause is included in the final agreement, which now appears likely, it is considered that a material contribution will have been made to the protection of the American oil concession and interests in Saudi Arabia. You may wish to consider this development in connection with the suggestion made in your 138, April 30, 7 p.m., to the effect that American interests in Saudi Arabia can be safeguarded adequately only if the Government is prepared to assume the entire responsibility of providing financial aid and supplies to Saudi Arabia. In view of the President’s approval of the Department’s recommendation referred to in Department’s 58, April 13, 7 p.m., and developments arising out of conversations between Mr. Wallace Murray and Sir Maurice Peterson in London reported to you in subsequent telegrams, the Department proposes to endeavor to work out with the British a program for the extension of joint assistance to Saudi Arabia on a substantially 50–50 over-all basis. It is considered that it would be consistent with this policy for a British officer to head a joint military mission and for an American to head a financial and economic mission. It is hoped, therefore, that the Department, together with the War Department, may be able to arrange with the British and with King Ibn Saud for a joint military mission, taking into consideration the developments reported in your 144, May 3, 4 p.m., of a character that would not embarrass Colonel Shomber or reflect upon American prestige. Hull 98 For correspondence regarding these discussions, see vol. iii , pp. 94 ff. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 890F.20 Missions/13a: Telegram [Document 766] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , May 31, 1944—5 p.m. 4322. The Department is extremely anxious to ascertain as soon as possible the views of the Foreign Office in regard to the suggestions made in Department’s 3489, May 1, 5 p.m. concerning military and financial advisers for Saudi Arabia. As the Foreign Office is doubtless aware, American and British officials are now discussing in Cairo Saudi Arabian supply and fiscal problems with a view to endeavoring to seek their solution through joint American-British cooperative assistance. It is believed that a settlement of the adviser question might contribute to the successful outcome of these conversations now taking place in Cairo. It may be recalled that Foreign Office officials recently expressed to Mr. Wallace Murray the hope that conversations in Washington between American and British Treasury officials regarding Saudi Arabian fiscal and monetary matters might be resumed as soon as possible. In as much as the adviser question is of a fundamental character with respect to the solution of Saudi Arabian problems, it has been considered advisable to await receipt of the Foreign Office’s expression of opinion regarding this question before resuming the financial discussions in Washington. Please convey the substance of the foregoing to appropriate officials of the Foreign Office and express to them the hope that the Department may receive their expressions of opinion regarding the adviser question as soon as possible. Hull The Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 890F.515/113: Telegram [Document 767] The Chargé in Egypt ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 3, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 6 p.m.] 1503. To Acheson 99 and Crowley. 1 Personal for [ from? ] Landis. Subject Saudi Arabian matters. 1. After long negotiations we have reached a considerable measure of agreement. We have an agreed supply program conditional upon acceptance of our proposals. 2. We are not agreed on the 1944 budget. Our difference here is 10 million riyals. In reaching this figure we have receded from a better than 20 million riyal figure in an effort to meet the British. The issue involved is the extent to which we will force Saudi Arabia to curtail her present program of the free distribution of goods. The British proposal forces a 50% reduction. This we believe too much and we think it endangers amicable relationships that exist with Saudi Arabs. We are thus adamant on this point although we have been agreeable to other economies. 3. British have communicated our proposal to London in a sympathetic manner. 4. Our proposal leaves a budgetary deficit after the goods subsidy of about 10 million riyals. This would have to be made up by lend-lease in riyals. 5. British here, I believe, would accept our proposal because of its intrinsic merit except for the fact that it forces Cairo to let Jordan, British Minister to Jidda, down and they would prefer to have London do it and British Treasury heretofore has been adamant against introduction of more lend-lease riyals into Saudi Arabia on allegedly [garbled group] our judgment have to [ no? ] merit and we believe they screen political reasons. 6. Our proposal cuts over-all subsidy British and American last year from about 80 to 60 million riyals. Of the latter subsidy some 35 millions has already been granted; our share in that has been negligible. 7. You will be interested to know that British Treasury has determined that all subsidies granted or to be granted to Saudi Arabia are clear gifts. This has not yet been communicated to Saudia Arabs. 8. Our budgetary proposal is sensible in light of potentially increasing revenues to Saudi Arabia. We can balance her budget when oil production reaches 250,000 barrels per day. It will reach 100,000 next September and the pipe line would easily bring it over 350,000 mark. 9. We have not discussed provision of advisers to Saudi Arabian Government but it has been agreed in the interim that no new projects for aid to Saudi Arabia will be started independently. 10. We have not communicated with Saudi Arabs during course of negotiations. They are aware that we have been struggling for a fair budget as against the fearful economies proposed by Jordan. [11.] There are reasons other than political for not communicating as in paragraph 10 which cannot be disclosed except personally. 12. British and ourselves are completely agreed that we should present a common program to Saudi Arabs and adhere honestly to the concept of joint action. I do not believe we can do otherwise. Neither as a nation nor institutionally are we equipped to handle this issue alone and in competition with the British. We are not far advanced in our over-all foreign policy nor have we the resources out here successfully to carry through such a program. 13. There will be left over provided we get agreement from London ( a ) mechanics for 50–50 division of subsidy ( b ) general instructions to our respective Ministers ( c ) currency reform ( d ) nature of advisory help to be rendered Saudi Arabian Government. These matters cannot be settled here. I propose therefore pursuant to authority granted in Department’s 1158 May 16, 1944 2 to proceed to Washington on this and many other Middle East matters as soon as word from Condon [ London ?] has been received. We have a change [ chance ] now to do an over-all concrete job of Saudi Arabia involving concrete Anglo-American cooperation and we should not let that chance lapse. If we can succeed in this case the pattern and the spirit of this cooperative effort may well apply to other countries of the Middle East and result in the formulation of a concrete and clear American policy for the Middle East. Saudi Arabia presents the best test case for concrete cooperation with British in all the Middle East and we should succeed in making it work here. 14. I am informing British of my intention to proceed to Washington and the objectives of my visit. 15. Among the Middle East matters I wish to discuss are my relationships with the Department, my responsibility with reference to the Balkans, a series of problems that have the commodity index as their focus, the area of importers choice, relaxation of import restrictions, policy regarding the disposition of salvage and installations and others. 16. Moose has cited this telegram, it also represents his views. 17. Please pass copy of this cable to the President and the Secretary of the Treasury. Sent Department as No. 1503. Repeated to Winant personal in London as 80. [Landis.] Jacobs 99 Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State. 1 Leo T. Crowley, Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration. 2 Not printed. The Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/183: Telegram [Document 768] The Chargé in Egypt ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] Cairo , June 7, 1944—10 a.m. [Received June 8—10:52 a.m.] 1534. Cairo’s 1513, June 3, 6 p.m. 3 For Murray from Moose. (1) Discussions of joint American-British assistance for Saudi Arabia have been confined to economic considerations though political factors have obviously determined attitude on both sides. American aim has been to devise supply and financial program adequate to maintain order and stability of Government of Saudi Arabia with ultimate objective of insuring Saudi independence and of protecting existing American interests. British on other hand have been so determined to effect drastic reduction not only in British subsidy but in all Saudi expenditures that they seem to consider Saudi stability as of secondary importance. Coupled with other projects originated or encouraged by Jordan since February it appears that he at any rate hopes to establish and exercise effective control over Saudi Government. (2) Any economic discussion which Landis may have in Washington should keep in mind fundamental political nature of Saudi problem and importance of oil interests involved. (3) British say latest proposals referred to London sympathetically. They promised to show Landis telegram to London before sending it but failed to do so. 4 … (4) Proposals represent large concession to British insistence on economy made in effort to secure joint program. In my opinion additional assistance may have to be provided before end of year. Proposed program to some extent based on confidential information supplied by British which could not be verified. Data from Saudi official sources entirely different. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (6) Jordan says British Treasury opposes further silver for Saudi Arabia on grounds of inflationary tendencies and has so advised “Washington”. Please advise if Department has been informed of this attitude. Jordan objects to more lend lease silver because when Saudi Arabia agrees to return silver United States has Saudi Arabia “in a cleft stick” meaning United States can use indebtedness to apply pressure on Saudi Arabia. This would seem to be a danger only when United States is creditor because Jordan proposed to King Ibn Saud a sterling loan secured by 1944 pilgrimage revenues and British experts here revived suggestion of sterling loan to cover 1944 budget deficit. (7) British say all their advances to Saudi Arabia are unconditional and that no repayment is expected though Saudi Government not informed. This is new development since hitherto advances have been described as loans in receipts taken by British Legation in Jidda. (8) Since Jordan opposed lend lease silver for Saudi Arabia and even attempted to persuade King and Saudi officials not to accept such silver, failure of the United States to supply at least part of the 20 million riyals already requested will be construed locally as proof that British policy overrules American policy. Such impression would be most unfortunate. (9) British authorities have not disavowed military mission, road mission or financial adviser sponsored or encouraged by Jordan in competition with American plans known to him nor have they shown any alacrity in reaching agreement on military and economic missions. It is therefore suggested that until the full scope and degree of American-British cooperation in Saudi Arabia is determined the Department continue with the Treasury’s plans for currency reform and central bank preferably with British participation but if necessary without. [Moose.] Jacobs 3 Not printed. 4 A copy of the telegram was given to Landis; see telegram 1563, June 8, 8 p.m., from Cairo, infra. The Chargé in Egypt (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/185: Telegram [Document 769] The Chargé in Egypt ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 8, 1944—8 p.m. [Received June 9—10:50 a.m.] 1563. To Acheson and Crowley from Landis. British have sent following paraphrased cable to Foreign Office: “Talks with Landis have centered about possible devices for putting into effect 50–50 sharing in assistance to Saudi Arabia from year’s beginning. Agreement is had on undesirability because of shipping and supply considerations of major switching of sources of supply. Two other courses remain. First is for Americans to pay us in dollars and second is for us to receive credit from Americans by way of reciprocal aid. First poses difficulties for Americans and we may have technical objections to the second. We assume you will discuss this problem with United States Treasury. Transfer of title to the commodities supplied under the British subsidy is not required by either alternative if we agree in making a joint declaration to Ibn Saud that all help rendered him from the start of the year was done so equally by United Kingdom and United States. If deliveries can now be made under cover of such a declaration, it would not be important who made them. The only question would then be an accounting question. On this question you will note that our subsidy is a free gift whereas subsidy from United States is lend-lease. Especially significant is this with regard to lend-lease silver which is normally repayable in kind after the war. Provided agreement is reached with Americans on general question of aid to Saudi Arabia as set forth in our earlier cable, we hope Jordan will be instructed to join with the United States Minister in making the declaration referred to above. Settlement of the accounting question can be had thereafter.[”] I am in accord with the general approach set forth in this telegram. [Landis.] Jacobs The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 890F.20 Mission/15: Telegram [Document 770] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State 5 London , June 9, 1944. [Received June 9—2:48 p.m.] 4615. See the Department’s 3489, May 1, 5 p.m. The Embassy has received the following letter dated June 8 from Sir Maurice Peterson: [“]I am writing in reply to your letter of the 2nd May, communicating the substance of a telegram from the State Department concerning military and financial advisers to Saudi Arabia. I note that the State Department accepts the suggestion we made to Mr. Wallace Murray that we should propose to Ibn Saud a joint British-American military mission to Saudi Arabia with a British officer at the head, but that the State Department’s approval is subject to the condition that any economic or financial mission that may be sent to that country at the request of Ibn Saud should be headed by an American. I think I should let you know that our latest information indicates that it may be very difficult to persuade Ibn Saud to accept any Christian officers at all. Should this prove to be the case, we will consult with the State Department whether it is better for us to supply Moslem officers only, or whether the whole idea of a military mission should be dropped. I think that our conversations in London showed conclusively that in this matter our interests and the American interests run entirely parallel and we shall discuss it with you with complete frankness. I presume that the condition regarding an economic or financial mission does not apply to the request which Ibn Saud made to us last March to be provided with a Sunni-Moslem financial adviser to help him with expert advice in reorganizing his country’s finances? (It is apparently essential that the financial expert shall be a Moslem owing to the Saudi Arabian Treasury, where he will have to work, being situated in Mecca.) There has not yet been any question of an economic or financial mission being sent to Saudi Arabia so far as we know, and I am not quite sure how far such a proposal would meet with Ibn Saud’s approval. But if and when the question of sending an economic mission arises, we should be inclined to agree that the leadership of it should be determined according to which party has the preponderant interest in Saudi Arabian economy and finance at the time. As you will recall, we agreed with Mr. Wallace Murray that ‘the larger financial and supply problems of Saudi Arabia ought to be dealt with as far as possible on a joint basis in consultation between the two Governments’. We entirely adhere to this. I hope you will agree, moreover, that we can each support the experts which either of us select for these important places where we have joint interests, and can have confidence in their willingness to further our common interests. We for our part have, as Mr. Wallace Murray recognized, done everything in our power to support Dr. Millspaugh 6 and make the Persians understand that he and his staff have our full and entire confidence. Similarly we trust that when the Middle East Supply Centre send a representative to Jidda (I understand that Colonel Coneybear, an American, is their latest appointment) he may count on the assistance of both our Legations and that he may be correspondingly counted upon to further the joint interests of both our countries. The same considerations should, I think, apply to the work of any British or American experts whom our two Governments may agree to send to advise Ibn Saud. Would you very kindly communicate this reply to the State Department; if, as I hope, we can agree on this basis then we will send the necessary instructions to our Minister in Jidda. I should like if I may to refer to another matter concerning Saudi Arabia as I am writing to you on the subject. I hear that there is a rumor in the Middle East that His Majesty’s Government, through their representatives at Jidda, themselves suggested to Ibn Saud that he might make this stipulation about the financial adviser and the officers being Sunni Moslems, with the object of restricting the choice to British subjects, and to cut out the Americans. I should like to say that the State Department may be categorically assured that this rumor, into which we have enquired, is absolutely unfounded. The proposal originated spontaneously from Ibn Saud, without any prompting from Mr. Jordan, or any other British source, and we have reason to believe that Ibn Saud feels strongly on the subject. I feel that in this question of advisers we have to consider not only American and British interests but also Ibn Saud’s own position. He has to be extremely careful not to expose himself to criticism to the effect that he, as guardian of the holy places of Islam and as leader of one of the strictest Moslem sects, has come under foreign influence and has accepted Christians to administer his affairs. I am sure the State Department will agree that we shall have to be careful to handle these questions of advisers in a way which will not lower Ibn Saud’s prestige amongst his own people.” Winant 5 Repeated verbatim to Moose and Landis at Cairo in telegram 1441, June 12, midnight. 6 Arthur C. Millspaugh, American Administrator General of Finances in the Iranian Government; for correspondence regarding the Millspaugh Mission, see pp. 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] ff. The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 890F.515/115: Telegram [Document 771] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 17, 1944—11 a.m. [Received June 17—9:45 a.m.] 1667. From Moose. Yesterday morning the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs delivered to me the following message from King Ibn Saud with the request that it be transmitted to Washington. “We are gratefully indebted to our two Allies, America and Great Britain, for their kindness and help which have had a great effect on us and our country, a thing which we will never forget and for which we will always be grateful to them. We would like to inform them now that there has happened exactly what we were afraid of and to which we referred a few weeks ago. It has actually taken place and there is no doubt that the two Legations are aware of the situation; and if they want further explanation our Ministers of Foreign Affairs PI and of Finance are ready to give them full details about the situation. Moreover, conditions at Riyadh and in the various parts of Nejd are worse and there is no doubt that if things are left without remedy they will have a bad repercussion on all the neighboring countries. Prices will go up and troubles and unusual disturbances may result. In view of our cordial friendship with the two Allied Governments and of their past services to us we have decided to inform them of everything that takes place in our country and about conditions surrounding us. We beg the two Legations to transmit this to their Governments in the hope that a solution may be found for they are capable of finding such a solution. We would like to know where we stand and what they can do to help us.” A similar message was delivered to the British Chargé d’Affaires. 7 Commentary will follow in a separate message. 8 [Moose.] Tuck 7 Robert E. Ellison. 8 Telegram 1670, June 18, 10 a.m., infra. The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 890F.515/116: Telegram [Document 772] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 18, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 5:57 p.m.] 1670. From Moose. Background of message from King Ibn Saud quoted in Cairo’s 1667, June 17, 11 a.m., as described by Acting Foreign Minister and Finance Minister consists principally of five following points: Firstly, commercial imports into Saudi Arabia have virtually ceased because foreign exchange is available to Saudi importers only at unreasonable rates. Secondly, Saudi Government recently paid 2 months’ arrears in official salaries largely through issues of foodstuffs but partially in coin. Two months’ salaries are still in arrears. Thirdly, deliveries of foodstuffs under British supply program have been inadequate. Fourthly, such payments deplete Saudi Government’s stocks to danger point and free distribution of bread is ceasing immediately throughout Saudi Arabia. Fifthly, special emphasis was laid on fact that supply of foodstuffs is insufficient without regard for transportation facilities. An attempt will be made to verify foregoing assertions of Minister. Foreign exchange difficulties are traceable among other causes ( a ) to reduction in sales of foreign exchange for rivals [ riyals ] by Saudi Government, Arabian American Oil Company and mining syndicate ( b ) to enforcement of ban on export of gold and silver and ( c ) possibly to unusually large number of orders recently placed abroad. Jidda banking house will sell foreign currencies for riyals or sovereigns only at rate unsatisfactory to Saudi merchants while refuses unexportable gold or silver under any circumstances. Finance Minister seems willing to consider relaxing ban on gold exports used to finance imports of essential requirements. Conversationally Finance Minister stated that prompt establishment of bank of issue would help with foreign exchange problem. Acting Foreign Minister, British Chargé and I agree with his opinion. Both Ministers pointed out that discussion of 1944 supply and finance program for Saudi Arabia began with British 6 months ago, joint American-British conversations have lasted over a month, and nothing has been proposed beyond British supply program which, in opinion of Saudi authorities and in mine, is inadequate. Saudi Government has three possible sources of aid: British Government, American Government and Aramco. 9 King’s message seems to indicate that he has little hope of getting necessary help from British and that American help is not materializing rapidly enough nor to extent he considers necessary. His next move may, therefore, be to turn to Aramco for loans or other assistance and Aramco may feel that it is in no position to refuse. The King has asked Ohliger 10 and Lebkicher 11 to meet him at Al-Kharj 12 for unspecified conversations and it is not unlikely that he will request company help. The Department’s attention is called to the fact that pressure on Saudi Arabia is being increased according to British plan although with American acquiescence. This is being achieved, intentionally or not, by British delay in plans for a joint program of assistance; while any plans for independent action by United States seem to be in abeyance so long as conversations continue. It is, therefore, suggested that further consideration now be given to establishment of bank of issue with or without British participation, considering at the same time what steps are to be taken for American aid to Saudi Arabia in event no adequate joint program can be agreed upon or put into effect with reasonable promptness. [Moose.] Tuck 9 The Arabian American Oil Company. 10 Floyd Ohliger, manager in Saudi Arabia of the Arabian American Oil Company. 11 Roy Lebkicher, representative of the Arabian American Oil Company who acted in a liaison capacity with the Saudi Arabian Government on currency problems. 12 Location of an experimental agricultural station and principal location of the American Agricultural Mission while in Saudi Arabia in 1942 under the leadership of K. S. Twitchell; for correspondence regarding the American Agricultural Mission to Saudi Arabia in 1942, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 561 ff. In 1944 plans reached fruition for the establishment of a Foreign Economic Administration agricultural project at Al-Kharj, under the auspices of the Department of State, and in pursuance of certain findings of the Twitchell Mission. The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 890F.515/118: Telegram [Document 773] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , June 20, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 4:55 p.m.] 1698. From Landis. Reference Moose’s 1670, June 18, 10 a.m., from Cairo. 1. I have pressed the British here twice to expedite reply on our Saudi Arabian proposals from London pointing out how delay threatens the ability to reach agreement. 2. I am checking recent imports to Saudi Arabia in order to gauge accuracy of Saudi Arabian official statement referred to in above cable. 3. One element possibly governing scarcity of foreign exchange is due to fact that all import licenses had been blocked for 3 months when I was in Jidda. Recent unblocking of these licenses may have caused an abnormal demand on foreign exchange. Note that exchange rates still have not brought riyal down to proposed 30 cents. [Landis.] Tuck The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) 890F.515/115: Telegram [Document 774] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) Washington , June 20, 1944—6 p.m. 1536. For Moose. Please inform King Ibn Saud immediately that, with reference to his message transmitted in Cairo’s 1667, June 17, 11 a.m., Landis is being recalled to Washington to discuss the matters to which the King refers and that it is hoped it will be possible promptly to take care of Saudi Arabia’s immediate supply and transport requirements and to work out a satisfactory long-range Saudi Arabian requirements program. Inform Landis. Hull The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) 890F.24/189a: Telegram [Document 775] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) Washington , June 21, 1944—2 p.m. 1542. For Landis. It is extremely difficult to reconcile the statement contained in paragraph 6 of Legation’s 1663, June 17, 9 p.m. 13 from you, to the effect that there is no cereal shortage in Saudi Arabia, with King Ibn Saud’s message set forth in Cairo’s 1667, June 17, 11 a.m. and the statements contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Cairo’s 1670, June 18, 10 a.m. from Moose to the effect that deliveries of foodstuffs have been inadequate and that the free distribution of bread is ceasing in Saudi Arabia. Without definite concrete factual information, and having been provided with statements from several sources which appear on the surface at least to be confusing and conflicting, we find it impossible to formulate any kind of a definite program. Furthermore, telegrams such as No. 1663 are distributed to other governmental agencies. For example, it may be rather difficult to request supplies for Saudi Arabia on the basis of the King’s appeal if it is reported that no cereal shortage (and by implication no food shortage) exists in Saudi Arabia. It is hoped that when you proceed to Washington you will bring with you all available factual data regarding the supply situation and stocks on hand in Saudi Arabia together with the best available estimates of what Saudi Arabia’s requirements are going to be over a stated period. Hull 13 Not printed; in this telegram Mr. Landis had reported as follows: “I cannot agree that any cereals shortage is at present indicated in Saudi Arabia …” (811.20 Defense (M) 15986) The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/188: Telegram [Document 776] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] Jidda , June 22, 1944—10 p.m. [Received 10:09 p.m.] 175. Acting Foreign Minister today amplified statements reported in Cairo’s 1670, June 18, 10 a.m. stating that deaths by starvation are occurring in southern Hejaz and that besides stopping free distribution of food Saudi Government has suspended sales because of depleted stocks. He produced figures to show that present Government stocks of foodstuffs now total 2,105 tons only, of which 1,363 are for general distribution. American representative in MESC 14 has been asked to supply Legation with statistics of food imported in 1943 and current year to aid in evaluating figures of Acting Minister. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statistics by airmail tomorrow. 15 Moose 14 Middle East Supply Center. 15 Forwarded from Jidda in despatch 193, June 22. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 701.4190F/5–2444 [Document 777] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] June 26, 1944. The British Ambassador called at my request. I said to him that our officials in the Middle East were convinced beyond peradventure of doubt that the British representative at Jidda in Saudi Arabia, was doing his level best to injure the American Government’s relations with the King and, in other ways, endeavoring to undermine the American situation, and that we just could not put up with this without constant and louder complaint. The Ambassador requested that Messrs. Murray and Alling give his British associates the full facts on this point, and then he would be prepared to move in accordance therewith. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 890F.24/6–2744: Telegram [Document 778] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , June 27, 1944—11 p.m. 5065. Please inform the Foreign Office that we should appreciate being informed as soon as possible whether the appropriate British authorities concur in the joint goods subsidy program for Saudi Arabia worked out in Cairo by Mr. Landis and British representatives there, who are understood to have referred their suggested program to London for approval. 16 Hull 16 In his telegram 5271, July 4, 6 p.m., the Ambassador in the United Kingdom reported that he had been informed by the British Foreign Office that “the British Embassy in Washington has been instructed to inform the Department of the British Government’s reaction to the joint goods subsidy program for Saudi Arabia.” (890F.24/7–444) The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/6–2944: Telegram [Document 779] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , June 29, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 1:30 p.m.] 185. Yesterday morning British Chargé d’Affaires and I together called on Acting Foreign Minister. I repeated verbally substance of Department’s 1536 to Cairo, June 20, 6 p.m., and of similar message from Landis (Cairo’s June 22, 8 a.m.) which had already been communicated in writing. British Chargé stated that his Government in replying to King’s message had expressed hope of prompt solution of Saudi supply problem and had added that necessary instructions were already on their way to Cairo. Importance of this communication can only be judged on disclosure of nature of instructions about which British Chargé knows nothing. Sent Department. Repeated to Cairo for Landis. Moose The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 890F.20 Mission/15: Telegram [Document 780] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) 17 Washington , July 1, 1944—11 p.m. 5199. Please make the following reply to Sir Maurice Peterson’s letter of June 8 concerning Saudi Arabia quoted in your 4615 of June 9: “I have been asked to convey the gratification of the Department of State that you have expressed in your letter of June 8, 1944, reiterated assurance of adherence to the agreed principle that the larger financial and supply problems of Saudi Arabia ought to be dealt with as far as possible on a joint basis in consultation between our two Governments. The support to which you refer accorded to Dr. Millspaugh by British officials in Iran is fully appreciated. It may be recalled, however, that Dr. Millspaugh’s mission was formed at the suggestion of the British Government, as well as upon the request of the Iranian Government, to cope with special conditions arising out of the war. The situation in Iran, therefore, for this and other reasons does not appear to be entirely analogous to that prevailing in Saudi Arabia. In considering Saudi Arabian matters, both our Governments, I believe, are seeking a solution of long-range problems which will ensure the prosperity and development of Saudi Arabia, as well as safeguard our respective interests in that country. It is recognized that the Near East, in which there are many British Moslem subjects, is an area of primary British military operational responsibility. For this reason the Department of State, in conjunction with the War Department, signified its approval of the Foreign Office’s suggestion that a joint military mission be sent to Saudi Arabia under the leadership of a British officer of Anglo-Saxon extraction. This approval, however, was made contingent upon the understanding that any financial or economic mission which might be sent to Saudi Arabia should be headed by an American. By this reference was meant any mission of a financial or economic character or any expert or experts furnished by either the American or British Government for the purpose of advising the Saudi Arabian Government with respect to financial or economic matters. In making this suggestion the Department had in mind particularly the request for a financial adviser reported to have been made last March by King Ibn Saud. It was contemplated, therefore, that if but one adviser should be furnished, he should be an American and that, if he should be provided with an assistant, such assistant should be British or, if with several assistants, they should be of mixed nationality. The reason it was proposed that the head of any financial mission or that a single financial adviser furnished to the Saudi Arabian Government be an American is that the preponderant interest in Saudi Arabian economy is unquestionably American in character and will presumably remain so for many years to come. As you know, the principal economic resource of Saudi Arabia is its petroleum reserves. As you know also, the concession to develop these reserves is held by an American company. Inevitably, therefore, the economy of Saudi Arabia will be based upon oil produced as the result of substantial American capital investments. For this reason it is considered that the question does not arise as to which party may have a preponderant economic and financial interest in Saudi Arabia at such time as a financial mission might be formed. Saudi Arabia’s traditional commercial relations with neighboring British countries, however, must be taken into consideration. Thus, it is sincerely hoped that satisfactory arrangements may be worked out to deal jointly with the larger Saudi Arabian financial and supply problems. Of course, with respect to furnishing advisers, we must be guided by the wishes of King Ibn Saud. However, I think you will agree that, if our Governments are to support the Saudi Arabian economy through the extension of joint material aid, it would not appear unreasonable to suggest that King Ibn Saud have the benefit of the advice of qualified experts as to the manner in which this aid is utilized. Advice of this kind not only would contribute to the implementation of our plans for the extension of joint assistance but also undoubtedly would prove helpful to the Saudi Arabs themselves. It might be well, therefore, to ask the King whether he is agreeable to our suggestions, namely, that he avail himself of the services of a joint military mission headed by a British officer of Anglo-Saxon extraction and of an American financial adviser to function either singly or as head of a joint financial mission. To demonstrate to him our cooperative approach toward the solution of Saudi Arabian problems, it is proposed that our respective representatives at Jidda be instructed to visit King Ibn Saud together in order to make these suggestions to him. In the event you feel you cannot concur in this proposal, my Government may contemplate instructing the American representative to visit the King to ascertain his views regarding the adviser question. If it should appear that the location of the Treasury at Mecca presents complications, an inquiry might be made as to the possibility of transferring the Treasury elsewhere. At least, such a transfer should not present many physical or transportation difficulties. However, if this should not prove feasible, it is believed that a foreign financial adviser could function effectively with respect to matters of policy at Jidda, the port of Mecca. It is hoped that we shall be able soon to formulate detailed plans for dealing with Saudi Arabian financial and supply problems on a joint and cooperative basis and that our representatives in Jidda may be instructed to discuss the adviser question with King Ibn Saud in the near future.” Hull 17 Repeated verbatim to Jidda in telegram 119, July 3, 7 p.m. The British Embassy to the Department of State 890F.24/7–744 [Document 781] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire As the Department are aware, discussions have been proceeding in Cairo and Jedda between United States and British representatives about the proposed programme of joint economic and financial help to Saudi Arabia. It has been agreed that such aid should be furnished on a fifty-fifty basis by the United States and the United Kingdom. 2. These discussions resulted in a programme for 1944 of supplies for Saudi Arabia which contemplates that the United Kingdom shall provide goods free to the value of £2,754,000 and the United States goods on credit lend-lease to the value of £292,000. His Majesty’s Government accept this supply programme, and are prepared in addition to provide Ibn Saud with a sterling cash credit of £10,000 a month to cover the expenses of his Diplomatic Missions and Consulates abroad. 3. Ibn Saud will also raise revenue by selling part of the goods furnished under the joint programme. The United States representatives at the discussions maintained the view, however, that he would need a further subsidy in cash of 10,000,000 rials. While they do not share this view, His Majesty’s Government, in their desire to reach an agreed solution with the United States Government, have decided to accept the proposal on the basis that this additional subsidy should take the form of lend-lease silver. 4. His Majesty’s Government wish to make it clear that their agreement to this arrangement should not be regarded as indicating any departure from the views which they have expressed to the United States Treasury as to the proper solution of the Saudi Arabian currency problem, in connexion with which the scheme proposed by His Majesty’s Government is still under discussion with the United States Treasury. It is in any case too late to introduce it this year, but His Majesty’s Government hope that it can be introduced next year and that there will then be no further need for a supply of silver rials. 5. His Majesty’s Government understand that in the Saudi Arabian budget for 1944 provision has been made for receipts arising out of the sale of the 10 million rials referred to in paragraph 3 above, (i.e. 40% of the dollar proceeds of the silver rials supplied for financing the oil companies less minting and transport costs) on the assumption that His Majesty’s Government will provide sovereigns against gold in New York. His Majesty’s Government regret that owing to their very limited supply of sovereigns and the lack of available minting capacity they cannot accept this assumption. They do not know how much difference this will make to the estimated revenue of 4.7 million rials if some other method of using the American gold is adopted. 6. During the discussions, consideration was given to possible methods of putting into effect the principle, which had already been agreed between the two governments, that Anglo-American aid to Saudi Arabia should be on a fifty-fifty basis, in view of the fact that owing to shipping and supply considerations the value of the aid to be furnished by the United Kingdom under the agreed programme would be considerably more than that to be furnished by the United States. The suggestion was made that the necessary adjustments should be effected by means of a credit to the United Kingdom on reciprocal aid account. His Majesty’s Government regret that they are unable to accept this suggestion, the effect of which would be the same as if the United Kingdom were to supply goods to the United States on reciprocal aid for the latter to furnish without acknowledgment to a third party as United States lend-lease aid. His Majesty’s Government would welcome the views of the United States Government on how best to make the adjustment in such a manner as to lend substance to the proposed statement to Ibn Saud that the Anglo-American aid offered him is on an equal basis as between the United States and the United Kingdom. His Majesty’s Government feel that such a statement could only be made if there is a cash adjustment, i.e. by the transfer of the appropriate sum in dollars to His Majesty’s Government. 7. Finally, His Majesty’s Government consider that it would be better to avoid any attempt at detailed control of Saudi Arabian expenditure. We should seek rather to convince Ibn Saud that the help now promised is all that we can give him, and that it is his responsibility, by using forethought and the technical means which have already been indicated to him in general terms, to make the resources thus put at his disposal meet his requirements. His Majesty’s Government also think it desirable that, in accordance with the agreements reached during the Cairo discussions, Ibn Saud should be warned that it will be necessary to carry out further cuts next year in the amount of supplies available to him for free distribution within his territories. 8. On the assumption that the above proposals are acceptable to the United States Government, His Majesty’s Government consider that the necessary communication to the Saudi Arabian Government can be drafted and agreed between the American and British representatives in Jedda. Washington , July 7, 1944. The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 890F.24/7–1144: Telegram [Document 782] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) Washington , July 11, 1944—2 p.m. 128. In view of King Ibn Saud’s recent urgent appeal to the American and British Governments for aid, it is considered essential that the King be informed as soon as possible that both Governments have reached agreement on the joint aid program worked out recently in Cairo. You should, therefore, arrange to visit the King as soon as practicable to apprise him thereof. You should also invite your British colleague to accompany you in order that this information may be conveyed to the King jointly if possible. At the time of your visit you should convey to the King substantially the information contained in the following lettered paragraphs: [Here follow paragraphs ( a ) through ( g ), which were superseded by those contained in telegram 149, July 26, 5 p.m., printed on page 719 [ Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] .] ( h ) In view of the joint supply program which has been worked out with the consequent assurance that Saudi Arabia’s requirements will be met, it is hoped that the King will consider it unnecessary to use, and will refrain from using, for supply purchases the dollar funds being made available to him by the Arabian American Oil Company as a result of his recent request to the Company for assistance. It should be pointed out to the King that if he does use these funds for supply purchases and reimburses the oil company, as has been suggested, out of the 40 percent profit accruing from the 10 million riyal purchase transaction whereby riyals are to be sold to commercial firms in Saudi Arabia, the Government of Saudi Arabia will lose the substantial profit to be derived from the contemplated purchase and sale of gold. 2. In connection with the matter discussed in lettered paragraph ( h ) above, you are advised for your own information that officials of the Arabian American Oil Company here agree that, in view of the joint supply program which has been outlined to them, it will be both unnecessary and undesirable for the King to draw upon the funds which they have placed at his disposal as an emergency measure without prior consultation with the Department. The oil company, therefore, is advising one of its representatives in Dhahran to fly to Jidda to discuss this matter with you, if possible, before you visit the King. 3. It is suggested that Gunter, Treasury representative from Cairo, accompany you on your visit to the King to be of such assistance as may be desirable in the technical explanation of the supply program and the budget. The British are making the same suggestion with reference to Mr. Bailey, 18 or other suitable representative, accompanying Jordan. 4. The foregoing paragraphs 1 through 3 have been agreed upon in consultation with British officials in Washington. They are being telegraphed by them immediately to London with a request that if the British Government concurs, it will forthwith issue identical instructions to the British Minister in Jidda. You should not therefore make arrangements to visit the King until your British colleague has received his instructions. Hull 18 Deputy Director General of the Middle East Supply Center. The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 890F.24/7–1244: Telegram [Document 783] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) Washington , July 12, 1944—6 p.m. 130. It has been agreed by the Department and the Foreign Office that the American and British Governments send the following instruction mutatis mutandis to their respective diplomatic representatives at Jidda, these instructions being repeated to Mr. Landis’ office in Cairo by the Department 19 and to Lord Moyne 20 by the Foreign Office: “The joint programme for supply and financial aid towards Saudi Arabia which has been agreed upon by the U.S. Government and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom is to be regarded as the expression of a single combined policy in this field towards Saudi Arabia on the part of the two Governments. In the light of this policy you are to treat all proposals for supply and financial aid to Saudi Arabia jointly with your British colleague. You should cooperate with him closely and wholeheartedly. Any approach to the Saudi Arabia Government in this field should in future be made jointly with him. 2. Identical instructions are being sent to your British colleague.” Hull 19 Repeated to Cairo as telegram 1781, “for AEMME” (American Economic Mission, Middle East, Cairo headquarters of James M. Landis). 20 British Minister Resident in the Middle East. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.5151/7–1344: Telegram [Document 784] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , July 13, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 10:50 p.m.] 206. Refer Cairo’s 1670, June 18, 10 a.m., and my 175, June 22, 10 p.m. To remedy unfavorable local rate for foreign exchange Saudi Government has suggested firstly borrowing foreign exchange for current sale to importers at official rate and repaying loan from foreign exchange proceeds of 1944 pilgrimage or, secondly, permitting exportation of gold from Arabia conditional upon undertaking of exporter to import counter value in approved merchandise within specified period. Acting Foreign Minister has referred question to this Legation and to British Legation since both Legations are interested in Saudi finance and supply. He would like to have comment of United States and British Governments on both plans and wishes to know if there are any objections. He has not asked assistance on first plan but probably would have done so had he not been discouraged therefrom. A decree setting up the second plan has been drafted but not yet issued. Moose The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/7–1744: Telegram [Document 785] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , July 17, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:42 p.m.] 214. Reference my July 7, 8 p.m. to Cairo repeated to Department. 21 Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs informs me that Saudi Government stocks of wheat and flour will be exhausted in about 3 days. Repeated by airmail to Cairo. Moose 21 Not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 890F.20 Missions/7–2144: Telegram [Document 786] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , July 21, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 22—6:30 a.m.] 5768. See the Department’s 5199, July 1, 11 p.m. Embassy has now been handed by Sir Maurice Peterson a reply to its letter of July 7 concerning Saudi Arabia. The text of the reply reads as follows: “Many thanks for your letter of the 7th July regarding the adviserships in Saudi Arabia. We should have been very willing to consider the basis which the State Department have put forward for a joint approach to Ibn Saud if that basis did not itself rest on what seems to us false premises. I refer more particularly to the statement contained in the 4th paragraph of your letter, viz.: ‘The preponderant interest in Saudi Arabian economy is unquestionably American in character.’ Quite apart from the small export activities of Saudi Arabian merchants, which in normal times have to a very large extent always been transacted with British territories and sterling area countries, there is the revenue arising from the pilgrimage (which is not even mentioned in your letter). Even today, when the pilgrimage is much reduced for war reasons, the foreign revenue accruing to Saudi Arabia from it is estimated at the equivalent of 40 million riyals. Some of this is in the form of pilgrimage tariff revenue accruing to the Saudi Arabian Government and some in the form of money spent in the country by the pilgrims. While, of course, the pilgrimage is not exclusively a British concern, Britain is the greatest Moslem power and a large proportion of the pilgrims are British, while even those of other nationalities come, to a very great extent, from sterling area countries which is of major importance for Saudi Arabia. As against this present American contribution to the economic life of Saudi Arabia (apart from the present supply program which is to be shared between us equally and, therefore, need not come into this discussion) is, according to our information, somewhat below 4 million riyals a year in royalties by the oil company plus local expenditure by the company estimated at about 10 million riyals. Incidentally, the arrangement recently made by which the company’s requirements of currency for local expenditure are met by the supply of silver riyals on lease-lend will, in fact, mean that Saudi Arabia will receive the benefit of only a proportion of the foreign currency which the company’s local expenditure would normally bring into the country. If we turn to the future, it seems certain that the Saudi Arabian income from its oil resources will increase and, indeed, we hope it will be so. It is however at least equally certain that pilgrimage revenues also will increase by anything up to 100% when the Indian and Far Eastern pilgrimages can again take place. It is also to be foreseen that when conditions of travel become easier larger numbers of pilgrims will visit Mecca from Middle Eastern sterling area countries. In all frankness, therefore, it seems to us that the American claim to present preponderance in Saudi Arabian economy is based upon a misconception of the facts. The situation will no doubt change in the future as oil production develops, and the position can, very willingly on our part, be reconsidered when Saudi Arabia ceases to depend mainly on economic relations with sterling area countries. I should like to recall again that we have to take account in Saudi Arabia of the undoubted prejudice against Christians. A Christian financial adviser will certainly find difficulties, in obtaining information and in getting his advice accepted, which will not apply to the same extent to a Moslem. I think experience in other Middle East countries shows conclusively that unless the local officials cooperate wholeheardedly it is very hard for a foreign adviser to make effective progress. Therefore as both you and we wish for improved financial conditions in Saudi Arabia it still seems to us more practical to give Ibn Saud the sort of adviser he wants. I should be grateful if you would bring the above to the notice of the State Department.” Sir Maurice said that the Foreign Office would be glad to learn and give prompt consideration to the comments of the Department on the contents of this letter. Winant The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) 890F.24/7–2644: Telegram [Document 787] The Secretary of State to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) 22 Washington , July 26, 1944—5 p.m. 149. The British Foreign Office desires certain revisions in the text of the joint instructions contained in Department’s 128, July 11, 2 p.m. The Foreign Office’s revised version has been revised further after discussions between officers of the Department and officials of the British Embassy, which is telegraphing the text of the revision of the Foreign Office’s version to London for approval. If the Foreign Office approves of the text thereof as agreed upon in Washington the following instructions will be telegraphed mutatis mutandis by the Foreign Office to your British colleague and in that event the following text constitutes the joint instructions to you and to him regarding your forthcoming visit to King Ibn Saud in connection with the supply program, in lieu of the instructions contained in Department’s no. 128, July 11, 2 p.m.: “In view of Ibn Saud’s recent urgent appeal to British and American Governments for aid it be considered essential that the King be informed as soon as possible that both Governments have reached agreement on a joint aid programme worked out recently in Cairo. You should therefore arrange to visit the King as soon as possible and in any event not later than Tuesday, 1st of August, to apprize him thereof. You should also invite your British colleague to accompany you on that journey in order that this information may be conveyed to the King jointly. At the time of your visit you should make to the King a communication in the following sense but so worded as to take account of His Majesty’s susceptibilities:— A. As Ibn Saud is aware, a schedule of all supplies essential for Saudi Arabia for 1944 has been prepared by MESC. Within that framework His Majesty’s Government and the U.S. Government have decided for their part to furnish Ibn Saud with certain supplies. They have worked out a joint supply programme for 1944 the aim of which will be to maintain a 3 months’ supply of cereals, tea and sugar in Saudi Arabia at all times. The list of supplies which comprise this programme is contained in the appendix to these instructions. B. The joint nature of this supply programme should be made clear by emphasizing that the total expense of this programme is to be shared in equal measure by the American and British Governments, irrespective of the countries of origin of the supplies, which will be procured in accordance with sound economic practice and with utmost regard to economy of shipping space. C. As result of this joint American-British programme 150 trucks have recently been or shortly will be delivered to Saudi Arabia and it is assumed that these trucks will assist materially in the immediate problem of food distribution. Furthermore it is the intention of H.M. Government and the American Government to do all they can to continue to supply Saudi Arabia with sufficient motor vehicles, spare parts and tires to meet essential transportation needs. 23 D. It should be emphasized to the King that the supply programme for 1944 contemplates that he will sell an increased proportion of the goods supplied to him. It should be explained also that as oil company operations expand, and as the pilgrimage traffic increases with improvement in transportation facilities, His Majesty’s Government and the U.S. Government will expect the Saudi Arabian Government and people to become increasingly self-supporting. Firstly, employment of Saudi Arab workers by the oil company together with sale of services and profits from sale of goods to increased numbers of pilgrim visitors, should increase the ability of the Saudi Arabian people either to purchase supplies from the government, or to finance imports of goods through normal commercial channels. Thus a lesser proportion of the essential needs of the Saudi Arab people will have to be met by free distribution of goods or money subsidies by the government. Secondly, the revenues of the government itself should increase, both from sale of more goods to the people, and from increased pilgrimage tariffs and oil royalties. This will enable the government to pay for a greater proportion of any goods supplied under a 1945 or any subsequent joint British-American supply program, and should also provide the King with sufficient money revenues to cover his essential needs. E. It should be pointed out that it is essential that British and American Governments should be provided with fullest possible statistics regarding supply and consumption in Saudi Arabia to enable them to estimate what help is required. The MESC has to judge within the limits of shipping and supplies available for the Middle East between conflicting demands of a number of countries. It can only decide fairly on basis of accurate statistics. F. H.M. Government and American Government have given full and sympathetic consideration to Ibn Saud’s present difficulties and they believe that with the assistance mentioned above His Majesty will be able to overcome his supply and budgetary difficulties. G. Should the King enquire whether supplies provided for in 1944 programme are actually being delivered you should reply that shipments of cereals, sugar and tea to date have been made according to schedule. If you have concrete information about delivery of other commodities you may tell Ibn Saud that also. Annex to Joint Instructions Saudi Arabia subsidised joint Anglo-American programme 1944 Commodity Tons Pounds Sterling Cereals 40,000 1,647,000 Dates 4,500 112,000 Sugar 3,000 105,000 Tea 130 26,000 Cotton piece goods 1,000 620,000 Medical supplies Blank 15,000 Steel Blank 1,000 Tyres Blank 215,000 Spares (V.A.C. trucks) Blank 13,000 Cotton piece goods 430 200,000 Medical supplies Blank 15,000 Steel Blank 1,050 Lend-Lease trucks and spares Blank 40,000 Special tyres Blank 4,000 Spares Blank 32,000 Estimated grand total £3,046,000 In addition, the following will be provided as part of the joint programme:— ( a ) His Majesty’s Government will provide £10,000 a month to cover the expenses of Ibn Saud’s Legations and Consulates as from July 1st, 1944 (these expenses have been otherwise covered down to June 30th). ( b ) The United States Government will provide 10,000,000 silver riyals on credit Lend-Lease.” In view of the foregoing you should disregard the instructions contained in Department’s no. 128 from the beginning of that telegram up to but not including lettered paragraph ( h ), which concerns Aramco funds. The instructions contained in no. 128 from lettered paragraph ( h ) through ensuing numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof ending “accompanying Jordan” although not a part of the joint instructions remain effective as individual instructions to you, transmitted to you with the full knowledge and concurrence of British officials in Washington. It has been agreed in Washington by the Department and the British Embassy that the joint visit shall be made not later than August 1st in view of the King’s anxiety regarding the supply situation. It has been agreed furthermore that, in the event either you or your British colleague is personally unable to make the visit because of illness or other personal reasons, the senior subordinate member of your or his staff should proceed in your or his stead. It was also agreed that the joint official party should be kept as small as possible, preferably including no officials other than you, your British colleague, Gunter and Bailey. Please forward text of this message to Cairo for the information of AEMME. Hull 22 In telegram 224, July 29, 1 p.m., the Minister Resident informed the Department that “arrangements are being made for Jordan and me to go to Riyadh August 1st to deliver to the King message contained in the Department’s telegram No. 149 …” (890F.24/7–2644) 23 In telegram 227, July 31, 11 a.m., the Minister Resident reported that paragraph C was being omitted from the joint United States-British communication to King Ibn Saud because of discrepancies in the instructions received from the two Governments (890F.24/7–3144). The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/8–644: Telegram [Document 788] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , August 6, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 2:19 p.m.] 235. This message briefly summarizes sense of King’s reply mentioned in my 229, August 4, 6 p.m. 24 King acknowledges receipt of joint communication, expresses gratitude for past and present help, states that his Government has supplied detailed statements of country’s requirements and that circumstances have proven need for increased supplies of foodstuffs and transportation equipment. He has no alternative to acceptance of program but asks assistance of two Governments in finding solution following problems: 1. Joint supply program is insufficient. Country has consumed 1944 deliveries thus far, also stocks existing at beginning of year. Having exhausted stocks of foodstuffs and piece goods, how can reduced deliveries suffice in remainder of year, particularly in view of approaching pilgrimage; foodstuffs for remainder of 1944 should be greater in quantity than those received since January 1st. 2. Basra dates proved so unsatisfactory last year King would prefer to replace programmed dates with equivalent quantity of cereals. 3. There is immediate need for vehicles, tires and spare parts to ensure transport of pilgrims, travelers and foodstuffs. 4. Present financial plight of Saudi Government is of utmost gravity. Government is unable to pay obligations and official salaries are several months in arrears. King requests British Government to pay over 1943 pilgrimage revenues either in rials or in gold as the British Government promised to do. 5. While he would be glad to share cost of essential supplies for Saudi Arabia in proportion to predicted increase in revenues, King does not share optimism of American and British Governments about increases. He expects no improvement in Saudi revenues so long as economic transactions are restricted and trade is limited by war conditions. Moose 24 Not printed; in this telegram the Minister Resident reported that the United States-British joint communication was delivered to King Ibn Saud on August 1 (890F.24/8–444). The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/8–644: Telegram [Document 789] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , August 6, 1944—noon. [Received 2:37 p.m.] 237. Conversations with Jordan during trip to Riyadh disclosed that (1) he doubts sincerity of King; (2) he remains hostile to Abdullah Sulaiman 25 and; (3) he estimates annual Saudi consumption of cereals at 48,000 tons and contemplates 1945 program based on that figure. That King is disappointed in supply program seems evident from reply summarized in my 235, August 6, 10 a.m. Jordan predicted King would be fairly well satisfied and still maintains that view. King’s demand for payment of pilgrim revenues reported in 4th paragraph of cable above cited may be justified. Jordan once said he had a telegram from King authorizing payment of funds to UKCC. 26 Saudi officials disclaimed any knowledge of such message and asserted that King had had no such intention. I shall endeavor to see telegram in question. All other evidence seems to support King’s demand. In view of circumstances surrounding supply program it is important to retain confidence of King by making deliveries in full and on time. Entire 10 million riyals should be delivered before end of year and at least 5 million should be delivered early in October for stabilization of exchange during pilgrimage. It would be desirable to begin discussion of 1945 Saudi supply program as early as October 1. Moose 25 The Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance. 26 United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/8–644: Telegram [Document 790] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , August 6, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 6:45 p.m.] 238. This message continues my 237, August 6, noon. A further indication of King’s disappointment at supply program is fact that Finance Minister has informed Aramco that further assistance from oil company will be necessary. King has asked upward revision of cereals program. In considering this request following factors might be considered: (1) Aramco is vulnerable to pressure from Saudi Government and is sure to be asked to make up deficiencies in program. (2) King’s good will may be worth many tons of wheat when he answers request recently made by U S Army for permission to survey air route direct from Cairo to Dhahran 27 or when pipe line projects discussed with him. (3) British aims with regard to Saudi Arabia are not yet clear but it was not by accident that Sir Maurice Peterson omitted all reference to comparative investments in his recent attempt to show that British economic interests are preponderant in Saudi Arabia. (4) Consideration might be given course to be pursued should it be necessary to choose between a joint supply program and an adequate one. (5) Care might be taken that joint supply program and proposed other joint activities do not tend toward joint military concession. Moose 27 For correspondence regarding this subject, see pp. 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 717 ] ff. The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.515/8–944: Telegram [Document 791] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , August 9, 1944—noon. [Received 8:04 p.m.] 243. ReLegs 237, August 6, noon. To achieve a feature of stability in riyal-sovereign rate during pilgrimage, the Saudi Government should offer to convert sovereigns into riyals at a fixed rate. Jordan concurs in opinion that such procedure is practicable and desirable. Such plan, which requires a quantity of riyals in Saudi Government hands at beginning of pilgrimage season, was effective last year though Government sales were small. Please advise what portion, if any, of 10 million subsidy riyals can be delivered in Jidda by October 15. If the answer is “none” please investigate possibility of obtaining riyals from those already minted for dollar riyal conversion scheme and later replacement from subsidy riyals. Moose The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) 890F.515/8–1044 [Document 792] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury ( Morgenthau ) Washington , August 10, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : The United States Government and the Government of the United Kingdom have recently reached agreement upon a joint supply program for Saudi Arabia for the calendar year 1944. This program contemplates that part of this Government’s contribution will consist of provision of ten million silver riyal coins which it is estimated will be adequate to meet the coinage requirements of Saudi Arabia for the balance of the current calendar year. The Department of State recommends that sufficient silver for the coinage of these ten million riyal coins be made available from the Treasury’s stocks of silver under a Lend Lease arrangement similar to that under which fifteen million coins were provided during the calendar year 1943. 28 The assistance of the Treasury in implementing such an arrangement will be appreciated. 29 Sincerely yours, For the Secretary of State: Dean Acheson Assistant Secretary 28 A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Bell), August 10, which crossed this one, dealt with this same question. Among other things, it pointed out that “This Government has already provided under lend-lease arrangements the silver necessary for the coining of 25 million Saudi Arabian riyals of which 10 million riyals are covered by special collateral arrangements to assure the return of the silver”, and requested the assurance of the Department that a new loan would be “important to the foreign policy of the United States.” (890F.515/8–1044) 29 In a letter of August 23 to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) Assistant Secretary Acheson reiterated the importance which the Department of State attached to the new program. In turn, a letter by the Assistant Secretary on August 26 informed the Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) of the new program, and asked the assistance of the FEA in implementing it (890F.24/8–2644). The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/8–1444: Telegram [Document 793] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , August 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 9:01 p.m.] 247. Finance Minister advises that deputy Foreign Minister now in Cairo has arranged purchase from Egyptian Government of 10,000 tons of rice and other cereals and sugar delivered in Suez and asks help of American and British Governments in shipping cargo to Jidda. Cost of foodstuffs will be paid from pilgrimage tariff items collected in Egypt. Part of same arrangement provides preferential riyal rate for use of Egyptian pilgrims in paying tariff items. I recommend and my British colleague concurs that assistance be given insofar as MESC policy permits. This will be another lien on 1944 pilgrimage revenues reLegs 244, August 9, 2 p.m. 30 Present purchase tends to show genuineness of Saudi Government’s belief that subsidy program of foodstuffs is inadequate. Repeated to Cairo for AEMME. Moose 30 Not printed; it reported that the British firm of Gellatly, Hankey and Company had offered the Saudi Arabian Government a loan of £100,000 sterling at 6% with a minimum of 2½% repayable from foreign exchange proceeds of the 1944 pilgrimage (890F.515/8–944). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) 890F.24/8–1444: Telegram [Document 794] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) 31 Washington , August 14, 1944—7 p.m. 2168. For AEMME. The Legation at Jidda reports that King Ibn Saud, in reply to joint American-British communication regarding the joint supply program for 1944, has stated that the program is insufficient, pointing out that Saudi Arabia has consumed deliveries made to date during 1944, as well as stocks on hand at first of the year. The King contends that deliveries during rest of 1944 should be larger than quantities received thus far, particularly in view of coming pilgrimage. Department has informed British officials in Washington of these views of the King; that, in the absence of accurate statistical data to the contrary, we must accept the King’s statement that the quantities scheduled are insufficient to meet his country’s needs; that we infer therefrom that there is not being maintained at all times in Saudi Arabia a 3 months’ supply of tea, sugar and cereals as contemplated fundamentally in the program. It was pointed out that, if the King is right, there is grave danger of internal disorder and of an insufficiency of foodstuffs to feed the pilgrims unless additional supplies of tea, sugar and cereals are sent to Saudi Arabia. If, as a result of providing additional supplies as a precautionary measure, it should transpire that too much is shipped during 1944, an adjustment can be made in 1945 upon the compilation of more complete statistical information. The British officials were asked, therefore, to request the Foreign Office to instruct British MESC officials in Cairo to cooperate with American officials there to arrange for the shipment of sufficient quantities of tea, sugar and cereals to realize the fundamental aim of the program, that is, to maintain a 3 months’ supply of these commodities at all times. As soon as British officials in Cairo have received instructions to this effect, AEMME should, in cooperation with them, arrange for the expeditious and continuing shipment to Saudi Arabia of sufficient quantities of these commodities to implement this fundamental principle embodied in the program. Hull 31 Repeated in telegram 158, August 14, 7 p.m., to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia, with instructions as follows: “You should arrange to have King Ibn Saud informed immediately that this Government has informed the British Government that it appears from his reply to the joint communication that the quantities programmed appear to be insufficient to provide for the maintenance of a 3 months’ supply at all times in Saudi Arabia of tea, sugar and cereals and that as soon as the British Government issues appropriate instructions to its officials, this Government, in conjunction with the British Government, win arrange for the expeditious shipment to Saudi Arabia of sufficient additional quantities of these commodities to achieve the basic aim of the joint supply program. You should inform your British colleague that you are conveying to King Ibn Saud a message to this effect.” (890F.24/8–644) The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/8–1644: Telegram [Document 795] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , August 16, 1944—6 p.m. [Received August 17—2:07 a.m.] 251. Message concerning maintenance at all times in Saudi Arabia of 3 months’ stocks of cereals, tea and sugar contained in next to last paragraph of Department’s 158, August 14, 7 p.m. 32 was today conveyed both verbally and in writing to Minister of Finance, now Acting Foreign Minister. He expressed pleasure and predicted that King would be gratified at action of United States Government. In response to question Minister opined that if plan is put into effect promptly and if Saudi Government can draw requirements from stocks in Arabia plan for purchase of food stuffs described in my 247 August 14, 5 p.m. will be dropped. Aramco representative greatly relieved since he thinks Saudi Government will relax pressure for additional help from oil company. My British colleague was informed of the message before it was delivered. He protested verbally stating that action of United States Government was not cooperation and that he could not agree to acceptance of King’s statement of needs. He also produced figures to show that with joint supply of cereals limited to 40,000 tons, cereal imports into Saudi Arabia this year will total 68,700 tons. A despatch 33 will explain why I consider his figures misleading. Repeated to Cairo for AEMME reference Cairo’s August 15, 1 p.m. Moose 32 See footnote 31, p. 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] . 33 Despatch 208, August 17, not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) 890F.24/8–1944: Telegram [Document 796] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) Washington , August 23, 1944—9 p.m. 2262. For AEMME. Reference Cairo’s 2460, August 18 and 2472, August 19, 3 p.m., and Jidda’s 251, August 16, 6 p.m. 34 1. You are instructed to proceed with MESC on the problems of revising the supply program of Saudi Arabia to the extent that it needs revision in the light of King Ibn Saud’s reply as transmitted with Jidda’s despatch no. 205 of August 3 35 and other available data. 2. In that connection: you will bear in mind that it was always understood that the subsidy program would not suffice to meet all the food requirements of Saudi Arabia, that additional tonnages were programmed to be supplied commercially by dhows or other purchases by merchants or the government, and to the degree that these tonnages were not forthcoming it was contemplated that the subsidy program would be increased by joint action. 3. The King’s reply seems to indicate that this aspect of the Anglo-American proposal was not emphasized. 4. It was also contemplated that additional supplies for the pilgrimage might be required. 5. You will also have to consider how to make the 1944 pilgrimage fees available for 1944 expenditures, as this also was contemplated. Indeed, the budget as such needs to be explained to the appropriate officials of the Saudi Arabian Government, and work on the 1945 budget should be begun. 6. Reference Jidda’s despatch no. 207, August 11 36 (not repeated to Cairo), you are authorized jointly with the British to substitute 3,000 tons of cereals for 3,000 tons of dates. 7. You will consider desirability of supplying 50 trucks to Saudi Arabian Government as against trucks reserved for Iraq or other sources of supply. 8. If the supply program is to be increased, you will make your recommendations as to the extent to which that increase shall be met by increasing the subsidy and the extent to which the Saudi Arabian Government should be required to rely on private purchasing or its own purchasing power to finance suggested increases. 9. If Eddy is still in Cairo, 37 let him assist in opening negotiations with MESC on this matter. In any event, put your best supply men on this problem. 10. For Jidda. Reference Department’s 158, August 14. 38 The purport of that telegram was to have you inform Saudi Arabian Government that joint reconsideration was being undertaken through the MESC of the subsidy program in the light of the King’s reply in order to maintain the three months’ inventory principle then suggested and not to indicate that the United States had unilaterally reached decisive conclusions on its course of action. You should so inform the British Minister and the Saudi Arab Government. Department has fully informed British Embassy of the foregoing, and Embassy states instructions to take parallel action have already been sent to British representatives in Cairo and Jidda. Landis concurs. Sent to Cairo, repeated to Jidda. 39 Hull 34 Telegrams 2460 and 2472 not printed. 35 Not printed; for telegraphic report of the King’s reply, see telegram 235, August 6, 10 a.m., from Jidda, p. 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 788 ] . 36 Not printed. 37 At the time that plans for economic aid to Saudi Arabia were laid before President Roosevelt in early April the proposal was also made that the status of the diplomatic representative of the United States in Saudi Arabia be raised from Minister Resident to Minister Plenipotentiary. The President approved this proposal and also a recommendation made by the Secretary of State on May 31 that Colonel Eddy be appointed the first Minister. The Appointed Minister was en route to Jidda at this time. 38 See footnote 31, p. 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] . 39 Repeated as telegram 106. The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Geier) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/8–2644: Telegram [Document 797] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia ( Geier ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , August 26, 1944—midnight. [Received August 27—11:12 a.m.] 257. British Minister and Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, Acting Foreign Minister, were informed separately today of Department’s August 23, 9 a.m. [ p.m. ] to Cairo, repeated to Jidda as 166. Jordan held 2-hour conference this morning with Colonel Coneybear and Major Nicholson, American and British MESC representatives in Jidda, and myself. He again stated forcefully all his arguments against revising supply program quotas, expressing fundamental disbelief in Saudi statistics and sincerity. He adduced various secret information allegedly official intercepts which, if genuine, are persuasive as proof that country has adequate stocks and that Saudi officials are endeavoring to take advantage of Anglo-American generosity to accumulate supplies sufficient for one year. He conceded that political considerations might be the determining factor but from economic point of view is unalterably opposed to accepting Saudi claims declaring that rejecting the King’s figures did not worry him. He stated also that Shaikh Yussuf’s plan to purchase 10,000 tons of foodstuffs in Egypt will not be permitted (reLeg’s 247, August 14, 5 p.m.). Coneybear and I underlined arguments favoring acceptance King’s expressed desire at face value but avoided controversy. Nicholson seems to maintain strictly fair and open mind on question. Jordan and staff were obviously angered by Department’s 158 of August 14, 7 p.m. 40 Their latest instruction from London reportedly contains information which this Legation does not have to effect that Department’s 158 had been drafted by “two Department officials who are away on leave and could not be questioned as to their intentions”, and that it had been corrected by conference between Murray, Landis, and British. Shaikh Abdullah, apparently worried and deeply preoccupied by local problems, showed no reaction when I delivered Department’s message. The course which affair has taken renders imperative in my opinion that at least some increase in supply program be granted for fundamental political considerations and those of American prestige in Saudi Arabia. Repeated to Cairo for Eddy and Moose. Geier 40 See footnote 31, p. 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] . The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Geier) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/8–3044: Telegram [Document 798] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia ( Geier ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , August 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 5:46 p.m.] 261. Jordan informed me today that after the joint Anglo-American note on the subsidy program had been delivered to King Ibn Saud at Riyadh on August 3 [ 1 ], the King had written the Prime Minister and Amir Faisal had written Mr. Eden requesting additional supplies for Saudi Arabia. Churchill’s reply to Ibn Saud has been postponed by his journey 41 but Jordan, under instructions from his Government, read me draft reply from Eden to Faisal. It was couched in general unobjectionable terms and embodied British arguments against food subsidy increases. However, key sentence declared that figures contained in joint note “represent total supply which British and American Governments have decided to give Saudi Arabian Government without payment during 1944”. Since this reply will be dated August 22, it would have contradicted both Department’s 158, August 14, 7 p.m. 42 and 166, August 23, 9 p.m. 43 by declaring that quotas stated in note were final whereas in point of fact they are under joint reconsideration by MESC. Jordan advanced specious argument that it was only after the 22nd that British Government had agreed to such reconsideration and therefore the reply was true as of that date. The Legation’s note of August 16 (re Legation’s 251, August 16, 6 p.m.) had been delivered over his protest and had no validity since it represented a unilateral decision. Upon insistence he agreed to change wording to past tense “represented total which Governments had decided to give” and said he would give Legation a copy of letter to Faisal. He minimized importance of change. I had distinct impression he was hoping to rush through original unsatisfactory text before arrival of Eddy. Sent Department. Repeated Cairo. Geier 41 Mr. Churchill had gone to Canada for the Second Quebec Conference with President Roosevelt, September 11–16, 1944; correspondence regarding this conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations . 42 See footnote 31, p. 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] . 43 See footnote 39, p. 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] . The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/9–444: Telegram [Document 799] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , September 4, 1944—8 a.m. [Received 4:47 p.m.] 264. Jordan told me today: 1. Highly qualified Indian Muslim already selected and available for financial adviser to King whenever our two Governments agree. 2. British Military Mission at Taif being reinforced by mobile repair units and 22 personnel. 3. Eastern Bank has requested Saudi Government for permission to open branch in Saudi Arabia on Persian Gulf, obviously a move to match National City Bank. 44 4. He rejects proposal to explain budget to Saudi officials. (See Department’s 166, August 23, 9 p.m. 43 ) 5. He proposes MESC plan to supervise food reserves in controlled warehouses. 6. He declines to leave statement of present food reserves and overall needs to MESC Jidda, claiming they lack experience and facts. MESC conference in Jidda this week will be crucial in determining Jordan’s ability to dominate MESC British personnel and in arriving at satisfactory supply program. Details by pouch. 45 Eddy 44 The National City Bank of New York had requested permission from the Saudi Arabian Government to open a branch at Ras Tanura. 43 See footnote 39, p. 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] . 45 Despatch 4, September 5, not printed. The British Embassy to the Department of State 890F.51/9–544 [Document 800] The British Embassy to the Department of State Memorandum His Majesty’s Embassy has been instructed to inform the State Department that Gellatly Hankey and Company are considering offering the Saudi Arabian Government a loan of £100,000 Sterling, to be secured by a lien on some or all of the pilgrimage tariff dues to be collected in sterling area countries. The matter has been discussed by the manager of the firm in Jedda and is now under active consideration in London. It is understood that the United States Minister in Jedda has also participated in the discussions there. The subject has not yet been broached with the Saudi Arabian Government. 2. The question of the interest to be paid on the loan has not yet been settled, but is now being examined. The rate of interest would depend partly on the duration of the loan. 3. The Foreign Office has been glad to learn of the observations made on this subject by a member of the Near Eastern Division to a representative of the United Kingdom Treasury Delegation on August 17th. The Foreign Office agrees with the Department that, as long as the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government are providing the King with a subsidy, any loan by a private company should only be made by agreement with the two Governments. The Foreign Office has accordingly requested Messrs. Gellatly Hankey and Company not to proceed with this proposal until further notice. 4. The Foreign Office does not however, agree with the Department’s view that provision for extra supplies under the subsidy programme would have the same result as a loan and that they could provide a substitute for a loan. While London agree that Ibn Saud should, if possible, be prevented from spending in advance, possibly on unessential purchases, revenues he will need for his country next year, they consider that the loan would provide Ibn Saud with the foreign exchange which he needs to purchase supplies not covered by the subsidized supply programme. The projected extension of the latter would only supply the King with an increased amount of Saudi Arabian currency and not with foreign exchange. If Saudi Arabia’s commerce is ever to return to normal channels its merchants must be able to purchase abroad and it is therefore essential that Saudi Arabia should be able to acquire foreign exchange. This is all the more necessary in view of our declared intention to reduce our joint subsidy next year. However, the Foreign Office feels that, unless we arrange for Ibn Saud to be assisted in this way he might turn to other lenders over whom we have no control. 5. The present proposal therefore appears to be a good one, especially as the sum involved only represents a small proportion of the total revenues likely to accrue from the pilgrimage. The Foreign Office will be glad to learn whether, in the light of these considerations, the Department would be prepared to reconsider its attitude. Washington , 5 September, 1944. The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.50/9–744 [Document 801] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State No. 5 Jidda , September 7, 1944. [Received September 13.] Sir : Yesterday I had a long conference with Shaikh Yussuf Yassin, Deputy Foreign Minister and Private Secretary to King Abdul Aziz al Saud, who had just returned from several days at Taif where he received from Amir Faisal personally special communications from the King. Shaikh Yussuf said he wanted to speak with me on a subject of the greatest importance, in the strictest confidence, not about the details of the current supply program now under reconsideration, but regarding the mutual interests of Saudi Arabia and America in the years to come. His remarks are summarized as follows: 1. The King is convinced of the personal friendship of President Roosevelt, which he reciprocates. From experience he has a high regard for the Americans who have come to Saudi Arabia, for their good works and their good will. He is persuaded that the new American Minister to Saudi Arabia has Arabian welfare close to his heart. 2. On the other hand, recent events give no assurance that these auspices will fulfill our mutual hopes. When His Majesty was informed last spring that the American Government was prepared to extend aid to Saudi Arabia, up to the amount to be given by the British, it was assumed that the country would benefit from this generous intervention. Instead, the combined supply and financial aid is less than that received from the British in 1943 in supplies alone, besides which the British financial subsidy was also cut off. The net result of America’s offer, therefore, is that Britain is relieved of half of her already reduced obligations, without any benefit whatsoever to Arabia. It matters not that this may be called a misunderstanding of the American offer, which has no doubt been fulfilled to the letter, but the disappointment is there and the failure to get any benefit from America’s participation is also there. If the American participation prevents benefit to Saudi Arabia, then Lend-Lease to Saudi Arabia is Lend-Lease to Britain alone. 3. When the King sees the great nation of America content to have its economic activity in Arabia reduced and defined by its ally, Britain, America in turn will surely understand that Saudi Arabia may be excused if it yields to the same constraint from the same source, not merely to please an ally, but to survive. Without arms or resources, Saudi Arabia must not reject the hand that measures its food and drink. 4. Unwilling as he is to entertain the thought, the King cannot but consider the possibility that America may lose interest in his distant land, after the war, as she has retired to domestic preoccupations after other wars. Even more to be dreaded is the possibility that America might permit her policy to be dictated by influential pressure groups, which have already spoken through the party platforms to foreshadow a possible “MESC” (political of course) for Palestine, wherein America’s generous intentions may be compressed and diverted into a policy beneficial to someone no doubt, but not to the Arabs. 5. The Saudi Arabian Government therefore inquires whether there is an exit for our two nations from this confinement. It is understood that neither wishes a break of confidence or of cooperation with the British. It is not suggested that the joint program be broken off. The question is whether over and above the MESC program and limitations there is not some large area in which Saudi Arabia and America can collaborate alone, on a basis that leads far beyond the end of the war. Only thus can our combined effort assure continuity, stability, and mutual benefit. With the European war nearing its glorious end, the question is urgent. I made little comment during the above, interrupting only to ask Shaikh Yussuf to repeat and clarify his remarks from time to time. I am convinced that he was transmitting a point of view which is basic to our future interests in Saudi Arabia. More he would not say on behalf of the King. When I asked him to suggest ways and means, he was very reluctant to do so. In reply to statements made by me, I found that he understands perfectly that under American law our government cannot grant financial subsidies, but he expressed the conviction that loans could be made, directly or indirectly. He pointed out that America had already offered to help by selling gold and silver bullion to Saudi Arabia, and that they would take advantage of this offer gratefully. However, the sums they can secure by advance royalties from Aramco are small, too small to meet the point under discussion whereby a substantial development of Saudi Arabian economy could be undertaken with American cooperation. Insisting again that he was speaking only for himself, he hinted at possible American interest in aviation, military and commercial, citing the recent request of the U.S. Army for a direct route across northern Arabia (Legation’s telegram 265 September 4, 9 a.m., 47 and despatch No. 1 of September 4 48 ). I asked him whether he had in mind a treaty whereby the United States would have all aviation rights in Saudi Arabia, or only a concession to commercial aviation. He said a proposal, if any, should come from the United States, not from Saudi Arabia, and if made he hoped it would be for not less than twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five. I got the distinct impression that the King would be hospitable to a treaty for American aviation rights if thereby he could secure financial resources soon. Shaikh Yussuf pointed out that the patrolling and protecting of our oil concession, refineries, and possible pipe-lines should justify investment by the American Government. I thanked Shaikh Yussuf for what he had said in confidence, and assured him that I would be glad to study with him in the weeks to come, ways and means whereby our two Governments might promote economic cooperation in Saudi Arabia outside the MESC supplies. Respectfully yours, William A. Eddy 47 Ante , p. 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] . 48 See footnote 12, p. 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 718 and Doc. 719 ] . The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/9–844: Telegram [Document 802] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , September 8, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 11:07 p.m.] 270. I have agreed to joint recommendation that grain shipped under subsidy program for 1944 should be increased from 40,000 tons to 50,000 tons. This represents net increase of 7,000 tons cereal since it includes 3,000 tons grain substituted for dates (re MESC Cairo’s telegram August 26 49 ). In addition to the 50,000 tons is 1,500 tons grain, 300 tons sugar and 12 tons tea for the pilgrimage and 3 months’ reserve stocks, arrangements and location of which not yet agreed. Agreed also that 50,000 tons grain constitute provisional basis for 1945 supply and shipping purposes to be revised up or down according to developments. Pilgrimage requirements and reverse stock is to be addition to the 50,000 tons. MESC Cairo will cable complete text. 50 Immediate joint instructions on their paragraph 2 needed to end anxiety of Saudi Arabian Government who would be informed urgently. Comment follows in separate telegram. 51 Eddy 49 Not printed. 50 This was done by the Minister in Egypt in telegram 2687, September 8, 6 p.m., not printed. 51 Telegram 271, infra . The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/9–844: Telegram [Document 803] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] Jidda , September 8, 1944—3 p.m. [Received September 9—1:03 a.m.] 271. Re Legation’s 270, September 8, 3 [ 2 ] p.m. 50,000 tons plus pilgrimage supplies and reserve stocks constitutes substantial increase of 1944 supply program though still a compromise as I held irregular and uncontrollable dhow traffic should not be counted in imports at Government disposal. Figure was reached by taking 1944 import consumption as 65,000 tons of which 8,000 were stocks sold and 7,000 were dhow traffic per Saudi figures. Method of hold reserve stocks and location not yet agreed but admitted by all that it is physically possible in open-air warehouse at Jidda. Controlled reserves imperative to give confidence and reassurance when famine threatens. I will study problem and report later. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eddy The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/9–944: Telegram [Document 804] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] Jidda , September 9, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 8 p.m.] 273. While Saudi Government should be informed without delay of increase in food subsidy (re Legation’s 270, September 8, 2 p.m. paragraph 1) this communication should be shortly followed by reply to King’s demand for return of 1943 pilgrimage revenues (re Legation’s 235, August 6, 10 a.m. paragraph 4). King expects full reply to that communication be made to both Governments. Hope Department can insist on reply by British. It concerns us because (1) affects Saudi finances and (2) demand addressed to US as well as British. Reply to King should be before Jordan leaves September 15 on 6-week vacation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eddy The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/9–1044: Telegram [Document 805] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , September 10, 1944—12 a.m. [Received 2:20 p.m.] 274. Yesterday Jordan and I agreed to recommend to our Governments: (1) Additional 7,000 tons of grain and therefore entire 50,000 tons grain supplied in 1944 should be included in subsidy part of Joint Supply program, (2) reserve stocks referred to in joint note to King (reDepts 149, July 26, 5 p.m., paragraph A) can be [ procured? ] and held at Jidda in warehouse supervised by MESC if Saudi Government wishes to have this done to guarantee readiness of supplies and to give assurance against shipping delays. If Saudi Government objects to MESC controlled warehouse for reserves whose delivery is not yet due, stocks can be held elsewhere in Red Sea areas under Allied control. Repeated Cairo for AEMME. Eddy The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/9–1044: Telegram [Document 806] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , September 10, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 8:22 p.m.] 275. Yesterday held preliminary conversation with Jordan re subsidy for 1945. He insists on one-third cut from 3 million sterling to 2 million. I stated that I have no instructions to help force Saudi Government back to their 1941 budget, that we had jeopardized benefit of 1944 program and much good will by haggling, that I must, therefore, seek specific instructions from Department before joining in any recommendation. Jordan urges three arguments: (1) To reduce burden on British and American taxpayers which I conceded in principle. (2) To make Saudi Government self-supporting which increased 1945 oil and pilgrimage revenues should permit. Against this I claim not even well-organized nation can suddenly cut revenue by one-third. Increased revenue problematic and, in any case, would be realized late in 1945. Expansion of refineries for Army may postpone Aramco production. Some new revenue should be available to King to purchase durable goods when markets and shipping open up. Present budget and reforms by MESC committee only just beginning. Saudi Government should have chance to put house in order before mortgaging all potential income. I suggest maintenance present subsidy. If economy becomes stable next summer we can announce cut in subsidy for 1946. (3) To estimate [ stimulate? ] revival of merchant trade. Jordan proposes to maintain food and transport subsidies cutting off subsidy in cotton textiles etc. Against this I claim, and Coneybear agrees, benefit will be to textile industry in Britain and India alone and entrench British in Saudi import business. Futhermore, commodities in question should come to Saudi Government not to local merchants, otherwise costs will increase, prices soar and distribution be prevented. Revival of merchant trade should be in goods not now supplied. When subsidy is cut U.S. trade should have equal chance. Urgently request early instructions. Eddy The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) 890F.24/9–844: Telegram [Document 807] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) Washington , September 12, 1944—5 p.m. 177. ReLegs 270, September 8, 2 p.m. Department and FEA approve of agreement reached in Jidda, set forth in paragraph (B) of Cairo’s 2687, September 8, 6 p.m., 52 to increase grain shipments from 40,000 to 50,000 tons under joint American-British supply program for Saudi Arabia during 1944. Department and FEA also approve of use of 50,000 ton figure as provisional basis in determining amount of grain to be supplied during 1945. You and your British colleague jointly should notify King Ibn Saud of the 10,000-ton increase in grain supplies under the 1944 program as soon as your British colleague receives similar instructions from his Government. Sent to Jidda, repeated to Cairo 53 for AEMME. Hull 52 Not printed; paragraph B repeated terms of agreement for supply as described by the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia in his telegram 270, September 8. 2 p.m., p. 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] . 53 Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2457. The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) 102.1/9–1444: Telegram [Document 808] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) 54 Washington , September 14, 1944—8 p.m. 180. From Treasury. The following is the text of the letter to be sent to the Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury: “Reference is made to previous communications between representatives of our respective Governments relative to the vital need of Saudi Arabia for a supply of silver for coinage purposes. “Accordingly, I request, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, that you will be so kind as to inform the Foreign Economic Administration that the need of Saudi Arabia for silver for coinage purposes during the balance of the calendar year 1944 may be met to the extent of 3,437,500 ounces of silver from the stocks of silver of the United States Treasury. I also request, subject to the mutual convenience of the United States and Saudi Arabia, that this silver be made available to Saudi Arabia as soon as possible. “I am prepared, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, to transmit to the Foreign Economic Administration requests of Saudi Arabia for the above mentioned silver and the agreement of Saudi Arabia to return to the United States Treasury within 5 years after the end of the existing emergency as determined by the President of the United States, an amount of silver bullion in an equivalent or higher fineness and equivalent in quantity and form to the total number of ounces of silver transferred to Saudi Arabia under the Act of March 11, 1941, 55 from the stocks of the United States Treasury silver, provided, however, that if conditions of the world supply of silver make it advisable, such period may be extended by agreement of both Governments for an additional 2 years. Respectfully yours” The following is the text of the letter to be sent to the Honorable Leo T. Crowley, Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration: “His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, through (name) , (title), hereby requests the Foreign Economic Administration to supply as soon as possible 3,437,500 ounces of silver under the Act of March 11, 1941, from the stocks of the United States Treasury silver. “I hereby agree on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia that Saudi Arabia shall return to the United States Treasury within 5 years after the end of the existing emergency, as determined by the President of the United States, an amount of silver bullion in an equivalent or higher fineness and equivalent in quantity and form to the total number of ounces of silver transferred to Saudi Arabia under the Act of March 11, 1941, from the stocks of the United States Treasury silver, provided, however, that if conditions of the world supply of silver make it advisable, such period may be extended by agreement of both Governments for an additional 2 years. Respectfully yours,” It may be advisable to explain that the change in language in the agreement for return of the silver is being made in all lend-lease silver agreements to assure the return of all lend-lease silver in the form and fineness in which it was made available. It should be made clear that irrespective of whether the United States lend-leases, or Saudi Arabia pays for, the cost of minting and shipping, all silver is lend-leased to Saudi Arabia in bullion form and that the provision for return refers to the form and fineness of the silver as bullion and not as coin. You should explain that the cost of any minting and shipping services furnished by the United States Government in connection with the silver lend-leased will be charged to the account of Saudi Arabia under the Lend-Lease Act, as a credit Lend Lease item. [Treasury.] Hull 54 The texts of the letters included in this telegram were signed September 21, 1944, by the Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and were received in the Department about September 29. 55 55 Stat. 31. The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/9–1544: Telegram [Document 809] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , September 15, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 11:29 p.m.] 278. Jordan left for vacation today stating: (1) His instructions to communicate revised cereals program not yet received, (2) his instructions received to reject King’s demand for revenues 1943 pilgrimage, (3) British road repair mission being withdrawn Jordan insists any independent lend-lease such as pumps for Amir Abdullah, the King’s brother, and condensers for Jubail violate spirit of joint supply and that all supply from either Government now or after European hostilities cease must be confined to joint agreed program. Instructions requested. 56 Eddy 56 In telegram 198, September 28, 7 p.m., the Minister was informed, in part, as follows: “It is considered that the return of the 1943 pilgrimage revenues is primarily a question for the King to settle with the British Government. This Government was not a party to the original arrangements, which were made at a time when the British subsidy greatly exceeded the extent of lend-lease and, since we were not a party, we are not in a position to judge the merits of the dispute concerning the nature of commitments alleged to have been made, in as much as they are dependent upon facts not at our disposal.… The purpose of the 1944 joint supply program is to maintain the economy of Saudi Arabia by compensating for the difference between estimated imports and consumption of basic commodities during the specific period contemplated by the agreed program. Lend-Lease supplies for purposes not contemplated by the program are outside its scope. By agreeing to the program or to a similar program for 1945, therefore, this Government is not precluded from extending additional lend-lease aid for other purposes at such time and under such circumstances as may be considered desirable.…” (890F.24/9–1544) The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) 890F.515/9–1644: Telegram [Document 810] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) Washington , September 16, 1944—7 p.m. 182. Regarding present status of riyal shipments, 2,000,000 are en route to Ras Tanura and 5,000,000 en route to Jidda; 3,000,000 have been lost at sea. Mint has begun work on 10,000,000 subsidy riyals and 3,000,000 additional to replace those lost. Since Depts 162, August 17, 6 P.M., 57 SAG 58 has asked Aramco to pay in dollars for 2,000,000 riyals already advanced by King. Department proposes to issue shipping instructions to FEA for 7,000,000 riyals destination Ras Tanura and 6,000,000 riyals destination Jidda. This would mean that out of a total of 20,000,000 riyals promised during 1944, excluding those lost, 9,000,000 will go to Ras Tanura for use by oil company, and 11,000,000 to Jidda. Of the latter, 1,000,000 will be for use of the Legation and commercial companies, and the balance will represent the currency portion of the joint Anglo-American supply program. Please obtain concurrence on these shipping instructions from appropriate Saudi officials. 59 Mint will probably complete work by October 1. Inform Department immediately upon signature of documents sent you in Dept’s 180, September 14, 8 P.M. It may be possible to begin shipment before actual documents are received in Washington. Hull 57 Not printed. 58 Saudi Arabian Government. 59 In telegram 293, September 25, 5 p.m., the Minister reported that the Saudi Arabian Government concurred in the proposed shipping instructions (890F.515/9–2544). The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) 890F.24/9–1044: Telegram [Document 811] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) Washington , September 16, 1944—9 p.m. 184. ReLegs 275, September 10, 1 p.m. The actual needs of Saudi Arabia should determine the extent of economic assistance to be rendered under the joint supply program. While reductions should be made as rapidly as circumstances permit, reductions per se constitute an unsound objective if it appears that they will retard the orderly development of a sound economy which will provide the basis for ultimate financial self-sufficiency. Rather than to attempt to adjust the Saudi Arabian budget to an arbitrary reduction it would appear more logical to ascertain whether a sound and reasonable budget will permit reductions in the 1945 program as compared with 1944. It is believed, therefore, that the Saudi Arabian Government should be requested to submit a budget for 1945 as was done for 1944. A study of this budget should be correlated closely with an estimate of probable importations through normal commercial channels, together with an objective estimate of the relative proportions of goods the King may be reasonably expected to sell and to give away as subsidies to his tribesmen for reasons of domestic political expedience involving the maintenance of law and order. Stimulation of merchant trade of course will contribute to the attainment of self-sufficiency. However, it is considered that normal trade should expand progressively along general lines rather than with abnormal rapidity with respect to only limited categories of goods such as textiles; that consequently the 1945 supply program should include substantially the same basic categories of essential goods provided in 1944. Sent to Jidda, repeated to Cairo 60 for AEMME. Hull 60 Repeated as telegram 2524. The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/9–1844: Telegram [Document 812] The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , September 18, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 11:21 p.m.] 282. ReDepts 177, September 12, 5 p.m. Today British colleague 61 and I jointly notified King of 10,000–ton increase in 1944 grain subsidy supply. British colleague also has instructions to notify King of (1) extra food supply for 1944 pilgrimage as listed in Legation’s 270, Sept. 8, 2 p.m. and (2) offer to stock food reserves at Jidda under conditions stated in Legation’s 274, September 10, noon. Request similar instructions. 62 Repeated Cairo for AEMME. Eddy 61 Robert B. Ellison, British Chargé. 62 In telegram 200, September 30, 7 p.m., the Minister was informed as follows: “You are authorized jointly with your British colleague to notify King Ibn Saud of authorization for additional food supplies for the pilgrimage in 1944, as described in your 270, September 8, 2 p.m.” (890F.24/9–1844) The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/9–2544: Telegram [Document 813] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , September 25, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 1:12 p.m.] 290. Suggestions below predicated on my assumption that joint supply program is a war measure necessitated by MESC rationing which will not preclude larger American-Arabian agreements after hostilities cease. Please confirm or correct this assumption. Am planning to postpone first official visit to King until Department authorizes broaching for preliminary discussion with King long-range cooperation similar to the following in scope. Unless Saudi Arabs can foresee vigorous large-scale American cooperation they will continue to be intimidated by surrounding sterling controls. After consultation with Coney bear 63 I suggest to Department (see despatch No. 5, September 7), effective when European hostilities cease: (1) Loan of 10 million dollars first year decreasing by 1 million each year for 10 years then repayable in inverse ratio beginning with 1 million 11th year, total repaid in 25 years loan secured by Government revenue from Arabian oil. Loan would stabilize economy till oil revenue made nation self-sufficient and would provide means to acquire equipment for public services, agricultural developments and communications. Loan to be spent in USA for goods and services. If direct loan forbidden by US laws could it be made indirectly through National City Bank? (2) Saudi Government to give US concession to construct airdromes and operate commercial and military airways. US to assure some internal air transport, adequate native air force for border patrols, by equipping and training Saudi pilots and mechanics. (3) US to contract to build a highway artery across Arabia with spurs to principal cities to organize transportation and repair shops and to provide at reasonable prices motor vehicles and replacements. Conditional upon an American supervisor of transport. Unlike other nations Saudi economy and order wholly dependent for transport upon motor vehicles alone. When hostilities cease US industry will be geared to meet this need. (4) Simultaneous with proposals above or equivalent, Department to request appointment of American financial and economic adviser. I am convinced proposal for adviser should not be isolated but go hand-in-hand with offer of far-reaching economic cooperation. (5) Other possible offers ( a ) to rebuild Medina–Damascus railroad or ( b ) build railroad from Jidda to Mecca for port merchandise and pilgrimage traffic. However, not certain railroads will tempt King. 64 Eddy 63 Col. John F. Coneybear, FEA representative and chief of MESC, Jidda. 64 In telegram 220, October 25, 7 p.m., the Minister in Saudi Arabia was informed: “We have been working intensively and as expeditiously as possible on plans relating to the suggestions you have made. We are keenly aware of the urgency and importance of the matter and hope it will be possible to provide you with definite information with regard thereto in the comparatively near future.” (890F.24/9–2544) The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) 890F.20 Missions/9–2944 [Document 814] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) Washington , October 5, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I refer to your letter of September 19, 1944 65 stating that the United States Military Mission to Saudi Arabia will be continued at least until January 1945 and requesting an expression of my opinion regarding the need of continuing the Mission after that time. The American Minister in Jidda has been asked to submit his recommendations regarding the continuance of the Mission after January 1, 1945. In this connection he has expressed the following opinions: 1. The Minister recommends a continuance of the United States Military Mission of Instruction after January 1945. 2. The Saudi Arabian Government and people deeply appreciate the Mission, which has been successful. The political effect of the Mission has been helpful in Saudi Arabia as well as have been the professional achievements of the Mission. 3. The Military Mission is beng instrumental in overcoming prejudices against travelling freely in the interior of Saudi Arabia and is also overcoming suspicions of infringement upon sovereignty or of military encroachments. 4. The British Government at present is strengthening its comparatively ineffective Mission, and the Government of the United States ought to maintain the lead which it has at present. 5. The United States Military Mission could also include the proposed Air Mission which is to provide training for Saudi Arabian mechanics and pilots. The Minister believes strongly that one continuing Military Mission is to be preferred to separate missions of a temporary character. In view of the foregoing, it is strongly recommended that the Military Mission be continued after January 1945. It would be appreciated if it might be stated that it would be possible to do so. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 65 Not printed. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/10–1644 [Document 815] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State No. 24 Jidda , October 16, 1944. [Received October 23.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to my Despatch No. 13 of September 20, 1944, 65 which transmitted a copy of the joint communication to King Abdul Aziz al Saud, made by my British colleague and myself, in accordance with instructions from the Department (telegram No. 177, September 12, 5 p.m.). I now have the honor to transmit a translation of the reply from King Abdul Aziz al Saud, handed to my British colleague and myself simultaneously by the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 15, 1944. Although this reply states that the Minister of Finance has been ordered by the King to amplify the King’s reply, when queried yesterday, the Minister of Finance said he had no further comments to add. It is possible that the statement in the King’s letter refers to details of the supply program which the Finance Minister has orders to discuss with the Jidda committee of the Middle East Supply Center rather than with the British and American Ministers. Respectfully yours, William A. Eddy [Enclosure—Translation] The King of Saudi Arabia ( Ibn Saud ) to the American Minister ( Eddy ) 67 We have received with pleasure Your Excellencies’ joint letter, dated September 18, 1944, 68 by which you transmitted to us the decision of the two friendly governments, Great Britain and the United States of America, concerning their help to us in supply matters for our country, and their joint agreement to increase the quantity of cereals, which has been decided as a supply to this country, from 40,000 tons to 50,000 tons. We are sincerely thankful for the two friendly governments for their endeavor in assisting us and appreciate their nice attention and fine help for our country. We have already ordered our Minister of Finance, Abdullah Suleiman, to state the remarks we have regarding this matter. Accept our highest regards. Written on Shawal 14, 1363 (October 2, 1944). 65 Not printed. 67 Sent also to the British Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Ellison). 68 See telegram 177, September 12, 5 p.m., to Jidda, p. 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] . The Department of State to the British Embassy 890F.51/9–544 [Document 816] The Department of State to the British Embassy Memorandum Reference is made to the Embassy’s memorandum of September 5, 1944, stating that Gellatly Hankey and Company contemplates offering the Government of Saudi Arabia a loan of 100,000 pounds sterling to be secured by a lien on some or all of the pilgrimage tariff fees to be collected in sterling area countries. It appears that the Embassy believes that this proposed loan is necessary to accomplish two distinct objectives: 1. To provide the Saudi Arabian Government with foreign exchange for the purchase of supplies not covered by the joint American-British supply program. 2. To provide foreign exchange which can be sold to private Arab merchants to stimulate the return of Saudi Arabia’s commerce to normal channels. As to the first objective, it is hoped that the recent upward revision of the joint supply program will make it unnecessary for the Saudi Arabian Government to purchase additional supplies immediately. The annual pilgrimage is due to take place in the very near future, and presumably the collection of fees from prospective pilgrims has already commenced. If these fees are made available promptly to the Saudi Arabian Government as they are collected they should provide adequate foreign exchange to cover any governmental purchases which may become necessary. As to the second objective, the Department shares the desire of the Foreign Office to encourage the movement of trade through normal commercial channels. However, it is the Department’s understanding that pilgrim tariff fees have not normally been a source of foreign exchange for private merchants. It is believed that in addition to the foreign exchange proceeds from commercial exports, now substantially curtailed, a major source has been the sovereigns brought into the country by pilgrims and spent by them for goods and services. The merchants then used the sovereigns to finance the importation of goods to replenish their stocks. It appears that the embargo on the export of sovereigns from Saudi Arabia is interfering with this normal procedure. The Department would appreciate the views of the Embassy or the Foreign Office as to how this difficulty can be overcome. It is not clear that the Gellatly Hankey and Company loan would provide an adequate solution. Even if it is determined that the pilgrim tariffs should be used to provide foreign exchange to merchants, it would appear that the collection of the tariffs is so close at hand that an advance against them should not be required. For the above reasons it is considered that the proposed loan is unnecessary. The Department sincerely appreciates receiving information from the Embassy regarding the proposed loan. As long as the American and British Governments jointly are furnishing economic assistance to the Government of Saudi Arabia, the Department considers that it would be undesirable if any loan by a private company which involves payment of interest or any other charge by the Saudi Arabian Government were to be made without prior consultation between the American and British Governments. The Department, however, does not consider that the agreement of the two Governments should be necessarily a condition precedent to the conclusion of such a transaction. In referring to the desirability of making foreign exchange available to Saudi Arabia, the Embassy states in its memorandum that “this is all the more necessary in view of our declared intention to reduce our joint subsidy next year”. In this connection it may be recalled that the Embassy stated in a previous communication to the Department that “it was agreed that the two Ministers should warn Ibn Saud that it was the hope of the U.S. and U.K. Governments that with increased revenues from the oil company and with better economic conditions it would be practicable for the balance of supplies given away by the King without payment to be reduced in 1945”. Although it is hoped that economic conditions in Saudi Arabia will permit a reduction in any joint supply program for 1945, it is understood that both the American and British Governments have expressed a “hope” rather than a “declared intention” in this regard. Washington , October 16, 1944. The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State 890F.51/10–2744 [Document 817] The Secretary of War ( Stimson ) to the Secretary of State Washington , October 27, 1944. Dear Mr. Secretary : As a result of a recent conference between representatives of the War Department and Department of State concerning the various problems arising out of our relations vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, it has become apparent that the national interests of the United States can best be safeguarded by presenting to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, through diplomatic channels, all of the requirements and desired concessions of the United States and at the same time informing the King of the nature of the assistance that can be given by the United States to Saudi Arabia. Both from a long and a short range point of view the most important military interest in Saudi Arabia is oil and closely following this in importance is the right to construct airfields, the use of air space, and the right to make aerial surveys in connection therewith. There are also a number of relatively minor matters that require consideration and determination at the earliest practicable time. The King of Saudi Arabia, as a result of discussions with representatives of various War Department agencies during the past two years, has requested directly or inferentially various types of assistance. These take the form of military supplies and equipment, including aircraft, training missions, and engineering construction and technical services. The assistance, however, has not been requested nor granted as a quid pro quo for any one of the above items specifically, but such aid that has been given has been furnished on an individual basis with the firm knowledge that any help to the King would serve both to promote good will and to enhance our position. It is realized that it is necessary to complete action on the matters that have not been finally agreed upon and to make further concessions if our interests are to be safeguarded. In order that you may have before you all of the matters pending concerning Saudi Arabia, a list of these items have been tabulated in the attached enclosure. I would appreciate an expression by you of the views of the Department of State as to the means and methods which should be adopted in order to promote and safeguard these interests of the United States in Saudi Arabia. Copies of this letter are being sent to the Secretary of Navy and to the Army-Navy Petroleum Board. Sincerely yours, Henry L. Stimson [Enclosure] Brief of Problems Concerning Saudi Arabia I. Requirements and desired concessions of the United States . 1. The right to construct airfields, including the construction of weather observation stations, emergency landing fields and other navigational aids . This would include the immediate construction of an airfield at Ras Tanura (Dhahran) to relieve the increasing congestion at Bahrein (Iraq Island). 2. Permission to use air routes across Saudi Arabia and to use air space as needed . A direct route from Cairo to Dhahran would result in a saving of over 200 miles on each flight. 3. Permission to make aerial surveys of Saudi Arabia for the pro-posed air routes, fields, etc . 4. Permission to exercise control of law and order, including trial by American judges, over all United States citizens, both civilian and military, located in the oil sections of Saudi Arabia and in the areas used by the Air Force . See letter dated September 30, 1944 on this subject. 69 5. Oil for military use . The Department of State, the Navy Department and the Army-Navy Petroleum Board are familiar with the details concerning oil concessions and requirements. II. Aid and assistance requested by the King of Saudi Arabia including such assistance as has already been given . 1. A military mission has been requested to train the Saudi Arabian Army and Airforce on modern lines . This mission would include training in the arms and services for the army and the training of pilots and mechanics for the airforce. It would be necessary to send aircraft and other training aids in addition to the military personnel. (At the present time there is a small United States Military Mission to the Saudi Arabian Army engaged in instructing technical services and this mission is scheduled to be discontinued on January 1, 1945.) The Department of State has requested in a letter dated October 5, 1944, that this mission be expanded and also to include the proposed Air Mission and be continued after its expiration date of January 1, 1945. The Department of State further recommended one continuing mission of a permanent character is to be preferred to separate missions of a temporary character. It has been proposed that in the performance of this training mission, occasional air transportation for the King and his highest officials be undertaken and, together with further training in the United States for some of the advanced students, that all training equipment and planes used in the Mission should become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government. (An air mission to train each group of 10 pilots and necessary mechanics would represent an approximate outlay of $250,000.00 based upon the best available information.) 2. Lend-Lease for military equipment and supplies for the Saudi Arabia Army has been requested and given . Saudi Arabia has been declared eligible for Lend-Lease and the United States is now engaged in sending military equipment on the basis of a 50–50 contribution by Great Britain. The American commitment is approximately 82% complete. Total amount of Lend-Lease to be furnished by the United States Government amounted to $1,100,093.23 of which $793,828.41 has been assigned according to the latest figures. In addition to the above, it is proposed that uniforms for 11,000 men be provided and these supplies be furnished on the same basis as the Lend-Lease agreement. The King has also requested that: a . six transport aircraft, preferably C–47’s, and four bombers be furnished; b . that a small arms plant capable of producing 45–calibre and 7.9 mm. cartridges be built; c . that certain roads of strategic importance be either constructed or repaired; d . that a survey of water supply points be made for improvement of existing ones or development of new water supply points, and that pipe be furnished for this water system; e . that certain radio communication equipment be furnished; and f . that certain English speaking natives be educated in the medical profession in the United States for service as medical officers in the Saudi Arabia Army. 3. A request has been wade for taxes or other revenues for the use of landing fields . The proposed airfields would be of some assistance to Saudi Arabia but such assistance would not equal the benefits that would accrue to the United States. Therefore, some further recompense to Saudi Arabia will be necessary. 4. Copies of surveys and charts prepared as result of aerial survey have been requested by the King of Saudi Arabia . The cost of these surveys would be approximately $85,000.00. 5. Oil Revenue . No comment is made on this by the War Department as this is believed to be a matter within the purview of the Department of State, the Navy Department, and the Army-Navy Petroleum Board. 69 Not printed. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/10–3044: Telegram [Document 818] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , October 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received October 30—12:10 p.m.] 325. ReDepts 220 October 25, 7 p.m. 70 Aramco report dated October 24 on visit of Ohliger and Lebkicher to Riyadh October 18 to 20 mailed to their home office. Recommend Department request copy urgently. King admitted consulting British on American proposals because he lacks any assurance of United States support. “Colonel Eddy called to see me last spring and asked questions about needs of Saudi Arabia. Colonel Eddy now back as Minister but has nothing whatever to say to me about American assistance,” Aramco report emphasizes displeasure and possible disgust of King at lack of American policy assurances to him and implies greater confidence in British material help over many years. Proposals for substantial United States cooperation should precede piece meal requests by us for air fields, radio communications et cetera which might be granted easily if King could count on United States support. Delay in riyal shipments has furthered [ further lowered? ] the American prestige (reLegs 324, October 30, 4 p.m. 71 ) Aramco officials confirm my conviction that the favor of the King is at stake and his patience at low ebb. Eddy 70 See footnote 64, p. 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 813 ] . 71 Not printed; in it and in telegram 318, October 24, 10 a.m., the Minister had reported that “American failure to keep schedules” in the delivery of 5 million riyals, stated to be en route to Jidda in mid-September, was “seriously embarrassing Saudi Government who cannot supply cash needs of pilgrims arriving in considerable numbers.” (890F.515/10–3044, 10–2444) In this connection, see Department’s telegram 182, September 16, 7 p.m., p. 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] . In telegram 347, November 20, 5 p.m., the Minister reported that the 5 million riyals had arrived at Jidda by steamship and were delivered to the Saudi Arabian Government and receipted for on November 19 (890F.515/11–2044). The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F. 24/11–344: Telegram [Document 819] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , November 3, 1944—4 p.m. [Received November 3—2:30 p.m.] 331. British Chargé today informed me Foreign Office has approved offer by Muslims of India to ship 500 tons cereal as gift to Muslims in Saudi Arabia. He informed me but did not seek concurrence. I told him that speaking personally I am glad to see additional food coming to Arabia but I hoped this would not delay arrival of subsidy cereals long overdue, nor preempt cargo space needed by any subsidy shipments. I suggest that the Department consider this good news (1) because Saudi Arabia is undernourished and (2) because it establishes a precedent for independent supply over and above joint subsidy program. What is permitted to India must be permitted to the United States. Eddy The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F. 24/11–2444: Telegram [Document 820] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , November 24, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 4:10 p.m.] 352. Jordan requests discussion to reduce joint subsidy in 1945. I declined discussion as premature pending (1) agreement on over-all supply needed and (2) clarification of the general situation. Since Jordan constantly discusses United States affairs privately with Saudi Government and since United States should be equally free to communicate with the Saudi Government I recommend that paragraph 2 of joint instructions (Department’s 130, July 12, 6 p.m.) be rescinded at end of 1944. I recommend further that any 1945 joint program substitute this simple statement in place of paragraph depleted [ deleted ]: “Any approach to the Saudi Arabian Government regarding the formulation, implementation, or revision of the joint supply program should be made jointly with your British (American) colleague.” Eddy The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 890F.24/11–2844: Telegram [Document 821] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , November 28, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 9:14 a.m.] 354. Summary of MESC Cairo supply procurement for Saudi Arabia for 1945 just received. Omitting cereals and motor transport it urges all remaining commodities be returned to private commercial channels with subsidy “if any” confined to foodstuffs. Am convinced Jordan will lead British effort to embroil us in resentment of King by proposing drastic reduction in subsidy. I suggest Jordan’s argument from increased oil revenue (Legation’s 275, September 10, 1 p.m.) be rejected. Aramco informs me King cannot expect larger payments in 1945 than were due in 1944 and that King’s recent borrowing from Aramco further decreases what he should receive from them. I recommend that (1) I be authorized to defer 1945 subsidy discussion with Jordan until after my visit to Riyadh although giving him no reason except as in Legation’s 352. 72 (2) If British insist on unreasonable reduction of subsidy we return the subsidy to them alone and assist Saudi Government by direct and independent agreement. (3) Increase in oil revenues be excluded from subsidy consideration as new revenue reserved for national development not part of 1941 budget to which Jordan wants Saudis to return. (4) I be authorized to insist on joint discussion of budget with Saudi officials who are certainly an interested party to prevent unnecessary misunderstandings or disappointments. Such discussion was proposed by Department (184 September 16 and 166 August 23, 73 paragraph 5) but was rejected by Jordan (Legation’s 264 September 4). Eddy 72 Dated November 24, supra . 73 With regard to telegram 166, see footnote 39, p. 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 890F.51A/12–644: Telegram [Document 822] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , December 6, 1944—midnight. 10223. Please reply as follows to the Foreign Office’s letter of November 23 74 regarding a financial adviser for King Ibn Saud: “In reply to your letter of November 23, 1944, I have been asked to say that the Department of State appreciates the request for an expression of its views regarding the proposal to make available the services of Zahid Hussain, an Indian Sunni Moslem, as a financial adviser to King Ibn Saud. It is fully understood that nothing in the nature of a financial mission is contemplated and that it is proposed that Zahid Hussain serve as an official of King Ibn Saud, rather than of the British Government. In previous references to a ‘financial mission’ to Saudi Arabia my government has been employing merely for sake of convenience a generic term applicable to proposals for furnishing the King with financial advisers of American or British nationality under a variety of possible circumstances. In this connection it may be recalled that, in the Embassy’s letter of July 7, 1944, to Sir Maurice Peterson, it was stated that the Department had in mind particularly the request for a financial adviser reported to have been made last March by King Ibn Saud. The views expressed in that letter were intended, therefore, to apply to such a proposal as the one to make Zahid Hussain available to the King to act as his own official paid by him. The Department of State continues to entertain the views expressed in that letter. It therefore is gratified that the British Government is prepared to agree not to proceed any further with the proposal.[”] Sent to London, repeated to Jidda. 75 Stettinius 74 Text transmitted to the Department in telegram 10325, November 23, 7 p.m., from London (not printed). 75 Repeated as telegram 266. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) 890F.24/11–2844: Telegram [Document 823] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) Washington , December 9, 1944—8 p.m. 268. Department considers that the basis of any joint supply program for 1945 is its adequacy in meeting the reasonable supply and budgetary needs of Saudi Arabia and that you should not concur in any proposals which in your judgment fail to meet this requirement (foregoing repeated to Landis). You are authorized, therefore, in accordance with your recommendations (reLegs 354, November 28, 9 a.m.) (1) to defer discussion of joint supply program with Jordan until after your visit to the King, giving only the reasons stated in your 352; 76 and (2) to insist upon joint discussion of budget with Saudi officials at the appropriate time. In as much as Aramco considers that net royalty payments in 1945 will be no greater than in 1944, the question of what to do with any increase appears to be hypothetical. It is suggested, therefore, that budgetary estimates be based on the assumption that royalties next year will be the same as they are this year, and that if this assumption should prove incorrect, the question be decided at a later date if it should arise. A decision regarding the second of your numbered recommendations necessarily must await future developments, including the extent of the aid this Government may be in a position to provide and the attitude to be adopted by the British with respect to reductions. Landis is being requested to furnish Department with a copy of the MESC supply procurement summary to which you refer. Stettinius 76 Dated November 24, p. 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , and Doc. 820 ] . The Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State 890F.6363/12–1144 [Document 824] The Secretary of the Navy ( Forrestal ) to the Secretary of State Washington , December 11, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : On 27 October 1944, the Secretary of War sent me a copy of a letter addressed to the Secretary of State under date of October 23 [ 27 ], 1944, relating to the War Department’s interest in Saudi Arabia. It is my purpose to set forth here the strategic interest of the Navy in this same area. Our interest is twofold: 1. The supplementing of Western Hemisphere oil reserves as a source of world supply . The operations of the Navy, including the Naval air arm, in peace as well as in war, are dependent to a large degree upon the availability of refined petroleum products. The certain availability of such products, in turn, depends in time of crisis upon the existence of adequate reserves of natural crude petroleum in areas so situated geographically as to assure their availability to the United States. The known reserves of natural crude petroleum in the Western Hemisphere have for years been the foremost contributors to the various uses of petroleum throughout the world, and have been more fully developed and exploited than the reserves in other areas. Indeed, there is a substantial body of expert opinion that the known reserves of natural crude oil within the continental limits of the United States are inadequate to supply the civil economy as well as the needs of the armed forces of the nation over any considerable period of years. The degree of accuracy of this opinion, or the extent to which the severity of its conclusion is mitigated by the possibilities of the discovery of new reserves or the growth in the use of synthetic fuels, are not currently susceptible of precise determination; but, obviously, in a matter of this kind, the Navy cannot err on the side of optimism. The largest known oil reserves outside of the Western Hemisphere are located in the Mesopotamian Basin in the area of the Persian Gulf. These reserves are largely undeveloped. It is distinctly in the strategic interest of the United States to encourage industry to promote the orderly development of petroleum reserves in the more remote areas such as the Persian Gulf, thereby supplementing the Western Hemisphere sources and protecting against their early exhaustion at inefficient rates of production. 2. The expansion, or at least the preservation of the continuity, of ownership by United States nationals of oil reserves outside of the continental United States . The prestige and hence the influence of the United States is in part related to the wealth of the Government and its nationals in terms of oil resources, foreign as well as domestic. It is assumed, therefore, that the bargaining power of the United States in international conferences involving vital materials like oil and such problems as aviation, shipping, island bases, and international security agreements relating to the disposition of armed forces and facilities, will depend in some degree upon the retention by the United States of such oil resources. The strategic interests (military and naval) of the United States will, of course, be profoundly affected by the agreements which issue from such conferences. Under these circumstances, it is patently in the Navy’s interest that no part of the national wealth, as represented by the present holdings of foreign oil reserves by American nationals, be lost at this time. Indeed, the active expansion of such holdings is very much to be desired. In view of the foregoing, it is my own considered judgment that the Government, through the State Department, should work out a program, carefully conceived and far-reaching in its effect, which would result in the greater use, now and in the peacetime years ahead, of petroleum products made from oil produced in the Mesopotamian Basin and other overseas areas. At the same time, the good offices of the State Department should be used to the greatest possible extent to promote the expansion of United States oil holdings abroad, and to protect such holdings as already exist, i. e., those in the Persian Gulf area. You may be sure that in the development of such a program and in carrying it out, this Department will cooperate in every way possible. Sincerely yours, Forrestal Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 890F.51/12–2044 [Document 825] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 77 Washington , December 22, 1944. Subject: Proposals for the Extension of Long Range Financial Assistance to Saudi Arabia. In a memorandum from the Secretary of State dated April 3, 1944, which you approved, it was recommended that lend-lease funds be used for the extension of increased economic assistance to Saudi Arabia and that subsequently Congressional approval be sought for the provision of direct financial aid. Largely because of wartime conditions, Saudi Arabia is experiencing budgetary deficits. These may be expected to continue for the next few years until oil royalties and a revival of normal trade provide sufficient sources of revenue to meet essential governmental expenditures. Meanwhile Saudi Arabia is dependent for survival upon help from abroad. If such help is not provided by this Government, undoubtedly it will be supplied by some other nation which might thus acquire a dominant position in that country inimical to the welfare of Saudi Arabia and to the national interest of the United States. An American national interest, basically strategic in character, exists in Saudi Arabia for the following reasons: 1. A strong and independent Saudi Arabian Government in the Near East, where two great world powers come in contact, is less likely to fall victim to war-breeding aggression than a weak and disintegrating state vulnerable to economic and political penetration. 2. The vast oil resources of Saudi Arabia, now in American hands under a concession held by American nationals, should be safeguarded and developed in order to supplement Western Hemisphere oil reserves as a source of world supply. 3. The military authorities urgently desire certain facilities in Saudi Arabia for the prosecution of the war, such as the right to construct military airfields and flight privileges for military aircraft en route to the Pacific war theater. King Ibn Saud has indicated that he prefers to rely upon the United States for the assistance his country needs and that he would adopt a much more independent attitude toward third countries if he were assured that this Government will extend adequate aid on a long-range basis. This cannot be done through lend-lease ( a ) because the Foreign Economic Administration is unwilling to continue it beyond the present fiscal year; and ( b ) because there is no assurance in any case that lend-lease would be available on a long-range basis. Your approval is requested of the following steps to be taken in order to enable this Government to extend adequate long-range assistance to Saudi Arabia for the purpose of affording protection to the American national interest in that country and of obtaining wartime facilities urgently needed there: 1. That the Congress be requested to appropriate funds for use in meeting the urgent financial requirements of Saudi Arabia to the extent deemed necessary by the Secretary of State: 2. That the Secretary of State inform the President of the Export-Import Bank that you desire the Bank to make a commitment in principle of its intention to extend, after the necessary study, development loans to finance long-range projects for the improvement of economic conditions and living standards in Saudi Arabia; 3. That the military authorities, after consultation with the Department of State, give immediate consideration to such projects as it may be advisable for them to undertake promptly in Saudi Arabia in order to provide interim assistance by means of such measures as the construction of airfields and related installations, the dispatch of training missions and equipment, and the construction of strategic roads, together with other facilities. The Secretaries of War and the Navy concur in the foregoing proposals. [Annex] Supplementary Note to Memorandum for the President Entitled “Proposals for the Extension of Long-Range Financial Assistance to Saudi Arabia” It cannot be stated with certainty at this time the funds which will be needed to meet the urgent financial requirements of Saudi Arabia. It is estimated, however, that the budgetary deficits of the Saudi Arabian Government will continue for approximately five years. If the war should continue for several years more and if the return of normal trading conditions should be delayed unduly, the maximum sum to meet these deficits is estimated at $57,000,000. Should the war end in the near future, and should more favorable economic conditions obtain, only about $28,000,000 will be needed. A reasonable expectation, however, is that the sum of $43,000,000 will suffice to meet these budgetary deficits over a five-year period until Saudi Arabia becomes financially self-sufficient. 77 Drafting of this memorandum was undertaken by the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, after which it was discussed informally with officers of the War and Navy Departments; on December 1 the draft was forwarded by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State for approval (890F.51/12–144). The memorandum was submitted on December 13 by Secretary Stettinius to Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal for approval, with covering letters which constituted an acknowledgment to Secretary Stimson’s letter of October 27 and Secretary Forrestal’s letter of December 11. By December 20 both of the Secretaries had expressed concurrence in the proposals contained in the memorandum and in the view that it should be transmitted to President Roosevelt as soon as possible; the memorandum was sent to the President on December 22. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) 890F.51/12–2444: Telegram [Document 826] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) Washington , December 24, 1944—2 p.m. 283. ReLegs 375, December 21, 6 p.m. 78 You should seek a private audience with King Ibn Saud at the time of his forthcoming visit to Jidda. During this audience you should inform the King that a comprehensive plan has been worked out for the extension by the American Government of substantial financial and economic assistance to Saudi Arabia on a long-range basis but that, before this plan can be explained in further detail to the King, it must be submitted for approval to the legislative branch of this Government, which is expected to give consideration thereto in the near future. Notwithstanding the instructions contained in Department’s 130, July 12, 6 p.m., you should not inform your British colleague that you are about to convey the foregoing information to the King, in as much as he has continued to discuss American affairs privately with Saudi Arabian officials (reLegs 352 November 24, 3 p.m.) as illustrated particularly by his private discussion with the Deputy Foreign Minister regarding the radio station matter. (ReLegs 349, November 21, 1 p.m. 79 ) Shortly prior to the appointed time of your private audience with the King, the Department proposes to inform appropriate British officials in Washington (1) of the general nature of the message you are going to convey to the King, and (2) that you are not advising your British colleague thereof because of his apparently deliberate failure to cooperate with you regarding similar matters. You should therefore inform the Department as soon as possible of the date of your proposed audience with the King in order that British officials in Washington may be informed at the proper time. 80 Stettinius 78 Not printed. 79 Post , p. 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] . 80 No exact date had been settled upon before the end of the year, although agreement had been reached that the King would grant a private audience to Minister Eddy during the royal visit to Jidda early in January. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State Files of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs: Lot 57–D178 [Document 827] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] December 30, 1944. Lord Halifax telephoned me this morning and during the course of our conversation I mentioned to him the disappointment which we had felt to learn that the British Minister to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Jordan, had been returned to his post. 90 The Ambassador seemed to understand and asked if I would leave it in his hands. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] 90 Minister Jordan, who had been on leave, returned to Jidda about mid-November. Representations to Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom regarding proposed establishment of a direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia Representations to Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom regarding proposed establishment of a direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia [828] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State Jidda, July 7, 1944—9:00 a.m. [Received July 18—8 a.m.] 811.7490F/7–744: Airgram [829] The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State Cairo, September 29, 1944—8 p.m. [Received September 30—10:13 a.m.] 890F.74/9–2944: Telegram [830] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, October 6, 1944—8 p.m. 811.7490F/7–744: Telegram [831] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, October 21, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 10:20 p.m.] 811.7490F/10–2144: Telegram [832] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, October 22, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:15 p.m.] 811.7490F/10–2244: Telegram [833] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, October 26, 1944—2 p.m. 811.7490F/10–2644: Telegram [834] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, November 1, 1944—8 p.m. [Received November 2—12:55 a.m.] 811.7490F/11–144: Telegram [835] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) Washington, November 3, 1944—7 p.m. 811.7490F/10–2844: Telegram [836] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 6, 1944—10 a.m. [Received November 6—9:58 a.m.] 811.7490F/11–644: Telegram [837] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, November 8, 1944—10 p.m. 811.7490F/11–144: Telegram [838] Informal Statement Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs [Washington, November 9, 1944.] 890F.74/11–944 [839] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) Washington, November 18, 1944—7 p.m. 811.7490F/10–2844: Telegram [840] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, November 20, 1944—midnight. 811.7490F/11–644: Telegram [841] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 21, 1944—noon. [Received 12:35 p.m.] 811.7490F/11–2144: Telegram [842] The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 21, 1944—1 p.m. [Received November 22—3:42 a.m.] 811.7490F/11–2144: Telegram [843] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, November 22, 1944—5 p.m. [Received November 22—1:35 p.m.] 811.7490F/11–2244: Telegram [844] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, November 25, 1944—6 p.m. 811.7490F/11–2244: Telegram [845] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, December 12, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 12—noon.] 811.7490F/12–1244: Telegram [846] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, December 22, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 5:30 p.m.] 811.7490F/12–2244: Telegram [847] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, December 31, 1944. [Received December 31—9:37 a.m.] 811.7490F/12–3144: Telegram The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State 811.7490F/7–744: Airgram [Document 828] The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia ( Moose ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , July 7, 1944—9:00 a.m. [Received July 18—8 a.m.] A–57. In continuation of the Legation’s airgram No. A–54, June 22, 4:45 p.m., 1944. 91 A few days ago, Messrs. F. Ohliger and E. Lebkicher, representing the Arabian American Oil Company, 92 met King Ibn Saud at Al-Kharj, and among other things, discussed the need for direct radio communications between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The King favors the establishment of such a service, and is ready to take the first steps in that direction, but he wishes to move cautiously and to cause no irritation to the Cable and Wireless, Ltd., holder of a monopoly concession on Saudi Arabia’s telegraphic communications with foreign countries. The first measure contemplated by the King is to secure a modification in the present concession which will permit the Saudi Government to communicate by radio with countries not served by the Eastern Telegraph Company, Ltd., the company operating a cable service into Saudi Arabia. After establishment of this principle, negotiations would be opened through the oil company for the construction and operation of a radio station, either by the oil company or by some American radio system. In the course of the conversation, it appeared that the present monopolistic concession in favor of the Eastern Telegraph Company, Ltd. (The Cable and Wireless, Ltd.), was granted by the King on the insistance of Mr. S. R. Jordan, then British Vice Consul in Jidda, and now British Minister here. Moose 91 Not printed. 92 The Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), known until January 1944 as the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoe), was owned entirely by two American corporations, the Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Company. Floyd Ohliger was the general manager of the company in Saudi Arabia; Roy Lebkicher was a representative of the company who worked closely with the Saudi Arabian Government in matters of mutual interest. The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State 890F.74/9–2944: Telegram [Document 829] The Minister in Egypt ( Tuck ) to the Secretary of State Cairo , September 29, 1944—8 p.m. [Received September 30—10:13 a.m.] 2931. From Eddy. 93 Reliable confidential source informs me London has replied ( a ) objecting to a Saudi Government radio station and ( b ) asking that their objection be kept secret. Since notice to terminate monopoly of Eastern Telegraph must antedate December 1, I recommend following immediate steps. 1. Department request from British Government “no objection” to Saudi Government radio station for communication with countries not served by Eastern Telegraph, including the United States of America. 2. Legation Jidda be instructed to ask Saudi Government whether they have London reply and whether they plan radio station. [Eddy] Tuck 93 William A. Eddy, Minister in Saudi Arabia. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 811.7490F/7–744: Telegram [Document 830] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) 94 Washington , October 6, 1944—8 p.m. 8183. Present telecommunication facilities between United States and Saudi Arabia are entirely inadequate and this Government is anxious to see established as soon as possible a direct radiotelegraph circuit between the two countries. At the present time under an existing concession between the Saudi Arabian Government and Cable and Wireless, latter has an effective monopoly of telecommunications between Saudi Arabia and other countries. The agreement is valid until May 31, 1960, but parties thereto are entitled to give written notice of their desire to terminate or modify it 6 months prior to June 1 in any year exactly divisible by 5, therefore such notice could be given on December 1, 1944. Solution of difficulty would be establishment of a radio telegraph station by Saudi Arabian Government to communicate with countries not served by Eastern Telegraph Company, including the United States. Please bring foregoing immediately to attention of Foreign Office and stressing importance attached by this Government to establishment of direct radio circuits between United States and points abroad, obtain assurances that British Government would interpose no objection to establishment of proposed radio station by Saudi Arabian Government. Hull 94 Repeated to the Minister in Saudi Arabia as telegram 205, October 6, 8 p.m., with the instruction that he “ascertain whether Saudi Government has received a reply to inquiry it has addressed to London and whether it is planning to establish the radio station.” (811.7490F/10–644) The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 811.7490F/10–2144: Telegram [Document 831] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , October 21, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 10:20 p.m.] 316. Saudi Government has not yet replied to question in Department’s 205, October 6, 8 p.m., 95 but today British Chargé 96 informed me British objected to Saudi radio station. He stated: (1) That the commercial interests of Cable and Wireless were secondary to primary objection based on security, in which American censors concurred with British. (2) That London’s objection was conveyed to Saudi Government 2 months ago. It was not revealed because they hoped Aramco had forgotten about the proposal and they hoped Americans would not press issue. However, Foreign Ministry told British Legation that American Government had asked for news of project and British decided to inform me. (3) That Aramco communications with United States of America could not be very much delayed at present because Aramco sends most of its traffic at deferred rate therefore need of direct channel not apparent. I stated that on the contrary direct channel to United States of America would be very useful to Aramco and other Americans in Arabia and that I personally regretted the unnecessary 2 months’ delay shortening the brief interval before deadline of December 1. Eddy 95 See footnote 94, p. 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , and Doc. 830 ] . 96 Robert E. Ellison. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 811.7490F/10–2244: Telegram [Document 832] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , October 22, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:15 p.m.] 317. Following comment on Legation’s 316, October 21, 2 p.m. This confirms secret information reported my 2931 from Cairo September 29, 8 p.m. that British planned to conceal their objection to Saudi radio station until after deadline December 1 when nothing could be done for 5 years. 1. If security of communications was the reason why conceal their objection from our Government? 2. Why would Saudi Government radio station be less secure than Cable and Wireless Company in Shaikhdom of Bahrein? Can we not appeal to King’s pride? 3. American investments in Arabia justify request for direct communications with United States America. Aramco personnel and traffic with United States America will increase greatly. 4. Together with objection to United States Army airdrome Dhahran 97 we have two recent proved incidents where British are attempting to damage or limit American interests. I recommend official approach to Saudi Government requesting cable service to United States America be authorized with notification to cable and wireless before December 1st, details of new station and its operation to be settled later if necessary. If British succeed in delaying action past deadline American interests will have suffered a definite defeat. Eddy 97 For correspondence regarding this situation, see pp. 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 717 ] ff. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 811.7490F/10–2644: Telegram [Document 833] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) 98 Washington , October 26, 1944—2 p.m. 8924. ReDepts 8183, October 6, 8 p.m. Legation at Jidda has reported that British authorities in London object to establishment of Saudi Arabian Government radio station on security grounds and state that American censors have concurred with the British in this regard. Jidda has not reported, however, who or where these American censors are or the circumstances under which the alleged concurrence was given. Please report fully to the Department on this matter at the earliest possible moment, bearing in mind the December 1 deadline for giving notice. Repeated to Jidda. Stettinius 98 Repeated to the Minister in Saudi Arabia as telegram 221, October 26, 2 p.m., with the request that he report to the Department such detailed information as he might have regarding the questions raised therein (811.7490F/10–2144). The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 811.7490F/11–144: Telegram [Document 834] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State London , November 1, 1944—8 p.m. [Received November 2—12:55 a.m.] 9453. The Embassy took up with the Foreign Office the contents of the Department’s 8924 October 26, 2 p.m. Foreign Office tells us that the Departmental Committee on Censorship in London on which Lt. Commander Patterson, United States Navy, is a representative objected to the establishment of a Saudi Arabian Government radio station on security grounds because the control of the station would be in the hands of the Saudi Arabian Government. The Foreign Office also stated that Mr. Berle 99 had discussed this matter with the British Embassy in Washington and that the Foreign Office would prefer that this whole question be handled through that channel. Gallman 99 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) 811.7490F/10–2844: Telegram [Document 835] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) Washington , November 3, 1944—7 p.m. 234. You are authorized to approach the Saudi Government requesting establishment of direct radiotelegraph service between the United States and Saudi Arabia, with notification to Cable and Wireless before December 1. Details of new station and its operation to be settled later if necessary as suggested in your 317 October 22 and 322 October 28. 1 For your information it is understood that it would take at least 5 months for station to be shipped from this country and placed in operation in Saudi Arabia by which time war in Europe might well be over. You are further advised that question of direct circuit and British objection thereto is being taken up with London in strongest possible terms. You will be kept advised of developments. Stettinius 1 Latter not printed. The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 811.7490F/11–644: Telegram [Document 836] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , November 6, 1944—10 a.m. [Received November 6—9:58 a.m.] 332. ReDept’s 234, November 3, 7 p.m. Request to Saudi Government delivered yesterday. However it is possible Saudi Government will await British concurrence before replying just as they require prior concurrence in Dhahran airdrome (Legation’s 330 November 3, 3 [ 2 ] pm. 2 ). I hope Department can follow request with British concurrence in Saudi radio telegraph station earliest possible. Eddy 2 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 811.7490F/11–144: Telegram [Document 837] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , November 8, 1944—10 p.m. 9374. Lieutenant Commander Patterson who is at present in Washington has informed Department that at meeting of Departmental Committee on Censorship in London which considered question of establishment of Saudi Arabian Government radio station, he did not object to establishment of station but agreed that while the war was on adequate censorship provision should be made in connection with running of station. Foregoing for your information in connection with your 9453 of November 1. Byron Price, Director of Censorship, is instructing his representative on Censorship Committee in London to offer no objections to the erection of radio station in Saudi Arabia. Stettinius Informal Statement Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 890F.74/11–944 [Document 838] Informal Statement Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 3 [ Washington , November 9, 1944.] The Saudi Arabian Communications Matter In 1926 Cable and Wireless Limited entered into an agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government whereby Cable and Wireless Limited acquired a practical monopoly on the external communications of Saudi Arabia. This agreement provided that it might be terminated or modified by either party on June 30 of any year divisible by five provided six months’ notice is given by December 1 of the previous year. Cable and Wireless has a cable station at Jidda on the Red Sea side of Saudi Arabia and another cable station in Bahrein. The company, however, has no communication facilities on the Persian Gulf side of Saudi Arabia. The Arabian American Oil Company is building on the Persian Gulf side of Saudi Arabia a large strategic refinery under a Directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This company has no adequate means of communication with the United States. The nearest commercial station is on Bahrein where messages must be sent by hand from Dhahran for transmission. The company uses a tug which transmits outside territorial quarters [ waters? ] several times a week to the United States. The company uses this tug for its urgent and confidential messages and sends only routine messages through the cable station at Bahrein. The company regards these communication facilities as entirely inadequate; furthermore, the use of the tug is not strictly in accordance with the terms of the agreement between Cable and Wireless Limited and the Saudi Arabian Government. In June 1944 the Arabian American Oil Company suggested to the Saudi Arabian Government that the Saudi Arabian Government erect a station of its own in the vicinity of Dhahran and give notice to that effect to Cable and Wireless Limited by December 1, 1944. Having failed to receive any satisfactory reply from the Saudi Arabian Government to its inquiry, the company requested the Department of State to endeavor to ascertain on its behalf the attitude of the Saudi Arabian Government in regard to the matter. In October 1944, upon instructions from the Department of State, the American Minister at Jidda took the matter up with the Saudi Arabian Government. He ascertained that the reason the Saudi Arabian Government had not replied to the Arabian American Oil Company was that the British Government had expressed to the Saudi Arabian Government its objection to the establishment of such a radio station. It is understood that the Saudi Arabian Government would give notice of the modification of its agreement with Cable and Wireless and proceed to establish its own station provided the objection of the British Government is withdrawn. If this objection is to be withdrawn, it must, be withdrawn in sufficient time for the Saudi Arabian Government to give notice to Cable and Wireless Limited before the approaching deadline of December 1, 1944. Both the American and British Governments are in agreement that suitable censorship control should be established over this station as long as the war lasts. There is no reason to believe that the Saudi Arabian Government would object to the exercise of such censorship control during the war, and it is considered likely that appropriate arrangements therefor could be made quite easily. 3 Forwarded under cover of a letter of November 9 to the Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling). The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) 811.7490F/10–2844: Telegram [Document 839] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) Washington , November 18, 1944—7 p.m. 252. ReDeps 234, November 3, 7 p.m. The Department is continuing its efforts to secure withdrawal of British objection to radio station. However, the Department does not consider, as suggested by King Abdul Aziz through his Acting Foreign Minister, that the giving of notice by the Saudi Arabian Government to Cable and Wireless is essentially a matter for settlement between the American and British Governments or that the withdrawal of the British objection before December 1st is necessarily a condition precedent thereto. You should convey immediately through the Acting Foreign Minister a message to the King stating that this Government, together with the Arabian American Oil Company, is in urgent need of adequate communications facilities for the Consulate at Dhahran and the company between eastern Saudi Arabia and the United States and that if notice is not given to Cable and Wireless before December 1, 1944, there is no assurance that adequate communication facilities will be established for at least another 5 years. It should be stressed in this message that this Government has supported the economy of Saudi Arabia by furnishing many millions of dollars worth of goods and services and is giving consideration to means by which the extent of this aid may be broadened. It should be pointed out also that the establishment of these communication facilities is not only in the interest of this Government but also in the interest of the Government of Saudi Arabia in that they will enable the Arabian American Oil Company to conduct its operations with greater efficiency and thus produce the oil upon which royalties are paid and in other ways contribute to the welfare and development of Saudi Arabia. The King should be reminded that the suggestions made for the provision of adequate means of communication involve the ownership and operation by the Saudi Arabian Government itself of a radio station from which revenue may be derived. The message should emphasize that the giving of notice by the Saudi Arabian Government to Cables and Wireless of intention to modify the agreement is strictly in accordance with the agreement itself and in no way involves avoidance of contractual obligations. Furthermore it should be made clear that the giving of notice is merely a declaration of intention and does not mean that such declaration is irrevocable; that if this notice is not given by December 1st presumably it will not be possible even to consider the means of altering the present unsatisfactory arrangement. Please keep Department fully and promptly informed of developments. Stettinius The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 811.7490F/11–644: Telegram [Document 840] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , November 20, 1944—midnight. 9765. Question of direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia which you were requested to present to Foreign Office in Department’s 8183 of October 6, 1944, is becoming extremely urgent in view of deadline of December 1. Legation in Jidda has been authorized to approach Saudi Government requesting establishment of circuit with notification to Cable and Wireless before December 1. Matter has been discussed at length with Michael Wright of British Embassy here, who has been told that this Government attaches greatest importance to establishment of circuit. It is understood that views are being exchanged between Embassy here, Foreign Office in London and British Legation in Saudi Arabia concerning this matter. However, in view of urgency and importance of matter will you please take matter up with Foreign Office immediately and personally and state that this Government earnestly hopes that British Government will advise Saudi Arabian Government that it has no objection to establishment of a radio station by Saudi Arabian Government for direct radio circuit between Saudi Arabia and the United States on understanding that if station operates before termination of European war, adequate security precautions will be taken by Saudi Arabian Government in connection with operation of station. Please telegraph Department result of your action not later than November 22. Stettinius The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 811.7490F/11–2144: Telegram [Document 841] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , November 21, 1944—noon. [Received 12:35 p.m.] 348. Shaikh Yussuf Yassin, Deputy Foreign Minister, informed me confidentially that by order of the King official written notice was today given to Cable and Wireless reserving the right to modify the existing agreement in such way as His Majesty may decide. Since this was done in compliance with request transmitted in consequence of Department’s 234, November 3, 7 p.m. and my several subsequent inquiries I did not deliver message in Department’s 252, November 18, 7 p.m. which I had with me already for delivery. Comment in separate telegram. 4 Eddy 4 Telegram 349, November 21, 1 p.m., infra . The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State 811.7490F/11–2144: Telegram [Document 842] The Minister in Saudi Arabia ( Eddy ) to the Secretary of State Jidda , November 21, 1944—1 p.m. [Received November 22—3:42 a.m.] 349. Continuing Legation’s 348, November 21, noon. Official communication confirming Saudi notice to Cable and Wireless will be made soon after deputy Foreign Minister reports to King. Jordan argued with Shaikh Yusuf at great length against giving notice urging that since subject is under discussion between British and American Governments and Cable and Wireless it could be re-opened any time without notice. Shaikh Yusuf, however, stated that King had ordered giving clear notice to Cable and Wireless of intention to modify the agreement which was done in writing today and confirmed by telegraph from Saudi Government to Cable and Wireless home office. King Abdul Aziz, however, reports that active steps toward establishment of radio communication must be preceded by concurrence between British and American Governments who should relieve the objection based upon security. Informed Shaikh Yusuf that I had with me another message from my Government which I could not deliver in view of his report that our request had been fulfilled already. Eddy The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 811.7490F/11–2244: Telegram [Document 843] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , November 22, 1944—5 p.m. [Received November 22—1:35 p.m.] 10259. ReDepts 9765 November 20, midnight. Our earnest hope that the Saudi Arabian Government would be advised that the British Government had no objection to the establishment of a radio station by the Saudi Arabian Government, making possible a direct circuit to the United States, was presented with emphasis. Preliminary, oral reply was that British Government could not go so far as to tell Saudi Arabian Government, in effect, to cancel a contract with a British company. At British Government’s insistence, however, Cable and Wireless was now engaged in exploring the possibility of improving its present service so as to meet our contention that it was entirely inadequate. A detailed written reply will be made by Foreign Office very shortly and will be forwarded to you. There are other considerations involved. Winant The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 811.7490F/11–2244: Telegram [Document 844] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , November 25, 1944—6 p.m. 9918. Following is text of telegram dated November 21, 1944, from American Legation at Jidda: [Here follows text of telegram 349, November 21, 1 p.m., printed on page 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] .] In view of fact that contract is between Saudi Arabian Government and Cable and Wireless, Jordan’s contention that notice was not necessary and that subject could be reopened at any time without notice is not believed to be valid. In this connection British contention as stated in your 10259 of November 22, 5 p.m. that British Government could not go so far as to tell Saudi Arabian Government in effect to cancel a contract with a British company is also invalid, since Article 17 of contract permits termination or modification every 5 years upon 6 months’ notice. It is clear therefore that notice is perfectly legal if given on or before December 1 and in any event does not entail cancellation but merely modification. With regard to possibility of improving existing Cable and Wireless service it may be observed that Department informed that Allied military authorities in Mediterranean area are highly dissatisfied with service rendered in that area by Cable and Wireless and that this is one of the reasons why Sir Edward Wilshaw 5 is inspecting the company’s installations in these parts. We again must insist that if it is to the mutual advantage of Saudi Arabia and the United States to operate a direct radiotelegraph service between the two countries and if the Saudi Arabian Government can establish such a service without violating its existing contractual relations with Cable and Wireless, which is obviously the case under the terms of Article 17 of the existing contract, then the British authorities should not indirectly or directly try to prevent the establishment of such a circuit. If the only telegraph service between Santiago and London were routed by All America Cables through New York, this Government certainly would not support All America Cables in trying to prevent installation of a direct radiotelegraph circuit between Santiago and London. That is not this Government’s conception of the kind of relations that should exist between Allies in time of war, and does not constitute a proper basis for the kind of cooperation we envisage in the postwar period. This matter should be considered objectively, sanely and in a mutually conciliatory manner by British and American authorities. There is no disposition on the part of this Government to hurt the interests of Cable and Wireless but we do believe that the commercial interests of one company should not stand as an obstacle to the desire of the Saudi Arabian and American Governments to improve telegraphic relations between the two countries, nor should it be the cause of bad feeling between our two Governments. I wish you would present these views personally at earliest possible opportunity to Mr. Eden 6 and express the hope that from now on there will be no further difficulty with regard to this matter and that we may confidently expect the closest cooperation between our two Governments, which can only redound to our mutual advantage. Stettinius 5 Chairman of Cable and Wireless, Ltd. 6 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 811.7490F/12–1244: Telegram [Document 845] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , December 12, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 12—noon.] 11006. ReDept’s 9918, November 25, 6 p.m. and 10264 December 8, 3 p.m. 7 Department’s views were presented personally by me to Mr. Eden. In order to be able to reply fully Eden is consulting Foreign Office officials who are directly concerned with certain aspects of this matter. I expect soon to be able to telegraph Eden’s reply. Winant 7 Latter not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 811.7490F/12–2244: Telegram [Document 846] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , December 22, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 5:30 p.m.] 11374. ReEmbs 11006, December 12, 2 p.m. A written reply to our representations and observations made on the establishment of a direct radio circuit between Saudi Arabia and the US has now been received. A paraphrase of the reply follows: Records of Foreign Office show that on November 21 Sheikh Yusuf Yasin expressed to Minister Jordan the desire of the Government of Saudi Arabia to reserve its rights, in accordance with article XVII of the Agreement of April 13, 1935, to modify, if it so desired, certain articles of the agreement. No objection was raised by Jordan to this suggestion and the Saudi Arabian Government’s reservation was communicated on the same day to Cable and Wireless. A new situation has of course been created by this and Cable and Wireless are consequently waiting for any proposals which the Saudi Arabian Government may see fit to make with a view to modifying the agreement. The company for its part is meanwhile continuing to explore the possibility of improving the service between the US and Saudi Arabia in a way to meet the complaints of the US Government. It is hoped that shortly certain suggestions can be made which can then be discussed jointly taking into account security and other considerations which are involved. The State Department’s statement that the Allied military authorities in the Mediterranean Theater are not satisfied with the services rendered by Cable and Wireless is the first suggestion of that kind to reach us. Winant The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 811.7490F/12–3144: Telegram [Document 847] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , December 31, 1944. [Received December 31—9:37 a.m.] 11579. The following communication has just been received from the Foreign Office: “Nevile Butler 8 in his letter to you No. W17867/1476/801 of the 20th December 9 said that he hoped soon to be in a position to pass on to you certain suggestions by Cable and Wireless Limited for improving communications between Dhahran and the United States. We have now received the company’s proposals and consider that when they have been put into effect they should fully meet the practical requirements of the United States Government. The company state that the relative situation of Bahrein and Dhahran is such that a much clearer and better telegraphic service with London and New York can be given by a station situated on the island of Bahrein than by a station on the mainland at Dhahran. The company therefore proposed to erect a 10kw transmitter with the necessary power plant receivers et cetera at their existing station at Bahrein which is already in communication with Aden, Muscat, Karachi and other places. This new station would be worked by the company’s operators and would be capable of giving a satisfactory direct service to London, New York and the other places mentioned. It remains to consider the necessary link between Bahrein and Dhahran and in this respect the company are prepared to do whatever is necessary to give an entirely satisfactory service. If communication is required with other places on the mainland besides Dhahran the company would be glad to consider the matter on receiving further details. You will thus see that these proposals provide in effect for an efficient and direct service from Dhahran and on learning that they are acceptable to your Government the company will enter into negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government on this basis. It would no doubt be useful if the United States representative in Saudi Arabia were authorized to inform the Saudi Arabian Government that the proposals were acceptable to the United States Government. It would then remain to consider the security aspect of these proposals.” Winant 8 British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 9 See telegram 11374, December 22, 3 p.m., supra . Syria and Lebanon: Syria and Lebanon: Contents Agreements regarding treaty rights of the United States and its nationals in Syria and Lebanon and recognition by the United States of the independence of Syria and Lebanon; attitude of the United States toward the question of treaty relations between these countries and France (Documents 848-877) Agreements regarding treaty rights of the United States and its nationals in Syria and Lebanon and recognition by the United States of the independence of Syria and Lebanon; attitude of the United States toward the question of treaty relations between these countries and France Agreements regarding treaty rights of the United States and its nationals in Syria and Lebanon 1 and recognition by the United States of the independence of Syria and Lebanon; 2 attitude of the United States toward the question of treaty relations between these countries and France 1 For previous correspondence regarding American rights in Syria and Lebanon, see Foreign Relations , 1938, vol. ii , pp. 1003 ff. 2 For previous correspondence concerning the interest of the United States in the development of self-government in Syria and Lebanon, see ibid. , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 953 ff. [848] The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) Washington, September 5, 1944—7 p.m. 890D.01/8–944: Telegram [849] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, September 9, 1944—noon. [Received 3:52 p.m.] 890D.01/9–944: Telegram [850] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) [Washington,] September 13, 1944. 890E.01/9–1344 [851] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, September 15, 1944—6 p.m. [Received September 16—1:15 p.m.] 890E.01/9–1544: Telegram [852] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, September 16, 1944—7 p.m. [Received September 16—2:30 p.m.] 890E.01/9–1644: Telegram [853] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, September 19, 1944—10 p.m. [Received September 20—3:45 p.m.] 890E.01/9–1944: Telegram [854] Statement Issued to the Press by the Secretary of State. September 19, 1944 September 19, 1944 890E.01/9–1444 [855] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, September 20, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 4:08 p.m.] 890E.01/9–2044: Telegram [856] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] September 22, 1944. 890E.01/9–2244 [857] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, September 22, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 6:03 p.m.] 751.90D11/9–2244: Telegram [858] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, September 22, 1944. [Received September 30.] 890D.01/9–2244 [859] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, September 23, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 3:35 p.m.] 751.90E11/9–2344: Telegram [860] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) [Washington,] September 28, 1944. 890E:01/9–2844 [861] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , September 28, 1944. 890E.01/9–2844 [862] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) [Washington,] October 4, 1944. 890E.01/10–444 [863] The Department of State to the French Delegation in Washington Washington , October 5, 1944. 890E.01/10–544 [864] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, October 6, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 8:01 p.m.] 751.90D11/10–644: Telegram [865] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) Washington, October 7, 1944—8 p.m. 751.90D11/9–2244: Telegram [866] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, October 9, 1944—8 p.m. [Received October 9—3:30 p.m.] 751.90D11/10–944: Telegram [867] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) [Washington,] October 10, 1944. 890E.01/10–544 [868] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, October 11, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 3:20 p.m.] 751.90D11/10–1144: Telegram [869] The Chargé in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State Damascus, October 12, 1944—noon. [Received October 13—11:14 a.m.] 890D.01/10–1244: Telegram [870] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) Washington, October 14, 1944—6 p.m. 751.90D11/10–944: Telegram [871] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) [Washington,] October 17, 1944. 890D.01/10–1744 [872] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, October 20, 1944—10 a.m. [Received October 21—3:43 p.m.] 890E.00/10–2044: Telegram [873] Memorandum, of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) [Washington,] October 23, 1944. 890D.01/10–2344 [874] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, November 2, 1944—4 p.m. [Received November 3—7:27 p.m.] 751.90D11/11–444: Telegram [875] The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Beirut, November 18, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 19—5:30 p.m.] 890D.01/11–1844: Telegram [876] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 1, 1944. [Received December 9—6 p.m.] 890E.01/12–144: Airgram [877] President Roosevelt to the President of the Syrian Republic (Kuwatly) Washington, December 7, 1944. The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) 890D.01/8–944: Telegram [Document 848] The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut ( Wadsworth ) 3 Washington , September 5, 1944—7 p.m. 134. The United States Government has observed with friendly and sympathetic interest the accelerated transfer of governmental powers to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments since November 1943 and believes that the local Governments may now be considered representative, effectively independent and in a position satisfactorily to fulfill their international obligations and responsibilities. The United States is therefore prepared to extend full and unconditional recognition of the independence of Syria and Lebanon, upon receipt from the local Governments of written assurances that the existing rights of the United States and its nationals, particularly as set forth in the Treaty of 1924 between the United States and France, 4 are fully recognized and will be effectively continued and protected by those Governments until such time as appropriate bilateral accords may be concluded by direct and mutual agreement between the United States and Syria and Lebanon, respectively. Following the receipt of such assurances this Government proposes to appoint an EE and MP 5 as its representative near the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and would be pleased to receive in this country diplomatic representatives of Syria and Lebanon of the same grade. You should address separate notes to the Syrian and Lebanese authorities in the foregoing sense, forwarding copies of your communications and the replies thereto promptly to the Department. The President desires to appoint you as United States Minister near the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. The Department trusts that such appointment will be agreeable to you and requests that you ascertain informally from the appropriate local authorities that it would likewise be agreeable to them. It is the Department’s intention to notify the French of this decision, as a matter of courtesy, following the receipt of satisfactory replies from the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and before the news is announced publicly. Hull [For agreement between the United States and Syria regarding the treaty rights of the United States and its nationals in Syria and recognition by the United States of the independence of Syria, effected by an exchange of notes signed September 7 and 8, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 434, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1491. For similar agreement between the United States and Lebanon, signed September 7 and 8, 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 435, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1493.] 3 Accredited also to Syria; resident in Beirut. 4 Convention between the United States and France, defining American rights in Syria and Lebanon, signed at Paris, April 4, 1924, Foreign Relations , 1924, vol. i , p. 741 . 5 Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 890D.01/9–944: Telegram [Document 849] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , September 9, 1944—noon. [Received 3:52 p.m.] 182. On September 7 I handed identic notes to Lebanese and Syrian Foreign Ministers 6 as directed in Deptel 134 September 5, 7 p.m. Yesterday I received Syrian Government’s reply and this morning that of the Lebanese Government. Written in English, both cite essential portions of my notes, give requested assurances textually as set forth therein, express appreciation of friendly attitude of United States Government and welcome and accept proposal to exchange ministers. Copies of four notes are forwarded to Department under cover of despatch No. 512 7 airmailed today. It is indeed most agreeable to me that the President should desire that I be appointed Minister near the two Governments. On my informing Foreign Ministers of the very real satisfaction which such appointment would afford me, should it be agreeable to them, each asked me cordially to convey to you his Government’s formal agreement. Both Ministers expressed desire that texts of exchanges of notes be made public so soon as possible. They inquire whether it is your wish that this be done simultaneously here and in Washington. I should appreciate receiving Department’s instructions on this point. On evening of presentation of notes I broke Ramadan Fast with the Syrian President. 8 He too expressed keenest satisfaction, adding in substance: “My country, I too believe, has merited your Government’s confidence. My dearest hope is that it will continue to do so and that I shall continue to merit that of President Roosevelt. Please tell them I sincerely believe that we shall.” Repeated to Caserta for Murphy. 9 Wadsworth 6 Selim Tacla, Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Jamil Mardam, Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 7 Despatch dated September 8, not printed. 8 Shukri al-Kuwatly. 9 Robert D. Murphy, United States member, Advisory Council, Allied Control Commission for Italy. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) 890E.01/9–1344 [Document 850] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Kohler ) [ Washington ,] September 13, 1944. I called M. Baudet 10 today and confirmed to him that a decision had been taken to extend full recognition to the Republics of Syria and Lebanon, as was suggested to him by Mr. Alling 11 in their conversation on September 7. 12 M. Baudet asked whether we were seeking the approval of the French authorities. I told him that it was my understanding that we were simply giving them friendly advance notice on the assumption that there was no need for clearance with them since they were themselves receiving an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the Republics of Syria and Lebanon and since other Powers had exchanged such representatives with these States. M. Baudet thanked me for this information and said that they would inform their “Government”. 10 Philippe Baudet, member of the Delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation in the United States. 11 Paul H. Alling, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. 12 Memorandum of conversation not printed. The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 890E.01/9–1544: Telegram [Document 851] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , September 15, 1944—6 p.m. [Received September 16—1:15 p.m.] 190. During last week, following return to Beirut of Spears 13 and Holmes, 14 there has arisen in these countries a situation which in my view warrants your careful consideration. Spears tells me that recent Anglo-French conversations in London resulted in his receiving categoric instructions from Foreign Office to inform Syrian and Lebanese Governments immediately on his return that British Government would favor conclusion of treaties between them and the French; were they to counter that the de Gaullist regime 15 does not possess capacity to conclude treaties he was to say that while there was force in such argument it was his Government’s view that negotiations might well be undertaken and agreements initialed. He was to explain that, with approaching end of war in Europe, British Government felt it highly desirable that position in Levant States should be “finalized”, that normal method of ending mandate was through treaty and that it would be of advantage to local governments to know exactly where they stood with the French—in short, that Foreign Office had felt that time had come “to get things ironed out”, that there was “no other way out, no other evolution but a treaty”. Spears commented that Foreign Office view that in all this there was no change in policy but only change of emphasis; previously London had favored conclusion of Franco-Levant treaties but “rather as a pious hope” whereas today it urges their early conclusion. He added “the French have gained a very great deal”; previously London was prepared to accept treaty relations acknowledging privileged position to France and to say so publicly at any moment agreeable to the three parties (Syria, Lebanon and France) whereas now the French have obtained Foreign Office agreement to make such statement “at a propitious moment” without concurrence of Levant Governments; even now Eden 16 might well say in House of Commons “we are very much in favor of treaty”. Spears then said he had carried out his instructions to the letter. He had talked at length with Lebanese Foreign Minister, briefly with Premier, 17 and he had twice met with Syrian President, first alone and then with his Premier 18 and Foreign Minister. Lebanese Foreign Minister he recounted had shown “calm wisdom” but firm opposition, saying: “You are asking us to commit suicide; not so long ago you set up an independent Lebanon; now you suggest action which would lead inevitably to its destruction”. Premier was outraged. Both stressed that no Moslem and only portion of Catholic Christian Lebanese would accept treaty and that for Government even to negotiate would cause bitter schism between communities 19 and lead to breakup of country, with predominantly Moslem provinces joining Syria. Syrian reaction had been even stronger. At our first meeting, Spears said, the President was appalled, “a veil fell between us”; he feared coercion and asserted Syria would never sign with France any treaty it would not willingly conclude with other countries as well; at end of last war French were imposed on Syria, “Emir Faisal’s 20 only roots were the four legs of his chair whereas mine are deep and the whole country is behind me”. At second meeting, Spears continued, Syrian Foreign Minister termed as farcical any idea that French mandates should be converted into French protectorate; was not France unable to protect itself? And Premier was forcefully indignant: Britain had only begun to gain Arab confidence; this would end any hopes therefor; Syria “would knock at every door” for help; wires would go to King George, 21 President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin; 22 special appeal to its Arab neighbors and Jinnah 23 in India would not be forgotten. Spears, I gathered, had only avoided further incensed comment by suggesting, rather to gain time than because it might appease, that Lord Moyne 24 was expected to visit him shortly when further discussion of problem might be had. This morning I called on Lebanese Foreign Minister to deliver invitation to International Civil Air Conference 25 (circular Deptel September 11 to Cairo 26 ). He was forthrightly pleased to receive this first invitation that Lebanon participate on a basis of sovereign equality with United Nations at a conference designed to lay one of foundation stones for post-war world. He confirmed to me, substantially in Spear’s words, his Government’s reactions to Spear’s representations; “For Lebanon to tie its future to that of France at this time would be to commit suicide”, internal crisis would develop and Lebanon would lose friendship of Arab States with whose representatives he is to meet at Arab Unity Congress in Cairo 10 days hence; 27 Lebanon asks today that France be not permitted to impose by intrigue or force of arms any special or privileged relationship. He confirmed, too, much of what Spears had told me of Syrian Government reaction, for he had talked yesterday with Syrian Foreign Minister. They had agreed to answer unequivocally that they would not enter into any treaty negotiations with the French, not even for a commercial convention. He concluded: “Our intention is to await end of war and then to conform our treaty relationships to the international situation; and in such relationships, we like to believe that the principles of the Atlantic Charter 28 will be applied”. Two other comments perhaps bear quoting: The first from the Syrian President “I would rather make of Syria a Soviet Republic”, and the other from my Iraqi colleague “We will help, even with our army.” From influential Lebanese Moslem political leader Karami also I have confirmation of this official reaction. Immediately following Spear’s visit, he was called to confer with Syrian President, first alone and then with two Premiers. All were strongly indignant, et cetera, as above, and President concluded, “If necessary we shall stand up and fight”. However, Karami concluded calmer councils prevailed, especially in light of a remark by Spears (to which he made no reference in talk with me) to effect that “should there occur again an incident similar to that of last November I am sorry to say we shall not be able to take a stand similar to that then taken”. 29 I shall visit Damascus this weekend and report further. I believe that the two Governments will limit current action to formal communications to Spears of their categoric refusal to negotiate with the French and that they will then solicit all possible foreign support of their stand. Repeated to Caserta. Wadsworth 13 Sir Edward L. Spears, British Minister to Syria and Lebanon. 14 Gen. Sir William G. Holmes, General Officer Commanding the British Ninth Army in Syria. 15 The French Committee of National Liberation under the Presidency of Gen. Charles de Gaulle. In June 1944, the Committee proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of the French Republic. The United States recognized the Provisional Government on October 23, 1944. 16 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 17 Riad as-Solh. 18 Saadallah Jabri. 19 i.e., the various religious denominations. 20 Faisal I, first King of Iraq (1921–1933) and a leader of the Arab Revolt in the First World War. He was proclaimed King of Greater Syria in March 1920 by the Syrian National Congress and deposed by the French in July 1920. 21 King George VI of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 22 Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union. 23 Mohammed Ali Jinnah, President of the All-India Moslem League. 24 British Minister Resident in the Middle East. 25 For correspondence relating to the International Civil Aviation Conference, see vol. ii , index entry under Civil Aviation Conference. 26 Not printed. 27 See bracketed note. p. 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 715 and Doc. 716 ] . 28 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. i , p. 367 . 29 For correspondence concerning the Franco-Lebanese crisis of November 1943, see ibid. , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 996 ff. The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 890E.01/9–1644: Telegram [Document 852] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , September 16, 1944—7 p.m. [Received September 16—2:30 p.m.] 191. Legtel 190, September 15, 6 p.m. Foreign Minister informed me that at meeting of Lebanese Cabinet last evening decision was taken to refuse to enter into any treaty negotiations with the French. He understood that Syrian Cabinet was to meet today to take similar decision. Spears has just sent me word that Lebanese decision has been formally communicated to him. Repeated to Caserta. Wadsworth The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 890E.01/9–1944: Telegram [Document 853] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , September 19, 1944—10 p.m. [Received September 20—3:45 p.m.] 193. At official reception in Damascus yesterday morning President expressed special satisfaction that Syria and Lebanon had been invited to send delegates to Civil Aviation Conference, readily agreed to await your pleasure in matter of publication of exchange of notes regarding recognition and said I would receive shortly formal communication regarding British proposal reported in my 190, September 15, 6 p.m., that Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese treaties be negotiated. Lunch for Diplomatic Corps followed after which President retained me for hour’s talk, Premier and Foreign Minister participating. They confirmed reaction reported in my telegram under reference with emphasis on following: Syria wishes treaties of friendship with all countries, a treaty of special privilege with none; it cannot believe that application of Atlantic Charter principles would permit it to be made victim of new Anglo-French entente. It wishes to contribute in any possible manner to common victory over Japan as well as Germany; it willingly offers its territory as half-way training area for Allied troops moved from European to Far Eastern theater of operations; and its vital interests demand that Lebanon take similar stand; were such not taken Lebanon’s predominantly Moslem provinces would elect to return to Syria; but this would leave small predominantly Christian Mount Lebanon which would in all probability seek and receive French protection, a development which would constitute continuing threat to peace of Syria and of Arab world. President then said he was drafting special appeal to President Roosevelt which he would ask me to transmit by airmail pouch. 30 I replied that I would be glad to do so. Finally President said he wished especially to tell me they had decided to ask American Government to assist in choice of eminent American technical advisors for agriculture and irrigation and of a gendarmerie mission, principal task of which would be reorganization of existing service with emphasis on training of officers; his Foreign Minister would prepare formal written request. I answered that I should be happy so to inform you and felt certain request would receive sympathetic consideration soon as lessening of present overriding war needs might permit release of fully competent personnel. Premier then reverting to British démarche , I was pressed to answer two questions: What kind of a treaty did I think British wanted them to negotiate and what did I personally think of démarche? First question was particularly interesting for it had been only through questioning that I had in my reported conversation with Spears been able to pin him down to admission that British Foreign Office envisaged treaty of special relations. I replied that, as Spears had told us there was no basic change in British policy, as Churchill 31 himself had defined that policy to be that France achieve in Syria and Lebanon a position similar to that of Britain in Egypt and Iraq, and as such British position was based on treaties of alliance, it seemed only reasonable to conclude that similar Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese treaties were envisaged. In answer to second question I admitted that I too was troubled. They had, I recalled, referred to Atlantic Charter; might I begin with United Nations pact; 32 put very simply it bound signatories to wage common war, make common peace and observe principles of Charter; I was troubled both because I sensed that this British démarche might have disturbing repercussions on orderly progress of Middle East political relationships and because it might mean that Britain had reaffirmed a commitment perhaps not illogical when given de Gaulle in 1941 33 but which, nevertheless, if in fact reaffirmed in changed conditions of today, might tie its hands when moving to negotiate such common peace. With both my answers they seemed in full accord. I trust you will approve. To have spoken with less frankness would I felt have led them to question the consistency and bona fides of our own declared policy. This morning Beynet 34 called in [ on ] President to propose opening of treaty negotiations. Reply was firm, polite refusal; details by later telegram. 35 Repeated to Caserta. Wadsworth 30 Despatch 525 September 22, from Beirut, p. 787 [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 857 and Doc. 858 ] . 31 Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister. 32 The United Nations Declaration, signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 25 . 33 On August 7, 1941, an agreement defining relations in Syria and Lebanon between Britain and the National Committee of the Free French at London was accomplished by an exchange of letters between Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the National Committee, and Capt. Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of State in the Middle East; see British Cmd. 6600, Syria No. 1 (1945): Statements of Policy by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in Respect of Syria and the Lebanon, 8th June–9th September, 1941 , pp. 3–4. For correspondence relating to the interest of the United States in the agreement, see Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. iii , pp. 725 ff. 34 Gen. Paul E. Beynet, French Delegate General in Syria and Lebanon. 35 Telegram 194, September 20, 11 a.m., p. 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] . Statement Issued to the Press by the Secretary of State. September 19, 1944 890E.01/9–1444 [Document 854] Statement Issued to the Press by the Secretary of State. September 19, 1944 36 September 19, 1944 The recognition by the United States of the independence of Syria and Lebanon, by the accrediting of an American Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Governments of those countries, is a matter of gratification to the people and Government of the United States. The eventual right of Syria and Lebanon to independence was recognized by the terms of the Mandate entrusted to France. 37 Since the proclamation issued at Damascus regarding the independence of Syria and the proclamation issued at Beirut regarding the independence of Lebanon, in 1941, effective powers have been transferred to the Governments of both countries, subject to the exigencies of war. In that process, French cooperation has been of great assistance. I am confident that the free nations of Syria and Lebanon will play a helpful part in the cooperative task of international peace and progress which lies before us. The rights of the United States and its nationals in Syria and Lebanon, as defined in the Convention between the United States and France dated April 4, 1924, will remain unchanged pending the conclusion of new accords between the United States and Syria and Lebanon, respectively. The notes exchanged on this subject between this Government and the Governments of Syria and Lebanon will be made public in the near future. 36 On September 20, 1944, a statement was also issued to the press by President Roosevelt; for text, see Department of State Bulletin , September 24, 1944, p. 313. 37 The terms of the mandate are enumerated in the Convention between the United States and France of April 4, 1924, Foreign Relations , 1924, vol. i , p. 741 . The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 890E.01/9–2044: Telegram [Document 855] The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , September 20, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 4:08 p.m.] 194. See last paragraph my 193, September 19, 10 p.m. The Beynet–Quwatly conversation of yesterday morning crystalized situation and opposing viewpoints. Beynet was accompanied by Ostrorog 38 (who returned last week from London); the President was accompanied by his Premier and Foreign Minister. I was received shortly thereafter at President’s invitation by him and Premier. They informed me Beynet had made four chief points as follows: In London there had been Anglo-French agreement that France has right to privileged position in Levant; France cannot ignore its international obligations, assumed before the war, devolving from its exercise of the mandate with which it had been charged by League of Nations; for effective transition from mandatory status to independence treaty with France is indispensable “to tie the past with the future”; And such treaty should properly safeguard “the traditional position of France in the Levant” which, the Premier said, would if recognized embrace right to protect Christian minorities. President’s reply, I was then informed, had stressed following points and considerations firmly and unequivocally: Syria will not engage itself in any relationship of special privilege with France or any other power, but rather conserve its full liberty of action while contributing however possible to common war effort; As to pretended French international obligations Syria considers they no longer exist; Catroux 38a suppressed the mandate; under December 22 accord 39 all powers then remaining in French hands have been transferred; article 22 of League Covenant 40 provides that after such period of tutelage states under mandate shall become fully independent; Syria has been so recognized by states, members of League and others; even Vichy France renounced the mandate when it withdrew from League; And it is not the past but rather hope for the future which would encourage Syria to negotiate treaty of friendship with France; far better forget the past; we will negotiate with France only when we can simultaneously negotiate with other powers for similar treaties; our inherited international obligations require that we accord most-favored-national [ nation ] treatment to all. Beynet had interpolated question as to how Syria could assume responsibility for military security; British now had three divisions in the country. President had replied “Transfer Troupes Speciales to us and arm our Gendarmerie; if you do not do latter we shall be obliged to ask another power”. (Rumor points to Iraq as that other power.) I was then shown first draft of letter elaborating foregoing theme which President proposes to address to President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, King George and Arab sovereigns. He added that he had asked Beynet to convey his argument to de Gaulle and that arrangements were being made for whole question to be discussed next week in Cairo at Arab unity preparatory conference. Finally President said he had made special point to Beynet that while Syria had obligated itself to retain present French officials in its service until 6 months after war it considered itself as of now entirely free to engage experts of any nationality. Repeated to Caserta. Wadsworth 38 Count Stanislas Ostrorog, member of the French Delegation in Syria and Lebanon. 38a Gen. Georges Catroux, Free French Delegate General in Syria and Lebanon, 1941–43. 39 See telegram 9, December 24, 1943, 3 p.m., from the Chargé at Damascus, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 1054 . 40 Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , pp. 69 , 93 . Article 22 established the mandate system. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 890E.01/9–2244 [Document 856] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) [ Washington ,] September 22, 1944. Mr. Michael Wright 41 of the British Embassy called at my request to discuss with Mr. Alling and me the present political situation in Syria and Lebanon. I informed Mr. Wright that we had received a number of telegrams from our representative in Beirut indicating that General Spears, the British Minister, was pressing the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to enter into negotiations with the French authorities for treaties of alliance establishing a special and privileged position for France in those countries. I remarked that in as much as the British frequently in situations of this kind have requested us to support the position taken by their representative on the ground, we would appreciate prompt and full information as to the policy of the British Government respecting such special treaty relationship between France and the two Levant states of Syria and Lebanon. Referring to the proclaimed intention of the French authorities to exact such a treaty from the Syrians and Lebanese, I remarked that we were not aware of the precise grounds on which the French were in a position to make such a demand. It was not clear that the French mandate over Syria and Lebanon gave France any legal right to force treaties of this kind on the two states in question as a quid pro quo for the termination of France’s mandatory position there. Taking as an example the earlier British position in Iraq during the time that it was a British mandate, I pointed out that while it was true that the British did in fact negotiate with the Iraqis the treaty of alliance 42 which came into effect after the termination of the mandate, I was not aware that the British had ever taken the position that the Iraqis were in fact obligated to enter into any such treaty with them. Was it not a case of the British so handling their relations with the Iraqis that the latter felt it would be in their interest to enter into a treaty of alliance with the British? Since the French have allowed their relations with the Syrians and Lebanese to deteriorate to such a degree that the treaty of alliance could only be negotiated under pressure, I expressed the view to Mr. Wright that we for our part would hesitate to consider joining with the British in bringing any such pressure on the Governments of the two Levant states. Furthermore, I asked Mr. Wright whether he did not agree that in such treaties of alliance as Great Britain had with Iraq and Egypt, 43 not to mention those with the Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, 44 there had been a very important inducement which Great Britain was in a position to extend to those states, namely a guarantee of protection against all acts of aggression, wherever arising. France unfortunately herself a defeated power was hardly in a position to offer any such guarantees to the fledgling states of Syria and Lebanon and the treaties of alliance imposed by France, therefore, would be without any appropriate quid pro quo on her part in return for the “preeminent and privileged position” which she has claimed in that area and in which the British appear to have acquiesced. Mr. Wright would recall that we had made it clear from the beginning that we would not recognize any such superior position of France in the states of Syria and Lebanon, when those states became independent, since, as he would agree, France had no such position there even as a mandatory power. Mr. Wright said he was not familiar with his Government’s position on this question but that he would immediately communicate with the Foreign Office and request a statement of British policy in the matter. Wallace Murray 41 Counselor of the British Embassy. 42 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, signed at Baghdad, June 30, 1930, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxii , p. 363; or British Cmd. 3797, Iraq No. 15: Treaty of Alliance Between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and His Majesty the King of Iraq With an Exchange of Notes, Baghdad, 30th June, 1930. 43 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed at London, August 26, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 401; or British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxl , p. 179. 44 Sir Charles U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads …, vol. x , passim. The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 751.90D11/9–2244: Telegram [Document 857] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) 45 to the Secretary of State Beirut , September 22, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 6:03 p.m.] 200. Following is text of telegram addressed to the Secretary by the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs just handed me by his secretary with request that I forward it textually and that identic telegrams are being sent to Messrs. Eden and Molotov 46 through the British Minister and Soviet Chargé d’Affaires respectively. “Mr. Cordell Hull, Washington: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the British Minister and the French Representative in Syria have suggested that the Syrian Government enter into negotiations with the French representative for the conclusion of a treaty under which France should obtain as stated by the latter a privileged position in Syria. The Syrian Government considers this suggestion to be contrary to the high principles proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter and other documents by the leading statesmen of the United Nations on many occasions. The Syrian Government which is unwilling to recognize a privileged position in Syria for France or any other state has firmly refused to consider this suggestion. The Syrian Government considers the mandate formerly held by France to have been terminated both de jure and de facto since the constitution in Syria of liberal democratic and independent institutions and since the recognition by Great Britain, USSR, the USA [and] other countries including all those of Arab world of Syria’s independence and the exchange of diplomatic representatives with those countries. The French representatives themselves concluded with Syria on December 22, 1943, an agreement transferring to it all the powers and prerogatives hitherto exercised by France in Syria’s name. I can assure Your Excellency that the Syrian Government intends to continue to observe its national and international obligations in accordance with the desire of the Syrian people and with the support of the United Nations who have fought this war in defense of the ideals of liberty and justice and for the maintenance of peace throughout the whole world including the Middle East. Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest-considerations. Signed Jamil Mardam Bey.” Repeated to Caserta. Wadsworth 45 Mr. Wadsworth had been appointed Minister to Syria and to Lebanon on September 21, 1944. 46 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 890D.01/9–2244 [Document 858] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State No. 525 Beirut , September 22, 1944. [Received September 30.] Sir : Supplementing my telegram no. 201 of today’s date, 6 p.m., 47 I have the honor to transmit herewith the original of the letter referred to therein as having been addressed to President Roosevelt by the President of Syria. This letter is dated September 19, 1944, and is written in the English language. Copy is enclosed for the Department’s convenience. I venture to add, as of personal knowledge, that great care has gone into the preparation of this letter, the President himself having studied and worked over its every paragraph with his Premier and Foreign Minister. Consequently its statement and discussion of the burning issues of this pre-war-end period, as they see them, are of special interest. Similar appeals, I was informed by the Foreign Minister’s secretary who today handed me this letter, have been addressed by President Quwatly to King George and Marshal Stalin with appropriate modification of opening paragraph. Respectfully yours, George Wadsworth [Enclosure] The President of the Syrian Republic ( Kuwatly ) to President Roosevelt [ Damascus ,] September 19, 1944. Mr. President : Your diplomatic representative, who has our entire confidence and whose aim is to assure the mutual interests of your great country and our own, and to maintain peace and justice in this part of the world, has informed us of the disposition of the United States to recognize the Syrian Republic unconditionally and to exchange diplomatic representatives with it. The Syrian Government has expressed its great satisfaction and high appreciation for this friendly gesture and I am pleased to add thereto my own. This gesture is moreover a confirmation of the political traditions of the United States and of its idealism, which have always found in this country a deep and sympathetic repercussion since the time when your great predecessor, President Wilson, proclaimed to the world the principles of justice for all nations, large and small, and since an American commission 48 came to Syria in 1919 to carry out a plebiscite which would indicate the desires of the Syrian people. Moreover, in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms 49 which you yourself have proclaimed you have given a new impetus to the traditional American policy. In this connection permit me to describe the political state of our country. Syria has been liberated during this war from the chains of secret agreements which it was made to endure in the name of the Mandate, and has struggled ceaselessly until its rights and national identity have been realized. The situation in Syria is, however, from the internal as well as external viewpoint clear and normal. From the internal viewpoint Syria has during the past year established its constitutional and democratic institutions based on the will of the people. As to the external viewpoint the great Powers, such as the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and all the Arab States and others as well, have recognized the sovereignty and independence of the Syrian Republic to which they have also accredited their diplomatic representatives. Even the representatives of France concluded on December 22, 1943, an agreement with the Syrian Government recognizing the independence and sovereignty of Syria and turning over to it all the powers which France had hitherto exercised in the name of Syria. The Syrian Government, for its part, continues to administer all the interests of the country and to exercise completely its attributions with all the responsibilities resulting therefrom. Only the question of the Army still remains unsettled, for, in spite of the fact that negotiations for turning it over to the Syrian Government have already been completed, the French have not yet done so. We insist however that this be done. In view of the foregoing, you will be surprised to learn, Mr. President, that the British Minister has made a verbal communication to the Syrian Government, the tenor of which is to invite this Government to enter into negotiations with the representatives of France for the conclusion of a treaty between France and Syria. These negotiations would have as their purpose, he states, the normalization of the situation in Syria on a diplomatic basis. The French Delegate General has made the same request adding that with this treaty France should obtain a privileged position in Syria and that he made this request as a result of a recent exchange of views between M. Massigli 50 and Mr. Eden in London. We can see no reason however why Syria should enter into negotiations with the French Government, since such negotiations could have no useful result, in view of the fact that we do not wish to grant France any advantage from either the cultural, material, political or military viewpoint. We desire to treat with all Nations, especially the great Powers, on a footing of complete equality. This attitude on our part does not signify a hostile feeling toward any State whatsoever but does signify a legitimate attachment to the defense of our rights and interests. Any other attitude would be in contradiction with the principles of the common law and the basic rules proclaimed in the course of this war concerning the law of nations by the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations’ Declaration, and other documents and statements, and would above all be in contradiction with the rights and the interests of the Syrian people and the interests of peace in the Middle East. The Syrian Government believes it to be its duty to avoid any contractual policy with France alone, because such a policy would signify the renunciation of everything that has so far been accomplished and would moreover signify the abandonment of the rights of the Syrian people, who have based such great hopes on the United Nations and the great principles for which they have fought in the course of the present war. Therefore, the Syrian Government, placing its entire confidence in the great statesmen of the democratic countries, especially in the United States and its eminent President, declines to make any agreement according a privileged position to any State whatsoever. It furthermore desires to have a common policy with all the Arab States in order to safeguard peace in the Middle East, the great importance of which this war has demonstrated. The high principles of the freedom and liberty of nations are being put to the test in this country as well as everywhere else in the world. We trust that the world will not again be deceived by secret and private agreements made before the end of the war. We also trust that the United States will not again remain isolated from the affairs of the old world but will rather help to uphold right and justice everywhere and will aid the weak nations who do not have the means of defending themselves against the strong, for peace cannot be placed on a permanent basis if colonial and expansionist ambitions are not everywhere eliminated. Will you please accept [etc.] Chucri Al-Kuwatli 47 Not printed. 48 The American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey (the King–Crane Commission) sent by the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to the Middle East “to acquaint itself … with the sentiments of the people of those regions with regard to the future administration of their affairs”. For correspondence relating to the Commission and the report of the American Section, see Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xii , pp. 745 ff. 49 Contained in the President’s Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 6, 1941; Congressional Record , vol. 87, pt. 1, pp. 44–47. 50 René Massigli, appointed French Ambassador to the United Kingdom, September 11, 1944. The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 751.90E11/9–2344: Telegram [Document 859] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , September 23, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 3:35 p.m.] 202. Beynet and Ostrorog called by appointment yesterday afternoon on President Khouri 51 to propose negotiation of Franco-Lebanese treaty. Premier and Foreign Minister were present. The latter asks me to inform you of their discussion substantially as follows: Beynet said that in course of recent Eden–Massigli conversations in London the situation in Lebanon was discussed it being agreed that France should enjoy privileged position in the country; that the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement having dealt primarily with military matters and provided for wartime regime, it was thought best that the situation should now be regularized by treaty. President replied that, as Beynet must know, Lebanese answer had already been given Spears, (see my 191, September 16, 6 [ 7 ] p.m.) and that knowing of Beynet’s démarche to Syrian Government (see my 194, September 20, 1 [ 11 ] a.m.) Lebanese Cabinet had met again during the morning and reaffirmed its decision, i.e. that it declined to enter into proposed negotiations or to sign treaty of special privilege with any country, preferring to await end of hostilities and integrate its position with that of other smaller nations in postwar world. After replying that he would so inform his Government Beynet commented that Lebanon would do well to remember that it was three great powers only, powers with their own interests primarily at stake which appeared to have allotted to themselves the major role of peacemaking. France, he added, had not been invited to join them in that role but would always as in the past be ready to support the smaller nations especially Lebanon because of their long traditional friendship and close relations. President said that, although he hoped such friendship would always continue, Lebanon’s position had materially changed during past year and that now Russia and United States had in turn accorded it unconditional recognition. Beynet commented that Soviet policy is essentially realistic, its action in 1939 towards Baltic States 52 being hardly such as to warrant confidence of smaller nations, and that United States seemed concerned primarily with Pacific affairs. To President’s reply that he placed high faith in American idealism Beynet answered that though such idealism no doubt existed its effectiveness as factor in determining the peace should be considered in light of concurrent isolationist sentiment among its people; it could hardly be expected to interest itself actively in Levant problems except in protection of its various cultural and trade interests. Beynet then turned conversation to progress of the war voicing conviction in Allied victory but fearing it might not be achieved in Europe before spring. Their leave-taking the Foreign Minister concluded struck a note of sober parting of the ways. Repeated to Caserta. Wadsworth 51 Bechara al-Khouri, President of the Lebanese Republic. 52 For correspondence relating to pressure by the Soviet Union upon Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to conclude pacts of mutual assistance, see Foreign Relations , The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 934 ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) 890E:01/9–2844 [Document 860] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Kohler ) [ Washington ,] September 28, 1944. Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor, British Embassy Mr. Murray Mr. Alling Mr. Kohler Mr. Wright called and presented the attached Aide-Mémoire dated September 28, 1944, 53 in response to Mr. Murray’s request of September 22, 1944, for information as to the present British policy toward Syria and Lebanon in the light of the reported recommendation of the British Minister at Beirut to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments that they consent to negotiate treaties with the French regulating their respective relations. Mr. Wright read a telegram which the Foreign Office had just sent to General Spears instructing him not to press the question further at present in view of the strong negative reaction of the Syrian and Lebanese authorities. The Foreign Office explained, however, that it had not envisaged treaties which would be unduly onerous on the Levant Republics or derogatory to their independence but rather a normal regularization of the status of the States and termination of the mandate on the lines of the Iraqi precedent. (Mr. Wright has since supplied the text of this telegram, copy attached. 54 ) In the ensuing discussion, Mr. Wright said that the British could not be expected to remain in the Levant States indefinitely to provide a counter-weight which the local authorities could use against the French and expressed the opinion that France was rapidly becoming stronger and that Syria and Lebanon might not be able to obtain later the same favorable terms they could expect at present. Mr. Wright was asked to explain the meaning which the British attached to their recognition of a “predominant position” for France among European powers in the Levant States, and particularly whether they considered that there was any conflict between their use of the word “predominant and privileged” as the equivalent thereof. Speaking personally but as an official who had been closely associated with the problem, Mr. Wright said the British purpose had been to calm the French apprehensions, rampant at the time of the invasion of the Levant States in 1941, 55 that the British intended to supplant the French in that territory; and that the British meant simply that they were prepared to see the French have relations with the Levant States similar to British relations with Iraq. He emphasized that the British concession to the French was limited to “predominance among European States” and that it was specifically stated that this predominance should not prejudice the independence of Syria and Lebanon. He thought that the de Gaulle–Lyttleton exchange had been done in something of a hurry to calm the French; that the British had not taken issue with the phraseology used by General de Gaulle at the time and that it had just not been specifically clarified since. Asked whether Russia was included among the “European nations” in reference, Mr. Wright replied that no one was thinking about Russia in that area then. As to the proposed treaty between France and the Levant States, Mr. Wright agreed with Mr. Murray that the case was not exactly parallel to that of Britain in Iraq or Egypt, as the French were not in a position to offer the usual quid pro quo of military security and protection in return for the rights and privileges obtained. 53 Infra. 54 Not printed. 55 For correspondence relating to the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by Free French and British forces in 1941, see Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. iii , pp. 725 ff. The British Embassy to the Department of State 890E.01/9–2844 [Document 861] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire His Majesty’s Minister returned to Beirut recently with instructions that with the end of the war in view it is most important that our efforts should be used to the fullest possible extent to pave the way for an eventual agreement between the Levant States and the French which would permit the conduct of their future relations on an ordinary diplomatic basis. No less formal agreement than a treaty seemed likely to attain this object. Sir E. Spears was therefore to neglect no opportunity of impressing on the local Governments our view that a treaty was not only the best but perhaps the sole method of securing full and unchallenged independence. 2. The outcome of the interview which Sir E. Spears had with the Syrian and Lebanese Governments on his return is summarised in the attached statement. 56 3. There is, of course, no intention on the part of His Majesty’s Government of imposing treaties on the Levant States (as they have implied in commenting to Sir E. Spears) although it still seems to His Majesty’s Government essential that some further agreement or treaty be made for the final definition and regularisation of the position. His Majesty’s Government do not propose to press the matter further at this stage. Washington , September 28, 1944. 56 Not printed; see telegram 190, September 15, 6 p.m., from Beirut, p. 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 851 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) 890E.01/10–444 [Document 862] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Kohler ) [ Washington ,] October 4, 1944. Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor, British Embassy Mr. Murray, NEA Mr. Alling, NEA Mr. Kohler, NE Mr. Wright called to continue his recent discussions with us regarding the situation in Syria and Lebanon, and handed to Mr. Murray the attached documents received from the Foreign Office, 57 namely: 1) Text of telegram from Mr. Eden to the Earl of Halifax 58 dated September 26, 1944, summarizing a letter from the Syrian President to Mr. Churchill; 2) Text of telegram from Mr. Eden to the Earl of Halifax dated September 26, 1944, repeating the text of a telegram addressed to Mr. Eden by the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs; 3) Text of telegram from Mr. Eden to Sir Edward Spears dated October 1, 1944, containing British reply to Syrian Foreign Minister. We informed Mr. Wright that communications similar to 1) and 2) above had likewise been addressed to President Roosevelt and the Secretary by the same Syrian officials. Mr. Wright said that Sir Edward Spears had been instructed to emphasize to the Syrians, in delivering 3) above, that it was no part of the intention of the British Government to impose any particular procedures or any particular conditions in suggesting the negotiation of a treaty with the French; that the British Government considered the present time the most favorable for the Syrians and Lebanese to obtain confirmation and regularization of their independence and interests and felt the local Governments would make a mistake if they did not give serious consideration to this factor. Mr. Wright continued that the Foreign Office, referring to the exchanges of views on this subject between the Embassy and the Department last year, had asked the Embassy to express the earnest hope that the Department would agree with its present views. Elaborating as to the timeliness of negotiations now, Mr. Wright emphasized that with the favorable developments of hostilities the time would soon be reached when British forces, which had been a source of strong support for the local Governments, would have to be withdrawn. … It seemed important to him [Mr. Murray] that the British and ourselves should do what we could to persuade the French that their own best interests would be served by a friendly and generous attitude toward the Syrians and Lebanese rather than insistence upon a legalistic and dictatorial approach. Mr. Wright strongly agreed and undertook to recommend to London that Mr. Duff-Cooper 59 be asked to talk with the French in this sense. Mr. Murray said that he would try to discuss the matter also with Mr. Caffery, 60 prior to his departure for Paris. Concluding the discussion, it was generally agreed that it was not necessary at this time to raise the technical question of the capacity of the French Committee of National Liberation to enter into a treaty of the nature in question, since present developments indicated that there would probably be a recognized provisional French Government before any negotiations came to a conclusion. 57 None printed. 58 British Ambassador. 59 Alfred Duff Cooper, formerly British Representative with the French Committee of National Liberation; appointed Ambassador to France, October 23, 1944. 60 Jefferson Caffery, Representative to the de facto French Authority at Paris; appointed Ambassador to France, November 25, 1944. The Department of State to the French Delegation in Washington 890E.01/10–544 [Document 863] The Department of State to the French Delegation in Washington 61 Memorandum The Government of the United States has been guided in its attitude toward Syria and Lebanon since the events of July 1941 by two principal considerations: 1) Its frequently reiterated sympathy with the aspirations of the Syrian and Lebanese peoples for the full enjoyment of sovereign independence which has been envisaged since the establishment of the “Class A” Mandate; and 2) its established policy of according recognition to another government only when such government is in possession of the machinery of state, administering the government with the assent of the people thereof and without substantial resistance to its authority, and is in a position to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of a sovereign state. The United States Government was thus unable to accede to the original request that it grant full recognition to Syria and Lebanon, made to it by the French authorities following the issuance of the independence proclamations by General Catroux in 1941, 62 though it was glad to recognize the step thus taken towards independence by establishing Legations at Beirut and Damascus and accrediting to the local Governments a “Diplomatic Agent,” 63 a rank customarily used in the case of semi-independent States. This Government has subsequently followed developments in the Levant States with careful attention. It welcomed the accords concluded with the local Governments by General Catroux in December 1943 and observed with satisfaction the transfer to them of the substantial governmental powers previously exercised by the French authorities. As the French Delegate at Washington was recently informed, the Government of the United States has concluded that Syria and Lebanon may now be considered to be effectively independent, and is therefore according full recognition of this independence by accrediting to the local Governments at Beirut and Damascus an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. It will be seen from the foregoing that the relations of the United States Government with Syria and Lebanon have been conducted in accordance with the realities of the situation. In the view of this Government, the war powers exercised by the French and British authorities in Syria and Lebanon could not be considered inconsistent with or derogatory to the independence of the States, since these powers have been freely and willingly granted and have been repeatedly confirmed by the local Governments. As to the complex legal situation, involving questions of the status of the League of Nations and of the position of France therein, as well as of the juridical validity of the independence proclamations themselves, it is the opinion of this Government, as the French Committee of National Liberation was informed at Algiers in November 1943, 65 that no useful purpose would be served by academic discussion of these legal technicalities. As regards “the accords to be concluded between France and the States,” these would appear to constitute a question between France and the Syrian and Lebanese Republics, respectively, which would not affect the relationship between these Republics and other sovereign States. The United States would naturally have no reason to object to the conclusion of agreements defining the relationship of France with Syria and Lebanon which were freely and voluntarily agreed to between the interested parties and did not infringe the rights and interests of others. In this connection, it may be recalled that France long ago accepted the general principle that all nations should receive equal treatment in law and in fact even in the mandated territories and that France guaranteed such treatment to the interests of the United States and its nationals in Syria and Lebanon by the Treaty of 1924 and related instruments. The United States could therefore not agree that France or French nationals should enjoy discriminatory privileges in independent Syria and Lebanon. On the other hand, the United States Government gladly recognizes the relations of special friendship which have long existed between France and the Levant States, particularly Lebanon. It was distressed when this relationship was endangered by the crisis of November 1943 in Lebanon and sincerely hopes that the close friendship and mutual good will heretofore prevailing between the French people and the peoples of Syria and Lebanon will continue to characterize the relations between them in the future. Washington , October 5, 1944. 61 Notation on the original: “Presented personally to M. Hoppenot by Mr. Wallace Murray Oct. 10, 1944 FDK.” See memorandum of October 10, p. 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 867 ] . Henri Hoppenot was a member of the French Delegation in Washington. 62 For correspondence relating to the refusal of the United States to recognize the new regimes in Syria and Lebanon, see Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. iii , pp. 785 ff.; see also memorandum of October 23, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, post , p. 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] . 63 See Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 641 ff. 65 See telegram 2096, November 9, 1943, to Algiers, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 1007 ; and telegram 1986, November 13, 1943, from Algiers, ibid. , p. 1024 . The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 751.90D11/10–644: Telegram [Document 864] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , October 6, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 8:01 p.m.] 213. Legtel 200 September 22, 5 p.m. Spears has kindly shown me telegraphic text of Eden’s reply to Syrian Foreign Minister’s telegram of September 22 addressed also to you and to Molotov. Supplementary Foreign Office telegram indicates that British Embassy in Washington has been directed to communicate text to Murray. Following brief comments may be of interest. First paragraph of Eden reply asserts that treaty seems “accessary [ necessary? ] and inevitable” to define future relations between Syria and France. I believe Syrian Government will contest this assertion by contending that, with assumption of duties of full sovereignty, Syria has obligated itself only to accord France and French nationals most-favored-nation treatment and that adequate assurance on this score can be given by unilateral declaration. Second paragraph is to effect that only by such treaty can there be final formal realization of Syrian independence. This seems hardly consistent with reference in first paragraph to Syria having “become in every respect a fully independent state”. Third paragraph, after stating that “by virtue of the mandate, legally speaking” the French authorities still possess “various rights and functions”, asserts that there are “various questions” which can only be settled by formal agreement with France. Spears tells me he has inquired by telegraph just what “various questions” Foreign Office has in mind, for he feels certain Syrian Government will press him for unequivocal detailed answer. Should Murray consider it advisable to make similar enquiry of British Embassy when Eden note is communicated to him I venture to suggest he enquire also as to just what “rights and functions” Foreign Office recognizes French as still possessing. Most of fourth paragraph and in fact the note as a whole would seem to have been drafted primarily to reassure the French as to British bona fides . Spears tells me that Duff Cooper has been instructed to communicate full telegraphic text of [ to? ] Bidault 66 and that after delivery of note to Syrian Government next week following return of Premier and Foreign Minister from Alexandria Conference copies will be communicated to Lebanese Government and Beynet. Wadsworth 66 Georges Bidault, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government of the French Republic. The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) 751.90D11/9–2244: Telegram [Document 865] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) Washington , October 7, 1944—8 p.m. 176. Your telegram no. 200, September 22, 5 p.m. Please inform the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to his note of September 22, 1944, that this Government considers the question of the possible negotiation of treaties between Syria and other powers as one for determination by the Syrian Government within the limits of the international obligations and responsibilities incumbent upon it. The United States would not desire to influence the Syrian Government’s decision in this regard, though it would naturally have no reason to object to the conclusion of accords between Syria and France, defining the relationship between them, if such accords were freely and voluntarily agreed to between the interested parties and contained appropriate safeguards of the rights and interests of the United States and its nationals. You should assure the Minister of Foreign Affairs that this Government appreciates the feeling of friendship and confidence which inspired him to address us with regard to this matter, as well as the statements contained therein as to the resolve of the Syrian Government to carry out fully its national and international obligations. Sent to Beirut. Repeated to London and to Paris for Chapin. 67 Hull 67 Selden Chapin, Counselor of Mission at Paris. The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 751.90D11/10–944: Telegram [Document 866] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , October 9, 1944—8 p.m. [Received October 9—3:30 p.m.] 216. I hesitate to make verbal statement suggested in Department’s 177, October 7, 7 [ 9 ] p.m. 68 prior to learning something of Syrian Government reaction to Eden reply (Legtel 213, October 6, 8 p.m.) which is to be handed Foreign Minister this week. May I not therefore when presenting reply outlined in Department’s 176 October 7, 8 p.m. limit my remarks to inquiry as to whether the Minister believes more favorable terms could be obtained now than later. Wadsworth 68 Not printed. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) 890E.01/10–544 [Document 867] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs ( Kohler ) [ Washington ,] October 10, 1944. Participants: M. Hoppenot, French Delegate at Washington Mr. Murray Mr. Kohler M. Hoppenot called today, at Mr. Murray’s request, to receive the Department’s memorandum dated October 5, 1944, regarding United States policy toward Syria and Lebanon. In presenting this memorandum, Mr. Murray said he desired to emphasize our earnest hope that in their dealings with the Syrians and Lebanese, particularly as relates to the conclusion of treaties, the French would pursue a tactful, generous and friendly policy rather than narrow, legalistic and dictatorial methods. We were convinced, he said, that the former would obtain the maximum goodwill and concessions for France in the Levant States and that the latter might well obtain nothing. In this connection, Mr. Murray pointed out to M. Hoppenot that with the Russian recognition of the independence of Syria and Lebanon and the revival of active Soviet interest in the Near East a new factor had entered the picture. The Levantine peoples were old hands at playing one party off against the other and might well turn to Russia for support if pressed too hard by the French; it seemed significant that the Syrian President had already protested not only to Roosevelt and Churchill, but also to Stalin, regarding the pressure he thought was being put on him to negotiate a treaty of “special privilege” with the French. Mr. Murray continued that there was only one previous case of the termination of a mandate by a Treaty of Alliance, that of Iraq, and he wasn’t sure that could be called a complete success in view of the troubles of 1941 in Iraq. 69 In addition, he felt that the situation had changed fundamentally since the previous treaties had been negotiated between France and the Levant States in 1936. 70 Consequently he hoped that the French authorities would not slavishly insist on following the pattern of 1936 or the so-called “precedent” in Iraq. He was confident that French intelligence and wit was capable of devising more appropriate and successful methods, adapted to the real situation; he could envisage a France reviving the slogans and the leadership of the Revolution and in this spirit evoking an enthusiastic response from the Syrian and Lebanese peoples. M. Hoppenot said he was not currently informed as to the situation in the Levant States, due to the present dislocation of communications with Paris, but indicated that he was in essential agreement with Mr. Murray’s views. He desired, however, to make two observations: 1) He felt that a treaty was necessary. France had invested a lot of money in Syria and Lebanon and acquired interests there which must be protected. 2) Negotiations would be difficult if Wadsworth, not to mention Spears, continued his “anti-French” activities. 71 Replying to 2), Mr. Murray said we were awaiting a report from Wadsworth on the representations recently made by M. Hoppenot, and would discuss the matter further after its arrival. However, he could assure M. Hoppenot that the Department’s instructions to Mr. Wadsworth were invariably marked by the goodwill which this Government feels toward France, and he found it hard to believe that these instructions were not carried out in the same spirit. 69 For correspondence regarding the attitude of the United States toward the attempted overthrow of the Iraqi Government, see Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. iii , pp. 486 ff. 70 Treaty of friendship and alliance between France and Syria, signed at Damascus, December 22, 1936, and treaty of friendship and alliance between France and Lebanon, signed at Beirut, November 13, 1936; France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban ( année 1936 ), pp. 201 and 229, respectively. Neither treaty was ratified by France. For correspondence regarding American interest in these treaties, see Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iii , pp. 484 ff. and 496 ff. 71 In Department’s telegram 140, September 15, 1 p.m., instruction 225, September 16, and telegram 184, October 12, 7 p.m. (none printed), Mr. Wadsworth was informed that the French Delegation in Washington had made certain complaints to the Department of his “anti-French” activities and he was requested to transmit to the Department his answers to the French allegations. In telegram 220, October 14, 11 a.m., and letter of the same date (neither printed), Mr. Wadsworth denied any anti-French conduct on his part; the Department replied in telegram 210, October 28, 9 p.m. (not printed), that the telegram and letter had “enabled us to make satisfactory reply to the French here”. (890E.00/9–1544, 123 Wadsworth, George, and 800.00 Summaries/10–1244) The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 751.90D11/10–1144: Telegram [Document 868] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , October 11, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 3:20 p.m.] 217. A telegram received by Spears yesterday from British Embassy in Washington mentioned that Embassy had been shown by Department text of provisional convention which French propose to endeavor to negotiate with Levant States. If Department can properly communicate this draft to me by telegraph and perceives no objection, I should appreciate authorization to give copy to Spears. We feel it might go far towards clarifying our thinking on such questions as those suggested in my 213, October 6, 8 p.m. and others. British Embassy telegram mentions also that in conversations with Murray importance was ascribed to consideration that, if present seemingly not unfavorable occasion for negotiation of treaty were to be lost, Russia might find opportunity in resulting void to extend its influence in these countries. On this point I ventured following comment: Syrians feel that you, the British, let them down when you urged negotiation of treaty. That feeling will, I believe, be heightened rather than mollified by Mr. Eden’s reply to Foreign Minister’s protest. That protest, together with Syrian President’s letter to King George, was in nature of appeal in extremis to British Government. It was supplemented by appeals to American and Russian Governments. Now if America in reply to such appeal were to support British position in urging signature of treaty (Note: I had in mind Department’s 177, October 7, 7 [ 9 ] p.m. 72 ), Syrians might not unreasonably be expected to turn the sooner to Russia. Spears replied that he agreed fully, and our ensuing brief discussion carried the thought a step further. It seemed to us that even were our Governments to prevail on Russia to make common cause with them in urging on Syrian Government conclusion of treaty of special privilege with France, that Government would resist by all available means, even possibly in last report [ resort? ] by use of violence (see Syrian President’s statements reported in my despatch 432, July 5 72 ). Wadsworth 72 Not printed. 72 Not printed. The Chargé in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State 890D.01/10–1244: Telegram [Document 869] The Chargé in Syria ( Satterthwaite ) to the Secretary of State Damascus , October 12, 1944—noon. [Received October 13—11:14 a.m.] 25. While addressing Parliament last evening Premier Jabri unexpectedly announced the resignation of his Government. Although he gave no reason therefor, it is reliably reported that he and the President, following his return from Alexandria, had agreed that a change of Government was necessary because of general dissatisfaction in Parliament, which reconvened October 5, with the internal situation. No announcement concerning the President’s choice of a new Premier has yet been made. Although not believed to have any direct connection with the reason for his resignation, it is of interest to report that during his speech the Premier stated that an agreement had been reached with the French for the transfer of half of the Troupes Spéciales to Syria now and the rest after the signature of the armistice, but that the French had withdrawn from their agreement. They had then confronted his Government with the request for the conclusion of a treaty giving France a privileged position in Syria. His Government had refused this request as it considered a privileged position incompatible with full independence and the terms of the Atlantic Charter. A privileged position would also, he asserted, mean the return of capitulations and special protection for the Christians, whereas the Christians of Syria do not desire protection because they themselves are the protectors of the country. Satterthwaite The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) 751.90D11/10–944: Telegram [Document 870] The Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) Washington , October 14, 1944—6 p.m. 188. Reurtel 217, October 11, 11 a.m. Probably due to faulty transmission Spears seems to have misunderstood British Embassy’s telegram. That communication reported simply that we had mentioned a discriminatory draft agreement on educational matters, which the Embassy had not seen, as indicative of the type of over-all accord we feared the French might seek to obtain from Syrian’and Lebanese Governments. Our reference was to text submitted with your despatch no. 441, July 14. 73 Moreover, there seems to have arisen an even broader misunderstanding of the Department’s views as regards the possible negotiation of accords between the French and the Levant Governments. We have no desire to urge the local Governments to sign or conclude an agreement of any type with the French. We would even refuse to approve a treaty giving discriminatory privileges to France or French nationals. It is our understanding that the British themselves do not contemplate and have not suggested “conclusion of treaty of special privilege with France.” We believe the local Governments should make their own decisions in this matter. On the other hand, we see no harm in negotiations or in agreements as such. French proposals derogatory to independence or discriminatory against others could be rejected: it would appear that no one knows definitely at this stage what the French would seek to obtain. International agreements are supposed to be mutually advantageous to the participating parties; we consider for example that we have ourselves concluded an “executive agreement” of this type with the local Governments by the notes exchanged in connection with full recognition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department’s views are fully clarified in memoranda of conversations with British Embassy on September 22 and 28 and October 4 and with French Delegation on October 10, all en route by air mail. We suggest, reurtel 216, October 9, 8 p.m., that you defer presenting written reply to Syrian Foreign Minister pending receipt of these documents and that you be guided thereby in your verbal remarks to him. Sent to Beirut. Repeated to London and Paris. Hull 73 Not printed. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) 890D.01/10–1744 [Document 871] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) [ Washington ,] October 17, 1944. Mr. Michael Wright called me by telephone this morning and, referring to our most recent conversation about the question of treaty relations between the French and Syria and Lebanon, stated that a telegram had been received from the British Foreign Office expressing appreciation of our viewpoint in this matter. The telegram went on to express the hope that we would counsel the French, as well as the Syrians and Lebanese, to adopt a policy of moderation in this matter with a view to bringing about some mutually satisfactory understanding. I told Mr. Wright that we had already spoken to both M. Hoppenot and Admiral Fenard in that sense and that we expected Mr. Wadsworth to give the same advice to the Syrians and Lebanese very shortly. Mr. Wright then asked whether we would be willing to instruct Mr. Caffery to consult with Duff-Cooper, the British representative in Paris, and thereafter advise the competent French officials along the lines that we and the British have agreed on. I assured Mr. Wright that we would be glad to take such a step. The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 890E.00/10–2044: Telegram [Document 872] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , October 20, 1944—10 a.m. [Received October 21—3:43 p.m.] 228. Last week saw important new developments in Levant political situation following return of Syrian and Lebanese delegations from Alexandria Conference. 74 On October 13 Beynet called on Lebanese President who immediately thereafter sent for Spears. Latter’s report to London recounted: 1, that Beynet said conference resolutions made Franco-Lebanese treaty impossible and French Government might therefore consider Catroux’s declarations of Lebanese independence invalidated; and 2, that President replied such interpretation was nonsense and independence was established fact which could not be abolished. On 14th, Secretary of British Legation obtained from Ostrorog confirmation of French position as follows: Catroux declaration provided for treaty; since this was no longer possible (for idea of submitting it to Iraq, for example, was ludicrous) Alexandria resolutions had in effect impaired independence of Levant States as defined in such declaration. Ostrorog added under questioning that Beynet had not acted under instructions. My personal reaction to this was that for him to take so important a step without specific directive seemed incongruous. Syrian President and Foreign Minister Mardam with whom I discussed matter on 16th pressed [ expressed ] serious concern, later elaborated by Mardam. The situation he says seems to be developing along lines disturbingly similar to those preceding November 1943 crisis; it was striking that now as then French pressure is exerted primarily on Lebanon; he had had two half hour talks with Beynet since démarche to Lebanese President without mention being made thereof. On 18th Lebanese Foreign Minister Tacla gave me following version of French démarche: Beynet said he was disturbed—and from his telegrams his Government seemed troubled—by Conference resolutions; personally he thought Paris might be led to reconsider the Catroux accords. Tacla too expressed grave concern especially as the démarche followed so closely French Ministerial Council decision of October 6 (published in Egyptian press but stopped by local British military censor) refusing to transfer Troupes Spéciales. Spears has shown me British Foreign Office telegram to Paris protesting strongly against this decision. Tacla also, as another important indication of French policy, [apparent omission] a démarche made by Ostrorog in two recent conversations with Maronite Patriarch. On first visit he left copy of Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement and on second he proposed signature of appeal to Beynet for continuing French protection of Maronites and all Oriental Christians. Patriarch refused. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It was in this troubled atmosphere that on October 16 I presented note outlined in 176 October 7, 8 p.m. during call on Mardam at his invitation. Spears had presented Eden’s reply earlier same morning and I did not receive until that evening your 188 October 14, 6 p.m. suggesting delay. I communicated at same time the Franco-American exchange of memoranda enclosed with Department’s instruction 234 of October 6. 76 Actually the timing was satisfyingly effective and Mardam arranged that I discuss situation with President Kuwatly same afternoon. They commented with obvious sincerity that my communications had been as encouraging as Spears’ had been disturbing. I found no difficulty in asking whether they believed more favorable terms might be obtained now than later, for Spears had emphasized Eden’s suggestion in that sense. President replied, “Do you mean now while the British Army is still here, for if you do the answer is no, because when later British Army does go what will then prevent French from returning and insisting on more? They can always invent a pretext.” I then told him of my conversation with Umari which had included suggestion that Lebanon and Syria might propose similar treaties to Britain, Russia, United States and France latter to be supplemented by accords dealing with specific French interests. President replied he would gladly propose treaties to first three powers but not with France until Troupes Spéciales had been transferred and he had a recognized constituted government to deal with. Spears tells me President also insists that French undertake not to increase their Levant military strength now or later. In conclusion President implied clearly he did not believe British really wanted him to conclude treaty with France. I have gathered same impression in high British Army circles. Wadsworth 74 See bracketed note, p. 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 715 and Doc. 716 ] . 76 Instruction and French memorandum not printed; for Department’s memorandum, dated October 5, see p. 795 [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 862 and Doc. 863 ] . Memorandum, of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) 890D.01/10–2344 [Document 873] Memorandum, of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Alling ) [ Washington ,] October 23, 1944. M. Baudet had called on October 16 to request clarification of a statement in the Department’s memorandum of October 5 reading as follows: “The United States Government was thus unable to accede to the original request that it grant full recognition to Syria and Lebanon, made to it by the French authorities following the issuance of the independence proclamations by General Catroux in 1941, though it was glad to recognize the step thus taken towards independence by establishing Legations at Beirut and Damascus and accrediting to the local Governments a ‘Diplomatic Agent’, a rank customarily used in the case of semi-independent States.” At that time I had told M. Baudet that we should be glad to look into the record and furnish him with information on the basis of which the statement was made. I therefore asked him to call today and I read to him the text of the attached memorandum of October 19, 1944, entitled “French Representations to the United States Government Regarding Recognition of the Independence of Syria and Lebanon”. Subsequently I gave him a copy of page 2 of this memorandum. M. Baudet remarked that it was now clear to him why we had kept referring during the past two years to the efforts of the French Delegation to obtain recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence. He said that absolutely nothing appeared in the Delegation’s files indicating that such recognition had ever been requested. He therefore concluded that in this matter, as in others, M. Tixier 77 had been following an independent line without instructions. He agreed, however, that the Department was justified in believing from the record which I had presented to him that the French authorities were pressing for American recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence. I then took up with M. Baudet the manner in which various foreign governments had accorded recognition of the independence of Syria and Lebanon. I thereupon read to him pertinent extracts from the attached memorandum of October 19, entitled “Recognition of the Independence of Syria and Lebanon by Various Foreign Governments”. 78 M. Baudet said that he was glad to have this information for his own reference but that he assumed it was already available to the French authorities in Paris. I then referred to the complaints which M. Baudet and M. Hoppenot had made to Mr. Murray and to me regarding the activities of our representative at Beirut, Mr. Wadsworth. I told M. Baudet that we had taken this matter up with Mr. Wadsworth and that we had recently received a lengthy telegram (Beirut’s no. 220 of October 14 79 ), portions of which I proceeded to read to him. After I had finished reading, M. Baudet said that this message threw additional light on the entire matter and was of great interest to him. He was equally sure that it would be of interest to the French Foreign Office and asked if we could give him an informal memorandum setting forth a résumé of the message. He said that he was sure that this would do a great deal of good in Paris and would be equally welcome in Beirut. In this connection he pointed out that the French authorities in Paris could transmit the gist of our memorandum to General Beynet at Beirut while Mr. Wadsworth might be somewhat reluctant to transmit the same information to General Beynet. I told M. Baudet that I thought this could be arranged and that we would try to send him the memorandum requested. [Annex—Memorandum] [ Washington ,] October 19, 1944. French Representations to the United States Government Regarding Recognition of the Independence of Syria and Lebanon During May and June, 1941, indications were received from the American Legation at Cairo that the Free French desired American support of their proclamations declaring the independence of Syria and Lebanon. In telegram no. 590 of May 26, 1941, from Cairo, 80 it was stated that: “General Catroux has drawn up a plan which consists of proclaiming the independence of Syria in the name of France upon his entry into the country with his troops. His plan also envisages that Churchill will issue a proclamation and it has been intimated that it would be helpful if the President could express approval thereof in some way.” On June 2, 1941, in telegram no. 640 80 the Legation stated: “The same source (Free French) suggested that the endeavor to impart an international character to the invasion would be greatly facilitated if the President subsequent to General Catroux’s proclamation would issue a statement in favor thereof.” Again, on June 8, 1941, 81 the Legation at Cairo reported as follows: “In the course of informal conversations between members of this Legation and British Embassy and Free French representatives regarding the proposed proclamation of General Catroux and supporting declaration of British Government on the entry of the Allied forces into Syria … the question was raised on several occasions as to whether the American Government might be disposed to make some sort of supporting declaration or statement either in the boundaries of the French and British declaration or justification of the occupation.” The Department’s records contain several memoranda of conversations which took place in 1942 between M. Tixier, of the Free French Delegation, and officials of the Department, from which it is apparent that M. Tixier desired this Government’s recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence. In a memorandum of conversation on May 2, 1942 83 between M. Tixier and Mr. Berle 84 the latter recorded the following: “He (M. Tixier) said he wished to urge the recognition of the independence of Syria. Axis and Vichy propagandists have made much of the fact that though the Free French declared its independence, and the British have recognized it, we have not.” On August 4, 1942, in a conversation between M. Tixier and Mr. Welles, 85 at which time the question of this Government’s intention to appoint a Diplomatic Agent and Consul General to Syria was raised, M. Tixier said that he was instructed to request that this action should not be taken before the United States accorded recognition to Syria and Lebanon as independent states. Mr. Murray, in a memorandum of August 13, 1942, 86 to Mr. Welles, commenting on the above conversation, stated: “As regards Syria and Lebanon, the Free French position as explained to me somewhat more fully by M. Tixier is that he would like the United States to grant full recognition to Syria and Lebanon as independent States, as an assistance to the Free French in their efforts to convince the Syrians and the Lebanese that Free French promises to them are genuine.” 77 Adrien Tixier, Free French Delegate in Washington. 78 Not printed. 79 See footnote 71, p. 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] . 80 Not printed. 80 Not printed. 81 Telegram 684, not printed. 83 Not printed. 84 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State. 85 For memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , p. 655 . 86 Memorandum not printed. The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 751.90D11/11–444: Telegram [Document 874] The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] Beirut , November 2, 1944—4 p.m. [Received November 3—7:27 p.m.] 240. Syrian Foreign Minister Mardam has shown me his minutes of four meetings had during last week by him and Premier with Beynet and Ostrorog to discuss “matters in suspense”, notably question of transfer of Troupes Spéciales (Legtel 132, July 4, 6 p.m. 87 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Finally Beynet insisted that meetings were designed to consider ensemble of questions in suspense, and Ostrorog gave following five “heads of chapters” of all questions requiring solution: (1) Treaty of alliance. This Beynet later described as treaty of friendship which might be used as model for treaties with other powers as well. (2) Military convention. This, Ostrorog said, would regulate transfer of Troupes Spéciales and collaboration of French military mission their training as Syrian army. (3) Convention of establishment. This was to be concluded on basis of absolute reciprocity; but Mardam commented to me that he conceived it as designed to legalize the illegalities of 20 years during which France, in violation of its mandate, had acquired various concessionary rights. We have, he said, no railways or port concessions in France. (4) Consular convention. Spears tells me he asked Beynet what this meant and received vague reply that it would provide for exchange of consuls. Mardam fears French wish to include, as in 1936 treaty, right to protect Syrians in foreign countries where Syria be not represented. (5) University convention. This was to be concluded on basis of text sent Department with my despatch 441, July 14. 88 American University and Mission are now preparing further comment thereon to show potentially prejudicial effect on our educational interest. Syrians maintained their position that army should be transferred irrespective of their unwillingness to conclude such a treaty and conventions or otherwise bind themselves at his [ this ] time to special relationship with any power. Beynet insisted all France wanted was agreement on all questions “made in most loyal spirit and which will not harm any interests”. He added: “My Government is within its rights to consider as unfriendly your attitude towards my country”; also “we are in a vicious circle”. Syrians replied it was “an impasse” which they would wish to take to the Hague 89 were that Court functioning; such being impossible they intended to appeal to British good offices, for British Government had already intervened in broader questions at issue and army question was one which peculiarly concerned Britain. Mardam explained to me that by this last he referred to Britain’s primary military responsibility to the Allies in Middle Eastern theatre of operations. Yesterday Secretary General to Syrian President called on me to say that a note in foregoing sense would be delivered to Spears tomorrow. He adds that copies of minutes of meetings and note to Spears would be given me for despatch to Department 90 which it was hoped would support Syrian proposal. Spears has already wired proposal to London. Wadsworth 87 Not printed. 88 Not printed. 89 The Permanent Court of International Justice, located at The Hague. 90 Despatch 566, November 22, from Beirut, not printed. The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 890D.01/11–1844: Telegram [Document 875] The Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State Beirut , November 18, 1944—6 p.m. [Received November 19—5:30 p.m.] 257. I presented my letter of credence to Syrian President November 17 [ 16? ] and to Lebanese President yesterday. There can be no doubt that any references in my remarks to “full and unconditional recognition” and to your declaration of September 19 were highly appreciated by both Governments, especially in current atmosphere of political tension engendered primarily by complete absence of information as to Franco-British policy discussions regarding Levant States had during Churchill–Eden visit to Paris. Three other factors contributing to tension were: Failure of London Foreign Office to reply to Syrian request for exercise of British good offices in matter of transfer to Troupes Spéciales (Legation telegram 240 November 2, 4 p.m.); the acute rise in cost of living (Legation telegram 253, November 17, 3 p.m. 91 ) which … has threatened Governments with serious loss of public support; and apparently well-confirmed reports of new démarches by French to Maronite clergy in endeavor to induce them to petition French protection (Legation telegram 228 October 20, 10 a.m. 8th paragraph). Especially the last mentioned matter caused serious disquiet in Beirut, Lebanese President and members of Government informed me; they personally urged on archbishops that, as the French-created Greater Lebanon had refused to negotiate treaty of alliance with France, the church would do well to lead in inducing smaller predominantly Christian Mount Lebanon to demand such treaty, and result is [ in ] loss of Tripoli or other predominantly Moslem “added area” be considered only as blessing in disguise. Syrian President’s reply to my remarks stressed bond of common striving to uphold rights and liberties; our unconditional recognition was a practical proof; Syria too would meet her responsibilities “treating with all foreign powers on a footing of equality, without discrimination in privileges or preferences”; the President’s 92 and your words has found grateful echo, a natural consequence of policy which places mutual confidence above material force and interest. Lebanese President’s reply similarly stressed keenest appreciation of unconditional recognition; our friendship had deep roots in American hospitality to Lebanese emigrants many of whom now loyally serve common cause; in aspiring to a future of freedom and peace Lebanon places its all at disposal of Democratic Powers. Syrian President struck key note of official reaction when after presentation ceremonies he said informally “you give us new courage to deserve [ sic ] to persevere in the way we have chosen; only once before since assuming office have I felt so moved, so sure of our future; that was when we signed the Catroux protocol of last December”. Wadsworth 91 Not printed. 92 President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 890E.01/12–144: Airgram [Document 876] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State Paris , December 1, 1944. [Received December 9—6 p.m.] A–143. Reference the Department’s airgram 166 of November 8, 93 the position of the United States with regard to the relationship between France and the Independent States of Syria and Lebanon was discussed at length with Mr. Chauvel, Director General of the Foreign Office, who was familiar with the Department’s memorandum of October 5 and the substance of Mr. Murray’s remarks to Mr. Hoppenot. It was emphasized that the Department had no objection to the conclusion of the agreements defining relationships between the French and Independent States which were agreed to in a friendly manner between the interested parties provided they did not infringe the rights and interests of others, although the United States Government took note of the “relations of special friendship which have so long existed between France and the Lebanon [ Levant? ] States.” Mr. Chauvel stated that the latest reports from the Levant indicated that the course of Franco-Levantine relations which he described roughly as “following a chart of abating fever” seemed for the time being to have returned to a “normal temperature.” Ostrorog was now in the Ministry on consultation, and he reported no feeling of apprehension that relations would become aggravated. Chauvel stated that the French Government felt that some agreements were absolutely essential between France and the States in question, that he felt that a treaty was by far the most preferable way of definitely handling [ terminating? ] mandate status, and he repeated the now familiar French thesis as regards France’s responsibility to the League of Nations. He said, however, that France was fully prepared to undertake the negotiation of the subsidiary conventions before proceeding to the more thorny treaty. Among the conventions he mentioned: One establishing judicial rights and procedures both as regards French citizens in the Lebanon [ Levant? ] States and Lebanon [ Levant? ] citizens in France and its colonies; one military convention regarding protection of the area and the disposal of the special troops; one with regard to other military matters; one with regard to education matters and one with regard to commerce. Chauvel stated that in his opinion the chief difficulty was that the two Levant Governments were obsessed with the idea that they would be afforded an opportunity to participate actively, although in a minor role, at the Peace Conference and that they felt that this participation would be handicapped if they concluded any treaties before the Conference met. This he felt was an error. He said that some days ago an invitation had been sent out to the Syrian Foreign Minister to come to Paris to negotiate. While no answer had been received, Chauvel was encouraged by the fact that at least the invitation was receiving consideration. He stated that the experience of 1936 had proven that negotiations could be much expedited provided they did not take place in the Levant. He said that if the Syrian Minister accepted, a similar procedure would follow automatically as respects the Lebanon. Caffery 93 Not printed; it instructed Ambassador Caffery to discuss informally with the French Provisional Government the American position on French relations with Syria and Lebanon (890E.01/11–844). President Roosevelt to the President of the Syrian Republic (Kuwatly) [Document 877] President Roosevelt to the President of the Syrian Republic ( Kuwatly ) 94 Washington , December 7, 1944. My Dear President Kuwatly : Your letter of September 19, 1944, 95 setting forth your views and those of the Syrian Government as regards the present situation and policy of Syria, has had my sympathetic attention and that of the competent officers of the Department of State. While I have not heretofore been able to reply directly to your friendly letter, I am sure you will understand that the several communications which have recently been made to you and to your Prime Minister and Foreign Minister by Mr. Wadsworth have constituted a response intended to define the attitude of the United States Government toward the issues in question. I refer particularly in this regard to the State Department’s memorandum of October 5, 1944, to the French Delegation at Washington and to Mr. Wadsworth’s note to your Foreign Minister of October 11, 1944, 96 copies of which I attach for your convenient reference. I believe these documents speak for themselves and I have been glad to hear from Mr. Wadsworth that you found them reassuring as regards the policy of this Government. The American people have recently recorded overwhelmingly their determination that the United States shall assume its full share of the responsibility, in cooperation with other nations of like mind, in creating a future world of peace, prosperity and justice for all. I therefore have no hesitation in assuring you that my Government will pursue these objectives with all the influence at its command, and am confident that we shall enjoy the wholehearted cooperation of the Syrian Government in this task. Very sincerely yours, Franklin D. Roosevelt 94 Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.; original transmitted to Beirut in instruction 270, December 13 (not printed). 95 Ante , p. 787 [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 857 and Doc. 858 ] . 96 Not printed; for substance, see telegram 176, October 7, 8 p.m., to Beirut, p. 798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] . Representations by the United States and the United Kingdom in effecting a severance of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany Representations by the United States and the United Kingdom in effecting a severance of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany 1 1 Concerning the attitude of the United States toward the entry of Turkey into the war, see bracketed note, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 1057 ; for previous correspondence regarding preemptive buying of Turkish goods, see ibid. , pp. 1111 ff.; for previous correspondence on the efforts of the United States and the British Governments to acquire Turkish chrome and to prevent its sale by Turkey to Germany, see ibid. , pp. 1150 ff. [878] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [Washington,] January 8, 1944. 740.0011 European War 1939/32640 [879] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, January 11, 1944—6 p.m. 740.0011 European War 1939/32769a: Telegram [880] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, January 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received January 17—4:35 a.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/32718: Telegram [881] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, January 18, 1944—11 p.m. [Received January 19—8:40 p.m.] 740.0011EW1939/32765: Telegram [882] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, February 4, 1944—2 p.m. [Received February 5—2:37 a.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/2–444: Telegram [883] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, February 7, 1944—7 p.m. 740.0011 European War 1939/2–744: Telegram [884] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, February 10, 1944—5 p.m. [Received February 11—12:20 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/33181: Telegram [885] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, February 18, 1944—1 p.m. [Received February 24, 1944—6:43 p.m.] 811.20 Defense(M) Turkey/928: Telegram [886] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, February 21, 1944—6 p.m. 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/838: Telegram [887] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, February 23, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 10:17 p.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/927: Telegram [888] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, March 18, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:19 p.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/947: Telegram [889] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, March 30, 1944—8 p.m. 740.00112 European War 1939/10464: Telegram [890] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 5, 1944—10 a.m. [Received April 6—4:48 p.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10487: Telegram [891] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 14, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 14—4:48 p.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/981: Telegram [892] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 15, 1944—6 p.m. [Received April 16—7:36 p.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10546: Telegram [893] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 15, 1944—8 p.m. [Received April 16—9:38 p.m.] 811.20 Defense (M) Turkey/985: Telegram [894] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 15, 1944—midnight. [Received April 16—9 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/33961: Telegram [895] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 15, 1944—12 p.m. [Received April 16—8:52 p.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/984: Telegram [896] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, April 17, 1944—7 p.m. 811.20 Defense (M) Turkey/1021c [897] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 18, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 9:40 p.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10581: Telegram [898] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 18, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 9:15 p.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/988: Telegram [899] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 18, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 19—3:40 p.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/990: Telegram [900] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 19, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 20—11:33 p.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/994: Telegram [901] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 21, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 7:46 p.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/996: Telegram [902] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 22, 1944—9 p.m. [Received April 23—10:30 p.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/1005: Telegram [903] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 23, 1944—10 p.m. [Received April 25—8:37 a.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/1008: Telegram [904] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 23, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 25—4 a.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/1010: Telegram [905] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 26, 1944—9 a.m. [Received April 27—5:35 p.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10661: Telegram [906] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, May 5, 1944—10 p.m. 740.00112 European War 1939/10661: Telegram [907] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 10, 1944—10 p.m. [Received May 12—8:19 p.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10770: Telegram [908] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 10, 1944—11 p.m. [Received May 12—12:57 p.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10771: Telegram [909] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 12, 1944—7 p.m. [Received May 13—10:50 a.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10774: Telegram [910] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 13, 1944—midnight. [Received May 14—10:35 a.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10775: Telegram [911] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 19, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:51 p.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10814: Telegram [912] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 20, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 7:30 p.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10835: Telegram [913] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, May 20, 1944—8 p.m. 740.00112 European War 1939/10814: Telegram [914] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 23, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 24—12:24 a.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10869: Telegram [915] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 23, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 11:51 p.m.] 664.6731/45: Telegram [916] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 26, 1944—10 a.m. [Received May 29—10:39 a.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10906: Telegram [917] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 26, 1944—11 p.m. [Received May 28—11:20 a.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10896: Telegram [918] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , 26 May, 1944. 740.00112 European War 1939/5–2644 [919] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 27, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 28—12:55 p.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10888: Telegram [920] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, May 29, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 7:12 p.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10907: Telegram [921] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, May 31, 1944—7 p.m. 740.00112 European War 1939/10888: Telegram [922] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, June 1, 1944—8 p.m. 740.00112 European War 1939/11033c: Telegram [923] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, June 2, 1944—1 p.m. [Received June 3—12:32 a.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/1047: Telegram [924] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, June 5, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 3:06 p.m.] 740.00112 European War 1939/10933: Telegram [925] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, June 5, 1944—9 p.m. 740.00112 European War 1939/1124a: Telegram [926] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , June 23, 1944. 740.0011 European War 1939/6–2344 [927] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, June 23, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 24—11:45 p.m.] 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/1067: Telegram [928] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State Moscow, June 28, 1944—midnight. [Received June 29—1 a.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/6–2844: Telegram [929] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State Moscow, June 30, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 7:58 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/6–3044: Telegram [930] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, June 30, 1944—10 p.m. [Received July 1—3:41 a.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/6–3044: Telegram [931] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) Washington, June 30, 1944—11 p.m. 740.0011 European War 1939/6–3044: Telegram [932] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 1, 1944—8 p.m. [Received July 2—1:23 a.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/7–144: Telegram [933] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 3, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 4—8:39 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/7–344: Telegram [934] The President of the Turkish Republic (Inönü) to President Roosevelt Ankara, July 3, 1944. 740.0011 EW 1939/7–344 [935] The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 4, 1944—8 p.m. [Received July 6—4:30 a.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/7–444: Telegram [936] The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 4, 1944—9 p.m. [Received July 6—2:49 a.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/7–444: Telegram [937] The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State Washington , July 10, 1944. 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1044 [938] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, July 11, 1944—9 p.m. 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1144: Telegram [939] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) [Washington,] July 12, 1944. 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1244 [940] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , July 12, 1944. 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1244 [941] The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy Washington, July 13, 1944. 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1244 [942] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) Washington, July 14, 1944—7 p.m. 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1444: Telegram [943] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , July 20, 1944. 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1944 [944] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) Washington, July 20, 1944—7 p.m. 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2044: Telegram [945] The Department of State to the Soviet Embassy Washington , July 22, 1944. 761.67/7–1044 [946] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington , July 22, 1944. 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2244 [947] The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 23, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 7:48 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2344: Telegram [948] The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 23, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 9:29 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2344: Telegram [949] The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 25, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 9:09 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2544: Telegram [950] The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 25, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 11:34 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2544: Telegram [951] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) Washington, July 25, 1944—4 p.m. 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2344: Telegram [952] The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 26, 1944—8 p.m. [Received July 27—7:48 a.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2644: Telegram [953] The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State [ Washington ,] July 27, 1944. 761.67/7–2744 [954] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) Washington, July 27, 1944—8 p.m. 740.0011 E.W.1939/7–2744: Telegram [955] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State Moscow, July 28, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:25 p.m.] 762.67/7–2844: Telegram [956] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State Moscow, July 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received July 30—2:40 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/7–3044: Telegram [957] The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 31, 1944—9 p.m. [Received August 1—5:15 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/7–3144: Telegram [958] The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State Ankara, August 1, 1944—7 p.m. [Received August 2—11:49 a.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/8–144: Telegram [959] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, August 2, 1944 August 2, 1944 740.0011 E.W.1939/8–244 [960] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] August 7, 1944. 740.0011 European War 1939/8–744 [961] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) Washington, August 12, 1944—3 p.m. 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2644: Telegram [962] President Roosevelt to the President of the Turkish Republic (Inönü) Washington, August 18, 1944. 740.0011 EW1939/7–344 [963] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, August 26, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 10:57 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/8–2644: Telegram [964] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, September 12, 1944—10 p.m. [Received September 13—12:10 p.m.] 740.0011 European War 1939/9–1244: Telegram Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt 740.0011 European War 1939/32640 [Document 878] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt [ Washington ,] January 8, 1944. The British Government informs us that it has learned through an extremely secret source that the Turkish authorities consider the United States to be much less insistent upon Turkey’s entering the war than the British are and that Great Britain alone is putting pressure on Turkey in this regard. The British Embassy in Washington has requested the Department to authorize Ambassador Steinhardt 2 to “back up any representations that the British Ambassador in Ankara 3 may make”, in order to dispel the Turkish impression. Furthermore, the British Government intends to let the Turks know that the present offer to the Turks to enter the war is final and that if it is not accepted Great Britain will be obliged to reconsider its whole Turkish policy. Am I correct in assuming that while you would not wish us to authorize Ambassador Steinhardt to back up any representations which the British Ambassador may make, you would like him to make it clear to the Turks that we as well as the British would welcome Turkey’s contribution to the common victory by active participation in the war? 4 C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] 2 Laurence A. Steinhardt, Ambassador in Turkey. 3 Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen. 4 Marginal notation: “CH OK FDR”. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 740.0011 European War 1939/32769a: Telegram [Document 879] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , January 11, 1944—6 p.m. 29. The British authorities believe that Turks have gained the impression that only Great Britain is pressing Turkey to enter the war and that a much more lenient attitude is held by the United States. Consequently, the British have requested the Department to authorize you to support the British Ambassador in Ankara fully in this connection, as a means of counteracting the above-mentioned Turkish impression. The American Government believes that the present war is being fought by the Allies in the interests of all nations large and small and that all peoples have a common interest in the achievement of the victory for which we are fighting. Turkey, as the outstanding nation of the Balkans and Near East, has particularly important interests in the future world which we are fighting to bring about. We believe that Turkey will wish to contribute its part, in a direct military manner, to the achievement of these aims, and the American Government hopes that Turkey’s decision will be to join its forces with those of the United Nations for rapid victory. You are authorized to make clear again to the Turkish authorities this Government’s attitude as indicated above. Hull The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/32718: Telegram [Document 880] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , January 14, 1944—5 p.m. [Received January 17—4:35 a.m.] 77. Department’s 29, January 11. If as the British authorities believe the Turks gained the impression from the Cairo Conference 5 that only Great Britain is pressing for their entry into the war and that a much more lenient attitude is held by the United States, my conversations since then with the Minister for Foreign Affairs 6 and numerous other high Turk Government officials must have disabused them of any such impression. Very shortly after our return from Cairo my British colleague expressed concern to me on this same point and it was at his suggestion that I have made it unmistakably clear to Numan on several occasions that my Government hoped the Turk Government would take an active part in collaboration with the British in accelerating the impending victory of the United Nations. In view of the Department’s instructions I shall continue to emphasize to Numan that my Government desires Turkey’s active participation in the war and hopes the Turks will reach a speedy agreement with the British as to the time and condition of Turkey’s entry. For the Department’s information I may add that it is not unlikely that any impression the Turks gained at Cairo that Great Britain was pressing them to enter the war and that a much more lenient attitude is held by the United States may have been reinforced by the fact that the negotiations since the meeting in Cairo have been carried on exclusively by the British. Steinhardt 5 For correspondence regarding the conference at Cairo, December 4–6, 1943, between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and the President of the Turkish Republic (Inönü), see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 655 ff. 6 Numan Menemencioglu. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011EW1939/32765: Telegram [Document 881] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , January 18, 1944—11 p.m. [Received January 19—8:40 p.m.] 104. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. In conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, I again took occasion to emphasize our desire that Turkey take an active part in bringing the war to a speedy termination and reminded him that we were as much interested as Britain and Russia in Turkey’s active participation in the war. Numan replied that he knew this to be the case as he quite understood the close association and collaboration between the United States, Great Britain and Russia and their common desire to bring the war to a successful conclusion as soon as possible. He then remarked that as I was aware the Turkish Government had decided in principle to enter the war and that insofar as concerned the date of Turkey’s entry, this was entirely in the hands of the British, as the Turkish General Staff had informed the British Military Mission that 180,000 tons of war material exclusive of gasoline was essential for the defense of the country and that as soon as this material is delivered Turkey will enter the war. From this he said it followed that the date of Turkey’s entry could be expedited or delayed by the tempo of the deliveries of the requisite war material. In response to my observation that the reasonableness of the Turkish list of desired war material viewed in the light of the war material already delivered and the country’s limited transportation facilities thus became the measure of his Government’s intentions, Numan replied that the list was reasonable and constituted an irreducible minimum adding that he did not think it was too much to expect that the three great powers which desired a militarily vulnerable Turkey to enter the war should have been able to provide what he described as 18 ship loads of war material exclusive of gasoline between early December and the date to be fixed for Turkey’s entry into the war. Numan then referred to the delivery of war material since the Cairo Conference which he said had been considerably less than the capacity of the country’s ports and transportation system and expressed his dissatisfaction with the plan of joint operations thus far proposed by the British which he said contemplated a purely defensive operation, adding that he could not understand how the Straits could be opened to Allied vessels carrying war material to Russia under any such plan as that proposed. He then remarked that there must be a political reason which he said he could not fathom for the British desire that Turkey remain on the defensive after entering the war and that there must be some relationship between this desire and apparent unwillingness of the British to deliver what he described as a “modest” quantity of war material. At the close of our talk, after I had expressed concern at the lack of progress in the negotiations, Numan remarked in a more cheerful tone “Don’t worry, we will eventually reach an agreement”. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/2–444: Telegram [Document 882] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , February 4, 1944—2 p.m. [Received February 5—2:37 a.m.] 196. For the President, the Secretary and Under Secretary. The British Ambassador informed me yesterday that he had received instructions in the morning directing the immediate departure of the British Military Mission from Ankara. He was instructed not to give any reason to the Turk authorities for the departure. Accordingly the entire mission left last night for Cairo. The Ambassador further informed me that all shipments of war material to Turkey are being suspended and that he had been directed to avoid association including social relations with Turk officials other than relations regarded by him as essential pending further instructions from London. Hugessen said that no action has as yet been taken by his Government to suspend commercial shipments to Turkey because of possible retaliation by the Turks with particular reference to chrome. He added that when the inevitable inquiries are made of all of us by the Turk authorities as to the reasons for the action taken by the British Government it is desirable that no reason be ascribed so that the Turk Government will be left to draw its own conclusions from the action taken. He said he assumed the Russian Ambassador 7 and I would receive instructions to conform our course to his. The abrupt departure of the British Military Mission after several weeks of fruitless discussion as to the amount of war material to be delivered to Turkey is designed to impress upon the Turk authorities the extreme displeasure of the British Government with the attitude adopted by Turk authorities in the course of the negotiations. It now remains to be seen whether the action taken by the British Government will cause the Turk authorities to recede from their position that they will accept nothing less than the entire 180,000 tons of war material requested by them exclusive of 68,000 tons of gasoline. Steinhardt 7 Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 740.0011 European War 1939/2–744: Telegram [Document 883] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , February 7, 1944—7 p.m. 103. British Embassy has informed the Department of the British decisions respecting the current negotiations with the Turks, as reported in your 196, February 4, 2 p.m., requesting our cooperation to the extent of instructing you to “cool off” in your relations with the Turks for the time being. The President has approved this course, which you are requested to follow. Please keep Department closely informed of developments. Sent to Ankara. Repeated to London. 8 Hull 8 As telegram 937. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/33181: Telegram [Document 884] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , February 10, 1944—5 p.m. [Received February 11—12:20 p.m.] 241. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. My 196, February 4, Department’s 103, February 7. Since my telegram “under reference no overtures have been made by the Turks to reopen the negotiations with the British. While I have every reason to believe that the Turkish Government is seriously disturbed at the abrupt departure of the British Military Mission there is as yet no evidence that the steps thus far taken by the British to express their displeasure are bringing about any change in the Turkish position. This may be due to the desire of the Turkish Government to await a clarification of recent international developments such as the Pravda incident with regard to alleged British negotiations with Germany, the rejection of Allied good offices in the Polish-Russian dispute, the constitutional changes in Russia, the rupture of diplomatic relations between the Argentine and Germany, Allied pressure on Spain, etc., before resuming negotiations which it is well aware must then lead to a commitment. The desire to await such clarification is probably strengthened by the conviction that the general military situation in Europe at the present moment does not warrant irrevocable commitment by the Turkish Government at this time to enter the war as of a fixed date. Having made it clear to the Allies that they are prepared in principle to enter the war the Turks seem disposed to avoid fixing a date for their entry pending developments which will permit them to select the most opportune time. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M) Turkey/928: Telegram [Document 885] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , February 18, 1944—1 p.m. [Received February 24, 1944—6:43 p.m.] 284. In view of the increased deliveries of Turkish chrome to Germany during the past 3 months and considerable decrease in recent months in the movement of chrome for British account, my British colleague and I have made strong representations in writing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After a full discussion of the developments in the chrome situation during the past few months, Hugessen and I have agreed to renew to our Governments the recommendation made by the Embassies last October, reported in the Embassy’s 1716, October 18, 9 that urgent consideration be given to the interruption of rail communications between Turkey and Axis Europe and that appropriate action be taken to disrupt the railway line between Istanbul and Sofia. In view of the changed conditions we do not consider it necessary to make the reservation made previously, that the rupture of the railway shall not occur too close to the Turkish frontier. We recommend that the railway be ruptured at the point which will result in the disruption of rail communication for the longest possible time. Steinhardt 9 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 1163 . The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/838: Telegram [Document 886] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , February 21, 1944—6 p.m. 135. Department fully shares FEA’s 10 expressed concern over substantially increased rate of Turkish chrome shipments to Germany during past 3 months. We understand from British here that your British colleague has lodged a protest with Minister for Foreign Affairs. After consultation with your British colleague, please make such representations or take such action as you jointly agree would be most effective. In this connection assurances given Embassy last fall and reported in Embassy’s 1720 of October 18 11 would appear to provide secure basis for vigorous protest. Stettinius 10 Foreign Economic Administration. 11 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 1165 . The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/927: Telegram [Document 887] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , February 23, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 10:17 p.m.] 319. Department’s 135 February 21, 6 p.m. As reported in my 284 February 18, 1 p.m., I have already made a vigorous protest in writing. In subsequent conversation with the Secretary General of the Foreign Office, 12 he informed me that immediately upon receipt of my protest the Foreign Office had given instructions that the movement of chrome for British account be materially increased. Although he gave me no specific assurance of a decrease in the movement of chrome for German account I gained the impression that this will follow. Steinhardt 12 Cevat Acikalin. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/947: Telegram [Document 888] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , March 18, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:19 p.m.] 484. See my 319, February 23. The Secretary General of Foreign Office informed me last night that in response to the assurances given me by him that the movement of chrome for British account would be materially increased, approximately 4,000 metric tons of 45 to 50 percent chrome ore had arrived Iskenderun during the last few days and that the movement would continue. Steinhardt The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 740.00112 European War 1939/10464: Telegram [Document 889] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , March 30, 1944—8 p.m. 280. 1. British Embassy here has informed the Department London has been reconsidering the question of economic policy toward Turkey particularly in relation to the facts that a ) Turkish trade with Axis has been condoned in the past on grounds that Turkey obtained thereby from Germany goods which the United Nations were not in a position to supply, and b ) the expiration on April 30 of the Clodius Agreement. 13 2. Department’s and FEA’s agreement is sought to the proposal that you and your British colleague should jointly present to Turkish authorities in immediate future following statement: [Here follows text similar to text of note quoted in telegram 689, April 15, 12 p.m., from Ankara, printed on page 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] .] 3. In presenting the foregoing British Embassy indicated that this would lay a moral platform which would permit the adoption in future of a “tough” blockade policy toward Turkey. 4. British proposal is now under consideration by FEA and Department and may be referred to Policy Committee. However, preliminary Departmental and FEA thinking regarding proposal is as follows: Proposal condones fulfillment of existing commitments including chrome. Having cut off military supplies, our arsenal for further economic reprisals is pitifully bare. It is doubted that Turkey’s standard of living is such that it is economically vulnerable to blockade action. Even oil presumably can be obtained from Rumania. It is doubted that suggested approach should be made without Russian participation or concurrence because Turks would interpret this as a wedge between the Allies. 5. Considering what Turks might expect from the Axis under similar circumstances, they may regard proposed approach not as a hardening of our joint policy but as a relatively friendly gesture. 6. By reason of our formal recognition of Turkey’s right to continue to trade with the Axis, direct action against rail communications might be precluded. 7. Tentative Departmental and FEA counter proposals are as follows: ( a ) Immediate execution special project (your 536, March 27 14 ). This might obviate necessity for ( b ), ( c ) and ( d ) below. ( b ) Delivery of the President’s letter 15 with British approval on grounds that this will constitute one last friendly appeal to Turks. If no result is obtained within reasonable interval, a firm line should be adopted. ( c ) Seek from Combined Chiefs of Staff information as to whether strategic considerations remove necessity of regarding Turks in light of potential and valuable allies thereby giving a free hand regarding the imposition of economic sanctions without regard to Turkish reaction. ( d ) If ( c ) above permits, inform Turks flatly, in association with British and Russians, that Turkey’s right to prolong the war by continuing to supply Axis with strategic materials is no longer recognized. 8. Your comments and recommendations are requested urgently. 16 Hull 13 Carl Clodius was head of the German trade delegation to Turkey in 1941 which negotiated the Turkish-German commercial understanding of October 9, 1941. For summary of provisions of the agreement, see telegram 388, October 17, 1941, 7 p.m., from Ankara, Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. iii , p. 964 . 14 Not printed; it was an FEA message concerning a proposed “New Plan” for supplies for Turkey. 15 Under instruction 361, March 16, the Secretary of State had forwarded to the Ambassador in Turkey a letter dated March 10 from President Roosevelt to the Turkish President, the contents of which President Roosevelt had communicated to British Prime Minister Churchill and Soviet Premier Stalin, and which was to be transmitted to President Inönü only when the Department specifically instructed (811.20 Defense (M) Turkey/949b); the Ambassador, however, on President Roosevelt’s decision, was never authorized to deliver the letter (811.20 Defense (M) Turkey/951a, 955, 963). 16 In telegram 291, April 3, 7 p.m., the Ambassador was requested again “urgently” to reply (740.00112 European War 1939/10464). The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10487: Telegram [Document 890] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 5, 1944—10 a.m. [Received April 6—4:48 p.m.] 605. Department’s 280, March 30, and 291, April 3. 17 In my opinion the action proposed by the British would lay the foundation for the adoption in the future, if found desirable, of a rigorous economic and commercial policy towards Turkey. Although the language of the proposed text particularly the words “further export” appears to be open to two interpretations it seems reasonably clear that what the British have in mind is to prevent the Turks from entering into any new agreements rather than to compel them to violate existing obligations under which the Germans have already performed. This would, of course, apply to chrome. In this connection as the repudiation by Turkey of its obligation to deliver agreed quantities of chrome to Germany in return for military equipment already delivered to Turkey by Germany would undoubtedly be regarded in Germany as tantamount to a declaration of war the Turkish Government could hardly be expected to repudiate this obligation unless prepared to enter the war. In light of present strained Anglo-Turkish relations it seems to me that the most that could be expected in respect of chrome would be a substantial reduction in the amount of deliveries to Germany. Such action would not constitute a flagrant violation if it were attributed by the Turks to transportation or other difficulties [apparent omission] our arsenal for further economic reprisals is pitifully barren or that Turkey’s standard of living is such that it is not economically vulnerable to blockade action. Turkey’s economy would be severely damaged by a stoppage or even substantial reduction in shipments of civilian supplies from the British Empire and the United States. Furthermore, the Turkish Government is fully alive to the inevitable time when its imports via the Balkans will be completely shut off and Turkey for a considerable period of time thereafter will be wholly dependent on imports from the United Nations. Faced with this eventuality the Turkish Government would seriously hesitate to provoke economic sanctions by the British Empire and the United States and which it must anticipate would be continued as a punishment after Turkish imports via the Balkans had been cut off. While limited supplies of oil are still obtainable by Turkey from Rumania these deliveries become more precarious from day to day and their discontinuance is subject to the consideration pointed out above. I have no reason to believe that the suggested approach without Russian participation or concurrence would be interpreted by the Turks as a wedge between the Allies. As there is practically no trade between Turkey and Russia, the Turks would not find it unnatural if the approach were made without Russian participation or concurrence and would not be likely to interpret such action as a wedge between the Allies. Furthermore, Russian participation or concurrence in the approach would add little to its effectiveness as the Russians are only in a position to threaten to discontinue non-existing trade. The suggestion that the Turks might regard the proposed approach not as a hardening of Anglo-American policy but as a relatively friendly gesture because of what they might expect from the Axis under similar circumstances completely overlooks the fact that the British are Allies of the Turks and that the United States and Britain have succeeded in convincing Turks that their treatment of the smaller countries has been and will be somewhat above Nazi standards. In my opinion the proposed approach runs not the slightest risk of being regarded as a relatively friendly gesture but, quite the contrary, will be regarded as a further step taken by the British with American concurrence to compel Turkey to enter the war. I am at loss to understand why any individual who is prepared to advocate that Turkey be compelled to flagrantly violate contractual obligations with Germany in respect of chrome should have any compunctions about taking direct action against rail communications while formally recognizing Turkey’s right to continue to trade with Axis. Nor can I see any connection between formal recognition of neutral Turkey’s right to continue to trade with Axis and destruction of bridge in enemy Bulgarian territory as consequence of which Turks may be unable to avail themselves of use of a particular railroad passing through non-Turkish territory. In this connection and as I have pointed out on several occasions, Turks have been expecting destruction of bridges for over a year and some Turks have referred to their nondestruction as evidence of Allied incompetence to wage war effectively. With respect to the tentative Departmental and FEA counter proposals: a . (I again urge the immediate execution of the special project.) With [apparent omission] we invite the attention of Department and FEA to the fact that in considering the imposition of economic sanctions against Turkey it is important to bear in mind that Turkey is still an ally of Great Britain and that while there has been a disagreement between them as to the conditions under which Turkey would be prepared to enter the war at this time in so far as I am aware the British have by no means abandoned their hope that Turkey will enter the war, a development which they may find it desirable or even necessary to bring about at some time in the future as a result of unforeseen military or political developments or the prolongation of the war. Even though Turkey should not enter the war there are innumerable services which the Turks may be able to render the British or ourselves in the future no less in the political than in the economic field which may grow out of developments not now foreseeable in view of the complexities of the political and military situation. For this reason the Department may wish to consider whether it is in the interest of the United States and Britain at this time to treat Turkey as Spain, Switzerland and Sweden are treated and thereby create the impression in the minds of the Turks that they are no longer to be regarded as Allies but as Neutrals from whom only neutrality is expected. Should economic sanctions be applied to Turkey at this time and should the British find it expedient or necessary in the near future to seek Turkey’s assistance the accomplishment of their purpose would be seriously impeded and delayed by the inevitable time lag in removing the sanctions and by the resentment aroused in Turkey as a result of their application. In view of the foregoing and having regard to all of the numerous factors involved, political as well as economic, I recommend that my British colleague and I be instructed to present to the Turk Minister for Foreign Affairs immediately a statement no stronger than the text proposed by London. In this connection it is essential that such statement as it is to be presented be submitted immediately in view of the fact that negotiations have already begun or are about to begin with Rumanian, Hungarian and German delegations for new commercial agreements. 18 Steinhardt 17 Regarding telegram 291, see footnote 16, above. 18 In telegram 312, April 8, 8 p.m., the Ambassador was informed that “Both Department and FEA concur in your recommendation that an immediate joint declaration be made to the Turks”; he was authorized to prepare a statement with the British Ambassador, “closely following” an amended draft worked out in London, of which a paraphrase was simultaneously transmitted (740.00112 European War 1939/10487). In telegram 325, April 14, 1 p.m., the Ambassador was instructed to keep the Soviet Ambassador “fully informed regarding joint declaration” (740.00112 European War 1939/10487). The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/981: Telegram [Document 891] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 14, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 14—4:48 p.m.] 664. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has now agreed to reduce to 4,200 tons monthly the deliveries of chrome to Germany. This is approximately 50 percent of the rate at which deliveries have been made during recent months. He has also agreed to substantially increase deliveries for British account to the accessible ports. In view of the foregoing and particularly by reason of the nature of the joint declaration which the British Ambassador and I are presenting to the Minister for Foreign Affairs today concerning the delivery of strategic materials to Germany by Turkey it would seem that delivery of the President’s proposed letter to President Inonu would serve no useful purpose. 19 For the Department’s information the letter was received today. Steinhardt 19 See footnote 15, p. 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 889 ] . The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10546: Telegram [Document 892] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 15, 1944—6 p.m. [Received April 16—7:36 p.m.] 678. Department’s 312, April 8. 20 I called on Foreign Minister yesterday and presented to him text of a note 21 almost identical with that set forth in Department’s cable under reference. British Ambassador presented an identic note to Foreign Minister same day. Numan accepted note in a friendly spirit indicating a cooperative state of mind. He remarked that reaction of Turkish Government to our note would be one way, if it was a friendly request to cooperate, but that reaction would be quite different if it was intended as a “summons or a threat”. He then referred at length to difficulties Turkey had encountered during past 2 years in obtaining vitally needed commodities from the United States and Britain, commodities which notwithstanding an acute need Germany had provided. He observed that he had no particular desire to trade with Germany if for no other reason than that he realized traffic with Germany would abruptly cease in relatively near future and if he could count on deliveries from the United States and Britain which had [been?] marked by their unreliability in the past he would much prefer the United States and Britain as Turkey’s source of supply. He then expressed his inability to understand why the United States and Britain had not long since taken action to relieve him from his “dilemma” by destroying means of transportation between Turkey and Germany and said such action would make his position much easier. From this and other remarks I gained impression Numan is desirous of cooperating with us and he would go far to meet our wishes provided we could guarantee prompt delivery of commodities which Germany has been delivering to Turkey. If the “special project” is carried out in very near future it would materially facilitate Numan’s desire to cooperate with us as he informed me that he is under almost daily pressure from Germans to make deliveries in payment for deliveries already made by Germany. I gained impression that Numan might not be unresponsive to suggestion of a war trade agreement such as has been entered into with other neutral countries provided terms are not unreasonable and that [it?] is presented to him as a voluntary act of cooperation by Turkish Government and not under pressure or resulting from threats. At close of our talk Numan said he would give careful consideration to our note and discuss subject with me further. Shortly after visits of British Ambassador and myself Numan granted an interview to the United States and British correspondents and made a statement to them which is incorporated in my next numbered telegram. 22 Steinhardt 20 Not printed, but see footnote 18, above. 21 See the Ambassador’s telegram 689, April 15, 12 p.m., p. 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] . 22 Telegram No. 679, not printed. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense (M) Turkey/985: Telegram [Document 893] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 15, 1944—8 p.m. [Received April 16—9:38 p.m.] 681. In my conversation with Foreign Minister yesterday I again took up with him the matter of deliveries of chrome to Germany. After full discussion of subject, Numan agreed to immediately reduce deliveries to Germany to 4,000 tons per month as against following deliveries: November 5180; December 6926; January 11294; February 6752. He also agreed to immediately increase to 9,000 tons monthly deliveries to accessible ports for British account. He said that 4,000 tons monthly for German account would be maximum and that if German deliveries to Turkey of vitally needed commodities declined as now seem highly probable he would reduce deliveries of chrome to Germany below 4,000 tons monthly and that any reduction below 4,000 tons monthly to Germany would be added to 9,000 tons to be delivered for British account. At close of our talk Numan remarked that during past week he had received almost daily visits from von Papen 23 demanding explanation as to why locomotives and freight cars furnished by Germany to move chrome for German account were no longer being used to their full capacity for this purpose and why deliveries of chrome to Germany had recently been reduced by 50 per cent notwithstanding fact that compensating deliveries of German commodities, including war material, had been received in Turkey a long time ago. Numan remarked that as long as rail communication between Turkey and Germany was functioning it would become increasingly difficult for him to give von Papen a satisfactory answer. Steinhardt 23 Franz von Papen, German Ambassador in Turkey. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/33961: Telegram [Document 894] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 15, 1944—midnight. [Received April 16—9 p.m.] 686. There has been no noticeable change of late in Anglo-Turk relations. The British continue their attitude of aloofness which the Turks have now adopted in their attitude towards the British. In conversation yesterday with the British Ambassador he indicated that if the Turk Government responds in a cooperative manner to the British and American notes on future trade between Turkey and Germany an improvement in Anglo-Turk relations may result. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/984: Telegram [Document 895] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 15, 1944—12 p.m. [Received April 16—8:52 p.m.] 689. Following is the text of the note (No. 761) dated April 14 which I presented in person to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday: “Excellency: On instructions from my Government I have the honor to make to your Excellency the following communication: The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Great Britain have been seriously perturbed by the economic assistance which Turkish trade relations with Europe have given to the enemy. Hitherto however they have acquiesced in this situation on the informal understanding that Turkish exports were limited to what was required to purchase essential Turkish requirements which could not be obtained from the United Nations. The rapidly approaching crisis in the war situation, when it is essential that the enemy should be deprived of all means of resistance, compels the two Governments to revise their attitude even though they realize that this may cause some temporary inconvenience to Turkish economy. Accordingly they feel bound to warn the Turkish Government that the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain view with serious disfavor as prejudicial to their vital interests the Turkish agreements with Germany and her satellites whereby Turkey undertakes to supply commodities to those countries which are essential to the conduct of the war. Any renewal of agreements or the conclusion of fresh agreements on the same lines will entail the application to Turkey of blockade measures such as the two Governments have throughout the war applied for [ to ] neutral countries. Among the articles which the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain consider essential to the conduct of the war are the following: chrome; copper; iron and steel; vegetable oils; oil seeds; tanning materials; gall nuts; skins; cotton; cotton rags, waste and clippings; woolen rags; mohair; silk cocoons and silk waste; hemp; flax; opium; lambs’ casings for cat gut. Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Signed Laurence A. Steinhardt.” The British note mutatis mutandis was identic. Steinhardt The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 811.20 Defense (M) Turkey/1021c [Document 896] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , April 17, 1944—7 p.m. 340. Last week British Embassy here submitted memorandum detailing recent and prospective steps being taken by your British colleague with respect to chrome and requested, if Department agreed, that you be similarly instructed. Department replied that you were fully aware of importance attached to chrome and amply authorized to support your British colleague at all times in manner in your joint judgment deemed most effective. Hull The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10581: Telegram [Document 897] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 18, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 9:40 p.m.] 699. Department’s 325, April 14. 24 I have kept the Russian Ambassador informed concerning our note to the Turk Government with respect to trade between Turkey and the Axis and immediately following my talk with the Minister for Foreign Affairs (see my 678, April 15, 6 p.m.) furnished Vinogradov with a copy of our note. Steinhardt 24 See last sentence of footnote 18, p. 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] . The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/988: Telegram [Document 898] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 18, 1944—11 a.m. [Received 9:15 p.m.] 702. See my 689, April 15, midnight. I am in receipt of a note from Minister for Foreign Affairs under date of April 17 in reply to my note of April 14 a translation of the text of which reads as follows: 25 “Mr. Ambassador: The Government of the Republic has examined the note which Your Excellency was good enough to deliver to me on the 14th instant, in order to make to me, in the name of the Government of the United States of America, a communication regarding Turkey’s trade relations with the Axis countries. Your Excellency is fully aware that, even before the start of the world conflict, Turkey had chosen her place and in the various circumstances which have subsequently occurred, she has never, at any time, deviated from the clear-cut position which she had thus adopted. The collaboration which is requested of her today is, accordingly, in conformity with her foreign policy, and it is in this spirit that the Government of the Republic has received the words of the very Honorable Mr. Cordell Hull as well as the communication which Your Excellency has made to me in the same sense. The mutual aid which our two countries have given each other throughout all the vicissitudes of the war has been based upon a reciprocal understanding of the unavoidable necessities and of the vital interests of each of them, and I can assure Your Excellency that the same spirit of understanding is at the basis of the favorable consideration accorded by the Turkish Government to the suggestions of the Government of the United States of America. I can, therefore, state to Your Excellency that, in the spirit of sincere collaboration which forms the foundation of its policy, the Government of the Republic will, within the limits of its material possibilities, give to the United States of America the aid which has been suggested. Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my very high consideration. Signed N. Menemencioglu.” Steinhardt 25 Telegram 703, April 18, 7 p.m., from Ankara, reported that a similar note had been delivered to the British Ambassador as a reply to the British note of April 14 (811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/989). The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/990: Telegram [Document 899] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 18, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 19—3:40 p.m.] 705. Supplementing Turk reply to our note on commercial relations between Turkey and the Axis, Foreign Minister states it is his intention to create a bureau in the Ministry which will examine all future commercial transactions between Turkey and Axis and will have final decision in approving or disapproving all such transactions. He desires appointment of representatives from British and the United States Embassies who will confer regularly with this bureau with object of ascertaining in each instance whether the United States and Britain are prepared to guarantee to furnish Turkey commodities which Turks would fail to receive by refusing to approve a transaction with an Axis country involving shipment of Turkish commodities in exchange therefor. Numan indicated commodities which he would request of the British and ourselves with a view to stopping export of strategic materials to Axis would be only those vital to Turk economy. In short he expressed a desire to cooperate in limiting Turkish exports of strategic materials to Axis within the limits of the survival of Turk economy which he said would depend more on willingness than on undoubted ability of the United States and Britain to furnish Turkey with commodities vital to its economy. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/994: Telegram [Document 900] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 19, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 20—11:33 p.m.] 714. I have had a talk this morning with my British colleague on subject of chrome. It was agreed between us I should have a further talk with Foreign Minister in course of next few days with a view to endeavoring to persuade him to agree to a further reduction from 4,000 tons monthly in shipments to Germany. As Department and FEA doubtless appreciate, matter of obtaining further reductions in the shipments of Turk chrome to Germany will be a part of our general discussions with the Turks growing out of the Anglo-American Joint Declaration. My British colleague and I are not without hope of ultimate success in effecting a further substantial reduction in shipments of chrome to Germany. Much will depend on our ability in the course of general discussions to guarantee Turk requirements of commodities which the Turks have been and are receiving from the Axis countries. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/996: Telegram [Document 901] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 21, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 7:46 p.m.] 717. Late yesterday afternoon, at the conclusion of a lengthy address to the Grand National Assembly on the subject of chrome, the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced to Parliament the Government’s decision to cease all shipments of chrome to Germany and other Axis countries as of 7 o’clock this evening and to forbid the further export of chrome from Turkey. Although I have not as yet had an opportunity of talking with the Minister for Foreign Affairs since his statement to Parliament, I assume that the prohibition of the further export of chrome from Turkey will not affect the continued shipment by the British of the very large quantities heretofore purchased by them and which at the rate of shipment during the past 2 years will take at least 3 years to withdraw. My next numbered telegram 26 contains the Minister’s statement to Parliament. Steinhardt 26 Telegram 718, not printed. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/1005: Telegram [Document 902] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 22, 1944—9 p.m. [Received April 23—10:30 p.m.] 730. Repercussions from Turkish Government’s publicly announced decision to discontinue all further shipments of chrome to Germany have been swift. First noticeable effect is consternation which this action has evoked in German circles. Steadily increasing strain on Anglo-Turkish relations during past 2 months which was well known to German Embassy had engendered conviction that there was no longer any possibility of Turkey’s entry into war on side of Allies. Abrupt action of Turkish Government in publicly announcing repudiation of its obligation to deliver over 100,000 tons of chrome to Germany, for which Germans had made payment in advance over past year by delivery to Turkey of war material including tanks, airplanes, et cetera, has made Germans uneasy. I am reliably informed that Von Papen has inquired of Numan as to whether he should “pack his bags”. In short, action of Turkish Government has revived German fears that Turkey has decided to engage in more active participation on Allied side. The critical attitude of the Turk press during the past 10 days towards the American and British representations to the neutrals 27 indicates that the press was not prepared for the action taken by its Government. In consequence it may now be expected that the Turk press will shift its line and adopt a more friendly attitude towards the Allied position on this subject. The effect in Parliamentary circles and among the public in general should also be favorable. Having announced its intention to discontinue shipments of chrome to Germany and having already offered United States from 4000 to 5000 tons of copper provided 3000 tons are paid in Swiss francs it should not now be too difficult to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with the Turk Government with respect to shipments to the Axis of the other strategic materials listed in our note provided we and the British are prepared to guarantee to the Turks the delivery of commodities vital to the continuance of Turk economy and which they have heretofore been receiving from the Axis. The decision of the Turk Government in the matter of chrome is generally regarded here as implying that Turkey is now prepared to more actively associate itself with the United States and Britain in bringing the war to a speedy conclusion and as therefore having political implications transcending the economic action taken in this particular matter. Steinhardt 27 For correspondence regarding representations to neutral governments against the granting of asylum to persons guilty of war crimes, see vol. i . The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/1008: Telegram [Document 903] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 23, 1944—10 p.m. [Received April 25—8:37 a.m.] 738. See my 730, April 22. In conversation with Foreign Minister this morning he told me he had had great difficulty in persuading Cabinet to agree to discontinuance of further shipments of chrome to Germany and decision had only been arrived at a few hours before his statement to Parliament. He said action taken by Turkish Government had come as a great shock to Germans and von Papen had at once inquired of him as to whether he should “pack his bags”. Numan said he was not as yet informed of official German reaction but should it take form of breaking off trade relations with Turkey and interrupting Turkey’s trade with Sweden and Swiss which was of vital importance to Turkish economy he assumed the United States and British Governments would take necessary steps to furnish Turkey with commodities heretofore obtained from Axis, Sweden and Swiss. He said if Germans did not interrupt their trade with Turkey it was his intention notwithstanding Turkey’s commitments to deliver commodities other than chrome for which the compensating deliveries have already been received by Turkey, to reduce the shipments of such commodities during the next 2 or 3 months by about 50% pending a clarification of American and British policy towards Turkey in the commercial field. I judge this to mean that having discontinued all shipments of chrome to the Axis and having reduced the shipments of other strategic materials by about 50% notwithstanding the fact that Germany has already delivered the compensating commodities, Numan wishes to ascertain whether the United States and Britain will be willing to promptly provide the commodities essential to Turkish economy. In this connection he emphasized the uncertainty, irregularity and great delays in respect of shipments from the United States and the British Empire during the past 2 years as contrasted with the prompt deliveries from Germany. He specifically referred to the fact that he had been “driven into” the German-Turkish opium atabrine transactions as the result of the failure of the United States and Great Britain to give effect to their assurances that adequate quantities of atabrine would be delivered to Turkey. He said he had been and still was determined to prevent the occurrence in Turkey of what he had been informed had happened in parts of Egypt where as he described it “whole communities had been wiped out by malaria” because of the failure of the British to deliver promised atabrine. Numan also said that he was setting up a bureau in the Foreign Office which would hereafter control all trade with the Axis and in future no order of any kind would be accepted in Turkey for shipment of any commodity to the Axis until bureau had first ascertained whether the United States and Britain were prepared to furnish commodity required by Turkey in exchange therefor. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/1010: Telegram [Document 904] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 23, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 25—4 a.m.] 739. With reference to my 717, April 21, the British Ambassador informed me last night that he had satisfied himself in the course of a talk with the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the prohibition of the further export of chrome from Turkey would not apply to shipments to Great Britain and the United States. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10661: Telegram [Document 905] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , April 26, 1944—9 a.m. [Received April 27—5:35 p.m.] 748. My British colleague and I feel that the present is an opportune time to review Anglo-American policy vis-à-vis Turkey. 1. In respect of our future economic policy we are of the opinion that the time has come to discontinue dealing with individual commodities separately and to endeavor to arrive at a general or global agreement with the Turks involving, if possible, the discontinuance as of an agreed date of further shipments of all strategic materials to the Axis in return for an agreement on our part to furnish to the Turks those commodities which are essential to the maintenance of Turkey’s economy and which have been and are being obtained by Turkey from Axis sources. Such an agreement might take the form of an “agreement for mutual economic assistance” under which we would agree to purchase specified quantities of certain commodities and deliver specified quantities of certain commodities. I feel that the expression “war trade agreement” should be avoided as it has come to mean an agreement which neutrals have been compelled to accept in order to obtain products desired by them as distinguished from a voluntary cooperative agreement with an Ally. In view of the fact that the Turkish Government has taken action in the matter of chrome even beyond the request made by us regarding it, it is most desirable that we take prompt action to capitalize the spirit behind this gesture. This we can best accomplish by removing any doubt that may exist in the mind of the Turkish Government of our ability or willingness to take the place of Axis as purveyor of Turkey’s essential requirements. This is all the more important by reason of our past unsatisfactory record in respect of deliveries to Turkey. I have reason to believe from talks during past 3 days with influential Turks that if we respond immediately to gesture just made by making it clear we intend to take care of essential Turkish requirements provided Turks discontinue further shipments of strategic materials to the Axis, it may be possible to bring about a total cessation of such shipments in near future. I cannot emphasize too strongly there should be a minimum of delay in indicating to the Turks what our attitude in this matter now is. Foreign Minister pointed out to me in my last talk with him that a shift by Turkey from Germany to the United States and Britain in obtaining essential requirements will entail at best serious disturbance to the national security. 2. In view of the far-reaching significance of the step taken by the Turk Government in repudiating engagements to Germany and in view of fact that there is evidence that the Turk Government is now desirous of cooperating with the Allies, my British colleague and I believe it is desirable that we be informed as to whether Turkey’s active military participation in the war is envisaged or whether our objective hereafter is to be limited to obtaining Turkey’s full cooperation short of participation in the war. If our aim is to be the active participation of Turkey in the war consideration should at once be given to the preparations essential to that result. The view that Turkey’s entry into the war this summer is not envisaged should not be permitted to obscure the fact that Turkey’s active participation in the war at a later date would require that appropriate steps be initiated at this time. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the Turks regard a certain period of time—probably from 3 to 4 months—as essential to prepare their country for entry into the war. Thus the possibility that Turkey’s active participation in the war may be desired in the fall or even next spring should be examined at the present time in light of necessity for this period of preparation. It would be most unfortunate were a decision arrived at that Turkey’s entry into the war this summer is not desired and circumstances subsequently dictate the desirability of Turkey’s entry into the war in the fall without any steps having been taken during the intervening months to prepare the country for participation in the war. In effect this would be a repetition of what happened last winter. In connection with the foregoing I have no hesitancy in recording my opinion that the Turk Government would be prepared to enter the war and participate actively therein if furnished the 180,000 tons of war material and the approximately 60,000 tons of gasoline previously requested and a plan of joint military operations were agreed upon. In other words Turkey’s active participation in the [apparent omission] with any decision to be made by the Turk Government which has already decided the issue in principle. If, on the other hand, we are only interested in obtaining Turkey’s full cooperation short of war, I believe we could obtain Turkey’s full economic cooperation by apprising the Turks definitely that that is the maximum assistance desired of them and that we are prepared to meet the country’s essential economic requirements. Steinhardt The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 740.00112 European War 1939/10661: Telegram [Document 906] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) 28 Washington , May 5, 1944—10 p.m. 397. This telegram is in reply to your 748, April 26, 9 a.m. and sets forth the Department’s preliminary views on the principles which should underlie our economic policy toward Turkey for the immediate future in the light of the complete stoppage by Turkey of chrome shipments to Germany. 1. Department agrees every effort should be made promptly to capitalize on spirit behind chrome embargo. The objective toward which our strategy henceforward should be directed is the total stoppage of all Turkish exports to enemy or enemy-occupied territory. Should this goal prove unattainable in its entirety the minimum objective would be the complete elimination of all exports of strategic materials to the Axis. With addition of opium and cotton, commodities on New Plan list, including all categories, represent minimum embargo list to be sought. 2. Department agrees in general that wisest tactics would be to negotiate on comprehensive basis rather than attempt to obtain Turkish agreement item by item. This would not preclude, however, dealing individually on items where speed was important. Department also fully appreciates necessity of increasing imports into Turkey from Allied sources in order to compensate for expected lost imports from Axis agreed to be of an essential character. We must be careful, however, to avoid arousing extravagant Turkish hopes. Three obvious limitations apply. First, the supply situation in the U.K. and U.S. remains critical in many key materials and products. Secondly, there is no imminent prospect of an easing in the tightness of shipping. Finally, the intake capacity of Turkey’s accessible ports and deficiencies of Turkish internal transport system impose limitations on rate of absorption even if all Turkey’s wants could be supplied and shipped. The Turks should be left in no doubt as to our desire or intended efforts to perform, but they should likewise be left in no doubt as to the surrounding difficulties. 3. Department agrees that it would be inappropriate to consider negotiating a War Trade Agreement comparable to those negotiated early in the war by the British with Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. This type of agreement had its greatest usefulness when we were relatively weak whereas today, as I stated in my recent speech, 29 we are strong. Indeed Department questions wisdom of negotiating any formal agreement at this time. Instead Department suggests for your consideration and discussion with your British colleague the following procedure: A. Prompt acceptance of Turkish proposal to establish special bureau to scan individually all proposed exports to Axis in relation to the projects offsetting import. This procedure we assume would involve appropriate streamlining of BACC 30 machinery to ensure special service on resultant inquiries. In Washington and, assuming British agreement, in London as well, urgent efforts would be made to provide material in question. This arrangement would provide stopgap pending negotiation of comprehensive embargo on exports to the Axis in return for more comprehensive supply program. B. Department believes no time should be lost in initiating discussions with the Turks on comprehensive basis. We are clear as to our objective. It should be pointed out to the Turks in this connection that we are appreciative of their action with respect to chrome, but that our views on the continuance of trade in strategic materials with the Axis have been made quite clear. Hence our willingness to discuss their needs rests on the assumption that they intend to go the whole way. It would then be up to the Turks to inform us of what they considered their essential requirements. Any such requests would have to be first screened by BACC as to essentiality and then tailored in Washington and London to supply and shipping availability. Simultaneously the Turks should also be asked to furnish for your scrutiny and comment an estimate of their intake capacity including possible use of Turks’ flag vessels for shuttle service between Suez ports and Turkish ports other than Mersin and Iskenderun. The nature of any ultimate supply commitment in the Department’s opinion should be informal in the sense that (1) commercial channels should be relied on, and (2) this Government would confine itself to pledge to use its best efforts in facilitating such exports and in sponsoring allocations where necessary. C. As to purchases of Turkish products, the decision to continue preemptive buying so long as traffic in strategic materials continues between Turkey and the Axis is obviously FEA’s and MEW’s. 31 Assuming an embargo is agreed to by the Turks or all physical communication with the Axis interrupted by military or other action, the Department at the present time sees no justification for making any other purchases of Turkish products than those which would be required for supply reasons or voluntarily negotiated by U.S. commercial importers. Your views on this point, however, are particularly desired. 4. As you are aware, Powell and Diamond 32 are now en route to Turkey. They are FEA officials most familiar with Turkish supply problems. They can also furnish up-to-date background on supply situation and procedures here. In this general connection they should be highly helpful to you in conducting your negotiations. It seems to the Department that you might capitalize on their presence as evidence of our genuine desire to meet this supply problem promptly and realistically. 5. In answer to numbered paragraph 2 of your 748, Department will attempt to secure from military authorities more precise statement of their hopes and wishes with respect to Turkey’s possible entrance into the war. 6. This telegram is being repeated to London as the Department’s 3613 of May 5 for discussion by our Embassy with the British authorities concerned. We fully recognize that agreement with the British on broad policy lines is necessary before definitive discussions with the Turks. Your comments and views on this telegram are urgently requested. 7. It should be noted that an underlying assumption is that our basic bargaining position vis-à-vis the Turks is extremely strong. It would appear that, notwithstanding Numan’s speech of April 20, Turkey’s embargo of chrome to Germany was a realistic action. In making a “gift” which military developments might not much longer have left in her power to proffer, Turkey burned her bridges to Germany behind her. Once our economic warfare objectives are fully achieved there is little we need of Turkey in terms of procurement. On the other hand since Turkey will need our supplies, the British and we will be on the giving rather than the receiving end. 8. FEA concurs fully in this telegram. Hull 28 Repeated to London as telegram 3613, with instructions to discuss the proposal contained therein with appropriate British officials. 29 Address by the Secretary of State over the network of the Columbia Broadcasting System, April 9, 1944, Department of State Bulletin , April 15, 1944, p. 335. 30 The British-American Coordinating Committee in Turkey. 31 Ministry of Economic Warfare. 32 George Powell of the Foreign Economic Administration, Washington, was at this time on a special mission to examine and report on the policies and procedures governing Anglo-American supply operations in Turkey; William Diamond was his assistant. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10770: Telegram [Document 907] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 10, 1944—10 p.m. [Received May 12—8:19 p.m.] 845. In view of instructions received by my British colleague and Department’s 397, May 5 to me, he and I conferred yesterday with a view to deciding what immediate action should be taken by us in light of views of our Governments and what recommendations we should make to our Governments regarding further action. We were of opinion it was imperative both of us should see the Foreign Minister separately as usual as soon as possible in order to make clear to him that while we were appreciative of action taken in respect to chrome our Governments desired discontinuance of shipment to Axis of all other strategic materials specified in our notes 33 and in order to dissipate any impression under which he might be laboring as a result of our failure during past 2 weeks to approach him on subject that we were satisfied with the generalities contained in his reply 34 to our notes and with his oral assurances to us that he contemplated reducing the export of strategic materials other than chrome to the Axis by approximately 50%. Furthermore we were disturbed by the conclusion of the new trade agreement between Turkey and Hungary. 35 It was agreed that in the course of our visits each of us should make the following points to Numan: (1) That while appreciative of the action taken with respect to chrome our notes covered other strategic materials of importance to the Axis. (2) That while the Turkish note expresses the best of intentions as to the action to be taken concerning other strategic materials, negotiations with Hungary have been concluded and negotiations with Germany and Rumania are reported to be under way and we did not know of any step thus far taken by the Turkish Government to discontinue exports to the Axis of strategic materials other than chrome. (3) That our respective Governments regarded any new agreement with Germany, Hungary or Rumania involving exportation of strategic materials listed in our notes as incompatible with the Turk Government’s note of April 17. (4) That we felt that Turkey can only continue to maintain her ambiguous position as regards trade with the Axis in these strategic materials at the expense of her commercial relations with the United States and Great Britain; that as soon as the Turk Government has definitely decided to discontinue the supply to the Axis of all of the commodities listed in our notes of April 14 and thereby evidenced its intention to cooperate wholeheartedly in the economic field with the Allies, the American and British Governments will be prepared to examine closely the question of Turk essential needs and that in this connection our respective Governments were not unmindful of these essential needs and were aware of the necessity of meeting them to the best of our ability should Turkey discontinue the shipment of all strategic materials to the Axis. I am replying to the Department’s request for my views and comments on various aspects of our economic negotiations with the Turk Government by separate telegram within the next day or two. Steinhardt 33 U. S. and British notes dated April 14; see telegrams 678, April 15, 6 p.m., and 689. April 15, 12 p.m., from Ankara, pp. 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] and 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] , respectively. 34 Turkish note dated April 17; see telegram 702, April 18, 11 a.m., from Ankara, p. 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 897 and Doc. 898 ] . 35 The new commercial agreement between Turkey and Hungary was concluded on May 3. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10771: Telegram [Document 908] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 10, 1944—11 p.m. [Received May 12—12:57 p.m.] 846. See my 845, May 10. In accordance with our understanding my British colleague called on Foreign Minister today and spoke to him along lines agreed upon. He informed me when he pointed out to Numan that conclusion of new trade agreement with Hungary was incompatible with assurances given by Turkish Government in its note of April 17, in that it provided for shipment of many of the strategic materials listed in British note of April 14; Numan replied he should not take specific commodities and quantities stipulated in agreement “too seriously” since Turkish commodities were to be furnished Hungary only after Turks had placed orders for Hungarian goods and latter had arrived in Turkey. Any such orders would be placed through newly created bureau in Foreign Ministry and would be reduced in the Ministry to what was absolutely essential and could not be obtained from Britain or the United States. Consequently, it remained with Turkish Government to decide whether or not these orders were to be placed. In point of fact, Numan intended to reduce deliveries of strategic materials to Hungary to 60% of 1943 deliveries. The British Ambassador in reminding him of his promise of a 50% reduction pointed out that what we wanted was a complete stoppage. Numan said he was working to reduce percentage to 50% He insisted that Turkish economic life could not be entirely strangled and that when essential commodities could not be obtained from Britain or United States it would be necessary to rely on Axis deliveries. He observed that British had accepted this principle in case of Spain and Portugal. In reply to Hugessen’s inquiry as to why he had felt obliged to conclude an agreement with Hungary providing for an exchange of goods to an extent greatly beyond what he intended to effectuate in practice Numan stated that if he notified Hungarians in advance that Turkey would only furnish 50% of the strategic commodities delivered in 1943 the Hungarians would be unwilling to make delivery of certain essential materials required by Turkey. Hugessen left the discussion open pending a reply from Numan as to whether the Turkish Government is prepared in principle to discontinue all further shipments to the Axis of the strategic materials listed in the British note of April 14. In this connection Numan told Hugessen that he expected to see Von Papen tomorrow and would send for him after he had talked with Von Papen at which time their discussion will presumably be continued. Hugessen and I are agreed that Numan having thus far had no reaction from the German Government with respect to the discontinuance of the shipment of chrome desires to ascertain the German reaction before continuing his discussions with United States. In view of the foregoing I am deferring my call on Numan until after he has seen Von Papen. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10774: Telegram [Document 909] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 12, 1944—7 p.m. [Received May 13—10:50 a.m.] 856. At the close of a lengthy conversation this morning with the Minister for Foreign Affairs relative to the discontinuance by Turkey of all shipments to the Axis of the strategic materials specified in our note of April 14, Numan intimated that he might be willing to consider a brief general agreement between Turkey and the United States and Great Britain which would provide for ( a ) discontinuance of all chrome shipments to Axis countries (as to which we have no binding commitment), ( b ) the reduction of shipments of all other strategic materials listed in our note by 40% as compared with deliveries in 1943; the reduced deliveries to be on a monthly basis so that they would be evenly distributed throughout the year, and ( c ) agreement by Great Britain and the United States to furnish Turkey’s essential requirements within their capacity to do so. When I argued with Numan that my Government desired the complete discontinuance of all shipments of the commodities in question and that a 40% reduction would not be satisfactory to Washington, I gained the impression that if pressed Numan might increase the percentage of reduction to 50%. He said that he would be compelled to categorically refuse a demand for the complete cessation of all shipments since any such action on his part would be political rather than economic and would involve a rupture of relations between Turkey and Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. He remarked, incidentally, that he had been informed that despite publicity to the contrary Spain had agreed to reduce wolfram shipments to Germany by only 20% of previous deliveries. He emphasized that reduction of 40% would be minimum reduction and would be made as gesture of good will on part of Turkish Government without even knowing extent to which Britain and United States could or would furnish Turkey’s essential requirements. He said that any reduction beyond this percentage would depend upon Great Britain and United States as new bureau which he proposed to create in Foreign Office would not permit any shipments of strategic materials to Axis until it had first ascertained from British and ourselves whether compensating commodity offered by Axis could or would be provided by Great Britain or United States. If delivery of compensating commodity was assured from Great Britain or United States shipment of proposed strategic material would not be made by Turkey. In this way it would be within power of Great Britain and United States to effect further reduction in shipment of strategic materials from Turkey to Axis and if deemed sufficiently worthwhile to bring about complete discontinuance thereof. Numan said he could not afford luxury of a complete rupture of all Turkey’s commercial relations with Germany, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, which would affect Turkey adversely for many years after war and for this reason he contemplated agreements with these countries which would be paper agreements in order to preserve a semblance of commercial relations between Turkey and the countries in question. He emphasized that these agreements would be in the nature of “private compensation agreements” and that Great Britain and the United States would have an opportunity in respect of each proposed delivery of Turk strategic materials to prevent the export thereof to the Axis by furnishing the proposed compensating commodities. He cited as an example the proposed Rumanian-Turk agreement which would involve primarily the delivery of oil products by Rumania to Turkey. He said he intended to make such an agreement but that not a ton of Turk commodities of any kind would ever go to Rumania if Great Britain or the United States furnished the oil products that Rumania would be obliged to furnish in compensation for the Turk products. Discussions are now taking place between my British colleague and myself with regard to the joint recommendation to be made by us to Washington and London in the light of the foregoing. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10775: Telegram [Document 910] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 13, 1944—midnight. [Received May 14—10:35 a.m.] 864. My 856, May 12, and Department’s 397, May 5. Joint recommendations of my British colleague and myself are as follows: 1. In our joint view governing factors in this problem are: ( a ) Turk-Hungarian agreement is hard to reconcile with assurance in Turk note of April 17 and establishes a precedent for similar agreements Rumania and Germany. ( b ) Application of blockade originally threatened in our note of April 14 and therefore before chrome decision would have adverse political repercussions and might also react against ourselves, e.g., by giving Turks loophole for more extensive agreement with Axis including perhaps chrome in return for goods cut off by us such as petroleum products. Moreover, we must recognize in final analysis blockade weapon is far less effective in dealing with Turks than with Spaniards or Swiss. ( c ) The Minister of Foreign Affairs informed Ambassador Steinhardt on May 12 that he is prepared to sign forthwith an agreement with United Kingdom and United States engaging Turkey to reduce by 40% immediately and unconditionally exports to Axis of the strategic materials listed in our notes of April 14 and in response to the remaining 60% which are to be distributed on a monthly basis to submit to United States and United Kingdom Embassies through this bureau all orders to Axis for essential commodities which would involve strategic exports as counter-value. Under this agreement we should be sure of a 40% reduction of 1943 exports and a further reduction corresponding to our ability to replace Axis supplies of essential goods. ( d ) We have Minister for Foreign Affairs’ past record and can assume that he is out to give away as little as possible. We should if possible avoid doing battle on ground of his choosing and in particular should not be drawn into statistical discussions [which?] would give him opportunity for procrastination and bargaining. ( e ) Time factor is of paramount importance, first, to make Turks understand we are in earnest, secondly, to prevent renewal of Clodius and other Axis agreements, and thirdly, to stop at earliest possible moment present outflow of strategic commodities to Axis Europe. 2. With above considerations in mind my British colleague and I recommend that we be immediately authorized to take following action: ( a ) Lodge a protest formally and strongly against terms of Turko-Hungarian agreement which so flagrantly ignore wishes of British and American Governments as expressed in their notes of April 14 and seem contrary to assurances contained in Turk reply of April 17. ( b ) Take note of the valuable contribution which the Turk Government has made to the Allied cause by their chrome decision. ( c ) Point out that even so and in spite of Numan’s oral explanations of his intentions regarding execution of Turko-Hungarian agreements, two Governments must ask to have position clearly stated so as to avoid possibility of further misunderstanding. ( d ) Request a formal written assurance from the Turk Government that under the recently concluded Turko-Hungarian agreement the export of strategic commodities as defined in our notes of April 14 shall in no case exceed 50% of the quantities exported to Hungary in 1943 and that the remaining 50% shall be reduced by any quantities representing the counter-value of goods covered by the agreement which after consultation can be made available from Allied sources. ( e ) Request a further written undertaking that in the event of the conclusion or renewal of any further agreement with Germany or Axis countries involving the strategic commodities, Turkey’s contractual obligations to export these commodities will in no case exceed 50% of the deliveries of these commodities made by her to that country in 1943 and that the remaining 50% shall be reduced by any quantity representing the counter-value of goods which after consultation the Allied powers would provide. ( f ) The British and American Governments offer to undertake to do their utmost within their material possibilities and in full consultation with the appropriate Turkish authorities to supply Turkey’s essential needs. With this end in view they would immediately remove all export bans and be ready to enter into immediate discussions with the Turkish Government with a view to programming the supply to Turkey of her essential needs. In this connection stress might be laid on their realization of the necessity of providing such commodities as anti-malarial and other drugs, raw wool, cotton piece good yarns, load carrying vehicles, tires, agricultural machines et cetera. ( g ) It might be desirable to indicate that the two Governments would be prepared to discuss the development of their purchasing program in Turkey with a view to cushioning the effect of the cessation of Turkish exports to the Axis. 3. As has been stressed above speed was more essential factor and though we do not suggest that the above course of action is perfect or that if successful it would give us 100% satisfaction we feel that it is most important that we should act at once in anticipation of German moves retaining the initiative and set ourselves to obtain a result which combined with the chrome embargo would give us in practice a much greater measure of satisfaction than could have been hoped for a month ago. Early public knowledge of the conclusion of such an agreement would undoubtedly be of assistance to the Department in its dealings with other neutrals. The alternative in our view is prolonged discussion of detail, the loss of initiative and of present favorable tide and a continued flow to the Axis of strategic materials at a decisive period of the war. A similar telegram has been sent to London by my British colleague. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10814: Telegram [Document 911] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 19, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 6:51 p.m.] 908. My 864, May 13. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs made to Hugessen proposals similar to those reported in my 856, May 12, and is pressing for an immediate reply in order that he may meet insistent German pressure with an agreement concluded by Turkey with her ally. The British Embassy in Washington has been instructed to show the Department telegrams Nos. 762, 763, and 765 from Hugessen to London. My British colleague and I urge very strongly that we receive if possible before Monday instructions along the line of those requested in Hugessen’s 765, paragraph No. 6. He is telegraphing London today to this effect. Hugessen and I feel strongly that we should take advantage immediately of the Turkish proposal with a view to concluding at once a concrete agreement which will furnish us with certain very definite advantages such as prohibition of all chrome exports to Germany and immediate reduction by 50% of exports of all other strategic materials to Axis Europe without our being obliged to undertake any specific obligations. It would greatly facilitate an early settlement of the matter if my British colleague and I were to be given immediate authority to conclude the best possible agreement with the Turks along the lines of Numan’s proposal. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10835: Telegram [Document 912] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 20, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 7:30 p.m.] 916. My 908, May 19. Foreign Minister has informed Hugessen and myself that as a measure of good will he has directed appropriate Turk authorities that exports to Axis of strategic materials listed in British and American notes of April 14 are to be immediately reduced to 55 percent of quantities exported in 1943. Steinhardt The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 740.00112 European War 1939/10814: Telegram [Document 913] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , May 20, 1944—8 p.m. 454. British Embassy here has made available to Department British Ambassador’s telegrams to Foreign Office numbered 762, 763 and 765 from Ankara and Embassy’s 908, May 19, 4 p.m. has been received. Department and FEA approve approach to Turks along lines suggested by you and your British colleague. However, for your joint consideration an amendment is suggested in the form of a caveat to be inserted at opening of proposed oral statement. The suggested insertion has been agreed by British Embassy here and on basis of earlier telegram from Foreign Office is presumed entirely acceptable to London. Accordingly you are authorized, upon receipt of parallel instructions by your British colleague, to concert your actions with him as follows: 1. Present to the Turkish Government a written protest which in substance would refer to Turkish decision on chrome and reiterate our desire to secure a complete cessation of the export of Turkish strategic commodities to the Axis. 2. Supplement delivery of note by oral statement which in so far as possible should be along following lines: “While we must reserve all rights to approach the Turkish Government in the future when our vital interests so dictate for the purpose of obtaining further reductions in the export of Turkish strategic materials to the Axis, it is recognized that certain difficulties exist. If the Turks are willing to reduce all future obligations of a contractual nature to Germany and her satellites (and in the case of Hungary to reduce deliveries in practice) with respect to the commodities listed in our note of April 14 to 50 percent of Turkish exports in 1943 on a monthly basis and in practice only to export commodities within the foregoing limit to the extent to which they are compensated for directly by imports which we cannot furnish and which are agreed to constitute essential Turkish requirements, then we are prepared on this basis to enter discussions with the Turks. The field to be covered by such discussions could include the possibility of meeting from Allied sources Turkey’s essential requirements, the removal of certain export embargoes now in force and the question of future purchases of Turkish products.” Sent to Ankara repeated to London. 36 Hull 36 As telegram No. 4023. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10869: Telegram [Document 914] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 23, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 24—12:24 a.m.] 936. The following is text of the aide-mémoire which I left with the Foreign Minister this morning. “The proposals made to the American Ambassador by the Minister for Foreign Affairs have been examined by the American Government and the British Government. They are interesting but in their present form do not attain the degree of aid and collaboration which the two Governments were encouraged to expect from the Turkish note of April 17. The aim of the two Governments remains the complete cutting off of the commodities of strategic importance mentioned in their notes of April 14. They recognize, however, that this may involve certain difficulties in practice at the present time and are prepared to come to an understanding with Turkey falling short of this aim provided that they receive a prior written assurance from the Turkish Government: ( a ) That for the duration of the war Turkey will continue to prohibit the export of chrome ore to Germany and her allies. ( b ) That commencing immediately and for the duration of the war and whatever may be the commercial arrangements existing or to be concluded with Germany and other Axis countries, the Turkish Government will ensure that the annual export from Turkey to those countries of the commodities enumerated in the American note of April 14, 1944, will in no case exceed 50% of the actual deliveries of each commodity made to the country concerned in 1943; and that no more than ½th of such amounts will be exported in any one month. (N. B. The American Government and the British Government expect that in case of agreement with Germany or other Axis countries not already concluded or renewed the Turkish Government will find it possible to reduce its contractual obligations to this extent.) ( c ) That within the limits of the foregoing the strategic commodities in question will only be supplied to Germany and other Axis countries insofar as they represent the counter value of goods which after full discussion between Turkey and the American and British Governments as to each proposed transaction are mutually agreed to be essential to Turkey’s economy and that in cases when it is found possible to replace by goods from Allied sources enemy goods which would represent the counter value of Turkish exports of strategic commodities the deliveries of such commodities will be still further reduced to that extent below the limit in ( b ) above. ( d ) That the Turkish Government will furnish in confidence to the American Government and the British Government all relevant statistics. On receipt of these assurances the American Government, the British Government, while reserving full liberty at any time to press for reductions in Turkish exports to enemy countries if they consider it necessary to do so in their vital interests, are prepared to enter into immediate discussions on the basis of ( c ) above, such discussions to cover inter alia the extent to which Turkey’s essential needs can be supplied from Allied sources within the limits of material possibilities, the conditions on which existing export bans on commercial supplies destined for Turkey can be removed, and future purchasing arrangements.” Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 664.6731/45: Telegram [Document 915] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 23, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 11:51 p.m.] 937. Department’s 454, May 20, and my 936, May 23. I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and left with him a written protest relative to the Hungarian-Turk commercial agreement and an aide-mémoire the text of which appears in my 936, May 23, containing our counter proposals to Numan’s proposals as reported in my 856, May 12 and as reported by Hugessen in British Embassy, Ankara, telegram to London No. 763. The protest and aide-mémoire are identic with those submitted by Hugessen today. After reading the aide-mémoire Numan remarked that while it contained certain provisions that would have to be the subject of further discussion particularly the phrase in paragraph ( c ) that the essentiality of commodities to Turk economy would have to be mutually agreed upon with the American and British Governments, the terms of the aide-mémoire constituted the basis for an agreement. He said he was as anxious as we were to conclude an agreement speedily because of the pressure to which he was being subjected by von Papen, who he had avoided seeing during the past 2 days in the hope of being able to reach an agreement with the British and ourselves. He said it was essential for him in dealing with the Turk Parliament not to permit anything to creep into the agreement which affected Turk sovereignty and that if we did not create too many difficulties for him in respect of some minor changes that he might find essential, he hoped the agreement could be concluded before the end of the week. In this connection in drafting the counter proposal Hugessen and I inserted certain clauses such as the one to which Numan has already taken exception fully conscious of the fact that it might be necessary to modify one or more of them in order to obtain a speedy agreement. For reasons which the Department will appreciate Numan, Hugessen and I have agreed that every effort will be made by all of us to avoid any “leaks” concerning the proposal under consideration or our discussions. Numan pointed out that premature publicity might cause the Germans to take action which could upset the negotiations. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10906: Telegram [Document 916] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 26, 1944—10 a.m. [Received May 29—10:39 a.m.] 960. My 937, May 23. 1. At a joint conference this morning between the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the head of the new bureau referred to in my 738, April 23, the British Ambassador, the British Minister, 37 Kelley, 38 Powell and myself, Numan submitted a draft of an agreement, to be embodied in an exchange of notes between the Turkish, American and British Governments relative to the reduction by Turkey of the export of strategic materials to the Axis. The draft is based on our proposals of May 23. The full text embodying certain changes proposed by us and accepted by Numan is transmitted in my next numbered telegram. 2. With regard to paragraph 2 of his draft, Numan said that he would accept our proposed limitation that not more than one-twelfth of the permissible exports to the Axis could be exported in any one month provided we would agree to the carry-over to subsequent months of any unutilized portion of a monthly quota. He explained the necessity for such a provision in view of the seasonal character of Turk exports and unforeseen delays in effecting exports due to administrative and transportation problems. He hoped that we would accept this proposal as a reasonable one since our object was to ensure the distribution of the annual export quota throughout the year and this proposal would not affect the attainment of this objective. I said that I found this proposal reasonable and would recommend it to my Government. When Numan’s attention was invited to the fact that paragraph 2 contained no provision relative to the reduction to 50 percent of Turkey’s contractual obligations to Axis countries he declared that he could not accept a provision along this line. If he informed the Germans in advance that they would not receive from Turkey more than 50 percent of the amount of the strategic commodities exported to Germany in 1943 it would be impossible for Turkey to obtain from Germany the commodities which Turkey needed within the reduced limits. He would do his best to conclude a compensation agreement with Germany which would specify only the goods which might be exchanged between the two countries and make no mention of quantities but he did not know whether the Germans would agree to the omission of specification of quantities. 3. With regard to paragraph 3 of Numan’s draft, we called his attention to the fact that it omitted any reference to the question of the essentiality of the goods which Turkey might wish to order in Axis countries. Numan declared that the Turkish Government could not agree to the insertion of any clause stipulating that essentiality of commodities to Turkish economy in effect was to be determined by foreign governments. Any such provision would be an infringement of Turkish sovereignty. The essentiality of any commodity to Turkish economy could be determined only by the Turkish Government. Numan pointed out that we had no reason to fear that Turkey would waste on non-essentials the limited quantity of strategic materials now available to her for bargaining with Axis countries. It was unreasonable to suppose that Turkey would utilize such strategic materials vitally needed to maintain her normal national economy. He said that he had the impression from decisions made by the BACC that that organization considered that it was in a better position than the Turk Government to decide whether the continuance of a certain factory in operation was essential to the economic welfare of the Turk people. The Turk Government which was responsible to the Turk people for the economic welfare of Turkey could never agree that foreign governments had the right or the necessary information available to determine the course of Turkey’s economic life. 4. As regards paragraph 4 it was pointed out to Numan that he had omitted the reservation which we had made in our proposals with regard to our pressing at any time for a further reduction in Turk exports to enemy countries if we considered it necessary to do so. Numan pointed out that the reservation proposed by us merely gave us a right which we already possessed to approach him at any time with regard to subject matter of the notes. He could not accept a unilateral reservation since he enjoyed the same right to approach us at any time. If we insisted on stipulating a right which we already possessed he must also stipulate the right which he already possessed. We stressed the importance which the American and British Governments attached to the reservation and said we thought it desirable to guard against a possible contention at a later date that by signing the proposed agreement we had renounced the right to press Government to go further. Numan said that he had no objection to adding to his text a bilateral reservation as paragraph 6 if our two Governments thought it necessary to make such a reservation. 5. At close of our conversation I brought up question of publicity. I pointed out bad impression which would be produced both in Great Britain and the United States by conclusion of new agreement with Germany providing ostensibly for undiminished trade and said it was consequently necessary that some publicity be given to agreement reached between British and American Governments in Turkey. Numan said that, of course, notes must remain strictly secret but that he would be prepared as soon as notes were exchanged to call in representatives of American and British press and tell them that a satisfactory agreement had been reached between American, British and Turkish Governments but without disclosing details. In this connection I feel that once Numan has made general statement of this nature to American and British newspaper correspondents there is no longer any reason why secrecy should be maintained provided, of course, that any details which may become public in the United States cannot be directly traced to Department or FEA. In view of fact Numan will now probably conclude an agreement with Germany at once it seems desirable that our agreement and such publicity as Department and FEA may desire to give thereto should for obvious reasons precede conclusion of German agreements. 6. Numan’s draft is now undergoing detailed study by the two Embassies and joint recommendations of my British colleague and myself will be submitted shortly. Steinhardt 37 John C. Sterndale Bennett. 38 Robert F. Kelley, Counselor of Embassy in Turkey. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10896: Telegram [Document 917] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 26, 1944—11 p.m. [Received May 28—11:20 a.m.] 961. Following is a translation of the draft agreement proposed by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning which embodies certain changes proposed by the British and ourselves and accepted by Numan: “1. For the duration of the war Turkey will continue to prohibit the export of chrome ore to Germany and her allies. “2. Commencing June 1, 1944 and for the duration of the war and whatever may be the commercial arrangements existing or to be concluded with Germany and her allies Turkey will take steps to maintain the exportation to those countries of the commodities enumerated in the American note of April 14, 1944, at a level which in no case will exceed 50% of the exports of each of the same commodities to the aforementioned countries during the year 1943; this annual amount shall be divided into 12 equal monthly quotas and only the quantities which have not been used during the preceding months may be added to the quotas for the following months. “3. The Turkish Government agrees that in all cases in which the commodities which it proposes to order can, other things being equal, be furnished both by the Allies and the Axis, preference shall be given to the offers to supply these commodities from Allied sources in order that the total exports to the Axis of the commodities mentioned in the British and American notes on the subject may by this means be further reduced. “4. Since the reduction specified in Article II will have an adverse effect on the supply to Turkey of the commodities necessary for her economy, the British and American Governments shall enter into negotiations with the Turkish Government with a view to determining by mutual agreement on the one hand the increase in the exports of these two countries to Turkey in order to compensate for the deficit in her imports and, on the other hand, the increase in the purchases to be made in Turkey in order to replace those purchases which would have been made by the Axis in the normal course of commercial transactions developed up to the present time. “5. The Turkish Government will furnish in confidence to the American and British Governments statistics relating to commercial transactions with the Axis countries. “6. The American, British and Turkish Governments reserve the right to request at any time the opening of new conversations on any question dealt with in the present note.” Steinhardt The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.00112 European War 1939/5–2644 [Document 918] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire The following represents the substance of a telegram received from the Foreign Office on May 26th, in which the Foreign Office give an account of the present thinking of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom on the subject of policy towards Turkey in the immediate future:— As a result of the Turkish chrome decision and the general reorientation of Turkish policy in our favour, the question has again been brought up whether we should not on the eve of operations in the West increase the threat to Germany’s position in the South-east of Europe through Turkey by reestablishing military contacts with the Turks. In recent months the importance of maintaining this threat has greatly influenced our Turkish policy, but since the breaking off of military conversations in February, the threat has been a very distant one. A number of hints have been thrown out recently that the Turks would be ready for a resumption of military talks, and it must not be forgotten that in January the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs offered to give us an assurance that Turkey would come into the War within one fortnight of a successful landing in the West. The despatch of a military mission to Angora might therefore seem at first sight an admirable means of increasing German anxieties. 2. We are not however any longer prepared to pay any price for Turkey’s entry into the War at this stage, although if she were to come in voluntarily and at her own request her entry would be welcomed. A military mission therefore would have nothing to discuss and this fact would become immediately obvious to the enemy. Moreover its arrival would be hailed by the Turks as a victory for their previous policy of non-cooperation and our position would be correspondingly weakened. 3. On the other hand we have several indications that our economic policy has been taken by Germany as an attempt on our part to push Turkey into the War by economic pressure after having failed to do so by direct military conversations. We feel therefore that our best means of maintaining the threat to the Germans through Turkey is to continue to concentrate our attention on the economic field. The action which is being taken by the United States and British Governments in that field will enable us to keep up constant pressure between now and the launching of the attack on the West. In reply to our pressure the Minister of Foreign Affairs will doubtless use his old argument that the reductions in Turko-German trade which we are asking for amount to a rupture of relations. We will let him argue like this until after D day and then on, say, D + 4, we shall, if we want to tell him frankly that this is in fact what we are asking. In consequence we may be faced with a request for military conversations, but a mission could then be sent to Ankara without weakening our position, for there may be military questions connected with later developments in our strategy which could then usefully be discussed with the Turks. The effect on the Germans of our demand for the severance of economic and diplomatic relations, coupled with the presence of a military mission might be extremely satisfactory. Washington , 26 May, 1944. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10888: Telegram [Document 919] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 27, 1944—6 p.m. [Received May 28—12:55 p.m.] 965. My 960 and 961, May 26. 1. My British colleague and I make the following joint recommendations. We advise acceptance of ( a ) Numan’s idea of an exchange of notes; ( b ) his wording of last sentence of paragraph 2 of his draft concerning monthly quotas subject to substitution for sake of clarity of “licensed but not exported” instead of “not utilized”; ( c ) his contentions that he cannot mention in his contractual obligations with Germany proposed reduction by 50% and he cannot consent to discuss with us the essentiality of commodities to be ordered by Turkey from Axis countries. 2. Paragraph 3 is not as specific as we should like to have it and we are prepared to endeavor to persuade Numan to agree to addition of words “in corresponding proportion” at end of paragraph. It must, however, be recognized in the last analysis we are dependent on his good faith. 3. On other hand, if we meet Numan to extent suggested above we see no reason why we should accept the wording of his proposed paragraph 4 which might in its present form be construed to constitute a recognition by us of an obligation to make good to the full the loss to Turk trade occasioned by the 50% reduction in strategic materials. We have considered three possible alternative texts: ( a ) American [and] British Governments agree to enter into immediate negotiations with Turk Government with a view to determining extent to which they can increase their commercial exports to and purchases in Turkey; ( b ) American and British Governments agree to enter into immediate negotiations with Turk Government with a view to determining extent to which it may be practicable to supply Turkey’s essential needs from Allied sources and increased Allied purchases in Turkey. ( c ) The American and British Governments recognizing that realization of foregoing arrangements could not be without effect upon Turk economy and desiring to cooperate with Turkey in mitigating the effect so far as may be practicable will enter into immediate negotiations, will cover more particularly procedure to be adopted to give effect to paragraph 3 above, extent to which Turkey’s essential needs can be supplied from Allied sources, removal of existing export bans on commercial supplies to Turkey and future purchasing arrangements in Turkey. 4. While alternatives ( a ) and ( b ) have the advantage of removing idea of entirely filling up gap created by reduction in Turco-German trade, they might lead us further than Numan’s draft which at least places a ceiling to the increase in exports to Turkey and purchases sent to Turkey. We ourselves unanimously and strongly favor alternative ( c ). 5. We think it politically and psychologically important to come to an immediate understanding with Turkey and if possible before Turco-German negotiations are concluded. We do not think it would pay us to haggle over wording provided we can eliminate any appearance of definite obligation to make entirely good to Turkey the reduction contemplated in Turco-German trade. We recommend, therefore, that we be given immediate authority to sign exchange of notes at once (with or without mutual reservation contained in paragraph 6 of draft transmitted in my 961) provided Numan will accept the substance whatever may be exact wording of paragraph 3 ( c ) above in place of his proposed paragraph 4, it being understood that we will try to secure addition to his paragraph 3 of words recommended in paragraph 2 above. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10907: Telegram [Document 920] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , May 29, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 7:12 p.m.] 971. My 965, May 27. In view of impending conclusion of our negotiations regarding reduction of Turk exports of strategic materials to the Axis I cannot emphasize too strongly necessity of making every effort in the future to furnish goods essential to maintenance of Turk economy which may be recommended hereafter by Embassy and BACC It seems to me imperative an appropriate directive be issued by Department to all other interested agencies of our Government that every effort be made to meet Turk essential requirements as certified by BACC from Ankara. I desire to point out that in the course of my conferences with Numan he stated repeatedly that at great risk to Turkey’s national economy his Government was pledging itself to every substantial reduction in export to Axis of its most important products which would entail a very substantial reduction in its imports of all commodities essential to maintenance of country’s economy. He said he was entering into agreement in good faith with every intention to carry it out as a gesture of goodwill towards the United States and Britain in an effort to aid them in shortening war and if circumstances permitted he might find it possible to even go beyond obligations he had assumed under agreement but if at any time he came to feel the United States and British Governments were not exercising same degree of good faith and he had reason to believe orders were being accepted with intention not to fill them or to delay their execution with the ulterior purpose of preventing same from being placed in Axis countries to prevent the counter value in Turk exports from going to Axis he would consider himself released from his obligations under agreement and would act accordingly. Over and above considerations advanced by Numan I feel the United States and British Governments in requesting the real sacrifice which Turk Government is making in putting United States in a position to stop substantially all Turk exports of strategic materials to the Axis have assumed a moral obligation to meet Turkey’s essential requirements to the fullest extent of their ability and that the convenient excuse of military necessity or shortage of shipping should not hereafter be advanced excepting in cases of imperative necessity. Furthermore, I envisage three substantial benefits which will flow from making every effort to meet Turk essential requirements ( a ) the incentive to Turks to take further steps to cut off all trade with Axis, ( b ) the salutary effect on the other neutrals and ( c ) the strengthening of our postwar commercial position in Turkey. Steinhardt The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 740.00112 European War 1939/10888: Telegram [Document 921] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , May 31, 1944—7 p.m. 489. A decision re recommendations in Embassy’s 965, May 27, 6 p.m. is in suspense pending Foreign Office clarification of its recent policy telegram no. 4667, 39 sent to Washington and repeated to British Embassy Ankara. This indicates that “constant pressure between now and launching of Second Front” should be maintained on the Turks as a means of maintaining a threat to the Germans. Numan is expected to use his old argument in reply to such pressure that what is asked is tantamount to a rupture in relations with Germany. “We will let him argue like this” until attack opens and then tell him frankly that this is what is wanted. Preliminary Departmental thinking is that the signature of anything with the Turks at this stage might reduce greatly the field to which “constant pressure” might be applied and relieve Numan from his present serious dilemma. From this distance it seems doubtful that even without an agreement the Turks would withdraw their cessation of chrome shipments at this stage of the war. This constitutes by far the most important of our economic warfare objectives in Turkey. It also would appear to be difficult for the Turks in the face of Allied public opinion to facilitate deliveries of the remaining strategic commodities contrary to our strong notes of April 14 (other notes of protest might be delivered) and in the light of Churchill’s recent speech. 40 Please telegraph urgently your views on foregoing. Hull 39 See aide-mémoire from the British Embassy, May 26, p. 852 [ Pg. 852 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] . 40 May 24; for text, see Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 400, cols. 764–766. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 740.00112 European War 1939/11033c: Telegram [Document 922] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , June 1, 1944—8 p.m. 494. 1. British Embassy here communicated today to Department clarification of its telegram No. 4667 to which reference was made in Department’s 489 of May 31. Foreign Office now concurs in your and your British colleague’s recommendation that notes be exchanged with Turkish Government subject to conditions given in paragraph 2 below. The primary purpose behind London’s view appears to be to keep the Germans guessing, and we appreciate that the exchange of notes may have this effect. Much will depend upon the manner in which the negotiations are handled with the Turkish Government and in particular upon the skillful handling of subsequent publicity. 2. Department herewith accords you authority to sign exchange of notes provided Numan accepts substance of paragraph 3 ( c ) of your 965, May 27, 6 p.m. It is understood that you will make firm effort to secure addition to paragraph 3 of Numan’s redraft of language given in paragraph 2 of your 965. Finally, it is requested that at signature, or such other time as you deem most appropriate, you emphasize verbally to Numan that while the agreement meets the present circumstances, your Government regards it only as a first installment of the economic assistance which it believes justified in expecting of the Turkish Government and that with altered circumstances, your Government naturally will desire further concessions. Department understands that your British colleague already holds instructions in foregoing sense and consequently no delay will be involved in concerting your actions. 3. As stated in paragraph 1 above, Department believes handling of publicity following signature is extremely important. Please keep Department fully informed regarding any statements made in this connection by Turkish authorities and give us your then recommendations as to course to follow here with particular reference to usefulness of calculated leaks regarding terms of note. Repeated to London. 41 Hull 41 As telegram 4359. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/1047: Telegram [Document 923] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , June 2, 1944—1 p.m. [Received June 3—12:32 a.m.] 998. Department’s 489, May 31. As Department has solicited my views I feel free to express following. I cannot follow London’s reasoning that maintenance of constant pressure on the Turks between now and launching of second front will operate as a threat to Germans. Quite the contrary the pressure which has been applied has been known to Germans and has evidenced a divergence of views between Britain and her ally Turkey, a divergence which has been publicized by discussions in British and Turkish press and referred to by Churchill in his recent public statement. Thus the continued maintenance of pressure would indicate continuation of divergence and continued Turk opposition to British desires which Germans know full well to be reduction in shipment of strategic materials to Axis, ceding of Turk bases or Turkey’s entry into war. On other hand sudden cessation of pressure accompanied by a pubic announcement of an agreement between Britain, the United States and Turkey, without disclosing details, would lead the Germans to believe that the agreement perhaps even transcended anything that might be published regarding the details. It follows from the foregoing that if it is desired to cause the Germans anxiety as to the position of Turkey at the moment of the opening of second front this result is much more likely to be achieved by a sudden and well publicized change in Anglo-Turkish relations than by continuing a policy of emphasizing disagreement. I am at a loss to follow the argument that when Numan objects to continued pressure by contending that what is asked is tantamount to a rupture of relations with Germany the British “will let him argue like this until the attack opens and then tell him frankly that this [is] what is wanted”. I don’t see what the British will gain after the attack has opened by telling Numan “frankly” that a rupture of relations with Germany is what is wanted as they have been telling him this since December. With reference to Department’s preliminary thinking that the signature of anything containing terms at this stage might greatly reduce the field to which “constant pressure” might be applied I am inclined to the view that even after the agreement has been signed an adequate field for pressure will remain in endeavoring to curtail the export of the remaining 50% and in other domains. Insofar as concerns not relieving Numan from his dilemma it would seem that he would be relieved by the non-acceptance of the substantial concessions offered by him much more than by their acceptance for on their acceptance he is on notice that further demands will shortly be made. In the light of the over-all situation I have no reason to change or modify the recommendations contained in my 969 [ 965 ], May 27, other perhaps than to stress further the advantages to be derived from a publicized agreement before the opening of the second front. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.00112 European War 1939/10933: Telegram [Document 924] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , June 5, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 3:06 p.m.] 1009. Department’s 494, June 1. The British Ambassador told me yesterday that he had been informed by his Naval Attaché 42 that the Turk authorities had permitted the passage through the Straits from the Black Sea into the Aegean of a number of unarmed German barges without giving adequate consideration to the claims of Admiral Jackson that based on previous experience, these barges on arrival in the Aegean would be armed and used for military purposes. On being advised of the foregoing, Hugessen called on Numan and informed him that he was unwilling to conclude the economic agreement until he received assurances that no additional German barges would be permitted to pass through the Straits. As Numan’s reply was noncommittal, Hugessen requested instructions of London. He received immediate instructions approving position taken by him in his talk with Numan with regard to economic agreement but inquiring as to whether he did not think that in refusing to conclude economic agreement until matter of barges was satisfactorily disposed of, “we may not be cutting off your [ our ] nose to spite our face” and directing him to present matter of barges to President 43 in person immediately. Hugessen is accordingly proceeding tomorrow to Izmir accompanied by Numan to see President. 44 Steinhardt 42 Rear Adm. William L. Jackson. 43 Ismet Inönü, President of the Turkish Republic. 44 The British Ambassador’s intervention with the Turkish President resulted in a denouement favorable to the British point of view, after which the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs resigned, on June 15 (767.68119/7–844). The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 740.00112 European War 1939/1124a: Telegram [Document 925] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , June 5, 1944—9 p.m. 510. British Embassy here has informed Department of telegraphic correspondence between your British colleague and Foreign Office in connection with passage of German ships through Straits and relation of protest on this development to exchange of notes referred to in Department’s 494, June 1. Department assumes that you will act in concert with your British colleague and take no independent action with respect to exchange of notes until his existing instructions have been confirmed or altered. In latter case Department will promptly instruct you. Stettinius The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.0011 European War 1939/6–2344 [Document 926] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire On June 16th His Majesty’s Ambassador at Ankara telegraphed to the Foreign Office to the following effect: ( a ) Turkey’s relationship to the Allies has recently undergone a considerable change for the better. The question of the Straits and the export of chrome have both been settled and an assurance has been given that Turkey wishes to cooperate whole-heartedly with the Allies. ( b ) The moment seems exceptionally favourable for making real progress in our relations with Turkey. This can best be achieved, not by a piecemeal approach to individual questions but by the establishment of a general framework of cooperation. The time for the proposed exchange of economic notes has passed. This would merely give us in writing what we have already obtained in practice. A new approach is needed and it is important that this approach should not fall short of the standard which the Soviet Government has already laid down for Turkey’s rehabilitation. 45 In return, however, we must be prepared to tell Turkey exactly what we are prepared to contribute to her equipment for the role in which we now propose to cast her. ( c ) Meanwhile, we cannot continue stalling indefinitely but should make an immediate response to recent developments, with a view to encouraging the Turkish Government and at the same time gaining time for the preparation of our desiderata. With this end in view, we should at once inform the Turkish Government that His Majesty’s Government has taken note with satisfaction of their decision on the Straits question, that they welcome the assurance given by the Turkish Government, that they are anxious to follow it up immediately and that they would like to know whether the Turkish Government are now ready to enter into discussions with a view to reaching an agreement on the methods by which their assurances can best be implemented. 2. In replying to His Majesty’s Ambassador at Ankara, Mr. Eden 46 agreed that an exchange of notes on the lines originally proposed no longer meets the needs of the situation as it now presents itself. The atmosphere in Ankara, hitherto unpropitious, has now changed to one in which it should be possible to make a bolder and more open bid for Turkish cooperation than was considered feasible at the time of drafting the notes. 3. On the other hand, Mr. Eden considers that the action proposed by Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, as outlined in paragraph ( c ) above, is inadequate. Whilst agreeing that His Majesty’s Government should express their satisfaction at the Turkish Government’s decision on the Straits question and at the assurances received, Mr. Eden feels that H.M.G. should follow this up with some concrete suggestion of their own for the immediate implementation of this new attitude: they should not lag behind the Soviet Government, who have already told Turkey that she should break off relations with Germany and enter the war against her. Whilst not wishing at this stage to go quite so far or so fast as the Russians, Mr. Eden feels that, acting on the assumption of full and immediate Turkish cooperation, H.M.G. should forthwith make the following concrete proposal to the Turkish Government: 4. “The whole situation has been altered by the opening of the Western front and the measure of assistance that the Turkish Government were prepared to give us before this development (viz., a complete ban on chrome supplies to Germany and a 50% reduction on the export of other strategic commodities) should now be increased to meet the changed circumstances. The time has therefore come when the Turkish Government should consider breaking off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany, so as to put an end once and for all to the German manoeuvres of playing off Turkey against Great Britain and her Allies. It is only in this way that Turkey can clarify her policy which has become obscure and confused by recent events, and fill the international position to which she is entitled both during the war and at the peace making”. 5. Mr. Eden’s telegram continues in the following words: “I do not think it would be desirable at this stage to accompany this proposal by a direct appeal to Turkey’s obligations under her Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain. 47 But if in the course of discussions it becomes necessary to invoke the Treaty, the Turkish Government would be reminded that the only occasion on which His Majesty’s Government have formally appealed to the Treaty of Alliance was when Italy came into the war and that it was suggested to the Turkish Government that in default of their being able to declare war on the Axis they should at least break off diplomatic relations. On that occasion the Turkish Government appealed to the second protocol of the Treaty, alleging that any action on their part would endanger their relations with the Soviet Union. The imminent collapse of France furthermore gave the Turks some justification for feeling that the Treaty no longer fitted the new situation, where, with the collapse in the West, German and Italian enemies could be concentrated on South-East Europe. It could be pointed out to the Turkish Government that to-day the Soviet Government have made it quite plain to the Turkish Government that they wish Turkey to break off relations with Germany and the landings in Normandy have more than restored the military balance to that in which the Anglo-Turkish Treaty was designed to operate. 6. It is true that if we make a request to the Turkish Government to sever diplomatic relations with Germany we may be faced with demands to know what assistance we could give Turkey in the event of Germany retaliating forcibly. We certainly cannot commit ourselves on this point and would have to try and persuade the Turkish Government that the Germans would neither be able, nor wish, to take violent counter-measures. By taking violent action they would automatically bring Turkey into the war and much as they would dislike the rupture of relations, they would dislike even more the prospect of Turkey being an actual belligerent since militarily they have not the forces available to enable them to take on a fresh campaign and because in particular a belligerent Turkey would seriously affect Germany’s position in Bulgaria and also enable Great Britain to get at vital Aegean Islands from Turkish bases. It is to be hoped that these arguments, though wasted on Numan, might convince his successor. Meanwhile I should prefer to avoid resuming military conversations at the present moment, though I realise that the Turkish Government might press for them as the price for their breaking with Germany.” 7. Lord Halifax 48 is instructed to bring the foregoing to the attention of the Government of the United States and to enquire whether, if it agrees to the line of action proposed, it will consider the despatch to the United States Ambassador at Ankara of the necessary instructions to support his United Kingdom colleague. Washington , June 23, 1944. 45 See telegram 2327, June 28, midnight, from Moscow, p. 863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] . 46 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 47 Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey, signed at Ankara, October 19, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc , p. 167; British Cmd. 6165, Treaty Series No. 4 (1940). 48 The British Ambassador. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/1067: Telegram [Document 927] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , June 23, 1944—6 p.m. [Received June 24—11:45 p.m.] 1142. The British Ambassador read to me this morning London’s 5616 of June 22 to Washington 49 which sets forth as London’s objective the rupture of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Axis. Hugessen expressed the view that if he is to succeed in persuading the Turks to break off economic relations with the Axis it will be necessary for Britain and the United States to undertake to furnish Turkey with its essential requirements. In this connection he referred to the necessity of lifting the existing embargoes on copper, cotton piece goods, etc., pointing out that at best there would be a very considerable time lag between the lifting of these embargoes and the arrival of the goods in Turkey in comparison with the relative speed with which goods arrive in Turkey from Axis Europe. He also expressed grave doubt that a complete economic rupture could be achieved much less a diplomatic rupture without some kind of commitment by Britain to afford the Turks military assistance in the event they are attacked by Germany. I am in agreement with the view expressed by Hugessen that it is desirable we advise the Turks as soon as possible of our objectives particularly as their attainment will require protracted discussions, especially in connection with Turkey’s discontinuance of all trade with the Axis, as to how the United States and Britain can best furnish Turkey with its essential requirements and at the same time absorb Turkey’s surplus export products. Accordingly, I recommend that I be instructed as soon as possible to support Hugessen’s representations. 50 With regard to any aspects of subsequent discussions concerning which the Department may hold views other than those expressed in London’s telegram or entertain doubt as to the best means of attaining our objectives, I shall be available to the Department for personal conference as I have made plans to leave Ankara on June 29 for Washington. Steinhardt 49 Apparently the communication on which was based the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of June 23, supra. 50 In telegram 581, June 28, 9 p.m., the Ambassador was “authorized to support the British Ambassador insofar as you deem it desirable in his representations based on the principles set forth in Foreign Office telegram 5616, June 22 and in accord with recommendations in your 1142, June 23, 6 p.m.”; Ambassador Steinhardt was also informed that the “Department looks forward to early consultation with you on this subject” (740.0011 European War/6–2644). Telegram 581 was repeated to London as 5111 and to Moscow as 1581. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/6–2844: Telegram [Document 928] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , June 28, 1944—midnight. [Received June 29—1 a.m.] 2327. Molotov 51 called me over this evening to explain developments regarding Turkey. He said that on May 27 the Turkish Government had approached the Soviet Government verbally but officially with a proposal that an agreement be reached envisaging closer political collaboration which would include consultation on Balkan questions. In the first days of June the Soviet Government had replied pointing out that the Balkans were in the hands of Hitler, that as the Turkish Government was maintaining relations with Germany any consultation on the Balkans “would lose its meaning”, that the Soviet Government was ready to discuss closer collaboration with Turkey including consultation on the Balkans if Turkey broke with Germany and entered the war on the side of the Allies. Molotov further explained that they had had no answer to this Soviet counter proposal. Molotov then went on to describe a communication he had received from the British Ambassador 53 on June 25 [in?] which the British Government asked the Soviet Government to support a British demand on Turkey to break diplomatic and economic relations with Germany as a first step toward getting Turkey into the war. Molotov said he had not as yet answered the British Government and asked me whether I knew what the attitude of my Government was in regard to the proposal of the Soviet Government to the Turks and the proposal of the British Government. I replied that as far as I knew my Government had no previous knowledge of the Soviet-Turkish interchange but that I believed my Government would be prepared to support steps towards a break by Turkey with Germany in agreement with the British and Soviet Governments. Molotov commented that the British proposal was not in accordance with the Moscow decisions. 54 We discussed at some length the arguments for the British proposal. I said that I understood we were not in a position to supply the large quantities of aircraft and arms which the Turks had demanded as a condition to their entering the war. Molotov said that these demands were only excuses and that we should not take them seriously. If we had expected Turkey to enter the war in 1943 it would not be logical to reduce our demands after our military successes which should be convincing to the Turks. He said that we had a right to present our demands although he [would?] not predict what the Turkish attitude would be. I then asked whether I could understand from what he said that the Soviet Government was opposed to the British proposal and wished the United States and British Governments to support their proposal for Turkish entry into the war immediately. In reply Molotov said that the Soviet Government was studying the matter and had not come to a conclusion. In the meantime he was desirous of obtaining the attitude of the United States Government. I agreed to cable you Mr. Molotov’s question and ask for your position. I am sure he would appreciate an early reply. Repeated to Ankara. Harriman 51 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. 53 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. 54 Concerning the agreement regarding Turkey reached at the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943, see telegram from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to President Roosevelt, November 2, 1943, and telegram from President Roosevelt to the Ambassador, November 4, 1943, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. i , pp. 697 and 698 , respectively. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/6–3044: Telegram [Document 929] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , June 30, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 7:58 p.m.] 2374. Reference my 2327, June 28, midnight. The British Ambassador has shown me a note of June 29 from Molotov which reads in paraphrase translation as follows: Reference is made to the British Ambassador’s letter of June 25 relating to the plan of the British Government to approach the Turkish Government and invite the Turkish Government to break off diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. In this connection Mr. Molotov considers it necessary to inform the British Ambassador as follows: There is no ground for supposing, insofar as the Soviet Government is aware, that the Turkish Government will agree to the step proposed by the British and even if the Turks should do so, it would be a half measure and would have no important effect upon hastening the conclusion of the war. The British are cognizant of the Turkish Government’s offer to the Soviet Government of May 27 and of the Soviet Government’s reply of June 5. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, evidence of the Turkish Government’s real desire to act with the Allies against Hitlerite Germany might be a decision on the Turkish part immediately to break with Germany, and Turkey’s joining with the Allies in the war against the common enemy, Germany. At the Moscow and Tehran Conferences 55 as long ago as last year, this was recognized to be necessary by the three Allied Governments. Turkey might in this case lay claim, both during the war as well as when peace is concluded, to a deserving place among the Allies. Repeated to Ankara for Ambassador Steinhardt. Harriman 55 For documentation regarding Turkey at the Tehran Conference between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier Stalin, November 28–December 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, index, p. 928 , entry on Turkey under Tehran Conference. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/6–3044: Telegram [Document 930] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , June 30, 1944—10 p.m. [Received July 1—3:41 a.m.] 1189. Hugessen called on the Prime Minister 56 this morning and submitted in accordance with his Government’s instructions, a request that the Turk Government break off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany. Hugessen states that Saraçoğlu observed that Turkey was being asked to take action which was “dishonorable”, adding that it would be very difficult for the Turkish Government to break off economic and diplomatic relations as it could not take such action without obtaining the prior approval of the party, the Grand National Assembly and the country and it was doubtful that such approval could be obtained. Saraçoğlu then remarked that it would be much more difficult to obtain approval for such action than for Turkey’s entry into the war. Hugessen said he hoped the Turk Government would not take this position since it would have a most unfortunate effect in London. When London had requested Turkey to enter the war the Turk Government had presented as a condition a list of requirements which were “exaggerated and impossible to fill”. Now when the British were requesting Turkey to break off economic and diplomatic relations, they were told that such action could not be taken because it was “dishonorable”. Saraçoğlu admitted that the Turk Government had requested an “extravagant” amount of war material as a condition of its entry into the war and remarked that the situation had now changed so that a much lesser amount of material would be required. Upon Hugessen’s observing that the Turk Government would probably still need an excessive amount of war material and remarking that present Allied military plans probably did not envisage Turkey’s participation in the war and that he knew of no plan for a major Balkan operation, Saraçoğlu replied that the British might now fix what Turkey needed in the way of military equipment, the preparatory period, and the date of her entry into the war. While discussing the possibility of Turkey’s entry into the war, the Prime Minister set forth his conception of the role that should be played by Turkey. He suggested that Turkey issue an ultimatum to Bulgaria to expel the Germans from her territory and if the Bulgarians failed to do so, the Turkish army aided by the troops “of her Russian ally” would drive them out. Hugessen remarked that he was not authorized to discuss the question of Turkey’s entry into the war. He urged Saraçoğlu to give the most serious consideration to his Government’s request that Turkey break off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany. Saraçoğlu said he would discuss the matter with the President and let him have a reply in a few days. Later in the day Saraçoğlu requested Hugessen to call to see him, and said he had noted that the British request was not made under the alliance. Hugessen agreed. He explained that the British Government was making the request with a view to ascertaining whether the alliance was still alive. Saraçoğlu then inquired as to whether Hugessen could assure him that if the Turk Government complied with the request now made by London, the British Government would thereafter treat Turkey as a full ally. Hugessen assured Saraçoğlu to this effect. I have made an appointment to see Saraçoğlu tomorrow for the purpose of supporting Hugessen’s representations. I understand that Hugessen has requested Vinogradov to seek authority from his Government to do likewise. Steinhardt 56 Sükrü Saraçoğlu. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) 740.0011 European War 1939/6–3044: Telegram [Document 931] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) Washington , June 30, 1944—11 p.m. 1602. Embassy’s 2327 June 28, midnight. As you will have seen from the Department’s 5111 [ 1581 ], June 28, 9 p.m., 57 our Embassy at Ankara has been authorized to support British efforts to persuade the Turks to sever economic and diplomatic relations with the Axis. This step does not preclude pressure on the Turks to go further along the lines of Molotov’s proposal to the Turks to enter the war, if it is agreed that this course is militarily desirable in the light of present circumstances. A statement of the current Russian view on this point is awaited with interest. Steinhardt is expected in Washington about July 3 and will be consulted on the practical aspects of obtaining from Turkey at this time the cooperation which will contribute most effectively to the Allied cause. Repeated to London and to Ankara Hull 57 See footnote 50, p. 863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] . The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–144: Telegram [Document 932] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State 58 Ankara , July 1, 1944—8 p.m. [Received July 2—1:23 a.m.] 1198. I called on the Prime Minister today to support the British Ambassador’s representations in the matter of the rupture of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany. The following is the gist of an hour and a half’s conversation in the course of which I pointed out that the war was progressing so rapidly to the inevitable Allied victory that the present might be Turkey’s last opportunity to actively associate herself with the United Nations. In outlining the Turkish position Saraçoğlu said that his Government did not understand and had been “hurt” by the British policy of “sulking” since the departure of the British Military Mission in February. He referred to the fact that the Turk embargo on chrome deliveries to Germany and the prohibition of the passage of certain classes of German ships through the Straits had failed to evoke any indication of appreciation from London. He remarked that when he had sent cordial messages to Eden and Molotov he had received a most cordial reply from Molotov and a “frigid” reply from Eden. He said that all in all his Government had come to doubt during recent months that Britain really wanted Turkey to enter the war. He knew the Russian position because the Russians spoke plainly and had made it clear that they desired Turkey’s entry into the war but insofar as concerned the British “their legalistic and devious methods of approach” had left the Turk Government perplexed as to Britain’s real desire with respect to Turkey’s entry into the war. As matters stood today whereas the Russian position was clear that Turkey’s entry into war was desired the British were requesting merely a rupture of economic and diplomatic relations with Germany. In consequence in the light of the relatively limited amount of war material previously requested by the Turks and the abrupt departure of the British Military Mission could the Turk Government be criticized for wondering whether the British were serious in their request at Cairo that Turkey enter the war? Could it be that British international interests of which the Turks had no knowledge dictated a rupture between Turkey and Germany without active participation by Turkey in the war? The Prime Minister emphasized several times that the Turks “are a proud people” remarking that “if the British continue to treat us as slaves, inferiors or colonials nothing can be accomplished but if they treat us as full Allies, for example accord us the same treatment shown the refugee Governments in London which rule no countries, we are ready to go to the end of the road with the Allies”. Saraçoğlu then made the following statement: “I have suggested to Hugessen that the British determine what additional war material we should receive and send their experts here for that purpose and have informed him that we will abide by their decision and will let the British fix the date for Turkey’s entry into the war.[”] In outlining his views as to the part Turkey could play on entering the war Saraçoğlu stated that the Turk Army could eject the Germans from Bulgaria observing that he was convinced that within 48 hours after the Turk Army entered Bulgaria the Bulgarians “would shift over to our side”. He said that in his opinion Bulgaria would not offer prolonged or serious resistance to both Turkey and Russia observing that he assumed the Russians would be prepared to carry out the offer previously made to declare war on Bulgaria if Turkey entered the war. Thus he said the road to Yugoslavia would be opened and it would be for the British to decide whether they wished to cross the Adriatic into the Balkans. Saraçoğlu then told me that the Council of Ministers would meet on July 3 to consider the reply to be made to the Anglo-American request for a rupture of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany. He said that without undertaking to forecast the decision the Council of Ministers might arrive at, a negative reply to the specific Anglo-American request would not mean that the Turk Government was not prepared to discuss Turk entry into the war along the lines outlined above. I gained the impression from everything the Prime Minister said that the Turkish reply to the Anglo-American request will in effect amount to a proposal that Turkey enter the war. I also gained the impression that Saraçoğlu himself had not yet made up his mind as to how best to deal with the Anglo-American request for a rupture of economic and diplomatic relations. However he made it unmistakably clear that the Turk Government is much more interested in entering the war than in a mere rupture of economic and diplomatic relations. Thus if the Council of Ministers agrees to break off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany it will be in anticipation of Turkey’s entry into the war. I am now more convinced than ever that the Turk Government is not only willing but anxious to enter the war and that if Turkey’s entry into the war at some time in the near future is deemed desirable for either political or military reasons this result can be achieved if account is taken in London of Turkish susceptibilities. I am persuaded that by offering to the Turks additional war material in quantities commensurate with the military operations to be undertaken by them, promising them that delivery will be made within the time agreed upon, assuring them of fighter protection for their principal cities and obtaining the assurance that the Russian Government will declare war against Bulgaria the Turk Government would undertake to enter the war as of an agreed date. Steinhardt 58 Paraphrase sent to London as 5224 and to Moscow as 1606, July 2. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–344: Telegram [Document 933] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , July 3, 1944—6 p.m. [Received July 4—8:39 p.m.] 1207. Personal for the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. The Prime Minister sent for me this afternoon and told me that earlier in the day the Council of Ministers had considered the Anglo-American request for a rupture of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany and had reached the following decision. The British and American Governments will be informed within the next day or two that the Turkish Government is prepared to break off all relations with Germany immediately. Saraçoğlu added that of course there were assurances which the Turkish Government would like to receive from the British and American Governments before rupturing relations with Germany but that in order to avoid a repetition of what he characterized as the “unfair” accusation previously made by the British that the quantity of war material requested by Turkey in the course of the military negotiations had been made excessive for the purpose of delay, this time the Turkish Government would merely seek assurances in respect of the three points enumerated below, before breaking off relations, and would rely upon the British and American Governments to carry out the assurances as given. Saraçoğlu emphasized that the assurances to be requested by the Turkish Government should not be regarded as conditions but primarily as a statement of the treatment the Turkish Government would expect to receive after having broken off all relations with Germany at the request of Britain and the United States. He then set forth the three points as follows: 1. Turkey to be treated by Britain as a full Ally. 2. Turkey to receive such assistance as Britain and the United States may find it possible to accord in connection with the disposal of its export surpluses which will result from the discontinuance of trade relations with Germany and to provide Turkey with the commodities essential to the maintenance of its national economy many of which have been and are being furnished by Germany. 3. Turkey to be provided with such war material as Britain and the United States may regard as necessary to protect the country against a surprise attack by Germany resulting from the rupture of relations, and, should Turkey become involved in the war, to be furnished as much war material as may be deemed necessary by Britain and the U.S. Saraçoğlu said that as the Turkish note had not yet been drafted, there might be one or two other assurances that would be sought but that they would be of a minor nature. The Prime Minister emphasized that Turkey intended to make the rupture complete. Von Papen would be handed his passports; German diplomats in Turkey would be exchanged for Turkish diplomats in Germany; and all other German nationals would be expelled from Turkey with the exception of a few German professors who have been teaching in Turkish schools for many years whose anti-Nazi sentiments are well-known and a few German Jewish refugees. In response to my observation that I assumed all commercial and economic relations would also cease, Saraçoğlu replied: “The rupture will be complete and absolute and will cover all phases of the relations between the two countries.” In response to my inquiry as to what action the Turkish Government contemplated taking in respect of Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, Saraçoğlu replied that as Britain and the United States had only requested a rupture with Germany the Turkish Government did not contemplate a simultaneous rupture with these countries but that of course similar action would be taken in respect to them if and when requested. In elaborating his views as to procedure Saraçoğlu remarked again that he did not propose to be placed “this time” in a position where his Government could be accused of being responsible for any delay. He said that in drafting tomorrow the Turkish reply to the Anglo-American request it was his intention to phrase it so that as soon as the desired assurances are given the Turkish Government will be able to immediately break off relations with Germany. At the close of our talk Saraçoğlu informed me that as soon as agreement had been reached it was his intention to request the Grand National Assembly for full powers to meet any situation that might develop as a result of the rupture of relations with Germany. I judged from his remark that the Turkish Government envisages the rupture of relations with Germany as merely a step towards entering the war. Saraçoğlu said that as he had not as yet informed the British or Russian Ambassadors of the foregoing he must request that we refrain from discussing the matter with the British or the Russians until the Turkish Government has made its formal reply to the Anglo-American request. I am leaving Ankara tonight and expect to arrive in Washington about July 9. Steinhardt The President of the Turkish Republic (Inönü) to President Roosevelt 740.0011 EW 1939/7–344 [Document 934] The President of the Turkish Republic ( Inönü ) to President Roosevelt 59 [Translation] Ankara , July 3, 1944. Dear Mr. President : I do not wish to allow the occasion of the departure on leave of your distinguished and eminent Ambassador to Ankara to pass without evoking here the memory of our Cairo meetings in December 1943, in the course of which I had an opportunity to appreciate personally and at first hand the qualities of heart and spirit of the great statesman who, with admirable vigilance and skill, watches over the glorious destinies of the American people. Mr. Steinhardt, whom we are very happy to have among us, will explain to you, with the clarity of vision which distinguishes him, the political situation in Turkey. This is what it has always been, that is, an attitude of unswerving fidelity on the part of Turkey to its alliance, open solidarity with the cause of the Allies, and the determination, joining its efforts with those of its ally and friends, to give, at the proper time, more effective and tangible expression to this strong desire for cooperation. We regard the great ideals of the American people in their pursuit of fraternal relations among civilized nations with understanding and admiration. We understand and admire them because we see in these ideals of justice and peace aimed at safeguarding the independence of all nations, even the smallest, in untroubled tranquility, the very expression of our own aspirations. I hope with all my heart that this war, which has caused so much unhappiness and destruction in the world, will not only result in the triumph of the Allies, but will at the same time serve as a conclusive, salutary lesson providing that aggression is never a profitable expedient. In your message of October 26, 1943, 60 I read with keen pleasure the passage in which you urge me to let you know if at any time you can be of service to me. Permit me, Mr. President, to express to you my profound gratitude for this mark of friendship. Rest assured that I shall be very happy to call upon your assistance whenever the occasion arises. I hope, Mr. President, that circumstances will one day afford us an opportunity to meet and discuss at length the grave problems facing the world of tomorrow. Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my sincere and cordial friendship. Ismet Inönü 59 Marginal notation on the French text copy in the Department’s files: “Original left Aug. 18 with F[ranklin] D. R[oosevelt] by L[aurence] A. S[teinhardt]”. 60 Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 43 . The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–444: Telegram [Document 935] The Chargé in Turkey ( Kelley ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , July 4, 1944—8 p.m. [Received July 6—4:30 a.m.] 2013 [ 1213? ]. The Prime Minister requested me to call at the Ministry this morning and handed me drafts of notes which the Turk Government proposed be exchanged between the British and Turkish Governments relative to the rupture of diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and Germany. The following is a translation of the text of the note which the Turkish Government desires to receive from the British Government. “His Majesty’s Government considers that by reason of the development taken by the war on the different fronts, the time has come for the Turkish Government to furnish to its ally greater assistance than it has furnished up to the present moment since the beginning of the war. Basing itself on the provisions of the treaty of alliance of October 19, 1939, His Majesty’s Government thinks that the rupture of diplomatic and economic relations with Germany would constitute the most effective way of increasing Turkey’s assistance to its ally. Also, in view of the considerations set forth below, His Majesty’s Government considers itself entitled to request the Government of the Turkish Republic as ally to adopt the attitude thus suggested by the British Government. “Having, by the decision thus taken, definitively consecrated the bonds of alliance resulting for the two countries from the treaty of alliance of October 29 [ 19 ], 1939, the right of Turkey, devolving upon her as equal allied partner to take part in the settlement of all international questions at the time of the liquidation of the war and the edification of the peace will be sanctioned. “It goes without saying that in anticipation of eventualities which might result for Turkey from the adoption of such an attitude, His Majesty’s Government will proceed with all possible despatch ( a ) to restore the mechanism of Lend-Lease, and ( b ) to furnish Turkey war material, and in particular planes and aviation material which will permit her to cope with any initial surprise. “In other respects, and as was done in the past, Great Britain will make available to Turkey all facilities with a view to: ( a ) purchasing products remaining without markets and ( b ) satisfying in the measure possible the civil needs of which Turkey will find herself deprived as a result of the attitude set forth above for the purpose of preventing disturbances which might result from this attitude. “If, as a consequence of the decision and the attitude which Turkey will find herself deprived as a result of the attitude set forth above which she will thus have adopted, Turkey will become the object of aggression, the United Kingdom will furnish Turkey all aid and assistance in its power, in order to permit it to defend itself and to successfully resist aggression. This aid and assistance will be the subject of conversations between the two general staffs. “At the same time the requisite financial aid will be assured to Turkey with a view to permitting it to meet the necessities and the exigencies of the war and the consequences flowing from it.” The following is the translation of the text of the note which the Turk Government proposes to address to the British Government upon receipt of the foregoing note. “The Government of the Republic has studied with the most minute attention the request contained in the note which His Majesty’s Embassy has submitted to it in the name of its Government, as well as the considerations advanced in support of the request. The Government of the Republic, faithful to the line of conduct which it set for itself at the beginning of the war and from which it has never departed since, has decided to reply in the affirmative to the request which has been addressed to it by His Majesty’s Government, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of alliance of October 19, 1939, and, consequently, break off, as of (date to be fixed), its economic and diplomatic relations with Germany, in the conditions determined by the said note. “The Government of the Republic takes note that a perfect harmony of views exists between it and His Majesty’s Government as to the right of Turkey to take part, as equal allied partner, in the settlement of all international questions at the time of the liquidation of the war and the edification of the peace. “In taking note of the aid and assistance which Great Britain declares itself ready to furnish to Turkey, the Government of the Republic is anxious to express its keen satisfaction for the comprehension which it shows of the necessities which Turkey will be called upon to meet.” Kelley The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–444: Telegram [Document 936] The Chargé in Turkey ( Kelley ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , July 4, 1944—9 p.m. [Received July 6—2:49 a.m.] 2014 [ 1214? ]. In handing me the text of the proposed exchange of notes between Turkey and Great Britain transmitted in my 2013 [ 1213? ], July 4 the Prime Minister said that we have [ he had ] set forth to Mr. Steinhardt in his conversation with him yesterday afternoon the attitude of the Turk Government in this matter but that he desired to emphasize again that the Turk Government was not making its action dependent upon the fulfillment of any conditions; it was merely requesting the British Government to make certain “promises” which he was certain we would not find unreasonable in the circumstances. The British Government would be the judge of the amount of assistance it could render Turkey in respect to war material and economic aid. He said that the Turk Government was anxious to avoid any delay in taking the action desired by its ally. The British Ambassador informs me that the Prime Minister when handing him the drafts of the proposed notes emphasized as he did to Ambassador Steinhardt and myself that the Turk Government was not setting up any conditions but merely suggesting certain assurances which the Turk Government considered reasonable in the circumstances. He says he gained the impression from his conversation with the Prime Minister that the Turk Government would be willing to accept any changes which the British Government desired to make in the drafts of the proposed exchange of notes. When Hugessen pointed out for instance that his Government could hardly agree to the participation of Turkey [in?] “the settlement of all international questions” and that the draft would certainly have to be changed to restrict Turkey’s participation to questions affecting Turkey the Prime Minister immediately admitted the reasonableness of such a qualification. Both the British Ambassador and myself are convinced that the Turk Government is sincerely desirous of giving much greater assistance to Great Britain than Turkey has been giving hitherto and that it is fully prepared to break off all relations with Germany in accordance with the desire expressed by the British Government. We also believe that Turkey is ready to break off relations with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary if the British Government so requests. Kelley The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1044 [Document 937] The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire On May 27, Numan Menemencioğlu has transmitted through Soviet Ambassador to Turkey S. A. Vinogradov in an oral form a proposal of the Turkish Government to the Soviet Government to establish with us a closer political cooperation which could be vested in the form of an agreement. In this agreement would be determined the community of interests of both countries in the guarantee of their safety in certain of interest to them zones, in particular on the Balkans, and would contain a statement that the U.S.S.R. and Turkey will in the closest way politically cooperate with each other in the mentioned zones and will constantly consult each other on all questions touching their common interests. On June 5, Mr. Vinogradov orally informed Mr. Menemencioğlu that, if Turkey wishes to give a more friendly and closer character to its relations with the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government would be ready to consider appropriate proposals. However, under the conditions, when the Balkans are at present in the hands of Germany, which is waging war against the U.S.S.R. and with which Turkey is not in a state of war but is bound with a friendship treaty and is rendering her economic aid, the proposed by the Turkish Government political cooperation and consultation in respect to the Balkans is losing its signification without Turkey basically changing its relations with Germany. Therefore, if Turkey is striving toward the mentioned agreement with the U.S.S.R. the only way to such an agreement is immediate and complete break of relations of Turkey with Germany and entrance into war against Germany on the side of the Allies. Besides the Soviet Government has stressed, that such an agreement would also be in the interests of the Allies. In regard to that the Government of the United States was informed on June 28 by the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, through the American Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. W. A. Harriman. In addition to that information the Soviet Government considers it necessary to inform of the following. On June 27, the Turkish Government has informed through Soviet Ambassador S. A. Vinogradov, in answer to the statement of the Soviet Government of June 5, that it wishes to give the Soviet-Turkish relations a more friendly character. The Turkish Government proposed to solemnly confirm the friendly character of the connections between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey, for instance through a protocol about the pre-term prolongation of acts, mentioned in the protocol of November 7, 1935 61 or through a new independent document. As in respect to the Soviet statement of June 5, that the only way to Soviet-Turkish cooperation, proposed by the Turkish Government, is an immediate complete break of relations with Germany and entrance of Turkey into war against Hitlerite Germany on the side of the Allies, the Turkish Government has not given a reply to the point, having informed that this question is under consideration. To this statement of the Turkish Government, the Soviet Government has sent on July 3, 1944, through the U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Turkey S. A. Vinogradov, its reply to the Turkish Government in which it has stated that it will take into consideration the reply of the Turkish Government, but deems it necessary to draw its attention to the fact that, making on July [ June? ] 5, 1944 its statement, the Soviet Government proceeded from the fact that the decision of the Turkish Government on this question, as connected with the shortening of the duration of war, should not be postponed any longer. The Soviet Government has reminded also that on the part of the Turkish Government there has been lost a considerable amount of time from the moment, when, already at the end of 1943, the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, for the purpose of shortening the duration of the war made the Turkish Government a proposal to break with Germany and enter into war against Hitlerite Germany on the side of the Allies, but this proposal was declined by the Turkish Government. As regards the proposal of the Turkish Government to limit itself to solemn confirmation of the friendly character of Soviet-Turkish relations by way of pre-term prolongation of acts, mentioned in the protocol of November 7, 1935, or by way of some new similar declarative statement, the Soviet Government has stated that this proposal does not answer the purpose of shortening the duration of war in which are interested the fighting against Hitlerite Germany countries as well as all freedom-loving nations, and that such declarations of a general character cannot substitute for actions directed against Hitlerite Germany, the carrying out which by Turkey can, under present conditions, but serve as basis for close friendly political cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey, as it was stated in the reply of the Soviet Government of June 5. From the information of the Soviet Government in respect to Soviet-Turkish negotiations, as previously transmitted to the Government of the United States, as well as that communicated in this Aide-Mémoire , can be seen that the Soviet position in these negotiations fully corresponds the agreement reached in respect to Turkey at the end of 1943 at the Moscow Conference and confirmed at the Teheran Conference of the heads of the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States. The Soviet Government consistently carries out in respect to Turkey this agreed upon with the British and American Governments policy, although the Turkish Government has, to a considerable extent, already lost time for accepting the proposal in regard to a break with Germany and entering into war against Germany on the side of the Allies. About the stated above, its negotiations with the Turkish Government and about its position in these negotiations the Soviet Government has timely informed the British Government, on the part of which, there were no objections in respect to the stated Soviet position. In its Aide-Mémoire , directed to the British Government on July 8, 1944, the Soviet Government has pointed out that, in spite of the fact that there were no objections on the part of the Government of Great Britain against the Soviet position, the British Government already at the end of June has made a new proposal to the Turkish Government. In this proposal it has found it possible to depart from its former position, agreed upon between Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and already does not insist on the immediate entrance of Turkey into war against Germany as it was agreed upon between the three Governments. In this Aide-Mémoire the Soviet Government has also pointed out that the British Government has made its new proposal in Ankara on June 30 without a preliminary congruence with the Soviet Government, although the Soviet Government has already given its reply to the British Government on June 29 62 in Moscow on the given question of June 25. The Soviet Government has brought to the attention of the British Government the stated above circumstances. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to inform the Government of the United States in regard to the above-stated. Washington , July 10, 1944. 61 Protocol prolonging the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of December 17, 1925, the Protocols of Prolongation of December 17, 1929, and October 30, 1931, and the Naval Protocol of March 7, 1931; it was signed at Ankara, November 7, 1935, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxix , p. 127. 62 See telegram 2374, June 30, 4 p.m., from Moscow, p. 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 928 and Doc. 929 ] . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1144: Telegram [Document 938] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , July 11, 1944—9 p.m. 5449. Because time element is of great importance please telegraph urgently British reaction to exchange of notes proposed by the Turks. The general tenor of the Turkish proposal is such that undue delay in its acceptance may lay the British and ourselves open to Turkish criticism that we were not sincere in asking for a break of diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. It will be even more difficult for the Soviet Government, which does not consider that our request to the Turks implements the Moscow and Tehran agreements, to understand further delay in accepting the Turkish proposal. You may inform the Foreign Office that, subject to the advice of the military, this Government agrees in principle with the Soviet Government’s views as handed to the British Ambassador in Moscow June 29. By making the rupture of relations a preliminary step towards active belligerency in the very near future the Turkish Government is in a position to hasten the end of the war. If it is made clear to the Turks that, as Saraçoğlu has said, this is a first step to entry into the war, no question should arise regarding the agreement reached at Moscow and Tehran. From the long-range point of view it seems likely that a Turkey which has earned its seat at the peace table might be a useful friend. Steinhardt is now in Washington and will raise the question of Turkey shortly with the President and Admiral Leahy. 63 It is thus important to have the earliest possible report of London’s views. As the Turks are prepared to break with Germany first and to talk afterwards about the considerations therefor, there would seem little reason for delay. Further delay in accepting the Turks’ offer would lend some confirmation to the suspicions entertained by Ankara and perhaps to some extent in Moscow. Unless the British reply to the Turkish proposal, worked out by the British with Moscow in accordance with the general views of this Government as set forth above, is forthright and unequivocal, it might lead to the Turks breaking relations and entering the war on their own, thus pushing their Alliance with Britain into the background and turning their eyes eastward. Repeated to Moscow and Ankara. Hull 63 Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1244 [Document 939] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) [ Washington ,] July 12, 1944. Sir Ronald Campbell 64 called upon me this afternoon at his request. He presented to me the attached aide-mémoire 65 on the Turkish situation. In his opening remarks he apologized for dealing with the matter “in two bites rather than one”. After reading the memorandum I told him I thought there would be certain members of our Government who might now be willing to have Turkey actually declare war. Relative to the section of the aide-mémoire that deals with the question of commitment on the part of the United States Government to supply munitions to the Turks, I reminded Sir Ronald of the position of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff last November. He recalled this decision and I indicated this would probably present a problem but that we would review the question with the Joint Chiefs tomorrow and give him a response as soon as possible. He stated that there was a great urgency and he had been warned from London that any leak on this matter might prove very embarrassing to all concerned. He read aloud to me a cable he had just received from the Foreign Office recording a conversation that Eden had had with the Soviet Ambassador 66 relative to the Soviet attitude toward Turkey entering the war. Sir Ronald volunteered to have this paraphrased and submit it to us tomorrow. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] 64 Sir Ronald I. Campbell, British Minister. 65 Infra. 66 Fedor Tarasovich Gusev. The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1244 [Document 940] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire It seems to His Majesty’s Government fairly clear that the Turks really mean business and that they would probably be prepared to go further than breaking off relations with Germany and in fact enter the War. The motive for this sudden change of heart is equally clear. By action on the eleventh hour the Turks expect to rehabilitate themselves both in British eyes and in those of the United States of America and U.S.S.R. Thereby they hope firstly to qualify for participation in the peace settlement and secondly to avoid the consequences to Turkey’s economy and international position generally of Germany’s disappearance as a political and economic power, which they know is rapidly approaching. 2. Two questions have to be considered. The first is whether we should be content with merely a rupture of relations with Germany and the second is how far we should meet the Turks in their desire to rehabilitate themselves. 3. The advantages of asking Turkey, at this stage, only to break off relations with Germany are: ( a ) That this can be effected without delay. ( b ) That it should not involve us in military commitments; and ( c ) That it will produce very nearly the same moral effect on Germany and in the Balkans generally as would a declaration of War. At the same time if we now or at any subsequent date do wish to get Turkey into the War, the breaking off of relations with Germany will have been a most useful first step to this end. On the other hand if we were now to ask Turkish Government actually to go to War with Germany this would involve long discussions both as regards further war material which we would have to supply in order to bring the Turkish Army up to war strength. Pending these discussions no positive action would be taken and by the time agreement had been reached the War situation might have changed to such an extent that Turkish belligerency would no longer be of any value. 4. In view of Turkish eagerness to rehabilitate themselves we are not called upon in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government to pay a great price for a Turkish break with Germany. We must however reckon with the possibility that severance of relations may lead to a situation where Turkey will be involved in the War even if we do not press for this. The Turkish Government are therefore to some extent entitled even if they only break off relations to ask us for certain assurances regarding economic and military assistance which we shall be prepared to give them to meet the consequences of their action. His Majesty’s Government are not however in favour of an exchange of notes of any sort, especially of notes such as those proposed by the Turkish President of the Council which are both detailed and far reaching. 5. His Majesty’s Government proposes therefore to instruct His Majesty’s Ambassador to accept with satisfaction the Turkish Government’s agreement to break off relations with Germany and to ask them to take this action at once subject to the four days’ notice which the Turkish Government have said that they require. At the same time His Majesty’s Ambassador would be authorised to give the following assurances: ( a ) If Turkey breaks off relations with Germany, the Turkish Government will in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government have clarified her policy which had become obscure and confused by recent events and will have placed herself in a better position than hitherto to fill that International position at the peace making to which she aspires. ( b ) His Majesty’s Government will within the limits of their material possibilities afford the Turkish Government all assistance necessary to mitigate the economic disturbances which may result from severance of relations with Germany. ( c ) His Majesty’s Government undertake that if the action which the Turkish Government now takes or in the future shall take should involve her in hostilities with Germany, the United Kingdom will lend her all assistance economic and military in its power. This aid and assistance will be subject to conversations between two General Staffs and the two Governments as and when necessary. These conversations will cover question of resumption of military supplies of all sorts. ( d ) His Majesty’s Government also undertake to use their good offices with their Allies with a view to obtaining for Turkey assistance similar to that which in ( b ) and ( c ) they undertake to afford themselves. His Majesty’s Ambassador would be authorized to give these assurances in writing if the Turkish Government so desires it. They would however represent maximum which His Majesty’s Government would be prepared to offer. 6. His Majesty’s Government hope that this course has the approval of the United States Government and that they may count on their cooperation where necessary. In this connection they would welcome an assurance that the United States Government will share equally with His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom the burden of any financial and economic assistance (including the supply of military equipment) which it may be found necessary to give to Turkey. It would also be most useful if, after His Majesty’s Ambassador has taken action on the lines proposed, the United States Chargé d’Affaires could assure the Turkish Government that the United States Government associate themselves with His Majesty’s Government in the undertakings given in ( b ) and ( c ) of paragraph 5 above. His Majesty’s Government would be grateful for a very early reply. Washington , July 12, 1944. The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1244 [Document 941] The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy Washington , July 13, 1944. My Dear Admiral Leahy : I enclose for consideration on an urgent basis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff a copy of an aide-mémoire 67 left with the Under Secretary of State on July 12 by Sir Ronald Campbell. On political grounds this Department is inclined to accept the plan thus proposed by the British provided it is made clear to both the Turks and to the Russians that the severance of relations between Turkey and Germany is regarded as only a first step towards active belligerency . As you are aware, the American, British and Soviet Governments agreed at Moscow and Tehran that Turkey should come into the war and there is no reason to suppose that, even though action by the Turks has been long delayed, the course agreed to then is less desirable now, taking into account its possible repercussions on the satellite Balkan countries. The Soviet Government urges strongly that Turkey should be pressed to come into the war without further delay. The reference in paragraph six of the aide-mémoire to the effect that the British Government “would welcome an assurance that the United States Government will share equally with His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom the burden of any financial and economic assistance (including the supply of military equipment) which it may be found necessary to give to Turkey” will be of special interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this connection it should be understood that the Turkish Government has assured Ambassador Steinhardt that the quantity of arms the Turkish Army expects to receive is small. Ambassador Steinhardt estimates the initial quantity as possibly in the neighborhood of 100,000 tons of which the American share would be 50,000 tons or a few boatloads. A part of this quantity might come from the Lend-Lease munitions originally consigned to Turkey but held in Egypt last February. The United States Army is said to be now engaged in repossessing these munitions. Aside from the political returns from Turkey’s severing immediately all relations with Germany as a step towards entering the war there are likely to be immediate military returns even from the severance of relations. These include: ( a ) Immediate high altitude flights over Turkey en route to Russia—an objective understood to be of considerable interest to the United States Army Air Forces. ( b ) Immediate expulsion from Turkey of some 2,000 Germans and other Axis agents, many of whom are engaged in espionage and other activities inimical to our cause. ( c ) Immediate creation of an attitude among Turkish officials which would result in their giving favorable consideration to a request to use Turkish airfields as bases for strategic bombing. On an earlier occasion General Arnold 68 expressed interest in so using Turkish bases. ( d ) Immediate use of Turkish harbors in the course of naval operations. ( e ) Active cooperation by the Turks in furthering the Allied war effort. As regards the American financial and economic assistance which might be involved, this Department assumes that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced on military grounds of the utility of the course proposed in the aide-mémoire , to the same extent that this Department recommends it on political grounds, the relatively insignificant sums, and certain personnel to handle Turkey’s agreed essential civilian requirements, would be supplied by the Foreign Economic Administration. The Turkish Government has been waiting since July 3 for a reply to its proposal and further delay might lead the Turkish Government, as well as the Soviet Government, to question American-British good faith in requesting immediate severance of Turkish-German relations. It is hoped that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be able to make its view available to me at the earliest possible moment. Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 67 Supra. 68 Gen. H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1444: Telegram [Document 942] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) Washington , July 14, 1944—7 p.m. 1699. Reference your 2471, July 8, 11 a.m. 69 British Embassy has handed Department a paraphrase of Mr. Eden’s telegram of July 12 to British Ambassador, Moscow dealing with Mr. Eden’s statements to the Soviet Ambassador in London. Subject to the reply of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department views are as outlined in the telegram of even date to Ankara, 70 repeated to Moscow and to London. The Department is convinced that Turkey’s entry into the war is as desirable now as at the time of Moscow and Tehran. However, it believes that the method proposed by the British is a more practical and realistic approach to bringing the Turks into the war than the simple demand which appears to be contemplated by the Soviet Government. Such disagreement as might be thought to exist between the Soviet, American and British Governments is, in the view of this Government, only one of method and not of substance. In your discretion, you may make this point to the Soviet Government. Hull 69 Not printed. 70 Telegram 634, July 14, 6 p.m., to Ankara, repeated to London as 5528 and to Moscow as 1698, not printed; the opinions expressed were tentative and for informational purposes only. The Department of State to the British Embassy 740.0011 European War 1939/7–1944 [Document 943] The Department of State to the British Embassy Memorandum The Government of the United States has taken careful note of the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of July 12, 1944, and provided it is made clear to the Turks that the severance of relations between Turkey and Germany is regarded as only a first step towards active belligerency, is in agreement with the views of the British Government as expressed therein. In reaching this decision the Department of State consulted the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which replied on July 19, 1944 as follows: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff have given urgent consideration to the Secretary of State’s letter of 13 July enclosing copy of a British aide-mémoire concerning proposed action by Turkey in severing relations with Germany. “It is noted that the State Department is inclined to accept the plan thus proposed by the British provided it is made clear to both the Turks and to the Russians that the severance of relations between Turkey and Germany is regarded as only a first step towards active belligerency. From a military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the Secretary of State in the opinion that it is desirable that Turkey sever relations with Germany as soon as practicable. As to the proviso that such action be regarded as only a first step toward active belligerency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur therein, subject to the reservation that in taking this position, the United States should inform Turkey and our Allies, that the United States is not thereby committed to military, naval, or air support of any campaign in the Balkans. “As to the British desire for an assurance that the United States will share equally the burden of financial and economic assistance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that in so far as this refers to military equipment, the character, amount, and source of such equipment should be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in consultation if necessary with the Russians. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are definitely opposed to the diversion of any resources from the approved operations in Italy and the Western Mediterranean.” As regards the non-military assurances to be given to the Turks, the Government of the United States is in principle prepared to share equally with the British Government the burden of any financial and economic assistance which the United States and United Kingdom Governments may agree upon as being necessary for Turkey. Appropriate instructions are being sent to the American Chargé d’Affaires at Ankara with a view to his supporting, in accordance with this Government’s position as expressed above, the forthcoming representations of the British Ambassador. Washington , July 20, 1944. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2044: Telegram [Document 944] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey ( Kelley ) Washington , July 20, 1944—7 p.m. 647. See Department’s 634, July 14, 6 p.m. 72 A favorable reply having been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff you are authorized to call upon the appropriate Turkish authorities, following the visit of the British Ambassador, and in general terms to support the position taken by the British Government as regards the termination immediately by Turkey of all diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. In this connection you should make it clear that such action by the Turkish Government would be regarded by this Government as only a first step towards active belligerency, with the reservation that in taking this position the United States is not thereby committed to military, naval, or air support of any campaign in the Balkans. You may inform the Turkish Government that this Government will do all that is reasonable and possible to mitigate the economic disturbances which may result from severance of relations between Turkey and Germany. Hull 72 See footnote 70, p. 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 941 and Doc. 942 ] . The Department of State to the Soviet Embassy 761.67/7–1044 [Document 945] The Department of State to the Soviet Embassy 73 Memorandum The Government of the United States has taken careful note of the aide-mémoire dated July 10, 1944, in regard to Turkey, which the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has kindly made available. The views of the Soviet Government have been studied with the greatest interest, and this Government is happy to note that they coincide with the views of the American Government as expressed at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences. In the view of the Government of the United States a request to the Turks to sever immediately diplomatic and economic relations with Germany is only a first step toward active Turkish belligerency, and this Government is so informing the British and Turkish Governments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that in taking this position the United States is not thereby committed to military, naval, or air support of any campaign in the Balkans. This Government does not regard the method adopted, namely, urging the Turkish Government to sever relations with Germany, as a departure from its former position since it expects that such action will be followed by Turkey’s entry into the war, a development which this Government would welcome. It is believed that bringing Turkey into the war in this manner has definite practical advantages which will inure to the benefit of the Allies. This Government will not, of course, consider Turkey as an Ally until Turkey is in a state of war with Germany. Should Turkey then express a desire to adhere to the Declaration by United Nations, 74 this Government, on receiving such a request from Turkey will, of course, seek the views of the Soviet Government before taking action thereon. Washington , July 22, 1944. 73 Text transmitted in paraphrase in telegram 1761, July 24, 1 p.m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, along with text in paraphrase of telegram 647, supra , with the instruction that “The above information should enable you to explain clearly the viewpoint of this Government in any conversations which you may have with Soviet officials” (740.0011 European War 1939/7–2344). 74 Signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 25 . The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2244 [Document 946] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire In the light of the views expressed by the United States Government in their Memorandum No. 740.0011 EW 1939/7–1244 [ 7–1944 ] of July 20th, and by the Soviet Government, His Majesty’s Ambassador at Ankara has been instructed to approach the Turkish Government on the lines indicated in paragraph 5 of the Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of July 12th, and to make it clear to the Turkish Government that His Majesty’s Government expect them to break off relations with Germany four days after their approach and that they regard this as a first step towards ultimate belligerency, details of which will be discussed later with the Turkish Government. 2. His Majesty’s Ambassador at Ankara has further been instructed to inform the Turkish Government that the bans now in force on the export to Turkey of certain commodities will be lifted as soon as relations are broken and that at the same time the flow of military supplies will immediately be resumed as far as possible. He will also state that the question of the resumption of military supplies from the United States is being discussed with the United States Government. 3. His Majesty’s Ambassador at Ankara will then explain that the view of His Majesty’s Government, after careful consideration of the facts, is that Germany will be unlikely to attack Turkey as a result of rupture of relations. Nevertheless, His Majesty’s Government appreciate that the Turkish Government may wish to guard against all eventualities however remote and are prepared to send at short notice additional equipment to improve and extend Radar cover and essential communications in Turkey and to make available the equivalent of one night fighter squadron subject to the agreement of the United States Authorities concerned. 4. With regard to paragraph 5 ( c ) of the Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of July 12th, His Majesty’s Ambassador at Ankara has been instructed to omit any reference to conversations between the two General Staffs and the two Governments … 5. His Majesty’s Government hope that the United States Government will collaborate with them in the immediate resumption of supplies to Turkey as soon as relations between Turkey and Germany have been broken. Washington , July 22, 1944. The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2344: Telegram [Document 947] The Chargé in Turkey ( Kelley ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , July 23, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 7:48 p.m.] 1348. The British Ambassador conveyed to the Prime Minister yesterday evening the reply of the British Government in the matter of the rupture by Turkey of diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. I am sending you in my immediately following telegram the text of the statement of the British Government’s position made to the Prime Minister by Hugessen. The Prime Minister, after studying the statement carefully, inquired as to the meaning of the sentence “If Turkey breaks off relations with Germany, Turkey will, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, have clarified her policy which had become obscure and confused by recent events.” There was considerable discussion on this point and the Prime Minister reverted to it several times in the course of the conversation. He eventually said that what he wanted to know was whether the British Government considered the alliance in full force. Hugessen offered to put at once this question to his Government but the Prime Minister requested him not to do so for the moment. After Hugessen explained that his Government did not like the exchange of notes proposed by the Turk Government and preferred to incorporate the assurances desired by the Turk Government in an oral declaration, the Prime Minister made no further reference to a written exchange of notes. The Prime Minister said that it would be difficult to take immediate action in view of the fact that most of the members of the Cabinet had left Ankara and the Grand National Assembly would not meet again before 10 days. However, he would discuss the matter with the President and his colleagues with a view to seeing what could be done in the circumstances to expedite action as desired by the British Government. I shall call on the Prime Minister with a view to supporting the position taken by the British Government as soon as the Department’s 647, July 20, the latter part of which was so badly garbled that I have had to request that it be repeated, has been decoded. Kelley The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2344: Telegram [Document 948] The Chargé in Turkey ( Kelley ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , July 23, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 9:29 p.m.] 1349. Following is the text of the statement made to the Prime Minister by the British Ambassador: “His Majesty’s Ambassador has been instructed by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to inform the Turkish Government that they accept with satisfaction the Turkish Government’s agreement of which His Excellency Monsieur Saraçoğlu informed Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen on July 4th to break off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany. His Majesty’s Government accordingly rely on the Turkish Government to take this action forthwith subject to the 4 days’ notice which Monsieur Saraçoğlu indicated that the Turkish Government would require. 2. His Majesty’s Government would regard this rupture of relations by Turkey as a first step towards ultimate belligerency, details of which His Majesty’s Government will discuss with the Turkish Government at a later date. 3. Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen is at the same time authorized by his Government to give to the Turkish Government the following assurances: ( a ) If Turkey, within the framework of the alliance, breaks off relations with Germany, Turkey will, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, have clarified her policy … and will have placed herself in a better position than hitherto to fill that international position at the peace making to which she aspires; ( b ) His Majesty’s Government will, within the limits of their material possibilities, afford to Turkey all assistance necessary to mitigate the economic disturbances which may result from the severance of relations with Germany. The bans on the export to Turkey of certain commodities now in force will be lifted as soon as relations are broken. At the same time the flow of military supplies will be resumed as far as possible. His Majesty’s Government are requesting the United States Government also to resume military supplies. ( c ) His Majesty’s Government undertake that, if the action which Turkey now takes or in future shall take could involve her in hostilities with Germany the United Kingdom will lend her all assistance, economic and military, in its power. ( d ) His Majesty’s Government also undertakes to use their good offices with their Allies with a view to obtaining for Turkey assistance similar to that which in sub-paragraphs ( b ) and ( c ) above they undertake themselves to afford.” The British Ambassador also left with the Prime Minister the following memorandum: “It is the view of His Majesty’s Government after careful consideration of the facts that Germany will be unlikely to attack Turkey as the result of the rupture of relations. Nevertheless His Majesty’s Government appreciate that the Turkish Government may wish to guard against all eventualities, however remote. The equipment necessary for initial radar cover and communications for the air defence of Istanbul and Izmir are already in Turkey. Some additional equipment to improve and extend radar cover and essential communications can be sent from Mideast within a short period if required. The equivalent of one night fighter squadron will be available to move to Turkey at once if the Turkish Government should wish His Majesty’s Government to provide such assistance, Meanwhile the agreement of the United States Government to the transfer of these aircraft to Turkey is being sought.” Kelley The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2544: Telegram [Document 949] The Chargé in Turkey ( Kelley ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , July 25, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 9:09 p.m.] 1362. ReEmbs 1348, July 23. I called upon the Prime Minister at noon yesterday for the purpose of supporting, in accordance with the Department’s instructions, the position taken by the British Government in regard to the rupture by Turkey of diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. The Council of Ministers was in session at the time of my call on the Prime Minister. After I had set forth the position of my Government, the Prime Minister stated that the Turkish Government had decided to take action on the basis of the British Government’s proposal. He said that the Government in accordance with the Turkish Constitution would have to obtain the formal approval of the Grand National Assembly and this matter was now under consideration. I gathered from the Prime Minister’s remarks that the Council of Ministers was then considering whether the matter should be submitted to the Grand National Assembly at the next session on August 2 or whether the members of the Grand National Assembly should be summoned to return to Ankara for a meeting prior to that date. The Prime Minister requested the British Ambassador to call on him yesterday evening and handed him a written statement of the Turkish Government’s decision to break off diplomatic and economic relations with Germany and of its intention to submit the matter to the Grand National Assembly at its next meeting on August 2. A translation of the text of this statement is transmitted in my next numbered telegram. The Prime Minister stated orally that inasmuch as the Turkish Government was confident of receiving the approval of the Grand National Assembly it had decided to break off relations as of midnight August 2. The Prime Minister intended to ask the German Ambassador to come to Ankara on August 2 and he would inform him of the rupture a few hours before the matter became public on Thursday in connection with its submission to the Grand National Assembly. The Prime Minister said that he suspected that Von Papen might not want to return to Germany at this time as it was possible that he may have been connected in some way with the recent plot against Hitler. He would allow him to remain in Turkey as a private citizen if he so desired. The Prime Minister said that with a view to keeping the matter secret until August 2 he proposed to tell other Ambassadors who would call upon him in the meantime that discussions between Turkey and her ally were continuing and that the British were still evidencing an unwillingness to furnish Turkey with an adequate amount of military equipment. He hoped that Hugessen would take the same line. Hugessen and I have agreed that we shall follow the line suggested by the Prime Minister in any conversations we may have with foreign colleagues. Kelley The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2544: Telegram [Document 950] The Chargé in Turkey ( Kelley ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , July 25, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 11:34 p.m.] 1363. The following is a translation of the reply of the Turkish Government to the British Government’s communications of July 22: “The Turkish Government has taken cognizance of the two written communications under date of July 22 which His Majesty’s Ambassador, on behalf of his Government delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the rupture by Turkey of her economic and diplomatic relations with Germany, in accordance with the request which was made in this sense by His Majesty’s Government under date of June 20, 1944. “After a careful study of these two documents, the Turkish Government has found itself in agreement with the contents of the documents, and has decided, in accordance with the terms of the constitution, to submit to the Grand National Assembly for approval on August 2, 1944, the date of the next meeting of the Grand National Assembly which is in recess until that date, the question of the rupture of Turkey’s economic and diplomatic relations with Germany under the British-Turkish Alliance. “The Turkish Government has noted with a certain regret that for the second time, in a document emanating from His Majesty’s Embassy, the words ‘obscure’ and ‘confusing’ are used to characterize recent Turkish policy. The Turkish Government, conscious of having pursued a clear and clean-cut policy, and which, in spite of all vicissitudes, has never deviated from the line of its policy fixed for many years, considers itself entitled to point out the injustice of this characterization and to hope that the happier and more appropriate terms which have often been used in British documents and statements will be preferred to describe Turkey’s policy.” Kelley The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2344: Telegram [Document 951] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) Washington , July 25, 1944—4 p.m. 1765. It appears to us possible that the Soviet Government may have gained the impression, in view of our acquiescence in the British Government’s suggestion that Turkey move in steps toward a state of war with Germany, that the United States Government is not living up to its position taken at Moscow and Tehran, that Turkey should be brought into the war as soon as practicable. If, after discussing the contents of Department’s 1761 of July 24, 1944, 75 with the Soviet authorities you gain the above impression, it is felt that it might be well to bring up with Molotov the advisability of taking up and discussing among the Soviet, British and United States Governments the best method of implementing the decision to bring Turkey into the war as soon as practicable. In your discussion of this question with Soviet officials, you should make absolutely clear that this Government desires in every way to live up to the Moscow and Tehran decisions and that the only question in our mind is the most feasible method to bring Turkey into the war. Sent to Moscow, repeated to London, also repeated to Ankara for information of Chargé only. Hull 75 See footnote 73, p. 885 [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 943 , Doc. 944 , and Doc. 945 ] . The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2644: Telegram [Document 952] The Chargé in Turkey ( Kelley ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , July 26, 1944—8 p.m. [Received July 27—7:48 a.m.] 1374. ReDeptel 647, July 20. I gather from conversations which I have had at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Turkish authorities are somewhat disturbed at the reservation contained in the statement of the position of the American Government in the matter of Turkey’s rupture of relations with Germany. Both the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary General have queried me as to the meaning of the reservation. It is apparently being referred to in the Ministry as “the bad news from America”. From the questions put to me it would appear that the Turkish authorities are concerned over what they consider to be the implication of this reservation, namely, that the American military authorities are opposed to the Allies undertaking any military operations in the Balkans and therefore will not extend any assistance whatsoever, if any operations should be undertaken or a front established in that area. I have to make clear that the reservation meant merely that the American Government’s notification to the Turkish Government that it regarded the action taken by the Turkish Government as only a first step toward active belligerency did not thereby commit the United States to military support of a campaign in the Balkans. Kelley The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State 761.67/7–2744 [Document 953] The Soviet Embassy to the Department of State The Soviet Government expresses its gratitude for the reply of the Government of the United States of July 22 on the Turkish question. The Soviet Government remains of the opinion that the position taken by the Turkish Government in respect to Germany is unsatisfactory and comes to much too late discussions of those or other half-measures, which do not have any essential significance in the present situation. In view of this the Soviet Government considers it necessary to discontinue pressure on the Turkish Government and leave it entirely to its own will. [ Washington ,] July 27, 1944. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) 740.0011 E.W.1939/7–2744: Telegram [Document 954] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) Washington , July 27, 1944—8 p.m. 1789. ReDepts 1765, July 25, 4 p.m. The Russian Chargé d’Affaires sent me today the Soviet reply to our memorandum of July 22 on the Turkish question. The reply states that the Soviet Government remains of the opinion that the position the Turkish Government has taken in respect to Germany is unsatisfactory and comes much too late. It states that discussions of “those or other half measures” do not have any essential significance in the present situation. The reply concludes that the Soviet Government consequently considers it necessary to discontinue pressure on the Turkish Government and “leave it entirely to its own will”. In the light of this further indication of Soviet dissatisfaction with recent developments concerning Turkey, it seems all the more opportune for you to suggest to Molotov the advisability of a frank discussion of this question between representatives of the Soviet, British and United States governments, either at Moscow or wherever the Russians suggest. Sent to Moscow, repeated to London, also repeated to Ankara for information of Chargé only. Hull The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 762.67/7–2844: Telegram [Document 955] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , July 28, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:25 p.m.] 2791. The British Ambassador informed Molotov by letter that the British Government was going ahead with the demand on Turkey to break relations with Germany explaining the reasons for this decision and the limits of the concessions to Turkey. The fact that the British Government considered this the first step on the part of Turkey in the direction of coming into the war on the side of the Allies was emphasized. In reply the British Ambassador received a short note signed by Vyshinski 76 acknowledging receipt of the information but stating that the Soviet position as previously stated remains unchanged. From this correspondence and from my previous discussions with Molotov it is obvious that the Soviet Government chooses to hold itself aloof from this step by the Turks taken as a result of pressure of the British Government supported by ourselves. The reasons for this position may be any one of a series. The most probable I believe is that Soviet officials may not wish to recognize vis-à-vis the Turks that the breaking of relations is any concession to the Soviet Union. It is improbable though possible that they sincerely believe that this step is contrary to the Moscow Agreement. On the other hand they will probably maintain this position. I believe however that unless we do follow up this first step promptly with further steps designed to bring Turkey into the war the Soviets’ suspicion will definitely be aroused. Considering the above I believe that it would be wise for both the British Ambassador and myself to be instructed to approach the Soviet Government with a definite proposal and procedure for consultation on ways and means by which Turkey can best be brought into the war. Harriman 76 Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Soviet First Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–3044: Telegram [Document 956] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State Moscow , July 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received July 30—2:40 p.m.] 2813. Re Embassy’s 2791, July 28, 1 p.m. In my talks with Vyshinski today on other matters I took occasion to mention that Turkey would sever relations with Germany on August 1. Vyshinski stated that he was aware of this and that he felt sure that we knew the Soviet point of view in regard to Turkey. I said that we considered the break with Germany as the first step toward getting Turkey into the war as agreed at the Moscow Conference. Vyshinski remarked that there was now no time for a second step. I asked him whether he thought it would be useful to have conversations between the three Governments on how best to implement the second step. Vyshinski said that he did not believe that any useful purpose would be served by such conversations and remarked that Turkey should “now be left to its own fate”. Vyshinski in the talk showed no ill feeling but rather gave me the impression that he was well satisfied with the way things have developed. The Soviets have evidently now decided to hold aloof from Turkey and refuse to recognize that Turkey’s break with Germany or even entry into the war come soon enough to be of real help in the defeat of Germany. Under this policy the Soviets get whatever benefits the Turkish actions may bring without paying the price of recognition of any obligation on their part toward Turkey in the peace settlement. Thus also the Soviet Government has used the British and our action vis-à-vis Turkey without Soviet approval to free itself of its obligation assumed at Moscow to concert with us in dealing with Turkey. I have no indication, however, that the Soviet Government has any specific plans at present regarding Turkey which would give rise to difficulties between us. Under all the circumstances I believe that the situation should be reexamined with the British before any further approach is made to the Soviet Government. Harriman The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/7–3144: Telegram [Document 957] The Chargé in Turkey ( Kelley ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , July 31, 1944—9 p.m. [Received August 1—5:15 p.m.] 1398. ReEmby’s 1374, July 26. The Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs questioned me further this morning with regard to the meaning of the reservation contained in the statement of the position of the American Government in the matter of Turkey’s rupture of relations with Germany. He said that while his Government understood the literal meaning of the reservation they were somewhat concerned as to its possible implications. He inquired whether it implied that if Turkey, as a result of the action to be taken by it, should be attacked by Germany the United States would not render any military assistance to Turkey. I pointed out that the reservation referred to the matter of a campaign in the Balkans and said that in my personal opinion the reservation did not apply to the contingency mentioned by the Secretary General. If that contingency should arise I said that it was my personal opinion that the United States would cooperate with the British in extending to Turkey all military assistance possible under the circumstances. I said that I had no information which would throw any light on the reservation and that if the Secretary General so desired I would report our conversation to Washington so that my Government could send me any further instructions which it desired, relative to the point in question. The Secretary General said that he hoped that I would do so as his Government desired further information with regard to the meaning of the reservation. I assume that the Turkish Government has taken this matter up again with me as a result of the remark made by von Papen to the Prime Minister last Saturday to the effect that he did not understand how Turkey could take a step towards entering the war when the United States had made a reservation to the effect that it would not afford any military assistance to Turkey. Kelley The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/8–144: Telegram [Document 958] The Chargé in Turkey ( Kelley ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , August 1, 1944—7 p.m. [Received August 2—11:49 a.m.] 1404. ReEmby’s 1398 July 31. The Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested me to call on him this afternoon and stated that following our conversation yesterday he had given further consideration to the matter of the reservation contained in the statement of the position of the American Government relative to Turkey’s rupture of relations with Germany and decided to put down on paper the thoughts of the Turkish Government in regard to this matter. He thereupon handed me a memorandum which reads as follows in paraphrased translation: “The Turkish Government has taken cognizance of the communication made orally by the American Chargé d’Affaires on July 25, 1944, with a view to supporting the position taken by Great Britain relative to the immediate rupture by Turkey of economic and diplomatic relations with Germany, and emphasizing in this connection that such action by the Turkish Government would be considered by the American Government as only a first step toward actual belligerency, with the reservation that, in taking this position, the United States is not committed to military, naval or air support of any campaign in the Balkans. “From this communication and from the explanations which were given by the Chargé d’Affaires it is evident that the American Government, while considering the action of the Turkish Government on breaking off its economic and diplomatic relations with Germany as only a first step toward actual belligerency, is anxious to make it clear that it does not consider itself committed thereby to furnish military, naval or air assistance to any Balkan campaign which might be undertaken and in which Turkey might participate, without the American Government having given its previous consent. However since the American Government has supported the British request for the rupture of diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany and since it has always associated itself with the British Government in steps toward this end, the Turkish Government considers that, in the event that Turkey should become involved in a Balkan campaign as result of an aggression arising out of the decision thus made to break off her economic and diplomatic relations with Germany not only would the American reservation in such a contingency serve no logical purpose but the American Government should hasten to furnish Turkey all the assistance in its power.” I informed Acikalin that I had telegraphed to my Government a summary of our conversation yesterday and that I would bring to its attention the memorandum which he had just handed me. Kelley Press Release Issued by the Department of State, August 2, 1944 740.0011 E.W.1939/8–244 [Document 959] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, August 2, 1944 August 2, 1944 This Government welcomes as a step towards full cooperation with the United Nations in their struggle against Nazi aggression today’s decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to sever diplomatic and economic relations with Germany. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/8–744 [Document 960] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] August 7, 1944. The Secretary : I have just received a letter 77 from General Marshall in reply to two letters 78 from us requesting interpretation of the reservation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Turkey’s breaking of relations with Germany. You will recall that the Joint Chiefs approved the action subject to the reservation that the United States was not to be committed to a military campaign in the Balkans. The reason for the reservation is that our military resources are already committed to major campaigns in Europe and the Joint Chiefs are unwilling to make any additional commitments, although they express their willingness to consider whether any resources could be diverted to the Balkans in the event a campaign developed there. E[ dward ] S[ tettinius ] 77 August 4, not printed. 78 July 31 and August 3, neither printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) 740.0011 European War 1939/7–2644: Telegram [Document 961] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey ( Kelley ) Washington , August 12, 1944—3 p.m. 699. The Ambassador is returning fully informed regarding the questions raised in Embassy’s 1374, July 26, 8 p.m., 1398, July 31, 9 p.m. and 1404, August 1, 7 p.m. and will make the American point of view clear to the Prime Minister immediately following his arrival. If you are pressed for a reply, you may convey the foregoing informally to the Foreign Office. Stettinius President Roosevelt to the President of the Turkish Republic (Inönü) 740.0011 EW1939/7–344 [Document 962] President Roosevelt to the President of the Turkish Republic ( Inönü ) Washington , August 18, 1944. My Dear Mr. President : I have been touched by your kind letter of July 3, 1944 which Ambassador Steinhardt has handed to me. I want you to know that I heartily reciprocate the sentiments to which you have given expression in your letter. The Turkish Government, in breaking off all economic and diplomatic relations with Germany, has given tangible evidence of your desire to align Turkey openly on the side of the United Nations and has taken a step toward cooperation in bringing this war, which has caused so much suffering to humanity, to a speedy and victorious conclusion. May I express the hope that the Turkish Government will in the near future take further steps to hasten the triumph of right and justice over the forces of evil. In recalling our meeting in Cairo and the great pleasure thereby afforded me of coming to appreciate personally your high qualities, I share your desire that circumstances will permit of our meeting again in the near future. Please accept the expression of my sincere and most cordial friendship. Very sincerely yours, [ Franklin D. Roosevelt ] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/8–2644: Telegram [Document 963] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , August 26, 1944—8 p.m. [Received 10:57 p.m.] 1579. In conversation with the Russian Ambassador today he told me that subsequent to the rupture of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany the Turk Government had informed the Russian Government that it felt it had substantially complied with Allied desires and that closer collaboration between Turkey and the Allies had become possible. To this the Russian Government replied that Turkey’s entry into the war would serve no useful purpose and was no longer desired. The Turk Government then proposed a joint statement emphasizing the friendly relations between Turkey and Russia to which the Russian Government replied that such a statement would add nothing to the treaties already in existence between the two countries. The Turk Government then suggested that notwithstanding the existing treaties a joint statement along the lines proposed might be helpful. The Russian Government has not replied formally to this last suggestion. Vinogradov however has received instructions to discourage the Turks from pressing the same. Repeated to Moscow. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 European War 1939/9–1244: Telegram [Document 964] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , September 12, 1944—10 p.m. [Received September 13—12:10 p.m.] 1717. For Secretary and Under Secretary. I had a general talk today with the Prime Minister. I found him in a rather troubled state of mind. He said he had reached the point at which he could no longer understand British policy towards Turkey while at the same time he was becoming concerned with recent unfavorable radio and newspaper comment in the United States with respect to Turkey. In response to my inquiry as to what he could not understand about British policy towards Turkey Saraçoğlu replied that Turkey had complied with every request made by its [British] ally but that notwithstanding such compliance London continued to evidence irritation and dissatisfaction with the Turk Government. In response to my inquiry as to whether the irritation he said he had sensed could perhaps be ascribed to the fact that Turkey had not as yet declared war on Germany, Saraçoğlu replied that since the rupture with Germany no such request had been made of the Turk Government by the British. He expressed the firm conviction that the British for reasons best known to themselves have not desired and do not desire a declaration of war by Turkey against Germany. He then remarked that shortly after the rupture of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany he had inquired of Hugessen as to whether the British Government desired Turkey’s entry into the war and that Hugessen had answered him to the effect that it was too late for such action to be of any value. Saraçoğlu indicated that ever since the rupture of relations between Turkey and Germany his Government had been anticipating a request from the British either for air or naval bases, for the transit of British troops to the Balkans through Turkey, or for a declaration of war against Germany, observing that as long as no such request was received it was hardly advisable for the Turk Government to take such action on its own initiative. He expressed the opinion that were Turkey to declare war on Germany without having been requested to do so by the British London would be deeply offended. In consequence he said Turkey has for some months past been placed in a false light before the world. He said he was aware of the fact that the Russians some time ago had desired Turkey’s entry into the war but that it had not been possible for the Turk Government at that time to comply with the desire of the Russian Government because of the then British attitude and that even had it been disposed to do so notwithstanding the British attitude the reservation contained in the American note to the effect that Turkey could not look to the United States for any assistance in connection with a Balkan campaign would have been a sufficient deterrent. Saraçoğlu then expressed his concern with recent developments in Bulgaria remarking however that he regarded recent developments in the Balkans as a whole as more of a menace to British than Turk interests in that as he put it “we have been neighbors of the Russians for many years with a common frontier and have learned how to get on with them, something the British still have to learn”. From my talk with the Prime Minister I gained the impression that the present policy of the Turk Government is one of watchful waiting and that while it is prepared to grant bases, permission for the transit of British or American troops through Turkey to the Balkans, or to declare war on Germany if so requested by the British, it does not contemplate taking any action of its own volition unless extraordinary or unforeseen circumstances develop in the Balkans. Steinhardt Break by Turkey of relations with Japan at the request of the United States and British Governments Break by Turkey of relations with Japan at the request of the United States and British Governments [965] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, December 15, 1944—7 p.m. 767.94/12–1544: Telegram [966] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, December 28, 1944—3 p.m. [Received December 30—8:40 a.m.] 767.94/12–2844: Telegram [967] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, December 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 10:40 p.m.] 767.94/12–3044: Telegram [968] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, January 3, 1945—7 p.m. [Received 8:36 p.m.] 767.94/1–345: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 767.94/12–1544: Telegram [Document 965] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , December 15, 1944—7 p.m. 1180. 1. The British Embassy handed the Department a paraphrase of a telegram 80 from Mr. Eden 81 to Lord Halifax 82 dated November 24, which states that previous objections to the idea of requesting the Turkish Government to break relations with Japan have now disappeared. The message states that a good example has been set by Rumania and Bulgaria breaking relations with Japan under pressure from the British and American Governments and that the Soviet Government, particularly at the Moscow Conference, 83 made it clear that the USSR was not inclined to be tender towards Japan. Eden adds that he favors a combined Anglo-American request to the Turkish Government to take this step, outside the scope of the Anglo-Turkish Alliance, 84 but based on the desirability of Turkey helping to shorten the war by making a concrete contribution to the Allied victory against Japan. The message states that our Governments could point out, apart from this consideration, that Turkey lies along the route between the Far East and Great Britain and that important Japanese points of observation of Allied operations would be removed by the rupture of Turkey’s relations with Japan. In closing Mr. Eden expresses the view that at this stage Turkey should not be asked to declare war on Japan because he feels certain that Turkey would refuse on the justified grounds that Turkey could make no contribution to operations against the Japanese. 2. This message was sent to the Secretary of War 85 and to the Secretary of the Navy 86 on November 29, with request for their views as to the desirability of asking Turkey to sever diplomatic relations with Japan. 3. Identical replies have now been received from the War and Navy Departments stating that after studying the situation it has been found that there are a number of considerations which would make such a break advantageous from the point of view of our over-all military operations and that the two Departments know of no military disadvantage which would flow from Turkey’s taking this step. The letters urged that the representations referred to by Mr. Eden should be made to the Turkish Government. 4. In view of the foregoing you are authorized to act in concert with your British colleague 87 and, as soon as the latter receives similar instructions from London, to take this question up with the Turkish authorities in the manner agreed between you as the most effective. 5. The suggestion has been made that the Turks might wish to go beyond a break in diplomatic relations and, having in mind the acquisition thereby of belligerent status, to declare war on Japan. In the circumstances the Department considers it most unlikely that the Turks will suggest this. However, if they should do so, the Department sees no particular reason why they should be discouraged in this connection provided no additional burden on Allied resources will be thereby involved. 6. The British Embassy here is being advised of the foregoing. Sent Ankara, repeated to London, and to Moscow. Stettinius 80 Not printed. 81 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 82 British Ambassador in the United States. 83 For correspondence concerning the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. i , pp. 513 ff. 84 Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey, signed at Ankara, October 19, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc , p. 167; British Cmd. 6165, Treaty Series No. 4 (1940). 85 Henry L. Stimson. 86 James V. Forrestal. 87 Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 767.94/12–2844: Telegram [Document 966] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , December 28, 1944—3 p.m. [Received December 30—8:40 a.m.] 2421. Department’s 1180, December 15 and my 2389, December 20 and 2416, December 27. 88 I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs 89 this morning to express to him the desirability of a severance of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Japan. I left with him an aide-mémoire drafted in agreement with the British Ambassador the English text of which reads as follows: “In suggesting to the Turkish Government that it sever diplomatic relations with Japan, the Government of the United States believes that the Turkish Government may desire to help shorten the war by making a concrete contribution to the Allied victory against Japan. At the same time, such a severance of diplomatic relations would have the effect of depriving the Japanese of important points of observation of Allied operations.” Saka stated that without predetermining the reply his Government might make he could see little advantage to Turkey in taking the desired step but that if “Turkey’s allies” believed such action would be to their advantage he was certain his Government would give the most careful consideration to the suggestion. He then inquired as to the Russian point of view. I said that while I had no information as to the Russian position, it was my personal opinion that the Russians would see a decided advantage in a severance of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Japan as it would deprive the Japanese of a vantage point for espionage and observation purposes particularly at a time when the movement of war material to Russia through the Straits was imminent. Saka said he would discuss the matter with the Prime Minister 90 at the earliest possible moment and that there would be no unreasonable delay in the reply of the Turkish Government. The British Ambassador is seeing Saka this afternoon to take the matter up with him and will leave with him an aide-mémoire substantially the same as ours. Please repeat to London and Moscow. Steinhardt 88 Telegrams 2389 and 2416 not printed. 89 Hasan Saka. 90 Sükrü Saraçoğlu. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 767.94/12–3044: Telegram [Document 967] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , December 30, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 10:40 p.m.] 2434. Reference my 2421 December 28. The Minister of Foreign Affairs asked me to call this morning and after informing me that the Turk Government has decided to break off all economic and diplomatic relations with Japan handed me an aide-mémoire which in translation reads as follows: “The Turk Government has taken note of the aide-mémoire which the Ambassador of the United States of America on instructions from his Government was good enough to hand the Minister of Foreign Affairs on December 27 concerning a rupture by Turkey of its diplomatic relations with Japan. “The Government of the Republic notes that the request of the Government of the United States is based on the consideration that such a rupture in constituting a concrete combination [ contribution ] by Turkey to the Allied victory in the Far East would have the effect of shortening the duration of the World War. “Thus this Government which ardently desires the rapid and complete victory of the Allies has decided to submit during the session the question of the rupture of its diplomatic and economic relations with Japan to the approval of the Grand National Assembly. Dated Ankara December 30.” Saka indicated that he did not anticipate any difficulty in obtaining the approval of the Grand National Assembly to the proposed rupture of relations with Japan. Please repeat to London and Moscow. Steinhardt The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 767.94/1–345: Telegram [Document 968] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , January 3, 1945—7 p.m. [Received 8:36 p.m.] 14. The Minister for Foreign Affairs announced to the Grand National Assembly this afternoon that the Turkish Government had officially broken off all diplomatic and economic relations with the Empire of Japan and that the action taken by the Government would become effective on January 6. In his announcement to the Assembly, the text of which is not as yet available to me, Saka is reported to have stated that the decision of the Turkish Government to break off relations with Japan had been taken as the result of a friendly request by the American Ambassador, Mr. Steinhardt, and had been actuated by the friendly attitude of the US towards Turkey plus the fact that the views of the Turkish and American Governments with respect to the Axis countries were the same. He is reported to have further stated that the alliance between Great Britain and Turkey had also actuated the Turkish Government in that request of the American Government had been supported by the British Government. Shortly after Saka had completed his announcement, the Grand National Assembly voted unanimously to support the action taken by the Government. Repeated to London as No. 1 and Moscow as No. 1. Steinhardt Discussions regarding proposed Lend-Lease agreement between the United States and Turkey Discussions regarding proposed Lend-Lease agreement between the United States and Turkey 91 91 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 1087 ff. [Negotiations for a preliminary lend-lease agreement between the United States and Turkey languished during the first four months of 1944, due to political differences that arose early in the year between the British and Turkish Governments. In this situation, American and British policy was closely coordinated, and lend-lease shipments to Turkey of American origin were discontinued. (For correspondence regarding this subject, see pages 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] ff.) Though the Anglo-Turkish differences were clarified favorably in April and May, there was further delay in the lend-lease negotiations between the United States and Turkey because of the rise of a constitutional question within the United States Government. This involved a difference of opinion between Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, ranking Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Department of State, as to the extent of the treaty-making powers of the executive branch in the post-war implementation of article VII of the various lend-lease agreements. This question, arising in May, was resolved on August 8 and 9 by an exchange of letters (not printed), between the Acting Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and Senator Vandenberg, in which the Department undertook to add in the exchange of notes proposed with each agreement then pending a fourth article, as follows: “It is, of course, understood that in the implementation of the provisions of the agreement each Government will act in accordance with its own constitutional procedures.” This inclusion, along with certain minor technical changes, was communicated to the Ambassador in Turkey, Laurence A. Steinhardt, in instruction 460, August 17 (not printed), and the Ambassador was directed to secure the signing of the agreement “as soon as possible”.] [969] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, September 12, 1944—11 p.m. [Received September 13—10:41 p.m.] 867.24/9–1244: Telegram [970] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, September 20, 1944—6 p.m. 800.24/9–2044: Telegram [971] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, September 30, 1944—8 p.m. [Received October 1—5:40 a.m.] 867.24/9–3044: Telegram [972] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, October 10, 1944—7 p.m. 867.24/9–3044: Telegram [973] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, October 10, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 11:22 p.m.] 867.24/10–1044: Telegram [974] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, October 14, 1944—8 p.m. 800.24/9–2044: Telegram [975] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, December 1, 1944—7 p.m. 867.24/12–144: Telegram [976] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, December 29, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 30—7:15 p.m.] 867.24/12–2944: Telegram [977] The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State Ankara, December 30, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 31—4:25 p.m.] 867.24/12–3044: Telegram The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 867.24/9–1244: Telegram [Document 969] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , September 12, 1944—11 p.m. [Received September 13—10:41 p.m.] 1718. In conversation with the Prime Minister 92 today I inquired as to whether his Government had now prepared to sign the mutual aid agreement. Saraçoğlu replied that he was not familiar with the present status of the matter but that he would look into it at once and if as I assured him the text of the agreement had been virtually agreed upon at the time Lend-Lease shipments were discontinued there should be no difficulty in concluding the agreement in the near future. I told him that the changes we desired in the text were not of great importance and expressed the hope that he would direct the appropriate officials of the Foreign Office to give the matter their immediate attention. Steinhardt 92 Sükrü Saraçoğlu. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 800.24/9–2044: Telegram [Document 970] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , September 20, 1944—6 p.m. 811. All Middle Eastern lend lease agreements except Turkish are being signed in Washington with clear representations to the nations concerned that lend lease authority is limited to a period and purpose which are directly related to the war. This is interpreted to include end uses which contribute to the support and protection of American troops in Europe, even though hostilities may have terminated with Germany. No such contribution is expected in the case of Turkey, but lend lease goods in transit are not likely to be stopped for a few weeks after such termination. It is not contemplated, of course, that Turkey would make any contribution to the war against Japan, so that continued lend lease could hardly be expected for any such reason. It is not necessary to go into such detail with the Turks, but you should make sure that they have no expectation that they will get anything beyond the interpretation set forth in this telegram. Hull The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 867.24/9–3044: Telegram [Document 971] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , September 30, 1944—8 p.m. [Received October 1—5:40 a.m.] 1879. In conversation with the Prime Minister this morning, I again urged him to sign the mutual aid agreement. Saraçoğlu seemed embarrassed and then remarked, “Do you want me to speak frankly”, to which I replied, “Of course”. He then said that his failure to sign the mutual aid agreement was due to the fact that the British claimed that virtually all Lend-Lease deliveries to Turkey had been made by them and that while he was aware that a considerable quantity of Lend-Lease material had originated in the United States, receipts had been required by the British of the Turks for this material. In consequence, the British hold receipts from the Turks for virtually all Lend-Lease material that had been delivered by either Great Britain or the United States and the Turk Government was unwilling to formally acknowledge the receipt “of the same gun from two different sovereign governments”. Saraçoğlu then said that the “confused condition” which had been allowed to develop over nearly 3 years through no fault of the Turkish Government could only be cured by clear-cut statements by both the American and British Governments as to what part of the total quantity of Lend-Lease material actually received by Turkey should be regarded by the Turks as having originated with each country. He then remarked that of course it would be to the great advantage of Turkey if the amount decided to have originated in the United States were as large as possible in that deliveries made by the British had been made under the arms credit which Turkey must repay to Britain. 93 Saraçoğlu said that for a long time the Turk Government had been confused as it had never been informed as to what part of the total quantities delivered was to be regarded as for British account and what part was to be regarded as for American account and that until this phase of the matter is cleared up it seemed to him unreasonable that the Turk Government should be asked to sign a mutual aid agreement which involved an acknowledgement for past deliveries in respect of which for all he knew the Turk Government was already obligated to pay Britain. When I expressed surprise that this point had not been raised in the course of any of my previous talks with Turkish officials, Saraçoğlu indicated that the Turkish had feared that raising the point might annoy the British and perhaps bring about the discontinuance of Lend-Lease deliveries from Britain or the United States or both. When I pointed out that the mutual aid agreement did not specify that the Turkish Government was obligated to the United States Government for any specific deliveries or in any specified amount, Saraçoğlu said that from what he had been able to learn the books of the Lend-Lease Administration in Washington indicated that about 125 million dollars of deliveries had been made by the United States to Turkey and that until the extent to which this sum was properly chargeable to Turkey or Great Britain or in part to each had been determined by the Lend-Lease Administration and accepted by the British Government he would be placing himself in an extremely dangerous position vis-à-vis the Turkish Parliament were he to sign the agreement. At the close of our talk, Saraçoğlu said that he did not anticipate any difficulty in having the agreement approved by the Turkish Parliament once the matters referred to above have been cleared up. Steinhardt 93 The terms establishing the arms credit of 1939 to Turkey were incorporated in the Special Agreement annexed to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance concluded between Great Britain, France, and Turkey at Ankara on October 19, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc , p. 167. For a summary of the relationship between the military aid extended by Great Britain to Turkey under the 1939 credit from 1939 to 1942, and under Lend-Lease, including war material of American origin, following the Casablanca and Adana Conferences early in 1943, see letter from the First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States (Thorold) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), May 31, 1943, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 1104 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 867.24/9–3044: Telegram [Document 972] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , October 10, 1944—7 p.m. 880. Reurtel [1879] September 30, 1944, 8 p.m. You may reiterate to the Prime Minister that the mutual-aid agreement patently is not in the nature of a bill by us or a receipt by the Turks for specific deliveries. It is a statement of principle to be followed in providing mutual aid and in making a final settlement. It should be apparent to the Turkish authorities that they will not be held accountable by both the British and American Governments for the same material. If additional arguments are required, you might be able to use the fact that, according to FEA, 94 Saraçoğlu’s position would appear to be without justification, since the British Embassy in Ankara has filed monthly with the Turkish Foreign Office lists of arrivals of military stores, in which clear differentiation is made between goods of American, British, and Middle East Supply 95 origin. The separation of the list into United States and British shares is now being worked on by United States and British authorities. Furthermore, Article V of the master agreement signed by the British 96 requires the British to report to this Government all retransfers, thereby protecting Turkish interests. The British Government has been informed as a courtesy that discussions were taking place with the Turkish Government regarding the agreement. You should leave Saraçoğlu in no doubt, however, that the proposed agreement is looked upon by us as a means of regularizing mutual-aid relations between Turkey and the United States and as such solely of interest to our two Governments. The Department notes from your [1896] October 3, 1944, 7 p.m. 97 that Turkish Government is reconsidering its position and will inform you of all interpretations it desires to incorporate in an exchange of letters supplementary to the agreement. On our side, unless you perceive objection, we will wish to call attention to the aide-mémoire which was handed to the Turkish Ambassador in March, 1943, 98 particularly the reference therein to the fact that the agreement covers past as well as future transfers and those made by retransfer as well as directly, and to point out to the Turkish Government that under section 3 ( b ) of the Lend-Lease Act, 99 whatever benefits the United States is to receive shall be those which the President of the United States deems satisfactory. Settlement will, of course, be made in the light of the principles stated in the agreement. You are also requested to make clear to the Turks our understanding with respect to continued aid as outlined in the Department’s [811] September 20, 1944. These matters may be presented to the Turkish Government by note, aide-mémoire , or oral presentation, when and as you believe most appropriate. Hull 94 Foreign Economic Administration. 95 This refers to the Middle East Supply Center, a joint Anglo-American organization located at Cairo. 96 Preliminary agreement in regard to principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression, signed at Washington, February 23, 1942; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433. For correspondence leading to this agreement, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , pp. 525 ff. 97 Not printed. 98 On March 8, 1943, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 1096 . 99 Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 867.24/10–1044: Telegram [Document 973] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , October 10, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 11:22 p.m.] 1935. The Secretary General of the Foreign Office 1 informed me today that he had completed his discussions concerning the proposed mutual aid agreement with the Prime Minister and various Parliamentary leaders. He said that as a result of these discussions the Turkish Government was prepared subject to the qualifications set forth below to sign the mutual aid agreement and expected no serious difficulty in having the same approved by Parliament. 1. As Turkey has not been engaged in military operations, the Turkish Government will not be able to claim that the Lend Lease war material received from the United States was “destroyed, lost or consumed” and in consequence should the President of the United States pursuant to article V of the proposed agreement demand the return of this material, the Turkish Government would be confronted with a serious situation, if at the time of the demand it was either threatened by or engaged in war with another power and its position would be made untenable by an obligation to return this material. On the other hand, the Turkish Government recognizes the propriety of article V and proposes an exchange of letters under the terms of which the Turkish Government will have the option in the event of a demand by the President of the United States under article V for the return of the materials to pay therefor in lieu of returning the material. 2. The Turkish Government desires an assurance which it is prepared to accept verbally from me if I am authorized by Washington to give the same that article VII does not obligate or commit the Turkish Government beyond discussions in a spirit of good will. It appears that several Parliamentary leaders have raised the question with the ForOf as to whether article VII might not be construed by the United States as a binding commitment or obligation by the Turkish Government to agree to any demands that may be made with respect to the matters referred to in article VII. 3. The Turkish Government desires an assurance which it is prepared to accept verbally from me if I am authorized by Washington to give the same, that the signing of the mutual aid agreement will not be availed of by Washington to automatically terminate Lend Lease to Turkey or as merely regularizing past transaction but that Lend Lease to Turkey will continue to such extent as the Government of the United States deems appropriate having regard to developing conditions. Açikalin stated that as soon as the foregoing matters have been disposed of the Turkish authorities will be prepared to sign the agreement. As I assume the Department desires my comments with respect to the three foregoing points, they are as follows: 1. I have little doubt that the request for an option to pay in full for the war material thus far received instead of returning the material should a demand for its return be made is prompted by the fear entertained by nearly every Turk of an armed clash with Bulgaria ‘or Russia at some time in the near future and that to avoid being under the necessity in such event of publicly repudiating its obligation to return the material, it would prefer to pay in full therefor. 2. While on the face of article VII there does not appear to be any obligation by the Turkish Government other than to discuss in a spirit of good will the matters therein referred to and no definite commitment to take specific action appears to be required, the Turks apparently fear that as between a great power and a small power a contrary interpretation may be given to this article. 3. I am inclined to the view that the Foreign Office is less motivated in seeking this assurance by the hope that Lend Lease material in any quantities will be much longer forthcoming than by the fear of criticism in Parliamentary circles that in signing the agreement the Government put an end to Lend Lease whereas by dragging out the negotiations a small trickle might continue to arrive. In view of this state of mind, it seems to me that the desired assurance could be given as I understand that there is some Lend Lease material still en route and it being unlikely that actual arrivals in Turkey will stop completely for some weeks or perhaps months. In my opinion unless we seize the present opportunity of having the mutual aid agreement signed by the Turks, they will under one pretext or another drag the matter along indefinitely with the probability that it will become increasingly difficult to obtain their signature. Furthermore once Lend Lease deliveries cease to arrive in Turkey, I doubt the Turks will thereafter be willing to sign the agreement although they would probably be willing to sign some kind of receipt for the material received. Steinhardt 1 Cevat Açikalin. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 800.24/9–2044: Telegram [Document 974] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) 2 Washington , October 14, 1944—8 p.m. 900. Your cable [1935] of October 10, 1944. The Department welcomes the information that the Turks expect no serious difficulty in having the agreement approved by the Parliament and hopes that on the basis of the following understanding the agreement will be signed shortly. 1. With respect to the proposal of the Turkish Government for an exchange of letters under the terms of which the Turkish Government would have the option, in the event of a demand by the President of the United States under Article V for the return of the materials, to pay therefor in lieu of returning the materials, you are authorized to reply, orally or by an exchange of letters if you find it necessary, in the following sense: Since this Government cannot foretell its own future needs for material that has been transferred to other governments under lend-lease, it would not want to bind itself at this time to relinquishing the right to request return for such materials as it might find desirable to have returned to the United States for the reasons cited in Article V. It may be stated to the Turks, however, that the Government of the United States would at a mutually satisfactory time after the signing of the agreement provide the Turkish Government an ample opportunity to discuss with the United States Government the retention of such materials as the Turkish Government desired to purchase. 2. The Turks’ question as to whether Article VII might be construed by the United States as a binding commitment or obligation by them to agree to any demands that may be made with respect to the matters referred to in Article VII may be answered, in a manner which you consider appropriate, in the following sense: The Article pledges the signatories to work together with all other countries of like mind for the economic objectives therein described. Since it is recognized that the reduction of trade barriers, for example, is a matter for action by each country in accordance with its own constitutional procedures, provision is made for conversations to determine the best means of attaining the stated objectives of each government by their own “agreed” action. The broad discretion given to the President in Section 3 ( b ) of the Lend-Lease Act to determine the benefits to be received by the United States for lend-lease aid would, of course, permit him to take cognizance of the agreed action contemplated by Article VII as a benefit under Article VI. It may be appropriate to point out to the Turkish Government that there is some advantage to it in signing the agreement at least to the extent that Article VII establishes the principles on which a final settlement is to be based and to that extent indicates the area of discretion to be exercised by the President with respect to his determination of what constitutes a satisfactory settlement. 3. With respect to the Turks’ inquiry as to whether the signing of the agreement would be availed of by Washington to terminate lend-lease to Turkey automatically, you are authorized to answer, in a manner which you consider appropriate, in the following sense: It is not the intention of this Government to use the signing of the agreement as a basis for automatically terminating lend-lease assistance to Turkey. The amount of assistance in the future depends, of course, upon the course of the war. Our position in this respect remains as stated in Department’s [811] September 20, 1944. 4. The Department’s views as expressed in Department’s [880] October 10, 1944 are not to be considered as modified in any sense by the foregoing comments. Hull 2 Ambassador Steinhardt advised the Department in telegram 2020, October 21, 4 p.m., that he had called on the Secretary General of the Foreign Office that morning to convey to him the substance of this telegram, and had left with him an aide-mémoire which summarized the views of the Department on the three points raised in their previous conversation. Açikalin said that he would discuss the matter further with the Foreign Minister and hoped that it might “be possible to conclude the mutual aid agreement.” (867.24/10–2144) In telegram 2157, November 11, 1 p.m., the Ambassador reported on a conversation with the Turkish Prime Minister, in which the Ambassador had expressed to him “dissatisfaction with the continued delay in concluding the mutual aid agreement.” Thereupon the Prime Minister telephoned to the Secretary General and “directed him to prepare in conjunction with the Embassy the final documents for signature without any further delay.” (867.24/11–1144) The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 867.24/12–144: Telegram [Document 975] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , December 1, 1944—7 p.m. 1121. The Department is agreeable to the execution of the proposed lend-lease agreement in both the English and Turkish languages, both authentic, and the Embassy is authorized to verify and approve the Turkish text without further verification by the Department. 3 Since the agreement will be executed in both languages, it will be necessary to revise the wording of the last sentence in Article 8 as follows: “Done in duplicate in the English and Turkish languages, both authentic, at Ankara, this blank day of blank, 1944.” It is understood that the Turkish Government now suggests that the notes already proposed in connection with the agreement not be exchanged, but apparently no objection to the contents of the notes has been brought forward. 4 The Department is not agreeable to the suppression of these notes. Commitments have been made to Congressional leaders that the provision in paragraph 4 of such notes regarding the implementation of the provisions of the agreement in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each of the signatory governments will be included in any new lend-lease agreements. For your own information, paragraph 4 and the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of these notes are contained in notes proposed to other governments in the Middle East, and for the Department to agree that these notes need not be exchanged with the Turkish Government would seriously embarrass other negotiations. The Department has no objection to an exchange of notes embodying the statements contained in the memorandum handed to the Turkish Government by the Ambassador pursuant to our 880 of October 10 and our 900 of October 14. Stettinius 3 On November 15 the Turkish Foreign Office had handed to Ambassador Steinhardt a draft text in Turkish of the proposed Lend-Lease agreement (867.24/11–1644). 4 The draft exchange of notes provided for current payment by Turkey for foodstuffs and other supplies for the civilian population, and stated that other goods and services might be furnished on the same basis by agreement from time to time. For provisions contained in the proposed exchange of notes sent to Ambassador Steinhardt in telegram 60, January 16, 1943, midnight, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iv , p. 1088 . The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 867.24/12–2944: Telegram [Document 976] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , December 29, 1944—2 p.m. [Received December 30—7:15 p.m.] 2427. Department’s 1208, December 21. 5 During the past 3 weeks I have had numerous conferences with the Secretary General of Foreign Office with a view to concluding the mutual aid agreement. It is becoming increasingly apparent since discontinuance of Lend-Lease deliveries to Turkey earlier in the year, Turk Government is no longer interested in concluding a mutual aid agreement and in consequence continues to resort to delaying tactics with the object of ultimately avoiding signing an agreement. Without burdening Department with a detailed recital of the … objections raised by Foreign Office to terminology, interpretation, translation, et cetera, suffice it to say the Turks adhere to their objection to an exchange of notes dealing with possible delivery of foodstuffs and other supplies for use of civilian population. The argument advanced by Secretary General at our meeting yesterday was no foodstuffs are being provided for use of civilian population of Turkey, that Turk Government has no intention of requesting same and in consequence proposed exchange of notes is no longer necessary even assuming it was desirable when drafts were prepared. In connection with foregoing, I appreciate the necessity of preserving paragraph 4 of proposed note either in the note or by inserting same in text of the mutual aid agreement itself and believe it may be possible to persuade the Turks to incorporate paragraph 4 in text of the mutual aid agreement if the proposed exchange of notes is abandoned. While I also appreciate the abandonment of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of proposed notes might handicap Department’s negotiations for mutual aid agreements with other countries of the Middle East, the fact remains that failure to press for conclusion of a mutual aid agreement with Turkey over a period of nearly 3 years and until comparatively recently, during most of which time an agreement could have been concluded with relative ease by reason of the continuing deliveries of Lend-Lease war material, has resulted in a situation whereby in my considered judgment we would be better advised to take what we can get than to be left without any mutual agreement at all. Furthermore, although I am not informed on the subject, I am under the impression the other countries of the Mid-East have benefited or are benefiting from Lend-Lease deliveries of foodstuffs which is not the case with Turkey and are, therefore, less likely to raise objections to proposed exchange of notes. … Cajoling the Turk Government into signing a mutual aid agreement covering past deliveries which are safely in their physical possession and after deliveries have ceased promises to be a difficult enough task without endeavoring to wring from it an exchange of notes the provisions of which are intended to serve as a model for other Mid-Eastern countries. As result of a rather sharp exchange of words with the Secretary General yesterday, I succeeded in persuading him to tentatively accept the mutual aid agreement as now drafted and translated but without the exchange of notes referred to above. I have no way of forecasting whether he may not recede from this position as he has done before if the discussions continue. Under the circumstances I have no alternative than to recommend that I be authorized to endeavor to incorporate paragraph 4 of the proposed note into the text of the mutual aid agreement and to sign agreement as so amended without the exchange of notes if I am unable to persuade the Turk Government to accept paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the proposed [note. If] Department accepts my recommendation I trust it will be understood that I shall continue the struggle to have the exchange of notes accepted up to the last moment and will only sign the mutual aid agreement without exchange of notes if and when I am convinced that further insistence on exchange of notes may mean a refusal by the Turks to sign any mutual aid agreement covering past deliveries. In view of fact that negotiations are continuing from day to day and it is my intention to take matter up with the Prime Minister in the course of next 2 or 3 days, I request an urgent reply. Steinhardt 5 Not printed. The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 867.24/12–3044: Telegram [Document 977] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) to the Secretary of State Ankara , December 30, 1944—7 p.m. [Received December 31—4:25 p.m.] 2437. In conversation with Foreign Minister 6 this morning, he informed me that at the request of the Secretary General of the Foreign Office he had discussed with the Prime Minister the mutual aid agreement and proposed exchange of notes dealing with the possible delivery of foodstuffs and other supplies for the civilian population of Turkey. Saka said the Prime Minister had expressed himself as undoubtably opposed to the proposed notes on the grounds that the Turk Government was not seeking and did not intend to seek Lend-Lease foodstuffs or other supplies for its civilian population from the United States and would purchase through commercial channels and pay in dollars for any foodstuffs or other supplies it might acquire in the US. He said the Prime Minister had expressed the view that the proposed notes might open the door to an unwarranted interference by the US with Turkey’s trade, commerce and foreign exchange, and that he could find no justifiable relationship between the proposed notes and a mutual aid agreement covering past deliveries. Saka said that Saraçoğlu had referred to Lend-Lease deliveries by the US to Turkey as having consisted almost exclusively of war material intended to strengthen the Turkish Army on behalf of the Allied front, and that in consequence Turkey’s position in respect of past Lend-Lease deliveries of war material differed substantially from that of other countries which had received Lend-Lease aid by reason of their war requirements or to meet other exigencies. He said the Prime Minister had remarked that the Lend-Lease deliveries of war material to Turkey had been made primarily for the benefit of the Allies by strengthening the Turkish Army to resist possible German aggression and for no other purpose. Saka concluded with the statement that the Prime Minister had told him that parliamentary leaders with whom he had discussed the matter had informed him that while the mutual aid agreement would be approved by Parliament the exchange of notes would not, as the notes would be regarded as implying an impending shortage of foodstuffs in Turkey. He said the Prime Minister felt that presenting the proposed notes to Parliament from which such an implication could be drawn would not only encourage further hoarding of foodstuffs with a resultant increase in the already much criticized high cost of living but might even precipitate a government crisis. I gained the impression that the Turk Government, including the Prime Minister, is reluctant enough to sign the mutual aid agreement at this late date after deliveries of war material have ceased and is determined should it find itself hard pressed to sign the same to refuse to sign simultaneously anything even resembling an agreement in respect of possible future purchases of foodstuffs or other supplies for the civilian population. In view of the foregoing I renew the recommendation contained in my 2427 of December 29 that I be authorized to abandon paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the proposed notes and to endeavor to incorporate paragraph 4 thereof in the text of the mutual aid agreement. Steinhardt 6 Hasan Saka. Death of the Turkish Ambassador, Mehmet Münir Ertegün Death of the Turkish Ambassador, Mehmet Münir Ertegün [978] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) Washington, November 11, 1944. 701.6711/11–1144: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) 701.6711/11–1144: Telegram [Document 978] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Steinhardt ) Washington , November 11, 1944. 1026. The President today is telegraphing following directly to President Inönü: 7 “I send you my sincerest condolences in connection with the death of your Ambassador to this country and personal friend, Mehmet Münir Ertegün. 8 You must be proud of his able record here and the officials of this Government who have learned to appreciate Ambassador Ertegün’s personal integrity and noble and kindly spirit share in your loss. It is with particular sadness that I send to you, and through you to the Government and to the people of Turkey, the deep regret of my country upon the death of such a distinguished Turkish citizen and public servant.” 9 President’s statement to the press is as follows: “I am deeply grieved at the news of the sudden death of my personal friend the Turkish Ambassador, Mehmet Münir Ertegün. Turkish interests in this country have been ably represented by him for more than ten years and during this period I, along with hundreds of others both in and out of the Government, have come to esteem him as a diplomat of the highest type—kindly, sincere and accomplished. His personal integrity was outstanding. I am sending my condolences to President Inönü of Turkey, in the loss of such an able servant of the Turkish Government. My own Government feels this loss deeply.” The Acting Secretary 10 is telegraphing following directly to Foreign Minister: 11 “On behalf of Secretary Hull and myself I send you our deepest sympathy. The death of Mehmet Münir Ertegün has filled us with a sincere and deep sorrow, a sorrow which we share with his hundreds of friends in this country. His kindly and noble spirit and his great ability have given him a beloved position both in and out of Government circles. His loss will not be forgotten. For more than ten years he has represented Turkish interests in the United States with skill and honesty and all of us in the Department of State will miss his many high qualities.” 9 The Acting Secretary’s statement to the press is as follows: “I have just returned from a call at the Turkish Embassy to express my sincere condolences to the family and staff of the late Turkish Ambassador, His Excellency Mehmet Münir Ertegün, who died this morning. I am speaking for all of his many friends in the Department of State when I say that his death has filled us with a deep sense of personal loss. “For more than ten years Ambassador Ertegün, or Münir Bey, as he was known to his many intimate friends, has ably represented the interests of Turkey in the United States, and his invariably fair dealings and high personal integrity, his great personal charm, and his unfailing cooperation have given him an almost unique place among the diplomats in Washington. Since the death of the Peruvian Ambassador last April, he has been the distinguished Dean of the Diplomatic Corps. His kindly spirit, illuminated by his conviction that the nations in the world not only should but could follow the way of peace, will not be forgotten. He must have taken considerable satisfaction in the fact that American-Turkish relations have been most cordial throughout his tour of duty in this country. “In the death of Ambassador Ertegün the Republic of Turkey has lost one of its most able public servants.” The Secretary, who is absent from Washington, was grieved to learn of the death of his old friend and has requested you to convey in his name a message expressing his personal condolences to the Foreign Minister. Stettinius [Acknowledgments were made to the appropriate officials by the Turkish President and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 13. In a statement released to the press on March 6, 1946 (Department of State Bulletin , March 17, 1946, page 447), it was announced by the Department that the late Ambassador’s remains were being returned with full honors to Turkey on board the U.S.S. Missouri , with destroyer escort.] 7 Ismet Inönü, President of the Turkish Republic. 8 The Turkish Ambassador died early on the morning of November 11, 1944. 9 Message released to the press, November 11, 1944, Department of State Bulletin , November 12, 1944, p. 570. 10 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. 11 Hasan Saka. 9 Message released to the press, November 11, 1944, Department of State Bulletin , November 12, 1944, p. 570. The Far East: The Far East: Contents Initiative of the United States to secure cooperation among interested governments on measures to limit and control production and to suppress illicit traffic in opium in areas of the Far East to be liberated from Japanese control Japanese treatment of American prisoners of war and civilian internees (Documents 979-1028) Efforts by the United States to send financial and other assistance to American nationals held by Japan (Documents 1029-1106) Efforts by the United States to arrange a third exchange of American and Japanese nationals (Documents 1107-1130) Representations by Japan regarding the treatment of Japanese nationals by the United States (Documents 1131-1150) Protests by Japan against attacks by the United States on hospital ships (Documents 1151-1164) Protests by Japan against bombing of allegedly non-military objectives (Documents 1165-1167) Assurance by the Japanese Government that it would not use poison gas provided the United States also did not use it (Documents 1168-1169) Protest by Japan against treatment accorded the Japanese envoy to the Vatican by American armed forces; protest by the United States against the conduct of Japanese armed forces toward the American Legation in Thailand (Documents 1170-1173) Protests by the United States against attacks by Japanese naval forces on survivors of torpedoed American merchant vessels (Documents 1174-1176) Violation by Japanese authorities of American diplomatic and consular property, including archives, in occupied China (Documents 1177-1177) Decision of the United States and British Governments not to reply to Japanese peace feeler received through Sweden (Documents 1178-1180) Postwar policy planning in regard to Japan and areas under Japanese control (Documents 1181-1226) Interest of the United States in the future status of Korea and the question of recognition of a Provisional Korean Government (Documents 1227-1235) Consideration of problems relating to the Commonwealth of the Philippines (Documents 1236-1241) Interest of the United States in question of recognizing a Free Thai movement; attitudes of the United States and the United Kingdom toward the postwar status of Thailand (Documents 1242-1250) Thai protests against bombing of allegedly non-military objectives (Documents 1251-1253) China China [For correspondence regarding relations of the United States with China in 1944, see volume VI .] Initiative of the United States to secure cooperation among interested governments on measures to limit and control production and to suppress illicit traffic in opium in areas of the Far East to be liberated from Japanese control Initiative of the United States to secure cooperation among interested governments on measures to limit and control production and to suppress illicit traffic in opium in areas of the Far East to be liberated from Japanese control [For correspondence on this subject, see volume II .] Japanese treatment of American prisoners of war and civilian internees Japanese treatment of American prisoners of war and civilian internees 1 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 953 – 1012 . [979] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, January 5, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 4:37 p.m.] 390.1115A/1742: Telegram [980] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, [January 8, 1944.] [Received January 8—1:34 p.m.] 390.1115A/1745: Telegram [981] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, January 27, 1944. 711.94114A/277a: Telegram [982] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, January 27, 1944. 711.94114A/277b: Telegram [983] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, February 7, 1944—9 p.m. [Received February 14—5 p.m.] 711.94114A O.T./10: Airgram [984] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, March 1, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 10:14 a.m.] 711.94114A/356: Telegram [985] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, March 3, 1944. [Received March 3—10:31 p.m.] 711.94114A/361: Telegram [986] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, March 11, 1944. 711.94114 Pay-0/15: Telegram [987] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, March 24, 1944—midnight. 711.94114A/356: Telegram [988] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, March 25, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 10:29 a.m.] 711.94114A/393: Telegram [989] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, April 15, 1944. 740.00115A Pacific War/1131a: Telegram [990] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, April 15, 1944—7 a.m. [Received 11:46 a.m.] 711.94114A/419: Telegram [991] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, April 17, 1944. [Received April 17—10:54 p.m.] 711.94114 Mail/62: Telegram [992] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, April 19, 1944. 711.94114A/419: Telegram [993] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, April 28, 1944—9 p.m. 711.93114A/62: Telegram [994] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, May 10, 1944. [Received June 3.] 711.94114A/32 [995] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, May 13, 1944—midnight. [Received May 14—1:54 p.m.] 711.94114A/557: Telegram [996] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, May 15, 1944. [Received June 3.] 711.94114A/32 [997] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, May 23, 1944. [Received May 23—11:50 p.m.] 740.00115A Pacific War/1174: Telegram [998] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, June 13, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 11:40 p.m.] 711.94114A/596: Telegram [999] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, June 14, 1944. 711.94114A/557: Telegram [1000] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, June 20, 1944—8 p.m. 711.94114 Mail/79: Telegram [1001] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, June 21, 1944. 711.94114A/557: Telegram [1002] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, June 27, 1944. [Received June 27—11 p.m.] 711.94114A/6–2744: Telegram [1003] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, June 28, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 5:40 p.m.] 740.00115A Pacific War/6–2844: Telegram [1004] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, July 7, 1944—9 p.m. 740.00115A P.W./6–2844: Telegram [1005] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, July 8, 1944—10 p.m. [Received July 8—8:23 p.m.] 711.94114A/7–844: Telegram [1006] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, July 10, 1944. 711.94114A/361: Telegram [1007] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, July 29, 1944. [Received July 29—11:12 p.m.] 711.94114A/7–2944: Telegram [1008] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, August 24, 1944—8 p.m. [Received August 25—2:10 a.m.] 740.00115 PW/8–2444: Telegram [1009] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, August 25, 1944. 740.00115A P.W./8–2544: Telegram [1010] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, August 30, 1944—9 p.m. [Received August 30—2:56 p.m.] 711.94114A/8–3044: Telegram [1011] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, August 31, 1944—10 p.m. 711.94114A/7–1144: Telegram [1012] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, September 11, 1944. 740.00115A PW/9–1144: Telegram [1013] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, September 11, 1944. 711.94114A/9–1144: Airgram [1014] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, September 15, 1944. 711.94114A/9–1544: Telegram [1015] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, September 21, 1944—10 p.m. [Received September 22—8:35 a.m.] 711.94114A O.T./9–2144: Telegram [1016] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, September 23, 1944. [Received September 24—5:55 a.m.] 711.94114 Mail/9–2344: Telegram [1017] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, September 26, 1944—11 p.m. 711.94114A/9–2644: Telegram [1018] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, October 16, 1944—midnight. 740.00115A P.W./7–1244: Telegram [1019] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, October 23, 1944. [Received October 23—11:15 p.m.] 711.94114A/10–2344: Telegram [1020] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, October 26, 1944—11 p.m. 740.00115A P.W./10–2644: Telegram [1021] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, November 1, 1944. 711.94114A/10–1944: Telegram [1022] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, November 1, 1944—10 p.m. 711.94114A/9–2144: Telegram [1023] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, November 23, 1944. [Received November 24—4:04 a.m.] 711.94114A/11–2344: Telegram [1024] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, November 23, 1944—5 p.m. [Received December 5—6 p.m.] 740.00115A PW/11–2344: Airgram [1025] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) Washington, December 4, 1944. 740.00115A PW/12–444: Telegram [1026] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, December 18, 1944. [Received December 19—11:39 p.m.] 711.94114A/12–1844: Telegram [1027] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, December 19, 1944. [Received December 20—12:27 p.m.] 711.94114A/12–1944: Telegram [1028] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, December 20, 1944. [Received December 21—7:10 a.m.] 77.84114A/12–2044: Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 390.1115A/1742: Telegram [Document 979] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , January 5, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 4:37 p.m.] 81. American Interests—China—Civilian Internments. Foreign Office note December 31 states Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, telegraphs that Japanese authorities convoked for December 22 about 150 Americans, British and Dutch who previously exempted internment view health for segregation and departure December 29 to new camp established near Chapei camp. Several convokees seriously ill suffering dysentery, ulcers on same terms [ sic ], heart trouble and require constant medical treatment and strict diet. Others had been exempted to care for bedridden. Under the circumstances Japanese action causes worry especially as camp affords insufficient diet, medical care and heat. Swiss Consulate finally notes that these measures coincide with publication local press reports attributed Japanese repatriates Teia-Maru 2 to effect Japanese interned American countries received brutal treatment. Harrison 2 Vessel used by Japan to carry out exchange agreement with the United States in 1943. For correspondence on exchange agreement, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 867 ff. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 390.1115A/1745: Telegram [Document 980] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , [January 8, 1944.] [Received January 8—1:34 p.m.] 162. American Interests, China, Civilian Internments. Secretary this and British Legation handed identical informal communications at Foreign Office this morning of which substance follows: Fontanel 3 reverting situation described Legation’s 81, January 5, reports information he has been able obtain indicates situation camps growing worse: food insufficient, no heating, neither medicinals nor food necessary diet sick made available. Camp Commandants forced obtain food and funds from friends internees. This confirms insufficiency credits made available by Japanese Government for maintenance camps. Fontanel greatly concerned because requests he made September in concert with Gorgé 4 for authorization visit camps ignored by Japanese Consulate. Fontanel fears internees have impression that his activity as representative protecting power inadequate. Request American-British Governments be informed Japanese Civil and Military authorities make extremely difficult carrying out mandate with which he charged. Foreign Office informally inquires Department agreeable authorize Gorgé make representations in such manner as he deems advisable jointly behalf American-British Governments with view to obtaining either release sick persons or improvement their situation in camps. Foreign Office official believes delivery communication Japanese Government from the Department would not accomplish objective. British Legation telegraphing London requesting approval procedure suggested by Foreign Office. Please instruct whether Department concurs joint representatives [ representations? ] by Gorgé on basis he may determine best. 5 Harrison 3 Emile Fontanel, Swiss Consul General at Shanghai. 4 Camille Gorgé, Swiss Minister in Japan. 5 The Department approved the suggested procedure in telegram 162, January 15, 10 p.m., to Bern, and notified the British Embassy to this effect the same day (390.1115A/1745). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/277a: Telegram [Document 981] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , January 27, 1944. 274. American Interests—Japan. Please request Swiss Legation Tokyo to deliver the following textually to the Japanese Government: The Government of the United States refers to its communication delivered to the Japanese Government on December 23, 1942 by the Swiss Legation in Tokyo 6 in charge of American interests in Japan and Japanese-occupied territory concerning reports that the Government of the United States had received of the mistreatment of American nationals in Japanese hands. The Swiss Legation in Tokyo on May 28, 1943 forwarded to the Government of the United States a preliminary reply from the Japanese Government 7 to this communication in which that Government stated that it would communicate in due course the results of investigations concerning each instance referred to in the note of the Government of the United States. No reports of investigations regarding these instances have yet been received. The Government of the United States has taken due note of the statements of the Japanese Government “concerning the special circumstances prevailing in areas which have until recently been fields of battle” and concerning “the manifold difficulties which exist in areas occupied by the Japanese forces or where military operations are still being carried on.” The Government of the United States points out, however, that the regions in which Americans have been taken prisoner or interned have long ceased to be scenes of active military operations and that the Japanese holding authorities have therefore had ample opportunity to establish an orderly and humane internment program in accordance with their Government’s undertakings. Despite this fact the Government of the United States continues to receive reports that the great proportion of American nationals are the victims either of inhuman cruelty or of callous failure to provide the necessities of life on the part of the Japanese holding authorities, in violation of the common laws of civilization and of the Japanese Government’s undertaking to apply to American nationals the humane provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. 8 There follows a statement of the principal categories of the deprivation of rights, cruelties, wanton neglect, mistreatment and hardships to which, according to information received by the Government of the United States, from many sources, Americans in Japanese custody have been subjected. I. Representatives of the Swiss Government entrusted with the protection of American interests in Japan and Japanese-occupied territory have not been permitted to go to every place without exception where prisoners of war and civilian internees are interned, have not been permitted to interview without witnesses the persons held, and have not had access to all places occupied by the prisoners (Article 86 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention). II. Representatives of the International Red Cross Committee have been refused permission to visit most of the places where American nationals are held by the Japanese authorities (Articles 79 and 86). III. American nationals have not been permitted to forward complaints to the Japanese holding authorities or to representatives of the protecting Power (Article 42). IV. The Japanese authorities have punished and have threatened to punish American nationals for complaining concerning the conditions of captivity (Article 42). V. The Japanese Government has failed to furnish needed clothing to American nationals (Article 12). VI. The Japanese authorities have confiscated personal effects from American civilian internees and prisoners of war (Article 6). VII. American prisoners of war and civilian internees have been subjected to insults and public curiosity (Article 2). VIII. Civilians and prisoners of war interned by Japan are suffering from malnutrition and deficiency diseases because of the failure and refusal of the detaining authorities to provide health sustaining food for their charges, or to permit the United States to make regular shipments on a continuing basis under appropriate neutral guarantees of supplemental food and medical supplies. 9 (Article 11 and the specific reciprocal undertaking of Japan to take into account national differences in diet). 10 IX. The Japanese authorities have devoted to improper and forbidden uses the profits of the sale of goods in camp canteens instead of devoting them to the welfare of the persons held in the camps (Article 12). X. Contrary to the specific undertaking of the Japanese Government, the detaining authorities have compelled civilians to perform labor other than that connected with the administration, maintenance and management of internment camps. Officer prisoners of war have been forced to labor and noncommissioned officers to do other than supervisory labor (Article 27). XI. Prisoners of war have been required to perform labor that has a direct relation with war operations (Article 31). XII. Medical care has in many instances been denied to prisoners of war and civilian internees and when given has been generally so poor as to cause unnecessary suffering and unnecessary deaths (Article 14). XIII. The Japanese Government has reported the names of only a part of the American prisoners of war and civilian internees in its hands (Article 77) and of American combatants found dead by Japanese forces (Article 4 of the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and Wounded of Armies in the Field, to which Japan is a contracting party). 11 XIV. The Japanese Government has not permitted internees and prisoners of war freely to exercise their religion (Article 16). XV. The Japanese Government has not posted the Convention in camps in English translation, thus depriving American prisoners of war and civilian internees of knowledge of their rights thereunder (Article 84). XVI. The Japanese Government has failed to provide adequate equipment and accommodations in prisoner of war and civilian internment camps and transports, but on the contrary forced them to subsist in inhumane conditions (Article 10). XVII. The Japanese Government has completely failed to apply the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention (Title III, Section V, Chapter 3) with regard to trial and punishment of prisoners of war despite the fact that violations of its undertaking in this respect have repeatedly been called to its attention, but on the contrary has imposed cruel and inhuman punishments without trial. XVIII. The Japanese authorities have inflicted corporal punishment and torture upon American nationals (Article 46). The Government of the United States emphasizes that it has based the foregoing charges only on information obtained from reliable sources. Many well-authenticated cases can be cited in support of each of the charges. The Government of the United States also desires to state most emphatically that, as the Japanese Government can assure itself from an objective examination of the reports submitted to it by the Spanish, Swedish, 12 and International Bed Cross representatives who have repeatedly visited all places where Japanese are held by the United States, the United States has consistently and fully applied the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention in the treatment of all Japanese nationals held by it as prisoners of war or (so far as they are adaptable) as civilian internees, detainees or evacuees in relocation centers. Japanese nationals have enjoyed high standards of housing, food, clothing, and medical care. The American authorities have furthermore freely and willingly accepted from the representatives of the protecting Powers and the International Red Cross Committee suggestions for the improvement of conditions under which Japanese nationals live in American camps and centers and have given effect to many of these suggestions most of which, in view of the high standards normally maintained, are directed toward the obtaining of extrordinary benefits and privileges of a recreational, educational or spiritual nature. The Government of the United States demands that the Japanese Government immediately take note of the charges made above and take immediate steps to raise the treatment accorded American nationals held by Japan to the standard provided by the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, which the United States and the Japanese Governments have mutually undertaken to apply. 13 The Government of the United States also expects the Japanese Government to take proper disciplinary or penal action with regard to those of its officials, employees, and agents who have violated its undertakings with respect to the Geneva Convention and the international Common Laws of decency. The Government of the United States again directs the attention of the Japanese Government to the system of neutral supervision provided in Article 86 of the Geneva Convention. The Government of the United States again reminds the Japanese Government of the complete fulfillment of the provisions of this Article as respects the activities of the Government of Spain acting as protecting Power for Japanese interests in the continental United States and of the Government of Sweden as protecting Power for Japanese interests in Hawaii. The Government of the United States therefore expects the Japanese Government, in accordance with recognized practice of civilized states, fully to implement the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. The United States Government demands that the Japanese Government will, among other things, promptly implement the provisions of Article 86 in respect to the activities of the Government of Switzerland as protecting Power for American interests in Japan and Japanese-controlled territory and will make it possible for the Government of Switzerland to give to the Government of the United States assurances to the effect that Swiss representatives have been able to convince themselves by the full exercise of the rights granted under Article 86 that the abuses set forth in the foregoing statement have been completely rectified or that steps have been taken in that direction that are considered by Switzerland to be adequate. The United States Government until the present has refrained from publishing in this country the facts known to it regarding outrages perpetrated upon its nationals, both prisoners of war and civilian internees, by the Japanese. The United States Government hopes that as these facts are now again officially called to the Japanese Government’s attention that Government will adopt a policy of according to United States nationals in its hands the treatment to which they are entitled, and will permit representatives of the protecting Power to make such investigations and inspections as are necessary in order to give assurances to this Government that improved treatment is in fact being accorded to American nationals. In such case this Government would be in a position to assure the American people that the treatment of American nationals by the Japanese authorities had been brought into conformity with the standards recognized by civilized nations. Hull 6 See telegram 2814, December 12, 1942, to Bern, Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 832 . 7 See telegram 3389, June 4, 1943, from Bern, ibid. , 1943, vol. iii , p. 990 . 8 Signed July 27, 1929; for text, see ibid. , 1929, vol. i , p. 336 . 9 For correspondence on efforts by the United States to send relief shipments to Americans held by Japan, see pp. 1015 [ Pg. 1015 includes portions of Doc. 1029 and Doc. 1030 ] ff., passim . 10 See Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 797 , footnote 30. 11 For text of Convention signed at Geneva July 27, 1929, see Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. i , p. 321 . 12 Spain was protector of Japanese interests in the continental United States; Sweden in the Territory of Hawaii. 13 For the Japanese Government’s undertaking in this respect, see telegram 398, February 4, 1942, from Bern, Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 796 . The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/277b: Telegram [Document 982] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , January 27, 1944. 275. American Interests—Japan. There are recited in the following numbered sections, the numbers of which correspond to the numbered charges in the Department’s urgent telegram of even date, 14 examples of some of the specific incidents upon which this Government bases the charges made by it against the Japanese Government in the telegram under reference. The specific incidents have been selected from the numerous ones that have been reported from many reliable sources to this Government. Ask the Swiss Government to forward this statement textually to its Minister in Tokyo with the request that he present it to the Japanese Government simultaneously with the telegram under reference and that he call upon the Japanese Government promptly to rectify all existing derelictions and take such further steps as will preclude their recurrence. The Minister should further seek for himself or his representatives permission, in accordance with Article 86 of the Convention, to visit each place without exception where American nationals are detained and request of the Japanese Government the amelioration of any improper conditions that he may find to exist. The Swiss Minister in Tokyo should be particularly asked to report promptly and fully all steps taken by the Japanese Government in conformity with the foregoing. Charges I and II . Prisoner of war and civilian internment camps in the Philippines, French Indochina, Thailand, Manchuria, Burma, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, and prisoner of war camp no. 1 in Formosa have never been visited by Swiss representatives although they have repeatedly requested permission to make such visits. None of these camps except the one at Mukden are known to have been visited by International Red Cross representatives. In recent months visits have not been allowed to the prisoner of war camps near Tokyo and Yokohama, and the prisoner of war camps in and near Hong Kong, although the Swiss representatives have requested permission to make such visits. The value of such few visits as have been permitted to some camps has been minimized by restrictions. Swiss representatives at Shanghai have been closely escorted by several representatives of the Japanese Consulate General at Shanghai during their visits to camps and have not been allowed to see all parts of camps or to have free discussion with the internees. Similar situations prevail with respect to the civilian internment camps and prisoner of war camps in metropolitan Japan and Formosa. By contrast, all of the camps, stations, and centers where Japanese nationals are held by the United States have been repeatedly visited and fully inspected by representatives of Spain and Sweden who have spoken at length without witnesses with the inmates, and International Red Cross representatives have been and are being allowed freely to visit the camps in the United States and Hawaii where Japanese nationals are held. Charge III . Communications addressed by the persons held to the protecting Power concerning conditions of captivity in several of the civilian camps near Shanghai, among them Ash Camp and Chapei, remain undelivered. The same situation exists with respect to the civilian internment camp in Baguio, and in most if not all of the camps where American prisoners of war are held. Persons held at Baguio, Chefoo, Saigon, and at times in the Philippine prisoner of war camps were denied permission to address the camp commander. Charge IV . On one occasion during the summer of 1943 all of the persons held at the Columbia Country Club, Shanghai, were punished by cancellation of dental appointments because complaints were made to representatives of the Swiss Consulate General. During the same period, at Camp B, Yangchow, the entire camp was deprived of a meal by the Camp Commandant because complaints had been made concerning the delivery of spoiled food. There are cited under Section XVIII below, cases of prisoners of war being struck because they asked for food or water. Charge V . Civilian internees at Hong Kong have gone without footwear and civilian internees at Kobe have suffered from lack of warm clothing. In 1942 and 1943, American and Filipino prisoners of war in the Philippines and civilian internees at Baguio were forced to labor without shoes and clad only in loin cloths. Charge VI . This is reported to have been the case at the following camps: prisoner of war camps in the Philippine Islands, prisoner of war enclosures at Mariveles Bay, Philippine Islands, civilian internment camps at Baguio, Canton, Chefoo, Peking, Manila, Tsingtao, Weihsien, and Yangchow, and at the Ash Camp, Chapei Camp, Lunghwa Camp, and Pootung Camp, in or near Shanghai. The articles most needed by the prisoners and internees have been taken. For example, Japanese soldiers took the shoes from an American officer prisoner of war who was forced to walk unshod from Bataan to San Fernando during the march which began about April 10, 1942. Although the prisoners constantly suffered from lack of drinking water canteens were taken from prisoners during this march; one of these victims was Lieutenant Colonel William B. Dyess. At Corregidor a Japanese soldier was seen by Lieutenant Commander Melvyn H. McCoy with one arm covered from elbow to wrist and the other arm half covered with wrist watches taken from American and Filipino prisoners of war. Charge VII . American prisoners of war in Manila were forced by Japanese soldiers to allow themselves to be photographed operating captured American military equipment in connection with the production of the Japanese propaganda film “Kip down the Stars and Stripes”. Prisoners of war from Corregidor being taken to Manila were not landed at the port of Manila but were unloaded outside the city and were forced to march through the entire city to Bilibid Prison about May 23, 1942. Japanese school children, soldiers, and civilians have been admitted to internment camps and encouraged to satisfy curiosity regarding the persons held. Such tours were conducted at Baguio, Hong Kong and Tsingtao. Charge VIII . Deficiency diseases such as beriberi, pellagra, scurvy, sprue, et cetera, are common throughout Japanese internment camps. These diseases are least common in the civilian internment camps (called assembly centers) at Shanghai and in some other camps where the persons held have but recently been taken into custody or where trade by the internees themselves with outside private suppliers is allowed. It appears therefore that the great prevalence of deficiency diseases in prisoner of war camps where internees have been solely dependent upon the Japanese authorities for their food supply over an extended period is directly due to the callous failure of these authorities to utilize the possibilities for a health sustaining diet afforded by available local products. The responsibility for much of the suffering and many of the deaths from these diseases of American and Filipino prisoners of war rests directly upon the Japanese authorities. As a specific example, prisoners of war at Davao Penal Colony suffering from grave vitamin deficiencies could see from their camp trees bearing citrus fruit that they were not allowed to pluck. They were not even allowed to retrieve lemons seen floating by on a stream that runs through the camp. Charge IX . For example, in the prisoner of war camps at Hong Kong, the profits of the canteens have not been used by the holding authorities for the benefit of the prisoners. Charge X . At Baguio civilian internees have been forced to repair sawmill machinery without remuneration. Officer prisoners of war have been compelled by Major Mida, the Camp Commandant at Davao Penal Colony, to perform all kinds of labor including menial tasks such as scrubbing floors, cleaning latrines used by Japanese troops and working in the kitchens of Japanese officers. Charge XI . Ten American engineers were required to go to Corregidor in July 1942 to assist in rebuilding the military installations on that island, and prisoners of war have been worked in a machine tool shop in the arsenal at Mukden. Charge XII . The condition of health of prisoners of war in the Philippine Islands is deplorable. At San Fernando in April 1942, American and Filipino prisoners were held in a barbed-wire enclosure so overcrowded that sleep and rest were impossible. So many of them were sick and so little care was given to the sick that human excrement covered the whole area. The enclosure at San Fernando was more than 100 kilometers from Bataan and the abominable treatment given to the prisoners there cannot be explained by battle conditions. The prisoners were forced to walk this distance in 7 days under merciless driving. Many who were unable to keep up with the march were shot or bayoneted by the guards. During this journey, as well as at other times when prisoners of war were moved in the Philippine Islands, they were assembled in the open sun even when the detaining authorities could have allowed them to assemble in the shade. American and Filipino prisoners are known to have been buried alive along the roadside and persistent reports have been received of men who tried to rise from their graves but were beaten down with shovels and buried alive. At Camp O’Donnell conditions were so bad that 2,200 Americans and more than 20,000 Filipinos are reliably reported to have died in the first few months of their detention. There is no doubt that a large number of these deaths could have been prevented had the Japanese authorities provided minimum medical care for the prisoners. The so-called hospital there was absolutely inadequate to meet the situation. Prisoners of war lay sick and naked on the floor, receiving no attention and too sick to move from their own excrement. The hospital was so overcrowded that Americans were laid on the ground outside in the heat of the blazing sun. The American doctors in the camp were given no medicine, and even had no water to wash the human waste from the bodies of the patients. Eventually, when quinine was issued, there was only enough properly to take care of ten cases of malaria, while thousands of prisoners were suffering from the disease. Over 200 out of 300 prisoners from Camp O’Donnell died while they were on a work detail in Batangas. At Cabanatuan there was no medicine for the treatment of malaria until after the prisoners had been in the camp for 5 months. The first shipment of medicines from the Philippine Bed Cross was held up by the camp authorities on the pretext that they must make an inventory of the shipment. This they were so dilatory in doing that many deaths occurred before the medicine was released. Because of lack of medicines and food, scurvy broke out in the camp in the Fall of 1942. Since the prisoners had been at the camp for some months before this disease became prevalent, the responsibility for it rests upon the detaining authorities. It is reported that in the autumn of 1943 fifty percent of the American prisoners of war at Davao had a poor chance to live and that the detaining authorities had again cut the prisoner’s food ration and had withdrawn all medical attention. Though the medical care provided for civilian internees by the Japanese camp authorities appears to have been better than that provided for prisoners of war, it still does not meet the obligations placed on the holding authorities by their Government’s own free undertaking and by the laws of humanity. At the civilian internment camp Camp John Hay, childbirth took place on the floor of a small storeroom. At the same camp a female internee who was insane and whose presence was a danger to the other internees was not removed from the camp. A dentist who was interned at the camp was not permitted to bring in his own equipment. The Los Banos Camp was established at a recognized endemic center of malaria, yet quinine was not provided, and the internees were not allowed to go outside of the fence to take anti-malarial measures. The Japanese authorities have not provided sufficient medical care for the American civilians held in camps in and near Shanghai and the internees have themselves had to pay for hospitalization and medical treatment. Deaths directly traceable to inadequate care have occurred. Even in metropolitan Japan, the Japanese authorities have failed to provide medical treatment for civilian internees, and it has been necessary for Americans held at Myoshi, Yamakita, and Sumire to pay for their own medical and dental care. Charge XIV . For example the internees at Camp John Hay were not allowed to hold religious services during the first several months of the camp’s operation, and priests have not been allowed to minister to prisoners held by the Japanese in French Indochina. Charge XV . No copy of an English translation of the text of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention has been available to civilian internees or prisoners of war nor have the Japanese authorities taken other steps to inform the persons held of their rights under the terms of the Convention. Reports have been received of the Japanese authorities informing prisoners of war that they were captives, having no rights under international law or treaty. Charge XVI . At Camp O’Donnell many of the men had to live without shelter during 1942. In one case 23 officers were assigned to a shack, 14 by 20 feet in size. Drinking water was extremely scarce, it being necessary to stand in line 6 to 10 hours to get a drink. Officers had no bath for the first 35 days in the camp and had but one gallon of water each in which to have their first baths after that delay. The kitchen equipment consisted of cauldrons and a 55-gallon drum. Camotes were cooked in the cauldrons, mashed with a piece of timber, and each man was served one spoonful as his ration. In late October 1942, approximately 970 prisoners of war were transferred from the Manila area to the Davao Penal Colony on a transport vessel providing only 20 inches per man of sleeping space. Conditions on the vessel were so bad that two deaths occurred, and subsequently because of weakness some 50 percent of the prisoners fell by the roadside on the march from the water front at Lasang, Davao to the Penal Colony. The places used by the Japanese authorities for the internment of American civilians in the Philippine Islands were inadequate for the number of persons interned. At the Brent School at Baguio, 20 to 30 civilians were assigned sleeping accommodations in a room which had been intended for the use of one person. At the Columbia Country Club at Shanghai the internees were obliged to spend CRB 15 $10,000 of their own funds to have a building deloused so that they might use it for a needed dormitory. At Weihsien no refrigeration equipment was furnished by the Japanese authorities and some of the few household refrigerators of the internees were taken from them and were used by the Japanese guards, with the result that food spoiled during the summer of 1943. The lack of sanitary facilities is reported from all of these camps. Charge XVII . American personnel have suffered death and imprisonment for participation in military operations. Death and long-term imprisonment have been imposed for attempts to escape for which the maximum penalty under the Geneva Convention is 30 days arrest. Neither the American Government nor its protecting Power has been informed in the manner provided by the Convention of these cases or of many other instances when Americans were subjected to illegal punishment. Specific instances are cited under the next charge. Charge XVIII . Prisoners of war who were marched from Bataan to San Fernando in April 1942 were brutally treated by Japanese guards. The guards clubbed prisoners who tried to get water, and one prisoner was hit on the head with a club for helping a fellow prisoner who had been knocked down by a Japanese army truck. A colonel who pointed to a can of salmon by the side of the road and asked for food for the prisoners was struck on the side of his head with the call by a Japanese officer. The colonel’s face was cut open. Another colonel who had found a sympathetic Filipino with a cart was horsewhipped in the face for trying to give transportation to persons unable to walk. At Lubao a Filipino who had been run through and gutted by the Japanese was hung over a barbed-wire fence. An American Lieutenant Colonel was killed by a Japanese as he broke ranks to get a drink at a stream. Japanese sentries used rifle butts and bayonets indiscriminately in forcing exhausted prisoners of war to keep moving on the march from the Cabanatuan railroad station to Camp No. 2 in late May 1942. At Cabanatuan Lieutenant Colonels Lloyd Biggs and Howard Breitung and Lieutenant E. D. Gilbert, attempting to escape during September 1942 were severely beaten about the legs and feet and then taken out of the camp and tied to posts, were stripped and were kept tied up for 2 days. Their hands were tied behind their backs to the posts so that they could not sit down. Passing Filipinos were forced to beat them in the face with clubs. No food or water was given to them. After 2 days of torture they were taken away and, according to the statements of Japanese guards, they were killed, one of them by decapitation. Other Americans were similarly tortured and shot without trial at Cabanatuan in June or July 1942 because they endeavored to bring food into the camp. After being tied to a fence post inside the camp for 2 days they were shot. At Cabanatuan during the summer of 1942 the following incidents occurred: A Japanese sentry beat a private so brutally with a shovel across the back and the thigh that it was necessary to send him to the hospital. Another American was crippled for months after his ankle was struck by a stone thrown by a Japanese. One Japanese sentry used the shaft of a golf club to beat American prisoners, and two Americans, caught while obtaining food from Filipinos, were beaten unmercifully on the face and body. An officer was struck behind the ear with a riding crop by a Japanese interpreter. The same officer was again beaten at Davao Penal Colony and is now suffering from partial paralysis of the left side as the result of these beatings. Enlisted men who attempted to escape were beaten and put to hard labor in chains. At the Davao Penal Colony, about April 1, 1943, Sergeant McFee was shot and killed by a Japanese guard after catching a canteen full of water which had been thrown to him by another prisoner on the opposite side of a fence. The Japanese authorities attempted to explain this shooting as an effort to prevent escape. However, the guard shot the sergeant several times and, in addition, shot into the barrack on the opposite side of the fence toward the prisoner who had thrown the canteen. At about the same time and place an officer returning from a work detail tried to bring back some sugarcane for the men in the hospital. For this he was tied to a stake for 24 hours and severely beaten. In the internment camp at Baguio a boy of 16 was knocked down by a Japanese guard for talking to an internee girl, and an elderly internee was struck with a whip when he failed to rise rapidly from his chair at the approach of a Japanese officer. Mr. R. Gray died at Baguio on March 15, 1942 after being beaten and given the water cure by police authorities. At Santo Tomas, Mr. Krogstadt died in a military prison after being corporally punished for his attempted escape. Hull [The texts of telegrams 274 and 275, printed supra , were released to the press on February 11; see Department of State Bulletin , February 12, 1944, page 168. At midnight, January 28, the War and Navy Departments issued a joint press release on Japanese atrocities respecting American and Filipino prisoners of war in the Philippine Islands; see H. Doc. 393,78th Cong., 2d sess., page 1. For statement on Japanese treatment of British prisoners of war and civilian internees made by Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on January 28, see Parliamentary Debates , House of Commons, 5th series, volume 396, columns 1029–1033.] 14 Supra . 15 Central Reserve Bank notes issued by the Japanese-sponsored regime at Nanking. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A O.T./10: Airgram [Document 983] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , February 7, 1944—9 p.m. [Received February 14—5 p.m.] A–68. American Interests—Thailand—POWs. Legation’s 207, January 10. 16 The American POWs probably detained by the Japanese and are not under jurisdiction of the Thai Government. They number 194. The Japanese Embassy at Bangkok was requested by the Swiss Consulate at Bangkok to authorize a visit to these POWs. The Legation on January 22 requested the Swiss to inform its Legation at Tokyo, confidentially, the difficulties encountered in Bangkok and to take advisable action to support the representations made at Bangkok with the Japanese Government. A Swiss Note, dated February 4, quotes following English text message communicated by Japanese Embassy, Bangkok, to the Swiss Consulate there: “Concerning the visit to American POWs, has the honor to inform that the said visit has not been permitted on the reason of military purpose.” 17 The foregoing has been communicated to the Swiss Legation, Tokyo. Harrison 16 Not printed. 17 Despatch 7755, April 3, 1944, from Bern, reported the substance of an oral communication to Walter Siegenthaler, Swiss Consul at Bangkok, by a spokesman of the Japanese Embassy, as follows: The Japanese authorities do not recognize the Swiss Consulate at Bangkok as representing American and British, interests in Thailand and therefore gratuities to prisoners of war should be made to Mr. Siegenthaler in his private capacity. Receipts for relief parcels and pocket money would henceforth be signed by the Japanese Commandant and not, as before, by camp authorities and senior British Officers. Finally, the Japanese authorities do not recognize the representative of the International Red Cross Committee in Thailand. (711.94114A O.T./15) The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/356: Telegram [Document 984] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , March 1, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 10:14 a.m.] 1231. American Interests—Japan. Legation’s 1218. 18 Swiss Foreign Office notice dated February 28 adds following résumé Gorgé’s impressions following talks with Japanese Ministry Foreign Affairs. The question “atrocities” may be considered as belonging to the past. Japanese Government will reply to Department’s 274 and 275 of January 27 but principal problem remaining to be settled is present and future fate of prisoners of war. During conversations Gorgé expressed conviction that Japanese Government acting in own interest allowing protecting power exercise proper function inspection camps and recommend improvements. He pointed out American Government in strong position this connection and Japanese Government created difficult situation by refusal allow Swiss visit camps Japan which gave rise to suspicions Allied countries. Gorgé emphasized article 86 Prisoners of War Convention essential and expressed hope Japanese Minister of War would decide observe it more liberally. Also insisted delivery those prisoners of war lists which not yet delivered Swiss. Harrison 18 Dated February 29, noon, p. 1019 [ Pg. 1019 is part of Doc. 1034 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/361: Telegram [Document 985] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , March 3, 1944. [Received March 3—10:31 p.m.] 1288. Am[erican] Interests, Far East. Department’s 1164, May 15; Legation’s 3469, June 9; 4316, July 20. 19 Foreign Office note, February 28, states Swiss Minister, Tokyo, telegraphs that newspaper Nippon Times published February 11 article affirming POWs and civilian internees Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai have liberty write [and] receive letters after censorship camp commanders. As Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, still encountering great difficulties correspondence inmates civilian assembly centers and as all correspondence with other internees and POWs impossible, Swiss Minister intervened Japanese Foreign Office to inquire if regulations correspondence Shanghai camps recently modified. Swiss Minister took occasion also raise question general correspondence between POWs and protecting power for he has never received letters from POWs although Japanese authorities claim such correspondence permitted. Legation expressing appreciation action taken Swiss Minister and requesting information regarding results. Harrison 19 None printed; for summaries of 3469 and 4316, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 985 , footnote 50. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114 Pay-0/15: Telegram [Document 986] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , March 11, 1944. 812. American Interests—Japan—Prisoner of War Salaries. Your 3046, May 16 [ 18 ], 1943. 20 Request Swiss to inform Japanese Government that the United States Government accepts Japanese Government’s offer to pay American officer prisoners of war in its custody the same salaries as corresponding ranks in the Japanese armed forces. It is understood that these salaries will not include the cost of food and clothing which American officer prisoners of war will pay themselves out of their salaries. The United States Government will, on a reciprocal basis, pay Japanese officer prisoners of war of ranks equivalent to Captain and upwards in the United States Army the salaries paid by the Japanese Government to officers of these ranks in the Japanese armed forces. Japanese officer prisoners of war held by the United States Government will pay out of their salaries the cost of food and clothing. The United States Government understands that Japanese officers of ranks corresponding to First and Second Lieutenant in the United States Armed Forces are paid by the Japanese Government at the rate of 85 and 70.83 yen a month respectively. On the basis of the proposed exchange rate of one dollar equals four yen these salaries would be the equivalent of $21.25 and $17.71 a month respectively which is not considered adequate to cover the cost of their food and clothing in the United States. The United States Government will, therefore, on a unilateral basis, pay Japanese officer prisoners of war of these ranks a salary of 28 and 25 dollars a month respectively which will cover these costs and allow modest surpluses for incidentals. Hull 20 ibid. , p. 988 . The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/356: Telegram [Document 987] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , March 24, 1944—midnight. 989. American Interests—Japan. Please request Swiss Government reference Legation’s 1231, March 1, to inform Gorgé that Department cannot agree that atrocities referred to in its 274 and 275 of January 27 may be considered as belonging to the past, except to the extent that life taken cannot be restored. The examples cited in the January 27 telegrams were mentioned in the expectation that the Japanese Government (1) would promptly investigate the conditions that resulted in such atrocities, (2) would make appropriate amends, and (3) would take appropriate steps to prevent their recurrence as well as to provide henceforth correct treatment in accordance with the standard prescribed by the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. The paramount concern of the moment is, of course, as Gorgé rightly believes to obtain humane treatment for those who remain. Gorgé is to be commended for endeavoring to make the Japanese Government realize that its interests as well as those of the protected Power will best be served by complete implementation of Article 86 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. The best evidence that the Japanese Government intends henceforth to fulfill its undertaking to implement the humanitarian provisions of the Convention would be to permit representatives of the Swiss Government to visit all camps where American prisoners of war and civilian internees are held by the Japanese authorities, as required by that article. Such action would be much more effective in establishing the bona fides of the Japanese authorities than any number of verbal assurances. The Department will await with anxious interest further reports from Gorgé concerning the measure of success attending his representations. Hull The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/393: Telegram [Document 988] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , March 25, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 10:29 a.m.] 1830. American Interests, Japan. Legation’s 1231, March 1, 5080 [ 1580 ], March 15. 21 Substance informal communication Foreign Office official March 22 handed Tait 22 follows: Gorgé discussed March 11 with Shigemitsu, Japanese Foreign Minister, question POWs: Shigemitsu strongly criticized American, British campaigns which described repeatedly as “nasty”. Added these greatly irritated Japanese military, naval authorities and he endeavoring calm tempers. Japanese Government decided not yield methods intimidation. Informant stated with regard general attitude Japan his country overlook nothing toward prosecute successful war. Consequently would do nothing contrary its military interests. However, subject this reservation Japan has no intention divest itself humanitarian obligations. Shigemitsu confirmed his Government preparing reply American protest which would set forth principles Japanese authorities intend follow in matters relating POWs. As no definite decision yet taken Japanese Government, Shigemitsu unable tell Gorgé more this point. Gorgé pointed out that while Swiss Legation able visit certain camps metropolitan territory it unable visit camps situated conquered territory (except Hong Kong) and that Japan’s adversaries naturally conclude from this persistent refusal that conditions prevailing unvisited camps are not as they should be. Added that impossibility protecting power ascertain condition POWs finally resulted current situation regarding which Japan strongly complains. Gorgé expressed view rapid improvement present state of affairs would result if Japanese would apply terms Geneva Convention. Camp visits not only in interest United States, Great Britain but also Japan. Shigemitsu replied Japan applies policy conforming its principles and that within scope military necessity these are just. Shigemitsu made no further statement regarding present state affairs but screened himself behind his Government. He repeated always prepared examine with Gorgé all questions pertaining American, British interests on condition this be not under pressure intolerable for Japanese of campaigns launched Americans, British. Gorgé observed there would be no further reason this campaign if these concessions obtained. Terminated interview expressing hope conditions would soon become sufficiently favorable for him act both in interests powers protected by Switzerland and those Japan. Harrison 21 Latter not printed: it cited reports from Mr. Gorgé that he had been frequently informed at the Japanese Foreign Office that Anglo-American attacks in connection with atrocities were political maneuvers, and that Mr. Eden’s statement before the House of Commons on January 28, 1944, had caused little reaction in Japan and no visible reaction in occupied China (711.94114A/379). 22 George Tait, First Secretary of Legation in Switzerland. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A Pacific War/1131a: Telegram [Document 989] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , April 15, 1944. 1295. American Interests—Japan. Department has received reliable information that Japanese authorities have provided almost no fuel for heating the quarters occupied by civilian internees at Kobe. Please request Swiss authorities to point out to the Japanese authorities that in the climate existing at Kobe considerable quantities of fuel for heating are necessary if the quarters are to be considered sufficiently heated within the meaning of Article 10, Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, when it is applied to the treatment of civilian internees. Moreover, it is understood that the preparation of supplementary food is impossible because of lack of fuel, although Article 11, Geneva Prisoners of War Convention provides that prisoners shall receive facilities for preparing additional food. It is also reported from one camp at Kobe that no soap has been distributed by the Japanese authorities since December 1, 1943, or thereabouts. Failure of the Japanese to provide soap indicates that all sanitary measures necessary to assure the cleanliness and healthfulness of the camps are not being taken in accordance with Article 13 of the Convention. Hull The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/419: Telegram [Document 990] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , April 15, 1944—7 a.m. [Received 11:46 a.m.] 2357. American Interests—Japan. Foreign Office note April 12 states contents Department’s 990 [ 989 ], March 24, transmitted Swiss Minister, Tokyo, and encloses memorandum, translation of which follows giving substance remarks telegraphed by Gorgé following interview April 6 at Foreign Office: “Gorgé shares opinion American Government regarding measures to be taken prevent repetition acts charged against Japanese Government in treatment POWs. His representations Japanese Foreign Office always with this intention. Again referred this matter April 6 and Japanese Foreign Office confirmed Japanese reply to American Government in preparation; reply long and will be received soon. At this occasion, Gorgé resumed discussion regarding application Article 86 Geneva POW Convention and insisted on fact that Japanese authorities in permitting camp visits might eliminate suspicion that POW treatment not conformity general principles admitted and especially with Geneva Convention. Gaimusho 23 continues complain situation reported concerning certain Japanese civilians who refused declare allegiance United States. 24 In this connection Gorgé again drew attention Japanese to fact that they would be better placed in basing protests regarding Japanese citizens American hands if they show themselves more conciliatory on the question POWs in Japanese hands. He insisted that reciprocity should exist on this point between the United States and Japan which is not case since Spain permitted visit Japanese internees whereas authorization visit American POWs refused Switzerland. Situation, therefore, much better United States but Gorgé hopes with perseverance obtain improvement present conditions Far East.” Although reference not specifically made, Legation assumes foregoing replies partially to the Department’s 1073, March 30 25 (please see Legation’s 2321, April 14 26 ). Harrison 23 Japanese Foreign Office. 24 For formal Japanese protest on this matter, see Memorandum No. 86, Ex. 113.00T, April 24, from the Spanish Embassy, p. 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 1133 and Doc. 1134 ] . 25 Post , p. 1087 [ Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 1111 and Doc. 1112 ] . 26 Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 68, p. 1088 [ Pg. 1088 includes portions of Doc. 1112 , Doc. 1113 , and Doc. 1114 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114 Mail/62: Telegram [Document 991] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , April 17, 1944. [Received April 17—10:54 p.m.] 2423. American Interests, Japan. Department’s 435, February 9. 27 Foreign Office note April 14 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, telegraphed April 13, it had been advised by Japanese Foreign Office that commanders all internment camps Japan 28 informed that POWs and civilian internees should be permitted date correspondence. Harrison [For memorandum dated April 18, prepared in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, discussing, among other subjects, “Efforts of this Government in Behalf of American Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees in Japanese Hands”, see pages 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 1204 ] , 1234 [ Pg. 1234 is part of Doc. 1204 ] .] 27 Not printed. 28 In telegram 2830, May 4, the Minister in Switzerland stated that the words “and Japanese occupied territory” should have been included after “Japan” (711.94114 Mail/75). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/419: Telegram [Document 992] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , April 19, 1944. 1347. Request Swiss to inform Gorgé at Tokyo that the Department has noted with appreciation (your 2357, April 15, 7 a.m.) that he is continuing to press the Japanese Government fully to honor its commitment to implement Article 86 of the Geneva Convention and thus establish full reciprocity between visits permitted to places where Japanese nationals are held by the United States and visits to places where American nationals are held by Japan. Request Swiss also to give Gorgé following information regarding activities protecting Powers for Japanese interests: Representatives of the Spanish Embassy and Swedish Legation which have undertaken the protection of Japanese interests in the continental United States and Territory of Hawaii, respectively, have made frequent visits during the past two years to all places without exception where Japanese nationals have been held as detainees, internees, evacuees or prisoners of war, have been freely permitted to interview them without witnesses and have been allowed the greatest freedom in inspecting all features of the various places of detention. [Here follows an account of visits made by representatives of Spain and Sweden to camps where Japanese nationals were held.] The Department has just received a request from the Spanish Embassy Washington again to visit all places in the United States where Japanese nationals are held and desiring to provide complete reciprocity in this respect wishes urgently to learn from Gorgé what provision the Japanese Government has now made (or which he has good reason to believe is being made) to enable the Swiss representatives to visit all those places not yet visited where American nationals are held by Japan. The Department would be pleased particularly to learn that those places in the Philippine Islands, Netherlands Indies, Malaya, Burma and Thailand which it understands have not been visited since their establishment (in some cases more than two years ago) may now be visited and that the Swiss representatives will henceforth be permitted, as are the Spanish and Swedish representatives here, fully to enjoy the privileges guaranteed to them by Article 86 of the Convention. Hull The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.93114A/62: Telegram [Document 993] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , April 28, 1944—9 p.m. 1478. If Swiss Government has not protested Fontanel’s difficulties to Tokyo, reference your despatch 7484 of March 6, 29 and is disposed to ask Gorgé to bring them to the attention of the Japanese Government, the Department would be glad to have a communication in the following sense made by Gorgé to the Japanese Government in this connection in reference to Department’s 1347, April 19: “There has been brought to the attention of the Department of State what appears to be an unnecessarily restrictive attitude on the part of the Japanese Consulate General at Shanghai in dealing with the interests of American nationals and with the Swiss representative who is charged with their protection. This Japanese office is either unaware of or evidently misinterprets the reciprocal obligations assumed by the Japanese Government toward the United States Government in such matters. On the assumption that the Japanese Government wishes to avoid misunderstandings with respect to the extent of its fulfillment of the commitments voluntarily assumed in respect of American nationals and their interests, it is suggested that it take appropriate steps to enlighten the local Japanese authorities dealing with such matters regarding the purpose and character of such commitments and to forbid their defeating the reciprocal accomplishments thereof by local restrictive regulations of their own invention.” Department will await with interest report of action taken and results obtained. Hull 29 Not printed; it transmitted a memorandum prepared on August 9, 1943 by the Swiss Consulate General at Shanghai regarding the protection of American, British, and Netherlands isnterests in occupied China. The memorandum said in part: “While nominally friendly, relations with the Japanese Consulate General, on whose intermediary the Swiss Consulate General in almost all matters depends, are in actual practice far from satisfactory. There is a definite lack of co-operation and a pronounced tendency on the part of the Japanese Consulate General to ignore the duties of the Protecting Power and to resent any intervention on their part in favour of the Protected Nationals. Letters to the Japanese Authorities remain in most cases unanswered. In the few cases where a reply is received it is usually with great delay. On hardly any actions taken by the Japanese Authorities against enemy nationals, has the Swiss Consulate General received any prior information; thus, for instance, while the internment of enemy nationals had been proceeding already for 2 months, the Japanese Authorities maintained complete silence and on specific inquiry, pretended not to be in a position to give any information because the camps ‘did not officially exist’. The usual reply on almost all issues has been that matters are under consideration or that they have to be referred to the Central Authorities in Tokyo. In several instances we have experienced that while the local authorities declared themselves incompetent to decide on a particular issue, information from the Swiss Minister in Tokyo purported that the local Authorities were fuller authorized by the Caimusho to take all necessary decisions on this spot. In reply to personal representations on important subjects, the Japanese Consular Authorities have regularly advanced the entirely untenable argument that under the Japanese Military regime in occupied China the representative of the Protecting Power may only lend his good offices, but could not claim any such rights as might be recognized under international law to the same representative in Japan proper.” (711.98114A/62) The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/32 [Document 994] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State No. 8150 Bern , May 10, 1944. [Received June 3.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegrams Nos. 274 and 275, both dated January 27, 1944, which set forth charges made by the United States Government against the Japanese Government with respect to the mistreatment of American nationals in Japanese hands. Reference is also made to the Legation’s telegram No. 2947 of May 10, 1944, 30 which reported the receipt from the Swiss Foreign Office of the Japanese Government’s reply 31 to the Department’s telegrams under reference. Inquiry was also made in this latter whether the Department desires to have the Japanese reply transmitted by telegraph. Inasmuch as the Swiss pouch to Lisbon carrying American interests communications closes this evening, the Legation transmits herewith, without awaiting reply to its telegram No. 2947, a copy of an annex to a note dated May 9, 1944, from the Swiss Foreign Office, which contains the above-mentioned reply from the Japanese Government. Respectfully yours, For the Minister: George Tait First Secretary [Enclosure] The Japanese Foreign Office to the Swiss Legation in Japan 32 [ Tokyo , April 28, 1944.] The Japanese Government have carefully studied the communication of the United States Government transmitted under date of the 5th February by the Swiss Minister in Tokyo in charge of American interests in Japan regarding the treatment of United States citizens in areas under Japanese administration. It is considered that the United States communication under review is, as also are their previous communications, based upon a serious misunderstanding as to the position of Japan in respect of the application of the 1929 convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. This point will be dealt with in the section headed I below. The Japanese Government have taken note of the eighteen complaints enumerated in the United States communication, and have caused detailed investigations to be made into the instances given of alleged maltreatment of United States citizens. The results of these investigations are given in the section headed II below. It is stated in the United States government’s communication that in the treatment of all Japanese subjects within areas under United States administration, the United States has consistently and fully applied the provisions of the 1929 convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. But according to information received from perfectly reliable sources, the United States Government are not always applying the provisions of the said convention as fully as they have expressed themselves bound to do. This is stated in detail in the section headed III below. The Japanese Government enter the most emphatic protest on this point, 33 and demand of the United States Government an immediate investigation into each instance given, the rectification of the maltreatment, and the punishment of the persons responsible or the adoption of measures for the improvement of discipline over them. Those facts which are mentioned in the section headed IV below are based upon information from the most reliable sources. While the instances cited in this section are not specifically contemplated by the 1929 convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, they are not only contrary to the spirit of the convention but also are contrary to the principle of international law and to humane feeling. A protest concerning these matters 34 has already been lodged, but no satisfactory reply has yet been received. The Japanese Government therefore take this opportunity once again to enter an emphatic protest, and they demand that the United States Government take adequate measures to improve the state of affairs. I. The Position of Japan in Respect to the Convention of 1929 Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War As regards the treatment of prisoners of war, Japan has ratified the 1907 convention relating to the law and custom of land warfare, 35 and the 1929 convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick of armies in the field, but the Japanese Government have not ratified the convention of 1929 relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. Consequently Japan is under no obligation to be bound by that convention. However, the Japanese Government have notified the United States Government of their intention on purely humanitarian grounds to apply mutatis mutandis in the present war the provisions of the 1929 convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war to American prisoners of war within areas under Japanese administration. As regards the treatment of civilian internees, no international agreement exists, except that an expression of desire is contained in the final protocol to the 1929 convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. In the present war, the Japanese Government have notified the United States Government of their intention to apply as far as possible under the condition of reciprocity the provisions of the 1929 convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war 36 (provided that no labour is imposed upon the internees against their will by the country detaining them). By the above mentioned intention of the Japanese Government to apply mutatis mutandis the provisions of the 1929 convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war to American prisoners of war, it is meant that the provision of the convention will be applied with the modifications necessary in order to conform with the provisions of the existing laws and regulations of the country and with the requirements of the actual situation as it develops. In the same manner the provisions of that convention are also applied to American civilian internees. In the present war in greater East Asia the field of operations extends over an expansive area including many remote, undeveloped and pestridden regions with innumerable islands scattered over the ocean, involving considerable difficulties in the way of communication and transport. The change introduced by the system of aerial fighting has also made it difficult to distinguish zones of combat from other areas. The Japanese forces, which have taken under their control an unexpectedly large number of enemy nationals in these areas far distant from Japan, are making the utmost efforts to accord them fair and just treatment. Such a situation was certainly not contemplated at the time when the 1929 Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war was concluded. That Convention has not been ratified by Japan because there are provisions in it which are not acceptable to this country. The Japanese Government are, however, dealing, from a humanitarian point of view, with matters relating to prisoners of war and civilian internees, on the basis of the 1907 Convention relating to the law and custom of land warfare and the 1929 Convention for the amelioration of the conditions of the wounded and sick of armies in the field, taking moreover into consideration the provisions of the 1929 Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. These intentions of the Japanese Government have already been made known to the United States Government. In these circumstances, the Japanese Government are unable to understand how the United States Government have seen fit to enumerate certain articles of the Convention and to demand their absolute application as if the Japanese Government by the above mentioned-expression of intention had admitted an obligation to observe the provision of the Convention as a party thereto. II. Reply of the Japanese Government to the Protest of the United States Government Dated the Fifth February 1944 1) With reference to 1 and 2 of the American protest the United States Government state, whereas the Japanese Government are permitting the representatives in charge of American interests and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit prisoner of war camps, civilian internee camps and civilian centres in Japan proper, Taiwan, Chosen, China, Manchoukuo and Hongkong; the United States Government protest to the effect that the representatives of the Swiss Government in charge of American interests in Japan and in Japanese occupied territories have not been permitted to go to every place without exception where prisoners of war and civilians were interned; they have not been permitted to interview without witnesses the persons held, and have not had access to all places occupied by the prisoners. The United States Government state that the representatives of the Swiss Government in Japan are entrusted with the protection of American interests in Japanese occupied territories, whereas, as already communicated to the United States Government through the intermediary of the Swiss Government, the policy of the Japanese Government is not to recognize representation of enemy interests in Japanese occupied territories and, therefore, is not permitting visits to the war prisoner camps and civilian internee camps in those territories. Furthermore in view of the needs of military operations, visits of the representatives of relief societies and others also are not permitted for the time being. For interviewing prisoners of war, the presence of witnesses is required by Japanese regulations enacted in accordance with the regulations concerning the law and custom of land warfare, annexed to the Convention of 1907 ratified by Japan. The United States Government protest to the effect that Swiss representatives at Shanghai, during their visits to the camps, were closely escorted by representatives of the Japanese Consulate General and were not able to see all parts of camps. According to the investigation, however, the Consul General of Switzerland walked at the head of the visiting party and inspected the camps freely, and though staff members of the Consulate General did accompany him they did so as a matter of courtesy. 2) With reference to 3 and 4 of the American protest the United States Government alleged that American nationals were not permitted to forward complaints to the competent Japanese authorities or to representatives of the protecting power, or that the Japanese authorities had punished or had threatened to punish those who made complaints. But, in the prisoner of war camps and civil internment camps in areas under Japanese administration, communications addressed by the prisoners of war and internees to the detaining authorities of the camps are not rejected. Communications addressed to the representatives of the protecting power are being forwarded in exactly the same way as in the case of the mail sent by the prisoners of war, although there might have been some difficulties at the time of opening the camps. Thus, the forwarding of complaints has not been prevented and in no case was a punishment inflicted merely on account of complaints. The protest of the United States Government to the effect that dental appointments at the Columbia Country Club at Shanghai were cancelled in the summer of 1943 for punishment must be due to some misunderstanding. According to investigations carried out by the Authorities of the Japanese Government there was no such incident. Neither was there a case of punishment inflicted on the internees at the civilian centre at Yangchow. 3) With reference to 5 of the American protest the United States Government state to the effect that the Japanese Government failed to furnish needed clothing to American nationals and cite the suffering of the internees at Hongkong, Kobe and in the Philippines, whereas the Japanese Government are giving specially thorough consideration to the matter and proper measures are being taken, with the view to furnishing clothing at the expense of the Japanese Government to the extent that is necessary. As regards the difficulty of furnishing shoes to the internees at Hongkong, owing to the fact that there was no stock of boots or shoes in the city at the time they were interned, the Authorities could not avoid supplying “sandals” as substitutes and this measure was not taken expressly to cause difficulty or inconvenience in their daily life. As for the internees transferred from the island of Guam to Kobe, since they possessed no winter clothes, the Authorities concerned of the Japanese Government immediately set about procuring the material and preparing the necessary clothing for them. In the meantime, as the Swiss Consulate at Kobe was ready to offer to the internees the heavy clothing, the Japanese Authorities helped in securing the materials. The question of providing winter clothing was then satisfactorily disposed of, thanks to the efforts of the Swiss Consulate. 37 As regards the statement to the effect that the prisoners of war in the Philippines were forced to labour without shoes and clad only in loin clothes, exactly the same as in the case of Hongkong, when no boots or shoes are provided, their substitutes are given and clothing for use while at work is also provided. It is possible however that the prisoners in question, while at work in the tropical climate, chose to remove their clothes on account of heat. 4) With reference to 6 of the American protest the United States Government protest to the effect that the Japanese Authorities confiscated personal effects from American civilian internees and prisoners of war. According to the regulations concerning the treatment of prisoners of war in Japan, when the persons liable to treatment as prisoners of war are captured, their personal effects are examined at once; arms, munitions and any other article liable to military use are confiscated; other articles are either held in custody; (in which case a receipt for the articles issued to the owner), or handed back to the owner, allowing him to carry them. The troop concerned then must prepare an inventory of the articles confiscated or held in custody; the inventory in question must be handed over to the camp Authorities along with the articles which had been held in custody when the prisoners of war are transferred to the prisoner of war camp. The articles thus handed over must be held in custody by the Government Authorities and returned to the owners when the latter are freed. These regulations are strictly observed in Japan. The United States Government state that at the prisoner of war camps in the Philippine islands, prisoner of war enclosures at Mariveles Bay, civilian internment camps at Baguio, Canton, Chefoo, Peking, Manila, Tsingtao, Weihsien and Yangchow, and at civilian centres of the Ash camp, Chapei camp, Lungwha camp and Pootung camp in or near Shanghai, the articles most needed by the prisoners and internees have been taken. Since the statement is mere enumeration of various camps, and centres, it was difficult to investigate the matter. According to enquiries, however, made by the Japanese Authorities, no such incident, as is complained of, occurred anywhere. At Tsingtao, neither a prisoner of war camp, nor a civil internment camp, nor a civilian centre has ever been set up. As regards the statement that the personal effects of an American prisoner of war were taken, when he was captured in the Philippine islands in April, so far no such occurrence is found by the investigation carried out by the Japanese Government. 5) With reference to 7 of the American protest the United States Government state that whereas the Japanese Government are enforcing strict regulations with a view to according fair treatment under all circumstances, American prisoners of war and civilian internees have been subjected to insults and public curiosity. The allegation is at variance with the treatment actually accorded to prisoners of war and civilian internees. The United States Government protest by citing the case of a march through Manila city by American prisoners of war, but as a matter of fact, the latter took the road which was necessary in going to the camp. It entailed neither insult nor public curiosity. As for the statement to the effect that at Baguio, Hongkong and Tsingtao, the public was allowed to visit the internment camps and encouraged to satisfy curiosity regarding the persons held: at Tsingtao, to begin with, neither a prisoner of war camp nor a civil internment camp has been set up, as already pointed out. At all camps and centres in areas under Japanese administration, the entrance of the public (including visits and interviews) to the camps and centres is strictly under official control and no one is allowed to enter without the permission of the commander of the garrison or of the supervising Authorities. At Hongkong, permission of the Governor General is required. A foreigner wishing to enter a prisoner of war or internment camp must obtain the permission of the War Minister, or of the supervising Authorities in case of civilian internment camp. Even a soldier is not allowed to enter without due cause. Such being the case at the prisoner of war camps and civil internment camps under the supervision of the Japanese Authorities, no such incidents as are complained about by the United States Government have ever occurred. 6) With reference to 8) of the American protest the United States Government state to the effect that the Japanese Government refused to provide health sustaining food to the prisoners of war held by them or did not permit the United States to make regular shipments in a continuing basis under appropriate arrangements of supplemental food and medical supplies and, because of this, the prisoners of war are suffering from diseases resulting from malnutrition and deficiency. On the contrary, the Japanese Government are providing the prisoners of war with food, which is exactly the same as the food for their own reserve army troops in respect of both quantity and quality. Moreover, the authorities are giving specially considerate treatment to the prisoners of war, by supplying them for example with European meals and thus taking the national and racial customs of prisoners into special consideration. The conditions of health of the prisoners and the labour performed by them are watched with special care and measures which are considered best are being taken in supplying food to them. The United States Government regard the deficiency diseases as common throughout Japanese internment camps, and comparing the health conditions of internees at Shanghai and in the Philippines, state that these diseases are relatively less common among the internees at Shanghai on account of presents sent in for them from the outside whereas deficiency diseases prevail among the majority of American prisoners of war in the Philippines. As regards the protest of the United States Government relating to the conditions in the Philippine Islands, as mentioned at length in the reply of the Japanese Government dated April 24th, 1944, sent in response to the protest of the United States Government which was forwarded by the Swiss Minister in Tokyo on December 23rd 1942, 38 the best efforts were made to procure and furnish food at the internment camps at Santo Tomas in the Philippines, Davao and elsewhere, despite the difficulties encountered by the Japanese army. That the food supply of the American army was inferior and general sanitary and health conditions had already reached a precarious state at the time the Japanese army occupied the Philippine Islands is evident by the reports of enemy army records which have come into the possession of the Japanese army. The following is a résumé of the said record relating to health conditions that prevailed; conditions of illness of American soldiers in Bataan front due to malnutrition after the ration was reduced to two meals a day toward the end of January 1942. a ) Field artillery corps: Due to vitamin deficiency diseases a certain number of the soldiers has shown the symptoms of paralysis and dropsy of the legs. Their eyes and eyelids were swollen up. The soldiers began to eat covetously various wild plants; some have eaten by mistake noxious plants. Their daily ration was estimated at less than 1500 calories and the soldiers who performed heavy labour lost gradually their vitality. b ) The second field artillery regiment: Many men’s faces turned pale and haggard, suffering beriberi. Their legs were swollen up due to undernourishment. c ) The flying corps: Among the soldiers some had the legs swollen up and the haemorrhage of the gums. Generally the body weight decreased. Two-thirds of the soldiers became ill because of malnutrition. Toward the end of March some had eaten coupongnut and bataannut. Those who have eaten the first were subject to attacks of vertigo while those who have taken the latter suffered from diarrhoea. Even though they realised the dangerous consequences they have not ceased to eat them as the result of lack of provisions. d ) Field hospital: Soldiers who were admitted to the hospital were suffering from malaria or looked pale and haggard while many of them had their lower thighs swollen up due to the lack of proper nutritions. Furthermore according to the investigation by the Japanese Authorities it was found that in the field hospital of American Army near Cap Carben there were about 6000 patients of American and Filipino soldiers on the day of their surrender. The American Army Authorities forcibly ejected from the hospital the Filipino soldiers who were dangerously wounded and seriously ill with malaria by reason of food shortage. Many Filipino soldiers suffered death soon after. From these facts, it is clear that prior to their capitulation, the health conditions of the American Army had already reached a precarious state owing to malnutrition and general decline of health, prevalence of beriberi, malaria, etc. The situation was made worse still by the tactics adopted by the American army of burning, destroying and reducing to ashes all the food and medical supplies that had been stored. Under the war conditions at that time, the Japanese army itself was short of reserve food; the number of American prisoners of war exceeded by far the original expectation; civilian people in general were also short of food supply so that food could not be obtained from them. In these circumstances, it was inevitable that food supply for the prisoners of war captured by the Japanese army would be insufficient and medical treatment for them could hardly be as satisfactory as would be desired. In spite of all these difficulties, the Authorities of the Japanese Government did their utmost to provide for the prisoners of war. The remarkable improvement made in health conditions of the prisoners of war in the Philippine Islands thereafter is clearly traceable by the reduction of death cases among the prisoners of war during 1943. Of approximately 10,000 American prisoners of war in all of the Philippine Islands in 1943, the number of deaths was 168. In November of that year, there was only one case of death. The United States Government compare the situation in the Philippine Islands with the health conditions of the internees at Shanghai. At Shanghai even enemy aliens are living peacefully under the protection of the Japanese Authorities, but on the other hand, in the Philippine Islands they were subject to the atrocious tactics adopted by the American army of reducing all to ashes. The Japanese Government cannot but express utter astonishment when the United States Government close their eyes to these facts and venture to censure the Japanese Government, ignoring all the efforts made by the Authorities of the Japanese Government and holding Japan responsible for all. As regards the relief supplies mentioned in the protest of the United States Government, the Japanese Government gave permission to the International Committee of the Red Cross for the reception of the relief articles of approximately ten thousand tons forwarded by the American Red Cross Society on two occasions by the Japanese-American exchange vessels. Permission was also given for delivery of these articles to every prisoner of war camp and civil internment camp. The difficulty of granting further permission for transportation of relief supplies by vessels of neutral powers through the maritime areas of war operation under present conditions of war has already been communicated to the United States Government. 39 At the same time the Japanese Government are at present seriously studying to solve the question, and the Japanese Government have not at all refused the shipment of relief supplies, as has been alleged by the American Authorities. 7) With reference to 9 of the American protest the United States Government state to the effect that the Japanese Authorities turned to improper and prohibited uses the profits from the sale of goods in camp canteens instead of devoting them to the welfare of the persons held in the camps. On the contrary the following is the actual handling of profits from the sale of goods in camp canteens according to the investigations carried out: ( a ) The profits from the sale of goods in camp canteens at each prisoner of war camp are being used for the welfare of the interned prisoners of war by their representatives at each camp. ( b ) At civil internment camps in Japan proper, no camp canteen has been set up, because, the number of internees being small, it is more convenient to allow them to purchase from the outside whatever they desire than to store materials in the canteens; hence no question of profits arises. ( c ) The protest of the United States Government is irrelevant to the prisoner of war camp at Hongkong because there the articles sold to the war prisoners are sold at cost price and no profits accrue. According to the report of Mr. Egle representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross at Shanghai who visited the prisoner of war camp at Hongkong in July 1942, ‘conditions of living quarters, of food and clothing, camp canteen, sanitary corps, dental treatment, amusements, provisions, library, observance of religious rites, etc., have been found to be quite satisfactory. The interned prisoners expressed gratitude to the Authorities for their kind treatment’. The Japanese Government regret that the United States Government have raised a protest restoring [ regarding? ] the measures taken by the Japanese Authorities in favour of the prisoners interned and ignoring such facts as are mentioned above. 8) With reference to 10 and 11 of the American protest the United States Government protest to the effect that contrary to the specific undertaking of the Japanese Government, the detaining Authorities compelled civilians to perform labour other than that connected with the administration, maintenance and management of internment camps; and officers in prisoner of war camps were forced to labour, and non-commissioned officers to do other than supervisory labour. There is also a statement to the effect that prisoners of war were required to perform labour that had a direct relation with war operations. As already communicated to the Swiss Legation in Tokyo by the verbal votes of January 28 and February 4 [ 20 ], 40 1943, regarding intentions with respect to the performance of labour by prisoners of war, 41 the Japanese Government are having prisoners of war perform labour which involves no danger in industry, civil engineering, mining and transportation, they are also performing labour which has no direct relation with war operations. Civilian internees are not required to perform labour other than that connected with the administration, maintenance and management of internment camps. As regards the incident alluded to, by the United States Government, of civilian internees forced to repair machinery without remuneration in the Philippines, no such incident occurred according to the investigation carried out by the Japanese Authorities. The information must be due to some misunderstanding. At prisoner of war camps, needless to say, no officer prisoner is forced to perform neither labour nor menial labour, since there are always soldiers on duty who perform the personal errands of the officers to whom they are detailed. Though it is claimed that ten American engineers were required to assist in rebuilding the military installations in Corregidor island in 1942, an investigation has clearly brought out the facts that the work of cleaning away and putting in order in the locality such as Corregidor, did require the assistance of expert engineers who are familiar with the locality. It was not, however, in the least in the sense to assist in rebuilding any military installations. Their service was required in directing the work of cleaning away or putting in order damaged or destroyed buildings and roads, only to such an extent that it could be regarded as ordinary labour and this cannot be claimed to have a direct relation with war operations. It is also protested that American prisoners of war were made to work in a machine tool shop in the arsenal at Mukden, but this is due to some misinformation. The plant where prisoners of war worked was an ordinary factory with no relation whatever to the arsenal. 9) With reference to 12 of American protest the United States Govt charge that medical care has in many instances been denied to prisoners of war and civilian internees, and when given has been generally so poor as to cause unnecessary sufferings and deaths, adding that conditions of health of prisoners of war in the Philippine islands is deplorable. As has been explained above under the section six relating to rations for prisoners of war, the inadequacy of food and medical supplies for the prisoners of war captured by the Japanese forces in the Philippines was absolutely unavoidable owing largely to the action of the American forces who in pursuance of their “scorched earth” tactics had burned vital commodities, to the war situation which rendered difficult for procuring food and medical supplies even for the use for Japanese armies, and also to the unexpectedly large numbers of American soldiers surrendered which caused further drain of the provisions of [ on ] hand. In any case, the general state of health of these prisoners of war at the time of their capture, have been already extremely poor as shown by the reports left by American army surgeons. The Japanese Authorities are paying proper attention to the health of all prisoners of war and taking appropriate measures including monthly health medical examinations and vaccinations and preventive injections, and recesses for those engaged in labor. As regards food, the daily rations provided war prisoners by the Authorities concerned are being criticized as being far too good both in quality and quantity as compared with the food generally available. In the Philippines, epidemic squads were organized in 1942, to which was assigned the task of preventing contagious diseases, resulting in a notable improvement in the general conditions of health among the prisoners and in the reduction of deaths as is pointed out under the above mentioned paragraph 6). All these are entirely due to the devoted services of the medical corps of the Japanese armies. The American Government charge that certain internees in the civilian camps at Shanghai and in Japan proper were made to pay for their own medical care and hospital expenses. At all the internment camps the Authorities have taken measures for proper medical care, and for hospitalization free of charge. However, in case any internee requests for a physician and hospital of his own choice, the request is granted on the condition he pays the costs on his own account. Accordingly, it is quite proper that those at Shanghai and in Japan proper, who chose their own hospitals and doctors, should have paid the costs on their own accounts. 10) With reference to 13 of the American protest the United States Government state that the Japanese Government have reported names of only a part of the American prisoners of war and civilian internees and of the American combatants found dead by Japanese forces. Immediately upon the outbreak of the war of greater East Asia the Japanese Government established the War Prisoners Information Bureau, to which has been assigned the task of exchanging information regarding prisoners of war, conducting investigations, compiling individual cards, and transmitting names. The Japanese Government are attaching great importance to the reporting of the names of the war prisoners and internees in their hands, and have been exerting special efforts in that direction. As fast as individual cards are filed, the names entered thereon are being cabled regardless of nationality to the Central Agency of the War Prisoners Informations at Geneva. By the end of March 1944, the number of the names so reported exceeded at 145000, including more than 25660 of American nationality. Further reports will continue to be made hereafter. 11) With reference to 14 of the American protest, the United States Government charge that the Japanese Government have not permitted internees and prisoners of war freely to exercise their religion. Religious freedom is recognised by the Japanese Government at all the war prisoner camps and internment camps. While it may be true that at some camps during first few weeks the incompletion of the necessary facilities, the absence of ministers or priests and other circumstances rendered it difficult to hold religious exercises, the Japanese Authorities nowhere ever prevented intentionally the free exercise of religion by prisoners of war and internees. In fact, they are being afforded special facilities in this respect, as for instance, in the Tokyo war prisoner camp and internment camp where wine and bread for holy communion are allowed to be sent in and priests from outside are admitted in compliance with the request of the Vatican Delegate, for administering the last rites to those of the Roman Catholic faith. In the Philippines, the Japanese camp Authorities are according the inmates such treatment as is suitable to their habits and manners beside respecting their persons and recognizing their complete religious freedom. Those instances alleged by the American Government to have taken place at Camp John Hay and in French Indochina appear to be based upon erroneous reports. 12) With reference to 15 of the American protest the United States Government protest against the non-posting of an English text of the Geneva Convention at the camps. The Japanese Government, as they are not applying the 1929 Convention exactly as it stands, have not posted the text of the said convention. But they will be prepared to post the rules and regulations concerning the treatment of war prisoners which they have promulgated in accordance with the 1907 Convention relating to law and customs of land warfare at all the camps for war prisoners and for civilian internees. 13) With reference to 16 of the American protest the United States Government allege that Japanese Government have failed to provide adequate equipment and accommodations in prisoner of war and internment camps, and transports and forced them to subsist in inhuman conditions. The allegation is utterly unfounded. It is the policy of the Japanese Government to provide prisoners of war with such shelter as will ensure health and sanitation as far as possible. American prisoners of war are being housed in buildings free from damp, properly lighted and heated, with sleeping quarters which are in respect of space, ventilation and other accommodations, entirely the same as those for Japanese army. The report by the representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross who have inspected these places, points out that these American prisoners of war are being placed in proper buildings fully adequate for the purposes of health preservation. The American note cites instances in the Philippine Islands. The conditions in the Philippines during the early days of Japanese occupation have already been described under 6) and 9). According to the investigations conducted by the Japanese Government into the matter of transportation of prisoners of war, all the American war prisoners, about 200 in number, who were captured in the vicinity of Limay during the days, May 10th–20th 1942, were, after being given food, transported in automobiles and under the supervision of Japanese officers to the temporary prisoners of war camp. Again some two hundred Americans, who surrendered during May 12th-20th, in the same year, were all sent to the temporary camp at Jalanga in motor trucks for munitions after they had been duly provided with food. American civilian internees in internment camps at Baguio and elsewhere in the islands are all grateful to the treatment accorded by the Japanese authorities. As regards the alleged confiscation by Japanese guards at Weihsien internment camp of the refrigerators belonging to American internees, the fact of the case as have been brought to light as the result of official investigation is merely that the household refrigerators some internees brought with them were used for the benefit of the entire camp 14) With reference to 17 of the American protest, the United States Government protest against the non-application by the Japanese Government of the provisions of the 1929 Geneva Convention with regard to trial and punishment of prisoners of war. The views of the Japanese Government relating to the punishment of war prisoners have been communicated and fully explained in their notes of February 17th, 42 and of March 3rd, 1943, 43 addressed to the Swiss Minister in Tokyo. 15) With reference to 18 of the American protest, the American note charges the Japanese Authorities with inflicting corporal punishment and torture upon American nationals, citing a number of instances alleged to have occurred in the Philippines. As has been repeatedly stated, it is the policy of the Japanese Government to accord a fair and equitable treatment to all prisoners of war, and in pursuance of that policy the Japanese Authorities concerned are devoting their best efforts to the handling of the war prisoners, and paying the most careful attention to every detail so as to ensure the disposition of all matters under strict military discipline. The instances cited in the American note all go back to the early days of Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The investigations which have been conducted under difficult circumstances owing to the lapse of time since the alleged events occurred, have not so far brought out any result which substantiate those allegations. III. Protest of the Japanese Government against cases of illtreatment by the American Authorities of Japanese held by the Authorities of the United States Government (1) The United States Government stated that when the representatives of the protecting powers for Japanese interests in the United States visited the internment camps and relocation centers where Japanese nationals were held, the representatives have spoken at length without witnesses with the Japanese internees and evacuees and fully inspected the places; but such was not the case. At a large number of internment camps and relocation centers the interview of the representatives of protecting powers for Japanese interests took place in presence of camp Authorities and officials of the State Department, etc., and the representatives were able to inspect only such places as would raise no question and could not visit all parts of the camp. When visiting the internment camp at Sand Island in Hawaii, for instance, the representatives were generally not allowed to converse with the internees at all, but could only interview their representatives. Moreover, the said interview took place in the presence of the Authorities of the internment camp, the Army Authorities, etc., and the questions raised by the internees were severely restricted. (2) The Authorities of the United States have not improved the treatment despite the fact that complaints have been made by Japanese internees and have not permitted to forward their complaints when they wished to appeal to the representatives of the Protecting Powers. There are numerous instances of punishment, or threats thereof, inflicted on those who have complained. At the temporary camp at Ellis Island, the person who made complaints concerning food on behalf of all inmates was punished being designated as “detainee for the duration of war” and he was sent subsequently to Fort Missoula. In July 1942, when the Japanese internees at the Lordsburg internment camp had their delegates complain about labour, other than that connected with the internment camp, which they had been forced to perform, the delegates were either placed under confinement or forbidden thereafter to leave the building of the internment camp. And not only that, they were forbidden to buy things at the camp canteen. The Authorities of the Livingston internment camp decreased the amount of food of those who raised complaints about labour. At the Fort Missoula internment camp also the Authorities placed under confinement those who made complaints. (3) As regards the supply of clothing, the Authorities of the United States did not supply enough winter clothing to the Japanese nationals transferred from Hawaii to the snow covered McCoy internment camp, and thereby exposed the interned Japanese to the severe cold. (4) The United States Authorities confiscated from every internee Japanese books, printed matter, metals (including camera, fountain pens, cigarette lighter, watches, cuffbuttons, badges, travelling knife and fork, coins, etc.), rubber wares (including the eraser attached to pencils), diapers for infants, drugs, canned food (including vegetables in tin boxes intended for children and canned milk for feeding infants) etc. In confiscating personal effects, strict inspection was enforced. For instance, at the temporary camp at Ellis Island, for a period of three days from June 7, 1942, the officials of Federal Bureau of Investigation and Customs officers inspected the personal effects of the passengers of the exchange vessel without the least concern about the damage caused thereby, thus forcibly opening watches and damaging them; cutting the lapel of coats and undoing the seams; cutting or tearing belts etc. Not only they completely undressed the repatriates but also carried on a thorough search even inside their hair. Adhesive plaster applied to cuts or wounds were ripped off. Women also were subjected to severe physical examination, and confiscation was carried out but not on a few occasions no receipt was issued for articles confiscated. (5) The Japanese civilian internees and evacuees have been subjected to insults and public curiosity. Immediately after the outbreak of war, one of approximately two hundred Japanese interned at Sand Island having happened to carry a small knife made by himself, the authorities of the camp made a thorough search of all the internees. In carrying out the search, the Japanese were lined up and left stark naked for two whole hours. The wife (of British extraction) of Mr. Taoka, manager of San Francisco branch of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and their daughter were forced to remove all their clothes and were examined at the temporary camp at Ellis Island in 1943. A staff member of the Japanese Consulate at Los Angeles, while being transferred from Fort Missoula to White Sulphur Springs in April 1942, was forced to ride an ordinary coach despite the fact that he was suffering from illness and moreover, was handcuffed by the Immigration officer who accompanied him, and chained to the bed even while sleeping and thus was treated like a criminal before the eyes of other passengers. (6) Japanese nationals interned in the United States are not often receiving food either in quality or quantity necessary for the maintenance of health. The food for the internees at the Fort Missoula internment camp was being provided at 30 cents per head per day. At the Kennedy internment camp, food was to be provided at 51 cents per head per day, but the Authorities of the said camp, as the director of the camp admitted, kept back 10 cents and food was actually provided at 41 cents. The Japanese residing in Virginia were imprisoned, when the war broke out, in a negro prison and were subjected to the same treatment as negro prisoners in respect of food and other matters. Not only was contact with the outside forbidden, but nothing was permitted to be sent in from the outside. At the Fort Missoula internment camp, the Authorities refused to transmit to the internees the drugs sent in by their families, with the excuse of prevention of the use of poison, and the result was that those suffering from chronic illness had difficulty in recovery. Japanese nationals interned at the internment camps at Uption, Ellis Island, Livingston, and Sand Island suffered from weakening eyesight, their weight decreased, and the number of people requiring eye glasses increased on account of malnutrition. (7) At the Livingston internment camp, a large portion of the profits made by sales at the canteen was spent for purchasing second hand car for the use of the officers guarding the camp and also for repainting it. (8) The Japanese interned at the internment camps in the United States have been forced to perform labour other than that connected with the administration, management and maintenance of the camps. At the Lordsburg internment camp, the United States Authorities forced Japanese nationals to engage in the transport of gravel and road repairing outside the camp, transport of empty cans and scrap iron to the railway station, cleaning of toilets in the guards barracks and in the recreation hall. One of the soldiers forced the Japanese to perform labour under the blazing sun at the point of the gun, threatening to kill if they dared to take a rest. At the Livingston internment camp, the Japanese were forced to cut grass outside the camp and also to engage in the work of leveling the ground adjacent to the camp for the construction of an aviation field. At Fort Missoula, the Authorities, claiming that the Japanese were duty bound to work without compensation, obliged the Japanese to engage in lanudry work for approximately one thousand persons interned in the camp including Italians. Furthermore, they obliged the Japanese to clear the stable of the camp Authorities and to engage in the construction of a Japanese garden and swimming pool for Americans not connected with the camp, threatening the Japanese internees that disagreeable consequences would ensue if they should refuse to work. The Authorities of the Santa Fe internment camp forced the Japanese over their protest to engage in building work that had been delayed on account of a strike. The Japanese internees at Sand Island were forced to engage without compensation in the work of putting up tents for the interned Germans and Italians, building fences, planting vegetables and performing laundry work for American officers and men. The Japanese who were handed over to the United States army by the Authorities of Panama at the outbreak of the war were subjected to cruel treatment, being obliged to perform the work of transporting square timber, sharpening and repairing saws, digging holes in the ground for water closets, mixing gravel with cement and so forth. The internment Authorities let the Japanese dig a hole and then fill it again immediately, or let them load a truck with mud with their bare hands using no tools. Neither drinking water nor any rest was allowed. The Japanese who were exhausted and worn were beaten or kicked and all this lasted over a month. (9) The United States Authorities subjected the interned Japanese to engage in work directly connected with war operations. The Authorities of the Livingston internment camp subjected the Japanese to the work of removing stumps in the military aviation field, infested with poisonous snakes adjacent to the United States military barracks. The Authorities of the Lordsburg internment camp forced the Japanese to engage in the digging of the trenches and transport of the cases containing rifles and cannon shells. In May 1942 the director of the Manzanar relocation center put the Japanese to the work of manufacturing camouflage nets for military use and threatened them with decreased food allowances or worse of [ sic ] treatment in the event that production is not increased. At the Sand Island internment camp, the Japanese were forced to engage in the dangerous work of digging out from the ground unexploded shells of anti-aircraft guns beside digging trenches. In enforcing the performance of the dangerous work, the United States Authorities took no proper measures to forestall possible injury or to minimize the risk. (10) The United States Authorities have provided no medical treatment to the interned Japanese. Not only are the medical provisions at the internment camps and relocation centers generally imperfect, but the medical staff and pharmaceutical provisions are so defective and deficient that they have caused unnecessary suffering to the patients and have even resulted in deaths as a consequence. The United States Authorities permitted Sasaichi Kato in Los Angeles who had received an injury in his right eye no time for treatment. They interned him first at Tuhunga, transferring him next to the internment camp at Santa Fe but not allowing him to receive treatment in the meantime, with the result that the man eventually lost his eyesight completely. One Ouchi was gravely ill when he was handed over to the American Authorities in Panama, but the Authorities gave him neither medical treatment, nor liquid nourishment which was all he could take. His wife requested that he be taken into Panama hospital but the request was not heeded, and he was sent on to Fort Sill in April 1942 together with other Japanese internees. As no nurse was provided at the new camp, his fellow internees looked after him, but no medical treatment having been given, he finally died on May 1st. (11) The United States Government have sent neither a list of names nor any detailed official communication concerning the interned Japanese who have been shot to death or died of accidents: nor have they forwarded any precise and complete list regarding all of the interned Japanese. Whereas the total number of evacuees held at relocation centers in the United States amounts to approximately one hundred thousand, the names communicated only recently to Japan are no more than six thousand. (12) As regards free exercise of religious rites, in July 1942, while Japanese nationals interned at the Lordsburg internment camp were observing ceremonial rites in the dining hall, several guards with bayonets in their hands broke into the hall before the ceremony was over and drove out all the participants. (13) At the internment camps in the United States, neither the text, nor Japanese translation, of the international convention of 1929 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war is posted. In spite of repeated requests of the interned Japanese to the holding Authorities for access to the text of the convention, they were not able to receive the text for a period of from half a year to a whole year after their internment. (14) At the internment camps, temporary camps, and relocation centers, and for transport facilities, etc. in the United States, there is no adequate equipment or accommodation and the Japanese have been subjected to inhuman treatment. At the detention place of University Station in Los Angeles, thirteen Japanese were jammed into a room which could admit only two persons. Only prisoners clothes could be had and they spent a whole day and night there without bedding and without food. The Japanese in that city were interned in the Lincoln Heights jail and were left there under confinement in cells for a period of two weeks. At the internment camp at Sand Island, meals were always served outdoors on the lawn regardless of weather, rain or shine, but the internees on being transferred thence to the American mainland were herded into the bottom of the boat which was severely guarded with iron nets on all sides and locked. No water was given even for washing one’s face. The Japanese who were transported from Panama to the United States were also jammed in the bottom of the boat filled with offensive smells. The women’s toilets at the Manzanar relocation center were so imperfectly constructed having no partitions between one toilet and another. The American Catholic nuns who visited the camp noticed this and protested. (15) The Authorities of the United States maltreated Japanese nationals and inflicted punishment on them without trial in contravention of the principles of humanity. a ) At the internment camp at Fort George Meade, Japanese nationals were forced en masse to salute the American flag day after day, but in March 1943, one Adachi was placed in solitary confinement on the charge that he failed to attend the saluting ceremony and was given only water and bread for three days and nights. In May 1942, a guard at Fort Sill, seeing Kenzaburo Oshima who had become insane as a result of insomnia, approaching the barbed wire fence, was on the point of firing at the man, when a Japanese who saw this cried out: “Don’t fire! he is insane.” Despite this warning, the guard shot Oshima to death. In April 1943 at the Topaz relocation center, one Wakasa was shot to death on pretext of not responding to the guard questioning him. In July 1942, Shiro Obata (53 years), a patient of pulmonary tuberculosis and Hirota Isomura (56 years) suffering from spinal disease while being transferred from the Bismarck internment camp to Lordsburg camp with other internees, parted company from the group on account of their illness and inability to walk and where [ were ] later shot to death by the guards who had escorted them, on the pretext that they had attempted escape. An American soldier who had witnessed the incident and rejoined the company immediately afterwards remarked to the Japanese internees: “Had I been the guard escorting the two men, I would not have shot them to death”. A Japanese in Los Angeles who had received an operation for cancer in the stomach and was still in such a condition that excretion had to be effected by means of a rubber tube run into the abdomen was interned by the United States Authorities who permitted him no opportunity for receiving treatment with the result that the man finally died. Shigeichi Hazama had received an operation for cancer in the rectum and was in a grave condition but he was transported from his bed to Fort Missoula for internment. During the train trip of three days and nights, the man was treated indiscriminately like an ordinary healthy person and as a result finally died. One Nakamura was assaulted by policeman at a police station in Los Angeles and several of his front teeth were broken. He was subsequently interned in the internment camp at Fort Missoula. The Authorities of the camp attempted to force the man to sign a document stating that the assault was the result of his own fault, but when he declined to write his signature, he was again assaulted and then placed under confinement. At the internment camp at Fort Lincoln likewise, a Japanese was beaten and kicked by the inspecting officer and two of his front teeth were broken. Many similar incidents occurred at other internment camps in the United States. b ) In the Philippine islands, 44 the United States Authorities resorted to extreme violence and maltreated all Japanese nationals as described below: in Manila, at the outbreak of the war, the United States Authorities carried out a wholesale arrest of Japanese nationals, broke into their private residences and shops and plundered money and various other articles. Arrests were made indiscriminately irrespective of whether the person was old, young or invalid. People were all bound with rope and taken to places for internment. Countless numbers of persons were beaten and kicked. Those who were arrested at other than their own homes were prevented from having sent from their homes daily necessaries, much less changes of clothing. The internment quarters consisted of only three rooms of approximately each four hundred square metres and no less than three thousand five hundred persons were confined therein. The rooms were not only overcrowded, but there were neither chairs to sit on nor bedding to sleep in, the internees sleeping on the bare floor. Neither food nor even a drop of water was provided for them. Later they were transferred to houses provided by Japanese Commercial Establishments for their employees, but congestion was by no means eased. Finally provisions were brought from Japanese owned warehouses and consumed. Of these internees 270 people were interned in the Montenluba prison. For two whole days, these people were subjected, at the point of machine guns to the meaningless labour of digging holes in the ground and then filling them up again and of carrying water up steep hills after having wilfully stopped the iced water supply. Any one daring to take a rest was struck on the head with oak clubs. The same people were forced to clean the kitchen and toilet of the guards office and to repair the road outside the prison compounds. For nearly a fortnight, no vegetables were supplied, and though thereby cases of sickness occurred no medicine was to be had. Neither treatment by one of the interned Japanese doctors, nor by hospital physicians was permitted and finally death ensued. On the night of December 23rd, 1941, as the electric wire in front of the Japanese Consul General’s official residence in Manila caught fire, the American forces watching the area commenced to fire at the house, claiming that it was the work of the staff members of the Consulate General. They were obliged to escape from the danger. The Japanese residing at Davao, numbering eighteen thousand were placed under confinement en masse at the outbreak of the war and subjected to excessive labour by the American military forces, digging air-raid shelters and trenches day in and day out. The accommodation at the internment camp was totally inadequate. Particularly lacking in facilities was the central primary school where one thousand two hundred Japanese were interned in the outdoor playground. There they were left in mud and were under a heavy downpour of rain for four long days. During these four days, no food was given during the first two days. From the third day, a handful of uncooked rice and a meager amount of salt were handed out as the day’s ration but the recipients had to pay for all they received. The camp was surrounded with iron fences and machine-guns. The latter were manipulated to intimidate the internees and in the course of their intimidating manipulation, no less than three Japanese were shot to death. Of the two thousand four hundred Japanese women interned in the Japanese primary school, a large number suffered outrageous acts and violence perpetrated by the American soldiers. On December 20th, American soldiers commanded by American officers bound up ten Japanese nationals who had been interned at the Davao internment camp, poured boiling water on the victims, cut their ears off, gouged out their eyeballs, sliced off the tips of their noses, amputated their arms, mutilated their legs and escaped after committing this orgy of inhuman savagery. The number of Japanese victims tortured and shot to death by the American soldiers during the period of internment rose to as many as fifty six. [IV.] The unjust actions taken by the American Government toward Japanese subjects (1) Unjust action toward Japanese nationals in internment camps and relocation centers. ( a ) the American Government forced the hundred thousand Japanese subjects and American citizens of Japanese origin to move into the interior from the Pacific coast States upon an extremely short notice, causing them thereby to lose at one stroke livelihood, property and positions they had won through years of labour, and to suffer immense losses. More recently it is reported that the American military authorities have been empowered to remove Japanese nationals to the interior 300 miles from the Atlantic coast, and that already Japanese residents of Virginia have been ordered to move to Philadelphia, so that these Japanese are also faced with the same fate as those on the Pacific coast. The Japanese Government protest to the American Government against these unjust actions, and at the same time reserve all their rights to make such demands as they may see fit to make upon the American Government. ( b ) since February 1943, the American Authorities subjected Japanese nationals in the various relocation centers to inhuman questionings asking them whether or not they would renounce their allegiance to Japan, or they would take part in the American national defense in case the United States was attacked by an external enemy. Moreover, the American Authorities intimidated the Japanese nationals, threatening that those professing allegiance to Japan or desiring to return to Japan would be considered as being disloyal to America and as such they would be segregated, as a measure of punishment, in the special relocation center at Tule Lake where they would be given a treatment worse than at other centers. Moreover, armed soldiers intervened in connection with declarations of Japanese evacuees whether they would swear allegiance to the United States. Thus, the American Authorities exerted undue pressure upon Japanese nationals in their expression of conscience, and likewise in their free choice of the decision as to their repatriation under the exchange agreement. At Tule Lake where those “disloyal to America” had been segregated a disturbance broke out owing to negligence on the part of the American Authorities, in regard to provision for evacuees whereupon the American Authorities used tanks and machine-guns to intimidate the evacuees. According to later reports, it still appears to be the intention of the American Authorities to cause Japanese subjects to renounce their allegiance to their home country. The Japanese Government solemnly request the American Government to cease such inhuman actions and to make no discriminations in treatment on account of the attitude of the evacuees regarding the questions of conscience. ( c ) the internment camps and relocation centers in the United States are surrounded with barbed wire fences, equipped with watch towers, and posted with armed soldiers, which is not the case with those maintained by the Japanese Government. The above-mentioned American guard system is a source of considerable apprehension and alarm to the Japanese internees and evacuees. In fact, as stated under III in the present note, there have been victims of illegal shooting by these soldier guards namely, two at Lordsburg, two at Fort Sill and one at Topaz. Unfortunately, such incidents continue to occur despite the repeated protests by the Japanese Government. On December 1, 1943, one evacuee at Gila River relocation center, was shot and wounded, and at the same place and during the same month three more men were fired at. According to certain information, the Japanese Government understand that there is no basis in the American law for the posting, as it is actually done, of armed guards at relocation centers and the firing at internees or evacuees. Moreover, those Japanese inmates had not been warned of the risk of being fired at in going near the barbed wire fence. And in all cases, there was no evidence to prove that any of the victims had intended to escape, and the firing by the soldier guards was clearly illegal. Nevertheless, they have been all unpunished. The Japanese Government demand that the American Government properly punish the culprits, and take such measures as will remove the apprehensions on the part of the Japanese nationals in internment camps and relocation centers and ensure the safety of their lives, and thereby forestall the reoccurrence of similar incidents. Furthermore, the Japanese Government reserve all their rights to make such demands as they may see fit to make regarding each of the above mentioned cases. (2) Unjust treatment of Japanese subjects in Central and South Americas. The American Government exerted pressure on the Government of Panama and caused to [be] sent to America all the Japanese nationals residing in the republic, and moreover these Japanese are being mistreated by American Authorities, as has already been stated. The Peruvian Government also at the instigation of the American Government resorted to the inhuman act of removing to America some 1000 Japanese nationals engaged in peaceful pursuits in Peru, and causing them to lose their property and to break up their families. As a matter of fact, the Peruvian Authorities let it be known that the initiative for the measure was taken by the American Government. Accordingly, the Japanese Government has protested against the inhuman action of the American Government. 45 Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the deportation of Japanese nationals from Peru to the United States is still being continued, the Japanese Government are constrained to demand the immediate suspension of such action even from the humanitarian point of view. 30 Not printed. 31 The enclosure herewith. 32 A virtually identical version of the Japanese message was transmitted to the Department by the Spanish Embassy in its Memorandum No. J–96, Ex. 119.01, May 11 (not printed). 33 For correspondence on protests by Japan regarding the treatment of Japanese nationals by the United States, see pp. 1099 [ Pg. 1099 includes portions of Doc. 1130 and Doc. 1131 ] ff. 34 See Memorandum No. 61, Ex. 119.01, March 13, from the Spanish Embassy, p. 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 1132 ] . 35 Signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907, Foreign Relations , 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204 . 36 For the Japanese Government’s notification of intention to apply the provisions of the Convention to civilian internees, see telegram 733, February 24, 1942, from Bern, ibid. , 1942, vol. i , p. 799 . 37 In airgram 263, May 16, 5 p.m., the Minister in Switzerland reported the view of the Swiss Legation in Japan that this passage was “based on misunderstanding because Swiss Consulate, Kobe, furnished this clothing only because competent authorities did not do so notwithstanding numerous Swiss representations.” (740.00115A Pacific War/1176) 38 The protest was embodied in telegram 2814, December 12, 1942, to Bern, Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 832 . The Japanese reply was transmitted in despatch 8171, May 15, 1944, from Bern, post , p. 966 [ Pg. 966 includes portions of Doc. 995 and Doc. 996 ] . 39 See telegram 4186, September 13, 1942, from Bern, Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 818 . 40 Correction based on telegram 3201, May 19, from Bern, not printed. 41 Substance of the notes of January 28 and February 20 was transmitted to the Department in telegrams 905, February 9, and 1383, February 27, 1943, from Bern. The former is printed in Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 961 ; the latter is summarized in footnote 5, ibid. , p. 961 . 42 See telegram 1240, February 23, 1943, from Bern, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 965 . 43 Reference is possibly to information in telegram 1904, March 24, 1943, from Bern, ibid. , p. 975 . 44 For correspondence on Japanese allegations of massacre of Japanese residents of Mindanao, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , pp. 855 ff. 45 In memorandum No. 41, Ex. 119.01, February 10, 1943, the Spanish Embassy transmitted a Japanese demand for an explanation as to the right of the United States Government to transfer to the United States and detain Japanese nationals deported by the Peruvian Government; the Department’s reply of February 25, 1943, stated that the United States Government had received from the Peruvian Government certain Japanese nationals whom the Peruvian Government desired to make available for repatriation. (740.00115 Pacific War/1430) In memorandum No. 73, Ex. 119.01, April 6, 1943, the Spanish Embassy transmitted a protest by the Japanese Government in which the reply of the United States Government was declared “unsatisfactory”; the protest stated that the Japanese Government had never designated for repatriation Japanese permanent residents of Peru, that their transfer to the United States “on the pretext” of making them the object of exchange without the prior consent of the Japanese Government was unjustifiable, and that the abandoning in Peru of the families of the deportees without resources “can only be termed inhuman act on the part of the American Government.” (740.00115 Pacific War/1549) The Department’s reply of April 19, 1943, stated the intention of the United States Government “at the earliest practicable opportunity” to bring to the United States the Japanese-wives and children of the deportees and reiterated that the bringing of deportees to the United States was “the wish of the Peruvian Government … a wish with which the United States Government was in concurrence.” (740.00115 Pacific War/1549) A Japanese objection to the transfer of Japanese nationals in Bolivia to the United States was communicated by the Spanish Embassy in its memorandum No. 133, Ex. 119.01, of May 31, 1944; the Department’s reply of June 7, 1944, stated that the transfer had been effected in accordance with hemispheric security considerations set forth in a resolution acccepted by the American Republics and that, for the most part, Japanese nationals had been nominated by local authorities and their cases “had not previously come to the attention of the United States Government.” (740.00115 Pacific War/2470) The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/557: Telegram [Document 995] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , May 13, 1944—midnight. [Received May 14—1:54 p.m.] 3076. American Interests—Japanese Atrocities. Swiss note May 9 which transmitted Japanese replies mentioned in Legation’s 2947 46 and 2949, 47 both May 10, states that these were given on May 6 to Minister Gorgé by Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu at which time they had two and half hour conversation regarding representation of Foreign Ministers [ interests? ]. He was simultaneously given third Japanese communication (mentioned Legation’s 3038, May 12 48 ) and was provided for his exclusive information with text of Japanese protest regarding alleged attacks on Japanese hospital ships Yosino Maru and Tatibana Maru which being communicated through Spanish Embassy Washington. 49 Swiss report that long discussion between Gorgé and Shigemitsu followed concerning situation prisoners of war. Shigemitsu stated Gorgé would be given opportunity to visit all camps in Japan. Reverting to Gorgé’s numerous representations, Japanese Foreign Minister stated that question of visiting camps in occupied territories was under examination but no guarantee could yet be given. Latter expressed hope that Japanese enemies would not thwart through a new campaign against Japan the efforts which he proposed to make in this connection. Gorgé considers that his efforts are apparently beginning to produce results because recently he had opportunity to visit Fukushi camp and will shortly be able to send a delegate to visit camps at Niigata and Nagoya. He has also been promised early authorization to visit Hakodate camp. In continuing conversation Shigemitsu confirmed that Japan objects to any intervention having for its object protection of foreign interests in territories occupied by Japanese forces. Difficulties which hinder visit to prisoner camps in these territories may be attributed to this decision because the Japanese Government fears that authorization to visit these camps might be interpreted as an abandonment of policy thus far pursued. Gorgé then directed Shigemitsu’s attention to fact that Switzerland had not drawn from permission to visit Hong Kong camps conclusion that it would be authorized in future to assume protection of foreign interests there. According ta Gorgé’s views, it is entirely possible to treat these two questions separately. Gorgé took occasion to request that Ministry of War reply more fully to notes addressed to it and insisted on fact that refusals would be preferable to silence so Swiss authorities, would thereby at least know where they stood. Shigemitsu promised to examine possibility of improving this state of affairs. Harrison 46 Not printed; but for summary, see despatch 8150, May 10, from Bern, p 941. 47 Post , p. 1033 [ Pg. 1033 is part of Doc. 1051 ] . 48 Not printed; but for summary, see despatch 8171, May 15, from Bern, infra . 49 See memorandum No. 88, Ex. 111.00, May 1, p. 1154 [ Pg. 1154 includes portions of Doc. 1155 and Doc. 1156 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/32 [Document 996] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State No. 8171 Bern , May 15, 1944. [Received June 3.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Legation’s telegram No. 3038 of May 12, 1944, 50 which reported that the Legation has received a note dated May 11, 1944, from the Swiss Foreign Office transmitting photostatic copies of a telegram from the Swiss Minister at Tokyo which quotes a letter dated April 24, 1944, from the Japanese Foreign Office, constituting the Japanese Government’s reply to the Department’s telegram No. 2814 of December 12, 1942, 51 in accordance with the ultimate paragraph of the Legation’s telegram No. 3389 of June 4, 1943. 52 There is now enclosed, without awaiting the Department’s response to the Legation’s telegram No. 3038 of May 12, 1944, a photostatic copy of the telegram from the Swiss Legation at Tokyo, which accompanied the above-mentioned note of May 11, 1944, from the Swiss Foreign Office. Examination of the attached document discloses that an “annex A” and an “annex B”, 53 mentioned on pages seventeen and twenty-four, respectively, accompanied the communication which the Japanese Foreign Office delivered to the Swiss Minister at Tokyo, but that these were not forwarded telegraphically by the latter to the Swiss Foreign Office. The Legation, in reply to an inquiry from the Swiss Foreign Office whether the transmission by telegraph of the annexes in question is desired, requested that the originals thereof be forwarded by pouch and that the contents thereof be transmitted by telegraph unless they are unduly long. The Swiss Foreign Office was requested, if the latter be the case, to have the Swiss Legation at Tokyo indicate the number of words contained in the annexes in order that it may be determined whether telegraphic transmission thereof should be undertaken. Respectfully yours, For the Minister: George Tait First Secretary [Enclosure] The Japanese Foreign Office to the Swiss Legation in Japan [ Tokyo , April 24, 1944.] Reply on the Individual Cases Cited in the Protest of the American Government As was stated in the Japanese Government’s reply dated on the 26 May 1943, 54 addressed to the Swiss Minister in Tokyo the individual cases cited in the protest of the U.S. Government as examples of the treatment accorded American civilians in detention, all relate, with one or two exceptions, to prisoners charged with criminal offenses, including those who after having been duly tried and convicted, are now actually serving their prison terms. It is unnecessary to explain the impropriety of expecting the application of the stipulations of the Convention of 1929 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war to those criminally accused persons who under the laws of Japan are treated alike regardless of whether they are Japanese subjects or foreigners. Nevertheless, the Japanese authorities concerned have accorded to the American accused, nationals of an enemy country, a treatment as generous as permitted by law, by taking into consideration the mode of their daily life, and their respective social positions and ages, for which they have often expressed their gratitude, as is described hereunder. That the American Government’s protest has been made by distorting and exaggerating the facts which are contradictory for instance, by complaining at one place of the placing of Americans in common jail and remonstrating, at another, against their solitary confinement. In the following pages are given the description of the actual conditions as regards the individual cases, excepting those to which answers have already been given. ( A ) Civilians ( a ) Conditions in prisons and internment camps. Primo . The Bridge House, Shanghai. All the cases in Shanghai cited by the American Government are concerned with the violators of military regulations. Such criminals in detention are subject of [ to ?] restrictions as provided for by law, which are applied to all without discrimination between Japanese subjects and foreigners. Needless to say, they are not to be considered as being on the same footing with those civilians interned under civil procedure. The military police detention house in Shanghai is used for prisoners of all nationalities, Japanese nationals, nationals of enemy countries and those of third countries. As regards health, there is nothing to be considered unsatisfactory. Food is rational [ rationed ] alike to all, no distinction being made. However, in consideration of their mode of living, Europeans and Americans are permitted to eat such articles of food as they may [have] received from outside or they may choose to purchase at their own expense. As to wearing apparels they are allowed to use those of their own, beside those supplied by the institution, including blankets. As is indicated above, the American inmates of the house, were accorded an unusually good treatment through the special considerations by the authorities. There existed no impropriety nor negligence in the manner or method of their detention. Nor did there occur any case of disease due to detention, such as mentioned in the American note. Secundo . Army Prison, Peking. The six persons, Floyd F. Spielman, R. E. McCann, C. J. Eskeline, J. B. Sherwood, E. X. Mills and P. H. Benedict, mentioned in the American note, were arrested under the warrant issued on March 7, 1942 by the procurator of the military court of the Japanese Army in North China on account of their violation of military regulations. They were taken into the North China army prison in Peking on March 11 at 6:30 p.m. On the following day at 4:30 p.m. they were ordered to detention in accordance with the warrant issued on the same day by the military procurator. The agreement for the exchange of diplomatic officials and residents between Japan and the United States 55 was concluded while their cases were being investigated. Accordingly, the proceedings were dropped, and by order of the military procurator they were released on June 8, 1942, at 8:00 a.m. Section 1. Conditions of health during detention. Eskeline was ordered to rest for 23 days because of an internal malady and a sprain of the left leg, and Benedict for 3 days because of inflammation of the bladder, but both recovered, owing to a timely treatment. McCann was examined by an Army doctor, and was allowed to wear glasses. The remaining three men maintained good health throughout the period of their detention. Section 2. Food. All those in detention—Japanese and foreigners—are alike given the soldiers’ rations. But in view of their mode of daily life and their ages, and as a special caution against any adverse effect a sudden change of diet might have upon their health, mental as well as physical, these men were served western meals with bread for breakfast and dinner, and the soldiers’ food only for lunch, during the first month. It was then discovered that they became gradually accustomed to, and began to prefer the soldiers’ food. In fact, one of the six men, Sherwood, indicated his preference for the soldiers’ food from the outset, while after the lapse of about two months all the men were asking for it. The daily ration per capita consisted of for main food 600 grammes of cleaned rice, and 187 grammes of cleaned barley; or 900 grammes of wheat [bread]; 56 and for subsidiary food 21 grammes of beef, or 42 grammes of fish, with 480 grammes of vegetables, having in all 3500 calories of nutritive value. All meals were served warm. Section 3. Bathing. A hot bath was regularly provided for all twice a week, on Sundays and Wednesdays, while a shower bath was substituted on occasions during the summer months. Eskeline on account of his malady was ordered to refrain from bathing for 23 days from the day of his incarceration until April 2. To the rest of the men bathing was neither prohibited nor suspended at Amus at any time throughout the entire period. Section 4. Physical exercise. The men were ordered to take outdoor exercises for half an hour to one hour, and to do free exercises indoors in bad weather. Save that for some 20 days Eskeline was ordered to stop exercising upon the doctor’s advice, the others were never prohibited for any reason from taking physical exercises for any extended period as is alleged in the American note. Section 5. Detention cells. Each detention cell has a floor space 15.75 square meters, being 3.34 meters high. It is provided with one window and equipped with ventilation, electric lights, and toilet facilities. The walls being plastered, and the floor and ceiling covered with wooden boards, the cell is of permanent construction. All cells are always kept clear. While two to five persons are usually put in one cell, the Americans in question were allotted one cell for two persons, so that they might have more room. Moreover, their cells were selected from among the best situated and most quiet in the entire prison. Section 6. Clothing and beddings. The six men were all too big and tall for the regular prison clothes. Accordingly, for the sake of their comfort, they were allowed to use their own clothes which they were wearing, or had brought with them, or those which were presented to them by friends. As to beddings, the articles in general use were supplied. Although the rule prescribes one cotton quilt, one woollen blanket and one pillow for each person and two mats for three persons, the Americans were provided each with two quilts, two blankets, a pillow and a mat. And all these articles were regularly laundered and always kept clean. It may be added that because at the time they were brought to the prison, the weather was still cold, they were permitted to wear their overcoats they had with them. Section 7. Gains and losses in weight. The six men were weighed when they were taken into the prison, and when they were released. Figures for their respective weights in grammes are as follows: Spiel-man 71900 grammes when taken in, 71800 when released, difference minus 100; McCann 83100, 83000, minus 100; Eskeline 7880[0], 78500, minus 300; Sherwood 83500, 82300, minus 1200; Mills 62800, 62850, plus 50; Benedict 70000, 70100, plus 100. The American note alleges that these men lost an average of about 18 kilogrammes in weight, but their actual loss, as shown above, mounts to no more than to 258 grammes. It should be noted, moreover, that the men were incarcerated in March, while they were released in summer when all persons generally lose in weight, in view of which an average loss of 258 grammes is of no significance. Section 8. Special considerations. The army prison had no one who could speak English fluently, and the Americans did not know the Japanese language. Accordingly, a Japanese, who had long resided in America, was employed on [ in ] April 1942 and was assigned exclusively to the duty as interpreter for the Americans. They all greatly appreciated the devoted service of this man and thanked the prison authorities for the special considerations in this regard. Especially at the time of their departure from Peking for Tientsin the said interpreter proved so helpful in every respect that the Americans were profuse in expressing their gratitude. The alleged maltreatment of these prisoners, mentioned in the American note is utterly groundless. Tertio . Tsingtao. The seven persons mentioned in the American note, namely Frank G. Keefe, Cady Cooper, Frank B. Hailing, Charles Liebgold, Y. J. Meyer, N. H. Mills and H. J. Zimmerman—were all suspected of espionage and taken to the military police headquarters on December 8, 1941 and placed in detention in the assembly hall of the Tsingtao Municipal Police Bureau for the purpose of examination until the 27th of the same month, on which date Meyer and Mills were released while the others were transferred on the following day to the residence of the manager of the Ewo Company. Here the five men were held while on the basis of the preliminary investigations the authorities were proceeding with the examination of the evidence on hand. In the meantime with the operation of the exchange agreement they were set free. The conditions under which they lived during the period of their detention are as follows: The conditions of the detention quarters. The assembly hall of the Tsingtao Municipal Police Bureau in which the Americans were first detained, is a large room, about 250 square meters in size, which is used as a classroom and for holding ceremonial functions. Here two large stoves were installed, and the temperature of the hall was maintained at 15–20 degrees centigrade. The detainees were provided with improvised beds, while they were allowed to use, as they wished, their own clothing and beddings. As to food, they were allowed, according to their wish, to have it sent from their respective homes, and no restriction of any kind was imposed. Daily outdoor exercises for an hour were also permitted, and everything was done to look after their health. The manager’s residence of the two [ Ewo? ] company to which the five men were transferred is one of the best houses to be found in the city of Tsingtao with complete equipments and facilities. They were allowed to use their own beds, beddings, clothes, and to have their meals sent from their homes, and to use freely the piano and the ping pong on the premises. Besides, they were permitted to meet friends and the members of their families in the presence of an official. All in all, these Americans were accorded as generous a treatment as possible. All allegations made in the American note, such as that “they were confined in an unheated common jail for a period of three weeks” have no foundation on facts. Quarto . Fort Santiago, Manila. Of the two men, Roy Bennett and Robert Abbott, who are mentioned in the American note as having been imprisoned in Fort Santiago, Manila, Eoy Bennett was placed in the internment camp at Santo Thomas on April 20, 1943 where he has been since and is well. As for Robert Abbott, although he had participated in the battle of Bataan and was later captured, he concealed the fact on being admitted in the Philippine National Hospital toward the end of May 1942; and by pretending to be an engineer so as to evade the treatment as a prisoner of war he entered the Santo Thomas internment camp following his discharge from hospital on November 23 of the same year and continued to remain there until January 12, 1943. On the discovery of his fraudulent act, he was sentenced to minor imprisonment for 3 months, and upon the expiration of the term he was put in the prisoners of war camp, where he has since been and is well. In the light of the facts the protest of the American Government is irrelevant, and its insistence upon Abbott’s release from prison is wide of mark. Quinto . Camp Stanley, Hong Kong. All the nationals of the enemy countries interned at Fort Stanley are being well treated, for which they are grateful. There has never existed, nor exist[s], such a situation as is described in the American note. The internees are all doing well, being view [ given? ] special permission to use their own things and to purchase whatever articles of food they prefer. Sexto . Santo Thomas, Manila. The Japanese Army entered the city of Manila of [ on ] January 2, 1942, and opened the internment camp at Santo Thomas on the 4th of the same month, and let the internees to take charge of management of the camp. The internees were notified in advance to bring with them their personal effects and daily necessaries, so as to render their life in the camp as comfortable as possible. In spite of this advance notice given, there were some who failed to bring mosquito nets, clothes and beddings. In the face of the disruption of communication immediately following the Japanese occupation of the city and the immense number of the internees to be dealt with, which reached 3000 at the end of January, the military authorities speedily granted them permission and facilities to send for their personal belongings. That the Japanese Army, while pursuing the retreating enemy on the one hand, went about earnestly on the other hand to take American civilians under protection and placed at their disposal the transportation facilities and men they could ill afford to spare, was source of general gratitude on the part of all Americans on the spot. It should be noted that the actual situation was totally different from what is alleged to have been in the American note. The protest regarding food is also in contradiction with facts. At the beginning, in compliance with the wishes of the internees and with a view to avoiding a sudden change of diet and respecting personal preferences, each internee was allowed to obtain his meals at his own expense. But as time passed, it was feared this arrangement might prove unfair to those who did not have much money. Therefore beginning with the last day of February 1942, in accordance with the general desire of the internees, a ration system was adopted, the Philippine Red Cross Society, which was then in their process of organization, being authorised to pay the cost, while those who so wished, were permitted to purchase supplementary food at their own expense. This system proved satisfactory and convenient to the internees. The Red Cross, responsible only for the distribution of the daily rations at the camp as a whole, did not, of course, undertake to loan money to individuals separately. The purchase and preparation of the food was left entirely to the self governing body of the camp, and the army helped to obtain such commodities as were difficult to find on the market. Never on any occasion, the cost of the ration was limited to 25 centavos. The Philippine Red Cross which was formally established in April 1942 continued to distribute rations until June. Since then the Japanese military authorities have borne all the cost of the rations and all other expenditures for the maintenance of the camp, while the management of the camp is left as before in the hands of the selfgoverning body organized by the internees themselves. The food served at the camp has been ever since its opening quite satisfactory both in quality and quantity—so much so, in fact, that it is even criticized as being too good as compared with the food available to the people of the city in general. Within the camp, order is maintained and various activities are carried on by the abovementioned selfgoverning body in accordance with the code of regulations formulated by itself and through the respective officials appointed by itself. For this magnanimous treatment the internees are all grateful. Septimo . Davao and other internment camps in the Philippines. The “first six weeks” mentioned in the American note refer to the period during which American residents in the city were housed for protection in the American Club without being required to do absolutely no [ any? ] work. Later some persons for the sake of their health requested to be allowed to do some light outdoor work, and they were assigned the work of removing objects which were lying on the streets and obstructing traffic. On the other hand, the Santa Anna area where the warehouses of Davao for provisions were situated had been set on fire and reduced to ashes by the fleeing American soldiers, and the provisions in the shop within the city had been carried away and secreted also by American soldiers, so that the people of the city were faced with an extreme scarcity of food. They had practically nothing to eat but corn and millet, and even these were difficult to obtain. That at such a time those Americans at the club were provided with meals containing with [ sic ] certain amounts of corn was due entirely to the generous efforts of the Japanese Army, who moreover supplied them with cleaned rice, fish, and canned foods out of their own none too ample stock. Indeed, those Americans were being fed far better than the average Japanese residents and [ in ] the Philippines at that time. By April 1942 the situation at Davao had gradually improved, and supplementary articles of food such as vegetables began to appear on the market. Accordingly, in compliance with the wishes of the internees, they were permitted to purchase their food on their own account, while rice, sugar, salt, condiments, etc., that were not easily obtainable were distributed by the military authorities. At first all Americans were interned for protection in view of the situation which rendered it impossible for them to secure food if they had lived by themselves, and the military authorities used their good offices in enabling them to procure the provisions, for which they were required to pay. But since September 1942, when the persons to be interned were decided upon, the cost of provisions for these internees has been borne by the military authorities, while the matters of purchase, cooking, etc., have been left to the self governing body organized by the internees themselves. Americans at other camps in the Philippines have been given a treatment similar to that accorded the American internees at Davao as described above. ( b ) Maltreatment and torture. Primo . Torture and physical violence. Section 1. R. A. Reiner and Edwin W. Koons. Beginning with February 8, 1942, Edward Hughes Mills, an American, was being examined at the Ryuzan police station, Keijo, as a suspect for espionage. In the course of the said examination it was established from his statements and as the result of the search of his house that Reiner was involved in the crime. He was therefore taken to the Ryuzan police station and an examination of his case was commenced. It was found that Reiner beside being charged with the aforesaid crime, was also guilty of an infringement upon the Foreign Exchange Control Ordinance. During the examination, though he appeared to be in good health, he was segregated from other criminals and allowed to occupy a solitary cell in view of his rather advanced age. Moreover, it was asked several times to state his wishes, which were taken into consideration in order to afford him the best possible treatment. Whereas his crime was clearly established, the case was dropped with the coming into force of the exchange agreement, and he was set free on May 25, 1942. On the occasion of his release, Reiner while thanking the police authorities on behalf of the Americans who had been similarly held at the police station, stated to the effect that as he was being examined as an enemy national suspected of acts of benefitting the enemy, he had anticipated a most severe and rigorous examination, but he had been dealt by police authorities always in the kindest manner; that he deeply admired the Japanese spirit thus manifested. In the American note of protest it is stated that Reiner was tortured six times between May 1 and May 6, add [ and ] that he was kicked by a gendarmerie employee named Syo in such a manner that his rib was broken, and that a vicious blow was struck over his broken rib by another gendarmerie employee named Kim. As a matter of fact, no gendarmes, to say nothing of their employees, were ever permitted to frequent the premises of the Ryuzan police station, while [at?] the station itself was no employee named either Syo or Kim. It must be concluded the story is a fabrication. Furthermore, the records of the medical examination made on Reiner at the time of his release established the fact that he was sound and healthy and nothing unusual was to be noted on his person. That a man, 59 years of age, who had his rib broken and received “half inch deep cuts” on his arms and legs should have so quickly and so completely recovered within several days as to retain no trace thereof, is unbelievable. It only proves the careless and groundless character of the American protest. From the statement of Mills and as the result of the search of his house it was established that Koons was also an accomplice, and he was taken to the Ryuzan police station on May 11, 1942. He was examined and treated like Reiner. His case was also dropped, and he was released for repatriation. Here the note of the American Government is equally perfunctory and careless. Koons has left a record of his “impressions” [ vide Annex A] 57 which proves further how unwarranted is the American protest. Section 2. Beating at Ichang. The allegation that Elsie W. Riebe and Walter P. Morse in Ichang were beaten is entirely unfounded. It is plain to common sense whether or not any man can remain alive after having been “beaten for two hours with an iron rod, one-half inch thick”. The above mentioned two persons were allowed to remain in their respective houses, the only restriction they were subjected to being that they were required to obtain permission for going out to town—excepting to the portion of the city between Malu and Kang Chianglu. The Japanese authorities prohibited Chinese connected with church to visit the residences of Riebe and Morse, but the two were afforded special facilities for obtaining food and daily necessaries. Neither of them, except on errands of their own regarding the matters of housekeeping, did ever visit the authorities. Nor did the latter ever take them out anywhere. The atrocities cited in the American note have no foundation on fact. Section 3. Joseph F. MacSparran. Joseph F. MacSparran was arrested on December 8, 1941, as a suspected violator of the National Defense and Security Ordinance in accordance with the criminal procedure as provided for under the same ordinance. He was placed in the Yokohama penitentiary for examination. On February 21, 1942, he was indicted on charge of violation of the National Defense and Security Ordinance and the Foreign Exchange Control Ordinance. He was accused on April 21 with an additional offense of violating the police peace regulations. It was while the examination by a preliminary judge was in progress that with the conclusion of the exchange agreement the prosecution was cancelled and he was set free. At the penitentiary MacSparran was accorded a specially favorable treatment, being placed in the best western-style cell, well lighted and well ventilated, and provided with desk and chair, a bed, a washroom with flush toilet. Immediately upon his incarceration he was given a medical examination, and thereafter was visited daily by a physician. On December 20, 1941, he said he had a stomach trouble and requested medical examination. It was found he was suffering from no particular malady, but he was given a medicine. He returned the medicine saying that it was ineffective. Since then special attention was paid to the state of his health. However, he ate, exercised, aeed [ sic ] bathed as usual, and appeared entirely normal in every respect. Never once did he request medical attention for “hemorrhages from duodenal ulcers”. Altogether 21 times during his incarceration he was questioned by the procurator and the preliminary judge, and on every occasion he seemed to be in high spirits and cheerfully answered the questions put to him. The procurator came to the penitentiary for the questioning, but whenever it was necessary to take him to the court for preliminary examination light handcuffs were used in conformance with the law of Japan. It was the proper measure to take in the handling of any criminally accused person. That while under-going questioning he was unable, on account of internal hemorrhages, even to stand up is an allegation without a vestige of truth. Secundo . Solitary confinement. Section 1. H. W. Mayers. Suspected of violating the National Defense and Security Ordinance, H. W. Mayers was arrested on December 8, 1941, according to the criminal procedure as prescribed by the said ordinance. He was taken to the Kobe detention house where as the result of examination he was acquitted. On the other hand, it was established that he was guilty of violating the Army Criminal Code and the Foreign Exchange Control Ordinance. Accordingly, while released on March 5, 1942, as a suspected violator of the National Defense and Security Ordinance, he was indicted afresh on the same day before the Kobe district court on the charge of violations of the Army Criminal Code and the Foreign Exchange Control Ordinance, and remanded to the Kobe detention house under the warrant issued by the Judge of that court. On April 5 he was sentenced to imprisonment for 7 months counting the 20 days pending the trial. While he was serving his sentence, he was removed to the Osaka Prison on May 1st, and was granted a ticket of leave on June 7. During that period he was for a time, January 4–February 5, 1942, transferred to the temporary jail belonging to the Kikuaibashi police station of Kobe. At the Kobe detention house, in consideration of his advanced age and with a view to avoiding any adverse effect that confinement in common jail might have upon his health and especially to enabling him to sleep well, the best and newly furnished cell in the institution was assigned to Mayers for his exclusive occupancy. During his detention pending the trial he was permitted to use the private beddings and clothes of his own choice. He was provided with a chair, which is not a part of the regular furniture for ordinary cells. As regards meals, he was permitted in compliance with his wishes to obtain them from outside. During his penal servitude after conviction he was furnished with the regular prison bed, clothing and meals, but at the same time he was given special permission to wear shoes, and special care was taken in the preparation of his meals. As for books, he was allowed to read those sent to him after they had been duly censored. During his incarceration in the Osaka prison, he was shown similar considerations, and given a single cell for solitary confinement. He was permitted to receive the Bible, the Japanese National Reader, etc., from outside. His wife, Grace, visited him in the middle of May, under the prison regulations which permit the visit of a relative once a month. He was grateful especially as he was not put in common jail but given a single cell. It is strange that the American Government should make that very fact an object of protest. Section 2. William MacKesy. William MacKesy was given special permission to remain in his own house until he was interned in the civilian camp in Kobe. He appreciated fully the good will of the authorities concerned, and by avoiding contact with outsiders as much as possible, he endeavoured not to give any cause for misunderstanding on the part of the authorities to whom he frequently expressed his sense of gratitude. He lived in a room he had rented in a building attached to his church. With the privilege of remaining in his own residence, he was free to regulate his daily life as he liked and enjoyed special comfort and conveniences. Section 3. Alice C. Grube. Suspected of violation of the National Defense and Security Ordinance, Alice C. Grube was arrested on December 8, 1941, and taken to the temporary jail belonging to the Tamatsukuri police station in Osaka where she was first examined. On the 25th of the same month she was transferred to the Osaka detention house for further questionings by the procurator, as the result of which she was cleared of the suspicion, and set free on April 9, 1942. The authorities of the Osaka detention house, in deference to her position and prestige, did not confine her in common jail. Instead, she was allowed to occupy exclusively a sunny and healthy cell in the women’s section of the institution. Under the house regulations the cells are not equipped with stoves, and the use of fire for any purpose is prohibited. Special permission was granted Grube to use a hotwater bottle, which she declined, saying it was unnecessary, as she had a good sunny room. Accordingly, she was allowed to wear an overcoat in her cell. The rule prohibiting a detainee to bring in any personal effects or other articles, was waived in her case, and she was allowed to bring with her a large number of articles including 23 books, a bed, 3 cotton quilts, 2 blankets, a complete wardrobe and toilet requisites. She was always given the first turn for bathing, and provided with such food as she desired, besides tea and coffee, cakes and fruits which she was allowed to purchase as she pleased. Generosity to the maximum degree was shown in her treatment. Section 4. J. B. N. Talmadge. A search of the house of J. B. N. Talmadge, conducted according to criminal procedure, brought forth articles of evidence for violations of the Military Secrets Preservation Ordinance, the Wireless Telegraphy Ordinance and the regulations for the control of fire arms. Accordingly he was taken into custody in the detentions cell of the Koshu police station. As the result of investigations he was set for prosecution, which however was stayed as the consequence of the conclusion of the exchange agreement. He was released on April 8, 1942. During his detention, in view of his age and position Talmadge was given a single cell for solitary confinement. He was permitted to have clothing, bedding and books sent from outside, and to take indoor exercises for health. Grateful for the kind treatment accorded, he dispatched at the time of his departure a letter of thanks to the Provincial Governor of Zenra Nando [ vide Annex B]. 58 Section 5. Edward Adams. As a suspect for violation of the National Defense and Security Ordinance Edward Adams was arrested on December 8, 1941, and taken to the Taikyu police station where he was detained and examined. He was released on the 20th of the same month. The police authorities with due respect to his person did not lock him up in common jail, but confined him in a single cell. He was allowed to bring in his own beddings, and accorded special facilities regarding meals, physical exercise, and other matters. On his departure Adams left behind him a note thanking for the special favours shown to him. Tertio . Deaths due to mistreatment and neglect. The American Government protests against the deaths of several Americans, by ascribing them to mistreatment and neglect on the part of the Japanese authorities. For instance, it is alleged in the American note that Leo Peloquin was refused to enter a hospital in Heijo and forced to return to Kansai. As a matter of fact, it was in compliance with Peloquin’s express wish that he be sent back from Chosen. Again, it is alleged that Charles Liebgold imprisoned in an unheated jail at Tsingtao, contracted a cold, which developed into pneumonia. As is told elsewhere under the head of Tsingtao, Liebgold together with other American suspects were detained for a period, December 8–27, 1941, in the assembly hall of the Tsingtao Municipal Police Bureau. The said assembly hall, equipped with two large size stoves, was always kept warm with a temperature of 15–20 degrees centigrade. There he and his fellow detainees were accorded a specially good treatment. In view of such facts, the American protest is utterly unwarrantable. Investigations into other instances, have disclosed that the various allegations in the American note are equally unfounded. It appears that the protest of the United States Government is motivated by a desire to attribute to the responsibility of Japanese authorities the deaths of American nationals regardless of their actual causes. Such a protest which, ignoring the generous treatment of Americans by Japanese authorities, dwells upon baseless allegations, cannot be tolerated by the Japanese Government. Quarto . Violation of the exchange agreement. Section 1. Transportation. As regards the transportation fee of the American citizens evacuating from Tsingtao and Chefoo, requested by the Consul General of Switzerland in Shanghai the Japanese Government are prepared to pay such fee at any time, provided, however, that the Government of the United States shall agree to bear the expenses incurred by the Japanese Consular members in Brazil in their assembling to the City of Rio de Janeiro, which was already requested by the Japanese Government in their communication dated under March 4, 1943, 59 and which will be communicated in detail. The train fare between Nagasaki and Yokohama [17 yen 90] 60 has been paid to each one of the three nonofficial Americans, Francis Henry Carls, Alfred William Harding and William Frederick Campbell, on board the exchange vessel, Asama Maru . Later it was found that Campbell was already provided with a train ticket at the time of his departure from Nagasaki. Besides these aforementioned items, it is desired to be informed whether there is any other item still left unpaid. The Japanese Government desire to be notified as to the names of all those persons who have paid their own expenses, as well as to their items and amount thereof in detail, in addition to those already demanded by the Government of the United States under the date of March 25 [ 22 ], 1943. Section 2. Baggage limitation and search. The baggage of American Government officials was permitted to be shipped without limitation and without inspection. As regards nonofficial Americans, facilities were afforded those in Japan proper, such as special permission to return to their houses in order to attend to their baggage and baggage inspection by custom officers at their own residences. Moreover, they were allowed to take out their baggage without restriction on the amounts as long as it did not contain objectionable articles. Japanese authorities in Chosen, Manchukuo, Hong Kong and Thailand were instructed to handle the matter of baggage in a similar manner. Consequently, Americans were allowed to take not only what they could carry themselves but other pieces of their baggage. In contrast to this treatment, American authorities, as stated in the protest lodged with the American Government by the Japanese Government in its communication of October 27, 1942, 61 addressed to the Swiss Minister in Tokyo, searched the persons of nonofficial Japanese evacuees in a most outrageous manner, by stripping stark naked practically all persons subjecting them to intolerable indignities and inhuman treatment. The baggage inspection was extremely harsh and rigorous, and the evacuees had part of their belongings confiscated, so that not a few were obliged to board the ship, leaving everything behind them, save one or two suitcases. To the above-mentioned protest of the Japanese government, the American Government in its intermediate reply dated December 24 [ 12 ], 1942, 62 promised that it would make a report on the completion of investigations. No report has yet been received, and the Japanese Government requests that the said report be transmitted without further delays. As regards porters, it is true that a certain number of them were assigned to duties at such place, but in order to avoid disorder and confusion the evacuees were prohibited to employ them on their own account. A similar situation was observed also in the United States. Regarding the baggage of nonofficials the U. S. Government protests against the reinspection of their baggage at the port of embarcation after it had been inspected at the place of departure. But in the United States, the baggage of nonofficial Japanese nationals was inspected at the place of departure and subjected without exception to a second and most rigid inspection at the port of embarcation. Japanese customs authorities were instructed not to inspect the baggage of American officials. A case is cited by the American note in which, the effects of American officials in Chosen were said to have been searched, but investigations made into the case, failed to produce nothing [ sic ] to substantiate that allegation. On the contrary, when Japanese Vice Consul, Mr. Masaru Sano, stationed in Houston, Texas, and his wife were leaving that city on January 10, 1942, the American officials in charge at the time had taken away five cases of Mr. Sano’s personal belongings on the ground that those cases were wooden boxes. Upon arrival at the Homestead Hotel in Virginia, Mr. and Mrs. Sano finally succeeded in obtaining those boxes after negotiations made through the Spanish Embassy in Washington, D. C, and they were requested to pay the amount of 50 dollars for the transportation. The boxes arrived but every one of them was opened and inspected, and moreover, several articles contained in the boxes were missing. This action on the part of the American officials clearly constitutes a violation of the agreement, and accordingly, the Japanese Government renew the protest against the Government of the United States. ( B ) Prisoners of War. The American Government states that it has received reports of inhuman treatment accorded American prisoners of war by the Japanese authorities, which is inconsistent with the provisions and spirit of the Geneva Convention, and proceeds to cite instances alleged to have occurred in the Philippines and the punishment of Americans for an attempted escape at Shanghai. Section 1. The Philippines. The American Government is reminded of the situation in the Philippines during those days immediately following the Japanese occupation of the Bataan Peninsula. Order had not yet been restored; traffic facilities had been destroyed; the American soldiers prior to their retreat and surrender had burned food and medical supplies in accordance with their “scorched earth” tactics; the Japanese Armies themselves were finding it difficult to replenish their stock of provisions and medical supplies; and furthermore, the number of American prisoners of war were far greater than anticipated. It was inevitable that under these circumstances the American war prisoners should have suffered temporarily from scarcity of food and inadequate medical attention. Nevertheless, the Japanese military authorities, in the face of insuperable difficulties, did their best to feed the Americans and to care for the sick and wounded. The Americans captured in Bataan were obliged to go on foot when they were being taken to camp O’Donnell, because owing to the destruction of the means of conveyances it was impossible to send them in automobiles. However, as regards the alleged instances of mistreatment of the prisoners on their way to and after their arrival at the camp, cited in the American note, are groundless according to the investigations, that have been made under the difficult circumstances. Section 2. Shanghai. Relating to the punishment of W. S. Cunningham and D. Smith, the views of the Japanese Government are clearly set forth in its communication of March 3, 1943, 63 to the Swiss Legation in Tokyo, and they need not be repeated here. It should be added that the report of alleged mistreatment of American Marines, also cited in the American note, is unfounded. Gorgé 50 Not printed. 51 Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 832 . 52 ibid. , 1943, vol. iii , p. 990 . 53 Copies of these annexes were transmitted to the Department in despatch 8940, August 7, 1944, from Bern. They consisted of a statement of May 27, 1942, by E. W. Koons and a letter of May 30, 1942, by Eliza E. Talmage to the Governor of South Zenra Province, Chosen. Both messages alluded to the “many kindnesses” shown to these missionaries by the Japanese authorities in Korea. (711.94114A/8–744) 54 See telegram 3389, June 4, 1943, from Bern, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 990 . 55 For correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , pp. 377 ff. 56 Brackets appear in the original. 57 Brackets appear in the original. Regarding Annex A, see footnote 53, p. 967 [ Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 996 ] . 58 Brackets appear in the original. Concerning Annex B, see footnote 53, p. 967 [ Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 996 ] . 59 Quoted in memorandum No. 59, Ex. 119.01, March 13, 1943, from the Spanish Embassy; not printed. In his reply of March 22, 1943, the Secretary of State stated that “the United States Government, which had previously no knowledge of the expenses in question, expects to receive a detailed and documented statement thereof in order that it might be in position to give consideration to the request of the Japanese Government that these expenses be paid by the United States Government.” The reply also outlined several instances in which the Japanese authorities had not fulfilled their obligations in paying the corresponding expenses of a number of American consular officials repatriated from the Far East and expressed the “expectation that the Japanese Government will refund these expenses upon demand,” (701.9432/65) 60 Brackets appear in the original. 61 See memorandum 473 from the Spanish Embassy, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1050 . 62 Ibid. , p. 1055 . 63 See telegram 2079, April 3, 1943, from Bern, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 976 . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A Pacific War/1174: Telegram [Document 997] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , May 23, 1944. [Received May 23—11:50 p.m.] 3272. American Interests—Japan. Department’s 1295, April 15. Foreign Office note May 17 states Gorgé reports that upon receipt Department’s 1295 he made verbal representations Japanese Foreign Office, observes however that during past winter Japanese homes and offices were not heated nor were internment camps, Tokyo. Therefore difficult obtain more favorable treatment for enemies than Japanese. Gorgé notes Swiss residing Japan could not heat homes. In transmitting foregoing Gorgé added he for long time endeavoring obtain soap for Kobe internees and feels they will receive some soon. Harrison The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/596: Telegram [Document 998] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , June 13, 1944—7 p.m. [Received 11:40 p.m.] 3777. American Interests—Japan. Legation’s 3033, May 12, 64 3076, May 13. Foreign Office states informally that Gorgé observes in recent telegram that situation regarding POW questions recently somewhat changed. Japanese Foreign Office finally decided support Swiss Minister at Japanese War Ministry. Results quickly felt and Swiss Legation able visit Nagoya and Niigata camps under excellent conditions. Gorgé also received formal promise in special [ respect? ] other camps Japan. To prove its spirit of collaboration and understanding, War Ministry decided have qualified officer each time accompany delegates of Swiss Legation. His attitude proved helpful at time Nagoya, Niigata visits. POW Information Bureau accepted Gorgé’s often repeated proposal to establish schedule future visits and is currently examining this matter. This Bureau also promised improve system POW lists which matter constant concern for Gorgé. He further recalls that Japanese Foreign Office informed him question visits camps occupied territory under examination. Gorgé observes there is varied [ very? ] changed attitude Japanese Government and hopes this will continue. Harrison 64 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/557: Telegram [Document 999] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) 65 Washington , June 14, 1944. 2050. American Interests—Japan. Request Swiss Government to inform Gorgé that United States Government is grateful to him for his continued efforts to obtain full reciprocity in the matter of visits to camps for American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan and Japanese-controlled territory. The Department has taken account of Gorgé’s statement that the difficulties which prevent visits to all places in Japan and Japanese-occupied territories where Americans are held are due in his opinion to the Japanese Government’s fears that authorization to make such visits might be interpreted as an abandonment of its policy not to recognize representation of foreign interests in occupied territories. The Department approves the position taken by Gorgé that it is entirely possible to treat separately the question of Swiss protection of American interests generally in Japanese-occupied territories and the question of visits by Swiss authorities to all places in Japan and Japanese-occupied territories where American nationals are held. It may be of interest to Gorgé to know and he may find it helpful so to inform the Japanese Government that a precedent exists in French North Africa for the separation of general representation duties and camp visitation. In the spring of 1943, the German and Italian Governments with the concurrence of the American Government and the French authorities in Algiers, arranged for the representation of German and Italian interests in North Africa by the Spanish Government but delegated to the Swiss Government responsibility for the inspection of camps where German and Italian prisoners of war were held in North Africa by the military authorities of the United States. The American Government agreed to this arrangement and also granted to the Swiss Government authority to send medical supplies, if needed, to the camps. The Swiss Government was thus charged with safeguarding the interests of German and Italian prisoners of war held by the American authorities in French North Africa, while the Spanish Government was granted authority generally to represent German and Italian interests in French North Africa. The Department notes with appreciation that as a result of Gorgé’s numerous representations, he has received assurance from the Japanese Foreign Minister that the question of visiting camps in occupied territories is under examination. The Department requests that on the basis of the above considerations Gorgé again request that facilities for visiting camps where American nationals are held in Japan and Japanese-occupied territories be granted him. Hull 65 Telegram 2051, June 14, 11 p.m., to Bern, advised that this telegram (No. 2050) referred to Bern’s 3076, May 13, p. 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 994 and Doc. 995 ] . The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114 Mail/79: Telegram [Document 1000] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , June 20, 1944—8 p.m. 2111. American Interests—Japan—Mail POWs. Request Swiss to inform Japanese authorities that the Government of the United States is disposed to exchange with the Japanese Government information regarding the receipt of prisoner of war and civilian internee mail in the United States and Japan respectively. It is suggested that each Government submit through the protecting Power monthly reports on the total receipts of prisoner of war and civilian internee mail received from the opposite country, regardless of the nationality of the sender or receiver, and that the reports contain the following information: (1) Mail shipments received during month (by pieces) and date of receipt; (2) route by which received; and (3) date of dispatch by enemy country, if possible. This exchange of information would enable the United States and Japanese Governments to determine the reliability of the routes used in the exchange of their mails and the time consumed in transmission. The United States Government will render its first report through the protecting Power upon the receipt of information that the Japanese Government will submit similar reports through its protecting Power. Hull The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/557: Telegram [Document 1001] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) 66 Washington , June 21, 1944. 2115. American Interests—Japan. Request the Swiss Government to express to Gorgé the thanks of the United States Government for having pointed out to the Japanese Government that Japan’s adversaries naturally conclude from its persistent refusal to permit Swiss representatives to visit camps in Japanese-occupied territory that conditions prevailing in the unvisited camps are not as they should be. The Government of the United States has noted with interest Shigemitsu’s statement that he is endeavoring to bring about an improvement in the conditions under which American nationals are held in Japan and Japanese-occupied territories, and that the question of permitting visits to camps in occupied territories is being given consideration. Note has also been taken of Shigemitsu’s characterization of the release of reports of the neglect and cruel treatment of Americans in Japanese custody as an atrocity campaign intended to discredit Japan. The Government of the United States emphasizes, and desires Gorgé so to inform the Japanese Government, that the published reports to which Shigemitsu objects are accounts of the sufferings of American nationals in camps in Japanese-occupied territories that came into the hands of American government agencies from reliable sources. To end the publication of such accounts Japan has only to remove the conditions giving rise to such accounts and permit Swiss representatives so to inform the United States Government. The Government of the United States is obliged to inform its citizens of the condition of its nationals in enemy custody. The continued refusals of the Japanese Government to permit visits by representatives of the protecting Power to camps in Japanese-occupied territories leads naturally to the conclusion that conditions in these areas continue to remain unsatisfactory and such as to make Japan ashamed to have them observed by neutrals. In giving reality to its numerous professions of its intent to apply humanitarian considerations in its treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees and in making the improvements promised by Shigemitsu, the Japanese Government has at its command the most effective method of removing the causes of unfavorable reports and thereby preventing the future publication of such reports. When the Japanese Government accords to American nationals the humanitarian treatment it has promised and when it permits representatives of the Swiss Government to visit all places where American nationals are held and to verify and confirm that their treatment is in accordance with the promises of the Japanese Government, the United States Government will be in a position to reassure the relatives and friends of American nationals held by Japan with regard to their condition and treatment. The United States Government continues to hope that the Japanese Government will be persuaded without further delay to enable the Swiss representatives to visit all detained nationals of the United States wherever detained. There would seem to be no reason why the Japanese Government should not permit such visits without prejudice to the juridical position taken by Japan on the question of representation of enemy interests. See Department’s 2050, June 14. Hull 66 Telegram 2116, June 21, 4 p.m., to Bern, advised that this telegram (No. 2115) referred to Bern’s 1830, March 25, 9 a.m., p. 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 987 and Doc. 988 ] , and 3076, May 13, midnight, p. 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 994 and Doc. 995 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/6–2744: Telegram [Document 1002] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , June 27, 1944. [Received June 27—11 p.m.] 4097. American Interests, Japanese Occupied Manchuria. Foreign Office note June 23 states Gorgé inquired of Japanese Foreign Office regarding report contained Department’s 3279, December 30, 67 was informed interned American POWs detained Manchuria camp condemned to death. Japanese Government referred to Japanese attitude regarding application Geneva Convention set forth enclosure Legation’s airmail 8150, May 10. Following three POWs executed listed DM/3, DM/6 and DM/7 (see Legation’s A–40, January 24 67 ): (1) Jo Bill Bastain (listed as Chastain), Sergeant; (2) Ferdinand F. Meringold (listed as Meringolo), Staff Sergeant; (3) Victor Palliotti, Corporal. Japanese Foreign Office stated three prisoners prepared long time their escape. Bastain had already endeavored escape twice and had stolen kitchen knife and Meringold a dagger. Night of June 21, 1943 interned POWs escaped camp cutting through barbed wire and fled direction Russia. July 2 they accosted police inspector endeavoring obtain food and stating they were starved. Inspector questioned them and they endeavored pass as German aviators explaining their plane crashed. Inspector and two Mongols went with them to scene of accident. Enroute Bastain killed inspector with kitchen knife while Meringold seriously wounded one Mongol. Other fled and succeeded arresting escapees with aid local inhabitants. Three prisoners condemned death July 31, 1943 basis following: (1) confession of each prisoner before military court; (2) report of arrest; (3) report of court session; (4) reports of witnesses; (5) declarations of chief of work office of prisoners; (6) report on autopsy body police inspector and medical certificate regarding wounded Mongol. Among evidence were dagger, map Manchuria and compass. Foregoing documents communicated Swiss Legation which will forward them by mail with copy of Japanese Foreign Office report. 68 Harrison 67 Not printed. 67 Not printed. 68 The original Japanese Foreign Office note and translation thereof outlining the case were forwarded to the Department in despatch 9742, November 1, from Bern; received November 17. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A Pacific War/6–2844: Telegram [Document 1003] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , June 28, 1944—3 p.m. [Received 5:40 p.m.] 4110. American Interests—China—Civilian Internees. Swiss note dated June 24 states 360 sick and aged citizens of countries at war with Japan including 24 Americans will be interned June 28 special Shanghai camp. This concerns with exception Orientals last nationals of enemy countries still at liberty and previously exempted owing grave state of health. Japanese authorities allowing no exception these internment steps except small minority of sick who will be placed hospital where subject same restrictions as internees. Fontanel intervened behalf the sick not benefiting from this exception stressing danger transfer seriously ill and helpless to camp inadequately furnished receive such internees and lacking necessary medical equipment. Fontanel nevertheless told that in principle no exception may be granted. 69 Harrison 69 In despatch 8600, June 26, the Minister in Switzerland advised of reports regarding conditions in civilian internment centers at Shanghai. These reports, based on confidential sources, had been sent to the Swiss Foreign Office on March 31 by Mr. Fontanel. The principal grievances set forth by the internees concerned inadequacy of food and hygienic measures. Mr. Fontanel had been unable to visit the centers and the Japanese consular authorities had not permitted the internees to make known their grievances to him. Furthermore, the consular authorities had not permitted the dispatch of parcels by the International Red Cross, payments for medicinals, and the cost of hospitalization in very urgent cases. Mr. Fontanel also reported, however, that the situation was much less unfavorable at Weihsien and Yangchow where his representatives had made regular visits and could converse with the internees “almost freely”. (740.00115A P.W./6–2644) The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A P.W./6–2844: Telegram [Document 1004] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , July 7, 1944—9 p.m. 2327. American Interests, China, Civilian Internees. Urge Gorgé to call attention of Japanese Government to its responsibility for giving adequate housing facilities and care to aged, ill and helpless American nationals recently interned at Shanghai (Reference Bern’s 4110, June 28). The fact that the camp is inadequately prepared to receive them and is lacking in necessary medical equipment constitutes grave neglect. It is expected that in view of Japanese Government’s commitments to extend humane treatment to civilian internees, it will take immediate steps to remedy this condition and not subject these aged and infirm people to needless and cruel suffering. Hull The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/7–844: Telegram [Document 1005] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , July 8, 1944—10 p.m. [Received July 8—8:23 p.m.] 4367. American Interests, Japan. Department’s 2115 and 2116 both June 21. 70 Swiss note July 5 states Gorgé replied American Government’s views will greatly assist him in continuing negotiations with Japanese. Observes he already used in conversations Jap Foreign Office virtually all arguments American Government advanced. However, considering that arguments would carry more weight if pronounced by Department, Gorgé addressed letter July 1 to Shigemitsu fully setting forth American attitude. During conversations Jap Foreign Office recent weeks Gorgé only able obtain confirmation that question is continually under study but difficulties which thwart solution not concealed from him. Jap spokesman especially insisted on fact that occupied territories are now in zone of operations and added that if American authorities held Jap prisoners, for example on Marshall Islands, United States Government would also doubtless hesitate authorize camp visits. Without desiring interpret this as possible refusal, Gorgé believes it may be considered factor demonstrating difficulty of military authorities in effecting solution. Gorgé added with view avoiding possible misunderstanding that observations contained Legation’s 3076, May 13 did not signify that Jap Foreign Minister and Jap Government had given any pledge whatsoever but only that Shigemitsu had promised examine question camp visits without being able guarantee positive results. End summary note. In handing above cited note to Legation Secretary, Swiss Foreign Office official stated informally that Gorgé’s telegram also expressed belief that if British Government for tactical reasons would forward statement similar that contained Department’s 2115 expressing views corresponding those made by American Government his position would be considerably strengthened. Department may wish consult London. 71 Foreign Office official added Gorgé cited to Japanese precedent contained Department’s 2050, June 14, and left memo June 30 Jap Foreign Office. Reply awaited. Harrison 70 Latter not printed, but see footnote 66, p. 985 [ Pg. 985 includes portions of Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , and Doc. 1001 ] . 71 On August 2, the Department inquired of the British Embassy whether the British Government would forward a statement similar to that in Department’s telegram 2115; the Embassy responded on August 17 that the British Foreign Office was sending instructions to the British Minister in Switzerland to make similar representations. (711.94114A/7–844, 8–1744) However, in view of a written declaration by the Japanese Foreign Minister, the substance of which had been conveyed to the Foreign Office by the British Minister on August 8, the position was thought to have changed slightly and therefore the Swiss Minister in Japan was being given discretion as to whether or not to make use of the British communication to the Japanese Government. The written declaration stated that Thailand recognized the right of Switzerland to protect British and American rights within its borders but, according to the Japanese concept, this did not extend to prisoners of war camps, which were administered by Japanese military authorities, and admitted the possibility of allowing representatives of the prisoners to sign receipts for relief, rather than the Japanese camp commandants. Similar information on the declaration was conveyed to the Department in despatch 8979, August 10, from Bern (711.94114A O.T./8–1044). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/361: Telegram [Document 1006] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , July 10, 1944. 2362. American Interests, Far East. Reference Legation’s 1288, March 3. Inquire of Gorgé whether there has been any improvement in facility with which civilian internees and prisoners of war may send and receive letters. Also inquire whether Gorgé has yet received any communications from prisoners of war or civilian internees. Hull [For statement by the Department of State on the number of American civilians held in Japanese custody as of July 12, see bracketed note, page 1043 [ Pg. 1043 is part of Doc. 1061 ] .] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/7–2944: Telegram [Document 1007] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , July 29, 1944. [Received July 29—11:12 p.m.] 4885. American Interests, Far East. Department’s 2362, July 10. Foreign Office note July 25 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, reports it has been corresponding for long time and regularly with civilian internees Japan. Legation Tokyo Delegate during recent visit various camps was able, with approval Japanese authorities, inform POWs that they might write to Swiss Legation. Gorgé again intervened Japanese Foreign Office so that POWs be informed of right to correspond with Swiss Legation and that Japanese authorities offer all facilities for correspondence. With reference first paragraph Legation’s 1288, March 3, Gorgé notes he will again intervene Japanese Foreign Office if Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, reports difficulty in corresponding with POWs of [ or ] civilian internees occupied China. 72 Harrison 72 In telegram 6944, October 19, the Minister in Switzerland stated: “Swiss Consulate Shanghai reports it can correspond satisfactorily with civilian internees regarding purely administrative questions. Civilians however do not seem authorized write to Consulate to submit complaints or report disciplinary measures taken against them. Consulate has only received few letters from POWs at Kiangwan.” (711.94114A/10–1944) The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115 PW/8–2444: Telegram [Document 1008] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , August 24, 1944—8 p.m. [Received August 25—2:10 a.m.] 5546. American Interests, Far East. Department’s 2738, August 9. 73 Substance Swiss aide-mémoire August 22 follows: Gorgé replies to Department’s observations that he already made new representation end July to Japanese Foreign Office concerning visits POW camps in Japan and territory occupied by Japanese forces, but that this representation produced no result, his interlocutor taking refuge in complete silence. Swiss Minister fully understands reasons why American Government requests contemplated representation to Spanish and Swedish Governments should not be divulged. Under these circumstances Gorgé believes that a new personal representation would be useless. However, he continues to discuss the question using the customary arguments and he has just obtained authorization visit three important POW camps in northern Japan, at Hakodate. As this very limited authorization always covers only camps in metropolitan Japan and despite assurance given that after visit to Hakodate camps other visits will occur it appears that representation foreseen by American Government to Spanish and Swedish Governments might now be made. 74 Harrison 73 Not printed; the Department stated it was willing to delay briefly its contemplated requests to the Spanish and Swedish Governments along the lines set forth in footnote 74, p. 992 [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 1008 and Doc. 1009 ] . 74 Letters of September 14 to the Spanish Ambassador (Cárdenas) and the Swedish Minister (Boström), not printed, requested their Governments to inform the Japanese Government of the scrupulous endeavors of the United States Government to fulfill the application of the Geneva Convention to Japanese prisoners of war and of its concern regarding reports of mistreatment of American nationals by Japan, and “to emphasize to the Japanese Government that only through the extension of complete reciprocity can the Japanese Government expect to continue indefinitely to enjoy for its nationals the protection that stems from the complete freedom with which representatives of the Powers protecting Japanese interests have visited, and continue to be permitted to visit, all places without exception where Japanese nationals are interned or accommodated by the United States, to speak with these nationals without witnesses, and freely to correspond with them regarding their desires, complaints, property, et cetera.” (740.00115 P.W./8–2444) The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A P.W./8–2544: Telegram [Document 1009] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , August 25, 1944. 2934. American Interests—China. Request Swiss to inform the Japanese Government that this Government on the basis of reliable reports is gravely concerned with regard to the treatment being accorded American civilians in the camps in China, particularly the inadequacy of food, clothing, and medical supplies, and the failure of the authorities to provide for the maintenance of hygienic and sanitary conditions. It has been reported that the diet provided by the Japanese authorities amounts to from 1600 to 1850 calories per day, that it is seriously lacking in protein, fats and citrus fruits and that the food situation is steadily deteriorating. Most of the internees are actively engaged in camp labor, yet caloric value of the food supplied is considerably lower than the internationally established minimum standard. As a result complaints of hunger are not confined to a few malcontents but are wide-spread throughout the camps. In many instances the food is not only inadequate in quantity but the condition in which it is supplied is dangerous to the health of the community. The meat ration in all camps has been cut 30 percent and the form in which the meat is delivered makes it not only unpleasant to handle but difficult to prepare. Under normal conditions and by pure food standards, the meat would be condemned as unsuitable for human consumption. Bread is often delivered to the camps in Shanghai coated with dust, in uncovered containers, a potentially dangerous state of affairs in a city where enteric diseases (dysentery, typhoid, et cetera) are a major problem. Lack of medical supplies exposes the internees to great risks. Through gifts of absolutely essential drugs, the internees were formerly able to overcome in some degree the negligence of the Japanese authorities. Gifts are no longer available and the internees are now in the position of being compelled to rely on the authorities in this vital matter. Occasionally, and not necessarily in correlation with their needs, the camps have received certain medical supplies from the authorities. Urgently needed drugs are, however, often long delayed in delivery and are in other instances never delivered at all. Much of the medicine, drugs, and equipment has been available locally. It would appear that the authorities, if they were so inclined, could arrange to deliver these supplies when they are needed and in the amounts required and without delay. With much labor and considerable ingenuity, the internees have managed in most camps to establish limited hospital facilities, but failure on the part of the authorities to furnish adequate foodstuffs for invalid diets has made it impossible to take advantage of the full use of these facilities. With regard to hospitalization, the Japanese authorities in Shanghai have not facilitated but have even obstructed the efforts of the International Red Cross Committee and the Swiss Consulate General by refusing in a number of instances to grant permission for hospitalization and to authorize payment for the cost involved. The Japanese Government has also failed in its obligation to provide needed clothing and footwear. Many of the adult internees have worn out their shoes and the children have outgrown theirs. No provision has been made for replacement or repair. The clothing which the internees brought with them is wearing out and the authorities are not making adequate provision for replacements. Last winter when the camp buildings were but slightly heated, the authorities made no effort to supply warm clothing to those who were in need. The approach of another winter heightens the distress of the internees and gives urgency to the obligation of the Japanese authorities to furnish the internees with necessary clothing before the cold weather sets in. A grave condition exists with regard to the sanitary situation. Cleanliness is a first line of defense against disease where sanitation facilities are as primitive as those which exist in the camps, but cleanliness cannot be maintained where adequate materials and equipment are not provided. The appeal of the internees for such supplies as buckets, shovels, brushes, mops, drain pipe cleaners, rat poison, soap and disinfectant is evidence of the extent of the failure of the authorities to provide the essentials. The Japanese Government must be aware that the lives of thousands of people are involved in its failure to make available the tools and supplies needed for maintaining the hygiene and cleanliness of the camps. The internment of the sick and aged at Chung Shan University is totally at variance with the humanitarian professions of the Japanese Government. Many of the internees were receiving regular medical treatment prior to their internment but this was ordered discontinued while at the same time no adequate provision was made for proper medical care in the camp. No attempt was made to furnish persons suffering from sprue, stomach ulcers, et cetera, with any form of special diet. No steps had been taken or preparations made before the internment of these people to make habitable the quarters assigned to them. Most of the rooms were in an unclean condition and the buildings in a state of disrepair. Although the rooms of the Japanese guards were suitably heated, no heat was provided in the internees’ quarters. No laundry facilities were provided and washroom facilities were inadequate. The lavatories were primitive and in an unsanitary condition. Adequate equipment by means of which it might have been possible to bring about an improvement in the sanitary condition of the camp was lacking. The poor quality and insufficiency of the food and the cold dampness of unheated rooms, combined with the dirt of their surroundings, caused severe suffering to the aged and ailing persons interned in this camp. Although a letter pointing out the deficiencies of the camp was submitted to the commandant, no steps were taken to remedy the situation. Failure to make provision for essential needs and negligence in maintaining proper standards in the treatment of American nationals held in Japanese custody in China constitute grave transgressions and are serious violations not only of the letter but of the spirit of the Geneva Convention, the humanitarian provisions of which the Japanese Government has voluntarily undertaken to apply. The United States Government continues to expect that the Japanese Government will honor its commitments to observe the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention and will give effect to its professions that it is according humane treatment to the American nationals in its custody. Department desires to be informed of date of delivery of this communication to the Japanese Government, 75 and thereafter to receive report of steps taken by Japanese Government to remedy situation and degree of amelioration accomplished. Hull 75 In telegram 6018, September 12, the Minister in Switzerland stated that this communication was delivered to the Japanese Government on September 5 (740.00115A P.W./9–1244). The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/8–3044: Telegram [Document 1010] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , August 30, 1944—9 p.m. [Received August 30—2:56 p.m.] 5659. American Interests—Japan. Given below substance Swiss Note August 22, with reference enclosure Legation’s airmail 8150, May 10, and Legation’s 4367 July 8. Japanese Foreign Minister August 12 informed Gorgé of following: With regard American Government’s protest concerning Japanese treatment of Americans, Japanese Government’s views were set forth in detail in Shigemitsu’s letter April 28 76 to Swiss Minister. Simultaneously Japanese Government defined line of conduct adopted in connection treatment Americans, and also expressed to him its views regarding “campaign of false accusations” which American Government launched against Japan at time American Government’s protest. In addition Shigemitsu’s letter April 28 explained why authorization visit POW camps situated Japanese occupied territory cannot now be granted. If Shigemitsu promised examination question, this is because Japanese Government intends despite numerous difficulties observe in treatment enemy citizens an attitude which is just and in conformity with line of conduct already mentioned. Shigemitsu will later inform Swiss Minister result this examination. Former felt required direct attention American Government to fact that from that time on (Legation’s note: presumably April 28) Japanese Government has strongly desired that measures be taken on basis Geneva Convention for treatment enemy nationals even with regard situations not specifically foreseen in said convention. Japan hopes from humanitarian standpoint American Government will undertake soonest possible detailed examination requests formulated last part Shigemitsu’s letter April 28 (enclosure to Legation’s airmail 8150) and shortly communicate result. Gorgé thinks foregoing quite precisely defines Japanese attitude and hopes Department will soon make possible his reply, because failing this he will be unable make representations of general character. He made further representations July 21 to obtain authorization visit camps and then left memorandum at Japanese Foreign Office. Latter replied August 15 that if Gorgé based this representation on declaration Shigemitsu made during conversation May 3 (Legation’s note: Swiss official considers this is probably same conversation referred to in Legation’s 3076, May 13) it should be pointed out only promise given was that “Shigemitsu would do all he is able with regard to visiting camps in metropolitan Japan and China”. After this conversation delegate of Japanese Foreign Office successively visited POW camps Nagoya, Niigata, Tokyo, et cetera, and Gorgé expressed his satisfaction to competent authorities. Japanese reply finally reports competent authorities intend authorize visits other camps as applications presented by Swiss Legation. End Swiss Note August 22. Swiss notice dated August 25 transmits following interpretative comment by Gorgé on immediately preceding paragraph: Gorgé gave to understand in discussing his memorandum of July 21 at Japanese Foreign Office that he had very well understood Shigemitsu’s declaration which had been made without reservation as concerns visits POW camps metropolitan Japan. Besides War Ministry some days later gave same assurances. In addition POW Bureau voluntarily declared it would prepare general plan for camp inspections Japan which Gorgé requested more than two years [ago?]. All these declarations made without slightest reservation. Now Japanese Foreign Office exerting every effort demonstrate to Gorgé that he had not understood quite well and that these declarations only meant to convey that Japanese authorities would do all that they could concerning camp visits metropolitan Japan and China. Gorgé stresses that even if admitted that he placed too broad interpretation these declarations he is compelled to observe that now Japanese reservations also aim at camp visits Japan itself. Gorgé unaware nature these reservations and considers Japan would do better frankly to state difficulties hindering visits. Once again during Foreign Office conversation he directed attention to importance of question from humanitarian standpoint and to anguish thousands of families who have no specific news regarding fate their kin. Japanese official while saying nothing regarding question reservations promised examine with War Ministry problem of visits to be made after coming inspection Hokkaido camp. Concerning last sentence August 15 memorandum in which Japanese Foreign Office repeated that competent Japanese authorities intend permit visits other camps as applications presented by Swiss Legation, Gorgé made formal reservations in stating that he had never admitted thesis already held on several occasions that Japanese will give authorization “as applications presented by Swiss Legation”. Gorgé requested during these numerous representations authorization visit all camps without exception; he informed War Ministry that he was at its complete disposal to visit any camp at any time. He is, therefore, not to be reproached for not having made application to visit this or that camp whose existence is perhaps not even known to him. Gorgé took occasion to request spokesman provide complete official list of camps and added that he would immediately present a request for inspection each camp. Harrison 76 See note from the Japanese Foreign Office to the Swiss Legation in Japan, p. 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 994 ] . The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/7–1144: Telegram [Document 1011] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , August 31, 1944—10 p.m. 3007. American Interests—Japan. Request Swiss Government to communicate the following message to Gorgé to be delivered textually to the Japanese Government: “The Government of the United States has received conclusive evidence of the torture and decapitation of an American airman captured by the Japanese in the Aitape area, New Guinea. The airman was decapitated on March 24, 1944, by a Japanese civilian in the presence of an officer of the Japanese Army and fifteen Japanese soldiers. The United States Government protests vigorously against the wanton, inhumane and barbarous methods employed by the Japanese who participated in this base deed. It has been ascertained that the American airman in question parachuted to earth near Aitape on March 23, 1944, landed in the water and swam ashore. He was taken captive about nine a.m., by Japanese troops near the mouth of the Waimegol Creek, approximately 12 miles east of Aitape. The flier had discarded all equipment except a notebook and a small knife and was wearing only a pair of trousers, belt and socks when he swam ashore. Upon capturing the American flier, the Japanese confiscated the prisoner’s notebook and knife and bound his hands behind his back and commenced beating him with sticks. This beating continued until the afternoon of March 23 at which time the prisoner was taken to the quarters of the Aitape garrison commander, Kurita, at Korako village. Here beating was resumed and continued throughout the night. At 7 o’clock the following morning the prisoner was taken back to the place of capture by Lieutenant Seto and a Japanese civilian named Inouye. There the American was again subjected to relentless beating until 3 o’clock in the afternoon at which time he was decapitated by Inouye with six slashes of the saber. The loud shouts of joy which emanated from the Japanese troops during the torture of the American flier indicate the sadistic character of his tormentors and executioners. The United States Government hereby charges that the following Japanese are guilty for the wanton murder of the American flier: First Lieutenant Kurita, commanding officer, 26th Air Construction Unit. First Lieutenant Seto, second in command, 26th Air Construction Unit. Lieutenant Seto was present at the time the American flier was decapitated. First Lieutenant Watanabe, third in command, 26th Air Construction Unit. Inouye, the Japanese civilian who performed the decapitation. Inouye was the Japanese overseer of coolie laborers in the area in question at the time it was held by the Japanese Armed Forces. The United States Government holds the Japanese Government responsible for the perpetration of this crime and expects the prompt receipt of assurances from the Japanese Government that 1. all participants have been punished severely and that 2. necessary steps to prevent the recurrence of such inhuman treatment of prisoners of war have been taken.” Hull The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A PW/9–1144: Telegram [Document 1012] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , September 11, 1944. 3133. American Interests—Philippines. Request Swiss Government to communicate following message to Gorgé to be delivered textually to the Japanese Government: The Government of the United States has received from reliable sources information that certain American civilian internees in the Philippine Islands have been removed from the Los Baños Camp to Fort McKinley where a major ammunition dump for central Luzon is maintained. As Article 9 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention provides that no prisoner may, at any time, be sent into a region where he might be exposed to the fire of the combat zone, nor used to give protection from bombardment to certain points or certain regions by his presence, the action taken by the Japanese authorities constitutes a flagrant violation of the obligation undertaken by it to apply to civilian internees in so far as they are adaptable, the provisions of the Geneva Convention and of its commitment at all times to accord protection and humane treatment to the American nationals in its custody. The United States Government expects that the Japanese Government will at once remove the American nationals at Fort McKinley to a region far enough from military installations for them to be out of danger, and that the Japanese Government will exercise every care to forestall a repetition of the violation of the laws of war in exposing civilian internees or prisoners of war to bombardment by housing them in areas in the vicinity of military objectives. Hull The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/9–1144: Airgram [Document 1013] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , September 11, 1944. A–554. Am[erican] Interests, Far East. Legation’s airmail 8150, May 10. Foreign Office note September 6 encloses copy telegram August 29, substance quoted below, from Swiss Legation, Tokyo, transmitting text report received from Shigemitsu. In transmitting following, Swiss Foreign Office adds that according recent telegram from Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, no inspection civilian internment camps permitted since July 1943 but Japanese authorities promised give authorization this month. Begin substance: Regarding treatment American POWs and civilian internees within areas under Japanese administration, Japanese Government replied in detail to U. S. Government April 28. 77 As further information has since been received from POW and CI camps Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong, Java and Philippines concerning treatment accorded, some particulars thereof which it is considered will supplement above-mentioned reply of Japanese Government are given below: A. Treatment POWs at Shanghai camps. 1. POW petitions. It is provided that POWs may petition camp authorities according existing regulation. 2. POW clothing. POWs provided with clothing same quality as Japanese soldiers and permitted use clothing owned by them. All clothing received from outside as relief supplies is handed over to them. 3. Permission retain personal effects. POWs permitted retain and use such personal effects of daily necessity as toilet articles, etc. Other articles unnecessary or requiring control are kept in custody by camp authorities although some such articles permitted to be used when necessary. 4. Food and nutrition. Same rate of food supplies which are provided Japanese soldiers as to sufficiently maintaining health is supplied POWs. Rations further supplemented by relief supplies from outside. Camp authorities striving ensure supply of variety of provisions for POWs by raising cattle and cultivating vegetables [and on] camp premises they raise swine, rabbits, sheep, ploughoxen and ploughhorses, etc. Among Shanghai POWs at present none suffering pellagra, scorbutus or sprue [and] only few slight cases beriberi. Existing percentage however considerably lower than among Japanese soldiers. Weights of POWs show average increase approximately 4 kilograms over those at time commitment camp. Among them there is not single patient suffering disease due malnutrition or undernourishment. 5. Camp canteens. At POW camps, Shanghai, management canteens entrusted POWs and profits are permitted be spent for POW comfort and welfare. 6. Labor. At POW camps, Shanghai, no POW ever subjected labor directly related war operations. 7. Medical facilities. POW camps, Shanghai, adequately provided medical facilities. 8. Observance religious rites. POWs permitted observe religious rites at camp once weekly in accordance respective sects and religious minister invited from outside once monthly. On special occasions like Easter, Catholic father permitted visit camp, conduct prayer and communion services. 9. Permission for possession text of treaties. Certain number officers permitted retain their own text of treaties. 10. Letter written by POW. Copy of letter written by American POWs attached hereto for information U. S. Government. (Annex 1. 78 ) B. Treatment civilian internees, Shanghai camps. 1. Visits of representative U. S. interests to internment camps. Swiss Consul General, Shanghai, charged [with] U. S. interests visited and inspected all parts internment camps Shanghai. Expressed satisfaction with accommodations of camps. Intercross 79 Delegate, Shanghai, also visited camps since established. Both Consul General and Intercross Delegate during inspection visits spoke to leader of each compartment and their acquaintances among internees. 2. Internees petitions. Internees have through their representatives sometimes made petitions to camp authorities but none in nature of complaint is known to have ever been made. 3. Clothing. As internees brought with them plenty clothing at time their commitment to camp, it has not been found necessary make further supply by camp authorities. 4. Provisions in addition to the fixed rations supplied by camp authorities. Intercross Delegation permitted send gifts and authorized purveyors supply them with supplementary provisions if desired. Moreover camp authorities permit internees who volunteer for health and recreation to cultivate vegetables and cereals on part of camp premises assigned such propose [ purpose ?], and produce is appropriated as food for internees. 5. Camp canteens. Internment camps Shanghai self-managed by internees so canteens also left their management and camp authorities do not interfere disposal profits. 6. Labor and comforts. At Shanghai internment camps internees never been forced engage any labor. Internees can enjoy reading, indoor games, open air exercise, etc., and naturally health excellent in spite average age 47. Stage equipment provided in camp hall where concerts and dramatic performances often given. Adequate and sufficient comforts thus secured for internees. 7. Medical and other facilities. At internment camps Shanghai well equipped medical offices exist and sufficient attention given sanitation and medical treatment under supervision Japanese surgeon captain and assisted by soldier nurses and interned physicians. When necessary, patients temporarily released and sent designated hospitals outside for treatment. Camps perfectly equipped with sitting rooms, bathrooms, showers, kitchens, lavatories and heating apparatus. Buildings spacious and gardens and playgrounds are attached. 8. Observance religious rites. Perfect freedom granted internees for observance religious rites. In May 1943 seven marriages among British, American and Greek nationals permitted and performed accordance respective religions. Several religious ministers among internees conduct services every Sunday. 9. Shanghai internment camps conclusion. Camp authorities pay due regard personality internees and permit lead daily life regularly. Consequently everything good order and no dispute ever occurred. Internees act in concert with wishes camp authorities endeavoring always cooperate making internees life happy. Copy letter from Egle, Intercross Delegate attached. (Annex 2.) C. Treatment civilian internees Canton camp. 1. Internment enemy nationals, Canton. Upon outbreak greater East Asia war, enemy nationals resident Canton prohibited leave respective premises except for purchases of necessities, bank business, medical treatment, religious services and other purposes deemed necessary by authorities and for open air exercise necessary for preservation health. Apart from foregoing no restriction imposed. November 5, 1942, nine of them, four Americans and five British, transferred to internment camp but camp closed May 25, 1942, and inmates transferred newly established civil center. 2. Details internees treatment. At camp internees not only free from all restraint or restriction regarding daily life but cooking meals, cleaning rooms and laundry are done by three Chinese women employed Japanese army. Therefore internees have so much leisure some volunteered gardening or ploughing camp premises and there was absolutely no instance forced labor. If internees became ill they were permitted immediately consult doctor and receive treatment. Camp authorities never refused medical treatment nor did any internee ever complain due illness. Internees permitted observe religious rites not only every Sunday but also other occasions demanded. Since transfer civil center, internees continued receive fair and just treatment and civil center visited occasionally by Swiss Consul. Due very generous treatment accorded inmates civil center and also their own cooperative efforts none until present ever subjected to punishment. D. Details regarding treatment POW camp Hong Kong. Goods previously sold [at] prime cost [to] canteens attached POW camp Hong Kong but since April 1, 1944, they are permitted be sold uniform rate 5 percent profit which under supervision and permission Japanese authorities is spent promotion welfare of internees. (Annex 3.) Since establishment Hong Kong POW camp, no children, soldiers or civilians permitted visit except those whose visit especially permitted by Government General there. Nor has curiosity of public regarding POWs at camp ever been allowed to be satisfied. E. Details treatment American POW and CI camps Java: 117 American POWs including 9 officers, 108 noncoms or privates, and 39 CIs Java all receiving just and fair treatment as stated below. 1. POW petitions. Senior POW officer and Chairman Self Government Committee of CIs enjoy privilege making petitions and stating complaints to camp authorities and no punishment ever inflicted or threatened upon complaints. 2. Clothing. POWs supplied necessary clothing and CIs permitted use their own clothing. Clothing question comparatively simple in tropical region where no seasonal change. POWs engaged bodily labor always supplied straw hats and sporting shoes. 3. Personal effects. POWs and CIs permitted retain and use personal effects for daily use as far as circumstances permit, permitted possess personally certain amounts of own money, remainder being deposited with banks on their respective accounts. 4. Provisions. As American POWs and CIs not accustomed to rice they are supplied bread. Fruits plenteously rationed to ensure sufficient vitamins and camp stalls specially ordered sell papayas, bananas and oranges. Further as preventative measures against declined physical strength due tropical heat, POWs and CIs given yeast prepared from Dindinan [ Indian? ] corn by physicians among POWs. For preservation health those POWs engaged labor, special attention given by utilizing nutritious value of vitaminous food such as bovine blood, intestines, etc. To secure abundance of rations, POWs made attend to cow milking, raising swine, ducks and fish and cultivation vegetables. 5. Camp canteens. Profits accruing from sales at stalls in Java camps corresponding canteens other regions are spent purchasing sporting and amusement articles, newspapers, magazines for welfare POWs. 6. Labor. Officer POWs have attendants appointed look after personal demands. Are not engaged labor except gardening and [the] like which they do own accord. CIs work in connection operation maintenance and management camps and never forced do any bodily toil. 7. Medical treatment. Each POW camp provided medical office and sickroom, and physicians and nurses among POWs examine and treat patients. CIs also looked after by physicians appointed amongst them and when necessary patients permitted enter and receive medical treatment at Government or public hospitals outside. 8. Observance religious rites. In POW and CI camps, chapels provided where observance religious rites permitted and freedom of faith granted. 9. POW and CI camps accommodations. In Java POWs confined former Dutch [East] Indian army barracks and CIs in ordinary dwelling houses. Electric lighting and water supply abundant and nothing is wanting to make places comfortable to live in. Moreover to prevent malaria, POWs and CIs each supplied mosquito net. [F.] In details treatment POWs at Philippine camps. Regarding details treatment accorded POWs Philippine camps, following are attached for information U. S. Government. 1. Radio broadcast speech on medical treatment in POW hospitals made by Commander I. B. Sartin, Medical Corps, USN. (Annex 4.) 2. Radio broadcast concerning observance religious rites, etc., at POW camps by Chaplain Perry O. Wilcox, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. regular army. (Annex 5.) [ Harrison ] 77 See despatch 8150, p. 941 [ Pg. 941 includes portions of Doc. 993 and Doc. 994 ] . 78 Annexes transmitted by the Minister in Switzerland in despatch 10991, February 27, 1945; received March 9. None printed. 79 International Red Cross Committee. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/9–1544: Telegram [Document 1014] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , September 15, 1944. 3197. Request the Swiss Government to have Gorgé deliver the following communication textually to the Japanese Government: The United States Government has been informed of an order issued on February 11, 1944 to the Japanese armed forces in Siam by the Command of the 138th Infantry Regiment, 31st Division of the Japanese Imperial Army, to the effect that captured enemy air personnel are not to be treated as prisoners of war, that they are to be separated from other prisoners, that after being searched they are to be handed over to the gendarmerie , and that they are to be severely punished excepting those who can be put to some special use. The United States Government protests against this violation of the internationally agreed rules of warfare which guarantee to all captured personnel of belligerent forces the rights of prisoners of war. The United States Government insists that the Japanese Government fulfill its undertaking to apply the humane provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention to the treatment of captured personnel without exception. The United States Government calls upon the Japanese Government to rescind the order in question and to restore to any captured American airmen who may have been deprived of them the full rights to which as prisoners of war they are entitled. By the international obligations it has undertaken, the Japanese Government may not declare these rights abolished or suspended. Hull The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A O.T./9–2144: Telegram [Document 1015] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , September 21, 1944—10 p.m. [Received September 22—8:35 a.m.] 6274. American Interests—Indochina. Legation’s 5069, August 7. 80 Note September 19 from Foreign Office states Swiss Consulate, Saigon, reports unofficially advised that 1861 POWs detained Saigon camp include 209 Americans. Camp leader is Captain J. H. Fowler. According a detained officer, treatment satisfactory. Japanese Commanding Officer correct. About 430 patients in hospital where dangerous and cruel soldier in charge. Insufficient supplies given doctors who lack anti-tetanous serum, morphine, pills and syringes. Harrison 80 Not printed. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114 Mail/9–2344: Telegram [Document 1016] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , September 23, 1944. [Received September 24—5:55 a.m.] 6317. Am[erican] Interests, Japan, POW Mail. Foreign Office note September 19 states Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphs September 16: Japanese Government after lengthy examination proposal contained Department’s 2111, June 20, regrets unable accept for following reasons. (1) Exchange information regarding number letters received would cause great work and would not improve POW and internee postal service. (2) Preparation monthly report regarding dates despatch and receipt does not satisfy a necessity. If needed it might be possible after inquiry during given period calculate approximate number days required transmit mail. (3) Exchange information regarding mail routes not necessary as all mail now routed Siberia; notification changes in routing would suffice. Harrison The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/9–2644: Telegram [Document 1017] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , September 26, 1944—11 p.m. 3322. Request Swiss Government to have Gorgé deliver the following communication textually to the Japanese Government: The American Government is reliably informed that a private of the United States Army was captured by Japanese forces near Arayat, Pampanga, Philippines on September 21, 1943 and taken to Angeles where he was kept without food or water for two days. A detachment of the Japanese army then took him to a cemetery where he was tied to a tree with barbed wire, and used for bayonet practice until he was dead. Not content with subjecting their victim to brutal cruelty, his tormentors made a public spectacle of his torture and suffering. The United States Government considers such barbarous conduct on the part of members of the Japanese armed forces as outrageous. The Japanese Government has full responsibility for the behavior of individual members or detachments of its armed forces. This prisoner of war was in the custody of Japan, not of the Japanese individuals or corps who have captured him. It is the solemn duty of the Japanese Government to protect him against precisely such acts of violence and public degradation; and the Japanese Government is implicated in the guilt of its soldiers. The United States Government demands prompt, thorough and just investigation of this matter, and insists that those who ordered and committed the acts herein reported shall be brought to full account for their cruelty, and that punishment commensurate with their crime be imposed upon them. It further insists that the Japanese Government guarantee that it will take all steps necessary to prevent repetition of such heinous offences on the part of its armed forces. Hull [In telegram 6760, October 10, 10 p.m., the Minister in Switzerland reported that the Swiss Consul General at Shanghai had visited almost all civilian assembly centers in the Shanghai area. For text of this message, see page 1057 [ Pg. 1057 includes portions of Doc. 1075 and Doc. 1076 ] .] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A P.W./7–1244: Telegram [Document 1018] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , October 16, 1944—midnight. 3532. American Interests—Japan. Please request Swiss Government to inform Gorgé that United States Government has received information considered reliable which indicates that on or about December 20, 1943 at a place near Kapitunan, Capiz Province, Panay, Philippine Islands, a detachment of the Japanese Army under the command of “Captain Tarasaki” brutally put to death a group of seventeen American men, women and children. The names of the Americans involved are listed below: Dr. and Mrs. Francis H. Rose Rev. and Mrs. Erie F. Rounds and their son, Earl Douglas Miss Signe A. Erickson Rev. and Mrs. J. H. Covell Dr. and Mrs. F. M. Meyer Miss Jennie C. Adams Dorothy A. Dowell Mr. and Mrs. Mark Clardy and children, Terry and John Albert W. King. Gorgé should be asked to approach the Japanese Government with a view to obtaining at the earliest possible moment such information regarding this matter as may be readily available and as may later become available through a prompt investigation of this matter by the appropriate Japanese authorities. If the information obtained from the Japanese Government confirms the deaths of these persons, a full report of the circumstances surrounding their deaths should be furnished for the United States Government. If the Japanese Government should deny the charges that the seventeen persons involved were brutally murdered, Gorgé should demand that the Japanese Government provide full information concerning the whereabouts and welfare of all of the persons listed. Please request that Gorgé report when he takes up this matter with the Japanese Government 81 and also that he keep his Government informed telegraphically of all steps taken by him to obtain the desired information. Hull 81 In telegram 7433, November 9, 5:45 p.m., the Minister in Switzerland reported delivering the information on October 31 (740.00115A PW/11–944). In airgram 1038, September 5, 1945, the Minister in Switzerland reported that Mr. Gorgé had intervened with the Japanese Foreign Office six times on the matter and had been informed that the names of the alleged victims did not appear among the lists of internees held by the military authorities and that investigation remained without result (740.00115A PW/9–545). The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/10–2344: Telegram [Document 1019] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , October 23, 1944. [Received October 23—11:15 p.m.] 7021. American Interests, Far East. Legation’s airgram 484, August 16. 82 Foreign Office note October 19 states according Japanese Foreign Office beriberi cases do not exceed 1% POWs Japan and barely exceed 2% POWs Thailand and Burma, View action taken these figures tend decline. Japanese Foreign Office adds notwithstanding present difficulties, POWs continue receive food equal quantity and quality Japanese base troops and this food even superior that of Japanese civilians. Harrison 82 Not printed; it reported that the Swiss Legation in Tokyo had invited the attention of the Japanese Government to the fact that many POWs were dying of beriberi because their diet of polished rice had insufficient vitamins and that the Swiss Legation had been informed by the Japanese Foreign Office that rations accorded POWs had been minutely studied and, as a result, unhusked rice and concentrated vitamins were now being provided (711.94114A/8–1644). The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A P.W./10–2644: Telegram [Document 1020] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , October 26, 1944—11 p.m. 3664. American Interests—Japan. Please request Swiss Government to inform Gorgé that United States Government has received information considered reliable which indicates that Father Joseph Thomas Kotrba, a United States missionary attached to the Catholic Society of the Divine Word at Kire, New Guinea, was taken into custody by the Japanese military authorities under the command of “Captain Owe” when Father Kotrba arrived on February 7, 1943, at the Mission station at Bogia, New Guinea. He was deprived of all of his personal belongings, was put under strict guard, was for one day tied up, was threatened to be shot or bayoneted, and was otherwise mistreated. On February 12, 1943, he was required to leave Bogia with a Japanese officer and a non-commissioned officer. It is also reported to this Government that in June 1943 an unnamed Japanese officer is understood to have made the statement that Father Kotrba “had been shot while trying to escape at Wewak”. Please request that Gorgé handle this matter in same manner as matter discussed in Department’s 3532, October 16, and telegraph pertinent developments. 83 Stettinius 83 Telegram 8304, December 23, 7 p.m., from Bern, reported that “inquiry conducted by Japanese authorities regarding Kotrba’s death gave no result.” (740.00115A P.W./12–2344) The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/10–1944: Telegram [Document 1021] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , November 1, 1944. 3738. American Interests—Japan. Legation’s 6946, October 19, Legation’s 6788, October 11, 84 Intercross US2373, October 10 to PIWAR, and Intercross Geneva C1006. Request Swiss Government to have Gorgé deliver the following message textually to the Japanese Government: The American Government was advised, one year and a half after the event occurred and only after inquiry on its part, of the shooting of an American prisoner of war, Private Coleman Greelich. 85 The American Government considers such perfunctory notification in direct contravention to Article 77 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention which states that the Information Bureau shall receive from the various services concerned full information respecting internments and transfers, releases on parole, repatriations, escapes, stays in hospitals, deaths, as well as other information necessary to enable it to make out and keep up to date an individual return for each prisoner of war. The American Government expects that the Japanese Government will take all steps necessary to prevent in the future such unjustifiable delay in making official reports. Stettinius 84 Neither printed. 85 Private Greelich was shot and killed on April 1, 1943, while attempting to escape from a Japanese prisoner of war camp on Formosa. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/9–2144: Telegram [Document 1022] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , November 1, 1944—10 p.m. 3739. American Interests—Indochina. Legation’s 6274, September 21. Request Swiss Government to have Gorgé deliver the following message textually 86 to the Japanese Government: The American Government is reliably informed that in Saigon sick and wounded American prisoners of war are subjected to the authority of a cruel and irresponsible soldier who has been placed in control of the hospital and that the medical supplies and drugs essential to the proper care of these prisoners of war have not been provided. Such administration of a military hospital is in direct opposition to the Japanese Government’s commitment to accord protection and humane treatment at all times to American nationals in its custody as well as to Article 1 of the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick of Armies in the Field to which Japan is a party and which states that officers, soldiers, and other persons officially attached to the armies who are wounded or sick shall be respected and protected in all circumstances; they shall be humanely treated and cared for without distinction of nationality by the belligerent in whose power they are. The American Government demands that a prompt investigation be made of this matter and that the Japanese Government undertake immediately to rectify the conditions reported herein. Stettinius 86 In telegram 3784, November 7, 1 p.m., to Bern, the Acting Secretary of State directed that the word “textually” be changed to read “in paraphrase”. (711.94114A/9–2144) The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/11–2344: Telegram [Document 1023] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , November 23, 1944. [Received November 24—4:04 a.m.] 7704. Am[erican] Interests, Far East. Legation’s 4885, July 29. Foreign Office note November 15 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, reports Japanese Foreign Office has replied to Swiss Legation’s representations that competent authorities have been informed of Swiss Legation’s request that all POWs Japanese hands be informed of their right to correspond with protecting Power. Japanese Foreign Office points out, however, that it is not its responsibility to see that POWs write to Swiss Legation for POWs must already know they have that right but their correspondence is limited. Swiss Legation informed Japanese Foreign Office that it was not question of having POWs write protecting Power but only inform them that they might do so. Swiss Legation therefore endeavoring send circular this subject to all POW camps. Huddle The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A PW/11–2344: Airgram [Document 1024] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , November 23, 1944—5 p.m. [Received December 5—6 p.m.] A–704. American Interests—China. Legation’s telegram No. 6760, October 10, 10 p.m. 87 Given below is substance material portion Swiss note dated November 18: Fontanel has dispatched by courier detailed report covering his visits to civilian assembly centers in Shanghai area. This report will be transmitted Legation upon receipt at Swiss Foreign Office. He intervened with Japanese Consulate General with a view making arrangements for Japanese authorities to do more on behalf of persons confined in the assembly camps. Japanese Consulate General replied that it has repeatedly requested Japanese Government to make supplementary credits available to it but that Consulate General does not believe that it will receive them in the near future. It added that the living conditions of the internees are in every case equal to, or perhaps even better than those of the average Japanese and Chinese civilian and that more could not be asked in time of war. Fontanel believes that this statement is generally in conformity with the truth, although it does not take cognizance of the fact that the internees are not accustomed to the frugal food which satisfied the Japanese and Chinese. In these conditions, he would not consider it opportune to instruct the Swiss Legation at Tokyo to intervene with the Japanese Government regarding this matter. Such a representation might also run the risk of prompting the Japanese authorities to carry out their project of transferring the internees to the north of the country or to Manchuria. The Japanese authorities have given their assent to Fontanel’s proposal to send a single shipment of a certain quantity of food to the camps. He therefore plans to purchase wheat, millet, crushed barley as well as several varieties of kidney beans, soya and bacon. Huddle 87 Post , p. 1057 [ Pg. 1057 includes portions of Doc. 1075 and Doc. 1076 ] . The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) 740.00115A PW/12–444: Telegram [Document 1025] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) Washington , December 4, 1944. 4089. Request Swiss Government to inform the Japanese Government that this Government is deeply concerned with regard to the condition of American civilians interned at Urawa, Futatabi, Kanagawa, and Koishikawaku. It has been reliably reported that at Urawa the majority of internees are ill with stomach and intestinal ailments and all suffer from weakness and fatigue. The general debility of the group has been induced by a diet composed primarily of potatoes, rice and noodles and one in which oils, fats, proteins, sugar and salt are badly needed. The building in which the American nationals are housed is only dimly lighted and no heat is provided. The Japanese Government has not replaced clothing which as long ago as January 1944 was worn and shabby. In addition, in violation of the primary rules of cleanliness and sanitation, the Japanese have neglected to furnish implements and materials necessary to keep the toilets constantly clean. At Futatabi the disregard of the rudimentary laws of hygiene exposes the internees, who are losing weight and recover slowly from any illness, to grave risk. The Japanese authorities did not fumigate the camp buildings which are infested with vermin, bugs and lice; they have neglected the repair of broken or unserviceable sanitary installations and pay no heed to the urgent requirements of the internees for soap as well as for cleaning and disinfecting materials; they ignore the importance to the camp of an adequate and pure supply of water; they fail to issue warm clothing to the needy and the food, from which proteins and fats especially are lacking, is often spoiled and insects are found in it. It is evident that men living under such conditions cannot escape illness. The Japanese authorities, satisfied by routine medical visits every three or four weeks, rarely call a physician. His arrival is generally belated as access to the camp is difficult. Internees can only obtain medicaments and dental treatment if they have the money with which to pay for them. At Kanagawa, where in winter the temperature drops to below zero, American nationals were installed in unheated buildings badly in need of repair and built only for summer use. Representations that the premises be made weather-proof have been refused although another winter is beginning. To add to the plight of the internees the Japanese authorities have failed to issue warm, suitable clothing and appropriate footgear. Rations, which in the beginning were not too inadequate, have dwindled to such an extent that the internees are losing weight and their constitutions are undermined. Hunger is prevalent. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government has rescinded permission, now that it is desperately needed, for the internees to purchase foodstuffs from outside at their own expense and no longer allow friends and relatives to bring food into camp. At Koishikawaku the Japanese Government has not deemed it necessary to supply any soap for over a period of months and has disregarded wash basins that are out of order. The lighting is insufficient and, as in other camps where American civilians are interned, there is no infirmary and any dental work is at the expense of the internees. Article 10 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention provides that all prisoners shall be lodged in buildings or in barracks affording all possible guarantees of hygiene and healthfulness and that quarters must be sufficiently heated and lighted. Article 11 provides that a sufficiency of potable water shall be furnished. Article 12 states that clothing, linen and footwear shall be furnished by the detaining Power, that replacement and repairing of these effects must be assured regularly and that canteens shall be installed where food products and ordinary objects may be obtained at market price. Article 13 provides that all sanitary measures necessary shall be taken to assure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics and also that prisoners shall have at their disposal installations conforming to sanitary rules and constantly maintained in a state of cleanliness. Article 14 provides that every camp shall have an infirmary to furnish every kind of attention needed and that expense of treatment shall be borne by the detaining Power. As conditions in civilian internment camps in Japan transgress in part or in totality the provisions cited above and as the Japanese Government voluntarily undertook to apply the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention to civilian internees, the American Government expects that a prompt investigation be made of these matters and further expects that the Japanese Government will undertake to bring about an improvement to provide for the essential needs of the internees and to maintain proper standards in the treatment of American nationals held in Japanese custody. Stettinius The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/12–1844: Telegram [Document 1026] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , December 18, 1944. [Received December 19—11:39 p.m.] 8204. Am[erican] Interests, Japan. Your 2115, June 21. Foreign Office note December 15 received today regarding visits POW and civil internment camps Far East quotes following letter Shigemitsu to Gorgé. “I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Imperial Government has taken, as a result of particular consideration, the following decision regarding visits to camps in occupied territory. I should be greatly obliged if you would communicate to me the views of the British [and] United States Governments and their Allies regarding following communication. Imperial Government which has carried out its studies on visits by third persons to POW and civil internee camps in occupied territories in the south has decided following: In accordance with desire British, American and Allied Governments and agreeing to request of International Red Cross Committee, Imperial Government will recognize—on a provisional basis during camp visits—the status of representative of the Committee delegate to Japan to those persons residing here and depending on this organization whom the Imperial Government shall consider well qualified to be authorized to visit these camps under control military authorities. This authorization will be given to the extent that there will be no objection because of military operations. In proposing to place in practice this decision in the first place in the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, Imperial Government simultaneously with the present communication will enter into negotiations on this subject with International Red Cross Committee. The present authorization will not, however, be given except on condition that British, American and Allied Governments accord to delegate international committee on basis of reciprocity permission to visit Japanese POW and civilian internee camps in regions they occupy in particular New Caledonia, Saipan, Tinian and Guam territories concerning primarily the American Government.” 88 Huddle 88 In telegram 8213, December 18, 8 p.m., the Chargé in Switzerland reported information from Mr. Gorgé that no mention was made of visits to camps in the Dutch East Indies because visits to camps in the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand represented “only first trial”. (711.94114A/12–1844) The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/12–1944: Telegram [Document 1027] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , December 19, 1944. [Received December 20—12:27 p.m.] 8221. American Interests—Thailand, Japan. Department’s 3197, September 15, and Legation’s 6487, September 29. 89 Foreign Office note December 12 states Japanese Foreign Office has informed Swiss Legation Tokyo that February 11 order does not exist. Japanese Foreign Office adds that Japanese authorities continue observe international regulations regarding conduct war and that they expect enemy states adopt same attitude. Japanese Government desires draw serious attention of American Government to acts directly contrary to international regulations committed by enemy aviators during attacks against Japanese forces 90 and requests that orders be given so that such illicit acts are not repeated. Enemy aviators who will have committed in bad faith obvious violations of recognized customs will be held responsible for acts in accordance international law in same manner as enemy soldiers of other categories who commit similar acts. Huddle 89 Latter not printed; it reported that contents of telegram 3197 had been delivered to the Japanese Foreign Office on September 26 (711.94114A O. T./9–2944). 90 For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 1175 [ Pg. 1175 includes portions of Doc. 1173 and Doc. 1174 ] ff. The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 77.84114A/12–2044: Telegram [Document 1028] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , December 20, 1944. [Received December 21—7:10 a.m.] 8235. American Interests—Japan—Intercross. Legation’s 8204, December 18. Substance Committee letter December 18 received today stated following proposal received from Japanese Minister Foreign Affairs containing these conditions. “1. That only such POW camps and internment camps be visited that do not cause obstacles to military operations of the Japanese forces. 2. The visitor shall be a person residing on the spot who shall be recommended by the International Committee and approved by the Japanese Government. 3. That this representative shall carry out his visits acting in the capacity of an agent for the time being of the International Committee of the Red Cross Delegation in Tokyo. 4. That this arrangement shall be carried out on the principle of reciprocity; that is on condition that the United States, British and Allied Governments concerned shall permit delegates of the International Committee to visit POWs and civilian internee camps where Japanese subjects are detained in areas under the administration of the United States, Great Britain or an Allied country and in particular in respect of the United States Government on condition that they should permit visits to the POW camps and internment camps where Japanese subjects are detained in New Caledonia, Saipan, Tinian and Guam.” If foregoing conditions agreeable parties concerned Japanese Government proposed visit following camps: Santo Thomas, POW camp Singapore and POW hospital Thailand. Japanese Government intimated prepared consult Committee’s delegates Japan regarding details for placing proposal in operation. On receipt of foregoing proposal Committee advised Japanese Government it accepted first three numbered conditions and that terms fourth condition would be immediately submitted American, British and Allied Governments. Committee proposed to Japanese following representatives: Schweizer, Committee correspondent for Singapore, Salzmann, Committee Agent Bangkok for Thailand, Bessmer, for Santo Thomas. Committee further informed Japanese it would submit names additional representatives for visiting camps remaining occupied territories not mentioned in communication from Japanese Foreign Minister. Committee letter concluded with request foregoing be communicated Department with request for early reply. Additionally Committee requested, since Japanese mentioned Allied Governments, for Department’s reply to be made in consultation with Allied Latin American Governments. 91 Communication same nature addressed by Committee British Minister, Bern. Huddle 91 In a memorandum of March 8, 1945, to the Chief of the Special War Problems Division (Plitt), Augusta B. Wagner of the same Division stated that Allied Latin American Governments had not been consulted since the Japanese Government had not requested it and “as it would cause further complications and delay in replying.” (711.94114A/2–2845) Efforts by the United States to send financial and other assistance to American nationals held by Japan Efforts by the United States to send financial and other assistance to American nationals held by Japan 92 92 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 1012 – 1035 . See also ibid. , 1944, vol. iv , section under Soviet Union entitled “Efforts to arrange with the Soviet Union for the acceptance …”. [1029] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, January 19, 1944—10 p.m. 740.00115A Pacific War/922: Telegram [1030] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, February 10, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 7:49 p.m.] 711.93114A/42: Telegram [1031] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, February 17, 1944—2 p.m. 711.93114A/42: Telegram [1032] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, February 22, 1944—12 a.m. [Received February 22—7:30 p.m.] 711.93114A/47: Telegram [1033] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, February 23, 1944. [Received February 23—9:45 p.m.] 390.11 B 15/37: Telegram [1034] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, February 29, 1944—noon. [Received 4:14 p.m.] 711.94114A/353: Telegram [1035] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, March 4, 1944—10 p.m. 711.93114A/47: Telegram [1036] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, March 6, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 10:21 p.m.] 711.93114A/50: Telegram [1037] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, March 7, 1944—9 p.m. 740.00115A Pacific War/512: Telegram [1038] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, March 8, 1944—7 a.m. [Received 10:10 a.m.] 711.93114A/51: Telegram [1039] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, March 13, 1944—6 p.m. 711.93114A/47: Telegram [1040] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, March 13, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 10:12 p.m.] 390.1115A/1774: Telegram [1041] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, March 25, 1944. 711.93114A/51: Telegram [1042] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, March 30, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 8:17 p.m.] 711.93114A/63: Telegram [1043] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, April 4, 1944—8 p.m. 711.93114A/63: Telegram [1044] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, April 10, 1944—6 p.m. 711.93114A/42: Telegram [1045] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, April 12, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 11:35 p.m.] 711.93114A/68: Telegram [1046] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, April 14, 1944. [Received April 27—3 p.m.] 740.00115A Pacific War/1144: Airgram [1047] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, April 15, 1944. [Received April 16—3:46 a.m.] 740.00115A Pacific War/1131: Telegram [1048] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, April 20, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 20—8:35 p.m.] 711.93114A/69: Telegram [1049] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, April 26, 1944—3 p.m. [Received April 27—7:38 a.m.] 711.93114A/74: Telegram [1050] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, April 26, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 27—8:55 a.m.] 740.00115 Pacific War/2381: Telegram [1051] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, May 10, 1944. [Received May 10—2:24 p.m.] 711.94114A/447: Telegram [1052] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, May 16, 1944—5 p.m. 711.94114A/447: Telegram [1053] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, May 16, 1944. [Received May 16—9:52 p.m.] 740.00115A Pacific War/1166: Telegram [1054] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, May 20, 1944—10 p.m. 740.00115A Pacific War/512: Telegram [1055] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, June 1, 1944. 711.94114A/447: Telegram [1056] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, June 5, 1944—3 p.m. [Received June 6—4:15 a.m.] 711.93114A/83: Telegram [1057] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, June 19, 1944. [Received June 20—3:34 a.m.] 711.62114 Mail/146: Telegram [1058] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, June 24, 1944—midnight. 390.1115A/6–2444: Telegram [1059] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, June 30, 1944—9 p.m. 711.93114A/6–2644: Telegram [1060] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, July 1, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 1:20 p.m.] 740.00115A Pacific War/7–144: Telegram [1061] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, July 14, 1944. [Received July 14—5:57 p.m.] 711.94114A/7–1444: Telegram [1062] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, July 27, 1944. [Received July 27—10:47 p.m.] 740.00115A Pacific War/7–2744: Telegram [1063] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, July 27, 1944. [Received July 27—11:29 p.m.] 740.00115A P.W./7–2744: Telegram [1064] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, August 11, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 5:17 p.m.] 711.94114A/8–1144: Telegram [1065] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, August 15, 1944—1 p.m. [Received August 16—11:40 a.m.] 740.00115A PW/8–1544: Telegram [1066] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, August 19, 1944—7 p.m. 711.94114A/8–1144: Telegram [1067] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, August 19, 1944—8 p.m. 711.94114A/8–1144: Telegram [1068] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, August 31, 1944. 711.94114 Supplies/8–2644: Telegram [1069] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, September 2, 1944—10 p.m. 740.00115A P.W./8–1544: Telegram [1070] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, September 14, 1944—11 p.m. 711.94114A/7–844: Telegram [1071] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, September 16, 1944. 711.94114A/9–244: Telegram [1072] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, September 26, 1944—9 p.m. 740.00115A P.W./9–1144: Telegram [1073] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, September 26, 1944—10 p.m. 71)1.94114 Mail/6–1944: Telegram [1074] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, September 30, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:32 p.m.] 740.00115A P.W./9–3044: Telegram [1075] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, October 10, 1944—8 p.m. 740.00115A P.W./9–3044: Telegram [1076] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, October 10, 1944—10 p.m. [Received October 10—2:04 a.m.] 740.00115 P.W./10–1044: Telegram [1077] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, October 11, 1944. [Received October 11—8:57 p.m.] 740.00115 P.W./10–1144: Telegram [1078] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , October 17, 1944. 740.00115 P.W./10–1744 [1079] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, October 18, 1944. [Received October 18—7:34 p.m.] 711.94114 Supplies/10–1844: Telegram [1080] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, October 20, 1944—4 p.m. 740.00115 P.W./10–1044: Telegram [1081] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, October 20, 1944. 711.94114 Supplies/10–1844: Telegram [1082] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, October 21, 1944. [Received October 21—1:08 p.m.] 711.94114 Supplies/10–2144: Telegram [1083] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, October 24, 1944. [Received October 24—4:55 p.m.] 711.94114 Supplies/10–2444: Telegram [1084] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, October 26, 1944—9 p.m. 794.41114/9–3044: Telegram [1085] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, October 26, 1944. 711.94114 Supplies/10–2444: Telegram [1086] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , October 27, 1944. 740.00115 P.W./10–1744 [1087] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, November 4, 1944. 740.00115A PW/10–2744: Telegram [1088] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, November 7, 1944—noon. [Received November 7—9 a.m.] 711.11B114A/11–744: Telegram [1089] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, November 7, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 11:44 p.m.] 740.00115A PW/11–744: Telegram [1090] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, November 14, 1944—10 p.m. 740.00115A PW/10–2744: Telegram [1091] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, November 17, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 10:12 p.m.] 711.94114A/11–1744: Telegram [1092] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) Washington, November 24, 1944. 711.94114 Supplies/11–244: Telegram [1093] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, November 25, 1944. [Received November 25—7:12 p.m.] 711.94114 Supplies/11–2544: Telegram [1094] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, November 27, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 6:30 p.m.] 740.00115A PW/11–2744: Telegram [1095] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) Washington, November 29, 1944—8 p.m. 711.94114A/11–1744: Telegram [1096] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) Washington, December 5, 1944. 711.94114 Supplies/11–2544: Telegram [1097] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) Washington, December 5, 1944—midnight. 711.94114 Mail/12–544: Telegram [1098] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) Washington, December 11, 1944—8 p.m. 740.00115A PW/11–744: Telegram [1099] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) Washington, December 12, 1944—9 p.m. 740.00115A PW/11–2744: Telegram [1100] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington , December 16, 1944. 711.94114 Supplies/12–1444 [1101] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, December 18, 1944—11 p.m. [Received December 19—9:53 a.m.] 740.00115A PW/12–1844: Telegram [1102] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, December 21, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 6:40 p.m.] 711.94114 Mail/12–2144: Telegram [1103] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, December 23, 1944. [Received December 24—6:25 p.m.] 711.94114A/12–2344: Telegram [1104] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, December 26, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 6:27 p.m.] 740.00115A PW/12–2644: Telegram [1105] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, December 29, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 11:21 a.m.] 711.94114A/12–2944: Telegram [1106] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) Washington, December 29, 1944. 740.00115A PW/12–2744: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A Pacific War/922: Telegram [Document 1029] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , January 19, 1944—10 p.m. 187. American Interests—Philippines. 1. Express gratitude of Department for progress made by Swiss as set forth your telegram 54, January 4 93 in developing channels of contact with Philippines and the hope that situation may soon make possible an extension of financial aid to prisoners of war detained there. 94 2. Detailed reports of Internee Executive Committee concerning utilization of funds thus far distributed awaited with interest here. 3. For the present and until otherwise informed inclusion of British in distribution of funds may continue. Department assumes this arrangement does not presently work hardship on Americans and wishes to be informed if this assumption incorrect or if subsequent developments impose hardship as result of this arrangement. 4. Department assumes that 100,000 yen requested are military yen with conversion rate approximately 4 to 1 and therefore present financial authorization sufficient to cover stated need. Please confirm this assumption giving details if otherwise. 95 Hull 93 Not printed; it stated relief funds had been “proportionally distributed all camps according Department’s 1979”, August 18, 1943 (740.0015A Pacific War/922). See Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1030 . By January 4, the Japanese had closed all internment camps in the Philippines except Santo Tomas, Los Banos, Baguio, and Davao. The Santo Tomas Executive Committee administered relief measures in all four camps. 94 In telegram 725, March 4, to Bern, the Department stated: “In view of the situation outlined in Department’s 275 of January 27, it is considered highly desirable to get financial assistance to prisoners of war in the Philippines on the same basis as is being done for civilian internees.” (711.94114A/366a) For text of telegram 275, see p. 925 [ Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 981 and Doc. 982 ] . 95 Telegram 983, February 17, 11 a.m., from Bern, advised of a report from the Swiss Legation in Japan that regular yen, with a value approximately equal to that of Swiss francs, was intended and that it would be desirable to increase monthly relief to 150,000 yen because of the rising cost of living (740.00115A Pacific War/1038). The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.93114A/42: Telegram [Document 1030] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , February 10, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 7:49 p.m.] 822. American Interests, China. Department’s 1687, July 17, Legation’s 4482, July 27. 96 Swiss note February 7 states Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, able thus far purchase on free market CRB dollars 97 required financial assistance Americans occupied China. Progressive devaluation CRB dollar enabled Fontanel 98 augment this monetary relief little by little to compensate rise in cost of living which practically proportionate this devaluation. Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, now reports Japanese authorities insist that Swiss francs which it needs representation foreign interests be transferred through Yokohama Specie Bank at Tokyo, and its Shanghai branch. Yen would be acquired at rate 98.05 yen per 100 Swiss francs. At exchange rate 18 yen for 100 CRB dollars the cost of 100 CRB dollars would be 18.36 Swiss francs instead of current exchange 2.50. Current quarterly American relief budget of Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, is 10,000,000 CRB dollars for internees and 3,500,000 for so-called comfort allocations (apparently to compensate above mentioned rise cost of living) making total 13,500,000 CRB dollars. At rate used currently this represents approximately 696,000 Swiss francs while rate envisaged Japanese would bring it to 2,480,000 Swiss francs. Swiss Foreign Office inquires whether Department disposed augment in foregoing proportion the sum devoted for assistance Americans occupied China or if it desires other arrangements be made this connection. It also points out that Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, endeavoring organize and finance delivery to American internees through intermediary Red Cross gifts in kind which would permit discontinuation said comfort allocations in case American Government not disposed continue maintenance thereof. Would appear, however, that Japanese authorities would require that purchases necessary delivery such gifts in kind also be financed through Swiss francs. Legation has informally discussed foregoing with Swiss Foreign Office. Latter has telegraphed Fontanel to ascertain whether he has resumed relief payments which were reported as suspended (Legation’s 7574, December 3 99 and Department’s 3089, December 11 1 ). Fontanel’s reply will be forwarded upon receipt. It appears to the Legation that in view of the above outlined financial control by the Japanese the question of relief payments to Americans in occupied China requires an examination by the Department of the possibility of increasing several-fold the relief maximum authorized for China under the Department’s instruction no. 1202 of February 14, 1942. 2 Swiss request urgent reply. Harrison 96 Neither printed 97 Central Reserve Bank notes issued by the Japanese-sponsored regime at Nanking. 98 Emile Fontanel, Swiss Consul General at Shanghai. 99 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1010 . 1 Not printed; but for summary, see ibid. , p. 1011 , footnote 93. 2 Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 262 . The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.93114A/42: Telegram [Document 1031] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , February 17, 1944—2 p.m. 538. American Interests—China. As indicated by Department’s 1695, July 3, 1942, 3 monthly payments to qualified civilian internees and prisoners of war may, if necessary, be increased, in accordance with paragraph 15 of Department’s 1202 of February 14, 1942, 2 to $65, the maximum for China. (Your 822, February 10.) Fontanel should report number of American civilian internees and number of American prisoners of war now receiving financial assistance in occupied China. For Department’s information in considering possible increase in maximum for qualified uninterned American nationals in occupied China, ask Fontanel to report total number receiving financial assistance and to recommend maximum monthly payment that would provide for their minimum essential needs. Further information concerning suggested gifts in kind through Red Cross, or any further suggestions for alleviating situation of Americans in occupied China, would be appreciated. Stettinius 3 Not printed. 2 Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 262 . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.93114A/47: Telegram [Document 1032] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , February 22, 1944—12 a.m. [Received February 22—7:30 p.m.] 1078. American Interests—China. Department’s 538 transmitted Swiss Foreign Office February 19. Foreign Office note February 18 received February 21, refers contents Legation’s 822, February 10, and states Swiss Consul, Shanghai, reports Japanese Consulate, Shanghai, decided immediate suspension all payment financial assistance Swiss protected nationals. This decision attributable failure Yokohama Specie Bank receive Swiss francs. Fontanel notes suspension relief affects approximately 432 Americans and 209 Filipinos. 1452 British and Dutch likewise deprived. During January 1, 828,000 CEB dollars paid Americans and 338,000 CRB dollars Filipinos. Notwithstanding precarious situation recipients Fontanel feels obliged cease relief payments to avoid greater difficulties Japanese authorities. Transmitting foregoing Fontanel again invites attention situation resulting constant depreciation CRB dollar which would have necessitated increase approximately 50% relief February total, low [for] recipients’ minimum existence. Fontanel observes that at rate proposed by Japanese believes doubtful interest Governments to be disposed bear high cost which minimum relief to Swiss protected nationals would entail. Fontanel desires urgent indication relief he permitted accord. Harrison The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 390.11 B 15/37: Telegram [Document 1033] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , February 23, 1944. [Received February 23—9:45 p.m.] 1107. Am[erican] Interests—Hong Kong. Legation’s 4182, July 15. 5 Swiss note February 18 states following situation Filipinos [in] Hong Kong August 1943. Philippine citizens continued able communicate Red Cross representative Hong Kong. Despite Swiss efforts Japanese authorities maintained refusal financial assistance these persons. Japanese authorities declare requests relief should be addressed “Philippine Government, Manila”. Japanese authorities also indicated they could not permit anyone be concerned with Orientals; in addition local authorities assist Philippine citizens. Out of approximately 300 Filipinos, some able find work, others on farms near Macao, remainder receiving financial assistance. As reported Legation’s 6384, October 11, 6 substantial number Hong Kong Filipinos taken Philippine Islands aboard Teia Maru. Harrison 5 Not printed; but for summary, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1025 , footnote 31. 6 Not printed; it reported 182 Filipinos were removed to the Philippines (701.0090/2498). The Teia Maru was the vessel used by Japan to effect the second exchange agreement with the United States. For correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 867 ff. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/353: Telegram [Document 1034] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , February 29, 1944—noon. [Received 4:14 p.m.] 1218. American Interests—Japan. Foreign Office aide-mémoire February 25 refers your 274 and 275, January 27, 1944, 7 and states Swiss Minister, Tokyo, 8 reports Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew his attention verbally to fact that, contrary to United States Government declarations concerning treatment prisoners of war Japan, Japanese Government has not refused authorization transport supplies stored Vladivostok, that Gaimusho 9 studying question and if solution not yet found delay must be attributed attacks on Japanese hospital ships and treatment Japanese internees United States; 10 Japanese Government waiting until situation clarified but intended announce in press its point of view concerning Vladivostok shipments, and that Gaimusho believes question can be reconsidered when atmosphere clearer. Statement from Japanese Bureau Information appeared press February 16 affirming question Vladivostok shipments postponed for reasons stated. Gorgé then informed Gaimusho of fact he was never informed that Vladivostok shipments connected with these two questions, that press had not stated Swiss representatives not permitted visit camps under Japanese control and [ in? ] Metropolitan Japan and that latter point important as ability visit camps would dissipate misunderstandings. Gorgé interviewed Suzuki, chief, Foreign Interests Section, Gaimusho, February 21, concerning Vladivostok shipments and publicity by American Government Japanese atrocities. Suzuki stated that contrary Early’s 11 radio statement Japanese had not refused transportation Vladivostok supplies but question under study and delayed by events mentioned. Also referred following statement attributed Breckinridge Long: 12 “Japanese Government has refused to resume negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on further exchange of civilian internees, 13 this despite unsuspected [ undisputed? ] fact that neutral Spanish diplomats have reported favorably on treatment accorded to Japanese nationals interned in America.” Concerning that statement Suzuki stated that question only postponed by publicity Japanese atrocities. Gorgé informed Suzuki that Japanese Government on questions third exchange and Vladivostok shipments rightly could be interpreted as refusal and misunderstandings thereby ensue. Suzuki informed Gorgé that Japanese disposed re-examine two questions in suspense but present conditions unfavorable and if United States Government wishes practical solution it is in latter’s interests discontinue “campaign of atrocities”. Japanese Government now studying communication for American Government because of treatment prisoners and internees and will endeavor reply soon. Translation aide-mémoire under reference follows by air mail. 14 Legation invites Department’s attention Geneva’s Red Cross telegrams 56 and 57, February 24, 15 this connection. [Re?] Reply to request for Japanese plan facilitate shipment Vladivostok supplies, Department’s 627, February 24, 16 not yet received. 17 Harrison 7 Ante , pp. 921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 981 ] and 925 [ Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 981 and Doc. 982 ] , respectively. 8 Camille Gorgé. 9 Japanese Foreign Office. 10 For correspondence on these subjects, see pp. 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 1151 ] ff. and 1099 [ Pg. 1099 includes portions of Doc. 1130 and Doc. 1131 ] ff., respectively. 11 Stephen Early, Secretary to President Roosevelt. 12 Assistant Secretary of State. 13 For correspondence on negotiations for an exchange agreement between the United States and Japan, see pp. 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 1106 and Doc. 1107 ] ff. 14 Despatch 7437, March 1, from Bern, not printed. 15 Neither printed. 16 Not printed. 17 In connection with this message, see telegram 1073, March 30, 8 p.m., to Bern, p. 1087 [ Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 1111 and Doc. 1112 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.93114A/47: Telegram [Document 1035] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , March 4, 1944—10 p.m. 730. American Interests—China. This Government desires that there be no interruption in extension of financial assistance to qualified American nationals and requests that Swiss Government direct its representatives at Shanghai to resume at once, if possible, the advances which were suspended as reported in your 1078, February 22. Upon the receipt of a reply to its 538, February 17, the Department will consider authorizing such increase in maximum monthly payments as may be necessary. Department will communicate with you separately concerning working out of more equitable exchange rates. Stettinius The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.93114A/50: Telegram [Document 1036] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , March 6, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 10:21 p.m.] 1349. American Interests, China. Legation’s 1078, February 22. Foreign Office note March 2 states Swiss Consul, Shanghai, reported following prior to receipt contents Department’s 538, February 17; arrangements made with Intercross 18 delegate for regular expedition gifts in kind and money to internees to ameliorate their situation. Fontanel organized service send internees packages containing essential foodstuffs. Japanese authorities seem disposed accept this indirect procedure which permits Fontanel finance assistance from CRB dollars available. Nevertheless such procedure excludes obtention promise repay. Payment pocket money for Haiphong road camp continues but only as donations via Intercross. Fontanel has been informed indirectly that situation camps seems difficult due lack foodstuffs necessary aged and children and defective equipment especially internment camp Chapei recently established (see Legation’s 81, January 5 19 ) where many aged and infirm suffering from privations and winter. View foregoing and assistance now furnished internees via Intercross, Fontanel inquires whether Russian [ United States? ] Government disposed approve transmission funds China at official rate permitting payment pocket money especially as food is most important problem. At present free exchange rate 100 CRB dollars worth less one Swiss franc and official Japanese rate increases cost relief 20 times. Fontanel refers Legation’s 1078 and confirms relief non-interned mostly Asiatics suspended since February 15. He nevertheless will examine possibility assistance such persons via Intercross. Harrison 18 International Red Cross Committee at Geneva. 19 Ante , p. 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 979 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A Pacific War/512: Telegram [Document 1037] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , March 7, 1944—9 p.m. 769. American Interests—Philippines. Effective March 1, 1944, the sum authorized by Department’s 1979 of August 18, 1913, 20 for financial assistance in the Philippines is hereby increased in compliance with the request in your 983 of February 17 21 to an amount not exceeding $37,500 monthly. Stettinius 20 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1030 . 21 Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 95, p. 1015 [ Pg. 1015 includes portions of Doc. 1029 and Doc. 1030 ] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.93114A/51: Telegram [Document 1038] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , March 8, 1944—7 a.m. [Received 10:10 a.m.] 1386. American Interests—China. Department’s 538, February 17, my 1349, March 6. Foreign Office note March 4, received March 6 subsequent to delivery contents Department’s 730, March 4, states Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, reports: 1. POWs receive no relief of any sort from Swiss Consulate. As Japanese object payment assistance from official funds, relief granted 877 American POWs detained Kiangwan exclusively by Intercross delegate who sends each month relief in kind financed Red Cross funds. Due this aid conditions rather satisfactory. 2. 760 interned Americans (530 Shanghai region and 230 outports especially Weihsien) received until suspension relief 1200 CRB monthly each. Upon resumption payments, relief should be increased to at least 2500 CRB due increase cost living. Internees also received special assistance, rice, medical care. To replace suspended comfort allotments, Fontanel is endeavoring send necessary collective foodstuffs, medicine, clothing, shoes as donation via Intercross. He estimates 2500 CRB necessary per person monthly for only foodstuffs but not sure Jap authorities will permit such increase in deliveries made camps by Intercross. During February considerable deliveries effected but still insufficient. Fontanel studying possibility send via Intercross monthly individual packages to internees not receiving gifts in kind from neutral friends. Packages might be 15 pounds costing 2000 CRB. 22 3. 506 Americans uninterned China including alien dependents benefiting relief. 220 Filipinos assisted. 5500 CRB accorded in February per person not including medical hospital and special assistance food and clothing. If payments resumed, relief should be increased to at least 7500 CRB due increase cost living. 23 Harrison 22 Telegram 1826, March 24, 10 p.m., from Bern, advised of a report from Mr. Fontanel that “Japanese authorities refuse [to] forward foodstuffs he had given Intercross delegate for American, British and Dutch civilian internees [and] therefore no assistance in kind can be granted them.” (711.93114A/59) 23 In telegram 1009, March 25, 10 p.m., the Department requested the Minister in Switzerland to “Discuss with Swiss Government the possibility that Fontanel might be able to meet his CRB dollar needs in part by transactions at official rate and in part otherwise.” (711.93114A/51) The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.93114A/47: Telegram [Document 1039] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , March 13, 1944—6 p.m. 822. American Interests—Far East. It is hard for the Department to escape the conclusion that the difficulties at Shanghai referred to in the Department’s immediately preceding telegram, 24 in your 1078, February 22, 12 a.m., and in associated messages are at least in part attributable to a misguided effort on Fontanel’ part to attempt to economize on our behalf by financing all of the expenses of our representation through black market operations. This is substantially confirmed by reports from repatriates with a knowledge of finance. It is the view of the Department that some of these difficulties might have been obviated had Fontanel been more judicious in purchasing at least a part of his requirements at the official rate. While this Government at this particular juncture does not want to interfere with the manner in which the Swiss acquire local currency, a discreetly planted suggestion that Fontanel might now act along these lines may yet lead to a solution of the difficulty. Hull 24 No. 821, not printed. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 390.1115A/1774: Telegram [Document 1040] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , March 13, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 10:12 p.m.] 1526. Am[erican] Interests—Hong Kong. Legation’s airmail 6493, November 6. 25 Foreign Office note March 8 refers special situation Hong Kong created by Japanese authorities refusing Swiss Legation, Tokyo, have Hong Kong representative. Swiss Legation however able use services Intercross delegate especially payment financial assistance. Note points out Intercross feels important its delegate should not be considered by Japanese as representative protecting Power for action might be taken creating difficulties his fulfilment Intercross duties. Owing foregoing and as Japanese appear have acquiesced to Intercross delegate according relief Swiss protected nationals Hong Kong, Foreign Office feels it preferable Swiss Legation, Tokyo, should no longer concern itself these matters and that Department’s and Legation’s decisions regarding relief Americans Hong Kong and necessary funds be transmitted Intercross delegate via Intercross Geneva. In conclusion Swiss note states Gorgé recently telegraphed problem representation interests Hong Kong not yet settled and he constantly examining with Japanese Foreign Office possibility have agent Hong Kong other than Intercross delegate. In opinion of ranking Foreign Office official, Gorgé has small chance being permitted appoint agent Hong Kong. Japanese will probably not refuse request but will adopt dilatory tactics. To avoid jeopardizing Zindel’s valuable assistance as Intercross delegate to American POWs and civilian internees Hong Kong by Japanese objections his activities as agent Swiss Legation, Tokyo, Foreign Office official recommends communications be established via Intercross Geneva. Effect of the procedure might be temporary and, should Gorgé obtain Japanese authorization establish agency Hong Kong, communications could be resumed via Bern, Tokyo. Legation concurs in this procedure. Please instruct. 26 Harrison 25 Not printed. 26 In telegram 892, March 18, 4 p.m., to Bern, the Department indicated its concurrence but without prejudice to continued effort for Swiss representation at Hong Kong (390.1115A/1732). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.93114A/51: Telegram [Document 1041] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , March 25, 1944. 1011. American Interests—China. Paragraph 9 of Department’s 1202 of February 14, 1942, as amended, 27 is hereby amended to reclassify China under Class VIII, for which basic maximum monthly payment is $110. Department trusts this will alleviate situation until foreign exchange question is clarified. As stated in its 274 of January 30, 1942 28 Department desires that financial assistance extended to American nationals shall be limited to the minimum amount necessary for ordinary subsistence and essential extraordinary needs, and that the scale of assistance in no case shall be such as to enable the recipients to enjoy a higher standard of living than that to which they would ordinarily be accustomed. Department approves any practicable procedure for providing gifts in kind, foodstuffs, and money to American nationals whether interned or uninterned, through Intercross or otherwise, within limits of maximum established for occupied China, and desires effective action to ameliorate situation in camps and immediate resumption of assistance to non-interned American nationals either directly or through Intercross. As principal needs of interned nationals appear to be met by assistance in kind, pocket money payments might be suspended until a more satisfactory conversion rate, or at least a greatly reduced one, is obtained. Request Swiss to inform you when payments to uninterned American nationals are resumed and to keep you currently informed on general financial assistance situation in occupied China; report to Department on an urgent basis. Hull [For a proposal by the United States to the Japanese Government for the shipment of relief supplies and the carriage of mail to Allied nationals held by Japan and Japanese nationals in Allied custody, see telegram 1072, March 30, to Bern, page 1085 [ Pg. 1085 includes portions of Doc. 1110 and Doc. 1111 ] .] 27 Amended version transmitted to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers as Foreign Service Serial No. 109, January 22, 1944; not printed. 28 Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 259 . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.93114A/63: Telegram [Document 1042] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , March 30, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 8:17 p.m.] 1934. American Interests—Far East. Your 821, March 13, 29 822, March 13, 1009, March 25. 30 Tait 31 and Daymont 32 have discussed matter fully with responsible Foreign Office officials. Following is substance Foreign Office views: 1. Department’s 418, February 11, 1942, 29 represented unilateral proposal of means devised to make available to protecting Powers funds required for representation Axis interests in United States. Japanese have never replied. 2. Situation Far East arises in part from Japanese efforts to enforce so-called “official exchange rate”. Swiss consider this inequitable and not corresponding purchasing power now prevailing. It does not otherwise arise from any unwillingness by Swiss to employ transmission means prescribed by Japanese. 3. Foreign Office officials expressed view that recent restrictions imposed by Japanese on American remittances are probably in retaliation for restrictions by American Government on Japanese expenditures United States and also represent endeavor to enforce official exchange rate. Legation also informed Department’s steps (see your 759, March 23, 1942 29 ) to control expenditures for foreign interests by protecting Powers may have inspired Japanese position Shanghai. 4. Foreign Office and its representatives Far East have conducted extensive negotiations over considerable period with Japanese to endeavor establish equitable exchange rate. Thus far no satisfactory response received. In consequence further approach not planned. Swiss not in a position to offer any suggestions how this end achievable. Officials added Fontanel no longer able negotiate at other than rate established by Japanese. This includes even his own office expenses. In connection this whole question, Swiss have shown constant tendency and desire to leave matters regarding exchange rates relating to representation our interests Axis territories to Swiss representative in the field (they feel that Swiss representative abroad is in much better position to judge and take advantage of circumstances affecting exchange rates). Foreign Office now estimates that to provide adequate relief for 760 interned civilians in occupied China and 726 non-interned civilians in occupied China and the Philippines at the respective monthly rates per person of 7500 CRB dollars and 22,500 CEB dollars at the official rate of exchange of 18.36 equals 100 CRB dollars would cost approximately 12,060,000 USA dollars annually. Unofficial rate last reported was 90 Swiss centimes for 100 CRB dollars with statement that the cost of living increases in proportion to the decreased value of CRB dollars without any appreciable lag. In view foregoing, Department’s reclassification of China (your 1011, March 25) to Class VIII with maximum basic monthly payment of $110 will not form a basis for meeting more than a small fraction of requirements if purchases must be made at the official exchange rate. Regret Legation unable to offer any recommendation supplementary to Swiss views above given other than that Department determine total amount of money that it is willing to expend at Shanghai annually for relief and authorize Legation to notify Swiss Government as to that amount with advice that Department leaves utilization of this money to complete discretion of Swiss representatives in the field and without any of the restrictions or limitations previously imposed. For Department’s background information, following figures prepared at Swiss Foreign Office based upon monthly salary temporary Swiss Government employee: ( a ) Shanghai August 1943:20,000 CRB dollars equals unofficial exchange 200 USA dollars; at official rate 880 USA dollars; February 1944:86,600 CRB dollars equals unofficial exchange 200 USA dollars; at official rate 3,696 USA dollars. Actual unofficial rate one USA dollar equals 433 CRB dollars whereas official rate 23.43 CRB dollars. [Here follow comparable figures for currencies in various European capitals.] Harrison 29 Not printed. 30 Telegram 1009 not printed; but for summary, see footnote 23, p. 1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 1037 and Doc. 1038 ] . 31 George Tait, First Secretary of Legation in Switzerland. 32 Lawrence J. Daymont, clerk at Legation in Switzerland and serving as special disbursing officer. 29 Not printed. 29 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.93114A/63: Telegram [Document 1043] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , April 4, 1944—8 p.m. 1134. American Interests—China. With reference to your no. 1934 of March 30, Department, in view of exceptional circumstances and as an emergency measure, authorizes the expenditure for months of February, March, and April of equivalent of not to exceed $110 monthly each to qualified internees and non-internees as provided in Department’s 1011 of March 25. Please request Swiss Government to make necessary financial arrangements on an urgent basis and to ask Fontanel to begin payments immediately pending further consideration of matter by the Department. Department urgently desires information as to “the restrictions or limitations previously imposed” referred to in Section 2 of no. 1934 and advantages that might be expected to accrue from their removal. Also please refer to your 1386, March 8, in connection with your 1934 and verify number of interned and non-interned nationals and minimum monthly amount necessary for financial assistance to each. Hull The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.93114A/42: Telegram [Document 1044] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , April 10, 1944—6 p.m. 1214. American Interests—China. You are authorized to pay to the International Red Cross, Geneva, each month beginning April 1, 1944, not to exceed $18,000 to be expended by its representative at Shanghai for financial assistance to persons, including civilians, detained as American prisoners of war in occupied China, 35 in such amounts as are reasonably necessary for their health and comfort. The American Red Cross wishes to discontinue the supply of its funds for this purpose. Separate accounts should be rendered by the Legation under this instruction charging authorization no. 12, 1943–1944 until the end of the present fiscal year. The Department approves any practicable procedure by the representative of the International Red Cross at Shanghai for providing foodstuffs, medicines, clothing, toilet and comfort articles or other assistance in kind and pocket money to those persons detained as American prisoners of war. The expenditure of funds under this authorization should be governed so far as practicable by the provisions of the Department’s amended 1202, 36 but exceptions may be made to the extent that such procedure is inapplicable. If necessary, the expenditure of more than 10 percent of the maximum for occupied China is authorized (Department’s 538 of February 17). The Department desires to be furnished as soon as possible the names and service branch of the members of the armed forces and the names of the civilians receiving financial assistance at the prisoner of war camps under this instruction and to receive a quarterly report showing the amounts expended by the Red Cross representative and the number of recipients. Hull 35 In telegram 3693, October 28, midnight, to Bern, the Department increased to $36,000 the monthly sum authorized for such expenditures (711.93114A/10–2844). 36 Amended version not printed. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.93114A/68: Telegram [Document 1045] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , April 12, 1944—4 p.m. [Received 11:35 p.m.] 2270. (1) Please disregard numbers interned and non-interned contained my 2055, April 3. 37 Figures as to categories correctly reported in my 1934, March 30, but monthly rates of relief should have been stated in last reference as 22,500 CRB dollars for non-internees and 7,500 CRB dollars for interned with total annual cost at official rate of exchange that basis United States $11,290,119 or $940,843 monthly. (2) Division of Foreign Interests 38 has today informally confirmed last available total figures 760 internees and 726 non-internees with minimum monthly requirements as indicated above. (3) As Department’s 1134 in effect authorizes payment of equivalent of not to exceed $110 per month to internees and to non-internees or to 1486 persons, the payment of equivalent of United States $110 at official rate of exchange will equal 2,576 CRB dollars monthly or approximately one-third of suggested minimum monthly requirements for internees and one-ninth suggested minimum monthly requirements for internees. It is expected that Fontanel will pay monthly maximum to all concerned at a cost of United States $163,460 per month or a total of United States $490,380 for the months of February, March and April 1944. (4) Since Division reports that Fontanel is at present unable to use any part of the 60,000,000 CRB dollars he now has on hand for relief or any other purpose whatsoever, Legation has today requested Division to cause an urgent transfer of 2,150,000 Swiss francs equivalent of United States $500,000 to be made through Yokohama Specie Bank in Tokyo and Shanghai for Fontanel 39 in accordance with exchange conditions reported my 822, February 10. This should produce 11,710,000 CEB dollars which figure is not for comparison with requirements as reported my 822, which because of further devaluation must be multiplied by four while requirements as reported my 1386, March 8, for same reason should be multiplied by three. (5) Please see my 2247, April 11, 40 reporting advance to DIV of additional million francs to facilitate so far as possible above transfer. (Your 1134, 41 1230, April 11 42 ). DIV has reported today that because offers to other points made yesterday this transaction will leave us with a debit balance of 400,000 francs and that the estimated additional requirements of 3,000,000 francs through June 30 did not include funds for May and June Shanghai relief payments which on present basis will require additional 1,500,000 francs. (6) Concerning Legation’s reference in section 2 of 1934, 43 to restrictions and limitations previously imposed and Department’s request for amplification of advantages that might be expected to accrue from their removal, it is felt Fontanel might well be advised that under existing circumstances strict compliance with Department’s 1202, February 14, 1942, as amended will not be required, that receipts for relief payments when and if available need as to amounts only show a dollar value whether covering payments in cash or kind, that matter of handling relief is left wholly in his hands at his discretion provided total expenditures for that purpose remain within monthly amount of total in United States dollars obtained by multiplying number of relief payments (persons paid relief in or for a given month) [by] United States $110. Harrison 37 Not printed. 38 Of the Swiss Foreign Office. 39 Telegram 2534, April 20, midnight, from Bern, reported receipt of a note from the Swiss Foreign Office stating that necessary steps had been taken to transfer 2,150,000 Swiss francs to the Shanghai branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank for the account of the Swiss Consulate at Shanghai (711.93114A/70). 40 Not printed. 41 Dated April 4, p. 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 1043 and Doc. 1044 ] . 42 Telegram 1230 read as follows: “Telegraph immediately the information requested in last paragraph of Department’s no. 1134 of April 4 and total monthly amount needed for financial assistance in occupied China.”(711.93114A/63) 43 Section 2 begins with the words “Foreign Office now estimates”, p. 1026 [ Pg. 1026 is part of Doc. 1042 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A Pacific War/1144: Airgram [Document 1046] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , April 14, 1944. [Received April 27—3 p.m.] A–209. American Interests—Japan. Legation’s airmail 7110, January 21. 40 Foreign Office note April 12 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, decided increase effective April 1 from 50 to 75 yen monthly relief accorded internees from Guam. 44 Swiss Consul, Kobe, 45 ascertained during last visit that food less plentiful and quality worse than before. Internees therefore purchase supplements at increasing cost. Swiss Legation adds that food served camps 3 and 4 prepared Japanese restaurant generally served cold. Harrison 40 Not printed. 44 Telegram 2921, May 9, from Bern, advised of a report by the Red Cross representative in Japan that a monthly relief expenditure of 75 yen was still inadequate to permit internees to make purchases indispensable to the maintenance of health and that a further increase of 50 yen monthly should be granted or alternative methods be used to increase available funds. In telegram 1762, May 20, to Bern, the Department authorized the Swiss Minister in Japan to make the increase of 50 yen monthly if he considered such action justifiable. (740.00115A PW/1161) In telegram 2222, June 30, the Department instructed the Minister in Switzerland to increase the amount, if necessary, to the equivalent of $70, the maximum for relief in Japan (740.00115A PW/1227). 45 Maurice Champoud. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A Pacific War/1131: Telegram [Document 1047] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , April 15, 1944. [Received April 16—3:46 a.m.] 2372. American Interests—Japan. POW mail. Legation’s 7261, November 18, Department’s 3170, December 18. 46 Swiss note April 13 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, telegraphs Japanese Government decided forward via Siberia POW and civilian internee mail addressed persons resident United States; also mail addressed Japanese nationals living there. Owing status negotiations further Anglo-Japanese exchange, Japanese Government requests American Government take similar action basis reciprocity. 47 Harrison 46 Neither printed. 47 Department’s reply given in telegram 1379, April 21, 8 p.m., to Bern. In this telegram the Department stated that the United States was carrying to Tehran mail of Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees to be forwarded by the Soviet Government to Japanese authorities and suggested similar mail from the Far East be delivered by Japanese authorities to the Soviet Government for forwarding to United States authorities at Tehran. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.93114A/69: Telegram [Document 1048] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , April 20, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 20—8:35 p.m.] 2533. American Interests—China. Department’s 1099, April l. 48 Foreign Office note April 17 states Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, reports Japanese refusal permit expedition concerns only packages and other shipments from Intercross or Swiss Consulate for latter not permitted accord relief in kind using official funds which have not been acquired at official rate. Transmission by Intercross of packages from private persons still authorized as well as transmission by mail but latter incurs great risk of theft. Harrison 48 Not printed. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.93114A/74: Telegram [Document 1049] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , April 26, 1944—3 p.m. [Received April 27—7:38 a.m.] 2662. American Interests]—China. Department’s 1134, April 4, Legation’s 2270, April 12 and 2534, April 20. 49 Foreign Office note April 25 states Fontanel telegraphs that necessary steps taken for payment assistance this week to Americans from funds transferred via Yokohama Specie Bank. CRB 2567 equivalent of United States 110 will be paid for February, March, April and May. Fontanel states CRB 2567 absolutely insufficient for minimum existence, therefore recommends following scale already adopted for assistance British subjects: (1) Caucasian adult CRB 7100 equalling Swiss francs 1308 or United States 305.60; for married couple CRB 14000 equalling SF 2579, United States 602.57; for married couple with children CRB 17700 [equalling] SF 32261, United States 761.92, each additional child receiving between three and four thousand CRB dollars according age. (2) Eurasians receive generally 80% accorded Caucasians. (3) Asiatics receive 60%. 50 Fontanel states foregoing equal approximately 65% that which should be accorded view present cost life and represent absolute minimum indispensable subsistence. Further increase cost of life will necessitate corresponding increase relief. In conclusion states these amounts do not include medical expenses and special diet for invalids. Upon receipt foregoing Legation urgently requested Swiss Foreign Office telegraph Fontanel indicate recommendations for interned as it is assumed foregoing applies recipients at liberty. 51 Also requested lie report number Americans in each category indicated above. Harrison 49 Telegram 2534 not printed; but for summary, see footnote 39, p. 1029 [ Pg. 1029 includes portions of Doc. 1045 and Doc. 1046 ] . 50 In telegram 1627, May 10, 7 p.m., to Bern, the Department stated its assumption “that differentials among the three groups are based solely on differences in standards of living and the minimum essential needs of recipients.” (711.93114A/74) Mr. Fontanel’s confirmation of this assumption was reported in telegram 4074, June 26, noon, from Bern. 51 Telegram 2811, May 3, 6 p.m., from Bern (711.93114A/75), advised of a report from Mr. Fontanel that these recipients were not interned and that they consisted of 197 Caucasians including 74 children, 253 Eurasians including 140 children, and 523 Asiatics including 221 children. Telegram 4065, June 26, from Bern (740.00115A PW/6–2644), advised of a further report from Mr. Fontanel which gave the number of non-internees as 930, including 124 alien wives and children of American internees, a group not included in telegram 2811. Mr. Fontanel estimated their monthly relief needs at 3,998,000 CRB dollars. He also estimated the number of interned Americans and loyal Filipinos at 784 and their monthly relief needs at 1,970,000 CRB dollars. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115 Pacific War/2381: Telegram [Document 1050] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , April 26, 1944—11 p.m. [Received April 27—8:55 a.m.] 2675. American Interests—Indochina, Japan. Your 1132, April 4. 52 Swiss Legation, Tokyo, reported Gorgé instructed take action as requested telegram under reference but latter replied in his opinion Japanese Government would never permit Filipinos accept relief from American Government and states fears intervention would result no reply or refusal and render more difficult situation Filipinos who expressed loyalty United States. In circumstances Gorgé believes preferable in interests Filipinos not take action indicated and states Swiss will continue assist Filipinos who apply, but latter not numerous as they expose themselves long imprisonment by applying. Foreign Office inquires whether Gorgé’s attitude approved. 53 In second telegram Gorgé states after proclamation independence of Philippines, 54 Embassy of latter created Tokyo and Japanese Government evidently cannot permit Filipinos receive assistance American Government. Swiss Legation not officially informed thereof but learned several Filipinos arrested for accepting relief. Intervention of Swiss Legation remains without reply and Gorgé believes Filipinos will probably abstain from requesting assistance Swiss. Harrison 52 Not printed; it requested Mr. Gorgé to bring to the attention of the Japanese Foreign Office the action of Japanese authorities in Thailand requiring a Filipino to sign a statement he would join the “Philippine National Government”. (740.00115 Pacific War/2258) 53 In telegram 1684, May 15, 5 p.m., to Bern, the Department approved the position taken by Mr. Gorgé “in view of existing circumstances.” (740.00115 Pacific War/2381) 54 For information regarding the setting up of a puppet regime in the Philippines on October 14, see circular telegram dated October 18, 1943, 9 p.m., Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1105 . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/447: Telegram [Document 1051] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , May 10, 1944. [Received May 10—2:24 p.m.] 2949. American Interests—Japan. Vladivostok relief supplies, Legation’s 1218, February 29, and 2925, May 9. 55 Swiss Foreign Office official this morning handed Tait note dated May 9 with annexes. One of these latter gives following text of letter date April 24 [ 28 ] 56 addressed to Swiss Legation, Tokyo, by Japanese Foreign Office in reply to Department’s 2814, December 12, 1942. 57 “The Japanese Government are prepared to comply with the request of the United States Government to render facilities in regard to the transport of relief goods and letters sent to American prisoners of war and internees via Vladivostok under the following conditions. 1. The Japanese Government will as a rule send a Japanese ship to Vladivostok once a month in order to transport the relief goods and letters sent from the United States by a Soviet ship provided that the United States Government obtain the consent of the Soviet Government to the entry of the Japanese ship into the port of Vladivostok. 2. The quantity to be transported shall be decided and notified by the Japanese Government upon consideration of the capacity of the Japanese ship sent for the purpose. 3. The Governments of the interested countries shall give a safe conduct for the navigation of the Japanese ship to be sent for the transport of the goods and letters. 4. The country sending relief goods shall pay all the dues, rates, taxes and other public charges to be levied at Vladivostok on the Japanese ship sent for the freight of the relief goods from Vladivostok to the port of destination in Japan and the cost of the loadings on and landing of the Japanese ship and the warehousing of the relief goods. 5. In cases where the Japanese Government send relief goods and letters to Japanese subjects held by the United States Government the United States Government shall take the necessary steps for the transport of them to be effected by a route and method similar to those about to be adopted.” Please instruct whether Department authorizes transmission foregoing text to Intercroix, 58 Geneva, for its information but not for dissemination. Harrison 55 Latter not printed. 56 Correction based on telegram 3040, May 12, from Bern (not printed). 57 Reference apparently should be to Department’s telegram 2908, November 24, 1943, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 824 . 58 International Red Cross Committee. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/447: Telegram [Document 1052] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , May 16, 1944—5 p.m. 1700. Reference your 2949, May 10. Soviet Government is being requested urgently to permit a Japanese vessel to enter Vladivostok and, if not, to designate another acceptable port. Pending consideration of Soviet Government’s reply Department is not making public text of Japanese proposal and considers it inadvisable at this time even to inform Intercross in confidence of Japanese Government’s conditions. Department will inform you when latter may be done, if at all. 59 Hull 59 In telegram 1981, June 9, 7 p.m., to Bern, the Department authorized communication to the International Red Cross of the text of the Japanese proposal as well as the text of the Department’s reply contained in telegram 1888, June 1, p. 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 1054 and Doc. 1055 ] . The Department requested that the International Red Cross give no publicity to the matter since negotiations with the Japanese Government were still in progress. (711.94114A/447) The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A Pacific War/1166: Telegram [Document 1053] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , May 16, 1944. [Received May 16—9:52 p.m.] 3114. American Interests—Japan. Department’s 554, March 8, 1943. 60 Swiss Minister, Tokyo, reports first payment effected 22 Americans [on] Guam. While awaiting receipts which Japanese Government requested obtain, husbands interned Kobe signed promissory notes. Gorgé inquires whether may continue such payments or await assurance recipients received payment. 61 Harrison 60 Not printed. 61 In telegram 1792, May 23, to Bern, the Department authorized continuation of payments and requested that Mr. Gorgé make every effort to obtain receipts (740.00115 Pacific War/1166). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A Pacific War/512: Telegram [Document 1054] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , May 20, 1944—10 p.m. 1760. American Interests—Philippines. From funds made available for representation of American interests, Department authorizes the Swiss Government to make monthly payments of $25,000 beginning May 1, 1944 to Bagge, Swedish Minister at Tokyo and Chairman of War Prisoners’ Aid of YMCA in Japanese-controlled territories, for transfer to Janson, Chairman WPA of YMCA in Philippine Islands and Swedish Consul. The funds are to be used by the latter for the purchase locally of relief supplies to be sent to American prisoners of war and civilian camps in the Philippines. A telegram dated about May 15 from Bagge to WPA, Stockholm, requested this sum, stating that permission had been given Janson to send clothing, foodstuffs, etc., twice monthly to one prisoner of war camp and once a week to one camp of civilians, Manila. Monthly reports of expenditures should be made by the WPA representative in the Philippines, giving number of recipients divided into prisoners of war and civilians. Receipts signed by Chairman, Executive Committee, 62 or camp spokesman of camps should be obtained, if practicable. This authorization is in addition to authorizations for remittances to the Internees’ Executive Committee of American internment camps (Department’s 769, March 7; and No. 1761, May 20. 63 ) Hull 62 C. C. Grinnell. 63 Latter telegram not printed; it stated that, in view of the reported increase in the cost of living in the Philippines, the Department authorized “provisionally such reasonable increase in financial assistance to recipients in Philippines as the Swiss Legation, Tokyo, may deem necessary to maintain adequate subsistence level.” (740.00115A Pacific War/512) Telegram 3776, June 13, 6 p.m., from Bern, advised of information from the Japanese Foreign Office that monthly transfers to Manila had been increased to 160,000 yen (740.00115A Pacific War/1216). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/447: Telegram [Document 1055] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , June 1, 1944. 1888. American Interests—Japan. Legation’s 2949, May 10. Please request Swiss Government to communicate following to Japanese Government with reference to the letter dated April 28 from the Japanese Foreign Office to the Swiss Legation at Tokyo in regard to the onward movement to Japan and Japanese-occupied territory of relief supplies sent via Soviet territory intended for distribution to Allied nationals in Japanese custody. “Replying to the specific conditions set forth in the Japanese Government’s proposal the United States Government informs the Japanese Government as follows: 1. The United States Government promptly referred the Japanese Government’s proposal to the Soviet Government and requested that Government’s cooperation in arranging for the onward movement of these supplies. 64 The latter has informed the United States Government that while it is not in a position to agree to the use of the port of Vladivostok as a transshipping point for supplies sent from the United States for distribution to Allied nationals in Japanese custody, it desires to cooperate in this humanitarian undertaking and is willing to carry out the transfer of relief supplies presently at Vladivostok either at the border railroad station Manchuriya or at the Soviet port Nakhodka as the Japanese Government may prefer. As regards subsequent shipments of relief supplies the Soviet Government has kindly agreed to designate the port of Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka which Japanese vessels may enter to pick up such supplies. The United States Government has been informed that the Soviet Government’s offer had been communicated direct to the Japanese Government. 2. The United States Government takes note that the quantity of relief supplies and mail to be transported will depend upon the capacity of the Japanese ships to be employed for this purpose. The United States Government expresses the hope, however, that monthly shipments will average initially 1500 metric weight tons which is the amount of relief supplies the Soviet Government has agreed to transport monthly from the United States to Soviet territory. 3. The Governments of the interested countries are prepared to accord safe conduct for Japanese ships engaged in the transportation of relief supplies and mail between Japanese ports and the agreed upon Soviet ports. Notification of dates of departure from Soviet ports as well as from Japanese ports should be made to the United States Government, which will inform the other interested Governments. In order to insure the safety of the Japanese ships during the course of their missions notifications of sailing dates should be received at least 7 days prior to the date of departure, together with a complete description of the ships and detailed information as to the course to be followed by such ships. 4. The Japanese Government may be assured that no obligation will accrue to it in respect of taxes, rates, dues and other public charges which may be levied on the Japanese ships at the Soviet transshipping ports. The Japanese Government will not be expected to pay the cost of the loading on and landing of the Japanese ships or the cost of warehousing relief supplies at the Soviet ports. 5. The United States Government agrees to the transportation of relief supplies and mail originating in Japan and intended for Japanese nationals in United States custody by the same route and method. The United States Government agrees to accept and deliver such supplies and mail to those persons in its custody for whom intended. The United States Government hopes that the Japanese Government will take the necessary steps as soon as possible to move onward the relief supplies now on Soviet territory and relief supplies and mail to be sent subsequently via Soviet territory and arrange for their early distribution to Allied nationals in Japanese custody including those in the Philippine Islands.” Hull 64 For correspondence regarding efforts to arrange with the Soviet Union for the acceptance and onward shipment of relief supplies, see under Soviet Union, vol. iv . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.93114A/83: Telegram [Document 1056] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , June 5, 1944—3 p.m. [Received June 6—4:15 a.m.] 3583. American Interests—China. Department’s 1765, May 20, 65 delivered Foreign Office May 23. Swiss Foreign Office official stated Japanese would certainly not agree Fontanel borrowing CRB dollars in China. Such action already carefully explored by Swiss and naturally not permitted by Japanese who desire obtain free foreign exchange (i.e., Swiss francs). Foreign Office official stated Gorgé reported he had been informed in conversation with Japanese Foreign Office official that Japanese would give one [additional?] CRB dollar for every CRB dollar transferred Shanghai via Yokohama Specie Bank. Such action tantamount reducing exchange rate to 9.18 Swiss francs for 100 CRB dollars instead of 18.36. Swiss endeavored have such action taken regarding 2,150,000 Swiss francs transferred Shanghai in April (see Legation’s 2534, April 20 66 ). Gorgé now reports Japanese refuse make such concessions as they claim transfer of 2,150,000 [francs] has already been made and was to cover previous expenditures. Gorgé also reports he has been informed verbally Japanese disposed release 30,000,000 of 60,000,000 [CRB dollars] blocked Shanghai. Fontanel however reports no such instructions given Japanese Consulate General, Shanghai, and no action taken. Of these 60,000,000, 18,100,000 which were purchased at average rate of 3.16 Swiss francs per 100 CRB dollars are United States Government funds. Remainder are British and Netherlands. Therefore if Gorgé and Fontanel successful Japanese might release 9,050,000 CRB dollars of U.S. Government funds. Legation obtained foregoing informally from Foreign Office officials who refuse submit notes claiming that nothing definite known and negotiations still in progress. All Gorgé’s information apparently from conversations at Japanese Foreign Office. Swiss endeavoring do utmost as their interests also vitally concerned. Confidential nature foregoing stressed as Gorgé reports Japanese say they are not according Germans similar facilities. Foreign Office officials doubtful outcome of negotiations 67 but feel all possible steps must be taken and hope eventually obtain some satisfaction promises given Gorgé. Harrison 65 Not printed; it stated that methods of financing the greatly increased cost of financial assistance in occupied China were being studied and requested that inquiry be made “whether Fontanel, if authorized by the Department, could borrow CRB currency locally against U.S. dollar credits to be established in blocked accounts in the United States, and whether he would be permitted to disburse proceeds of such loans.” (711.93114A/75) 66 Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 39, p. 1029 [ Pg. 1029 includes portions of Doc. 1045 and Doc. 1046 ] . 67 In telegram 3649, June 8, 10 a.m., the Minister in Switzerland reported informal advice from the Swiss Foreign Office that, pending outcome of these negotiations, “further transfers to Shanghai would not be made and that consequently additional estimated requirements reported in fifth paragraph my 2270, April 12, will not be required prior [to] June 30 but that natural advance of 3,000,000 francs will be required early [in] July for operating expenses and general distribution to field offices.” In telegram 2159, June 24, midnight, to Bern, the Department authorized the Minister to pay $54,000 to the Swiss Government for transmittal to the International Red Cross and to make future monthly payments of $18,000 in the same manner. (711.93114A/84) The authorization was amended in telegram 2331, July 7, midnight, so that the Minister might make payments directly to the International Red Cross. (711.93114A/6–2944) The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.62114 Mail/146: Telegram [Document 1057] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , June 19, 1944. [Received June 20—3:34 a.m.] 3928. American Interests—Far East. POW and internee mail, Department’s 1851, May 29. 68 Foreign Office note June 17 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, replies to contents Department 1379, April 21 69 that Japanese authorities accept in principle Department’s proposal. However, Ministry of Communications feels mail from Japan should be sent to Moscow for retransmission Tehran by Soviet authorities. Director Japanese post wrote in foregoing sense May 27 to Commissaire [of] Postal Communications, Moscow. Harrison 68 Not printed. 69 See footnote 47, p. 1030 [ Pg. 1030 includes portions of Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , and Doc. 1048 ] . The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 390.1115A/6–2444: Telegram [Document 1058] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , June 24, 1944—midnight. 2160. American Interests, China. Department is gratified that Swiss have effectuated the release of 9,000,000 CRB dollars of United States Government funds at Shanghai (Legation’s 3905, June 19 70 ) and that negotiations for reducing in effect the inequitable exchange rate are progressing (Legation’s 3583, June 5). The great difficulties encountered by Fontanel in affording financial assistance in occupied China are realized. It is hoped, however, that the obstacles interposed by the Japanese have now been overcome and that regular monthly payments to all qualified American nationals may continue uninterruptedly. Recipients of financial assistance in occupied China should be asked at present to sign promissory notes only for local currency received and, more particularly, as evidence of the actual receipt by the individuals concerned of the assistance for which Congress has provided, but the accounts of disbursements to each recipient rendered by Fontanel should show both local currency and United States currency equivalents (Legation’s 3812, June 15 71 ). Department’s 1202, February 14, 1942, as amended, contemplates that American nationals should in no event fail to receive financial assistance merely because they cannot foresee a time when they will be able to repay the sums advanced. The American nationals receiving financial assistance in occupied China may be assured that an equitable exchange rate for the local CEB currency will be the subject of determination by the Department at some future date, and that no demand will be made for settlement based on the present arbitrary and unrealistic relationship existing and over which neither we nor they have control. Reference complaints respecting insufficiency amounts financial assistance, Department approves effective June 1st the recommendations made by Fontanel for uninterned nationals in occupied China reported in Legation’s 2662, April 26, but requests that he make appropriate recommendations for revision of the rates of payment if the negotiations reported in your 3583 are successful. Department is informally advised that relief payments for noninterned British subjects have been paid in occupied China on the scale recommended in Legation’s 2662, and payments of 2500 CRB dollars monthly have been made through the Red Cross in cash or in kind for each interned British subject. Pending the receipt of recommendations by Fontanel respecting interned American nationals in occupied China, each may continue to receive not to exceed the equivalent of $110 United States currency monthly in cash or in kind, or both. Department is awaiting information requested in the first paragraph of its 1765, May 20, and unanswered portion of its 1627, May 10. 72 Department will arrange for the transfer to the Legation of the necessary funds as to which you will wish from time to time to inform it. Hull 70 Not printed; it stated that 9,000,000 CRB dollars represented one-half of United States funds held by the Swiss Consulate General at Shanghai (740.00115A PW/1223). 71 Not printed; it reported that due to unforeseen difficulties, especially the absence of necessary authorizations of the Japanese Consulate General at Shanghai, Mr. Fontanel had been unable to effect relief payments for March, April, and May until June 6 and that “many recipients bitterly complained obligation sign promissory notes for amounts at rate 23.30 CRB dollars for one United States dollar because they thereby guaranteed reimburse large sums American money for local currency insignificant and insufficient for their needs.” (390.1115A/1790) 72 Neither printed; they sought data regarding costs of financial assistance in China under the proposed scale of payments (711.93114A/75, 74). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.93114A/6–2644: Telegram [Document 1059] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , June 30, 1944—9 p.m. 2226. Financial Assistance, Occupied China. An increase of 50 percent in the financial assistance payments authorized by Department’s 2160, June 24 is hereby authorized effective June 1st (Legation’s 4074, June 26 73 ). You may authorize Fontanel to use the 9,000,000 CRB dollars released by the Japanese (Legation’s 3905, June 19 74 ) in making payments for June. Hull 73 Not printed. 74 Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 70, p. 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , and Doc. 1058 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A Pacific War/7–144: Telegram [Document 1060] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , July 1, 1944—10 a.m. [Received 1:20 p.m.] 4190. American Interests, China. Department’s 2160, June 24. Foreign Office note June 26, received June 29, referring contents Legation’s 3812, June 15, 75 states Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, submits telegraphically following: 1. March, April and May payments to non-interned Americans effected and exhaust 9,000,000 CRB dollars recently released. (Legation urgently requesting Swiss confirm whether February payment made as authorized Department’s 1134, April 4). 2. Remaining 9,000,000 CRB dollars designated by Japanese as reserve has been paid to blocked account with Yokohama Specie Bank at request Japanese Consulate General as condition precedent to resumption relief payments. Nothing remains in former account. 3. Reference Legation’s 4110, June 28, 76 Swiss Consulate reports paying these persons for June and July and allotting funds for camp equipment. Amounts spent on behalf 360 persons whose internment scheduled for June 28 will amount approximately 12,000,000 CRB dollars. (As only 24 Americans concerned, Legation requesting Swiss confirm 77 that only 800,000 CRB dollars paid from United States fund.) 4. Japanese authorities have approved resumption payment “comfort allowances” to internees beginning June 1 at 2,000 CRB dollars monthly per person and authorized payment 15,000,000 CRB dollars due internment camps when payment this assistance suspended. Legation inquiring regarding United States portion of latter amount. 5. Amounts mentioned paragraph 3 and 4 above, as well as assistance for non-interned must be taken from special account with Yokohama Specie Bank for funds used in representation foreign interests. This account now contains for American interests 11,000,000 CRB dollars representing equivalent 2,150,000 Swiss francs transferred April 14 (see Legation’s 2534, April 20 78 ) which is insufficient cover obligations June and July. Fontanel, therefore, requests additional 2,000,000 Swiss francs be transferred soonest possible for American interests. (From Daymont: As provision for this transfer not included in request for 3,000,000 contained paragraph 1, Legation’s 3649, June 8, 79 early July transfer of 5,000,000 francs to credit my account now requested.) 6. Reference Legation’s 2662, April 26, Fontanel recommends view continually rising living costs increase from June 1 monthly assistance per adult [in] category I to 10,300 CRB dollars. 80 Reference paragraph 1 and 5 Legation’s report 81 amounts expended March, April, May payments since foregoing indicates that approximately 9,000,000 relief these 3 months as compared figures Legation’s 2270, April 12 and 4065, June 26. 82 Harrison 75 Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 71, p. 1039 [ Pg. 1039 is part of Doc. 1058 ] . 76 Ante , p. 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1003 and Doc. 1004 ] . 77 Telegram 4807, July 27, from Bern, reported a Swiss Foreign Office note stating that 20 and not 24 Americans had been interned on June 28 and that 350,000 CRB dollars had been granted as June and July relief payments and as a contribution for camp equipment (740.00115A Pacific War/7–2744). 78 Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 39, p. 1029 [ Pg. 1029 includes portions of Doc. 1045 and Doc. 1046 ] . 79 Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 67, p. 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , and Doc. 1058 ] . 80 Telegram 2405, July 13, 11 p.m., to Bern, stated that authorizations already made in telegrams 2160, June 24, p. 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , and Doc. 1058 ] , and 2226, June 30, supra , should satisfy the request made in this paragraph (740.00115A PW/7–144). 81 Presumably in telegram 2270, April 12, 4 p.m., p. 1028 [ Pg. 1028 includes portions of Doc. 1044 and Doc. 1045 ] . 82 Latter not printed. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/7–1444: Telegram [Document 1061] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , July 14, 1944. [Received July 14—5:57 p.m.] 4507. American Interests—Japan. Department’s 1888, June 1. Swiss note July 13 contains following response from Japanese Foreign Office telegraphed July 12 by Swiss Legation, Tokyo. “Japanese Government are prepared to render facilities in regard to transport via Soviet port of relief supplies and correspondence sent for distribution to American and Allied prisoners of war and internees in Japanese custody on following conditions: I. 1. In view of negotiations hitherto conducted between Japanese and United States Government, Japanese Government have been under impression that American Government previously obtained consent of Soviet Government to transshipment of relief supplies and correspondence at Vladivostok. Said port being situated adjacent to Japan, it is considered from past experience that transshipment of relief supplies and correspondence would be conveniently effected there. Moreover, presence of Japanese consular service is necessary for Japanese ship to enter port and take delivery of supplies in question. For these reasons Japanese Government by their note of 28th April addressed to Swiss Legation, Tokyo, replies to American Government that Vladivostok should be the port of delivery. Japanese Government, therefore, desire that American Government will further negotiate with Soviet Government so that Soviet Government’s consent to use of Vladivostok may be obtained. 2. Should, however, Soviet Government find it difficult to accede to above proposal as result of negotiations, Japanese Government would agree to make delivery of supplies at Nakhodka, provided that American Government obtain consent of Soviet Government to following: ( a ) That two members of staff of Japanese Consulate General at Vladivostok be given facilities for coming to Nakhodka and being permitted to stay for a necessary period of time and to discharge their official duties relating to entry and clearance of Japanese ship and transshipment of relief supplies and correspondence. ( b ) That captain and senior officers of Japanese ship be permitted to go ashore and communicate with said Japanese consular officials. ( c ) That on arrival of Japanese ship at port she should be given first priority in entering port, enabled to load supplies without delays and allowed to leave port without any impediment. ( d ) That indication of safe course of ship to be followed and all other facilities for transport of supplies be accorded to Japanese ship. 3. Japanese Government cannot see their way to agree, for reasons of distance and other considerations, to taking delivery of subsequent relief supplies and correspondence at Petropavlovsk but suggest Vladivostok as transshipping point, as has already been expressed in their note of 28th April addressed to Swiss Legation, Tokyo. II. 1. As regards relief supplies and correspondence presumed to be now lying at Vladivostok, Japanese Government will take delivery of them to aggregate amount of 1,500 metric weight tons at Vladivostok or Nakhodka, whichever port is agreed upon, by a single voyage if possible. 2. As to subsequent shipments of relief supplies and correspondence, it will be necessary to take into consideration capacity of Japanese ship to be sent for the purpose and Japanese Government will each time notify American Government of quantity which can be taken. However, Japanese Government considers that it would be difficult to take 1,500 metric weight tons each month as desired by American Government. III. American Government shall pay all taxes, rates, dues and all other public charges which may be levied on Japanese ship at Soviet port to be agreed upon, cost of loading of Japanese ship, freight charges from such port or [ for? ] ports under Japanese administration, cost of landing and warehousing at ports under same administration, and any and all other expenses calculated on fair and reasonable basis. Japanese Government are ready to defray import duty and other taxes to be charged at ports under Japanese administration and freight charges by Japanese Government railway. IV. American Government shall give guarantee of safety to Japanese ship to be engaged in transport of relief supplies and correspondence between ports under Japanese administration and Soviet port to be agreed upon and shall obtain guarantee of safety for said ship from all other interested governments (including Soviet Government). Japanese Government will notify American Government of details of itinerary of such Japanese ship at least 7 days prior to her departure. Full description of ship will also be communicated. V. With regard to subsequent shipments of relief supplies and correspondence to be distributed to American and Allied prisoners of war and internees referred to in paragraph II (2) above, Japanese Government suggest that dispatch of parcels addressed to specific individuals should be refrained from for time being since it is expected that delivery of such parcels to their respective recipients will be accompanied by considerable difficulties. VI. It is understood that in case Japanese Government send any relief supplies and correspondence for distribution to Japanese and Allied prisoners of war and internees in United States custody American Government shall take necessary steps for transport of them by route and method similar to present proposal.” Note dated April 28 referred to in Section I above corresponds quoted text Legation’s 2949, May 10. Harrison [On July 17 the Department sent to the British Embassy a statement of the number of American civilians held in Japanese custody as of July 12, as follows: Philippine Islands, 4768; China, 964; Japan, 173; Malaya, 35; Manchuria, 9; Borneo, 9; Indochina, 8; Thailand, 7; Burma, 6; Sumatra, 3; Korea, 1; and Formosa, 1. The statement was described as providing a “fairly reliable estimate” but was “not entirely accurate” because the protecting Power and the International Committee of the Red Cross had not been able to furnish complete reports.] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A Pacific War/7–2744: Telegram [Document 1062] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , July 27, 1944. [Received July 27—10:47 p.m.] 4808. American Interests—China. Foreign Office note July 21 states Fontanel reports: (1) Cash monthly comfort allowances 2,000 CRB dollars payable internees permitting reopening canteens which now run in Shanghai region by Mitsudash (Fontanel being requested explain) 83 which it is hoped will eliminate unscrupulous practices adopted individual Japanese contractors. Canteens to be supplied with articles current use and certain foodstuffs. View insufficient camp rations and increasing cost, Fontanel judges this relief not sufficient and proposes open new negotiations for increasing relief to at least 3,000 beginning August 1st. Following resumption relief payments Japanese suppressed July 1st transmission private funds to internees. (2) Payment hospital expenses for persons hospitalized outside camp against promissory notes resumed. (3) In addition regular relief Consulate will pay on recommendation responsible camp doctor against separate promissory notes medical and dietary relief to internees requiring special diet due age, illness or dental, ocular or orthopedic treatment. (4) Consulate will deliver as donations via Intercross against requisitions from camp representatives medical material such assistance for which promissory notes not obtained necessitated by insufficient Japanese supplies. (5) Consulate will furnish shoes and clothing on same basis as (4). (6) Advances will be made to cover special urgent needs such as transportation ill to hospitals or relatives to funerals. Fontanel adds it not possible estimate expenses of (2) through (6) above but that supplies mentioned (4) and (5) will in part be taken from available stocks. Finally stresses that all expenses indicated are very necessary and recommends Department approve soonest possible. 84 Harrison 83 Telegram 4999, August 4, from Bern, reported information from Mr. Fontanel that the reference was to Mitsubishi, the “well known large Japanese commercial firm”. (740.00115A P.W./8–444) 84 In telegram 2812, August 15, to Bern, the Department approved the increase to 3,000 CRB dollars as of August 1 (740.00115A Pacific War/7–2744). The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A P.W./7–2744: Telegram [Document 1063] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , July 27, 1944. [Received July 27—11:29 p.m.] 4816. American Interests—Japan. Foreign Office note July 26 states Gorgé reports Intercross Delegate not authorized forward Kobe internees supplementary foodstuffs as reported Legation’s 3910, June 19. 85 Food situation not improved since transfer Kobe so that not only internees from Guam but other internees detained separate camps obliged obtain food black market. Swiss Legation, Tokyo, states it continuing representations have Japanese supply sufficient food and inquiries whether at least 175 yen monthly recommended by Swiss Consulate, Kobe, might be granted. Legation referred Foreign Office contents Department’s 2222, June 30, 86 approved payments up to 280 yen monthly and requested Tokyo indicate amounts granted and date decision. Harrison 85 Not printed. Telegram 6509, September 30, 9 a.m., from Bern, reported a Swiss Foreign Office request for a correction of this sentence since for a “certain period International Red Cross delegation Japan provided funds necessary purchase supplementary foodstuffs on black market because relief then paid by Swiss Legation inadequate.” The telegram advised that such expenditures were discontinued at the request of the International Red Cross. (740.00115A P.W./9–3044) Earlier, however, in telegram 3118, September 9, to Bern, the Department had requested the Swiss to inform the Japanese Government that the American Government was “seriously disturbed” that the Intercross Delegate was not authorized to forward supplementary foodstuffs to the internees at Kobe and that Americans confined at Nanasawa were beginning to suffer from malnutrition because they were no longer able to purchase food to supplement their inadequate diet (740.0015A P.W./7–2744). Telegram 6017, September 12, from Bern, reported that Americans at Nanasawa were receiving more abundant and better quality food following representations by the Swiss Legation in Japan (740.00115A P.W./9–1244). 86 Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 44, p. 1030 [ Pg. 1030 includes portions of Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , and Doc. 1048 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/8–1144: Telegram [Document 1064] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , August 11, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 5:17 p.m.] 5217. American Interests, Far East—Financial Assistance. Legation’s 4282, July 5, 87 and 4763, July 25. 88 Foreign Office note August 7 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, reports Japanese Foreign Office, while showing great reserve, stated that monthly assistance from 10 to 20 pesos per POW would not appear exceed limit of what might be considered financial relief. Gorgé suggests, provided American Government approves, that at outset 15 pesos be accorded each POW who, excluding officers, according lists furnished Swiss Legation, Tokyo, number approximately 15,000. Monthly relief, therefore, would approximate 225,000 pesos or 450,000 yen. Regarding relief Netherlands Indies, Gorgé states, according lists from Japanese, approximately 200 American prisoners of war Java, 3 Borneo, 40 civilians Java, 3 Sumatra, 9 Borneo. Relief of 15 florins monthly per prisoner of war or internee would, therefore, amount 3,825 florins, equaling 7,650 yen. Gorgé adds that until exact information received regarding conditions Netherlands Indies payments at the beginning might be reduced to 10 florins per person. Gorgé concludes, stating Swedish representatives pay non-interned Dutch 15 to 50 florins and interned 15 monthly, but not yet able forward funds prisoners of war. Swiss Foreign Office urgently requests instructions. Harrison 87 Not printed; it reported a statement by the Japanese Foreign Office that it was prepared to intervene with competent Japanese authorities for the payment of relief funds to Americans held in the Philippines (711.94114A/7–544). 88 Not printed; it reported a statement by the Japanese Foreign Office that there was no objection to sending relief to Americans held in the Netherlands Indies (711.62114A/7–2544). The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A PW/8–1544: Telegram [Document 1065] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , August 15, 1944—1 p.m. [Received August 16—11:40 a.m.] 5297. American Interests—Philippines. Department’s 2475, July 20. 89 Following substance of Swiss note August 10: Gorgé observes as previously that he fully agrees American Government’s view and always endeavored consider practical execution of plans for assistance without taking question of competency into account. As observed Swiss note summarized Legation’s 4042, June 24. 90 Gorgé inquired of Jap Foreign Office whether Jap Government would authorize him to transfer $25,000 monthly to Swedish Legation; Jap spokesman appeared surprised at question thus raised and stated inquiry would be ordered in agreement with War Ministry with view thorough examination problem general assistance prisoners and internees Philippines. As Japanese had not communicated their decision, Gorgé again made representations August 5 at Foreign Office which informed him of following declaration Japanese military authorities: Owing special situation of Philippines, Japan has not recognized and is unable permit activity of Intercross in that country, and is no longer able permit activity YMCA. Activity which representative latter organization had been able exercise heretofore and which had simply been tolerated by local authorities must therefore cease. Japanese Government declares, however, that protecting Power shall always have possibility requesting authorization transfer funds for assistance prisoners. However, these funds, in case said authorization given, must be transmitted to Japanese military authorities at Manila, and these latter will decide manner future utilization these funds. End declaration. Foreign Office informed Gorgé that Swedish Minister strongly insisted YMCA be given authorization continue Philippines activity but this Japanese replied in foregoing sense by note containing following statement, After having consulted interested authorities, it has been decided that no steps in assisting POWs and civilian internees in Philippines can be taken henceforth unless necessary funds be transferred on authorization of War Ministry to POW and civilian internee camps under Japanese control in Philippines. End statement. Japanese Foreign Office further observed to Gorgé that it would be absolutely impossible for YMCA continue purchases in kind which made thus far without recourse to military authorities because such purchases fall within general food rationing regulations of that country. Owing foregoing decision YMCA and Intercross no longer able handle relief for POWs and civilian internees and this task henceforth incumbent upon protecting Powers. Gorgé states that under these conditions American Government will have to decide whether it can authorize monthly transfer amounts indicated Legation’s 5217, August 11. In affirmative, POWs might receive relief as has been the case thus far for civilian internees. Aside from current financial relief, Department might also consider transfer of certain amounts for local purchase supplementary foodstuffs provided Japanese authorities agree. Gorgé notes this agreement not obtainable without difficulty because economic situation that country must be very difficult. Immediately upon receipt necessary instructions, Gorgé will make every effort take all appropriate action pursuant new procedure prescribed by Japs. Gorgé will seek delivery receipts signed by men of confidence of camps, if Department considers receipts from Jap military authorities insufficient. He adds for purpose information that relief in kind previously furnished POWs and civilian internees by YMCA representative possible only as result accidental circumstances which could only be considered temporary; even if this formerly tolerated action could have been maintained, YMCA funds certainly would no longer be able make purchases as heretofore as acquisition such large quantity supplies would doubtless be impossible because situation Philippines is hardly better than Japan. Harrison 89 Not printed; it deprecated the holding up of relief measures because of jurisdictional questions as to which neutral agency was to assume responsibility (740.00115A P.W./1235). 90 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/8–1144: Telegram [Document 1066] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , August 19, 1944—7 p.m. 2859. American Interests—Netherlands Indies. Your 5217 August 11. Bequest Swiss Foreign Office to instruct Swiss Legation Tokyo to take necessary action to extend financial assistance to American prisoners of war, merchant seamen and civilian American nationals in the Netherlands Indies qualified under Department’s 1202 February 14, 1942, as amended (Foreign Service Serial 109 January 22 91 ). Monthly payment of 15 florins (equivalent to about $7.08 at rate indicated in your 5217) should be made to American prisoners of war, interned merchant seamen and interned civilians. An uninterned American national in Netherlands Indies should be paid a monthly amount not to exceed the maximum of $60 established for that territory by Department’s 1202. It is desired that all American prisoners of war including officers share equally in the financial assistance and that officers of merchant vessels share equally in such assistance with other qualified merchant seamen. It is assumed that the Swiss Legation, Tokyo, will use the best method available to accomplish the desired objective of affording relief to American prisoners of war. Except in unusual situations, it is not believed that sums of money should be paid directly to the individual American prisoners of war, but that they should be expended on a group basis, with the advice and cooperation of camp committees, leaders, or spokesmen where feasible. Priority should normally be given to the purchase and distribution of medical and food supplies. It is assumed that all possible means will be used to insure receipt of the supplies by the prisoners, to assure that they will be utilized in addition to and not in lieu of those now supplied by the Japanese. To the extent practicable, the Swiss Legation at Tokyo should furnish reports concerning the expenditures of the funds in question and endeavor to obtain confirmatory evidence indicating the receipt of supplies and funds by American prisoners of war. Receipts in the form of promissory notes should be obtained, if possible, from all civilian recipients including merchant seamen. A monthly report should be made by Gorgé showing the number of each class of recipients (stating separately number of Army, Navy and Marine Corps) and the amount paid recipient of each class. The first report should state date when first payment is made. 92 Hull 91 Not printed. 92 Telegram 7390, November 7, 4 p.m., from Bern, reported that the Swiss Legation in Japan had been authorized to forward 3900 florins to Java but would have to seek, each month, authorizations from the Japanese Ministries of War and Finance for subsequent relief expenditures there (711.94114A/11–744). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/8–1144: Telegram [Document 1067] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , August 19, 1944—8 p.m. 2860. American Interests—Philippines. Legation’s 5217 August 11. In view of statement which Swiss Minister at Tokyo has obtained from Japanese Foreign Office, Department hereby authorizes him to arrange for financial relief or assistance for American prisoners of war in the Philippine Islands at the rate of 20 pesos (the equivalent of $10) monthly for each prisoner. It is desired that all American prisoners of war including officers share equally in the relief. [Here follows paragraph on methods of distributing funds similar to second paragraph of telegram 2859, August 19, 7 p.m., printed supra .] The Department would appreciate receiving a report from Gorgé as to whether the lists of approximately 15,000 American prisoners of war in the Philippines show the prisoners by name or whether they are just tabulations without names. 93 Hull 93 Telegram 6068, September 14, 8 p.m., from Bern, reported there were only 9,000 prisoners of war in the Philippines, some 5,700 having been transferred to Japan and 1,700 having died in the Philippines (711.11B114A/9–1444). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114 Supplies/8–2644: Telegram [Document 1068] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , August 31, 1944. 3006. Please request Swiss Government urgently to communicate following to Japanese Government with reference to Swiss note dated July 13 (Legation’s 4507, July 14) in regard to the onward movement to Japan and Japanese-occupied territory of relief supplies now warehoused on Soviet territory and those to be sent subsequently via Soviet territory intended for distribution to Allied nationals in Japan. “The United States Government, having referred to the Soviet Government for its consideration the Japanese Government’s response, has been informed that the Soviet Government on August 25 sent to the Japanese Embassy at Moscow an aide-mémoire confirming the willingness of the Soviet Government to permit a Japanese ship to enter the port of Nakhodka for the purpose of loading and carrying away relief supplies now stored on Soviet territory awaiting transshipment to Japan. The United States Government has been informed that the Soviet Government has specified the route to be followed by the Japanese ship while in Soviet waters and that the Soviet Government has indicated to the Japanese Government the arrangements which the former will make for transshipping relief supplies from the Soviet vessel to the Japanese vessel at Nakhodka. It is the understanding of the United States Government that the Soviet Government’s communication to the Japanese Embassy at Moscow of August 25 satisfactorily meets the conditions set forth under Section 1, paragraph 2 A, B, C, and D of the Swiss note of July 13. The Government of the United States agrees to the division of cost as proposed under Section 3 of the Swiss note of July 13, namely, that the Government of the United States will pay all taxes, rates, dues, and all other public charges which may be levied at Soviet ports on Japanese ships engaged in this traffic as well as the cost of loading such ships and freight charges from such port or ports to ports under Japanese administration, cost of landing and warehousing at ports under that administration and any and all other expenses calculated on a fair and reasonable basis. The United States Government notes that the Japanese Government is prepared to defray import duty and other taxes to be charged at ports under Japanese administration and freight charges by Japanese Government railway. Referring to Section 4 of the Swiss note of July 13, the United States Government assures the Japanese Government that the Allied Governments are prepared to accord safe conduct for the Japanese ship to be employed in this traffic between ports under Japanese administration to Soviet approach point. The Japanese Government is requested to inform the Government of the United States of the proposed route to be followed by the Japanese ship and to name a date on which it is intended to dispatch the ship. It is requested that the route, sailing date, and a full description of the ship be furnished the Swiss Legation, Tokyo, in sufficient time to insure that this information will reach the United States Government at least 7 days prior to the sailing date. Unless the Japanese Government is informed before the proposed sailing date that the proposed route is, in certain respects, not acceptable, the Japanese Government may assume that the proposed itinerary meets with the approval of the Allied Governments. If the Allied Governments find it necessary to request certain changes in the itinerary of the ship, the United States Government will so inform the Japanese Government and the latter will be requested to name a new sailing date. The United States authorities will assume responsibility for coordinating with the other Allied military authorities in respect of safe conduct for the Japanese ship. As regards subsequent shipments of relief supplies and correspondence for Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody (Sections 2 and 5 of the Swiss note of July 13), the United States Government has been informed that the Soviet Government has proposed to the Japanese Government that such shipments be made from Soviet territory overland to the border station Manchuriya where such shipments would be received and taken onward by the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government is informed that this means of regular shipment of relief supplies and correspondence is entirely acceptable to the Government of the United States and the latter expresses the hope that the Japanese Government will agree to this means of regular and continuous shipment of relief supplies and correspondence to a minimum amount of 1500 weight tons per month. The Government of the United States is willing, for the time being, to exclude from such shipments parcels addressed to specific individuals with the reservation that this phase of the matter may be re-opened at a later date. With reference to Section 6 of the Swiss note of July 13 the Government of the United States confirms that in case the Japanese Government sends relief supplies and correspondence for distribution to Japanese and Allied prisoners of war and internees in United States custody, the Government of the United States will take the necessary steps to arrange for the onward transport of such supplies and correspondence from Soviet territory to the United States and will arrange for the expeditious distribution of such supplies and correspondence to the persons for whom intended. For its part the Government of the United States is prepared to receive from Japan parcels addressed to specific Japanese nationals in United States custody and foresees no difficulty in arranging for the distribution of such parcels to the addressees. The Government of the United States hopes that the Japanese ship to be dispatched to Nakhodka to pick up and transport to Japan relief supplies now on Soviet territory awaiting transshipment will be of sufficient cargo capacity to transport as much as possible of the supplies now awaiting transshipment. The Government of the United States would appreciate being informed, at the Japanese Government’s earliest convenience, whether the proposal of the Soviet Government as regards subsequent shipments of relief supplies is acceptable to the Japanese Government.” Hull The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A P.W./8–1544: Telegram [Document 1069] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , September 2, 1944—10 p.m. 3035. American Interests Philippines. Expenditure of the equivalent of $10 monthly for relief of each American prisoner of war in the Philippines was authorized by Department’s 2860 August 19. Receipts signed by men of confidence, camp committee or camp spokesmen should be obtained if possible to show prompt delivery to prisoners. The meaning of the following sentence from Legation’s 5297 August 15 is not clear “Aside from current financial relief, Department might also consider transfer of certain amounts for local purchase supplementary foodstuffs provided Japanese [authorities] agree”. If that sentence refers to foodstuffs for American civilians in Philippines, Swiss Minister, Tokyo, already has authority under Department’s 1761 May 20 94 and 2599 July 28, 95 to expend amounts necessary for maintenance of an adequate subsistence level. If it refers to American prisoners of war, Department will make available such funds in addition to those authorized by Department’s 2860, as can be used for purchase of additional foodstuffs. Gorgé should report urgently amount of funds which Japanese will permit to be used monthly for that purpose, stating separately amount for civilians and for prisoners of war. Hull 94 Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 63, p. 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 1054 and Doc. 1055 ] . 95 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/7–844: Telegram [Document 1070] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , September 14, 1944—11 p.m. 3183. American Interests—Far East. Legation’s 4355, July 8. 96 In view of the success by Swiss Legation Tokyo in making arrangements for financial assistance to American prisoners of war in the Philippine Islands and the Netherlands East Indies (your 5217 August 11), the Department hopes that the Swiss representatives will be able to arrange for such assistance to all other American prisoners of war detained by the Japanese in the Far East. However, no financial assistance by the Swiss seems necessary for American prisoners of war in Hong Kong and Shanghai so long as they are receiving such assistance through the representatives of the International Red Cross. The Swiss representatives should endeavor to extend financial assistance under Department’s 1202 of February 14, 1942, as amended, to all American prisoners of war detained by the Japanese according to their needs regardless of whether the prisoners request such assistance. The instructions in Department’s 2859 August 19 (American Interests—Netherlands Indies) should be followed so far as applicable. Special reports are desired regarding the feasibility of financial assistance for all American prisoners of war in the Far East except those in the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Such reports on American prisoners of war should include those in the following areas or places: Japan (including Formosa), Burma Camp, Thai Camp (under Japanese control), Saigon, Mukden, and any other camps not known by the Department but which may have come to the knowledge of the Swiss. Swiss should also investigate and report the possibility of financial assistance to American civilian nationals and American merchant seamen in Japan and Japanese-occupied areas, such as those at Changi, Singapore, who are not receiving assistance. Hull 96 Not printed; it advised of a report from the Swiss Legation in Japan that it was “paying no financial relief to American POWs detained [in] Japan” and that they had never expressed a desire to receive such payments (711.94114A/7–844). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/9–244: Telegram [Document 1071] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , September 16, 1944. 3213. American Interests—Japan. Legation’s 5788 September 2. 97 You are authorized to pay $125 monthly beginning September 1, 1944 to International Red Cross Geneva for relief American prisoners of war at camps in Taiwan, and one payment of $250 as reimbursement for two monthly payments already made by Intercross. Sums herein authorized are to pay American share of funds advanced to prisoners of war in Taiwan by Pestalozzi. 98 All American prisoners of war, including officers, should share equally in relief. Report should be submitted quarterly by Intercross representative showing amount spent, number recipients, average amount to each, and number Army, Navy and Marine Corps personnel, and should be supported by receipts or confirmatory evidence indicating that funds have been received by American prisoners of war. Submit separate account charging authorization number 1, 1944–45. Reference airmail 8693 99 Department hopes Pestalozzi will be able to arrange for increase from maximum of 2 yen allowed each man to approximately same amount as authorized for American prisoners of war in Netherlands East Indies or Philippines. Hull 97 Telegram not printed. 98 Max Pestalozzi, International Red Cross Delegate in Japan. 99 Dated July 8, not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A P.W./9–1144: Telegram [Document 1072] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , September 26, 1944—9 p.m. 3320. Reurtel 5994 September 11, 1 American Interests—Philippines. Express to Gorgé Department’s deep appreciation for all his work on behalf of Americans in Philippine Islands and its full realization of difficult conditions with which he has to contend. Because of extreme solicitude of the Government of the United States and its people regarding the welfare of American nationals detained by the Japanese, Department, in efforts to leave no possibility of furnishing adequate relief unexplored, has made repeated requests for reports on the needs of internees in the Philippines. Department had hoped that the detaining Power might eventually agree to transmit information as to the internees’ needs. It seems, however, from Gorgé’s report that the Japanese have failed to transmit requests which internees may have made or that confusion has arisen on this subject. In view of this situation and the very great increase in cost of living (Reurdes 8753 July 17 2 and unofficial sources) and because of the reported increase in number of internees (Reurtel 4414 July 11 3 ), you may authorize Gorgé to increase, effective September 1st, to the equivalent of $100,000 the amount transmitted monthly to civilian internment camps in the Philippines for benefit of all internees and their uninterned destitute dependents in same manner as has been done with monthly remittance of $37,500. It is hoped Gorgé will be able to effectuate transfer of the increased monthly remittance as unofficial sources indicate that Japanese permitted Dutch internees, numbering about 45, in the Philippines to receive from their Government through Department of External Affairs a monthly allotment of 80 pesos each for relief. It is estimated that the amount herein authorized will be somewhat less than 80 pesos per capita for each internee and uninterned destitute dependent. Telegraph when increased amount is transmitted to Philippines. If the $100,000 monthly is insufficient, additional funds will be authorized. Hull 1 Not printed. 2 Not printed. 3 Not printed; it reported that Japanese military authorities had again interned British, American, and Dutch priests and missionaries on the ground that they were “engaged in espionage and other undesirable activities in the Philippines.” (740.00115 P.W./7–1144) The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 71)1.94114 Mail/6–1944: Telegram [Document 1073] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , September 26, 1944—10 p.m. 3321. ReDepts 1379, April 21; 4 reurtel 3928, June 19. Department has received a communication from AmEmbassy, Moscow, stating that the Soviet postal authorities have not thus far received from the Japanese authorities in the Far East any mail from American prisoners of war and interned civilians or mail of any other kind for forwarding via Tehran to the United States. Please communicate the foregoing information to the Swiss Government requesting it to ask the Japanese authorities to route all prisoner of war and civilian internee mail (both Japanese and American) to the United States via the Soviet Union and Tehran from which point it will be carried to the United States by air free of charge. The United States authorities believe that the route via Tehran offers at present the most expeditious method for the exchange of prisoner of war and civilian internee mail between the United States and the Far East. As noted in the Department’s 1379, April 21, it would be appreciated if the Swiss could obtain from the Japanese authorities notice when mails from the Far East are first routed via Tehran. Department would also appreciate receiving urgently information as to whether mails routed to the Far East via Tehran and the Soviet Union have arrived. Hull 4 See footnote 47, p. 1030 [ Pg. 1030 includes portions of Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , and Doc. 1048 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A P.W./9–3044: Telegram [Document 1074] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , September 30, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 1:32 p.m.] 6514. American Interests—China. Department’s 3187, September 14. 5 Note September 25 from Foreign Office refers contents Legation’s 6304, September 23, 5 and adds that rate obtained transmission funds Shanghai amounts approximately 9.18 Swiss francs for 100 CRB dollars which is more favorable rate than that referred to numbered paragraph 4 Legation’s 4933, August l. 6 In recent telegram Swiss Legation, Tokyo, reports no official reply made by Japanese Foreign Office to Swiss representative regarding deblocking 9,000,000 CRB dollars frozen Shanghai. Minister Gorgé personally intervened again with Foreign Office which gave to understand that serious difficulties face solution. In hope Japanese authorities might deblock funds for other use than administration expenses or payment financial relief, Swiss Foreign Office suggested that Gorgé propose to Japanese utilization blocked funds for partial payment clothing, shoes, medicaments, food, et cetera, which must be delivered camps as stated Legation’s 6304. Harrison 5 Not printed. 5 Not printed. 6 Not printed; numbered paragraph 4 mentioned no specific exchange rate but stated that negotiations with Japan to reduce the exchange rate were continuing and that the Swiss Foreign Office hoped agreement would be reached shortly (711.93114A/8–144). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A P.W./9–3044: Telegram [Document 1075] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , October 10, 1944—8 p.m. 3482. American Interests China. Reurtel 6304, September 23. 7 Department approves increase in basic monthly loan for an uninterned American adult in occupied China to 14,900 CEB dollars beginning September 1st. For budgetary and other reasons it is impracticable for Department to give Fontanel authority to increase financial assistance payments with each rise in cost of living but will consider specific recommendations which he may make. Inform Swiss Foreign Office that Department authorizes it to place necessary United States official funds at the disposition of Fontanel to pay proportionate share of expenditures made available to Intercross for transmission to internment camps in occupied China and to pay proportionate share of necessary relief payments independent of individual financial assistance loans. It is noted that the total of these relief payments is estimated at 60,000,000 CEB dollars. An enclosure to your despatch 9000, August 12, 8 gives number of interned American, British and Netherlands nationals entitled to comfort allowances on May 4 and shows that slightly more than 11 per cent of them are American nationals. It is assumed that there has been little change in the proportions since that time and that the United States share of the 60,000,000 CEB dollars would be approximately in the same ratio. Ask Swiss Foreign Office to suggest to Fontanel that he endeavor to make gifts through Red Cross and supply necessary camp equipment to camps at Weihsien, Canton and Peking on same basis as to camps at Shanghai. Fontanel should be requested to submit monthly telegraphic report showing separately amount expended during previous month in payments to interned American nationals, to uninterned recipients, to Intercross for internees and for camp equipment or other authorized purposes. Any recommendations which he may care to make might accompany these reports. Reurtel 6514 September 30 Department desires report giving date when funds first obtained at more favorable rate. 9 Results Foreign Office suggestions to Gorgé regarding proposed use blocked funds are awaited with interest. 10 Request Swiss Foreign Office to convey to Gorgé this Government’s appreciation of his great service to the United States in obtaining the more favorable exchange rate, and similarly to Fontanel for his handling of the exchange situation and his constant protection of American nationals. Hull 7 Telegram not printed. 8 Not printed. 9 Telegram 7051, October 24, 4 p.m., from Bern, reported the “first transmission funds at more favorable rate made August 18 at 9.18 Swiss francs for 100 CRB dollars.” (740.00115A P.W./10–2444) 10 Airgram 71, January 10, 1945, 3 p.m., from Bern reported the Japanese authorities had agreed to deblock CRB $29,500,000 at Shanghai, of which Mr. Fontanel would use CUB $1,760,000 for assistance to Americans and CRB $3,358,730.71 to cover administrative expenses incurred in representing American interests (740.00115A P.W./1–1045). The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115 P.W./10–1044: Telegram [Document 1076] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , October 10, 1944—10 p.m. [Received October 10—2:04 a.m.] 6760. American Interests—Shanghai. Legation’s airmail 8600, June 26. 11 Swiss note October 6 states Fontanel September 27 through 29 visited seven civilian assembly centers, that is all in Shanghai area except Yangchow camps which he hopes be able visit in future and Haiphong Road which under military control. Able at each center converse freely with man of confidence and other committee members in presence Japanese commandant and representatives Japanese Consulate General. Fontanel ascertained that quality, quantity food insufficient; medical care greatly impeded by lack of medicaments and instruments; confinees no longer have sufficient clothing and are obliged to live in too limited quarters. Men of confidence have above all insisted on necessity furnishing foodstuffs and paying greatly increased financial assistance. Fontanel will forward detailed report on subject, but desires authorization now to make most urgent expenditures. He will later give details regarding sums necessary this connection, although constantly rising cost of living makes preparation of exact budget for any specified period impossible. In Fontanel’s view it would not be desirable in present circumstances to request Swiss Legation, Tokyo, make representations Japanese Government. Swiss inquire whether Department disposed give authorization sought by Fontanel. Although no reference made thereto, Department may wish consider foregoing in connection Legation’s 6304, September 23. 12 Harrison 11 Not printed. 12 Not printed, but see supra . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115 P.W./10–1144: Telegram [Document 1077] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , October 11, 1944. [Received October 11—8:57 p.m.] 6789. American Interests—China. Financial relief. Foreign Office note October 7 states Fontanel reports he believes single supplementary relief payment to non-interned in occupied China for purchase warm clothing and fuel indispensable. Swiss Consulate judges at least 13,000,000 CRB dollars necessary for this purpose. Foreign Office inquires whether such action meets Department’s approval. 13 Harrison 13 In telegram 3575, October 20, to Bern, the Department approved a single supplementary payment of 13,000,000 CRB dollars to uninterned American nationals for purchase of warm clothing and fuel (740.00115 P.W./10–1144). The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00115 P.W./10–1744 [Document 1078] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 227 Ex. 123.15 The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State, and has the honor to inform it that by Memorandum received through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” 14 in Madrid, the Imperial Japanese Government, according with the terms of the Nipo-American agreement is willing to send to Japanese nationals interned at Relocation Centers and Internment Camps in the United States the following articles for charitable assistance donated by the Japanese Red Cross: 1: Four cubic tons of books 2: Thirty-two cubic tons of tea 3: Five cubic tons of text books, especially for members of families interned in Crystal City (for this item, the International Red Cross apparently secured the agreement of the American Government) The Imperial Japanese Government wishes to have those articles forwarded on a Japanese boat. This ship should arrive in October at Port Nakhodka (near Vladivostok); said steamer will also take charge of similar items sent by the American Government. The Japanese Government would also appreciate that the American Government urgently secure the Soviet Government’s consent on the matter under review. It also asserts that it will ask the International Red Cross Commission in the United States to distribute such articles as soon as the American Government will express its willingness thereto. The Spanish Embassy would greatly appreciate the State Department’s advice on the above matter. Washington , October 17, 1944. 14 Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114 Supplies/10–1844: Telegram [Document 1079] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , October 18, 1944. [Received October 18—7:34 p.m.] 6916. American Interests—Japan. Foreign Office note October 16 received this morning encloses text quoted below of Japanese Foreign Office note October 9 to Swiss Legation, Tokyo, in reply to Department’s 3006, August 31. Swiss note states paragraphs tertio (2) and guinto (3) obviously garbled in transmission where indicated by question marks and corrections requested Tokyo. Swiss Foreign Office adds that telegram October 13 received from Swiss Legation, Tokyo, referring to paragraph quarto below and stating: “Japanese Foreign Office asks that American Government pay directly to Soviet authorities all taxes, local taxes, port taxes, all other public charges and loading charges incurred by Japanese vessel at Nakhodka”. Beginning Japanese Foreign Office note: “Transport via Nakhodka of relief supplies and correspondence sent for distribution to United States and Allied prisoners of war and internees in Japanese custody shall be carried out on following principles: Primo . Japanese Government intend to despatch one Japanese ship to Nakhodka towards end of October to take delivery by a single voyage of approximately 1500 metric tons of relief supplies and correspondence presumably now lying at Vladivostok. Secundo . Japanese Government by verbal note of 8th July 15 addressed to Swiss Legation, Tokyo, requested United States Government to guarantee safety to Japanese ship engaging in this traffic and to obtain such guarantee from all other governments concerned (including Soviet Government). The guarantee thus sought by Japanese Government shall include all risks against floating Soviet mines within respective seas. Memorandum of 25th August of Soviet Government to Japanese Embassy, Moscow, stated that question of safety of Japanese ship for the whole remaining part of voyage both ways between a port or ports in Japan and the above-mentioned approach point should be considered and settled between Japanese, United States and British Governments. In this respect United States Government has declared as follows: [Here follows text of assurances set forth in the fourth paragraph of the communication to the Japanese Government, sent to Bern as part of telegram 3006, August 31, printed on page 1049 [ Pg. 1049 includes portions of Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , and Doc. 1068 ] .] In these circumstances Japanese Government understands that by the assurance given by United States Government, it undertakes to procure guarantee of safe voyage for Japanese ship from all military authorities concerned taking into consideration all risks of floating mines and that United States Government holds itself finally responsible for any and all possible incidents. Japanese Government will notify Swiss Legation, Tokyo, about route, departure and ship’s description sufficiently early to insure information reaching United States Government at least 7 days before ship’s departure. Tertio . 1. Japanese Government noted Soviet Government’s notification concerning entry of Japanese ship into Nakhodka. Japanese ship will reach approach point in latitude 42 degrees, 24 minutes, 6 [ 36 ] 16 seconds north and longitude 132 degrees, 24 minutes, 6 [ 36 ] 16 seconds east before daylight. At approach point Japanese ship shall be met by Soviet guard ship and pilot. Soviet pilot shall then guide Japanese ship into Nakhodka harbor. In case pilot should be prevented by a storm from boarding Japanese ship, she shall follow a route indicated by Soviet guard ship. Soviet guard ship shall precede Japanese ship from approach point to berth in harbor of Nakhodka. 2. Japanese Government will notify to Soviet Government the following items 240 [hours] 17 prior to arrival of Japanese ship at approach point: A. Data [ Date? ] and time of arrival of Japanese ship at approach point and her route thereto. B. Name and tonnage of the ship. C. The ship’s length, breadth and draught. D. The kind of ship cargo, ship or cargo and passenger ship. E. The ship armament. F. Particulars of her external appearance (such as number of funnels and masts and the color). G. Number of the members of crew. H. The marks. I. The international code address. 3. Before entering port of Nakhodka, Japanese ship will notify wireless station at said port of her approach to the approach point 24 hours in advance. Her code address is UIK and the wave length 600 meters. 4. Japanese Government note Soviet Government’s statement to effect that Soviet Government will ( a ) permit two members of staff of Japanese Consulate General, Vladivostok, to proceed to Nakhodka, ( b ) guarantee to Japanese ship first priority in entering the port, loading without delay and clearance without any impediment, ( c ) require the formalities in regard to entrance, anchorage and clearance of Japanese ship to be observed in accordance with existing regulations based on general principles for dealing with foreign ships in Soviet harbors, ( d ) guarantee safety to Japanese ship on both ways between approach point and port of Nakhodka, ( e ) carry the said two members of staff of Japanese Consulate General, Vladivostok, by above-mentioned Soviet guard ship and allow them to go on board Japanese ship and ( f ) employ same methods for escorting Japanese ship from berth in port of Nakhodka back to approach point and for return trip of the two members of staff of Japanese Consulate General. Quarto . United States Government shall pay all taxes, rates, harbor dues and other public charges which may be levied at port of Nakhodka on Japanese ship and cost of loading Japanese ship as well as freight charges from port of Nakhodka to a port or ports under Japanese administration, cost of landing and warehousing at such port or ports and any and all other expenses calculated on a fair and reasonable basis. Japanese Government will defray import duty and other taxes to be charged at ports under Japanese administration and freight charged by Japanese Government railway. All taxes, charges and other expenses to be defrayed by United States Government as stated above shall be paid in Swiss francs. Quinto . 1. United States Government are requested to notify to Japanese Government names of officials to be in charge of delivery of goods in question to Japanese ship at port of Nakhodka. 2. With reference to tertio , 3, Japanese Government desire that Soviet Government indicate such signals as may be agreed upon if necessary for the meeting at approach point. 3. In view of possibility of damage being caused to ships, should goods be transshipped from ship to ship [in the port] 18 of Nakhodka, Japanese Government [propose] 18 the use of lighters and wish to be informed of the transshipping capacity of lighters to be such [ so? ] used. Sexto . As to subsequent shipments of relief supplies and correspondence addressed to United States and Allied prisoners of war and internees in Japanese custody, it is felt difficult to take 1500 tons per month by water still more so if goods were delivered at Manchouli and carried by rail. The matter shall be left for future considerations. Septimo . It is understood that in case in future Japanese Government send any relief supplies and correspondence for distribution to Japanese and Allied prisoners of war and internees in United States custody, United States Government shall carry out transport of the goods oy a route and methods similar to those stated above.” Swiss Foreign Office states 6 o’clock this evening no message yet received from Tokyo clarifying garbles. Harrison 15 See telegram 4507, July 14, from Bern, p. 1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. 1060 and Doc. 1061 ] . 16 Correction based on telegram 7239, October 31, from Bern (not printed). “Bracketed insertion based on telegram 6922, October 19, from Bern (not printed). 16 Correction based on telegram 7239, October 31, from Bern (not printed). “Bracketed insertion based on telegram 6922, October 19, from Bern (not printed). 17 Bracketed insertion based on telegram 6922, October 19, from Bern (not printed). 18 Bracketed insertion based on telegram 6922, October 19, from Bern (not printed). 18 Bracketed insertion based on telegram 6922, October 19, from Bern (not printed). The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115 P.W./10–1044: Telegram [Document 1080] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , October 20, 1944—4 p.m. 3573. American Interests China. Reurtel 6760 October 10. Department is gratified that Fontanel has been able to visit seven civilian assembly centers in Shanghai area. The request by Swiss Foreign Office gives insufficient basis upon which to judge accurately the needs of American nationals interned in occupied China. However the authorizations contained in Department’s 3482 October 10 may supply part of the needs of the internees. In the circumstances, inform Swiss Foreign Office that the equivalent of $50,000 may be made available to Fontanel as a special additional allotment to be used for most urgent requirements of internees for purchase of food, clothing, medicines or other necessary purposes or for relief in cash or in kind or for both methods combined. In the circumstances receipts from the internees will be considered unnecessary under this special allotment. Fontanel’s specific recommendations for further increased financial assistance for internees and for additional emergency expenses will be given sympathetic consideration. A statement of the number of interned American national recipients should be included in the recommendations. Hull The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114 Supplies/10–1844: Telegram [Document 1081] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , October 20, 1944. 3582. Please request Swiss Government urgently to communicate following to Japanese Government with reference to Japanese Foreign Office note of October 9 to Swiss Legation, Tokyo, reference Legation’s 6916, October 18. “Government of the United States is gratified to note the Japanese Government is prepared in immediate future to send a Japanese ship to Nakhodka to pick up relief supplies and correspondence intended for Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody as indicated in the Japanese Foreign Office note of October 9 to the Swiss Legation, Tokyo. As stated in Swiss Legation’s communication (based on Department’s 3006, August 31), United States Government, acting for itself and its Allies in the Pacific, is prepared to assure safe conduct between ports under Japanese administration and the Soviet approach point for the Japanese vessel engaged in this traffic provided the Japanese Government follows the notification procedure suggested in the Swiss Legation’s communication referred to above. It appears from the Japanese Foreign Office communication of October 9 that Japanese Government is agreeable to this procedure. As regards payment of taxes, local taxes, port taxes, all other public charges and loading charges incurred by Japanese vessel at Nakhodka, United States Government agrees to make direct payment to Soviet authorities. Other expenses connected with this operation which the United States Government has agreed to pay will be met by the transfer of Swiss francs to the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government, of course, appreciates that the security of the Japanese vessel between the Soviet approach point and Nakhodka is a matter under the sole jurisdiction of the Soviet Government. While the United States Government does not have the text of the Soviet Government’s communication of August 25 to the Japanese Embassy, Moscow, United States Government assumes that the Soviet Government has given adequate assurances to the Japanese Government regarding safe passage for the Japanese vessel while in Soviet waters. In order that this fact may be confirmed to the Japanese Government, United States Government is communicating to the Soviet Government the full text of the Japanese communication of October 9 with the suggestion that the Soviet Government communicate direct with the Japanese Government with respect particularly to the following portions of the Japanese Government’s communication of October 9: Tertio , 1, 2, 3, 4; Quinto , 1 (since Soviet officials will be in charge), 2, 3. With reference to Sexto and Septimo of Japanese Government’s communication of October 9, United States Government offers following observations: United States Government hopes that the successful completion of the current operation will indicate to the Japanese Government the feasibility of further similar operations either by the same or similar means. United States Government desires again to stress that it is willing to accord to the Japanese Government full and complete reciprocity in connection with the transportation and distribution of relief supplies and correspondence sent from Japan to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in Allied custody by whatever means may be agreed upon for further operations of this nature either in connection with the despatch of relief supplies and correspondence alone or with an attendant exchange of nationals. Upon the completion of the current operation United States Government will forward to the Japanese Government a proposal for continued operations of this nature and is hopeful that the Japanese Government will agree as to the desirability of maintaining in operation a channel by means of which relief supplies and correspondence may be forwarded regularly to nationals detained as the result of hostilities.” Hull The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114 Supplies/10–2144: Telegram [Document 1082] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , October 21, 1944. [Received October 21—1:08 p.m.] 6981. American Interests—Japan. Legation’s 6916, 18th, and 6922, 19th. 19 Foreign Office note October 21 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, telegraphs October 18 following communications from Japanese Foreign Office for Department. “1. Routes to be taken by Japanese ship on voyage to and from approach point off Nakhodka. A. Outward voyage: Leave Niigata on afternoon October 28; sail straight across Japan Sea; arrive Rashin forenoon October 30; leave Rashin afternoon November 2 and sailing straight arrive at approach point between 7:00 and 10:00 a.m. Japanese time, November 3 (ship will reach the point at indicated hour in order avoid night voyage as much as possible in consideration of dangers from floating mines). B. Homeward voyage: Leave approach point afternoon November 6 sailing straight; arrive Rashin forenoon November 7; leave Rashin afternoon same day sailing straight across Japan Sea; arrive Moji forenoon November 10 and arrive Osaka forenoon November 11. 2. Name and tonnage of ship: Hakusan Maru gross tonnage 4351.11. 3. Length 109.20 meters, width 15 meters, full draught 6.55 meters. 4. Kind of ship: cargo and passenger boat. 5. Armament nil. 6. Particulars of outside appearance: one funnel (center), two sets twin masts. 20 Painted grey. 7. Crew: 92 persons (16 officers 76 men). Two members Ministry of Foreign Affairs will also be on board. 8. Marks: a white cross is painted over upper deck and on central part of each side. At night all navigation lamps will be lighted and a white cross will be illuminated on upper part of each side. 9. International code address JNRO.” Department’s 3582, 20th, transmitted Swiss Foreign Office today for urgent communication Japanese Government. 21 Harrison 19 Latter not printed; it supplied corrections to telegram 6916. 20 Telegram 7167, October 28, from Bern, reported a Japanese Foreign Office request that the statement “two sets of twin masts” should read “two masts”. (711.94114 Supplies/10–2844) 21 For text of press release, issued on October 24, dealing with the completion of arrangements for the voyage of the Hakusan Maru , see Department of State Bulletin , October 29, 1944, p. 494. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114 Supplies/10–2444: Telegram [Document 1083] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , October 24, 1944. [Received October 24—4:55 p.m.] 7057. American Interests—Japan. Legation’s 6981, October 21. Foreign Office note today contains summary three Japanese notes dated October 18, 19 and 20 received from Swiss Legation, Tokyo, by telegram October 21. Following is translation: “ Primo: Japanese Foreign Office requests American Government pay directly to Soviet agents Nakhodka possible charges arising from shipments relief supplies and correspondence. Secundo: Soviet Government informed Japanese Embassy, Moscow, August 25 agreement to entry Nakhodka of Japanese vessel capable transporting 1500 tons of 1000 kilos relief supplies and correspondence. According to recent information [from] Intercross delegation Japan, merchandise actually on Soviet territory in Far East exceeds 3587 tons (2313 metric tons 22 ). Cargo capacity Japanese vessel which will be sent Nakhodka beginning November being about 2800 metric tons (approximately 1900 tons of 1000 kilos 22 ) Japanese Government is prepared to assure loading to this limit and requests American Government to make necessary representations Soviet Government in order that necessary instructions given Soviet authorities Nakhodka. Tertio: Japanese Foreign Office has requested Spanish Government to inform American Government that in accordance with agreement, it will load mail destined Japanese POWs and civilian internees and mail handled by Red Cross on Japanese vessel sent Vladivostok to carry American relief supplies. Mail will be unloaded Nakhodka and Japanese Foreign Office requests American Government to obtain authorization of Soviet Government for reforwarding United States.” At Legation’s request Foreign Office urgently endeavoring obtain explanation from Swiss Legation, Tokyo, tonnage figures given paragraph secundo above. Harrison 22 Telegram 8201, December 18, from Bern, reported receipt of a Swiss Foreign Office note stating a metric ton was a metric measurement ton, namely, 36 cubic feet, whereas a ton of 1,000 kilos was metric weight (711.94114 Supplies/12–1844). 22 Telegram 8201, December 18, from Bern, reported receipt of a Swiss Foreign Office note stating a metric ton was a metric measurement ton, namely, 36 cubic feet, whereas a ton of 1,000 kilos was metric weight (711.94114 Supplies/12–1844). The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 794.41114/9–3044: Telegram [Document 1084] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , October 26, 1944—9 p.m. 3656. Please request Swiss to inform the Japanese Government that the Soviet Foreign Office has stated that the Soviet postal authorities are prepared to transport parcel post containing medical supplies for American prisoners of war and civilian internees in the Far East provided the Japanese Postal Administration agrees to accept such parcels from the Soviet postal authorities. Such medical supplies will be shipped in packets weighing not more than two kilograms and otherwise complying with the dimension and weight requirements of the Universal Postal Convention. They will be placed in sacks similar to those which carry letter correspondence of civilian internees and prisoners of war and will be dispatched in the closed mails addressed to the terminal point in Japan with the notation “Via Tehran-Moscow”. The mail sacks will be labeled “correspondence of prisoners of war”. Medical supplies sent by this method will not exceed 100 kilograms per month and will not contain articles the transmission of which is prohibited by Article 46, Point C of the 1939 Postal Convention. 23 Medical parcels will be mailed by the American Red Cross and addressed to camp spokesmen at camps where American nationals are held. Amcross has been dispatching to camp spokesmen in Far East via Tehran 160 pounds weekly of such supplies in hope that they would reach addressees. Shipments will now be limited to 100 kilograms per month and will continue on assumption that Japanese authorities will receive and forward such parcels to the addressees. Swiss should request urgent assurances in this regard from Japanese. Stettinius 23 Signed at Buenos Aires, May 23, 1939; 54 Stat. (pt. 2) 2049. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114 Supplies/10–2444: Telegram [Document 1085] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , October 26, 1944. 3658. Reference your 7057, October 24. Please communicate following to Swiss Government for communication to Japanese Government with reference to Japanese notes dated October 18, 19, and 20. (Numbered paragraphs below refer to similarly numbered paragraphs reference telegram.) 1. American Government has previously indicated its willingness to make direct payment to Soviet authorities in regard to charges arising at Nakhodka in connection with transshipment of supplies. 2. American Government pleased to note Japanese Government’s willingness to take on board Japanese vessel supplies and correspondence to its full cargo capacity. This should permit the onward movement of all relief supplies which have been stored on Soviet territory awaiting onward shipment to Far East. 3. Department of State has informed Spanish Embassy, Washington, 24 of American Government’s willingness to facilitate and expedite the distribution of relief supplies and correspondence sent from Japan for Japanese nationals detained in the western hemisphere. The International Red Cross will, of course, be accorded full freedom to supervise the distribution of such supplies in the United States. Soviet Government has been informed of Japanese Government’s intention to forward to Nakhodka for onward shipment to United States relief supplies and correspondence for Japanese nationals. Stettinius 24 See note of October 27, infra . The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00115 P.W./10–1744 [Document 1086] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy The Department of State refers to memorandum no. 227 dated October 17, 1944, and to memoranda nos. 228 and 229 dated October 18, 1944, from the Spanish Embassy 25 in charge of Japanese interests in the United States concerning mail and relief supplies to be sent from Japan on the Japanese ship which the Japanese Government is arranging to send to the Soviet port Nakhodka, intended for distribution to Japanese nationals detained by the United States. The United States Government reiterates its willingness previously expressed to the Japanese Government to arrange for the forwarding of mail and relief supplies to the United States and assures the Spanish Embassy that mail and relief supplies sent from Japan will, upon arrival in the United States, be distributed promptly to the intended recipients. The United States Government is informing the Soviet Government that the Japanese Government intends to forward the above-mentioned supplies to Nakhodka on the Japanese ship. Since the Soviet Government has been fully informed as to the reciprocal nature of this operation, this Government foresees no difficulty in connection with the transshipment at Nakhodka of relief supplies and mail sent from Japan intended for Japanese nationals detained in the Western Hemisphere. It is noted that the above-mentioned relief supplies and mail are intended for internees in the Dominion of Canada, as well as those held in the United States. Upon arrival in the United States this Government will arrange for the forwarding of such mail and relief supplies to Canada. 26 Washington , October 27, 1944. 25 Nos. 228 and 229 not printed; they reported the Japanese Government’s intentions to include mail for internees on the vessel being sent to “Port Nakhodka” and desired that articles on this vessel be distributed to internees in Canada as well as in the United States. (711.94114 Mail/10–1844) 26 In telegram 4131, December 7, to Bern, the Department informed the Legation that 73 cases of books and 5 bags of prisoner of war mail had arrived at San Francisco and that arrangements were being made for expeditious distribution. Telegram 7895, December 2, from Bern, reported that the Japanese Government had not sent tea to Nakhodka. (711.94114 Supplies/12–244) The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A PW/10–2744: Telegram [Document 1087] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , November 4, 1944. 3768. American Interests—China. Legation’s 7135 October 27. 27 Department approves expenditure by Swiss Consulate Shanghai of 24,500,000 CRB dollars for November including 4,000,000 CRB dollars for purchase clothing, medicine and food for camps. Maximum monthly loans to internees may be increased to 4,000 CRB dollars and maximum loans to uninterned may be increased to 23,300 CRB dollars monthly. Sums necessary for assistance should be transferred to Shanghai before first of each month as requested by Fontanel. Legation’s monthly telegraphic report of Swiss franc requirements should state separately requirements for Shanghai. Telegraph Swiss francs you desire made available for November, and estimate for December (Legation’s 7135 and 7069 October 25. 27a ) Situation alien wives Americans (reference Legation’s 7037 October 24 28 ) is being studied. Department will consider Fontanel’s recommendations without commodity prices (Legation’s 6870 October 16 28 ) but will be glad to receive any prices which he believes necessary for proper consideration of his requests. Stettinius 27 Not printed. 27a Neither printed. 28 Not printed. 28 Not printed. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.11B114A/11–744: Telegram [Document 1088] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , November 7, 1944—noon. [Received November 7—9 a.m.] 7377. American Interests—Philippines—Prisoners of War Assistance. Department’s 3383, September 30, midnight. 28 Foreign Office note November 2 referring to the Department’s 2860, August 18 [ 19 ], and Legation’s 6068, September 14, 29 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, reports it authorized forward 180,000 pesos to prisoner of war camps Philippines. Necessary permit for future payments must be obtained each month from Japanese Ministries of War and Finance. Relief will be distributed 20 pesos monthly per person and will be utilized best possible by Japanese camp commanders but latter will be informed of Department’s desire that relief preferable be used communal purchases medicines and food. Pertinent Japanese regulations prescribed receipts must be signed by Japanese camp commander but men of confidence exceptionally permitted sign them. Harrison 28 Not printed. 29 Latter not printed; but for summary, see footnote 93, p. 1049 [ Pg. 1049 includes portions of Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , and Doc. 1068 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A PW/11–744: Telegram [Document 1089] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , November 7, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 11:44 p.m.] 7386. American Interests—China. Your 3768, November 4. De Pury 30 convened meeting November 6 of representatives United States, British and Netherlands Legations to whom he handed memorandum which follows air mail. 31 Main points are as follows: 1. Fontanel considers price inflation cannot be checked and will continue at increasing rate. 32 2. Sums now necessary assure minimum comfort entirely disproportionate materials benefits received. 3. Renewed representations Tokyo to obtain more favorable exchange rate would have little likelihood of success. 4. If relief payments again interrupted (please see Legation’s 1078, February 22) during conduct negotiations which may be lengthy, situation those concerned will be more precarious than during previous interruption because they now have no reserves available. 5. Purchase of CRB dollars on free market is impossible because (1) Fontanel cannot make any without authorization Japanese Consulate which exercises control over all funds utilized in protection foreign interests and (2) all sums must be remitted by official channels at official rates. 6. Matter is most urgent. 7. Suggestion advanced three interested governments might make collective approach to Japanese with view obtain facilities for assistance their nationals. De Pury, therefore, suggests two possible solutions: ( a ) Urgent examination possibility general repatriation by use neutral ship with Japanese crew (please see Legation’s 7047, October 24, noon [ midnight ]) 33 or ( b ) arrangement for sending relief in kind similar present arrangement between United States and Japan for transportation via Nakhodka. During general discussion it was brought out that question of repatriation including tentative Japanese suggestion (See Legation’s 7047, October 24, noon [ midnight ]) already under consideration but that no early solution along this or alternative line of relief in kind could be hoped for. Foreign representatives agreed submit Protecting Power’s suggestions their Governments. At same time De Pury undertook telegraph again to Fontanel requesting he use every endeavor Japanese to make further concession concerning official exchange rate for relief purposes. British representative indicated relief for British nationals for November not yet approved by London. Harrison 30 Arthur de Pury, Chief of the Division of Foreign Interests in the Swiss Foreign Office. 31 Despatch 9807, November 8, not printed. 32 The memorandum indicated that the cost of living in occupied China had tripled “since about six months”. The annex to the memorandum gave a comparison of prices as of June 1 and November 1. (740.00115A PW/11–844) 33 Post , p. 1092 [ Pg. 1092 includes portions of Doc. 1120 , Doc. 1121 , and Doc. 1122 ] . For Department’s response to this suggestion, see telegram 3851, November 11, 11 p.m., to Bern, p. 1094 [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 1123 and Doc. 1124 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115A PW/10–2744: Telegram [Document 1090] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , November 14, 1944—10 p.m. 3878. American Interests, China. Reurtel 7135, October 27, and 6870, October 16. 34 In view of extraordinary rise in prices at Shanghai, request Swiss to ask their Legation in Japan whether a more favorable basis may be arranged for obtaining local currency in that city. The doubling or tripling of commodity prices from June to October makes the rate of 9.18 Swiss francs for 100 CRB dollars (ReLegs 7051, October 24, 35 and 3583, June 5) at least as inequitable as was the former rate of exchange. Department appreciates action by Gorgé in negotiating present basis for obtaining Chinese Reserve Bank dollars as already stated (ReDeptel 3482, October 10) and hopes he will be able to make further advantageous arrangements. Stettinius 34 Neither printed. 35 Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 9, p. 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 1075 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/11–1744: Telegram [Document 1091] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , November 17, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 10:12 p.m.] 7605. American Interests—Far East. Foreign Office note November 14 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, accords financial assistance to all American prisoners of war and internees in Far East as requested Department’s 3183, September 14, and in accordance with procedure adopted in transmitting funds to American civilian internees Philippines. Japanese Foreign Office asked Swiss Legation establish assistance plan on basis of lists furnished by Japanese Prisoners of War Information Bureau. These lists reveal 1013 prisoners of war Fukuoka, 89 Hakodate, 1974 Osaka, 1344 Tokyo, 980 Mukden, 257 Formosa, 196 Thailand, 6 Malaya and 36 civilians reported Singapore and 6 Burma. Swiss Legation proposes fix relief at 15 yen monthly per person and it will insist that it be used preferably for collective purchases in accordance with Department’s 2860, August 19. Should 15 yen per person appear too much view lack purchaseable articles, Swiss Legation envisages reductions down to 5 yen monthly. Harrison The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) 711.94114 Supplies/11–244: Telegram [Document 1092] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) Washington , November 24, 1944. 3979. Please request Swiss Government communicate following to Japanese Government: American Government having noted from recent Japanese broadcast that Hakusan Maru arrived safely at Kobe on November 11 desires to convey to Japanese Government former’s gratification at the successful completion of this shipment of relief supplies and mail for the benefit of Allied and Japanese nationals detained as the result of hostilities. Operations of this nature implement in a positive sense declarations of humanitarian principles to which substantially all the nations of the world have expressed agreement and which give expression to the civilized concept that detained noncombatant and captured military personnel should, in so far as circumstances permit, be protected from unnecessary danger and hardship. The Government of the United States hopes that the Japanese Government will be willing to participate in further operations of this nature. The Government of the United States will address in the near future a further communication to the Japanese Government in this regard. Stettinius The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 711.94114 Supplies/11–2544: Telegram [Document 1093] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , November 25, 1944. [Received November 25—7:12 p.m.] 7756. American Interests—Far East Relief Supplies. Swiss note November 25 quotes following communication from Japanese Foreign Office dispatched November 22 by Gorgé. “1. Hakusan Maru which loaded 2,000 odd metric weight tons of relief supplies (that is, whole relief supplies brought by Soviet ship which was in excess of ship’s normal available capacity) at Nakhodka, unloaded at Rashin about 100 tons destined for POW and civilian internees Manchukuo and Chosen and upon entering port of Kobe November 11 unloaded remaining 1,900 odd tons in presence Intercross delegates, Japan. 2. Japanese authorities intend effect quickest possible manner transmission and distribution of the goods to POW and civilian internees in areas under Japanese administration. Transmission and distribution about 800 tons to recipients Japan proper already commenced and preparations being made for transmitting 1,100 odd tons China, Taiwan, Philippines and other southern areas including Thailand, French Indochina, Malaya and Java. 3. Japanese Government hope finish before Christmas transmission and distribution above mentioned 1,100 odd tons China and southern areas. But as it would not be possible dispatch a ship for this particular purpose relief goods will be carried by ships now plying between districts concerned either outward or homeward voyage. One ship will carry to Shanghai and Tsingtau and another to southern areas. From [the United States Government’s communications] 36 the Japanese Government understand that these two ships will on both their outward and homeward voyages be afforded same guarantee as in case of the ship engaged in transport between Nakhodka and Japan in order that they will not be subjected to any attack, visit or any interference whatever by United States and Allied forces. As soon as confirmation this understanding received from United States Government, Japanese Government will notify Swiss Legation, Tokyo, of characteristics for identification, sailing dates and routes these two ships in sufficient time to ensure that notification reaches United States Government 7 days prior departure vessels. Time departure would depend on reply from United States Government but Japanese Government are prepared utilize spaces available in some ships sailing about end November or beginning December.” Swiss Foreign Office official observes informally that telegram from Tokyo was garbled and suggests personally that perhaps word “from” at beginning fourth sentence point 3 above should possibly be deleted. In view foregoing communication from Japanese Government please instruct whether Department desires transmit its 3979, 24th, in present form to Japanese. 37 Huddle 36 Insertion based on telegram 7812, November 28, from Bern (not printed). 37 The Department authorized this action in telegram 4068, December 2 (711.94114 Supplies/11–2544). The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A PW/11–2744: Telegram [Document 1094] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , November 27, 1944—2 p.m. [Received 6:30 p.m.] 7784. American Interests—China. Note November 22 from Foreign Office (Department’s 3768, November 4) states Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, telegraphs following budget for December for financial assistance to Americans occupied China based on 60% increase cost of life resulting each adult non-interned receiving 37,300 CRB dollars. Comfort allowances for 825 internees 3,300,000; hospital expenses for interned and non-interned 3,500,000; medical diet allowances to camps 1,650,000; relief to 423 non-interned 11,500,000; total 19,950,000. As Swiss Consulate intends provide collective foodstuffs for camps (see Legation’s airgram 704, November 23 38 ) it does not propose increase comfort allowances which remain as for November at 4,000 CRB dollars. Foregoing does not include assistance to Filipinos which would amount approximately 7,000,000 CRB dollars. Swiss Consulate received from Japanese Consulate communication requesting payment to Filipinos and Hindus be ceased. Simultaneously Swiss Minister, Tokyo, received from Japanese Foreign Office two notes stating: “Government of Philippine Republic and Provisional Government of Free India request Swiss Government no longer concern itself with financial assistance Filipinos and Hindus.” Swiss Foreign Office instructed Swiss Minister, Tokyo, furnish additional information to permit examination situation. Huddle 38 Ante , p. 1000 [ Pg. 1000 is part of Doc. 1013 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) 711.94114A/11–1744: Telegram [Document 1095] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) Washington , November 29, 1944—8 p.m. 4032. American Interests Far East. Legation’s 7605 November 17. Request Foreign Office to convey to Gorgé an expression of the Department’s appreciation of his success in arranging for financial assistance to additional American prisoners of war and American civilians in Far East. It is especially gratifying that all American prisoners of war and American internees in the Far East will now receive financial assistance. Department trusts it will be possible to place relief in the hands of those prisoners of war, including commissioned officers, and civilians at a very early date. Financial assistance may be extended to prisoners of war and civilians mentioned Legation’s 7605 in accordance with the general principles contained in Department’s 2860 August 19. Department authorizes Swiss Legation at Tokyo to make any feasible arrangements for delivery or furnishing of supplies, including food, clothing and medicines, to prisoner of war or civilian camps in Japan and the other places or areas indicated in Department’s 3183 September 14 or Legation’s 7605. Reference is made in this connection to Legation’s 6435 September 27 39 reporting purchase by men of confidence of necessary foodstuffs for internees in Japan. Limit of 15 yen monthly for each person proposed by Swiss Legation Tokyo is deemed too low in view of all circumstances. Gorgé should endeavor to fix the monthly rate at not less than the equivalent of 10 United States dollars monthly for each person. Larger sums will be authorized if they can be employed for the benefit of American prisoners of war and civilians. The primary considerations are how much could be used for the recipients and how much Gorgé can arrange with the Japanese authorities to have used. A brief monthly report of action under this telegram is desired. Stettinius 39 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) 711.94114 Supplies/11–2544: Telegram [Document 1096] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) Washington , December 5, 1944. 4105. Legation’s 7756, November 25. Request Swiss to incorporate substance of following in reply to Japanese Foreign Office communication despatched November 22 by Gorgé: “Government of the United States is gratified at the cooperative attitude evidenced by the Japanese Government in the matter of arranging for the distribution among Allied nationals in Japanese custody in China and the southern areas of proportionate amounts of relief supplies which recently arrived in Japan aboard the Hakusan Maru . The Government of the United States accepts the offer of the Japanese Government to transport these supplies in two ships, one to proceed to Shanghai and Tsingtao and the other to the southern areas. The two ships selected to transport the relief supplies will not be subjected to attack, visit, or any interference whatever by United States and Allied forces either on the outward or homeward voyages connected with the transportation of these supplies, subject to the following: The Japanese Government will notify the Swiss Legation, Tokyo, in sufficient time to insure the receipt of the necessary information by the Government of the United States at least 7 days prior to the departure of the vessels, of the characteristics for identification, sailing dates, and routes of these two ships. The ships should have special markings of which the Government of the United States should be notified at the same time and during the voyages covered by this safe conduct the ships should burn all navigation lights. Provided the Japanese notification is received at least 7 days prior to the announced dates of departure, the Government of the United States undertakes to inform the Japanese Government prior to the departure dates whether the Japanese notification has been accepted.” For Legation: Forward Japanese notification, when received, to Department by telegram. 40 Stettinius 40 Undated telegram 8323, received in the Department on December 25, 4:10 p.m., from Bern, reported the Japanese Government’s request for assurances of safe-conduct by the American and Allied Governments for the round-trip voyage of the Hosi Maru , the vessel to leave Kobe the forenoon of January 4, to arrive at Shanghai the afternoon of January 12, after a stop at Moji, and to leave Shanghai the forenoon of January 16, and to arrive at Moji the afternoon of January 28, after a stop at Tsingtao. The requested assurances were given in telegram 1, January 1, 1945, to Bern. Minor modifications in the schedule of dates were proposed by the Japanese Government and transmitted from Bern in telegram 171, January 10, 1945. They were accepted by the American Government in telegram 146, January 10, 1945. (711.94114 Supplies/12–2544, 12–2845, 1–1045) For a statement by the Department, January 1, 1945, on relief supplies for Allied nationals interned in the Far East, see Department of State Bulletin , January 7, 1945, p. 32. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) 711.94114 Mail/12–544: Telegram [Document 1097] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) Washington , December 5, 1944—midnight. 4107. American Interests Japan—POW Mail. Please request Swiss to inform Japanese authorities that United States authorities are now routing prisoner of war and civilian internee mail destined for the Far East via Tehran and on Soviet vessels plying between the United States West Coast and Soviet Pacific ports. Please ask Swiss to ascertain urgently what routes, if any, the Japanese authorities are now using for POW mail addressed to persons in the United States. Thus far, no mail has been received in the United States via Tehran despite invitation set forth in Department’s 3321, September 26, 1944. Stettinius The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) 740.00115A PW/11–744: Telegram [Document 1098] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) Washington , December 11, 1944—8 p.m. 4176. American Interests—China. Reurtel 7386 November 7. Swiss suggestion of collective approach by representatives of United States, United Kingdom and Netherlands through protecting Power to Japanese with view of obtaining facilities for assistance for nationals of the three countries in occupied China is approved. You are authorized to join British and Netherlands representatives in presenting matter to Swiss Foreign Office for negotiations with Japanese. Department is well aware of seriousness of situation and welcomes the suggestion by Swiss. Although Swiss express doubt as to possibility success of renewed requests to Japanese for more favorable exchange rate, Department considers this probably most hopeful possibility in immediate future (ReDeptel 3878 November 14). It is hoped that a portion of relief supplies sent via Nakhodka and which arrived in Japan on November 11 will reach Shanghai. Intercross has received Japanese assurances that supplies will be distributed as far south as feasible. Efforts are being made to arrange for further shipments of relief in kind. General repatriation would be most desirable solution and efforts to bring it about are being continued, but it is feared any such repatriation would be too late to solve immediate problem of excessive cost of financial assistance in occupied China. Department assumes Gorgé keeps Fontanel informed of any progress made in negotiations for repatriation. 41 British Embassy here has received request from British Foreign Office for Department’s views as to whether collective approach might be made to Japanese. Foreign Office offered no suggestion as to the terms of any approach. Department had already conferred informally with British Embassy which requested suggestions from Foreign Office and opinion of Netherlands Government in exile, but no reply has yet been received from London. Netherlands Embassy has no information on subject. Your action under this instruction and any other significant developments in the matter should be reported by telegraph. Stettinius 41 For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 1106 and Doc. 1107 ] ff. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) 740.00115A PW/11–2744: Telegram [Document 1099] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) Washington , December 12, 1944—9 p.m. 4185. American Interests—China. Reurtel 7784 November 27. Budget of 19,950,000 Chinese [ Central ] Reserve Bank dollars submitted by Fontanel for December for financial assistance in occupied China is approved but the Department views with apprehension the necessity of increasing loans to individuals by 60 per cent in one month. It is hoped that the Swiss will be able to make some arrangement to reduce the cost or to prevent it from rising at such a rapid rate (ReDeptel 3878 November 14). Department has no information regarding the arguments which were used by the Swiss in persuading the Japanese that the rate of 18.36 Swiss francs to 100 CRB dollars was unreasonable but hopes something further might be accomplished by the same or similar representations. The question of the request by Japanese to Swiss to stop assistance to Filipinos will be considered in another telegram. Stettinius The Department of State to the British Embassy 711.94114 Supplies/12–1444 [Document 1100] The Department of State to the British Embassy The Department of State refers to the British Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of December 14, 1944, 42 in which is set forth the text of a proposed communication to the Japanese Government outlining a plan under which small quantities of medicines and vitamin concentrates might be dropped from Allied aircraft by night over Japanese-controlled territory if the Japanese Government will undertake to distribute supplies so delivered to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees and will assure safe conduct and protection to the aircraft used for this purpose. The American military authorities having given their approval in principle to this proposal, the Department of State offers no objection to the forwarding of this communication to the Japanese Government. Washington , December 16, 1944. 42 Not printed. The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A PW/12–1844: Telegram [Document 1101] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , December 18, 1944—11 p.m. [Received December 19—9:53 a.m.] 8216. American Interests—China. Department’s 4185, December 12 and previous regarding unreasonable CRB dollar exchange rate. Foreign Office notice December 15 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, instructed make representations to the Japanese Foreign Office in effort to obtain more equitable rates for transfer to Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, necessary relief for Americans, British and Dutch. Swiss Foreign Office suggested Gorgé examine possibility that funds be transferred at rates adapted at [ to? ] cost of life which would permit establishment fixed budgets in Swiss francs for relief. Gorgé discussed foregoing with Japanese Foreign Office which hesitates take up again this problem with competent Ministries for it sees no possibility of success. Gorgé adds however that Japanese authorities fully understand his representation but that Japanese themselves encounter similar difficulties in making payments to Japanese subjects China. Notwithstanding foregoing Japanese Foreign Office following Gorgé’s insistence agreed examine situation and give reply in near future. Huddle The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 711.94114 Mail/12–2144: Telegram [Document 1102] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , December 21, 1944—5 p.m. [Received 6:40 p.m.] 8254. American Interests—Japan—Prisoners of War Mail. Your 4107, December 5. Foreign Office note December 19 quotes following message December 15 from Gorgé (translation from French): “According to Japanese Foreign Office, mail for United States and possessions will henceforth be directly addressed according agreement with Soviet authorities to New York via Moscow-Tehran. Mail will be sent from Shimonoseki in American postal bags and Japanese request United States return Japanese postal bags forwarded United States before war. Mail from America via Moscow has already reached Japan.” 43 Huddle 43 In telegram 92, January 5, 1945, to Bern, the Department stated that mail for the Far East would be despatched in Japanese postal bags (711.94114 Mail/12–2144). The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/12–2344: Telegram [Document 1103] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , December 23, 1944. [Received December 24—6:25 p.m.] 8303. Am[erican] Interests—Far East. Foreign Office note December 22 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, informed by Japanese Foreign Office that American POWs and civilian internees are authorized since November 15 send and receive telegrams to and from families. Legation inquiring whether foregoing applies POW and internees detained throughout Far East by Japanese or only those held Japan. 44 Huddle 44 Telegram 296, January 15, 1945, from Bern, reported the authorization applied to persons detained in Japan and Japanese-administered territory (711.94114A/1–1545). The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 740.00115A PW/12–2644: Telegram [Document 1104] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , December 26, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 6:27 p.m.] 8341. American Interests—China. De Pury this afternoon discussed with MacKillop, British Counselor, Van Lynden, Dutch Secretary, and Tait following proposal in order obtain reaction three Governments concerned (Legation’s 7386, November 7; 8216, December 18; and 8321, December 24 45 ): Swiss proposal is that future relief Shanghai not exceed amount for December (approximately 13,000,000 Swiss francs) for relief about 8,000 British, 2,000 Americans and 300 Dutch. Such additional needs as might be necessary to be purchased by Fontanel on open market. In pointing out possible results, De Pury indicated that while Japanese might consider fictitious rate thus far effective constitutes sufficient face-saving and consequently that they might possibly be inclined to tolerate open market transactions as indicated above, should, on the other hand, this not be so and they learned of Fontanel’s purchasing open market, following would doubtless occur: (1) Fontanel’s position would undoubtedly be seriously compromised. (2) Japanese might stop all further relief. De Pury stated January 1945 requirements for United States nationals alone amount to 4,590,000 Swiss francs. He said Swiss prepared to accept possible compromise Fontanel’s position and while probable Japanese would ultimately learn should his proposal be placed in effect, this would doubtless provide some months relief from present increasingly difficult position. Representatives all three Legations inclined accept Swiss proposal. Please telegraph urgently instructions. Huddle 45 Telegram 8321 not printed; it reported that Mr. Fontanel’s budget for relief expenditures in January 1945 amounted to 50,020,000 CRB dollars, a figure based on an 80% increase in the cost of living during December. This budget was approved by the Department in telegram 167, January 11, 1945, 9 p.m. (740.00115A PW/12–2444) The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/12–2944: Telegram [Document 1105] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , December 29, 1944—9 a.m. [Received 11:21 a.m.] 8404. American Interests—Far East—Prisoner of War Financial Relief. Department’s 4032, November 29. Foreign Office note December 23 received December 26 states Swiss Minister, Tokyo, recently telegraphed he requested Japanese Foreign Office authorize monthly transfer following sums: ( a ) For prisoners of war detained Tokyo 60,000 yen, Osaka 85,000, Fukuoka 45,000, Hakodate 4,000, Formosa 12,000, Manchukuo 42,000, Malaya 300. ( b ) For civilians interned Burma 300 yen. Regarding foregoing assistance Gorgé observes: 1. Japanese Foreign Office has on various occasions repeated that relief authorized should not exceed 20 yen. Under these conditions requests to increase relief to 43 yen (equivalent $10) would only result new examination by military authorities and would risk delay transmission funds. Swiss Legation, therefore, requested authorization send immediately at least half sums indicated above if competent Japanese authorities do not perceive possibility authorize without delay transmission 43 yen per prisoner of war. 2. Gorgé emphasizes that arrangements above indicated only include Americans not yet assisted. Consequently internees Japan, Hong Kong, Philippines not included. 3. Regarding Indochina, Gorgé refers contents Legation’s 8374, December 28, 10 a.m., 46 and adds that internees at Singapore already assisted by International Red Cross. 4. Gorgé stresses that funds must be sent camp commanders and notes furthermore that delivery, et cetera, by Swiss Legation impossible view lack all articles on Japanese market. Purchases mentioned in the Legation’s telegram 6435, September 27, 47 for civilian internees at Kobe made on black-market with exceptional police authorization. Huddle 46 Not printed; it reported that Gorgé was trying to arrange to send to the Swiss Consulate at Saigon sufficient funds to permit monthly payments of 43 yen, the equivalent of $10, to each prisoner of war in Indochina (711.94114A O.T./12–2844). 47 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) 740.00115A PW/12–2744: Telegram [Document 1106] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) Washington , December 29, 1944. 4369. American Interests—Far East. Request that Swiss Government inform Japanese Government that United States Government has noted on various occasions attitude of Japanese Government toward protection or assistance to be extended to persons of Philippine ancestry who feel that they owe allegiance to United States Government and on that account seek protection and assistance. So far as the United States Government can determine, policy of Japanese Government is formulated without reference to legal right of individuals to claim allegiance to state of which they are nationals and of state to recognize that allegiance by extending its protection. United States Government wishes to point out that it has recognized Japanese nationality of Soon Ye Kim, a person of Korean ancestry who was repatriated on the Gripsholm in 1943; of Saburo Henry Mittwer, a person of American ancestry; and of Vincente Diaz, otherwise known as Jose Ingullardo, and Komakichi Okomoto, a person of Philippine ancestry. Likewise there has been no objection to the action of Quincy Flavius Cook, a person of American ancestry who claims Japanese nationality. If other individuals of Korean, Philippine, American or other non-Japanese ancestry should wish to assert a claim to Japanese nationality and to be extended corresponding treatment, the United States Government would not interpose objection on grounds of their ancestry. The United States Government expects that the Japanese Government will be reciprocally guided in such matters. It is noted that in the first exchange the Japanese Government appeared to recognize this principle and that it permitted the repatriation of certain American citizens of Japanese ancestry. 48 Stettinius 48 For correspondence on the exchange agreement between the United States and Japan in 1942, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , pp. 377 ff. Efforts by the United States to arrange a third exchange of American and Japanese nationals Efforts by the United States to arrange a third exchange of American and Japanese nationals 49 49 For previous correspondence, see ibid. , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 867 ff. [1107] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, January 11, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 6:42 p.m.] 711.94115 Exchange/69: Telegram [1108] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, January 26, 1944. [Received January 26—5:32 p.m.] 711.94115 Exchange/115: Telegram [1109] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, March 7, 1944. 711.94115 Exchange/115: Telegram [1110] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, March 29, 1944. [Received March 29—10:30 p.m.] 711.94115 Exchange/277: Telegram [1111] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, March 30, 1944. 711.94115 Exchange/298a: Telegram [1112] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, March 30, 1944—8 p.m. 711.94115 Exchange/298b: Telegram [1113] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, April 25, 1944—8 p.m. [Received April 25—5:39 p.m.] 711.94115 Exchange/332: Telegram [1114] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, May 2, 1944—5 p.m. [Received May 2—3:05 p.m.] 711.94115 Exchange/353: Telegram [1115] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, June 27, 1944—11 p.m. 711.94115 Exchange/6–2744: Telegram [1116] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, July 19, 1944—noon. [Received 4:37 p.m.] 711.94115 Exchange/7–1944: Telegram [1117] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, July 25, 1944—19 p.m. 711.94115 Exchange/7–1944: Telegram [1118] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, September 4, 1944. 740.00115 Pacific War/8–2444: Telegram [1119] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, October 5, 1944. [Received October 5—11:35 p.m.] 740.00115 P.W./10–544: Telegram [1120] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, October 11, 1944. [Received October 11—8:57 p.m.] 711.94115 Exchange/10–1144: Telegram [1121] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, October 19, 1944. 711.94115 Exchange/10–1144: Telegram [1122] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, October 24, 1944—midnight. [Received October 24—5:16 p.m.] 711.94115 Exchange/10–2444: Telegram [1123] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, November 2, 1944—10 p.m. 711.94115 Exchange/10–2444: Telegram [1124] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, November 11, 1944—11 p.m. 711.94114 Exchange/10–2444: Telegram [1125] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, November 18, 1944—noon. [Received November 18—11:10 a.m.] 711.94115 Exchange/11–1844: Telegram [1126] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, November 18, 1944—midnight. 711.94114A/11–1844: Telegram [1127] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) Washington, December 1, 1944—9 p.m. 711.94114A/12–144: Telegram [1128] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, December 15, 1944—noon. [Received 7:34 p.m.] 711.94114A/12–1544: Telegram [1129] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) Washington, December 15, 1944—10 p.m. 740.00115 PW 1939/10–544: Telegram [1130] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, January 17, 1945—6 p.m. [Received 10:50 p.m.] 711.94114A/1–1745 The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94115 Exchange/69: Telegram [Document 1107] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , January 11, 1944—6 p.m. [Received 6:42 p.m.] 246. American Interests—Japan. Legation’s 8210, December 30. 50 Swiss Foreign [Office?] official informally advised Legation receipt telegram from Swiss Minister, Tokyo, 51 reporting further conversation with official [in] Japanese Foreign Office regarding possibility third exchange. Swiss Foreign Office official while stating unable transmit contents telegram by note informed Legation orally that Japanese official stated questions of third exchange and transportation to Japan of Red Cross supplies now Vladivostok (Department’s 2908, November 24 52 ) should be held in abeyance until Japanese receive satisfactory reply their protests against attacks on 17 hospital ships 53 which apparently transmitted through Spanish Embassy, Washington. Harrison 50 Ibid. , p. 951 . 51 Camille Gorgé. 52 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 824 . 53 For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 1151 ] ff. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94115 Exchange/115: Telegram [Document 1108] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , January 26, 1944. [Received January 26—5:32 p.m.] 531. American Interests—Far East—Repatriation. Swiss note January 24 states Gorgé informed [of] Department’s 3121, December 15. 55 He informed Foreign Office that before determining general lines plan third exchange [he] wishes submit following observations. 1. Accommodations Teia Maru 56 being inadequate large number sick, seriously wounded, Gorgé proposes limit subject approval Japanese Government number sick to 100 including doctors, POWs, nurses. Failing [establishment of] neutral medical commission, Japanese War Ministry would select wounded, sick. 2. Presumes POW repatriation this category will all be Americans, Canadians. 3. Of 1400 places available following accommodation sick, wounded, Gorgé proposes fix quota 180 for Canada, 70 Latin America. These calculated approximately basis number repatriation requests presented. 4. Proposes give Hong Kong principal consideration allocation 1150 places reserved Americans. This connection reports cases certain number Americans whose families [are] alien. Under criteria established these repatriable only final exchange. They nevertheless request evacuation third exchange. As their situation becoming very distressing, Gorgé desires know whether some exception criteria may be authorized Hong Kong. Desires particularly receive directives inclusion third exchange Americans Chinese race. 5. For China should be about 1,000. 6. As evacuation Americans remaining Philippines excluded in principle, Gorgé proposes fix quota 100 in which he hopes include sick, women and children. Should Japanese Government during course negotiations agree evacuation Philippines on larger scale, this quota could be raised to 500 and quota foreseen China reduced proportionally. 7. Quota Japan and Manchuckuo limited to special cases. 8. Some places might be reserved Americans Indochina who applied too late for evacuation. However, Gorgé foresees possibility complete omission quota Indochina. 9. No Americans for repatriation remain Thailand. Swiss note adds Gorgé will study complete repatriation plan immediately upon receipt Department’s views foregoing. Will examine with Japanese Foreign Office arrangements third exchange basis this plan. Harrison 55 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 948 . 56 Vessel used by Japan in implementing second exchange agreement. The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94115 Exchange/115: Telegram [Document 1109] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , March 7, 1944. 767. American Interests—Far East. Your 531, January 26. Department gratified to receive this report which again shows Gorgé’s tireless interest in further exchanges of nationals with Japan. Department offers following comments for Gorgé’s guidance and would be pleased to receive his further suggestions after he has had ample time to study these comments and explore their possibilities. 1. Geographical distribution . The Department hopes that discrimination on purely geographical grounds preventing the repatriation of some of the Americans detained by the Japanese may be terminated in all future exchanges and that all Americans, regardless where captured, may be treated on an equal basis. If this hope can be attained it would naturally be the Department’s desire in the next exchange to restore equilibrium by having the geographical quota for the Philippines and for those captured at Guam and Wake made as large as possible and that consideration be given to repatriation of Americans in Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, Netherlands Indies and Burma, (concerning whose safety the United States Government has not received any reassuring information), all within the scope of the priorities prescribed in the following paragraph. 2. Priorities . It is the desire of the United States Government that in future exchanges absolute first priority be given to unaccompanied women and children who are interned or constructively interned as that term was defined in Department’s 1311 and 1322 [ 1333 ] (May or June), 1943; 57 after such women and children are accommodated it is the Department’s desire that remaining space be devoted to the accommodation of the seriously sick and seriously wounded, whether civilians or prisoners of war. In the opinion of the Department the determination of the sick or wounded individuals so to be accommodated should in the absence of finding by a Mixed Medical Commission rest with the committees in the various camps in consultation with competent medical opinion. It is hoped that the Japanese authorities will permit the committees to take appropriate action in this matter and will concur in their findings. It is suggested that the determination of numerical quotas for the various camps be established in consultation between Gorgé and Japanese authorities only after nominations from the various camp committees have been received. 3. After due provisions for persons entitled to priority on humanitarian grounds under paragraph 2 above, it is the desire of the Department that any remaining spaces be made available to those individuals who in the judgment of the camp committees or responsible medical authorities appear least likely to be able to withstand the rigors of continued internment. 4. Gorgé will undoubtedly perceive from the foregoing that it is the Department’s desire to emphasize the humanitarian basis for forthcoming exchanges. To cover exceptional cases which may arise, Gorgé is hereby requested to include in the second category above any individuals who are so closely confined under perilous conditions as to warrant the assumption that their health is or may soon be impaired, and to refer to the Department for consideration the case of any family group containing an individual qualifying on grounds of ill health the repatriation of which group would otherwise be deferred. 5. It is of course understood that sick and wounded prisoners of war who are permitted to avail themselves of the transportation facilities of the exchange will be members of the armed forces of the United States or Canada, regardless of individual national status. 6. Department assumes that allocation of 1150 places for Hongkong in paragraph 4 of your 531 is error for 150. Department recommends that Gorgé avoid fixing geographical quotas for various ports of call until completion of exploration of broader aspects of the repatriation program. 7. Department is again requesting Spanish Embassy 58 in charge of Japanese interests to ascertain wishes of Japanese Government with respect to preferences to be accorded Japanese nationals in next exchange so that appropriate facilities may be extended to Embassy in complying therewith. Stettinius 57 For telegrams 1311, June 2, 1943, and 1333, June 4, 1943, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 878 and 879 , respectively. 58 Memorandum of March 8, not printed. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94115 Exchange/277: Telegram [Document 1110] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , March 29, 1944. [Received March 29—10:30 p.m.] 1897. American Interests—Far East. Department’s 767, March 7th. Foreign Office note March 25 states Gorgé has reported he will examine all questions with view Department’s desires and adds that Japanese Foreign Office has not yet received from Spanish Embassy, Washington, communication regarding priorities choosing Japanese repatriates. 59 Gorgé already proposed to Foreign Office begin discussions regarding evacuation Americans as settlement several problems probably involve considerable time because principles adopted previous exchanges will have to be modified as, for example, concerning repatriation sick and wounded. By such actions, hopes make all preliminary arrangements so that evacuation can begin soon after Japanese definitely agree further American-Japanese exchange. Gorgé feels further exchange might interest Japan especially regarding repatriation personnel Buenos Aires Embassy but Japanese have made no statement [regarding?] question. Above-mentioned Foreign Office note handed to Tait 60 by Bisang 61 who is of opinion only method of arranging exchange is on the basis of repatriation Japanese from Argentina. Haerison 59 The communication referred to was Spanish Embassy Memorandum No. 360, Ex. 115.00 B, December 29, 1943, which transmitted a priority list of 387 Japanese nationals and two lists of 535 internees at Santa Fe who had requested, for themselves and the 738 members of their families, that the Japanese Government accord them the highest priority for inclusion in the next exchange. In telegram 1308, April 17, the Department informed the Minister in Switzerland that the priority list was received by the Japanese Legation in Spain on February 2, that the Japanese Foreign Office was so informed by telegraph on February 11, and that the complete text of the list was transmitted to the Japanese Foreign Office on February 12. (711.94115 Exchange/29, 277) 60 Georgé Tait, First Secretary of Legation in Switzerland. 61 Emil Bisang of the Division of Foreign Interests of the Swiss Foreign Office. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94115 Exchange/298a: Telegram [Document 1111] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , March 30, 1944. 1072. Please transmit a communication in the sense of the following to the Swiss Government for transmission to the Japanese Government: “In a memorandum from the Spanish Embassy dated at Washington, May 4, 1943 62 the Japanese Government made alternative proposals in regard to further exchanges of nationals; namely, that exchanges be effected either at a Soviet Pacific port or at Mormugão, Portuguese Goa. The latter exchange point was agreed upon for the second exchange effected late in 1943. Since then the Government of the United States has had under consideration the possibility of giving effect to the Japanese Government’s proposal for exchanges via Soviet territory. One of the major difficulties which have had to be overcome in considering this proposal concerns port facilities. The advantage to both the Japanese and United States Governments of making use of this considerably shorter route is, however, obvious. The Government of the United States has consulted the Soviet Government and has been informed that the latter is prepared in principle to extend its cooperation in giving effect to this proposal, in particular by permitting the use of a Soviet Pacific port and by making available a Soviet crew. The United States Government accordingly offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government the following outline of possibilities for arranging on a completely reciprocal basis for ( a ) further exchange of nationals, including seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war and protected personnel eligible for repatriation under the provisions of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929, 64 ( b ) the shipment of relief supplies for distribution to Allied nationals remaining in Japanese custody and to Japanese nationals in Allied custody, and ( c ) the carriage of mail for both prisoners of war and civilian internees. Japanese nationals desiring repatriation from among those in the Western Hemisphere, together with a quantity of relief supplies, would be put aboard a vessel provided by the United States Government and manned by a Soviet crew. The ship, traveling under safe conduct of all the belligerents, would proceed from an American West Coast port to a Soviet Pacific port (to be designated by the Soviet Government) from which point the ship would proceed on to Japan in charge of the Soviet crew or, if the Japanese Government so desires, in charge of a Japanese crew which in the meantime would have been sent to the designated Soviet Pacific port for the purpose of taking over operation of the ship. On arrival at the designated ports in Japan and Japanese-controlled territory the Japanese nationals on board would be disembarked and the relief supplies and mail unloaded and turned over to the appropriate authorities for distribution to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody. American nationals desiring repatriation would then be put on board together with such relief supplies and mail as the Japanese Government might wish to send to the Western Hemisphere for distribution to Japanese nationals held in custody. The vessel would then return to the same Soviet Pacific port thence to return to the United States. It is proposed that as many voyages be made as may be necessary to repatriate all exchangeable personnel. The Japanese Government, in order further to accelerate the exchange of nationals, may wish simultaneously to put one of its ships into this service under the same procedure using a port in Japan or Japanese-controlled territory as the point of departure. Such action by the Japanese Government would be welcomed by the United States Government and the former may be assured that in such case the United States Government will employ all means at its disposal to insure the safe return of said ship. In order to expedite exchanges, the selection from among verified nationals desiring repatriation might be made by the detaining power in consultation with the protecting power, or by the protecting power alone as may be preferred, such selection to be based primarily on compassionate and humanitarian grounds with due credit to recommendations of camp committees and competent medical authority. In appropriate cases either principal might, of course, designate particular individuals for repatriation. It is contemplated also that seriously sick and seriously wounded military personnel and protected personnel eligible for repatriation under the provisions of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929 would be put aboard the ship. It is understood that, if this proposal is accepted by the Japanese Government, nationals of the other American Republics and of Canada will be admissible to the resultant exchanges in the numerical proportion already established by the protecting power. This proposal is not intended to supersede or to postpone settlement of the pending question of arranging for the onward shipment and distribution to Allied nationals of relief supplies sent from the United States to Vladivostok pursuant to the proposal put forward by the Japanese Government in April 1943, 65 concerning which the Government of the United States hopes to receive an early indication of the Japanese Government’s intentions. Furthermore, this proposal is not intended to preclude the accomplishment of such further exchanges at Mormugão as the United States and Japanese Governments may undertake to accomplish through use, after the present monsoon ends in October of existing facilities available for that purpose.” Hull 62 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 872 . 64 Signed July 27, 1929, Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. i , p. 321 . 65 See telegram 2179, April 7, 1943, from Bern, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1019 . The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94115 Exchange/298b: Telegram [Document 1112] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , March 30, 1944—8 p.m. 1073. Reference Department’s 1072. Please request Swiss Government to ask Gorgé in a secret code to report date of delivery of proposal and Japanese Government’s reaction thereto. Should the Japanese authorities decline to give favorable consideration to this proposal or again raise the questions set forth in the Swiss Foreign Office Aide-Mémoire of February 25 (Legation’s 1218, February 29 66 ), he should point out to the Japanese Foreign Office that the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the United States and the Swedish Legation in charge of Japanese interests in Hawaii have had full opportunity to inspect all camps in which Japanese nationals are interned and to report on the conditions therein; that replies have been made to all Japanese protests which have been received by the United States Government concerning alleged attacks on Japanese hospital ships; and that, since the United States Government has done everything possible to overcome the concern expressed by the Japanese Government as the reason for its postponement of consideration of further exchanges and shipment of relief supplies, it is hoped that the Japanese Government will now give its immediate attention to the reciprocal proposal concerning the exchange of nationals and the shipment of relief supplies and also to the question of the onward shipment of relief supplies now warehoused at Vladivostok. Gorgé might well in this connection reiterate the suggestion he has already so fittingly made that the Japanese Government’s fulfillment of the humanitarian obligations it has undertaken would best serve to counteract the criticism which it contends has been unjustly directed against it. 67 Hull 66 Ante , p. 1019 [ Pg. 1019 is part of Doc. 1034 ] . 67 In connection with this telegram, see last paragraph of telegram 2357, April 15, 7 a.m., from Bern, p. 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94115 Exchange/332: Telegram [Document 1113] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , April 25, 1944—8 p.m. [Received April 25—5:39 p.m.] 2641. American Interests—Japan. F[oreign] O[ffice] note April 21 states complete text Department’s 1072, March 30, delivered April 18 Japanese F.O. (Legation’s 2321, April 14 68 ). In transmitting foregoing Swiss Minister, Tokyo, added that although Japanese F.O. official he spoke to knew for several days general outline American proposal he preferred make no statement with regard to it. Legation inquired informally of F.O. official Bern regarding Gorgé’s delay in transmitting contents Department’s 1072 after delivering it verbally Japanese F.O. F.O. official states message slightly garbled transmission. So Gorgé verbally outlined its contents and sent written confirmation following rectification garbling. Harrison 68 Not printed; it reported that contents of telegram 1072 had been delivered verbally to the Japanese Foreign Office on April 6 (711.94115 Exchange/315). The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94115 Exchange/353: Telegram [Document 1114] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , May 2, 1944—5 p.m. [Received May 2—3:05 p.m.] 2773. American Interests—Japan. Legation’s 2641, April 25. Foreign Office note April 27 states Japanese Foreign Office notified Swiss Legation, Tokyo, April 22, that study of Department’s proposals regarding third exchange will require some time. Harrison The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94115 Exchange/6–2744: Telegram [Document 1115] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , June 27, 1944—11 p.m. 2189. American Interests—Far East. Request Swiss Government to inform Japanese Foreign Office that if Japanese Foreign Office is agreeable, a series of continuous exchanges of nationals might be devised taking advantage of railroad connections between Japanese-held territory and Soviet territory. Similar repeated exchanges of nationals have in the past few months taken place on both Portuguese and Spanish territory, between the German Government and the United States and British Governments and their associates. 69 If Japanese Foreign Office exhibits interest in this particular proposal Department would be glad to study Japanese Government’s suggestions in this sense or, alternately the Department would be glad to make detailed proposals for the Japanese Government’s consideration. Department will welcome any suggestions which Swiss representatives care to make in this connection. Hull 69 For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iii , pp. 785 ff. The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94115 Exchange/7–1944: Telegram [Document 1116] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , July 19, 1944—noon. [Received 4:37 p.m.] 4606. American Interests—Far East. Foreign Office note July 12 states that contents of Department’s 2189, June 27, forwarded Swiss Minister, Tokyo, who replies he submitted it Japanese Foreign Office. Gorgé adds Japanese Government in usual manner will probably request reciprocity so that it would be of interest inform Japanese Government manner American Government intends to repatriate via Soviet territory Japanese subjects now in the United States. In handing above mentioned note to Secretary, Swiss Foreign Office official added that Gorgé reports Japanese did not understand “taking advantage of railroad connections between Japanese-held territory and Soviet territory”. Harrison The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94115 Exchange/7–1944: Telegram [Document 1117] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , July 25, 1944—19 p.m. 2549. American Interests—Far East. Your 4606, July 19, noon. Department’s proposal for overland repatriation across Soviet-Manchurian frontier was based upon possibility Japanese might agree to exchange of nationals by utilizing railroad transportation to and from points on Asiatic mainland to and from Manchouli or some other Siberian frontier point. Japanese to be repatriated could be delivered at a Siberian port by a vessel under neutral supervision and could be released onto Soviet territory simultaneously with release of American repatriates onto Soviet territory at a point to be agreed upon. Each exchanged group would then travel to its respective homeland via the reverse of the route traveled by the other to the exchange point. Number of persons who could be accommodated at any time would presumably be limited. However the important element of the suggestion is that facilities be established so that exchanges, however limited in number, be able to take place on a continuing basis so as to give hope to those internees on both sides who seek repatriation. It would seem that such a development is essential for the maintenance of morale of the American and the Japanese internees held by the respective Governments. It is hoped that the Japanese in view of their traditional attitude should be particularly sensible of the grave predicament of so many young children who are now confined behind barbed wire on both sides. It is hoped that the foregoing will assist Gorgé in clarifying to the Japanese the proposal in Department’s 2189 of June 27 which was intended to supplement not supplant its other repatriation proposals the study of which is apparently requiring considerable time in Tokyo. Hull The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00115 Pacific War/8–2444: Telegram [Document 1118] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , September 4, 1944. 3053. American Interests—Japan—Repatriation. Request Swiss Government to inform Japanese that on Saipan there have been captured approximately 10,000 civilians among whom are a number of high-ranking government officials. The United States Government is willing to exchange these civilians for sick and wounded United States prisoners of war and for United States civilians captured on Guam, Wake and in the Philippine Islands, and other Japanese-occupied territories, including nationals of the other American republics and Canada. Please submit this proposal to the Japanese Government for consideration pointing out that its views should be urgently formulated in order to preclude the adoption of measures which might make such an exchange less feasible. If the Japanese Government is interested in this proposal one of its hospital ships could be made a repatriation ship to effect the exchange and might carry American nationals to Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands, Latitude 11 degrees 30 minutes North, Longitude 165 degrees 25 minutes East. It would return to Japanese-controlled areas with a representative selection from among the Japanese civilians captured on Saipan. This operation could be repeated as long as there are nationals to be exchanged. The Japanese vessel might carry a neutral observer agreed upon by the Japanese and United States Governments and the United States Government might place on Bikini Atoll a neutral observer similarly agreed upon by both parties. The function of the two observers would be that of liaison during the period of exchange and the observation of the execution of the agreement by both parties. Hull The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 740.00115 P.W./10–544: Telegram [Document 1119] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , October 5, 1944. [Received October 5—11:35 p.m.] 6632. American Interests—Japan—Repatriation. Your 3053, September 4. Foreign Office note October 3 reports Japanese Foreign Ministry replied Swiss Legation it wishes receive earliest possible nominal list 10,000 Japanese nationals in question. Harrison The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94115 Exchange/10–1144: Telegram [Document 1120] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , October 11, 1944. [Received October 11—8:57 p.m.] 6790. American Interests—Far East. Department’s 2565, July 26. 70 Foreign Office note October 9 states during interview at Japanese Foreign Office Gorgé informed that Japanese do not believe possible exchange at Soviet port, exchange via Siberia believed possible however, but Japanese are of opinion Mormugão should be exchange port. Japanese Foreign Office believes American-Japanese exchange should be deferred until conclusion second Anglo-Japanese exchange which appears more urgent but now encountering serious technical difficulties. Harrison 70 Not printed; it stated, “Since it requires approximately 45 days for the Gripsholm to reach Mormugão from New York, preliminary arrangements should soon be begun if a further exchange of American and Japanese nationals is to take place at that port as soon as the monsoon ends in October.” (711.94115 Exchange/7–2644) The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94115 Exchange/10–1144: Telegram [Document 1121] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , October 19, 1944. 3566. American Interests—Far East—Repatriation. Your 6790, October 11. Please request that Gorgé suggest Japanese Foreign Office that if technical difficulties confronting Anglo-Japanese exchange, of which difficulties United States Government is uninformed, 71 seem likely to cause excessive delay, result will be unnecessary delay in American-Japanese exchange thereby continuing unduly distressing restraint on numerous American and Japanese children, women and invalids in internment camps. In behalf of these unfortunate individuals United States Government bespeaks consideration by Japanese Government on humanitarian grounds of prompt effectuation of American-Japanese exchange either at Mormugão or at Bikini Atoll (Department’s 3053, September 4) as technical difficulties for either such exchange do not in opinion of United States Government exist. Japanese Government should be reminded that period during which weather permits use of Mormugão as exchange port is not extensive and that prompt action is necessary if two or more exchanges at that port are to be effected before the monsoons change again. The Japanese reply to such communication as Gorgé may make on foregoing matter will do much to indicate to United States Government whether Japanese statement reported in your 6790 is or is not to be taken as sincere. Hull 71 Telegram 9327, October 28, 8 p.m., from London, reported the view of the British Foreign Office that technical difficulties were connected with the shortage of Japanese shipping (711.94115 Exchange/10–2844). The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94115 Exchange/10–2444: Telegram [Document 1122] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , October 24, 1944—midnight. [Received October 24—5:16 p.m.] 7047. American Interests—Far East—Repatriation. Foreign Office note October 20, referring Legation’s 679 [ 6790 ], October 11, states Gorgé again intervened personally October 10 Japanese Foreign Office to discuss American and British repatriation. Gorgé received from interview impression that this question still faces great difficulties particularly concerning transportation as Japanese authorities probably have no ship available for exchange. Under these conditions discussion made no progress. Furthermore during previous discussions Japanese Foreign Office officials had vaguely given to understand but without any obligation that problem might be solved if neutral vessel might be made available. This neutral vessel however should have Japanese crew for military authorities could not admit in Japanese-controlled waters vessel with neutral crew. These suggestions were personal opinions but as matter being delayed Gorgé felt obliged present them American and British Governments and requests opinions. Gorgé thinks that if American and British Governments make available civilian exchange vessel which would have Japanese crew one or more exchanges might be effect[ed]. Foreign Office official telephoned this morning stating that view foregoing from Gorgé absolutely no purpose might be gained transmitting to Tokyo Department’s 3566, October 19, which is being held Bern pending instructions as only possibility further exchange appears based on availability neutral ship which might proceed neutral port where could take on Japanese crew. Harrison The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94115 Exchange/10–2444: Telegram [Document 1123] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , November 2, 1944—10 p.m. 3752. Expatriation—Far East—American Interests. In light of information provided in your 7047, October 24, midnight, Department suggests that Gorgé might find it practicable to revive with Japanese Foreign Office discussion of project outlined in Department’s 1072, March 30, which in many ways meets the requirements of the situation, aside from the minor question of the flag on the vessel to be provided which can be easily solved. The proposed scheme might be effected at any number of points on the Soviet Pacific coast or perhaps elsewhere if desired. There is furthermore no reason why this scheme might not also be used for the effectuation of Anglo-Japanese exchanges. If the Japanese Government is willing to discuss exchanges concretely, Gorgé may be assured that the United States Government will take every practicable step to meet its suggestions. The Department feels that the suggestions so far made to the Japanese offer such a wide choice that some combination of them must be acceptable to the Japanese Government. The Department must rely upon the ingenuity of Gorgé to pursue these conversations with a view to determining some practicable means of arriving at a working arrangement. In particular if Gorgé could elicit from the Japanese at this time a statement of their practical objections if any to the scheme in Department’s 1072 which very closely parallels his suggestions in your 7047, a very definite advance in the negotiations will have been made. Department awaits with interest Gorgé’s further reports on this subject. Stettinius The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114 Exchange/10–2444: Telegram [Document 1124] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , November 11, 1944—11 p.m. 3851. The Department requests that you have Swiss ask Gorgé in his discussions based on its 3752, November 2, 10 p.m. to ascertain whether Japanese are more likely to agree on basis of first or second of following possible schemes of operation: A. A neutral vessel would take on board a capacity load of Japanese nationals and proceed to a designated intermediate point, the neutral crew to be exchanged for a Japanese crew. The vessel would then proceed in Japanese waters, discharge the Japanese nationals, take on board United States and other American nationals, return to the intermediate point, change crews once more and continue to the places of destination of the passengers then on board. This operation would be repeated as often as might be convenient. Suitable accommodations for neutral and Japanese crews while awaiting the vessel would have to be provided. B. A neutral vessel would be found and turned over to the Japanese to be operated by the Japanese. This vessel would be used for a continuing series of voyages between Japanese ports and an exchange point where passengers would be exchanged to other vessels bringing Japanese to that point. Both possible methods of operation present certain disadvantages. However, it is essential for Department to know which would be preferable to the Japanese in order adequately to consider the nature of concrete proposals which might be made. An urgent reply is requested. For the Legation. Department understands that British Government has made a proposal to the Japanese Government for an exchange at Mormugão in which the Japanese would use a neutral vessel provided by the British. Please endeavor to ascertain discreetly whether British suggestion involves alternative A or B above and whether it incorporates any new features which might be of use to Department in furthering its negotiations. You should point out to de Pury 72 (Reurtel 7386, November 7 73 ) the point made in Department’s 3752 that the proposals so far made by this Government regarding exchanges contain ample range of alternatives from which the Japanese Government could select desirable features enabling it to proceed with an exchange. Stettinius 72 Arthur de Pury, Chief of the Division of Foreign Interests of the Swiss Foreign Office. 73 Ante , p. 1069 [ Pg. 1069 is part of Doc. 1089 ] . The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 711.94115 Exchange/11–1844: Telegram [Document 1125] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State Bern , November 18, 1944—noon. [Received November 18—11:10 a.m.] 7615. American Interests—Far East. (1) Substance all but last two paragraphs your 3851, November 11, communicated Foreign Office November 14. (2) British Legation advises British Government has as yet made no proposal Japanese Government. Last communication from British Legation to London dated October 28 to effect Gorgé again personally approached Japanese Foreign Office on October 10. Gorgé gained impression repatriation difficulties particularly due transport as Japanese probably have no suitable ship their disposal. Under circumstances discussion made no progress. During previous interviews Japanese Foreign Office had vaguely made it understood but without assumption any obligation that solution could perhaps be found if neutral ship placed Japanese disposal manned by Japanese crew as Japanese military authorities could not allow neutral ship with neutral crew to navigate in waters under their control. Above suggestions had personal character but as matter dragging Gorgé considers it useful seek opinion British and American Governments. He believes that if Great Britain and United States could provide ship to be navigated by Japanese crew one or more exchanges could perhaps be carried out. British Legation has received no response from London. (3) De Pury advised by note November 16. (4) British Chargé, Bern, suggested joint action his and our Government and indicated is so recommending London. Harrison The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 711.94114A/11–1844: Telegram [Document 1126] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , November 18, 1944—midnight. 3933. American Interests—Far East—Repatriation. Please request Swiss Government to communicate with Gorgé in a secret code giving him the information in next following paragraph and asking that he take up with Japanese Government at the highest level feasible and on a confidential basis the proposal contained in the paragraphs ensuing thereafter. The United States Government is aware that there are on the islands of Nauru, Jaluit, Maloelap, Wake, Mille, Wotje and Ocean Japanese garrisons in some numbers which are isolated and thus deprived of normal means of relief evacuation or supply. It is presumed that the condition of these Japanese garrisons is approaching that of the American defenders of Bataan and Corregidor and that they are a military liability to the Japanese. The United States Government is willing to grant safe-conduct evacuation to the Japanese garrisons on Mille, Wotje, Jaluit, Ocean, Wake, Nauru and Maloelap, in exchange on a rank for rank basis for the return by the Japanese Government of a substantially equal number of United States, British Commonwealth (i. e. British and British Dominion) and Netherlands nationals who are held by the Japanese Government as prisoners of war. The evacuation of the Japanese garrisons would occur upon or after the delivery of the United States and Allied prisoners of war to the point agreed upon, which delivery should be effected under appropriate assurances and safe conduct. If the Japanese are willing to consider the above proposal, more detailed discussion may follow as to the means of accomplishing the proposed exchange. If the Japanese raise either of the following questions either directly or by implication Gorgé may inform them: ( a ) In regard to publicity or propaganda, that the United States Government will not engage in publicity or propaganda over the making of this proposal. ( b ) In regard to Article 74 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, 74 that that article will not be considered by the United States Government as applicable to Japanese evacuated under this proposal. Gorgé should telegraph date when the proposal is placed before Japanese and keep Department informed urgently and in fullest detail of Japanese reactions and other developments. Stettinius 74 Signed July 27, 1929, Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. i , p. 336 . The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) 711.94114A/12–144: Telegram [Document 1127] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) [Extract] Washington , December 1, 1944—9 p.m. 4060. The following comment is provided for your background information and for possible use only to the extent that comment from Gorgé or from the Swiss Foreign Office may require you to discuss the points mentioned: 1. In so framing the proposal contained in its 3933, November 18, midnight, as to provide for the inclusion of some British Commonwealth and Netherlands prisoners of war, the Department was acting with the approval of and at the request of the British and Netherlands Governments for which it is also acting in respect of this particular proposal. In this connection, however, as bearing on the proportions of respective Allied personnel to be included in the exchange you should be guided in your discussion by the last paragraph of this telegram. 2. It is considered that on grounds of national prestige it may prove difficult to obtain Japanese acceptance of the principle of the new proposal. For that reason suggestions regarding such concrete details as the point of exchange, means of transportation and the proportion of American, British and Netherlands prisoners of war to be included, were not discussed in the initial communication in order not to inject practical objections into Japanese consideration of the scheme. A premature effort to establish a ratio between the prisoners of war of different nationalities might for instance confront the Japanese with such difficult problems in assembling and transporting prisoners from inconvenient areas as to make the basic proposal entirely unacceptable without further consideration. 3. If the Japanese evince any disposition whatever to discuss the proposal, it will become urgently necessary to find out from which areas they are most disposed to repatriate prisoners and the approximate distribution of prisoners by nationality in those areas. Such information is essential to the proper development of the negotiations and to a solution of the problem referred to in the last sentence of the preceding paragraph. Accordingly, if Gorgé’s initial report indicates any possibility of success, please ask the Swiss to have him endeavor urgently to obtain this information. 4. It is assumed that the Japanese will wish not to make any public announcements on the subject if they accept the proposal and that they may wish that the transfers of Allied personnel necessary to effect the exchange have the appearance of transfers for Japanese convenience and not of evacuation or of repatriation. Even if this extends to a desire not to tell the prisoners of war that they are to be repatriated, there will be no objection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stettinius The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/12–1544: Telegram [Document 1128] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , December 15, 1944—noon. [Received 7:34 p.m.] 8144. Far East Repatriation—American Interests. Foreign Office note December 11 states American proposal contained your 3933, November 18, submitted by Gorgé to Minister [Koichi?] Suzuki, Chief of Foreign Interests Division, Japanese Foreign Office. After briefly outlining this proposal to Suzuki, Gorgé offered to submit it directly to Shigemitsu 75 but Suzuki stated that, as this was a question to be decided by War Ministry, he would handle it himself. Gorgé explained entire proposal to Suzuki and to avoid misunderstanding left a memorandum. Suzuki gave no reply but promised examine matter with Foreign Office with view to submitting it to War Ministry. Huddle 75 Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) 740.00115 PW 1939/10–544: Telegram [Document 1129] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) Washington , December 15, 1944—10 p.m. 4228. American Interests—Far East. Please request Swiss to obtain expedited reply to Department’s 3851, November 11, and preceding telegrams as Department is most anxious to continue with negotiations on this subject. With reference to your 6632, October 5. Please request that Gorgé be informed that initial lists of Japanese civilians captured on Saipan and Tenian have already been provided Spanish Embassy Washington and that further lists of such nationals and of Japanese nationals captured on Guam will follow promptly. 76 Stettinius 76 Telegram 249, January 16, 1945, 9 p.m., to Bern, stated that the United States Government had completed reporting to Spanish and International Red Cross channels the names of the 22,456 Japanese civilians taken in the Marianas and requested “that Gorgé now press Japanese Government to consider exchange of these persons against Americans in their control.” (740.00115 PW/1–1645) The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 711.94114A/1–1745 [Document 1130] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , January 17, 1945—6 p.m. [Received 10:50 p.m.] 338. American Interests—Japan—POW Repatriation. Legation’s 8144, December 15. Foreign Office note, January 15, states Swiss Minister, Tokyo, received from Japanese Foreign Office memorandum dated January 6 to effect Japanese Government cannot consider exchange proposed Department’s 3933, November 18. Gorgé adds Japanese memorandum indicates no reason for refusal and that Chief of Division Foreign Interests of Japanese Foreign Office was not able furnish explanation. 76a Huddle 76a In telegram 162, January 10, noon, Bern reported a Japanese Foreign Office spokesman, in a discussion with Mr. Gorgé, could give no assurances of an exchange arrangement because “final decision rests with military authorities” (740.00115 PW/1–1045). Representations by Japan regarding the treatment of Japanese nationals by the United States Representations by Japan regarding the treatment of Japanese nationals by the United States 77 77 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 1046 – 1080 . [1131] The Swedish Minister (Boström) to the Secretary of State Washington , February 2, 1944. 702.9411A/88 [1132] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , March 13, 1944. 740.00115 Pacific War/2259 [1133] The Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister (Boström) Washington , March 25, 1944. 740.00115 Pacific War/2257 [1134] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , April 24, 1944. 740.00115 Pacific War/2392 [1135] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , May 24, 1944. 740.00115 Pacific War/2421 [1136] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , June 6, 1944. 740.00115 Pacific War/2463 [1137] The Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister (Boström) Washington , July 21, 1944. 702.9411A/7–2144 [1138] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , August 10, 1944. 740.00115 Pacific War/2497 [1139] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , August 31, 1944. 711.94114/7–2444 [1140] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , September 1, 1944. 740.00114 Pacific War/9–144 [1141] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , September 18, 1944. 740.00115 P.W./8–544 [1142] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , October 27, 1944. 740.00115 PW/10–2744 [1143] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , November 20, 1944. 740.00115 PW/11–444 [1144] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , November 21, 1944. 740.00116 P.W./11–2144 [1145] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , December 5, 1944. 740.00114 P.W./9–144 [1146] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , December 9, 1944. 711.94114/11–1744 [1147] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , December 11, 1944. 711.94114/12–1144 [1148] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , December 11, 1944. 750.00115 P.W./12–1144 [1149] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , December 19, 1944. 740.00115 P.W./11–3044 [1150] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , January 8, 1945. 711.94114/12–2244 The Swedish Minister (Boström) to the Secretary of State 702.9411A/88 [Document 1131] The Swedish Minister ( Boström ) to the Secretary of State The Minister of Sweden in charge of the Japanese interests in the Territory of Hawaii presents his compliments to the Honorable, the Secretary of State, and has the honor to forward, herewith, copy of a cablegram, dated January 26, 1944, containing a protest from the Japanese Government in reply to the notes of the Department of State of September 8 and 9, 1943, 78 concerning the treatment of the personnel of the former Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu after the outbreak of the war in December 1941. Washington , February 2, 1944. No. 153/4–T–V [Enclosure] Cablegram Dated January 26, 1944, Addressed to the Swedish Legation, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs B, Stockholm B–7. Your B–48 last year. Please transmit to American Government following protest of Japanese Government dated January 21st, 1944. Japanese Government have received notes of United States Government dated 8th and 9th September, 1943, in reply to Japanese protest 79 regarding maltreatment accorded by United States authorities to Japanese Consul-General at Honolulu and his staff. Japanese protest is based upon facts. Various injustices and hardships which were actually experienced by Kita and his staff have been pointed out in Japanese note. Though American reply says that “careful consideration has been given to Japanese protest”, it consists of mere denials, and no satisfactory explanation of matters raised in protest is given. It may be either that American officials who were in charge of group did not report full facts to Government or that they made a wilful misrepresentation in order to conceal their misbehaviour. Japanese Government invite United States Government to give reconsideration to, and make reinvestigation of, following matters. Primo . It is stated in American reply that “Mr. Kita later expressed his appreciation for considerate treatment he and his staff had received”. This apparently refers to fact that, when on day of outbreak of hostilities Mr. Gabrielson, Chief of Honolulu police force, came and intimated to Kita that in view of seriousness of situation he was sending a squad of policemen to protect Consulate-General, Consul-General said that he had no objection to such steps being taken. But American reply makes no mention of unwarrantable conduct of eight or nine armed officials who soon after noon of same day forced their way into Consulate buildings, placed Consul-General and his staff under restraint, searched, and took away their belongings. The treatment given by American authorities to Japanese Consul-General at Honolulu and his staff may be divided into following several periods, namely, (A) December 7th, 1941, (B) from December 8th, 1941, till January 21st, 1942, inclusive period during which Japanese Consul-General and his staff were detained in offices of Consulate-General, (C) from January 21st till February 8th, 1942, inclusive period during which they were detained in official residence of Consul-General, (D) during their transport from Honolulu to American Continent, (E) during their detention in Arizona on and from February 10th, 1942, (F) from time of their departure from Arizona till their embarkation on exchange ship. 80 Treatment given them during one of these periods differs from that of during another, and American reply only refers to such periods as are most favourable to American contention. Kita, when he visited Col. Green 81 on December 29th, 1941, protested against treatment which he and his staff had received since December 7th, and demanded their release from custody and return of their belongings which had been taken away. They did not receive any “considerate treatment”, and therefore Kita could not have “expressed his appreciation”. It is a grossly irresponsible statement on part of Honolulu authorities to say that Kita “acknowledged fact that Consulate-General was under protective custody in view of outbreak of hostilities”. Personal liberty of Japanese Consul-General was unduly restrained and his person was searched and his belongings were seized. How could he acknowledge that as a protective custody. Seoundo . American reply says “it has been ascertained that no threats or force were used in any case”. But as has already been fully described in Japanese protest of December 1942, a party of armed officials who rushed into Japanese Consulate-General soon after noon of December 7th, 1941, encircled members of Consulate-General, threatened them, made them take off even their underclothing, seized their purses, keys, cigarette-lighters, etc., and thrust them into a corner of a room. During several hours during which they were detained there, loaded rifles were laid on desk with muzzles pointing at their chests, and American officials, now and then putting their hands on grips of guns, threatened and derided them. Upon their request, position of weapons was at one time altered, but they were soon returned to their original position. Such threatening affronts were repeated till morning of December 8th. Nothing would be farther from truth than to say that “not [ no ] threat or force were used in any case” or “at no time were any guns intentionally pointed at members of Consulate-General”. Tertio . As has been said before, all keys in possession of Consul-General and members of his staff were taken away on December 7th. But a few days later Captain Van Kuren demanded of Consul-General surrender of key of door of cable room. Consul-General replied that key was among things which had been taken away, whereupon Captain Van Kuren ordered his men to break open door and entered room. Misrepresenting this course of events American reply says, “Mr. Kita gave his assent to breaking of panels of doors in order to obtain keys”. The American officials did not demand key of steel cabinet (which also they had taken away among other things), but American reply says, “a locked steel cabinet was forced as there were no available keys to open it”. American officials destroyed cable room door and steel cabinet without obtaining consent of Consul-General. Quarto . As regards loss of money and other property belonging to members of Consulate-General, American reply says that no trace of them has been found, and that it has been determined that none of missing articles were taken by police authorities. But loss of money and other articles belonging to Seki, Chancellor, took place in upstair-room of Consulate-General while all members of Consulate were kept in custody and not allowed to stir a step. It is admitted by American police authorities that they allowed no other persons to enter Consulate-General. On other hand they freely came in and out of building, carried away books and stationery, and consumed cake and sweets which were there. Therefore police authorities are only persons who can be held responsible for missing articles. When Kita suspected the police authorities of stealing things from house of Tsukikawa, Chancellor, Captain Van Kuren admitted its possibility. Quinto . American reply asserts that Consul-General and members of his staff “lived almost normal life”. But on December 7th, 1941, Honolulu authorities were so excited that their behaviour became most erratic. They did not allow Consul-General and his staff any sleep. They did not allow them to use lavatory, but made them do their needs on lawn, while they watched them and pointed rifles at them. Even Mrs. Seki was not allowed to use lavatory that night, and on account of showery cold weather she had to refrain from doing her needs till 8 o’clock next morning. On night of 8th and 9th she was forced to sleep among male members of group on a mattress laid on office floor. On December 10th they were allowed to sleep in beds which had been carried into two rooms of official residence on second floor of office building. But from then till January 21st, 1942, not only male members of Consulate-General but also Mrs. Seki and Ozaki, chauffeur, were detained in office rooms of Consulate-General, and except for a short time daily for exercise accorded at request of detained persons, they were not allowed to go out into garden. When Mrs. Seki went upstairs in order to change her dress or have a bath, she was followed by a police officer with a revolver in his hand. Such is anything but a “normal life”. American reply makes a clearly false statement when it says, “at no time was anyone forbidden use of sanitary facilities or embarrassed in this connection”. Sexto . Members of Consulate-General and Mrs. Seki, who were detained in office building from about noon on December 7th, were not allowed to have lunch until after 3 o’clock in afternoon, when they were allowed to have some sandwiches and milk which were bought through intermediary of policemen. They spent evening in porch exposed to showers, and only at midnight could they appease their hunger with some riceballs carried from Kita’s official residence. It is absolutely untrue to say that “members even on first day of hostilities were served by a Japanese maid best food available on Island”. Septo . Consul-General and members of his staff were given a promise that they would be allowed to purchase necessary commodities when leaving for continent, but Captain Van Kuren totally refused to carry out this promise except as regards Consul-General. American reply again states a falsehood when it says that “there was no restriction on amount of available clothing and luggage which could be purchased other than space permitted on vessel”. Octavo . When on February 8th, 1942, Consul-General and members of his staff were put on board ship for transport to West Coast of American Continent, their luggage was examined and their persons searched by American naval officers in a most strict manner. They were made half naked, and persons of women were searched in such a contemptuous manner that decency forbids to describe it. It is contended that search was deemed by Captain of vessel to be necessary in interest of safety of vessel and its passengers. But what was actually done was clearly beyond limits of necessity. It is far from truth to say that search “was conducted with due regard to modesty of individuals”. Japanese Government once more express their desire that United States Government furnish them with a conscientious unequivocal reply to each of foregoing paragraphs. Japanese Government expect that United States Government will also reply to Japanese protest regarding treatment accorded by American authorities to Japanese residents in Hawaii. Japanese Government wish to add that they have received a report from Japanese subjects who were repatriated through second Japanese-American exchange 82 regarding ill-treatment of Japanese residents in Hawaii. According to this report, Japanese residents in Hawaii who were detained in said Island immediately after outbreak of hostilities were compulsorily employed by Hawaiian authorities in digging of blind shells, which even guard did not dare to approach. During their transport to continent they were locked up in ship’s bottom, given no water to wash themselves with, and on pretext of shortage of lifeboats they were compelled to bring lifebuoys with them. Japanese Government demand from United States Government an explanation for these various instances of inhuman treatment accorded to Japanese subjects. 78 Ibid. , pp. 1069 and 1072 , respectively. The second note was addressed to the Spanish Embassy. 79 See note B–113 from the Swedish Minister, December 31, 1942, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1059 . 80 For correspondence on exchange agreement with Japan in 1942, see ibid. , 1942, vol. i , pp. 377 ff. 81 Col. Thomas H. Green, Executive to the Military Governor of Hawaii. 82 For correspondence on second exchange agreement with Japan, see Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 867 ff. The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00115 Pacific War/2259 [Document 1132] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 61 Ex. 119.01 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit herewith a telegram that has been received from the Japanese Government, through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” 83 in Madrid. “ Memorandum of February 29th, 1944— Japanese Government [call attention of United States Government] to instances mentioned in following paragraphs of treatment accorded to Japanese subjects in America, which has come to knowledge of Japanese Government from report made by Japanese subjects who returned home through Second Japanese-American Exchange. Japanese Government hereby lodge protest with the United States Authorities; and in particular, as regards paragraphs 1 and 2, demand punishment of persons responsible and that adequate steps be taken to prevent recurrence of the similar incidents in future, and as regards paragraph 3 and 6, treatment of Japanese internees be substantially improved. Japanese Government also reserve all rights relative to any demand they may make in connection with matter under review. 1. Shooting, etc. of Japanese subjects near Lordsburg Internment Camp. A party of Japanese subjects numbering 147 were transferred from Bismarck Internment Camp in North Dakota to Lordsburg Internment Camp in New Mexico. Under escort of American soldiers they arrived 27th July, 1942, at 1:45 A.M. at a station on Plateau near Lordsburg. Two men of party, Shiro Kobata and Hirota Insomura, who were invalids aged nearly sixty years (60), former suffering from tuberculosis and latter from spinal disease caused by injury sustained while at work in fishing boat, were unable to walk any further, and had to follow party in automobile escorted by soldiers. Party felt uneasy about these two persons, as they failed to join them at Lordsburg Camp. Moreover reports of gun heard in direction of station gave them evil forebodings. So they made inquiries at Camp office and [office?] of army surgeon, but no definite information was given. It was announced by camp office next morning two invalids had been shot at dawn 27th on charge of attempt to escape. It is inconceivable that aged invalids hardly able to walk should while under military escort have attempted to escape. (Poston, ?) 84 who escorted two men it is learnt, was committed for trial by courtmartial, but was acquitted. At Lordsburg Internment Camp three cases of unwarrantable use of firearms occurred from April to June inclusive, 1943. At one time a Captain fired revolver to urge internees to hasten their work, at another time an internee requesting a sentry to fetch golf ball which had fallen out of fence was fired at from watchtower, and on third occasion internee was fired at while within twenty feet of fence. During 1942 some 20 American convict soldiers were interned at Lordsburg Camp. Japanese internees requested Commandant to remove these convicts to another place, but request was not complied with. On Thanksgiving Day one of convicts, under influence of liquor, intruded into Japanese internees quarters used abusive language, sat astride Doctor Uyehara, and wounded him in back with a knife. 2. Shooting of Japanese subjects at Manzanar Relocation Center. Assistant Commandant Campbell of Manzanar Relocation Center was guilty of corrupt practices in connection with distribution of stocks of sugar at Center, and he knew his illicit activities had come to the knowledge of Yoshio Uyeno, Secretary of Association of Workers in mess. On 5th December, 1942, a youth named Fred Masary Uamada was attacked and wounded by some person, and next morning Uyeno was arrested as suspected culprit by Assistant Commandant Campbell and sent to prison outside Center. Uyeno’s friends, who knew Campbell had from sinister motives arrested Uyeno upon false charge, formed themselves into a Committee, and on behalf of the whole body of internees pleaded innocence of Uyeno and requested for his release. Later on in the day Uyeno was removed to prison inside Relocation Center. In evening of same day, large number of internees anxious about Uyeno gathered to hear report of Committee, and requested them to see that Uyeno was released at once. It being extremely cold night, those present marked time or stepped about in order to warm themselves. Then suddenly there arose heavy gale peculiar to district. Some fifty or sixty soldiers, standing by in front of police station with machine guns, were evidently taken by surprise by sound of wind and noise made by the stepping internees. Under misapprehension, it appears, that something untoward had happened, they, without any warning, threw tear gas and fired machine guns at assembled people, who offered no resistance. As result, one Itoh was instantly killed, and ten persons were seriously wounded, one of whom named Kanagawa died two days later. They had been wounded in back. Six Committee men were arrested during course of incident. On 7th December a new committee of six persons were elected, but they were also arrested. Then four Representatives applied to Relocation Center Authorities for release of thirteen persons under arrest, but no favorable result was obtained. Thereupon all internees, except those working in mess and engaged in distribution of fuel oil, ceased work in passive resistance. Commandant intimated internees through Spanish Consul in San Francisco that he would consider their application if they resumed work. Some of them resumed work on or about 20th December, and others followed later. But no remedy was effected, except that Assistant Commandant was dismissed in January, 1943, and supervision over internees was made even stricter. Japanese Government call serious attention of the United States Government to these outrages on part of United States Authorities, in which aged invalids and unarmed civilian internees who offered no resistance were mercilessly killed and wounded. Japanese Government demand of the United States Government punishment of persons responsible, and notify that they must bear responsibility for any and all consequences of these outrages. 3. Improper levy of income tax. There are many cases where United States Authorities improperly assessed income tax on Japanese residents, or deducted income tax from their property or put it up for sale without giving them any notice. Ouraichi Nakanish, interned at Santa Fe, was compelled to pay out his money for taxes without being allowed to retain anything for his travelling expenses. He was given notice of income tax immediately before departure of exchange ship, and was threatened with refusal to be allowed to embark unless he paid it. 4. Improper treatment at Internment Camps. Food provided at Kenedy and Santa Fe Internment Camps is of quality inferior to what is given in other camps. Food given at Ellis Island Internment Camp is not only inferior in quality but meager in quantity, and as a result eye-sight of internees has been impaired and about ten persons put under necessity of using spectacles. Some of internees had to supplement their nutriment with provisions sent them by their families or friends. At Santa Fe Camp, some 65 persons were put in room of capacity for 40, as consequence cases of illness occurred. 5. Seizure of property of Japanese residents transferred from Alaska. All money and other belongings of Japanese residents transferred from Alaska to United States were seized at Internment Camp at Fort Sam Houston. Houston, in charge of Camp, gave them a provisional receipt showing total amount. Japanese internees applied to Authorities Washington for return of seized money and goods, nothing was returned and reply given showed that money had diminished. As a result, they are even hard up for pocket money. 6. Compulsory evacuation of Japanese residents in Virginia. A protest has already been lodged against compulsory evacuation of Japanese residents of Pacific coast to interior. 85 In addition to this, in July, 1943, Japanese residents in Virginia were ordered to evacuate at a week or ten days notice, and were transferred to Philadelphia. On account of short notice given they were unable to arrange their household affairs. They also had to defray expenses of evacuation. Nor have they been given any assistance in obtaining employment. As a result many of them are in difficulties as to getting living. As in case of compulsory evacuation from Pacific coast, United States Government must bear responsibility for injury sustained by these individuals compulsorily evacuated from Virginia.” Washington , March 13, 1944. 83 Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 84 As in original. 85 See memorandum No. 333, August 3, 1942, from the Spanish Embassy, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1046 . The Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister (Boström) 740.00115 Pacific War/2257 [Document 1133] The Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister ( Boström ) The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Sweden in charge of Japanese interests in the Territory of Hawaii and refers to a note dated December 31, 1942, 86 setting forth certain complaints of the Japanese Government concerning the treatment alleged to have been accorded Japanese civilians interned in the Territory of Hawaii. Investigation of these complaints has now been completed and there is transmitted herewith a statement embodying the findings of the investigation. The paragraphs of the enclosed statement are numbered to correspond with the numbered paragraphs of the communication from the Japanese Government which formed the enclosure to the Legation’s note under reference. Washington , March 25, 1944. [Enclosure] Statement Prepared in the Department of State Alinea (1)— Regarding alleged handcuffing and overcrowding . A report from the military authorities in Hawaii indicates that in no instance was it found necessary to use handcuffs during the apprehension and transportation of Japanese internees to custody. The internees, once in custody, were afforded living quarters in compliance with basic United States Army Regulations covering the housing of soldiers which take into consideration elements of health, ventilation, and comfort. Suitable toilet facilities were furnished and exercise periods were allowed. The internees were fed in a roofed inclosure and were not subjected to the elements as alleged in Alinea (1). With reference to the alleged overcrowding of civilian internees, it is believed that the communication from the Japanese Government refers to the arrival on the West Coast at one time of a group of 161 civilian internees. This group was temporarily held while awaiting processing in a bedroom with 192 beds and was fed in a new mess hall seating 250 persons. Alinea (2)— Regarding compelling civilian internees to work . A full report on the treatment of Japanese internees at Sand Island Detention Camp, Territory of Hawaii, shows that within the first few weeks after December 7, 1941, a large number of aliens was taken into custody. Action had to be taken immediately to “tent” them adequately until permanent housing could be constructed. Japanese civilian internees were instructed to erect and align their tents. Similar instructions were given to other internees. No order was given, as far as is known, that Japanese should erect the tents of Germans and Italians. It was the policy of the Commanding Officer of the Sand Island Detention Camp never to order Japanese to perform labor for German or Italian internees, or vice versa. Pursuant to a request made of the leaders of Japanese internees, a number of young Japanese willingly assisted in the construction of a fence around their inclosures. The laundry was made available to Japanese internees in January 1942, for their use in laundering their own bed linen and clothing. They occasionally voluntarily assisted in doing the laundry of American Army personnel. Later, when the laundry was operated by the Quartermaster of the United States Army, internee labor, including Japanese, was employed at the rate of eighty cents per day. These work groups were selected by their own group leaders. Permission to raise vegetables was given as a considerate gesture to enable the Japanese, who desired fresh vegetables, to supply themselves therewith. Implements and seeds were furnished. The internees furnished the labor and there was never any understanding or order that they were raising vegetables for American troops. Apparently on some occasions when crops of certain vegetables were greater than needed by the internees, the internees themselves offered the excess vegetables to the troops. Before funds were available for the payment of internee labor, there may have been instances of gratuitous labor but such work was performed voluntarily and not under force or as the result of a direct order. However, when funds were available, payments were made for all work performed and a three dollars monthly allowance was granted each internee retroactively to the date of initial interment. In those cases in which internees were transferred to the Mainland prior to the inauguration of payments to internees, they were later credited with the amounts due up to the time of their departure from the Sand Island Detention Camp. Alinea (3)— Concerning search of internees . Upon arrival at camp, the clothing and baggage of internees were completely searched. All valuables were taken from them, listed and a receipt given, signed by the internees and the receiving officer. Any article which might have been considered a possible lethal weapon was confiscated. When any group of Japanese was transferred to the Mainland, its members were searched again before leaving camp to assure that no forbidden articles were taken aboard ship. All personal valuables except money were returned upon departure of the internees for the Mainland. Concerning Money . In Hawaii, funds received from internees or donations to internees, were deposited in a Hawaiian bank and books were set up to show the amounts credited to each internee. Upon transfer to the Mainland the money was forwarded to the Provost Marshal General, Washington, D.C., for credit to the internee’s account at the Mainland internment camp to which he was transferred. It is reported that a total of $26,679.65 of internee funds was forwarded to Washington. It is possible that some internees were inconvenienced because of lack of funds upon arrival on the Mainland before their funds were received and made available. Alinea (4)— Concerning alleged mistreatment during transfer to the Mainland . During the transfer of civilian Internees from Hawaii to the Mainland they were provided adequate accommodations and were not restricted by wire netting or any other similar device. Toilets, in all cases, were furnished within the rooms or were readily accessible. Accommodations given internees were superior to those furnished either the ship’s crew or transit troops. Within the West Coast area adequate facilities were afforded internees and no complaints were lodged during any transfer. The report from the military authorities in Hawaii indicates that the treatment of Japanese and other persons held in custodial detention has, since the beginning of hostilities, been marked by scrupulous observance of treaty obligations and agreements. Throughout the process of investigation, apprehension and detention, Japanese civilians were treated humanely and were protected against violence, insults and public curiosity. 86 Ibid. , p. 1059 . The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00115 Pacific War/2392 [Document 1134] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 86 Ex. 113.00T Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit a Memorandum received through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” in Madrid, from the Japanese Government and which reads as follows: “ Memorandum of April 18th, 1944— According information received from reliable source, United States authorities, at various times from February to August inclusive 1943 put to Japanese subjects and United States citizens of Japanese origin interned at Relocation Centers, questions whether or not they would swear allegiance to United States. Japanese subjects were asked in first instance to say whether they would renounce allegiance to Sovereign of Japan and swear unconditional allegiance to United States, on second occasion, whether they would cooperate in defence of United States in event of that country being attacked by enemy, and on third occasion whether they would swear to abide by United States law and refrain from all such actions as would interfere with prosecution of war. Among United States citizens of Japanese origin (Second and Third generation), male citizens were asked to say whether they would voluntarily enlist in United States Army, female citizens were asked whether they would volunteer for enlistment in “Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps., and both male and female citizens were asked to say whether they would swear unconditional allegiance to United States and renounce allegiance to any foreign country. At time when these questions were asked, United States authorities gave out declaration to following effect. United States Government intends to release evacuees not necessarily but as far as possible, but they cannot release any who are dangerous to United States, and any who wish to return to Japan are deemed most dangerous to United States. Therefore, those persons at Relocation Centers, who have repudiated allegiance to United States and those who do not cooperate with authorities there, as well as those who desire to return to Japan, will be transferred to special relocation center at Tule Lake. As above narrated, United States authorities three times repeated their questioning of Japanese subjects. It appears that Japanese subjects, indignant of first and second questions abstained from or refused any answer, and United States authorities in their attempt to induce them to alter their attitude brought pressure to bear upon them, but without success, and finally were compelled to mitigate their cross examination till they formulated third question. Most of United States citizens of Japanese origin answered above mentioned questions in negative. United States authorities attempted to force them to alter their negative answer to affirmative answers, and to summon so many of them to Tule Lake was a punishment metered [ meted ] out to Japanese subjects and United States citizens of Japanese origin who failed to swear allegiance to United States. United States authorities interned Japanese subjects at Internment Camps or at Relocation Centers at outbreak of war under pretext of protecting their lives from danger and so forth. (Several incidents actually occurred in which Japanese subjects were killed, of which at least four cases involving six deaths have come to knowledge of and have been protested against by Japanese Government). When hostile feeling of United States against Japanese had become redoubled, as evidenced by debates in Congress and articles in Press, United States authorities tried to remove Japanese subjects out of Relocation Centers and utilize their labour. A large number of evacuees, who knew this motive actuating United States authorities and who were aware their safety after release from Relocation Centers not guaranteed, did not change their answer despite American Authorities threats, and even an increased number of them applied for repatriation, or expressed their desire to be transferred to Tule Lake. The [ As? ] reported United States authorities announced suspension of decision to transfer those desiring repatriation. It is presumably due to these circumstances that during negotiations for second exchange of residents between Japar and United States, an American note 87 alleged many Japanese suojects several times changed their minds as to whether they should be repatriated or not. Report of Representative of Spanish Embassy, who visited Tule Lake on 20th August, 1943, bears witness to fact that armed soldiers interposed their interference in connection with declaration of Japanese evacuees as to whether they would swear allegiance to United States. Report says Japanese evacuees requested Spanish Representative to report to Japanese Government that ‘During the process of registration they were subjected to the embarrassment of armed soldiers entering the camp to pick up young men who were termed recalcitrants.’ It appears at time of Tule Lake incidents which occurred since October last year, United States authorities exercised great pressure and threats on Japanese evacuees there by dispatch of troops with tanks and machine guns. In Tule Lake, as said above, there were evacuees whom United States authorities regarded as disloyal to United States, and it is not difficult to see great discontent and anxiety prevailed among evacuees. As regards direct cause of occurrence of incidents, report of Spanish Embassy, Washington, says employees of relocation center were blamed for negligence in relation to provisions for evacuees and funds for purchasing them, which led to occurrence of fist [ first? ] disturbance and Military Authorities then declared fourteen (14) representatives of evacuees who endeavoring to arrive at settlement of incidents to be mutineers and arrested more than two hundred evacuees whom they considered responsible. In these circumstances, Japanese Government hereby notify following to United States Government: (1) It is unjust on part of United States authorities that on pretext of necessity of deciding upon policy of segregation they should have attempted to force Japanese subjects to renounce allegiance to Japan and have regarded those who expressed desire to be repatriated as disloyal to United States. So also is the fact they should have brought threats of compulsion to bear upon United States citizens of Japanese origin in their attempt to force them to alter their answer whether they would swear allegiance to United States or not. Recent A.B.C. broadcast has even announced that a Bill has been introduced into Congress requiring Japanese subjects in United States to renounce their allegiance to Japan. These circumstances show United States Government are attempting by all means to force Japanese subjects to renounce their allegiance to Japan. Japanese Government protest against such measure, and demand its immediate discontinuance. (2) A memorandum of United States Department of State dated 11th October, 1943, 88 alleges policy of segregation had not yet been decided upon in course of 1942, and beginning of 1943, during which time Japanese subjects in Relocation Centers were asked to declare their intention whether they desired to be repatriated or not, and therefore said policy in no way influenced their determination. But as has been said, thrice repeated questioning of Japanese subjects was carried on from February to August 1943, and during this period Japanese Government were communicating successively names of repatriates negotiations were proceeding thereupon between Japanese and United States Government, and United States authorities brought pressure to bear on evacuees in order to force them to change their minds or refused to accept their application for repatriation. It cannot be denied questioning unduly influenced their expression of intention as to repatriation. (3) Although United States Government declared treatment accorded to Japanese evacuees in Tule Lake does not differ from treatment accorded to those at other centers and they will not be put to any compulsory labor, in view of fact United States authorities gave out such threatening statements as above mentioned, Japanese Government demand United States Government give suitable and sufficient opportunities to Spanish Representative in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States for verifying above declaration in question. (4) Japanese Government deem minimum requirement in order to relieve state of anxiety prevailing at Tule Lake to be compliance with three demands presented to Department of State by Spanish Representative, that is to say: 1. Withdrawal of troops from Tule Lake and restoration of control of that relocation center to non-military authorities. 2. Recognition of legitimacy of committee of fourteen, 3. Release of fourteen committeemen and over two hundred persons arrested in connection with incident. Japanese Government press for immediate compliance of United States Government with these demands, if not already accorded.” Washington , April 24, 1944. [For further views of the Japanese Government on the treatment of Japanese nationals held by the United States, see section III of the enclosure to despatch 8150, May 10, from Bern, page 941 [ Pg. 941 includes portions of Doc. 993 and Doc. 994 ] , and the enclosure, passim , to despatch 8171, May 15, from Bern, page 966 [ Pg. 966 includes portions of Doc. 995 and Doc. 996 ] .] 87 Based presumably on telegram 1781, July 28, 1943, to Bern, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 890 . 88 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 939 . The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00115 Pacific War/2421 [Document 1135] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 125 Ex. 113.01 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit a Memorandum received through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” in Madrid, from the Japanese Government and which reads as follows: “ Memorandum —May 23, 1944— Japanese Government did not make request to U. S. Government for inspection of documents and records relating to cases Oshima and Wakasa who were shot dead, but since measures taken by U. S. Authorities in regard those cases were unfair and contrary to law of humanity, Japanese Government lodged firm protest[s] with U.S. Government 89 and reserving all rights to further claim, demanded latter should make proper investigation these cases, punish persons found responsible, and guarantee non repetition such lamentable incidents. U. S. Government, however, simply assert 90 those victims were shot dead because they had attempted [to] make their escape. Japanese Government cannot admit this assertion for reasons stated below. In view, especially of subsequent occurrence similar affairs, viz: One Japanese evacuee was shot and injured by guard at Gila River Relocation Centre, December 1st, 1943, and three other[s] fired at during same month according to most reliable information, Japanese Government repeat herewith their protest and claim calling most careful attention U. S. Government to matter in question and from humanitarian point of view they emphatically demand, as step absolutely necessary for preventing recurrence such abominable incidents, strict prohibition unlawful firing by guards and sentinels so that utmost uneasiness felt by such large number of internees and evacuees may be removed and safety of their lives secured. (1) According reliable information received by Japanese Government, Kensaburo Oshima, whose mind had been deranged was walking toward barbed wire fence May 12th, 1942 at about 8 A.M. Soldier guard saw him and levelling his pistol approached him. A Japanese who happened to witness that cried out at top voice, “That’s a mad man, don’t fire”, and tried stop soldier shoot. Sentinel on watch tower heard cry and hurriedly lowered his gun, but soldier who had been following Oshima still continued his pursuit and having cornered victim within short distance, three metres or so, fired at him twice. Poor lunatic had his skull shot through and fell dead on spot. 91 As action of soldier on watch tower has shown clearly, guard murdered without any justifiable reason and committed most inhuman crime for which guard must be held responsible. (2) Most reliable additional information just received clearly established following acts: (A) Wakasa was shot and killed by sentinel Gerald B. Philpott of watch tower number nine on April 11th, 1943 at 7:30 p.m. Spot where Wakasa fell dead was six feet and four inches inside boundary fence relocation Centre and approximately two hundred and forty yards away from nearest watch tower, distance which according result actual experiment made view of challenger barely audible [ sic ]. Judging from position and attitude Wakasa’s dead body, it was evident he had happened to be walking parallel with fence facing toward sentinel. Under such circumstances it was genuinely demoniacal atrocity, making utterly light of human life, hastily to conclude he was attempting escape and to shoot and kill him on spot without attempting any more appropriate measures. 92 (B) Articles 22 to 25 of instructions for Government of Armies of United States in field, and general orders number 100, April 24th, 1863, War of Rebellion, official records series 3 111 154 (See especially Article 77) clearly state that sentry shall never shoot prisoners of war for intent escape. Mr. James F. Hughes, Assistant Director Centre, expressed sincere regret incident had taken place and stated Relocation Official[s] were powerless give effect to provisions memorandum of understanding as to functions of military police units at Relocation Centres and areas administered by War Relocation Authorities dated July 8th, 1942, and especially Paragraph 7. (C) Thereof in which no mention is made of sentry towers or wire fences. He gave it as his opinion one sentinel posted at principal entrance centre would be quite sufficient and any other sentinels would be unnecessary. He stated further, subsequently to occurrence incident, both Japanese and American Japanese descent at Centre lost sense security for themselves and their families and refused proceed perform labor outside centre boundaries. As regards danger approaching barbed wire in spite Authorities official declaration to effect such danger had been duly notified to residents at Centre through medium centre organ, Topaz Times , minute examination said paper shows that though it contains warning against crawling fences centre, no references made to any danger of shooting from sentinels. Topaz Times April 12th, 1943, which announced death Wakasa, states it happened, “While attempting to crawl through the west fence”, but according to testimony of witness he had never tried to crawl when he was assaulted by his murderer. Again although State Department affirms in reply evacuees at Relocation Centre were officially and unmistakably notified of fact sentinels were invested with right firing and killing any offenders against Centre regulations, Japanese evacuees unanimously declared that they had never been warned by Centre authorities of possibility of being shot dead if they approached boundary fences.” Washington , May 24, 1944. 89 Memoranda Nos. 105, Ex. 119.01, May 12, 1943, and 353, Ex. 113.01 C, December 16, 1943, from the Spanish Embassy, not printed. 90 Replies of June 29, 1943, and March 17, 1944, not printed. 91 The Department’s memorandum of June 29, 1943, to the Spanish Embassy, stated: “The guard fired only after the internee had climbed over two barbed, wire fences surrounding the internment camp and was in the process of climbing the outside fence.” (311.9415/415) 92 The Department’s memorandum of June 29, 1943, stated: “Mr. Wakasa was shot under conditions which indicated to the sentry that he was attempting to pass out of the relocation center at an unauthorized place. Mr. Wakasa was repeatedly challenged by the sentry and only when he failed to observe the order to halt, was he fired upon.” (311.9415/415) The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00115 Pacific War/2463 [Document 1136] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 140 Ex. 113.00 T–2 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit a memorandum received through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” of Madrid, from the Japanese Government, which reads as follows: Memorandum —June 3rd, 1944— “According to UP and AP telegrams dispatched from Tule Lake May 25th, Soichi Okamoto (Shoiza) died at Tule Lake Segregation Center as result of being shot at by guard. AP telegram further reported Mr. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, asserted, ‘So far as he had been able to learn Okamoto had been unarmed and had made no threatening gesture before being shot.’ It was, however, reported by UP and AP dispatches of May 29th, that Court held act of guard had been done in performance of his duty. Prior to occurrence of incident under review there had occurred seven cases of unlawful firing by guards of Internment Camps or Relocation Centers which came to knowledge of Japanese Government. In these cases six Japanese subjects were killed and ten wounded. Japanese Government have lodged strong protests with United States Government against each case of unlawful firing by guards and demanded repeatedly necessary steps be taken for prevention of recurrence of such incidents and persons responsible be duly punished in order to protect lives of Japanese subjects in area under United States Administration and to remove their serious feeling of insecurity. Despite all this it is deeply regrettable United States authorities have not been able to prevent recurrence of fresh incidents. It appears from above mentioned press reports, victims are United States citizens of Japanese lineage. Should such be case then, even in view of fact alone both Japanese subjects and United States citizens of Japanese lineage are detained together in centers, Japanese Government cannot but be most deeply concerned with matter. Japanese Government hereby lodge most emphatic protest, calling serious attention of United States Government to answer mentioned incidents and demand necessary steps be immediately taken for prevention of recurrence of such incidents in particular prohibiting unlawful firing by guards of camps and centers.” Washington , June 6, 1944. The Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister (Boström) 702.9411A/7–2144 [Document 1137] The Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister ( Boström ) The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Sweden in charge of Japanese interests in the Territory of Hawaii and has the honor to refer to the Legation’s note no. 153/4–T–V of February 2, 1944 transmitting a further protest from the Japanese Government concerning the alleged mistreatment of the personnel of the former Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu and the treatment allegedly accorded Japanese nationals who were residents in the Territory of Hawaii after the outbreak of war on December 7, 1941. After giving careful consideration to the additional protest from the Japanese Government regarding the alleged mistreatment of the personnel of the Japanese Consulate General, the United States Government considers that there is nothing to be added to the Department’s note of September 8, 1943 and to the communication of September 9, 1943 which was addressed to the Spanish Embassy 93 in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States. In reference to the penultimate paragraph of the enclosure to the Legation’s note under reference, concerning the alleged mistreatment of Japanese civilians in the Territory of Hawaii, it will be recalled that the United States Government replied to the protest of the Japanese Government on this subject in a note sent to the Legation on March 25, 1944. The Japanese Government refers, however, to additional reports received from Japanese nationals repatriated in connection with the second American-Japanese exchange. The allegation is made that Japanese nationals detained at the Sand Island Internment Camp were compelled by the Hawaiian authorities to dig “blind shells”. Investigation has failed to disclose any occasion when internees at Sand Island were required to handle ammunition of any kind including what are commonly referred to as “duds” or what the Japanese Government refers to as “blind shells”. The allegations of the Japanese Government concerning the transportation of civilian internees from Hawaii to the United States have been examined. Investigation has revealed that these internees were carried on troop transports where the conditions were identical to those when troops are carried. The facilities given them were also similar to those which United States troops receive. Internees transported to the United States for repatriation to Japan had ready access to clean and adequate toilets and showers; washstand facilities with running water were also available. On a few occasions when internees were quartered on a deck which did not have latrine facilities adequate arrangements were made to give them access to nearby facilities. On at least one voyage, a Japanese internee who was also a doctor was in charge of sanitary arrangements provided for the internees and was responsible for seeing that proper provision was made for them in this connection. On one voyage internees were not permitted to go above “D” deck because of the crowded condition of the vessel. When conditions permitted, however, internees were given access to open decks for relaxation. The United States Government, having thoroughly examined the reports of these Japanese repatriates, considers that these additional allegations reported to the Japanese Government are without foundation in fact and that these Japanese nationals were treated with humanity and consideration. The protest must accordingly be rejected. Washington , July 21, 1944. 93 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 1069 and 1072 , respectively. The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00115 Pacific War/2497 [Document 1138] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to memorandum No. 86, Ex. 113.00 T, dated April 24, 1944, from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States transmitting a communication from the Japanese Government with regard to the treatment of Japanese nationals at Tule Lake and at other War Relocation Authority centers. Before considering in detail the individual points made in the memorandum from the Japanese Government, one basic consideration should be clarified. Throughout the memorandum there are various references not only to Japanese nationals, but also to American citizens of Japanese ancestry. At the outset, therefore, it seems desirable to reaffirm the understanding of the Government of the United States that the Japanese Government has a legitimate concern for Japanese nationals only. Since a considerable portion of the memorandum from the Japanese Government is given over to the registration which was conducted at all relocation centers in the early part of 1943, it is necessary that some of the basic facts concerning this registration program be set forth. The purpose of the registration was two-fold: to acquire information on the background and attitudes of (1) male American citizens of Japanese ancestry with a view to possible service in the Army of the United States; (2) Japanese nationals and other persons at relocation centers with a view to restoring them to normal life outside the centers. Among the many questions which were asked of the registrants, only one was referred to specifically in the memorandum of the Japanese Government. This question was originally drawn up primarily with American citizens of Japanese ancestry in mind. Through an inadvertence, however, it was phrased in identical form both for American citizens and for Japanese nationals. However, as soon as it was realized that this wording was not applicable to Japanese nationals, a substitute question was presented to them. In the period between presentation of the original question and development of the substitute, a third type of question was used at the Manzanar Relocation Center. When the substitute question was presented to the Japanese nationals residing at the Manzanar Center, the answers to the interim question were disregarded. Consequently, although at first Japanese nationals were asked to answer the same question as were United States citizens, no attempt was made to force them to renounce their allegiance to Japan, and with the change in question, they were finally asked merely whether they would promise to abide by the laws of the United States and to refrain from interfering with its war effort. Throughout the entire registration program, every person was free to answer all questions, including the question referred to in the Japanese Government’s memorandum, according to the dictates of his judgment and conscience. At no time did any official use restraint or duress to force anyone to change an answer previously given. Since the entire purpose of the registration was to obtain honest answers regarding the background and attitudes of the registrants, it seems obvious that any attempt to use compulsion in influencing the replies would be self-defeating. It is true that some of the American citizens at the centers were given an opportunity to reconsider their answers to the question under reference, in view of the evidence that they might have been influenced by threats from other evacuees or by undue emotional strain or by lack of understanding when they gave their original answers. This reconsideration was permitted, however, in order to assure each person the fullest possible opportunity to make his own answers on the basis of his own individual choice and not in any sense as an attempt to influence ultimate decisions. All those who preferred to let their original answers stand after reconsideration were freely permitted to do so. The memorandum from the Japanese Government suggests that the majority of American citizens of Japanese ancestry at the relocation centers answered the question under reference in the negative and that they were transferred to the Tule Lake Center as a form of punishment. Actually, the answers to the question were such that it was necessary to transfer only a small minority of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry as well as only a small minority of the Japanese nationals to the Tule Lake Center. While it is true that both the American citizens and the aliens who answered the question under reference in the negative were among the evacuees segregated at the Tule Lake Center, this segregation process is not and was never intended to be a form of punishment. The primary purpose of the segregation program carried out by the War Relocation Authority was to separate the people in relocation centers whose loyalty and sympathies lie with Japan from those who wish to remain in the United States as loyal American citizens or law-abiding aliens. As representatives of the Spanish Embassy who have visited the relocation centers can doubtless testify, there was at all centers, prior to the segregation program, a considerable amount of tension between these two groups. After the centers had been in operation approximately one year, it became clear that peaceful and orderly communities could probably not be maintained as long as people of sharply diverging loyalties were living in such close proximity. Many evacuees, including a number who have openly professed their intention of returning to Japan, urged that a separation be made between the two groups. Accordingly, after a long and careful consideration, steps were taken in the late summer of 1943 to consolidate in the one center at Tule Lake all those who had expressed a desire to move to Japan or who had indicated by word or action that their loyalties are not with the United States. The living conditions and facilities provided at the Tule Lake Center are in accordance with the standard set for all War Relocation Authority centers. The major differences are (1) that those segregated at Tule Lake are not eligible to leave the center except through an appeals board procedure, (2) that they are not permitted the same degree of latitude in establishing their own community government, and (3) that additional precautions have been taken to insure maintenance of law and order. The incidents at Tule Lake referred to in the memorandum of the Japanese Government occurred at the center shortly after the completion of the first major segregation movement. At that time the Committee of Fourteen met with officials of the War Relocation Authority, including the National Director, 94 and presented a series of “demands”. The National Director indicated to the members of the Committee that the War Relocation Authority would not accede to any “demands” as such, but expressed a willingness to consider requests or complaints made on behalf of the evacuees at any time. Three days after this meeting between the officials and the Committee of Fourteen, a group of evacuees armed with clubs entered the area where employees of the War Relocation Authority reside and made attacks upon some of the personnel. As a result, troops stationed immediately outside the center were summoned inside to restore order, and the center was placed under Army jurisdiction for a period of several weeks while conditions were being gradually returned to normal. Peaceful conditions having been restored, the center was returned to full civil administration on January 15, 1944. The War Relocation Authority is now responsible for all phases of internal administration at the center and has been for the past few months. So long as the residents of the center continue to maintain a peaceful and well ordered community, it is not contemplated that there will be any further occasion for summoning troops or placing the center under military control. In one place, the memorandum of the Japanese Government suggests that United States authorities attempted to remove Japanese subjects from the relocation centers in order to utilize their labor. This statement is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the program of the War Relocation Authority. The Authority has never considered its primary purpose to be the operation of a detention program. It has, rather, conceived its purpose to be the relocation into normal life so far as practicable of persons of Japanese ancestry who were evacuated from the West Coast in the early stages of war as a matter of military necessity. A considerable number have now been relocated in various parts of the United States, where the relocated citizens of Japanese descent are free to go about their business on the same basis as other American citizens, while the relocated aliens are subject only to the restrictions which apply to all other enemy aliens. Relocation is a privilege, and the War Relocation Authority extends liberal assistance to those who desire to avail themselves of the opportunity. On the other hand, it is not, and never has been, the policy of the War Relocation Authority to force any evacuees to leave the relocation centers against their will so long as the restrictions remain in effect which prohibit them from returning to their former homes. The Japanese memorandum also suggests that the United States authorities have brought pressure to bear on the evacuees in order to force them to change their minds concerning application for repatriation. There has never been any attempt to influence any person either to decline or to request repatriation. No officer of this Government has ever been authorized to refuse to accept a communication from a Japanese national regarding his wishes for repatriation or for non-repatriation. Decisions by individual Japanese were freely reached in all cases with the exception of some cases in which Japanese aliens attempted to force Americans of Japanese extraction to elect to go to Japan. The question of allegiance to Japan has at no time and in no way been associated with the eligibility of Japanese nationals for repatriation to Japan. The records affecting the repatriation status of Japanese nationals contain no entries regarding replies to the so-called allegiance question. The persons included in the lists submitted by the Government of Japan were informed that the Japanese Government had named them for repatriation and that they were requested to indicate whether they desired to accept or to decline. Such persons have been completely free to make their own decisions. In this connection, it may be pointed out that of all of the persons whose names were submitted in the Winter of 1942 and Spring of 1943, approximately ninety percent stated that they did not desire to return to Japan. Even though they were informed that the Japanese Government had named them, they indicated that they desired to remain in the United States. On the other hand, thousands of applications have been received from persons who were not named by the Japanese Government indicating their wish to go to Japan. These names have been reported to the Japanese Government and the Japanese Government is aware that the Government of the United States has made every effort to arrange for their inclusion in American-Japanese exchanges. 95 The demand made in the Japanese memorandum that representatives of the Spanish Embassy be given “suitable and sufficient opportunities” for investigating matters of interest to Japanese nationals at Tule Lake has already been met to the fullest possible extent. Representatives of the Embassy have visited the relocation centers, particularly Tule Lake, on several occasions. At no time have the representatives of the Embassy been denied access to any of the centers. The United States Government has given Japanese nationals in this country, whether at large or confined, every opportunity to register with the Spanish Embassy their wishes and their changes of wish with respect to repatriation from day to day, and cases could be found of individuals who have changed their minds as many as four or five times and on consecutive days. Whenever a Japanese national who previously refused repatriation has changed his mind, his new expression of wishes has been fully respected. The Spanish Embassy is in a position to verify this statement. The Spanish Embassy has had free access to all Japanese nationals without exception and has repeatedly been invited to verify all or any of the statements of the United States Government regarding the repatriation washes of Japanese nationals. In a great majority of cases the information provided by the Department of State regarding the wishes of Japanese nationals is supported by communications individually addressed to the Spanish Embassy by the Japanese nationals in question. The United States Government would welcome any investigation by any authority into the individual case of any Japanese to verify the accuracy of the foregoing statements. With respect to the Committee of Fourteen at the Tule Lake Center, the War Relocation Authority is not prepared to recognize this particular group since there is considerable evidence that it represents no more than a small minority of the total Tule Lake population. It is true that certain members of the Committee and approximately two hundred other evacuees were temporarily confined immediately following the riot at the center because they were suspected of complicity in its instigation. The majority of those confined, however, have now been released and those found guilty of inciting the riot will ultimately be transferred to other quarters. Their treatment will comply fully with the applicable provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929, 96 but they will not be in a position to foment unrest among the other residents of Tule Lake, the majority of whom desire to live quietly and peaceably. The question at Tule Lake is not whether the residents of the center will be treated according to the principles and provisions of the Geneva Convention, or whether the administration is prepared to cooperate with the evacuees in reaching a solution of common problems. Both these considerations are assured under the existing and past policy of the War Relocation Authority. The only question at issue at Tule Lake is whether a small group is to be permitted through methods of violence to force their leadership on the remainder of the community in such a manner as to cause a recurrence of a riot such as that of November 4. It is believed that the interests of the great majority of the evacuees at Tule Lake require that such troublesome individuals be housed in separate accommodations where their propensity for creating discord cannot contribute to the discomfort of the large number of law abiding residents of the camp. Washington , August 10, 1944. 94 Dillon S. Myer. 95 For correspondence on interest of the United States in negotiating a third exchange of American and Japanese nationals, see pp. 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 1106 and Doc. 1107 ] ff. 96 Signed July 27, 1929, Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. i , p. 336 . The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 711.94114/7–2444 [Document 1139] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to memorandum No. 156, Ex. 119.01 dated June 21, 1944, from the Spanish Embassy 97 in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States requesting all possible details and circumstances relating to the suicide of a group of Japanese prisoners of war in New Caledonia. 98 Immediately following the suicide of the Japanese prisoners of war, a board of officers was appointed by the American military authorities to investigate and report on the facts and circumstances preceding and concerning the cause of death of these prisoners of war. The board of officers was also ordered to include in its report findings of the adequacy or inadequacy of the nourishment and the general treatment of the prisoners prior to their death. The board having carefully considered the evidence, the following findings were established: 1. Seventeen Japanese prisoners of war committed suicide by hanging in the prisoner of war stockade at approximately 9:00 p.m. on January 9, 1944. Their names are as follows: 1. Saburo Ishii 2. Jihei Kanahara 3. Teiichi Kaneko 4. Tatsumi Kanie 5. Tokuichi Kumaki 6. Korito Naga 7. Toshio Nishimura 8. Takashi Matsui 9. Harumi Minami 10. Masakichi Saita 11. Tsutomu Sato 12. Sumio Sato 13. Yasuhiko Sato 14. Gimpu Takamura 15. Toshio Tomizawa 16. Shigehiro Yamazakei 17. Narakazu Yasuda 2. Two Japanese prisoners of war committed suicide by cutting their throats in the prisoner of war stockade at approximately 9:00 p.m. on January 9, 1944. Their names are as follows: 1. Shigeru Hagino 2. Mizue Sato 3. Interrogation of Japanese prisoners of war and American personnel in the prisoners’ stockade disclosed that no general dissatisfaction existed with regard to the treatment which prisoners of war received in the stockade and that there was no evidence prior to the death of the prisoners that they were developing a mentally depressed state. Inspection of the mess halls and kitchens and interrogation of prisoners and mess attendants revealed that the physical conditions under which the prisoners were held also were satisfactory, that an adequate supply of palatable provisions had been regularly furnished to the prisoners and that quarters and general surroundings were clean, orderly, and well maintained. 4. Careful examination of the bodies of the deceased prisoners revealed no marks of violence externally or internally. The bodies were well nourished and well developed. Investigation disclosed that there had been an average increase per man of at least ten pounds in weight from the time of entry into the prisoner of war stockade until the time of death. The mass suicides were the outgrowth of a premeditated plan on the part of the prisoners. It was the general consensus of opinion among prisoner witnesses that the fundamental motive for the suicides was a desire to redeem the shame which Japanese soldiers feel at being taken prisoner. The suicides were prompted by this sense of shame which the prisoners attached to their status and were not prompted by any mistreatment on the part of the personnel supervising the stockade in which they were held. 6. Three other prisoners attempted to commit suicide, one by strangulation and two by cutting their throats, but were frustrated in the attempt. Their names are as follows: 1. Yoshiji Tokuda 2. Yutaka Yamane 3. Shinnosuke Azuma. Washington , August 31, 1944. [In a memorandum of September 9 to the Spanish Embassy, the Department advised of the suicides on January 23 and February 4 of four additional Japanese prisoners of war in New Caledonia and stated that they “were apparently part of the same pact by which the other nineteen Japanese nationals earlier took their lives, and were brought about by the feeling on the part of the prisoners that they were in a shameful status because they had been taken prisoner.” (711.94114/9–244) The Department, in notes of November 22, 1944, and January 4, 1945, advised the Spanish Embassy of the circumstances of the deaths of two other Japanese prisoners of war, both episodes occurring at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. They involved Ichiro Yamashita, whose death on October 16 resulted from the explosion of a “dud” rocket smuggled into barracks by Mr. Yamashita and struck by him against the metal part of a bunk, and Shonzo Kobayaski who committed suicide by hanging on November 28. (711.94114/11–344, 12–1844)] 97 Not printed. 98 The Spanish Embassy had transmitted the Japanese Government’s first request for such information in its memorandum No. 95, Ex. 119.01, of May 10. The Department’s acknowledgment was sent on June 28 and stated that “If the Japanese Government so desires, the Department is further prepared on a reciprocal basis to endeavor to obtain from the appropriate French authorities permission for a neutral observer to enter New Caledonia to visit camps where Japanese nationals are held in American custody.” (711.94114/37) The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00114 Pacific War/9–144 [Document 1140] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 194 Ex. 119.01 II Memorandum The Spanish Embassy, in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States, presents its compliments to the Department of State, and has the honor to inform that a memorandum dated August 22nd, has been received from the Japanese Government through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores at Madrid”, with regard to the apparent desecration of the remains of Japanese soldiers by nationals of this country. In order to convey to the State Department a most accurate report of the contents of the Japanese Government’s communication it is transcribed in the Spanish language in which it was received: 99 “Memorandum August 22, 1944. As the Zurich correspondent of the Domei Agency declares in a recent communication, the official weekly of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Missouri has alluded to the fact that some children were playing with the skull of a Japanese soldier that was sent as a souvenir by a United States soldier who was on the South Pacific front, stating that out of the respect due to human remains that skull ought to be buried with due decorum, and its solemnity exhorted the Americans not to accept as souvenirs skulls and other remains of Japanese killed for their country. In that same article Drew Pearson, editor of the ‘Merry-Go-Round’, which a Washington daily publishes, also had revealed that Francis Walters, Representative for the State of Pennsylvania, presented to President Roosevelt a letter opener made from the forearm of a Japanese who fell in the Pacific [theater]. 1 “The Imperial Japanese Government, astounded by the fact that American soldiers are profaning the remains of Japanese soldiers who have fallen with honor on the battlefield and are sending them home as souvenirs, where some citizen has accepted them, also allowing them to be played with as if they were toys, declares that that constitutes a manifest and serious violation of the provisions of Article 3 and 4 of the Geneva Convention on the amelioration of the lot of the sick and wounded in the field, 2 as well as an unpardonable offense against humanitarian principles. The Japanese Government points out as an example of what could be considered one of the causes that has led to the perpetration of atrocities such as the ones referred to, what is reported in the New York Times in the number for April 1, 1942, in publishing the facsimile of a document for recruiting for the United States Marines, which bears as a title ‘Hunting License used by United States Marine’, signed by General Diwig [ Denig ] 3 of the American Navy [ sic ], 4 in which phrases such as the following occur: ‘no limits’—‘free ammunition and equipment with pay’—‘join United States Marines’. “In circulating recommendations such as those mentioned among young men of military age, the American authorities were considering Japanese subjects as wild beasts, and it can be understood that, being recruited and trained in such an unhuman atmosphere, United States soldiers naturally adopt a cruel attitude toward the Japanese soldiers, profaning their bodies. “Consequently, the Japanese Government presents to the American Government its strongest protest against the inhuman acts of profanation mentioned above, and demands that the United States immediately have the remains referred to interred with due honors and have proper measures taken effectively to prevent atrocious acts such as those reported from again being perpetrated by soldiers and citizens of the United States.” Washington , September 1, 1944. 99 The translation that follows was prepared in the Department of State. 1 Brackets appear in the file translation. 2 Signed July 27, 1929, Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. i , p. 321 . 3 Brig. Gen. Robert L. Denig, Director of Information, United States Marine Corps. 4 As in the file translation. The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00115 P.W./8–544 [Document 1141] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to memorandum (No. 179, Ex. 119.01) dated August 5, 1944 from the Spanish Embassy 5 in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States transmitting a communication received through the Ministerio de Asuntos Extranjeras at Madrid from the Japanese Government requesting a report on the Japanese nationals held by the American authorities at Saipan Island covering the treatment they are being accorded and if possible their number and names. The American Government has in conformity with Articles 77 and 79 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 6 been forwarding through the International Red Cross Committee and the protecting Power for transmission to the Japanese Government the names of Japanese nationals taken prisoner of war or interned by United States authorities. The Japanese Government has reciprocally been reporting through the International Red Cross Committee for transmission to the United States Government the names of American nationals held in custody by it. The United States Government is prepared on this reciprocal basis to transmit the names of Japanese nationals both prisoners of war and civilian internees held in custody on Saipan Island. The names are being collected and will be forwarded as soon as they are received in Washington. The Spanish Embassy may desire to point out to the Japanese Government in this connection that the names of considerable numbers of American nationals known to be prisoners of war of Japan have not yet been officially reported and that since March 1, 1944 the Japanese Government has reported the names of only 60 American prisoners of war and the deaths of 19 prisoners of war. In this same period, the names of 545 civilian internees have been transmitted by the Japanese Government but these are duplicates of names previously reported. The United States Government expects that the Japanese Government will as speedily as possible furnish to the International Red Cross Committee the names of all American prisoners of war and civilian internees not yet officially reported. 7 The Spanish Embassy’s memorandum transmits the Japanese Government’s request for a report on the conditions under which Japanese nationals are being held in Saipan and the treatment being accorded to them. The Japanese Government has consistently refused to permit representatives of the protecting Power and the International Red Cross Committee freely to visit the camps and to report on the conditions under which American nationals are held in Japanese-occupied territory. The United States Government again states its willingness to abide by its undertakings regarding the application of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. At such time as the Japanese Government extends reciprocity for representatives of the protecting Power, Switzerland, to visit and report on the camps in the Philippine Islands and other Japanese-occupied territories, the United States Government is prepared to permit visits by representatives of Spain or of any other neutral power that the Japanese Government may designate to inspect the camps not only on Saipan but also on the Marshall Islands. Immediately upon the receipt of advice that the Japanese Government has undertaken to fulfill its commitments with respect to camp visits in Japanese-occupied territories the Government of the United States will be pleased to make arrangements for accredited representatives to inspect the camps and to report on the conditions under which Japanese nationals are held by the American authorities on Saipan and the Marshall Islands. Washington , September 18, 1944. [A further memorandum, No. 240, Ex. 150.000, was sent to the Department by the Spanish Embassy on November 22. It indicated the Japanese desire to have as soon as possible the data already solicited regarding Japanese residents on Saipan and “urgently” requested the names and number of Japanese under American authority on Tinian and Guam. The Department’s reply on December 6 stated that “partial lists of the Japanese civilians on Saipan Island and on Tinian Island were forwarded by the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Office of the Provost Marshal General, War Department, on November 30’ to the International Red Cross Committee for transmission to the Japanese Government” and that “The census of Japanese civilians on these islands and on Guam is being continued and the list of names will be forwarded by the Prisoner of War Information Bureau to the International Red Cross Committee as soon as the lists are compiled.” (740.00115 P.W./11–2244)] 5 Not printed. 6 Signed July 27, 1929, Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. i , p. 336 . 7 For correspondence on Japanese treatment of American prisoners of war and civilian internees, see pp. 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 979 ] ff. The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00115 PW/10–2744 [Document 1142] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of a memorandum dated May 24, 1944 (No. 125, Ex.113.01) from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States reiterating a protest from the Japanese Government concerning incidents which occurred at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and at the Central Utah Relocation Center, Topaz, Utah, which resulted in the deaths of Mr. Kanesaburo Oshima on May 12, 1942 and Mr. James Hatsuki Wakasa, on April 11, 1943. The Spanish Embassy is requested to inform the Japanese Government that this Government has little it can add to the memoranda forwarded to the Embassy on June 3, 1943, June 29, 1943 and March 17, 1944. 8 With regard to these deaths the Japanese Government was informed on these occasions that the United States Government had made a thorough investigation of the deaths of Mr. Kanesaburo Oshima and Mr. James Hatsuki Wakasa. According to the regulations governing the conduct of relocation centers, persons are not permitted to pass in or out of the Relocation Center areas at any place except at the designated entrances and exits. Persons are not permitted to pass in or out of these designated entrances or areas except when in possession of a pass. As has been reported the evacuees were not only repeatedly informed of this restriction but regulations were posted for their information. The guards at relocation centers are strictly prohibited from firing without just cause. They are instructed first to challenge persons attempting to escape but when the challenge is unheeded, they are required to fire. Mr. Wakasa attempted to pass out of the Relocation Center at an unauthorized place and only after he had been repeatedly challenged was he fired upon. Mr. Oshima also was repeatedly ordered by the sentry to halt and only when Mr. Oshima failed to obey did the sentry shoot. The fact that Mr. Wakasa was deaf and unable to hear the challenge and that Mr. Oshima was suffering from a fit of mental derangement could not be known to the guard. The Japanese Government continues to make assertions based on partial evidence. This Government is of the opinion that it can offer no more convincing testimony that the measures taken by the United States authorities were neither unfair nor contrary to the dictates of humanity than to submit the records of the investigation for examination. It renews its offer at this time to make the proceedings available to representatives of the protecting Power with the understanding that representatives of the Swiss Government in charge of American interests in Japan and Japanese-occupied territory will be granted similar privileges by the Japanese Government in like circumstances. The United States Government is unable to understand the position taken by the Japanese Government 9 that the United States Government in offering to submit the documents for examination and review by a neutral representative on a reciprocal basis is trying to conceal the whole truth. On the contrary, the willingness of the United States Government to permit an inspection of its records by representatives of the protecting Power gives evidence that the United States does not fear an impartial investigation and that it is convinced that an unbiased review of the facts will confirm the findings of the boards of inquiry. The unwillingness of the Japanese Government to extend reciprocity under similar circumstances would appear to indicate that the Japanese Government on its part is unprepared to submit its investigations to the light of impartial review. Articles 22 to 25 of General Orders No. 100, War Department 1863, referred to in paragraph (2) (B) of the Japanese Government’s protest with regard to the death of James Wakasa concern the rights of enemy civilians in their own country and do not apply to enemy aliens interned in a belligerent country. They therefore have no bearing on the case of James Wakasa. In paragraph (2) (B) the Japanese Government also calls attention to Article 77 of General Orders No. 100, War Department 1863. This article provides that a prisoner may be killed in order to prevent his escape, and therefore constitutes plain legal justification for the position taken by this Government. With respect to the allegation that Mr. James F. Hughes, Assistant Project Director, expressed opinions concerning the requisites of an adequate guard, it would appear that Mr. Hughes, if he made such statements, spoke on a subject which was not within his jurisdiction. Under the memorandum of understanding between the War Relocation Authority and the War Department, the patrol and guarding of the perimeter fences of the Centers are the responsibility of the War Department and all questions relating either to the conduct of the sentinels or to the adequacy of the patrol are wholly under the jurisdiction of that Department. It will be of interest to the Japanese Government to know that the military guard contingent at the relocation centers has been reduced very materially within recent months. At certain centers the military guard is approximately one-half the size of the original contingent; at others only a token guard of not more than two dozen men and two or three officers exists. This Government regrets the occurrence of incidents resulting in the loss of life and assures the Japanese Government that it is prepared to punish severely those responsible where such loss has occurred as a result of unjustified action. An examination of the evidence in the cases of both Mr. Oshima and Mr. Wakasa reveals, however, that in neither case did the guards shoot without justifiable reason. It is to be regretted that Mr. Wakasa and Mr. Oshima lost their lives but the proceedings disclose no evidence that the sentries acted in haste or in violation of their orders or standing instructions. Washington , October 27, 1944. 8 None printed. 9 As set forth in memorandum No. 353, Ex. 113.01 C, December 16, 1943, from the Spanish Embassy; not printed. The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00115 PW/11–444 [Document 1143] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to memorandum (No. 61, Ex. 119.01) dated March 13, 1944, from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States transmitting complaints from the Japanese Government concerning the reported mistreatment of Japanese nationals held in custody in the United States. With regard to the deaths of Toshiro Kobata and Hirota Isomura during their transfer from Bismarck Internment Camp, Bismarck, North Dakota, to the Lordsburg Internment Camp, Santa Fe, New Mexico, on July 27, 1942, a thorough investigation with regard to the circumstances connected with the deaths of these two men was made in July–September 1942. The proceedings of the board appointed to investigate the matter revealed that in the early morning hours of July 27, 1942, one hundred and forty-seven internees arrived at the Lordsburg Railroad Station from Bismarck and were escorted by military police to the camp. The two internees, Toshiro Kobata and Hirota Isomura, who were reported to be unable to keep up with the main column on the march to the compound, were permitted to walk behind at their own pace, accompanied by a guard. They were ordered to keep on the main highway in the center of the road, but were permitted from time to time to rest. At times they walked slowly, at other times they proceeded rapidly. Before coming to the main gate of the military reservation where the internment camp is located the men appeared to be arguing between themselves. After they entered the reservation but before they were within the camp enclosure, they suddenly made a break and started running toward the boundary of the reservation. The guard shouted to them twice to halt and when his order was not obeyed he fired in accordance with his standing instructions. Hirota Isomura died instantly and Toshiro Kobata a few hours later. An inquiry into the circumstances was conducted at once. The court-martial of the guard was vigorously prosecuted and all the facts were developed. An acquittal of the guard resulted. While this Government regrets that Mr. Kobata and Mr. Isomura lost their lives in their attempt to escape, since they failed to stop when warned, the guard acting in the performance of his duty, had no other recourse than to shoot. Concerning the alleged unwarranted use of firearms at the Lordsburg Internment Camp during April to June 1943, to which attention was called in the second part of item 1 of the Embassy’s memorandum, the Japanese Government is informed that an investigation was conducted with regard to the cases cited. The Japanese Government maintained that at one time a captain fired a revolver to urge internees to hasten to their work. The investigation disclosed that, during a slow-down in internee work details, an American captain in charge of the internees fired a shot from his pistol to attract the attention of the internees in order to address them and tell them to proceed with their work. The captain was reprimanded for his action by the Commanding Officer. The allegation contained in the memorandum from the Spanish Embassy that an internee was fired at when requesting a sentry to fetch a golf ball, was reported not to be based upon facts. The only occasion when a sentry at Lordsburg Internment Camp fired in the direction of a Japanese internee was at a time when the guard had been alerted to expect an attempted escape by the internees. On that occasion, when an internee approached one of the gates during the evening, a sentry fired a warning shot at a nearby telephone post. The camp authorities on learning of the incident investigated the circumstances and as a result the sentry was relieved from further duty of this nature. Reference is made to the alleged wounding of Dr. Uyehara on November 26, 1942, by an American garrison prisoner who was confined at Lordsburg Internment Camp. Several American military personnel who were prisoners were confined at Lordsburg Internment Camp at this time. On November 26, 1942, one of these American prisoners became disorderly, and in the fracas Dr. Uyehara was knocked down, but was not injured to an extent requiring medical attention. After this incident, the prisoner who created the disturbance, together with all other American garrison prisoners, was removed and confined elsewhere. The prisoner was tried for this offense by special court-martial on December 31, 1942, and the commanding officer of the Lordsburg Internment Camp was given a written admonition because of the incident. The camp commander was subsequently removed from command. With regard to the incident at Manzanar Relocation Center reported in item 2 of the Embassy’s memorandum, it is necessary in view of the number of misstatements and distortions of fact which appear in the Japanese Government’s communication to give a resume of the incident and the events leading up to it. For some time prior to the incident, unrest and dissension among the Center residents had been apparent. A great many complex and not altogether related factors led to this unrest. These factors included frictions among various groups of the Japanese center residents themselves over matters of group interest in which the Center Administration was not directly concerned. A small group of younger evacuees was particularly persistent in expressing antagonism toward the authorities of the Center. One of the charges made by some of this group was a claim that Mr. Ned Campbell, Assistant Project Director, was misappropriating sugar intended for evacuee consumption. This is apparently the basis of the statement in the Japanese Government’s communication that Mr. Campbell was guilty of corrupt practices in connection with sugar distribution. The War Relocation Authority investigated this claim thoroughly and found it to be without any basis in fact. Mr. Campbell was not, as is stated in the Japanese Government’s communication, discharged. However, because of the unpleasant situation which had been created for Mr. Campbell by the agitators who made of him the victim of their unfounded charges, he was transferred to another branch of the War Relocation Authority service. Yoshio (Harry) Ueno, an American citizen, was one of the most active members of the group engaged in agitation against the center authorities. On December 5, 1942, Fred Tayama (who is referred to in the Spanish Embassy’s memorandum as Fred Masary Uamada), a young American citizen, was brutally attacked and wounded by a group of masked men. Ueno was identified by Tayama as one of his assailants. Ueno was questioned, and was then arrested and confined in the jail at Independence, California. It was on the basis of the identification of Ueno as an assailant in the attack on Tayama that Ueno was arrested, and not because of any alleged personal animosity of any Center staff member toward him. About noon on December 6, 1942, several thousand evacuees met in a mass meeting. It was later revealed that the purpose of the meeting was to protest Ueno’s arrest and demand his release, to denounce and threaten physical violence to Tayama and other evacuees regarded as informers, and to appoint a Committee of Five to negotiate with the Center Director. In the afternoon, the Committee of Five, leading a crowd of one thousand men and boys, presented to the Center Director at the Administration Building, demands for Ueno’s release. For the Center Director to accede to mob rule would have been disasterous to the interests of the Center and its entire population. He walked among the crowd for about an hour and a half, attempting to persuade them to abandon the resort to mob tactics and to disperse and to leave the settlement of the matter to orderly and lawful processes. The crowd remained unruly and surly, refusing to disband. A small number of soldiers who were deployed near the Administration Building were taunted and insulted and sticks and stones were thrown at them. It was apparent that the crowd was turning into an unmanageable mob. In view of the imminent danger of bloodshed, the Center Director proposed to the Committee of Five to return Ueno to the Center jail; that all future grievances would be taken up with the Center Director through recognized evacuee representatives; and that the committee would help find Tayama’s other assailants. After discussion among its members the evacuee committee unanimously agreed to these conditions. It was later learned that the committee’s spokesman did not explain the committee’s agreement to the crowd but instead ordered that the crowd disperse and, in violation of this agreement, to meet again later in the day to secure Ueno’s release from the Center jail. In fulfilment of his part of the agreement, the Center Director had Ueno returned to the Center in mid-afternoon. In the late afternoon it became apparent that the agreement reached with the committee was being flagrantly violated by the mob. A mob of several hundred persons gathered in front of the hospital and demanded that Tayama be delivered to them. When the hospital authorities refused to deliver Tayama to the rioters, they invaded the hospital and ransacked it in search for him, but he was well hidden and the mob failed to find him. The rioters then divided into several groups to search throughout the Center for Tayama and several others who had not been sympathetic with the riotous and disruptive activities of the mob. While none of these persons were found, their apartments were entered and wrecked. In the early evening a second mob converged upon the police station for the purpose of obtaining Ueno’s release from the Center jail by force if necessary. It was apparent that order could not be maintained without the assistance of the military police, and the commander of the military police was requested to assume control of the Center. The commander did so and soldiers were deployed around, the police station. A line was drawn, beyond which the mob was instructed not to pass. The commander talked to the rioters at length requesting them to disperse which they refused to do. The rioters cursed the soldiers, spat on them, threw stones at them and attempted to disarm some of them. It was then, nearly two hours after the mob had arrived at the police station and all attempts to quiet and disperse the rioters had failed, that the commander ordered tear gas released on the north side of the mob from which direction the wind was blowing. Considerable confusion resulted and the mob scattered in all directions. Part of it ran toward the soldiers who then fired three rounds from shotguns. At about the same time several of the rioters seized a truck, started it and headed it in the direction of the police station and then jumped off in the darkness. It struck the corner of the station running into a Government truck. As it careened toward the soldiers a commissioned officer, who could not see that it was driver-less opened fire on it with a submachine gun. The mob then retreated and dispersed. The injured who were found lying on the ground were promptly removed to the hospital. During the night and following day a number of law-abiding evacuees who had refused to join the rioters were assaulted and others were threatened. About sixty-five of them came to the Administration Building for protection and were later transferred out of the Center. Some school teachers were also intimidated and threatened by the rioters and as a consequence the schools were temporarily closed. A temporary work stoppage took place, and only such labor as was necessary in connection with the operation of the mess and certain other services essential to the evacuees was carried on. Normal activities were, however, restored in the course of several weeks as a result of further negotiations between the residents of the Center and the Project Director. Of the eleven men who received gunshot wounds, two lost their lives. These two men were not Japanese nationals. Among the other nine men who received gunshot wounds two were Japanese nationals. All the nine men, including the Japanese nationals, recovered completely from their wounds. Not one of the dead or injured was, as is stated in the Japanese Government’s communication, “an aged invalid”. The elder of the two Japanese nationals who were involved was fifty years of age, the younger was forty years of age. During the weeks immediately following the incident, a thorough investigation was made by a duly appointed board of officers and the persons deemed primarily responsible for inciting and leading the rioters were apprehended and questioned. Most of these persons were later transferred to a special detention center from which they have since been transferred to another Relocation Center. The board, on December 15, 1942, found that the Center Director, was fully justified in requesting the Commander of the Military Police and his Command to enter the Relocation Center to suppress the mob and put an end to the disorders then existing, and that he made such request only after exhausting every other possibility to restore order. The board further found that the Commander and the officers of the Escort Guard Company, in suppressing the mob and its violence, acted with promptness, patience and determination, and employed only so much force as appeared necessary after all other measures had failed. The board further found that the soldier or soldiers who fired the shots acted in obedience to the standing order given by the company commander to fire only when ordered to do so or when attacked, and that the soldier or soldiers who fired the shots did so because members of the mob were closing in and surging toward them. It is apparent from the foregoing recital that the rioters who participated in the incident must be considered to be primarily responsible for its unfortunate consequences. Instead of trying to settle their grievances by peaceable and lawful means, they adopted the expedient of disregarding lawful authority and attempted to achieve their ends by force and mob violence. This can no more be tolerated in a relocation center than in any other community. That the shooting occurred was unfortunate; however, had the mob dispersed when ordered, instead of refusing to do so and intensifying an already menacing situation, the incident would not have occurred. Since the incident, there have been no further serious difficulties in the administration of the Manzanar Relocation Center. The evacuees resident there have been and are receiving the same consideration and treatment that evacuees in other relocation centers are receiving. In item 3 of the communication from the Japanese Government it is stated that there are many cases where United States authorities improperly assessed income tax on Japanese residents, or deducted income tax from their property, or put it up for sale without giving them notice. The specific case referred to is that of Muraichi George Nakanishi (who is referred to as Ouraichi Nakanish in the Spanish Embassy’s memorandum). With respect to his case the Japanese Government states that he was given notice of income tax liability immediately before the departure of the exchange ship, and was threatened with refusal to be allowed to embark unless he paid it. Muraichi Nakanishi, United States Detention Station, Santa Fe, New Mexico, filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of New Mexico, an income tax return, Form 1040, for the calendar year 1942, which was executed August 27, 1943, and showed a tax liability of $254.50. A return, Form 1040, for the period January 1 to September 1, 1943, was filed by the taxpayer at the time of his departure showing no tax liability for that period. Mr. Nakanishi was taxed on the income reported by him for 1942 as a resident alien and allowed a personal exemption of $1200.00 as a married man living with his wife, the same as any other resident alien. He was also allowed a credit of $350.00 for his dependent daughter, Akiko. Furthermore, in computing his net income he was allowed a deduction for California State income taxes of $41.32. In as much as his income tax return for the year 1942 was not filed within the prescribed time (on or before March 15, 1943) a penalty of twenty-five percent was assessed, and his total tax liability including interest amounted to $325.53 for the year 1942. This together with an unpaid installment of tax for 1941 of $63.00 and an unpaid installment owed by his wife, Tsuruyo Nakanishi, of $79.00, made an aggregate outstanding unpaid tax liability of $467.53. According to the information available in this Department Mr. Nakanishi did not have the money with which to pay his income tax liability. Certain stock owned by him in the Pacific Trading Company, Inc., 100 Sacramento Street, San Francisco, California, as well as stock in the same company owned by his daughter (which was transferred to her in 1939 by her father as a gift), were therefore, voluntarily assigned to the Alien Property Custodian for the purpose of liquidating his outstanding liability, by written assignment in affidavit form dated August 27, 1943. The tax-payer, accompanied by his wife and daughter, sailed aboard the exchange ship Gripsholm on September 2, 1943. From an examination of the facts in this case it appears that no injustice was done to the taxpayer, but that he was merely required to satisfy his income tax obligations prior to his departure from the United States, in accordance with the provisions of section 146 ( e ) of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 146 ( e ) of the Internal Revenue Code reads as follows: “( e ) Departure of Alien—No alien shall depart from the United States unless he first procures from the collector or agent in charge a certificate that he has complied with all the obligations imposed upon him by the income, war-profits, and excess-profits tax laws.” The treatment received by Mr. Nakanishi was not discriminatory or unlawful but is the same as that accorded to all aliens departing from the United States. With reference to the general protest in regard to collection of income taxes from Japanese who depart from the United States, it has been the policy of this Government to endeavor to collect outstanding tax liabilities of Japanese nationals and other aliens prior to their departure from this country when they possess assets. This Government knows of no case where departure of repatriated Japanese aboard the exchange ship Gripsholm was prevented for the sole reason that the taxpayer had not cleared his tax liabilities and was unable to do so. There would seem to be no reason, however, why outstanding income tax liabilities of Japanese nationals should not be paid prior to departure in cases where assets in the United States can be used to liquidate such liabilities. It is the opinion of this Government, therefore, that the complaint of the Japanese Government with respect to these matters is unjustified. In item 4 of the Japanese Government’s communication it is alleged that food provided at Kenedy and Santa Fe Internment camps is of a quality inferior to that provided at other camps. It is also alleged that the food provided at Ellis Island Detention Station is not only inferior in quality but meagre in quantity, and that as a result, the eyesight of internees has been impaired. The Government of the United States is forwarding herewith 10 a complete analysis, taken from random samples, of food provided at the Kenedy and Santa Fe Internment Camps at various periods since these stations were first established. The bulk of the food served at these camps is obtained from the Army Quartermaster and is identical with food being served to American troops with the exception that account has been taken of Japanese tastes. For example, fish is shipped by express from the Pacific Coast in order that the internees may enjoy fresh raw fish. Also the quantity of rice issued is considerably in excess of the starch requirement used in the American dietary. Fresh fruits and vegetables are furnished rather than dehydrated fruits and vegetables. All canned goods and fresh meats as well as fruit and vegetables conform to Government Specifications and are of quality and grade superior to that obtainable in ordinary wholesale or retail markets. The internees have not only been provided with foodstuffs of excellent quality, scrupulously in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, but account has been taken of Japanese national dietary habits. As to the food served at Ellis Island to Japanese nationals, it has been found upon investigation that the cost was uniformly higher than that for food provided for American troops at base camps. The same food is furnished to persons of all nationalities and also to the officers and members of the Immigration Service. The menus are well balanced and more than ample. During the period under reference frequent visits were made to the Ellis Island Detention Station by representatives of the Central Office of the Immigration Service who have personal knowledge that the complaints as to the food are not based on fact. With respect to the complaint that some sixty-five persons were put in a room with capacity only for forty, causing illnesses among them, at no time has the population in the Santa Fe Internment Camp exceeded that allowed under Army regulations for the billeting of American troops at base camps. If the internees had properly distributed themselves in the facilities provided, no congestion would have existed. Such congestion in a given dormitory as did exist at any time was due to the insistence of certain groups of internees on being billetted in the same set of barracks. This Government is in possession of no facts that would indicate that illness was caused by overcrowding. In item 5 of the memorandum it is stated that money and belongings of Japanese nationals transferred to the United States from Alaska were seized by authorities at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and that the applications of these internees for the return of the property were not considered. This Government on May 6, 1944 in an effort to facilitate tracing the property under reference, requested the Spanish Embassy to endeavor to obtain from the internees the receipts given to them. When the receipts are received from the internees, this Government will make every effort to trace the property, and to investigate the complaints made by the Japanese Government. With regard to the complaints in item 6 of the memorandum of the Japanese Government that the Japanese residents of Virginia were subjected to compulsory evacuation, a total of ten Japanese in the Norfolk, Virginia, area were apprehended in the Summer and early Fall of 1943 under the authority of the Department of Justice and released on parole, the parole conditions requiring that they live outside of the immediate vicinity of the Norfolk Naval Base. Seven of these persons voluntarily accepted parole to Chicago. The Immigration Service made arrangements with social organizations for assistance in establishing these persons in the Chicago community. The remaining three voluntarily accepted parole to Philadelphia. Transportation was furnished in each case. It is the opinion of this Government that these facts are sufficient to demonstrate that the charge as to compulsory evacuation at the expense of the Japanese nationals is unfounded. Washington , November 20, 1944. 10 Enclosures not printed. The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00116 P.W./11–2144 [Document 1144] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 11 No. 251 Ex. 150.000 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to transmit below a memorandum received from the Japanese Imperial Government through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” of Madrid, in which it complains of the attack made on the Japanese motor vessel Taiei Maru by an American submarine: Memorandum —November 20th, 1944— “1. Taiei Maru , Japanese motor sailing vessel of 130 tons, carrying on board seventy-seven (77) civilian refugees (seventy-five (75) being women, children and aged persons and two being policemen) and crew of six persons, while navigating area between islands of Yap and Palau, was attacked by large size submarine of enemy at Point about 150 miles NEE of Palau on 3rd July, 1944, at 10:15 a.m. Said submarine on rising to surface about 1000 meters off in rear of vessel immediately opened fire and coming up to distance of OG [ sic ] 200 meters, continued bombarding her until vessel was fatally damaged and set ablaze. Persons on board following command of Captain plunged into sea. Enemy submarine which had attained its object of damaging vessel did not depart from scene of disaster but coursed surface at lowest speed in a gradually contracting circle round Taiei Maru which was in blaze and approached women, children and aged persons, who were drifting in groups struggling pathetically to help each other. When submarine arrived within closest range some members of its crew appeared on deck and began to fire machine guns and revolvers at drifters one by one. Surface of sea around quickly became smeared with blood of victims. At this moment Japanese navy plane happened to appear in sky above. The submarine hurriedly submerged. But as soon as plane disappeared submarine came up again and men on deck pecked floating victims with long poles to confirm their death. When they found any survivors of any persons whose death was uncertain they shot them with revolvers. After that, up to 6:00 P.M. enemy submarine which went under water each time Japanese aircraft came in sight, rose to surface four times to repeat this act. Account of above facts was given by Captain of Taiei Maru and other survivors. It has also been reported by Captain that he feigned death in order to escape being murdered and observed following facts: namely, That the enemy submarine was in the 200 ton class and painted silvery. That ten odd members of crew appeared on bridge and on deck. That one of them who wore jumper (the others being seminude) stood on bridge and issued orders, and That they all made merry over sight of unfortunate victims, dying in agony. After lapse of about thirty hours from happening of disaster, two women and five members of crew including Captain were rescued, but all other sufferers, seventy-six (76) in number, among whom there [was a] three year old child, were killed in this so-called “Japanese hunting”. 2. Japanese Government regard cruel act committed by above-mentioned submarine as most flagrant offence against fundamental principles of humanity and as constituting violation of Convention for adaptation of principles of Geneva Convention of Maritime war concluded at [The] Hague in 1907. Japanese Government cannot but view with most profound seriousness fact that enemy submarine deliberately chose slaughter civilian refugees who had entirely no means of self-defence and that its crew including commander, imprudently amused themselves with such massacre. Japanese Government therefore demand United States Government immediately to make thorough investigation of matter with view to determining where responsibility lies and to guarantee prevention of recurrence of such outrage in future. Japanese Government reserve all rights relating to matter.” Washington , November 21, 1944. 11 Acknowledged by the Department on December 14. The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00114 P.W./9–144 [Document 1145] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to memorandum (No. 194, Ex. 119.01 II) dated September 1, 1944 from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States transmitting the protest of the Japanese Government concerning the failure of some members of the armed forces of the United States to treat with due respect the remains of fallen Japanese soldiers and referring to a Marine recruiting advertisement which the Japanese Government assumed was related thereto. The United States Government shares the profound indignation of nil civilized people for the desecration and profanation of the bodies of men who have fallen on the field of battle. This Government by its commitments to observe the Geneva Convention gave recognition to this fact. It considers violations of the bodies of the dead shameful and assures the Japanese Government that it does not countenance such depravity. It is the desire of the United States Government that the traditional respect which men of all faiths have from time immemorial rendered the dead should during the period of hostilities be observed as scrupulously as possible. The United States Government informs the Japanese Government that the form in which the advertisement appeared was entirely unofficial, having been devised and printed by a small civilian group. The United States Government did not endorse the action of these individuals and the advertisement never received the official sanction of either the Marine Corps Headquarters or of the Navy Department. So far as is known the form is no longer in circulation. Prior to the receipt of the Japanese Government’s protest, there had come to the attention of the military authorities of the United States Government the incidents referred to by the Japanese Government. The War Department thereupon issued a message to its commanding generals in the Pacific theater directing that all army personnel be reminded of the provisions of the Geneva Convention governing the treatment of the enemy dead, and to the rules of land warfare on this subject. The War Department message also directed that necessary action be taken to make decent and honorable disposition of such parts of enemy bodies as were not yet interred. Since these steps were taken by the authorities, no further offenses of this nature have come to their attention. The United States Government, however, points out to the Japanese Government that deeply as American sentiment is appalled by profanation of the dead it is equally appalled by cruelty to the living. In considering the Japanese protest, the many and terrible outrages committed upon American soldiers by their Japanese captors must therefore be taken into account. As the Japanese Government is aware, American soldiers in the Philippine Islands were thrown, while living and in full view of their comrades, into their grave and those who tried to rise were beaten down with shovels and buried. The malevolence of the Japanese troops who relentlessly beat and tortured the American airman who parachuted to earth near Aitape, made of his suffering a public spectacle and then, to loud shouts of joy, with six slashes of the saber decapitated him must also be recalled. Another act of horrible cruelty was the pitiless suffering inflicted upon the American private near Arayat, Pampanga, Philippine Islands. As the Japanese Government knows, he was taken by his Japanese captors to a cemetery, was tied to a tree with barbed wire and used for bayonet practice until he was dead. These are but a few of the terrible acts committed by the Japanese armed forces. Such vicious conduct on the part of the enemy could not fail to have a profound effect on the men of the United States forces. White the great body of these men do not condone or sanction, under any circumstances, the desecration of the dead, it is not difficult to understand that in certain instances men who had witnessed their comrades tortured in life by the Japanese forces should have failed to treat the bodies of the Japanese dead with the respect to which they are entitled. With regard to the memorial presented to the President of the United States to which the Japanese Government refers in its communication, the Japanese Government is informed that the proffered gift was refused by the President and that he ordered it to be returned with the suggestion that decent burial be accorded it. The United States Government desires to emphasize that it considers its obligation to accord honorable burial, even to unidentified bodies of the enemy dead, to be absolute, and that the Commanders and men of the theaters in which American forces are operating-against the Japanese forces are committed to this obligation. The United States Government expects that the Japanese Government will likewise fulfill its obligation and cause its armed forces to desist from their savage behaviour toward the Americans taken captive by them. The civilized and honorable treatment which the Japanese Government expects for the dead, and which American soldiers are prepared to extend to their Japanese opponents both living and dead, can best be assured by humane and civilized conduct on the part of the Japanese armed forces. Washington , December 5, 1944. The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 711.94114/11–1744 [Document 1146] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to memorandum (No. 234, Ex. 113.00 G) dated November 2, 1944 from the Spanish Embassy 12 in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States transmitting the request of the Spanish Embassy for a report on the fatal shooting at the Fitzsimons General Hospital, near Denver, Colorado, of three Japanese prisoners of war, Kuzunori Makino, Saburo Nakagawa and Sadamu Okada, who were being treated at the hospital for tuberculosis. Exhaustive investigations were conducted on November 5, 1944 in the cases of each of the three deceased prisoners. Thirteen witnesses, constituting all of the persons who had any knowledge regarding the events leading up to and in any manner connected with the incident in question, were examined in each case. The three prisoners were admitted to the hospital on May 18, 1944. From the time of their arrival they were confined in the Japanese section of Ward B–1, with the exception of a few days during which they were convalescing from abdominal wounds resulting from their attempt to commit “hara kiri”. On September 1, 1944 the three prisoners refused all food for a period of about ten days. At about 9 o’clock p.m. on October 29, 1944 the three prisoners were given a bottle of milk. One of the prisoners threw the bottle at the guard. It broke and spilled the milk on the floor. The prisoners adopted a belligerent attitude toward the guard who at about 9:25 p.m. called the Corporal of the Guard and informed him that there was trouble in Ward B–1. The Corporal, accompanied by two sentinels armed with clubs, proceeded to Ward B–1. Upon arrival they were informed by the guard on duty of the milk bottle incident. Thereupon they opened the door which led into the Japanese prisoners’ section, gave one of the prisoners a broom and ordered him to clean up the floor. Nakagawa said something in Japanese to his compatriots who then refused to obey the orders. Nakagawa seized the club from one of the sentinels and Nakino and Okada rushed the other, grasped him by the throat and tried to strangle him. The guard fired a shot into the floor in order to frighten the prisoners, but they continued their attack upon the sentinel who appealed to the guard for his gun. Upon obtaining it he ordered the prisoners back into their section. Instead of obeying, Nakagawa attacked him. The sentinel fired. Nakagawa fell to the floor. Thereupon the other two prisoners attacked the sentinel who fired at them both. Makino fell and Okada ran into his room. Upon examination all three prisoners were found to be dead. According to the medical report Makino’s death was caused by a gun shot wound described as “Wound, perforating, result of bullet, left cranial cavity; entrance left frontal region; exit left tempero-occipital region, with destruction lateral inferior portion left cerebral hemisphere”. Nakawaga died of a gun shot wound, described as “Wound, perforating, result of bullet entering right inferior anterior neck, through superior mediastinum, left innominate vein, left common carotid, left phrenic nerve, left upper lobe lung, left 5th rib, skin left axilla, left humerus, left radial nerve, exit over left deltoid”. The cause of Okada’s death was described as “Wound, perforating, result of bullet, entrance through right anterior thorax, through right rib (5th), right middle lobe lung, pericardial sac, right ventricle heart, left lower lobe lung, left leaflet diaphragm, left lobe liver, left 8th rib, exit left 6th interspace”. The sentinel, when examined by the medical authority at about 10 p.m. was found to have sustained “a severe contusion of the mid-occipital parietal region of the skull”. The medical authority testified that in his opinion the injury was caused by some blunt object “used with considerable force”. In each case the board which conducted the investigation found that the prisoner in question was engaged in a mutiny at the time of his death, that the sentinel “was acting in the execution of his duty as a sentinel” when he inflicted the fatal injuries, and that the shootings were in self defense. Washington , December 9, 1944. 12 Not printed. The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 711.94114/12–1144 [Document 1147] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 250 Ex. 150.000 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to transmit the following memorandum received from the Japanese Government through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” in Madrid: Memorandum , December 9, 1944. “Dispatch dated 1st November sent to New York Herald Tribune from Dagami by Frank Kelly attached to U.S. Seventh Division in Leyte, contains an account of battle on the day preceding All Saints’ Day given by Lieutenant Bronks of New York State which is to following effects. Harry Travers of New Orleans killed Japanese Captain who rushed on from right hand side of Dagami Cemetery with sword and revolver in hand. Private named Will Carry who had been wounded by Japanese Captain with revolver, took sword from deceased. Curney Mill, who had been wounded with sword took revolver and Travers who had killed Japanese Captain looted latter’s wrist watch. Above fact shows that United States troops took no steps to protect Japanese soldiers killed in battle from looting and ill treatment. Above mentioned conduct of U. S. soldiers is violation of Article 3 of 1929 Geneva Convention regarding amelioration of condition of wounded, and Japanese Government therefore file protest with United States Government and demand them to give instructions to their forces in order to prevent any recurrence of such unlawful conduct in future.” Washington , December 11, 1944. The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 750.00115 P.W./12–1144 [Document 1148] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 13 No. 252 Ex. 150.000 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to transmit the following Memorandum from the Imperial Japanese Government, received through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” in Madrid: Memorandum —December 9, 1944. “A dispatch from Newsweek correspondent in Saipan dated 28th August, which was published in United States, reveals the fact that whole Japanese male civilians interned in Saipan ranging between ages of sixteen and fifty-five are registered for work and are engaged in work from eight hours a day on airfields, etc. It is presumed from above report that Japanese civilian internees in Saipan are forced to work and if so, Japanese Government wish to point out that it is contrary to understanding between Japan and United States relating to mutual treatment of civilians. Even if work is not compulsory it is needless to say that it is unlawful to engage internees in construction of military airfields. Japanese Government, therefore, protest to United States Government against this unlawful employment of Japanese civilian internees and demand United States Government immediately put a stop to it.” Washington , December 11, 1944. 13 Acknowledged by the Department on December 22. The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00115 P.W./11–3044 [Document 1149] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to memorandum No. 140, Ex. 113.00 T–2, dated June 6, 1944 from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States transmitting a memorandum dated June 3, 1944 from the Japanese Government concerning the shooting of Soichi Okamoto (Shoiza) at the Tule Lake Relocation Center. With reference to the Japanese Government’s protest concerning the death of Soichi Okamoto, since he was an American citizen, the United States Government is at a loss to understand the Japanese Government’s concern with his death. The United States Government, however, states for the information of the Spanish Embassy that a thorough investigation of all of the circumstances surrounding the death of Soichi Okamoto was made by a duly appointed board of four officers, in the course of which the board interviewed all available witnesses, some twenty in number. The investigating board found that Soichi Okamoto was shot by the sentry in performance of his duties. In view of the fact that the incident resulted in the death of a human being, the sentry was tried by general court-martial, charged with manslaughter under the 93rd Article of War. The court-martial established that the sentry fired in the performance of his duty and he was, therefore, acquitted. Washington , December 19, 1944. The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 711.94114/12–2244 [Document 1150] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to a memorandum dated December 11, 1944 (No. 250, Ex. 150.000) from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States transmitting a memorandum from the Japanese Government dated December 9, 1944 protesting against the alleged rifling by American soldiers of the possessions of deceased Japanese soldiers. The Spanish Embassy is informed with regard to the protest that the revolver and the sword alleged to have been removed from the body of a deceased Japanese officer are considered to be necessary war material susceptible of direct military use as prescribed in Annex to Hague Convention, No. IV, Article 53, Paragraph 2 14 which states that all kinds of ammunition of war may be seized even if they belong to private individuals. The removal, therefore, of the revolver and sword was in no way unlawful. The wrist watch might also be included in this category unless it were removed for personal gain. The War Department is accordingly informing the Theater Commander of all details concerning the alleged incident for corrective action if such may be found necessary. Washington , January 8, 1945. 14 Signed October 18, 1907, Foreign Relations , 1907, pt. 2, pp. 1207 , 1216 . Protests by Japan against attacks by the United States on hospital ships Protests by Japan against attacks by the United States on hospital ships 15 15 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 1036 – 1046 . [1151] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , January 8, 1944. 740.00117 Pacific War/61 [1152] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , February 5, 1944. 740.00117 Pacific War/96 [1153] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, February 9, 1944. 740.00117 Pacific War/85: Telegram [1154] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , March 28, 1944. 740.00117 Pacific War/93 [1155] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, April 27, 1944. 740.00117 Pacific War/103: Telegram [1156] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , May 1, 1944. 740.00117 Pacific War/106 [1157] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , May 9, 1944. 740.00117 Pacific War/110 [1158] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , May 11, 1944. 740.00117 Pacific War/111 [1159] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , June 10, 1944. 740.00117 P.W./106 [1160] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , June 14, 1944. 740.00117 P.W/116 [1161] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , July 27, 1944. 740.00117 P.W./111 [1162] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , September 26, 1944. 740.00117 P.W./9–2644 [1163] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , December 4, 1944. 740.00117 Pacific War/12–444 [1164] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , December 27, 1944. 740.00117 P.W./12–2744 The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00117 Pacific War/61 [Document 1151] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to memorandum no. 148 of June 28, 1943 from the Spanish Embassy 16 in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States and to the Department’s preliminary reply of July 6, 1943 17 regarding alleged attacks on six Japanese hospital ships. 1. The United States Government has caused a detailed investigation to be made of the alleged attacks on the six Japanese hospital ships and, as a result thereof, the following determinations have been made: a. Arabia Maru: On 4 January 1943 airplanes dropped bombs on a vessel, described as a transport, in the Rangoon River scoring hits and near misses, as a result of which heavy smoke was billowing up from this vessel when last seen. The Japanese protest refers to bombs dropped adjacent to the alleged hospital ship. The alleged jeopardy to the hospital ship must have arisen, therefore, from its proximity to a military target. b. America Maru: Enemy shipping in Rabaul Harbor was attacked by airplanes at 0505 on 30 January 1943 and at 1205 on the same date an airplane attack was made against a transport in the open bay. On neither occasion was any hospital ship or illuminated vessel observed in the area referred to in the Japanese protest. The Japanese allege the attack as occurring at 0420 and if it occurred it must, therefore, have been as a result of the presence of the hospital ship in proximity to military targets and without identifying illumination. c. Manila Maru: On 4 March 1943 in the area stated, but at 1257–1301, torpedoes were fired at a zigzagging light grey Japanese vessel during a rain squall. The ship was not painted as prescribed for hospital ships by the Hague Convention. 18 d. Urabu Maru: An airplane attack was made on a vessel near Kavieng at 1600 on 3 April 1943. At the time of sighting this vessel, the aircraft concerned was at a height of 6,000 feet. The crew of the aircraft did not observe any of the conventional markings which indicated a hospital ship, but did see what appeared to be a canvas-covered gun position forward. From the photographs taken during the attack, it is not possible to distinguish with the naked eye any hospital ship insignia and only in one of these can such insignia be distinguished by the aid of a magnifying glass. No insignia appears from an overhead position, and no Red Cross flag was flown. The absence of distinctive and obvious markings from overhead made it quite impossible for the aircraft to determine the special status of this vessel and the presence on the deck of what appeared to be a gun, added strength to the presumption that the vessel was other than a hospital ship. e. Huso Maru: No operation by a United Nations aircraft has been reported against any ship on 15 April 1943 in any area adjacent to the alleged location. On 16 April a night attack was made upon Kahili and Ballale where previous reconnaissance had revealed the presence of a number of warships and cargo vessels, presenting a legitimate military target. Among the targets attacked was a large ship, subsequently identified as a hospital ship. Illumination of the hospital ship was such that its identity was not apparent above 2,000 feet. The attack was abandoned immediately after identification. f. Buenos Aires Maru: The Japanese report alleges an attack by submarine near Hongkong at 1545 on 25 April 1943. No United States submarine nor, as far as this Government is aware, any other United Nations submarine made an attack in the general vicinity of Hongkong on this date. 2. The Armed Forces of the United States are under strict instructions to observe scrupulously the terms of the Hague Convention applicable to hospital ships and to accord all due immunity to such vessels. The United States Government is satisfied that these instructions are complied with to the limit permitted by the compliance of Japanese hospital ships with their reciprocal obligations. The fact that the conventions are known to the personnel of the Armed Forces and that such personnel make every effort to observe them is demonstrated by repeated reports of the sighting of hospital ships which have not been molested when recognized as such. 3. It must be pointed out, furthermore, that international law expressly recognizes certain circumstances under which belligerents may be unable to accord immunity to hospital ships. These circumstances arise, for example, when a hospital ship at its own risk and peril stations itself in the vicinity of a legitimate military target whether in port or on the high seas, or when a hospital ship fails to provide itself with adequate and clearly visible markings and illuminations as it is under obligation to do by the terms of Article 5 of the Hague Convention. 4. The United States Government regrets that accidental attacks should have been made upon Japanese hospital ships. But the attacks alleged appear to be definitely attributable to the failure of the Japanese authorities either to insure the identification of their hospital ships or to remove those ships from the immediate vicinity of legitimate military targets, or to both causes. 5. The United States Government, while for the above reasons rejecting entirely the protests made by the Japanese Government, desires to assure the Japanese Government that it has every intention of continuing to respect the immunity of hospital ships in accordance with its assumed obligations and international practice. It is observed, however, that it is not always possible for aircraft to distinguish the identification for hospital ships prescribed by the Hague Convention. The United States Government points out that the markings prescribed by the Hague Convention must be considered the minimum rather than the maximum requirements, and that at the time they were prescribed the circumstances of naval warfare only were envisaged. 6. The United States Government has accordingly taken steps to place upon its hospital ships markings additional to those prescribed by the Hague Convention and in order to facilitate their identification as such in the light of the conditions of modern warfare, has adopted the following policies, the adoption of which with respect to Japanese hospital ships should similarly facilitate their identification: a . In order to acquire right to immunity at night, hospital ships must be illuminated continuously from sunset to sunrise. b . In order to acquire right to immunity at night, the funnels and hulls of hospital ships must be illuminated from sunset to sunrise to show the Red Crosses, white painting and green band. Distinctive markings which must at all times be displayed on the decks for identification from the air must be similarly illuminated at night. c . If markings are not illuminated at the time of an attack at night, no complaint can be entertained. It is not, however, illegal for a hospital ship to darken ship at her own risk on necessary occasions such as when lying in a port, passing through defensive minefields or in company with the fleet. 7. The United States Government notes that the altered markings of certain Japanese military hospital ships, as well as the provision for their illumination at night, which are described in the Embassy’s memorandum no. 329 (Ex. 111.00) of November 8, 1943, 19 are similar in nature to those referred to in subparagraph 66 above. Washington , January 8, 1944. 16 Ibid. , p. 1036 . 17 Not printed; but see footnote 58, ibid. , p. 1037 . 18 Convention for the Adaptation to Naval War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907, Foreign Relations , 1907, pt. 2, p. 1229 . The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field was signed July 6, 1906, ibid. , 1906, pt. 2, p. 1559 . 19 Not printed. The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00117 Pacific War/96 [Document 1152] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers further to memorandum no. 354 (Ex. 111.00) of December 20, 1943 from the Spanish Embassy 20 in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States regarding the alleged aerial bombardment and sinking by United States aircraft of the Japanese hospital ship Buenos Aires Maru. A detailed investigation by the United States Government concerning the alleged attack on the Buenos Aires Maru has disclosed that an attack was made against a ship which, at the time of bombing from an altitude of 7,000 feet, was believed to be a Japanese freight-passenger vessel and that hospital ship markings on the vessel were not apparent until after the attack had been made. The Japanese Government alleges that the attack was made in longitude 129 degrees, 20 minutes east, but it appears that this is an error and that the correct longitude was 149 degrees, 20 minutes east. It has been determined that the attack was accidental and arose from the fact that the hospital ship markings were not discernible from the attacking aircraft overhead. In the circumstances, the United States Government is of the opinion that blame cannot be attached to the personnel of the attacking aircraft. With respect to the alleged machine gunning on December 1, 1943 of drifting lifeboats from the Buenos Aires Maru , it has been established that the particular identity of the boats was again not apparent. The other circumstances of the attack were such that there was no basis for the attacking aircraft to presume that the boats were those of a hospital ship. For these reasons, the United States Government rejects in its entirety the validity of the protest of the Japanese Government. If, however, the ship attacked was in fact the Buenos Aires Maru , the United States Government expresses its sincere regrets and emphasizes the accidental nature of the attack. It is stressed in this connection that the terms of the Hague Convention setting forth the markings, use and immunity of hospital ships, as well as the altered markings of certain Japanese hospital ships as described in the Embassy’s memorandum no. 329 (Ex. 111.00) of November 8, 1943, 21 have been communicated to all concerned in the United States armed forces for their guidance. The United States Government is convinced that these instructions meet with full compliance. Repeated reports of the sighting of hospital ships by United States submarines and aircraft which were in a position to attack, but did not do so when hospital ship markings were recognized, demonstrate that members of the armed forces are familiar with, and make every effort to observe, accepted international usage concerning the immunity of hospital ships. The United States armed forces have molested no hospital ship when recognized as such. The difficulty of recognizing hospital ships from the air is of deep concern to the United States Government and it believes that the avoidance of attacks on such vessels is desired by all belligerents. The Japanese Government is assured, moreover, that the United States Government has every intention of continuing to respect the immunity of hospital ships in accordance with its assumed obligations and international practice. Washington , February 5, 1944. 20 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1044 . 21 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00117 Pacific War/85: Telegram [Document 1153] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , February 9, 1944. 436. For immediate delivery to Japanese Government: “A report from the Pacific Theater of Operations discloses that a United States aircraft on the night of January 31, 1944 while on a reconnaissance mission at an approximate location of 4 degrees 13 minutes south and 151 degrees 30 minutes east made one bombing run dropping three bombs over what appeared to be a Japanese cargo vessel. Red Cross lights were observed on the vessel after that attack and the aircraft immediately refrained from further hostile action. The United States Government regrets any damage that may have been caused to a Japanese hospital ship as a result of this accidental attack.” Hull The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00117 Pacific War/93 [Document 1154] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers further to memorandum no. 352 (Ex. 119.01) of December 13, 1943 from the Spanish Embassy 22 in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States regarding alleged attacks on four Japanese hospital ships. The alleged attacks on the four Japanese hospital ships have been the subject of exhaustive investigation by the United States Government, as a result of which the following conclusions have been reached: 1. Takasago Maru . It is presumed that the alleged attack in this instance was made on 26 April 1942 and not on 26 April 1943, as stated in the protest from the Japanese Government, in view of the fact that there is a record of an attack on the former date against a vessel which later proved to be a hospital ship. On April 26, 1942, a United States submarine attacked a darkened ship in the position stated. After the attack the vessel switched on lights which revealed Red Crosses on the boat decks. The United States Government can accept no responsibility for damage to a hospital ship which does not take steps to reveal her identity at night. In addition if this vessel was the Takasago Maru it is pointed out that she was not notified by the Japanese Government to the United States Government as a hospital ship until June 2, 1942. The United States Government can accept no responsibility whatever for attacks on vessels prior to their notification as hospital ships. 2. Mizuho Maru . Since no information can be obtained of any attack by an aircraft against any vessel on the date and in the locality specified, the United States Government must disclaim all responsibility in this case. 3. Muro Maru . If an attack was made against this hospital ship as alleged, the circumstances of the attack and the absence of hospital ship markings obviate any basis for responsibility on the part of the United States Government or its forces. The only recorded attack upon any vessels at a time and place near those alleged was upon an armed convoy in which none of the merchant vessels was noted to have been marked as a hospital ship. 4. America Maru . An attack by aircraft against shipping took place on the date and in the locality specified but no Red Cross markings were discernible on any ship. As stated in the Department’s memorandum of February 5, 1944 regarding the alleged sinking by United States aircraft of the Japanese hospital ship Buenos Aires Maru , the terms of the Hague Convention outlining the markings, use and immunity of hospital ships have been made known to all concerned in the armed forces of the United States, and the altered markings of certain Japanese hospital ships, described in the Embassy’s memorandum no. 329 (Ex. 111.00) of November 8, 1943 23 have likewise been communicated to the armed forces for their guidance. The United States Government is convinced that its armed forces are complying with these instructions to respect the immunity of hospital ships. The fact that the terms of the Convention are known to the personnel of the armed forces and that such personnel make every effort to observe them is demonstrated by repeated reports of the sighting of hospital ships by submarines and aircraft which were in a position to attack, but did not do so when hospital ship markings were recognized. No hospital ship when identified as such has been molested by the armed forces of the United States. The Department repeats in this connection that the United States Government is deeply concerned over the problem of recognizing hospital ships under all conditions and most earnestly urges the Japanese Government to take every possible step to increase the size of markings and to adopt the maximum measures of illumination of hospital ship markings at night. While rejecting entirely the validity of the Japanese Government’s protest regarding alleged attacks on the Takasago Maru, Mizuho Maru, Muro Maru and America Maru , the United States Government reiterates its assurances that it has every intention of continuing to respect the immunity of hospital ships in accordance with its assumed obligations and international practice. Washington , March 28, 1944. 22 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1043 . 23 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 740.00117 Pacific War/103: Telegram [Document 1155] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , April 27, 1944. 1457. Department’s 416, February 8th. 24 Following for immediate delivery to Japanese Government: “An amplification of the preliminary report received by the United States Government from its forces in the Pacific Theater of Operations concerning the accidental attack upon a hospital ship, presumably Japanese, about 30 miles north of Rabaul during the night of January 25 to 26 which was referred to in the previous communication to the Japanese Government pertaining to this matter 25 discloses that at about 0410 local time on January 26 a single aircraft while on a scheduled night patrol made contact with a vessel in position approximately 3 degrees 51 minutes south latitude and 151 degrees 43 minutes east longitude. The weather at the time of the attack consisted of 40 to 60 percent cloud coverage with scattered showers. The attack was conducted from an altitude of about 1200 feet. Under the prevailing visibility conditions the illumination of the ship was indistinct, and on the approach the vessel appeared to be on fire. Just prior to reaching the release point the navigator was able to distinguish three illuminated crosses on the top deck of the vessel and identified it as a hospital ship. No lights were observed on the side. The navigator immediately announced over the inter-phone system of the aircraft that the vessel was a hospital ship, whereupon the bombardier made an unsuccesful attempt to lock the bomb racks, and the pilot kicked left rudder in an effort to turn the bombs clear of the target. Three bombs were dropped and the nearest landed in the vessel’s wake about 100 feet from the stern. No apparent damage was sustained by the ship. It has been established that this attack was clearly unintentional and was the result of inability to distinguish the hospital ship markings in sufficient time to break off the attack before the bombs were released. Prompt action by the pilot, however, prevented damage to the ship. While the United States Government regrets this accidental attack, the investigation has revealed that the hospital ship was not illuminated in accordance with established international practice which provides for the hull, as well as the upper deck, to be illuminated at night to show the Red Crosses, white paint and green band.” Please request Swiss Legation Tokyo to telegraph date this message is delivered to Japanese Government. 26 Hull 24 Not printed. 25 Telegram 416. 26 Telegram 2957, May 30, from Bern, reported delivery of the message on May 5. The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00117 Pacific War/106 [Document 1156] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 88 Ex. 111.00 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit a Memorandum received through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” 27 in Madrid, from the Japanese Government and which reads as follows: “ Memorandum —April 28th, 1944 1. (A) Japanese Hospital ship Yosino Maru while sailing singly with 6300 wounded and sick soldiers aboard, was attacked by a United States aeroplane apparently a reconnoitring place at 0230 on 26th January at a point 40 miles North of Rabaul, latitude 3 degrees 45 minutes south, longitude 151 degrees 42 minutes east. The Enemy plane, descending to an altitude of 300 metres behind the hospital ship, dropped a bomb, which missed starboard side of bow only by 30 metres, wounding a member of medical corps who was on duty on ship through concussion of air which it had caused. (B) In accordance with provisions of convention for adaptation of principles of Geneva Convention to maritime war, Japanese Government notified U.S.A. Government in December 1942 that Yosino Maru was used as hospital ship. The ship in conformity with provisions of convention was painted white, and red cross markings, seven in number, were affixed to both sides, stern, both sides of funnel, over bridge, and over poopdeck. All these markings were illuminated at time of attack. The red cross over bridge was 9.60 metres long and 1.30 metres wide, and red cross over poopdeck was 11.60 metres long and 1.20 metres wide. It is presumed that Yosino Maru is that hospital ship which U.S.A. Government alleges was attacked in mistake for a burning ship at a point 30 miles to north of Rabaul on night between 25th and 26th January. 28 But illuminated red cross markings of Yosino Maru were large enough to be clearly discerned from height of over 400 metres and therefore could not but have been perfectly visible from so low altitude as 300 metres. Moreover, as illumination of red crosses on Japanese hospital ships is so designed as to prevent diffused reflection, it is impossible to mistake red crosses for flames of a fire on board ship. At time of attack sky was clear, the wind was NW whipped 4 metres, and visibility perfect. 2. (A) Japanese hospital ship Tatibana Maru while sailing singly, was attacked by consolidated B–24 in latitude 2 degrees 14 minutes south and longitude 124 degrees 37 minutes east between 0230 and 0247 on 14th March. The enemy plane, which was flying at height lower than 200 metres on south eastward course, twice attacked hospital ship at right angles to her starboard side, dropping three bombs and successively sweeping her with machinegun fire. Bombs fell within 100 metres of starboard quarter, and machinegun firing damaged hull. (B) In accordance with provisions of convention for adaptation of Geneva Convention of maritime war, Japanese Government notified U.S.A. Government in October last year that Tatibana Maru was used as hospital ship. The ship was painted in conformity with provisions of convention, and furnished with many red cross markings. Following six red cross markings especially were perfectly illuminated at time of attack; (1) A red cross facing skyward over bridge, length 8.50 by 9.00 metres, width 1.06 metres. (2) A red cross facing skyward over poopdeck length 7.84 by 5.30 metres, width 1.25 metres. (3) A red cross facing backward on poopdeck, length 4.95 by 5.14 metres, width 0.72 metres. (4) A red cross on mizzen masthead, length 4.06 by 4.06 metres, width 0.40 metres. (5) A red cross on each side of funnel, length 4.06 by 4.06 metres, width 0.40 metres. Though sky was cloudy at time of attack, there was moon and visibility was good. (C) No other ship was in vicinity at the time. From height of 200 metres, at which enemy plane was flying, illuminated red crosses were perfectly discernible. It has been experimentally proved that the smallest illuminated red cross on the ship, which is 4.06 metres long and 0.40 wide, is visible to naked eye at height of 250 metres. There is no doubt, therefore, that illuminated red crosses over bridge and poopdeck were clearly seen from the height from which attacks were made. 3. Japanese Government regret that despite repeated explanations given by U.S.A. Government of attacks on Japanese hospital ships, and their expression of intention to observe provisions of Hague Convention relating to hospital ships, there should have again occurred these unlawful attacks on Yoshino Maru and Tatibana Maru . Japanese Government lodge protest with U.S.A. Government and demand that U.S.A. Government punish persons responsible and take all necessary steps to prevent recurrence of such incidents. Japanese Government also reserve all rights to take necessary measures for suppression of such cruel acts. In advancing this protest, Japanese Government wish to make particular mention of fact that attacks under review were apparently committed with a malicious motive to molest antagonist, and that such violations of rules of war, it is to be feared, may eventually give rise to an untoward state of affairs which will bear hardly upon both belligerents.” Washington , May 1, 1944. 27 Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 28 This has reference to telegram 416, February 8, to Bern (not printed), which contained the text of a message on this subject to be delivered to the Japanese Government through the Swiss Legation in Japan; see telegram 1457, April 27, to Bern, supra. The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00117 Pacific War/110 [Document 1157] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 94 Ex. 111.00 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit a Memorandum received through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” in Madrid, from the Japanese Government and which reads as follows: “ Memorandum —May 9th, 1944 1. With reference to unlawful attacks on Arabia Maru and five other Japanese hospital ships, Japanese Government upon careful study of reply of United States Government and further detailed investigations have obtained following results: (1) Arabia Maru —Ship was painted white in full conformity with provisions of 1907 Convention for adaptation of principles of Geneva Convention to Maritime War. Ship also bore red cross markings in particular she had as markings for air, a Red Cross each of whose bars was 9 metres long and 1.50 metres wide over bridge and a Red Cross, each of whose bars was 6 metres long and 1 metre wide over poop-deck. Attack was made from height of 3000 metres but these markings are descernible at height of 4000 metres and weather was perfectly fine at time of attack. Arabia Maru was only vessel which was sailing up Rangoon River then and there was nothing to be regarded as military target within one mile of ship. (2) American Maru —As to when, where, and how attack was made it was fully described in former protest. There was no military target in vicinity. Ship bore Red Cross markings on funnel both sides of ship, both sides of bridge, stern, and over poop-deck. These Red Cross markings were perfectly illuminated before, during and after attack. Sky was clear, there was moon, and it was immediately before daybreak when attack was made. Enemy plane was at height of 3000 metres where markings of hospital ship must have been perfectly visible. (3) Manila Maru —Ship was painted white in perfect conformity with provisions of convention and she also bore Red Cross markings. At time of attack weather threatened of squall, but attackers were at distance from which they could clearly discern that their objective was hospital ship. Zigzag movement of Manila Maru was made in self defences after she was attacked, but not before. (4) Urabu Maru —Enemy plane dropped bombs from height of 800 metres and ascended and disappeared among wisps of cloud. Japanese hospital ship was painted white in accordance with provisions of convention and bore red cross markings of bars 9 metres long and 1.60 metres wide over bridge and over poop-deck. These markings were perfectly and distinctly discernible at height from which attack was made. White sail canvas said to have been observed about bow of ship was, it is presumed, a sheet of sail canvas covering two anchor winches which it was not practicable to paint white. (5) Huso Maru —First attack on this ship was made on 14th April off Namatanaian Island of New Ireland. Second attack was made at 2000 on 16th April at point 20 miles to south east of Erventa. An enemy plane dropped illuminating bombs and carried on bombing and machine gunning for about an hour. Ship was painted white in perfect conformity with provisions of convention and also bore red cross markings. A red cross of bars 10 metres long and 1 metre wide was affixed over bridge and a red cross of bars 6 metres long and 1.80 metres wide over poopdeck. These Red Crosses were fully illuminated at time of attack. From height at which enemy carried on attack, above-mentioned Red Cross markings are certain to have been discerned and the two illuminated Red Crosses on funnel and one illuminated Red Cross at Stern cannot but have facilitated recognition of vessel as hospital ship. (6) Buenos Aires Maru —This ship was torpedoed by an enemy submarine at 1545 on 25th April in longitude 22 degrees 12 minutes north and latitude 114 degrees 47 minutes east. At the moment when shock was felt many members of crew witnessed patches of white foam ahead of bow towards port side and also top of periscope moving in same direction as ship. It was thus confirmed that attack was made by submarine. Ship was painted white in accordance with convention and bore many distinct Red Cross markings. 2. It is alleged by United States Government that attacks on above mentioned hospital ships arose either from Japanese Authorities having failed to ensure sufficient marking of vessels for their identification as hospital ships or from their not having secured that presence of vessels in proximity to any legitimate military target was avoided or from both these circumstances combined. But what has been stated in 1 above shows that these allegations are groundless. All Japanese Authorities in any way connected with hospital ships are given strict instructions to observe provisions of convention and never to infringe them. Every possible care is taken in order that hospital ships shall not do anything whatever which may be mistaken for hostile act or go near any military target. From investigations made on spot and accounts furnished by eyewitnesses of attacks it has been established that attacks on Japanese hospital ships by United States aircraft or submarines were made from malicious motive of inflicting unnecessary suffering on antagonist, unless they were result of lack of due care on part of attackers. Most distinct markings of hospital ships and best illumination therefore could be no safeguard against such attacks. By alleging that Japanese hospital ships came near military targets or that their markings and illumination thereof were imperfect, United States Government are attempting to excuse their own fault. Provisions of article 4 of Convention for adaptation of principles of Geneva Convention to Maritime War, however, furnish no excuse for attacking an hospital ship deliberately or through any lack of due care. Japanese Government therefore are unable to accept as sufficient reply of United States Government and in confirmation of their previous protest they demand that United States Government conduct thorough reinvestigation of the matter and admit all responsibility for unlawful attacks on hospital ship. Japanese Government also invite serious attention of United States Government to fact that in spite of United States Government’s allegation of all possible efforts having been made to make United [States] forces on front to observe provisions of Hague Convention relating to hospital ships, Government orders in this respect are apparently not always complied with by United States Forces.” Washington , May 9, 1944. The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00117 Pacific War/111 [Document 1158] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 97 Ex. 111.00 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and with reference to its memorandum of February 8, 1944 29 regarding a reported attack of Hospital Ships, presumably Japanese, begs to transmit a memorandum received through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” in Madrid from the Japanese Government which reads as follows: Memorandum —May 10th, 1944 “1. United States Government attempts to evade their responsibility for attacking and sinking of Japanese hospital ship Buenos Aires Maru by United States aeroplanes alleging in their memorandum of 5th February that attack was due to fact of markings of ship not being distinct enough for discerning her as hospital ship. As results of detailed reinvestigation of circumstances surrounding incident, Japanese Government assert that allegations of United States Government are entirely contrary to true facts. 2. (A) Buenos Aires Maru was not only perfectly marked in accordance with provisions of convention for adaptation of principles of Geneva Convention to maritime war, but also bore following Red Cross markings: Markings for Air: 1. A red cross whose bars were respectively 36 and 40 metres long and 3.80 metres wide bars extending to whole width of ship and whole length of deckhouse respectively and crossing each other at funnel. 2. A red cross each of whose bars was 11 meters long and 1.20 metres wide over poop-deck. Others: 1. A red cross each of whose bars was 14 meters long and 2.50 metres wide on each side of ship. 2. A red cross each of whose bars was 4.15 metres long and 0.40 metres wide one each side of funnel. 3. A red cross each of whose bars was 6 metres long and 0.60 metres wide on stern facing backward. Above mentioned red cross of 36 x 40 metres size placed over deck house is of largest and best conceivable kind especially designed in view of repeated attacks on Japanese hospital ships by the United States aeroplanes and it has been experimentally proved that it is perfectly discernible from height of 6000 metres. As was pointed out in previous protest, sky was clear, wind light, and sea calm, at time of attack. Two large sized enemy planes came from behind Buenos Aires Maru with rays of morning sun behind them and after dropping bombs flew through lower part of space between stratus (1,000 metres high) and cumulus (1,400 metres high) and disappeared among clouds. From these circumstances it is inferred that planes dropped bombs from height approximately of 1200 metres. Judging from weather conditions and height from which attack was made all such outward appearances indicative of hospital ship as white painting and green band as well as above mentioned red cross markings must have been discerned at a glance. Moreover, planes were flying with their backs towards morning sun in clear atmosphere. They could not expect more favorable conditions for discerning their objective. Keck-lessly and unscrupulously was attack in such circumstances made. (B) Details of attack on lifeboats fully laden with wounded and sick soldiers on first December, were as follows: How Enemy planes Came: 1. Two enemy planes passed overhead at about 0810 on 29th November. 2. After[ward] on same day an enemy plane circled once overhead and flew away. 3. At about 0910 on First December a large sized four-engined enemy plane circled overhead and gradually descended to height of 150 metres. However, it noticed red crosses made of red cloth 1.50 metres long and 0.30 metres wide stretched over boats and without making any attack, flew away. How They Attacked: 1. At about 1500 on First December a Consolidated B–24 came flying and circled at height of 500 metres. A red cross made of red cloth was displayed over each boat as on previous occasion. But enemy plane gradually descended till it circled at height of 100 metres and then from altitude as low as 70 metres, twice swept boats with 13 milimetre machine-gun bullets. Eight of the wounded and sick soldiers fell victims to this attack. 2. At the time there were 17 lifeboats laden to capacity with wounded and sick forming a circle of about one and half miles diameter. All boats were painted white and bore green bands and red crosses. Attacking plane was at so low altitude that inmates of attacked boats clearly discerned United States mark and white mark like skull painted on plane and even smiling faces of three of four members of crew of plane. There is no doubt therefore, that occupants of plane must have unmistakably discerned not only markings of lifeboats, but also white clothes worn by sick and wounded soldiers and red cross arm bands worn by members of medical corps. 3. From above-mentioned facts Japanese Government come to conclusion that occupants of United States plane deliberately attacked Buenos Aires Maru , in spite of their distinct recognition of her markings and of their consequent unmistakable knowledge of her being a hospital ship. Reckless manner in which attack was carried on further shows that attackers committed this offense from shocking motive of taking pleasure in murder of wounded and sick who were without means of defense. Japanese Government regret that they cannot but conclude that there exists no sufficient sincere willingness on part of United States Government to look into accurate facts of case in order to elucidate where responsibility lies and to effect a fair and just settlement of matter so as to prevent any recurrence of such inhuman acts. Japanese Government hereby notify United States Government that they are unable to accept as satisfactory United States reply of 5th February and demand of United States Government reinvestigation of matter, punishment of persons responsible and guarantees for future. Japanese Government also declare that they reserve all rights relating to unlawful acts under review.” Washington , May 11, 1944. 29 Memorandum to the Spanish Embassy quoted the text of a message in telegram 416, February 8, to Bern, not printed, which was to be delivered to the Japanese Government through the Swiss Legation in Japan; see telegram 1457, April 27, to Bern, p. 1153 [ Pg. 1153 includes portions of Doc. 1154 and Doc. 1155 ] . The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00117 P.W./106 [Document 1159] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to memorandum no. 88 of May 1, 1944 from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States and the Department’s memorandum of May 6, 1944 30 in acknowledgment thereof concerning alleged attacks by aircraft on the Japanese hospital ships Yosino Maru and Tatibana Maru. It is noted that the alleged attack on the Yosino Maru is said to have taken place on January 26, 1944 at three degrees forty-five minutes south latitude and one hundred fifty-one degrees forty-two minutes east longitude, while that on the Tatibana Maru is said to have occurred on March 14, 1944 at two degrees fourteen minutes south latitude and one hundred twenty-four degrees thirty-seven minutes east longitude. All evidence points to the conclusion that the alleged attack upon the Yosino Maru was that referred to in the Department’s memorandum of April 27, 1944, the substance of which was also sent to the American Legation at Bern for communication through Swiss channels 31 to the Japanese Government. A full account of the attack on January 26 is contained in the Department’s memorandum of April 27 and there is no further information to add thereto. It is assumed that the Japanese Government at the time of making its protest in respect of the Yosino Maru did not yet have available to it the information set forth in that memorandum. It has been ascertained after careful investigation that no United States aircraft was operating in the vicinity of the alleged attack upon the Tatibana Maru during the night that it purportedly occurred. The United States Government accordingly disclaims all responsibility for the attack said to have been made upon the Tatibana Maru . Washington , June 10, 1944. 30 Latter not printed. 31 Telegram 1457, April 27, to Bern, p. 1153 [ Pg. 1153 includes portions of Doc. 1154 and Doc. 1155 ] . The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00117 P.W/116 [Document 1160] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to memorandum no. 94 (Ex. 111.00) of May 9, 1944 from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States and to the Department’s memorandum of May 16, 1944 32 in acknowledgment thereof concerning a message from the Japanese Government in respect of the reply made by the United States Government to the Japanese protest alleging attacks on the Arabia Maru and five other Japanese hospital ships. The United States Government reiterates its regret that accidental attacks should have been made upon Japanese hospital ships. The present opportunity is also availed of to repeat the assurances that all United States forces are strictly admonished to respect the immunity of hospital ships and are doing so to the maximum extent that is provided for by international usage and that the distinguish-ability of Japanese hospital ships permits. The United States Government disclaims responsibility for the attacks cited, however, since those that have been substantiated were made under circumstances that unavoidably precluded the according of immunity under international practice. Washington , June 14, 1944. 32 Latter not printed. The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00117 P.W./111 [Document 1161] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to its memorandum of May 16, 1944 33 and to memorandum no. 97 (Ex. 111.00) of May 11, 1944 from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States which transmitted the text of a message dated May 10, 1944 from the Japanese Government regarding the reply made by the United States Government to a protest from the Japanese Government concerning the Japanese hospital ship Buenos Aires Maru. Upon receipt of the Embassy’s memorandum under reference the circumstances surrounding the attack upon a vessel alleged to have been the Buenos Aires Maru were subjected to a thorough re-examination during the course of which photographs were examined which were unavailable when the Department’s previous communication on this subject was formulated. An analysis of these photographs which were taken from the bombing plane substantiates the United States Government’s previously stated position regarding this matter. The Japanese Government in its rebuttal memorandum of May 10, alleges that the “sky was clear” at the time of the attack upon the ship but in the same statement admits that there were both stratus and cumulus clouds. Each of the two protests state that the bombing plane disappeared into clouds, and photographs taken during the attack show patches of stratus cloud formations below the plane. The original allegations of the Japanese Government claim that the bombing was done from an altitude of about 1,000 meters, and it is later estimated that the altitude was approximately 1,200 meters. From the photographs taken during the attack, knowing the length of the ship and the focal length of the camera, it is proven that the bombing took place at an altitude of slightly higher than 7,000 feet. The Japanese Government alleges in its recent memorandum that the white painting and green band, characteristics of hospital ships, must have been discernible at a glance from the attacking plane. However, the original protest of the Japanese Government admits that the bombing plane approached from the ship’s stern, and the photographs in the possession of the United States Government prove that the bombing run was made approaching from the stern and on a course only slightly divergent from that of the ship’s course, the plane passing directly over the ship. In approaching the ship from the stern neither the hull painting nor the green band would likely have been discernible. These photographs also show a narrow dark band extending lengthwise along the topworks amidships and distinctly broken in at least three places into segments of irregular length. Only one athwartship band is in evidence and this crosses at the funnel, is about four times the width of the longitudinal segments, and is distinctly of a different shade from the latter. The total impression is not of a Geneva cross but of lines, shadows and upper works such as might appear on a merchant vessel under certain light conditions. Furthermore, the point of bomb release was more than a mile astern of the ship and it is evident that at that point the alleged markings would have been even less indicative. The second protest of the Japanese Government alleges that there was a red cross over the poop deck with bars 11 meters long and 1.2 meters wide, and a red cross on the stern facing aft whose bars were 6 meters long and .6 meters wide. The aforementioned photographs disclose no evidence of any such crosses. In reference to the alleged machine gunning on December 1, 1943 of drifting lifeboats from the Buenos Aires Maru , supplementary information received since the reply of the United States Government on February 5, 1944 establishes that a motor launch and about 20 small boats were strafed at a position 3 degrees south, 149 degrees east. The only identification visible from the attacking plane was a Japanese flag carried on one of the small boats. The motor launch carried a weapon or weapons of a nature permitting effective use against the aircraft which is proven by the fact that the plane was hit and its nose damaged. The fact that the launch carried such weapons and fired on the plane was sufficient in itself to confirm the pilot’s identification of the boats as legitimate targets. For these reasons the United States Government disclaims all responsibility for the alleged attack on the Buenos Aires Maru and on lifeboats from the Buenos Aires Maru and rejects the protests of the Japanese Government as being entirely without validity. The records of the United States military and naval authorities show moreover, that hundreds of contacts with Japanese hospital ships have been made by American submarine and aircraft which were thus in a position to attack but refrained from doing so in view of the immunity enjoyed by hospital ships. Washington , July 27, 1944. 33 Not printed; it acknowledged memorandum No. 97 from the Spanish Embassy. The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00117 P.W./9–2644 [Document 1162] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 34 No. 210 Ex. 111.00 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and with reference to its Memorandum dated May 9, regarding a reported attack on Japanese hospital ships in Pacific waters, begs to transmit a new complaint from the Japanese Government regarding the same matter received through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” in Madrid, which reads as follows: “ Memorandum —September 26, 1944 In the two replies of the United States Government on the protest of the Japanese Government against the unlawful attacks made by the United States forces on the Arabia Maru and five other Japanese hospital ships, it is alleged that the hospital ships were in the vicinity of Military objectives or that the marking of the ships or its illumination was imperfect. Based on such false representation of facts, the United States Government attempt to excuse the acts of their forces which were perpetrated either deliberately or through lack of due care. The Japanese Government estably and refute [ totally refutes ] 35 these allegations in view of the indisputable facts which have been clearly stated in their two former communications. The Japanese Government regret that the replies of the United States Government are most unsatisfactory, and hereby confirm their notification to the United States Government that the Japanese Government reserve all rights relating to the unlawful attacks made on the Arabia Maru and five other Japanese hospital ships.” Washington , September 26, 1944. 34 In a letter of December 1, 1944, Acting Secretary of State Stettinius informed Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and Navy, that “the Department is merely acknowledging the receipt of these communications” of September 26 and October 18 (see footnote 35, below) “from the Spanish Embassy and is informing the British Embassy in the premises.” Both of these actions were taken on December 1. The British Government had been presented with a virtually identical Japanese protest. (740.00117 P.W./11–1544) 35 Correction based on memorandum No. 230, Ex. 111.00, October 18, from the Spanish Embassy (not printed). The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00117 Pacific War/12–444 [Document 1163] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 36 No. 245 Ex. 150.000 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to transmit below a memorandum received from the Japanese Government through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” of Madrid, in which it complains of the attack made on the Japanese hospital ship Tatibana Maru: “ Memorandum —December 2nd, 1944. “Japanese hospital ship Tatibana Maru while sailing about one kilometre off Capones Lighthouse which stands in southwest direction from San Antonio in Philippines at about 10:00 AM on 6th November, was machine-gunned by enemy formation of deckbombers from low altitude. Ship was exposed to serious danger as she was attacked at closest range. Weather was fine and visibility good. Ship’s name and particulars of her identification marks had been formally notified to United States Government in December, 1943. From circumstances at time of attack it is evident that attack was intentionally perpetrated. Against this unlawful attack Japanese Government protests of United States Government and demand them promptly to institute inquiry into affairs, punish those responsible, and guarantee prevention of such attacks in future. In order to show how carefully Japanese forces always pay attention to enemy hospital ships, Japanese Government point out fact that on 12th November at about 8:00 AM while Japanese army special attack corps air unit was raiding enemy surface craft in Leyte Gulf, one of Japanese planes was about to swoop down to ram itself against its objective, but on finding that it was hospital ship, plane refrained from attack and turned away to engage another ship defying interception attempted by P–38’s. Chivalrous act of Japanese plane which in midst of severe fighting and in spite of highest imminence of its own peril desisted from attacking enemy hospital ship lying so close to other enemy craft, makes fine contrast with criminal act of above mentioned enemy planes.” Washington , December 4, 1944. 36 The Department made acknowledgment on December 20. The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00117 P.W./12–2744 [Document 1164] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 37 No. 259 Ex. 160.000 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to transmit below the contents of a telegram received from the Japanese Government through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” in Madrid, regarding the sinking of the hospital ship Muro Maru outside the port of Manila: Memorandum —December 27th, 1944. “(1) On 13th November 1944 formations of United States planes began to raid Manila at 7:40 AM (Japanese time, so are times mentioned below). Japanese hospital ship Muro Maru which was outside port of Manila at the time was attacked by above mentioned planes at about 8:15 AM. Two bomber planes dropped four bombs in immediate vicinity of ship and then eight fighter planes machine-gunned her. On account of damage caused by this bombing and machine-gunning, hospital ship became flooded and in spite of every possible effort made to save her she finally sank at 12:08. (2) Name, identification marks, and other features of the Muro Maru , when formally notified in January last year, to United States Government through Spanish Government, painting and identification marks of the ship were in perfect condition and quite clear. Weather was fine and visibility good. There did not exist any other ship or any military objective within one thousand meters of hospital ship. In these circumstances Muro Maru was possessed of all necessary conditions being entitled to special protection guaranteed to hospital ships as expressly provided for in Convention for adaptation of principles of Geneva Convention to Maritime War, and she was in such state that she could not have been mistaken for any other thing than hospital ship [omission?] of accidentally attacked. Notwithstanding United States planes deliberately attacked and sank her, thus United States planes committed acts which could be nothing but violation of above mentioned Hague Convention and gave offence against fundamental principles of International Law and Humanity. (3) On the occasion of sinking of Buenos Aires Maru in November last year, Japanese Government gave a strict warning to United States Government relating to repeated unlawful attacks upon hospital ships, expressing great concern held by Japanese Government about repeated outrages. In reply to this, United States Government express every intention of continuing to respect immunity of Hospital ships in accordance with its assumed obligations and international practice. United States forces, however, did not cease from their unlawful activities, then attacked Houshing [ Yoshino? ] Maru and Tachibana [ Tatibana ] Maru in succession, and now they have attacked and sank another hospital ship Muro Maru . Japanese Government fear that repetition of such unlawful conduct on part of United States forces would lead to grave situation and demand of United States Government serious consideration of matter. Japanese Government while filing emphatic protest with United States Government against attacking and sinking of Muro Maru declares that they reserve all rights relating to matter. At same time Japanese Government demand, in view of repeated outrages, that United States Government admit unlawfulness of past conduct of United States forces, punish those responsible, give absolute guarantee to prevent the repetition of unlawful attacks in future, and thus actually show their willingness to render respect to hospital ships.” Washington , December 27, 1944. 37 The Department made acknowledgment on January 8, 1945. Protests by Japan against bombing of allegedly non-military objectives Protests by Japan against bombing of allegedly non-military objectives [1165] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , June 16, 1944. 740.00117 P.W./119 [1166] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , August 10, 1944. 740.00117 Pacific War/119 [1167] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , December 11, 1944. 740.00116 Pacific War/12–1144 The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00117 P.W./119 [Document 1165] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 154 Ex. 119.01 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit the following Memorandum received through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” 38 of Madrid, from the Japanese Government: Memorandum —June 16th, 1944— “1. United States fighters and bombers, that raided Rabaul on the 23rd and 24th May, constantly and repeatedly bombed and fired at the residential sections. They even perpetrated unscrupulous attacks on a hospital and its annexes, causing a serious damage to the buildings and large number of casualties among the sick and wounded who were under medical treatments there and the nurses. All the hospital buildings were at that time filled to capacity with the sick and wounded, and of course, no part thereof was used for any military purpose. They were all marked with distinct and large red crosses on a white ground so that they might easily be identified from above. The United States raiders made the attack in broad daylight and from a low altitude. The weather was fair, and the visibility good. It was therefore, perfectly easy for any pilot, however unskilled, to discern from the red cross marks that his objectives were hospital buildings. In spite of this, the American attackers did not stop the bombing and firing until the greater part of the hospital and its annexes had been destroyed. These facts cannot but show that the raid of the hospital was carried on deliberately and intentionally. 2. The above mentioned conduct of the United States airmen is a flagrant violation of International Law, and in particular of Article 27 of the [Annex to the] 1907 Customs of War on Land, 39 and Article 6 of the 1929 Red Cross Convention. 40 Moreover, it is in under [ utter? ] disregard of principles of humanity. 3. The Japanese Government lodge an emphatic protest with the United States Government against the unlawful act committed by the United States raiders, demanding at the same time the punishment of the persons and a guarantee for the prevention of recurrence of similar acts. The Japanese Government also reserve all rights of claiming an indemnity for the damage and injury caused by the above-mentioned unlawful attack.” Washington , June 16, 1944. 38 Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 39 Signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907, Foreign Relations , 1907, pt. 2, pp. 1204 , 1212 . 40 Signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929, ibid. , 1929, vol. i , pp. 321 , 323 . The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 740.00117 Pacific War/119 [Document 1166] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State refers to its memorandum of June 26, 1944 41 acknowledging the receipt of memorandum no. 154 (Ex. 119.01) of June 16, 1944 from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States transmitting the text of a protest from the Japanese Government alleging attacks by United States aircraft on certain hospital installations at Rabaul. Careful consideration has been accorded by the United States military authorities to the charges contained in the protest of the Japanese Government incorporated in the Embassy’s memorandum under acknowledgment. These authorities have recently reported that on May 23 and 24, 1944 fighter and bomber aircraft attacked a ridge about 600 yards northeast of the town of Rabaul, on which were installed concentrations of heavy, automatic and machine gun antiaircraft weapons. On this same ridge, interspersed among and in close proximity to the anti-aircraft gun positions, were many buildings including several marked with red crosses, and one of the buildings which was marked in this manner was only about 300 yards from three heavy anti-aircraft positions. The aircraft attacks on May 23 and 24 were directed at these concentrations of anti-aircraft guns. During the course of these attacks, several of the buildings on the ridge were unintentionally damaged or destroyed. As the Japanese Government does not specifically identify the hospitals which it is alleged were deliberately and intentionally attacked, it is presumed that they were situated among the gun positions. The United States Government has in the past and intends in the future to observe the principles of international law, including the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague on October 18, 1907 and the Red Cross Convention signed at Geneva on July 27, 1929. However, if the Japanese authorities choose to place hospitals adjacent to legitimate military targets, it is quite possible that those installations will be damaged or destroyed unintentionally during the course of attacks directed at the military targets. In view of the foregoing, the United States Government rejects the protest of the Japanese Government and disclaims all responsibility for any and all damage allegedly received by hospitals situated in the area attacked on May 23 and 24, 1944. Washington , August 10, 1944. 41 Not printed. The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 740.00116 Pacific War/12–1144 [Document 1167] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 42 No. 251 Ex. 150.000 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to transmit the following Memorandum received from the Imperial Japanese Government, through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” in Madrid: Memorandum —December 9, 1944. “On 10th October, 199 United States airplanes raided Okinawa Islands five times in broad daylight. First, second, and third raids aimed chiefly at military objectives. But fourth (from 12:40 till 13:40) and fifth (14:45 till 15:45) raids, American planes blindly attacked such non-military objectives as schools, hospitals, temples and dwelling houses in streets of Naha City and reduced them to ashes. At same time they wounded and killed large number of civilians by indiscriminate bombing and machine-gunning from low altitude. Japanese Government condemn above-mentioned deliberate attacks on non-military objectives and innocent civilians as most serious violations of principles of humanity and rules of International law which govern present day states. Japanese Government therefore while solemnly declaring that they reserve all rights relating to this matter, demand from United States Government immediate reply setting forth their views as to whether such indiscriminate attacks as above-mentioned when carried out by airplanes do not constitute violation of International law.” Washington , December 11, 1944. 42 The Department made acknowledgment on December 23. Assurance by the Japanese Government that it would not use poison gas provided the United States also did not use it Assurance by the Japanese Government that it would not use poison gas provided the United States also did not use it [1168] The Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State Washington, February 15, 1944. 740.00116 Pacific War/85 [1169] The Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani) Washington, March 30, 1944. 740.00116 Pacific War/85 The Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State 740.00116 Pacific War/85 [Document 1168] The Apostolic Delegate ( Cicognani ) to the Secretary of State Washington , February 15, 1944. My Dear Mr. Hull : The Cardinal Secretary of State has just informed me that the Special Envoy of the Japanese Government to the Holy See has brought to his attention an article by a Mr. Baldwin, in the New York Times , and pointed out that the tenor of this article appears to indicate that American military authorities are preparing to use poison gas in the Far East, on the grounds that gas has already been employed by the Japanese forces in China. The Japanese Ambassador to the Holy See assured His Eminence that the assertion on the use of gas by the Japanese army authorities in China is not true. 43 The Ambassador added that the Japanese will always refrain from the use of poison gas, provided the American officials follow this same principle. The Ambassador then requested His Eminence, in the name of the Japanese Government, to bring this assurance to the attention of the United States Government. His Eminence adds that he expressed to the Japanese Ambassador his own personal conviction that, in the light of its frequent condemnations of the use of poison gas as a military weapon, he feels certain that the United States military authorities have no intention of employing such means of warfare. While I convey this information to you according to the directions of His Eminence, I am [etc.] A. G. Cicognani Archbishop of Laodicea 43 In telegram 1251, July 20, 1 p.m., the Ambassador in China (Gauss) cited the Military Attaché in China (De Pass) as authority that there was no acceptable evidence of Japanese use of poison gas (740.0011 PW/7–2044). The Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani) 740.00116 Pacific War/85 [Document 1169] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Long ) to the Apostolic Delegate ( Cicognani ) Washington , March 30, 1944. My Dear Archbishop Cicognani : I have received your letter of February 15, 1944 conveying the assurances of the Special Envoy of the Japanese Government to the Holy See that Japanese forces in China have never used poison gas and that Japan would continue to refrain from the use of poison gas provided the same principle is followed by the United States. It is stated that the Special Envoy of the Japanese Government requested that these assurances be brought to the attention of the United States Government. The information which you have given me has been made known to the appropriate United States authorities. The attitude of the United States Government with respect to the use of gas warfare was fully and clearly enunciated by the President in his statement of June 8, 1943, 44 a copy of which I am enclosing for your convenience. Sincerely yours, Breckinridge Long 44 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. i , p. 406 . Protest by Japan against treatment accorded the Japanese envoy to the Vatican by American armed forces; protest by the United States against the conduct of Japanese armed forces toward the American Legation in Thailand Protest by Japan against treatment accorded the Japanese envoy to the Vatican by American armed forces; protest by the United States against the conduct of Japanese armed forces toward the American Legation in Thailand [1170] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , July 28, 1944. 311.22/7–2844 [1171] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Washington , October 2, 1944. 811.22/7–2844 [1172] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, October 2, 1944—2:50 p.m. 811.22/10–244: Airgram [1173] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State Washington , January 29, 1945. 811.22/1–2945 The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 311.22/7–2844 [Document 1170] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 171 Ex. 119.01 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its complaints [ compliments ] to the Department of State and begs to transmit the following memorandum received from the Japanese Government through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” 45 of Madrid in which it complains against the conduct of the American soldiers in Rome with regards to the Japanese Envoy to the Vatican: Memorandum —July 28th, 1944 “The Japanese Government have received a telegraphic report through Vatican from Mr. Ken Harada, Japanese Envoy to the Vatican, according to which Mr. Harada together with the members of his staff, and a number of visitors was confined to his official residence which is in the city of Rome, from the 6th June, It was on the 9th June that he was allowed to communicate with the Vatican under police supervision. During the period of confinement United States soldiers intruded into the official residence several times and when Mr. Harada demanded their withdrawal they retorted in threatening and insulting language. In particular they were so insolent as to note that as Japan disregarded international law, she had no right to claim its observance. They also expressed an entirely groundless allegation that female members of the families of the Envoy’s staff were spies disguised as women. The above mentioned conduct of the United States soldiers is not only a violation of the inviolability to which a diplomatic agent is entitled in international law, but also refusal of the due respect which is universally rendered to him in civilized countries. The Japanese Government hereby lodge a most emphatic protest with the United States Government against the above mentioned conduct of the United States soldiers.” Washington , July 28, 1944. 45 Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy 811.22/7–2844 [Document 1171] The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy Memorandum The Department of State presents its compliments to the Spanish Embassy and refers to the Embassy’s memorandum no. 171 of July 28, 1944 in which is quoted a memorandum from the Japanese Government alleging that the Japanese Envoy to the Vatican, Mr. Ken Harada, was confined to his official residence in the city of Rome from the 6th to the 9th of June, 1944, and that only upon the latter date was he allowed to communicate with the Vatican. The memorandum alleges further that during this period soldiers of the United States armed forces intruded into the official residence on several occasions and on one occasion when asked to withdraw, the soldiers responded in threatening and insulting language. The Japanese memorandum contends that the alleged conduct of the United States soldiers is not only a violation of the inviolability to which a diplomatic agent is entitled under international law but is also a denial of the respect which is said to be universally accorded to such agents in civilized countries. The Japanese Government protests against this alleged misconduct of the United States soldiers. It will be recalled that the Rome area was within a theater of military operations during the period referred to in the Japanese memorandum. Therefore it was necessary, for the personal safety of those Axis diplomats who resided in Rome outside the Vatican City, for the military to take certain precautions such as the posting of guards at the places of residence of such persons. However, according to official reports received by the Department of State from Rome the allegation that the Japanese Envoy was confined to his residence in Rome on and after June 6, 1944 is not borne out by the facts. These reports indicate that the Japanese Envoy was provided for his protection and at his request with a military escort to accompany him to and from the Vatican on frequent occasions prior to his change of residence from outside to inside the Vatican City. The reports indicate further that on at least one occasion the Japanese Envoy expressed to an Allied officer his satisfaction with the arrangements for his protection and movements. Owing to shifts in military personnel at Rome, as a result of the rapidly changing military situation in Italy, it has not been possible to verify the circumstances in which American soldiers are alleged to have entered the residence of the Japanese Envoy. If it should be confirmed that events transpired as alleged by the Japanese Government, suitable measures will be taken. Washington , October 2, 1944. The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 811.22/10–244: Airgram [Document 1172] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , October 2, 1944—2:50 p.m. A–446. Please request Swiss Government to communicate the following message to Minister Gorgé 46 to be delivered textually to the Japanese Government: “The United States Government recently received from the Japanese Government through the Spanish Government a communication asserting that the Japanese diplomatic envoy to the Vatican had been denied the respect universally rendered to such agents in civilized countries. The United States Government recalls in this connection the conduct of the Japanese armed forces toward the American Legation at Bangkok, Thailand, upon the occasion of their entry into Thailand in December 1941, under circumstances somewhat similar to the entry of Allied forces into Rome. “Following the entry of Japanese troops into Bangkok Japanese armed guards were stationed at the entrance of the American Legation in that city to prevent the entry and departure of the staff and, contrary to international comity, were actually posted on the Legation premises as well. The American flag was forcibly lowered from the Legation flagstaff and the Japanese flag was hoisted in its place. Japanese troops were quartered in a building of the Legation and Japanese troops under the command of officers of high rank conducted searches of the Legation buildings and grounds. Before this forcible Japanese control of an American diplomatic mission in a neutral country was discontinued Japanese soldiers threatened the American Minister and members of his staff with lethal weapons for fancied infringement of the Japanese security arrangements. They seized United States Government-owned equipment in the Legation with armed force, subjected the American Minister to Thailand 47 and members of his staff to the indignity of personal body searches, and deliberately kept the staff of the Legation without access to the representation of the protecting Power during the period of the Japanese control of the Legation. “The United States Government hereby lodges a most emphatic protest with the Japanese Government against the aforesaid acts of the Japanese armed forces.” 48 For your information, and for informal communication to the Swiss Foreign Office and to Minister Gorgé in connection with the foregoing, there is quoted below the text of a memorandum addressed by the Department, simultaneously with the despatch of this airgram, to the Spanish Embassy in Washington, replying to a Japanese protest against alleged mistreatment by American soldiers of Japanese diplomats in Rome. It would be preferable if the foregoing communication to the Japanese Government were to be delivered by Gorgé subsequent to the receipt by the Japanese Government of the communication sent through the Spanish authorities. Gorgé might therefore be requested to defer presentation of the above protest until such time as he deems that the Japanese Government can be presumed to have received the Department’s reply to the Japanese protest. The protest would presumably be more effective if Gorgé were to indicate his possession of the following text: [Here follows text of memorandum of October 2 to the Spanish Embassy, printed supra. ] Hull 46 Camille Gorgé, Swiss Minister in Japan. 47 Willys R. Peck. 48 There is no record in the Department files of a Japanese reply to this protest The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State 811.22/1–2945 [Document 1173] The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State No. 12 Ex. 150.000 Memorandum The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit the following memorandum received from the Japanese Government through the “Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores” of Madrid in which it further complains about the treatment given by American soldiers to the Japanese Envoy to the Vatican: Memorandum —January 27, 1945. “The Japanese Government are in receipt of the United States Government’s reply dated the second October, 1944, to their protest against unlawful conduct of United States soldiers toward Mr. Harada, Japanese Envoy to the Vatican. In the said reply the United States Government deny the fact of Mr. Harada having been confined to his Official residence in the city of Rome by United States soldiers. But a telegraphic report from Mr. Harada confirms that the United States soldiers cut off all communications between his official residence and the outside world; that they prohibited even drinking water and provisions from being brought in, and later, when they did permit it, they subjected the supplies to a rigid examination; that on several occasions they refused permission for calling in a doctor to attend to patients, and, when they granted permission, they demanded the presence of a United States Military Officer by the sickbed, and that, when a high official of the Vatican called at the Envoy’s Official residence on official business, he was refused permission to enter it. All these facts, the Japanese Government must point out, are well known to the Vatican Authorities. The United States Government contend in their reply that it is impossible to inquire into the circumstances under which the United States soldiers forced their way into the official residence of the Japanese Envoy and subjected the Envoy to threats and insults. But the Japanese Government stress the fact that, since those soldiers belonged to a small detachment then stationed in an elementary school building at the back of the Envoy’s Official residence, the United States Government can easily conduct the investigation if they are honestly willing to do so. The Japanese Government thereby once again present a protest to the United States Government against the unlawful conduct of the United States soldiers in question.” 49 Washington , January 29, 1945. 49 Marginal notation: “They never stop. Either we stop this exchange or we must protest their treatment of our replies!”. The Department’s reply of February 8, 1945, stated: “The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of the Spanish Embassy’s memorandum no. 12 of January 29, 1945 in which is quoted the text of a communication from the Japanese Government concerning the treatment of the former Japanese Envoy to the Vatican, Mr. Harada.” (811.22/1–2945) No further reply has been found in Department files. Protests by the United States against attacks by Japanese naval forces on survivors of torpedoed American merchant vessels Protests by the United States against attacks by Japanese naval forces on survivors of torpedoed American merchant vessels [1174] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) Washington, June 14, 1944. 195.7 Richard Hovey/6: Telegram [1175] The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State Bern, December 8, 1944. [Received December 9—3:08 a.m.] 195.7 Richard Hovey/12–844: Telegram [1176] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) Washington, December 12, 1944. 195.7 Jean Nicolet/12–1244: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) 195.7 Richard Hovey/6: Telegram [Document 1174] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) Washington , June 14, 1944. 2043. Request Foreign Office to deliver following message verbatim to Japanese Government: “The United States steamship Richard Hovey carrying cargo and one passenger was at 11:20 GCT 50 on March 29, 1944 torpedoed by a Japanese submarine in latitude 16 degrees 40 minutes north and longitude 64 degrees 30 minutes east. After torpedoing the Richard Hovey , the submarine attacked the personnel who escaped from the ship. Reports from the survivors, including the Chief Officer, disclose that subsequent to releasing three torpedoes and obtaining two hits, the submarine surfaced, opened fire on the ship itself, and then proceeded in the direction of the lifeboats, opening fire on them from about 1,000 feet with her forward gun, and continuing to fire as she circled around the lifeboats. The survivors in the lifeboats took to the water, keeping the boats between them and the submarine. The submarine approached the no. 2 lifeboat and, proceeding slowly, rammed and capsized it. She cruised slowly among the other boats, taking pictures and firing with rifles, machine guns, and other small arms. The submarine then made another circle around to the starboard side of the no. 4 lifeboat at which she fired her big gun, holing the boat on the starboard side above the water line, smashing thwarts, puncturing the engine casing, the fuel tanks, and one water tank so seriously that half its contents were lost. The submarine finally approached the master’s boat, took on board the master and three others, and took the boat in tow. The United States Government protests most emphatically against this inhuman form of warfare practiced by Japanese forces in brutally attacking helpless survivors of a torpedoed vessel and demands effective assurances from the Japanese Government that such criminal acts, which are contrary to all standards of civilized conduct, will not be repeated in the future. It is expected that the Japanese Government will at the same time punish those persons who with premeditation and full knowledge of their actions have so flagrantly violated the primary humanitarian concept of maritime warfare.” Request Swiss Minister Tokyo 51 to telegraph date of delivery to Japanese Government. 52 Hull 50 Greenwich Civil Time. 51 Camille Gorgé. 52 Telegram 4029, June 23, from Bern, reported delivery of message on June 19. The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State 195.7 Richard Hovey/12–844: Telegram [Document 1175] The Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) to the Secretary of State Bern , December 8, 1944. [Received December 9—3:08 a.m.] 8041. American Interests—Japan. Legation’s 4029, June 23; 53 Foreign Office note December 7 states Swiss Legation in Tokyo telegraphs December 5 Japanese Foreign Office declared that thorough investigation concerning torpedoing Richard Hovey has been made but revealed no action corresponding to that outlined in Department’s 2043, June 14. Huddle 53 See footnote 52, above. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) 195.7 Jean Nicolet/12–1244: Telegram [Document 1176] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland ( Huddle ) Washington , December 12, 1944. 4184. Request Swiss Foreign Office to deliver following message verbatim to Japanese Government: “On July 2, 1944 at approximately 1407 hours at position 3° South 74° 30′ East the United States merchant vessel Jean Nicolet was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine. The vessel sank at approximately 0220 hours July 3. Seventy-five survivors of the Jean Nicolet were murdered when, after leaving the sinking vessel, between 95 and 100 persons from the torpedoed vessel were subjected by the commander and crew of the Japanese submarine to treatment which was in contravention of the laws and customs of war and all humanitarian standards. The United States Government most emphatically protests against the criminal and inhuman treatment accorded these individuals. The United States Government protests that: (1) The life boats and life rafts were machine-gunned, evidently to render them unusable by any of the survivors of the Jean Nicolet . Survivors of the Jean Nicolet who were swimming were also machine-gunned. (2) The survivors upon boarding the submarine were robbed of all life belts, papers and other valuables; (3) The survivors of the Jean Nicolet , after boarding the submarine, were bound either with rope or wire and compelled to sit or kneel with heads down in rows athwartship from bow to stern facing forward on the forward deck; (4) Approximately half of the survivors of the Jean Nicolet were led separately to the afterdeck of the submarine and compelled to run between parallel rows of Japanese sailors armed with a variety of instruments, including gun butts and bayonets. While running this gauntlet, the men were subjected to severe beating and still bound were forced off the submarine into the water while the vessel was under way with the evident likelihood that they would be caught in the turning propeller. (5) The submarine suddenly, and with no warning to the survivors of the Jean Nicolet , submerged leaving a large number of them still bound on the deck of the vessel with the result that they were thrown into the water without means of self-preservation. D. M. Nilsson and Clem Carlin, master and chief mate, respectively of the Jean Nicolet were made prisoners and taken within the submarine, such treatment being similar to that accorded the master and three other survivors of the United States vessel Richard Hovey the Japanese attack on which was the subject of the United States Government’s protest delivered to the Japanese Government on June 19, 1944. The United States Government demands to be urgently informed regarding the present welfare and whereabouts of Captain Nilsson and Chief Mate Carlin. The United States Government most emphatically protests regarding the treatment accorded the survivors of the torpedoed vessel, such treatment being in violation of all humanitarian and legal principles. The Government of the United States demands a full and thorough investigation from the Japanese Government and that the persons responsible for the incredibly cruel and terrible conduct against the defenseless survivors of the torpedoed vessel promptly be fully punished and that it be informed of the action taken. The Government of the United States demands specific assurances from the Japanese Government that such criminal action will not be repeated in the future.” Request that Swiss Minister Tokyo telegraph date message is delivered to Japanese Government. 54 Stettinius 54 Date of delivery not clear. Telegram 130, January 9, 1945, 10 a.m., from Bern, reported that the Swiss Legation was “now outside of Tokyo” and that Mr. Gorgé had instructed an aide to proceed to Tokyo on January 5 to present the text of the Department’s message to the Japanese Foreign Office. Presumably he did so on that date. (195.7 Jean Nicolet/1–945) Violation by Japanese authorities of American diplomatic and consular property, including archives, in occupied China Violation by Japanese authorities of American diplomatic and consular property, including archives, in occupied China [1177] The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State Bern, March 6, 1944. [Received March 28.] 703.5493/128 The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State 703.5493/128 [Document 1177] The Minister in Switzerland ( Harrison ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] No. 7485 Bern , March 6, 1944. [Received March 28.] The American Minister at Bern has the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram No. 1500 of June 25, 1943, 55 regarding the communication of a statement to the Japanese Government concerning the repeated violation by the Japanese authorities of American diplomatic and consular property in Japanese-occupied territory. The Legation now desires to enclose, for the Department’s information and records, a translation of a note addressed on February 28, 1944 to the Legation by the Swiss Foreign Office. 56 This communication has as enclosures the following documents from the Swiss representatives in China: 1. Report dated July 30, 1943, to the Swiss Legation at Tokyo by the Swiss Consul General at Shanghai regarding the violation of official American property in occupied China. 2. Report dated November 24, 1942, from the Swiss Consul at Canton regarding the violation by the Japanese military authorities of the American consular offices at Canton. 3. Report dated April 9, 1943, from the Peiping representative of the Swiss Consulate General Shanghai regarding the violation of the American Embassy there. 4. Report dated April 20, 1943, from the Peiping representative of the Swiss Consulate General Shanghai regarding his protest against the violation of the American Embassy there. 5. Report dated May 12, 1943, from the office of the Peiping representative of the Swiss Consulate General Shanghai regarding the second inspection of the American Embassy archives there on May 12, 1943. These documents are also attached in single copy for the Department’s information and records. 57 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [Enclosure] The Swiss Consul General at Shanghai ( Fontanel ) to the Swiss Legation in Japan [ Shanghai ,] July 30, 1943. Report on Violation of American Official Properties in Occupied China I have the honour to submit to you the following facts on the subject which I have reported on from time to time to Berne and which have prompted the United States Government to request your intervention with the Gaimusho. 58 1) United States Properties not taken over. Following protracted negotiations with the Japanese Authorities immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, I took over during the months of April/June 1942 all American (as well as British and Dutch) diplomatic and consular properties in Occupied China with the exception of those at Tientsin, Swatow and Amoy. a ) American Consulates at Amoy and Swatow . At the time of the departure of the former American officials from these two ports, the latter handed over the keys to the respective Japanese Consulates and appointed caretakers to look after the premises and properties of the United States Government. It was not at the time possible for me to send any delegate to Swatow and Amoy for the taking over of these properties. The arrangements made by the out-going American Consuls were therefore left to stand—only during April/May of this year was it possible to send a delegate in the person of Mr. Zulauf from Canton to visit these places, when it was ascertained by the latter that at Swatow all official American archives (as also the British) had been removed by the Japanese Authorities, while those at Amoy were found to be intact. b ) American Consulate General at Tientsin . As reported to you in my letter dated July 1st 1942, the Japanese Authorities in Tientsin agreed to hand over the American Consulate General (as also British official properties) to my representative, Consul O. Joerg, only on the condition that the latter agreed in writing to a Japanese memorandum on the subject which contained a clause that the Japanese Authorities reserved the right to inspect all official records and confiscate any documents they might consider necessary. Mr. Joerg having refused to accept custody of the American official properties under these conditions, the local negotiations on the subject broke down. In your reply dated July 21st 1942, to my aforementioned letter, you stated that you would take this matter up with the competent authorities, but so far I appear to have remained without further news. The fact remains that up to this time, the official consular properties still remain in the custody of the Japanese Authorities. In connection with some water damage and theft which occurred to some of this American official property at Tientsin, the State Department again asked for an explanation as to why these properties had not yet been taken over by my representative. I should greatly appreciate it, therefore, if you could offer me any further information on this matter. 2) Violation of American official Archives. 59 a ) Canton . During October and December 1942, the Japanese Military Authorities at Canton repeatedly approached my representative there, Consul Hoffmeister, for permission to examine the American (also British) archives stored at the American Consulate General, which some three or four months previously had been taken over by Mr. Hoffmeister. Acting under threat by the Military Authorities that entry into the premises would be forced, Mr. Hoffmeister finally was authorized by me to hand over the keys to the Authorities concerned. The Japanese officials actually entered the American Consulate on November 20th and 22nd 1942 and were seen removing from the premises several sacks of American official records. A copy of Mr. Hoffmeister’s report on the incident is herewith enclosed. 60 Needless to say, Mr. Hoffmeister immediately filed a strong protest against the violation of the American archives. b ) American Embassy Peking . At the time of the departure of the American officials from Peking, the American Embassy Compound was provisionally handed over to my representative, Dr. R. Hoeppli, while the American archives were jointly sealed both by my representative and the Japanese Embassy officials. According to arrangements made, the latter were to be handed over to the exclusive custody of Dr. Hoeppli at a later date. Under the pretext of proceeding with the official handing over, Dr. Hoeppli was summoned by the Japanese Embassy to present himself at the American Consulate Compound on April 6th of this year. When he arrived at the appointed date and place, he found that besides the Japanese Embassy officials, there were a number of Japanese soldiers who received orders to examine the American archives and to remove certain records. Copies of Dr. Hoeppli’s and Dr. Vargas’ reports on the subject are herewith enclosed. 61 As was the case in Canton, Dr. Hoeppli subsequently filed a strong protest against the action of the Japanese Authorities. 3) Eviction from American Embassy and consular premises: a ) Shanghai . Shortly after the taking over of the American Consular offices in Shanghai (March 7th 1942) consisting of four large floors and one Vice-Consul’s apartment in the Development building, the Japanese Consulate General informed me that owing to the lack of office space in Shanghai, the premises occupied by the former American Consulate were urgently needed and they accordingly requested me to vacate the offices as soon as possible. Upon my representations that the American consular offices should be duly respected, the Japanese consular officials stressed that as the lease for the premises in question had expired they were entirely in their right to demand vacant possession of the same. Following further negotiations and with the approval of the State Department, it was finally agreed to vacate two of the floors as well as the Vice-Consul’s apartment and to remove all archives and properties into the offices on the two remaining floors in the Development building (4th and 5th floors). Accordingly a new lease was signed with the Japanese supervised Realty Company in charge of the Development building. In the course of the last few weeks, the Japanese Consulate again approached me with the request to vacate also the two remaining floors now holding the American consular archives and properties. Negotiations are still pending, but in all probability I shall have no other alternative but to again remove all the properties in question to some other storage place. 62 b ) Nanking . The American Embassy in Nanking consists of a large leased property owned by a Chinese and administered by the Sin Hua Trust and Savings Bank Limited. The lease expires in 1947, but contains the option of renewal. For some time past the lessors have informed me that the Japanese Authorities are very anxious to take over the American compound in Nanking and requested that the existing lease should be cancelled. Being put under strong pressure by the Japanese Authorities and notwithstanding my demand that the lease agreement must be fully respected, the lessor, acting under duress, finally signed a new lease with the Japanese Embassy officials in Nanking. Cables exchanged with Berne on the matter elicited a reply from the United States Department [of State] that they wish to retain their premises at Nanking and that I should insist with the Authorities here that they should respect the latter in the same way that the United States Government respects all Japanese consular or Embassy properties, whether owned or leased, in the United States. Although I duly informed the local Japanese Consulate of the State Department’s wishes, the latter at the instigation of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking recently urged me to send a delegate to Nanking in order to arrange for the removal of the Nanking archives and properties stored there. Without in any way agreeing to this request, I sent one of my staff members to Nanking in order to examine the situation on the spot and to ascertain whether in case of need the American properties could be stored in the British Embassy compound. To my surprise, my representative reported that the former American Ambassador’s residence and the American Embassy compound had already been occupied by the Japanese Ambassador towards the end of May of this year and that my caretaker had been forced to surrender the keys and leave the compound. On being informed of these developments, the State Department replied via Berne that they had requested you to intervene with the Gaimusho in the matter and that pending a decision from the latter they expect that the Japanese Authorities would not take any further action. At the same time, they asked me to do my utmost to protect the Embassy archives and to arrange, in case of need, for their transfer to another place of safe-keeping. 63 c ) Hankow: Although the lease for the American Consulate General at Hankow was still in force, the Japanese Military Authorities there insisted that my representative remove all the archives and official properties for storage in the British Compound; they claimed that by military necessity they required the building in question (Shell Building) and under these circumstances, I authorised my representative to effect the removal, which took place on December 5th 1942. d ) Tsinanfu: As in the case of Hankow, the Japanese Military Authorities at the beginning of December 1942 claimed to require the building housing the former American Consulate General at Tsinanfu for which the lease was still valid. In order to avoid the risk of seeing the property removed by the Japanese Military Authorities themselves, I instructed my representative to proceed to Tsinanfu and to supervise the removal to the British consular compound. 64 [ Emile Fontanel ] 55 Not printed; it requested that the following statement be communicated to the Japanese Government: “The United States Government has repeatedly protested against the violation by the enemy of American diplomatic and consular property, including archives, as a breach of international practice and has reiterated its own respect both for diplomatic and consular property. The United States Government would like to see both diplomatic and consular archives and other property respected, whether in the territory of the opposing belligerents or in the territory of third Powers. For its future guidance, the United States Government requests a specific indication of the Japanese Government’s policy in that respect.” (703.5493/90) 56 Not printed. 57 Nos. 2 through 5 not printed. 58 Japanese Foreign Office. 59 A note of July 21, 1943, from the Swiss Foreign Office to the American Legation in Switzerland gave the substance of a Japanese Foreign Office statement regarding Japan’s attitude toward the protection of archives of enemy governments: “The Japanese Government expresses in its acts its intention to respect the archives of the diplomatic and consular missions of … countries at war with Japan.… The Japanese Government is of the opinion that the special measures taken to protect these archives must be attributed to its desire to offer a spontaneous and generous protection … the decision of the Japanese authorities to inspect the archives before surrendering them to the Protecting Power constitutes a formality which is quite natural in handing them over to this country. It is on this opinion that the Japanese authorities at Peiping based their action in inspecting the archives of the former American mission and, as the number and the types of documents to be examined did not allow them to finish the inspection on the spot, they were temporarily removed. It is, of course, understood that the archives will be returned as soon as they will have been examined, so that the representative of the Protecting Power may be able to assure their protection.” (703.5493/111) A copy of the Swiss Foreign Office note was transmitted from Bern in despatch 5745, July 28, 1943. Telegram 5227, August 25, 1943, from Bern, reported further violation of American archives at Peiping on August 9 when large quantities were carried away and no receipt given (703.5493/112). 60 Not printed. 61 Neither printed. 62 Telegram 4724, August 4, 1943, from Bern, reported that Mr. Fontanel had been obliged to consent to removal of the furniture and archives stored on the two floors (703.5493/106). 63 Telegram 7408, Novemer 23, 1943, 2 p.m., from Bern, reported Japanese sale of perishable material and furniture which had been under seal in the former American Embassy in Nanking (703.5493/118). 64 Airgram 305, August 30, 1943, from Bern, reported seizure by “Manchukuoan” authorities of “plot of land former American Consulate Mukden, using it partly for vegetable garden, partly storage material.” (703.5493 Manchuria/8) Telegram 431, January 19, 1944, from Bern, reported that the Japanese Consul at Chefoo had occupied the premises of the former American Consulate there since December 1, 1943 (703.5493/123). Decision of the United States and British Governments not to reply to Japanese peace feeler received through Sweden Decision of the United States and British Governments not to reply to Japanese peace feeler received through Sweden [1178] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] September 26, 1944. 740.00119 PW/9–2644 [1179] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax) Washington, September 29, 1944. 740.00119 PW/9–2644 [1180] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Hickerson) to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and Navy Washington, October 10, 1944. 740.00119 P.W./9–2644 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/9–2644 [Document 1178] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] September 26, 1944. The British Ambassador 65 called at his request and left with me the attached copies of paraphrases of telegrams from the Foreign Office relating to a Japanese peace feeler. I thanked him and said the letter would receive appropriate attention. C[ ordell ] H[ ull ] [Annex 1] The British Ambassador ( Halifax ) to the Secretary of State Paraphrase of a Telegram From the Foreign Office, Dated September 24 th , 1944 Please convey to Mr. Hull the contents of Stockholm telegram of September 24th 66 and inform him that we propose to answer the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs 66a that we are not in fact prepared to return any reply to the indirect approach from the Japanese. It will therefore be open to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs to reply, if he so wishes, in the sense of the last sentence in paragraph 4 of the telegram under reference. 2. Provided that the United States Government concur, I propose to inform the Soviet Government in accordance with the resolution adopted at the Moscow Conference October 1943 67 on the action to be taken in the event of peace feelers being received from enemy countries. 3. Please inform me as soon as possible of the United States reply. [Annex 2] The British Ambassador ( Halifax ) to the Secretary of State Paraphrase of a Telegram Received by the Foreign Office From Stockholm, Dated 24 th September , 1944 The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this afternoon to communicate text of a telegram just received from the Swedish Minister at Tokyo 67a whom he described as a man of calm and good judgment. 2. The substance of the telegram was as follows: Begins: I learn from a very reliable source that in important civilian circles in Japan the peace problem is being discussed with increasing anxiety. A speedy German collapse is expected and it is not believed that Japan can then continue the war. It is therefore considered necessary to get peace as soon as possible before the country and towns are destroyed. In order to obtain peace, Japan is prepared to surrender territories which during the war have been taken from Great Britain and to recognize all former British investments and interests in East Asia. It is also realized that all other territories occupied during the war must be restored to their former owners; it is even recognized that sacrifice of Manchukuo may also be necessary. It is desired that London should be sounded on this question and it is believed that perhaps this could best be done through Swedish channels under a guarantee that no publicity whatever should be given. If any willingness appeared to exist in London the Japanese would be ready for preliminary discussions through Swedish channels. Behind the man who gave me this message there stands one of the best known statesmen in Japan and there is no doubt that this attempt must be considered as a serious one. Ends. 3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he thought at first sight that it looked rather like an attempt by the Japanese to get at Great Britain behind the back of the United States. Of course he realised that you would wish to pass on this information to the United States Government but he hoped you would impress upon them the importance of avoiding publicity and that even if any leakage occurred the name of Sweden should not appear. 4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs quite realised that our terms were unconditional surrender. He told me that he would be grateful for your guidance as to how you would like him to answer the Swedish Minister at Tokyo. If you wished he could quite well reply that the Swedish Government considered it useless to deliver such a message to His Majesty’s Government. 5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs added that his information from Tokyo all went to show that there was great anxiety and unrest in Japanese political circles and that the war was not popular in the country itself. 65 The Earl of Halifax. 66 Annex 2, p. 1184 [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1178 ] . 66a Christian E. Günther. 67 See Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, October 30, 1943, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. i , p. 755 . 67a Widar Bagge. The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax) 740.00119 PW/9–2644 [Document 1179] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador ( Halifax ) Washington , September 29, 1944. My Dear Mr. Ambassador : On September 26 you came in to see me and left with me a copy of a paraphrase of a telegram dated September 24 from the Foreign Office in regard to a Japanese peace feeler which was communicated to the British Minister in Stockholm by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have noted that the British Government proposes to inform the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply that the British Government is not in fact prepared to return any reply to this indirect approach from the Japanese and that it will therefore be open to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs to reply, if he so wishes, that the Swedish Government considered it useless to deliver such a message to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. I agree with this proposed procedure. I concur in the view of your Government that the Soviet Government should be informed by the British Government of this approach in accordance with the resolution adopted at the Moscow Conference in October 1943 on the action to be taken in the event of peace feelers being received from enemy countries. Since the message was directed to your Government and not to the American Government, we shall not ourselves send anything to the Soviet Government about this approach. 68 Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 68 By telegram 2344, October 3, 1 p.m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union was informed of this peace feeler and of the reply made to the British Ambassador (740.00119 PW/9–2644). Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Hickerson) to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and Navy 740.00119 P.W./9–2644 [Document 1180] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs ( Hickerson ) to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and Navy Washington , October 10, 1944. The Department’s memorandum of October 3, 1944 69 transmitted for the information of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff certain papers concerning a Japanese peace feeler received by the British Government through the Swedish Government. Word has now been received from the British Government that the British Minister at Stockholm was instructed on September 29 to advise the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs that the British Government was not prepared to return any reply to indirect approaches by the Japanese Government. On the same day the British Minister at Moscow was instructed to inform the Soviet Government confidentially of the information received from the Swedish Foreign Minister and of the British reply. On October 1 the Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office advised the British Minister in Stockholm that he would telegraph the Swedish Minister in Tokyo that it was known from experience that the British Government would not answer such indirect approaches and that the Swedish Government had therefore thought it useless to pass on the message to the British Government. The Secretary General also stated that a new telegram had been received from the Swedish Minister in Tokyo stating that he had been advised that the Japanese Foreign Minister was himself preparing to approach the British Government. J[ ohn ] D. H[ ickerson ] 69 Not printed. Postwar policy planning in regard to Japan and areas under Japanese control Postwar policy planning in regard to Japan and areas under Japanese control 70 70 For other material, see Department of State Publication No. 3580 (General Foreign Policy Series 15): Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1989–1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950). [1181] Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State [Washington,] December 10, 1943. 890.0146/12–1043 [1182] The Adviser on Liberated Areas for the Far East (Moffat) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) Washington, December 14, 1943. 890.0146/12–1443 [1183] The Navy Department to the Department of State [Washington,] 23 December, 1943. 890.0146/3 [1184] Major General J. H. Hilldring and Captain H. L. Pence to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) Washington, 18 February, 1944. 890.0146/6 [1185] The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) Washington, February 24, 1944. 740.0011 Pacific War/3751 [1186] The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) Washington, February 28, 1944. 890.0146/6 [1187] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 11, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1188] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State Washington, 11 March, 1944. 893.014/3–1144 [1189] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 13, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1190] The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) Washington, March 14, 1944. 890.0146/6 [1191] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 15, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1192] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 21, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1193] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 21, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1194] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 22, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1195] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 22, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1196] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 22, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1197] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 22, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1198] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 23, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1199] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 24, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1200] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Hickerson) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) [Washington,] March 27, 1944. 893.014/5–2244 [1201] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 29, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1202] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] March 29, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1203] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] April 17, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1204] Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs [Washington,] April 18, 1944. 890.00/7–744 [1205] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] May 4, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1206] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] May 4, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1207] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] May 4, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1208] The Adviser on Liberated Areas for the Far East (Moffat) to Captain H. L. Pence of the Occupied Areas Section, Navy Department Washington, May 6, 1944. 890.0146/13a [1209] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] May 9, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1210] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East” [Washington,] May 9, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1211] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] May 9, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1212] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] May 9, 1944. Lot 122. Box 53 [1213] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State Washington, 14 May, 1944. 890.0146/14 [1214] The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) Washington, May 15, 1944. 890.0146/10 [1215] The Secretary of State to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, May 27, 1944. 890.0146/14 [1216] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State Washington, 7 June, 1944. 811B.20/6–744 [1217] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Grew) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] June 23, 1944. 890.0146/6–2344 [1218] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] June 28, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1219] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] June 28, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1220] The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) Washington, July 21, 1944. 894a.01/7–1944 [1221] Captain H. L. Pence of the Occupied Areas Section, Navy Department, to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) Washington, 25 July, 1944. 890.0146/7–2544 [1222] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East [Washington,] September 27, 1944. Lot 122, Box 54 [1223] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, November 9, 1944. 740.00119 P.W./11–944 [1224] Memorandum Prepared by the Committee on Post-War Programs [Washington,] November 13, 1944. Lot 122, Box 53 [1225] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, November 21, 1944—7 p.m. 890.00/11–2144: Telegram [1226] Agreement Between the United States and the Netherlands Indies 10 December 1944. Agreement No. 36Filed in the Office of the Legal Adviser. Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State 890.0146/12–1043 [Document 1181] Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State [ Washington ,] December 10, 1943. Participants: Members from PS and ES 71 Officers from the Naval Office of Occupied Territories. The meeting was requested for the purpose of exploring the possibility of a continuing exchange of views concerning the military government to be exercised by the Navy in the islands of the Central Pacific, particularly the Marshall Islands. 72 We were informed that by agreement with the War Department, on the one hand, and with the British on the other hand, military government in the occupied islands of the Central Pacific theatre is to be exclusively in the hands of the United States Navy. A special agreement has been made concerning the Gilbert Islands, by which the British accept the position that their military governors in those islands should be responsible to the United States commander in the Central Pacific Theatre, until the “American forces move westward”. The naval officers wished to be certain that the measures of military government which they are planning will conform to the policy of the Department of State as to the future political status of the islands. They said that they would, for example, be greatly assisted in planning measures of military government if they could be informed as to the views of the Department with regard to such matters as repatriation of Japanese, possible confiscation of Japanese investments, obligations arising from the mandate status. They seemed perplexed and somewhat disappointed at our inability to supply them with information as to the policy of the Department. Commander Shears stated that the Dutch had expressed a desire to have Soerabaya be made an international base. 71 Divisions of Political Studies and of Economic Studies. 72 On January 31, 1944, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, established the first military government under exclusive authority of the United States in the Marshall Islands. The Adviser on Liberated Areas for the Far East (Moffat) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) 890.0146/12–1443 [Document 1182] The Adviser on Liberated Areas for the Far East ( Moffat ) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department ( Hilldring ) Washington , December 14, 1943. My Dear General Hilldring : I think it would be very helpful to the State Department and to the Civil Affairs Division if the Adviser on Liberated Areas for the Far East would participate, if only as an observer, in the planning of military government in Japan and other Far Eastern areas. The military were in North Africa and in Sicily before any particular machinery was devised by the State Department for coordinating State Department policies with the work of CAD. As a result the State Department failed to keep abreast of the problems on which its policy recommendations were desired by you. This serious lag arising from lack of coordination from the beginning could, I believe, be avoided in the case of the Far East by such cooperation as I have suggested. I would be very happy to meet with you or with any officers whom you care to designate to discuss the matter further if, as I hope, this suggestion appeals to you. 73 Sincerely yours, Abbot L. Moffat 73 Capt. Wilbur L. Williams of the Civil Affairs Division was designated by Maj. Gen. Hilldring to maintain liaison with Mr. Moffat. The Navy Department to the Department of State 890.0146/3 [Document 1183] The Navy Department to the Department of State 74 [ Washington ,] 23 December, 1943. Proposed Financial Directive for the Japanese Mandated Islands in the Central Pacific Finance 1. The currency to be used in the Japanese Mandated Islands during the period of occupation will be U. S. dollar notes overprinted “Hawaii”, hereinafter referred to as H dollars, and regular U. S. coins. As soon as practicable after the occupation of any area a proclamation will be issued declaring the H dollar legal tender in that area. 2. The present rate of exchange between the H dollar and any Japanese yen currency will be one H dollar for 20 yen. Transactions at any other rate will be prohibited under penalty applying both to the local population and to the personnel of the Armed Forces. 3. All foreign financial and foreign trade transactions and all exports and imports of currency will be prohibited, except as permitted under regulations issued by the area commander. Safeguards similar to those now imposed in Hawaii will be imposed in order to minimize the exportation of H dollars to any area other than Hawaii. 4. All postal savings accounts or other accounts held in financial institutions will be blocked and will remain subject to the control of the area commander. Withdrawals from any such accounts will be effected in dollars at the decreed rate of exchange. Within specified limits individuals may be permitted to withdraw amounts from their blocked accounts for ordinary living expenses. Business enterprises may be permitted at the discretion of the area commander to use their funds for normal local operations. The program will be administered in a flexible manner so as not to interfere with the restoration of financial and commercial activities approved by the area commander. 5. Accounts and other assets held by, or on behalf of, the following persons will for purposes of safeguarding, pending determination of future disposition, be impounded and dealt with subject only to instructions issued by an Enemy Property Custodian appointed by the area commander: ( a ) Individuals who are not allowed personal freedom, including internees and prisoners of war, and business enterprises owned or controlled by such individuals, ( b ) Persons resident in enemy or enemy-occupied territory and enemy agencies or organizations, ( c ) Other absentee owners and holders. ( d ) Business enterprises controlled directly or indirectly by the enemy, or acting directly or indirectly for the benefit of the enemy. 6. As soon as practicable all Japanese (yen) currency will be withdrawn from circulation in the following manner: ( a ) At the earliest moment, but under no conditions later than 90 days after occupation of an area, all Japanese military scrip or other yen currency within the area will be surrendered. A proclamation to this effect will be issued immediately upon occupation of the area setting forth, among other items, the manner and place of surrender. ( b ) For the yen currency surrendered on or before the date specified in the proclamation H dollars will be given at the decreed rate of exchange in an amount decided by the area commander, but in no event to exceed fifty dollars (1000 yen) to an individual. All yen currency surrendered by an individual in excess of the aforesaid maximum will be deposited to a postal savings account, or to an account in any other financial institution, which accounts will be blocked in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 above. ( c ) If the initial supply of available U.S. coins is insufficient, a proclamation may be issued to authorize temporary local use beyond the date specified of Japanese yen currency in denominations of less than 20 yen. All Japanese currency in denominations of 20 yen and over will be declared not to be legal tender after the date specified, and may be accepted thereafter only under express approval of an authorized officer who should satisfy himself as to the source of the funds or the inability of the applicant to have surrendered the currency prior to the date specified. As soon as practicable all yen currency will be removed from circulation. 7. The military authorities will have the authority to maintain existing tax law to the extent desirable and to raise such contributions for the administration of the islands as are consistent with international custom and usage. Accordingly new taxes may be imposed and old taxes modified when deemed necessary by the military authorities. 8. None of the tax receipts or other revenues will be used for the payment of principal or interest on Japanese Government obligations. 9. The area commander may set up such safeguards and penalties as he may deem advisable to carry out these provisions. 10. Appropriate records will be kept of all financial transactions. 74 Handed by a member of the Occupied Areas Section of the Office of Naval Operations to the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) on December 23, 1943. Mr. Ballantine consulted other officers of the Department and then replied that the Department perceived no objection to the contents of the directive. It was sent on December 28 to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (Nimitz) by the Chief of Naval Operations (King). Major General J. H. Hilldring and Captain H. L. Pence to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) 890.0146/6 [Document 1184] Major General J. H. Hilldring and Captain H. L. Pence to the Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Dunn ) Washington , 18 February, 1944. Dear Mr. Dunn : Pursuant to our recent discussions, there is transmitted herewith an inclosure enumerating some of the fundamental questions which confront us in the planning, training and organization for civil affairs administration in Japan Proper, the Mandated Islands, and the countries occupied by Japan. It is requested that we be furnished with the recommendations and advice of the State Department for consideration in connection with our future planning for such civil affairs administration. The inclosed memorandum is not to be considered as embracing all the questions which are or may become inherent in the future occupation of Japan. It is recognized that the State Department cannot at this time answer all questions posed in the memorandum. It will be appreciated, however, if the State Department will furnish these offices with its advice seriatim as the answers thereto become fully or partially available. It will also be of invaluable aid to us if the State Department will from time to time transmit such additional information or policy advice as may be indicated in its continuing or progressive consideration of these or any other questions of which the State Department will be cognizant. Sincerely, J. H. Hilldring Major General, USA Director, Civil Affairs Division H. L. Pence Captain, USN Officer-in-Charge Occupied Areas Section [Enclosure] Memorandum Prepared in the War and Navy Departments Washington , 18 February, 1944. Preliminary Political and Policy Questions Bearing on Civil Affairs Planning for the Far East and Pacific Areas 1. The War and Navy Departments are engaged in the planning, training, and organization for civil affairs administration in Japan and its possessions or occupied lands. The advice and recommendations of the State Department will be of invaluable aid in the formulation of the necessary military decisions. At the outset, certain basic questions arise: a . What territories should be subjected to Civil Affairs Administration (hereinafter abbreviated as CAA)? b . Should such administration be conducted by the United Nations or will it be solely by the United States? In the latter case, the Army and Navy, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff can readily make the necessary allocations of areas of responsibility on a purely military basis, but the State Department may have a special interest therein, as, for example, with reference to Karafuto (vis-à-vis the Russians) and in the mandated islands as to any residual League of Nations interest. c . Should the administration be punitive, mild, or primarily to safeguard reparations? d . Does the American Government have any long-range policies for the postwar period which will in any manner influence the near-term conduct of CAA during the last phase of military operations and during the early phase of actual military occupation? 2. The foregoing questions cannot be posed effectively as mere generalities. They must be related to specific areas and specific commitments or operations functions. Broadly, the areas over which the United States Army and Navy forces may operate can be divided into groups as follows: a . Enemy country —Japan proper and its long integrated possessions such as Korea, Formosa and Manchukuo. b . Mandated islands —held by Japan under League of Nations trusteeship. c . Liberated countries —territory presently occupied by the enemy but belonging to the powers of the United Nations such as China and the Netherlands and France (though France is not one of the United Nations). d . Neutral countries —lands overrun by the enemy but owned by countries which are not at war, such as Timor owned by the Portuguese; and Thailand against whom the United States has not declared war although the present puppet government of Thailand has announced a declaration of war against the United States and Britain. 3. Japan proper . For present planning purposes, Japan proper is being considered as embracing the four present islands, but not including Korea and Manchukuo. In this area the authority of the military commander will be absolute and will stem by operation of international law, and as such, he will be limited only by directive to him from the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff. In any case, the following problems, among others, will be presented: a . Will all of Japan be occupied? If so, what should be the manner of occupation? b . What countries should participate in such occupation? c . What should be the nature of occupation? Should it be by zones or by one supreme council of interested United Nations membership? d . Should the exercise of the powers of the present existing government be suspended? e . Are there any political agencies or political parties of the enemy country with whom we can deal to assist in the restoration of essential authority in Japan and in its subsequent administration? f . Are there any political parties, organizations or groups in enemy country that should be dissolved? If so, which ones? g . Are there any obnoxious laws that should be nullified? If so, what are they? h . Should we permit freedom of worship in view of the position and status of the Japanese church and religion—Shintoism? Advice is requested as to the proper course insofar as the church, personnel, and property are concerned. i . What will be the status of the Emperor? Will he be removed both as an individual and as an institution? Will the individual be removed but the institution preserved? Will both remain? If so, under what measure of control? j . Should the Japanese Government be supervised at only the national and prefectual levels? Should control of the lower echelons of the native government be through inspectors rather than supervisory officials? k . What will be the duration of the CAA and will it be followed by a control commission? l . Should the military government take any steps to effect the enemy recall of diplomatic and consular officials? m . What particular steps should be taken in regard to the employer, the head of government and cabinet ministers who are or may not be war criminals? n . There are certain problems the solution of which will require guidance from the policy making departments of the U.S. government. Those problems deal with problems of currency stabilization and banking, taxes, payment of pensions, obligations of the enemy country and interests thereon. o . Should the various labor employee-employer organizations be permitted? What, if any, labor union activities can be tolerated? To what extent should the Japanese labor laws concerning courts and labor exchanges be abolished, modified or changed? p . Should unemployment insurance, relief and public works be continued? q . It will be desirable to inform the people of Japan concerning the purposes of military government. What special statements should be included in any proclamations to be issued by the military commander? r . Who should participate in military government—the British? Chinese? Dutch? Free French? USSR (if the Soviets enter the Far East war)? s . Will the conceivable interest of the Soviets in southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) affect the nature and extent of the control in this area? In any event, if the USSR participates in the Far East war, will Karafuto become a special and exclusive concern of the Soviets? 4. Mandated islands . The United States Senate did not ratify the League of Nations covenant. 75 Inherent in the situation are certain questions: a . Does Japan’s violation of her international trusteeship carry any special implications for CAA? b . Does the League of Nations have any residual rights in the mandated islands which must be subserved by the military occupant? c . Are all Japanese personnel (military and civilian) to be evacuated from the mandated islands? 5. Liberated countries . There is unanimous opinion that in enemy country the authority of the military commander is theoretically absolute, but there are limitations in free or neutral countries as to the status, jurisdiction, and arrangements for CAA. Therefore, it will be necessary to explore the form and subjects of agreements (if any) with the Netherlands, China, and French Committee. So far as concerns liberated territory of the U. S. and U. K., it has been agreed that the governments concerned will prepare the necessary directives for CAA. 6. Neutral countries . Timor is a possession of Portugal, a neutral nation. Thailand was overrun by the Japanese and its puppet government declared war on the United States and Britain. Thailand was the subject of public statements by the Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek on February 26, 1943, 76 and by President Roosevelt on March 4, 1943. 77 On March 13, 1943, the British Embassy stated that the British would “take the same line.” a . What special considerations or principles control CAA in Timor and Thailand? b . Should Thailand’s independence be guaranteed? Or is it to be mandated or trusteed to some foreign power or powers? c . Should King Anata Mahidal be enabled or encouraged to ascend the throne? d . What use, if any, should be made of the Pibul collaborationist government? e . Should conversations be initiated with the Chinese military representatives concerning the interest of China in her nationals in Thailand? f . Will foreign capital be allowed to invest freely in Thailand during the period of occupation? g . Should relief for civilian population be administered by the military occupant? By some international agency? By the Thai Government itself? h . Are the Shann States, taken from Burma by the Japanese and given to Thailand, to be returned for CAA by the British? The same question applies as to the four Malaya States given by the Japanese to Thailand in 1943. 7. French Indo-China. a . What should be the status of the French National Committee (de Gaullist) in this territory? b . Should there be any AMG (Allied Military Government) in this area; if so, what should be the AMG-de Gaullist relationship? c . In short, should the U.S. Army plan for any degree of military government or civil affairs administration in French Indo-China? If so, what limiting factors should there be? 8. Korea. a . In view of the Cairo pronouncement 78 that Korea is ultimately to be made independent, what interim governmental machinery is to be set up? b . To what extent will the U.S. Army and/or Navy have administrative civil affairs responsibility? c . Will civil affairs responsibility be shared with the British? The Chinese? And/or the Russians (if they join the Far East war)? d . What policies and responsibilities will govern in the problem of civilian relief? e . What policy will be followed with respect to technically qualified Japanese nationals who may remain? 9. Manchukuo. a . Will Chinese sovereignty be immediately re-established or will there be an interim CAA? b . If the latter, will this be American or United Nations? c . What nations will participate? And, what will be their degrees of participation? d . Will China and/or the Soviets (if the USSR joins the Far East war) have a paramount interest and participation? e . What considerations should be reflected in the economic directive (if there is U.S. participation) with reference to Japanese subsidized enterprises? 10. Miscellaneous . The foregoing questions and their arrangement are not all-embrasive or preclusive. For example, the Philippines are not discussed in this memorandum. Other and detailed questions will emerge as planning progresses and will be submitted to the State Department for its advice and recommendations. 75 Part 1 of the Versailles Treaty of Peace, June 28, 1919, Foreign Relations , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii , p. 69 . 76 See telegram 293, February 27, 1943, from Chungking, Foreign Relations , 1943, China, p. 13 . 77 For proposed statement, see letter of March 6, 1943, from the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, ibid. , pp. 23 – 24 , and footnote 28, p. 24 . For President Roosevelt’s press conference statement March 12, 1943, see telegram 362, March 17, 1943, to Chungking, ibid. , p. 36 . 78 For text of the Cairo Declaration, December 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448 . The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) 740.0011 Pacific War/3751 [Document 1185] The Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Dunn ) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department ( Hilldring ) Washington , February 24, 1944. My Dear General Hilldring : In our conversation on February 1, 1944 you asked for an opinion, from the point of view of the State Department, on Admiral Mountbatten’s 79 suggestion that American Military Civil Affairs officers be assigned to his staff. We believe that from a political point of view such assignments would be inadvisable under present circumstances. The presence of American Military Civil Affairs officers on the staff of the Southeast Asia Command, under a British Commander, would further increase the belief among the peoples of India and presumably throughout the Far East that our policy and that of the British in Asia are the same. On the other hand, if American forces, independent of Admiral Mountbatten’s command and under an American Commander, temporarily occupied parts of southeast Asia in the course of military operations against Japanese forces, it would be advisable from the political point of view for the American forces to have with them American Military Civil Affairs officers. If you wish we shall be glad to discuss this question with you further in the light of any considerations you may present. You are, of course, aware that it is possible that developments may occur in the future that would make it advisable for American Civil Affairs officers to be sent to Thailand and French Indochina. It will be appreciated if you will inform me of any action the War Department may take in connection with the matter. 80 Sincerely yours, James C. Dunn 79 Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. 80 At a meeting on March 2 of War and Navy Department officers concerned with civil affairs, it was decided that the Department of State’s recommendations embodied in this letter should be applied except when military necessity required otherwise. (890.20/3–2444) The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) 890.0146/6 [Document 1186] The Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Dunn ) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department ( Hilldring ) Washington , February 28, 1944. My Dear General Hilldring : Reference is made to the letter of February 18, 1944 sent to me jointly by you and Captain H. L. Pence, U.S.N., Officer in Charge, Occupied Areas Section, Navy Department, requesting the recommendations and advice of the State Department in connection with planning for civil affairs administration in the Far East and Pacific areas. I shall communicate with you later regarding civil affairs administration in Japan, the mandated islands and the Japanese occupied areas other than the Netherlands East Indies. The problem in the Netherlands Indies is complicated by the fact that Sumatra is under the theater command of Lord Mountbatten, while the remaining islands are under General MacArthur. 81 As arrangements for civil administration and jurisdiction in Sumatra have already been the subject of preliminary informational conversations between the Netherlands Government and the British Government, and the Civil Affairs Agreement to be concluded with respect to Sumatra is primarily a concern of the British military authorities, the following discussion is confined to the arrangement to be instituted in the Netherlands Indies areas which will be under the theater command of General MacArthur. The Netherlands Constitution has abolished any juridical distinction between the European territories of the Netherlands Empire and the former “overseas” or “colonial” territories. Constitutionally, therefore, the “Kingdom of the Netherlands” is an integral whole consisting of four administrative areas: the European area; Surinam; Curaçao; and the Netherlands Indies. Under normal conditions, the Crown is charged by the Netherlands Constitution with the “supreme administration” over the East Indies, while the “general administration” of the East Indies is entrusted to the Governor General. Since the Japanese occupation of the Indies, both the supreme administration and the general administration of Indies affairs rests with the Royal Netherlands Government in London acting with the advice of various agencies thereof such as the Ministry for Overseas Territories, the Ministry for the Coordination of Warfare of the Kingdom, and the Netherlands Indies Commission for Australia and New Zealand now established in Melbourne. The latter group is in no sense “a Government in exile” but merely a group of administrative officials who are occupied with plans for the reestablishment of Netherlands governmental authority in the Indies after the liberation of the area. Under existing circumstances, therefore, it may be assumed that any agreement with respect to the jurisdiction over and administration of civil affairs in the Netherlands Indies will, on the Netherlands side, be negotiated and signed by representatives of the Netherlands Government in London. Preliminary conversations with respect to civil administration in the Netherlands Indies have already taken place between representatives of the Netherlands Government and representatives of the State Department and the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. Dr. van Mook, Lieutenant Governor General of the Indies and a member of the Netherlands Cabinet, is now on his way to Australia for discussions with General MacArthur after which he intends to present for our consideration a draft civil affairs agreement. We understand that this agreement will be based upon the principles incorporated in the agreement in regard to the European territories of the Kingdom 82 with such minor modifications in detail as may be necessary because of the special conditions in the Indies, including the separation of the area into two theaters of operation, one under British command and the other under American command. The Department of State is of the opinion that arrangements with the Netherlands Government for civil administration and jurisdiction of the Netherlands Indies territory (except Sumatra) liberated by an Allied Expeditionary Force under American command should observe the following principles: 1. Full freedom of action of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force should be insured. 2. In general, the principles already agreed upon by the United States and Netherlands Governments with respect to civil administration and jurisdiction in the European territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands would seem to furnish a satisfactory working basis for the development of a corresponding agreement with respect to the Netherlands Indies. 3. Arrangements for the civil administration of liberated Netherlands Indies territory should be predicated on the assumption that the exercise of all attributes of sovereignty will be resumed by the Netherlands Government as soon as the situation, in the judgment of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, permits. However, in any military agreement of the nature under consideration no commitments should be made which would prejudice the right of the Government of the United States to bring up either prior to or after the resumption of sovereign rights by the Netherlands Government certain proposals for discussion and agreement of a general character which it may believe to be of rightful concern to the United States Government and to all governments which have subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, 83 and to the Four Nation Declaration at Moscow 84 and certain particular proposals which may be of special mutual concern to the people of the Netherlands Empire and the people of the United States. 4. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force should be entirely free to select his own chief civil affairs officer, although appointment of an American might be preferable in that it would facilitate the execution of the Supreme Commander’s will. 5. In view of the complex and specialized problems involved in the administration of the affairs of the over 70,000,000 persons in the Indies, Netherlands civil affairs officers and loyal local officials should be consulted and used freely in the civil affairs administration so far as is compatible with the successful conduct of military operations. 6. Jurisdiction over civilians in the Indies owing allegiance to the Netherlands Government and members of the Netherlands Armed Forces accompanying the Allied Forces should be granted to the Netherlands civil and military courts to the fullest extent compatible with the freedom of action of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in the conduct of military operations. 7. Jurisdiction over American military personnel should be reserved to American military courts. I assume that as in the case of the Netherlands (European), Belgian and Norwegian Agreements negotiations with respect to the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Agreement will continue to be conducted through military channels with the advice of the State Department on political points when requested by the War or Navy Departments. 85 The foregoing observations are transmitted with particular reference to paragraph numbered five of the memorandum dated February 18, 1944 and entitled “Preliminary Political and Policy Questions Bearing on Civil Affairs Planning for the Far East and Pacific Areas” which was sent to me as an enclosure to the letter of the same date under reply. I am sending a copy of this letter to Captain Pence. Sincerely yours, James Clement Dunn 81 Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Southwest Pacific. 82 Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands respecting arrangements for civil administration and jurisdiction in Netherlands’ territory liberated by an Allied expeditionary force, signed at London, May 16, 1944, Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2212; 2 United States Treaties and Other International Agreements 601. 83 August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. i , p. 367 . 84 October 30, 1943, ibid. , 1943, vol. i , p. 755 . 85 For agreement signed on December 10, see p. 1286 [ Pg. 1286 includes portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1187] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–118 CAC–104 [ Washington ,] March 11, 1944. Japan: Occupation Problems: Diplomatic and Consular Officers I. The Problem Should diplomatic or consular representatives from or to Japan be permitted during the period of occupation? (Question 3, l , 86 CAC 100 Preliminary, Annex A). II. Discussion The “Provisions for Imposition upon Germany at the time of Surrender” (WS 10a) contains the following requirement: “22. German Diplomatic Relations . Until otherwise determined the conduct of the diplomatic relations of Germany should be subject to the direction and control of the occupation authorities.” The same provision is made with regard to Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, and will presumably be made with regard to Japan. The following questions arise: Should diplomatic relations between Japan and foreign countries be permitted? Should the consular representatives of Japan in foreign countries be recalled? Should the consular representatives of foreign nations in Japan be permitted to function? And, as a consequent question, should the foreign office be suspended? Answers to these questions depend to a very large degree upon the length and the purposes of the occupation. If the occupation is to be short—i.e., for the few months necessary to disarm Japan and impress upon Japanese the lesson of their defeat—the maintenance of diplomatic or even consular relations would not be of great importance. If, on the other hand, an extended period of occupation is contemplated, these questions might cause difficulty. There are few if any appropriate precedents for occupation of an entire nation after surrender (rather than during war) and for some length of time. For such a situation, answers would have to be improvised according to the circumstances, and should be supplied by the Department of State. According to the Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, the first basic economic purpose of military government is “to revive economic life and stimulate production”, and to this end to reestablish trade. For this purpose, the performance of consular functions would be important, and the question whether they should be performed by Japanese consular officials or through the American consular offices is one which the Department wishes to leave open. Others of the United Nations might wish to resume diplomatic and consular intercourse with Japan and, since the occupation is in the name of the United Nations, their wishes cannot be disregarded by the military commander. III. Recommendations The diplomatic and consular agents of other enemy states in Japan should be deprived of their functions, treated with courtesy, and returned to their own countries. It is believed that, as a matter of general principle, there will be no occasion for the maintenance of diplomatic relations between Japan and other states until the period of occupation is ended. If the period is to be a long one, it might become desirable to reestablish diplomatic intercourse. It is recommended that the Japanese government be instructed to recall all its diplomatic and consular agents abroad. This action by the Military Government might be supplemented through notices from the Department of State notifying other states, in the name of United Nations, that such Japanese agents, until further notice, have no authority to act for Japan. In case of extended occupation, when presumably a national government would have been recognized, that government could be authorized to send consuls or commercial agents abroad, their appointment and instructions to be subject to the approval of the occupying authority. No objection is seen to permitting the consular representatives of other nations in Japan to perform their functions in Japan, but former exequaturs issued by Japan should be canceled and a formula should be found by which such consular representatives of other nations would recognize that the authority which they exercise in Japan is derived from the occupation authorities rather than from the Japanese government. In view of the above, the subordinate administrative staff of the Japanese Foreign Office should be continued in operation, under close supervision by occupation officials, and with its superior policy-making officers removed from office. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. 87 ISO: CEagleton (drafting officer) JA: ERDickover FSWilliams TS: GHBlakeslee LA: ALMoffat HBorton TA: WWilloughby RAFearey ME: MBHall AVandenbosch FMA: CFRemer FE: JWBallantine FSO: EHDooman AHiss CD: WTPhillips 86 See memorandum prepared in the War and Navy Departments, February 18, pp. 1190 [ Pg. 1190 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 87 Symbols used below are, in full, as follows: ISO, Division of International Security and Organization; TS, Division of Territorial Studies; FE, Office of Far Eastern Affairs; JA, Division of Japanese Affairs; LA, Liberated Areas Division; TA, Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements; ME, Division of Middle Eastern Affairs; FMA, Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs; FSO, Foreign Service Officer; CD, Commodities Division. The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State 893.014/3–1144 [Document 1188] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State 87a Washington , 11 March, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : As evidenced in the present war, the Japanese Mandated Islands bear a vital relation to the defense of the United States. Their assured possession and control by the United States are essential to our security. Together they constitute a single military entity, no element of which can be left to even the partial control of another nation without hazard to our control of that entity. 88 The implication in the Australia-New Zealand Agreement 89 that those countries are capable of defending all or any of those islands has no foundation in reality. On the contrary, the military capabilities of Australia and New Zealand not only for the present but for the future are so limited that they cannot assure the defense of their home territories against any one of the potentially strong Asiatic Powers. The Japanese Mandated Islands should be placed under the sole sovereignty of the United States. Their conquest is being effected by the forces of the United States and there appears to be no valid reason why their future status should be the subject of discussion with any other nation. Sincerely yours, For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: William D. Leahy Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 87a This letter was in reply to the request for comment contained in a letter from the Secretary of State to Admiral Leahy, dated February 5, 1944 (not printed). 88 Earlier, on September 15, 1942, Admiral Leahy had written for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to a question from Norman H. Davis, Chairman, American Red Cross and Chairman, Sub-committee on Security Problems, Department of State Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, as follows: “It is imperative that Japan be prevented from controlling the sea and air routes across the Pacific and the western Pacific and conversely, that these routes be controlled by the United Nations. This indicates the necessity of depriving Japan of all islands south of the latitude 30° north, with the possible exception of the Nansei (Ryu Kyu) Islands. This includes the Marshall, Caroline, Pelew, Bonin and Mariana Islands, and Formosa.” (894.014/9–1542) 89 For correspondence on concern of the United States over the Australia-New Zealand agreement of 1944, see vol. iii , pp. 168 ff. Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1189] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–111 CAC–80 [ Washington ,] March 13, 1944. Japan: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces To Occupy Japan I. The Problem The problem is to determine what countries should participate in the occupation of Japan and the kind of occupation which should be recommended. (Questions 3 b 3 c and 3 r ) 90 II. Basic Factors It is impossible to anticipate at this time the precise circumstances in which Japan will be occupied; it might be occupied as a whole following combat operations in Japan itself, or after Japan’s unconditional surrender, without there having been any such combat operations. Thus, the composition of the combat forces, on the basis of purely military considerations, in the first contingency might be different from that of the occupying forces in the second contingency. It might well be decided, for example, to limit the occupying force following combat to military units of only one nation and if occupation followed unconditional surrender to utilize forces from several nations. In either case, however, it would be desirable for the military authorities to give the fullest consideration to political factors which may call for representation, in so far as compatible with military necessity, in the combat forces of units from those allied countries participating in the war against Japan. These political factors may he even more important in determining the composition of military government. It is reported that the Combined Chiefs of Staff reached an agreement in January 1944 by which the British recognized that the Central Pacific area and Japan, for the purposes of prosecuting the war and for military government, came under the military and naval jurisdiction of the United States. The geographic position of the United States in relation to Japan, and the military and financial resources of the United States as well as events leading to the Pacific War—operate to place on the United States a primary responsibility for assuring the fulfillment of the terms of surrender and the operation of military government. Among the political considerations which may affect the composition of this military government is the fact that Article 2 of the Four Nation Declaration of Moscow, November 1, 1943, provides that those of the signatories “at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy”. Paragraph 3 adds: “They will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.” The composition and command of the forces to be used for the occupation and military government of Japan would seem to be a problem which relates, in part at least, to the surrender and disarmament of Japan and consequently would call for joint rather than unilateral decision thus underscoring the possibility of occupation by combined forces. There have been no public pronouncements by any of the United Nations on the subject of the composition of the occupation forces but the general statement issued by Churchill, Roosevelt and Chiang following the Cairo Conference, December 1, 1943 may have some bearing on the nature of this occupation. It read: “The three great allies (the United States, Great Britain and China) are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.” There is reason to believe from statements of Chinese officials that they anticipate Chinese participation in the occupation of Japan. Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan wrote in October 1943 that “the United Nations forces will land and occupy Japan”. The Association of British Malaya has written to the British Colonial Office pointing out the desirability of Malayan regiments forming part of any army of occupation. Various influential Americans, including Hanson Baldwin, 91 have expressed their opinion that occupation should be undertaken by national contingents drawn from the various United Nations. If the forces occupying Japan, including the personnel of military government, are restricted to those of the United States, it would appear to settle the question as to whether or not this Government would be solely responsible for the enforcement of the terms of surrender. Such a solution would force the United States to bear alone whatever cost and effect were necessary for such control; a condition which the American people might support only grudgingly. The presence of Asiatic units among the allied occupation forces and military government might well produce results more beneficial to American interests than if they were either exclusively American or Caucasian. The possibility of the use of allied rather than solely American forces for the occupation and military government of Japan raises the question of whether occupation should be by zones, either with or without a military council of United Nations membership, or according to other principles. The fact that Japan proper consists of four main islands might suggest the advisability of dividing Japan for purposes of occupation into zones corresponding to these geographical divisions. On the other hand, Japan proper is basically a single geographic, ethnic, sociological, economic and political unit. Centralization has been a predominant characteristic of modern Japan with the result that the inhabitants of northern Hokkaido or of southern Kyushu feel as closely controlled by the national government as do the inhabitants of the capital. The establishment of nine new administrative units in June 1943 is the first attempt of the Japanese to increase local autonomy in government, but even this change has not given these administrative units responsibility for purely national functions such as those of public order, transportation, communications, education, taxation and finance, and legislation on all matters of real significance. In the light of this situation, it is obvious that many difficult problems would arise if a zonal system of military government is superimposed on the national governmental structure. When the scope and kind of occupation and the composition of the occupying force are decided, questions of importance to the future security and peace of the United Nations, and particularly the signatories of the Moscow Four Nation Declaration who are at war with Japan, will still remain unsettled. It will be necessary to recognize and answer these questions, whether the occupation is complete or partial and whether or not it is mixed. The views of the Department on these matters are in the process of being formulated and to the extent that they may affect military government, will be communicated at a later time. The questions of the nature of the occupation and the composition of the occupation forces will be raised anew in the event that the Soviet Union participates in hostilities against Japan. III. Recommendations It is recommended that: 1. The forces to be used for combat purposes in Japan should include, if not prejudicial to the effectiveness of military operations, units of those allied countries which have actively participated in the war against Japan. It is assumed that all such forces will be under the command of the American theater commander. 2. During the operation of military government in the combat stages, there should be, if feasible, provision for representation in civil affairs administration for any allied country participating in the combat forces. 3. With the completion of military operation and after the unconditional surrender of Japan, there should be, so far as practicable, allied representation by those countries which have actively participated in the war against Japan in the army of occupation and in military government. It is assumed that such representation will not be so large as to prejudice the dominantly American character of CAA. 4. The occupation of Japan should be organized on the principle of centralized administration, avoiding the division of the country into zones administered separately by the different national contingents composing the occupation force. Representation of these contingents might be provided, in addition to regular staff representation, through a council made up of the ranking officers of the respective contingents. Such a council should have advisory powers only. While the relationship between its members and the commander in chief of the occupation force would approximate that of staff officers to a commanding officer, the establishment of such an advisory military council would probably accord more closely with the dignity, position, and authority of the individuals concerned and of the governments they represent than through staff representation only. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. (Drafting Officers) TS: HBorton ISO: DCBlaisdell JA: ERDickover FSO: EHDooman TS: GHBlakeslee ISO: CEagleton AVandenbosch LA: AMoffat FE: JWBallantine TA: WWilloughby AHiss ME: MBHall JA: BRJohansen FMA: CFRemer FSWilliams LED 93 : JRFriedman CA 92 : OEClubb 90 Ante , pp. 1191 [ Pg. 1191 is part of Doc. 1184 ] and 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 91 Military editor for the New York Times. 93 Division of Labor Relations. 92 Division of Chinese Affairs. The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) 890.0146/6 [Document 1190] The Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Dunn ) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department ( Hilldring ) Washington , March 14, 1944. My Dear General Hilldring : I refer again to the letter of February 18, 1944 addressed to me jointly by you and Captain H. L. Pence U.S.N., Officer in charge, Occupied Areas Section, Navy Department, requesting the recommendations and views of the State Department in connection with planning for civil affairs administration in the Far East and Pacific Areas. My letter of February 28, 1944 conveyed to you the Department’s views with regard to the Netherlands East Indies. This letter will deal solely with the question of French Indo-China. A complicating factor with respect to Indo-China is the fact that the United States does not at this time recognize the existence of a Government of France or a Government of the French Empire. On February 17, the State Department addressed the following memorandum to the President with a view to obtaining his decision on two questions which fundamentally affect the civil affairs planning for that area. “The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department has indicated its desire to proceed at once with civil affairs planning for Indo-China and before doing so has requested political guidance from the State Department. “A number of important decisions depend upon whether French troops are to be used in the military operations to regain control of Indo-China, and whether French nationals are to be used in civil administration and planning. There is ample evidence that the French hope to be consulted and to play a part in driving the Japanese from that area. “Subject to your approval, the State Department will proceed on the assumption that French armed forces will be employed to at least some extent in the military operations, and that in the administration of Indo-China it will be desirable to employ French nationals who have an intimate knowledge of the country and its problems. We would assume further that the use of French forces or civilians would be without prejudice to the question of the ultimate status of French Indo-China and would be related solely to problems directly connected with and flowing from possible military operations.” In reply, the President orally expressed the view to Mr. Stettinius 94 that no French troops whatever should be used in operations in Indo-China. He added that in his view the operation should be Anglo-American in character and should be followed by the establishment of an international trusteeship over the French colony. With regard to the question of international trusteeship, this Government has as yet made no approach to other Governments for the purpose of ascertaining their views. Sincerely yours, James Clement Dunn 94 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State. Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1191] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–115 CAC–117 [ Washington ,] March 15, 1944. Japan: Freedom of Worship Problem The problem is whether or not the occupying forces should permit freedom of worship in Japan, in view of the difficulty of differentiating Shintoism, as a religion, from extreme Nationalism. 95 Discussion The United Nations are committed to the principle of freedom of religious worship. Application of this principle in Japan is complicated by the fact that the Japanese nationalists have in recent times superimposed on the harmless, primitive animism, which was the original Shinto, a nationalistic Emperor-worshiping cult which has been used by the militarists to develop the present fanatically patriotic, aggressive Japan. It is necessary in any consideration of this subject to distinguish between these two aspects of Shinto. Ancient Shinto in itself is not injurious to our interests, but National Shinto, the cult of extreme militant nationalism, is a distinct source of danger to the peace of the Pacific and perhaps of the world. Just as the Institution of the Emperor is often condemned in the United States because of the misuse made of it, so ancient Shinto is condemned because of the nationalistic cult which has been grafted onto it. It is therefore apparent that while ancient Shinto can without danger be allowed to be practiced, the practice of the new National Shinto should be carefully watched. There are some 100,000 Shinto shrines in Japan falling into three categories, ( a ) Most of the Shinto shrines are of ancient origin and are dedicated to local tutelary deities. They are the scenes of local fetes and can be construed as strictly religious shrines; ( b ) a few, like the Grand Shrines at Ise, dedicated to the Sun Goddess, are also ancient religious shrines but with an over-layer of nationalistic symbolism; ( c ) some of the more recent shrines such as the Yasukuni, the Meiji, the Nogi, Togo and others dedicated to national heroes are not places of religious worship as we understand the term, but nationalist shrines dedicated to the veneration of nationalist militarist heroes and to the fostering of a militant national spirit. These last could be closed without any violation of the principle of freedom of religious worship, as the Japanese Government has repeatedly asserted that National Shinto is not a religion but rather a manifestation of patriotism. It may well be, however, that tolerance of such shrines coincident with military defeat and the demobilization of the Army would do more to weaken the hold of the National Shinto cult upon the people than would the forcible closing of such shrines, which might tend to strengthen the cult. The Christian churches in Japan in recent years have been subject to various restrictions and regulatory measures, in an attempt to assimilate them into the general scheme of a totalitarian state. Recommendations It is recommended that: (1) Freedom of religious worship should be proclaimed promptly on occupation. (2) Shrines of the ancient Shinto religion should be permitted to remain open except where it is found that such shrines are being utilized for subversive activities. (3) The Grand Shrines at Ise, dedicated to the Sun Goddess, should be permitted to remain open, unless experience indicates that it would be advisable to close them. (4) At the strictly nationalist shrines, ceremonies or gatherings which involve demonstrations or large crowds at such shrines should be forbidden. The staffs of the national shrines, other than physical caretakers, should be dismissed and not receive pay from the national treasury. These shrines should be permitted to remain open for individual worship, except in instances where such action appears to be contrary to public order and security. (CAA would be well advised to obtain the guidance of Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries in determining which are the nationalist shrines.) (5) Care should be taken that the troops of occupation do no damage to any of the shrines. (6) No action should be necessary in regard to Buddhist temples. (7) Christian churches should be liberated by restoration of complete freedom of organization and worship. Prepared and reviewed by Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. JA: ERDickover (drafting officer) ISO: QWright LA: AMoffat  ”  ” JA: BRJohansen FSO: EHDooman  ”  ” FSWilliams TS: GHBlakeslee CA: JCVincent HBorton ME: MBHall PRJosselyn FMA: CFRemer AVandenbosch LRD: JRFriedman FE: JWBallantine AHiss 95 Cf. paragraph 3 h , p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1192] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–120 CAC–126 [ Washington ,] March 21, 1944. Japan: Military Occupation: Proclamations I. The Problem It will be desirable to inform the people of Japan concerning the purposes of military government. What special statements should be included in any proclamations to be issued by the military commander? (3– q ) 96 (The problem has been broadened herein to cover the general problem of proclamations.) II. Basic Factors Section VI, paragraphs 35 and 36, of the United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs (FM 27–5) furnishes a suitable guide for drawing up proclamations regarding the occupation of Japan. The replies prepared to other questions propounded by the War and Navy Departments provide the basic information for filling in the political items called for in the outline. Because of their immediate circulation and unquestionable authority, proclamations should include a few basic statements designed to impress upon the Japanese people the reasons for and the purposes of the occupation and to encourage popular cooperation. The press and radio and similar media of public information are, however, more suitable for the development of material of this character. Such material can have an important influence on political developments in Japan during the period of occupation. The popular reaction to proclamations will depend to a very great extent upon the skill of the translator. In the Japanese language it is necessary to a unique degree to choose the proper words and forms in order to inspire respect rather than invite ridicule and to convey the correct impression of the authority of the occupying forces and of their attitude toward the Japanese people. III. Recommendations 1. The Department of State regards Section VI, paragraphs 35 and 36, of the United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs (FM 27–5) as a suitable guide for drawing up proclamations for use in the occupation of Japan. 2. Political items in the proclamation should be prepared in the light of the State Department’s replies to other questions propounded by the War and Navy Departments. 3. The State Department believes that most of the material designed to impress upon the Japanese people the reasons for and the purposes of the occupation and to encourage popular cooperation can best be disseminated by media such as the press and radio. However, it is recommended that the initial proclamation include the following basic material: a . A statement that Japan launched upon a career of unbridled aggression, which aggression forced the powers attacked by Japan to fight and to defeat Japan in their own self-defense. To insure Japan’s defeat, military occupation of Japan by the countries thus attacked by Japan has become necessary for the purpose of destroying the bases of Japan’s aggression. b . A statement that punishment of the Japanese people as a whole is not one of the purposes of the occupation, and, consequently, the treatment of the Japanese people and the duration of the occupation will depend in large measure on their behavior. c . If the Emperor is in the hands of the occupying forces, a statement (or a separate proclamation, issued at the earliest possible time by the occupying authorities) regarding the whereabouts, welfare and status of the Emperor, supplemented, if possible, by a proclamation issued by the Emperor himself to inform the people of his safety and to command them to comply with the directions of the occupying forces. (As explained in CAC 93, 97 the Emperor has a unique hold over the Japanese people.) 4. It is recommended that so far as possible the military authorities prepare their proclamations in advance and consult the State Department regarding both the English and Japanese texts thereof. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. JA: BE Johansen (Drafting Officer) FSO: EHDooman TS: GHBlakeslee JA: ERDickover HBorton CA: OEClubb KAFearey LA: ALMoffat PRJosselyn ME: MBHall FE: JWBallantine FMA: CFRemer 96 Ante , p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 97 PWC–116, March 21, not printed, but see PWC–116d, May 9, p. 1250 [ Pg. 1250 is part of Doc. 1210 ] . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1193] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–121 CAC–125 [ Washington ,] March 21, 1944. Japan: Karafuto ( Southern Sakhalin ): Occupation and Military Government I. The Problem The problem is “will the conceivable interest of the Soviets in Southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) affect the nature and extent of the control in this area” and “if the U.S.S.R. participates in the Far East war, will Karafuto become a special and exclusive concern of the Soviet?” (Question 3 s ). 98 II. Basic Factors Since the acquisition of Karafuto (Sakhalin south of the 50 degree parallel) by Japan in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905, 99 that territory has been energetically developed by the Japanese. The population in 1940 totalled 415,000 and was almost exclusively Japanese. In November 1942 Karafuto ceased to be considered a colony and was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs and has since been regarded by the Japanese as a part of Japan Proper. Strategically Karafuto lies athwart the most direct airline to Vladivostok from San Francisco via Dutch Harbor and Petropavlovsk. It commands the approaches from the northeast to the Japan Sea, The Maritime Provinces of Soviet Russia, and Vladivostok. The final disposition of Karafuto may depend, in large measure, on the course of Russo-Japanese relations. According to the neutrality pact of April 13, 1941, 1 both the Soviet Union and Japan “undertake mutually to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other.” In the event of war between the Soviet Union and Japan, Soviet forces may undertake to occupy the Japanese portion of Sakhalin, particularly if other United Nations forces have not already done so, and the Soviet Union may demand its cession at the end of hostilities. However, the predominantly Japanese character of the population and the close integration of the economy of Karafuto with Japan might make it advisable, in spite of possible Soviet demands, that Karafuto be retained by Japan with provision for complete disarmament and periodic inspection to prevent its rearmament. If Karafuto is occupied by United Nations forces, under the same American theater commander as for Japan, the problem of the composition of the occupation forces for Karafuto is identical with the problem for Japan, irrespective of whether or not the Soviet Union enters the war in the Pacific. (See CAC–80 “Japan: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan”). 2 There is a possibility, however, that Karafuto may be under a different American command than that for Japan. If such is the case, the principle that units of those allied countries which have actively participated in the war against Japan should be included in the forces to be used for combat purposes and in the various stages of military government in Japan, would be applicable to Karafuto. Moreover, the principle that the occupation of Japan should be organized on a basis of a centralized administration rather than by zones would also be appropriate for Karafuto. (See CAC–80 “Japan: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan”). If the Soviet Union enters the war in the Pacific prior to the occupation of Karafuto by other United Nations forces, new problems will be presented. An agreement would have to be reached by the highest authorities as to whether Karafuto should be under a Soviet or American theater commander and if under a Soviet command whether American forces should participate in combat operations and civil affairs. III. Recommendations A. On the assumption that Karafuto is under the American theater commander for Japan, it is recommended that: No special consideration be given to Karafuto as its occupation and military government would be part of the occupation and military government of Japan Proper. (See CAC–80 “Japan: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan”). B. On the assumption that Karafuto is occupied by United Nations forces under an American command separate from that for the rest of Japan, it is recommended that: 1. The principle, which is recommended for Japan, that those countries which have actively participated in the war against Japan be represented in the combat forces and in the army of occupation and in military government, should be applied to Karafuto (See CAC–80 “Japan: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan”). 2. The principle, which is recommended for Japan, that the occupation be centralized, should be applied to Karafuto. Karafuto should not be divided into separate zones to be administered by different national contingents. (See CAC–80 “Japan: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan”). 3. Representation of the different national contingents in the military government of Karafuto might be through an advisory council of the ranking officers of the respective contingents, in addition to representation on the civil affairs staff. (See CAC–80 “Japan: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan”). 4. The Soviet Union, if it enters the war against Japan, should participate in civil affairs in Karafuto on the same basis as other Allies. C. On the assumption that the Soviet Union enters the war in the Pacific prior to the occupation of Karafuto by United Nations forces, it is recommended that: 1. The Governments of the nations concerned should decide whether Karafuto should be placed under a Soviet or American theater commander. 2. If Karafuto is placed under a Soviet commander, the competent military and political authorities of the American Government should decide whether American participation would be advisable in combat operations and civil affairs in Karafuto. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: HBorton (drafting officer) JA: ERDickover GHBlakeslee BRJohansen RAFearey FSWilliams FE: JWBallantine CA: JCVincent AHiss OEClubb ISO: DCBlaisdell ME: MBHall LA: ALMoffat FSO: EHDooman 98 Ante , p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 99 Foreign Relations , 1905, p. 824 . 1 Department of State Bulletin , April 29, 1945, p. 811; cf. also telegram 763, April 13, 1941, 11 p.m., from Moscow, Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. iv , p. 944 . 2 PWC–111, March 13, p. 1202 [ Pg. 1202 is part of Doc. 1189 ] . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1194] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–109 CAC–120 [ Washington ,] March 22, 1944. Japan: Should the Military Administration of Civil Affairs Be Punitive, Mild or Primarily To Safeguard Reparations? 3 It is recommended that the military authorities should administer civil affairs in Japan, so far as is consistent with the maintenance of security and with military requirements, with the view of assisting toward the realization of the stated objectives of the United States. The character of the military government, the degree of severity which may be found necessary or, on the other hand, the extent of assistance which it may be possible to extend to the Japanese people, and the time when this assistance may be given, will depend in large measure on the conduct and attitude of the Japanese, their willingness to carry out the terms of surrender and of the treaty of peace, and their cooperation with the military authorities and with the governments of the United Nations. The military government will naturally take such action as may be found necessary to safeguard the security of the occupying forces. Otherwise, its measures should not aim to be punitive in character or needlessly humiliating to the Japanese people. As to reparations, the military government should await a directive from the Department of State. The military authorities, in short, should aim to establish an administration of civil affairs which will give the greatest measure of effectiveness with the least possible friction. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: GHBlakeslee (drafting officer) ISO: QWright JA: ERDickover ”  ” JA: BRJohansen FSO: EHDooman ”  ” FSWilliams LA: ALMoffat ”  ” CA: JCVincent TS: HBorton LA: ALMoffat PRJosselyn ME: MBHall AVandenbosch FMA: CFRemer FE: JWBallantine LED: JEFriedman 3 Cf. paragraph 1 c , p. 1191 [ Pg. 1191 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1195] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–114 CAC–123 [ Washington ,] March 22, 1944. Japan: Nullification of Obnoxious Laws I. The Problem Are there any obnoxious laws that should be nullified? If so, what are they? (Question 3 g ) 4 II. Discussion It is assumed that the term “laws” as used in the question above refers to ordinances and regulations issued under laws (enabling acts), as well as to the laws themselves. The Commander-in-Chief of the occupying forces is in full authority during the period of occupation and therefore is able to suspend any obnoxious laws, ordinances and regulations for that period. It may be found desirable, however, to have ordinances and regulations rescinded in accordance with Japanese legal procedure, in order that they will not become immediately operative again upon the termination of the occupation. Ordinances and regulations are issued and revoked in Japan by the ministries concerned by virtue of powers granted them by enabling acts, but the acts are passed and repealed only by the Diet, which, it is contemplated, will be suspended during the period of occupation. However, the force and effect of any such act can be nulhfied by the rescission of ordinances and regulations issued under its authority. As the retention of essential ministerial machinery has been recommended in answer to other questions, the means are retained for eliminating obnoxious ordinances and regulations and for rendering inoperative obnoxious laws in a manner which conforms with Japanese legal procedure. Information is not available in Washington upon which a complete list of obnoxious laws, ordinances and regulations can be compiled (especially as many of them have been issued since the outbreak of war in the Pacific) but attention is invited to certain broad categories in the recommendations given below. III. Recommendations It is recommended that laws be rendered inoperative and ordinances and regulations be revoked when found to be contrary to the purposes of the military occupation as defined in the directives which will be issued to the commanding officer. It may be found that some laws, ordinances and regulations which in normal times might be considered obnoxious will be found useful to the occupying forces in the emergency period following the surrender (e.g., any ordinances or regulations forbidding large public gatherings). Such ordinances need not be rescinded until the emergency period has passed. Broad categories of laws, ordinances and regulations which may be considered as subject to suspension and rescission are as follows: 1. Those relating to the creation of the armed forces including the conscription and training of officers and men for active or reserve duty. 2. Those relating to the mobilization of industry, and labor for war purposes, such as the National Mobilization Act of 1938 and the Munitions Companies Act of 1943, and the ordinances and regulations issued thereunder. 3. Those restricting unduly freedom of expression, with particular reference to prohibitions against “dangerous thoughts”. 4. Those restricting freedom of worship, such as undue restraint on the freedom of churches to organize into independent sects as they deem proper. 5. Those granting extraordinary powers to the police, such as authority to hold persons in custody for indefinite periods before bringing them to trial. 6. Those which exploit the control by the Central Government of the educational system to indoctrinate Japanese youth with ultra-nationalist ideas and which require military training by students. Prepared and reviewed by Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. JA: ERDickover (drafting officer) JA: BRJohansen TS: GHBlakeslee FSWilliams HBorton CA: OEClubb RAFearey LA: ALMoffat PRJosselyn LRD: JRFriedman FE: JWBallantine FSO: EHDooman 4 Ante, p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1196] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–122 CAC–99 [ Washington ,] March 22, 1944. Mandated Islands: Disposition of Japanese Nationals I. The Problem Are all Japanese personnel (military and civilian) to be evacuated from the Mandated Islands? (Question 4 c ) 5 II. Departmental View A. Japanese Military Personnel Japanese military personnel captured on the Islands should be treated by the military authorities like any other prisoners of war and may be removed to such places as the military authorities may determine. B. Japanese Official Personnel Japanese official personnel should, except where the military governor may in his discretion otherwise determine, be interned. Such internment should be at such place or places as the military authorities determine. C. Japanese Civilians Japanese civilians whose activities the military governor may feel to be harmful to the military occupation should also be interned. Other Japanese civilians, in the discretion of the military governor, may be segregated and kept apart from the native population if military necessity so requires. There should be no evacuation of such persons from the Mandated Islands, unless military necessity so requires, during the period of military occupation. D. Koreans Attention is called to the need for giving Koreans special consideration. E. Internees All civilian persons who are interned as herein provided should be accorded treatment compatible with the Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war 6 in so far as such Convention is adaptable to civilian internees. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. LA: ALMoffat (drafting officer) SP 7 : LESalisbury TS: GHBlakeslee MWBishop HBorton KPLandon AVandenbosch ISO: CEagleton RAFearey TA: WWilloughby JA: ERDickover ME: MBHall FSWilliams FMA: CFRemer FSO: EHDooman CD: WTPhillips 5 Ante , p. 1193 [ Pg. 1193 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 6 Signed July 27, 1929, Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. i , p. 336 . 7 Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs. Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1197] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–123 CAC–106 [ Washington ,] March 22, 1944. Japan: Mandated Islands: Status of Military Government I. The Problem Does Japan’s violation of her international trusteeship carry any special implications for CAA? Does the League of Nations have any residual rights in the Mandated Islands which must be subserved by the military occupant? (Questions 4 a and b ) 8 II. Departmental View It will be recalled that the Government of the United States has consistently taken the position that its rights in certain former German territories are equal to the rights of any other of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in whose favor Germany renounced her rights in those territories. That position has been made clear in official correspondence with other governments concerned, in our Peace Treaty with Germany of 1921, 9 and in our Treaty of 1922 with Japan in which we assented to the mandate given to Japan. 10 It is unnecessary to consider at this stage whether violation by Japan of the terms of the mandate ipso facto terminated the mandate because existence of the mandate does not present any legal obstacle to an American military administration of the islands during occupation. The United States, as belligerent occupant of the territory, supersedes the Japanese Government as the actual and lawful government of the territory. There is no question of the lawfulness under international law of the American occupation. Belligerent occupation is a temporary rather than a permanent status and does not transfer sovereignty to the occupant although during such occupation the belligerent occupant is entitled to exercise the rights of sovereignty subject to the rule of international law dealing with military occupation. The fact of occupation does not operate to terminate the mandate although it may suspend its operation. The belligerent occupant is not subject to the terms of the mandate or responsible to the League of Nations. The military administration of the belligerent occupant is not bound by the mandate provision concerning the establishment of bases and fortifications and is not required to make reports to the Council of the League of Nations. Any rights of the League of Nations in the mandated territory are in abeyance during belligerent occupation and need not be of concern to the military administration. The belligerent occupation does not confer United States nationality upon the inhabitants of the Japanese Mandated Islands. The mandate, however, did not confer Japanese nationality upon them. Native inhabitants, therefore, should not be treated as enemy aliens. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. LA: ALMoffat (drafting officer) JA: ERDickover TS: GHBlakeslee BRJohansen HBorton FSWilliams PRJosselyn CA: JCVincent AVandenbosch ME: MB Hall FE: JWBallantine FMA: CFRemer ISO: QWright LED: JRFriedman SFO: EHDooman 8 Ante , p. 1193 [ Pg. 1193 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 9 Foreign Relations , 1921, vol. ii , p. 29 . 10 Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, ibid. , 1922, vol. i , p. 46 . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1198] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–113 CAC–111a [ Washington ,] March 23, 1944. Japan: Political Parties or Agencies Problem Are there any political parties, organizations, or groups in enemy country that should be dissolved? If so, which ones? (3– f ) 11 Are there any political agencies or political parties of the enemy country with whom we (the military administration) can deal to assist in the restoration of essential authority in Japan and in its subsequent administration? (3– e ) 11 Discussion The Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society which were formed following the dissolution of the regularly constituted political parties of the Lower House in 1940 are roughly the Japanese equivalent of the German Nazi Party or the Italian Fascist Party. The IRAA has a number of affiliates. It will not be possible to draw up a complete list of these affiliates, which include youths’ and women’s organizations, but they are all directly or indirectly designed to meet Japanese war problems or to promote popular indoctrination policies. Organized groups in the Japanese House of Peers are more in nature of clubs than of political parties; the House of Peers for the most part represents the conservative and cultured elements in Japan. In addition to associations of war veterans and avowedly terroristic or nationalistic organizations (such as the well-known Black Dragon Society and the Nihon Butokukai which maintains gymnasia for training in the medieval military arts for the purpose of fostering the national militaristic cult) there are numerous quasi-public cultural and other organizations which have political significance as they are designed to be helpful to the Japanese war effort by means such as cementing Axis relations, propagating national Shintoism, spreading Japanese influence in the Far East, and popularizing official Japanese propaganda at home and abroad. The Neighborhood Associations (known as Chokai or Tonarigumi) should not be regarded as political organizations. Although during the war they may have assumed functions of political significance such as the enforcement of attendance at rallies, their new wartime tasks are in the main connected with the administration of rationing, the conduct of air-raid drills, and the like. Their normal peace-time work concerned matters such as garbage disposal, fire prevention and posting of night watchmen. These associations have complete lists of all residents within their jurisdictions. Recommendations 1. Existing political parties, which now consist of the IRAA (and its affiliates) and the IRAPS, should be dissolved. Club houses of organized groups in the Japanese House of Peers should be closed under prohibitions relative to public gatherings, but the groups themselves need not be dissolved. 2. Associations of war veterans and known terroristic and nationalistic organizations should be dissolved. 3. As it will be impossible to determine in advance which of numerous existing quasi-public cultural and other organizations are unobjectionable, it would be advisable immediately to close all organizations of this type under prohibitions relative to public gatherings. It would be politically advantageous if the military administration could conduct a study with a view to the disbandment of all such organizations which prove to be basically organs of Japanese nationalistic groups. Such a study might also bring to light a few organizations capable of being of service to the military administration. 4. The Neighborhood Associations should not be regarded as political organizations and merit study by the military administration with a view to their utilization in matters such as the maintenance of order and the handling of problems of sanitation and relief. 5. In view of the recommendation already made to disband existing political agencies and parties, there will be no such organization with which the military administration can deal unless some new organization or old parties in reorganized form should appear which would require reconsideration of that recommendation. The attitude to be taken by civil affairs officers towards so-called liberal political elements in Japan is a matter fraught with many pitfalls requiring special handling and if it is desired to advise the military authorities on this matter, further information will be provided at a later time. In any event, the military administration should be careful to avoid identification with any individual who has been closely associated with the formulation or execution of the policies of the militaristic rulers of Japan. Prepared and reviewed by: Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. JA: BRJohansen (drafting officer) JA: ERDickover TS: GHBlakeslee FSWilliams HBorton CA: OEClubb AVandenbosch ISO: DCBlaisdell FE: JWBallantine LA: ALMoffat AHiss ME: MBHall FMA: CFRemer LRD: JRFriedman 11 Ante , p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 11 Ante , p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1199] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–119 CAC–105 [ Washington ,] March 24, 1944. Japan: Occupation Problems: War Criminals I. The Problem The problem is to formulate recommendations as to the policy to be followed towards alleged war criminals by allied military authorities at the time of the occupation of Japan. (Question 3 m , 12 CAC–100 Preliminary, Annex A). II. Basic Factors A. Certain of the United Nations, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and China, have established the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes. The purpose of this Commission is to investigate and record the evidence of war crimes, identifying where possible the individuals responsible, and to report to the governments concerned cases in which it appeared that adequate evidence might be forthcoming. B. No statement on Japanese atrocities has been issued corresponding to the declaration on German atrocities signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin and issued November 1, 1943, 13 on the conclusion of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. C. Persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analagous offences are the subject of specific reference in the surrender terms imposed on Italy and are likewise brought within the purview of draft terms prepared by the United States and by the British Government for imposition upon Germany at the time of surrender. The purpose of these provisions is to bind the governments of these Axis powers to surrender such persons to the United Nations for trial and punishment. D. The unique character of the institution of the Emperor in Japan is of basic importance and introduces into the problem of apprehension and trial of Japanese war criminals an element not found in the case of other Axis countries. E. In the past, when military leaders in Japan have been faced with defeat, they have made themselves national heroes by suicide. In more recent years, those accused of political crimes have used their trials as an opportunity to explain their political philosophy and to win public approval of their actions. For example, at the trials of the young officers for the political assassinations of May 15, 1932, 14 the accused insisted they were motivated by the highest type of patriotism. The trials dragged on for months, were given wide publicity, and aroused widespread sympathy for the accused among the Japanese. As a result of these and later trials, those who committed political assassination in the name of patriotism were thought of as national heroes rather than as criminals. III. Recommended Attitude A. It is believed that the provisions for imposition upon Japan at the time of surrender should include an obligation on the part of the Japanese Government and Japanese military command to apprehend and surrender to the United Nations such persons alleged to have committed war crimes as are designated by the United Nations. B. The head of the government and cabinet ministers should be apprehended if their names appear in any official list of alleged war criminals. Otherwise, they should not be interfered with, except as to their official status as provided in the answer to question 3 d (CAC–110, “Japan: Suspension of Powers of Government” 15 ). C. As for the Emperor, it has been recommended, as a result of a consideration of the relations of the institution of the Emperor to military government, that the military authorities should place him under protective custody, and, that certain functions of government should be exercised, if possible, through the Emperor or in his name with the approval of the occupation authorities. (“Japan: Political Problems: Institution of the Emperor,” CAC–93). 16 D. Designated persons suspected of having committed war crimes who are not surrendered by the Japanese in accordance with the obligation in A should be taken into custody by the occupation authorities. Care should be taken to avoid an opportunity being given to the Japanese public to make martyrs of Japanese war criminals as they have done with political assassins in the past. To this end, the occupation authorities should try to prevent the suicide of suspected war criminals and should give no publicity to their detention. E. The occupation authorities should hold all suspected war criminals in custody, without prejudice, pending receipt of instructions as to trial, unless in the meantime specific directions for their disposition shall have been received. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. ISO: DCBlaisdell (drafting officer) JA: ERDickover TS: GHBlakeslee (” ”) BRJohansen HBorton (” ”) CA: OEClubb FE: JWBallantine LA: ALMoffat AHiss FMA: CFRemer TS: RAFearey FSO: EHDooman AVandenbosch 12 Ante , p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 13 Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. i , p. 768 . 14 See Foreign Relations , 1932, vol. iv , pp. 672 – 728 , passim. 15 PWC–112, March 22, not printed, but see PWG–112c, May 9, p. 1247 [ Pg. 1247 is part of Doc. 1209 ] . 16 PWC–116, March 21, not printed, but see PWC–116d, May 9, p. 1250 [ Pg. 1250 is part of Doc. 1210 ] . Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Hickerson) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) 893.014/5–2244 [Document 1200] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs ( Hickerson ) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Matthews ) 17 [ Washington ,] March 27, 1944. Mr. Matthews : I handed you a day or so ago a copy of the exchange of notes of February 16 and February 21, 1917, between the British and the Japanese Governments in which those two Governments divided up between themselves the former German Islands in the Pacific, the British agreeing to support the Japanese claims north of the Equator in return for the Japanese supporting British claims to Islands south of the Equator. 18 I have heard for many years that the two Governments signed a secret treaty dealing with this same subject in 1916. There is no copy of any such treaty in our files. For that matter there is no official copy of the exchange of notes of February 1917. We have found various indications in the files, tending officially to confirm the fact that an agreement on the former German Islands was made secretly in 1916. For instance, the following quotations are taken from the memorandum of a conversation between Secretary Hughes and the British Ambassador on April 12, 1921: 19 “The Ambassador then said that the reply of his Government to our note on Yap would probably be that the British Government was bound by its agreement with Japan in 1916 to favor the awarding of the Islands in the North Pacific to Japan. The Ambassador said that when they were pressed with the submarine attacks an agreement had been made with Japan in 1916 that Japan should have the North Pacific Islands and that no matter what the consequences might be, his Government, he was sure, would feel that it was bound to stand by this agreement.… “The Secretary asked if President Wilson was acquainted with this agreement. The Ambassador said that Mr. Balfour had given him a copy when he was here. The Secretary asked if Mr. Balfour had called President Wilson’s attention to it. The Ambassador said that he did not know as to that but he understood it was left with a number of papers. The Ambassador stated, however, that President Wilson knew of it when he reached Paris.… “The Ambassador asked the Secretary to consider the position of his Government; that it had entered into this agreement with Japan in good faith and that it felt bound to carry it out. He asked what else it could do.… The Ambassador said that the position was simply that Japan was entitled to Great Britain’s votes but that it remained for the United States to express its agreement … “The Secretary said that he thought the British Government should seriously consider the effect of such a position upon public opinion in America; that the Secretary believed the reaction would be immediate.… The Ambassador said that his Government was fully alive to the possible effect upon public opinion in America … but that they thought they had no alternative and that no matter what the consequences they must abide by their agreement with Japan—at least, he added, unless Japan could be persuaded to admit the contention of the United States.” John Hickerson 17 Copy of this memorandum, together with copy of Joint Chiefs of Staff letter, March 11, p. 1201 [ Pg. 1201 is part of Doc. 1188 ] , transmitted by Mr. Hickerson to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) on May 22; letter of May 22 not printed. 18 For texts of notes, see Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894–1919 (New York, 1921), vol. ii , pp. 1167–1168. Copies of these texts were transmitted to the Department by the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at Paris, February 26, 1919 (793.94/783). 19 Foreign Relations , 1921, vol. ii , p. 284 . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1201] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–125 CAC–128 [ Washington ,] March 29, 1944. Korea: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces I. The Problem The problem is to determine what countries should participate in the occupation of Korea, whether “civil affairs responsibility will be shared with the British, the Chinese and/or the Russians (if they join the Far East War) and to what extent will the United States Army and/or Navy have administrative civil affairs responsibility?” (Questions 8 b and c ). 20 II. Basic Factors Korea has been under Japanese sovereignty for nearly thirty-five years. As early as 1905 Japan established a protectorate over Korea by which Japan assumed control of Korean foreign affairs. This control was gradually increased until formal annexation was consummated in 1910. Since that time Japanese domination has been directed towards making Korea an integral part of Japan. For an entire generation Koreans have lived as subjugated people; the various exiled Korean political groups have questionable influence within Korea and the leaders have never governed at home. In spite of this domination by Japan, Korea has remained as a definite ethnic, cultural and geographic unit. Out of a population of over 24 million (1940), there were less than a million Japanese. The Korean language, dress and other cultural habits are still prevalent, and the Koreans still consider the old traditional northern border—the Yalu and Tumen Rivers—as their present frontier. Korea is contiguous to both China and Russia and the rivalry for control of Korea between those countries and Japan was one of the chief causes of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. It is impossible to anticipate at this time the precise circumstances under which Korea will be liberated from Japanese domination by the United Nations forces. It might be the result of combat operations in Korea itself, or of unconditional surrender by Japan without actual fighting in Korea. If Korea is occupied in the course of combat operations, it would be desirable for the military authorities to give the fullest consideration to political factors which may call for representation, in so far as compatible with military necessity, in the combat forces of units from those allied countries which have a substantial interest in the future political status of Korea. Among those countries is China. It has territory contiguous to Korea and has had a long history of close political relations with that country. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has pledged, on behalf of China, Korean independence. It would seem likely that China would expect to participate in the combat forces in Korea. The United States is also interested in Korea’s future status. This country is pledged both to the unconditional surrender of Japan and to the establishment of a free and independent Korea. The assumption by the United States of a major part in civil affairs and in international supervision of an interim government would be facilitated by the participation of the United States in such military operations as take place in and around Korea. Great Britain has made similar pledges and even though it might not insist on direct representation in the combat forces in Korea, it might at least wish indirect representation through one of the Dominions, such as Canada. Finally, the Soviet Union, if it entered the war against Japan, would in all probability attack the Japanese through northern Korea and, if so, Soviet forces would be in occupation of considerable portions of Korea. The various groups of trained Korean soldiers outside of Korea will doubtless be anxious to participate in combat operations in Korea and in the occupation of the country. The units supported by the “Korean Provisional Government”, now located in Chungking, probably contain less than 1,000 trained troops. At present they are directly under the control of the Chinese. It is reported that there are other Korean units with the Chinese Communist armies in and around Shensi but their actual numbers are unknown. There is also a large group of Korean settlers in Manchuria, some of whom may become soldiers. In 1939 they totalled over a million and were concentrated in the regions just north of the Korean border. The most significant group of Korean troops is doubtless that trained by the Soviet Far Eastern Army. It is believed that this group has been thoroughly indoctrinated with Soviet ideology and methods of Government, is well trained and equipped, and may total 35,000, of whom 20,000 are believed to be in actual military service. These Koreans may participate in the operations in Korea as soon as the military situation warrants it and may operate independently and separately from a Soviet command. Whether the liberation of Korea is the result of a military campaign or of the general capitulation of Japan, the profound interest of several of the United Nations in the future political status of Korea would indicate the desirability that the military government of Korea should be inter-allied in character and that the participating states be China, the United States, Great Britain or one of the British Dominions, and, if it enters the war in the Pacific, the Soviet Union. The possibility that allied forces rather than those of a single power may be used for the occupation and military government of Korea, and the prospect that military operations in Korea may be carried on simultaneously in separate areas under the direction of commanders of different nationalities, raises the question of whether occupation should be by zones, either with or without a military council composed of representatives of the allies or according to other principles. However, if the basic principles for military government of Korea are to be uniform, and if this military government is to facilitate the preparation of Korea for its future independence, it would seem highly desirable that a zonal system of military government should be avoided, and that a combined civil affairs administration be established as early as possible with all the participating countries bearing a joint responsibility. The question of the composition of the forces for the occupation and military government of Korea will be considered anew in the event that prior to its occupation by a substantial number of troops of any of the other United Nations, the Soviet Union occupies a portion of Korea. III. Recommendations It is recommended that: 1. It would be politically advisable that the forces to be used for combat purposes in Korea should include, if not prejudicial to the effectiveness of military operations, contingents from China, the United States, Great Britain or one of the British Dominions and, if it had entered the war in the Pacific, the Soviet Union, with the United States having a substantial representation. If the forces from the several participating states carry on military operations in separate zones, the administration of civil affairs will be the responsibility of the commanders of each combat zone and to the extent that such commanders may be American, the United States military authorities must be prepared for such responsibility. If military operations are under a combined command, civil affairs during the combat period should also be combined. 2. With the completion of military operations in Korea, there should be, so far as practicable, allied representation in the army of occupation and in military government. Such representation should be by those countries which have a real interest in the future political status of Korea. If military operations have been organized by separate combat zones, it may be necessary for the early stages of military government to be organized on the same basis. 3. The occupation of Korea should be organized on the principle of centralized administration. If zonal operations have resulted in zonal military government, this type of civil affairs administration should be changed as soon as practicable into a centralized administration, composed of representatives from those same countries which have participated in the military operations in and around Korea. Such representation of these forces might be provided, in addition to regular staff representation, through a council made up of the ranking officers of the respective forces. Such a council might have supervisory powers and be responsible for the coordination of the operation of military government throughout Korea. It is assumed that the representation of other states will not be so large as to prejudice the effectiveness of American participation in CAA. 4. The final form of a supervisory authority or trusteeship for Korea following military government and prior to the establishment of an independent Korea has not yet been determined. It seems likely that this supervisory authority will be inter-allied with the United States as a participant. Consequently, American military and naval authorities should be prepared to continue occupation and to assume their share of the-administration of civil affairs until the organization of such an authority is effected. It is to be hoped that the military government in Korea will be of short duration, but the difficulties inherent in the establishment of a satisfactory interim supervisory authority may necessitate a military government of considerable duration. Korean personnel, however, should be utilized to the fullest extent possible and care should be taken to train them for future usefulness in their own government. 5. If an effective force of Korean troops, such as that which may now exist within the Soviet Far East, should enter Korea as a separate command, or as irregulars, the Department of State will inform the military authorities as to the political status of these Koreans and the attitude to be taken toward them by the American military authorities. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: HBorton (drafting officer) JA: ERDickover GHBlakeslee CA: OEClubb PRJosselyn LA: ALMoffat RAFearey ME: MBHall FE: JWBallantine FMA: CFRemer AHiss LRD: JRFriedman ISO: DCBlaisdell FSO: EHDooman 20 Ante , p. 1194 [ Pg. 1194 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1202] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–126 CAC–138 [ Washington ,] March 29, 1944. Korea: Occupation and Military Government: Japanese Technical Personnel I. The Problem What policy will be followed with respect to technically-qualified Japanese nationals who may remain? (Question 8 e ). 21 II. Discussion A number of important and difficult questions, of which not all can yet be answered, are in various degrees involved in this problem. Among these are the following: (1) Will all or part of the Japanese population of some 650,000 (in 1939) be permitted to remain in Korea on a permanent basis and must that population in whole or in part be interned for its protection or for reasons of security or of policy during the occupation? (2) What disposition will be made of privately and publicly owned Japanese property in Korea? (3) To what extent and in what form will continuance of the present industries in Korea be encouraged? (4) To what extent will mines, industrial plants, transportation and communications facilities and similar properties be intact or reparable at the time that Korea is occupied? (5) Will the attitudes of technically-qualified Japanese and of Korean personnel be such that employment of the former will help rather than hinder the operation and restoration of Korean economy during the occupation? The Department of State will continue to give consideration to such aspects of these questions as lend themselves to policy determination. Certain facts pertaining to Korean economy are pertinent to the problem: (1) Japan has developed and dominated the Korean industrial economy for more than a generation; (2) during that period Japanese have held most of the administrative and technical positions of any consequence in that economy; (3) however, an increasing number of Koreans have acquired administrative and technical training and experience, a trend which has probably been accelerated during the war; and (4) industrial development in Korea is in some fields over-expanded in relation to peace-time needs. Although it seems unnecessary in this paper to attempt a detailed examination of the foregoing questions and facts, it seems pertinent to point out that: (1) it will unquestionably be impossible and unnecessary during the period of military administration for Korean industry to operate on the scale now prevailing; (2) it may be impossible for Korean industry to be kept alive or to be restored to a desirable extent with the use of only Koreans and Allied military personnel; and (3) at present it seems likely that politically undesirable results of the use in the Korean economy of Japanese technical (including administrative) personnel can to a great extent be controlled and will be more than offset by the practical need for the use of such personnel. III. Recommendations It is recommended that, providing security factors permit, the employment of technically qualified Japanese in Korean economic life be authorized during the period of military government, to the extent that qualified Koreans or other suitable personnel are not available. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: GHBlakeslee CA: OEClubb HBorton ME: MBHall RAFearey FMA: CFRemer FE: JWBallantine LA: ALMoffat AHiss FSO: EHDooman JA: ERDickover (drafting officer) BRJohansen FSWilliams 21 Ante , p. 1194 [ Pg. 1194 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1203] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–110a CAC–109a [ Washington ,] April 17, 1944. Japan: Occupation and Military Government: Extent of Occupation I. The Problem Will all of Japan be occupied? If so, what should be the manner of occupation? [Question 3 ( a )] 22 II. Basic Factors It is assumed that the reference here is to occupation after actual hostilities have ceased in any given area; occupation in the wake of combat is a military and not a political function. The primary political purposes of occupation may be summarized as follows: (1) To insure the fulfillment of terms of the armistice or surrender. (2) To impress upon as large a proportion of the Japanese people as possible the extent of the defeat to which their military leaders have brought them. (3) To create conditions which will facilitate the emergence of a liberal government with which the United Nations can deal. (4) To prevent the resurgence of military power. The first two aims can be attained in a fairly short period; the second two will require more time. To accomplish the first two it would appear desirable that our right to occupy all of Japan proper (as well as the Empire) be stated in the terms of armistice or surrender; that as soon as possible after the surrender our (or Allied) military forces put in an appearance and occupy all of the prefectural capitals, other important cities and strategic areas; and that units be sent from these centers from time to time through the outlying districts on tours of inspection, or otherwise make their presence noticeable. After these primary political purposes have been achieved, the troops may be concentrated in those centers from which they will be able to observe developments and where they will be in a position to suppress any undesirable movements which may arise. This period should continue until a reasonably stable civil government has been established by the Japanese and strict control by the occupying forces is no longer necessary. It is contemplated that some sort of Allied supervisory body will be set up to insure the disarmament of Japan, to prevent rearmament, and to exercise such supervision of Japanese internal affairs as the United Nations may deem essential. It is anticipated that such a supervisory body will require the support of some armed forces in Japan, at least in the early stages of its operations. III. Recommendations It is recommended that the Army and Navy be advised to be prepared: (A) To have adequate forces available to occupy all of the prefectural capitals, other important cities and strategic areas, including divisional headquarters and industrial districts, as soon as possible after the capitulation of Japan. (B) When the purposes of the initial occupation have been accomplished, to concentrate these forces in those centers from which they will be able to observe developments and where they will be in a position to suppress any undesirable movements which may arise. This period should continue until such time as a reasonably stable civil government has been established by the Japanese. (C) To continue the presence of such forces as may be required to support such an Allied supervisory body as may be established for the supervision of Japanese internal affairs. It is anticipated that these forces will not be large. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: GHBlakeslee ISO: DCBlaisdell HBorton QWright RAFearey LA: ALMoffat FE: JWBallantine TA: WWilloughby AHiss ME: MBHall JA: ERDickover FMA: CFRemer BRJohansen LRD: JRFriedman FSWilliams FSO: EHDooman CA: JCVincent CD: WTPhillips OEClubb 22 Brackets appear in the original. For question 3 a , see p. 1191 [ Pg. 1191 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs 890.00/7–744 [Document 1204] Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs 23 [ Washington ,] April 18, 1944. General Considerations The area of the Pacific and eastern Asia is of greater importance, both absolutely and relatively, to the United States than most of our people realize. The United States has longer coastlines on the Pacific than has any other power. We have more trade in and across the Pacific than has any other power. We have more wide-flung cultural interests in the Pacific than has any other power. After the people who have come under the domination of Japan’s armed forces are liberated our task will be that of making the Pacific and eastern Asia safe—safe for the United States, safe for our Allies, safe for all peace-loving peoples. Once there is peace and security, the Pacific and the Far East will be areas of great opportunity—for their own peoples, for us, for all who seek honest and mutually profitable relationships on a basis of reciprocal fair treatment. Toward achievement and maintenance of peace and security we rely heavily on the principles and provisions embodied in the Four Power Declaration of Moscow. 24 Military victory of the United Nations will not by itself eradicate the roots of future conflicts in the Far East, nor will any balance of power concept, which would inevitably offer an opportunity for the resurgence to power of a militarist Japan, in application serve to maintain peace. Cooperation among the four great powers, all of which have an important stake in the peace and the stability of the Far East, offers a promising approach to the problems of the Far East. Relations with China should be founded on mutual respect and understanding, and on collaboration. We do not, however, aspire to any exclusive relationship with China any more than we would welcome political combinations in the Far East which excluded us. Collaboration among the four principal powers of the Far East—the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, China, and ourselves—is essential because no political relationship based on balance of power concepts can maintain peace. It is our hope and expectation that there will be wider political participation of other Asiatic peoples in the post-war world. These peoples must be helped to develop materially and educationally and to prepare themselves for the duties and responsibilities of self-government and liberty. An excellent example of what can be achieved is afforded in the record of our relationship with the Philippines. Specific Questions Relating to China Press and thought control . We have been following closely and with a natural concern reports that Chinese governmental restrictions are operating to prevent the press from giving a true and objective picture of affairs in China, and also reports of measures to control the thought of Chinese students, including those sent abroad for study. We have noted as encouraging the fact, as evidenced by a recent public statement by Mr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, and by other signs, that Chinese liberal opinion is reacting strongly against such reported measures, and also statements by Chinese officials which would seem to indicate that the Government’s proposed action with regard to students may not be as far reaching as first reports suggested. 25 Kuomintang-Communist differences. 26 While the continued strained relations between the Kuomintang and the so-called Chinese Communists continue to give us concern from the point of view of our hopes for Chinese unity and tolerance, we regard as encouraging reports indicating that the Chungking authorities and the Communist groups are making efforts to reach amicable adjustment of their differences. Lend-Lease assistance to China. 27 Owing to transport limitations, our shipments of supplies to China have thus far been far below what we have wanted to deliver. However, the volume of goods sent into China has increased very rapidly in recent months, and, in the conviction that Chinese resistance will continue, the American Government is devoting constant thought and effort to carrying out its program of adequate aid to China as rapidly as possible. Comprehensive commercial treaty . In line with the provisions of the recent treaty abolishing our extraterritorial rights and related privileges in China, 28 we are giving intensive study to the subject of a comprehensive commercial treaty which we hope to negotiate with China at an early date. The Status of Korea 29 Our general policy in regard to Korea was stated definitely in the Cairo Declaration. In regard to the working out of this general policy, officers of the Department and of other agencies of the Government are giving constant thought to the subject, as are undoubtedly the governments of others of the United Nations concerned in the matter. Many Koreans and Americans interested in Korea naturally are impatiently desirous of ascertaining the exact nature of the postwar plans for Korea, but while the United Nations are engaged in the terriffic effort of winning the war and of formulating broad outlines for a post-war settlement which will provide security, it is impossible to produce complete blue-prints for the settlement of every problem which has arisen or which may arise. Efforts of This Government in Behalf of American Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees in Japanese Hands 30 The Department is continuing to explore every avenue in its efforts to cause the Japanese to accept and distribute relief supplies sent to American prisoners, to cause the Japanese to adopt humane practices in the treatment of such Americans, and to effect further exchanges of nationals, including the categories of military prisoners who are eligible for repatriation under the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. Negotiations are now being conducted looking toward a third and further exchange of nationals, and we are still hopeful of success. It must be realized, however, that, although this Government will keep these matters continually before the Japanese Government, success or failure depends upon the response of that Government, as this Government cannot accomplish its aims in this regard by unilateral action. From such reports as are available, conditions in internment camps in general appear to have substantially improved over those prevailing in the earlier days of the war. 23 Prepared for the use of the Secretary of State in conversations with persons outside the Department and indicative of the trend of thought among Department officers concerned with Far Eastern matters; copy transmitted in instructions of April 24, to the Embassy in Chungking, and July 7 to the Consulate at Colombo (neither printed). 24 Signed on October 30, 1943; issued November 1, 1943; Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. i , p. 755 . 25 For further reports on this subject, see vol. vi , pp. 1161 – 1164 . 26 See Foreign Relations , 1943, China, pp. 191 – 399 . 27 See ibid. , pp. 491 – 514 . 28 Signed at Washington, January 11, 1943; 57 Stat. 767. Cf. Foreign Relations , 1943, China, p. 690 . 29 See also pp. 1290 [ Pg. 1290 includes portions of Doc. 1227 and Doc. 1228 ] ff. 30 See also pp. 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 979 ] ff. Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1205] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East 31 PWC–108b CAC–116b [ Washington ,] May 4, 1944. Japan: The Post-War Objectives of the United States in Regard to Japan I. Fundamental Objectives ( a ) Japan must be prevented from being a menace to the United States and the other countries of the Pacific area. ( b ) American interests require that there be in Japan a government which will respect the rights of other states and Japan’s international obligations. In order to achieve these fundamental purposes the policies of the United States should be considered separately for three distinct periods of Japan’s post-war development. The first of these periods will be that during which the immediate terms of surrender for Japan will be enforced, and Japan will undergo the stern discipline of occupation as the inevitable retribution for military aggression. The second period will be one of close surveillance; restrictions will be progressively relaxed as Japan demonstrates its willingness and ability to live at peace with other nations. The third period will be one which will look toward the ultimate aim of the United States, namely, a Japan properly discharging its responsibilities in the family of peaceful nations. II. The First Period In accordance with the Cairo Declaration Japan is to withdraw from Manchuria, the Mandated Islands and all areas under Japanese military occupation and is to be deprived of Korea, Formosa and all islands obtained since the beginning of the first world war. Japan’s military and naval forces are to be disarmed and disbanded, its military and naval installations destroyed and the country placed under military occupation and government. III. The Second Period ( a ) There will be developed such national or international bases as may be necessary to prevent Japanese aggression and to facilitate military policing. ( b ) Measures designed to eradicate militarism would include: (1) Military inspection to prevent rearmament; (2) Economic controls to prevent the development of a war potential; (3) Encouragement of democratic thought through the press, radio, cinema, and schools; (4) Impressing upon the moderate elements in Japan their responsibility for convincing the Japanese people that militarism is disastrous to their real interests; (5) Adoption of such other measures as will most effectively strengthen liberal political elements and liberal thought in Japan and assist the development of a civil government actually responsible to the people; (6) Rooting out of ultra-nationalistic societies. ( c ) Japan is to be permitted, within the framework of the restrictions necessary for international security, and having due regard for the matter of reparations, to begin to share in the world economy on a reasonable basis. IV. The Third Period The precise measures, whether political or economic, to be taken during the third period cannot be determined at this time. There is, however, to be borne in mind the fact that the break-up of the Japanese Empire, through the loss of dependencies, will call for permanent adjustments of fundamental importance. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: GHBlakeslee (drafting officer) CA: JCVincent HBorton (drafting officer) OEClubb RAFearey ISO: DCBlaisdell FE: JWBallantine (drafting officer) QWright AHiss LA: ALMoffat (drafting officer) JA: ERDickover (drafting officer) TA: WWilloughby BRJohansen ME: MBHall FSWilliams FMA: CFRemer LRD: JRFriedman FSO: EHDooman CD: WTPhillips 31 Marginal notation in the original: “Note: Changes from the original document are underscored.” (Document under reference, PWC–108a, April 17, not printed.) Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1206] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East 32 PWC–117b CAC–103c [ Washington ,] May 4, 1944. Japan: Occupation Problems: Duration of Military Government I. The Problem What should be the duration of the civil affairs administration and will it be followed by a control commission? (Question 3 k , 33 CAC–100 Preliminary, Annex A). II. Basic Factors The duration of civil affairs administration and the extent and nature of the control thereafter will obviously depend in some measure upon the circumstances prevailing at the time. At the present, however, the following stages may be foreseen: 1) an initial period of military government during which all parts of Japan proper would be occupied. This period would probably not be longer than a few months; 2) a second period, also characterized by strict United Nations control, during which military government might be continued for part of the period or the control during the entire period might be through a civilian agency representative of the United Nations. In either case, United Nations forces would be garrisoned in certain population centers and strategic areas; 3) a period during which restrictions will be progressively relaxed as Japan demonstrates its willingness and ability to live at peace with other nations. United Nations forces would be withdrawn to one or more areas where they would be kept from close contact with the Japanese population. It is advisable that the military authorities in their planning should envisage the possibility that the second and third periods may extend over a substantial period of time, possibly even over a number of years. A. It is not possible to predict accurately the duration of civil affairs administration in Japan, or to determine whether it will be followed by a period of administration under direction of a control commission. B. Among the factors which will influence the duration of military government will be the circumstances under which unconditional surrender occurs, particularly whether Japan surrenders unconditionally without fighting in the islands of Japan proper, whether surrender occurs after an assault upon the main islands of Japan, or whether combat operations continue in any part of Japan proper or in Japanese occupied areas after unconditional surrender. C. An additional factor will be the nature of the terms of surrender, particularly whether they will include any provision for a control commission or other agency representative of the United Nations for the enforcement of the surrender terms. However, even if the surrender contains no specific provision for a control commission, it will no doubt grant such sweeping powers that the occupation authorities can institute such agencies of control as they deem necessary. D. A further factor will be the attitude of the Japanese Government and people toward the fulfillment of the surrender terms. Adoption of an attitude of cooperation would undoubtedly shorten the period of military government, whereas an obstructionist attitude, particularly toward the disarmament provisions, would lengthen it. E. There are international political factors which have to be taken into account by the governments accepting Japanese surrender which may likewise affect the duration of the period of military government. III. Recommendations A. Military government should continue until order has been reestablished, until those terms of surrender requiring immediate execution have been carried out, and until there has been established a Japanese Government capable of discharging civil governmental functions and which will be politically acceptable to the United Nations. B. It is to be anticipated that such supervision of Japanese internal affairs as the United Nations may deem essential will require the continued presence of United Nations forces for a period longer than the maintenance of military government. It is not possible at this time to forecast just what agency will be adopted to ensure this supervision. It may be provided for in the terms of surrender. In any event, it seems likely that some supervisory agency, supported by military forces, will succeed to military government. C. The length of time during which United Nations forces may be required in Japan is scarcely subject to determination in advance. It is believed, however, that a prolonged occupation of Japan should be avoided. It would appear desirable, therefore, that no commitments on the matter be made. D. It is believed that administration of civil affairs in any part of Japan proper should not be turned over to a Japanese Government before combat operations have ceased in all parts of Japan proper. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: GHBlakeslee ISO: DCBlaisdell (Drafting Officer) HBorton QWright RAFearey CA: JCVincent FE: JWBallantine (drafting officer) OEClubb AHiss LA: ALMoffat JA: ERDickover TA: WWilloughby BRJohansen ME: MBHall FSWilliams FMA: CFRemer LRD: JRFriedman 32 Marginal notation in the original: “Changes in the original document are underscored.” (Document under reference, PWC–117a, April 17, not printed.) 33 Ante , p. 1102 [ Pg. 1102 is part of Doc. 1131 ] . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1207] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East 34 PWC–124a CAC–58a [ Washington ,] May 4, 1944. Korea: Political Problems: Provisional Government I. The Problem The question is “In view of the Cairo pronouncement that Korea is ultimately to be made independent, what interim governmental machinery is to be set up?” (Question 8 a ), 35 II. Basic Factors While there is an agreement among China, Great Britain and the United States that Korea shall be free and independent, it is assumed that this independence will be preceded by some form of interim government under the supervision of an outside power or powers. The Cairo Declaration, December 1, 1943, made by the leaders of these three countries states that: The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent. Koreans have had little experience in self-government. Prior to 1905, Korea was a monarchy in which everything belonged in principle to the sovereign and the average citizen was considered as something to be exploited for the benefit of the ruling class; the Korean government showed questionable efficiency and virility. As a colony of Japan, Koreans have been given only a limited opportunity to participate in government. This measure of participation has included the right to serve as officials of the Government-General under close Japanese supervision, and the right of males who are over twenty-five years of age, and who pay a minimum tax, to participate in the election of local councils. Though these councils have been quasi-legislative bodies since the reforms of 1931 and 1933, the subjects which they discuss have been unimportant and have never concerned political problems, while their decisions are subject to review and veto by higher authorities. Thus those Koreans who have had some slight experience in local government have never enjoyed any real freedom of political choice or action. The possibilities of an early revolution within Korea are remote. The majority of the people do not know the active leaders in any of the revolutionary centers abroad; many of the revolutionary leaders at home have been imprisoned, while other potential leaders have been drawn away from the movement by appointment to positions in the Japanese administration. The exclusion of Koreans from important political posts for the past thirty-five years has emasculated them politically and has deprived them of all experience in managing a state. These factors, together with the possibility that an independent but weak Korea would again become subject to international pressure and intrigue and threaten political stability and peace in the Pacific, make it highly desirable that some form of interim supervisory organization be established. The form which any such supervisory body for Korea may take is dependent on several imponderables. In the first place, if a general international organization is inaugurated under which a system of international trusteeship is established, such a trusteeship system might be applied to Korea. The basic purposes of any such temporary trusteeship for Korea might well be to foster a capacity for self-government among the Koreans, to safeguard their personal liberties, to promote the economic development of the territory and the social well being of the people, and to assure a just and efficient government. If the United States were a member of such an international organization it would automatically share in the responsibilities for the establishment of an international trusteeship commission and an administrative authority for Korea. Furthermore, as the security of the North Pacific will be of concern to the United States and as Korea’s political development may affect this security, the United States would naturally be interested in active participation in any Korean administrative authority. For a similar reason, and be cause it has been one of the dominant European states in the Far East, Great Britain will also have an interest in participation either directly or through the Dominions. Furthermore, both China and the Soviet Union have territory contiguous to Korea, have a primary concern in its future political status, and hence will presumably wish to take part in the administration. It is possible that a regular trusteeship will not be established for Korea, but that an international supervisory council will be set up. Such a council could operate regardless of whether or not there was an international organization. The members of any such international supervisory council would probably include China, Soviet Russia, the United States and Great Britain, or failing the latter, one of the British Dominions. If the temporary trusteeship over Korea were to be assigned to a single power, the difficult problem arises as to what state should assume this responsibility. Irrespective of the desires of any Chinese that their country be designated as trustee for Korea, the Chinese will be confronted with the colossal assignment of reconstruction of their own country and will have available few capable persons to assist in the control of Korean affairs. The supervision of Korea by the Soviet Union during the transition period would create serious political problems. China would be fearful lest Korea become sovietized and the United States might consider such a development as a threat to future security in the Pacific. Finally, it is questionable whether the United States would wish to accept a trusteeship for Korea. It seems likely, therefore, that the supervision of the administration of Korea prior to the establishment of its full independence, will be delegated to an authority composed of representatives of at least China, Soviet Russia, the United States and Great Britain, rather than to any single state. Such action would minimize the possible effort by individual countries to control Korea affairs and should facilitate the adjustment of any possible rival claims which might arise, for example, between China and the Soviet Union. Obviously, American membership in any sort of international supervisory organ, whether it be a trusteeship, or a supervisory council, would place on the United States a responsibility for Korean affairs which would last even after the termination of military government. Furthermore, in view of the determination of this Government, as expressed in the Cairo Declaration, “that in due course Korea shall become free and independent”, this responsibility will continue even though no international organization or international supervisory council for Korea is established. In the event that there is an international organization, any arrangement for Korea should be consistent with the general plan, but in any case there should be no mandate for the United States alone. III. Departmental Views It is believed that there will be in Korea, prior to its ultimate independence, an international administration or an interim government under international supervision, in which the United States will be represented. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: HBorton (drafting officer) ISO: DCBlaisdell GHBlakeslee JA: ERDickover PRJosselyn CA: OEClubb RAFearey LA: ALMoffat FE: JWBallantine ME: MBHall AHiss FMA: CFRemer LRD: JRFriedman FSO: EHDooman 34 Marginal notation in the original: “Changes in the original document are underscored.” (Document under reference, PWC–124, March 28, not printed.) 35 Ante , p. 1194 [ Pg. 1194 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . The Adviser on Liberated Areas for the Far East (Moffat) to Captain H. L. Pence of the Occupied Areas Section, Navy Department 890.0146/13a [Document 1208] The Adviser on Liberated Areas for the Far East ( Moffat ) to Captain H. L. Pence of the Occupied Areas Section, Navy Department Washington , May 6, 1944. My Dear Captain Pence : With reference to the questions bearing on the segregation of Japanese civilians which you sent me on March 20, 36 the following statement has been approved by the Inter-divisional Area Committee on the Far East and may be accepted as the informal opinion of the State Department. Segregation of Japanese Civilians It is, unfortunately, impossible at this time for the State Department to formulate the definitive policy of the United States relative to the disposition after the war of Japanese civilians, including civilian officials, in the Mandated Islands and Formosa. With regard to the Mandated Islands, the policies to be adopted will be dependent on the formal disposition of the Islands; with regard to Formosa, the determination will rest finally with China after sovereignty is restored to her. The Department has no information regarding any Chinese views as to the final settlement of Japanese civilians now in Formosa, and considers that it would be inadvisable to make inquiries on this subject at this time. It is possible that a determination of the question of repatriation of Japanese civilians from all territories to be taken from Japan may be the subject of international action after the conclusion of hostilities. It is urged, therefore, that no action be taken on policies adopted during the period of military government which might impair complete latitude of decision by the United States Government at the conclusion of the war. During the period of military government, the military authorities ( a ) should be guided by accepted international law, ( b ) should undertake no mass segregation, internment or removal except such as may actually be required by military necessity, and ( c ) should not attempt to anticipate a decision which must be predicated on agreements which it is not likely will be concluded with other countries until after the war. Formosa has been under Japanese sovereignty for half a century. Although technically all Formosans, therefore, are enemy nationals, the State Department looks upon the Chinese Formosans and the Formosan aborigines as quite apart from the persons of Japanese blood who live on the island. It anticipates that the Military Governor will act generally on the assumption that the Chinese Formosans, who speak Chinese and are of Chinese or of mixed Chinese and aborigine origin, are to be restored to Chinese citizenship after the war, and that the tribal aborigines, who are akin to the non-Christian peoples of Northern Luzon, are neither Japanese nor Chinese, but more properly to be considered as wards of whatever government has control of the island. The Marshall, Caroline and Marianas Islands, on the other hand, have been held by Japan only under mandate and the natives of these islands have never become Japanese nationals. They should be treated as wards of the military government. A number of Koreans may be found in the islands. If so, special consideration should be given them. About half of the Japanese civilian population of Formosa comprise officials, corporation executives, technicians and some business entrepreneurs; the other half are largely urban laborers and small businessmen. In the Mandated Islands, a far greater proportion of the Japanese civilian population will be found to be farmers and laborers, primarily workers on the sugar plantations in the Marianas, brought for such purpose from the Liuchiu Islands. It is quite possible that if there is intensive fighting in Formosa the Japanese civilians will be found segregated at one or more points, in which event, clearly, the United States military authorities should continue such segregation at least until stable conditions are restored. In the Mandated Islands, such segregation of the Japanese civilians does not seem probable. Unless there has been actual segregation as indicated, it is believed that the Military Governor should not undertake a mass segregation or internment of the Japanese civilian population in any area under naval control unless or until such action is clearly established as necessary for the security of the occupying forces or of the Japanese themselves or to protect the military effort. Politically, we believe such forbearance to be wise. It is hoped, instead, that only officials and others who may be in a position to affect adversely the security of the occupation will be interned at first. Strict warning should be given all other Japanese that they will be interned promptly for any lack of cooperation with the occupying authorities. It is possible that the non-segregation of many Japanese could be turned to substantial advantage in maintaining the administration and economy of the island. In the Mandated Islands, many of the Japanese could also be of value in maintaining and developing the agricultural production of the islands. The Military Governor may, however, find it a matter of military necessity to intern Japanese civilian official personnel and other civilians whose activities may be harmful to the military occupation and to segregate the entire remaining Japanese civilian population, including men, women and children. This may be necessary either for the security of the occupying forces or as a matter of protection for such civilians. Such mass removal of the Japanese civilian population to segregation areas or internment camps, if deemed a matter of military necessity by the Military Government, is permissible under international law. Although Axis propagandists may endeavor to make the most of any action which our military authorities may take, provided that such segregation or internment is carried out under decent American standards it is believed the Military Governor need not permit such possible propaganda to outweigh the more immediate military considerations confronting him. With regard to any of the civilians so segregated or interned there would clearly be a special duty, because of our treaty obligations and our concern for Americans in Japanese hands and for the reputation of the United States, to make adequate provision for their housing, feeding, health, and recreation. It is agreed that the experience of the War Relocation Authority 37 would be useful and it is possible that the services of some of those who have had experience with that agency might be available. It is suggested that valuable records on similar problems might be obtained by consulting with the Middle East Command which handled the problem of repatriation and resettlement of Italians in East Africa and from the records of the International Refugee Resettlement Commission, which arranged the transfer of populations between Greece and Turkey twenty years ago. Both of these sources might also provide experienced personnel. The location of segregation centers or internment camps and whether these are to be concentrated or to be at different points in each area must be decided by the Military Governor, having in mind military considerations and the adequacy of the proposed sites from the point of view of housing, feeding, health and recreation. Unless military necessity clearly so requires, the Department believes that during the period of military government the Japanese civilian population in the Mandated Islands should not be evacuated to points outside the Mandated Islands. All civilian persons who are interned should be accorded treatment compatible with the Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war so far as such Convention is adaptable to civilian internees. Work projects may be imposed upon those interned or segregated, provided that labor on such projects is in accordance with international law as set forth in the Annex to the Hague Convention, No. 4, of October 18, 1907. 38 Those so segregated or interned may not be compelled to work on any military project, and they must be paid for such other work as they perform. Work projects under these circumstances would be entirely different from the German practices of mass removal in order to provide forced labor, to secure a change in regional economy, or to give vent to racial hatreds. With regard to the property of any Japanese civilians segregated or interned by the military government, it is felt that there is definite obligation on the part of the Military Governor to take reasonable steps to protect such property. It is believed that the United States would not admit of claims for direct or indirect losses or damages on account of such segregation or internment, except, possibly, where gross negligence on the part of the military authorities can be shown. Regardless, however, of the question of liability every reasonable effort should be made to protect such property. This will include property known to have been illegally acquired, as restitution of this should be made after the war in accordance with legal arrangements yet to be worked out. It is especially important that the Military Governor take steps to protect and furnish custodial care and management for the large sugar and pineapple estates in Formosa nearly all of which are owned and operated by Japanese companies. Aside from any legal requirements under international law to protect this property, this is important in order to protect the Formosan economy and especially in order to assure food surpluses which may be urgently required by the Military authorities or by UNRRA 39 to meet civilian relief needs in other Far Eastern areas. The United States Alien Property Custodian has no jurisdiction over property in enemy areas nor does any American statutory law apply in such areas. The situation with regard to Japanese property and possessions will be quite different from that of German property in Italy. It is hoped that more effective measures than merely posting property or appointing a neighbor as caretaker can be devised. Although, as has been indicated, it is believed that no action should be taken which will in any way impair latitude of decision as to the post-war disposition of Japanese civilians in the Mandated Islands or Formosa, it is thought that those Japanese civilians who desire to return to Japan after its surrender should be permitted to do so whenever arrangements for their return can be effected. Such arrangements, naturally, will be conditional upon the consent of the Military Governor of Japan, the availability of shipping priorities for the return of Japanese from other liberated areas and other considerations. On the other hand, no Japanese civilian who does not wish to do so should be compelled to return to Japan during the period of military government. Of those who desire to return to Japan, those whose families or basic ties are there, and who were only temporarily in the Islands or in Formosa (viz. higher officials, executives, etc.) should be sent first. Those who have heretofore lived in the Islands or in Formosa but want to start afresh in Japan will have to await arrangements for resettlement which quite possibily will not take place until after the period of military government is over. It would seem probable that only a very few Japanese will want to stay in Formosa under Chinese sovereignty. There are few Japanese other than public officials or representatives of Japanese concerns who are not dependent for their livelihood on the presence of other Japanese. Japanese-run hotels, stores, barber shops, and the like cater only to Japanese. With the departure of the official and executive class, the remaining Japanese will face ruin and have no incentive to remain. In the Mandated Islands, a larger percentage than in Formosa may desire to remain to continue as farmers or farm laborers if the sugar plantations are to be continued. If, after the war, the sugar plantations are largely abandoned, it is thought that a large part of the Japanese civilian population now in the Mandated Islands may want to return to Japan. Sincerely yours, Abbot Low Moffat 36 Not printed. 37 Cf. pp. 1099 [ Pg. 1099 includes portions of Doc. 1130 and Doc. 1131 ] ff. 38 Foreign Relations , 1907, pt. 2, pp. 1204 , 1207 . 39 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1209] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East 40 PWC–112c CAC–110c [ Washington ,] May 9, 1944. Japan: Suspension of Powers of Government I. The Problem Should the exercise of the powers of the present existing government be suspended? (Question 3 d ) 41 Should the Japanese Government be supervised at only the national and prefectural levels? (Question 3 j ) 41 Should control of the lower echelons of the native government be through inspectors rather than supervisory officials? (Question 3 j ) 41 II. Discussion Plans for dealing with Japan during the period of occupation should proceed from the basic principle that the authority and responsibility of all Japanese officials and organs, including the Emperor, be superseded, and that all governing authority during occupation resides in the commanding officer of the occupying forces. However, the commanding officer may direct certain functions of these officials and organs to be exercised under his authority. A proclamation might be issued by the commanding officer immediately after occupation to the effect that, as provided by the rules of land warfare, all functions of government, legislative, executive, and administrative, whether general, provincial, or local, cease under military occupation or operate only with the sanction of the occupying authorities. Certain administrative parts of the Japanese Government might be utilized by the military government with great effectiveness and so avoid an impossible burden of administrative detail, but the policymaking agencies which constitute the very core of the modern Japanese Government should be utterly discarded by the military government: the Privy Council, the Cabinet, the Diet, the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, and the Supreme Military Council. The Privy Council is a consultative body and gives advice to the Emperor when requested to do so. The Cabinet is composed of the departmental Ministers and of Ministers without Portfolio and exists for the purpose of initiating, determining and carrying out policies of the Government. The Diet as it exists today is merely a “rubber-stamp” body, but in theory has certain legislative functions. The Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals and the Supreme Military Council are supposed to concern themselves only with military affairs but in fact in recent years they have exerted great influence over the civilian government. The position of the Emperor in relation to military government has been considered separately. (PWC–116a—Institution of the Emperor). 43 Military government must be supreme, and while it can effectively utilize much of the Japanese administrative machinery, obviously it cannot tolerate the existence of a separate Japanese government clothed with policy-making powers. Because the administration of everyday affairs is largely centralized in Tokyo, the military government will probably need to utilize the administrative machinery of some of the national ministries. For example, the Ministry of Home Affairs operates the nation-wide police system and supervises sanitation and local governments; the Ministry of Transportation and Communications operates the railways, postal system, telephones and telegraphs; the Ministry of Education operates or supervises all schools throughout the country. Maintenance of the administrative machinery in these ministries may appear desirable. The control of this machinery by a pernicious oligarchy would be gone and the military government, by placing its civil affairs officers in the policy-making posts including those now occupied by the ministers and vice-ministers, could use this machinery for the purpose of the occupation including the development of democratic tendencies. In order to assure as effective an administration as possible the military government may desire to utilize, also, the municipal and prefectural administrative machinery and there is no political objection to doing so. Indeed, if military considerations permit, the military government may find it desirable to continue the municipal and prefectural assemblies so as to aid in the development of democratic institutions and democratic processes. Control of municipal and prefectural government may, at first, have to be by means of CAA supervision, but it is hoped that supervision can shortly be changed to inspection. This change may be brought about by placing CAA supervisors at the seat of prefectural governments whence regional inspectors could make tours of inspection in order to insure compliance with CAA orders and to keep the Japanese officials and population keenly aware of the vigilance and power of CAA. Later, the nine Local Administrative Deliberative Councils established July 1, 1943 might serve as convenient intermediary organs between central and prefectural governments if active supervision is found unnecessary in some prefectures. III. Recommendations Since many potential factors in the situation which will face the occupying forces cannot be foreseen, the commanding officer should be given a wide latitude in dealing with that situation. Any directives of the War and Navy Departments should be tentative and flexible, in order to permit the commanding officer to make appropriate use of such cooperative Japanese elements as he may find. In order to carry on as quickly and as effectively as possible the ordinary administrative functions of government, such as those of the police, post office, and public utilities, and to obtain the cooperation of the Japanese office-holders, the military authorities may find it desirable to continue some or all of the following: 1. Administrative functions and machinery of the municipal and prefectural governments under CAA supervision or inspection, and also the municipal and prefectural assemblies. 2. Administrative functions and machinery of the Ministries of Home Affairs, Finance, Justice, Transportation and Communications, Agriculture and Commerce, Education, and Welfare under CAA officers in the top policy-making positions. 3. Administrative functions and machinery relating to demobilization of the Army and Navy, conversion of factories to peacetime use and general liquidation of the Ministries of War, Navy, Munitions and Greater East Asia Affairs; these functions might be handled by the Ministry of Home Affairs. 4. Routine administrative functions and machinery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to be performed under the direction of CAA officers. Any policy matters should be referred to the Department of State. 5. Certain limited administrative functions of the Emperor as described in “Japan: Political Problems: Institution of the Emperor”—(PWC—116a). Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: GHBlakeslee FSO: EHDooman HBorton (drafting officer) CA: JCVincent PRJosselyn OEClubb FE: JWBallantine LA: ALMoffat (drafting officer) AHiss ISO: QWright JA: ERDickover (drafting officer) ME: MBHall BRJohansen FMA: CFRemer FSWilliams LRD: JRFriedman 40 Marginal notation in the original: “Changes from document PWC–112b are underscored.” (Document under reference, dated May 4, not printed.) 41 Ante , p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 41 Ante , p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 41 Ante , p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 43 Dated April 24, not printed, but see PWC–116d, May 9, infra. Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East” Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1210] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East” 44 PWC—116d CAC—93e [ Washington ,] May 9, 1944. Japan: Political Problems: Institution of the Emperor I. The Problem The problem is the relation of the institution of the emperor to military government (Questions 3 d and 3 i 45 ). II. Basic Factors More than any other of the various questions submitted by the War and Navy Departments, this question is one which is difficult if not impossible to answer finally at the present time because it is impossible to prophesy accurately the effects of an attempt by the United Nations to eliminate the institution of the emperor. The Japanese may change their attitude towards the institution of the emperor. Since the Japanese at present show an almost fanatical devotion to their sovereign, an attempt from the outside to abolish the institution of the emperor, would, so long as the present attitude of the Japanese continues, probably be ineffective. The mere dethronement of the emperor against the will of the Japanese people would not accomplish the abolition of the emperorship nor could it probably be effectively legislated out of existence so long as the Japanese believed in it and were determined to maintain it. Under these circumstances, the indefinite occupation of Japan might be necessary if the United Nations wished to prevent the revival of the institution of the emperor. Such a situation is the result of the unique position of the Japanese emperor. He is considered the source from which all authority emanates and is regarded as sacred and inviolable. Accepted governmental procedure has allowed the emperorship to be made an instrument of the Japanese military in the achievement of their aims. This close relationship which the military have developed with the throne will in all probability have to be severed if militarism is to be wiped out of Japan. Another factor which makes it difficult to answer this question is that while the purposes of the United Nations are clear—the abolition of militarism and the furthering of democracy in Japan—there may be a divergence of views as to the most practical means to achieve these ends. The various United Nations, including the United States, apparently have not yet decided on what is the best course to follow. For example, in relation to the emperorship, there are indications that the Chinese may favor the abolition of the institution of the emperor and public opinion in the United States increasingly seems to prefer this solution. On the other hand, the British at the close of the war may oppose such action. In view of the possibility that there may be some disagreement among Great Britain, China, and the United States as to the best policy to follow in regard to the emperor, the final decision may have to be determined by common agreement among these three nations. Any decision that is taken with regard to the commanding officer of the occupying forces permitting the emperor to exercise certain of his functions will not, of course, in any way affect the right of the military commander to issue any proclamation he may desire. Military government in Japan will be the supreme authority over all of the territory in which that government operates. There are several courses of action open to the occupation authorities but three alternatives seem the most likely—they could 1) redelegate to the emperor the exercise of none of his functions, 2) redelegate all of his functions, or 3) redelegate only some of his functions. 1) Redelegation of none of the functions of the emperor Under this alternative, in view of the right of the theater commander to exercise directly all powers of government, the occupation authorities would hold the imperial family in protective custody and suspend the exercise of all of the functions of the emperor. The military government would then actually exercise the rights of sovereignty though the emperor might continue as the de jure sovereign of Japan. Such action might create a difficult situation for the occupation authorities. Japanese functionaries consider the throne as the source of authority to hold office. Therefore, if the emperor is deprived of his rights of sovereignty, it might well be that a substantial group of Japanese officials would feel that their country had lost its independence and that it would be impossible for them to serve under foreign masters. If such a situation developed, it might cause a breakdown in the entire administrative structure. In a highly industrialized country like Japan, such a breakdown would create an extremely serious situation for the occupation authorities, as it is questionable whether a sufficient number of civil affairs personnel could ever be trained to operate alone the entire administration of Japanese government and the essential functions of Japanese economy. The size of such a task is indicated by the fact that in 1937 there were over 140,000 persons of civil service status in the various governmental ministries, exclusive of the Army and the Navy and 60,000 national police and 330,000 national employees without civil service ranking. However, the suspension of the exercise of all of the functions of the emperor has the advantage that it would permit the greatest possible freedom of action in regard to the future treatment of the emperor—either all or certain of his functions and sovereign rights could be restored or all of the functions might continue to be suspended. 2) Redelegation of all of the functions of the emperor The occupation authorities would hold the emperor in protective custody but permit all the functions of government to be carried on through the emperor or in his name. Such a course would allow the issuance of necessary directives for the operation of government under the seal of the sovereign and would presumably facilitate the task of obtaining government officials for service in the actual administration of civil affairs within Japan. However, the occupation authorities might possibly feel that such action could not be taken as it would infringe too much on their own authority. Furthermore, such use of the emperorship would seem to imply that the occupation authorities were supporting the continuance of the throne. It is questionable whether the American people would sanction a program which implied such positive support of the emperorship. 3) Apprehending of the Imperial family and redelegation of some of the functions of the emperor The occupation authorities would hold the imperial family in protective custody and would use the emperor for their own ends. In line with the basic principle that the authority and responsibility of all Japanese officials and organs, including the emperor, are superseded by the occupation authorities, but that certain functions of these officials and organs may be exercised under the direction of the occupation authorities, the military governor would permit only those functions of the emperor to be exercised which relate to the delegation of administrative duties to subordinate officials. This procedure, without impairing the essential authority of the theater commander, would tend to assure the good behavior of the Japanese people and to keep in office the maximum number of Japanese officials who would be willing to serve directly under the supervision of civil affairs officers. Such a solution might be interpreted as support of the emperorship and recognition of its symbolic value by the civil affairs administration and hence by the United Nations. It is unlikely, however, that the Japanese would interpret such action by the occupation authorities in this way. The apprehending of the imperial family by foreign military forces, the use of those forces of certain limited functions of the emperor for their own ends, and the uncertainty as to the eventual disposition of the emperor would be more likely to be interpreted by the Japanese as an open challenge to the inviolability of their emperor. In any event, it may well be possible for the civil affairs administration to diminish even the limited use it might make of the institution of the emperor as the administrative machinery of military government functions more effectively. It would be desirable politically for the theater commander to do so to the maximum extent which he may feel to be practicable. Finally, if there developed a substantial movement among the Japanese people for the abolition of the institution of the emperor, the military authorities should take no action against that movement (except such as may be incidental to maintaining law and order) and should cease to utilize the emperor as a political instrument. III. Recommendations It is recommended that the military authorities adopt as flexible a course as possible which can be altered to meet any situation that may arise. If, considering all circumstances, the military authorities should decide initially to permit the emperor to exercise certain limited functions it is suggested that consideration be given to proceeding as follows: 1. If it is politically practicable and physically possible, the emperor (regardless of whether the present sovereign or any of his successors is reigning or is under a regency at the time of occupation) and his immediate family should be placed under protective custody, and be removed from the Imperial Palace and Tokyo and be taken to a location which is comparatively easy to guard such as the Hayama Palace on the seacoast south of Tokyo. The emperor should be kept in seclusion, but his personal advisers should be allowed to have access to him under reasonable conditions and he should be accorded courtesy normally extended, in like circumstances, to a head of state. Such an arrangement should expedite the administration of civil affairs within Japan as the people would have assurance of the emperor’s safety and welfare and of the fact that he was under surveillance. 2. In accord with the rights and responsibilities of the occupation authorities under international law, the theater commander has the powers necessary for the administration of civil affairs, and his authority and responsibility supersede that of all officials and organs in the occupied territory. However, he may direct certain functions of these officials and organs to be exercised under his authority. Consequently, the military governor would permit only those functions of the emperor to be exercised which relate to the delegation of administrative duties to subordinate officials. This procedure should facilitate the use of Japanese officials by the civil affairs administration, as such officials would continue in office by order of the emperor but would be, in reality, under the military government. In the proclamation concerning the authority of the occupation government, it should be stated that those functions of the emperor stipulated in Articles V, VI, and VII of the constitution which relate to the enactment of laws and Articles XI and XII which relate to the command and organization of the armed forces, have ceased. This course would constitute evidence to the Japanese people that the authority of the occupation government was superior to that of the emperor. However, the civil affairs administration would be in a position to use a maximum of Japanese officials who would be willing to serve directly under its supervision and would be able to leave the actual operations of administration in considerable measure to the Japanese themselves. 3. If it should be apparent that the exercise of certain functions of government through the emperor would be of comparatively little benefit to CAA and would not facilitate the use of Japanese personnel under the supervision of civil affairs officers, it might then become advantageous to suspend all of the functions of the emperor. In this contingency, the occupation authorities should be prepared to take charge of the actual operation, in addition to the previously assumed direction of the basic functions of Japanese government. Before such action is taken, however, the Department of State should be given an opportunity to express its opinion in regard to the matter. 4. If a portion of Japan proper is occupied for any length of time prior to the unconditional surrender of the entire country, the occupation authorities should be prepared to operate directly most of the functions of government in such occupied portion, with the possible exception of government in the small villages and townships. In such a case it will probably be difficult to obtain the services of any Japanese officials of significance in the area under occupation. These officials may either have fled to unoccupied territory or may refuse to serve under CAA. A similar situation may prevail throughout all of Japan if the emperor and his household, prior to the capitulation of Japan, escape or are spirited away. 5. The occupation authorities should in all of their treatment of and their contacts with the emperor refrain from any action which would imply recognition of or support for the Japanese concept that the Japanese emperor is different from and superior to other temporal rulers, that he is of divine origin and capacities, that he is sacrosanct or that he is indispensable. They should permit absolute freedom of discussion, except where there may be incitement to breaches of the peace, of political as well as other subjects. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: GHBlakeslee JA: ERDickover (drafting officer) HBorton (drafting officer) BRJohansen RAFearey CA: OEClubb PRJosselyn ME: MBHall FE: JWBallantine FMA: CFRemer AHiss FSO: EHDooman (drafting officer) LA: ALMoffat 44 Marginal notation in the original: “Note: This document has been thoroughly revised by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East.” 45 Ante , p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1211] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–136a CAC–119a [ Washington ,] May 9, 1944. Manchuria (“ Manchukuo ”): Government During Period of Military Occupation I. The Problem The problem as set forth in the questionnaire 46 is as follows: “9. Manchukuo a . Will Chinese sovereignty be immediately reestablished or will there be an interim CAA? b . If the latter, will this be American or United Nations? c . What nations will participate? And, what will be their degrees of participation? d . Will China and/or the Soviets (if the USSE joins the Far East War) have a paramount interest and participation?[“] II. Basic Factors “Manchukuo” includes in addition to the “Three Eastern Provinces” which comprise Manchuria (Heilungkiang, Kirin and Liaoning) the Province of Jehol. It does not include Kwantung Leased Territory. “Manchukuo” has never been recognized by the United States and the United States considers that Jehol and Manchuria are still parts of China and the question of reestablishing Chinese sovereignty, therefore, does not arise. Although the Kwantung Leased Territory is in Manchuria its legal status is different from the rest of Manchuria. This territory was leased by China to Russia in 1898 47 for a period of twenty-five years. In 1905, with the consent of China, the lease was transferred to Japan. 48 The duration of the lease was extended to a period of 99 years by the Sino-Japanese Treaty of May 25, 1915. 49 The validity of this action has been contested by China. III. Recommendations 1. It is recommended that full political control in Jehol and Manchuria (excluding Kwantung Leased Territory) should be turned over to the Chinese as soon as and wherever military operations permit. There should be no interim CAA. In combat zones administration of civil affairs will be the responsibility of the commanders of such zones and to the extent that such commanders may be American the United States military authorities must be prepared for such responsibility. 2. Final disposition of the Kwantung Leased Territory has not been determined. Unless or until a further statement of policy is made by the State Department with regard to such territory, American military or naval authorities should—if they occupy the territory—be prepared to continue such occupation and to assume responsibility for administration of civil affairs until the lawful transfer of such territory is effected. Chinese personnel, however, should be utilized in such administration to the fullest extent possible and it should be clearly understood that such occupation and administration is only temporary. 3. Should the forces of the Soviet Union enter Manchuria during the war against Japan, or should there occur new developments changing substantially the present political or military situation in the Pacific theatre of war, the problem may require reconsideration and the military authorities should consult with the Department of State. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. CA: OEClubb (drafting officer) FE: JWBallantine JCVincent  “  “ JA: ERDickover LA: ALMoffat  “  “ BRJohansen TS: GHBlakeslee ME: MBHall HBorton FMA: CFRemer RAFearey FSO: EHDooman PRJosselyn 46 Ante , p. 1190 [ Pg. 1190 is part of Doc. 1184 ] . 47 Convention signed March 27, 1898; John V. A. MacMurray (ed.), Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894–1919 (New York, 1921), vol. i , p. 119 . 48 Treaty signed at Peking, December 22, 1905; ibid. , p. 549 . 49 Foreign Relations , 1915, p. 171 . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122. Box 53 [Document 1212] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–152b CAC–185b [ Washington ,] May 9, 1944. Japan: Abolition of Militarism and Strengthening Democratic Processes I. The Problem The problem is to determine what measures the United Nations may take during the period of military government to abolish militarism and to strengthen democratic tendencies and processes in Japan. II. Destruction of the Military Machine A. Means of Destroying this Machine The present military machine in Japan will be destroyed as a natural consequence of the complete defeat of Japan, the unconditional surrender and the disarmament of all the Japanese armed forces, the dismantling of the military installations throughout Japan, and the dismemberment of the Empire as proclaimed in the Cairo Declaration. With the establishment of military government, all of the functions of the Japanese Government, except those permitted to continue under the direction of the occupation authorities, will cease. Consequently, any constitutional provisions or governmental procedures which have enabled the Japanese military clique to direct policies will become inoperative. B. Effects of Destruction of Military Machine The complete defeat of Japan and the destruction of the military machine will doubtless have a profound psychological effect upon the Japanese people. The high esteem in which the military have been held for the past eight or nine centuries, the dramatic victories of the Japanese Army and Navy in the past, with the resultant extension of the Japanese Empire, have convinced the Japanese people of the invincibility of their armed forces, and of the fact that Japan’s position as a world power can be maintained only by complete reliance on the military leaders. No one can say at this moment how the Japanese people will react to complete defeat, but it is possible that they may be jolted into a realization that their military leaders have led them to destruction and national disgrace and hence they may well turn to a new group of leaders. III. Steps to Prevent Revival of Militarism With the destruction of the Japanese military machine and the establishment of our military government, the occupation authorities will be in a position to take steps to prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism. These measures might include: a ) Nullification of Obnoxious Laics Broad categories of laws, ordinances and regulations which should be subject to suspension and recision should include: 1. Those relating to the creation of the armed forces, conscription and military training. 2. Those relating to the mobilization of industry and labor for war purposes. 3. Those restricting freedom of speech and freedom of worship. b ) Elimination of Ultra-Nationalistic Influences Ultra-nationalistic aspects of Japanese life should be discouraged through such means as: 1. The elimination, where possible, of ultra-nationalistic societies such as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Black Dragon Society. 2. The termination of police activities having to do with thought control and the enforcement of nationalist ideology. 3. The prohibition of motion pictures and dramas which glorify the military. c ) Creation of Internal Economic Conditions Favorable to the Growth of Democracy In view of the fact that intolerable economic conditions will seriously threaten any steps toward democracy and of the dependence of Japan on foreign trade, Japan ought to be permitted as soon as possible to carry on international trade under reasonable conditions. In the meantime needed relief and rehabilitation should be provided. d ) Encouragement of Liberal Forces The trend toward liberal reforms in the political life of Japan, which became marked in the decade following the world war, received a setback and a retrograde current developed after the world-wide depression in 1930. Nonetheless, there exists a fairly substantial body of moderate political influence which has been rigidly suppressed and silenced since 1931 but which it is believed can be encouraged and made the nucleus of a liberal movement. The elements comprising this body include the group of statesmen of the so-called Anglo-American school who held political offices in the 1920’s and who have been conspicuous among the personal advisers of the Emperor, a considerable sprinkling of business leaders whose prosperity was based on world trade rather than on the greater East Asia prosperity sphere, Christian leaders, such as Kagawa, a limited but courageous group of educators and social and political reformers, et cetera. Liberal thought and democratic processes might be strengthened by: 1. Freedom of the press, radio and motion pictures except for ideas subversive of the aims of the United Nations. 2. Freedom of discussion except as it might endanger security. 3. Elimination of restrictions on liberal education. 4. Explanation through press, radio and motion pictures of the meaning of personal liberties in a democracy. 5. Encouragement of political parties, labor unions, credit unions, consumers cooperatives and other organizations of the people. 6. Widespread use of municipal and prefectural assemblies. 7. Preparation of the people for and, if necessary, supervision of an election, or some other means, whereby the people may express, without prejudice, their will as to their own future form of government. IV. Inauguration of Basic Governmental Reforms In connection with the establishment of a Japanese Government acceptable to the United Nations, it may be possible to insist upon certain basic governmental reforms which should include: 1. A national legislature with full powers over the national budget and with the right to initiate amendments to the constitution. Heretofore, the Lower House had only limited powers for if it refused to approve a budget, that of the previous year automatically became effective. By giving the duly elected representatives of the people complete powers over the budget, a Prime Minister and all of his cabinet, including the War and Navy Ministers, if a parliamentary system continues, would be dependent on the legislative branch of government for whatever funds they needed. Hence the power which the military leaders have possessed through their special privileges, such as direct access to the throne, could be challenged by the people’s elected representatives. 2. If, notwithstanding the wide consensus which now exists that Japan should not be permitted in the post-war period to retain an army, navy, or air force, Japan should later be permitted to maintain some form of military establishment, such permission should envisage as an essential condition the elimination of existing statutes and ordinances which stipulate that ministers of war and of the navy shall be high-ranking military and naval officers. These statutes and ordinances have been repeatedly employed in the past by the military (through the resignation of the minister of war or the minister of the navy or the refusal of eligible officers to fill these posts) to overthrow an existing cabinet or to prevent the formation of a new cabinet. The elimination of these statutes and ordinances, and their replacement by a legal provision stipulating that the posts of minister of war and the minister of the navy shall be held only by civilians, would provide a substantial safeguard against complete domination of the armed forces by the military and contribute toward preventing the military from usurping control over the government. 3. Increased civil rights and emphasis upon the status of the individual. 4. 50 One of the important instruments for integrating the population into the nationalistic movement has been the courts. Places on the bench are by appointment by the Minister of Justice, who has power equally to remove judges. There is, therefore, so great a subservience by the courts to the Minister of Justice, which working closely with the police, is the principal civilian organ of militaristic nationalism, that the courts have largely become organs for the carrying out of the policies of the Minister of Justice and of the police; the function of safeguarding the rights of the individual, especially in cases involving offenses of a political character, has largely disappeared. The freeing of the judiciary from the control of the Minister of Justice and of the police, by election to the bench or by other well-tried devices, along with other necessary reforms, should be an essential feature of any program for the democratization of the Japanese. V. Supplementary Factors It must be emphasized that no matter what steps may be taken within Japan by the United Nations for the abolition of militarism and for the encouragement of the development of democratic processes, these actions will be of little avail if other factors are not such as to create conditions which will make the growth of militarism unlikely. The internal reforms mentioned above will contribute greatly to the rooting out of militarism within Japan but this objective of the United Nations will never be achieved unless ultimately: 1) the Japanese people are convinced by the acts of the United Nations that it is their intention to allow a peaceful Japan to discharge her responsibilities as a member of the family of nations; 2) Japan is given a share in the world economy on a reasonable basis with the hope for future betterment; 3) adequate security is provided in the Pacific and eastern Asia, presumably by the establishment of an international security system and a world international organization. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: GHBlakeslee JA: ERDickover HBorton (drafting officer) BRJohansen RAFearey FSWilliams FE: JWBallantine CA: OEClubb AHiss LA: ALMoffat (drafting officer) ME: MBHall FMA: CFRemer 50 Marginal notation in the original: “Note: Point 4 is an addition to document PWC–152a.” (Document under reference, dated May 4, not printed.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State 890.0146/14 [Document 1213] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State Washington , 14 May, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : A copy of the “Assumptions for Planning for Civil Affairs for the Period of Military Occupation,” as prepared by the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and concurred in by the Department of State, and as amended and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is enclosed for information. Sincerely yours, For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A. J. McFarland Colonel, U.S.A. Secretary [Enclosure] Assumptions for Planning for Civil Affairs for the Period of Military Occupation 1. In the four main islands of Japan proper and the southern half of Sakhalin (Karafuto) planning for the administration of civil affairs shall be a U.S. responsibility pending a determination of other United Nations interests, particularly those of the Soviet Union as regards Southern Sakhalin. 2. In the Philippine Islands administration of civil affairs shall be a U.S. responsibility. 51 3. In India civil affairs administration is not considered to be the responsibility of the United States. 4. In Burma, Malaya and Thailand administration of civil affairs is not considered to be the responsibility of the United States except that if United States forces are employed, the extent of United States civil affairs administration shall be a matter of recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the United States commander concerned. 52 5. In Sumatra the administration of civil affairs is not considered to be the responsibility of the United States, except that if U.S. forces are employed, the extent of U.S. civil affairs administration shall be a matter of recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the U.S. commander concerned. It is considered that during the course of any U.S. participation Dutch personnel will be used in the beachhead and combat zones to the extent permitted by the exigencies of the military situation and that total administration will be Dutch as soon as military expediency permits. 6. In Manchuria the administration of civil affairs is not considered to be the responsibility of the United States, except that if U.S. forces are employed the extent of U.S. civil affairs administration shall be a matter of recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the U.S. commander concerned. 7. In Korea (Chosen) planning for the administration of civil affairs shall be a U.S. responsibility pending a determination of other United Nations’ interests, particularly those of the Soviet Union and China. 8. In China, in combat zones occupied by forces under United States command, the United States should be prepared to undertake such affairs of civil administration as are beyond the capacity of the Chinese to perform to the satisfaction of the U.S. commander. 9. In the Netherlands Indies (exclusive of Sumatra) civil affairs administration shall be the responsibility of the United States except in so far as strategic developments may result in assignment of certain areas for operational responsibility to other United Nations’ forces. In so far as the United States is concerned, it is contemplated that Dutch personnel will be used in operational areas to the extent permitted by the exigencies of the military situation and that total administration will be Dutch as soon as military expediency permits. 10. In Portuguese Timor civil affairs responsibility shall be initially that of the United States but will be Portuguese as soon as military expediency permits. 11. In Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo, primary responsibility for civil affairs shall rest with the British. 12. In the Marianas, (including Guam), Carolines, Marshalls, Bonins, and Kuriles civil affairs administration shall continue the responsibility of the United States Navy as provided by J.C.S. 250/5. 13. In the Pescadores, Loochoos (Nansei), and such other small islands in the general vicinity of the Bonins and Formosa, as may be under military control, civil affairs administration shall be the responsibility of the United States Navy. 14. The responsibility for over-all planning for civil affairs administration in Formosa will remain with the Navy. Such plans, however, will recognize that in practice the administration of civil affairs in Formosa to a large extent will be delegated or otherwise assigned to and performed by the Army. 51 See also pp. 1299 [ Pg. 1299 is part of Doc. 1236 ] ff. 52 For correspondence on the postwar status of Thailand, see pp. 1311 [ Pg. 1311 is part of Doc. 1242 ] ff. The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) 890.0146/10 [Document 1214] The Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Dunn ) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department ( Hilldring ) 53 Washington , May 15, 1944. My Dear General Hilldring : In reference to a list of questions bearing upon your planning, training, and organization for civil affairs administration in certain Far East and Pacific areas, which you and Captain Pence sent to me under date of February 18, I am enclosing herewith three sets of twenty-one papers prepared as answers to most of these questions. 54 These papers contain both discussion and recommendations on certain of the questions in so far as they relate to Japan, the Japanese Mandated Islands, Korea and Manchuria. The papers have been prepared by interested officers of the Department, have received careful consideration by the appropriate authorities, and have been approved by the Department. The enclosed papers do not include answers to certain questions relating to Thailand, and to financial and economic matters. The Department is continuing to study the questions on Thailand. The financial and economic questions involve numerous purely technical considerations, in which other agencies beside the Department are intimately concerned. It is recognized, however, that a number of policy decisions must be made by the Department of State in order to provide the bases on which such technical questions may be decided. The Department is now engaged in studies of these financial and economic problems. We shall advise you as soon as final action is taken in the Department on the questions not covered by the enclosed. In the meantime, if there are further questions upon which you would like the comments of the State Department, I hope you will feel free to call upon us. With regards to the enclosed sets of papers, many of the problems presented therein will be under constant review by the Department and will be examined in the light of changing conditions. As new decisions on these matters are reached, I will endeavor to inform you accordingly. I am sending a similar letter with a set of the enclosed documents to Captain Pence. Sincerely yours, James Clement Dunn 53 Similar letter, with enclosures, sent to Capt. H. L. Pence, Navy Department. 54 The first paper, PWC–107, was a copy of the War-Navy questionnaire dated February 18, p. 1190 [ Pg. 1190 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , with parenthetical notations of PWC documents in reply. For texts of the other twenty papers, see pp. 1198 [ Pg. 1198 includes portions of Doc. 1186 and Doc. 1187 ] , 1202 [ Pg. 1202 is part of Doc. 1189 ] , 1207–1223 [ Pgs. 1207–1223 include portions of Doc. 1191 , Doc. 1192 , Doc. 1193 , Doc. 1194 , Doc. 1195 , Doc. 1196 , Doc. 1197 , Doc. 1198 , Doc. 1199 , and Doc. 1200 ] , 1224–1231 [ Pgs. 1224–1231 include portions of Doc. 1200 , Doc. 1201 , Doc. 1202 , and Doc. 1203 ] , 1235–1242 [ Pgs. 1235–1242 include portions of Doc. 1205 , Doc. 1206 , Doc. 1207 , and Doc. 1208 ] , and 1247–1260 [ Pgs. 1247–1260 include portions of Doc. 1209 , Doc. 1210 , Doc. 1211 , and Doc. 1212 ] . Copies of memorandum of May 9 (PWC–152b), p. 1257 [ Pg. 1257 is part of Doc. 1212 ] , were also transmitted to General Hilldring and Captain Pence on May 15. The Secretary of State to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 890.0146/14 [Document 1215] The Secretary of State to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington , May 27, 1944. Attention: Colonel A. J. McFarland, Secretary Dear Sirs : This will acknowledge and thank you for your letter of May 14 enclosing a copy of a paper entitled “Assumptions for Planning for Civil Affairs for the Period of Military Occupation.” This paper has been carefully considered in the Department and we should like to submit the following comments, the paragraph numbers corresponding to the numbered paragraphs of the paper under reference: 2. It is assumed that this statement will not preclude the making of some arrangements between the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth Government with regard to civil affairs administration should it develop that such arrangements would be desirable. 8. It is believed that the phrasing of this paragraph might be misconstrued by the Chinese in the event that it were to become known to them. It is therefore suggested that, if agreeable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this paragraph be revised to read substantially as follows: “8. In China, in combat zones occupied by forces under United States Command, the United States should be prepared to assume full responsibility for civil affairs administration. It is contemplated that Chinese personnel will be used in such zones to the extent permitted by the exigencies of the military situation and that total administration will be Chinese as soon as military expediency permits.” It will be noted that the above language is in line with that used in paragraph 9 relative to the Netherlands Indies. It is noted that no reference is made to Hainan, although in the earlier drafts of this document Hainan was specifically mentioned in the paragraph on China. It is assumed that the omission is not intended to indicate a change in the proposed treatment, but that Hainan is construed to be a part of China and therefore subject to the provisions of paragraph 8. 13 and 14. These paragraphs indicate a possibly different treatment for the Pescadores and Formosa. Administratively, the Pescadores are part of Formosa and it would seem logical that under military government this unity should continue. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: James Clement Dunn Director, Office of European Affairs The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State 811B.20/6–744 [Document 1216] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State Washington , 7 June, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : The Joint Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to an undated letter 55 addressed to them by the Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State, with reference to planning assumptions for United States civil affairs in Pacific Ocean Areas, with certain suggested amendments to the paper which the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared on this subject. The statement in paragraph 2 of the original paper—”In the Philippine Islands administration of civil affairs shall be a United States responsibility”—in no way precludes the making of some arrangements between the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth Government, should it develop that such arrangements would be desirable. To eliminate any doubt upon the subject, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have amended the assumption in such a way as to make this point clear. With reference to paragraph 8, which deals with China, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to point out that it is their wish that no part of the planning assumptions should be divulged to any persons or agencies save appropriate United States agencies. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have amended this paragraph to read as follows: “In China, in combat zones occupied by forces under United States command, the United States should be prepared to assume such responsibility for civil affairs administration as is considered necessary by the U.S. commander. It is contemplated that Chinese personnel will be used in such zones to the extent permitted by the exigencies of the military situation, and that total administration will be Chinese as soon as military expediency permits.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff assume that the Island of Hainan is considered an integral part of China proper by the United Nations. It is therefore unnecessary to make separate or special mention of this island in planning assumptions. The reasons which caused the Japanese to incorporate the Bokoto or Pescadores into the administrative system of Formosa would have no bearing upon the situation in the event of the occupation of these areas by United States forces. During the period of occupation by U.S. forces, the civil affairs problems which are likely to arise in the Pescadores are completely different from those to be expected in Formosa. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, see no reason why the military government of the Pescadores and Formosa should necessarily be united, though the presently accepted planning assumptions would not prevent this union if it were found advisable by the U.S. commander. Sincerely yours, For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: William D. Leahy Admiral, U.S. Navy Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 55 May 27, supra. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Grew) to the Secretary of State 890.0146/6–2344 [Document 1217] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] June 23, 1944. Mr. Secretary : Major General George V. Strong, Senior Army Member of the Joint Post War Committee, came to see me this morning at the request of Lt. General Stanley D. Embick, of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and showed me the record of the discussions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January and March last on the subject of the ultimate disposition of the Mandated Islands in the Pacific. In January the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that no action should be taken which directly or indirectly would prejudice the ultimate disposition of these islands. In March the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that in the interest of future security the Japanese Mandated Islands north of the equator should pass to the title and sole control of the United States. Some concern had been caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the agreement between Australia and New Zealand envisaging eventual control by these countries of certain of the Mandated Islands. 56 It was pointed out that Australia and New Zealand with their limited resources would not be able to defend these islands against any strong Pacific power; that if these islands should be attacked by some Pacific power, as in the case of the present war, the United States would again have to come to the rescue. The United States would, however, not be directly concerned with the eventual disposition of the Mandated Islands south of the equator provided that the United States should enjoy operational rights therein. J[ oseph ] C. G[ rew ] 56 Signed at Canberra, January 21; see telegram 12, January 22, from Canberra, vol. iii , p. 169 . Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1218] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–184a [ Washington ,] June 28, 1944. Papers Concerning Military Government in Formosa The Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East has prepared fourteen papers on military government in Formosa to answer twenty-eight questions submitted to the Department by the Civil Affairs Division of the Army and the Occupied Area Section of the Navy. 57 These answers are based on the conditions which it is believed will probably exist in Formosa during the period of military government. It is realized that new conditions may arise which will cause the Department to revise these papers or to issue new suggestions as to political aspects of military government in Formosa. The main points of the papers which contain recommendations as to policy, as distinct from details of administration, are as follows: 1. Transfer of Formosa to China It is recommended that the planning for military government in Formosa proceed on the assumption that Formosa and the Pescadores will be returned to China without reservations, that is, without any condition that China shall grant rights for bases on Formosa (PWC–185 58 ). It is envisaged that American military administration of Civil affairs in Formosa will continue until such time as Chinese sovereignty in Formosa is restored. 2. Military Government It is assumed that a military government will be established in Formosa by the United States (PWC–190 59 ). It is recommended that, even if the Japanese Government should capitulate before a forcible occupation of Formosa becomes necessary, the United States forces should, nevertheless, occupy the island, and establish a military government (PWC–197 60 ). The military authorities will retain sole responsibility and authority for civil affairs administration (PWC–195, 61 questions 1, 9 and 12). 3. Chinese Participation It is recommended that Chinese participation should be sought in both the planning and administration of civil affairs in Formosa. This participation, however, should not in any way restrict the exclusive authority of the American military government. If the occupation of Formosa should be aided by Chinese forces operating from the mainland, if feasible there should be provision for Chinese representation on the civil affairs staff. (PWC–190 and 195.) In the administration of Formosa, Chinese-Formosans should be used as fully as possible; American citizens and Filipinos of Chinese race should be employed on the same basis as other Americans; Chinese citizens, residing in China or in the United States, should be employed only with the approval of the Chinese National Government. All persons employed by the Civil Affairs Administration should be subject to the direct orders of the American military government. As a general rule, short-term administrative acts of the military government in Formosa should be designed to meet the immediate needs of Formosan interests as distinct from interests of the Chinese National Government; and administrative acts designed for operation over a comparatively long term, such as acts in respect to the educational system, should accord with Chinese Government policies in so far as those policies are consistent with American ideals and international law (PWC–195). 4. Treatment of the Inhabitants of Formosa and the Japanese Mandated Islands a. Japanese Residents The military government, in its treatment of Japanese civilians in Formosa and the Japanese Mandated Islands (1) should be guided by international law, (2) should undertake no mass segregation, internment or removal not required by military necessity, and (3) should not attempt to anticipate a decision as to the disposition of Japanese civilians after the war (PWC–198 62 ). b. Non-Japanese Inhabitants of Formosa Although Chinese-Formosans and the aborigines, in a legal sense, are enemy nationals, in a political sense, the Chinese-Formosans should be treated as “liberated peoples”, and the tribal aborigines as wards of the military government (PWC–194 63 ). 5. Treatment of Japanese Property The military authorities in their treatment of Japanese property in Formosa, both Government and private, should apply the Rules of Land Warfare of the Hague Convention of 1907. 64 Private Japanese interests should be respected. The military government should assume stewardship of all Japanese Government properties pending final settlement. (PWC–187, 188, 196). 65 It is recommended that in principle the Japanese Imperial Household properties be treated as though they were Japanese Government property (PWC–191 66 ). 6. Laws Under the Military Government Laws in force in Formosa at the time of military occupation should be regarded as continuing except as superseded by proclamation having the force of law issued under the authority of the military government. As to existing ordinary civil and criminal law, no attempt should be made to substitute Chinese law. With existing land-ownership rights and tenancy contracts the military government should interfere as little as possible. It will probably be necessary to replace the Japanese judges in the courts. (PWC–186 and 193.) 67 7. Currency It is recommended that, in determining the currency to be used in Formosa, primary consideration be given to the provision of a stable medium of exchange adapted to the needs of the military authorities and the civil population within Formosa, and that such a currency be distinct from and independent of the present Chinese currency (PWC–192 68 ). 57 PWC–199, letter of March 27 from Major General Hilldring and Captain Pence, and PWC–200, questionnaire of June 2 on “Political and Policy Questions Bearing Upon Civil Affairs Planning for Formosa”, not printed. 58 CAC–152, April 20, not printed. 59 CAC–161, April 24, not printed, but see PWC–190a, June 28, infra. 60 CAC–186, May 8, not printed. 61 CAC–177, May 15, not printed. 62 CAC–187, May 11, not printed. 63 CAC–174, May 11, not printed. 64 Signed October 18, 1907, Foreign Relations , 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204 . 65 CAC–156, May 11; CAC–157, April 26; and CAC–178, May 11; none printed. 66 CAC–162, May 9, not printed. 67 CAC–153, May 8, and CAC–173, May 5; neither printed. 68 CAC–166, April 25, not printed. Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1219] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–190a (CAC–161a) [ Washington ,] June 28, 1944. Formosa : ( Taiwan ) Occupation and Military Government Composition of Forces I. The Problem The problem is: 1) “If the Island of Formosa (including the Pescadores) is occupied after successful military assault by the sea-borne forces of the United States, is it desirable to invite the Chinese to participate in the administration of civil affairs after the occupation? 2) If the occupation is aided by Chinese forces operating from the mainland, is it desirable that the Chinese Government participate in civil administration? 3) Notwithstanding unofficial Chinese statements that China expects to assume control immediately, will it be understood that transfer of sovereignty will not take place until a final settlement? Is it contemplated that the United States singly or in collaboration with China, will assume major responsibility until such final settlements?” (Questions 4 a , 4 b and 4 c ) 69 II. Basic Factors According to the Cairo Declaration, “Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to China”. However, the present military weakness of China, especially the absence of a navy, makes it almost impossible for China to take the initiative in any campaign to drive the Japanese out of Formosa. On the other hand, it may be assumed that Pacific operations will include the capture and occupation of Formosa (including the Pescadores) by sea-borne forces of the United States or of the United States and its allies. As these operations would be under the direction of an American theater commander, it is likely that the United States will establish a military administration for civil affairs in Formosa and that the commander of the United States forces in that area will be responsible for the establishment and operation of such an administration and will continue to assume that responsibility until such time as arrangements have been made to reestablish Chinese sovereignty over Formosa. If it seems politically advisable at the time, representation of those combat forces which were not American might be provided for on the civil affairs staff. As the population of Formosa is predominantly Chinese and as this territory will be returned to China after the war, the Chinese Government’s cooperation would be helpful for the effective functioning of the military administration of civil affairs in Formosa, and would be politically advisable. This administration should be such as to expedite the return of Formosa to China. The Chinese Government should be informed of the general decisions which the Government may reach with respect to the establishment of civil affairs administration under an American commanding officer. It would be advisable to have the American plans for civil affairs in Formosa, so far as military considerations permit, coincide with China’s future plans for the administration of Formosa. It would be helpful if China should make available highly qualified Chinese advisers and persons skilled in financial and legal matters and in agriculture and industry who could assist American civil affairs officers with the formulation of plans for civil administration in Formosa and who could be employed in responsible positions in the island. Chinese personnel with a first-hand knowledge of conditions and of the dialects in Formosa, who could be entrusted with administrative and police functions under the military administration, might be invaluable to the civil affairs authorities. From a political point of view it would seem to make little difference whether these Chinese advisers and administrators were representatives of the Chinese Army or whether they were civilian personnel, providing they were officials of the Chinese Government and were directly under the command of the military government. If the occupation of Formosa is aided by Chinese forces operating from the mainland, the Chinese Government may expect to participate more actively in the civil administration of Formosa than if such an assault is solely by American sea-borne forces from the Pacific. Such participation may be expected to include the use of Chinese personnel in responsible administrative positions and representation by Chinese civil affairs officers on the civil affairs staff in Formosa. Such participation by the Chinese would be essential if large numbers of Chinese forces had contributed to the occupation of Formosa. III. Recommendations It is recommended that the planning for military government in Formosa proceed on the following lines: 1) It is assumed that if the armed forces of the United States undertake and effect the occupation and liberation of Formosa, a military administration for civil affairs in Formosa will be established by the United States. 2) It is envisaged that American military administration of civil affairs in Formosa will continue until such time as Chinese sovereignty in Formosa is restored. 3) If the occupation of Formosa is aided by Chinese forces operating from the mainland, a military administration will, nevertheless, be established by the United States but there should be, if feasible, provision for Chinese representation on the civil affairs staff. 4) In any event, as the cooperation of the Chinese Government would be helpful for the effective functioning of this administration, Chinese participation should be sought in the planning of civil affairs in Formosa and properly qualified Chinese personnel should be entrusted with administrative and police functions under the military administration. As the time approaches for the reestablishment of Chinese sovereignty over Formosa, it would be useful for the military administration to employ an increasingly larger number of Chinese personnel both in administrative and police functions and on the civil affairs staff. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: GHBlakeslee JA: ERDickover HBorton (drafting officer) BRJohansen RAFearey FSWilliams PRJosselyn CA: OEClubb MMKnight LA: ALMoffat FE: JWBallantine FMA: CFRemer AHiss ME: MBHall 69 PWC–200, Army-Navy questionnaire of June 2, not printed. The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Hilldring) 894a.01/7–1944 [Document 1220] The Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Dunn ) to the Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department ( Hilldring ) 70 Washington , July 21, 1944. My Dear General Hilldring : I am transmitting herewith a series of papers prepared by the State Department on “Military Government in Formosa” relating to political and policy questions presented by the War and Navy Departments. 71 These papers are identical with those which were transmitted earlier with the indication that they represent the informal views of experts in the Department. The papers have since been formally approved at the policy level and may now be regarded as the present views of the Department of State, subject, however, to such modifications as may be necessary in the light of future developments. 72 Sincerely yours, James Clement Dunn 70 Similar letter sent to Capt. H. L. Pence, Navy Department. 71 For summary, see PWC–184a, June 28, p. 1266 [ Pg. 1266 includes portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] . 72 See PWO-300, September 27, below. Captain H. L. Pence of the Occupied Areas Section, Navy Department, to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) 890.0146/7–2544 [Document 1221] Captain H. L. Pence of the Occupied Areas Section, Navy Department, to the Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Dunn ) (SC)A17–10 Washington , 25 July, 1944. Dear Mr. Dunn : Your letter of 21 July 1944, File PWC, enclosing three sets of a series of papers prepared by the State Department on “Military Government in Formosa” relating to political and policy questions presented by the War and Navy Departments has been received. These papers have been examined with a great deal of interest and found to be exceptionally helpful on the political and policy questions relating to the Military Government in Formosa. The prompt reply to these questions and the splendid cooperation received from the Department of State in this connection is deeply appreciated. Sincerely yours, H. L. Pence Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East Lot 122, Box 54 [Document 1222] Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East PWC–300 CAC–292 [ Washington ,] September 27, 1944. Formosa: Military Government: Cooperation With the Formosan Government I. The Problem The problem is: Is the creation of a Chinese sub-state in Formosa contemplated, and will the occupying forces be expected to cooperate with such a state, in the manner contemplated in Denmark, for example? 73 II. Basic Factors While the Chinese Government is reported to be planning to make Formosa into a separate province, and would doubtless welcome a chance to incorporate it into the Republic of China immediately upon its liberation, it is not contemplated that a sub-state or any other form of Government will be established in Formosa by the Chinese prior to the termination of American military government. In this connection, it has been recommended that the planning for military government in Formosa proceed on the following assumptions: 1) “A military administration for civil affairs in Formosa will be established by the United States” ( Formosa: ( Taiwan ) Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces , PWC–190a 74 ). 2) “This administration will continue until such time as Chinese sovereignty in Formosa is restored”. (PWC–190a) 3) “As the cooperation of the Chinese Government would be helpful for the effective functioning of this administration, Chinese participation should be sought in the planning of civil affairs in Formosa and properly qualified Chinese personnel should be entrusted with administrative and police functions under the military administration. As the time approaches for the reestablishment of Chinese sovereignty over Formosa, it would be useful for the military administration to employ an increasingly larger number of Chinese personnel both in administrative and police functions and on the civil affairs staff.” (PWC–190a) 4) “As Chinese-Formosans will naturally be acceptable to the local population, and are on the spot, they should be used as fully as possible” ( Political and Policy Questions Bearing Upon Civil Affairs Planning for Formosa —PWC–195 75 ) 5) “Plans for the temporary reorganization of the government of Formosa by the occupation authorities should be designed to secure the most effective administration. Any such temporary reorganization should be consistent with the accepted concept of international law that the existing basic legal structure continues during the period of military occupation. In planning such temporary reorganization official Chinese plans for permanent governmental reorganization should be given favorable consideration only to the extent that they meet the need of the occupying authorities, are in accordance with international law and consistent with basic American principles.” (PWC–195) 6) “After the return of Formosa to full Chinese sovereignty, it will be administered by officials appointed by the Chinese Government. ( Formosa ( Taiwan ) : Territorial Problems: Disposition —PWC–185) 76 It should be noted that these recommendations for the administration of civil affairs in Formosa differ fundamentally from the plans for civil affairs in Denmark, as set forth in the directives approved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. In the case of Formosa, military government is to be established and its administration continued until Formosa is turned over to China, at which time an entirely new Formosan government will be established by the Chinese authorities. In the case of Denmark, the basic aim of military government will be to facilitate the re-establishment of a Danish government by the constitutional action of the King, at the earliest possible moment. It is further assumed for Denmark that the existing administrative services and local authorities “may be regarded generally as well disposed towards the cause of the United Nations and suitable to cooperate with Allied military authorities” ( Directive on Denmark , CCAC–77/1). This assumption would not be valid for Formosa for the reason that these services and the local authorities will have been in large part Japanese and not Chinese officials. Finally, in view of the various circumstances mentioned above, it is likely that military government in Formosa will be much longer than that in Denmark. III. Departmental View 1. The creation of a Chinese sub-state in Formosa prior to the termination of military government is not contemplated. Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. TS: GHBlakeslee JA: ERDickover HBorton (drafting officer) FSWilliams FE: EHDooman ISO: CEagleton FMA: OCLockhart LA: WBKahn 73 Question contained in letter dated August 16 from Maj. Gen. Hilldring and Capt. L. S. Sabin, representing War and Navy Departments, to Mr. Dunn, not printed. 74 June 28, p. 1269 [ Pg. 1269 includes portions of Doc. 1218 and Doc. 1219 ] . 75 May 15, not printed, but see PWC–184a, June 28, p. 1266 [ Pg. 1266 includes portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] . 76 April 20, not printed, but see PWC–184a, June 28, p. 1266 [ Pg. 1266 includes portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) 740.00119 P.W./11–944 [Document 1223] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) 77 Washington , November 9, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : In connection with developments in the war in the Pacific, I wish to suggest to you the desirability of setting up, without undue delay, a committee composed of representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to undertake such studies as may appear appropriate in preparation to meet, as regards the Far East, problems similar to those which have come before the European Advisory Commission 78 with respect to the enemy states in Europe. It is our thought that among such problems as can be foreseen, the committee would occupy itself with the formulation of the surrender terms for Japan, the military administration of civil affairs in the Far East and such questions as may arise in connection with the disposition of various territories now occupied by the enemy. Efforts might be made to coordinate such studies with regard to these various problems as may already have been pursued by the interested departments. Consideration might also be given by the committee to the question of the desirability of the eventual establishment for the Far East of an international body comparable to the European Advisory Commission. Apart from representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is thought that representatives of other departments might from time to time be included in the committee on an ad hoc basis when questions of interest to those departments are to be discussed. In view of the fact that much of the work of the proposed committee will have to do with political problems involving foreign policy and relations with foreign nations, it is assumed that a representative of the State Department should assume the chairmanship of the committee. If you concur in the foregoing proposal, I shall be glad to learn from you the names of such officers as you may wish to assign as members of the committee. As soon as representatives of the War and Navy Departments and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been thus assigned, representatives of the State Department will likewise be chosen and it is hoped that the committee can begin to function at an early date. It is our feeling that it would be desirable to keep the actual membership on the committee as restricted as practicable and that advisers or experts be invited to take part in the committee meetings whenever it may appear desirable. 79 Sincerely yours, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. 77 Same sent to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal). 78 See vol. i , pp. 1 ff. 79 For correspondence on the establishment of SWNCO, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, see vol. i . Memorandum Prepared by the Committee on Post-War Programs Lot 122, Box 53 [Document 1224] Memorandum Prepared by the Committee on Post-War Programs 80 PWC–284a [ Washington ,] November 13, 1944. Japan: Terms of Surrender: Underlying Principles I. Introduction This Government has demanded the unconditional surrender of Japan as well as of Germany. Before this unconditional surrender is achieved, it will be necessary for this Government and other United Nations to decide certain basic issues. II. Basic Factors 1. Significance of Unconditional Surrender It is obvious from the various statements of the United Nations that hostilities will be carried on against Japan until that nation has laid down its arms on the basis of unconditional surrender or until it has been completely defeated. While there may be different interpretations as to just what is meant by “unconditional surrender”, there would seem inherent in the expression the right of the victors to impose whatever items they wish on the vanquished. Such an interpretation would not postulate that the instrument stating this fact was in any sense contractual. The instrument might be a unilateral statement by the Japanese authorities surrendering unconditionally and declaring that they will not oppose any measures which the United Nations consider necessary to carry out their policy. The draft of the instrument of unconditional surrender of Germany, which the European Advisory Commission transmitted on July 25, 1944 81 to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for their acceptance, states: The German Government and the German High Command, recognizing and acknowledging the complete defeat of the German forces on land, at sea, and in the air, hereby announce Germany’s unconditional surrender. The document also contains an announcement by “the Representatives of the Supreme Command of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, … acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of the United Nations”, of the “terms of surrender with which Germany shall comply”. To be assured of the necessary authority for any action which the Allies may wish to take, it is further stated that “the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany … The Allied Representatives will present additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the surrender of Germany”. 2. Should the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender for Japan be Contractual or Declaratory? One of the first questions in connection with the unconditional surrender of Japan is whether the surrender instrument should be contractual or declaratory. International law recognizes contractual instruments made in accord with the law of war between commanders of opposing belligerents (armistices, capitulations) and contractual instruments made between sovereign states (treaties, conventions). A contractual instrument of either type would seem to be contrary to the conceptions of unconditional surrender because it would impose limitations upon the victor arising either from the terms of the contract or from the implication that the rights of the victor are limited to those expressed in the contract. Furthermore, if there should be no authority in Japan competent to bind that country, a contractual instrument might raise issues concerning the powers of the Japanese signatories to contract for their Government. Finally, the Secretary of State has already stated, in a telegram to London, dated March 16, 1944 82 in connection with the German surrender instrument, that we wish to avoid any implication that a contractual relationship is involved. As the Hague Rules of Land Warfare (Art. 35) 83 and the United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940 (sees. 244–47) recognize capitulations as contractual instruments, if the instrument of unconditional surrender is a unilateral declaration by those Japanese authorities who exercise actual control over the Japanese armed forces, such an instrument would not imply a contractual relationship. 3. What Japanese Authority Should Sign the Surrender Instrument? The Japanese constitution provides that “the Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy” (Article 11), and that he “declares war, makes peace and concludes treaties” (Article 13). In all probability he would consult his highest advisers, including the Cabinet, the Privy Council and the High Command prior to signing any surrender instrument. However, the actual command of military and naval affairs and responsibility for all military operations is in the hands of the Imperial Headquarters, a body formally presided over by the Emperor and composed of the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staff, the Ministers of War and Navy, the Inspector General of Military Education, and the Inspector of Aviation. Consequently, the most conclusive and therefore the most desirable form of acknowledgment of unconditional surrender would be a document to that effect signed by the Emperor, and countersigned by authorized representatives of the Imperial Headquarters (the High Command) to assure recognition by the armed forces of Japan’s unconditional surrender. If there should be no Emperor in Japan to acknowledge the unconditional surrender of Japan, or if he should refuse to sign, it follows that the highest available military authorities should sign such a document. 4. Who should Receive the Unconditional Surrender of Japan? The next important question relating to Japan’s unconditional surrender is: Who Should Receive the Unconditional Surrender of Japan? In view of the pledge in the Declaration of the United Nations that the Governments signatory thereto would not make a separate armistice or peace with the enemy, it would seem incumbent upon whomever receives the unconditional surrender of Japan to do so on behalf of all of the United Nations at war with Japan. Furthermore, the Department of State has already recommended for Japan that: The forces to be used for combat purposes in Japan should include, if not prejudicial to the effectiveness of military operations, units of those allied countries which have actively participated in the war against Japan. ( Japan: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan —PWC–111.) 84 If this policy is adopted, presumably those nations most vitally interested in the surrender of Japan would participate in the combat forces against that country. However, certain members of the United Nations at war with Japan, as, for example, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, might find it impossible, for practical reasons, to participate in the combat operations against the homeland of Japan even though they had actively participated in the war against Japan. In view of these circumstances, the Theater Commander should be duly authorized to receive the unconditional surrender of Japan on behalf of all of the United Nations at war with Japan. 5. What Nations Should Determine the Policies and Participate in Dafting the Documents Connected with the Surrender of Japan? An extremely important question in connection with the unconditional surrender of Japan is: What members of the United Nations should determine the policies and participate in drafting the documents connected with the surrender of Japan? The Declaration of the United Nations, signed January 1, 1942 85 by twenty-six countries at war with one or more of the Axis powers, and later adhered to by other nations, declares: Each government pledges itself to cooperate with the governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies. Therefore, if only a limited number of nations actually formulate the instrument of unconditional surrender for Japan and the documents containing the measures to be applied by the United Nations as a consequence of this surrender, this procedure might be interpreted by the other signatory governments as counter to this pledge. Furthermore, while the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943 was made jointly by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China, the Declaration itself states that “the three Allies in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan”. The question then arises as to whether this Declaration should be interpreted to mean that these three nations alone, or these three countries together with the other United Nations at war with Japan, should be responsible for (1) determining the policies and procedures to be followed in connection with the surrender of Japan, (2) drafting the instrument of surrender for Japan, and (3) drafting the measures with which Japan must comply after surrender. There is the further question as to whether the inclusion of the Soviet Union is dependent on its entrance in the war against Japan. The Four Nation Declaration signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943, implies that such is the case. It reads: Those of the signatories at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy. The recent Anzac agreement 86 and subsequent statements of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand reflect the feeling of resentment of those countries in not having been permitted to participate in many of the basic policy decisions on the war and the peace in the Pacific. If they are not consulted on the problems bearing upon the surrender of Japan, it is probable that their resentment on this score will increase. Here a clear distinction should be drawn between the procedure to be followed in the treatment of two different problems. First, that of obtaining the unconditional surrender of Japan, and second, that of determining and implementing the policies to be adopted by the United Nations following Japan’s unconditional surrender. As regards the first problem, since the United Nations in their joint declaration of January 1, 1942 announced “that complete victory over their enemies is essential”, it is to be assumed that each of these nations will be completely satisfied by an unconditional surrender. As for the second problem, those countries which have actively participated in the war against Japan will have the major responsibility for carrying through whatever policies are adopted. Consequently, those countries, rather than all the United Nations at war with Japan, should determine the basic policies and procedures to be followed subsequent to Japan’s unconditional surrender. Up to the present time, military and naval operations in the Pacific Theater have been carried on almost entirely by the United States so that this Government has a primary responsibility to formulate, at the earliest possible date, the basic policies and procedures which it believes should be followed in connection with Japan’s unconditional surrender. When this Government has determined its own policy, probably the most desirable way to reach an agreement on these matters with the other United Nations would be for the United States to present its views to the United Kingdom and China, and the Soviet Union, if it has entered the war against Japan. After a preliminary exchange of views among themselves on these matters, these countries might invite the other United Nations which have actively participated in the war against Japan also to express their views, in order to obtain the largest possible measure of agreement. After receiving their suggestions, the leading powers should formulate definitively the documents containing the basic policies and procedures and transmit these documents to the other United Nations which have actively participated in the war against Japan. 6. What Nations Should Discharge the Responsibilities and Exercise the Powers Resulting from the Unconditional Surrender of Japan? Many of the United Nations at war with Japan will be unable to participate in combat operations against the homeland of Japan or to discharge the responsibilities arising from this unconditional surrender, such as the responsibilities connected with the military government of Japan. The Department of State has recommended that: With the completion of military operations and after the unconditional surrender of Japan, there should be, so far as practicable, allied representation by those countries which have actively participated in the war against Japan in the army of occupation and in military government. ( Japan: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan —PWC–111.) If such a policy is adopted, it is impossible to determine at the moment just what countries would be affected, but it is reasonable to assume that at least the United States, the United Kingdom, and China would be considered as having actively participated in the war against Japan. Other countries which so far are in a position to make a similar claim include Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands and the Philippines. Additional countries having territories in the Far East which so far have not participated in the war against Japan, may at a subsequent date do so and thereby establish a claim for representation. To be consistent with the recommendation of the Department just cited, the responsibilities resulting from unconditional surrender should be discharged, and the powers should be exercised primarily by the United States, China and the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, if it has entered the war against Japan, with the assistance of those United Nations which have actively participated in the war against Japan. 7. Extent of Authority to be Exercised The Department of State has recommended the military occupation of Japan, and that adequate forces be available. To occupy all of the prefectural capitals, other important cities and strategic areas, including divisional headquarters and industrial districts, as soon as possible after capitulation of Japan. (See: Japan: Occupation and Military Government: Extent of Occupation —PWC–110a.) 87 The unconditional surrender of Japan would make it possible for the United Nations to assume the supreme authority with respect to Japan and to exercise powers beyond those given a military occupant by international law. There would seem to be considerable advantage in the United Nations incorporating in a document or documents those measures which they intend to impose on Japan following its unconditional surrender and the general policy they expect to follow in regard to the post-war treatment of Japan. The documents should be transmitted to the Japanese upon the receipt of their acknowledgment of unconditional surrender and should specify the initial military measures with which Japan must comply as the consequence of unconditional surrender. They should, for example, provide for military government by the United Nations in Japan and for the demobilization and disarmament of the Japanese armed forces. They should state that, in addition, the United Nations would exercise whatever political and economic functions may be necessary to achieve their objectives and that directives to that effect would be issued from time to time. A statement of the policy of the United Nations in regard to the treatment of Japan might emphasize that: (1) The United Nations aim to destroy Japanese militarism and those forces responsible for Japanese aggression and thus to prevent Japan from again becoming a menace to world peace. (2) The United Nations have as their basic objective and ultimate aim the formation of a “Japan properly discharging its responsibilities in the family of peaceful nations”. ( Japan: Postwar Objectives of the United States in Regard to Japan —PWC–108b.) 88 (3) The United Nations will, as soon as conditions in Japan permit, facilitate the establishment of a government by the Japanese people which will forward these policies. These objectives indicate that the United Nations do not intend to destroy Japan as a state or permanently to subordinate it to the United Nations. There would be several advantages to the issuance by the United Nations of such basic documents. In the first place, if the Japanese are given some definite indication of the conditions to be imposed on Japan and if they are assured that the United Nations do not intend to destroy Japan as a state, they would be more likely to collaborate with the civil affairs administration. In the second place, the enunciation of these principles should give encouragement to whatever democratic and moderate elements still remain in Japan, as it would indicate the willingness of the occupation authorities to assist in the development of democracy in Japan. In this way, the Japanese would know what was expected of them and would know better how to work towards the reformation of their own country in line with the desires of the United Nations. 8. Special Aspects of Japanese Surrender The “unconditional surrender” of Japan will be influenced by certain other factors which require analysis. Hostilities against Japan may continue for some time beyond those in Europe. This situation will enable the United Nations to profit from the experiences in Germany, and, where conditions are similar, to modify the procedures related to the unconditional surrender of Japan. Therefore, whatever measures are drafted at the present time should be considered tentative and subject to revision as a result of the European experience. Even if both the highest military and civil officials in Japan proper should be willing to sign an unconditional surrender instrument, it is likely that there will be isolated contingents on the Asiatic mainland (especially in North China and Manchuria) which will refuse to recognize or abide by the decision reached by their superiors at home. Similar units may exist in isolated places within Japan. The capitulation of any such units could probably be brought about only by direct action against them rather than by continued hostilities against the main centers of Japanese resistance. If it is apparent that the highest recognized military authorities cannot exercise control over any such units the allied occupation authorities should be prepared, nevertheless, to accept the unconditional surrender of Japan in the homeland. The probable disposition of the Japanese to fight to the end might be moderated if the leaders of the United Nations continue publicly to emphasize the following points: 1. Japan will be expected to surrender unconditionally, but the measures consequent upon this surrender will not be enforced in a spirit of vindictiveness; 2. There will be military occupation of Japan, and political controls and economic restrictions over Japan will be necessary, but these limitations will be progressively relaxed as Japanese attitudes and actions warrant. 3. The ultimate aim of the United Nations is not the destruction of Japan as a nation but the emergence of a Japan properly discharging its responsibilities in the family of nations. 9. Need for Consultation with Our Allies In view of the importance of the various policies and procedures connected with the unconditional surrender of Japan, as outlined above, it would seem advisable for the Department of State at the earliest possible date, to present the views of this Government to the United Kingdom and China, and the Soviet Union, if it has entered the war against Japan, for their consideration and for the formulation of a common policy. III. Recommendations The following recommendations have been considered from the point of view of what now seem to be the most desirable policies and procedures to follow. It may be, however, that conditions both inside and outside Japan will develop in such a way that some of these policies and procedures will not be entirely applicable. Consequently, it may be necessary to issue supplementary recommendations or to authorize the Allied Theater Commander to decide, within certain designated limits, the most desirable course to follow under the circumstances as they may exist. It is recommended that: 1. The Emperor should proclaim that Japan has surrendered unconditionally to the United Nations at war with Japan and should command the armed forces and people of Japan to offer no opposition to any measures which the Allies may adopt. At the same time, a document acknowledging Japan’s unconditional surrender and stating that the armed forces and people of Japan have been ordered to offer no opposition to the Allies should receive the Emperor’s official signature and privy seal, should be countersigned by the highest available representatives of the Japanese High Command, and should be delivered to the Allied Theater Commander. This document will constitute the instrument of unconditional surrender of Japan. 2. The Allied Theater Commander for Japan, being duly authorized, should receive the unconditional surrender of Japan on behalf of all of the United Nations at war with Japan. 3. If the several requirements as to the acknowledgment of unconditional surrender by the Emperor are not fulfilled, the Theater Commander should be empowered to determine whether, in the light of existing circumstances, he would accept unconditional surrender of Japan by the highest military authorities of Japan or whether he would by proclamation take over supreme authority of Japan, exercise the necessary powers, and issue directives as provided in Recommendations 7, 8 and 9. In view of the political implications of such a decision, he might wish to have the question brought to the attention of the political authorities of the United Nations principally concerned. 4. In order to fulfill any obligations arising from the United Nations Declaration to the effect that they will not make a separate peace, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China, and the Soviet Union, if it has entered the war against Japan, should, at the appropriate time, inform the other United Nations at war with Japan that they intend to proceed on the basis of the provisions of Recommendation One and Two. 5. To determine the basic policies and procedures to be followed subsequent to Japan’s surrender, the United States should present its views on this subject to the United Kingdom and China, and the Soviet Union, if it has entered the war against Japan, as a preliminary step towards reaching a general agreement. These nations should then invite the other United Nations which have actively participated in the war against Japan to express their views. After receiving suggestions which may be presented, the leading powers should formulate definitively the documents containing the basic policies and procedures and transmit these documents to the other United Nations which have actively participated in the war against Japan. 6. The United States, the United Kingdom, and China, and the Soviet Union, if it has entered the war against Japan, should, with the assistance of those other countries which have actively participated in the war against Japan, exercise the powers and discharge the responsibilities resulting from the unconditional surrender of Japan. 7. Upon Japan’s unconditional surrender the Allied Theater Commander for Japan, being duly authorized, should deliver to Japan the documents referred to in Recommendation Five which would state ( a ) the initial military and other measures with which Japan must comply in consequence of unconditional surrender, and ( b ) the general policy of the United Nations in regard to the treatment of Japan. 8. These basic documents should also state, inter alia , that the Allies will provide for military government in Japan, and that in addition, they will exercise supreme legislative, judicial, and executive authority and power to be outlined in later directives. 9. The statement of general policy to be included in these basic documents should emphasize the fact that ( a ) The United Nations aim to destroy militarism and those forces which are responsible for Japanese aggression, but not to destroy Japan as a state; ( b ) The United Nations have as their basic objective and ultimate aim the emergence of a Japan properly discharging its responsibilities in the family of nations; ( c ) The United Nations will, as soon as conditions in Japan permit, facilitate the establishment of a government by the Japanese people which will forward these policies. 10. The Allied Theater Commander for Japan, being duly authorized, should be prepared to receive the unconditional surrender of Japan, even though certain contingents of Japanese armed forces refuse to acknowledge that surrender and continue resistance. 11. The leaders of the United Nations should, in anticipation of unconditional surrender, publicly affirm that ( a ) the measures consequent upon unconditional surrender will not be enforced in a vindictive spirit; ( b ) the necessary restrictions and controls on Japan following surrender will be progressively relaxed as Japanese attitudes and actions warrant; ( c ) the ultimate aim of the United Nations is not the destruction of Japan as a state but the emergence of a Japan properly discharging its responsibilities in the family of nations. 12. The Department of State should, as soon as possible, take such steps as are necessary to obtain the approval of these policies and procedures by the United Kingdom and the Republic of China, and the Soviet Union, if it has entered the war against Japan. Originally prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East. Reviewed and revised by the Committee on Post-War Programs, November 10, 1944. 80 Prepared for the War and Navy Departments, which were drafting material on the subject of surrender terms. 81 Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 113 . 82 No. 1976 (13 EAC), printed in vol. i , under section entitled “Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission,” part V. 83 Annex to convention IV signed October 18, 1907, Foreign Relations , 1907, pt. 2, pp. 1207 , 1213 . 84 March 13, p. 1202 [ Pg. 1202 is part of Doc. 1189 ] . 85 Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 25 . 86 January 21; see memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, June 23, p. 1266 [ Pg. 1266 includes portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] , and footnote 56. 87 April 17, p. 1230 [ Pg. 1230 includes portions of Doc. 1202 and Doc. 1203 ] . 88 May 4, p. 1235 [ Pg. 1235 is part of Doc. 1205 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 890.00/11–2144: Telegram [Document 1225] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , November 21, 1944—7 p.m. 9791. Reports received here indicate that the British and Dutch may have reached common understandings as to political, security or economic aspects of the future of Southeast Asia and have included or hope to include the French in such common understandings. The President desires that it be made clear to all appropriate officers of the Government that we expect to be consulted on any arrangements as to the future of Southeast Asia. In your discretion please inform the Foreign Office of this Government’s position on some appropriate occasion and in such manner as you deem advisable. Please inform Schoenfeld 89 citing this as Department’s Neter No. 12. Sent to London, repeated to Paris as Department’s 497. Stettinius 89 Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, Minister-Counselor of Embassy near the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Netherlands, Norway, and Poland, established in England. Agreement Between the United States and the Netherlands Indies Agreement No. 36 90 [Document 1226] Agreement Between the United States and the Netherlands Indies 91 Principles Governing Arrangements for Civil Administration and Jurisdiction in Netherlands Territory in the Southwest Pacific Area The discussions which have taken place between the Netherlands and the United States representatives concerning the principles which will govern questions of civil administration and jurisdiction of Netherlands territory in the Southwest Pacific Area liberated by Allied forces under the Commander in Chief of that area, have led to agreement upon the following broad conclusions. The principles set out below are designed to provide a practical solution of immediate problems and to facilitate as far as possible the work of the Commander in Chief and thereby the common purpose of the Allied Governments, to expel the Japanese from the Netherlands Indies and gain final victory over Japan. It is understood that these arrangements in no way affect the sovereignty of the Netherlands Government. 1. In combat areas, it is recognized that the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, will, to the extent necessitated by the military situation, possess de facto authority to take all necessary measures. 2. It is agreed that the Netherlands Government will resume as rapidly as practicable, even in combat areas, full responsibility for the civil administration of reoccupied Netherlands territory. To accomplish this, it will reestablish the Netherlands Indies administrative and judicial services as rapidly as possible and will make available key members of its civil administrative service to accompany the military forces reoccupying Netherlands territory. The Commander in Chief will, as rapidly and as fully as the military situation in his judgment permits, notify the Lieutenant-Governor-General of the extent to which such responsibility should be resumed. 3. As long and in so far as the full responsibility for the civil administration has not yet been transferred to the Netherlands Government, the allied military commanders will, as a rule, for matters relative to the civilian population, make use of the intermediary of the Netherlands Indies civil affairs officers available in the area. 4. The Netherlands Indies Government will, in any territory wherein it has resumed responsibility for the civil administration, render all possible assistance to the Commander in Chief in the prosecution of the war, particularly with reference to the use of ports, lines of communication and airfields and other facilities of military importance. 5. Appointments in the Netherlands Indies administrative and judicial services will be made by the competent Netherlands Indies authorities in accordance with Netherlands Indies law. 6. Members of the Netherlands armed forces serving in Netherlands units with the Allied forces in Netherlands territory shall come under the exclusive jurisdiction of Netherlands courts. Netherlands subjects who, at the time of entering the Netherlands Indies, are serving as members of the Allied forces under conditions which render them subject to the naval, military or air force law of another Allied Government, will not be regarded as members of the Netherlands armed forces for this purpose. 7. In the exercise of jurisdiction over civilians, the Netherlands Indies authorities will make the necessary arrangements for ensuring the speedy trial in the vicinity by Netherlands Indies courts of such civilians as are alleged to have committed offences against the persons, property or security of the Allied forces, without prejudice however to the power of the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, if military necessity in his judgment so requires, to bring to trial before a military court any such civilian. 8. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 14, the Service courts and authorities of the Allies whose forces are cooperating with the Netherlands forces in the liberation of Netherlands territory will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of their respective forces and over all persons of non-Netherlands nationality not belonging to such forces who are employed by or who accompany those forces and are subject to their naval, military or air force law. The question of jurisdiction over such merchant seamen (of non-Netherlands nationality) as are not subject to Allied Service law will require special consideration and should form the subject of a separate agreement. 9. a . Persons who are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Netherlands authorities, as mentioned in paragraph 6, may, in the absence of Netherlands authorities, be arrested by Allied military police and detained by them until they can be handed over to competent Netherlands authorities. b . Persons subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Allied Service courts and authorities, as mentioned in paragraph 8, may, however, be arrested by the Netherlands Indies police for offences against Netherlands Indies law and detained until they can be handed over to the appropriate Allied Service authority. A certificate signed by an Allied Service officer of field rank or its equivalent, that the person to whom it refers belongs to one of the classes to whom paragraph 8 applies, will be conclusive. The procedure for handing over such persons is a matter for local arrangement. 10. The Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, and the Netherlands Indies authorities will take the necessary steps to provide machinery for such mutual assistance as may be required in making investigations, collecting evidence and securing the attendance of witnesses in relation to cases triable under their respective jurisdictions. 11. Members of the Allied forces referred to in paragraph 8 and organizations and persons employed by or accompanying those forces, and all property belonging to them or to their Governments, shall be exempt from all Netherlands Indies taxation (including customs) except as may be subsequently agreed between the Netherlands Government and the Allied Governments concerned. The authorities of such forces will take the necessary steps to ensure that such property is not sold to the public in the Netherlands Indies except in agreement with the Lieutenant-Governor-General. 12. The Netherlands Indies authorities, in accordance with Netherlands Indies law, will make available to the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, such labor, billets and supplies, the use of lands, buildings, transportation and other services as he may request for the military needs of his command. 13. The immunity from Netherlands Indies jurisdiction and taxation resulting from paragraphs 8 and 11 will extend to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments present in the Netherlands Indies on duty in furtherance of the purposes set forth in the preamble hereto, as may from time to time be notified by the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, to the Lieutenant-Governor-General. 14. Should circumstances in future be such as to require provision to be made for the exercise of jurisdiction in civil matters over non-Netherlands members of the Allied forces present in the Netherlands Indies, the Allied Governments concerned and the Netherlands Government will consult together as to the measures to be adopted. 15. Other questions arising as a result of the liberation of Netherlands territory by Allied forces (in particular questions relating to finance and currency, the handling of claims for compensation for damage or injury preferred by Netherlands subjects) which are not dealt with in this statement of principles are subject to separate agreement as far as necessary. 16. It is understood that when changes in the situation make it urgently necessary, the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, and the Lieutenant-Governor-General may by mutual agreement temporarily modify or suspend the application of any of the provisions of this agreement, subject to later confirmation by the United States and Netherlands Governments. H. J. van Mook Lieutenant-Governor-General, Netherlands Indies. Douglas MacArthur Commander in Chief Southwest Pacific Area. 10 December 1944. 90 Filed in the Office of the Legal Adviser. 91 In a letter of transmittal on December 10 to Dr. H. J. van Mook, General MacArthur said he had been authorized “to formalize the agreement which you and I reached informally during your visit to Australia last March” and that “All details of the draft which was prepared at that time have been approved, with the exception of a minor change in the wording of the second paragraph of the preamble.” In reply the same day, Dr. van Mook accepted and signed the draft agreement and suggested that Australia be informed of the contents of the agreement. On December 22 General MacArthur wrote Dr. van Mook that he was writing the Australian Prime Minister and suggested that the Netherlands similarly inform Australia. (Copies of letters of December 10 and 22, 1944, are filed in the office of the Legal Adviser.) Korea: Korea: Contents Interest of the United States in the future status of Korea and the question of recognition of a Provisional Korean Government (Documents 1227-1235) Interest of the United States in the future status of Korea and the question of recognition of a Provisional Korean Government Interest of the United States in the future status of Korea and the question of recognition of a Provisional Korean Government 1 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 1090 – 1096 . [1227] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss) Washington, March 28, 1944—3 p.m. 895.01/325a: Telegram [1228] The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Chungking, April 13, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 9:38 p.m.] 895.01/328: Telegram [1229] The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Chungking, April 26, 1944—4 p.m. [Received April 26—10:17 a.m.] 895.01/333: Telegram [1230] The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Chungking, May 19, 1944. [Received June 2.] 895.01/338 [1231] The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Chungking, June 3, 1944—5 p.m. [Received June 3—11:15 a.m.] 895.01/340: Telegram [1232] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss) Washington, June 12, 1944—9 p.m. 895.01/340: Telegram [1233] The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State Chungking, June 21, 1944. [Received July 11.] 895.01/6–2144 [1234] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss) Washington, August 16, 1944—9 p.m. 895.01/8–1644: Telegram [1235] The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Chungking, November 14, 1944. [Received November 25.] 895.01/11–1444 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss) 895.01/325a: Telegram [Document 1227] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Gauss ) Washington , March 28, 1944—3 p.m. 396. Syngman Rhee, Chairman of the Korean Commission in Washington, has applied to the Department for permission for Tjo So-wang, “Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Korean Provisional Government”, and four other Koreans (including one woman) now in Chungking to visit the United States for the alleged purposes of securing firsthand information regarding the situation here and of endeavoring to bring about closer cooperation among the various Korean organizations in this country. At your discretion please discuss the proposed visit informally with U.S. Army authorities and possibly with appropriate Chinese and telegraph your comments and recommendations. For your confidential information it is not unlikely that underlying purposes of the proposed visit of these Koreans are (1) to bring about recognition by this Government of the “Korean Provisional Government”; (2) to induce this Government to grant Lend-Lease aid to their organization here and in China; and (3) to give support to the position of Syngman Rhee which is believed to be somewhat insecure. Hull The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 895.01/328: Telegram [Document 1228] The Ambassador in China ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Chungking , April 13, 1944—1 p.m. [Received 9:38 p.m.] 647. As Korean representative here had previously indicated to Embassy Chinese authorities would not permit Koreans to send representatives abroad, I took up informally with Foreign Minister 2 April 4 and 12 matter of proposed visit of five Koreans to United States (Department’s 396, March 28, 3 p.m.). He states Chinese Government has no objection to proposed visit and that Gmo, 3 whom he consulted, expressed hope Koreans would go as such visit would develop interest in Far Eastern situation and in promise Korean independence. United States Army authorities are indifferent to matter but have no objection to trip, indicating they would be governed by Embassy’s recommendations. David Young (Young So Buck), who states he is member of Korean Independence Party, called at Embassy April 7 to show two telegrams March 27 and 28 from Syngman Rhee to Tjo So-wang (Provisional Government Foreign Minister) regarding proposed visit and to give list of following Koreans who will compose group for trip: Tjo So-wang, David Young, Choi Sojung (Mrs. David Young), Lim Yitack and Colonel Choy Yongduck (said to be head of Korean Army but not known to Embassy). First four are said by Young to be members of Independence Party while political affiliation of Colonel Choy not known. Mr. and Mrs. Young wish to take two children, four and six. Korean Congress, which began session October 9 last year (Embassy’s despatch 1815, November 15 4 ), still meeting with deadlock in vote said to have been reached on Cabinet changes and revision of Provisional Constitution to allow for more representative Congress. National Revolutionary [Party] reportedly supported by younger members Independence Party but changes blocked by older members latter group. In view apparent continued lack of unity and seeming intention Independence Party to monopolize selection of group for proposed visit as representatives Provisional Government, it might be desirable to suggest inclusion in group of Revolutionary Party members. Members both parties reluctant to discuss Congress meetings since information proposed visit as [ has? ] reached them. Independence Party member Congress March 25 was bitterly critical of his party as responsible for deadlock and expressed belief situation had reached impasse but Kim Kiu-sik (Revolutionary Party head and Provisional Government Minister) stated April 6 there was hope of reaching some compromise agreement on differences between two parties, thus giving possible indication of Korean reaction to news of proposed trip. Gauss [For memorandum of April 18, 1944, giving the views of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on “The Status of Korea”, see page 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 1204 ] . For policy planning papers PWC 124a, 125, and 126 submitted to the War Department on May 15, 1944, dealing with the establishment of a provisional government in Korea and with the composition of forces and the utilization of Japanese technical personnel during occupation of Korea and under a military government, see pages 1239 [ Pg. 1239 includes portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] , 1224 [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 1200 and Doc. 1201 ] and 1228 [ Pg. 1228 includes portions of Doc. 1201 and Doc. 1202 ] .] 2 T. V. Soong. 3 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China. 4 Not printed; it reported that the Korean National Revolutionary Party had demanded equal representation in the Cabinet with the Korean Independence Party and revision of the provisional constitution to allow election of Congressional delegates at large by all Koreans in free China rather than proportional representation of all Korean provinces (895.01/300). The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 895.01/333: Telegram [Document 1229] The Ambassador in China ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Chungking , April 26, 1944—4 p.m. [Received April 26—10:17 a.m.] 733. Central News Agency despatch April 25 reports reelection of Kim Koo as President of Korean Provisional Government April 24. Under revised organic law passed same day Kim Kiusic elected Vice President and total of 14 members said to represent all Korean political parties were elected to new government, including Tjo So-wang and General Kim Yak-san. 5 Further details will be reported when available. 6 Gauss 5 Secretary-General of the National Revolutionary Party. 6 Despatch 2561, May 15, from Chungking, reported that the State Political Council designated on April 24 consisted of nine members of the Korean Independence Party, five of the National Revolutionary Party, one of the Korean Emancipation [Communist] Party and one of the Korean Anarchist Alliance; also that the Cabinet designated by the Council on May 9 consisted of five members of the Korean Independence Party, two of the National Revolutionary Party, and one non-party member (895.01/337). The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 895.01/338 [Document 1230] The Ambassador in China ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State No. 2583 Chungking , May 19, 1944. [Received June 2.] Sir : Referring to the Embassy’s despatch No. 2561 of May 15, 1944. 7 in regard to the Korean Provisional Government and the projected trip by a Korean group to the United States, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of my conversation on May 16, 1944. 8 with Tjosowang, “Minister for Foreign Affairs” of the Korean “Provisional Government” and head of the Korean Independence Party, and Shen Yi-hsi, described by Tjosowang as “Minister of the Interior” of the Korean “Provisional Government”. (Mr. Shen is also reported by the Chinese press as having been elected to that post although other Korean sources had earlier said that Wang Hai-kung was the new “Minister of the Interior”.) Summary . In reply to Mr. Tjosowang’s inquiry regarding the American attitude toward Korean independence and recognition of the Korean Provisional Government, I informed him that the American attitude toward Korean independence had been made known in the Cairo Conference Declaration 9 and that, while I had seen no official comment on the phrase “in due course” contained in that Declaration, my personal reaction was that the military phase of expelling the Japanese from Korea must come first, followed by preparation for civil government and in due course independence. With reference to the question of “recognition” of the Korean Provisional Government, I replied that I had no instructions from my Government but that my personal view was that the “Korean Provisional Government” was not a Government in exile, such as the Governments of Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, but rather a Korean independence movement and that the question of “recognition” is not a matter of moment to the United Nations or to those constituting the “Provisional Government” or independence movement. Mr. Tjosowang intimated that recognition was a matter of great importance to the “Provisional Government” in that by receiving “recognition” the “Government” expects to gain “authority” and wishes to receive financial and lend-lease aid from the Allies. He went on to explain, by implication, the Korean dissatisfaction with the Chinese Government and the former’s desire to be freed from the dependence upon the Chinese which now exists. The trend of his remarks indicated the strong Korean desire to gain Allied financial assistance. I reminded Mr. Tjosowang that the Korean movement was functioning on Chinese soil and that the Koreans had much to do in their own inter-factional relations and in their relations with the Chinese Government before they can expect to receive attentive consideration of any of their requests by the United Nations. In reply to his question in regard to his projected visit to the United States and the possibility of his being received by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, I informed Mr. Tjosowang that we had heard of the proposed visit from Washington, that while the Embassy had no objections to the trip authorization for visas must come from Washington and that no assurance could be given that he would be able to see either the President or Mr. Hull. I pointed out that no one yet seemed to know what or whom the group proposing to go to the United States represented. I made clear to the Korean representatives that my replies to their questions (which were direct and pointed) were my personal reactions and not those of my Government. End of Summary . Respectfully yours, C. E. Gauss 7 Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 6, above. 8 Not printed. 9 Made by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill; released by the White House December 1, 1943. For text, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448 . The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 895.01/340: Telegram [Document 1231] The Ambassador in China ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State Chungking , June 3, 1944—5 p.m. [Received June 3—11:15 a.m.] 969. Information Minister 10 is quoted by Ta Kung Pao as stating May 28 at Sino-Korean Cultural Association tea for new members Korean Provisional Government “China must be the first nation to recognize” Korean Provisional Government as both KMT 11 and Chinese people favor such action. Sun Fo 12 also quoted as saying at same function he hoped “Allies would recognize New Korean Government as early as possible”. Koreans apparently making determined effort obtain recognition as evidenced by Korean submission to Kuomintang CEC 13 during session in late May of appeal for Chinese recognition of “Provisional Government”. Appeal pointed out that China should be first to extend recognition as action would further strengthen China’s right to speak for “oppressed people of Asia”. Korean representative here has shown to Embassy officer document asking for United States assistance in obtaining recognition which Koreans wish to present to Vice President 14 upon his arrival. Chinese may have purposely given impetus to this Korean action and Information Minister’s statement may have been made to indicate to Koreans that failure of Allied Nations to recognize “Provisional Government” not Chinese fault. Otherwise, this public statement difficult to explain as it does not seem likely that China would unilaterally extend recognition without prior consultation with her Allies. Gauss 10 Liang Han-chao. 11 Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China). 12 President of the Chinese Legislative Yuan. 13 Central Executive Committee. 14 Henry A. Wallace. For correspondence on his mission to China, see vol. vi , pp. 216 ff. Despatch 2727, June 29, from Chungking, reported: “It did not prove feasible for the Vice President to see representatives of the ‘Korean Provisional Government’ while he was here, and although the letter addressed to him by that ‘Government’ … was handed to Mr. Wallace, it is doubtful if, in the press of his visit, he was able to give it very close attention.” (895.01/6–2944) The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss) 895.01/340: Telegram [Document 1232] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Gauss ) Washington , June 12, 1944—9 p.m. 813. The views and opinions which you expressed to the Korean “Foreign Minister” (your despatch no. 2583, dated May 19, 1944) have the full approval of the Department. In view of the statement in your telegram no. 969 June 3, 5 p.m., that Koreans plan to approach the Vice President on the subject of recognition, please acquaint him with the contents of your despatch, but point out to him that your comments regarding the Chinese role in Korean affairs do not imply that this Government would not deplore recognition of a Korean Government by China without full prior consultation with us. If the Vice President so desires, he might, if approached by Koreans, emphasize the importance of unity among the various Korean groups. The Department would be interested to learn what action if any was taken by CEC in response to the appeal for Chinese recognition of the “Korean Provisional Government” reported in your telegram no. 969 and would appreciate information regarding any further indications such as the speech of the Information Minister that the Chinese Government is considering such recognition. 15 In the circumstances of the Cairo Declaration it would seem that the Chinese would hardly be likely to act in the matter of Korean recognition without prior consultation with the parties to that instrument but you may consider it desirable to seek occasion informally to discuss the Korean situation with Chinese officialdom and in the course of your discussion to endeavor to ascertain what the intentions of the Chinese Government are. It is also suggested that at your discretion you approach the Soviet Embassy informally and unofficially in an endeavor to ascertain the opinion of that Embassy in regard to recent developments in Korean circles in Chungking and the relations of those circles with the Chinese Government. Hull 15 Despatch 2727, June 29, from Chungking, reported that an Embassy officer had been advised by the Minister of Information in the Korean Provisional Government (Yen) that the Central Executive Committee had neither discussed the matter of Chinese recognition of the Provisional Government nor made any reply to its appeal (895.01/6–2944). The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State 895.01/6–2144 [Document 1233] The Ambassador in China ( Gauss ) to the Secretary of State No. 2708 Chungking , June 21, 1944. [Received July 11.] Sir : I have the honor to enclose two covers, the first addressed to the President of the United States by one Koo Kim, styling himself “Chairman, Provisional Government, Republic of Korea”, and the second addressed to yourself by the “Minister of Foreign Affairs” of that “Government”, Y. Tjosowang. 16 They contain more or less identical letters, each with two enclosures, a “Statement” signed by the “Minister of Foreign Affairs” and a memorandum entitled “Korea’s Role in the Anti-Axis War”. Similar covers, with the same enclosures, were addressed to Vice President Wallace and to myself. A copy of the letter addressed to the Vice President is attached. 17 The original has been handed to Mr. Wallace. Summary of the enclosures: (1) The covering letter. Each of the letters offers hearty congratulations to the addressee and to the Government and people of the United States on the opening of the second front, occupation of Rome, and the continued advance in the Pacific which will expedite the downfall of the enemy both in the East and West. Reference is then made to the enclosures, and the statement is made that: “We Koreans are anxious to establish as early as possible direct and effective contact with the Government of the United States of America and those of the leading Allied Powers so that we may coordinate the movement for our national liberation with the present and immediate operations of the Allied armies in Eastern Asia.” (2) The “Statement” expresses the hope that as an anti-Fascist measure the four leading Powers will recognize the Korean “Provisional Government”; this is supported by four principal arguments: ( a ) the unification of the Korean Independence Movement has already been achieved; ( b ) Korea has already started on her march toward modern democracy; ( c ) she has begun to coordinate her activities with those of the United Nations; and ( d ) the “Provisional Government” represents the unification of all Korean constituencies. (3) The “Memorandum” reviews the historic position of Korea; notes the “statesmanlike decision that Korea ‘should be free and independent in due course’”; and lengthily undertakes to outline briefly the ways in which Korea could contribute to the United Nations’ war efforts. Under “I. Actual Potentialities”, it is suggested that the Koreans functioning in scattered groups on the various fronts in North and Central China could serve as a nucleus for a large combat force to be recruited from the reported 3,600,000 Koreans in North China and Manchuria as well as from the 300,000 in eastern Russia; liaison work behind the enemy’s lines could also be extended. Under “II. Why the Korean Provisional Government Should be Recognized” an effort is made to show that such recognition would muster Korean resistance, forestall a possible Japanese move to create a puppet independent Government, and would be a step toward the setting up of a truly democratic Korean government. Respectfully yours, C. E. Gauss 16 Both dated June 17, not printed. The letter to President Roosevelt was transmitted to him on July 27 by the Secretary of State with a covering memorandum containing this statement: “In as much as the United States Government hag not in any way extended recognition to the organization above-mentioned [the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea], I believe that no reply should be made to Mr. Koo Kim’s communication.” (895.01/6–2144) Telegram 7246, September 5, 5 p.m., from London, reported that communications had been sent by the Korean Provisional Government to the British Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary and that the British Foreign Office did not see any reason to contemplate recognition at that time (895.01/9–544). 17 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Gauss) 895.01/8–1644: Telegram [Document 1234] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China ( Gauss ) Washington , August 16, 1944—9 p.m. 1084. The Department will soon engage in exchanges of papers and in informal discussion with the British Foreign Office regarding postwar Korea. A questionnaire covering the major problems to be considered has been agreed upon. Because of China’s special interest in Korean affairs the Department and the Foreign Office propose that there take place similar exchanges in Chungking with the Chinese Foreign Office. The proposed parallel bilateral discussions have as their primary purpose the exchange of information and ideas and it is not intended that they shall in any way commit the respective Governments in regard to policy. Instructions are being sent by air pouch. 18 Hull 18 Instruction 785, August 24, not printed. Appended to the instruction was an “Amended Draft Questionnaire on Korea” whose opening paragraph accepted” as the “settled policy” of the three Governments concerned the Cairo Declaration statement that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” It then raised a series of 20 questions under the headings of “Political”, “Military”, “Economic”, and “Koreans Outside Korea.” (895.01/8–1644) The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 895.01/11–1444 [Document 1235] The Chargé in China ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State No. 3147 Chungking , November 14, 1944. [Received November 25.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch no. 3014, September 28, 1944 19 on the subject of postwar Korea, in which it was reported that the proposal for the study of the problem by the United States, China, and Great Britain had been referred to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 20 There is now enclosed a translation of a third person note dated November 8, 1944, from the Ministry, 21 in which it is stated that the Chinese Government is prepared to undertake a study of the question and to exchange opinions and reports with the American and British Governments. 22 Respectfully yours, George Atcheson, Jr. 19 Not printed. 20 On September 26. 21 Not printed. 22 Despatch 2, December 13, from Chungking, reported that the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wu) had indicated, in discussing the draft questionnaire with American and British Embassy representatives on November 28 and 30, that the “Chinese Government was sympathetically inclined toward the ‘Korean Provisional Government’.” (895.50/12–1344) Philippines: Philippines: Contents Consideration of problems relating to the Commonwealth of the Philippines (Documents 1236-1241) Consideration of problems relating to the Commonwealth of the Philippines Consideration of problems relating to the Commonwealth of the Philippines 1 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 1097 – 1117 . [1236] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Lockhart) [Washington,] February 4, 1944. 811B.01/641 [1237] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) Washington, February 28, 1944. 811B.01/640 [1238] Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State March 9, 1944 811B.01/642 [1239] The Secretary of State to the Philippine Resident Commissioner to the United States (Elizalde) Washington, March 24, 1944. 811B.01/643 [1240] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Lockhart) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Grew) and the Deputy Director of that Office (Ballantine) [Washington,] October 10, 1944. 811B.00/10–1044 [1241] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization (Dickstein) Washington, November 20, 1944. 130 (1940)/759 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Lockhart) 811B.01/641 [Document 1236] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs ( Lockhart ) [ Washington ,] February 4, 1944. Mr. Hall 2 and Col. Boekel 3 came to see me today for the purpose of making inquiry regarding possible plans which the Department may have evolved, or which may have been evolved elsewhere, looking to the establishment of a civil government in the Philippines following the reoccupation of the Islands by American military forces. I told Col. Boekel that so far as my knowledge goes the Department of State does not have in mind, at least at the present time, any plans for the establishment of a civil government or temporary civil administration in the Philippines when our forces return there; that in my judgment there already existed a government—that government being the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines—which could function, and would be expected to do so, as the civil administration in the Philippines as soon as the Japanese are driven from the Islands and the military authorities had given their consent for such un administration to function; that the Commonwealth Government is still recognized as the government of the Philippine Islands and that it is a government which was created as the result of legislative action on the part of the Congress of the United States 4 and as a result of the choice of the people of the Philippine Islands; that it is a constitutional government in every respect, well organized and functioning, and that I felt sure no one in the Department would be disposed to set aside this legal government for some newly-created civil administration which might be proposed on the reoccupation of the Islands; that in my judgment the Commonwealth Government now in exile in Washington, with Mr. Quezon as president, would return to the Islands almost as soon as the reoccupation occurred and that it would be ready to resume its functions as the regularly constituted government of the Philippine Islands. I said that the officials are experienced in Philippine affairs and that they were selected by popular vote of the Filipino people and that they had a burning desire to return to their duties in the Philippines as quickly as possible and that legislation had recently been enacted 5 providing for the succession to the Presidency as soon as the Commonwealth Government returns to the Philippines. It was pointed out that there is a strong personal and official relationship between the President of the Commonwealth Government, Mr. Quezon, and General MacArthur 6 and that the latter had repeatedly announced his determination to return to the Philippines with his troops and that my own personal view was that he would see that Mr. Quezon and the Commonwealth Government would return almost simultaneously with him. The actual time of renewing Government functions in the Philippines would in my judgment have to be determined by agreement between General MacArthur and President Quezon, with perhaps the sanction of the President and the Secretary of War; that the question of when and how the Commonwealth Government would enter the scene seemed to be one to be determined largely on the basis of military exigencies then existing. I discouraged any idea on the part of Col. Boekel that General Stilwell’s command should make any definite plans for setting up a special new civil government in the Philippines following reoccupation of the Islands, the reasons being substantially those set forth above. I said that the situation in the Philippines, on this point, was distinctly different from areas which our forces have occupied in Northern Africa, Sicily and Italy in that an adequate and legally constituted government of our own creation is already in existence and that it would be a mistake to repudiate it and set up, or attempt to set up, a new administration. While Col. Boekel did not so declare himself, I received the impression at the close of the interview that he was satisfied with the situation as unfolded to him and that he would do nothing to disturb the present arrangement which apparently could take over civil functions in the Philippines at the proper time and administer them in an entirely satisfactory manner. Frank P. Lockhart 2 Monroe B. Hall, Secretary of Commission at New Delhi, on consultation in the Department. 3 Lt. Col. W. A. Boekel, Civil Affairs Officer attached to Headquarters of Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in China, Burma and India. 4 The Tydings–McDuffie Act, approved March 24, 1934; 48 Stat. 456. 5 Public Law 186, approved November 12, 1943; 57 Stat. 590. 6 Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commander of United States Army Forces in the Far East. The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) 811B.01/640 [Document 1237] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War ( Stimson ) Washington , February 28, 1944. My Dear Mr. Secretary : The receipt is acknowledged of your Department’s letter of February 20, 1944, 7 in which you state that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, have designated the War Department as the agency to plan for the administration of civil affairs in the Philippines during the initial military period, and that it is desirable to coordinate the activities of civilian agencies engaged in planning and making preparation for the return of United States forces to the Philippines with the plans to that end of the military authorities. You propose that an ad hoc committee be formed composed of representatives of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Interior, respectively, and of the Foreign Economic Administration and you request, if the Department of State approves of the proposal, that a representative thereof be appointed. I approve of the formation of an ad hoc committee as above outlined and have appointed as this Department’s representative Mr. James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs, with Mr. Frank P. Lockhart, Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs, as alternate. Sincerely yours, Edward E. Stettinius, Jr. 7 Not printed. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State 811B.01/642 [Document 1238] Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State 8 March 9, 1944 President Quezon’s letter 9 under reference proposes an amendment to S. J. Resolution 93, now pending in the House of Representatives, which would add an additional section expressly stating that nothing in the joint resolution should be construed to authorize the postponement of Philippine independence beyond July 4, 1946. There would appear to be some question whether the joint resolution which was approved by the President on November 12, 1943 [Public Law 186, 78th Congress] 10 has any effect upon those provisions of the Tydings–McDuffie Act of March 24, 1934, as amended, which provide for the granting of independence to the Philippines on July 4, 1946. If the Act of November 12, 1943 does not affect the independence provisions of the Act of March 24, 1934, it would seem that a somewhat embarrassing question might well arise in the event that the conditions envisaged in the Act of November 12, 1943 (which would appear clearly to include expulsion of the Japanese from the Philippine Islands) should not have developed prior to July 4, 1946. Should the Japanese still be in occupation of the Philippines at that time, it would appear that we might be faced with formal independence of the Philippines (and consequent dissolution of the Commonwealth Government) while at the same time pursuant to legislative enactment by the Government of the United States the present President and Vice President of the Commonwealth would be continued in their respective offices. If, on the other hand, it should be determined that the Act of November 12, 1943 does modify the date of independence as specified by the Act of March 24, 1934, then the proposed amendment to S. J. Resolution 93 might not accomplish its purpose unless it specifically reaffirmed the date fixed in the Act of March 24, 1934 regardless of all other existing legislation. A further question of interpretation would appear to be raised by the present form of S. J. Resolution 93. Section 1 declares it to be the policy of the Congress that the United States should establish the complete independence of the Philippines after having driven the Japanese from the Islands. Section 3, however, expressly authorized the President to advance the date of the independence in order to effectuate the policy declared in Section 1. With or without the amendment proposed in its present form by President Quezon there would seem to be serious question whether S. J. Resolution 93 would, if enacted, authorize postponement after July 4, 1946, in the event that the Islands have not been reoccupied by American forces prior to that date. If it does not, an amendment of the kind proposed by President Quezon would appear to be unnecessary, except perhaps in connection with the questions raised in the preceding paragraph. (2) It would seem that apart from questions of interpretation referred to above there are serious questions of policy. It is not believed that American public opinion would support any policy which would place the United States Government in the position of formally granting independence to the Philippines while they remained under Japanese occupation. Such a situation would be adverse to our broad national interests in the Far East as well as in the Philippines themselves and would contribute in no way to the benefit and welfare of the Filipino people. Furthermore, our action would probably be widely interpreted as abandoning the Philippines in their hour of peril. It would, as indicated above, raise serious questions as to the legal status of any group outside the Islands which might claim to be the lawful Government of the Philippines and it would at the same time strengthen the hold of any group of puppet officials who might, at the time independence is granted, be functioning in the Philippines under Japanese sponsorship. (3) It is suggested that for the present it would be advisable not to complicate the Philippine question further by adopting the amendment requested by President Quezon. It is impossible at this time to predict with certainty whether or not our forces will have reoccupied the Philippines by July 4, 1946 and it seems doubtful whether public discussion at this time of that question would be in the national interests. Expressly to reaffirm the provisions of the Tydings–McDuffie Act might, for reasons indicated above, result in unfortunate consequences to correct which would require further legislation before July 4, 1946. The possibility that such further action might have to be taken would seem to militate against the desirability of reaffirming the July 4, 1946 date at this time. 11 8 Sent on March 9, 1944, to Chairman C. Jasper Bell of the House Committee on Insular Affairs. 9 Dated January 12 to Congressman Bell, not printed; copy sent to the Secretary of State by Mr. Bell with his letter of March 1 (not printed). 10 Brackets appear in the original. 11 Legislation authorizing the President of the United States to advance the date of Philippine independence was enacted as Public Law 380, approved June 29, 1944; 58 Stat. 625. The Secretary of State to the Philippine Resident Commissioner to the United States (Elizalde) 811B.01/643 [Document 1239] The Secretary of State to the Philippine Resident Commissioner to the United States ( Elizalde ) Washington , March 24, 1944. My Dear Mr. Elizalde : Reference is made to Mr. Stettinius’ letter of February 29, in reply to your letter of February 24, 1944, 12 regarding a proposal to establish an Office of Exterior Relations and National Economy as a part of the Commonwealth Government and referring to other matters associated with that proposal. The Department is not unmindful of the desirability of having within the Commonwealth Government a regularly organized and smoothly functioning department which would deal adequately with many of the matters to which reference is made in your letter of February 9 to President Quezon. 13 In that connection the Department has assumed that President Quezon would not wish, in advance of the complete independence of the Philippines as pledged in the Act of March 24, 1934, to take any step which would nullify the right of this Government, when and where the need arises, to act on behalf of the Commonwealth Government and all matters concerning its foreign relations. Reference to Section 2, paragraph 10, of the above mentioned Act will show that it was the clear intent of the Congress that the foreign relations of the Commonwealth Government should be under the direct supervision and control of the Government of the United States until such time as the Philippines become free and independent. In view of this condition and notwithstanding the Philippines even now possess many of the attributes of an independent state, the Department does not feel that it would be free to acquiesce at this time in the establishment of any department, bureau or office in the Commonwealth Government possessing functions which would permit it directly to conduct relations of a diplomatic character with foreign governments in a capacity such as is customarily vested in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the understanding, therefore, that jurisdiction in such matters would remain, as at present prescribed by act of Congress, with the Government of the United States until full independence is granted to the Philippines, the Department would certainly offer no objection if President Quezon should establish a bureau or office in the Commonwealth Government designed to work specifically along the lines described in the second and third paragraphs of page three of your letter of February 9 to President Quezon, namely, to make a thorough study of trade treaties and their possibilities with respect to the Philippines, to make plans for the organization of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of a Foreign Service to function when the Philippines become independent, to effect a better liaison between the Commonwealth Government and the Department of State, to effect a method of exchanging information between the Commonwealth Government and the Department of State on Pacific affairs and on all subjects of actual or possible concern to the Philippines, and to effect coordination in all matters relating to special studies and special researches undertaken to promote the mutual interests of the two governments. I am sure that a bureau or office created to deal exclusively with such matters would be of the greatest benefit to the Commonwealth Government pending the granting of full independence. With reference to the training of a limited number of pensionados, as mentioned in President Quezon’s letter to you of February 16, 1944, 14 the Department is prepared to offer facilities for training in diplomatic and consular work to a few especially selected young men whom the Commonwealth Government might recommend for that purpose. It would be expected that no young man would be recommended for this training who had not, in advance of his appointment, been given a deferred status by the Selective Service System for a cause satisfactory to the Department. If the Commonwealth Government should decide to avail itself of this offer, the details of the arrangement could be worked out at a later date between representatives of the Commonwealth Government and of the Department of State. It would scarcely be possible to afford facilities, initially, for more than ten or twelve pensionados, but it might be possible to increase this number later if so desired by the Commonwealth Government and if in practice it is found that the plan is feasible. This letter is intended to be an acceptance in principle of the suggestion looking to the training of a limited number of pensionados in the manner described above. To the end that arrangements may be concluded with as little delay as possible the Department is prepared to designate a representative, or representatives, to confer with one or more representatives of the Commonwealth Government at such time as may be mutually agreed upon to devise a plan which will make available to the appointees a broad and useful training program. The Department stands ready to lend its fullest cooperation in this matter in every feasible way. 15 Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 12 Neither printed. 13 Not printed; copy transmitted to the Department with letter of February 24. 14 Not printed; copy transmitted to the Department with Mr. Elizalde’s letter of February 24. 15 On December 29, 1944, the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs sent to the Philippine Secretary of Finance at Washington (Hernandez) an “informal and unofficial” memorandum entitled “Preparations for the Handling of the Future Foreign Affairs of the Philippine Republic” (811B.021/12–2944). No copy of this memorandum has been found in Department files. The transmitting letter cited an earlier memorandum handed to President Quezon by Francis B. Sayre, United States High Commissioner to the Philippines, at an undisclosed date. This memorandum, of identical title, not printed, was prepared in the Office of Philippine Affairs on June 4, 1940, and transmitted by the Secretary of State to the High Commissioner on June 11, 1940 (811B.01/450a). Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Lockhart) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Grew) and the Deputy Director of that Office (Ballantine) 811B.00/10–1044 [Document 1240] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs ( Lockhart ) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Grew ) and the Deputy Director of that Office ( Ballantine ) [ Washington ,] October 10, 1944. The most important recent development in Philippine affairs is the departure about a week ago of President Osmeña, 16 accompanied by Colonel Romulo, Philippine Resident Commissioner to the United States, 17 and other Filipinos of cabinet rank, for the Philippines via New Guinea. It has been learned from Commonwealth authorities now in Washington that President Osmeña and his party arrived in Hollandia the day before yesterday. The Commonwealth authorities in Washington do not wish this information to be made public, in as much as it was the understanding with Mr. Osmeña that any publicity regarding his future plans or movements would be issued on his direct authority wherever he might be. For background information it may be appropriate to recount, briefly, some of the events that led up to President Osmeña’s departure. General MacArthur, some weeks ago, telegraphed directly to the then President of the Commonwealth, Mr. Manuel Quezon, and requested him to formulate and submit to General MacArthur plans for civil government and relief on the return of the Commonwealth Government to the Philippines. It was desired that these plans be correlated with military requirements. Mr. Quezon was also further requested to send a member of his cabinet to Australia at once to discuss the matter with General MacArthur. Due to President Quezon’s illness, no action was taken on this message and subsequent to his death a similar telegram was sent to President Osmeña. President Osmeña at first declined on the grounds that he was badly needed in Washington and would be more valuable here. Subsequently, General MacArthur exerted extreme pressure on President Osmeña to induce him to come to Australia immediately. General MacArthur sent a member of his staff, General Marshall, 18 to Washington to exert pressure to that end and also sent General Valdes 19 with letters from guerrilla leaders to the effect that they expected Osmeña to arrive in the Philippines with the first troops. It will be recalled that President Quezon had broadcast his intention to return to the Philippines with General MacArthur and this was used as a means of bringing pressure on President Osmeña, it being inferred that unless he returned to the Philippines with the American forces his prestige would suffer. President Osmeña entertained serious doubts concerning the propriety of his proceeding on the sole request of General MacArthur. He felt that the Commonwealth Government had been ordered to Washington by the President of the United States and that it should return only under orders from the President. He also entertained fears concerning his status if he complied with General MacArthur’s request, since he felt that he might find himself under the direct control of General MacArthur without any clear understanding of his (President Osmeña’s) powers and responsibilities. Accordingly, President Osmeña arranged for an interview with the Secretary of the Interior, 20 who in turn arranged for President Osmeña and himself to call on the President. This took place at noon October 2. The result of the interview is not known but since President Osmeña left that afternoon it is presumed the President told him that he should leave at once for the Philippines. Other activities of General MacArthur which are believed to be highly significant include (1) the insistence by General MacArthur on a civil affairs directive which would place him in supreme control and authority not only during military operations but also during the period of civilian military administration, with the right to delegate powers to the Commonwealth Government as he saw fit. (2) General MacArthur is understood to have requested the War Department to provide a total of $75,000,000 worth of civilian relief supplies for use in the Philippines. It was stated that this enormous quantity of relief supplies would be distributed by the Army, which fact may, or may not, have political implications. It is known that the Commonwealth Government feels that it must have an important part in any and all relief plans. (3) General MacArthur has distributed by plane, submarine or other methods substantial quantities of propaganda materials consisting of matches, cigarettes, soap, et cetera, much of which bore the legend, “I will return. Douglas MacArthur”. It is stated that in some cases General MacArthur’s picture was also on the packages. It is understood that these packages contained no reference either to the United States or Commonwealth Governments. (4) General MacArthur maintains a staff said to number about 45 individuals engaged solely in publicity and propaganda work. This appears to be a highly effective organization, judging from the flood of publicity articles now appearing in newspapers and magazines. From all of the foregoing it is obvious that General MacArthur wishes to have President Osmeña and responsible members of the Commonwealth Government close at hand prepared to accompany him into the Philippines when American forces are returned there. There have been indications in connection with the preparation in War Department conferences of the civil affairs directives for the use of General MacArthur in the Philippines that the General’s plans contemplate making extensive use of the Commonwealth Government in the administration of Philippine affairs following the return of our troops to the Islands. Although the fact is not definitely established, there are reasons to believe that General MacArthur would prefer to have Philippine civil affairs administered without the aid and assistance of an American High Commissioner. A revised directive, however, gives General MacArthur certain discretionary powers in utilizing the services of officials of the United States Government in the administration of civilian affairs in the Philippines. 21 Definite plans for the reopening of the American Consulate in Manila are being made by the Department and the matter has been formally brought to the attention of the Secretary of War 22 with a view to obtaining his cooperation and the cooperation of General MacArthur in completing the arrangements for the reopening. In the course of the last few weeks information from a reliable source indicated that General MacArthur wished to employ at least two divisions of Australian troops in the Philippine operations. Later information indicates that this proposal has been abandoned. The above plans indicate that the recovery of the Philippine Islands is closer at hand than we had hoped some months ago would be the case. The activities of the puppet government authorities in the Philippines, as broadcast by the Japanese radio, leave a distinct impression that the Japanese and their puppets are now convinced that the attack may come soon. Among such signs is the fact that “President” Laurel of the puppet government, following the first bombing attack on the Philippines, issued a proclamation declaring war on the United States and Great Britain. 23 This declaration of war was not submitted to the Philippine Assembly before the proclamation was issued, but it is now claimed that it later received the sanction of the Assembly. The puppet government is taking strenuous measures to persuade the people of Manila to go to the interior to avoid bombings and other direct consequences of war. It may be significant that Laurel has announced that there will be no conscription of a Philippine Army. Commonwealth authorities in Washington have expressed the view that this failure to form a Philippine Army was at the instance of the Japanese, who fear that such an army would turn against them when the fighting is renewed in the Islands. To support this view it is known that there are many instances in which members of the constabulary have been armed, after which they proceeded to the interior to join up with the guerrillas. Mr. Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of Finance, has been placed in charge of Commonwealth affairs in Washington. This has been done by Executive Order No. 20–W, 24 signed by President Osmeña on September 27, 1944. There is a very hopeful atmosphere in Commonwealth circles in Washington. Frank P. Lockhart 16 Sergio Osmeña became President following the death of President Quezon on August 1 at Lake Saranac. In a letter to Mr. Osmeña on August 2, Acting Secretary of State Stettinius stated that officers of the Department stood ready to render him “all appropriate assistance” and gave assurances “that it is, the purpose of this Government for its part to see that the happy and mutually helpful relations which have so long subsisted between the peoples of the United States and the Philippines will continue during the present period of transition and under the independent government which the Congress has authorized.” (811B.001 Osmeña, Sergio/8–244) For text of the Acting Secretary’s statement on the death of President Quezon, released on August 1, see Department of State Bulletin , August 6, 1944, p. 134. 17 Col. Carlos P. Romulo became Resident Commissioner on August 10. 18 Maj. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, Deputy Chief of Staff to Gen. MacArthur. 19 Maj. Gen. Basilio J. Valdes, Secretary of National Defense in President Osmeña’s cabinet. 20 Harold L. Ickes. 21 For an account of plans, during 1944, for the administration of civilian affairs in the Philippines, see M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines , in the official Army history United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 198–200. 22 Henry L. Stimson. 23 The Domei News Agency reported that Laurel’s declaration was made on September 23. 24 Official Gazette , vol. 41, No. 1, p. 40. The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization (Dickstein) 130 (1940)/759 [Document 1241] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization ( Dickstein ) 25 Washington , November 20, 1944. My Dear Mr. Dickstein : The Department has been importuned at various times to support legislation to make Filipinos eligible to naturalization in the United States. While I am not unmindful of the fact that the question whether the privilege of naturalization should be extended to members of any race not now eligible to naturalization is a matter involving legislative policy, I do not consider that I would be unwarranted in pointing out that the Filipino people have long shown their attachments to the ideals and principles of the United States; that they have a long and unbroken record of loyalty to the United States; that they have valiantly resisted the invaders of the Philippines and are continuing to do so; that Filipino soldiers fought courageously against the Japanese in the Philippines, especially at Bataan; that many Filipinos are now serving in the military forces of the United States, the maritime service and the essential war industries in this country and that Filipinos in the United States have always been held in high esteem by the American people. While I could cite many reasons why Filipinos should be made eligible to naturalization, I know of no reason why they should not be. I have ascertained that there are now pending before Congress a number of bills to authorize the naturalization of Filipinos. One such bill, H. R. 4826 which was introduced in the House of Representatives on May 18, 1944 by Representative McGehee and which was referred to your Committee, comes nearest to meeting the views of the Department. Its enactment would make Filipino persons or persons of Filipino descent eligible to naturalization in the United States. The Department believes, however, that a proviso should be added to Section 1 of the bill reading somewhat along the following lines: “Provided that no certificate of arrival shall be required of any Filipino person or person of Filipino descent who is now a citizen of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and who entered the United States prior to May 1, 1934 and has since continuously resided in the United States.” Prior to May 1, 1934 Filipino persons or persons of Filipino descent who owed allegiance to the United States generally were not considered aliens for immigration purposes and no record could have been made of their entry into the United States as aliens upon which a certificate of arrival could be issued. Since May 21, 1934, records have been made of the admission to the United States of all such persons as aliens. It would seem inequitable for a Filipino person or a person of Filipino descent who is now a citizen of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and who entered the United States prior to May 1, 1934 and has since continuously resided herein to be unable to become naturalized because of his inability to obtain a certificate of arrival. For this reason a proviso such as that suggested would seem desirable and just. I should be pleased if the Congress in its wisdom should approve H.R. 4826 with the amendment above suggested or any similar bill having the same purpose. 26 The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the transmission of such report as the State Department may deem appropriate after considering the suggestions made by the Attorney General in his letter dated October 17, 1944, of which a copy is enclosed, 27 together with a copy of the letter of transmittal from the Bureau of the Budget. 28 Sincerely yours, Edward E. Stettinius, Jr. [Further legislation authorizing the naturalization of Filipinos was introduced into the 79th Congress as H.R. 776. In commenting on this bill in a letter of February 2, 1945, to Chairman Dickstein, Acting Secretary of State Grew stated: “I desire to say that it is the considered opinion of the Department that the privilege of naturalization should be extended to Filipino persons and persons of Filipino descent.” (130 (1940)/783) The Acting Secretary of State sent a letter of similar import to Chairman Russell on May 22, 1945. The House of Representatives and the Senate passed differing versions of H.R. 776 on April 17, 1945, and June 14, 1946 ( Congressional Record , vol. 91, pt. 3, p. 3454 and ibid. , vol. 92, pt. 6, pp. 6933–6934) but the measure did not go to conference. Instead, legislation of similar purport was enacted as part of Public Law 483, approved July 2, 1946 (60 Stat. 416).] 25 Copy sent on November 20 to Chairman Richard B. Russell of the Senate Committee on Immigration. 26 In Report No. 1940, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., submitted on November 27, 1944, to the Committee of the Whole House, the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization recommended passage of the bill with amendments. The measure was discussed in the House on December 4 ( Congressional Record , vol. 90, pt. 7, p. 8765) but no action was taken. 27 Letter of Attorney General Francis Biddle to Harold D. Smith, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, not printed. 28 Letter of November 18 not printed. Interest of the United States in question of recognizing a Free Thai movement; attitudes of the United States and the United Kingdom toward the postwar status of Thailand Interest of the United States in question of recognizing a Free Thai movement; 1 attitudes of the United States and the United Kingdom toward the postwar status of Thailand 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , pp. 1118 – 1125 . [1242] The Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) Washington, February 9, 1944. 892.01/46 [1243] Proposed Declaration by the British Government in Regard to Thailand February 26, 1944 892.01–/53 [1244] The British Minister (Sansom) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) Washington, February 28, 1944. 892.01/52 [1245] The Department of State to the British Embassy March 20, 1944 892.01/55 [1246] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, August 16, 1944—5 p.m. 892.01/8–1644: Telegram [1247] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, September 5, 1944. [Received September 30—5 p.m.] 892.01/9–544: Airgram [1248] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) Washington, October 19, 1944—7 p.m. 892.01/9–544: Telegram [1249] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State London, November 24, 1944. [Received November 29—6 p.m.] 892.01/11–2444: Airgram [1250] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Landon) [Washington,] December 12, 1944. 892.01/12–1244 The Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) 892.01/46 [Document 1242] The Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services ( Donovan ) Washington , February 9, 1944. My Dear General Donovan : During a conversation held on January 26 between officers of the Department and the Office of Strategic Services, there was discussion concerning the desire of Free Thai leaders in Thailand to come out of that country and to establish headquarters at some point in the United Nations. As indicated in the enclosed copy of a memorandum of the conversation, 2 it was arranged that officers of the Department should explore further with the Thai Minister 3 certain aspects of the matter. In pursuance of that arrangement, on February 1 officers of the Department had a talk with the Thai Minister as recorded in a memorandum of conversation, copy of which is enclosed. 2 It will be noted that in reply to questions the Thai Minister indicated that he understood that Pradist 4 would prefer to establish himself in India and that he and other Thai leaders would like to be given assurances before they come out of Thailand that facilities would be extended them to enable them to organize and function. It will also be noted that the Thai Minister brought up the question of obtaining assistance on a project to set up in China a Sino-Thai Army. In view of the Minister’s having raised this latter question a copy of the memorandum of conversation of February 1, together with a copy of a memorandum of December 23 which the Thai Minister handed to an officer of the Department, 6 is being referred to the War Department for its information and consideration. 7 Sincerely yours, Cordell Hull 2 Not printed. 3 Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj. 2 Not printed. 4 Luang Pradist Manudharm, also known as Nai Pridi Bhanomyong, member of the Thai Council of Regents. 6 Not printed; it stated the Thai Minister’s readiness “to enter into negotiations with the United States Government, with a view to carrying on to its honourable conclusion the Thai resistance as provided by law.” (892.01/48) For a further summary of this, communication, see memorandum of December 31, 1943, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Foreign Relations , 1943, vol. iii , p. 1121 . 7 Letter of February 9 to the Secretary of War (Stimson), not printed. The reply of February 23 by the Acting Secretary of War (Patterson) stated: “The problem of supply to China is such as to require that we concentrate our efforts for some time to come on the United States forces and the Chinese forces currently receiving Lend-Lease aid.… it is not desired at this time to add unduly to the supply difficulties over the restricted lines of communication from India.” (892.01/49) For correspondence on control of Lend-Lease supplies sent to China, see vol. vi , pp. 952 ff. Proposed Declaration by the British Government in Regard to Thailand 892.01–/53 [Document 1243] Proposed Declaration by the British Government in Regard to Thailand 8 February 26, 1944 The position of Thailand is in some respects unique in the Far East though not without parallel in Europe. A country with a long traditional friendship with us has, though admittedly under pressure from Japan, betrayed that friendship. Not content with collaborating with our enemy and despite her treaty of non-aggression with us the quisling government of Luang Pibul 9 took the initiative in declaring war upon us. For these acts Thailand is already paying the price and will undoubtedly pay a yet heavier price as the war reaches her territories. It is still possible for the people of Thailand to do something to save themselves from the worst consequences of their betrayal, and they will be judged by the efforts that they make to redeem themselves from the position in which the action of their present régime has placed them. Like other countries in like case “They must work their passage home”. If they do so they can look to this country to support the emergence of a free and independent Thailand after the war is over. 10 8 Handed to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) on February 26 by the British Minister (Sansom). 9 Field Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram, Thai Premier. 10 Marginal notation: “Declaration to be made on first suitable occasion—early.” The British Minister (Sansom) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) 892.01/52 [Document 1244] The British Minister ( Sansom ) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Ballantine ) Washington , February 28, 1944. Dear Ballantine : Confirming my oral communication to you on February 26, this is to inform you that it is proposed to make the Declaration regarding Siam, of which I handed you a copy, at the first suitable opportunity. We were instructed in handing you the text of the Declaration to give you a general statement of the policy of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom towards Siam on the following lines: The declaration does not in our opinion tie our hands as regards any political, economic or strategic arrangement which may be thought desirable in the interest of collective security after the war. Equally, it does not prejudice one way or the other the question of the ultimate recognition of a Free Siamese Committee, but we propose that this question should be left in abeyance pending further clarification of the complex issue involved. While there may be advantage in having Pradit outside of Thailand, we do not propose to offer to him or to anyone else any inducement to come out, beyond this declaration. We would not, for instance, at once offer him the presidency of a Free Siamese Committee or the unfreezing of Siamese funds. If he comes out we can reconsider the matter. Meanwhile our interest is confined to seeing that the best use is made of such Free Siamese material as is at our joint disposal. We propose to keep in close touch with the Department of State and trust that they will agree to consult us before any further step is taken. I should add that I do not read the above statement as meaning that we shall not give what assistance is in our power to Pradit to enable him to leave Siam. Yours sincerely, G. B. Sansom The Department of State to the British Embassy 892.01/55 [Document 1245] The Department of State to the British Embassy 11 March 20, 1944 This Government has given very careful consideration to the text of the declaration which the British Government proposes to make in regard to Thailand, a copy of which Sir George Sansom was so good as to bring personally to us. We have come to the conclusion that the declaration as it now stands would not be helpful in giving encouragement to the Thai people to resist the Japanese, might very likely be exploited by the Japanese to the disadvantage of the United Nations, and would augment distrust in the United States and in China and elsewhere of the motives of Great Britain. It is, in fact, this Government’s feeling that it would be better that the British Government make no declaration rather than make the proposed one under consideration, and that, if the proposed declaration is to be made, it would be advisable that it include at least an unequivocal commitment that Great Britain has no territorial ambitions in Thailand. As regards this Government’s attitude toward Thailand, you are of course aware that the United States has not declared war on Thailand although the Thai Government, after Japanese occupation of Thailand, declared war on the United States. 12 We look forward to an early expulsion from Thailand of the Japanese invaders. Until the Japanese are expelled from Thailand, we shall treat Thailand for various purposes, including economic and psychological warfare, as enemy occupied territory. In any situation in which Thai nationals or groups actively engage in or cooperate with the Japanese in military operations, whether offensive or defensive, against the forces of the United States or of other of the United Nations, and in any situation in which presence of Thai armed forces obstructs the operations or threatens the security of forces of the United Nations, we shall treat those Thai forces as enemies. The United States continues to regard Thailand as an independent state. We do not recognize the present Thai government. We continue to recognize as “Minister of Thailand” the Thai Minister in Washington, who has denounced his government’s cooperation with Japan. We regard with sympathy a free Thai movement in which the Thai Minister in Washington is a prominent figure. We have not made and we do not contemplate making at this time any political commitment to any particular Thai national or Thai group prejudicing the future political situation. We favor restoration to Thailand of complete freedom as a sovereign state and we favor creation in Thailand of a government which will represent the free will of the Thai people. 11 Handed to the British Ambassador (Halifax) on March 20 by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle). This document incorporated the substance of two memoranda sent by Acting Secretary of State Stettinius to President Roosevelt on March 8. One gave the Department’s proposals “to crystallize its attitude towards Thailand” (892.01/50); the other stated the Department’s views regarding the proposed British declaration (892.01/53). Both memoranda received Presidential approval. 12 See telegram 350, February 2, 1942, from Bern, Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 915 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 892.01/8–1644: Telegram [Document 1246] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , August 16, 1944—5 p.m. 6486. Further conversations between officers of the British Embassy and of the Department with respect to a proposed declaration by the British Government in regard to Thailand were brought to a pause by a statement from the British Embassy on July 31, 1944 to the effect that “His Majesty’s Government” does not believe that any useful purpose could be served by the issuance at this time of a statement with respect to Thailand in the terms proposed. (See Department’s 3893 of March 28, 1944 13 enclosing copies of various documents regarding the Department’s attempt to elicit a statement of British attitude toward Thailand.) It is requested that in your discretion you approach Mr. Eden 14 and remind him that on February 26, 1944 Sir George Sansom, British Minister at Washington, transmitted to the Department a copy of a declaration which the British Government proposed to make in regard to Thailand to the effect that Thailand had “betrayed” its friendship with Great Britain, had collaborated with the enemy, had declared war, and that the Thai people would have to “work their passage home”. Subsequently on March 20 a statement regarding United States attitude toward Thailand was handed to Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington, with comment that the proposed British statement was “rather rough” and that it might be misunderstood, as it failed to give any intimation that Thailand would be continued as an independent power. In the months that followed there were frequent discussions between officers of the British Embassy and of the Department which as indicated above were fruitless. Several months ago officers of the Department raised the question with the Embassy as to whether the British Government had given consideration to the possibility of communicating to this Government a confidential statement of British policy toward Thailand. On July 31 the Embassy indicated that the matter of a confidential statement would be taken up with the Foreign Office by airmail. You may say to Mr. Eden that this Government would view with extreme regret the inability, of the United States and the United Kingdom to take an identical position with regard to problems which involve the long-term objectives for which this war is being fought. If, however, the British Government is reluctant, because of considerations involving the security or integrity of any British territory, to give the undertaking desired for the confidential information of this Government, it would hardly be necessary to remind the British Government that any such undertaking, if given at this time, would in no way prejudice the right of the British Government to present any such problem of territorial security or integrity to the United Nations for such consideration and action as they might consider desirable and helpful to British interests. You might also state that absence of a statement of British intentions with respect to Thailand causes considerable inconvenience to this Government in that it delays decision on important cognate matters relating to Thailand and Indochina. Hull 13 This instruction not printed. 14 Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 892.01/9–544: Airgram [Document 1247] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , September 5, 1944. [Received September 30—5 p.m.] A–1085. With reference to the Department’s secret telegram 6486, August 16, 5 p.m., regarding the British attitude towards Thailand, there is given below the text of a secret letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Ambassador 15 on this subject: “I welcome your secret letter of 18th August as giving me the opportunity for a much-needed clearing of the air in regard to our respective attitudes towards Siam. Frankly we were very disappointed at the reception by the State Department of our honest attempt to show that we were no less favourable than in the United States and China to the idea of a free and independent Siam after the war. 16 Nothing could have been more definite in its discouragement of our attempt than the first paragraph of the statement handed to Lord Halifax on 20th March and, incidentally, the remark that our proposed declaration would ‘augment’ distrust of our intentions produced, if I may say so, an unfortunate impression here. If you will consult the statement of 20th March again I think you will agree that the burden of the criticism was not, as suggested in paragraph 1 of your letter, that our declaration failed to give any intimation that Siam would be continued as an independent Power (a point dealt with in fact in the last sentence of our draft declaration). The criticism appeared to be rather that the declaration did not include an ‘unequivocal commitment’ that Great Britain had no territorial ambitions in Siam, and the suggestion was made that this omission should be remedied in any declaration on our part. This suggestion was an invitation to go further than the United States Government had themselves gone in their proposed declaration, which was silent on the territorial point. Moreover, it implied the existence of a doubt on a matter already covered by this country’s undertakings in the Atlantic Charter 17 and the Cairo Declaration. 18 I am relieved to see that your present letter offers a different and more hopeful approach to the subject and I am happy to take advantage of it. Our two Governments have, I think, the same basic objects as regards Siam. We, like the United States, want to see the restoration of Siam after the war as a free, sovereign and independent State, subject only to its acceptance of such special arrangements for security or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary within an international system. Before this stage is reached we have to drive out the Japanese and to this end we wish, as do the United States, to encourage the Siamese themselves to create the maximum difficulties for the Japanese and thus to make the maximum contribution to their own liberation. But at present we and the United States Government have not got our ideas coordinated and if we are to get this problem straightened out it is essential that we should recognise that we necessarily view it from somewhat different angles. The United States Government do not regard themselves as being at war with Siam. His Majesty’s Government do. Moreover, while appreciating the possible advantages of Siam’s resistance to the Japanese, His Majesty’s Government do not rate its practical value very high and feel that it is in any case of doubtful wisdom to encourage the comfortable view that the Siamese can count on an easy and assured future regardless of their attitude towards the Japanese and the efforts which they make to help themselves and us. We feel, in fact, that if resistance is to be encouraged it may need a spur rather than a sugar-plum. Again, we are bound to consider the effect upon neighbouring territories of any public declaration about Siam and it is here that any reference to territorial integrity presents difficulties. As declared at Cairo, ‘we have no thought of territorial expansion’, but it goes without saying that Siam cannot be allowed to keep the ill-gotten gains which she has accepted from her Japanese ally at the expense of Malaya, of Burma and of French Indo-China. 19 Some special strategic arrangements may also be necessary in the Kra Isthmus within the framework of an international security system. I am glad to note the assurance in your letter that our right to present such problems of territorial security or integrity to the United Nations for consideration would not be prejudiced, so far as the United States Government are concerned, by any undertaking we might now give. But there is a danger that any pronouncement about territorial integrity might create popular misunderstanding unless hedged about with reservations on the particular questions referred to above. A detailed statement on the other hand would be likely to have the undesirable result of encouraging premature discussion of a matter which it is our policy to leave to the peace settlement. Even in the case of Allies we have refrained from any commitment about territorial integrity and I cannot believe that the United States Government would wish to press us to treat an enemy more tenderly than an Ally. Any formal statement on Siam, whether for publication or otherwise, would require Cabinet approval and the concurrence of the Dominions. But I trust that this personal letter in which I have attempted to make our position quite clear will serve the purpose of removing any uncertainty about our intentions. I need hardly say that I shall welcome further consultation on the whole question.” Winant 15 Dated September 4. 16 For statements by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and President Roosevelt on this subject, see telegrams 293, February 27, 1943, from Chungking, and 362, March 17, 1943, to Chungking, Foreign Relations , 1943, China, pp. 13 and 36 , respectively. 17 Joint Statement of August 14, 1941, by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. i , p. 367 . 18 Made by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill and released by the White House December 1, 1943; for text, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448 . 19 For French Indochina–Thailand border dispute, see indexes in Foreign Relations , 1941, vol. iv , p. 1041 , and ibid. , vol. v , p. 934 ; for texts of convention of peace between France and Thailand and its protocol, and French-Japanese and French-Japanese-Thai protocols, all signed at Tokyo May 9, 1941, see British and Foreign State Papers , vol. cxliv , pp. 805, 800, and 802, respectively. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) 892.01/9–544: Telegram [Document 1248] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) Washington , October 19, 1944—7 p.m. 8676. We have been giving further consideration to the question of Thailand and believe, subject to your concurrence, that you might now send to Eden a note, rather than a personal letter, reading in substance as follows: (Your A–1085, September 5). The American Government appreciates greatly the spirit of Mr. Eden’s recent personal letter to Ambassador Winant on the subject of Thailand and his suggestion that he would welcome further consultation on this whole question with a view to seeking coordination of policy by the American and British Governments. While, as Mr. Eden suggests, our two Governments view the question of Thailand from somewhat different angles, we believe it desirable in the highest degree that our two Governments reach, if possible, a common policy toward Thailand. The American Government has noted with the utmost satisfaction the statement in Mr. Eden’s letter: “Our two Governments have, I think, the same basic objects as regards Siam. We, like the United States, want to see the restoration of Siam after the war as a free, sovereign and independent State.…” But it is apparent that there are several points which require mutual clarification before there can be that coordination of policy which both governments desire, and we believe that on these points and on any others which may arise, there should be as full and frank an exchange of views as possible. We note that Mr. Eden felt that the American Government had asked the British Government to make a public declaration going beyond what the American Government was willing to do. We desire to assure the British Government that at no time did the American Government so intend. In discussing with the British Embassy the possibility of a British public statement on Thailand, it had been the hope of the American Government that the British Government would feel able to associate itself with the public statements already made by President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek favoring a free, independent, and sovereign Thailand and expressly disclaiming territorial ambitions. In view of the feeling expressed by the British Government on July 31 that no useful purpose would be served by such a British statement at this time, this Government has not since pressed for any public declaration. On the contrary, it has sought only a confidential indication of British views respecting Thailand as a necessary step toward coordinating the policies of the two Governments and reaching a common understanding. We note, also, a possible doubt in Mr. Eden’s mind as to the views of the American Government with regard to territories acquired by Thailand while under Japanese domination. We are glad of the opportunity to clarify this point. The American Government fully concurs with the views expressed by Mr. Eden with regard to such territories. We do not recognize the lawfulness of such acquisitions and agree that such territories must in fact be restored to Indochina, Malaya and Burma from whom they were taken. This statement of course is without prejudice to the presentation of claims by any nation, including Thailand, for adjustments of boundaries or transfers of territories by orderly, peaceful processes. Finally, we note that Mr. Eden’s statement favoring restoration of Thailand as a free, sovereign and independent state is, however, qualified by certain important reservations. Such restoration, he suggests should be conditioned upon Thailand’s “acceptance of such special arrangements for security or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary within an international system”. Mr. Eden further states “Some special strategic arrangements may also be necessary in the Kra Isthmus within the framework of an international security system”. It is not clear to the American Government precisely what is contemplated by these reservations. In furtherance of the desire of the two Governments to reach a common understanding and to coordinate their policies toward Thailand, the American Government would appreciate an indication from the British Government at an early date as to what it has in mind in connection with these reservations. Hull The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State 892.01/11–2444: Airgram [Document 1249] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State London , November 24, 1944. [Received November 29—6 p.m.] A–1404. There is given below complete text of Mr. Eden’s reply to the Ambassador’s note of October 21 regarding coordination of British and American policy toward Thailand, which was delivered in accordance with the Department’s cable no. 8676, October 19. “22nd November, 1944. No. F 4969/23/G. Secret. “My Dear Ambassador, “Since my return to this country I have been giving some thought to your note No. 4013 of the 21st October about Siam. “Such difference as may still exist between the respective points of view of our two Governments results, I think, from the different angle of approach which I mentioned in my letter of the 4th September and which your reply recognises. To us Siam is an enemy who must ‘work her passage’ before she can rehabilitate herself; whereas the United States Government regard her, in spite of her declaration of war, merely as an enemy-occupied territory. “The two conditions suggested in my letter of the 4th September, on which you asked for further clarification, were in the nature of general reservations to be filled in in detail when the outline of the post-war settlement in the Far East is clear. I should like to meet your Government’s wish for greater precision, but I do not really think that it is practicable to be more precise at this stage when there are so many unknown factors as regards the future. Nor could I in any case attempt a binding definition without prior consultation with experts in this country, with the Dominions, and with the Cabinet. But I shall be happy to review the matter with you from time to time as the situation develops. “I cannot think that the general reservation which I made in paragraph 5 of my letter of the 4th September will be other than acceptable to the United States Government. It is, I suggest, a matter of ordinary prudence, even in the case of those who are but the satellites of our main enemies, to re[serve the right to stipulate that as a condition of their 20 ] ultimate freedom, sovereignty and independence they should accept such special arrangements for security or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary to the functioning of the post-war international system. “As regards the special reservation affecting the Kra Isthmus, it is a matter for our respective military experts to recommend what regime may be necessary in the circumstances of the post-war world. But the part which this area played in the Japanese plans for the capture of Singapore and the ultimate subjugation of Burma suggest that it will have to figure in whatever arrangements may be made for the future security of South-East Asia, and in particular for the defence of Singapore within the framework of the future international system. “Finally, let me say that I welcome the statement in paragraph 5 of your note about the restoration of territory acquired by Siam at the hands of Japan from Burma, Malaya and Indo-China. This statement is valuable as it further narrows whatever difference there may be in the respective points of view of our two Governments. “Yours sincerely, (signed) Anthony Eden.” Winant 20 Insertion taken from telegram 10341, November 24, 5 p.m., from London (not printed). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Landon) 892.01/12–1244 [Document 1250] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs ( Landon ) [ Washington ,] December 12, 1944. Participants: The Thai Minister, Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj; Messrs. Abbot L. Moffat 21 and Kenneth P. Landon, SP. The Thai Minister called at the request of Mr. Landon to receive a message with respect to the Free Thai movement contained in Stockholm’s 5040 of December 8. 22 The Minister was informed that a message had been received from Minister Arthakitti at Stockholm to the effect that his brother, the Regent at Bangkok, 23 desired Minister Pramoj to organize a free government in the United States with himself at the head of it. Minister Pramoj was also requested by Minister Arthakitti to send a representative to Stockholm to discuss the matter. The Thai Minister stated that the message was not what he had expected and was contrary to his declared principles. He said that it was not clear to him just why the Regent would make such a request. Mr. Landon suggested that possibly the Regent planned to escape from Thailand and wished to prepare an organization to which he could go immediately and with which he would have status. Mr. Moffat indicated that it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to send a Thai representative to Stockholm without having such a representative noticed by the enemy. The Thai Minister said that possibly an American might be sent inconspicuously but that this was a matter for further study. It was the general opinion that further study should be given to the various questions raised by Minister Arthakitti’s message. 24 21 Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs. 22 Not printed. 23 Luang Pradist Manudharm became sole Regent with the resignation of Prince Aditya Dibabha from the Council of Regents on July 24, 1944. 24 In a memorandum of conversation with the Thai Minister on December 15, Mr. Moffat wrote as follows: “The Minister stated that after much thought he had decided that establishment of a Free Thai Government with himself as head would be completely illegal; that he would have no right or power to do so and that he would under no circumstances do this. Later, he qualified this by implying that he might consider the proposal if the situation appeared desperate and the Regent absolutely required some such action. He stated that he thought the request if bona fide indicated that the position of the Regent was very serious and that there must be excessive Japanese pressure on him.” (701.9258/12–1544) In a memorandum of conversation with the Thai Minister on December 22, Mr. Moffat stated: “We discussed briefly the question of the establishment of a Free Tai government here, and I said that while it had not been considered by the Department, my own personal view was that such a move, unless there was some compelling reason of which we did not know, would not help them and might be embarrassing to us.” (701.9258/12–2244) Thai protests against bombing of allegedly non-military objectives Thai protests against bombing of allegedly non-military objectives [1251] The Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) to the Secretary of State Washington , February 4, 1944. 740.0011 Pacific War/3708 [1252] The Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) to the Secretary of State Washington , February 14, 1944. 740.0011 Pacific War/3729 [1253] The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) Washington , January 27, 1945. 740.00117 P.W./1–2745 The Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Pacific War/3708 [Document 1251] The Swiss Minister ( Bruggmann ) to the Secretary of State Th. 1 Thailand The Minister of Switzerland presents his compliments to The Honorable, The Secretary of State, and has the honor to submit a communication from the Government of Thailand which has been received from the Federal Political Department in Berne, with the request that it be transmitted to the Government of the United States: “In air raids about the end of 1943 and January 1944 Anglo-American aeroplanes dropped bombs on Chulalongkon Hospital, Saowapha, on the Pasteur Institute of the Red Cross Bangrak Hospital and two mental disease hospitals. Such humanitarian establishments cannot be said in any way to be military objectives and the indiscriminate bombing thereof is not only a violation of the Geneva Convention of 1929 25 but also of the principles of humanity. His Majesty’s Government therefore enters a strong protest against the unjustifiable act of destruction above mentioned.” The Minister would be grateful to The Honorable, The Secretary of State, for an acknowledgment of this communication. 26 Washington , February 4, 1944. 25 International Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field, signed July 27, 1929, Foreign Relations , 1929, vol. i , p. 321 . Presumably, reference to Article 6 was intended. 26 Acknowledgment was made by the Secretary of State on February 14. The Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 Pacific War/3729 [Document 1252] The Swiss Minister ( Bruggmann ) to the Secretary of State Th. 1. The Minister of Switzerland presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to the Minister’s note of February 4, 1944, and to submit a further communication from the Government of Thailand which has been received from the Federal Political Department in Bern, with the request that it be transmitted to the Government of the United States: “Anglo-American aeroplanes have been dropping bombs on the entire area of Bangkok causing serious damages to the people, dwellings as well as temples and schools and inflicting a heavy list of casualties among the civilian population while Thailand has never committed similar acts upon her enemies. His Majesty’s Government consider the indiscriminate bombing abovementioned as being contrary to the general principles of international law as well as the principles of humanity and register vigorous protest against such unjustifiable acts of destruction.” The Minister would be grateful to the Honorable the Secretary of State for an acknowledgment of this communication. 27 Washington , February 14, 1944. 27 Acknowledgment was made by the Secretary of State on March 3. In a memorandum of April 25, the Department informed the British Embassy that no further reply to the Swiss notes was contemplated (740.00117 PW/101). In a note of December 1, the Secretary of State informed the British Ambassador (Halifax) that “The United States Government has now decided to make a definitive reply to the protests received from the Thai Government.” (740.00116 PW/10–1144) The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) 740.00117 P.W./1–2745 [Document 1253] The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister ( Bruggmann ) The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Switzerland and has the honor to refer to the Legation’s notes (Th. 1.) dated, respectively, February 4, 1944 and February 14, 1944 each quoting the text in translation of separate communications received from the Government of Thailand concerning bombing attacks upon certain areas in that country. Receipt of the Legation’s notes under reference was acknowledged by the Department of State on February 14 and March 3, 1944 respectively. The Legation may inform the Government of Thailand that the United States Government has conducted a lengthy and detailed investigation into this matter. The results of this investigation reveal that certain hospitals in the area surrounding Bangkok were damaged by bombs from British or American aircraft. However, it is not possible to state whether the damage was inflicted by American or British forces. Investigation also reveals that United States planes did participate in several raids against Bangkok during the latter part of 1943 and January 1944 and study of target objectives in the Bangkok area indicates the probability that non-military targets occasionally may have been damaged in spite of the best efforts to avoid them. Military forces of the United States Government are continuing, as in the past, to direct their attacks against installations of, or being used by, the armed forces of the enemy. It is regrettable that upon occasion the proximity of these installations to areas occupied by non-combatants may result in casualties among the civilian population. The United States Government regrets that the civilian population of Thailand and non-combatant installations in Thailand suffered as a consequence of military operations directed solely against military objectives. Washington , January 27, 1945. Index Index 1 Abadan Island. See Iran : American postwar civil air rights, etc. Abdullah, Amir, 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 596–597 [ Pgs. 596–597 include portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] Abdullah Suleiman, Shaikh, 658 n [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 734 and Doc. 735 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , and Doc. 744 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 772 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] Acheson, Dean, 223–224 [ Pgs. 223–224 include portions of Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , and Doc. 230 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 258–260 [ Pgs. 258–260 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , and Doc. 268 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 286 ] Açikalin, Cevat, 820 n [ Pg. 820 includes portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , and Doc. 889 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 includes portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , and Doc. 889 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , and Doc. 953 ] , 895–897 [ Pgs. 895–897 include portions of Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , and Doc. 961 ] , 908 n [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 908–909 [ Pgs. 908–909 include portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 910 n [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 973 and Doc. 974 ] , 912–913 [ Pgs. 912–913 include portions of Doc. 975 and Doc. 976 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 includes portions of Doc. 976 and Doc. 977 ] Afghanistan, essential import requirements, supply of, and problems relating to joint U.S.-British policy, 44–55 [ Pgs. 44–55 include portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] Ala, Hussein, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , and Doc. 472 ] , 453–460 [ Pgs. 453–460 include portions of Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] passim , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 499 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L., 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 152–153 [ Pgs. 152–153 include portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , and Doc. 163 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 169 n [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] All America Cables, 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] Allen, George V., 51–52 [ Pgs. 51–52 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 309–311 [ Pgs. 309–311 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , and Doc. 392 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] Alling, Paul H., 99–100 [ Pgs. 99–100 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 476–477 [ Pgs. 476–477 include portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 496–497 [ Pgs. 496–497 include portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 849 and Doc. 850 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 805–807 [ Pgs. 805–807 include portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] American University, Beirut, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] Amery, Leopold S., 250 [ Pg. 250 includes portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 261–262 [ Pgs. 261–262 include portions of Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , and Doc. 270 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 274 ] Anglo-American Petroleum Commission, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 21 ] Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] Arabian American Oil Co. (formerly California Arabian Standard Oil Co.) ( see also under Saudi Arabia : Economic and financial assistance ), 8–13 [ Pgs. 8–13 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , and Doc. 10 ] , 24–25 [ Pgs. 24–25 include portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 34–36 [ Pgs. 34–36 include portions of Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 801 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 751–752 [ Pgs. 751–752 include portions of Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , and Doc. 820 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 820 and Doc. 821 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 823 and Doc. 824 ] , 760 n [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 830 and Doc. 831 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 838 ] Arab union, question of, 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 683 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 683 ] , 660–661 [ Pgs. 660–661 include portions of Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , and Doc. 717 ] Arab-Zionist controversy. See Palestine . Argyropoulos, Alexander, 220 [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 222 n [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Army-Navy Petroleum Board, 17–20 [ Pgs. 17–20 include portions of Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Atlantic Charter, cited: Greece, 226 [ Pg. 226 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] ; Middle East oil reserves, 27 [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 21 ] ; Morocco, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 568 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , and Doc. 570 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 608 ] ; Netherlands East Indies, 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 1186 ] ; Palestine, 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 617 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 626 and Doc. 627 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 630 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 664 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 683 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 706 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 708 ] ; Syria and Lebanon, 779–802 [ Pgs. 779–802 include portions of Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , Doc. 862 , Doc. 863 , Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] passim; Thailand, 1316 [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 1247 ] Axis activities. See Turkey and Morocco : Spanish Zone . Aziz, Abdol Hosayn, 46–47 [ Pgs. 46–47 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] Bagge, Widar, 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , and Doc. 1054 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 1054 and Doc. 1055 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 1065 ] , 1184 [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1178 ] , 1186 [ Pg. 1186 includes portions of Doc. 1180 and Doc. 1181 ] Bajpai, Sir Girja Shankar, 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 258–259 [ Pgs. 258–259 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] Balfour Declaration, 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 605 n [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 695 ] Baudet, Philippe, 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 849 and Doc. 850 ] , 805–807 [ Pgs. 805–807 include portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] Baxter, C. W., 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 657 ] Bayat, Morteza Qoli, 352 n [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 371 n [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 436–444 [ Pgs. 436–444 include portions of Doc. 460 , Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , and Doc. 469 ] passim , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , and Doc. 516 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , and Doc. 525 ] Berle, Adolf A., Jr., 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248 ] , 291–292 [ Pgs. 291–292 include portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298 ] , 560–561 [ Pgs. 560–561 include portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 720 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 includes portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , and Doc. 835 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] Beynet, Gen. Paul E., 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] Bloom, Sol, 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 676 and Doc. 677 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] Boekel, Lt. Col. W. A., 1299 n [ Pg. 1299 is part of Doc. 1236 ] , 1299 [ Pg. 1299 is part of Doc. 1236 ] , 1300 [ Pg. 1300 is part of Doc. 1236 ] Boheman, Erik C., 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 351–352 [ Pgs. 351–352 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , and Doc. 525 ] Bowen, Col. John W., 669–670 [ Pgs. 669–670 include portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] Bowman, Isaiah, 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 657 ] Bulgaria, 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 869 [ Pg. 869 is part of Doc. 932 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 is part of Doc. 933 ] Bullard, Sir Reader W., 305 n [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 393 n [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , and Doc. 415 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , and Doc. 472 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 454–455 [ Pgs. 454–455 include portions of Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , and Doc. 485 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 465–481 [ Pgs. 465–481 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] passim Burma, 1006 [ Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 1018 ] Cable and Wireless, Ltd., 760–773 [ Pgs. 760–773 include portions of Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , and Doc. 847 ] Cairo Conference, 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] Cairo Declaration ( 1943 ), cited, 1194 [ Pg. 1194 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 1189 ] , 1234 [ Pg. 1234 is part of Doc. 1204 ] , 1235 [ Pg. 1235 is part of Doc. 1205 ] , 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 1206 ] , 1239 [ Pg. 1239 includes portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] , 1269 [ Pg. 1269 includes portions of Doc. 1218 and Doc. 1219 ] , 1279 [ Pg. 1279 is part of Doc. 1224 ] , 1293 [ Pg. 1293 is part of Doc. 1230 ] , 1316 [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 1247 ] California Arabian Standard Oil Co. (later Arabian American Oil Co.), 8–13 [ Pgs. 8–13 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , and Doc. 10 ] , 24–25 [ Pgs. 24–25 include portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 34–36 [ Pgs. 34–36 include portions of Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] Campbell, Sir Ronald I., 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252 ] , 241–242 [ Pgs. 241–242 include portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 269–270 [ Pgs. 269–270 include portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , and Doc. 280 ] , 273–274 [ Pgs. 273–274 include portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , and Doc. 940 ] Carlsson, Gunnar, 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 213–214 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 223 ] Caroe, Sir Olaf, 237 n [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 245–246 [ Pgs. 245–246 include portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 257 ] Castillo, Cristóbal del, 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 580 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , and Doc. 588 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , and Doc. 590 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] Catroux, Georges, 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 862 and Doc. 863 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 873 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 875 and Doc. 876 ] Chandler, Senator A. B., 243–244 [ Pgs. 243–244 include portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 244–245 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 245–246 [ Pgs. 245–246 include portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Chauvel, M., 811–812 [ Pgs. 811–812 include portions of Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 1193 [ Pg. 1193 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 1189 ] , 1225 [ Pg. 1225 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1291 n [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 1228 ] , 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 1228 ] , 1316 n [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 1247 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 1248 ] China ( see also Japan : Financial and other assistance, etc. : American nationals in China ; and under Japan : Postwar policy planning ): American diplomatic and consular property, including archives, in occupied China, Japanese violation of, 1178–1183 [ Pgs. 1178–1183 include portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] Japanese internment of Americans in China, 919–920 [ Pgs. 919–920 include portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 940–941 [ Pgs. 940–941 include portions of Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , and Doc. 994 ] , 988–989 [ Pgs. 988–989 include portions of Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , and Doc. 1005 ] , 991 [ Pg. 991 includes portions of Doc. 1007 and Doc. 1008 ] , 992–994 [ Pgs. 992–994 include portions of Doc. 1008 and Doc. 1009 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 includes portions of Doc. 1016 and Doc. 1017 ] , 1009–1010 [ Pgs. 1009–1010 include portions of Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , and Doc. 1025 ] Korea, Chinese policy toward, and attitude concerning recognition of a provisional government, 1294 [ Pg. 1294 includes portions of Doc. 1230 and Doc. 1231 ] , 1295 n [ Pg. 1295 includes portions of Doc. 1232 and Doc. 1233 ] , 1297–1298 [ Pgs. 1297–1298 include portions of Doc. 1233 , Doc. 1234 , and Doc. 1235 ] Kuomintang, 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 1204 ] , 1294 [ Pg. 1294 includes portions of Doc. 1230 and Doc. 1231 ] Relations with United States, 1944 , citation to correspondence on, 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 979 ] Chrome. See under Turkey : Economic policy, etc. Churchill, Winston S.: Exchange of messages with President Roosevelt, 96–99 [ Pgs. 96–99 include portions of Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 114–115 [ Pgs. 114–115 include portions of Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , and Doc. 117 ] , 117–119 [ Pgs. 117–119 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , and Doc. 122 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 125–127 [ Pgs. 125–127 include portions of Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] , 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 133–134 [ Pgs. 133–134 include portions of Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 150–151 [ Pgs. 150–151 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 154–155 [ Pgs. 154–155 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] , 159–160 [ Pgs. 159–160 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 169–170 [ Pgs. 169–170 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] , 173–175 [ Pgs. 173–175 include portions of Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , and Doc. 185 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 271–274 [ Pgs. 271–274 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , and Doc. 283 ] Miscellaneous, 237 n [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 538 n [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 920 and Doc. 921 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 923 ] , 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 1189 ] , 1221 [ Pg. 1221 includes portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] , 1316 n [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 1247 ] Views regarding— Greek liberation from German occupation and subsequent restoration of political stability, 96–99 [ Pgs. 96–99 include portions of Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 143–144 [ Pgs. 143–144 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , and Doc. 151 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 148–149 [ Pgs. 148–149 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] , 149 n [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 150–160 [ Pgs. 150–160 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] passim , 169–178 [ Pgs. 169–178 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] passim Palestine situation, 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 586 n [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 600–601 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 642–643 [ Pgs. 642–643 include portions of Doc. 698 , Doc. 699 , and Doc. 700 ] Temporary British-Soviet arrangement regarding Greece and Rumania, 114–127 [ Pgs. 114–127 include portions of Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] passim Cicognani, A. G., 1169–1170 [ Pgs. 1169–1170 include portions of Doc. 1167 , Doc. 1168 , and Doc. 1169 ] Communist activity in Greece, and influence in Greek affairs, 85–86 [ Pgs. 85–86 include portions of Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 102–103 [ Pgs. 102–103 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 136–137 [ Pgs. 136–137 include portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] Coneybear, Col. John F., 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 770 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 813 ] Connally, Senator Tom, 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 698 and Doc. 699 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 700 and Doc. 701 ] Connolly, Gen. Donald H., 307 n [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 316–317 [ Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322 ] , 317–318 [ Pgs. 317–318 include portions of Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , and Doc. 323 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 319 n [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 320–321 [ Pgs. 320–321 include portions of Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , and Doc. 326 ] , 339 n [ Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 341–342 [ Pgs. 341–342 include portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 369–370 [ Pgs. 369–370 include portions of Doc. 374 and Doc. 375 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 385 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 386–387 [ Pgs. 386–387 include portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] Cooper, Alfred Duff, 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 862 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , and Doc. 872 ] Cornwallis, Sir Kinahan, 613 n [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 668 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 683 ] Cotton. See under India . Craig, Gen. Howard A., 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , and Doc. 726 ] Crowley, Leo T., 253–255 [ Pgs. 253–255 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Culbertson, William S., special economic mission to Middle East, 38–40 [ Pgs. 38–40 include portions of Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , and Doc. 29 ] , 616–617 [ Pgs. 616–617 include portions of Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , and Doc. 674 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] Cultural relations program of Department of State for Middle East, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 31 ] ; for India, 281–290 [ Pgs. 281–290 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , and Doc. 296 ] Daftary, Mahmood Subhi al-, 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] , 583–584 [ Pgs. 583–584 include portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 686 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 706 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 706 and Doc. 707 ] Daftary, A. A., 466–467 [ Pgs. 466–467 include portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , and Doc. 503 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , and Doc. 505 ] Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens, 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 152–161 [ Pgs. 152–161 include portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , and Doc. 171 ] passim , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 168–179 [ Pgs. 168–179 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] passim Dennis, G. L., 504–505 [ Pgs. 504–505 include portions of Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] Dewey, Thomas E., 617 n [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 685 and Doc. 686 ] Diamantopoulos, Cimon P., 99 n [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 99–100 [ Pgs. 99–100 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 216 n [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 223–224 [ Pgs. 223–224 include portions of Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , and Doc. 230 ] , 224–225 [ Pgs. 224–225 include portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , and Doc. 233 ] Duff Cooper, Alfred. See Cooper, Alfred Duff . Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 612–613 [ Pgs. 612–613 include portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , and Doc. 670 ] Ebtehaj, Abol Hassan, 401–402 [ Pgs. 401–402 include portions of Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , and Doc. 410 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 422–423 [ Pgs. 422–423 include portions of Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , and Doc. 443 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 430 n [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 454 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] Eddy, Col. William A., 687 n [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 687–688 [ Pgs. 687–688 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , and Doc. 756 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 730 n [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 798 and Doc. 799 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 743–744 [ Pgs. 743–744 include portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 814 and Doc. 815 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] Eden, Anthony: Activities relative to coordination of U.S.-British policies in Near East, 3–4 [ Pgs. 3–4 include portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 4 n [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 7 n [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 380 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , and Doc. 434 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , and Doc. 510 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 510 and Doc. 511 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , and Doc. 715 ] , 731–732 [ Pgs. 731–732 include portions of Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , and Doc. 799 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 862 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 860–862 [ Pgs. 860–862 include portions of Doc. 925 , Doc. 926 , and Doc. 927 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 932 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , and Doc. 940 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 941 and Doc. 942 ] , 900–901 [ Pgs. 900–901 include portions of Doc. 964 and Doc. 965 ] Miscellaneous, 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 580 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , and Doc. 582 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 936 n [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 987 and Doc. 988 ] , 1315 [ Pg. 1315 is part of Doc. 1246 ] , 1316–1317 [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 1247 ] , 1318–1319 [ Pgs. 1318–1319 include portions of Doc. 1248 and Doc. 1249 ] , 1319–1320 [ Pgs. 1319–1320 include portions of Doc. 1248 , Doc. 1249 , and Doc. 1250 ] Views on temporary British-Soviet arrangement regarding Greece and Rumania, 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 128–129 [ Pgs. 128–129 include portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] Egypt ( see also Palestine ), 56–70 [ Pgs. 56–70 include portions of Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , Doc. 57 , Doc. 58 , and Doc. 59 ] American postwar civil air rights, U.S. representations to Egypt and United Kingdom regarding, 56–62 [ Pgs. 56–62 include portions of Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] New Egyptian export duty, U.S. informal representations regarding effect upon American petroleum interests, 67–70 [ Pgs. 67–70 include portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , Doc. 57 , Doc. 58 , and Doc. 59 ] Suez–Cairo pipeline, U.S. interest in possible transfer of postwar title rights, 62–67 [ Pgs. 62–67 include portions of Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] U.S. diplomatic mission in Egypt, U.S.-British exchange regarding status of, 3–5 [ Pgs. 3–5 include portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Entezam, Nasrollah, 372 n [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 372–373 [ Pgs. 372–373 include portions of Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , and Doc. 380 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , and Doc. 465 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] Ertegün, Mehmet Münir, death of, 915–917 [ Pgs. 915–917 include portions of Doc. 977 and Doc. 978 ] Ethiopia, 71–83 [ Pgs. 71–83 include portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] American scholarships for Ethiopian students at American University, Beirut, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 31 ] Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Military Convention of 1942 , U.S. interest in negotiations for its replacement by a new agreement, 76–83 [ Pgs. 76–83 include portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] ; provisions of new agreement signed Dec. 19 , 82–83 [ Pgs. 82–83 include portions of Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] Arms for Ethiopia, U.S. concern to have equal access with United Kingdom in supply of, 73–75 [ Pgs. 73–75 include portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , and Doc. 65 ] Gift by Emperor Haile Selassie of property for the American Legation, 71–73 [ Pgs. 71–73 include portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , and Doc. 62 ] U.S. military equipment, including 5,000 rifles, shipment to Ethiopia, 73–75 [ Pgs. 73–75 include portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , and Doc. 65 ] Exchange of nationals, United States and Japan. See Japan : Third exchange . Export–Import Bank, 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 825 ] Federal Communications Commission, 293–296 [ Pgs. 293–296 include portions of Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , and Doc. 304 ] Fontanel, Emile, 920 [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , and Doc. 986 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 includes portions of Doc. 992 and Doc. 993 ] , 988 n [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1003 and Doc. 1004 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 includes portions of Doc. 1003 and Doc. 1004 ] , 1009–1010 [ Pgs. 1009–1010 include portions of Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , and Doc. 1025 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 1030 ] , 1018 [ Pg. 1018 includes portions of Doc. 1032 and Doc. 1033 ] , 1021–1079 [ Pgs. 1021–1079 include portions of Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , Doc. 1042 , Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , Doc. 1045 , Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , Doc. 1058 , Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , Doc. 1068 , Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , Doc. 1073 , Doc. 1074 , Doc. 1075 , Doc. 1076 , Doc. 1077 , Doc. 1078 , Doc. 1079 , Doc. 1080 , Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , Doc. 1084 , Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , Doc. 1087 , Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , Doc. 1098 , Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , Doc. 1104 , and Doc. 1105 ] passim , 1179–1183 [ Pgs. 1179–1183 include portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] Foreign Economic Administration, activities in regard to— Afghanistan, 46–47 [ Pgs. 46–47 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 51–52 [ Pgs. 51–52 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 42 ] Cairo–Suez pipeline, 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 53 ] Ethiopia, 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , and Doc. 65 ] India, 250–269 [ Pgs. 250–269 include portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279 ] passim Iran, 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] Saudi Arabia, 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 681–683 [ Pgs. 681–683 include portions of Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , and Doc. 744 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 767 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 740–741 [ Pgs. 740–741 include portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 825 ] Turkey, 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , and Doc. 886 ] , 821–822 [ Pgs. 821–822 include portions of Doc. 889 and Doc. 890 ] , 837–838 [ Pgs. 837–838 include portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , and Doc. 913 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 941 and Doc. 942 ] Foreign petroleum policy, U.S. formulation of, and concern regarding petroleum resources in Saudi Arabia, 8–37 [ Pgs. 8–37 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] Conversations with British Government on problems of mutual interest regarding Middle Eastern oil, 10–11 [ Pgs. 10–11 include portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 26–27 [ Pgs. 26–27 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 32–33 [ Pgs. 32–33 include portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 36–37 [ Pgs. 36–37 include portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] Objectives and implementation of policy, 17–20 [ Pgs. 17–20 include portions of Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] , 23–24 [ Pgs. 23–24 include portions of Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , and Doc. 19 ] , 27–33 [ Pgs. 27–33 include portions of Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , and Doc. 22 ] , 36–37 [ Pgs. 36–37 include portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] Refinery facilities in Persian Gulf area, question of construction of, 20–21 [ Pgs. 20–21 include portions of Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , and Doc. 16 ] Trans-Arabian pipeline proposed by California Arabian Standard Oil Co., and agreement in principle, 8–9 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 12–13 [ Pgs. 12–13 include portions of Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , and Doc. 10 ] , 21–23 [ Pgs. 21–23 include portions of Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 24–25 [ Pgs. 24–25 include portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 33–36 [ Pgs. 33–36 include portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] U.S. Government participation in companies holding oil reserves in Middle East, discussions concerning, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 11–12 [ Pgs. 11–12 include portions of Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , and Doc. 9 ] , 13–17 [ Pgs. 13–17 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 19 n [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 14 ] . Western Hemisphere oil reserves, conservation of, and interest of Latin American producing countries, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] Formosa. See under Japan : Postwar policy planning, etc. Forrestal, James V., 755–756 [ Pgs. 755–756 include portions of Doc. 823 and Doc. 824 ] , 757 n [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 825 ] , 901 n [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 965 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 includes portions of Doc. 1237 and Doc. 1238 ] Four Freedoms, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 568 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 858 ] France. See Morocco : French Zone ; and Syria and Lebanon . Gandhi, Mohandas K., 232 n [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 234–235 [ Pgs. 234–235 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] , 238 n [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 240 n [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 266 ] Gascoigne, Alvary D. F., 526 n [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 567 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 580 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , and Doc. 582 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , and Doc. 590 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , and Doc. 599 ] George II, King of the Hellenes, 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 87–98 [ Pgs. 87–98 include portions of Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , and Doc. 95 ] passim , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , and Doc. 110 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 123–124 [ Pgs. 123–124 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 151–167 [ Pgs. 151–167 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , and Doc. 177 ] passim , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Germany ( see also Morocco : Spanish Zone ; Turkey : Economic policy, etc. , and Severance of economic and diplomatic relations with Germany ), declaration of war on Germany by Liberia, 505 n [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] Giles, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F., 663 n [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 718 and Doc. 719 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 721 and Doc. 722 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 697 n [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] Gold. See under Saudi Arabia . Gold Reserve Act ( 1934 ), cited, 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , and Doc. 739 ] Gorgé, Camille, 920 [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 933–938 [ Pgs. 933–938 include portions of Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , Doc. 989 , Doc. 990 , and Doc. 991 ] , 965–966 [ Pgs. 965–966 include portions of Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , and Doc. 996 ] , 983–997 [ Pgs. 983–997 include portions of Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , Doc. 1009 , Doc. 1010 , and Doc. 1011 ] passim , 1006 n [ Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 1018 ] , 1013 n [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 1026 , Doc. 1027 , and Doc. 1028 ] , 1019–1057 [ Pgs. 1019–1057 include portions of Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , Doc. 1042 , Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , Doc. 1045 , Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , Doc. 1058 , Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , Doc. 1068 , Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , Doc. 1073 , Doc. 1074 , Doc. 1075 , and Doc. 1076 ] passim , 1070–1081 [ Pgs. 1070–1081 include portions of Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , Doc. 1098 , Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , and Doc. 1107 ] passim , 1088–1099 [ Pgs. 1088–1099 include portions of Doc. 1112 , Doc. 1113 , Doc. 1114 , Doc. 1115 , Doc. 1116 , Doc. 1117 , Doc. 1118 , Doc. 1119 , Doc. 1120 , Doc. 1121 , Doc. 1122 , Doc. 1123 , Doc. 1124 , Doc. 1125 , Doc. 1126 , Doc. 1127 , Doc. 1128 , Doc. 1129 , Doc. 1130 , and Doc. 1131 ] passim , 1173–1174 [ Pgs. 1173–1174 include portions of Doc. 1172 and Doc. 1173 ] , 1176 n [ Pg. 1176 includes portions of Doc. 1174 , Doc. 1175 , and Doc. 1176 ] , 1177 [ Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 1176 ] Grafström, Sven H., 190–191 [ Pgs. 190–191 include portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Greece, 84–231 [ Pgs. 84–231 include portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , Doc. 225 , Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] Financial assistance by United States, question of: Appeals by Greek Government for aid, and U.S. consideration of, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 220–222 [ Pgs. 220–222 include portions of Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] , 222 n [ Pg. 222 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 223–227 [ Pgs. 223–227 include portions of Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , and Doc. 233 ] British financial relations with Greece, 221–223 [ Pgs. 221–223 include portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , and Doc. 229 ] , 223 n [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Report of Greek financial situation by Greek Ambassador Extraordinary for Economic Affairs, 216–220 [ Pgs. 216–220 include portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] International Financial Commission, Greek desire to abolish, and U.S.-British attitude toward, 228–231 [ Pgs. 228–231 include portions of Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] Political organization of Greece following liberation from German occupation, question of, 84–179 [ Pgs. 84–179 include portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] British policy toward Greece, discussions concerning, and U.S. position ( see also National unity, etc. , and Regency, etc. , infra ) 97–99 [ Pgs. 97–99 include portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 100–102 [ Pgs. 100–102 include portions of Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , and Doc. 99 ] , 103–104 [ Pgs. 103–104 include portions of Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , and Doc. 102 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 121–122 [ Pgs. 121–122 include portions of Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , and Doc. 125 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 136–137 [ Pgs. 136–137 include portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 152–153 [ Pgs. 152–153 include portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , and Doc. 163 ] , 156–158 [ Pgs. 156–158 include portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , and Doc. 168 ] , 159–160 [ Pgs. 159–160 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 172–173 [ Pgs. 172–173 include portions of Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , and Doc. 184 ] ; British force to preserve order following German evacuation, and U.S. attitude, 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 133–134 [ Pgs. 133–134 include portions of Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 140–141 [ Pgs. 140–141 include portions of Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , and Doc. 147 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] British-Soviet informal agreement on Greece and Rumania, and U.S. attitude, 112–115 [ Pgs. 112–115 include portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , and Doc. 117 ] , 117–121 [ Pgs. 117–121 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] ,–127 [ Pg. 127 includes portions of Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] , 128–129 [ Pgs. 128–129 include portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] , 130–131 [ Pgs. 130–131 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] Communist activity in Greece, and influence in Greek political affairs, 85–86 [ Pgs. 85–86 include portions of Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 102–103 [ Pgs. 102–103 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 136–137 [ Pgs. 136–137 include portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] Exchange of letters between Roosevelt and Churchill regarding Greek situation, 96–99 [ Pgs. 96–99 include portions of Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 150–151 [ Pgs. 150–151 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 154–155 [ Pgs. 154–155 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] , 159–160 [ Pgs. 159–160 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 169–170 [ Pgs. 169–170 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] , 173–175 [ Pgs. 173–175 include portions of Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , and Doc. 185 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Exchange of messages between King George II and President Roosevelt, 163–164 [ Pgs. 163–164 include portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Macedonia, question of return to Greece, 167–168 [ Pgs. 167–168 include portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] National unity, question of and efforts to achieve ( see also British policy, etc. , supra; also Regency, etc. , and Return to Greece, etc. , infra ): Government in exile, political crisis in: Changes in Greek Cabinet, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] ; information concerning, 90–95 [ Pgs. 90–95 include portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 101–194 [ Pgs. 101–194 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] ; Soviet attitude, and Greek reaction, 95–96 [ Pgs. 95–96 include portions of Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , and Doc. 94 ] , 99–100 [ Pgs. 99–100 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] , 103–104 [ Pgs. 103–104 include portions of Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , and Doc. 102 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 103 ] Greek armed forces in Middle East, mutiny of, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 94–95 [ Pgs. 94–95 include portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] ; British action, 92 [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 98 ] Guerilla groups in Greece, unity among and status of ( see also National Liberation Front and Rebellion , infra ): British-Greek conference in Italy regarding, 134–135 [ Pgs. 134–135 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , and Doc. 142 ] ; Mountain and Sacred Brigades, proposals concerning, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] ; Political Committee, formation and activities of, 88 n [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 88–89 [ Pgs. 88–89 include portions of Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , and Doc. 87 ] , 91–92 [ Pgs. 91–92 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 127–128 [ Pgs. 127–128 include portions of Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] ; Soviet support of unity efforts, 84–86 [ Pgs. 84–86 include portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] Lebanon Conference for National Unity, 106–112 [ Pgs. 106–112 include portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 115–116 [ Pgs. 115–116 include portions of Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , and Doc. 118 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] National Army, question of establishment and status, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] National Liberation Front (EAM) ( see also Guerilla groups in Greece , supra, and Rebellion, etc. , infra ), 86–87 [ Pgs. 86–87 include portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 93–94 [ Pgs. 93–94 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 102–193 [ Pgs. 102–193 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] , 127–128 [ Pgs. 127–128 include portions of Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133 ] , 129–130 [ Pgs. 129–130 include portions of Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , and Doc. 135 ] , 133–143 [ Pgs. 133–143 include portions of Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] passim , 148–149 [ Pgs. 148–149 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 184 ] Rebellion of leftist elements, and ensuing political crisis: Information and reports concerning, 139–142 [ Pgs. 139–142 include portions of Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 143–145 [ Pgs. 143–145 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 148–149 [ Pgs. 148–149 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 153–154 [ Pgs. 153–154 include portions of Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] , 150–158 [ Pgs. 150–158 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , and Doc. 168 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 176–177 [ Pgs. 176–177 include portions of Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] ; British attitude and armed intervention, 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 143–144 [ Pgs. 143–144 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , and Doc. 151 ] , 140–147 [ Pgs. 140–147 include portions of Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] , 151–152 [ Pgs. 151–152 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 154–155 [ Pgs. 154–155 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] , 159–160 [ Pgs. 159–160 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 168–169 [ Pgs. 168–169 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] ; negotiations for cessation of hostilities, and Churchill’s mission to Greece regarding, 161 [ Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 166–167 [ Pgs. 166–167 include portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 169–172 [ Pgs. 169–172 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 176–177 [ Pgs. 176–177 include portions of Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] ; U.S. attitude, 142–143 [ Pgs. 142–143 include portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 147–151 [ Pgs. 147–151 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] Regency, efforts toward establishment, and attitude of King, 87–89 [ Pgs. 87–89 include portions of Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , and Doc. 87 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 156–159 [ Pgs. 156–159 include portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , and Doc. 169 ] , 160–161 [ Pgs. 160–161 include portions of Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , and Doc. 171 ] , 164–165 [ Pgs. 164–165 include portions of Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] , 167–168 [ Pgs. 167–168 include portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 173–176 [ Pgs. 173–176 include portions of Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , and Doc. 187 ] , 178–179 [ Pgs. 178–179 include portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] Return to Greece of King, question of, and proposed plebiscite regarding, 122 [ Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 123–124 [ Pgs. 123–124 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 149–150 [ Pgs. 149–150 include portions of Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] Relief supplies for liberated Greece, 179–215 [ Pgs. 179–215 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] Allied forces in Greece, question of relations with Greek Government, 183–188 [ Pgs. 183–188 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , and Doc. 199 ] , 189–190 [ Pgs. 189–190 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , and Doc. 201 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] British-Greek Civil Affairs agreement, and U.S. attitude, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 193–194 [ Pgs. 193–194 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 209–210 [ Pgs. 209–210 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] Economic and financial conditions in Greece, and U.S. concern, 199–201 [ Pgs. 199–201 include portions of Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , and Doc. 210 ] , 205–206 [ Pgs. 205–206 include portions of Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , and Doc. 216 ] Greek War Relief Association of New York, 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Sweden, question of continued participation in Greek relief scheme: British-U.S. position and representations regarding, 179–181 [ Pgs. 179–181 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , and Doc. 194 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , and Doc. 200 ] , 198–199 [ Pgs. 198–199 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 210–211 [ Pgs. 210–211 include portions of Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , and Doc. 221 ] ; Swedish reaction, 181–182 [ Pgs. 181–182 include portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 213–214 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 223 ] Swedish relief vessels, problem of safe conduct for and continued use of, 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 190–191 [ Pgs. 190–191 include portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 192–193 [ Pgs. 192–193 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] , 194–196 [ Pgs. 194–196 include portions of Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , and Doc. 206 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 207–208 [ Pgs. 207–208 include portions of Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , and Doc. 218 ] , 213–214 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] Swedish-Swiss Relief Commission in Greece, status and activities of, 198–199 [ Pgs. 198–199 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 201–202 [ Pgs. 201–202 include portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 203–204 [ Pgs. 203–204 include portions of Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , and Doc. 214 ] , 206–207 [ Pgs. 206–207 include portions of Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] , 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , and Doc. 219 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, role in Greek relief, 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 190–191 [ Pgs. 190–191 include portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 198–199 [ Pgs. 198–199 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] Gresham, Harold, 436 n [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 460 , Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , and Doc. 463 ] Guan, U.S. aid to Americans held by Japanese, 1029–1030 [ Pgs. 1029–1030 include portions of Doc. 1045 , Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , and Doc. 1048 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , and Doc. 1054 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1063 and Doc. 1064 ] Gulf Exploration Co., 24–25 [ Pgs. 24–25 include portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 20 ] Gulf Oil Co., 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 10 ] Gunter, John W., 671 n [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 727 and Doc. 728 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 787 ] Günther, Christian E., 1183 [ Pg. 1183 includes portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] , 1184 [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1178 ] Gusev (Gousev), F. T., 85 n [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 327 n [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 879 n [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , and Doc. 940 ] Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, 71–73 [ Pgs. 71–73 include portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , and Doc. 62 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , and Doc. 65 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 80–81 [ Pgs. 80–81 include portions of Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , and Doc. 75 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , and Doc. 77 ] Halifax, Viscount, 112 n [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 112–113 [ Pgs. 112–113 include portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 242–252 [ Pgs. 242–252 include portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] passim , 260–261 [ Pgs. 260–261 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , and Doc. 269 ] , 261–262 [ Pgs. 261–262 include portions of Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , and Doc. 270 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , and Doc. 274 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 373–375 [ Pgs. 373–375 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , and Doc. 383 ] , 418 n [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , and Doc. 434 ] , 673–674 [ Pgs. 673–674 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , and Doc. 778 ] , 759–760 [ Pgs. 759–760 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 1183 [ Pg. 1183 includes portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] , 1185 [ Pg. 1185 includes portions of Doc. 1178 and Doc. 1179 ] Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T., 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] Harada, Ken, 1169–1170 [ Pgs. 1169–1170 include portions of Doc. 1167 , Doc. 1168 , and Doc. 1169 ] , 1171 [ Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 1170 ] , 1172 [ Pg. 1172 is part of Doc. 1171 ] , 1174 [ Pg. 1174 includes portions of Doc. 1172 and Doc. 1173 ] Hassan, Mahmoud, 564 n [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 615 and Doc. 616 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 615 and Doc. 616 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] Hilldring, Maj. Gen. J. H., 1188 n [ Pg. 1188 includes portions of Doc. 1182 and Doc. 1183 ] , 1190 [ Pg. 1190 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , 1195 [ Pg. 1195 includes portions of Doc. 1185 and Doc. 1186 ] , 1267 n [ Pg. 1267 is part of Doc. 1218 ] , 1272 n [ Pg. 1272 includes portions of Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , and Doc. 1222 ] Hirschmann, Mr., 623–624 [ Pgs. 623–624 include portions of Doc. 680 and Doc. 681 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] Hoppenot, Henri, 795 n [ Pg. 795 includes portions of Doc. 862 and Doc. 863 ] , 799–800 [ Pgs. 799–800 include portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , and Doc. 872 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 873 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 875 and Doc. 876 ] Hoskins, Harold B., 339 [ Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 625 n [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 681 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] Hugessen. See Knatchbull-Hugessen, Sir Hughe M. Hull, Cordell, communication of views and recommendations to President Roosevelt, 15–16 [ Pgs. 15–16 include portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 73–74 [ Pgs. 73–74 include portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 124–125 [ Pgs. 124–125 include portions of Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , and Doc. 129 ] , 235–236 [ Pgs. 235–236 include portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 272–273 [ Pgs. 272–273 include portions of Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , and Doc. 283 ] , 303–304 [ Pgs. 303–304 include portions of Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , and Doc. 312 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661 ] , 679–680 [ Pgs. 679–680 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 1296 n [ Pg. 1296 is part of Doc. 1233 ] Hungary, trade agreement with Turkey, 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 907 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] , 843–844 [ Pgs. 843–844 include portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 916 ] Ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, views in connection with Palestine situation, 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] , 580 n [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , and Doc. 641 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 681 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 710 ] ; in connection with Saudi Arabian relations with U.S. and British Governments, 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 720 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 722 and Doc. 723 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 727 and Doc. 728 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 734 and Doc. 735 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 685–696 [ Pgs. 685–696 include portions of Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , and Doc. 762 ] passim , 705–708 [ Pgs. 705–708 include portions of Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , and Doc. 773 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 780 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 781 and Doc. 782 ] , 720–738 [ Pgs. 720–738 include portions of Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] passim , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 754–761 [ Pgs. 754–761 include portions of Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , and Doc. 830 ] passim , 767–769 [ Pgs. 767–769 include portions of Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] Ickes, Harold L., 10 n [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 11–12 [ Pgs. 11–12 include portions of Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , and Doc. 9 ] , 13–15 [ Pgs. 13–15 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 20–21 [ Pgs. 20–21 include portions of Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , and Doc. 16 ] , 21 n [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 23 n [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 27 n [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 34 n [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 628 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 1115 [ Pg. 1115 includes portions of Doc. 1136 and Doc. 1137 ] , 1307 n [ Pg. 1307 is part of Doc. 1240 ] Independence movements. See India : Political situation ; Korea ; and under Syria and Lebanon . India, 232–302 [ Pgs. 232–302 include portions of Doc. 238 , Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , Doc. 297 , Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] Afghanistan, trade with, 44–47 [ Pgs. 44–47 include portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 51–55 [ Pgs. 51–55 include portions of Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] Cotton, Indian representations concerning effect of U.S. surplus cotton export program on India’s trade, and U.S. position, 275–281 [ Pgs. 275–281 include portions of Doc. 284 , Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] Cultural cooperation program between United States and India, initiation of, 281–290 [ Pgs. 281–290 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , and Doc. 296 ] Agricultural exchange program, 287–289 [ Pgs. 287–289 include portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , and Doc. 294 ] Technical training for Indian students in United States, proposal for, 284–285 [ Pgs. 284–285 include portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] Visit to United States of Dr. J. M. Kumarappa as guest of State Department, 281–284 [ Pgs. 281–284 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290 ] , 286–287 [ Pgs. 286–287 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Food crisis in India, proposed special allocation of ships to carry wheat to India from Australia, 271–274 [ Pgs. 271–274 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , and Doc. 283 ] Indian Muslim gift of cereals to Saudi Arabia, 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , and Doc. 820 ] Lend-Lease of silver for anti-inflationary purposes, negotiations leading to direct U.S.-Indian agreement and U.S.-British exchange of notes, 248–271 [ Pgs. 248–271 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281 ] British attitude, and U.S.-British discussions regarding, 249–250 [ Pgs. 249–250 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 260–262 [ Pgs. 260–262 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , and Doc. 270 ] , 264–267 [ Pgs. 264–267 include portions of Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , and Doc. 277 ] Evaluation of Indian proposal by U.S. Government, and discussions among U.S. officials, 248–249 [ Pgs. 248–249 include portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 253–255 [ Pgs. 253–255 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 258–260 [ Pgs. 258–260 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , and Doc. 268 ] , 262–264 [ Pgs. 262–264 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , and Doc. 274 ] , 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , and Doc. 278 ] Indian-U.S. conversations regarding, 250–253 [ Pgs. 250–253 include portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , and Doc. 262 ] , 255–258 [ Pgs. 255–258 include portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , and Doc. 266 ] Reciprocal aid to U.S. forces in India, relation to, 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 259–260 [ Pgs. 259–260 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , and Doc. 268 ] Text of U.S.-Indian agreement signed June 8 , 268–269 [ Pgs. 268–269 include portions of Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279 ] ; of U.S.-British exchange of notes, 269–271 [ Pgs. 269–271 include portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281 ] Political situation, U.S. interest in, 232–247 [ Pgs. 232–247 include portions of Doc. 238 , Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] Announcement of release of Gandhi from prison on medical grounds, 234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] Cripps proposals of 1942 as possible basis for negotiations on constitutional settlement, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 232 n [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 238 ] Letter of Aug. 1, 1942 , from President Roosevelt to Gandhi, question of its disposition, 234–237 [ Pgs. 234–237 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] Mission of William Phillips as Personal Representative of President Roosevelt: Correspondence between Phillips and Roosevelt regarding India, unauthorized publication of, and discussions with British concerning, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248 ] , 241–243 [ Pgs. 241–243 include portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , and Doc. 255 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 257 ] Proposed statement to British Government of U.S. interest in Indian situation, 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 239–241 [ Pgs. 239–241 include portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252 ] Publication of Indian telegram to British Foreign Office regarding status of Ambassador Phillips, and U.S.-British discussions concerning, 243–247 [ Pgs. 243–247 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] Resignation of Ambassador Phillips as President’s Personal Representative in India, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 257 ] Rajagopalachari–Gandhi formula for Hindu–Moslem settlement on Pakistan, question of, 238 n [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 240–241 [ Pgs. 240–241 include portions of Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252 ] Viceroy’s statement to Houses of Indian Legislature on political situation, 232–233 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 238 ] Postwar civil aviation, U.S.-Indian discussions regarding, 291–293 [ Pgs. 291–293 include portions of Doc. 297 , Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , and Doc. 300 ] Radiotelegraph circuit between United States and India, establishment of, 293–296 [ Pgs. 293–296 include portions of Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , and Doc. 304 ] United Press, application for lease of teletype telegraphic lines in India, U.S. representations in support of, 297–302 [ Pgs. 297–302 include portions of Doc. 305 , Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] India Supply Mission, 45 [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , and Doc. 34 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Indochina: Americans held by Japanese, 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , and Doc. 1016 ] , 1008–1009 [ Pgs. 1008–1009 include portions of Doc. 1021 , Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , and Doc. 1024 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 1049 and Doc. 1050 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1064 and Doc. 1065 ] , 1048–1049 [ Pgs. 1048–1049 include portions of Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , and Doc. 1068 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. 1093 ] , 1080 [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 1105 and Doc. 1106 ] ; civil affairs administration, question of, 1206 [ Pg. 1206 is part of Doc. 1190 ] Inönü, Ismet, 815 n [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] , 859 n [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 924 and Doc. 925 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 934 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 978 ] International Civil Aviation Conference (Egypt), 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] International Cotton Advisory Committee, 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] International Financial Commission, Greek desire to abolish, and U.S.-British attitude toward, 228–231 [ Pgs. 228–231 include portions of Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] International Petroleum Council, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] International Red Cross: Aid to Americans held by Japan, 923 [ Pg. 923 is part of Doc. 981 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 994 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 994 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 is part of Doc. 1013 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 includes portions of Doc. 1025 and Doc. 1026 ] , 1013–1014 [ Pgs. 1013–1014 include portions of Doc. 1026 , Doc. 1027 , and Doc. 1028 ] , 1016–1080 [ Pgs. 1016–1080 include portions of Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , Doc. 1042 , Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , Doc. 1045 , Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , Doc. 1058 , Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , Doc. 1068 , Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , Doc. 1073 , Doc. 1074 , Doc. 1075 , Doc. 1076 , Doc. 1077 , Doc. 1078 , Doc. 1079 , Doc. 1080 , Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , Doc. 1084 , Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , Doc. 1087 , Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , Doc. 1098 , Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] passim; relief activities in Greece, 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 210 ] International Red Cross Committee, 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 1140 and Doc. 1141 ] , 1127 [ Pg. 1127 is part of Doc. 1141 ] , 1128 [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 1141 and Doc. 1142 ] Iran, 303–499 [ Pgs. 303–499 include portions of Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , Doc. 469 , Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] American advisers in Iran, problems concerning the position of, 390–444 [ Pgs. 390–444 include portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , and Doc. 469 ] British attitude toward adviser program, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , and Doc. 415 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , and Doc. 434 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 770 ] , 711–712 [ Pgs. 711–712 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] Gendarmerie (Schwarzkopf Mission), 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 318 n [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 393–395 [ Pgs. 393–395 include portions of Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , and Doc. 402 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , and Doc. 434 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 421–422 [ Pgs. 421–422 include portions of Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , and Doc. 441 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , and Doc. 446 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 includes portions of Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , and Doc. 449 ] , 428–429 [ Pgs. 428–429 include portions of Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , and Doc. 452 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] Military Mission, 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 318 n [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 396–397 [ Pgs. 396–397 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , and Doc. 405 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 412–413 [ Pgs. 412–413 include portions of Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , and Doc. 426 ] , 419–420 [ Pgs. 419–420 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] , 420–421 [ Pgs. 420–421 include portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 423–424 [ Pgs. 423–424 include portions of Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , and Doc. 446 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 includes portions of Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , and Doc. 449 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 433–435 [ Pgs. 433–435 include portions of Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , and Doc. 459 ] , 442–443 [ Pgs. 442–443 include portions of Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , and Doc. 468 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] Millspaugh Financial Mission: General, 307–342 [ Pgs. 307–342 include portions of Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , and Doc. 344 ] passim , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , and Doc. 369 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , and Doc. 478 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , and Doc. 483 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 510 ] ; Iranian opposition to, and efforts to solve problem, 390–392 [ Pgs. 390–392 include portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 395–396 [ Pgs. 395–396 include portions of Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 397–399 [ Pgs. 397–399 include portions of Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , and Doc. 406 ] , 400–402 [ Pgs. 400–402 include portions of Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , and Doc. 410 ] , 404–407 [ Pgs. 404–407 include portions of Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , and Doc. 417 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 410–412 [ Pgs. 410–412 include portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , and Doc. 424 ] , 413–418 [ Pgs. 413–418 include portions of Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , and Doc. 434 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] , 422–423 [ Pgs. 422–423 include portions of Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , and Doc. 443 ] , 424–425 [ Pgs. 424–425 include portions of Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , and Doc. 445 ] , 427–428 [ Pgs. 427–428 include portions of Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , and Doc. 450 ] , 429–432 [ Pgs. 429–432 include portions of Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , and Doc. 455 ] , 436–442 [ Pgs. 436–442 include portions of Doc. 460 , Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] , 443–444 [ Pgs. 443–444 include portions of Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , and Doc. 469 ] Purpose of adviser program, and U.S. policy regarding, 336–337 [ Pgs. 336–337 include portions of Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , and Doc. 339 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 410 ] Soviet attitude toward adviser program, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 343 ] U.S. note to Iran regarding status of advisers, and Iranian reaction, 406–410 [ Pgs. 406–410 include portions of Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , and Doc. 420 ] American armed forces in Iran ( see also Economic assistance : U.S. military forces , infra ), 355–373 [ Pgs. 355–373 include portions of Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , and Doc. 380 ] Disposal of U.S. military installations and equipment in Iran: British-U.S. tentative agreement on, 367–370 [ Pgs. 367–370 include portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] ; compensation for war damages, Iranian desire for, and U.S.-British attitude, 361–365 [ Pgs. 361–365 include portions of Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , and Doc. 372 ] , 365–366 [ Pgs. 365–366 include portions of Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , and Doc. 372 ] ; transferral to Allied use, question of, 367 [ Pg. 367 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 374 and Doc. 375 ] ; U.S. policy regarding, 365–366 [ Pgs. 365–366 include portions of Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , and Doc. 372 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] Presence of U.S. troops in Iran, problems regarding proposed agreement between Iran and United States: Discussions concerning resumption of negotiations, 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 355–359 [ Pgs. 355–359 include portions of Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] ; position of Shah, 359–361 [ Pgs. 359–361 include portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] ; question of criminal jurisdiction over troops, 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] ; proposal by Iran for legislation legalizing status of troops, and U.S. attitude, 372–373 [ Pgs. 372–373 include portions of Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , and Doc. 380 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] American postwar civil air rights in Iran, U.S. efforts to safeguard: Representations to United Kingdom and Iran regarding, 486–491 [ Pgs. 486–491 include portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , and Doc. 537 ] , 493–496 [ Pgs. 493–496 include portions of Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] ; British and Iranian reactions, 491–493 [ Pgs. 491–493 include portions of Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , and Doc. 539 ] ; settlement of matter ( 1945 ), 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] American scholarships for Iranian students at American University, Beirut, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 31 ] Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance ( 1942 ), 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 380 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , and Doc. 388 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , and Doc. 510 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] Economic assistance to Iran, U.S. policy of, and efforts to implement Tehran Declaration of Dec. 1, 1943 regarding Iran ( see also American advisers , supra ), 306–355 [ Pgs. 306–355 include portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358 ] Consultation and coordination of efforts of U.S., British, and Soviet Ambassadors in Tehran, 326–327 [ Pgs. 326–327 include portions of Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , and Doc. 330 ] , 328–331 [ Pgs. 328–331 include portions of Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] , 332–337 [ Pgs. 332–337 include portions of Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , and Doc. 339 ] Conversations of American Ambassadors Morris and Harriman with the Shah, 353–355 [ Pgs. 353–355 include portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358 ] Exchange of messages between Shahanshah of Iran and President Roosevelt, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 348–351 [ Pgs. 348–351 include portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , and Doc. 354 ] Grain collection in Iran, résumé of situation, and U.S.-British consultation, 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 327–328 [ Pgs. 327–328 include portions of Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , and Doc. 331 ] Iranian press attacks on Allies, proposed tripartite representation to Iranian Government regarding, 342–343 [ Pgs. 342–343 include portions of Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] Soviet exploitation of Iran, and U.S. and British positions regarding, 312–316 [ Pgs. 312–316 include portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 321–324 [ Pgs. 321–324 include portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327 ] , 320–327 [ Pgs. 320–327 include portions of Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , and Doc. 330 ] , 351–352 [ Pgs. 351–352 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] U.S. military forces: Increased assistance to Iran, broadening of directives to permit, 306–311 [ Pgs. 306–311 include portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320 ] , 317–321 [ Pgs. 317–321 include portions of Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , and Doc. 326 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] Inspection tour by Shah and other Iranian officials as guests of U.S. military forces, 316–317 [ Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322 ] Withdrawal of American military personnel from Iranian Road Transport Administration, question of, 339–340 [ Pgs. 339–340 include portions of Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , and Doc. 343 ] , 346–348 [ Pgs. 346–348 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] U.S. policy in Iran, considerations in development and implementation of, 340–342 [ Pgs. 340–342 include portions of Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , and Doc. 344 ] , 343–346 [ Pgs. 343–346 include portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , and Doc. 348 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] Elevation of American and British Legations in Tehran and Iranian Legations in Washington and London to status of Embassies, 303–306 [ Pgs. 303–306 include portions of Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] Exports to United States, Iranian representations with respect to increasing transportation facilities for, and U.S. reply, 497–499 [ Pgs. 497–499 include portions of Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] Millspaugh Financial Mission. See under American advisers , supra . Oil concessions in Iran, 445–486 [ Pgs. 445–486 include portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] American oil companies, negotiations with Iran regarding, and U.S. attitude, 445–452 [ Pgs. 445–452 include portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] Postponement by Iran of petroleum development negotiations: Iranian announcement of, 455–456 [ Pgs. 455–456 include portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , and Doc. 488 ] Iranian legislation forbidding oil concession negotiations with foreign representatives, 479–481 [ Pgs. 479–481 include portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] Soviet unfavorable reaction: Aggressive actions by Soviet Government, and resulting tension in Soviet-Iranian relations, 351–352 [ Pgs. 351–352 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , and Doc. 488 ] , 457–459 [ Pgs. 457–459 include portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491 ] , 460–461 [ Pgs. 460–461 include portions of Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , and Doc. 495 ] , 464–465 [ Pgs. 464–465 include portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] , 466–472 [ Pgs. 466–472 include portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , and Doc. 510 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , and Doc. 516 ] , 479–484 [ Pgs. 479–484 include portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , and Doc. 525 ] ; British position, 472–473 [ Pgs. 472–473 include portions of Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , and Doc. 510 ] , 474–478 [ Pgs. 474–478 include portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , and Doc. 516 ] ; U.S. attitude and representations, 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 462–463 [ Pgs. 462–463 include portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 473–474 [ Pgs. 473–474 include portions of Doc. 510 and Doc. 511 ] , 478–479 [ Pgs. 478–479 include portions of Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 480–483 [ Pgs. 480–483 include portions of Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 484–485 [ Pgs. 484–485 include portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] U.S. reaction, 456–457 [ Pgs. 456–457 include portions of Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , and Doc. 490 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 461–462 [ Pgs. 461–462 include portions of Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] , 465–466 [ Pgs. 465–466 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] Tehran Conference Declaration regarding Iran ( 1943 ) ( see also Economic assistance , supra ), 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , and Doc. 525 ] Iraq ( see also Palestine ): American scholarships for Iraqi students at American University, Beirut, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 31 ] ; settlement of claims for damages suffered by American nationals during the 1941 revolt, 500–503 [ Pgs. 500–503 include portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] ; U.S. diplomatic mission in Iraq, U.S.-British exchange regarding status of, 3–5 [ Pgs. 3–5 include portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Jabiri, Sandallah al-, 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] , 778 n [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 857 and Doc. 858 ] , 801–802 [ Pgs. 801–802 include portions of Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] Japan, 919–1289 [ Pgs. 919–1289 include portions of Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , Doc. 989 , Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , Doc. 1009 , Doc. 1010 , Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , Doc. 1016 , Doc. 1017 , Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , Doc. 1020 , Doc. 1021 , Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , Doc. 1025 , Doc. 1026 , Doc. 1027 , Doc. 1028 , Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , Doc. 1042 , Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , Doc. 1045 , Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , Doc. 1058 , Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , Doc. 1068 , Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , Doc. 1073 , Doc. 1074 , Doc. 1075 , Doc. 1076 , Doc. 1077 , Doc. 1078 , Doc. 1079 , Doc. 1080 , Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , Doc. 1084 , Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , Doc. 1087 , Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , Doc. 1098 , Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , Doc. 1109 , Doc. 1110 , Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , Doc. 1113 , Doc. 1114 , Doc. 1115 , Doc. 1116 , Doc. 1117 , Doc. 1118 , Doc. 1119 , Doc. 1120 , Doc. 1121 , Doc. 1122 , Doc. 1123 , Doc. 1124 , Doc. 1125 , Doc. 1126 , Doc. 1127 , Doc. 1128 , Doc. 1129 , Doc. 1130 , Doc. 1131 , Doc. 1132 , Doc. 1133 , Doc. 1134 , Doc. 1135 , Doc. 1136 , Doc. 1137 , Doc. 1138 , Doc. 1139 , Doc. 1140 , Doc. 1141 , Doc. 1142 , Doc. 1143 , Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , Doc. 1146 , Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , Doc. 1149 , Doc. 1150 , Doc. 1151 , Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , Doc. 1154 , Doc. 1155 , Doc. 1156 , Doc. 1157 , Doc. 1158 , Doc. 1159 , Doc. 1160 , Doc. 1161 , Doc. 1162 , Doc. 1163 , Doc. 1164 , Doc. 1165 , Doc. 1166 , Doc. 1167 , Doc. 1168 , Doc. 1169 , Doc. 1170 , Doc. 1171 , Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , Doc. 1174 , Doc. 1175 , Doc. 1176 , Doc. 1177 , Doc. 1178 , Doc. 1179 , Doc. 1180 , Doc. 1181 , Doc. 1182 , Doc. 1183 , Doc. 1184 , Doc. 1185 , Doc. 1186 , Doc. 1187 , Doc. 1188 , Doc. 1189 , Doc. 1190 , Doc. 1191 , Doc. 1192 , Doc. 1193 , Doc. 1194 , Doc. 1195 , Doc. 1196 , Doc. 1197 , Doc. 1198 , Doc. 1199 , Doc. 1200 , Doc. 1201 , Doc. 1202 , Doc. 1203 , Doc. 1204 , Doc. 1205 , Doc. 1206 , Doc. 1207 , Doc. 1208 , Doc. 1209 , Doc. 1210 , Doc. 1211 , Doc. 1212 , Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , Doc. 1217 , Doc. 1218 , Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , Doc. 1222 , Doc. 1223 , Doc. 1224 , Doc. 1225 , and Doc. 1226 ] American diplomatic and consular property, including archives, in occupied China, Japanese violation of, 1178–1183 [ Pgs. 1178–1183 include portions of Doc. 1177 and Doc. 1178 ] American Legation in Thailand, U.S. protest against conduct of Japanese armed forces toward, 1173–1174 [ Pgs. 1173–1174 include portions of Doc. 1172 and Doc. 1173 ] Exchange of American and Japanese nationals. See Third exchange , infra . Financial and other assistance to Americans and alien dependents held by Japan, U.S. efforts to send, 1015–1081 [ Pgs. 1015–1081 include portions of Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , Doc. 1033 , Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , Doc. 1038 , Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , Doc. 1042 , Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , Doc. 1045 , Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , Doc. 1050 , Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , Doc. 1055 , Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , Doc. 1058 , Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , Doc. 1061 , Doc. 1062 , Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , Doc. 1068 , Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , Doc. 1073 , Doc. 1074 , Doc. 1075 , Doc. 1076 , Doc. 1077 , Doc. 1078 , Doc. 1079 , Doc. 1080 , Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , Doc. 1084 , Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , Doc. 1087 , Doc. 1088 , Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , Doc. 1098 , Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , and Doc. 1107 ] Allied aircraft, proposed use of to drop supplies in Japanese-held territory, 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , and Doc. 1101 ] American nationals (including Filipinos) in— China: Hong Kong, 1018 [ Pg. 1018 includes portions of Doc. 1032 and Doc. 1033 ] , 1023–1024 [ Pgs. 1023–1024 include portions of Doc. 1039 , Doc. 1040 , and Doc. 1041 ] ; occupied China, 1017 [ Pg. 1017 includes portions of Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , and Doc. 1032 ] , 1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 1037 and Doc. 1038 ] , 1024–1025 [ Pgs. 1024–1025 include portions of Doc. 1040 , Doc. 1041 , and Doc. 1042 ] , 1027–1029 [ Pgs. 1027–1029 include portions of Doc. 1043 , Doc. 1044 , Doc. 1045 , and Doc. 1046 ] , 1031–1032 [ Pgs. 1031–1032 include portions of Doc. 1048 , Doc. 1049 , and Doc. 1050 ] , 1038–1040 [ Pgs. 1038–1040 include portions of Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , Doc. 1058 , Doc. 1059 , and Doc. 1060 ] , 1056–1057 [ Pgs. 1056–1057 include portions of Doc. 1075 and Doc. 1076 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 includes portions of Doc. 1077 and Doc. 1078 ] , 1061–1062 [ Pgs. 1061–1062 include portions of Doc. 1079 , Doc. 1080 , and Doc. 1081 ] , 1069–1070 [ Pgs. 1069–1070 include portions of Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] , 1072–1073 [ Pgs. 1072–1073 include portions of Doc. 1093 , Doc. 1094 , and Doc. 1095 ] , 1074–1075 [ Pgs. 1074–1075 include portions of Doc. 1095 , Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , and Doc. 1098 ] , 1076–1077 [ Pgs. 1076–1077 include portions of Doc. 1098 , Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , and Doc. 1101 ] , 1077–1078 [ Pgs. 1077–1078 include portions of Doc. 1099 , Doc. 1100 , Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , and Doc. 1104 ] ; Shanghai, 1015–1017 [ Pgs. 1015–1017 include portions of Doc. 1029 , Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , and Doc. 1032 ] , 1017–1018 [ Pgs. 1017–1018 include portions of Doc. 1030 , Doc. 1031 , Doc. 1032 , and Doc. 1033 ] , 1020–1021 [ Pgs. 1020–1021 include portions of Doc. 1034 , Doc. 1035 , Doc. 1036 , and Doc. 1037 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 1039 and Doc. 1040 ] , 1025–1026 [ Pgs. 1025–1026 include portions of Doc. 1041 and Doc. 1042 ] , 1030–1031 [ Pgs. 1030–1031 include portions of Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , Doc. 1048 , and Doc. 1049 ] , 1037–1038 [ Pgs. 1037–1038 include portions of Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , and Doc. 1058 ] , 1040–1041 [ Pgs. 1040–1041 include portions of Doc. 1058 , Doc. 1059 , Doc. 1060 , and Doc. 1061 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 1061 and Doc. 1062 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 includes portions of Doc. 1073 and Doc. 1074 ] , 1057 [ Pg. 1057 includes portions of Doc. 1075 and Doc. 1076 ] , 1067–1068 [ Pgs. 1067–1068 include portions of Doc. 1086 , Doc. 1087 , and Doc. 1088 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 includes portions of Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] , 1078–1079 [ Pgs. 1078–1079 include portions of Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , Doc. 1104 , and Doc. 1105 ] Guam, 1029–1030 [ Pgs. 1029–1030 include portions of Doc. 1045 , Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , and Doc. 1048 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , and Doc. 1054 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1063 and Doc. 1064 ] Indochina, 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 1049 and Doc. 1050 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 includes portions of Doc. 1064 and Doc. 1065 ] , 1048–1049 [ Pgs. 1048–1049 include portions of Doc. 1065 , Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , and Doc. 1068 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. 1093 ] , 1080 [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 1105 and Doc. 1106 ] Japan, 1030 [ Pg. 1030 includes portions of Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , and Doc. 1048 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 1049 and Doc. 1050 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , and Doc. 1054 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 1063 and Doc. 1064 ] , 1053 [ Pg. 1053 includes portions of Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , and Doc. 1072 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 includes portions of Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] , 1079–1080 [ Pgs. 1079–1080 include portions of Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] Philippine Islands, 1015 [ Pg. 1015 includes portions of Doc. 1029 and Doc. 1030 ] , 1021–1022 [ Pgs. 1021–1022 include portions of Doc. 1036 , Doc. 1037 , and Doc. 1038 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 1049 and Doc. 1050 ] , 1034–1035 [ Pgs. 1034–1035 include portions of Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , and Doc. 1055 ] , 1045–1046 [ Pgs. 1045–1046 include portions of Doc. 1063 , Doc. 1064 , and Doc. 1065 ] , 1046–1048 [ Pgs. 1046–1048 include portions of Doc. 1064 , Doc. 1065 , and Doc. 1066 ] , 1049 [ Pg. 1049 includes portions of Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , and Doc. 1068 ] , 1051–1052 [ Pgs. 1051–1052 include portions of Doc. 1068 , Doc. 1069 , and Doc. 1070 ] , 1053–1054 [ Pgs. 1053–1054 include portions of Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , Doc. 1072 , and Doc. 1073 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 includes portions of Doc. 1087 and Doc. 1088 ] , 1080–1081 [ Pgs. 1080–1081 include portions of Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , and Doc. 1107 ] Conversations with British and Netherlands Governments regarding proposed joint representations to Japan on general questions of relief, 1069–1070 [ Pgs. 1069–1070 include portions of Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] , 1075–1076 [ Pgs. 1075–1076 include portions of Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , Doc. 1098 , and Doc. 1099 ] , 1078–1079 [ Pgs. 1078–1079 include portions of Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , Doc. 1104 , and Doc. 1105 ] Estimated number of American civilians held by Japan, 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 1061 and Doc. 1062 ] Exchange rates, question of, 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 1030 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 1039 and Doc. 1040 ] , 1025–1026 [ Pgs. 1025–1026 include portions of Doc. 1041 and Doc. 1042 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 includes portions of Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , and Doc. 1091 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 1098 and Doc. 1099 ] , 1079 [ Pg. 1079 includes portions of Doc. 1104 and Doc. 1105 ] Mail ( see also Mail privileges under Prisoners of war, etc. , infra ), transmission of, 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 1041 and Doc. 1042 ] , 1030 [ Pg. 1030 includes portions of Doc. 1046 , Doc. 1047 , and Doc. 1048 ] , 1031 [ Pg. 1031 includes portions of Doc. 1048 and Doc. 1049 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 1056 , Doc. 1057 , and Doc. 1058 ] , 1054–1055 [ Pgs. 1054–1055 include portions of Doc. 1072 , Doc. 1073 , and Doc. 1074 ] , 1065–1066 [ Pgs. 1065–1066 include portions of Doc. 1083 , Doc. 1084 , and Doc. 1085 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 1096 , Doc. 1097 , and Doc. 1098 ] , 1078 [ Pg. 1078 includes portions of Doc. 1101 , Doc. 1102 , Doc. 1103 , and Doc. 1104 ] Reciprocity in connection with transportation and distribution of relief sent from Japan to Japanese internees in United States and Canada, 1058–1059 [ Pgs. 1058–1059 include portions of Doc. 1077 , Doc. 1078 , and Doc. 1079 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 1079 and Doc. 1080 ] , 1063 [ Pg. 1063 includes portions of Doc. 1081 and Doc. 1082 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 1083 and Doc. 1084 ] , 1066–1067 [ Pgs. 1066–1067 include portions of Doc. 1084 , Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , and Doc. 1087 ] Soviet Union, U.S. efforts to send assistance by way of, 1015 n [ Pg. 1015 includes portions of Doc. 1029 and Doc. 1030 ] , 1019–1020 [ Pgs. 1019–1020 include portions of Doc. 1034 and Doc. 1035 ] , 1033–1034 [ Pgs. 1033–1034 include portions of Doc. 1051 , Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , and Doc. 1054 ] , 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 1054 and Doc. 1055 ] , 1041–1043 [ Pgs. 1041–1043 include portions of Doc. 1060 and Doc. 1061 ] , 1049–1051 [ Pgs. 1049–1051 include portions of Doc. 1066 , Doc. 1067 , Doc. 1068 , and Doc. 1069 ] , 1059–1061 [ Pgs. 1059–1061 include portions of Doc. 1078 , Doc. 1079 , and Doc. 1080 ] , 1062–1065 [ Pgs. 1062–1065 include portions of Doc. 1080 , Doc. 1081 , Doc. 1082 , Doc. 1083 , and Doc. 1084 ] , 1066–1067 [ Pgs. 1066–1067 include portions of Doc. 1084 , Doc. 1085 , Doc. 1086 , and Doc. 1087 ] , 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , Doc. 1093 , and Doc. 1094 ] , 1087 [ Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 1111 and Doc. 1112 ] Swiss efforts to extend distribution of relief to Americans in all Japanese-held areas, 1052–1053 [ Pgs. 1052–1053 include portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , and Doc. 1072 ] , 1070–1071 [ Pgs. 1070–1071 include portions of Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. 1093 ] , 1073–1074 [ Pgs. 1073–1074 include portions of Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , and Doc. 1096 ] , 1079–1080 [ Pgs. 1079–1080 include portions of Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] Japanese envoy to the Vatican, Japanese protest against treatment accorded by U.S. armed forces, and U.S. reply, 1171–1175 [ Pgs. 1171–1175 include portions of Doc. 1170 , Doc. 1171 , Doc. 1172 , Doc. 1173 , and Doc. 1174 ] Mandated islands. See under Postwar policy planning, etc. , infra . Opium traffic in areas to be liberated from Japanese control, citation to correspondence regarding, 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 979 ] Peace feeler from Japan received through Sweden, U.S. and British decisions not to reply, 1183–1186 [ Pgs. 1183–1186 include portions of Doc. 1177 , Doc. 1178 , Doc. 1179 , Doc. 1180 , and Doc. 1181 ] Poison gas, Japanese assurances with respect to, 1169–1170 [ Pgs. 1169–1170 include portions of Doc. 1167 , Doc. 1168 , and Doc. 1169 ] Postwar policy planning in regard to Japan and areas under Japanese control ( see also Thailand ), 1186–1289 [ Pgs. 1186–1289 include portions of Doc. 1180 , Doc. 1181 , Doc. 1182 , Doc. 1183 , Doc. 1184 , Doc. 1185 , Doc. 1186 , Doc. 1187 , Doc. 1188 , Doc. 1189 , Doc. 1190 , Doc. 1191 , Doc. 1192 , Doc. 1193 , Doc. 1194 , Doc. 1195 , Doc. 1196 , Doc. 1197 , Doc. 1198 , Doc. 1199 , Doc. 1200 , Doc. 1201 , Doc. 1202 , Doc. 1203 , Doc. 1204 , Doc. 1205 , Doc. 1206 , Doc. 1207 , Doc. 1208 , Doc. 1209 , Doc. 1210 , Doc. 1211 , Doc. 1212 , Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , Doc. 1215 , Doc. 1216 , Doc. 1217 , Doc. 1218 , Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , Doc. 1222 , Doc. 1223 , Doc. 1224 , Doc. 1225 , and Doc. 1226 ] China, consideration of policy toward ( see also Formosa , Korea , and Manchuria , infra ), 1233–1234 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 1204 ] , 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 1215 and Doc. 1216 ] , 1265 [ Pg. 1265 is part of Doc. 1216 ] Civil affairs administration, consideration of general policy and plans for, 1187–1188 [ Pgs. 1187–1188 include portions of Doc. 1181 , Doc. 1182 , and Doc. 1183 ] , 1190–1196 [ Pgs. 1190–1196 include portions of Doc. 1184 , Doc. 1185 , and Doc. 1186 ] , 1205–1206 [ Pgs. 1205–1206 include portions of Doc. 1189 and Doc. 1190 ] , 1261–1265 [ Pgs. 1261–1265 include portions of Doc. 1213 , Doc. 1214 , Doc. 1215 , and Doc. 1216 ] Former German islands in the Pacific, 1223–1224 [ Pgs. 1223–1224 include portions of Doc. 1199 , Doc. 1200 , and Doc. 1201 ] Formosa, occupation and military government, considerations regarding, and question of Chinese and Soviet interests in, 1266–1274 [ Pgs. 1266–1274 include portions of Doc. 1217 , Doc. 1218 , Doc. 1219 , Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , Doc. 1222 , and Doc. 1223 ] French Indochina, considerations in regard to civil affairs administration, 1206 [ Pg. 1206 is part of Doc. 1190 ] Karafuto (Southern Sakhalin), occupation and military government, and question of Soviet interest in, 1211–1213 [ Pgs. 1211–1213 include portions of Doc. 1193 and Doc. 1194 ] Korea, occupation and military government, considerations regarding: British, Chinese, and Soviet interests in, consideration of, 1225–1227 [ Pg. 1225 is part of Doc. 1201 ] , 1241 [ Pg. 1241 is part of Doc. 1207 ] ; composition of occupation forces, 1224–1228 [ Pgs. 1224–1228 include portions of Doc. 1200 , Doc. 1201 , and Doc. 1202 ] ; general policy toward, 1234 [ Pg. 1234 is part of Doc. 1204 ] ; Japanese technical personnel, status of, 1228–1230 [ Pgs. 1228–1230 include portions of Doc. 1201 , Doc. 1202 , and Doc. 1203 ] ; provisional Korean government, 1239–1242 [ Pgs. 1239–1242 include portions of Doc. 1206 , Doc. 1207 , and Doc. 1208 ] Manchuria (“Manchukuo”), government during period of military occupation, question of, 1194 [ Pg. 1194 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , 1255–1256 [ Pgs. 1255–1256 include portions of Doc. 1210 and Doc. 1211 ] Mandated islands: Evacuation of Japanese nationals, question of, 1216–1217 [ Pgs. 1216–1217 include portions of Doc. 1195 , Doc. 1196 , and Doc. 1197 ] ; financial directive for, proposed, 1188–1189 [ Pgs. 1188–1189 include portions of Doc. 1182 and Doc. 1183 ] ; military government in, considerations regarding, 1186–1187 [ Pgs. 1186–1187 include portions of Doc. 1180 , Doc. 1181 , and Doc. 1182 ] , 1217–1218 [ Pgs. 1217–1218 include portions of Doc. 1196 and Doc. 1197 ] ; treatment of inhabitants, 1268 [ Pg. 1268 is part of Doc. 1218 ] ; ultimate disposition of, and considerations of security, 1193 [ Pg. 1193 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , 1201 [ Pg. 1201 is part of Doc. 1188 ] , 1266 [ Pg. 1266 includes portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] Netherlands East Indies, civil administration and jurisdiction in, 1196–1198 [ Pgs. 1196–1198 include portions of Doc. 1186 and Doc. 1187 ] ; U.S.-Netherlands Indies agreement on principles governing arrangements for ( Dec. 10 ), text, 1286–1289 [ Pgs. 1286–1289 include portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] Occupation and military government of Japan, problems and plans regarding: Abolition of militarism and strengthening of democratic processes, 1257–1260 [ Pg. 1257 is part of Doc. 1212 ] Character of military government, 1213–1214 [ Pgs. 1213–1214 include portions of Doc. 1193 , Doc. 1194 , and Doc. 1195 ] Duration of military government, 1237–1239 [ Pgs. 1237–1239 include portions of Doc. 1206 and Doc. 1207 ] Emperor, institution of, 1250–1255 [ Pgs. 1250–1255 include portions of Doc. 1210 and Doc. 1211 ] Extent of occupation, 1230–1231 [ Pgs. 1230–1231 include portions of Doc. 1202 and Doc. 1203 ] Freedom of religion, 1207–1208 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1191 ] Japanese diplomatic and consular officers, status of, 1198–1200 [ Pgs. 1198–1200 include portions of Doc. 1186 and Doc. 1187 ] Nullification of obnoxious laws, 1214–1216 [ Pgs. 1214–1216 include portions of Doc. 1194 , Doc. 1195 , and Doc. 1196 ] Occupation forces, composition of, 1202–1205 [ Pgs. 1202–1205 include portions of Doc. 1189 and Doc. 1190 ] Political parties or agencies, 1219–1221 [ Pgs. 1219–1221 include portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] Proclamations, issuance of, 1209–1210 [ Pg. 1209 is part of Doc. 1192 ] Suspension of powers of government, 1247–1249 [ Pg. 1247 is part of Doc. 1209 ] War criminals, treatment of, 1221–1223 [ Pgs. 1221–1223 include portions of Doc. 1198 , Doc. 1199 , and Doc. 1200 ] Sakhalin. See Karafuto , supra . Segregation of Japanese civilians in liberated areas, question of, 1242–1246 [ Pgs. 1242–1246 include portions of Doc. 1207 and Doc. 1208 ] Shintoism, 1207–1208 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1191 ] State – War – Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), proposal for establishment of, 1274–1275 [ Pgs. 1274–1275 include portions of Doc. 1222 , Doc. 1223 , and Doc. 1224 ] Surrender terms for Japan, consideration of underlying principles, 1275–1285 [ Pgs. 1275–1285 include portions of Doc. 1223 , Doc. 1224 , and Doc. 1225 ] U.S. policy and postwar objectives in Japan and the Far East, 1232–1236 [ Pgs. 1232–1236 include portions of Doc. 1204 and Doc. 1205 ] , 1285–1286 [ Pgs. 1285–1286 include portions of Doc. 1224 , Doc. 1225 , and Doc. 1226 ] Prisoners of war and civilian internees, U.S. and Japanese treatment of ( see also Treatment of Japanese nationals, etc. , infra ), 917–1014 [ Pgs. 917–1014 include portions of Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , Doc. 989 , Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , Doc. 996 , Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , Doc. 1001 , Doc. 1002 , Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , Doc. 1009 , Doc. 1010 , Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , Doc. 1016 , Doc. 1017 , Doc. 1018 , Doc. 1019 , Doc. 1020 , Doc. 1021 , Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , Doc. 1025 , Doc. 1026 , Doc. 1027 , and Doc. 1028 ] Aviators captured by Japan, 997–998 [ Pgs. 997–998 include portions of Doc. 1010 , Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , and Doc. 1013 ] , 1003–1004 [ Pgs. 1003–1004 include portions of Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , and Doc. 1016 ] , 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 1026 , Doc. 1027 , and Doc. 1028 ] British position, 990 n [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , and Doc. 1007 ] China, internment of American and other Allied nationals in, 919–920 [ Pgs. 919–920 include portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 940–941 [ Pgs. 940–941 include portions of Doc. 992 , Doc. 993 , and Doc. 994 ] , 988–989 [ Pgs. 988–989 include portions of Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , and Doc. 1005 ] , 991 [ Pg. 991 includes portions of Doc. 1007 and Doc. 1008 ] , 992–994 [ Pgs. 992–994 include portions of Doc. 1008 and Doc. 1009 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 includes portions of Doc. 1016 and Doc. 1017 ] , 1009–1010 [ Pgs. 1009–1010 include portions of Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , Doc. 1024 , and Doc. 1025 ] Escape attempts, cases of, Japanese sentences for, 931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 includes portions of Doc. 1019 and Doc. 1020 ] Food, clothing, medicines, housing, etc., U.S. concern for inadequate supply of ( see also Mistreatment, etc. : U.S. protest , infra ), 919–920 [ Pgs. 919–920 include portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 997 and Doc. 998 ] , 992–994 [ Pgs. 992–994 include portions of Doc. 1008 and Doc. 1009 ] , 1010–1012 [ Pgs. 1010–1012 include portions of Doc. 1024 , Doc. 1025 , and Doc. 1026 ] Geneva Convention of 1929 , question of Japanese compliance with terms of, 921–925 [ Pgs. 921–925 include portions of Doc. 981 and Doc. 982 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 935–936 [ Pgs. 935–936 include portions of Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , and Doc. 988 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. 988 and Doc. 989 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 991 and Doc. 992 ] , 943–944 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 994 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 994 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 994 ] , 992 n [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 1008 and Doc. 1009 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , and Doc. 1016 ] , 1009 [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , and Doc. 1024 ] , 1011–1012 [ Pgs. 1011–1012 include portions of Doc. 1025 and Doc. 1026 ] ; representations to Swedish and Spanish Governments regarding, 992 n [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 1008 and Doc. 1009 ] Indochina, reports on conditions of Japanese-held Americans, 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , and Doc. 1016 ] , 1008–1009 [ Pgs. 1008–1009 include portions of Doc. 1021 , Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , and Doc. 1024 ] International Red Cross. See Visits, etc. , infra . Mail privileges, 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , and Doc. 986 ] , 938–939 [ Pgs. 938–939 include portions of Doc. 990 , Doc. 991 , and Doc. 992 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 includes portions of Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , and Doc. 1001 ] , 990–991 [ Pgs. 990–991 include portions of Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , Doc. 1007 , and Doc. 1008 ] , 1004–1005 [ Pgs. 1004–1005 include portions of Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , Doc. 1016 , and Doc. 1017 ] Manchuria, U.S. concern for Japanese-held Americans in, 987 [ Pg. 987 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] Mistreatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees: Japanese reply to U.S. protest of Dec. 12, 1942 , 966–982 [ Pgs. 966–982 include portions of Doc. 995 and Doc. 996 ] Transfer of Japanese nationals from Central and South America to United States, Japanese protests and U.S. replies, 964–965 [ Pgs. 964–965 include portions of Doc. 994 and Doc. 995 ] , 965 n [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 994 and Doc. 995 ] U.S. protest alleging mistreatment of Japanese-held Americans, and statement of specific cases of, 921–932 [ Pgs. 921–932 include portions of Doc. 981 and Doc. 982 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] ; Japanese reply, including counter-allegations, 941–965 [ Pgs. 941–965 include portions of Doc. 993 , Doc. 994 , and Doc. 995 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 1010 ] , 998–1003 [ Pgs. 998–1003 include portions of Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , Doc. 1013 , and Doc. 1014 ] Philippines, U.S. concern for Japanese-held Americans in ( see also Mistreatment, etc. , supra ), 998 [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 1011 , Doc. 1012 , and Doc. 1013 ] , 1003 [ Pg. 1003 includes portions of Doc. 1013 and Doc. 1014 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 includes portions of Doc. 1016 and Doc. 1017 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 1018 ] Salaries of officer prisoners, payment of, 934–935 [ Pgs. 934–935 include portions of Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , and Doc. 987 ] Sick and injured, U.S. concern regarding Japanese treatment of ( see also Mistreatment, etc. , supra ), 919–920 [ Pgs. 919–920 include portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 988–989 [ Pgs. 988–989 include portions of Doc. 1003 , Doc. 1004 , and Doc. 1005 ] , 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 1009 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , and Doc. 1016 ] , 1008–1009 [ Pgs. 1008–1009 include portions of Doc. 1021 , Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , and Doc. 1024 ] Thailand, U.S. concern for Japanese-held Americans in, 933 [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 983 and Doc. 984 ] , 1003–1004 [ Pgs. 1003–1004 include portions of Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , and Doc. 1016 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 includes portions of Doc. 1019 and Doc. 1020 ] Visits of inspection by representatives of protecting powers and International Red Cross, question of ( see also Geneva Convention of 1929 , and Mistreatment, etc. , supra ), 920 [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 979 and Doc. 980 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 981 and Doc. 982 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , and Doc. 986 ] , 935–936 [ Pgs. 935–936 include portions of Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , and Doc. 988 ] , 936–937 [ Pgs. 936–937 include portions of Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , and Doc. 989 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 990 and Doc. 991 ] , 939–940 [ Pgs. 939–940 include portions of Doc. 991 , Doc. 992 , and Doc. 993 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 includes portions of Doc. 995 and Doc. 996 ] , 983–985 [ Pgs. 983–985 include portions of Doc. 997 , Doc. 998 , Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , and Doc. 1001 ] , 985–987 [ Pgs. 985–987 include portions of Doc. 999 , Doc. 1000 , Doc. 1001 , and Doc. 1002 ] , 989–990 [ Pgs. 989–990 include portions of Doc. 1004 , Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , and Doc. 1007 ] , 991–992 [ Pgs. 991–992 include portions of Doc. 1007 , Doc. 1008 , and Doc. 1009 ] , 995–997 [ Pgs. 995–997 include portions of Doc. 1010 and Doc. 1011 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 is part of Doc. 1013 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 includes portions of Doc. 1016 and Doc. 1017 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 includes portions of Doc. 1025 and Doc. 1026 ] , 1013–1014 [ Pgs. 1013–1014 include portions of Doc. 1026 , Doc. 1027 , and Doc. 1028 ] , 1127 [ Pg. 1127 is part of Doc. 1141 ] Protests by Japan, and U.S. replies, relative to— U.S. attacks on hospital ships, 1147–1166 [ Pgs. 1147–1166 include portions of Doc. 1151 , Doc. 1152 , Doc. 1153 , Doc. 1154 , Doc. 1155 , Doc. 1156 , Doc. 1157 , Doc. 1158 , Doc. 1159 , Doc. 1160 , Doc. 1161 , Doc. 1162 , Doc. 1163 , and Doc. 1164 ] U.S. bombing of allegedly nonmilitary objectives, 1167–1169 [ Pgs. 1167–1169 include portions of Doc. 1165 , Doc. 1166 , Doc. 1167 , and Doc. 1168 ] Relief shipments to American nationals held by Japan. See Financial and other assistance , supra . Repatriation of nationals. See Third exchange , infra . Shintoism, 1207–1208 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 1191 ] Third exchange of American and Japanese nationals, U.S. efforts to arrange, 1081–1099 [ Pgs. 1081–1099 include portions of Doc. 1106 , Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , Doc. 1109 , Doc. 1110 , Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , Doc. 1113 , Doc. 1114 , Doc. 1115 , Doc. 1116 , Doc. 1117 , Doc. 1118 , Doc. 1119 , Doc. 1120 , Doc. 1121 , Doc. 1122 , Doc. 1123 , Doc. 1124 , Doc. 1125 , Doc. 1126 , Doc. 1127 , Doc. 1128 , Doc. 1129 , Doc. 1130 , and Doc. 1131 ] Allied nationals, proposed exchange for certain isolated Japanese garrisons, 1096–1098 [ Pgs. 1096–1098 include portions of Doc. 1126 , Doc. 1127 , Doc. 1128 , and Doc. 1129 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 includes portions of Doc. 1130 and Doc. 1131 ] Allocation of space on exchange vessels, 1082–1083 [ Pgs. 1082–1083 include portions of Doc. 1108 and Doc. 1109 ] Anglo-Japanese exchange, relation to, 1091–1094 [ Pgs. 1091–1094 include portions of Doc. 1118 , Doc. 1119 , Doc. 1120 , Doc. 1121 , Doc. 1122 , Doc. 1123 , and Doc. 1124 ] passim Arrangements for exchange, proposals and discussions ( see also Transportation, etc. , infra ), 1081–1083 [ Pgs. 1081–1083 include portions of Doc. 1106 , Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , and Doc. 1109 ] , 1085–1088 [ Pgs. 1085–1088 include portions of Doc. 1110 , Doc. 1111 , Doc. 1112 , Doc. 1113 , and Doc. 1114 ] , 1090–1091 [ Pgs. 1090–1091 include portions of Doc. 1117 , Doc. 1118 , Doc. 1119 , and Doc. 1120 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 includes portions of Doc. 1127 , Doc. 1128 , and Doc. 1129 ] Continuous exchanges, proposed, 1089–1090 [ Pgs. 1089–1090 include portions of Doc. 1115 , Doc. 1116 , Doc. 1117 , and Doc. 1118 ] Quotas and priorities, question of, 1083–1085 [ Pgs. 1083–1085 include portions of Doc. 1108 , Doc. 1109 , Doc. 1110 , and Doc. 1111 ] , 1080–1087 [ Pgs. 1080–1087 include portions of Doc. 1105 , Doc. 1106 , Doc. 1107 , Doc. 1108 , Doc. 1109 , Doc. 1110 , Doc. 1111 , and Doc. 1112 ] Transportation and related difficulties, discussions concerning solution of, 1091–1095 [ Pgs. 1091–1095 include portions of Doc. 1118 , Doc. 1119 , Doc. 1120 , Doc. 1121 , Doc. 1122 , Doc. 1123 , Doc. 1124 , and Doc. 1125 ] Treatment of Japanese nationals by United States, representations by Japan regarding ( see also Prisoners of war, etc. : Mistreatment , supra ), 1099–1146 [ Pgs. 1099–1146 include portions of Doc. 1130 , Doc. 1131 , Doc. 1132 , Doc. 1133 , Doc. 1134 , Doc. 1135 , Doc. 1136 , Doc. 1137 , Doc. 1138 , Doc. 1139 , Doc. 1140 , Doc. 1141 , Doc. 1142 , Doc. 1143 , Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , Doc. 1146 , Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , Doc. 1149 , and Doc. 1150 ] Hawaii, Japanese allegations of mistreatment of personnel of former Consulate General in Honolulu and other Japanese civilians, 1099–1103 [ Pgs. 1099–1103 include portions of Doc. 1130 and Doc. 1131 ] ; U.S. replies, 1106–1109 [ Pgs. 1106–1109 include portions of Doc. 1132 , Doc. 1133 , and Doc. 1134 ] , 1115–1117 [ Pgs. 1115–1117 include portions of Doc. 1136 , Doc. 1137 , and Doc. 1138 ] Japanese protest concerning alleged desecration of remains of Japanese soldiers by U.S. nationals, 1125–1126 [ Pgs. 1125–1126 include portions of Doc. 1140 and Doc. 1141 ] ; U.S. reply, 1140–1142 [ Pgs. 1140–1142 include portions of Doc. 1144 , Doc. 1145 , and Doc. 1146 ] New Caledonia, suicide of Japanese prisoners of war, U.S. reply to Japanese representations concerning, 1122–1124 [ Pgs. 1122–1124 include portions of Doc. 1138 and Doc. 1139 ] Relocation centers in United States, Japanese allegations of mistreatment of Japanese nationals in, 1104–1106 [ Pgs. 1104–1106 include portions of Doc. 1132 and Doc. 1133 ] , 1109–1115 [ Pgs. 1109–1115 include portions of Doc. 1133 , Doc. 1134 , Doc. 1135 , Doc. 1136 , and Doc. 1137 ] ; U.S. replies, 1117–1122 [ Pgs. 1117–1122 include portions of Doc. 1137 , Doc. 1138 , and Doc. 1139 ] , 1128–1139 [ Pgs. 1128–1139 include portions of Doc. 1141 , Doc. 1142 , Doc. 1143 , and Doc. 1144 ] , 1142–1144 [ Pgs. 1142–1144 include portions of Doc. 1145 , Doc. 1146 , and Doc. 1147 ] , 1145–1146 [ Pgs. 1145–1146 include portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , Doc. 1149 , and Doc. 1150 ] Saipan Island, question of treatment of Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees, 1120–1128 [ Pgs. 1120–1128 include portions of Doc. 1138 , Doc. 1139 , Doc. 1140 , Doc. 1141 , and Doc. 1142 ] , 1145 [ Pg. 1145 includes portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] Taiei Maru , Japanese protest regarding alleged U.S. submarine attack on, 1139–1140 [ Pgs. 1139–1140 include portions of Doc. 1143 , Doc. 1144 , and Doc. 1145 ] Treatment by U.S. troops of Japanese soldiers wounded or killed in battle, Japanese protest concerning, 1144–1145 [ Pgs. 1144–1145 include portions of Doc. 1146 , Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] ; U.S. reply, 1146 [ Pg. 1146 includes portions of Doc. 1149 and Doc. 1150 ] Turkey, severance of relations with Japan at request of United States and United Kingdom, 900–904 [ Pgs. 900–904 include portions of Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , and Doc. 968 ] U.S. protests against Japanese attacks on survivors of torpedoed American merchant vessels, 1175–1177 [ Pgs. 1175–1177 include portions of Doc. 1173 , Doc. 1174 , Doc. 1175 , and Doc. 1176 ] Jewish Agency for Palestine, 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] Jews. See Palestine . Jinnah, Mohammed Ali, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 238 n [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 245 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.), 20–21 [ Pgs. 20–21 include portions of Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , and Doc. 16 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 882–883 [ Pgs. 882–883 include portions of Doc. 941 and Doc. 942 ] , 884–885 [ Pgs. 884–885 include portions of Doc. 942 , Doc. 943 , Doc. 944 , and Doc. 945 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , and Doc. 961 ] , 1186 [ Pg. 1186 includes portions of Doc. 1180 and Doc. 1181 ] , 1191 [ Pg. 1191 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , 1264–1265 [ Pgs. 1264–1265 include portions of Doc. 1215 and Doc. 1216 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 includes portions of Doc. 1237 and Doc. 1238 ] Jordan, S. R., 672–703 [ Pgs. 672–703 include portions of Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , Doc. 741 , Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , and Doc. 769 ] passim , 719 [ Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 730–733 [ Pgs. 730–733 include portions of Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , and Doc. 800 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , and Doc. 820 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 820 and Doc. 821 ] , 759 n [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , and Doc. 830 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 includes portions of Doc. 846 and Doc. 847 ] Jordana, Count Francisco Gómez, 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] Karafuto. See under Japan : Postwar policy planning. Karapaniotis, Byron, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 92–93 [ Pgs. 92–93 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Kavtaradze, S. I., 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 452–464 [ Pgs. 452–464 include portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , and Doc. 499 ] passim , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , and Doc. 505 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 475–486 [ Pgs. 475–486 include portions of Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] passim Kerr, Sir Archibald J. K. Clark, 474 n [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 510 and Doc. 511 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 510 and Doc. 511 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 864 n [ Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 928 ] , 893–894 [ Pgs. 893–894 include portions of Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , and Doc. 956 ] Khouri, Beshara el- (or Bechara al-), 790–791 [ Pgs. 790–791 include portions of Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , and Doc. 860 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 875 ] Khoury, Faris al-, 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] Kim Kiu-sik, 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 1228 ] , 1292 [ Pg. 1292 includes portions of Doc. 1228 , Doc. 1229 , and Doc. 1230 ] Kim Koo, 1292 [ Pg. 1292 includes portions of Doc. 1228 , Doc. 1229 , and Doc. 1230 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 includes portions of Doc. 1232 and Doc. 1233 ] , 1296 n [ Pg. 1296 is part of Doc. 1233 ] Kita, Nagao, 1100–1103 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 1131 ] , 1115–1117 [ Pgs. 1115–1117 include portions of Doc. 1136 , Doc. 1137 , and Doc. 1138 ] Knatchbull-Hugessen. Sir Hughe M., 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 817–902 [ Pgs. 817–902 include portions of Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , Doc. 921 , Doc. 922 , Doc. 923 , Doc. 924 , Doc. 925 , Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , Doc. 929 , Doc. 930 , Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , Doc. 933 , Doc. 934 , Doc. 935 , Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , Doc. 943 , Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , Doc. 946 , Doc. 947 , Doc. 948 , Doc. 949 , Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , and Doc. 966 ] passim Kohler, Foy D., 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 220–222 [ Pgs. 220–222 include portions of Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 227 n [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , and Doc. 233 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 297–299 [ Pgs. 297–299 include portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 322–324 [ Pgs. 322–324 include portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327 ] , 600–604 [ Pgs. 600–604 include portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 849 and Doc. 850 ] , 791–792 [ Pgs. 791–792 include portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] , 793–795 [ Pgs. 793–795 include portions of Doc. 861 , Doc. 862 , and Doc. 863 ] , 799–800 [ Pgs. 799–800 include portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] Korea ( see also under Japan : Postwar policy planning ), U.S. interest in postwar status and question of recognition of a provisional government 1290–1298 [ Pgs. 1290–1298 include portions of Doc. 1227 , Doc. 1228 , Doc. 1229 , Doc. 1230 , Doc. 1231 , Doc. 1232 , Doc. 1233 , Doc. 1234 , and Doc. 1235 ] Kumarappa, Jagadisan Mohandas, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 283–284 [ Pgs. 283–284 include portions of Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290 ] , 284 n [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 286–287 [ Pgs. 286–287 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Kuomintang, 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 1204 ] , 1294 [ Pg. 1294 includes portions of Doc. 1230 and Doc. 1231 ] Kuwait, Shaikhdom of, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 20 ] Kuwatly, Shukri, 776 n [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 849 and Doc. 850 ] , 776–813 [ Pgs. 776–813 include portions of Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , Doc. 862 , Doc. 863 , Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] passim Landis, James M., 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 42 n [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 307–308 [ Pgs. 307–308 include portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 734 and Doc. 735 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 700–702 [ Pgs. 700–702 include portions of Doc. 767 and Doc. 768 ] , 703–704 [ Pgs. 703–704 include portions of Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 709 n [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] Landon, Kenneth P., 1320 [ Pg. 1320 includes portions of Doc. 1249 and Doc. 1250 ] , 1321 [ Pg. 1321 includes portions of Doc. 1250 and Doc. 1251 ] Laurel, José P., 1308 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 1240 ] Leahy, Adm. William D., 878 n [ Pg. 878 includes portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] , 1164 n [ Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 1162 and Doc. 1163 ] , 1201 [ Pg. 1201 is part of Doc. 1188 ] , 1201 n [ Pg. 1201 is part of Doc. 1188 ] , 1264–1265 [ Pgs. 1264–1265 include portions of Doc. 1215 and Doc. 1216 ] Lebanon. See Syria and Lebanon . Lebkicher, Roy, 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] Leeper, Reginald W. A., 89 n [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 100–102 [ Pgs. 100–102 include portions of Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , and Doc. 99 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 107 n [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 121–122 [ Pgs. 121–122 include portions of Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , and Doc. 125 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 142–167 [ Pgs. 142–167 include portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , and Doc. 177 ] passim , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 185–186 [ Pgs. 185–186 include portions of Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , and Doc. 198 ] Lend-Lease Act ( 1941 ), cited, 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] Lend-Lease Agreement with United Kingdom ( 1942 ), cited, 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 909–911 [ Pgs. 909–911 include portions of Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , and Doc. 975 ] Lend-Lease aid: India. See under India . Saudi Arabia. See under Saudi Arabia . Turkey, discussions regarding proposed agreement with United States, 904–915 [ Pgs. 904–915 include portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] Liberia: Declaration of war en Germany and Japan, and adherence to United Nations Declaration, 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 505 n [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] ; U.S. interest in defense and security of, 504–506 [ Pgs. 504–506 include portions of Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] Lockhart, Frank P., 1299–1300 [ Pg. 1299 is part of Doc. 1236 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 includes portions of Doc. 1237 and Doc. 1238 ] , 1305 [ Pg. 1305 includes portions of Doc. 1239 and Doc. 1240 ] Long, Breckinridge, 243–245 [ Pgs. 243–245 include portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 1019 [ Pg. 1019 is part of Doc. 1034 ] , 1170 [ Pg. 1170 includes portions of Doc. 1168 and Doc. 1169 ] Lyttelton, Capt. Oliver, 782 n [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 872 ] MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 1196 [ Pg. 1196 is part of Doc. 1186 ] , 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 1186 ] , 1286 n [ Pg. 1286 includes portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] , 1286–1289 [ Pgs. 1286–1289 include portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] , 1300 [ Pg. 1300 is part of Doc. 1236 ] , 1306 [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 1240 ] , 1307–1308 [ Pg. 1307 is part of Doc. 1240 ] Macedonia, question of return to Greece, 167–168 [ Pgs. 167–168 include portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Macmillan, Harold, 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 156–157 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , and Doc. 168 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 160–161 [ Pgs. 160–161 include portions of Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , and Doc. 171 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 167–168 [ Pgs. 167–168 include portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] Mahindra, K. C., 250–253 [ Pgs. 250–253 include portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , and Doc. 262 ] , 255–256 [ Pgs. 255–256 include portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Mail. See under Japan : Financial and other assistance, etc. , and Prisoners of war . Mallet, Sir Victor A. L., 190 n [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 223 ] Manchuria (“Manchukuo”): Government during period of military occupation, question of, 1194 [ Pg. 1194 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , 1255–1256 [ Pgs. 1255–1256 include portions of Doc. 1210 and Doc. 1211 ] ; U.S. concern for Japanese-held Americans in, 987 [ Pg. 987 includes portions of Doc. 1001 and Doc. 1002 ] Mardam, Jamil, 567 n [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 786–787 [ Pgs. 786–787 include portions of Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , and Doc. 858 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 857 and Doc. 858 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] Marshall, Gen. George C., 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , and Doc. 961 ] Massigli, Renee, 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] Maximov, M. A., 331 n [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 342–343 [ Pgs. 342–343 include portions of Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 425 n [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 453–454 [ Pgs. 453–454 include portions of Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , and Doc. 484 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 490 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 499 ] , 469–470 [ Pgs. 469–470 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , and Doc. 506 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , and Doc. 510 ] , 472–474 [ Pgs. 472–474 include portions of Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , Doc. 510 , and Doc. 511 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 519 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] McCloy, John J., 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 317–318 [ Pgs. 317–318 include portions of Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , and Doc. 323 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 581–582 [ Pgs. 581–582 include portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] Menemencioglu, Numan, 815 n [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] , 816–817 [ Pgs. 816–817 include portions of Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , and Doc. 882 ] , 825–862 [ Pgs. 825–862 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , Doc. 921 , Doc. 922 , Doc. 923 , Doc. 924 , Doc. 925 , Doc. 926 , and Doc. 927 ] passim , 875 [ Pg. 875 includes portions of Doc. 936 and Doc. 937 ] Middle East, general policies relative to ( see also Foreign petroleum policy ): Anglo-American cooperation, question of, 690–691 [ Pgs. 690–691 include portions of Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , and Doc. 756 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 767 ] Arab union, question of, and U.S. attitude, 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 683 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 683 ] , 660–661 [ Pgs. 660–661 include portions of Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , and Doc. 717 ] Culbertson Mission for restoration of trade to commercial channels, 38–40 [ Pgs. 38–40 include portions of Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , and Doc. 29 ] Cultural relations program of Department of State, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 31 ] U.S.-British exchange regarding conduct of policies, 6–7 [ Pgs. 6–7 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] ; regarding status of U.S. diplomatic missions in Egypt and Iraq, 3–5 [ Pgs. 3–5 include portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] U.S. vital interest in Middle East, letter from President Roosevelt to James M. Landis, 1–2 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] Middle East Supply Center, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 307 n [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 770 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , and Doc. 778 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 787 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 787 ] , 728–739 [ Pgs. 728–739 include portions of Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] passim , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 820 and Doc. 821 ] Mikhailov, S. S., 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] , 623–624 [ Pgs. 623–624 include portions of Doc. 680 and Doc. 681 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] Millspaugh, Arthur C. See Iran : American advisers in Iran : Millspaugh Financial Mission . Minor, Harold B., 311–316 [ Pgs. 311–316 include portions of Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , and Doc. 321 ] , 357–358 [ Pgs. 357–358 include portions of Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] , 378 n [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 381–384 [ Pgs. 381–384 include portions of Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , and Doc. 394 ] , 429 n [ Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452 ] Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran: Iranian relations with United States, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 350–351 [ Pgs. 350–351 include portions of Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , and Doc. 354 ] , 353–355 [ Pgs. 353–355 include portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358 ] , 359–361 [ Pgs. 359–361 include portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , and Doc. 516 ] ; with Soviet Union, 452–460 [ Pgs. 452–460 include portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] passim , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 499 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , and Doc. 516 ] Molotov, V. M., 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 863–865 [ Pgs. 863–865 include portions of Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , and Doc. 929 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 930 and Doc. 931 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 932 ] , 876 [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 937 ] Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 253–254 [ Pgs. 253–254 include portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 266 ] Morocco, 507–559 [ Pgs. 507–559 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , Doc. 585 , Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , Doc. 593 , Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , and Doc. 608 ] French Zone: American treaty rights, U.S. concern for protection of, and consent, with reservations, to wartime restrictions on American protégés, 507–524 [ Pgs. 507–524 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , and Doc. 567 ] Moroccan Nationalist agitation to alter character of French Protectorate, and U.S. concern for effect on war effort in North Africa, 524–539 [ Pgs. 524–539 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , and Doc. 580 ] Spanish Zone: Axis sabotage and espionage agents, expulsion of, U.S. representations to Spanish authorities in Morocco regarding, 539–542 [ Pgs. 539–542 include portions of Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , and Doc. 583 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 547–548 [ Pgs. 547–548 include portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , Doc. 593 , and Doc. 594 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 549–553 [ Pgs. 549–553 include portions of Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , Doc. 601 , and Doc. 602 ] German Consulate General at Tangier, closing of, U.S. representations to Spanish authorities regarding, 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 580 ] , 542–547 [ Pgs. 542–547 include portions of Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , Doc. 585 , Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] U.S.-Spanish Agreement of May 2 , cited, 539–540 [ Pgs. 539–540 include portions of Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , and Doc. 580 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] Tangier Zone, U.S. interest in termination of Spanish occupation, 553–559 [ Pgs. 553–559 include portions of Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , and Doc. 608 ] Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference ( 1943 ), 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 380 ] , 864 n [ Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 928 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 928 and Doc. 929 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , and Doc. 953 ] , 900–901 [ Pgs. 900–901 include portions of Doc. 964 and Doc. 965 ] ; Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, cited, 1184 [ Pg. 1184 is part of Doc. 1178 ] , 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 1186 ] , 1204 [ Pg. 1204 is part of Doc. 1189 ] , 1221 [ Pg. 1221 includes portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 1204 ] , 1279 [ Pg. 1279 is part of Doc. 1224 ] Mossadegh, Mohammed, 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 441–442 [ Pgs. 441–442 include portions of Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 479–480 [ Pgs. 479–480 include portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] Mountbatten, Adm. Lord Louis, 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 1195 [ Pg. 1195 includes portions of Doc. 1185 and Doc. 1186 ] , 1196 [ Pg. 1196 is part of Doc. 1186 ] Murray, Wallace, interest in U.S. relations with Afghanistan, 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] ; Egypt, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] ; Greece, 223 n [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] ; India, 248–249 [ Pgs. 248–249 include portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 298–299 [ Pgs. 298–299 include portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] ; Iran, 309–310 [ Pgs. 309–310 include portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 310–311 [ Pgs. 310–311 include portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 318–331 [ Pgs. 318–331 include portions of Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] passim , 359–360 [ Pgs. 359–360 include portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , and Doc. 372 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , and Doc. 392 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 389–390 [ Pgs. 389–390 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399 ] , 417–418 [ Pgs. 417–418 include portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , and Doc. 434 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] , 467–469 [ Pgs. 467–469 include portions of Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , and Doc. 505 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , and Doc. 525 ] , 485–486 [ Pgs. 485–486 include portions of Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] ; Iraq, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] ; Morocco, 555 [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] ; Palestine, 581–582 [ Pgs. 581–582 include portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 595–596 [ Pgs. 595–596 include portions of Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , and Doc. 651 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 614–615 [ Pgs. 614–615 include portions of Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] , 619–626 [ Pgs. 619–626 include portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , and Doc. 682 ] passim , 633–635 [ Pgs. 633–635 include portions of Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , Doc. 688 , and Doc. 689 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 697 and Doc. 698 ] , 642–643 [ Pgs. 642–643 include portions of Doc. 698 , Doc. 699 , and Doc. 700 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] , 651–652 [ Pgs. 651–652 include portions of Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , and Doc. 708 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 includes portions of Doc. 708 and Doc. 709 ] ; Saudi Arabia, 35–36 [ Pgs. 35–36 include portions of Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , and Doc. 715 ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , and Doc. 726 ] , 684–685 [ Pgs. 684–685 include portions of Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , and Doc. 746 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 692–693 [ Pgs. 692–693 include portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , and Doc. 759 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 764 and Doc. 765 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 770 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] ; Syria and Lebanon, 784–786 [ Pgs. 784–786 include portions of Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , and Doc. 857 ] , 791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 862 ] , 799–800 [ Pgs. 799–800 include portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , and Doc. 872 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 875 and Doc. 876 ] Muslim League, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 245 ] Nahas Pasha, Mustapha, 589 n [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 608–609 [ Pgs. 608–609 include portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] Nai Pridi Bhanomyong. See Pradist Manudharm, Luang . Netherlands, agreement with United States regarding civil affairs administration in liberated Netherlands territory, May 16 , cited, 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 1186 ] Netherlands East Indies. See under Japan : Postwar policy planning . Nicholson, Maj., 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 796 and Doc. 797 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] Nimitz, Adm. Chester W., 1187 n [ Pg. 1187 includes portions of Doc. 1181 and Doc. 1182 ] Nuri as-Said. See Said, Nuri as- . Oakes, Calvin H., 46–47 [ Pgs. 46–47 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 250–253 [ Pgs. 250–253 include portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , and Doc. 262 ] , 255–256 [ Pgs. 255–256 include portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , and Doc. 276 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 299–300 [ Pgs. 299–300 include portions of Doc. 305 , Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , and Doc. 308 ] Ohliger, Floyd, 707 n [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 772 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] Oil. See Foreign petroleum policy ; and under Iran and Saudi Arabia . Opium traffic in areas to be liberated from Japanese control, citation to correspondence regarding, 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 979 ] Orgaz, Gen. Luís, 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 580 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , and Doc. 588 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , and Doc. 590 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 595 and Doc. 596 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , and Doc. 599 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] Osmeña, Sergio, 1305–1307 [ Pgs. 1305–1307 include portions of Doc. 1239 and Doc. 1240 ] , 1308 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 1240 ] Ostrorog, Count Stanislas, 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 875 and Doc. 876 ] Pachachi, Hamadi al-, 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 706 ] Pahlavi. See Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi . Pakistan, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 238 n [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 245 ] Palestine, Arab-Zionist controversy concerning future status of, and the question of Jewish immigration, 560–657 [ Pgs. 560–657 include portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , Doc. 624 , Doc. 625 , Doc. 626 , Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , Doc. 688 , Doc. 689 , Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , Doc. 696 , Doc. 697 , Doc. 698 , Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , Doc. 708 , Doc. 709 , and Doc. 710 ] Arab States, attitude of ( see also British White Paper , Resolutions in U.S. Congress , U.S. concern, etc. , and Zionist planks , infra ): Arab federation, question of, 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 683 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 683 ] Conference of Arab groups in Cairo to express opposition to U.S. policy toward Palestine, 638–640 [ Pgs. 638–640 include portions of Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696 ] Egyptian views and representations to United States, and discussions concerning, 571–573 [ Pgs. 571–573 include portions of Doc. 625 , Doc. 626 , and Doc. 627 ] , 591–597 [ Pgs. 591–597 include portions of Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 608–609 [ Pgs. 608–609 include portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] , 638–640 [ Pgs. 638–640 include portions of Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696 ] Iraqi views and representations to United States, and discussions concerning, 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 617 ] , 584–585 [ Pgs. 584–585 include portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 610–611 [ Pgs. 610–611 include portions of Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , and Doc. 667 ] , 612–614 [ Pgs. 612–614 include portions of Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , and Doc. 670 ] , 617–619 [ Pgs. 617–619 include portions of Doc. 673 , Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 626–629 [ Pgs. 626–629 include portions of Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , and Doc. 683 ] , 631–633 [ Pgs. 631–633 include portions of Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , and Doc. 687 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 649–651 [ Pgs. 649–651 include portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , and Doc. 707 ] , 652–654 [ Pgs. 652–654 include portions of Doc. 707 , Doc. 708 , and Doc. 709 ] Lebanese attitude, 607–608 [ Pgs. 607–608 include portions of Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] Saudi Arabia, views of Ibn Saud, and U.S. attitude toward, 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , and Doc. 641 ] , 580–590 [ Pgs. 580–590 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 681 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] Syrian views, 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 630–631 [ Pgs. 630–631 include portions of Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , and Doc. 686 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] Balfour Declaration ( 1917 ), cited, 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 605 n [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 695 ] British-U.S. joint statement regarding settlement of Palestine question, consideration of, 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 586–588 [ Pgs. 586–588 include portions of Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , and Doc. 642 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 595–596 [ Pgs. 595–596 include portions of Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , and Doc. 651 ] , 602–603 [ Pgs. 602–603 include portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 603–604 [ Pgs. 603–604 include portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] ; draft statement proposed, 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] British White Paper ( 1939 ): Arab attitude, 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 617 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 590–591 [ Pgs. 590–591 include portions of Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , and Doc. 647 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 664 ] ; British and U.S. positions regarding extension of immigration provisions of, 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] , 562–563 [ Pgs. 562–563 include portions of Doc. 612 , Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , and Doc. 615 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 590–591 [ Pgs. 590–591 include portions of Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , and Doc. 647 ] , 592–593 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 600–601 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 611–612 [ Pgs. 611–612 include portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668 ] , 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , and Doc. 678 ] , 636–637 [ Pgs. 636–637 include portions of Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] ; Zionist attitude toward, 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 590–591 [ Pgs. 590–591 include portions of Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , and Doc. 647 ] , 592–593 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 657 ] Jewish Agency for Palestine, 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] Jewish immigration into Palestine, and refugee problem. See Arab States, attitude of , and British White Paper , supra; also Resolutions, etc. , infra . Jewish political state in Palestine, question of establishment of. See Arab States, attitude of , supra; Resolutions, etc. , and Soviet position , infra . Resolutions in U.S. Congress calling for open colonization and establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine: Arab States, views and representations to United States, and discussions concerning: Egypt, 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 615 and Doc. 616 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] ; Iraq, 564–567 [ Pgs. 564–567 include portions of Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 568–569 [ Pgs. 568–569 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , and Doc. 623 ] , 573–574 [ Pgs. 573–574 include portions of Doc. 626 , Doc. 627 , and Doc. 628 ] , 579–580 [ Pgs. 579–580 include portions of Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 580–581 [ Pgs. 580–581 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , and Doc. 634 ] , 583–585 [ Pgs. 583–585 include portions of Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , and Doc. 638 ] , 649–651 [ Pgs. 649–651 include portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , and Doc. 707 ] , 652–654 [ Pgs. 652–654 include portions of Doc. 707 , Doc. 708 , and Doc. 709 ] ; Lebanon, 578–579 [ Pgs. 578–579 include portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] ; Saudi Arabia, 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 589–590 [ Pgs. 589–590 include portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 includes portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , and Doc. 651 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 681 ] ; Syria, 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] ; Transjordan, 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 596–597 [ Pgs. 596–597 include portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] ; Yemen, 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 598–599 [ Pgs. 598–599 include portions of Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , and Doc. 656 ] Attitudes of War and State Departments, and testimony before Congressional committees, 563–564 [ Pgs. 563–564 include portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 567–568 [ Pgs. 567–568 include portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , and Doc. 622 ] , 574–577 [ Pgs. 574–577 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , and Doc. 629 ] , 619–620 [ Pgs. 619–620 include portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , and Doc. 677 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 643–645 [ Pgs. 643–645 include portions of Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , and Doc. 704 ] , 651–652 [ Pgs. 651–652 include portions of Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , and Doc. 708 ] British attitude, U.S. interest in, 561–562 [ Pgs. 561–562 include portions of Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Discussions among U.S. officials regarding, 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] , 581–582 [ Pgs. 581–582 include portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 641–642 [ Pgs. 641–642 include portions of Doc. 697 , Doc. 698 , and Doc. 699 ] Letter from Amir Abdullah to President Roosevelt, and President’s reply, 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 590–597 [ Pgs. 590–597 include portions of Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] Text of Resolutions, 560–561 [ Pgs. 560–561 include portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] Zionist attitude, 637 n [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 641–642 [ Pgs. 641–642 include portions of Doc. 697 , Doc. 698 , and Doc. 699 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 700 and Doc. 701 ] , 651–652 [ Pgs. 651–652 include portions of Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , and Doc. 708 ] Soviet position, and U.S. observations and discussions concerning, 622–624 [ Pgs. 622–624 include portions of Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , and Doc. 681 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 686 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 697 and Doc. 698 ] , 646–648 [ Pgs. 646–648 include portions of Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , and Doc. 705 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] Stern Gang and other Jewish terrorist groups in Palestine, 602–603 [ Pgs. 602–603 include portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 634–635 [ Pgs. 634–635 include portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] ; assassination of Lord Moyne, British Minister of State in Middle East, 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 688 ] Trusteeship for Palestine, 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 601–602 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 657 ] U.S. concern and efforts to find solution of basic problems ( see also Arab States, attitude of ; British-U.S. joint statement , and Resolutions, etc. , supra ): British-U.S. conversations on Palestine situation, 592–595 [ Pgs. 592–595 include portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 600–604 [ Pgs. 600–604 include portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667 ] , 613–614 [ Pgs. 613–614 include portions of Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , and Doc. 670 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] Consultation with both Arabs and Jews prior to final settlement, U.S. position and assurances regarding, 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 589–590 [ Pgs. 589–590 include portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 681 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 682 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 710 ] Conversation between Churchill and Chaim Weizmann, 642–643 [ Pgs. 642–643 include portions of Doc. 698 , Doc. 699 , and Doc. 700 ] Culbertson Mission to Middle East, Arab boycott of, 616–617 [ Pgs. 616–617 include portions of Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , and Doc. 674 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] Discussions and memoranda concerning, 592–595 [ Pgs. 592–595 include portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 624–626 [ Pgs. 624–626 include portions of Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , and Doc. 682 ] , 648–649 [ Pgs. 648–649 include portions of Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , and Doc. 706 ] , 655–657 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 710 ] Statements of President Roosevelt regarding, 588–689 [ Pgs. 588–689 include portions of Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , Doc. 688 , Doc. 689 , Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , Doc. 696 , Doc. 697 , Doc. 698 , Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , Doc. 708 , Doc. 709 , Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , Doc. 712 , Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , Doc. 741 , Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 590–591 [ Pgs. 590–591 include portions of Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , and Doc. 647 ] , 615–616 [ Pgs. 615–616 include portions of Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , and Doc. 673 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 698 and Doc. 699 ] Zionist planks in Democratic and Republican party platforms, 605 n [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 606 n [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661 ] , 615–616 [ Pgs. 615–616 include portions of Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , and Doc. 673 ] ; attitudes of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, 604–607 [ Pgs. 604–607 include portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , and Doc. 663 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 664 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] Papandreou, George, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 102–116 [ Pgs. 102–116 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , and Doc. 118 ] passim , 122–166 [ Pgs. 122–166 include portions of Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , and Doc. 176 ] passim , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 209 n [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Papen, Franz von, 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 903 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 915 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 is part of Doc. 933 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 949 ] , 896 [ Pg. 896 includes portions of Doc. 957 and Doc. 958 ] Peace feeler from Japan, U.S. and British discussions concerning, 1183–1186 [ Pgs. 1183–1186 include portions of Doc. 1177 , Doc. 1178 , Doc. 1179 , Doc. 1180 , and Doc. 1181 ] Pearson, Drew, 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252 ] , 241–242 [ Pgs. 241–242 include portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Peck, Willys R., 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , and Doc. 294 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 1173 n [ Pg. 1173 is part of Doc. 1172 ] Pence, Capt. H. L., 1190 [ Pg. 1190 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , 1195 [ Pg. 1195 includes portions of Doc. 1185 and Doc. 1186 ] , 1198 [ Pg. 1198 includes portions of Doc. 1186 and Doc. 1187 ] , 1205 [ Pg. 1205 includes portions of Doc. 1189 and Doc. 1190 ] , 1267 n [ Pg. 1267 is part of Doc. 1218 ] , 1272 [ Pg. 1272 includes portions of Doc. 1220 , Doc. 1221 , and Doc. 1222 ] Peterson, Sir Maurice, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 322–331 [ Pgs. 322–331 include portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] passim , 600–603 [ Pgs. 600–603 include portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 603–604 [ Pgs. 603–604 include portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , and Doc. 715 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 698–699 [ Pgs. 698–699 include portions of Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , and Doc. 766 ] , 718–719 [ Pgs. 718–719 include portions of Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , and Doc. 787 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] Petroleum. See Foreign petroleum policy ; see also Oil under Iran and Saudi Arabia . Petroleum Reserves Corp., 8–37 [ Pgs. 8–37 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] passim Philippines ( see also Japan : Financial and other assistance : American nationals in Philippine Islands , and under Japan : Prisoners of war ), 1299–1310 [ Pgs. 1299–1310 include portions of Doc. 1236 , Doc. 1237 , Doc. 1238 , Doc. 1239 , Doc. 1240 , and Doc. 1241 ] Civilian relief supplies following reoccupation, question of, 1307 [ Pg. 1307 is part of Doc. 1240 ] Commonwealth Government, status of, and plans with respect to future of, 1299–1301 [ Pgs. 1299–1301 include portions of Doc. 1236 , Doc. 1237 , and Doc. 1238 ] , 1303–1309 [ Pgs. 1303–1309 include portions of Doc. 1238 , Doc. 1239 , Doc. 1240 , and Doc. 1241 ] Independence of, 1301–1303 [ Pgs. 1301–1303 include portions of Doc. 1237 , Doc. 1238 , and Doc. 1239 ] Japanese puppet government in, 1308 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 1240 ] U.S. Consulate in Manila, plans for reopening, 1308 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 1240 ] U.S. legislation authorizing naturalization of Filipinos in United States (approved July 2, 1946 ), 1309–1310 [ Pgs. 1309–1310 include portions of Doc. 1240 and Doc. 1241 ] Phillips, William. See India : Political situation : Mission of William Phillips . Pibul Songgram, Field Marshal Luang, 1193 [ Pg. 1193 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 includes portions of Doc. 1242 , Doc. 1243 , and Doc. 1244 ] Pierson, Warren Lee, 225–226 [ Pgs. 225–226 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Plastiras, Gen. Nicholas, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , and Doc. 168 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 176–177 [ Pgs. 176–177 include portions of Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] Poison gas, 1169–1170 [ Pgs. 1169–1170 include portions of Doc. 1167 , Doc. 1168 , and Doc. 1169 ] Pradist Manudharm, Luang, 1311 n [ Pg. 1311 is part of Doc. 1242 ] , 1311 [ Pg. 1311 is part of Doc. 1242 ] , 1313 [ Pg. 1313 includes portions of Doc. 1244 and Doc. 1245 ] , 1320 n [ Pg. 1320 includes portions of Doc. 1249 and Doc. 1250 ] , 1321 [ Pg. 1321 includes portions of Doc. 1250 and Doc. 1251 ] Pramoj, Mom Rajawongse Seni, 1311 n [ Pg. 1311 is part of Doc. 1242 ] , 1311 [ Pg. 1311 is part of Doc. 1242 ] , 1312 n [ Pg. 1312 includes portions of Doc. 1242 , Doc. 1243 , and Doc. 1244 ] , 1314 [ Pg. 1314 includes portions of Doc. 1245 and Doc. 1246 ] , 1320–1321 [ Pgs. 1320–1321 include portions of Doc. 1249 , Doc. 1250 , and Doc. 1251 ] , 1321 n [ Pg. 1321 includes portions of Doc. 1250 and Doc. 1251 ] Prisoners of war. See under Japan . Puaux, Gabriel, 510–511 [ Pgs. 510–511 include portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 522 n [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 567 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 567 ] , 529–530 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 568 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 571 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578 ] Quezon, Manuel, 1300 [ Pg. 1300 is part of Doc. 1236 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 includes portions of Doc. 1237 and Doc. 1238 ] , 1302 [ Pg. 1302 is part of Doc. 1238 ] , 1303 [ Pg. 1303 includes portions of Doc. 1238 and Doc. 1239 ] , 1304 [ Pg. 1304 is part of Doc. 1239 ] , 1305 n [ Pg. 1305 includes portions of Doc. 1239 and Doc. 1240 ] , 1306 [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 1240 ] Quwatly, Shukri. See Kuwatly, Shukri . Radiotelegraph circuit between United States and India, establishment of, 293–296 [ Pgs. 293–296 include portions of Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , and Doc. 304 ] ; between United States and Saudi Arabia, question of, 760–773 [ Pgs. 760–773 include portions of Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , and Doc. 847 ] Rayner, Charles B., 11–13 [ Pgs. 11–13 include portions of Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , and Doc. 10 ] , 17 n [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 21–22 [ Pgs. 21–22 include portions of Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , and Doc. 17 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 23 n [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Recognition. See Syria and Lebanon : Independence, etc. Relief. See Japan : Financial and other assistance ; and under Greece . Repatriation of nationals. See Japan : Third exchange . Rhee, Syngman, 1290 [ Pg. 1290 includes portions of Doc. 1227 and Doc. 1228 ] Ridley, Gen. Clarence S., 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 401 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 419–428 [ Pgs. 419–428 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , and Doc. 450 ] passim , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 456 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 434–435 [ Pgs. 434–435 include portions of Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , and Doc. 459 ] , 442–443 [ Pgs. 442–443 include portions of Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , and Doc. 468 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] Roosevelt, Franklin D.: Exchange of messages with Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 596–597 [ Pgs. 596–597 include portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] ; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , and Doc. 62 ] ; George II, King of the Hellenes, 163–164 [ Pgs. 163–164 include portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] ; Ismet Inönü, President of Turkey, 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , and Doc. 963 ] , 915–916 [ Pgs. 915–916 include portions of Doc. 977 and Doc. 978 ] ; Mohandas K. Gandhi, 234 [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 236 n [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] ; Prime Minister Churchill, 96–99 [ Pgs. 96–99 include portions of Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 114–115 [ Pgs. 114–115 include portions of Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , and Doc. 117 ] , 117–119 [ Pgs. 117–119 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , and Doc. 122 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 125–127 [ Pgs. 125–127 include portions of Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] , 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 133–134 [ Pgs. 133–134 include portions of Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 150–151 [ Pgs. 150–151 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 154–155 [ Pgs. 154–155 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] , 159–160 [ Pgs. 159–160 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 169–170 [ Pgs. 169–170 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] , 173–175 [ Pgs. 173–175 include portions of Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , and Doc. 185 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 271–274 [ Pgs. 271–274 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , and Doc. 283 ] ; Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran, 348–349 [ Pgs. 348–349 include portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 349–350 [ Pgs. 349–350 include portions of Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , and Doc. 353 ] ; Senator Robert F. Wagner, 615–616 [ Pgs. 615–616 include portions of Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , and Doc. 673 ] ; Shukri al-Kuwatly, President of Syria, 787–790 [ Pgs. 787–790 include portions of Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , and Doc. 859 ] , 812–813 [ Pgs. 812–813 include portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] Miscellaneous, 1–2 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 16–17 [ Pgs. 16–17 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] , 27 n [ Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 34 n [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 304 n [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , and Doc. 312 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 536 n [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 782 n [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 810 n [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 814 n [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 821 n [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 934 ] , 1170 [ Pg. 1170 includes portions of Doc. 1168 and Doc. 1169 ] , 1193 [ Pg. 1193 is part of Doc. 1184 ] , 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 1189 ] , 1206 [ Pg. 1206 is part of Doc. 1190 ] , 1221 [ Pg. 1221 includes portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] , 1286 [ Pg. 1286 includes portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 includes portions of Doc. 1237 and Doc. 1238 ] , 1306 [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 1240 ] , 1307 [ Pg. 1307 is part of Doc. 1240 ] , 1313 n [ Pg. 1313 includes portions of Doc. 1244 and Doc. 1245 ] , 1316 n [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 1247 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 1248 ] Views on— British desire for temporary arrangement with Soviets regarding Greece and Rumania, 117 n [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 117–118 [ Pgs. 117–118 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 includes portions of Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] Greek liberation from German occupation and subsequent restoration of political stability, 98–99 [ Pgs. 98–99 include portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , and Doc. 101 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , and Doc. 110 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 133–134 [ Pgs. 133–134 include portions of Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 150–151 [ Pgs. 150–151 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Palestine situation, 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 615 and Doc. 616 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 586 n [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 589–590 [ Pgs. 589–590 include portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 681 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 685 and Doc. 686 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 637 n [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 645 n [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] Rumania, temporary British-Soviet arrangement regarding, 112–115 [ Pgs. 112–115 include portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , and Doc. 117 ] , 117–121 [ Pgs. 117–121 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 124–127 [ Pgs. 124–127 include portions of Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] , 128–129 [ Pgs. 128–129 include portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] , 130–132 [ Pgs. 130–132 include portions of Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , and Doc. 137 ] Sadler, Gen. Percy L., 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] Saed, Mohammed: Development of Soviet opposition to, 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 351–352 [ Pgs. 351–352 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 490 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 499 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , and Doc. 510 ] ; Iranian relations with United States, 304 n [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , and Doc. 312 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 359 n [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , and Doc. 369 ] , 362 n [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , and Doc. 369 ] , 362–364 [ Pgs. 362–364 include portions of Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , and Doc. 370 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 390–392 [ Pgs. 390–392 include portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 395 n [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] , 405–421 [ Pgs. 405–421 include portions of Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] passim , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 454 ] , 446–459 [ Pgs. 446–459 include portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491 ] passim , 480 [ Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] Said, Nuri as-, 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 617 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] , 579–580 [ Pgs. 579–580 include portions of Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] Saipan and other Mariana Islands; Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees on Saipan Island, question of treatment of, 1126–1128 [ Pgs. 1126–1128 include portions of Doc. 1140 , Doc. 1141 , and Doc. 1142 ] , 1145 [ Pg. 1145 includes portions of Doc. 1147 , Doc. 1148 , and Doc. 1149 ] ; U.S. proposal for repatriation of Japanese civilians on reciprocal basis, 1090–1091 [ Pgs. 1090–1091 include portions of Doc. 1117 , Doc. 1118 , Doc. 1119 , and Doc. 1120 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 includes portions of Doc. 1127 , Doc. 1128 , and Doc. 1129 ] Saka, Hasan, 39 n [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 902 n [ Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] , 903–904 [ Pgs. 903–904 include portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] , 914–915 [ Pgs. 914–915 include portions of Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 978 ] Sakhalin Island, 1211–1213 [ Pgs. 1211–1213 include portions of Doc. 1193 and Doc. 1194 ] Sandström, A. Emil F., 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] Sanson, Sir George, 1312 n [ Pg. 1312 includes portions of Doc. 1242 , Doc. 1243 , and Doc. 1244 ] , 1312–1313 [ Pgs. 1312–1313 include portions of Doc. 1242 , Doc. 1243 , Doc. 1244 , and Doc. 1245 ] , 1315 [ Pg. 1315 is part of Doc. 1246 ] Saraçoglu, Sukrü, 39 n [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 866 n [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 930 ] , 866–878 [ Pgs. 866–878 include portions of Doc. 930 , Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , Doc. 933 , Doc. 934 , Doc. 935 , Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , and Doc. 938 ] passim , 887–888 [ Pgs. 887–888 include portions of Doc. 946 , Doc. 947 , and Doc. 948 ] , 889–890 [ Pgs. 889–890 include portions of Doc. 948 and Doc. 949 ] , 890–900 [ Pgs. 890–900 include portions of Doc. 949 , Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , and Doc. 965 ] , 905–907 [ Pgs. 905–907 include portions of Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , Doc. 971 , and Doc. 972 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 910 n [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 973 and Doc. 974 ] , 914–915 [ Pgs. 914–915 include portions of Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] Saud, Abdul Aziz al-. See Ibn Saud . Saudi Arabia ( see also under Palestine : Arab States and Resolutions in U.S. Congress ), 658–773 [ Pgs. 658–773 include portions of Doc. 711 , Doc. 712 , Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , Doc. 741 , Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , Doc. 807 , Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , Doc. 820 , Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , and Doc. 847 ] Air route over Saudi Arabia and construction of airfield near Dhahran, U.S. proposals for, and discussions with British and Saudi Arabians regarding, 661–670 [ Pgs. 661–670 include portions of Doc. 717 , Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 817 ] American Consulate at Dhahran, establishment of, 658–660 [ Pgs. 658–660 include portions of Doc. 711 , Doc. 712 , Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , and Doc. 716 ] ; British cooperation in arrangements relative to Bahrein, 659–660 [ Pgs. 659–660 include portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , and Doc. 716 ] Arab union, question of, and U.S. attitude, 660–661 [ Pgs. 660–661 include portions of Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , and Doc. 717 ] Direct radiotelegraph circuit between United States and Saudi Arabia, proposed establishment of, and U.S. representations to British and Saudi Arabians, 760–773 [ Pgs. 760–773 include portions of Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , and Doc. 847 ] Economic and financial assistance ( see also Lend-Lease assistance , infra ): Anglo-American joint program: Discussions concerning, and formulation of program, 673–674 [ Pgs. 673–674 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] , 679–680 [ Pgs. 679–680 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] , 683–684 [ Pgs. 683–684 include portions of Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , and Doc. 745 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 753 and Doc. 754 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 693–694 [ Pgs. 693–694 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , and Doc. 760 ] , 699–704 [ Pgs. 699–704 include portions of Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 710–717 [ Pgs. 710–717 include portions of Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , and Doc. 784 ] , 719–722 [ Pgs. 719–722 include portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 725–726 [ Pgs. 725–726 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , and Doc. 793 ] , 727–728 [ Pgs. 727–728 include portions of Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , and Doc. 795 ] , 731–732 [ Pgs. 731–732 include portions of Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , and Doc. 799 ] Ibn Saud, attitude toward, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , and Doc. 772 ] , 723–724 [ Pgs. 723–724 include portions of Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , and Doc. 790 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 745–746 [ Pgs. 745–746 include portions of Doc. 814 , Doc. 815 , and Doc. 816 ] Program for 1945 , discussions regarding, 715 [ Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 781 and Doc. 782 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 738–739 [ Pgs. 738–739 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 816 and Doc. 817 ] , 752–753 [ Pgs. 752–753 include portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , Doc. 820 , and Doc. 821 ] , 754–755 [ Pgs. 754–755 include portions of Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , and Doc. 824 ] Supply program: Foodstuff subsidy, 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 734 and Doc. 735 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 772 ] , 709–710 [ Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , and Doc. 778 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 787 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 788 ] , 726–728 [ Pgs. 726–728 include portions of Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , and Doc. 795 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 733–734 [ Pgs. 733–734 include portions of Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , and Doc. 801 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , and Doc. 804 ] ; grain shipments, increase in, 736–738 [ Pgs. 736–738 include portions of Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 includes portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] ; revision of, and negotiations with MESC regarding, 729–731 [ Pgs. 729–731 include portions of Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , and Doc. 798 ] Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), question of assistance to Saudi Arabian Government, 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 707–708 [ Pgs. 707–708 include portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 787 ] , 724–725 [ Pgs. 724–725 include portions of Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] British aid program, and Saudi Arabian attitude toward ( see also Anglo-American joint program , supra, and Ibn Saud, etc. , infra ), 672–673 [ Pgs. 672–673 include portions of Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , and Doc. 732 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 734 and Doc. 735 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 767 ] , 732–733 [ Pgs. 732–733 include portions of Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , and Doc. 800 ] Central bank under American auspices, U.S. proposal for, 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 683–684 [ Pgs. 683–684 include portions of Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , and Doc. 745 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 768 and Doc. 769 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 772 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] Conversion of dollars into rials, proposed plan for, 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 727 and Doc. 728 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 742 ] Currency problems ( see also Anglo-American joint program , supra, and Lend-Lease assistance : Silver , infra ), 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , and Doc. 732 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 781 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 783 and Doc. 784 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] Financial and economic advisory mission, consideration of Saudi Arabian request for, and U.S.-British discussions regarding ( see also Mission of Col. William A. Eddy , infra ), 684–685 [ Pgs. 684–685 include portions of Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , and Doc. 746 ] , 687–689 [ Pgs. 687–689 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , and Doc. 756 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 764 and Doc. 765 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 765 and Doc. 766 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 767 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 768 and Doc. 769 ] , 704–706 [ Pgs. 704–706 include portions of Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , and Doc. 772 ] , 712–713 [ Pgs. 712–713 include portions of Doc. 780 and Doc. 781 ] , 718–719 [ Pgs. 718–719 include portions of Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , and Doc. 787 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 798 and Doc. 799 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] Fiscal reform. See Anglo-American joint program and British aid program , supra . Ibn Saud, concern for Saudi Arabian economic and financial situation, 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 734 and Doc. 735 ] , 706–708 [ Pgs. 706–708 include portions of Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , and Doc. 773 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] ; U.S. and British discussions with the King regarding, 675–677 [ Pgs. 675–677 include portions of Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 694–696 [ Pgs. 694–696 include portions of Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , and Doc. 762 ] Indian Muslim gift of cereals to Saudi Arabia, 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , and Doc. 820 ] Loan to Saudi Arabian Government by British firm, proposed: British position, 733–734 [ Pgs. 733–734 include portions of Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , and Doc. 801 ] ; U.S. attitude, 746–748 [ Pgs. 746–748 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] Mission of Col. William A. Eddy to Saudi Arabia, 687–689 [ Pgs. 687–689 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , and Doc. 756 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] U.S. long-range aid and cooperation program, consideration of, 734–736 [ Pgs. 734–736 include portions of Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , and Doc. 802 ] , 743–744 [ Pgs. 743–744 include portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 748–752 [ Pgs. 748–752 include portions of Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , and Doc. 820 ] , 755–759 [ Pgs. 755–759 include portions of Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , and Doc. 827 ] Gold, discussions concerning, 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 727 and Doc. 728 ] , 672–673 [ Pgs. 672–673 include portions of Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , and Doc. 732 ] , 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , and Doc. 739 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 772 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 781 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 783 and Doc. 784 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] Lend-Lease assistance to Saudi Arabia ( see also Economic and financial assistance : Anglo-American joint program and U.S. long-range aid , supra ): Military aid: Equal Anglo-American assistance, plans for, 670–671 [ Pgs. 670–671 include portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] Military advisory mission, request of Ibn Saud for, U.S. and British consideration of and discussions regarding, 684–686 [ Pgs. 684–686 include portions of Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , and Doc. 747 ] , 686–689 [ Pgs. 686–689 include portions of Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , and Doc. 756 ] , 692–693 [ Pgs. 692–693 include portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , and Doc. 759 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 764 and Doc. 765 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 765 and Doc. 766 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 767 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 768 and Doc. 769 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 769 and Doc. 770 ] , 712–713 [ Pgs. 712–713 include portions of Doc. 780 and Doc. 781 ] Military equipment, U.S. supply of, 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] , 750–751 [ Pgs. 750–751 include portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] U.S. military mission in Saudi Arabia, status and activities of, 670 [ Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 726 and Doc. 727 ] , 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] , 685–686 [ Pgs. 685–686 include portions of Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , and Doc. 747 ] , 697–698 [ Pgs. 697–698 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , and Doc. 765 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 814 and Doc. 815 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 817 ] Silver, lend-lease of: Minting and delivery of rials, 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , and Doc. 732 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 738 and Doc. 739 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 752 n [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , and Doc. 820 ] Rials for sale to foreign legations and commercial companies, 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 727 and Doc. 728 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 738 and Doc. 739 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 742 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] Saudi Arabian request for increase in amount of, 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 727 and Doc. 728 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 674–675 [ Pgs. 674–675 include portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , and Doc. 735 ] ; British attitude, 674–675 [ Pgs. 674–675 include portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , and Doc. 735 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 767 ] , 702–703 [ Pgs. 702–703 include portions of Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , and Doc. 769 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 781 ] ; U.S. position and favorable response, 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 734 and Doc. 735 ] , 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , and Doc. 739 ] , 681–683 [ Pgs. 681–683 include portions of Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , and Doc. 744 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 767 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 781 ] , 725–726 [ Pgs. 725–726 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , and Doc. 793 ] , 740–741 [ Pgs. 740–741 include portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] Trucks, supply of by United States and Britain, 694 [ Pg. 694 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 787 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 796 ] Oil reserves, U.S. concern for safeguarding and developing ( see also Foreign petroleum policy ), 679–680 [ Pgs. 679–680 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] , 755–756 [ Pgs. 755–756 include portions of Doc. 823 and Doc. 824 ] Palestine situation, views relative to, 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , and Doc. 641 ] , 589–590 [ Pgs. 589–590 include portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 includes portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , and Doc. 651 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 681 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] U.S.-British policy conflict, and question of general Anglo-American cooperation, 679–680 [ Pgs. 679–680 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] , 685–686 [ Pgs. 685–686 include portions of Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , and Doc. 747 ] , 690–691 [ Pgs. 690–691 include portions of Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , and Doc. 756 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 702–703 [ Pgs. 702–703 include portions of Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , and Doc. 769 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , and Doc. 778 ] , 759–760 [ Pgs. 759–760 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] Schwarzkopf, Col. H. Norman, 393–395 [ Pgs. 393–395 include portions of Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , and Doc. 402 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 418–429 [ Pgs. 418–429 include portions of Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , and Doc. 452 ] passim , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , and Doc. 467 ] Scobie, Gen. Ronald M., 135–147 [ Pgs. 135–147 include portions of Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] passim , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 184 ] Shayesteh, Mohammed, 355 n [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 357–358 [ Pgs. 357–358 include portions of Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , and Doc. 369 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380 ] , 409 n [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 456 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] Shigemitsu, Mamoru, 936–937 [ Pgs. 936–937 include portions of Doc. 987 , Doc. 988 , and Doc. 989 ] , 965–966 [ Pgs. 965–966 include portions of Doc. 994 , Doc. 995 , and Doc. 996 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 1001 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 1004 and Doc. 1005 ] , 990 n [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 1005 , Doc. 1006 , and Doc. 1007 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 1010 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 1013 ] , 1012–1013 [ Pgs. 1012–1013 include portions of Doc. 1025 , Doc. 1026 , Doc. 1027 , and Doc. 1028 ] , 1014 [ Pg. 1014 is part of Doc. 1028 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 includes portions of Doc. 1127 , Doc. 1128 , and Doc. 1129 ] , 1186 [ Pg. 1186 includes portions of Doc. 1180 and Doc. 1181 ] Siantos, George, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] Silver. See India : Lend-Lease of silver ; and under Saudi Arabia : Lend-Lease assistance . Silver, Abba Hillel, 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 664 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 697 and Doc. 698 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] Sinclair Oil Co., 447–452 [ Pgs. 447–452 include portions of Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] passim Soheily, Ali, 316 n [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 356 n [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , and Doc. 360 ] , 392–393 [ Pgs. 392–393 include portions of Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , and Doc. 401 ] , 395 n [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 470 ] Solh, Riad es-, 778 n [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] Sophoulis, Themistocles, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 92–93 [ Pgs. 92–93 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , and Doc. 168 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 164–165 [ Pgs. 164–165 include portions of Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] Soviet Union ( see also Iran and Japan ): British-Soviet temporary arrangement regarding Greece and Rumania, and U.S. attitude, 112–115 [ Pgs. 112–115 include portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , and Doc. 117 ] , 117–121 [ Pgs. 117–121 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 124–127 [ Pgs. 124–127 include portions of Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] , 128–129 [ Pgs. 128–129 include portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] , 130–132 [ Pgs. 130–132 include portions of Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , and Doc. 137 ] Palestine situation, position regarding, 622–624 [ Pgs. 622–624 include portions of Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , and Doc. 681 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 686 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 697 and Doc. 698 ] , 646–648 [ Pgs. 646–648 include portions of Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , and Doc. 705 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] Turkey, position on problems relative to, 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 890 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 897 and Doc. 898 ] , 861–862 [ Pgs. 861–862 include portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 863–865 [ Pgs. 863–865 include portions of Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , and Doc. 929 ] , 875–878 [ Pgs. 875–878 include portions of Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , and Doc. 938 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 941 ] , 892–893 [ Pgs. 892–893 include portions of Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , and Doc. 955 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 955 and Doc. 956 ] , 898–899 [ Pgs. 898–899 include portions of Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , and Doc. 964 ] Spain. See Morocco : Spanish Zone and Tangier Zone . Spears, Sir Edward L., 777–779 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 791 [ Pg. 791 includes portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 862 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 869 and Doc. 870 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 874 ] Stalin, I. V., 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 1221 [ Pg. 1221 includes portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] Standard Oil Co., of California, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] Standard-Vacuum Oil Co., 445–452 [ Pgs. 445–452 include portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] passim State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), proposed establishment of, 1274–1275 [ Pgs. 1274–1275 include portions of Doc. 1222 , Doc. 1223 , and Doc. 1224 ] Stettinius, Edward R., Jr.: Communication of views and recommendations to President Roosevelt, 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 148–150 [ Pgs. 148–150 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 484–485 [ Pgs. 484–485 include portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , and Doc. 641 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 641–642 [ Pgs. 641–642 include portions of Doc. 697 , Doc. 698 , and Doc. 699 ] , 643–645 [ Pgs. 643–645 include portions of Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] , 648–649 [ Pgs. 648–649 include portions of Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , and Doc. 706 ] , 655–657 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 757–758 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 825 ] Interest in U.S. relations with Greece, 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 148–150 [ Pgs. 148–150 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 226 ] ; India, 241 [ Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252 ] , 249–250 [ Pgs. 249–250 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 262–263 [ Pgs. 262–263 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] ; Iran, 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 326–327 [ Pgs. 326–327 include portions of Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , and Doc. 330 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] , 466–467 [ Pgs. 466–467 include portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , and Doc. 503 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 484–485 [ Pgs. 484–485 include portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] ; Japan, 1164 n [ Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 1162 and Doc. 1163 ] , 1274–1275 [ Pgs. 1274–1275 include portions of Doc. 1222 , Doc. 1223 , and Doc. 1224 ] ; Palestine, 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 615 and Doc. 616 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] , 567–568 [ Pgs. 567–568 include portions of Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , and Doc. 622 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] , 587–588 [ Pgs. 587–588 include portions of Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , and Doc. 642 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 645 n [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 706 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 708 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 710 ] ; Philippines, 1301 [ Pg. 1301 includes portions of Doc. 1237 and Doc. 1238 ] , 1309–1310 [ Pgs. 1309–1310 include portions of Doc. 1240 and Doc. 1241 ] ; Saudi Arabia, 759–760 [ Pgs. 759–760 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] ; Thailand, 1313 n [ Pg. 1313 includes portions of Doc. 1244 and Doc. 1245 ] , 1322–1323 [ Pgs. 1322–1323 include portions of Doc. 1251 , Doc. 1252 , and Doc. 1253 ] ; Turkey, 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , and Doc. 940 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , and Doc. 961 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 978 ] Stimson Doctrine, 559 n [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 608 ] Stimson, Henry L., 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 378–379 [ Pgs. 378–379 include portions of Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , and Doc. 388 ] , 412–413 [ Pgs. 412–413 include portions of Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , and Doc. 426 ] , 434–435 [ Pgs. 434–435 include portions of Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , and Doc. 459 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 608 ] , 563–569 [ Pgs. 563–569 include portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , and Doc. 623 ] passim , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 676 and Doc. 677 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 688 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 748–749 [ Pgs. 748–749 include portions of Doc. 816 and Doc. 817 ] , 757 n [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 825 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 includes portions of Doc. 1237 and Doc. 1238 ] Suez–Cairo pipeline, U.S. interest in possible transfer of postwar title rights, 62–67 [ Pgs. 62–67 include portions of Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] Sun Fo, 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 1189 ] , 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 1204 ] , 1294 [ Pg. 1294 includes portions of Doc. 1230 and Doc. 1231 ] Surrender terms for Japan, consideration of underlying principles, 1275–1285 [ Pgs. 1275–1285 include portions of Doc. 1223 , Doc. 1224 , and Doc. 1225 ] Suzuki, Koichi, 1019 [ Pg. 1019 is part of Doc. 1034 ] , 1020 [ Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 1034 and Doc. 1035 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 includes portions of Doc. 1127 , Doc. 1128 , and Doc. 1129 ] , 1009 [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 1022 , Doc. 1023 , and Doc. 1024 ] Sweden. See under Greece : Relief supplies . Switzerland, efforts to extend distribution of relief to Americans in all Japanese-held areas, 1052–1053 [ Pgs. 1052–1053 include portions of Doc. 1069 , Doc. 1070 , Doc. 1071 , and Doc. 1072 ] , 1070–1071 [ Pgs. 1070–1071 include portions of Doc. 1089 , Doc. 1090 , Doc. 1091 , Doc. 1092 , and Doc. 1093 ] , 1073–1074 [ Pgs. 1073–1074 include portions of Doc. 1094 , Doc. 1095 , and Doc. 1096 ] , 1079–1080 [ Pgs. 1079–1080 include portions of Doc. 1104 , Doc. 1105 , and Doc. 1106 ] Syria and Lebanon, 744–813 [ Pgs. 744–813 include portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , Doc. 820 , Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , Doc. 862 , Doc. 863 , Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] American treaty rights, agreements with Syria and Lebanon regarding, 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] Changes in Syrian Government, 801–802 [ Pgs. 801–802 include portions of Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] Exchange of messages between Syrian President Kuwatly and President Roosevelt, 787–790 [ Pgs. 787–790 include portions of Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , and Doc. 859 ] , 812–813 [ Pgs. 812–813 include portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] France, relations with, question of conclusion of treaties between France and Syria and Lebanon: British démarche to Syria and Lebanon in favor of: Information concerning, and discussions with United States, 777–778 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 784–786 [ Pgs. 784–786 include portions of Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , and Doc. 857 ] , 791–795 [ Pgs. 791–795 include portions of Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , Doc. 862 , and Doc. 863 ] , 800–801 [ Pgs. 800–801 include portions of Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , and Doc. 869 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 869 and Doc. 870 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , and Doc. 872 ] ; refusal of Syria and Lebanon to enter into treaty negotiations, 778–781 [ Pgs. 778–781 include portions of Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , and Doc. 853 ] ; U.S. position, 781–782 [ Pgs. 781–782 include portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] French efforts to secure treaty of special privilege: Approach to Syria and Lebanon, and Syrian and Lebanese opposition, 783–784 [ Pgs. 783–784 include portions of Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] , 790–791 [ Pgs. 790–791 include portions of Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , and Doc. 860 ] , 803–805 [ Pgs. 803–805 include portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , and Doc. 873 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] ; U.S. position and discussions with French, 795–796 [ Pgs. 795–796 include portions of Doc. 862 and Doc. 863 ] , 799–800 [ Pgs. 799–800 include portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 800–803 [ Pgs. 800–803 include portions of Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , and Doc. 872 ] , 805–808 [ Pgs. 805–808 include portions of Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , and Doc. 874 ] , 811–812 [ Pgs. 811–812 include portions of Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] Syrian appeals to United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union, 786–790 [ Pgs. 786–790 include portions of Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , and Doc. 859 ] ; replies of U.S. and British Governments, 797–798 [ Pgs. 797–798 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , and Doc. 866 ] Independence, U.S. recognition of, 774–776 [ Pgs. 774–776 include portions of Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , and Doc. 850 ] , 782–783 [ Pgs. 782–783 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , and Doc. 855 ] , 805–808 [ Pgs. 805–808 include portions of Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , and Doc. 874 ] , 810–811 [ Pgs. 810–811 include portions of Doc. 875 and Doc. 876 ] International Civil Aviation Conference, U.S. invitation to attend, 778–779 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] Palestine situation: Lebanese views relative to, 578–579 [ Pgs. 578–579 include portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 607–608 [ Pgs. 607–608 include portions of Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] ; Syrian views regarding, 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 includes portions of Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 630–631 [ Pgs. 630–631 include portions of Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , and Doc. 686 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] Troupes Spéciales , question of transfer to Syria, 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 875 ] Tacla, Selim, 578 n [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 630 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 630 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 778–779 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 851 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 872 ] Tehran Conference Declaration regarding Iran ( 1943 ): Miscellaneous, 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , and Doc. 525 ] U.S. efforts to implement. See Iran : Economic assistance . Texas Company (Texaco), 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 6 ] Thailand, 1311–1323 [ Pgs. 1311–1323 include portions of Doc. 1242 , Doc. 1243 , Doc. 1244 , Doc. 1245 , Doc. 1246 , Doc. 1247 , Doc. 1248 , Doc. 1249 , Doc. 1250 , Doc. 1251 , Doc. 1252 , and Doc. 1253 ] American Legation, U.S. protest against conduct of Japanese armed forces toward, 1173–1174 [ Pgs. 1173–1174 include portions of Doc. 1172 and Doc. 1173 ] Free Thai movement ( see also U.S.–British exchange , infra ), U.S. interest in, 1311–1312 [ Pgs. 1311–1312 include portions of Doc. 1242 , Doc. 1243 , and Doc. 1244 ] , 1313 [ Pg. 1313 includes portions of Doc. 1244 and Doc. 1245 ] , 1314 [ Pg. 1314 includes portions of Doc. 1245 and Doc. 1246 ] , 1320–1321 [ Pgs. 1320–1321 include portions of Doc. 1249 , Doc. 1250 , and Doc. 1251 ] Japanese-held American prisoners of war, U.S. concern regarding, 933 [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 983 and Doc. 984 ] , 1003–1004 [ Pgs. 1003–1004 include portions of Doc. 1013 , Doc. 1014 , Doc. 1015 , and Doc. 1016 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 includes portions of Doc. 1019 and Doc. 1020 ] U.S.–British exchange of views in regard to postwar status of, 1312–1320 [ Pgs. 1312–1320 include portions of Doc. 1242 , Doc. 1243 , Doc. 1244 , Doc. 1245 , Doc. 1246 , Doc. 1247 , Doc. 1248 , Doc. 1249 , and Doc. 1250 ] Tixier, Adrien, 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 873 ] , 807–808 [ Pgs. 807–808 include portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] Tjo So-wang, Y., 1290 [ Pg. 1290 includes portions of Doc. 1227 and Doc. 1228 ] , 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 1228 ] , 1292 [ Pg. 1292 includes portions of Doc. 1228 , Doc. 1229 , and Doc. 1230 ] , 1292–1294 [ Pgs. 1292–1294 include portions of Doc. 1228 , Doc. 1229 , Doc. 1230 , and Doc. 1231 ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 is part of Doc. 1233 ] Trans-Arabian pipeline. See under Foreign petroleum policy . Trans-Iranian Railway, 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 372 ] Transjordan, 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 596–597 [ Pgs. 596–597 include portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] Treaties, conventions, etc.: Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance ( 1936 ), cited, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] Anglo-Ethiopian military conventions: 1942 , cited, 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 77 n [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] ; Dec. 19, 1944 , summary of provisions, 82–83 [ Pgs. 82–83 include portions of Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance ( 1930 ), cited, 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 856 ] Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance ( 1942 ), cited, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 337 and Doc. 338 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 380 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 384 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , and Doc. 388 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , and Doc. 510 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] Australia–New Zealand agreement of Jan. 21 , cited, 1201 [ Pg. 1201 is part of Doc. 1188 ] , 1266 [ Pg. 1266 includes portions of Doc. 1217 and Doc. 1218 ] , 1279 [ Pg. 1279 is part of Doc. 1224 ] British-French-Turkish treaty of mutual assistance ( 1939 ), cited, 861 [ Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 926 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 965 ] , 906 n [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 971 ] British-Portuguese agreement on Azores ( 1943 ), 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] French protectorate treaty with Sultan of Morocco ( 1912 ), cited, 526–527 [ Pgs. 526–527 include portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] Geneva Convention of 1929 regarding amelioration of condition of sick and wounded of armies in the field, 1125 [ Pg. 1125 is part of Doc. 1140 ] , 1144 [ Pg. 1144 includes portions of Doc. 1146 and Doc. 1147 ] , 1167 [ Pg. 1167 is part of Doc. 1165 ] , 1321–1322 [ Pgs. 1321–1322 include portions of Doc. 1250 , Doc. 1251 , Doc. 1252 , and Doc. 1253 ] Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 ( see also under Japan : Prisoners of war ), cited, 1096 [ Pg. 1096 is part of Doc. 1126 ] , 1122 [ Pg. 1122 includes portions of Doc. 1138 and Doc. 1139 ] , 1141 [ Pg. 1141 is part of Doc. 1145 ] , 1245 [ Pg. 1245 is part of Doc. 1208 ] Hague Convention (Fourth) of 1907 , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 994 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 is part of Doc. 994 ] , 1146 [ Pg. 1146 includes portions of Doc. 1149 and Doc. 1150 ] , 1167 [ Pg. 1167 is part of Doc. 1165 ] , 1245 [ Pg. 1245 is part of Doc. 1208 ] , 1268 [ Pg. 1268 is part of Doc. 1218 ] , 1277 [ Pg. 1277 is part of Doc. 1224 ] Hague Convention (Tenth) of 1907 , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 1151 ] , 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 1154 ] , 1154–1158 [ Pgs. 1154–1158 include portions of Doc. 1155 , Doc. 1156 , Doc. 1157 , and Doc. 1158 ] Portsmouth, Treaty of ( 1905 ), cited, 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1193 ] Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact ( 1941 , cited, 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 1193 ] Statute of Tangier ( 1923 ) and revision ( 1928 ), 556 n [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , and Doc. 607 ] Syria and Lebanon, treaties of alliance with France ( 1936 ), cited, 799 n [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 867 ] Turkish-Hungarian trade agreement, May 3 , cited, 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 907 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] , 843–844 [ Pgs. 843–844 include portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 916 ] U.S.–Ethiopia, treaty of 1914 , cited, 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] U.S.–France, convention defining American rights in Syria and Lebanon ( 1924 ), cited, 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] U.S.–India, special Lend–Lease agreement regarding silver, June 8 , text, 268–269 [ Pgs. 268–269 include portions of Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279 ] U.S.–Netherlands, agreement regarding civil affairs administration in liberated Netherlands territory, May 16 , cited, 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 1186 ] U.S.–Netherlands East Indies, agreement on principles governing arrangements for civil administration and jurisdiction, Dec. 10 , text, 1286–1289 [ Pgs. 1286–1289 include portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] U.S.–Spain, agreement regarding Morocco, May 2 , cited, 539 n [ Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , and Doc. 580 ] , 539–540 [ Pgs. 539–540 include portions of Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , and Doc. 580 ] , 547 n [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] U.S.–United Kingdom: Exchange of notes July 15 and 28 regarding U.S.–Indian special Lend–Lease agreement on silver, 269–271 [ Pgs. 269–271 include portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281 ] ; Lend–Lease agreement ( 1942 ), cited, 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 909–911 [ Pgs. 909–911 include portions of Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , and Doc. 975 ] Tsouderos, Emmanuel J., 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 86–96 [ Pgs. 86–96 include portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , and Doc. 94 ] passim Tubman, W. V. S., 504–505 [ Pgs. 504–505 include portions of Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] Turkey, 814–917 [ Pgs. 814–917 include portions of Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , Doc. 921 , Doc. 922 , Doc. 923 , Doc. 924 , Doc. 925 , Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , Doc. 929 , Doc. 930 , Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , Doc. 933 , Doc. 934 , Doc. 935 , Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , Doc. 943 , Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , Doc. 946 , Doc. 947 , Doc. 948 , Doc. 949 , Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] Balkan questions, 863–864 [ Pgs. 863–864 include portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] , 875–876 [ Pgs. 875–876 include portions of Doc. 936 and Doc. 937 ] , 884–897 [ Pgs. 884–897 include portions of Doc. 942 , Doc. 943 , Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , Doc. 946 , Doc. 947 , Doc. 948 , Doc. 949 , Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , and Doc. 961 ] passim Chrome negotiations. See under Economic policy , infra . Culbertson economic mission to Middle East, Turkish interest in, 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] Death of Turkish Ambassador to United States, Mehmet Münir Ertegün, 915–917 [ Pgs. 915–917 include portions of Doc. 977 and Doc. 978 ] Economic policy of Allies toward Turkey, looking toward discontinuance of Turkish trade with Axis: Anglo-American discussions, and representations to Turkey, 818–819 [ Pgs. 818–819 include portions of Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , and Doc. 886 ] , 820–828 [ Pgs. 820–828 include portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , and Doc. 896 ] , 834–841 [ Pgs. 834–841 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] , 842–844 [ Pgs. 842–844 include portions of Doc. 909 , Doc. 910 , and Doc. 911 ] , 845–848 [ Pgs. 845–848 include portions of Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , and Doc. 915 ] , 852–856 [ Pgs. 852–856 include portions of Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , Doc. 919 , Doc. 920 , and Doc. 921 ] Attitude of Turkey ( see also Turkish bureau, etc. , infra ), and negotiations concerning an agreement with Allies, 829–830 [ Pgs. 829–830 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] , 841–842 [ Pgs. 841–842 include portions of Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , and Doc. 910 ] , 844–845 [ Pgs. 844–845 include portions of Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , and Doc. 913 ] , 848–852 [ Pgs. 848–852 include portions of Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , and Doc. 918 ] , 856–860 [ Pgs. 856–860 include portions of Doc. 920 , Doc. 921 , Doc. 922 , Doc. 923 , Doc. 924 , Doc. 925 , and Doc. 926 ] ; draft agreement proposed by Turkey, 851–852 [ Pgs. 851–852 include portions of Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , and Doc. 918 ] Chrome negotiations, and Turkish assurances as to discontinuance of shipments to Germany, 819–820 [ Pgs. 819–820 include portions of Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , and Doc. 889 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] , 826–827 [ Pgs. 826–827 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 830–834 [ Pgs. 830–834 include portions of Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , and Doc. 905 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] , 847 [ Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 914 ] Passage of German ships through Straits, relation to, 859–860 [ Pgs. 859–860 include portions of Doc. 924 , Doc. 925 , and Doc. 926 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 932 ] Rail communications between Turkey and Axis Europe, proposed rupture of, 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , and Doc. 886 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 823–824 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 890 ] , 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. 893 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 906 ] Sanctions against Turkey, proposed, and question of Soviet participation, 820–825 [ Pgs. 820–825 include portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] , 827–828 [ Pgs. 827–828 include portions of Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , and Doc. 896 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 897 and Doc. 898 ] , 842–843 [ Pgs. 842–843 include portions of Doc. 909 and Doc. 910 ] Turkish bureau for regulation of Axis trade, creation of, and Allied participation in, 830 [ Pg. 830 includes portions of Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 903 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 906 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 909 and Doc. 910 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 916 ] War material for Turkey, question of, 816–817 [ Pgs. 816–817 include portions of Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , and Doc. 882 ] , 835–836 [ Pgs. 835–836 include portions of Doc. 905 and Doc. 906 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 930 ] , 870–871 [ Pgs. 870–871 include portions of Doc. 932 and Doc. 933 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 941 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 includes portions of Doc. 946 and Doc. 947 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 948 and Doc. 949 ] ; British Military Mission, departure from Turkey, 817–818 [ Pgs. 817–818 include portions of Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , and Doc. 884 ] , 853 [ Pg. 853 includes portions of Doc. 918 and Doc. 919 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 932 ] Entry into the war, question of ( see also Severance of economic and diplomatic relations with Germany , infra ), 814–817 [ Pgs. 814–817 include portions of Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , and Doc. 882 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , and Doc. 886 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 890 ] , 835–836 [ Pgs. 835–836 include portions of Doc. 905 and Doc. 906 ] , 852–853 [ Pgs. 852–853 include portions of Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , and Doc. 919 ] , 861–862 [ Pgs. 861–862 include portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 864–867 [ Pgs. 864–867 include portions of Doc. 928 , Doc. 929 , Doc. 930 , and Doc. 931 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 932 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 includes portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] , 891–892 [ Pgs. 891–892 include portions of Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , and Doc. 953 ] , 894–895 [ Pgs. 894–895 include portions of Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , and Doc. 957 ] , 898–900 [ Pgs. 898–900 include portions of Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , and Doc. 965 ] Ertegün, Mehmet Münir (Ambassador to United States), death of, 915–917 [ Pgs. 915–917 include portions of Doc. 977 and Doc. 978 ] Exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and President Inönü, 872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 934 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , and Doc. 963 ] Germany, relations with. See Economic policy, etc. , supra, and Severance, etc. , infra . Hungary, trade agreement with, 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 907 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] , 843–844 [ Pgs. 843–844 include portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 916 ] Japan, severance of relations with, at U.S. and British request, 900–904 [ Pgs. 900–904 include portions of Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , and Doc. 968 ] Lend-Lease agreement with United States, proposed, discussions regarding, 904–915 [ Pgs. 904–915 include portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , Doc. 970 , Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] Severance of economic and diplomatic relations with Germany, U.S.-British efforts leading to: British proposals, with U.S. support, and Turkish favorable response, 860–863 [ Pgs. 860–863 include portions of Doc. 925 , Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , and Doc. 928 ] , 866–875 [ Pgs. 866–875 include portions of Doc. 930 , Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , Doc. 933 , Doc. 934 , Doc. 935 , Doc. 936 , and Doc. 937 ] , 878–891 [ Pgs. 878–891 include portions of Doc. 937 , Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , Doc. 943 , Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , Doc. 946 , Doc. 947 , Doc. 948 , Doc. 949 , Doc. 950 , and Doc. 951 ] ; U.S. reservation in connection with severance of relations, interpretation of, 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , and Doc. 953 ] , 895–897 [ Pgs. 895–897 include portions of Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , and Doc. 961 ] , 897–898 [ Pgs. 897–898 include portions of Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , and Doc. 963 ] Soviet position, 861–862 [ Pgs. 861–862 include portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 863–865 [ Pgs. 863–865 include portions of Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , and Doc. 929 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 941 ] , 892–893 [ Pgs. 892–893 include portions of Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , and Doc. 955 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 955 and Doc. 956 ] , 898–899 [ Pgs. 898–899 include portions of Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , and Doc. 964 ] ; Turkish-Soviet cooperation, proposed, 875–878 [ Pgs. 875–878 include portions of Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , and Doc. 938 ] Turkey’s entry into the war, severance of relations as first step toward. See British proposals, etc. , supra . Turkish decision to sever relations, Aug. 2 , 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 949 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , and Doc. 961 ] ; subsequent position and policy, 899–900 [ Pgs. 899–900 include portions of Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , and Doc. 965 ] U.S. and British financial and economic assistance, 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 941 and Doc. 942 ] , 884–885 [ Pgs. 884–885 include portions of Doc. 942 , Doc. 943 , Doc. 944 , and Doc. 945 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 includes portions of Doc. 946 and Doc. 947 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 includes portions of Doc. 948 and Doc. 949 ] U.S.-British-Soviet consultation in connection with, proposed, 891–892 [ Pgs. 891–892 include portions of Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , and Doc. 953 ] , 893–895 [ Pgs. 893–895 include portions of Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , and Doc. 957 ] Tydings–McDuffie Act ( 1934 ), cited, 1299 [ Pg. 1299 is part of Doc. 1236 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 includes portions of Doc. 1237 and Doc. 1238 ] , 1302 [ Pg. 1302 is part of Doc. 1238 ] , 1303 [ Pg. 1303 includes portions of Doc. 1238 and Doc. 1239 ] Umari, Arshad al-, 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 604–605 [ Pgs. 604–605 include portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 682 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 686 ] United Kingdom ( see also Egypt ; Ethiopia ; Greece ; India ; Iran ; Japan ; Morocco ; Palestine ; Saudi Arabia ; Syria and Lebanon ; Treaties, conventions, etc. ; and Turkey ): Afghanistan, problems related to joint U.S.-British policy of supplying with essential import requirements, 44–55 [ Pgs. 44–55 include portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] Anglo–American cooperation in Middle East, question of, 690–691 [ Pgs. 690–691 include portions of Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , and Doc. 756 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 767 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 768 and Doc. 769 ] Exchange with United States regarding policies in Near and Middle East, 6–7 [ Pgs. 6–7 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] Korea, proposed U.S.-British discussions concerning future status of, 1297–1298 [ Pgs. 1297–1298 include portions of Doc. 1233 , Doc. 1234 , and Doc. 1235 ] Middle East Supply Center, U.S. representations leading to a relaxation of import controls administered by, 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 30 ] Thailand, U.S.-British exchange of views regarding postwar status of, 1312–1320 [ Pgs. 1312–1320 include portions of Doc. 1242 , Doc. 1243 , Doc. 1244 , Doc. 1245 , Doc. 1246 , Doc. 1247 , Doc. 1248 , Doc. 1249 , and Doc. 1250 ] United Nations: Conference on Food and Agriculture, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] ; Commission for Investigation of War Crimes, 1221 [ Pg. 1221 includes portions of Doc. 1198 and Doc. 1199 ] United Nations Declaration ( 1942 ), cited, 781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1278 [ Pg. 1278 is part of Doc. 1224 ] , 1279 [ Pg. 1279 is part of Doc. 1224 ] ; adherence of Liberia, 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 505 n [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 179–212 [ Pgs. 179–212 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , and Doc. 222 ] passim United Press, application for lease of teletype telegraphic lines in India, U.S. representations in support of, 297–302 [ Pgs. 297–302 include portions of Doc. 305 , Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] Uriarte, Gen. D. Jenaro de, 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , and Doc. 582 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608 ] U.S. armed forces: Greece. See Greece : Allied forces, etc. India, reciprocal aid to U.S. forces in India, relation to Lend–Lease of silver agreement, 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 259–260 [ Pgs. 259–260 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , and Doc. 268 ] Iran. See Iran : American armed forces in Iran . U.S. Congress: Consideration of legislation authorizing naturalization of Filipinos in the United States (approved July 2, 1946 ), 1309–1310 [ Pgs. 1309–1310 include portions of Doc. 1240 and Doc. 1241 ] Resolutions in regard to Palestine. See Palestine : Resolutions in U.S. Congress . U.S. diplomatic missions in Egypt and Iraq, U.S. exchange with British regarding status of, 3–5 [ Pgs. 3–5 include portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] U.S. War Department, 1301 [ Pg. 1301 includes portions of Doc. 1237 and Doc. 1238 ] van Mook, H. J., 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 1186 ] , 1286 n [ Pg. 1286 includes portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] , 1286–1289 [ Pgs. 1286–1289 include portions of Doc. 1225 and Doc. 1226 ] Varvaressos, K., 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 210–220 [ Pgs. 210–220 include portions of Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , Doc. 225 , Doc. 226 , and Doc. 227 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 227 ] Venizelos, Sophocles, 90–102 [ Pgs. 90–102 include portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , and Doc. 99 ] passim , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] Vinogradov, S. A. 817 n [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 897 and Doc. 898 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 includes portions of Doc. 930 and Doc. 931 ] , 875 [ Pg. 875 includes portions of Doc. 936 and Doc. 937 ] , 876 [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 937 ] , 898–899 [ Pgs. 898–899 include portions of Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , and Doc. 964 ] Voulgaris, Pierre, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 92–93 [ Pgs. 92–93 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 98 ] Vyshinsky, A. Y., 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , and Doc. 388 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 894–895 [ Pgs. 894–895 include portions of Doc. 955 , Doc. 956 , and Doc. 957 ] Wadsworth, George, 775–776 [ Pgs. 775–776 include portions of Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , and Doc. 850 ] , 786 n [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 873 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 875 ] Wagner, Senator Robert F., 563 n [ Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , and Doc. 615 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 641–642 [ Pgs. 641–642 include portions of Doc. 697 , Doc. 698 , and Doc. 699 ] Wallace, Henry A., 1294 n [ Pg. 1294 includes portions of Doc. 1230 and Doc. 1231 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 includes portions of Doc. 1232 and Doc. 1233 ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 is part of Doc. 1233 ] War Food Administration, 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 286 ] War Relocation Authority, 1119 [ Pg. 1119 is part of Doc. 1138 ] , 1122 [ Pg. 1122 includes portions of Doc. 1138 and Doc. 1139 ] , 1130 [ Pg. 1130 includes portions of Doc. 1142 and Doc. 1143 ] , 1244 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 1208 ] War Shipping Administration, 46 [ Pg. 46 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Wavell, Field Marshal Sir Archibald P., 232 n [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 232–233 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 240 n [ Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 283 ] Weizmann, Chain, 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 676 and Doc. 677 ] , 642–643 [ Pgs. 642–643 include portions of Doc. 698 , Doc. 699 , and Doc. 700 ] Welles, Sumner, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] Western Hemisphere oil reserves, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] Wheat: Food crisis in India, 271–274 [ Pgs. 271–274 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , and Doc. 283 ] ; grain collection in Iran, situation with respect to, 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 325–326 [ Pgs. 325–326 include portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 327–328 [ Pgs. 327–328 include portions of Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , and Doc. 331 ] White, Harry D., 248–249 [ Pgs. 248–249 include portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] Wilson, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland, 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 135 n [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 187 n [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 198 ] Wilson, Woodrow, 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 1224 [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 1200 and Doc. 1201 ] Wise, Rabbi Stephen S., 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 664 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 637 n [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] Wright, Michael, 266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , and Doc. 276 ] , 266–267 [ Pgs. 266–267 include portions of Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , and Doc. 277 ] , 381–383 [ Pgs. 381–383 include portions of Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , and Doc. 393 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , and Doc. 434 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 513 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 496–497 [ Pgs. 496–497 include portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , and Doc. 607 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 720 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , and Doc. 841 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 791–792 [ Pgs. 791–792 include portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] , 793–794 [ Pgs. 793–794 include portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , and Doc. 872 ] Yassin, Yusuf, 33 n [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 715 and Doc. 716 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , and Doc. 732 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 734 and Doc. 735 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , and Doc. 744 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 706–707 [ Pgs. 706–707 include portions of Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , and Doc. 772 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 783 and Doc. 784 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 734–736 [ Pgs. 734–736 include portions of Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , and Doc. 802 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 838 and Doc. 839 ] , 768–769 [ Pgs. 768–769 include portions of Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 includes portions of Doc. 846 and Doc. 847 ] Yehya Ibn Mohamed Hamid El Dine, King of Yemen, 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 664 ] , Yemen, 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 598–599 [ Pgs. 598–599 include portions of Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , and Doc. 656 ] Young Men’s Christian Association, aid to Japanese-held Americans in the Philippines, 1034–1035 [ Pgs. 1034–1035 include portions of Doc. 1052 , Doc. 1053 , Doc. 1054 , and Doc. 1055 ] , 1047–1048 [ Pgs. 1047–1048 include portions of Doc. 1065 and Doc. 1066 ] Zinchenko, Constantine, 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] Zionism. See Palestine . 1 In indexing persons the intention has been to include all references to persons of significance for an understanding of the record, with the following exceptions: (1) The name of the Secretary of State or the Acting Secretary of State appearing as the signer of outgoing instructions unless there is a clear indication of the Secretary’s or Acting Secretary’s personal interest; (2) the name of an American officer in charge of a mission appearing as the signer of reports to the Department of State, except for personal items; (3) the names of persons to whom documents are addressed. Persons are not identified by office in the index, but usually where a person is first mentioned in any section a footnote identification is given unless that person is identified in the text.